Rousseau's Children

Author(s): William Kessen

Source: Daedalus , Summer, 1978, Vol. 107, No. 3, Rousseau for Our Time (Summer,
1978), pp. 155-166
Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20024569

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WILLIAM KESSEN

Rousseau's Children

Rousseau had four sets of children; they are an odd lot, in many ways, and
some of the disputation about the meaning of our friend and his works may be
put in place if we look carefully at his parental quadruplicity.

Th?r?se LeVasseur's Foundlings

Late in 1746 or 1747, Rousseau returned to Paris from a successful season of
music and chemistry at Chenonceaux to find that his steady friend, Mile. Le
Vasseur, had grown as newly plump as he "though in another way." His free
wheeling companions at Mme. La Selle's table provided him with word of a
common practice that would "extricate" him from his embarrassment. The sto
ry of Rousseau's babies has been told often, but it deserves yet another look if
we are to understand the peculiar impact of Rousseau on children over the last
two centuries. The mechanics of disposal were easy enough: find a reliable mid
wife to manage the delivery and then let her take the newborn to Vincent de
Paul's Foundling Home where the child could join the three thousand or so
other abandoned infants of that year. There were one or two trickier problems
to be solved, to be sure. Th?r?se did not like the idea?"I had the greatest
difficulty in the world in persuading her to accept this sole means of saving her
honor." She did not like the idea any better when the episode was repeated with
her second child the next year, and we may guess that she was scarcely more
happy on occasions three, four, and five.J
But, for Rousseau, the gravest difficulty with the depositing of the found
lings lay in the future. His first child would have been an adolescent, when, on
June 12, 1761, Rousseau, exposed by Voltaire's charges of hypocrisy, retro
spectively discovered his scruples. In a letter to Mme. la Mar?chale de Luxem
bourg, he wrote:

Five children were born of [our] liaison, and all were placed in the Foundling's
Hospital, and with so little thought of the possibility of their identification that I
did not even keep a record of their dates of birth [or of their gender]. For several
years now, the self-reproach which my neglectful behavior has aroused in me has
disturbed my peace of mind and I am about to die [a frequent condition in
Rousseau's life] without being able to remedy it, much to the mother's and my
own regret . . .
155

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 156 WILLIAM KESSEN

The ideas with which my mind was filled as a result of my error were to a large
extent responsible for my writing [the Emile].2

But Rousseau conceived the Emile together with the Discourses on the road to
Vincennes in 1749; the children of his flesh (or, at least, of Th?r?se's) probably
continued until he left her bed in the midfifties. Rather, the abandonments
measured Rousseau's keen recognition that he could not manage the daily pull
of filial need and filial love any better than he could manage a full-blooded
sexual exchange. Living children?dirty pants, smallpox, requiring devotion,
and all?do not permit the ecstatic (and chaste) kiss of Sophie d'Houdetot that
can then be served up to posterity in passionate literary periods. Rousseau could
stay near Th?r?se, whose demands were familiar and meetable, and he could
love his dogs?Turc (formerly, Due) at the Hermitage ("my friend and constant
companion") and Sultan across Europe (Hume had to haul him from Sultan's
cries to a performance by Garrick before the King and Queen of England).3 But
he knew somehow that children would overtax his limited capacity for recipro
cal affection.
The Promenades of the R?veries, written a few months before his death,
return to the theme of Th?r?se's foundlings in a form that reveals Rousseau's
paternal dubiety best. It is no accident that his soliloquy, like his confessions to
Mme. de Luxembourg, was provoked by a recent public reference to his "er
ror": "In the middle of dinner, [the elder daughter of the woman Vauccasin],
who was married and pregnant, took it into her head to ask me abruptly, while
staring at me, if I had had any children. I answered, while blushing up to my
eyes, that I had not had that good fortune. She smiled maliciously while looking
around at the group ..." Rousseau was still incensed, in his Ninth Promenade,
by the implication that his error meant that he hated children "because I knew
that there never was a man who loved more to watch little children joking and
playing together than I, and often I stopped in the street and on walks to watch
their cuteness and their little games with an interest I never saw shared by
anyone." He had been forced to send his children to the foundling home by his
own indifference and incapacity, by the certainty of Th?r?se's spoiling ways,
by the monstrousness of her mother, and, in a wild paranoid flight, by the
premonition that, had he kept the children, he would have been trapped by his
enemies into an incestuous muddle. No, he loved children so much that pleas
ure in watching them was sometimes an obstacle to his studying them and, in
his customary defense with words against facts, "it would certainly be the most
amazing thing in the world for H?lo?se and Emile to be the work of a man who
did not like children."4 As we shall see, I have no difficulty with such an amaz
ing conclusion.
There is a franker meeting with himself along the ninth walk when
Rousseau thinks about how ugly he has become: "Children do not like old age;
the aspect of nature giving way is hideous in their eyes ..." But worse is his
discomfiture in talking to children: "I should be more at my ease before a mon
arch of Asia than before a child whom I must make babble." Perhaps it is as well
for the foundlings that Rousseau did not try to find "in [infant] eyes the joy and
contentment of being with me," perhaps as well that he was "obliged to seek
among animals the look of benevolence" he might have expected from his chil
dren.5

