A Mobile IP based WLAN Security Management Framework
with Reconfigurable Hardware Acceleration
Soumya Maity P. Bera
Indian Institute of Technology Indian Institute of Technology
Kharagpur Kharagpur
India 721302 India 721302
soumyam@iitkgp.ac.in bera.padmalochan@gmail.com skg@iitkgp.ac.in
ABSTRACT
The increasing use of wireless technologies in enterprise net-
works drives the network administrators to concern with
various security issues. Implementing the security policies in
wireless network is still an open challenge. The conventional
security policy management frameworks used in wired LAN
do not suit in wireless domain due to the dynamic topology
and mobility of the hosts. The enforcement of organiza-
tional security policies in wireless networks requires appro-
priate access control models as well as correct distribution
of access control rules to the network access points. In such
dynamic environments, role-based access control (RBAC)
mechanisms can be deployed with time and location con-
straints. In this paper, we propose a wireless LAN secu-
rity policy management framework supported by a spatio-
temporal RBAC (STRBAC) model and a SAT based verifi-
cation procedure. The concept of mobile IP has been used
to ensure a fixed layer 3 address of a mobile host. Every host
needs to register their unique MAC address to a Central Au-
thentication and Role Server (CARS). A home agent takes
care of routing a packet to the local host which is currently
located in a foreign network. Each policy zone consists of
an Wireless Policy Zone Controller (WPZCon) that coordi-
nates with a dedicated Local Role Server (LRS) to extract
the low level access configurations corresponding to the zone
access routers. The system can be mapped to a reconfig-
urable hardware like FPGA or CPLD to exploit the hard-
ware parallelism and acceleration in computing. We also
propose a formal spatio-temporal RBAC (STRBAC) model
to represent the global security policies formally and a SAT
based verification framework to verify the access configura-
tions. The framework uses a Boolean logic based decision
procedure instead of general table based matching.
Keywords
Wireless Network Security, Security Policy, STRBAC model
1. INTRODUCTION
S. K. Ghosh
Indian Institute of Technology
Kharagpur
India 721302
The security management in wireless networks (WLAN) is
becoming increasingly difficult due to its dynamic topology
characteristics. Mobile users remotely access the internal
network (network resources) from various network zones;
hence may violate the organizational security policies. Typ-
ically, organizational security policy defines set of rules to
provide authorized object accesses in the network. More-
over, this policy may change dynamically depending on var-
ious control states. Thus, there is a need of a strong security
policy management system with appropriate access control
models. The key idea of policy based security management
lies in partitioning the network topology into different policy
zones and enforcing the security policies in the policy zones
through a set of functional elements. It requires distribution
of the system functionality (or functional rules) into various
elements. In addition, for representing the dynamic nature
of security policies, the system requires appropriate access
control models (such as role-based access control (RBAC),
spatio-temporal RBAC). The dynamic topology character-
istics of wireless networks (wireless nodes may not bind to
a specific IP address) makes the use of mobile IP relevant.
The mobile IP [13] is always specific to a host and does not
change from location to location. The background and stan-
dards for policy based security management can be found in
RFC 3198 [4]. Role based access control (RBAC) mech-
anisms are already being used for controlled access man-
agement. In RBAC, permissions are attached to roles and
users must be assigned to these roles to get the permissions
for accessing the resources. Recently, temporal RBAC (TR-
BAC) and spatio-temporal RBAC (STRBAC) models are
also evolved for location and time dependent access control.
In STRBAC model, users associated to a role can access
network objects, if they satisfy certain location and time
constraints. For example, in an academic network, Students
are not allowed to access internet from their residential halls
during class time (say, 08:00-18:00 in weekdays). However,
they are always allowed to access internet from the academic
departments.
The IETF Policy working group developed a framework for
network policy based admission control [4]. It consists of
a central policy server that interprets the policies, makes
policy decisions and communicates them to various policy
enforcement points. The research outcome of IST-POSITIF
project [1] is policy-based security framework in local area
networks. J Burns et al. propose a framework [3] for au-
tomatic management of network security policies based on
central policy engine. A recent work [2] has been proposed
by Lapiotis et al. on policy based security management in
wireless LAN. But, they do not describe the type of secu-
rity policies enforced and also do not describe the formal
validation of the policies.
