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The Basic Principles of

Operational Art

and Tactics

( A Soviet View )
x

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THE LIBRAR OF THE

VO SIT1Y 8 197L4INOIS
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UNIN OF IL IGN
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SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

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‫‪..‬‬ ‫محصے‬
 САВКИН В. Е.

ОСНОВНЫЕ ПРИНЦИПЫ

ОПЕРАТИВНОГО

ИСКУССТВА

И ТАКТИКИ

Ордена Трудового Красного Знамени

ВОЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО
МИНИСТЕРСТВА ОБОРОНЫ СССР
МОСКВА — 1972
The Basic Principles of

l
Operationa Art

and Tactics

(A Soviet View )

V. YE . SAVKIN
Moscow — 1972

TRANSLATED AND PUBLISHED

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF
THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington , D.C. - Price $2.30
Stock Number 0870-00342
 355
Sa 94o E

American Editor's Comment on The Basic

Principles of Operational Art and Tactics

The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics was published in

1972 in 13,000 copies. It was probably the most important Sovietmilitary
publication of that year. The Soldier's Calendar for 1973 and 1974 have
included the title as recommended reading for the Soviet armed forces.
The author , Colonel Vasiliy Yefisovich Savkin , has served on the
faculty of the Frunze Military Academy. As a candidate of Military
Science he has written several military affairs articles and authored at
least two earlier books. They are titled How to Achieve a High Pace of
Advance under Modern Combat Conditions ( 1962) and Rates of Ad
vance ( 1965 ) .
According to Soviet military theorists , operational art and toctics are
two of the three components of military art. The third is strategy. Opera
tional art is the connecting link between strategy and tactics, and is
called on to work out the theory and practice of preparing and conducting
contemporary operations. This book , focusing on operational art and
tactics, does not deal with either doctrine, which represents the official
Soviet view of the nature of a future war, or strategy , since the most im
portant aspect of strategy is policy. In U.S. terms the book treats opera
tions, tactics, laws of war and laws of armed conflict.
A concise editorial description of this book appears on the Publisher's
identification page . Because of the significance of this overview it is
quoted here in entirety :
The book investigates a number of questions of tactics and operational
art of great theoretical and practical interest from a position of Marxist
Leninist philosophy. Some of these questions are very complex and are
on the dividing line of military art, philosophy, and history .
This work analyzes the views of military leaders and theoreticians of
the past concerning these principles. It investigates the substance and
significance of principles of military art and laws of armed conflict and
their dialectical relationship . Considerable attention is devoted to the con
tent of principles of operational art and tactics and to their use in a
combat situation according to views of the second phase in development
of the Soviet Armed Forces and of military art after the Great Patriotic
War (1953–1959 ).
A number of the theses expressed are open to debate and reflect the
author's personal point of view .
This book is designed for officers and generals of the Soviet Army.
The suggestion is made that the concepts expressed by Colonel Savkin
are very complex , open to debate , and therefore controversial in nature .
It is for these very reasons that books of this type are a rarity in Soviet
military literature . The fact that this major work has been published by
the Military Publishing House suggests considerable interest in its con
tents. It may be assumed that the editorial qualifications constitute an
official caveat to protect against possible doctrinal ambiguities expressed
by the author.
The book purportedly focuses on “ the second phase in development
of the Soviet Armed Forces and of military art after the Great Patriotic
War ( 1953–1959) .” It is clear, however, from the editorial caveat, that
the stipulated time frame should be considered a literary device which
does not detract from the contemporary nature of the subject matter .
In essence, the views of the author on the tactical use of nuclear
weapons, the element of surprise and other aspects of warfare are among
the most challenging yet presented in Soviet military literature . Colonel
Savkin argues for the surprise employment of massed tactical nuclear
strikes on a narrow front. The nuclear attack , he says , should then be
followed by a swift penetration in depth by armored forces combined with
airborne landings in enemy rear areas.
Colonel Savkin's book additionally offers a thorough Marxian inter
pretation of the military application of surprise, mobility , concentration
of forces, offensive actions and the use of all forms of combat to include
nuclear weapons and their means of delivery . He discusses the laws of
military science and the principles ofmilitary art. He points out that laws
and principles are not the same and it is due to advances in science and
technology that principles are constantly changing.

Colonel Savkin's book has been reviewed by General-Major V. Kulikov

on page 2 of the April 4 , 1973 , issue of Red Star. Appearing in the sec
tion titled “ The Commander's Bookshelf” Kulikov, himself a Candidate
ofMilitary Science, wrote as follows:
Scientific- technical progress is exerting an ever -increasing influence on
military affairs . The means of waging war are continuously being im
proved and even the ways of applying them are changing. All this places
many problems before military science , among which an important place
is occupied by an investigation into the essence and meaning of the prin
ciples of military art and the laws of armed combat.
The book of Candidate of Military Science , Colonel V. Savkin , THE

vi
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONAL ART AND TACTICS, is dedicated to
this theme.
The author undertook the elaboration of this extremely complicated
problem affecting a wide range of questions. And , in our opinion , he
managed to consider this problem in a quite popular manner, yet at the
necessary scientific level.
The opinions of generals of slave-owning, feudal, and capitalist socie
ties, as well as the bourgeois-scientific period between the First and
Second World Wars, are examined in the book from a Marxian position .
Criticism of their ideological and metaphysical views is applicable even
today.
The author thoroughly reveals the essence and significance of the
principles of military art and the laws of war , their dialectical correlation ,
and the forms of their practical utilization . He emphasizes that the prin
ciples of Soviet military art are based on the objective laws of war, from
which directly flow the principles of military art,
A significant place in the work is allocated to use of the principles of
military art in a combat situation and the idea is advanced that the prin
ciples of military art, embodied in practice , play the role of motivating
factors in armed conflict. The author justly ties the application of these
principles to the development of initiative and creativity in the actions of
commanders at all levels .
A separate chapter of the book is dedicated to an account of the funda
mental principles of operational art and tactics. In this chapter, particular
detail comes out regarding maintenance of the principle ofmobility and a
discussion of its significance. The means for increasing mobility of troops
and achieving high -speed battle maneuvers are also investigated . Such
attention by the author to the principle of mobility is fully justified . Fur
ther development of the material base of combat, in particular in troop
mobility, their fire -power, and the creation in some armies (USA , FRG ,
and others ) of air-mobile (airborne- assault) units heightens the importance
of this principle.
This book is undoubtedly one of the more interesting scientific books
which has been phblished in the last year. Soviet officers and generals are
able to draw much useful information from it.
With observations such as those above , Colonel Savkin provides the
student of military affairs a book of great interest which contributes to
understanding the complexities of Soviet military thought.

vii
 NOMENCLATURE

In the translation beginning on the next page, several Russian

words are used in their original transliterated form . They are :
1. Obʼyedineniye is a Soviet term which refers to a major field
force , such as a front or an army.
2. Soyedineniye is used by the Soviets to refer to a corps , a divi
sion , or a brigade. The components may be from a single
arm or from various arms and services. The term also is used
loosely for an army.
3. Chasť is a Soviet term which designates any unit of regimental
smaller size that is administratively self-contained and separ
ately numbered . Examples of this are a rifle regiment, an en
gineer battalion of a rifle division , and a corps signal battalion .
4. Podrazdeleniye is the Russian term for " subdivision .” It is
used to refer to a subordinate unit of a chasť ; it is any unit
which cannot be fully identified numerically except by refer
ence to the larger unit of which it is an integral part: bat
talions, companies, and platoons of a rifle regiment; the bat
talions and batteries of an artillery regiment; the companies
of an engineer or signal battalion .

The translation and publication of The BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERA

TIONAL ART AND Tactics does not constitute approval by any US Gov
ernment organization of the inferences, findings and conclusions contained
therein . Publication is solely for the exchange and stimulation of ideas.

viii
Table of Contents

American Editor's Comment iii

1
Foreword to the Russian Edition
Chapter 1. Principles of Military Art in Works by Military Leaders and
Theoreticians of the Pasi 5
Historical Method of Principles of Military Art 5
Slave-Owning Society 7
Feudal Society 9
Capitalist Society (Before the Great October Socialist Revolution ) 17
Principles of Military Art in Soviet Military Works of 1917-1940 39
Principles of Military Art in Works of Bourgeois Scholars Between
World War I and II (1919-1939) 46
Chapter 2. Essence and Importance of Principles of Military Art and of
Laws of Armed Warfare, Their Dialectical Correlation , Use , and
Classification 52
Essence of Laws of Armed Warfare, Their Importance and Use 32
Essence and Significance of Principles of Military Art, Their Correlation
With Laws of Armed Conflict, and Use in a Combat Situation 119
Classification of Principles of Military Art 152
Chapter 3. Summary of the Basic Principles of Operational Art and
Tactics (According to Views of 1953–1959) 167
Mobility and High Tempos of Combat Operations 167
Concentration of Main Efforts and Creation of the Necessary Superiority
in Men and Weapons Over the Enemy at the Decisive Place at the
Decisive Time (Concentration of Efforts ) 201
Surprise 230
Combat Activeness 240
Preservation of Combat Effectiveness of Friendly Troops 258
Conformity of the Goal of the Operation or Battle to Conditions of the
Actual Situation 266
Interworking 273
Conclusion 278

ix
Foreword to the Russian Edition

The revolution in military affairs has encompassed all aspects of mili

tary activities and has advanced many very important problems having
great practical and theoretical significance .
One of these problems is an investigation into the changes which have
taken place in principles ofmilitary art and the laws ofwarfare and armed
conflict, and a development of practical recommendations stemming
therefrom . Resolution of this very complex problem requires a combined
approach to the study of phenomena arising from the resolution in mili
tary affairs , and the use of achievements and unification of efforts of
specialists of different branches of knowledge , representing both military
science proper as well as the entire system of sciences comprising Marxist
Leninist social science. Such an approach to resolution of this problem is
necessary above all because many of its aspects are on the dividing line
of military art, philosophy, history , and sometimes of other sciences. And
even military science itself occupies a bordering position between the
social and natural-technical sciences. Being in essence a social science , it
also includes divisions of many natural and technical sciences involving
the creation of contemporary means of conflict and of troop control.
The principles of military art are understood to be the basic ideas and
most important recommendations for the organization and conduct of
battles, operations, and war as a whole which are suitable for practical
use in all basic forms of troop combat activity . It is accepted that the basic
principles of military art include those which are valid for all three of its
parts — tactics, operational art, and strategy . These include surprise, con
centration of effort, aggressiveness , and certain others. The wording of
corresponding basic principles of tactics, operational art, and strategy is
usually completely identical. However, a certain scale is assumed in setting
forth the content of a particular principle. If its content is set forth on a
tactical scale, this will be the basic principle of tactics, but if set forth on
an operational or strategic plane , it will be the basic principle of opera
tional art or strategy respectively. It is fully possible to state a certain
principle with respect to all three components of military art. In this case
it will be a basic principle of military art. For the sake of brevity we will
1
subsequently call them principles of military art (but do not confuse this
with particular and specific principles) .
Particular principles with significance only for general tactics, opera
tional art, or strategy are not examined in this work . The scale of prin
ciples will find precise reflection as their content and use are set forth .
Inasmuch as the essence of principles of tactics, operational art, and
strategy and their dialectical relationship with laws of warfare and armed
conflict are the same, the first and second chapters speak of the principles
of military art, while their scale ( i.e., of tactics, operational art, or
strategy ) is reflected only in the necessary instances . The third chapter
sets forth the content of principles as applied to the operational-tactical
scale, i.e., the question there is only about principles of operational art
and tactics.
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of principles of operational
art and tactics. Without a mastery of these principles it is impossible to
successfully control troops in modern combat or operations and to win vic
tory . The value of the principles depends to a great degree on their skilful
application . This is a complex matter which requires great art and a
thorough analysis of concrete and often contradictory situation data,
possibly not in a “ pure form ,” but the aggregate , with a certain “ struggle
of motives.”
Knowledge of the objective laws of warfare and armed conflict which
lie at the basis of principles of military art and from which the latter pro
ceed is an important condition for effective use of principles of operational
art and tactics.
By virtue of the above, the book sets forth the essence of laws of armed
conflict, their use, and their dialectical relationship with principles of
military art. Scientific management of armed conflict in all echelons is
impossible without conscious application of objective laws of warfare and
armed conflict and the laws of social sciences, primarily materialistic dia
lectics. Delving into the mechanism of laws of warfare and armed conflict
allows us to find the most effective methods and means of exerting influ
ence in the necessary direction on conditions under which these laws arise
and function , and to seek out in the situation at hand the maximum op
portunity formaking and implementing the optimum decisions.
We have not yet succeeded in achieving a unity of opinions on a num
ber of questions examined in this work in the materials published in our
military literature . Some authors express controversial, imprecise, and
even erroneous theses. Some urgent problems are still awaiting solution or
even have yet to be posed . It is the urgent task of Soviet military science
to fill this gap .
This book consists of three chapters. The first shows the historical
method of principles of military art and sets forth views of the most prom
inent military leaders and theoreticians of the past on these principles.
An overwhelming majority of these people considered the principles of

2
 military art to be eternal and unchangeable logical rules, thus denying the
objective character of laws and the historical method of principles. This
defect is also characteristic of contemporary bourgeois military -theoretical
thought, which is permeated by idealism and metaphysics, by agnosticism ,
and by a denial of natural ties and relationships in phenomena and
1

processes of armed conflict. The chapter also shows the priority of

Russian military -theoretical thought in formulating and using a number
of principles ofmilitary art.
The second chapter states in detail the essence and importance of prin
ciples of military art and laws of armed conflict and their dialectical
correlation . It provides a definition of the concepts of “ laws of warfare,”
“ laws of armed conflict,” and “ laws of military science.” It states a sup
position about the existence of laws of a new , regostatistical type. It
shows the historical method and mechanism of action of laws, forms of
their practical use , and correlation of laws of armed conflict with laws of
materialistic dialectics and other social sciences. This same chapter sets
forth formulations and a brief content of four laws of warfare and two
laws of armed conflict (sometimes in an interpretation somewhat different
from that generally accepted ) .
Much attention is given to the use of principles of military art in a
combat situation and to their classification , which is refined to a certain
extent by the author.
The third chapter provides the abbreviated content of the basic prin
ciples of operational art and tactics according to views of the second phase
of development of the Soviet Armed Forces and of military art after the
Great Patriotic War ( 1953–1959 ) . Here the attention is focused on the
principle of mobility and high rates of combat operations, and on the
principle of concentration of effort. The principle of concentration of
effort is used as an example in graphically revealing the historical method
of principles and the change not only in their content, but in their form
depending on the development of the material basis of combat and opera
tions and on other conditions. The insolvency of views of bourgeois
scholars, who regard these principles as eternal and unchangeable, is
quite clearly evident in the example of this principle.
The book does not pretend to illuminate fully the questions posed. For
this purpose a number of investigations are needed into the creative alli
ance of military science with Marxist-Leninist social science and with the
corresponding divisions of natural and technical sciences.
The author expresses his profound gratitude to all generals and officers
who have read this work in manuscript and in printing forms and who
gave much help in its revision .

3
Chapter 1 - Principles ofMilitary Art in Works by
Military Leaders and Theoreticians
of the Past

Historical Method of Principles of Military Art

The principles of military art bear a historical character. They are not
eternal primarily because war itself is not eternal. There was a time when
encounters among people did not turn into war. War as a socio -historical
phenomenon appeared for the first time during the period of decay of the
primitive communal system and emergence of the slave- owning system of
production . With the disappearance of war, the principles of military art,
too , will cease to exist.
The historical method of principles of military art is also reflected in
the fact that a change in objective reality, such as the material means of
waging war, leads inevitably to a change in the principles, to a discarding
of obsolete ones and development of new ones. The material basis of bat
tles and operations has a deciding influence on development of principles
of operational art and tactics. Military art depends on the economic order
and on development of production . Military art and its principles have
constantly developed and become enriched as changes have taken place
in the material conditions of the life of society and as technical means
have improved . However, the dependence of military art on the method
of production does not bear a strongly pronounced straight- line character.
Replacement of one method by another does not automatically and im
mediately involve the complete replacement of some principles of military
art by others. Even under new conditions the preceding course of the
historical process retains its influence for a certain time. However, as new
conditions develop , there is preparation and then completion of a leap in
the development of military art, and the transition of quantity into a new
quality. The old principles ofmilitary art are modified . They change their
content ( often radically), and sometimes are discarded completely .Never
theless, the form of expression of the principles is rather stable. Dialectical
materialism considers the determining factor in any object or phenomenon
to be the content, since form cannot play a self-contained role. Many
bourgeois scholars took metaphysical and idealistic positions and declared
the principles of military art to be eternal and unchangeable . They ad
5
vance the stability of the form of expression of the principles as the soie
argument in defense of this assertion. This is an example of the isolation
of form from content. In reality, these exist in unity .
Thus the " unchangeableness” and “ eternal nature ” of principles of
military art are only the unchangeableness of the form of their expression ,
which itself is relative . With regard to their content, this always changes
in accordance with the changing conditions for waging war.
A change in both the content and form of expression of the principle
of concentration of superior forces and means at the deciding point is seen
especially clearly. For Epaminondas only infantry was the subject of con
centration , while Alexander of Macedonia carried out a combined concen
tration of cavalry with infantry. Later artillery also began to be massed .
In World War II a multiple superiority in infantry, tanks , and artillery
over the enemy was created on selected axes .
In connection with the massive adoption by the armed forces
ber of states of nuclear weapons in 1953–1960, an important change of
the principle of concentration of forces and means was noted in our press
and the foreign press during this period. For example, in the book
Deterrence or Defense ? (London , 1960), Liddell Hart frankly admits:
“ The principle of concentration of forces and means should receive a new
interpretation . It must be replaced by the principle of controlled disper
sion .” In the book Pentomic Division , T. Mataxis and S. Goldberg in
1958 noted that concentration must not be understood merely as a simple
massing of a large mass of troops and the fires of conventional artillery.
Excessive overconcentration of combat formations could lead to heavy
losses from enemy nuclear weapons. In addition , there was no longer a
need for the previous concentration of forces and means in connection
with the colossal destructive effects of nuclear weapons. In this regard , the
concentration of forces and means began to be achieved in this period
primarily by the delivery of nuclear strikes against the most important
targets and by the concentration of troop fires. Therefore, this same prin
ciple not only was filled with new content, but was stated in a different
way: concentration of the main efforts at the decisive place and at the
decisive time. Its meaning essentially changed even in comparison with
that which it had during World War II.
Principles are not arbitrary constructions of the minds of military
theoreticians, but the reflection of objective conditions and possibilities
of armed conflict and the action of its laws transformed in their conscious
ness. The principles are inferred from the action of laws of warfare and
armed conflict. These laws are the objective basis of principles of military
art. But the laws of warfare and armed conflict themselves bear a deeply
historical character . A change in the content of a particular law leads also
to a change of those principles which proceed from it.
The character of politics and warfare and other factors such as the
morale of the army, its combat experience, and the activity of the military
leader have a determining influence , through the corresponding laws of
armed conflict, on development of principles of military art, except for the
method of production . These factors influence the principles of military
art, not in isolation , but in inseparable connection with the social system ,
character of the overall political line of the ruling class, and even its
legal and ethical ideas and views,
The principles of military art began to form spontaneously in ancient
times. People began to notice that if a military leader made a decision
which in past wars had led to success under similar circumstances, then
he won victory . And to the contrary , if decisions and actions which at one
time had led to failures under similar combat situations were repeated ,
then the troops suffered defeat now as well. The irreversibility of such
results and vague recognition of the objective conditionality of the proc
esses of armed conflict gave rise to a belief in the possibility of formulating
certain important rules on methods of troop combat operations.
Thus, certain principles of tactics and strategy arose as far back as
very ancient times. Their development took place empirically, proceeding
from the immediate demands of practice , and not on the basis of a pro
found analysis of the objective laws of armed conflict. Science was in no
position to discover these latter laws before the appearance of Marxist
teaching. The path along which the essence of a phenomenon and laws of
its development are first deeply perceived and then principles are formu
lated has unquestionable advantages. The principles inferred in such a
manner are more substantiated and more trustworthy . Here the phenom
nenon is perceived immediately as a whole, and not piecemeal, as is the
case with the empirical method . Such an approach was within the capa
bility only of scientists who relied on Marxist dialectical materialism in
their research . Therefore, while military science of the past still achieved
certain results in development of principles, it was helpless in resolving
the problems of laws of armed conflict. This problem was posed for the
first time on a broad plane and is being resolved only by Soviet military
science.