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 Rousseau's children 157

The Child of the Books

Rousseau's career as pedagogue probably began in 1735 when he "undertook

the charge of a child for a few weeks," an obstreperous youngster, apparently,
who was brought out of a temper tantrum when the author of the Emile locked
him alone all night in a dark room. About this time, in a letter to his father,
young Rousseau announced his first two principles of education?"le premier
comprend tout ce qui sert ? ?clairer l'esprit et ? l'orner de connoissance utiles et
agr?ables, et l'autre renferme les moiens de former le coeur ? la sagesse et ? la
vertu." Like the M?moire pr?sent? ? Mr de M[ably] and the Projet pour l'?ducation de
M. de Sainte-Marie, Rousseau's juvenile principles reflect almost perfectly the
overpowering influence of Locke and the current forms of French educational
theory; they are a pale potion, conventional enough medicine, from the man
who, in but twenty years, would be driven from home if not from fame with the
Parlement de Paris' denunciation; after the Emile, Rousseau stood condemned as
one of those who "abondonnent la foi, en suivant des esprits d'erreurs & des doc
trines diaboliques." What were Rousseau's devilish doctrines?6 Shortly after
1740, Rousseau left his short life as a practicing teacher to become Preceptor to
his contemporaries and to us all; in the ineluctable progression from the Second
Discourse to Julie to Emile to (near the end) the Government of Poland, he weaves
several ideological and psychological principles among one another and among
the vivid strands of his personal life to form a unique portrait of the child in
society. The principles are not the heresies of the Savoyard vicar that aroused
the Parlement; they are, taken together, a remarkable new child psychology.
Coherence and ineluctability have not always been assigned to Rousseau; Hui
zinga, not alone, quotes Benjamin Constant approvingly: "He thrashes about
among a thousand contrary ideas as in a dark night lit up by frequent flashes of
lightning." I disagree. Jean-Jacques maddens the modern rationalistic temper
ament with his insouciance about logic, but Cassirer, Crocker, and Clapar?de,
chief among others, have cleaned away enough of the disguise and dis
figurement of Rousseau's vain verbosity to reveal the child of his books.7
Rousseau makes two fundamental assignments to the mind of the child.
They are the roots from which his pedagogy, politics, and morality spring: the
child is driven by consuming impulse, and the child is almost infinitely adaptable. For
Rousseau, the joint operation of the two principles forces the central ped
agogical (and political) dilemma. How can human impulse, imperious and eter
nal, be brought into a moral social form? One conclusion follows immediately,
and it is unambiguously accepted throughout Rousseau: the child cannot solve
the problem alone! Unmoderated working out of impulse would lead?had
led?to the sickly evil society Rousseau ambivalently despised and ambivalently
fled. His disquisitions on his own masturbation and his safeguards against
Emile's falling into the same destructive practice are a mark and symbol of
insatiable lust and, "the more violent the passions, the more necessary laws are
to contain them." "Men, once they have left a fleeting age of innocence, are
evil." "It is our passions that make us weak ..." "[Man] should work to repress
[curiosity] along with all his other natural inclinations." "How many errors we
should spare reason, how many vices we should stifle before their birth, if we
were able to force the animal economy to favor the moral order it so often