Role based access control (RBAC) models [5] [6] are used for
addressing the access requirements of commercial organiza-
tions. Ray and Toahchoodee [7] propose a Spatio-Temporal
Role-Based Access Control Model incorporating both time
and location information. We introduce the notion of wire-
less policy zone to represent location in our model. The role
permissions to access network objects are modeled through
policy rules containing both policy zone(location) and tem-
poral constraints. The application of spatio-temporal RBAC
model in wireless network security is in its infancy. Laborde
et al. [9] presents a colored Petri Net based tool which allows
to describe graphically given network topology, the security
mechanism and the goals required. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the only work which uses spatio-temporal RBAC in
wireless network is by Tomur and Erten [8]. However, this
work does not describe the modeling of STRBAC policies
using existing ACL standards. In this paper, we propose a
wireless security policy management framework supported
by a spatio-temporal RBAC model and a SAT based verifi-
cation. The novelty of the work lies in
• The use of mobile IP to model the wireless nodes in-
creases the performance of the system and gives better
results compared to MAC based models as referred in
[11] and [14]. A comparison between the performances
of these paradigms has been analyzed with experimen-
tal results.
• Computation of low level access configurations has been
accelerated by the use of reconfigurable hardware (in
each policy zone controller) at deploy time. So mod-
ification or addition of rules might converge in slower
rate resulting faster forwarding of network packets.
• A SAT based framework has been presented to verify
the low level access configuration with respect to the
organizational policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
the architecture and operational flow of the proposed secu-
rity management framework has been explained. Then, the
formalization of the system entities and STRBAC model has
been described subsection 2.2. Next subsection describes the
SAT based verification procedure for analyzing the access
configurations with respect to the security policy. Section
3 describes the enhancement of system performance using
hardware acceleration. The analysis of the framework with
a case study has been presented in section 4. This section
also shows the experimental results. Finally, conclusion has
been drawn in section 5.
2. THE PROPOSED WLAN SECURITY MAN-
AGEMENT FRAMEWORK
The design of the framework for Mobile IP based Wireless
Security Policy Management is a solution to the aforemen-
tioned consideration on requirement of scalable and efficient
management system to overcome the challenges in dynamic
volatile wireless environments. The enforcement of correct
policies and Access Control Lists over the distributed net-
work and verifying the completeness is the novel approach
towards the policy based network management paradigm.
The framework consists of the following modules:
• Basic Architecture
• Formal Modeling of Security Policy
• Verification
2.1 Basic Architecture
The proposed Wireless policy management system shown in
Figure 1 stems from the notion of wireless policy zones. One
or more wireless Access Points (AP), a Wireless Policy Zone
Controller (WPZCon) and a Local Role Server (LRS) sepa-
rated from other zones by a zone router together comprises
a Wireless Policy Zone. The authentication of the users
and the access points are managed by a special authentica-
tion server (AS) called Central Authentication & Role Server
(CARS) which can be a RADIUS or an AAA server [11].
It also assigns appropriate roles to the authenticated users
based on user credentials and policy zone (location) infor-
mation. CARS is attached to Role Servers. Role servers
assigns a role to a host on basis of its hardware address.
Each host is assigned with a IP address from a pull of IP
addresses mapped with that Role. A home agent takes the
responsibility to forward a packet to a host using the concept
of Mobile IP [13].
• Home Agent is a designated router in the home net-
work of the mobile node, maintains a mobility binding
table where each entry is identified by the tuple <α ,τ
, 1̃ >. Here, α is permanent home address, τ is tem-
porary care-of address and 1̃ is association lifetime.
• Foreign Agent are specialized routers on the foreign
network where the mobile node is currently visiting.