Slave - Owning Society

Some principles of military art such as concentration of forces for the

main attack on the decisive point, surprise, interworking, and others found
application as far back as the wars of slave- owning states.
For example , in the words of Engels, the great tactical principle
uneven distribution of troops laterally so as to concentrate forces for the
main attack on the decisive point - was discovered for the first time by
the Boeotian ( Theban ) general Epaminondas in the battle of Leuctra in
371 B.C.
Alexander of Macedonia (356–323 B.C.) employed certain principles
of cavalry tactics consisting of the following: attack enemy infantry while
7
on the march or when it was reforming; attack enemy cavalry primarily
on the flanks; take advantage of disruption of the enemy's combat forma
tion in order to go to his flank or rear; pursue the enemy swiftly and
mercilessly . Engels calls these principles the first and foremost ones.
According to him , every cavalry commander should know them . Alex
ander of Macedonia can be considered one of the founders of the prin
ciple of interworking of combat arms and of individual chasti in the
combat formation .
The further development of principles of military art is connected with
the names of Hannibal (247–183 B.C.) and Julius Caesar ( 100_44
B.C. ). Hannibal skilfully employed the principles of surprise and active
ness . Julius Caesar employed to perfection (for conditions of the slave
owning society ) the principle of maneuver of troops on the battlefield .
The level of development of practical military art in the slave-owning
society was rather high . It is natural, therefore, that one can find in the
works of ancient authors on history or military theory , and even in works
of art, individual mention of recommendations, advice , and rules ; how
ever, they are still stated with insufficient precision and are not developed
as principles of military art. It is as if they are principles of military art in
an embryonic stage . In that era theoretical works on warfare bore a
descriptive character and in a majority of cases did not contain profound
theoretical generalizations and conclusions. This also relates to a consid
erable extent to the era of early feudalism .
Suffice it to say that over 2,000 years passed between the practical
application of the principle of concentration of forces and its “ scientific
formulation ,” since it was formulated for the first time only in the 19th
Century .
There are individual statements touching on certain rules of waging
war in the works of Xenophon , The Works of Julius Caesar , Laws of
Manu, and other works.
Xenophon (430–355 B.C.) was one of the first Greek military theoreti
cians who made an attempt to state the fundamental questions of military
matters. In particular, he gave a description of battles waged by Epami
nondas and was close to a statement of the essence of the principle em
ployed by the latter.
The Laws of Manu (1st Century B.C. to 5th Century A.D.) at times
examine individual aspects of principles of military art, especially the
attainment of surprise and interworking.
Much attention is given to the attainment of surprise and to military
strategems in the work by Roman general and military writer Julius
Frontinus entitled Strategems ( 1st Century A.D.) .
A military theoretician during the time of the decay of the Roman
Army, Flavius Vegetius Renatus (390–410 A.D.) , in his work entitled
Summary of Military Affairs devotes attention to seizing the initiative,
8
surprise, and swiftness of actions. He stated that “ in military affairs
swiftness usually produces greater benefit than valor.”
Vegetius attached decisive significance to active operations and to
battle, since victory is obtained only by battle, and only battle can break
the enemy's will once and for all. Vegetius repeatedly stressed the sig
nificance of military knowledge. He wrote : “Whoever desires to receive
a favorable result, let him wage war relying on art and knowledge, and
not on fate. "
In spite of the fact thatmilitary theoreticians in the period of the slave
owning society did not succeed in risin to major scientific generalizations
and the statement of laws of armed conflict and principles of military
art, their works contain many valuable thoughts on strategy and tactics.
There is great interest in the description of engagements of that time
conducted under the leadership of outstanding generals , especially those
engagements in which a number of principles of military art were dis
covered and applied for the first time. These engagements are an important
link in the study of the laws and principles of military art.

Feudal Society

Western Authors

In the basis of the combat experience of the army of the East Roman
Empire, Byzantine author Mauricus (or Pseudo -Mauricus) wrote a
theoretical work entitled Strategikon (6th Century A.D.). This treatise
illuminates questions of attaining surprise , seizing the initiative, activeness,
maneuver while preparing for battle, in the course of battle , and during
pursuit, organization of interworking of components of the combat
formation , securing the flanks, and supply of the battle from the depth . In
speaking of activeness , valor, and steadfastness of our forefathers, the
Slavs, Mauricus wrote : “ They can in no manner be won over to slavery
or to be subordinate in their own land. ... They are hardy and easily
endure heat, cold , rain , nakedness, and lack of food .” 1
After prolonged periods of early and advanced feudalism , which , in
Engels' words, were fruitless in development of military art, the treatise
of the Florentine politician and historian Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–
1527), entitled On Military Art, came to light. By this time there had
begun in Europe the period of the late Middle Ages, or late feudalism , the
process of decay of the feudalmethod of production and birth of capitalist
relationships . Elements of a new bourgeois order arose within the frame
work of the feudal order. Mercenaries became the main form for man
ning armies. Mercenary infantry detachments had as armament long
pikes, halberds, arbalests, swords, and firearms. Mercenaries were dis
tinguished by their lack of discipline and low moral qualities. They had

* Mauricus, Strategikon , Book II, Chapter 5 , Vestnik drevney istorii, No 1,

1941.

9
 enormous trains, which transported families and property . This limited
the mobility of the troops .
The growth of large manufacturing enterprises accelerated the develop
ment of firearms. In the 16th Century heavy, short-barrelled rifles
arquebuses — were replaced by muskets, the shot of which penetrated the
knights' armor. Since that time firearms began to have an increasingly
substantial influence on tactics and its principles.
Machiavelli's treatise ended with a code of general rules to be applied
in military affairs. Here are some of these rules in abbreviated form .?
The best plan is one concealed from the foe.
In lining troops up in combat formation , it is better to leave a strong
reserve behind the first line than to disperse the soldiers and stretch out
the front.
Anything unexpected frightens the army, and so accustom your army
to a new enemy.
Be capable of changing a decision if you note that it has been learned
by the enemy
Inform only selected people of what had already been decided .
In some chapters he recommends decisive actions and announces that
" anyone who wishes to wage war sets himself one goal — to obtain the
possibility of withstanding the enemy in the field and defeating him in
a decisive engagement.” “ The center of gravity of warfare consists of
the field engagements : they comprise the goal for the sake of which
armies are created .” “ To make marches, hit the enemy, and camp - these
are three main matters of warfare.” “ The attempt to shatter hostile forces
is almost the chief task of the general.”
However, Machiavelli also has other statements which are contradictory
to the theses quoted : “ It is better ot crush an enemy with hunger than with
iron, since victory is much more often a result of fortune than courage” ;
“ A good general never decides to do battle if not forced by necessity or
a tempting instance .”
Machiavelli also speaks approvingly of cautious generals who " limit
themselves mostly to repulsing an enemy attack and rarely attack him
themselves, since steadfast and strong soldiers easily withstand the most
violent attack , but unsuccessful fury easily becomes cowardice . That is
how Fabius acted against the Samnites and Gauls and came out the
victor."
Thus, Machiavelli adheres first to decisive and active operations, then
to Fabian tactics of waiting and slow exhaustion of the enemy. This gave
Delbrück cause to draw the following conclusion : “ In Machiavelli's works
the principles of strategy of smashing and strategy of stravation are set
forth in parallel, but not in coordination . The logical thinker and empirical
thinker included in them both have a say, but they still have not come
* See Niccolo Machiavelli, O voyennom iskusstve (On Military Art), Voyen
izdat, Moscow , 1939, pp 208-210 .

10
-
 to a mutual agreement.” 3 In reality , we are speaking of a serious con
tradiction in Machiavelli's work which he was not up to resolving .
In 1664 the Notes of Raymond Count Montekukoly or the Chief Rules
of Military Science appeared . Austrian general Montekukoly named in
this work some important rules of military art: don't fractionate one's
forces ; display swiftness, firmness , and activeness ; employ maneuver.
Montekukoly attached decisive importance to active combat operations.
“Whosoever thinks to take cities and provinces without fighting the enemy
on the field builds citadels in the air and fortresses on the clouds." 4
" Whoever intends to conquer the entire world without battle is nourished
by the winds and chases after the winds.”
In spite of the fact that number of important statements were made
touching particular aspects of certain principles of military art, these
principles themselves were not grounded in detail or set forth in a single
written treatise before the second half of the 18th Century, although they
found application in combat operations. This fact gave Marshal Moritz
of Saxony ( 1690–1750 ) cause (but not the basis ) to declare in his work
Military Dreams ( 1751) : “ War is a field of knowledge cloaked in dark
ness in which it is impossible to step with confidence. Routine and prej
udices make up its basis as a natural consequence of ignorance . All fields
of knowledge have principles. It is only warfare which still has none at
all. In writing about it, the great generals do not provide us with any
principles. One must have much experience in order to understand them .
Gustavus Adolphus created a method, but they soon digressed from it
since they turned it into routine . Consequently, there were only a few
customary actions, the principles of which are unknown to us.” These
words were interpreted totally incorrectly by many readers of the work
ofMoritz of Saxony, drawing the conclusion that no principles of military
art exist in general.
The following years were marked by the appearance of works by
Suvorov, Kutuzov, Napoleon , Jomini, Clausewitz, Leyer, and other out
standing military figures whose works contained many principles of mili
tary art which were formulated , developed , and received further
elucidation .

Works of Russian Authors

Russian Czar Peter I ( 1672–1725 ) made a considerable contribution

to development of principles of military art. The period of activity of

* Hans Delbrueck, Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva v ramkakh politicheskoy

ekonomii (The History of Military Art Within the Framework of Political Econ
omy), Vol. 4 , Gosvoyenizdat, Moscow , 1938, p 104.
* Zapiski Raymonda grafa Montekukoli ili glavnyye pravila voyennoy nauki
(Notes of Raymond Count Montekukoly or the Chief Rules of Military Science),
Moscow , 1960, pp 297 , 298 .

11
Peter I is characterized by development ofmanufactories, growth of the
all-Russian market, and formation of the Russian Empire of nobility . A
regular army was formed, outfitted with the most up -to -date technical
means of warfare for that time. The wide development of firearms in
Russia at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries led to
a transition to new line tactics. Peter I laid the foundations of a decisive,
offensive character of combat operations. He demanded “ seeking out the
foe in his land” and gave a leading role to combat operations and
engagement.
Principles of military art received further development in the works
and combat affairs of Field Marshal P. A. Rumyantsev, an outstanding
Russian general (1725–1796 ). His activity took place in the second half
of the 18th Century under conditions of a continuing development of
landownership by the nobility, of industry , and of trade. At this time the
armed forces of Russia consisted of regular troops manned on the basis
of compulsory recruitment, and irregular troops — Cossacks, settlement
troops, and troops of non -Russian peoples. In 1761 P. A. Rumyantsev set
the beginning of organization of chasseur infantry armed with rifles with
rifling and designed to conduct small arms fire in extended formation .
It was in the 18th Century that the development and formulation of
military science took place as the sum of knowledge on warfare, military
matters , and military art. This development ofmilitary science led to the
formulation of a number of principles of military art. The growth of
productive forces, expansion of economic base, and strengthening of the
state system were the main premises for all this . Well armed standing
armies arose on the base of a developing economy, manned at first by
means of recruiting, and later by compulsory recruitment.
Rumyantsev was an adherent of principles of the strategy of crushing
the enemy in a general engagement. He not only grounded its advantage
over the outmoded theory of linear strategy in theoretical works, but also
confirmed it brilliantly in many victorious engagements .
Rumyantsev considered " breaking up an army to be extremely un
fortunate .” 5 He was an adherent of decisive concentration of forces at
the most important point. The field marshal wrote that the general "has
one main point on the ground, and he drives for it with all his efforts,
inasmuch as by taking it he denies all others dependent on it.” In develop
ing this thesis, Rumyantsev for the first time in history advanced the
principle : go separately, but fight together. Following this principle, in
1770 Rumyantsev concentrated , before the engagement at Ryabaya
Mogila , at a single point troops which had before this advanced in
different axes as individual groups .
It follows from this that historians who attribute to Moltke the author
ship of the principle “move separately , but fight together,” are making

* L. G. Beskrovnyy , Ocherki voyennoy istoriografii Rossii (Sketches of the Mili

tary Historiography of Russia ), Izd . AN SSSR , Moscow , 1962, p 26 .

12
a mistake. In a note of 16 September 1865, Moltke ( 1800–1891) wrote :
“ The essence of strategy consists of organizing a march separately , having
in mind a timely concentration .” 6 From these words some writers then
drew the renowned “Moltke formula ” : " go separately , fight together.”
However Moltke stated this thought approximately 100 years after
Rumyantsev . Attentive research of this question shows that after Rum
yantsev , this principle was stated in 1802 by Scharnhorst ( 1755-1813 )
in an article entitled “ After the Battle of Marengo .” He wrote: “ A gen
eral rule of the more skilled generals is a careful division of their forces,
forcing the enemy to follow this example, and, concentrating their forces,
hitting him piecemeal.” Thus, in 1865 Moltke only revived the military
experience of Rumyantsev, Suvorov, and Napoleon . The famous principle
which up until now has been attributed to Moltke in fact was formulated
by Rumyantsev, and later by Scharnhorst.
The Great Russian general, Generalissimo A. V. Suvorov ( 1730–
1800 ) , was an outstanding military theoretician . His views on principles
of military art, their subsequent development, and the discovery of new
principles are found in his orders to the troops, in manuals, instructions,
in official and private correspondence , and also in aphorisms and defini
tions which have come down to us through Suvorov's contemporaries.
The circumstance that Suvorov's advanced principles were contained in
instructions and manuals attests to the fact that these documents had not
only a theoretical, but also a practical significance. The well-known work
Nauka pobezhdať ( The Science of Winning ) also belongs to the pen of
Suvorov . It is the most outstanding work of Russian and world military
theoretical thought of that time. Finally, Suvorov's views on principles
of military art are vividly depicted by Suvorov's own make -up as a gen
eral and by the history of his victorious campaigns and over 60 engage
ments and battles, which the Russian Army fought under Suvorov's lead
ership without losing one. As attested by Professor Gen A. A. Strokov, it
was only in two or three cases during major engagements that the Rus
sians had a superiority in forces.?
At first Suvorov worked out the principles of a strategy of general
engagement. He was an adherent of a concentration of all forces at one
point to decide the fate of the war by one general engagement. But as
early as the Italian campaign Suvorov advanced a new concept — a system
of engagements which was later developed by M. I. Kutuzov.
Suvorov's principles and combat practice refuted the old linear tactics
which no longer corresponded to the changed economic and military
technological conditions . He grounded and employed new tactics
column, or shock , tactics, based on decisiveness, on bold and deep

• Strategiya v trudakh voyennykh klassikov (Strategy in the Works of Military

Classics), Vol. 1, Gosvoyenizdat, Moscow , 1926 , p 163.
See A. A. Strokov , Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva (History of Military Art),
Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1955 , p 568.

13
maneuver, on a combination of fire and bayonet attack , and on the inter
working of ail combat arms and individual chasti of the combat formation .
The shock tactics with its invincible bayonet attack showed its total
superiority over linear tactics.
Suvorov demanded that one act always with exceptional activeness,
offensively . The conduct of combat operations must be permeated with
swiftness and impact. “Swiftness and impact,” said Suvorov, “ are the
soul of genuine warfare .” 8
“ The bayonet, swiftness, and surprise are the essence of the head of
the Russians.” Here Suvorov understood “ bayonet” to be not only a type
of weapon , but primarily the embodiment of activeness and resoluteness
of troops, and their desire to close with the enemy and destroy him in
hand to hand combat. Suvorov directly tied the time factor with swiftness :
“ Time is most valuable of all. Julius Caesar won by haste.” In instructions
to the Austrian general Belgard , Suvorov stated : “ Activeness is the most
important of all attributes of the military. . . . Hurry , your Excellency!
Money is dear; human life is still dearer, but time is dearest of all.”
Suvorov was an adherent of the principle of unrelenting pursuit of a
defeated enemy. At those times, when the idea of pursuit of the enemy
after a battle still had far from entered the consciousness, when there
was talk of the necessity of building the retreating enemy a " golden
bridge,” when shortcomings in the linear combat formation and principles
of supplying troops being used greatly hindered pursuit of the defeated
enemy, Suvorov was a fervent adherent of the principle of taking greatest
advantage of a victory ,
In 1789, in a letter to Repnin , Suvorov suggested using decisive pur
suit of the defeated enemy to develop the victory won at Focsani: " Take
advantage of the victory! Head for Tabak ! There is time to get set. . .
I will answer for the victory if measures are offensive. But defensive
measures ? Hhe Vizier will come! Shall we pierce him with a blunt end
instead of a sharp one? The right side is clean (right bank of the Prut
V. S.) : we will clear the left and reap the fruits .” 9
In 1793 Suvorov said : “ The falsest rule is the conviction that after
defeating the enemy everything is finished , at a time when it is necessary
to strive for larger successes.” In 1796 Suvorov demanded resolute pursuit
of the enemy: “ A strong pursuit, give no time for the enemy to think ,
take advantage of victory, uproot him , cut off his escape route .”
The demand to pursue a defeated enemywas a new principle for mili
tary art of the 18th Century . Before Suvorov pursuit was practiced ex
tremely rarely. In the Italian campaign ( 1796–1797) the army of Bona
parte conducted a pursuit, but gropingly and indecisively. Considerably

* A. V. Suvorov, Dokumenty (Documents), Vol. 4 , Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1953,

p 18 .
A. V. Suvorov, Dokumenty (Documents ), Vol. 2 , Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1951,
p 463.