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158 WILLIAM KESSEN

upsets!" Even poor Julie, fallen from virtue but redeemed by a good man and
her own devotion, must die tragically and, more to the present point, she must
die still loving her seducer. One of Rousseau's most significant psychological
discoveries was that the Wild Man of legend and folktale is not outside; he is
within us, and he cannot, by his nature, be extirpated. It is exactly in the Second
Discourse, where later writers have (incredibly) found a Noble Savage, that
Rousseau sketched most succinctly the inevitable decline of human culture into
"vanity and scorn . . . shame and envy" "as soon as a man needed another's
help." At least since Lovejoy's paper on the "supposed primitivism" of the Sec
ond Discourse in 1923, the Rousseau of Return to Nature! has been exposed as a
scandalous misreading. As Crocker notes, "It was always the evil in men that
worried Rousseau"; he was obsessed with destructive passions.8
Hope for the beast's salvation lay, paradox on paradox, in the second revolu
tionary principle of child mind?the principle of adaptability which had turned
man from morally neutral and mindless animal to social pestilence in the first
place! In the Second Discourse, we find the facult? de se perfectionner, the "per
fectibility" that set primitive man off from the other animals and which, in turn,
destroyed his simplicity. The postulation of perfectibility is staggering in its
psychological implications and it was not until our own time that the implica
tions have begun to be studied in the lives of children. Perhaps better called
"adaptability" (after all, perfectibility had led to a monstrous society), the prin
ciple and its representation in other parts of Rousseau's work inform a radical
vision of the child. The behavior of the child at any time is not incomplete or
"preadult"; his thought and his action are appropriate for the stage of his devel
opment. At any moment, the child is a construction of impulse and the de
mands of his environment for his adaptation. "Climates, seasons, sounds,
colors, darkness, light, the elements, food, noise, silence, movement, rest,
everything acts on our machine and consequently on our soul . . .," but not in
simple Humean association. Each stage of the child's development is a rebuild
ing of himself to effect a compromise between his passion and the requirements
of his world. Familiar now in the forms that Piaget has given us, the principle of
perfectibility was a genuine novelty for the eighteenth century, and it remains
an idea of moment because Rousseau did not attempt, as Piaget has, to remove
the burden on the child's adaptation of his continuing passion.9
Each of Rousseau's pedagogical writings represents an attempt to escape the
apparent inevitable descent into corruption and evil when impulse and adapt
ability work in society; each proposal, save only the untested last, failed in part.
The citizens of the Second Discourse become property-mad and vain, Julie dies
with her passion for Saint-Preux unslaked (we shall return to her success as a
mother), Emile's specially prepared mate is an adulteress. It is no wonder that,
in the Government of Poland, Rousseau confronts the failure of the weaker re
straints he had proposed on human passion and proposes a totalitarian regime
(of a very special kind, to be sure) with education as its foundation.

The newly-born infant, upon first opening his eyes, must gaze upon the father
land, and until his dying day should behold nothing else . . . Choke off vices be
fore they are born, and you will have done on behalf of virtue all that needs
doing . . .

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 Rousseau's children 159

Do not let the students in your school go off by themselves to play, just for the
fun of it. They should play together in public, and for some prize to which they all
aspire and which arouses in them the spirit of competition and emulation.10

Children, raised by the State, will learn "never to want anything except what
society wants." In the earlier words of the Social Contract, "For the impulse of
mere appetite is slavery, and the obedience to the law which we have prescribed
to ourselves is liberty." For Rousseau, at sixty, freedom came to mean "the
submission to a strict and inviolable law which the individual erects over him
self."
In short, the Discourses tell of the evolution of corrupting society, the Emile
explores the possibility of isolated tutorial control of the child's adaptation,/?/^
makes the boundaries wider but confines the children to a loving, manipulating
family, the Social Contract and the Poland announce that only the control of the
All, only obedience to the volont? g?n?rale can prevent the child (and the society)
from falling again into disarray and sin. Nature's instinctive amour-de-soi will
not, in adapting to ordinary society's demands, become foul amour-propre;
rather, the demands of the State force the perfectible child to take on "liberat
ing" amour-du-moi-commun.
But Rousseau, in each of these books and in different ways, adds a third and
social principle to the ascriptions he has made to the mind of the child. As ever,
the child needs help. All procedures for the rearing of children and for the
proper design of culture require an unseen hand, the wisdom of the Tutor, the
Father, the Lawgiver. Perfectibility cannot, as evolutionists from Diderot to
Gal ton hoped, guarantee progress and perfection. The guiding direction of the
Master, all-knowing and largely invisible, is necessary to the moral child, the
moral society. Lycurgus is a presence for Rousseau from the Discourses to the
Poland and when Julie says that her children behave under the "yoke of necessi
ty" one recalls that the Spartan leader imposed on his people "an iron
yoke . . . but he attached them to this yoke."11
The workers of the benign yoke of necessity in Rousseau?variants of the
Master?appear in four forms and with varying representation. The first, the
mysterious General Will, does not speak much of children. Lycurgus and
Moses aside, it is Rousseau himself who plays the second Lawgiver?the layer
on of gentle chains. In the Corsica and the Poland he acts on his earlier political
injunctions and, surprisingly for the hymnist of diversity and individuality, the
Rechtsstadt that emerges is tough, uniform, and authoritarian. The two more
pedagogical variants on the Master are, unlike the General Will and the writer
of constitutions, central to our understanding of Rousseau's psychology of the
child.
Julie's husband, Wolmar, is Paterfamilias, the cool certain protector of the
hearth; his benevolent reign brings the peace and security that permit the chil
dren to grow and the tutors to teach. He is a stuffed shirt. More, he was for
Rousseau the idealization of rationality, the man free of passion, perhaps the
General Father. "He is the same toward everyone, he neither seeks out nor
shuns anyone, and he never has other than rational preferences. [Julie was his
first "attachment" and his affection for her] is so well guided by decorum
and . . . equilibrium that he had no need to change his behavior in changing his