The foreign agent maintains a visitor list which con-
tains information about the mobile nodes currently
visiting that network. Each entry in the visitor list
is identified by the tuple <α, ψ, $, 1̃>, where ψ is
address of home agent and $ is MAC address of the
mobile node. Foreign agent provides the new τ to a
host.
• Central Authentication & Role Server (CARS) which
authenticates the users (or nodes) and access points
(AP) and also assigns appropriate roles to the users
based on user credentials.
• Local Role Servers (LRS) corresponding to the respec-
tive policy zones are populated with the user-role in-
formation from the CARS.
• The Global Policy Server formally models the global
security policy, GP; determines the high level policy
configurations for various policy zones.
• The distributed Wireless Policy Zone Controllers (WPZ-
Cons) determine the low level access configurations co-
ordinating with the local role servers and validates the
 Figure 1: Proposed Mobile IP based WLAN Security Policy Management Framework

access configurations with high level policy configura-

tions.

Each time a new node enters in the range of an AP, CARS

authenticates it and communicates the information to LRS
while associating the node in the corresponding zone. When
a node leaves the range of an AP, it can sense the node us-
ing the baecon packet and requests the CARS to remove
the local information regarding the node. The LRS is re- Figure 2: Operational Flow of the proposed frame-
sponsible for maintaining the AP and user-role informa- work
tion in a policy zone. The Global Policy Server (GPS) for-
malizes the global security policy (GP) through a spatio-
temporal RBAC model. The details of the STRBAC model
has been described in section 2.2.2. It also determines and
validates high level policy configurations for various policy
zones. GPS holds the pull of IP addresses for a particular
role. It is represented by a function, f (role) which returns
a valid IP address block. The DHCP server is assumed to
be configured in that way. For manual IP settings, the au-
thentication will fail if f (role) and IP does not match. Each
WPZCon coordinates with the local role server to derive low
level access configuration for the policy zone. Finally, the
implementation access rules corresponding to the low level
access configurations are implemented in various zone access
points. The operational flow of the system is shown in Fig.2.
In our framework, the distributed policy zone architecture
makes the task of policy enforcement and validation eas-
ier and efficient. We also propose a formal spatio-temporal
RBAC model for representing the security policies described
in the next subsection.

2.2 Formal Model of the System

Typically, the spatio-temporal RBAC model incorporates
the location and time information to the basic RBAC en-
tities through various relations. The basic RBAC entities
are users, roles, objects, permissions and operations. The
modeling of host mobility and STRBAC entities has been
described in the following subsections.
2.2.1 Mobility Modeling
Each host, x has a home network where it belongs to. H(x), x ∈
theN/W addressof homenetwork is the Home agent of x
which contains the tuple < α, τ, 1̃, ψ, $ > for each x. The
foreign agent, F (x), X ∈ anynetwork holds the information
of tthe same tuple. After x, x ↔ α, being registered to F (x),
Home agent gets the information about CO(x), CO(x) =
f (F (x)) ∈ address space of the network F(x) belongs to. The
function f defined on a foreign agent returns an IP address.
In practise, f always polls its identity in link layer by broad-
cast message. x reads the data and send necessary data to
be registered. F on the other hand registers CO(x) with the
H(x). H(x) maps the address of x with CO(x) and forwards
packets to CO(x) which are destined to x
2.2.2 STRBAC Modelling
In our model, the network location is represented in terms
of policy zones. The policy zones physically represent dif-
ferent sections or units in an organizational network. In the
previous section it is ensured that each host will be assigned
a static IP on the basis of their Role. So, there is a onto
mapping from the set of Roles to the set of zones. For ex-
ample, in a typical Academic network, the policy zones can
be Academic sections, Hostels or Administration etc.
The time must be modelled with appropriate granularity to
provide temporal object access. The granularity of time may
depend on the organizational access control requirements.
To represent time in our model, we use the notion of time
instant and time interval. The interval can be continuous
and non-continuous. Example of a continuous interval is
09:30-17:00 on 04th May. Example of a non-continuous time
interval is 10:00-18:00 on Monday to Friday in the month of
May. A time instant ti in the interval T is indicated as
ti ∈ T .