14
 earlier than Bonaparte Rumyantsev and certain other leading military
figures in the Russian Army came out as adherents of a resolute pursuit.
But it was only in Suvorov's combat activity that the pursuit was trans
formed into a system and received theoretical generalization in his
manuals, orders, and letters. Suvorov instructed : “ A forest which has
not been fully cut will grow up .” “ Only pursuit destroys a running en
emy,” he wrote . In one of his orders Suvorov demanded : “ Do not delay
in the attack . When the foe has been split off and cut down, pursue him
immediately and give him no time to assemble or form up . . . . Spare
nothing. Without regard for difficulties, pursue the enemy day and night
until he has been annihilated . In 1799 Suvorov prescribed : “ Pursue to
the last man to the Adda and throw the remains into it." " It is not neces
sary to open a golden bridge for the enemy,” said Suvorov.10
Suvorov steadfastly adhered to principles of concentration of forces
on a chosen axis for the attack and achieved outstanding art in applica
tion of this principle.
Suvorov attached special significance to surprise and strengthening a
high combat spirit in soldiers and their trust in their general. Soldiers
with Suvorov at their head became indefatigable and fearless. Suvorov's
personal influence on troops was magical. The soldiers firmly believed
in the invincibility of their general and went to their death unhesitatingly,
not even considering this a heroic deed , but fulfillment of the duty and
will of their beloved general.
Suvorov attained such exceptional authority by the entire system of up
bringing and training of troops. He believed the moral factor to be the
foremost basis for victories of his troops. Each engagement was preceded
bymoral preparation of the soldiers, which the general himself conducted .
In Nauka pobezhdať much space is devoted to development of boldness ,
courage , and steadfastness, and to instilling in the soldier initiative , re
sourcefulness, and confidence in his abilities. Suvoroy did not like “ I
can't do it.” He demanded that “ everyone in any case be quick -witted ,”
as well as " cheerful, bold , courageous, and self-reliant.” “ Death flees the
saber and bayonet of the brave ,” he said . Before a battle Suvorov usually
gave out orders which heartened the troops, and was able to do this with
exceptional talent. At the same time the general incessantly attempted to
enter into the closest contact with soldiers and officers. At long and short
halts he would usually ride up to each of the regiments, speak with the
people, and was able to raise enthusiasm with a fiery word and flattering
praise .
To A. V. Suvorov belongs the service of theoretical substantiation
and practical application of the most sophisticated military system of its
time. Subsequent generals, including Napoleon, made wide use of the

10 D. A. Milyutin , Istoriya voyny Rossii s Frantsiyey vtsarstvovaniye imperatora

Pavla 1 (History of the War of Russia With France in the Reign of Emperor
Pavel I), Vol. 2 , St. Peterburg, 1853, p 463.

15
Russian military system and Suvorov's principles, rules, and techniques.
In analyzing the Polish campaign of 1794 , Professor Heisman writes :
“ This campaign of Suvorov appears to represent an entire course of
military art set forth in practice by the great master of military affairs , in
which theory merged organically and harmoniously with practice, and
science with life . This is an inexhaustible reserve of classic decisions of
the most diverse questions relating to military art. In studying it, one
cannot help but be struck by how this person always penetrated every
where to the very essence of military affairs. It is remarkable that those
very techniques which until recently were considered employed for the
first time by the French in the era of the revolution were applied before
that by Suvorov .” 11
Soon after the Patriotic War of 1812 F. Glinka wrote that Suvorov
enriched Russian military art “by the rules and new means of fighting al
ways with success invented by him ,” and which had a great influence on
Napoleon . “ Now it is already clear and open that many rules of military
art were taken by Napoleon from our great Suvorov . This is not denied
by the French themselves, and Napoleon himself admits it . In letters
from Egypt intercepted by the British he clearly tells the Directoire that
" Suvorov will not be halted on the road to victory until they understand
his special art of fighting and counter him with his own rules.”
“Napoleon ,” says Glinka, “ having taken a portion of military rules from
Suvorov , especially his swiftness and surprise in attacks, employed them
skilfully in the great movements of large armies .” 12
One cannot help but agree with the following conclusion by A. Petru
shevskiy about Suvorov's military system : “ Its main basis is man and
his spiritual force. Its main attributes are energy, boldness, swiftness, and
simplicity . This system arose basically with Suvorov quite ready, about
30 years before the revolutionary wars. It was clearly expressed in his
command of the regiment and received practical application in the very
first war." 13
The brilliant battles, engagements, and campaigns conducted by
Suvorov attest to his amazingly capable use of principles of military art.
In this regard Suvorov's statement that “methodology is under me, I am
above rules ” should be understood only as a rejection of methodology in
the negative sense , i.e., of formalism , the set format, and also stereo
types in the use of rules ; and as a demand for broad initiative and crea
tivity in battles and engagements .
Suvorov often also annihilated " poor academicians” with sarcastic

11
Quoted from the book Taktika v trudakh voyennykh klassikov (Tactics in
the Works of Military Classics), Vol. 2, Gosvoyenizdat, Moscow -Leningrad, 1926 ,
p 46 .
12
Quoted from the book : L. G. Beskrovnyy, p 82.
13 A. Petrushevskiy , Generalissimus knyaz' Suvorov (Generalissimo Prince
Suvorov), Vol. 3 , St. Peterburg, 1884, p 31.

16
 remarks, but, in the adroit words of Petrushevskiy , included “ in this title
not people of science in general, but the untalented theoreticians who do
not understand the distinction between science and its application , since ,
in his opinion , the force of science should be reflected in application in
practice. At the same time . . . he gave no quarter to the practicing
ignoramuses , saying about them that they might know military matters,
but such matters do not know them .” 14
Suvorov's talent is surprising, great, and unique, but it is based on
general principles of military art. A portion of the statements of this
great general and luminary of military science , who stands two heads
higher than his century , concerning the principles ofmilitary art is cited in
subsequent chapters .

Capitalist Society (Before the Great October Socialist

Revolution )

Western Authors

The very great general and political figure Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–
1821) occupies a prominent place in the history of creation of bourgeois
military art. As a general he developed in the turbulent years of the
- French bourgeois revolution of 1789–1794 . Therefore, in evaluating the
significance of Napoleon's theoretical and practical heritage it is necessary
above all to consider the deciding role in changing the methods and
forms of waging war which belongs to the French Revolution .
The revolution led to a rejection in strategy of methodical maneuver
calculated to exhaust the enemy and to avoid decisive combat actions.
Decisive military actions with the aim of defeating the enemy in an
engagement became the basis. The new method of waging war rejected
the linear distribution of forces for covering fortresses and important
points and led to the delivery of powerful attacks by concentrated forces
against enemy troops. In place of the old linear tactics came new shock
tactics, based on a combination of bayonet and fire, columns and extended
formation , which corresponded to the new , mass bourgeois army. The
French bourgeois revolution produced a turnabout in the method of
supplying troops. The old store system of supplying troops was eliminated
and a new requisition system was introduced . In this manner mobility
was achieved , which was unknown to the troops of their enemies , who
were burdened with tents and all kinds of trains.
In explaining the reason for victories of the French bourgeois revolu
tion , V. I. Lenin wrote : “ They refer constantly to heroic patriotism and
wonders of military valor of the French in 1792–1793 . But they forget
about the material, historical-economic conditions which merely made

14 Ibid ., Vol. 1 , p 13.

17
these wonders possible.” 15 The revolution created “ those material, eco
nomic conditions which saved France with 'wondrous' swiftness, having
regenerated and renewed its economic basis.” 16 This economic renewal
of the country permitted creation of a previously unknown material base
for organization of a massive bourgeois army. A large part was also
played by the fact that " the entire people,” write Lenin , “ and especially
the masses, i.e., the oppressed classes, were gripped by a boundless
revolutionary enthusiasm . All believed the war to be just and defensive ,
and in fact it was such . Revolutionary France defended itself against
17
reactionary -monarchist Europe.1
Thus, the new bourgeois socio -economic and political relations became
the basis for military successes of a new , massive army and for the
elevation of Napoleon. Military science , created by the revolution , by
military figures of the revolution , and by Napoleon , was the inevitable
result of the new relationships born of the revolution.18
To Napoleon belongs a large number of works on military questions.
In many of them he touches on the principles of military art. “ The
genuine principles of waging war,” said Napoleon , “ are those which
guided seven great generals whose deeds have been preserved for us by
history : Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, de Turenne,
Prince Eugene, and Friedrich .”
After a brief sketch of the campaigns of Alexander of Macedonia ,
Napoleon draws the following conclusion from them : " His method of
waging war was methodical and deserves the greatest praise. Not a single
one of the trains was seized . His army grew as it advanced : it was weak
est at Granicus , i.e., at the beginning of the campaign ; on the Indus
already it was three times stronger. . . ” 19 We will note in passing that
Napoleon termed methodical actions those actions which were based
on the creative application of the basic principles of military art in
accordance with the concrete situation . Clausewitz and the majority
of later military writers (Leyer and some others represent an exception )
understood “ methodism ” to be completely the opposite : the stereotyped ,
mechanical application of one of the favorite methods of actions in
defiance of principles and the concrete situation , i.e., that which Suvorov
called “methods,” adding: "methods are below me.”
Napoleon was an adherent of the following principles of military art,
“ which guided seven great generals” : 1) the principle of concentration

15 V. I. Lenin , Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), 5th

ed ., Vol. 34, p 195 .
16 Ibid .
17 Ibid ., p 196 .
18
See K. Marks and F. Engel's Sochineniya (Works), 2nd ed., Vol. 7, p 510.
19
Napoleon, Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Works), Voyenizdat, Moscow ,
1956 , p 674 .

18
of forces (“maintain your forces in total” ) ; b ) the principle of security of
the operational line (“ have no vulnerable spots,” and also “ never lay
bare your operational line — that is the primer of military affairs” ) ;c ) “ rush
swiftly to the most important points ” ; d ) “ take advantage of the factor of
morale” and “ political means” ;e ) wage combat operations methodi
cally — in the positive sense in which it is stated above.
These principles are also revealed and substantiated in many other
statements by Napoleon . " If we intend to enter a fight,” he wrote, “ then
it is necessary to concentrate all our troops, not losing sight even of the
most insignificant unit; often one battalion decides an engagement.”
“ True military art consists of the ability to be stronger than the enemy
at a given moment.” “Go separately , hit in unison : this is the highest art
of strategy .” “Military art is the art of separating for life and.uniting for
battle.” “ On the battlefield there is no surplus battalion or squadron.”
“ Commanders who save fresh forces for operations after the battle will
almost always be defeated .” 20 Once the President of the Directoire told
Bonaparte : " You often defeated a stronger foe with fewer forces.” Bona
parte answered : “ But in this case , too, the lesser forces still suffered
defeat at the hands of the larger forces. With an enemy army superior in
numbers against me, I dashed like lightning to its flank, smashed it, took
advantage of the enemy's disarray, and again rushed with all my forces
to other points. Thus, I inflicted defeat piecemeal, and the victory which
I won was, as you see, nothing more than the victory of the stronger
over the weaker ." 21 " The first rule of war is that one must enter a battle
only with all forces present which can be concentrated in the operational
zone. " 22
Napoleon spoke in favor of an active, decisive, offensive form of action
in strategy and tactics . Like Suvorov, he demanded that “ the foe must
be attacked everywhere he is encountered .” “ To imagine that it is possible
to perform great military deeds without fighting is just empty dreams.”
" A bold form of action will support the honor of weapons-- this chief
portion of the strength of an army.” “ The true prudence of a general
consists of energetic resolve.” “ To act indecisively , timidly, and gropingly,
so to speak , is the more damaging in warfare,” said Napoleon . “ Un
certain and timid actions and half measures spoil everything in warfare .”
“ In decisive cases,” he wrote, “ there are moments when victory demands
sacrifices and when it becomes necessary to burn your own warships. If

20 V. A. Moshnin , Voyennye otkliki (Military Responses), St. Peterburg , 1902,

pp 115, 148, 175.
21 F. Kauzler, Pravila , mysli i mneniya Napoleona o voyennom iskusstve,
voyennoy istorii i voyennom dele (Rules, Thoughts, and Opinions of Napoleon on
Military Art, Military History, and Military Affairs), St. Peterburg , 1844 , Part 1,
P 95.
" So said Napoleon , issue 2 , Part 2 , Tifiis, 1911, p 123 .

13
military art consisted of always taking a safe position , then glory would
become the property of mediocre people.”
There are only individual statements in Napoleon's works about the
principle of surprise . With Suvorov this question was developed much
more fully. “ It is very advantageous,” noted Napoleon , “ to rush unexpect
edly on an enemy who has erred , to attack him suddenly and come
down on him with thunder before he sees the lightning.” “ In order to
smash , it is necessary to act suddenly .” “ One of the principles of military
art,” Wrote Napoleon , “ is: when it is possible to take advantage of sur
prise , it should be preferred to cannon.
These strategic and tactical principles of Napoleon were canonized by
many generals and military theoreticians for a long time, right up to the
beginning of the 20th Century , and were transformed into the absolute ,
into immutable rules of waging war, allegedly useful in a fight against any
army and under any conditions. However, attempts to blindly use the
methods employed by Napoleon in the middle of the 19th Century and
later did not lead to success due to their lack of correspondence with the
changed technical base of warfare and with the economic and political
situation .
Certain principles of military art were stated in works of the Austrian
Field Marshal, Archduke Karl (1771–1847 ) , and in a number of cases
earlier than Napoleon and Jomini. In his words (Instructions, compiled
for Austrian generals and published in 1806 , and Fundamentals of Strat
egy , published in 1803) , Karl noted : “Major goals may be achieved only
by decisive attacks. Therefore the most important art of a general consists
of the following: correctly determine the moment and points when and
where such decisive attacks can be delivered with greatest probability of
favorable results . Such a decisive attack is possible only with a superiority
in forces at the point at which it is delivered . . These principles, lying
in the nature of war and being the sole ones leading to decisive results,
permit a definition of military art as follows: it consists of the art of
concentrating and using numerically superior forces at a decisive point.” 24
Karl justly considers this principle the guiding thread of any com
mander both in an operation of the largest scale , and in the most minor
battle, in any form of combat operations. “Never divide your forces
where the outcome is to be decided ,” 25 repeated Karl more than once .
Karl considered the principles of military science to be unchangeable .
Iowever, he could not help but note that their application never is the
same and never can be .
Archduke Karl advances to the forefront in his works caution , a rejec
tion of risk , and a desire to fight only when sure . For this he is justly

23 Napoleon , p 637.
24 Strategiya v trudakh voyennykh klassikov, Vol. 2, pp 69, 70 .
25 Ausgewaehlte Schriften des Erzherzogs Karl von Oessterreich (Selected Works
of the Archduke Karl of Austria ), Vol. 1, Vienna, 1893 , p 47 .

20
called “ the careful strategist.” The fear for his lines of communication
and attempts to reduce the question of security of the operational line to
geometric theorems brought him near to Buelow . He also allowed an
overestimation of the geographic element, attaching decisive significance
to terrain conditions. In essence , terrain was taken by Archduke Karl
as the basis for his system .
Henri Jomini ( 1779–1869 ), a major military theoretician and author
ity in the field of strategy in the first half of the 19th Century , devoted
much attention to principles of military art in his works . He was by
origin Swiss, and was a general in the French and later the Russian
service.
Jomini's philosophical base is idealism . This predetermined his meta
physical views in questions of military affairs as well. He proceeds from
an assumption that principles of military art are eternal and unchange
able : “ The fundamental rules (of warfare ),” he wrote , " are unchangeable
and are independent both of time and place .” Jomini did not see the
development and change of military phenomena and their mutual ties.
Jomini asserts that “ strategy was one and the same both under Caesar
and under Napoleon ,” that eternal and immutable principles of strategy
“ do not depend on the nature and attributes of weapons or the organiza
tion of troops."
Jomini considered the main goal of his work Ocherki voyennogo
iskusstva ( Sketches of Military Art ) to be proof of the existence of the
basic principle of war. “ This principle consists of the following.
1. By means of strategic combinations, consistently direct the main
body of the army against the decisive points of the theater of war.
2. Maneuver so that these main forces operate only against units of
the enemy army.
3. On the day of the engagement, in a similar manner, using tactical
maneuvers , di rect your main body against the decisive point of the battle
direct
field or against that point of the enemy combat line which , because of the
situation , will be important to overcome.
4. Operate in such a way that these masses not only are present at
the decisive point, but so that there they are committed to battle ener
getically and altogether for employment in such a manner, by simul
taneous efforts .” 26
Jomini subjected to sharp criticism the linear military system formed
on the dispersion of troops, without shock groups or the delivery of
decisive attacks. He opposed it with a new system of attack and showed
its great advantages .
His last work ends with these characteristic words : “War , far from
being a precise science, is a terrible drama filled with passions. Although

26
Jomini, Ocherki voyennogo iskusstva (Sketches of Military Art), Vol. 1,
Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1939, p 90 .

21
true that it is subordinated to three or four general principles, the result
is dependent on a thousand moral and physical complications.” 27
Karl Clausewitz (1780–1831), the apex of German bourgeois military
thought, also devotes much space to the principle of military art.
In Clausewitz, along with advanced thoughts and fierce criticism of
the feudal military system , there lived side by side reactionary ideas
which characterize him as a representative of Prussian military caste ,
with its militarism , nationalism , and antidemocratism . German idealism
was the philosophical basis of Clausewitz's military theory, but Clause
witz's enormous advantage is the application of Hegel's dialectical method.
As a result of this, the philosophical basis of this theory was directed
against dogmatism and metaphysics.
In one of his early works entitled Most Important Principles of War,
written in 1811-1812 , Clausewitz establishes four strategic principles.
The first and most important principle consists of the following: exert
all forces at our disposal to the utmost.
The second principle is to concentrate as much force as possible on
the axis of main attacks, “ not stopping before the disadvantages stem
ming from this concentration for other sectors, so as to have greater
certainty of success on the main point. This success will cover all other
disadvantages.”

The third principle is not to lose time and to act swiftly. “ Through
swiftness it is possible to cut short many of the enemy's measures at the
very beginning . Surprise is the most effective basis for victory. Prominent
generals “ are obligated to swiftness of action for the brightest rays of
their glory .”

The fourth principle is to take advantage of successes achieved with

the greatest energy . “ Only pursuit of the defeated enemy will provide us
the fruits of victory . ... The first of these principles is the basis for the
other three. By following it, we can , without staking our all, apply the
others with the greatest daring.” 28
In his chief work entitled On War, published in 1832–1834 , Clausewitz
draws the conclusion : “ One must commit the greatest number of troops
possible at the decisive point.” 29 The ratio of forces at the decisive point
is an enormous matter, says Clausewitz , it is the most important of all
the conditions. Here Clausewitz believed that in strategy the inore force
used the better, and that forces at one's disposal must be used simul
taneously
Clausewitz sometimes considered the achievement of surprise to be
a component of the third principle stated above, sometimes relegated
it to the means of achieving numerical superiority, and sometimes viewed

27 Ibid ., p 207.
29
Clausewitz, o voyne (On War), Vol. 2, Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1941, p 390 .
29 Ibid ., Vol. 1 , p 181.