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 160 WILLIAM KESSEN

condition ..." Neither gay nor sad, he has no passion save his love for his wife,
and even that emotion "is so even and so temperate that one would say that he
loves only as much as he wishes to and that he wishes to only as much as reason
permits." One side of Jean-Jacques, the side that Kant saw in discerning clarity,
is revealed in Wolmar. If only we could, in Montmorency, in Clarens, in
Ajaccio, or in Warsaw, construct from the biological material our children pre
sent to us such judicious impartial observers of human weakness and error.12
The fourth Master?the Tutor proper?is the most familiar to us. Emile's
guide and Julie are Rousseau's nominations for the post and, different as they
are, they expose some of his most cherished and consistent premises. They
share a distaste for intellectualism (although Julie does not approach the Tutor's
"I hate books" and his disquisitions on "literary lumber"), they have a profound
aversion to traditional pedagogy with its drill and language learning and explicit
domination by the teacher, and their methods are devious. The best model for
the ever-present deviousness is Julie's garden. It has the look of naturalness and
informality, but it is the result of careful planning of carelessness, the system
atic reconstruction of nature. No visitor should perceive the hand of the garden
er; all the work of control and management (for example, saving the birds from
their enemies, "surtout les enfants") should be hidden. So too with the work of
education; the child should be brought to his tasks and to his maturity as though
nature had formed him. "In everything that displeases him, he feels the weight
[Pempire] of necessity, the effect of his own weakness, never the working of
someone else's bad will . . ."13 Emile's tutor conspires with the gardener to tear
up the young man's garden so that he can learn about property rights; Julie
excites her son by reading part of a story, then pretends to be called away so
that he will be moved to read by himself. The parents have unexceptionable
authority over even the remotest corners of their children's lives; the child has
none. He must not join adult conversation; he must have no sense of command
or superiority, and "perceiving that he has no authority over the people about
him he becomes tractable and obliging; in seeking to gain the esteem of others,
he contracts an affection for them in turn ..." Here, we get a glimpse of
Rousseau the behavioral engineer. He applies Locke's "esteem and disgrace"
with a persistence and rigor that lead Crocker to see Jean-Jacques as the forerun
ner of the twentieth-century behaviorists. And so he is, even to the use of what
is nowadays called "time out" from reward as a technique of control; in Julie's
words, "I make this a punishment by contriving to render every other place [but
where she wants the children to be] disagreeable to them." The passages on
education in Julie are parallel to Rousseau's discussion of political power in the
last books: "The order which defines [Wolmar's] house is the reflection of the
order of his soul; it seems to mimic in a tiny setting the order of the world's
governance . . . One recognizes the hand of the master always and one never
feels it . . ."14 It is the meeting of Julie's passion (even when it serves her hus
band's pedagogical plan) with Wolmar's chill reasonableness that makes some
relevant pages o? Julie an arousing and sometimes hateful treatise on education.
Rousseau as child psychologist and pedagogue maintained the selfsame tension
between penser and sentir that Cassirer has conjoined in presenting a larger vision
of Jean-Jacques: "Newton was the first to see order and regularity combined
with great simplicity, where disorder and ill-matched variety had reigned be

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 Rousseau's children 161

fore . . . Rousseau was the first to discover in the variety of shapes that men
assume the deeply concealed nature of man and to observe the hidden law that
justifies Providence." But "[Rousseau's new contribution] to his time seems to
have been his act of freeing it from the domination of intellectualism. To the
forces of rationalist understanding ... he opposed the force of feeling."15