A network object is represented as a network service and
associated network policy zone where, services refer to any
network applications conforming to TCP/IP protocol. For
example, some of the known network services are ssh, telnet,
http etc. The service policy zone is the destination location
associated to the service. For example, ssh service access
to a policy zone Zd can be represented by a network object
Obji < ssh, Zd >.
Roles represent group of users. For example, typical roles
for an academic institution may be faculty, student, admin-
istrator, guest etc. In our model, the assignment of roles
to the users is location and time dependent. For exam-
ple, an user can be assigned the role of faculty in acad-
emic policy zone at any time. Thus, valid users must satisfy
the spatial and temporal constraints before role assignment.
RoleAssignZone(ri ) represents the policy zone(s) where the
role ri can be assigned. RoleAssignT ime(rj ) represents the
time interval when the role rj can be assigned.
The predicate U serRoleAssign(ui , rj , T, Zk ) states that the
user ui is assigned to role rj during the time interval T and
policy zone Zk . This predicate must satisfy the property:
U serRoleAssign(ui , rj , T, Zk ) ⇒ (U serP Zone(ui , T ) = Zk )∧
(Zk ⊆ RoleAssignZone(rj )) ∧ (T ⊆ RoleAssignT ime(rj )).
The formalization of policy zones, time, network objects,
roles and other STRBAC entities has been addressed in our
earlier work [14].
2.2.3 Modeling of Global Policy
The global policy of an organization can be modeled through
a set of policy rules. A policy rule represents the network ob-
ject accessibility permissions (“permit” or “deny”) of a role
from a policy zone to the network objects during certain
time interval.
Definition 1: [Policy Rule] A Policy Rule P Ri < rj , Zl , Objk , T, p >
defines that the role rj is assigned the permission p (“per-
mit”/“deny”) to access the object objk from the policy zone
P Zonl during the time interval T .
Each policy rule must satisfy the following predicates: (1)
T ⊆ RoleAssignT ime(rj ), i.e., time interval T must be con-
tained in RoleAssignT ime(rj );
(2) Zl ⊆ RoleAssignZone(rj ), i.e., source zone Zl contained
in RoleAssignZone(rj ). The global policy is represented as
ordered set of policy rules {P R1 , ..., P RN }.
High Level Policy Configuration: To enforce the organi-
zational security policy in the wireless LAN, the rules in the
global policy model GP must be properly distributed to vari-
ous policy zone controllers (WPZCon). Thus, high level pol-
icy configuration is represented as a distribution of zonal rule
sets < GPZ1 , GPZ2 , ..., GPZN >, where GPZi represents the
zonal rule set for the policy zone Zi . This distribution must
satisfy the property: (GPZ1 ∧ GPZ2 ∧ ... ∧ GPZN ) ⇒ GP .
A policy rule P Ri is included in the zonal rule set GPZk
corresponding to the policy zone Zk , iff the policy zone of
P Ri is contained by the policy zone Zk .
Low Level Access Configuration: Each WPZCon de-
termines the low level configuration based on the local user-
role and high level policy configuration. A WPZCon co-
ordinates with the local role server (LRS) for getting pop-
ulated with the local policy states. The low level access
configuration LPZk represents a collection of implementa-
tion rules {IR1 , IR2 , ..., IRN } corresponding to the zonal
rule set GPZk of policy zone Zk .
Definition 2: [Implementation Rule] An Implementa-
tion rule IRx < ui , rj , Servk , Zs , Zd , T, p, netl > defines
that an user ui associated to the role rj is assigned the
permission p to access the network service Servk from the
source zone Zs to destination zone Zd during time interval
T ; where, netl represents the access router or the network
interface to which the rule is physically mapped.
The validation of the low level access configuration is en-
sured by the property: ∀(LPZi , GPZi ), LPZi ⇒ GPZi . It
states that each low level implementation rule set or access
configuration, LPZi must conform to the corresponding high
level policy rule set GPZi .