22
it as the most important independent principle. It is obvious that he was
correct in the last instance .
Clausewitz wrote about use of the fourth principle that once a major
victory had been won , there must be no mention of rest or a breather;
the agenda for the day is only pursuit and the delivery of new strikes
where necessary . In some chapters of his work Clausewitz defines active
ness and decisiveness as an independent principle of military art.
Clausewitz saw no essential distinction between laws and principles
of military art. The laws of military science he first calls laws, and then
principles. Clausewitz wrote : “ A law is the most general concept, which
is true to a similar degree both for cognition and for action . In its literal
meaning it includes something subjective and arbitrary , but in spite of
this, it lexpresses that very thing on which we are dependent and on
which all objects outside us are dependent. Law as an object of cognition
is the interrelationship of things and their effects. As an object of will
it determines action . A principle is the same law for action, but
not in its formal, ultimate meaning.” 30
In this definition Clausewitz succeeded in catching the interrelation
ship and ties in phenomena of reality . But Clausewitz commits an error
here : he did not understand that laws are objective and contain no
subjective elements at all, and that they are essentially distinct from
principles. It is unscientific to place an equal sign between laws and
principles.
Clausewitz, whose ideas, in Lenin's words, “ were fertilized by Hegel,”
viewed the phenomena of war and military art in their devlopment and
movement, speaking out against " eternal principles” of military art.
Herein lies his service, but he erroneously denied the laws of military
affairs or explained theim idealistically , assuming that “ the conception
of law in the sense of cognition in war is almost superfluous, since
complex phenomena of war are insufficiently natural, and those which
are natural are insufficiently complex .” Here Clausewitz proceeded from
an assumption that war is the “ field of chance," " the field of the un
authentic : three - fourths of that on which action is built in warfare lies
in the haze of obscurity.” From this comes an overestimation of the role
of the general: “ Talent and genius operate outside the law ,” and that
which a genius does "must be the best rule .”
Clausewitz's great service , which Lenin remarked on more than once ,
consists of establishment of the tie between war and politics .
This was a major achievement of military thinking of that time, in
spite of the limitation of Clausewitz's formula and the fundamental dis
tinction between Lenin's understanding of the essence of war and
Clausewitz's viewpoint. Clausewitz denied the class nature of politics
and understood politics to be only foreign policy, although in reality war

30
Ibid., pp 123-124.

23
is a continuation primarily of domestic policy , which directly reflects the
class structure of society . He had in mind actually only the politics of
the ruling class and did not recognize the presence of politics of the
oppressed classes and the fact that politics was conditioned by the
economic system of society .
At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, capitalism was developing
into its highest and last stage — imperialism . Productive forces in the
era of imperialism reached a very high level. This allowed creation of
different forms of new combat equipment. In just the first 20 years of
the 20th Century we saw created different models of automatic small
arms, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, tanks, flame throwers , toxic sub
stances, mortars , grenade launchers, antitank guns, etc. Mechanical
means of transport and communications received great dissemination , and
there began a process of motorization of armed forces. There was a
sharp increase in the importance of economic and moral factors. New
conditions and means of warmaking demanded fundamental changes in
the field of military art.
Several works were published in the West at the end of the 19th and
beginning of the 20th centuries which touched to one degree or another
on the problem of principles of military art. Here, in spite of the develop
ment of a material basis of battles and operations during this period and
the considerable changes in methods and forms of combat actions stem
ming from this, a majority of foreign military scholars lagged behind the
science of their age and ignored the outstanding works of the founders of
Marxism -Leninism on military questions and their only acceptable method
of research . They remained on metaphysical and idealistic positions.
Rear Admiral Mahan ( 1840–1914 ) of the U.S. Navy, British Vice
Admiral Columb (1831-1899 ) , German General- Field Marshal A.
Schlieffen ( 1833–1914 ), and other “ luminaries ” of foreign military
science considered the basis of military art to be " eternal and unchanging
principles of warmaking.” Columb, for example, in the face of obvious
facts stated : “ No one dared assert that railroads, the electric telegraph ,
breechloading guns and rifles changed the established principles of war
making on land.” 31 Such frank statements embarrassed even dyed in the
wool idealists and metaphysicians from among Columb's contemporaries
who held the same views.
Mahan nevertheless admitted , though with stipulations, certain changes
in individual principles of tactics, but not in all. With regard to principles
of strategy , they “ remain just as immovable as if on rock .” 32
As a result, the most well-known principles of military art of the
ground armies formulated by writers and generals of the past were shifted
by Mahan into a theory ofwar at sea. He diluted them with certain lessons

31 Columb, Morskaya voyna (Naval Warfare ), St. Peterburg, 1894 , p 1 .

Mahan , Vliyaniye morskoy sily na istoriyu 1660-1783 (Influence of Naval
Power on History 1660–1783), St. Peterburg , 1896 , pp 101, 102.

24
of strategy of the sailing fleet. What came out was a misshapen hermaph
phrodite, and not naval strategy for a fleet which by that time was already
fully powered by steam .
In the works of A. Schlieffen individual correct dialectical and even
materialistic statements were oddly intertwined with clearly metaphysical
and idealistic statements. Schlieffen correctly noted that “ war is only a
means of politics” and that tactics changes under the effects of new
weapons. He said that it had already become unthinkable to attack enemy
positions in columns similar to those of Napoleon , and it also was im
possible to defeat an enemy using the fire of dense masses of riflemen .
This did not hinder Schlieffen in declaring that, based on the “ eternal and
unchangeable principles of military art , there is an absolute idea of
battle and an eternal, ideal prototype of war for which it is necessary to
strive. “ Battle for destruction,” asserts Schlieffen , " can even now be
waged according to Hannibal's plan , drawn up in time immemorial.” 33
In the official manual entitled German Fundamental Principles of
Higher Troop Command , published in 1910 , a somewhat greater role was
given to principles of military art. “ In a varied and rapidly changing
situation in war,” says the manual, “ it is impossible to give some kind
of binding rules ; only fundamental principles and general starting points
can serve as a support in this regard ."
The French general Langlois ( 1839–1912 ), German general Schlich
ting ( 1829–1909 ) , French colonel and later marshal F. Foch ( 1851–
1929 ) , and Prussian general F. Bernhardy criticized the adherents of
" eternal and unchanging principles.” “ Tactics,” wrote Langlois, “ is not
a mathematical science ; it sooner is by its own nature related to the
physical and natural sciences, and so should be guided by the following :
proceed from the results of test data , group them , and extract from them
the principles. Any other method leads to shallow conclusions which
have no serious results .” 34
Schlichting admits that “ without firmly established principles no teach
ing can exist,” and that military art changes all the time, that no military
system can serve as a universal guide for warmaking. He wrote that
" strategy is not a constant science, such as mathematics with its sum of
the angles in a triangle or astronomy even with its Laplace Hypothesis.
It stems from the conditions of the epoch and from the combat means
given by it. Its methods are subject to constant changes.” 35
Nevertheless, Schlichting elevated to a universal principle the distri
bution of forces for their concentration on the chief, decisive point
the battlefield — with the aim of enveloping the enemy from the flanks.
His attempt to cram all the diversity of military art into this “ universal
33
Schlieffen, Kanny (Cannae), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1938 , p 14.
34
34 Taktika v trudakh voyennykh klassikov, Vol. 1 , 1925, p 20 .
35 Schlichting, Osnovy sovremennoy taktiki i strategii (Fundamentals of Con
temporary Tactics and Strategy), Part 2 , Book 1, St. Peterburg, 1910 , p 2 .

25
principle” attests to the onesidedness of such a view . A particular case
cannot have the character of universality. A skilfully performed envelop
ment is a decisive form of maneuver only in the appropriate situation.
Under certain conditions a breakthrough or turning movement might lead
to better results.
In the book On Principles of War, published in 1903, Foch arrived at a
proper conclusion : “ Military art, like any other art, has its inherent
theory and principles, otherwise it would not be an art. But ... a knowl
edge of principles without the ability to employ them in warfare leads
to nothing.”
" Thus,” continues Foch , “ the theory of war exists . It places the follow
ing principles in the foreground: the principle of economy of forces , the
principle of freedom of actions, the principle of free disposition of forces,
and the principle of support.” 36
Foch gave to the principle of economy of forces a very detailed for
mulation . It follows from this , however, that he actually understood this
to be the principle of concentration of forces on the decisive point at
the decisive time.
Foch explains : “We require of the principle of freedom of actions,
which will be expressed in support of the operation , the opportunity to
act in spite of the burden of the route and the unknown, and regardless
of the enemy. We seek to achieve this in order to arrive where ordered
and to fulfill the intentions of our commanders, and to save discipline ,
which comprises the chief strength of the army.”
With Foch the principle of free disposition of forces in essence dis
solved in the most confusing manner in the principle of freedom of actions
and in the principle of support, by which he understood “ the art to act
with certainty,” and “ security .” At first glance these are completely cor
rect theoretical views if there were no extremes within them . These ex
tremes consisted of the fact that Foch demanded the assignment of
excessively large advance guards, which were not only to set up a unique
" umbrella” covering the deployment and operations of the army's main
body, but also to fully reveal the situation . In practice this desire had a
pernicious effect on the operations of the main body and led to its
passiveness, to temporizing forms of actions, to a reduction in the active
ness of particular commanders, and to a prolonged inactivity of troops
until complete development of the situation . Theoretically Foch was an
adherent of decisive attack , but it was placed in dependence on strategic
support and the actions of the advance guard. Thus, a constant and
excessive desire for " support” and “ securiyt” was to the detriment of
the offensive and limited its decisiveness and scope.
Foch attempted to build military science from a position of subjective
idealism , especially intuitivism and positivism . This inevitably led to a

» F. Foch, O printsipakh voyny (On Principles of War) Petrograd, 1919, p 13.

26
degeneration of military theory and to narrow practicalness. Foch's
military system was not up to the demands for waging war of that time.
The insolvency of his military system was a result primarily of the falia
ciousness of his applied method and the narrowness of the base on which
he built his conclusions. This base was some particular instance from
the Napoleonic Wars or the France -Prussian War of 1870-1871.
Bernhardy correctly noted that as a result of changed circumstances
the principles of warmaking accepted in the age of Frederick and Na
poleon could not be applied without changes in the campaign of 1870 .
In just the same way, he says, using the experience of this latter cam
paign will be impossible in the future without corrections being intro
duced .
Bernhardy is one of the first western bourgeois military theoreticians
who pointed to the need to distinguish the laws of military science and
the principles of military art. “ The differentiation between those laws
which control the phenomena of war and the rules for its conduct has
an enormous and purely practical significance,” wrote Bernhardy, “While
the former is a constant, the latter must follow the development and
progress of military affairs.” 37
It is obvious from that set forth above that Bernhardy succeeded in
stating spontaneously and in the most general outlines, thanks to the
application of individual elements of dialectics, several correct and in
teresting thoughts on the patterns of processes of war, on the need to
distinguish the laws and principles of war, and on a change of principles.
However, the weak methodological basis and reactionary views of the
Prussian militarist did not allow these thoughts to go beyond the sphere
of conjecture. Here Bernhardy did not succeed in avoiding serious mis
takes. These include above all the statement of the eternal nature of laws
of war.
As a matter of fact, the laws of war , though extremely stable, are
nevertheless not eternal. It is incorrect, of course , to deduce laws from
principles, as was done by Bernhardy . Laws have an objective nature.
They do not depend on human consciousness or the will of people , and
exist of themselves. Principles, however, always are developed by people ,
although not as they would like to have them , but in dependence on
objective circumstances. Bernhardy's helplessness was also seen in the
fact that, even proceeding from correct premises, he was not able to
discover even one of the laws of military science . It is true , he deduces
the " law of number,” but this " law ” in fact turns out to be the principle
of concentration of forces and means at the decisive point.
On the other hand, Bernhardy noticed some principles of military art
correctly . He devoted particular attention to the " principle of extreme

* F . Bernhardy, Sovremenraya voyna (Contemporary Warfare). Vol. 1 , St. Peter

burg , 1912 , p 22 .

27
energy of actions” —to active, offensive , bold actions. He considered it
“ the first principle of warmaking.”

Native Authors

The process of decay of the feudal-serfdom system and development of

the capitalist method of production continued in Russia at the beginning
of the 19th Century . In 1861 the Czarist Government was forced to
abolish serfdom , and in the sixties and seventies to conduct bourgeois
military reforms and a reoutfitting of the army. In 1867 rifled firearms
were introduced into the Russian Army, and in 1870 a rifle with a sliding
bolt, a sighting range of 1,500 paces, and a rate of fire of 8–9 rounds
a minute.
At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries , capitalism entered into
the highest and last stage of its development— that of imperialism . The
diverse combat equipment employed on an enormous scale created new
conditions for conducting military operations and demanded fundamental
changes in the field of military art. This found expression in works of
foremost Russian military scientists.
Russian military art emerged from the Patriotic War as the most ad
vanced and most sophisticated for that time. The outstanding Russian
general, M. I. Kutuzov ( 1745–1813), played a large part in the develop
ment of military art at that time. He contrasted Napoleon's strategy with
his own strategy , based on principles of a large war of maneuver, and
achieved a brilliant victory over Napoleon .
Kutuzov adhered to the principle of active and resolute combat opera
tions. In a letter to Vitgenshteyn dated 15 November 1812 , Kutuzov
notes : “ The most important goal of our actions is destruction of the
enemy to the last limit of possibility.” Kutuzov also used masterfully
other principles of military art, especially the principle of concentration of
force .
In the first half of the 19th Century a number of foremost Russian
officers came out with a substantiated criticism of the views of western
authors on principles of military art. Decembrist Gen. Burtsov ( 1794–
1829 ) , considerably earlier than western authors, rose to assert that mili
tary art has its own laws. In military -historical literature the statement
of the question of the relationship of defense and offensive usually is
ascribed to Clausewitz. Meanwhile, Decembrists P. Pestel as well as N.
Murav’yev and P.Mukhanov not only posed this question , but also par
tially resolved it earlier and even better than Clausewitz — in favor of
offensive .
Gen. A. I. Khatov (1780–1846 ) stated soundly that the principles of
military art “ change as weapons and military institutions change.” 38

38 Khatov, Opyt obshchey taktiki (Experience of General Tactics), St. Peterburg,

1807, p 27 .

28
 Perceiving common features of military art in the army of Suvorov
and in troops of bourgeois France, Khatov stressed that Pichegru and
Suvorov were guided by the same principles in different campaigns,
having arrived at them independently of each other . “ Following these
rules,” wrote Khatov, “ Pichegru subdued Holland , studded with for
tresses, in one campaign , while in four months Suvorov wrested Upper
Italy from the French ."
N. Medem (1790–1870), a Maj. Gen. of artillery and professor of
strategy and military history of the imperial military academy, sharply
attacked the constant and absolute rules and principles in 1836. “ Con
stant, absolute rules for actions themselves cannot exist,” 39 he declared.
Medem criticized many works of military theoreticians of the 18th and
the beginning of the 19th centuries because they based “ their system
and their rules on some one dominant thought or on one element, and
usually on the one which contemporary events gave greatest importance .”
Medem criticized very conclusively and with great depth the absoluteness
of constant principles formulated in the works of Lloyd , Buelow , Ronia ,
Archduke Karl, and others. However, in his search for a proper solution ,
Medem in his polemical ardor “ threw out the baby with the bath water ."
From a grounded denial of the eternal and unchangeable character of
principles of strategy , he shifted to a denial of the possibility of existence
of a theory of military art in general.
The insolvency of such an assertion by Medem was soon noted by a
number of Russian authors . For example , Col. P. A. Yazykov criticized
military theoreticians who adhered to the “ eternal” principles, as well
as Clausewitz and Medem , who doubted the existence of a theory of
strategy , and those theoreticians who understand military strategy to be
only “ a collection of assuredly general rules.” 40 He believed that Jomini's
basic principle is shown bymany historic facts, but it is not unconditional,
but limited by certain conditions.
Some of the prominent Russian military scholars of that time adhered
to inconsistent and contradictory views on the principles of military art.
For example, Gen M. I. Bogdanovich ( 1805–1882 ) believed, on the
one hand, that there exist strategic and tactical principles, the eternal
nature and firmness of which si proven by military history and practice .
On the other hand, Bogdanovich remarked that he " did not have in mind
at all to set forth permanent and unconditional rules for actions ." He
recommended taking guidance from a single rule— " act in accordance

' N. Medem , Obozreniye izvestneyshikh pravil i sistem strategii (Review of

the Most Well-Known Rules and Systems of Strategy), St. Peterburg, 1836 , p 168.
*º P. Yazykov, Opyt teorii strategii (Experience of the Theory of Strategy ), Part
1 , St. Peterburg, 1842, p 16 .

29
with means and circumstances.” 41 “ Any theory of strategy ," wrote Bog
danovich , “ presented in the form of unconditional guidance for action
would , at the present time, be a backward step in science , so to speak .” 42
Col. F. P. Goremykin ( 1813–1850 ), a professor of tactics at the im
perial military academy, stressed that the principles of tactics “must be
viewed not as laws which are to be obeyed everywhere and unfailingly,
but only as general thoughts, as instructions, in the spirit of which con
siderations must be made in practice itself; but the execution of these
considerations, depending on the difference in cases, may and must
change infinitely . Consequently , in tactics it is not so much the rules as
their practical application which is of importance.” 13
Goremykin arrived at a conclusion that principles of tactics “ have
only a contemporary force : arising from experience , they can be kept
only so long as experience does not change them ; some new invention in
weaponry may change both the system and method of action of troops."
This profound thought, progressive for that time, unfortunately was not
developed to the end by Goremykin .
Coi. A. P. Astaf'yev (1816-1863) , one of the leading military writers
of his time, in his work O sovremennom voyennom iskusstve (On Con
temporary Military Art) , published in 1856 , expressed individual correct
thoughts about the interrelationship between laws of armed conflict and
principles of military art. Principles of military art, according to Astaf’yev,
are not the arbitrary judgments of generals nor the results of their
creativity , but still only an imprecise , approximate expression of laws of
armed conflict .

Knowledge of war, assumed Astaf'yev , would gradually reach that

level in its development where the rules of military art would become
laws. This error led Astaf'yev to the conviction that recognition of the
laws of armed conflict is at the same time a denial of the principles of
military art.
G. A. Leyer ( 1829–1904), a general and from 1858 a professor at
the general staff academy, from 1889 through 1899 the head of the
academy, and head of reactionary school of “ academicians,” was con
sidered one of the spokesmen of Russian military theoretical thinking
for three decades. Leyer asserted that there exist the following “basic

* M. I. Bogdanovich , Zamechateľneyshiye pokhody Petra Velikogo i Suvorova

(The Most Noteworthy Campaigns of Peter the Great and Suvorov ), St. Peterburg,
1846 , p 86 .
" Bogdanovich, Zapiski strategii. Pravila vedeniya voyny, izvlechennyye iz
sochineniy Napoleona, ertsgertsoga Karla , generaia Zhomini i drugikh voyennykh
pisateley (Notes of Strategy: Rules of Warmaking Drawn From the Works of
Napoleon , Archduke Karl, General Jomini, and Other Military Writers), Part 2 ,
St. Peterburg, 1847, p 322 .
** F. Goremykin , Rukovodsto k izucheniyu taktiki (Manual for the Study of
Tactics), St. Peterburg, 1849, pp V , VI.