Rousseau's Heirs

Huizinga is rude and unjust when he asks about the Citizen of Geneva,
"Why . . . try ... to make sense of a writer who so clearly shares Humpty
Dumpty's determination that words shall mean what one wants them to
mean?"16 but the image is apt for the educators and psychologists who have
used Rousseau as a screen on which to project their own interpretations of chil
dren and schools. In a sober sense, the history of Rousseau's influence on Eng
lish and American culture has been a history of neglect and misreadings, a series
of shallow commentaries on "Man was born free ..." and "God makes all
things good ..." Rousseau, of course, carries some responsibility for his surviv
al as a one-liner; his sensual delight in aphorism and his longwindedness invite
the search for nuggets. As a contemporary English reviewer of Emile wrote, "He
never knows where to stop . . . Poverty can hardly be more vicious than such an
abundance."17 But misinterpretation of Rousseau and diminution of interest in
his writings among professional students of children cannot be understood
merely as an incompatibility of style. The mystery continues.
During his lifetime, and to the end of the century, Rousseau was hardly
ignored; Julie and Emile were published over and over (Julie in seventy-two
known editions before 1800, Emile in scarcely fewer), and were translated, pi
rated, quoted, imitated, praised, and attacked in sufficiency to suggest that
every literate European had read the books. In England's record-keeping Annual
Register alone, a dozen or more references to Rousseau appeared between 1759
and 1783; the notes ranged from Voltaire's hilarious summary of Julie to a re
view of Lettre ? d'Alembert which was longer than the review of Johnson's Rasselas
preceding it or of Adam Smith's Moral Sentiments which followed it. The Regis
ter's review of the English Emile also set down, within a few months of the
book's publication in French, one of the main lines of critique through the
years?the essential eccentricity of Rousseau's ideas about education. Amid
brief notes of praise, parts of the work were seen as impracticable, chimerical,
highly blameable, and "dangerous both to piety and morals." But attention
Rousseau certainly received, from Kant's legendary disruption of his
K?nigsberg schedule to the Parlement's "sera lac?r? et br?l?."18
The Emile also quickly entered into the history of practical education. Al
though the Edge worths, for example, argued against Rousseau's "debasing cun
ning" as a tutor, they marked the breadth of his influence in 1798 by remarking
about the Emile and Locke's Thoughts, "We shall not produce long quotations
from books which are in every body's hands." Or, from even earlier lectures on
education, "Rousseau is in full possession of public attention . . ."19 The peak
was not to become a plateau, however, and Rousseau's most often cited heir in
pedagogy, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, diverted the intellectual inheritance in
so destructive a way that the masochist in Jean-Jacques would have been titil

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162 WILLIAM KESSEN

lated. Because the ritual genealogical litany of educational psychology in

variably goes Locke-Rousseau-Pestalozzi-Froebel, we should examine briefly
the distortion contained in the recital. A biographer of Pestalozzi catches both
the early onset of misreading and the beginning of Rousseau's neglect. "Into
[the Physiocrats'] movement there struck like lightning Rousseau's Emile . . .
with its attack on society and its call 'Back to Nature!' " It is true that Pestalozzi
named his first son, born in 1770, Jean-Jacques and that he managed (despite the
attempts of Frau Pestalozzi at subversion) to keep the boy from reading until he
was twelve years old, but he did not long hanker after continuing Rousseau's
pedagogy. By 1792, he had freed himself from the Emile, an "impractical dream
book," and with the reading of his paper on elementary education in 1809, he
publicly and explicitly broke off his branch of the family tree. We can under
stand the distortion of Rousseau a bit better when we recognize that there was
to be no Hume to his Locke.20
The German line of pedagogical theory, determined in part by the Froebel
of the litany, was not much influenced either directly by the Emile or indirectly
by Kant's remarkable perception of Rousseau as the Newton of morals. A later
holder of the K?nigsberg chair in philosophy and the nineteenth century's most
influential educational theorist, Johann Friedrich Herbart, somehow managed
in 1806 to misread both Locke and Rousseau in a single patriotic slap: "What
most distinctly raises [a pedagogue, Niemeyer] above foreigners, and entitles us
to think with pride of our nationality, is . . . the definite moral tendency of his
principles, whereas in the principles of Locke and Rousseau crude impulse
holds entire sway, and, barely mitigated by a highly unstable moral feeling,
leads to a superficial sensuous life."21
Ronda has recently taught us, in persuasive detail, about one of the blocks
that lay in the way of Rousseau's significant entrance into American pedagogy
and developmental psychology. Through the middle half of the nineteenth cen
tury, the traditional strenuous procedures of the American classroom, based on
Calvinism in manner and tone, came under their first credible attack. The vague
alliance of Transcendentalists, in their uneven march toward Unitarianism,
Abolition, and Nature, contained several educators and pedagogical theorists
who might have listened with some interest to Rousseau's complicated argu
ments about impulse and society. The eccentric Bronson Alcott, the solitary
Thoreau, even the intellectual anti-intellectual Emerson were, for wildly dif
ferent reasons, ripe for Julie and Emile. The union never took place; only Haw
thorne appears to have read Rousseau closely, and only Hawthorne maintained
his vision of the ambiguous child while his Concord friends were moving to
ward the child as redeemer and saint. For them, the proclaimer of the new child
was not Rousseau, but Wordsworth; the document of liberation was not Emile,
but Intimations of Immortality. The poem commanded the imagination and the
mind of reformers from Alcott to the far more rigorous Elizabeth Peabody,
who, in a rare aside, wrote of Rousseau's "vicious . . . pampering [of] human
idiosyncrasy." The puzzle of Rousseau's being leapfrogged in the discernible
progression of Locke to Wordsworth to American thought has not been solved,
but the facts seem clear enough. Reform in formal pedagogy came to the United
States through Pestalozzi, Froebel, and (later) Montessori; the reworking of
American ideas about the nature of the child came through the Romantic po
ets.22