2.3 Verification
The security of the proposed STRBAC model can be en-
sured by the following necessary and sufficient properties:
Property1: U serRoleAssign(ui , rj , T, Zk ) ⇒ ((U serP Zone(ui , T ) =
Zk )∧(Zk ⊆ RoleAssignZone(rj ))∧(T ⊆ RoleAssignT ime(rj ))
Property2: (GPZ1 ∧ GPZ2 ∧ ... ∧ GPZN ) ⇒ GP .
Property3: ∀(LPZi , GPZi ), LPZi ⇒ GPZi .
We have used SAT based decision procedure to verify the

Figure 3: Hardware Design Flow
security properties of the system. It reduces the conjunc-
tion (∧) of the security properties into a boolean formula
and checks its satisfiability (SAT). The verification proce-
dure uses efficient zChaff SAT solver [10] as a verification
tool. The SAT result indicates the correctness of the imple-
mentation corresponding to the security policy.
3. RECONFIGURABLE HARDWARE ACCEL-
ERATION
From the formal model of the proposed framework the Boolean
expressions can be obtained. The max terms represent the
permit rules. So we can formulate any Boolean function for
the AP or zone routers to decide the check the permit or
deny condition rule for a particular packet. As an example
say, a packet has a source IP Is and destination IP Id .
f (Isi ) = S, i ∈ 0, 1, 2, 3...31, where S is a Boolean variable
represents a true if the host exists. Similarly, f (Idi ) = D.
If the global policy says, Any packet should be dropped from
Is to Id , R(D, S) = F alse, where R is boolean function that
checks the permission.
So, this rule is a minterm in the decision making logic.
The comparative study between this approach and conven-
tional software based approach is given in ??.
Figure 3 explains the actual hardware design flow of the
system. 74 input ports (32 bit for Source IP, 32 destination
IP, 8 bit for service) are required. A HDL module is gen-
erated in deploy time and holds the boolean logic for the
permission rules. FPGA, CPLS or PROM based decision
acceleration can be achieved. Though each time a new host
registers with CARS, the boolean logic has to be modified
according to the role and permission assigned to the host.
We have simulated the model on Virtex2P board. Total
REAL time to Xst completion was 1.00 secs and Total CPU
time to Xst completion was 0.94 secs. Whereas the policy
checking time for each packet can be reduced to 3.802 ns
(maximum delay on the critical path).
4. CASE STUDY
In this section, we describe the reduction of the policy en-
forcement rules with the help of an example. Consider the
IP address of the mobile host under test is 10.14.3.103 with
role “employee”. Suppose the current security policy for the
“employee” role is to block “ssh” service access to the host
10.12.1.45. After distribution of the policy rules, the zone
router of 10.12.1.45 checks the packet. The rule written in
zone router:
zone employee 10.14.0.0[255.255.0.0]
zone director 10.12.1.45[255.255.255.255]
service ssh 22
RuleX: Deny ssh employee director
RuleY: Permit ssh director employee
The boolean reduction of the above rules are described as
follows:
employee ↔ ˜I0 ∧ ˜I1 ∧ ˜I2 ∧ ˜I3 ∧ I4 ∧ ˜I5 ∧ I6 ∧ ˜I7
∧˜I8 ∧ ˜ ∧ I9 ∧ ˜I10 ∧ ˜I11 ∧ I12 ∧ I13 ∧ I14 ∧ ˜I15
director ↔ ˜I0 ∧ ˜I1 ∧ ˜I2 ∧ ˜I3 ∧ I4 ∧ ˜I5 ∧ I6 ∧ ˜I7 ∧
˜I8 ∧ ˜I9 ∧ ˜I10 ∧ ˜I11 ∧ I12 ∧ I13 ∧ ˜I14 ∧ ˜I15 ∧
˜I16 ∧ ˜I17 ∧ ˜I18 ∧ ˜I19 ∧ ˜I20 ∧ ˜I21 ∧ ˜I22 ∧ I23 ∧
˜I24 ∧ ˜I25 ∧ I26 ∧ ˜I27 I ∧ I28 ∧ I29 ∧ ˜I30 ∧ I31
ssh ↔ ˜I0 ∧ ˜I1 ∧ ˜I2 ∧ I3 ∧ ˜I4 ∧ I5 ∧ I6 ∧ ˜I7
RuleX ↔ ˜ssh ∨ ˜employee ∨ ˜director
RulwX ⇔ ssh ∧ director ∧ employee
RuleX and RuleY will be embedded un hardware for fast
checking. So as a result, the whole framework ensures no
SSH packet from employee will be allowed to go to directors
machine. But Director can SSH to his employee’s machines.