30
principles of art, in which the entire theoretical store of the matter is
expressed :
1. Principle of extreme exertion of force at the beginning of a war
to begin each war (campaign , operation ) not only with sufficient forces,
but also with an extreme exertion of these forces, without the fear of
assigning too many forces, but on the contrary, with the fear of assigning
too few .
2. Principle of simultaneity of actions--the simultaneous deployment
of forces in a theater of war.
3. Principle of economy of forces - grouping them in time and space
in accordance with the relative importance of different sectors.
4. Principle of concentration of forces on the decisive point - concen
trating the main body on the most important sector , sacrificing for this
purpose all accessory , secondary ones.
5. To hit the enemy at his most sensitive point, having the enemy army
as the chief objective — not to be diverted by geographic objects of action,
but to have the enemy army as the immediate target, as the chief repre
sentative and bearer of the will and force of the enemy; the goal of a
march must be the enemy camp, and the goal of battle — destruction of
his army.
6. Principle of surprise — to concentrate superior forces on the battle
field unexpectedly (secretly and swiftly ) for the enemy and place them
before the battle in as favorable a position as possible .
7. Internal integrity and unity in actions as the high ideal in strategy
and tactics — to conduct the operation or battle in a spirit of their inner
integrity and unity of actions.
8. Importance of preparing the attack — a decisive attack in battle
is preceded by its preparation (in all forms), brought to the degree of
maturity permitted by the circumstances of a particular occasion .
9. The importance of victory in its energetic exploitation — not to limit
oneself to winning the battlefield , but to develop aftereffects of the victory
through energetic pursuit, following immediately after the victorious
battle .
10. Principle of security of the operation — have secured rear and
flanks in all positions of the army, i.e., an operational line secure in all
senses .
11. Principle of initiative and dominance over the enemy's will and
mind — from the very beginning of an operation enlist the support of
benefits of the initiative and of dominance over the enemy's will and
mind and retain it to the end.
12. Strive to be strong where the enemy is weak - present the strong
side and shun the weak side." 44

* G . Leyer, Metod voyennykh nauk (Method of Military Sciences), St. Peter

burg, 1894, pp 53 , 54 ; Leyer, Strategiya (Strategy), Part 1 , St. Peterburg , 1898 ,
pp 203, 204 .

31
 From results of his research of the principles of military art, Leyer
must be recognized as one of the most outstanding bourgeois military
scholars. His works are very thorough and stand above the works of
many scholars of later years, even those published at the beginning of
the 20th Century , such as the book by F. Foch , On Principles of War.
However, Leyer's reasoning is far from faultless. His philosophical
base was subjective idealism and positivism . Leyer called his method
of research critical-historical. It permitted Leyer arbitrarily to choose
and illuminate individual facts, separate them from the concrete historical
situation , and fit them into any idea .
Leyer called the principles of military art eternal and unchangeable
in his first major works, such as his capital work Opyt kritiko -istoriches
kogo issledovaniya zakonov isskustva vedeniya voyny. Polozhitel'naya
strategiya (Experience of Critical-Historical Research of the Laws of the
Art of Warmaking: Positive Strategy ) ( 1869) .
This position of Leyer's was criticized by Russian military writers.
The criticism was at times detailed and well argued in the scientific sense ,
but often it was in the form of satirical forays, excessively sharp and
even insulting.
Being a talented military theoretician , Level was not able to avoid
noticing the vulnerable places in his concept. Although Leyer did not
logically complete its revision ( and could not by virtue of its reactionary
philosophical base ), he subsequently took a great step forward in develop
ment of questions of the application of principles of military art.
Believing these principles to be eternal, unchangeable, and uncondi
tional, Leyer, in his last works, made an appeal to conform " to the infinite
flexibility in the form of application of these fundamental principles,”
and substantiate one's actions “ on the one hand, on a deep respect for
the fundamental principles, and on the other , on just as deep a respect
for the situation.” 45
Principles, said Leyer, of themselves are unconditional, but they are
conditional in their application to an infinitely changing situation , with
which the principles are in eternal collision . In order to somehow emerge
from this metaphysical dead- end, Leyer called on rules and norms for
help . He said : “ Rules and norms arise any time it is necessary to apply
an unconditional principle to a conditional situation . . . . Rules and
norms... are conditional, i.e., they are true only under certain condi
tions of the situation : in short, rules are the very same laws, only of a
more particular and conditional nature.” 46 In striving to avoid accusations
of stereotype and dogmatism , Leyer stressed that principles, rules, and
norms “ represent only starting points for solutions, but they are far from
being the solutions themselves to particular questions.” And still his as
sertion of the eternal nature of principles objectively led both to stereo
45
Leyer, Korennyye voprosy (Key Questions), St. Peterburg, 1897 , p 122.
Leyer, Metod voyennykh nauk, pp 55, 56 .

32
-
type and dogmatism , against which Leyer spoke out in words rather ac
tively in his last works.
Having correctly noted that all phenomena in the world take place
according to laws, Leyer was not in a position to reveal the essence of
laws of military science, just as other bourgeois scholars were not. The
shaky position of Leyer's philosophical idealism led to a situation where
he placed an equal sign between laws and principles of war .
Gen. M. I. Dragomirov ( 1830–1905 ) was a major specialist in the
field of tactics and pedagogics. He formulated and substantiated a number
of new principles of training. Thanks to his works, Russian military
pedagogics moved in the second half of the 19th Century to first place
in the world . But along with this, in Dragomirov's views there were many
reactionary tendencies which stemmed from his philosophical concep
tion . Dragomirov proclaimed that the basis of all military affairs were the
" eternal and unchanging” psychological attributes of man the soldier,
which were not dependent on the social system . According to Dragomirov ,
the method of warmaking is determined not by equipment, but by the
spiritual forces of the nature ofman . He asserted that “ Napoleon's tactics
rest on firm foundations which cannot be affected by any changes in the
armament of troops.” He idealistically set mind against will and drew
the groundless conclusion that “ military affairs are more volitional than
mental to a considerable degree .”
Dragomirov voluntarily denied the laws of war. He believed that the
theory of military art could not pretend to identification of the causal
conditionality of war phenomena, since the latter are completely random .
Dragomirov denied the existence of military science. “ At the present
time,” he wrote, “ it will enter no one's head to assert that there can be
a military science ; it is just as unthinkable as are the sciences of poetry ,
painting, and music .” 47 True, he admitted the existence of a theory of
military art, but reduced its role to the confirmation “ in knowledge of
the attributes of troops and terrain ” and to the indication of models of
creativity in the military field .
The prominent Russian admiral, scholar, and inventor S. O. Makarov
( 1848–1904 ) expressed considerably more progressive views on prin
ciples of military art in his work Rassuzhdeniya po voprosam morskoy
taktiki ( Dissertation on Questions of Naval Tactics ) , which appeared
in 1897. He recognized the change in military art depending on the
development of technology and essentially rejected the theory of “ eternal
principles.” Makarov wrote : “ I personally am no adherent of the servile
obeisance to principles. . . . I advise study of the venerated works such
as those of Mahan and Colomb , but not to believe that their conclusions ,

4 M. Dragomirov , Ocherki (Sketches), Kiev, 1898, p 48.

33
based on examples of the sailing era, are absolutely true in our age of
machines and electricity.” 48
Gen. A. N. Petrov ( 1837–1900) also criticized the theses on " eternal
and unchangeable principles .” After reading the manuscript of Petrov's
book , K voprosam strategii (On Questions of Strategy ) , well-known
military historian Gen. A. K. Puzyrevskiy wrote to him : " Your chief
service is the fact that you attach dominant importance to the situation
and shackle no one by the eternal chain of “ unchanging principles.”
“ This will be a truly healthy current of fresh air among the reigning
fumes in strategy .” 49
In stating the content of principles of military art, Petrov made no
revelations. He in fact generalized the statements of other writers, includ
ing Petrov's basic enemy, Leyer. Petrov's chief service lies in debunking
the view on principles as eternal and unchanging. He wrote : “ Therefore
it is possible to say about every known principle : Its application will be
useful or harmful, depending on the conditions of the situation . . . . If
there is a change in application of the principles, that means the principle
itself changes, and sometimes it is completely abolished or employed
even in the reverse sense.” 50
The highest achievement of prerevolutionary military thought in the
resolution of problems of the laws of armed conflict were the works of
Gen. N. P. Mikhnevich ( 1849–1922 ) . He believed that the presence of
principles of military art attests to the existence of laws of armed conflict.
“ It is of course difficult to seek out the laws of armed conflict,” wrote
Mikhnevich , “but it is not impossible. They must be and will be found.” 51
Here Mikhnevich did not succeed in avoiding a widespread error
identification of the principles of military art with laws of armed conflict.
But this identification was not total, as with his predecessors, but seem
ingly partial. According to Mikhnevich, principles are a convenient form
of expressing laws of armed conflict, the result of generalization of a
multitude of interrelationships in warfare . These interrelationships are
the laws. The latter, if formulated with all the strictness of logic , receive
the form of complex sentences with many conditional subordinate clauses,
but which are dropped for simplicity ; as a result the principle itself re
ceives a more elegant and more easily remembered , but at the same time
less precise , form .” 52

* S. O. Makarov, Rassuzhdeniya po voprosam morskoy taktili (Reflections on

Questions of Naval Tactics), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1943, pp 283, 284.
4° Quoted from the book by Strokov , p 635.
** A. N. Petrov, K voprosam strategii. Kriticheskiy ocherk (On Questions of
Strategy: A Critical Sketch ), St. Peterburg, 1899, pp 162, 163.
51 N. P. Mikhnevich , Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva s drevneyshikh vremen do
nachala devyatnadtsatogo stoletiya (History of Military Art From Ancient Times
up to the Beginning of the 19th Century ), St. Peterburg, 1895, p 6 .
Mikhnevich , Voyennaya nauka i stepen' tochnosti yeye vyvodov (Military
Science and the Degree of Accuracy of its Conclusions), St. Peterburg, 1899, p 16 .

34
 Mikhnevich approached the solution of questions of military art from
idealistic positions. His philosophical base was the positivism of Auguste
Comte , which involved a number of errors, especially in Mikhnevich's
early works. However, broad use of the experience of war led him in
many questions to correct theoretical generalizations, and toward the end
of his life Mikhnevich took a path based on a materialistic understanding
of the phenomena of military affairs, although he was no longer able to
fully realign his views.
Mikhnevich asserted that any science, including military science , “ is
defined as an objective authentic and systematic knowledge about real
phenomena from the aspect of their law or immutable order.” 53 This
statement of the question made it possible to concentrate the investiga
tor's attention on objective phenomena of military affairs. Mikhnevich
recognized " the existence of evolutions not only in the very application
of war, but even in the methods by which it is waged . ... This law of
evolutions passes through the entire history of mankind known to us.”
“ Phenomena with which war is concerned and with which itmust reckon,”
wrote Mikhnevich, " are subject to constant changes . Therefore the laws
of military art find themselves a constantly changing application. Almost
every epoch has its own military art distinct from others.” These words
attest to the fact that in essence Mikhnevich rejected his initial thesis
about the eternal and unchanging nature of the principles of military
art. It contradicted the basic meaning and spirit of his last works and
his actual position in this question . Mikhnevich , in a foreword to the
second book of Strategiya (Strategy ), stressed : “ Before our eyes, with
the introduction of steam , electricity , a considerable improvement in
firearms, and many auxiliary technical inventions, the situation in war and
the methods of waging it have changed so much that it would be
dangerous to be guided even by the methods and techniques which
Napoleon used in resolving contemporary questions of war. It is neces
sary to reckon with new factors which sometimes summon new and
completely unexpected forms in the solution ."
Mikhnevich examines the question of the tie between war and politics
even more broadly than Clausewitz. He clearly stressed that not only
foreign , “ but also domestic politics also have a great influence on war
making.” Mikhnevich's service is also the fact that in his last works,
especially the work Osnovy strategii (Fundamentals of Strategy ) (St.
Petersburg, 1913) , he devoted much attention to questions of economic
preparation of war. However, he did not succeed in tieing economics
with the laws of war on a truly scientific basis.
In the Voyennaya entsiklopediya (Military Encyclopedia ), published
in 1911-1915 , individual laws are at times correctly noted and " laws
of victory” are examined . According to the encyclopedia , the tasks of
the theory of military art are to " firmly establish its fundamental prin

** Mikhnevich, Strategiya (Strategy), Book 1, St. Peterburg, 1911, p 1.

35
ciples, study the most important elements of the situation , and indicate
how the principles are applied in war under the influence of the situ
ation .” The encyclopedia established four fundamental principles of
military art, formulated essentially in Mikhnevich's works: superiority
of force, importance of the spiritual element in war, significance of
chance, and surprise.54 The idealistic outlook of the encyclopedia's
authors did not allow them to bring individual correct thoughts to a
truly scientific level. They examined the development of military affairs
only as an evolutionary process and proclaimed the eternal and un
changing nature of principles of military art, which , in their words,
were a product of the genius of great generals.
Gen. V. A. Cheremisov, the author of the work Osnovy sovremennogo
voyennogo iskusstva (Fundamentals of Contemporary Military Art)
( 1910 ), exerted a positive influence on development of views on prin
ciples of military art. Two well chosen epigraphs reflect well the basic
idea of his work : “ I cannot imagine that something immovable could
exist in the world and that it could remain at rest for an entire eternity”
(Wagner); “ It must not be forgotten that times have changed , that war
has become completely different, and that other forces enliven it”
( Clausewitz ) .
Cheremisov called people who blindly adhered to " eternal and un
changing principles” the “ alchemists of military affairs” and “ followers
of historical routine.” His conclusion “ about the influence of technologi
cal inventions and the improvement of weapons on forms of formations,
methods of attack , and similar questions of applied tactics” must be
considered progressive for that time, although Cheremisov himself was a
spontaneous materialist and an inconsistent dialectician .
The Ustav polevoy sluzhby ( Field Service Regulations ) of the Russian
Army, approved in 1912, stressed the significance of the most important
principles of military art in a successful manner. The regulations say
about activeness that “ in war success is achieved by a firm and clear
statement of the goal of actions and by the persistent drive of all
from the highest commander to the private — to attain this goal no matter
what. Offensive actions serve as the best method for achieving the goal
which has been set. Only these actions make it possible to seize the
initiative and force the enemy to do what we wish ” ( articles 1 and 2 ) .
“ The decision to defeat the enemy must be irrevocably taken to the
end. A desire for victory must be in the head and heart of every com
mander. They must instil this resolve in all their subordinates" ( Article
487 ) .
The regulations also stressed the prime importance of interworking:
" The desire to attain the common goal demands the interworking of

54 See Voyennaya entsiklopediya (Military Encyclopedia ), Vol. 4 , St. Peterburg,

1911, p 479

36
 all chasti and combat arms, the selfless execution of duty by everyone,
and mutual aid ” (Article 3 ) .
Concerning the principle of massing forces and means on the axis
of main attack , the regulations state : “ The enemy can be smashed only
by a firm blow at a spot sensitive for him . Therefore , in attacking the
enemy, one must be concerned about being stronger than the enemy
-

on the axis of the main attack and while it is being carried out” (Article
430 ).
The regulations force attention on maneuver, surprise , and certain
other principles.
An interesting instruction is given in the regulations about the appli
cation of its provisions : “ The regulations provide guiding instructions
for troop actions ; however, in each instance they should be employed
deliberately , recalling the behest of Peter the Great “ not to follow
regulations is the same as a blind man not following a wall” ( Article
5).
Not long before World War I a small work by V. Novitskiy appeared
entitled Vysshaya strategiya ( Higher Strategy ) ( St. Petersburg , 1913) .
It remained unnoticed both by its contemporary critics and by subsequent
historians. Meanwhile , it represents a certain amount of interest. The
author stressed the importance of the basic principles of military art
for making the proper decision . Novitskiy included among the principles
of “ higher strategy” purposefulness, activeness, a total exertion of forces,
swiftness, and systematic planning. Novitskiy expounded the content
of these principles by completely disengaging himself from the material
technical base of war. In expounding the goals of war, Novitskiy degraded
the role of politics . For the year 1913 this bordered on the criminal.
Novitskiy extends the sphere of application of the principles of strategy
chiefly to the period of preparing for war, but military actions themselves
either are not encompassed at all by each of the principles, or are
encompassed only partially. Novitskiy also advances the concept of the
“basic military law ” and even the “ totality of the basic laws.” “ The
basic law ,” wrote Novitskiy , “ is part of the basic plan of higher strategy ."
Thus, Novitskiy uses the concept of “ law ” not as a scientific philosophical
category, but in the sense of “ part of a plan ,” which was not accepted
even by bourgeois scholars.
World War I ( 1914–1917 ) , which broke out soon , subjected the
principles of military art to a serious test. Armed forces in all countries
at the beginning of the war consisted of ground troops and the navy .
Infantry made up 70–75 percent of the ground troops. Thus, it was
assumed that all combat missions would be accomplished by the infantry
with insignificant support on the part of other combat arms. Infantry
divisions of 1914 (Russian , French , and German ) had from 24 to 32
machine guns and from 36 to 54 75–77 -mm cannon ( the German
division also had 18 105 -mm howitzers ). The basic weapon of the in

37
fantry were magazine rifles of 7.62—8 -mm caliber with a sighting range
of fire up to 2 km .
Magazine rifles , machine guns, and rapid fire artillery considerably
raised the firepower of the troops. The intentions of both sides to achieve
victory by attacks of large masses of infantry were groundless under
these conditions.
A crisis appeared in bourgeois military art as early as the campaign
of 1914. The theory of a transient war (around one year ) , let alone
a lightning-fast (several months) war, suffered total ruin . As a matter
of fact, the war lasted 4 years and 4 months. Military actions demanded
serious changes in the composition and organization of troops. There
appeared with all force the decisive role of economics and technology
and the dependence of the course and outcome of the war on the
country's rear area. The moral factor also had a profound influence
on the course and outcome of the war.
During the war years the tank industry was newly created with astound
ing swiftness , and the aviation industry was almost newly created . By
the end of the war there were 5,000 tanks in armies of the Entente, and
there were 10,136 operational aircraft in both coalitions. The infantry's
firepower rose by 21/2-3 times. The number of machine guns in the
French Army increased 20 times, in the German Army 9 times, and in
the Russian Army 6 times. The number of light artillery pieces in the
armies of Russia , Germany, France , and Italy increased 2–3 times , and
the number of heavy pieces by over 6 times .
The process of motorization of troops had serious influence on military
art. By the end of the war the French Army had 80,000 trucks. There
was 0.3–0.4 horsepower of mechanical energy per soldier in 1914 , while
in 1918 it was 1.5-2. World War I marked the beginning of a wide
employment of chemical weapons. In January 1917 the armies of both
coalitions numbered 33.5 million . Both sides suffered enormous losses
around 10 million killed and 20 million wounded . For the first time
in the history of mankind, war took on this grandiose scope and de
structive character.
Important changes of objective conditions of conducting military
actions and of the material base of war caused and conditioned the
further development of military art and its principles. The outward
form of expression of the principles was solid enough , but their content
suffered a noticeable evolution . There were also changes in the methods
of realization of the principles of military art, and of putting their
recommendations into effect.
It appeared that the buttresses of the principle of activeness were
shaken in 1914. For a certain period a situation formed where the defense
turned out to be stronger than the offense. Military art was in a positional
dead -end, but a way out was found when large masses of tanks, heavy
artillery , and aircraft appeared on the battlefields. After this, in connec

38
 tion with the fact that the initial attacks of a large force fell chiefly on
the first position , a temporary loss of one or several positions was
1

permitted in the defense, and activeness in the defense began to be

manifested primarily in the conduct of decisive counterattacks and the
delivery of counterblows.
Exploitation of success was represented already in the form of the
pursuit, but the actions of the pursuers still were limited . They followed
right after the capture of the enemy position and halted on encountering
new prepared resistance .
The mobility of troops (in its contemporary meaning) rose in connec
tion with the employment of vehicles for bringing up reserves to the line
of commitment to battle or the engagement. A new problem -— the devel
opment of tactical success into operational success — remained unresolved
until the end of the war because the radius of action of combat equipment
of that time did not go beyond the bounds of the tactical zone.
Operations of World War I showed the exceptional importance of the
principle of surprise, but the achievement of surprise became more
complex and demanded the conduct of a large set of measures and the
rejection of a prolonged artillery preparation .
The principle of interworking , especially that of infantry with artillery
as well as of infantry with tanks, received further development as well.
In the application of the principle of superiority of forces on the
decisive axis a tendency was noted to create a superiority over the enemy
not only in mass of troops and numbers of personnel, but also in means
of combat and their quality. War provided the first experience of a
massing of tanks and aviation . The breakthrough of the tactical defense
could be accomplished only with considerable average densities of men
and materiel.
The new material base of World War I and the experience of applying
therein the principles of military art had a decisive influence on the
development of principles between World War I and World War II.
New , particular principles were developed in connection with the
appearance and development of new means of warfare . These were
the empioyment of tanks, aviation , toxic chemical agents, and antitank
and antiaircraft defense .