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 Rousseau's children 163

Having missed the Transcendental bus, Rousseau was left behind. When
the academic reaction in pedagogy began to regather its forces (the traditional
group had, in any case, lost only in the essays and not in the classrooms), there
was no room for either Wordsworth or Rousseau. By 1886, it was possible to
write of both England and the United States, "the Emile has long ceased to be
read in this country, and the only English translation . . . was published in the
last century [1763, in fact] and has not been reprinted."23
The story has one more chapter, however?the rise of progressive education
and of systematic child study. Progressive education, with a notable exception,
called on Rousseau as a patron saint, not as a text, and some of the invocations
were peculiar. He was said to have "sounded the bugle call to [the] attack . . .
upon the school's imposition, on all children, of a rigid system of learning ..."
And he was held to have changed the emphasis from schooling in "formal reli
gious doctrine, preparatory for life hereafter, to the study of the life and institu
tions amid which man lives here." And, of course, he was celebrated for his
"doctrine of Return to Nature." For the opposition, with equal misunderstand
ing, he was lambasted for his part in the degradation of school discipline. "But
these rebellions against academic ways and in favor of 'the child' . . . ran to
ridiculous extremes . . . When 'the child' becomes the starting point, the center,
and the end of all education, the whole movement tends eventually to sterili
ty."24 Where, in a list like this, can we find the author of the Poland?
The exception to the usual casual readers of Rousseau was John Dewey,
who, on several occasions, demonstrated his secure control not only of the Emile
but of the Discourses and the Poland as well. Dewey gravely separated himself
from Rousseau's poor mouthing of society in education, but he cannot be charged
with misunderstanding him. Only rarely and recently has Dewey's perspicacity
been mimicked.25
As Ari?s has noted, "the association of childhood with primitivism and irra
tionalism or prelogicism characterizes our contemporary concept of childhood"
and Rousseau is unique in foreshadowing the association. More reason, then, to
be surprised that he figured so little in the invention of developmental psycholo
gy. The polymorph, G. Stanley Hall, like John Fiske, knew that the Genevan
was important to his reinvention of adolescence, but Hall wrote with now
familiar irrelevance: "We may dream of intuitive natures, like Schiller's 'esthetic
souls,' so ideally endowed and environed that they have acquired nothing they
later need to abandon; but such a being is as much a psychological impossibility
as the ideal savage of Rousseau and St. Pierre."26 And Freud? Rousseau looks to
me like a treasure trove of psychoanalytic ore, a demonstrandum ad oculos of very
nearly perfect phallicity. But, no, the architect of the unconscious refers to
Rousseau only four times in his entire corpus and none of the references is
beguiling. Academic psychology has had even less to tell us about the impact of
our hero; the standard works in the history of psychology are nearly silent and,
in the dozen hundred pages of the prestigious Manual of Child Psychology there is
one citation of Rousseau, the comment of a secondary source on his observa
tions of newborn behavior. As we commemorate an anniversary, we find no
body in American psychology and few in American education who are ready to
attend the party. Locke fully captured the disciplinary psychologists, as Pesta
lozzi captured the educators and Wordsworth the transcendental reformers.
Moreover, the political cry of the nineteenth-century conservatives that

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 164 WILLIAM KESSEN

"Rousseau was dethroned with the fall of his extravagant child the Republic"
faced a curious antistrophe in the claim of the twentieth-century democrats:
"From Plato to Rousseau, the only honest answer [to the question, 'Who shall
establish and enforce educational standards?'] is the idea of an educational dicta
torship, exercised by those who are supposed to have acquired knowledge of the
real Good. The answer has since become obsolete; knowledge of the available
means for creating a humane existence for all is no longer confined to a privi
leged elite."27
Rousseau's ideas about children and education have been no easier for the
twentieth century to assimilate than they were for the eighteenth and nine
teenth. He has slipped out of our intellectual grasp again and again, or, rather,
we have not had the strength to hold him fast. Generations of commentators on
the nature of children have pulled Rousseau off the shelf to hail him as saint or
to excoriate him as villain; the misreadings on both sides testify to the intricacy
and ambiguity of his vision. Perhaps we should listen again to that first English
reviewer: "The fault most generally observed in discourses upon education, is a
tendency to common place. Nothing, in fact can be more trite, than the greatest
part of the observations, which have been detailed upon that subject from Quin
tilian to monsieur Rollin. This is however the fault, into which the ingenious
author of Emilius is, of all others, in the least danger of falling. To know what
the received notions are upon any subject, is to know what those of Rousseau
are not."