4.1 Experimental Results
The proposed framework has been simulated in Unix envi-
ronment. Lapiotis et al. [2] have proposed another frame-
work which worked on link layer policy configurations. We
have used the IP layer security policy enforcement and bet-
ter performance is achieved. The Table4.1 shows the com-
parative studies between the two paradigm. Moreover the
subnetting is possible in IP layer which helps is achieving
drastically better performance in average or best cases ans
same in worst case.
For the reconfigurable hardware simulation we have used
Xilinx ISE 9.02 and the targeted architecture was Virtex 2
Pro FPGA chip (v2p-fg256-7). Total 97 I/O were used. 1
Input IOB and 1 output IOB were used and the maximum
combinational path delay is 3.802 ns.
The proposed framework is feasible. The performance analy-
sis shows that convergence time of modification of rules is
compromised to achieve faster permission checking time.
5. CONCLUSION
 Table 1: Performance Analysis of MAC based and IP based modelling of the Policy Framework
Zones Rules MAC Address Based Model IP Address based Model
User Time System Time SAT execution time User Time System Time SAT execution time
1 2 0.705 0.092 0.018 0.641 0.076 0.019
4 10 1.066 0.148 0.020 0.759 0.088 0.019
4 100 1.107 0.152 0.031 0.763 0.088 0.022
4 1000 1.125 0.159 0.060 0.765 0.092 0.058
16 10 1.680 0.172 0.023 0.910 0.112 0.023
16 100 1.720 0.186 0.031 0.921 0.115 0.028
16 1000 1.753 0.201 0.067 0.929 0.122 0.063
32 10 2.115 0.271 0.024 0.998 0.137 0.024
32 100 1.139 0.280 0.033 1.102 0.138 0.030
32 1000 1.1151 0.291 0.067 1.109 0.143 0.063

Network Security Policy, Proceedings of the 2nd DARPA

Table 2: Hardware Synthesis Results
Target Architecture xc2vp2-7-fg256
Maximum Delay 3.802 ns
Input Buffer Gate delay 0.878 ns
Output Buffer Gate delay 2.592 ns
Total Net delay (Routing) 0.332 ns
CPU time to XST completion 9.92 Sec
Memory Used 159352 kilobytes
In this paper we have presented a security policy implemen-
tation framework. The framework is based on the concept
of Mobile IP that abstracts the dynamic nature of the topol-
ogy. Use of mobile IP in this context is a novel approach.
The network is formally modelled to check the completeness
and correctness of the implementation. A SAT-based veri-
fication approach is used. For wireless scenario with Mobile
IP support no such security policy verification approach is
used. Boolean reduction of every formula helps to embed
it on reconfigurable hardware and achieve a faster solution.
The framework supports STRBAC. The onto mapping of
Roles with Zones simplifies the complexity of enforcement
of STRBAC over a network. Wireless Policy Zone Con-
troller(WPZCon) takes the responsibility of proper imple-
mentation of the Global Policy over the distributed net-
work. The system also uses a centralized authentication
and role server. This makes the policy enforcement and val-
idation more simple and efficient. The present work can be
extended for collective or dual roles in RBAC. Another di-
mension of extension might be deploying the framework over
a Mobile IP disabled network and still abstract the link layer
in changing topology by using some cross layer connectivity
protocols.
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