Principles of Military Art in Soviet Military Works of

1917-1940

Soviet military science formed in the course of a fierce armed conflict

of the young socialist state against internal counterrevolution and imper
ialist intervention . Soviet military science , in the period of its develop
ment, succeeded in overcoming the open and hidden resistance of spokes
men of views of bourgeois military science, as well as of representatives
of " ultrarevolutionary" tendencies, who were pushing toward total,

39
indiscriminate rejection of historical heritage and the artificial, speculative
creation of a new , “ proletarian ” military science in the bare spot.
Military actions during the period of foreign military intervention
and civil war ( 1917–1920 ) were an important phase in the development
of principles of military art. They were conducted on a weak economic
base, in the absence of new military-technological means and an enor
mous deficiency in trained commanders. Red Army operations, based
on the revolutionary enthusiasm of the laboring masses, were distinguished
from operations during the period of World War I by the decisiveness
of goals, low operational and tactical densities, great scope , and creative
application of the principles ofmassing, activeness, surprise , and mobility .
The experience of the Civil War served as the basis for subsequent
development of Soviet military theory and of views on principles of
strategy , operational art, and tactics . The outstanding theoretical works by
V. I. Lenin , his direct guidance of the defense of the Soviet Republic , and
his statements and directives on the most important questions of defense
and development of the Armed Forces played a deciding role in this
matter.
M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, B. M. Shaposhnikov, A. I.
Yegorov , A. I. Kork , I. P. Uborevich , and many other authors of scienti
fic works made a large contribution to the development of views on
principles of military art. Soviet military science also developed in the
practice of outstanding Soviet generals and military figures, who did not
leave any scientific works in the field of strategy, operational art, and
tactics. Of the latter, I. E. Yakir, V. K. Blyukher, A. I. Sedyakin , R. P.
Eydeman , and others played a particularly noteworthy role .
In resolving a wide range of problems on general questions of military
development of the armed forces of socialist states and on the basic
questions of Soviet military ideology and doctrine, M. V. Frunze (1885–
1925 ), an outstanding Soviet general and theoretician , also investigated
some of the most important principles of military art, especially ma
neuverability , activeness , and the offensive .
Frunze tied the principle of maneuverability with the change in the
rank -and- file composition, and especially a change in commanders, which
“ must have had and did have an effect on methods of combat operations
employed by the Red Army.” This circumstance, said Frunze, goes a long
way in explaining the fact that maneuverability based on the great mobil
ity of troops found such a wide use in the combat experience of the Red
Army. Giving purely objective moments (size of theaters of military
operations, boundless nature of our land expanses, etc.) which had an
influence on the principle of maneuverability, Frunze stresses : “ But I
repeat that along with these purely objective conditions, there is no doubt
that a role was played — and a very large one — by moments stemming

40
 from the class nature of the Red Army and from the spiritual attributes of
the proletarian elements leading it.” 55
-

Maneuverability, mobility, and activeness, said Frunze, give us to a

considerable extent the possibility to balance our chances with the capa
bilities of a technologically stronger enemy.
Objecting to those who, having wholly accepted the principle ofmaneu
verability , gave up as lost everything connected with positional warfare,
Frunze wrote : “ Such a bare and abrupt contraposition of these principles
is incorrect in general. No war, even the most maneuver- filled one, can
ever get by without elements of position warfare . . . . The only correct
conclusion will be that positionalforms of warfare with their characteristic
prolonged state of immobility and stability of front lines can in no way
be the basic, dominant forms of our immediate engagements.” 56 “ The
principle of position as a dominant form of military operations,” added
Frunze , “ is an exception for us."
Frunze wrote that another principle which characterizes the actions of
-

the Red Army is their offensive nature. Frunze considered the offensive,
the ultimate goal of which is the total destruction of the enemy, to be the
basic form of actions of the Red Army. Without denying the significance
of the defense (which under conditions of a war of maneuver sometimes
took on the form of a retreat ), Frunze saw in it only a method of prepar
ing for the following attack and defeat of the enemy. He recognized only
active defense as natural.
Frunze's remarks are of great interest concerning the influence of “ the
technical aspect” on principles of strategy and tactics, as are his objections
to those party members who declared that “ we have overturned all the
old principles and created a new strategy and tactics.” Frunze wrote that
there is no basis for an overturn in the sense of creation of independent
proletarian tactics and strategy (i.e., improvement in production , develop
ment of productive forces ) . However, Frunze correctly believed that crea
tion of a Soviet military art in the future was not only possible, but
inevitable.
Activeness ,maneuver, and massing are the principles of operational art
expounded in 1924 in the instructions approved by M. V. Frunze entitled
Vyssheye komandovaniye (Higher Command ). “ The task of every opera
tion and battle is destruction of the armed forces of the enemy and his
technical means of warfare” (Article 1) . “ This task is achieved only by
bold and decisive actions built on a simple but skilful maneuver which is
put into effect forcefully and insistently” (Article 2 ) . “Maneuver will be
successful only when the human and technical means of warfare are
skilfully distributed to attain massing like a battering-ram on the decisive
axes at the decisive moments ” ( Article 3 ) .

5 M. V. Frunze, Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Works), Voyenizdat, Mos

cow , 1950 , p 187 .
58 Ibid ., p 189 .

41
 Mar SU M. N. Tukhachevskiy ( 1893–1937) attached decisive im
portance to developing certain principles, especially those of maneuver and
activeness. Tukhachevskiy wrote that " contemporary combat must have as
its result not only the defeat and the pushing away of the enemy troops ,
but also their destruction , i.e., capture .”
Tukhachevskiy was one of the creators of a theory of consecutive
operations. He wrote : “ The impossibility of destroying the enemy's army
at one blow with contemporary broad fronts forces us to achieve this by a
series of consecutive operations, combined by constant pursuit; this can
replace the destructive engagement which was the best form of encounter
in previous armies.” 57
In 1928 Tukhachevskiy expressed the thought that the new material
technical base of the army ( long-range artillery , tanks, aviation ) permits
rejection of previous exhaustive forms of struggle for each enemy position
individually and a shift to new and more effective forms and methods of
conducting the battle and operation . This was a brilliant idea , a unique
use of principles of activeness and maneuverability under new conditions,
which was made the basis of the theory of deep offensive operation and
battle as developed by V. K. Triandafillov, G. S. Isserson , A. I. Yegorov,
K. V. Kalinovskiy, and other military commanders and theoreticians.
An interesting thought was expressed by Army Commander 1st Rank
S. S. Kamenev (1881-1936 ) : “ It is necessary to mass not cannon , but
their fires.” This statement received an even deeper meaning and content
under conditions of nuclear missile warfare : it is necessary to mass
primarily nuclear strikes and the fires of troops, and not only or not even
so much as the personnel and combat equipment.
Some of the military scholars who came to us for service from the
Czarist Army did not succeed in completely ridding themselves of
bourgeois outlook and idealistic and metaphysical philosophy, as a result
of which they committed a number of mistakes. This included especially
mistakes on questions touching the principles of military art. It is possible
to include here professors of the RKKA (Workers and Peasants Red
Army] I. I. Vatsetis ( 1873-1938), former Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Soviet State, A. A. Svechin ( 1878–1938 ) , the
author of several capital works, and A. I. Verkhovskiy ( 1886–1941) .
Vatsetis asserted that “ principles of strategy are eternal and unchanging ,
and since that is so, then they must appear for the strategist as an im
mutable law in his creativity, and violation of this law threatens the
strategist with catastrophe.” 58 It is true that he recognized quite specifi
cally the change in the applied aspect of the principles. Vatsetis' demand

57M. Tukhachevskiy, Pokhod za Vislu (Campaign for the Vistula ), Smolensk,

1923, p 25.
** Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voyennykh trudakh
1917-1940 godov (Questions of Strategy and Operational Art in Soviet Military
Works of 1917–1940), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1965, p 182 .
to create a uniform military school is of interest. This school would
advance " specific principles which all would learn with a completely
identical understanding."
Svechin in fact denied objective truth in military theory . He assumed
that there are many different philosophical methods, and all of them
have an equal right to existence alongside Marxism . Such a world outlook
led Svechin to a denial of the objective laws of armed warfare, to major
omissions of a methodological nature, and to an ignoring of the principles
of military art. The goal of any science is to reveal the objective laws of
phenomena, understand them , and state them . Denial of objective laws
leads to the liquidation of science and to a denial of the possibility of
scientific foresight.
Here is a characteristic statement by Svechin about one of the most
important principles of military art. Svechin explains the major failures of
Lord White's British Corps in battles against the Boers in October and
November 1899 as follows: “ The infamy of concentration ... had an
effect here , with modern weaponry , to the full extent.” 59 The real causes
for the victory of the Boers in the first period of the war were explained
by their seizure of the initiative, the high activeness and maneuverability
of their detachments , and by the strong morale of the personnel. With re
gard to the " infamy of concentration ,” the forces of the British , to the
contrary, often were excessively scattered and the Boers destroyed them
piecemeal.
Verkhovskiy understood the principle of activeness quite wrongly. In
spite of the active and decisive nature of Soviet military doctrine, he tried
to prove the advantages of a defensive form of actions as a method of
armed warfare. He asserted that a defensive engagement provides major
political benefits and permits a build -up of force . From this viewpoint,
concluded Verkhovskiy, it is inore advantageous for us in the first battles
to give up Minsk and Kiev than to take Belostok and Brest. Such a point
of view was decisively rejected by our military community. Verkhovskiy
also attempted to prove that in bourgeois society “ the mass army is
disappearing, to be replaced by a large army of ‘knights,' which can be
built according to the classic principle .” 60
But Verkhovskiy has some statements which even outstripped the epoch .
He wrote , for example : “ If we will look to see where the evolution of the
infantry is leading, it will become clear that the day is not far off when
all infantry will don armor , since without it it will be impossible to appear
in the clouds of gas and the hurricane of fire .” Certain of Verkhovskiy's
thoughts on maneuver and its forms and on the principle of concentration
of forces at the decisive point are also not devoid of interest.

* A. Svechin , Evolyutsiya voyennogo iskusstva (Evolution of Military Art), Vol.

2 , Gosizdat, Moscow -Leningrad , 1928, p 424 .
* A. I. Verkhovskiy , Ogon', manevr, maskirovka (Fire , Maneuver, Camouflage),
Moscow , 1928 , p 231.

43
 Being steadfast Bolsheviks , some of the authors of those years com
mitted characteristic theoretical mistakes in their works for one reason or
another. For example, A. Toporkov saw the law of the course and out
come of any war only in the action of laws of class struggle and the gen
eral laws of dialectics. He did not recognize an independent existence of
laws of armed warfare . By virtue of this, in defining the nature of prin
ciples of military art he believed that they proceed from the sphere of
awareness of the commanders and from their desire " to be aware of their
actions.”
.” 61 However, in reality the principles of military art arise on the
basis of perception of the objective laws of armed warfare .
Mar SU B. M. Shaposhnikov ( 1882–1945) , who correctly understood
the inner dialectics of war and the objective pattern of its processes, the
relative independence of war as a whole, and the presence of its special
laws, wrote : “War is that phenomenon of social life which , though serving
the attainment of political goals, has its own laws, its own ‘spirit,' and its
own nature, as does violence. ” 62
V. K. Triandafillov ( 1894–1931) , one of the founders of the theory of
deep offensive operation and battle,made a major contribution to develop
ment of principles of military art, especially activeness and maneuver
ability of combat operations. Triandafillov believed it advisable to have
three echelons of tanks — NPP [infantry direct support), DPP [long-range
support of infantry ), and DD [long range ]—which would allow attacking
the enemy to the entire depth of his combat formation .
Triandafillov believed clearly insufficient the rate of advance of 5–6 and
even 8–10 km per day planned for that time. He showed soundly that to
achieve decisive results the rate of advance should be “ at least 20-25
km per day; here individual chasti of the army (cavalry and motorized
chasti) should make up to 35–50 km in order to preserve an enveloping
position or one threatening the enemy's deep rear, and to ensure the
possibility of moving to his rear areas and hindering his planned with
drawal. ” 63
In researching the importance of the principle of massing of forces and
means, Triandafillov arrives at the conclusion : " One cannot undertake
deep operations which pursue a decisive goal without having a sufficiently
dense grouping of forces. . . . It is impossible to overcome the resistance
of a front saturated with machine guns and echeloned to a great depth with
a rather weak front and fingers spread wide.”
The principles of conducting a deep offensive operation were developed
bymany authors. They found detailed grounding in the works of Professor
G. S. Isserson .

61 A. Toporkov, Metod voyennogo znaniya (Method of Military Knowledge ),

Moscow , 1927, p 101.
« B. M. Shaposhnikov, Mozg armii (Brain of the Army), Book 3 , Gosizdat,
Moscow -Leningrad, 1929, p 230 .
83 V. Triandafillov , Kharakter operatsiy sovremennykh armiy (Character of Op
erations of Contemporary Armies), 4th ed ., Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1937, p 184.

44
 The essence of the theory of deep offensive operation consisted of reso
lution of the tasks of attack by the method of crushing blows against the
entire depth of the enemy's defense until his total defeat. Conduct of a
deep operation reduced to the accomplishment of three missions: first of
all, breaking through the enemy's tactical defense and forming a breach
therein by the combined efforts of infantry , tanks, artillery, and aviation ;
secondly, developing tactical success into operational success by commit
ting through this breach masses of tanks, motorized infantry , and mech
anized cavalry, and also by making airborne landings ; thirdly , developing
the operational success through operational pursuit until the complete
defeat of the enemy grouping and occupying a favorable initial position for
a new operation . For the accomplishment of a breakthrough , it was pro
posed to concentrate superior infantry forces and means on the axis of
themain attack and support them by the massed actions of artillery , tanks,
and aviation . Here the artillery, several echelons of tanks, aviation , and in
fantry which are interworking deliver a simultaneous assault on the
enemy's combat formation to its entire depth , breaking up his defense .
This theory was apparently the concentrated embodiment of principles
ofmass, activeness, interworking, and maneuver .
Isserson was an adherent of the principle of active offensive opera
tions . Preference for this principle was determined by the political char
acter and goals of war and the creation of a new material-technical base .
Isserson wrote that “ only one outcome is possible in these wars — the
downfall of capitalism and triumph of a new world , the world of socialism .
. . The decisive character of engagements predetermines the decisive
character of military operations. These will not be just any drawn out
operations for exhaustion with a limited goal, but basically active , crush
ing attacks with a decisive goal. Contemporary technical means of war
fare which are fastmoving and mobile and highly active in their combat
employment also lead to such a character of operations.” 64
The principles of tactics and operational art were brought to the
attention of the troops and made the basis of their combat training in the
Instruktsiya po glubokomu boyu ( Instructions for Deep Combat) ( 1935 )
and the 1936 Field Regulations. The theory of deep operation , the essence
of which was briefly set forth above , determined the forms and methods
of accomplishing operations of a scope previously not seen , conducted at a
high tempo with the mission of total defeat of the enemy.
Observance of the principle of massing forces and means on the decisive
axis was considered a necessary condition for success . On the axis of
main attack it was recommended that high densities be created : three bat
talions of infantry , 50–100 guns, 50–100 tanks per kilometer of front.
Much attention was devoted to the principles of interworking, maneuver,
and activeness.

64G. Isserson , Evolyutsiya operativnogo iskusstva (Evolution of Operational Art),

Gosvoyenizdat, Moscow , 1932, p 37.

45
 The principles of tactics were formulated in the 1936 Field Regulations
very precisely. “ Combat operations of the Red Army will be conducted for
destruction . Achievement of a decisive victory and total crushing of the
enemy are the basic goal in a war imposed on the Soviet Union .... Only
a decisive offensive on the main axis, crowned by a relentless pursuit
leads to the total destruction of enemymen and materiel.”
“ A constant desire to do battle with the enemy for the purpose of his
destruction must lie at the basis of the upbringing and actions of every
commander and soldier of the RKKA . Without special orders for this , the
enemy must be attacked boldly and forcefully everywhere he is discov
ered” ( Article 2 ) .
“ One cannot be equally strong everywhere . To ensure success it is
necessary to obtain a decisive superiority over the enemy on the main
axis by regrouping men and materiel” ( Article 3 ) .
“ To defeat the enemy . . . it is necessary to achieve the interworking
of all combat arms operating on the same axis, to the entire depth , and
the coordinated actions of chasti operating on different axes” (Article 4 ) .
“ Surprise has a stunning effect. Therefore all troop actions must be
accomplished with the greatest secrecy and speed . Swiftness of actions
in combination with organization , skilful maneuver, and the ability to
adapt to the terrain are the basic guarantee of success in battle”
( Article 6 ).
“ The employment of tanks in the offensive must be massive" ( Article
7).
Views on the principles of operational art and tactics accepted in
Soviet military science on the eve of the Great Patriotic War were
advanced for the time and basically corresponded to the objective con
ditions and possibilities. The basic provisions of the theory of Soviet
military art were confirmed in the experience of the war .

Principles of Military Art in Works of Bourgeois Scholars

Between World War I and II (1919–1939)

Among the most significant bourgeois military scholars in the period

between the two world wars, in whose works the principles of military art
found expression to one degree or another, are the following : John Fuller
(born 1878 ), a British theoretician and founder of the theory of “ tank” or
“mechanized ” warfare ; Giulio Douhet ( 1869–1930 ) , an Italian general
and author of the theory of “ air warfare ” ; American Col. G. H. Sagent;
the French military writer Lyuka ; Austrian Gen Ludwig Eimansberger;
German Gen. Ludendorf ( 1865–1937 ) , creator of the theory of total war;
French colonel and later general, political figure and President of France
Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970 ) ; Heinz Guderian ( 1888-1954), founder
of the theory of development and employment of armored troops of the
Hitler Wehrmacht.

46
1
 The main defect of Fuller's theory was an underestimation of the role
of man and the significance of military science and an overestimation of
the role of equipment in war. “ The cannons of war or weaponry, if only
they meet the needs of the situation ,” wrote Fuller, “ comprise 99 percent
of the victory . Strategy, command, control, bravery, discipline, supply , or
ganization , and all moral and physical appurtenances of war are nothing
in comparison with superiority in weapons; in the best instance they com
prise 1 percent." 65
Fuller recognized the presence of principles of military art. He said :
“ Similar to all other forms of human endeavor, war can be reduced to
scientific foundations.” He made an appeal to reduce war “ to a system
of knowledge based on specific principles.” Fuller's recognition of the
development of military science is very noteworthy. Believing that military
science “ is a living or dynamic science which must develop with the
development ofmankind,” he even fought for a revision of military science
and at the very same time gave it an insignificant role — some fraction of a
percent — as is evident from the quote above . In addition , Fuller fell into
an insoluble contradiction with his own view on the development of
principles of military art , interpreting them as a manifestion in war of the
universal, eternal, and unchanging law of nature— “ the law of economy
of force .”