Rousseau's Longest Living Child?Jean-Jacques

For a child psychologist, the temptation to expatiate on Rousseau's most
durable offspring?himself?is well nigh irresistible. His raging ambivalence,
his raw narcissism, his repetition of the family romance in which he joins an
untouchable (or untouched) woman and her virile partner (never her husband),
his ability to write flamingly paranoid letters in a precise and orderly hand (the
last letter to Hume is exquisite), the priority of shame in his life, his bladder and
his spleen?all call for the fancies and the facts of the psychologist. Rousseau
has surely received, at least, the fancies. No mystery remains more worthy of
study, however, than the discrepancy between the wild rage of his personal
polemic and the words his contemporaries used to describe him: gay in compa
ny, aimable, polite, gentle, modest, well-bred, gentle-spirited, warm-hearted,
cheerful. When Voltaire wrote that Rousseau might have been Paul if he hadn't
better liked being Judas, we can guess who Voltaire was casting as Jesus. Yet, in
his attempt to be seen as perfect, even as perfectly vile, Rousseau was his own
Judas and his own Paul. And "who is the greater danger . . . the Judases or the
Pauls? In both instances, aggression engages in an unholy alliance with ambiva
lence." Happily for the present-day student of children, Rousseau's aggression
did not destroy him, and his ambivalence did not destroy his artistry. In natural
genesis, his profound explorations into the place of the child in society and of
society in the child grow out of his attempt to comprehend that perverse genius
Rousseau fils de Jean-Jacques.2*

References
Rousseau tells the story in Confessions (1765/1781), trans. J. M. Cohen (London, 1953), pp.
320-322. Buffon1's Natural History tells of the admissions of Foundling's Hospital. Rousseau's found

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 Rousseau's children 165

lings probably did not grow up; the odds against a child of the mideighteenth century surviving in
the hospital for as long as five years were about four to one.
2J. Gueh?nno, Jean-Jacques (Paris, 1948-1952), vol. 2, p. 57f. Rousseau gives a somewhat dif
ferent account of Mme. de Luxembourg's involvement in Confessions, p. 515f.
^Confessions, p. 514; Hume to Comtesse de Bouffiers, January 19, 1766. Hume saw Sultan as
maintaining complete dominion over Rousseau. We are also presented with a historical puzzle;
when Rousseau, Hume, and their colleague slept in the same small room of a French inn on the way
to England, where was Sultan? Perhaps Hume did not say in his sleep "Je tiens Rousseau!" but,
rather, "Je tiens des puces!"
4Les R?veries du promeneur solitaire (1778/1782), (Paris: Editions Bordas, 1968), Fourth Prome
nade, lines 1389-1393; Ninth Promenade, lines 3166-3214, selected. Translation for the present
article by Lisa Mann Burke.
5Quotations are from The reveries of a solitary, trans. J. G. Fletcher (London, 1927), p. 178. I am
not unaware of the infusion through my quotations from the R?veries of the theme of looking.
"Staring," "eyes," "looking," "watching" are more than stylistic tics; they are, as Crocker points out,
an essential part of Rousseau's definition of himself and society. See L. G. Crocker, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, 2 vols. (New York, 1968-1973), passim.
6Rousseau's pedagogical writings are collected in volume 4 of Oeuvres compl?tes de Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1959-1969, Biblioth?que
de la Pl?iade). Rousseau's letter to his father is quoted on p. xix. The story of the tantrum is told in
Emile, trans. Barbara Foxley (London, 1911), p. 86. Rousseau's documents of condemnation are
cited in note 18. With great regret, I cannot here discuss the implications for child psychology and
education of Rousseau's view of women.
7J. H. Huizinga, Rousseau: The Self Made Saint (New York, 1976); Ernst Cassirer, The Question of
Jean-J?cques Rousseau, trans. Peter Gay (New York, 1954); Edouard Clapar?de, "Jean Jacques
Rousseau et la conception fonctionelle de l'enfance," Revue de M?taphysique et de Morale, 20 (1912):
391-416.
8Crocker, Rousseau, passim. Arthur O. Lovejoy, "The supposed primitivism of Rousseau's Dis
course on Inequality," reprinted in Essays in the History of Ideas (Baltimore, Md., 1948), pp. 14-37.
9For Piaget's development of Rousseau's fundamental insights and their transformation into a
neo-Kantian psychology, see Jean Piaget, Origins of Intelligence (New York, 1952).
l0The Government of Poland, trans. Willmoore Kendall (Indianapolis, Ind., 1972).
nCrocker, Rousseau, vol. 2, p. 335. With Rousseau's snobbery about social class put aside, the
finest representation of his ideas in political practice was Mao Tse-tung's China.
12I have used, as appropriate, Judith H. McDowell's translation and abridgment of Julie [La
Nouvelle H?lo?se (University Park, Md., 1968)], William Kenrick's [Eloisa, 4 vols. (London, 1761)],
or, rarely, my own. Unfortunately, McDowell has deleted from her translation, the only modern
one, most of the comments on child-rearing and education.
Julie adds to her description of Wolmar another of Jean-Jacques' obsessions. "[His] greatest
delight is observation." The portrait of Wolmar is balanced somewhat by the news that he cried at
Julie's death (the first tears since his birth) but put back in its proper frame by his placidly posting
Julie's deathbed lovenote to Saint-Preux.
l3Eloisa, vol. 3, p. 275.
14Ibid., p. 273; my translation from the Gamier edition o? Julie, p. 350. Other stories in Julie
indicate that the rule of necessity often meant that the more powerful, even among the children, got
what they wanted. I have, incidentally, altogether ignored Rousseau's long encomia to physical
fitness; he maintains that the best of Locke, Rollin, Fleury, and DeCrouzas was their emphasis on the
child's physical prowess.
15Cassirer, Rousseau, p. 73, p. 82.
16Huizinga, Rousseau, p. 234.
17The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politicks, and Literature, of the Year 1762 (London,
1763), p. 225.
l*The Annual Register of1759 (London, 1760), pp. 479-484; The Annual Register of 1761 (London,
1762), pp. 208-210; the Parlementas ruling of June 9, 1762 is in Censure de la Facult? de Th?ologie de
Paris, contre le livre qui a pour titre, Emile, ou de V?ducation (Paris, 1763).
19Maria and Richard Lovell Edgeworth, Practical Education, 2 vols. (London, 1798), vol. 1, p.
191, p. 167.
20Kate Silber, Pestalozzi: The Man and His Work (London, 1960), passim. Pestalozzis paper on
elementary education was not published until 1821.
2 Johann Friedrich Herbart, The Science of Education: Its General Principles Deduced from Its Aim and
the Aesthetic Revelation of the World (G?ttingen, 1806). Translation by Henry M. and Emmie Felkin
(New York, 1892), p. 251. Herbart was not a Fichtean, but one can see the directions of German
nationalistic education in his work.
22Bruce Allen Ronda, "The Transcendental Child: Images and Concepts of the Child in Ameri
can Transcendentalism," Yale Dissertation, 1975, University Microfilm 76-13, 750.