Douhet an appeal to develop new principles of military art correspond

ing to new means of warfare, and not be limited by lessons drawn from
previous wars . He wrote : “ Victory always smiled on one who was able to
renew traditional forms of warfare, and not on the one who hopelessly
tied himself to these forms.” 66

However, a number of Douhet's other statements contradict this posi

tion and make it inconsistent. He asserted that new principles of military
art do not supplement, but refute the old and that “ the past gives nothing
for the future , and the latter must be created anew .” 67
Sagent took a directly opposite, but no less erroneous a position . He
asserted that “ principles are steadfast. In our days they are the very same
as in the time of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar , and Napoleon .” 68
The French military writer Lyuka, apparently engaging in polemics with
Douhet, wrote : “We must beware of assertions, as was always the case
after major wars, that from now on everything has changed and that we

* J. Fuller, Tanki v velikoy voyne 1914-1918 88. (Tanks in the Great War of
1914–1918 ), Moscow , 1923, p 253.
* Gilulio Douhet, Gospodstvo v vozdukhe (Command of the Air ), Voyenizdat,
Moscow , 1936 , p 383.
* Ibid ., p 69.
* G. H. Sagent, Strategiya na zapadnom fronte (1914–1918 ) (Strategy on the
Western Front (1914-1918 ]), Moscow , 1923, p 7 .

47
must forget all the past.” 69 Lyuka notes that the principle of mass, or
superiority of forces, the principle of surprise , and the principle of ex
ploitation of success remained in force in the course of World War I. But
the viewpoints of Lyuka and Sagent are not identical. Lyuka examines
the comparatively short segment of time on the eve of and during World
War I.
According to Ludendorff, " the chief principle of total war” is the
" spiritual unity of the people,” but “ a protracted war creates a danger
for solidarity of a nation . The country's economy may not withstand
a military burden .” Therefore Ludendorff advances the thesis of a
“ blitzkrieg ." In order to end the war in the shortest possible time, it
must be total, waged mercilessly not only against the enemy's army, but
also against his peaceful population. This inhuman principle was seized
upon by the fascist generals and taken to the most criminal extreme in
their bloody practice .
Ludendorff considered surprise to be an important principle of total
war. “ Surprise ,” he says, “ will have a special importance , so the enemy
does not succeed in taking his own measures of counteraction.” 70
Ludendorff also attached much significance to the principle of superiority
in men and materiel at the decisive place . He wrote : “ The art of leader
ship on the land , on the water , and in the air consists of having superior
ity in numbers and in action of weapons, i.e., having such a center of
gravity of efforts, and delivering a defeat on the enemy at his weak point
and on that axis where it is possible to bring a victory over the enemy
to his total defeat.” 71
In 1934 de Gaulle advanced the idea of a “ professional army,” which
was to smash the enemy with crushing, surprise blows on the battlefield
and move forward with a rate up to 50 km a day into the depth of enemy
territory.
According to de Gaulle, surprise is the most important principle of
using such an army. “ The taking unawares, which reigned since time
immemorial in military art and which was given up to the archives
inasmuch as the force was not swift enough , will again acquire its base
and , consequently, its importance.” 72 Surprise is achieved not only by
the high mobility of a shock army, but also by skilful camouflage, cun
ning, and deception of the enemy, as well as by boldness and decisiveness
of actions.
All actions of the shock army should have a maneuverable character.
The attacking chasti, stresses de Gaulle, must not form a continuous

** Lyuka, Evolyutsiya takticheskikh idey vo Frantsii i Germanii vo vremya voyny

1914-1918 88. (Evolution of Tactical Ideas in France and Germany During the
Time of the War of 1914–1918), Gosvoyenizdat, Moscow , 1926, p 86 .
19 General Ludendorff, Der totale Krieg , Muenchen , 1935 , p 64 .
71
Ibid ., p 75 .
*2 Charles de Gaulle, Professionalnaya armiya ( A Professional Army), Gos
voyenizdat, Moscow , 1935, p 60 .

48
front along which the available weapons are evenly distributed ; tanks
operate in masses, as soyedineniya , the infantry is disposed in the form
of strong groups, and the artillery operates against specific targets,
displaying flexibility in shifting fire to new targets and using advantages
of its mobility to the maximum . “ The battle unfolds in such a form .
It is the interweaving of separate actions conducted at a high speed .”
“ With any breakthrough of the front line in future conflicts, “ wrote
de Gaulle, "we will see high -speed military chasti rushing into the deep
rear of the enemy, delivering blows at his most sensitive places and
overturning his entire defensive system .” In de Gaulle's concept of a
“ professional army” there is an extremely weak spot. It does not take
sufficiently into account that in the epoch of imperialism war is waged
by popular masses , and so a closed , caste, professional army, no matter
how strong it might be, now is in no position to decide the outcome
of war. Sensing the shakiness of his concept as set forth in the book,
de Gaulle speaks of a “ professional army supplementing the national
masses” in a number of articles, about the “ combination of a professional
army and national masses,” and about an addition to the army “ consist
ing of cadres, reserves, and recruits.” However, these theses of de Gaulle
did not find further development or popularization .
Nevertheless, the works of Charles de Gaulle were outstanding against
the background of French reality of the time. They stood immeasurably
higher than works which expressed the official doctrine of France . This
was a doctrine of positional warfare, of underestimation of new means
of warfare, and one which ignored the principles of activeness, maneuver,
and offensive combat actions. It was a doctrine which deliberately gave
the enemy the initiative of actions. Marshal Petain , for example , ex
pressed the conviction at that time that high -speed tanks and aviation
were not changing the method of waging war and that the main condition
of France's security was the presence of a solid front reinforced by
fortifications.
According to official French views, offensive battle was to take place
slowly and be waged by a frontal movement from line to line, without
any kind of attempts at a swift breakthrough into the depth of the
enemy's defense and his defeat in a short time. And here is how de
Gaulle himself , after many years, characterized the state of the French
Army and military science before World War II : “ ... The command
cadres , deprived of systematic and regular guidance on the part of the
government, were ruled by routine. Concepts ruled in the army which
were held even before the end of World War I. To a considerable extent,
this was also facilitated by the circumstance that military leaders grew
decrepit at their posts , and remained adherents of outmoded views which
at one time brought them glory.” 73
We will add in passing that the French Communist Party was the

**De Gaulle, Voyennyye memuary (Military Memoirs), Vol. 1, IL , 1957 , p 34 .

49
most consistent fighter for strengthening France's defenses under the
threat from fascist Germany .
In the book Attention ! Tanks! ( 1937) , Guderian proclaimed as the
basic principles of tank employment massing, surprise, and activeness.
It is necessary , wrote Guderian , to reject resolutely the dispersion of tanks
in small detachments across broad fronts by subordinating them to infan
try. The massing of tanks into divisions and corps is the only way to use
them properly . The remaining combat arms should be subordinated
to the tanks. Forceful attacks by independent mechanized soyedineniya
were transformed into the chief means of blitzkrieg .
Guderian set aside a large role for surprise. He wrote that high mobil
ity " ensures surprise in actions of armored units. As a result of this
the preparation for an attack also must be conducted with consideration
chiefly for surprise.” 74 Guderian's concept has very strong aspects. His
views are a step forward in development of the operational thinking
of the fascist German army. Use of his principles of employing armored
troops supported by large masses of aviation facilitated the really lightn
ing-like defeat of the Polish Army in September 1939 and the Franco
British troops in May -June 1940, as well as the success of fascist troops
at the initial period of the war against the Soviet Union (not being the
only reason , of course ).
And still Guderian's concept suffered from onesidedness and adven
turism . In an era when infantry remained the basis for armed forces
it was impossible to degrade it as Guderian did to the degree of an
auxiliary combat arm , and to proclaim as the chief one the armored
troops, which comprised not over 10 percent of the ground forces. With
regard to the principles of operations of tank troops as recommended
by Guderian , they could be used successfully only under certain favorable
conditions, in the absence of a prepared and deeply echeloned defense,
without troops taking up such a defense , with a withdrawal of troops
for operational-strategic considerations, with a belated strategic , opera
tional, and tactical deployment of troops, etc.
And in fact, as soon as the front line of our forces stabilized in the
vicinity of Tula and Moscow , Guderian's theoretical views turned out
to be inapplicable . It is noteworthy that this can be judged in the example
of the 2nd Tank Group (Army) of the enemy, headed by Guderian .
All its attempts to take Tula , and then break through via Venev to
Kashira, shattered against the steadfast resistance of Soviet troops .
Guderian's army, as all the main body of the enemy, shifted to the
defense and was set fleeing in the course of a counteroffensive by our
troops in the 1941-1942 winter campaign .

** Guderian , Bronetankovyye royska i ikh vzaimodeystviye s drugimi rodami

voysk (Armored Troops and Their Interaction With Other Combat Arms),
Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1940 , p 28 .

50
 The victory of the Soviet people and its army in the Great Patriotic
War was also a triumph of Soviet military science . In the course of the
war Soviet military art constantly improved, throwing aside obsolete ,
outmoded techniques and methods of combat operations and developing
new ones,
In the course of the war the principles of military art received con
siderable development on the base of enormous combat experience
and changes which had taken place in the material basis of combat
operations. They found expression primarily in orders and directives,
regulations , manuals, instructions, and descriptions of battles and opera
tions. Individual principles were also reflected in theoretical works, since
military science, as with any other social science , cannot help but clothe
the results of its research in specific principles and rules .
In the last 10–15 years an especially active and comprehensive dis
cussion has begun in the Soviet military press of the important and com
plex military -theoretical problems which before this were not given
proper attention , including problems touching on investigation of laws
of armed warfare and principles of military art.
Views on principles of military art also changed abroad . We will
examine this evolution of principles of military art in World War II
and the post-war period in subsequent chapters.

51
Chapter 2 - Essence and Importance of Princi
ples of Military Art and of Laws of
Armed Warfare , Their
Their Dialectical
Correlation , Use , and Classification

Essence of Laws of Armed Warfare, Their Importance

and Use

The goal of any science is understanding of the laws of the field of

phenomena it is studying and use of this knowledge in practical activity .
As Lenin stated , science “ in all fields of knowledge shows us the mani
festation of basic laws in a seeming chaos of phenomena.” 1 A law has a
primary meaning in a number of philosophical categories as “ one of
the degrees of man's cognition of the unity and connection , interdepen
dence, and integrity of the world process.
Understanding of the laws of armed warfare and formulation of the
principles of military art is the chief factor which separates Soviet mili
tary science and Soviet military art into relatively independent branches
of knowledge and defines their practical value in the field of organization
and conduct of armed defense of our Motherland . Investigation of the
essence and nature of the laws of armed warfare and their dialectical
correlation with principles of military art is one of the most important
military -theoretical tasks .
Objective laws of war and armed conflict lie at the basis of principles
of Soviet military art. The principles of military art stem directly from
these laws. The principles are correct only when they answer objective
laws. Therefore, knowledge of the laws of war and armed conflict and an
understanding of the character of their action is an important condition
for skilled use of the principles of military art in accordance with the
concrete situation , and it comprises the basis of military -theoretical
training of generals and officers, just as it comprises the basis of all
military practice involving both the resolution of tasks of military develop
ment and the organization and conduct of armed warfare .

V . I. Lenin , Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), 5th

ed., Vol. 25 , p 46 .
· Ibid ., Vol. 29, p 135.

52
 In recent years we have published a number of valuable theoretical
works which touch to one degree or another on laws of armed warfare .
The authors of these works are well-known philosophers as well as
prominent specialists in the field of military art. They have made an
outstanding contribution toward resolution of many problems of the
laws of armed warfare. However, this topic is so vast and complex
that many of its questions still remain a subject for further research and
discussion . Moreover, some authors sometimes express disputatious,
imprecise, and even erroneous theses.
For a precise understanding of the essence of the concept of " laws
of armed warfare,” let us examine the philosophical concept of “ law .”
The Marxist-Leninist concept of law has great methodological import
ance for understanding and using the laws of nature , society , and mili
tary science in the practical activity of people . Materialistic dialectics
understands the laws of the material world to be essential, general, neces
sary, relatively stable, repetitious attributes, aspects, connections ( re
lationships ) , inherent to objects ( or a totality of objects ) of reality and
determining their development and functioning.
The world around us consists of subjects or bodies (people, buildings,
machines, trees, mountains, animals, etc. ) . In it we also observe phenom
ena ( thunderstorm , earthquare , historical events, etc. ) and there are
ties, or, which is the same thing, relationships between subjects, phenom
ena, or attributes of subjects and phenomena. For example, there is a
tie between a sunbeam and plant life : deprived of light, a green plant
perishes. The law of gravity expresses the tie between bodies of nature
and the law of Boyle-Mariotte — the tie between pressure of gases and
volume. The law of obligatory correspondence of production relationships
to the character of productive forces discovered by K. Marx defines the
interaction of productive forces and production relationships , in accord
ance with which the economic life of society determines its political
and spiritual life and expresses the tie between different aspects of social
life .
Any phenomenon or group of phenomena always includes a ramified
network of various ties and relationships : necessary and random , essen
tial and inessential, internal and external, stable and fleeting, etc. But
can any tie be called a law ? It stands to reason that this is not so . A
law does not represent all these ties and relationships, but only those
which characterize the essence and qualitative definitiveness of a given
phenomenon . Lenin stated that a law represents a “ quiet reflection of
phenomena,” 3 “ quiet” in the sense of that relative stability which is
inherent to a law . K. Marx characterizes a law as " an internal and
necessary tie between two phenomena.” 4 Lenin defines that “ a law

* Ibid ., p 136 .
* K. Marx , Kapital (Capital), Vol. 3, Gospolitizdat, 1955 , p 233.

53
is the reflection of the essential in the movement of the universe,” 5 it is
" a relationship of essences or between essences.” 6 This means that laws,
having an objective nature, are not the arbitrary construction of the
human intellect. Laws cannot be confused with the phenomena of nature
or society themselves. Laws represent not facts, phenomena, or events,
but essential ties and the relationships among them .
The concept of a law and the concept of essence are close, related ,
and of the sarne order, but they are not identical concepts. Law is
narrower than essence, and does not reflect all its varied features and
peculiarities.
In contrast to essence, a phenomenon is that which , though containing
certain essential features, bears within its basis a transient, unstable
character. The sphere of a phenomenon is considerably more diverse
than essence, with which it is inseparably connected and which it ex
presses in a specific manner. However, essence , and consequently, law ,
embrace only that which is determining and do not include everything
secondary and unessential. Thus , law does not include anything isolated
or random , while a phenomenon contains a boundless multitude of un
essential and external details for the given natural connection . In this
sense law is poorer than a phenomenon . On the other hand , a law has
the important advantage that it is more profound than a phenomenon ,
since it expresses internal, determining, essential aspects or ties ( relation
ships). Here law and phenomenon are inseparably connected . They
are the unity of contrasts which exclude and at the same time presume
each other.
Law represents internal, necessary , essential ties of phenomena. Un
essential ties introduce a particular nuance into the action of a law
without changing its essence one whit, but at the same time often hiding
the latter. This is why it is very important in studying any phenomenon
to identify its necessary, internal, essential ties expressed in a law , and
not let them be hidden by irisignificant and unessential ties.
The essential and necessary character of ties represented by a law
imparts to it an obligatory and compulsory nature which is expressed
in the demands of the law . A law has a necessary nature. The necessity
of a law means that in the presence of certain conditions ( under which
the given law is manifested ) the action of the law always sets in . Any
law of nature possesses this necessity , which Marx figuratively called
the “ iron ” necessity . This includes the law of universal gravity , the law
of conservation and transformation of energy, the law of interdependence
of mass and energy ( E = mc ), of radioactive decay , etc. By virtue of
this necessary character , laws determine a certain order, structure, and
tie of phenomena and events in nature . The earth rotates about its axis
according to a specific law ; therefore, we can be quite sure that at a

' Lenin , Vol. 29 , p 137 .

• Ibid ., p 138.

54
certain time night will be replaced by day . Laws of social development
operate with the very same necessity. Engels wrote that an economic
law cannot be abrogated in the very same way as it is impossible to
change the multiplication tables or the chemical composition of water.
Law represents that which is continually repeated and reproduced in
a phenomenon . A phenomenon is internally contradictory. It is unique
in its individuality and at the same time is repeated and reproduced each
time. It is changeable and at the same time contains something stable,
firm , and at rest.
Lenin characterizes a law as firm (remaining) and adequate (i.e.,
identical, repetitious) in a phenomenon. This thought of Lenin's can
be illustrated in the example of the chemical law of definite proportions,
which states that no matter what the manner in which a chemical com
pound is obtained , its composition will always be one and the same.
Here is expressed the stability and repetition which is inherent to the
ties represented by a law .
Recurrence is inseparably connected with another very important
feature of the law — its universality . “ The form of universality in nature
is a law ,” 7 says Engels. A law is something universal in the sense that
it embodies necessary , essential, stable ties of all phenomena in a given
field without exception .
Thus, universality of a law consists of the fact that all phenomena
are decisively subordinated to it in the field in which it acts . For example ,
the Boyle -Mariotte law acts only in the field of gases. But on the other
hand, the “ behavior” of all gases taken in an “ ideal” form (i.e., when
the pressure of gas is low and temperature is not very low ) is subordi
nated to this law . There are no exceptions to this law . Some laws are
universal in the sense that all phenomena in the world are decisively
subordinate to them . For example , such is the law of causality. Nothing
can appear without the corresponding cause.
Based on the general concept of a law , it appears possible to define
the concepts of “ laws of war,” “ laws of armed conflict,” and “ laws of
military science.” Laws of war are the essential, necessary , and stable
ties or relationships of phenomena and processes of war; ties and
relationships among peoples and armies of countries participating in war
and their governments, policies, and goals of war; ties and relationships
between war, the course of armed conflict, and state of the rear of states
and their economic, moral-policies, and military potential.
Military affairs encompass extremely vast areas : development of armed
forces, design and creation of means of warfare, outfitting the armed
forces with them , comprehensive preparation of the armed forces and
country as a whole for war, conduct of the war, military science , mili

' F. Engels, Dialektika prirody ( The Dialectics of Nature ), Gospolitizdat, 1955,

p 186 .

55
tary doctrine, etc. By virtue of this the laws of war are researched by a
great number of social and technical sciences.
Military science investigates the laws of strictly armed warfare, de
velops questions of the theory of military art, which comprises the basic
content of military science , and questions of development and training
of the armed forces and their military -technical outfitting , and also
analyzes the military- historical experience accumulated . Military science
considers the achievements of all other sciences which facilitate constant
improvement and progress of military affairs , based on Marxist-Leninist
teaching to the extent to which this is necessary for best cognition of
the processes of armed conflict.
We believe it necessary to stress that military science does not investi
gate the laws of war in general, but strictly the laws of armed conflict,
guided herein by Marxist-Leninist theory. A more expansive interpreta
tion of the laws of military science proposed by the authors of some
theoretical works may lead to confusion and an underestimation of the
specific nature of war which is included in armed conflict.
The laws of armed conflict are the deep internal, essential, necessary ,
stable, repetitious ties and relationships among phenomena of military
operations or their attributes which are manifested on battlefields in the
course of armed conflict itself .
The founders of Marxism -Leninism stated directly that armed conflict
has its own specific laws. Engels wrote that after the order is given ,
“ military movements on sea and land are no longer subordinate to the
desires and plans of diplomats , but to their own laws which cannot
be violated without endangering the entire expedition.” 8 Lenin remarked
that “ an armed uprising is a special form of political warfare subordinate
to special laws which must be pondered carefully.” 9 “ One must not
forget,” said Lenin , “ the fundamental laws of any war. Spontaneity of a
war is a danger.” 10
The laws of armed conflict express its relative independence and
specific nature . They differ from laws of nature and society, since they
characterize an extremely antagonistic process in which there is a con
stant contest to destroy the enemy's forces and preserve one's own ,
for the sake of directly opposite military -political goals, according to
special plans, and with the help of a special military organization. This
process constantly changes quantitatively and qualitatively in different
directions. Thus , this contrast of laws of armed conflict is caused by the
specific nature of war as a sociopolitical phenomenon . However, the
laws of armed conflict also reflect its close ties with the entire life of
society, with the economy, policy, and ideological relationships, and with
those concrete conditions under which military operations are conducted .