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 166 WILLIAM KESSEN

23R. H. Quick, Jean Jacques Rousseau (Syracuse, 1886).

24Carleton Washburne, A Living Philosophy of Education (New York, 1940), p. 203; Ellwood P.
Cubberly, An Introduction to the Study of Education and Teaching (New York, 1925), p. 152f.; Joseph
Kinmont Hart, A So?al Interpretation of Education (New York, 1929), p. 144.
25See, especially, John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York, 1916). John P. Wayne, in
Theories of Education (New York, 1963) uses recent Rousseau scholarship to draw the critical dis
tinction between "natural unfoldment" and "natural perfection" in Jean-Jacques' writing on chil
dren.
26Philippe Ari?s, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life, trans. Robert Baldick
(London, 1962), p. 119; Granville Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relation to Physiolo
gy, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education, 2 vols. (New York, 1904), vol. 1, p.
319f.
27Freud's references to Rousseau are in the Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (1905), Der Wahn
und die Traume in W. Jensens 'Gr?vida' (1907), Zeitgemasses ?ber Krieg und Tod (Jmago, 1915), and
Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (1930); Paul H. M?ssen, ed., CarmichaeVs Manual of Child Psychology (New
York, 1970); R. H. Quick, Rousseau; Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (Boston, 1955), p. 206.
28"Gay in company, ..." are adjectives used by Hume and his friends just before and during
the English fiasco, but similar praise and affection were expressed by Mme. de Bouffiers, Diderot,
Malesherbes, and a long list of others.
Voltaire's remark was made in a letter to Damilaville several months after the publication and
seizure of the Emile. See Theodore Besterman, Voltaire's Correspondence (Geneva, 1959), vol. 50, p.
80. The modern quotation is from Kurt R. Eissler. Death drive, ambivalence, and narcissism.
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 26 (1971): 25-78. Rousseau's undoubtable clinical narcissism is
shown repeatedly (and without direct citation of Rousseau as case in point) in psychoanalytic writ
ings on the disturbance. See, in particular, Heinz Kohut, "Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic
Rage," Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 27 (1972): 360-400.

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