* Marx and Engels, Sochineniya (Works), Vol. 10 , p 1.

Lenin , Vol. 34, pp 382, 383.
10
Ibid., Vol. 44, p 210 .

56
Universal laws characterizing in a general form the development of the
material world also find reflection in the laws of armed conflict. As a
result of this, the laws of armed conflict possess, along with differences,
features which are similar to those of all other laws of nature and
society .
Laws of different types operate in nature and society : dynamic and
statistic , quantitative and qualitative , causal and noncausal, etc. Another
approach to a classification of laws is also possible, such as a gnosiologi
cal approach , which distinguishes empirical and theoretical laws. How
ever, it is the classification set forth , which is sometimes called ontologi
cal, that is of great importance for armed conflict. Depending on sphere
of action , laws are divided into laws of nature and society , as well as into
universal laws of the material world ( for example , laws of materialistic
dialectics), which act in all spheres of being and awareness ; general
laws, the sphere of action of which is sufficiently broad and not limited
by one or several phenomena (for example, the law of conservation
of energy); and particular laws, specific for individual sciences.
It is necessary to note that such a division bears an extremely con
ventional character. For example, many statistical laws relate to qualita
tive laws; dynamic and statistical laws are firmly connected and must not
be set in opposition ; quantitative lawsmay be either causal or noncausal,
either dynamic or static, empirical or theoretical.
Laws of a dynamic type fix the behavior of individual bodies. They
are distinguished by precision , and clearly express the tie between the
given and the subsequent state of the object. Laws of the dynamic type
obtained their classic expression in Newtonian mechanics. For example,
if two bodies are mutually attracted , then the force of their mutual
attraction is always the same and, according to Newton's law , directly
proportional to the square of the distance between them .
Military science , especially its military-technical branches, also has
to do with dynamic laws. The laws controlling the trajectory of flight
of a shell could serve as an example . At certain moments and under
certain conditions, maneuvering warships, tanks, and aircraft are sub
ordinate to the dynamic laws. Dynamic laws express the nature of
regulated processes. For example, the process of movement of planets
of the solar system , which possesses great autonomy, is regulated . Many
calculations concerned with the conduct of military operations and with
the use of nuclear missiles and radio and electronic systems are connected
with a calculation both of dynamic and of statistical laws operating in
spheres organically included in armed conflict. However, it is not the
dynamic, but the statistical laws, which express the nature of armed con
flict as a specific social phenomenon .
Statistical laws fix the behavior of the “ collective ” or “ ensemble”
of particles and act as a result of a totality of the action of a multitude
of individual movements. Statistical patterns are characteristic of pro

57
cesses distinguished by a massive nature . They are used widely both in
natural science and in the social sciences. Statistical laws, in contrast to
dynamic laws, express that tie between phenomena which does not bear
a single -value nature. They represent the result of a regular repetition
of a multitude of mass, homogenous phenomena. These laws operate
in processes of radioactive decay , in firing from a weapon against a
point target, in systems of mass operation, etc. For example, in the
spontaneous decay of radioactive atoms, various nuclei of a given element
decay independently of others at different segments of time, but the
average time of decay remains one and the same for this element, and
approximately one and the same amount of nuclei always decays in a
unit of time. The so-called radioactive constant shows what portion
of an overall number of atoms of 2 radioactive element decays in 'one
second. Here is another example. Let us imagine that have placed 1,000
black and 1,000 white balls into a box . They are distinguished only in
color and are mixed randomly in the box. With a small number of draws
from the box the number of balls of a certain color may be considerably
greater and we will not succeed in noting any specific trend . But with
a large number of draws, the number of black and white balls taken
out will become equal or almost equal.
Predictions based on statistical laws have a probabilistic nature. The
very theory of probabilities is actually a mathematical expression of the
real existing statistical laws. Statistical predictions do not allow fore
seeing an individual event belonging to an aggregate. But they are not
at all more " incomplete ” because of this than are predictions based on
scientific laws of other types. This is far from being an indicator of the
imperfection of statistical theory, as, for example , quantum mechanics.
The matter here lies in the nature of the objects themselves, in the
fundamental impossibility of “ precise” prediction , and in the essence
of natural patterns of these objects, which are qualitatively different
from the patterns of the dynamic type , although dynamic and statistical
patterns are closely connected .
Armed conflict is subordinate to statistical laws and has both general
features inherent to all laws of this type as well as specific features
stemming from nature and the special character of armed conflict.
The action of statistical laws in armed conflict arises as a result
of a mass employment of personnel, combat equipment, and weaponry
under approximately identical conditions, as well as with the manifold
repetition of events , when certain attributes common to all of them are
discovered .

For example, indicators of the tempo of offensive operations conducted

by the Soviet Army in the second half of the Great Patriotic War could
differ to a considerable extent in each concrete case and for a particular
combined arms or tank army, but still they varied about specific average
values characteristic of combat actions of that period and for the condi

58
tions which were in existence by that time. Thus in operations of the
second half of the war our combined -arms armies advanced with an
average daily rate of 20-30 km and tank armies advanced with a rate
of 25-50 km , and sometimes 80–100 km per day .
The width of zones of advance of armies in the second half of the
war varied from 7 to 145 km , but comprised 30-50 km on the average
for a majority of the armies .
The density of fire of small arms (bullets per minute per meter of
defensive front) set up in front of the forward edge of defense varied
from two to 12 , but the average was 5-6 .
Statistical laws express the nature of unregulated, chaotic processes .
For example , thermal, electromagnetic, and quantum movements are
unregulated.
The laws of armed conflict express the extreinely complex and contra
dictory nature of a special sociopolitical phenomenon --the process of
violent counteraction of warring sides to achieve diametrically opposed
military -political goals for each of them . The manifestation of laws in
armed conflict is complicated by the fact that the phenomenon and
processes of armed conflict are determined by the totality of economic ,
scientific, technological, and moral- political factors in the presence of a
certain lack of regulation or specificity and under the effect of opposite
tendencies and numerous chance happenings having the most diverse
character. Here the laws of armed conflict not only have to make a
path for themselves through a countless multitude of these varied random
happenings, but also operate under conditions where some laws oppose
others.
Armed conflict is, on the one hand, unregulated and chaotic process
in a certain sense. Lenin was favorably impressed by the words of Clause
witz that in the course of war there occurs a play of probabilities and
chance . Stressing this thought of Clausewitz, Lenin remarked that it
related more to the activity of a general. For example , each of the
warring sides attempts to use its actions to spread disorganization and
chaos in the planned actions of the other side , and often achieves this.
“ Any military action in any war you like,” wrote Lenin , “ introduces
a certain amount of disorganization into the ranks of the combatants.” 11
Such disorganization may be introduced by surprise massive nuclear
strikes by the enemy, by great losses of troops, interruption of control,
disruption of supply, an abrupt worsening of weather conditions or the
operational-tactical situation , etc. There may be a negative effect on the
planned actions of troops by the complexity of troop organisms consist
ing of a multitude of elements ( soyedineniya , chasti, podrazdeleniya )
with varying degrees of organization , combat training, coordination ,
moral-psychological conditioning of personnel, etc.
On the other hand , armed conflict is in a certain sense a process which

11 Ibid ., Vol. 14 , p 9.

59
constantly is regulated by more general laws, the political guidance of the
military organization , the activity of commanders and supervisors of all
echelons, etc. It was for this reason that Engels said that war is organized
armed violence for the purpose of attaining specific political goals.
A considerable degree of regulation of the process of armed conflict
may be achieved oniy by those commanders who possess high moral
psychological qualities, a deep knowledge of laws of warfare and armed
conflict, an ability to carry out in practice the principles of military
art based on the concrete situation , and a capability to foresee a majority
of chance phenomena and influence them in a timely and intelligent
manner. Even in the most difficult situation , such commanders are able
to skillfully control troops, correctly perceive and analyze the course
of combat actions, and foresee the onset of favorable or unfavorable
phenomena. Under the leadership of such commanders, the troops pre
serve or quickly restore combat effectiveness, a unity of will and actions,
and order and organization . With a more or less favorable ratio of
forces, such troops will be able to impose their will on the enemy and
parry him skillfully .
Thus, armed conflict is at the same time a chaotic and regulated
process .
A majority of statistical laws of war and armed conflict act with ex
ceptional specificity in comparison with the action of statistical laws in
other fields. This specificity is expressed primarily in maximum efforts
by both warring sides directed , first of all, at ensuring purposefulness ,
regularity, and organization in the actions of friendly troops and in their
firm control; and secondly , at creating the most unfavorable conditions
for enemy troops, disrupting their control, disturbing order and organiza
tion , and destroying or capturing them .
As a result of this , and also in connection with a rapid development
of military science and the revolution in military affairs, it appears to us
to be timely to pose the question of the advisability ofmaking corrections
in the classification of types of laws. A portion of the laws of armed
conflict operating under the most specific conditions should be relegated
to a new type of laws called , for example , regostatistical laws (from
the Latin rego , to guide ) , i.e., to statistical laws, the conditions of action
of which to a certain extent are subject to the control of man . It is
natural that this question can be resolved once and for all only after
supplementary special research .
Soviet military science is on the dividing line between social science
and natural science , and occupies a position between the social and
technical sciences. The existing classification of types of laws does
not fully answer the very involved effects of armed conflict and the
extremely specific conditions under which its laws force their way
through .
It is not excluded that laws of a regostatistical type may also be

60
discovered in processes being studied by other sciences such as nuclear
physics (with a controlled nuclear reaction ) .
Regostatistical laws facilitate the discovery, behind the seemingly
chaotic state of armed conflict, of a certain order and a specific logic,
and investigations of numerous attributes and indications of phenomena
and processes of armed conflict. They permit making new theoretical
deductions on this basis.
Laws may express the essential features of phenomena by means
of a quantitative or qualitative characterization of their inherent attri
butes.
Quantitative laws express quantitative relationships and yield to mathe
matical formalization . For example, such are the laws of mechanics,
the great part of the laws of physics, cybernetics, certain laws of biology,
medicine, linguistics, sociology, and others . These laws are stated with
the help of mathematical symbols, as a specific formula or system of
equations. Quantitative laws may be both dynamic as well as statistical.
Qualitative laws are expressed in science by words, since they do not
yield to mathematical formulation because they do not express quantita
tively measurable characteristics or relationships. For example, these
are the laws of dialectics, certain sociological laws, some biological laws,
and others. These laws express the qualitative specific nature of phenom
ena and reveal the general tendencies of their change and development
without uncovering the details and particulars inherent to this develop
ment. Qualitative laws, forming on the basis of an infinite diversity of
chance, specific relationships, particular natural patterns, etc., represent
a tendency which forces its way through a conglomeration of diverse
chance happenings. Qualitative laws are related to statistical laws. They
are law -tendencies, if one can express it in that way . In speaking of
capitalist production , Marx wrote : “ any general law comes to be in
a very confused and approximate manner, only as a reigning tendency
or as some average of constant variations which is never firmly es
tablished .” 12
It stands to reason that what has been said is far from exhausting
the problem of classification of laws. We have characterized here only
those types of laws required to be examined in an analysis of the philo
sophical essence of laws of armed conflict and principles of military
art.
Marxist philosophy, relying on the data of science and practice , irre
futably substantiates the objective character of laws, which is independent
of our will , desire , and awareness in general.
The objective character of laws means that they act regardless of
whether we know them or not. Thus the laws in accordance with which
the planets move about the Sun acted for tens of billions of years before
they were discovered by Copernicus, Galileo , and Kepler. The objective

» Marx, p 168.

61
character of laws also means that they act regardless of whether their
action is desirable for us or not, that people cannot create or destroy
laws, and that people can successfully carry out only that which corre
sponds to the laws of nature and society. With a change or elimination
of particular objective conditions, the laws of their effect also change
regardless of the will and awareness of people .
Inasmuch as the laws of armed conflict bear an objective character ,
the observance of these laws in guiding military actions is an essential
condition of the achievement of victory. To go against the objective laws
means to suffer failure. For example , such were the attempts to build a
“ perpetual motion machine,” i.e., such a machine which would work
perpetually without obtaining energy from without. They contradict the
laws of nature and so are doomed to failure. Demands of the law are one
of the expressions of its objective character. In order to attain the planned
goal it is necessary to reckon with the demands of the corresponding
laws. Violation of these demands dooms to failure activity in any area
until the given violation is eliminated .
History shows that the violation of laws of armed conflict leads to
defeat even by smaller enemy forces, let alone in battle with a strong
and able foe .
Sometimes the opinion is expressed that it is generally impossible
to violate the demands of objective laws of nature and society. This
assertion contradicts numerous facts . If the demands of laws were
impossible to violate , this would mean that any activity is carried on in
accordance with laws and must be successful for that reason . However,
this is hardly always the case . Failure in some affair often is the result
of just such a violation of the demand of laws. By a violation of the
demand of an objective law we have to understand not its abrogation
( it is impossible to do this ), but such actions which contradict this de
mand and thus make it impossible to preserve a given phenomenon or
hinder its development. Any attempt to ignore the demands of a law
makes itself known without fail from a negative point of view or even
has destructive consequences. For example, a house built without
sufficient consideration for the demands of the laws ofmechanics becomes
misshapen or falls down completely.
Laws of social development have a number of essential distinctions
from laws of nature .
The activity of people does not belong to the compulsory conditions
for manifestation of laws of nature . The laws of nature acted when man
still did not exist, and now act in an enormous number of instances with
out regard for what people do, without man's knowledge, independently
of him . With regard to the laws of society, they exist only on the basis
of those conditions which are created by the activity of people. Engels
wrote that the laws of society are laws of people's own social relation

62
ships. The effect of social laws is implemented in the form of people's
activity .
Another difference between laws of nature and laws of social life is
involved with the different relationship of laws of more developed forms
with laws of less developed forms in a particular field of objective reality.
Laws of complex forms of material in nature do not rescind laws of
less complex forms, but exist “next” to them and asume them . For ex
ample , when life with its laws arose on earth , the laws of chemistry ,
physics, and mechanics did not lose their force. Moreover, the laws of life
cannot and do not act without those premises which are created by the
laws of lower forms of movement of matter. However, in the history of
society , specific laws of an obsolete formation are not supplemented , but
are replaced by laws of a new social formation .
The peculiarity of laws of nature lies in the fact that they are changed
slower than laws of society. Some of them , such as the law of conservation
and transformation of matter and movement, are just as eternal as is
matter itself .
In nature there are many laws which , though not eternal, are very
long- lived . At the same time, a majority of laws of society are compara
tively short-lived and act only for a specific historical period , and then
give way to new laws.
Laws of even the most complex natural phenomena_biological phe
nomena — are incomparably simpler than laws of society, since the most
complex form of movement of matter is social.
The differences between laws of nature and laws of society also include
the fact that both categories occupy a different place in relationships
among classes, in class struggle . The laws of nature, as a rule, do not touch
on the interests of individual classes. Therefore their discovery and ap
plication take place smoothly and quietly.
However, social laws in a class society touch upon the fundamental
interests of classes. Classes which are dying out have a hostile attitude
toward the discovery and use of laws of social development, the action
of which leads to their downfall. The application of social laws is ac
complished in a class society in the process of acute class struggle.
Laws of nature are objective and exist independently of people , of
themselves. People study and get to know these laws. The objective laws of
nature and society are reflected in our awareness . We get seemingly two
sets of laws: some which are objective and others in our awareness , in
science . This second set we call the laws of science. These two sets of laws
are not identical and do not coincide fully, but they also do not con
tradict each other.

Laws of science represent a reflection of the objective in the subjective

awareness of people. They are the mental, ideal models of laws of nature
and society, and are , so to speak , a copy or photograph of the original
the objective laws.

63
 The laws of science more or less precisely reproduce objective laws.
The laws of military science are the laws of armed conflict which we have
come to know and which have received recognition. The laws of military
science thus represent a more or less precise reflection of those objective
laws, tendencies, and correlations which actually exist in armed conflict.
Of course , the difference between objective laws of armed conflict and
laws of military science , as between that which is being reflected and what
has been reflected , between the original and the translation , always is
preserved, but the basic essence of the objective law of armed conflict is
reflected in the correctly formulated law of military science.
The more essential and profound the ties of relations which the law
of science reveals, the more genuine it is. This means that laws of science
have an objective content inasmuch as they represent an approximately
true reflection of the laws of reality itself and the mental images of these
laws. Man does not invent the laws of science , nor does he create them
according to his own arbitrary rule or discretion, but he comes to know
the objective laws and discovers them . Science becomes a true science only
when it uncovers the essential ties among facts, i.e., when it finds the laws
which lie at the basis of these facts and, consequently, when it obtains
the opportunity of explaining and predicting phenomena of reality .
The content (and accordingly the formulation ) of laws of science
changes. This is caused , on the one hand , by a deeper understanding of the
corresponding objective laws, and on the other, by a change in objective
reality itself, and consequently , in its laws as well. D. I. Mendeleev
believed that the properties of chemical elements are determined by their
atomic weight. Subsequent data led to a conclusion that the properties of
chemical elements are determined by the charge of the nucleus. This
signified a refinement and a more profound comprehension of Mendeleev's
law . Along with a change in the objective laws of reality there should
also be a change in the laws of science which reflect them .
The laws of military science have a historical character, and are not
“ eternal" and " unchanging," as is asserted by many bourgeois scholars,
some of whom have been mentioned above . The historical method of laws
of military science is expressed in the fact that their content and forms
of manifestation are changing. Some of them cease their action , while
others arise in accordance with a change in concrete historical conditions .
Some of them in some wars receive determining importance, while in
other wars they receive secondary importance . Lenin wrote that in the
course of the French bourgeois revolution the revolutionary people not
only changed the system of social relationships, but also displayed “ a
giantic revolutionary creativity by recreating the entire system of strategy ,
breaking all old laws and customs of war, and creating in piace of the
old troops new , revolutionary , popular troops and a new conduct of
war.” 13

13 Lenin , Vol. 32 , p 80 .

64
 The historical method of laws of military science can be illustrated in
the example of a law which later we call the first law of war. It states :
the course and outcome of war waged with an unlimited employment of
all means of conflict are determined primarily by the corrleation of strictly
military forces 'available to the combatants at the beginning of the war,
especially in nuclear weapons and means for their delivery .
This law arose quite recently as a result of the revolution in military
affairs. However, in our view , there existed a law even earlier, in the
age of permanent mercenary armies, which determined the relationship of
the course and outcome of war to the correlation of available military
forces at the beginning of the war . True, it obviously was not discovered
or stated by anyone. This law existed objectively, since at that time war
was waged essentially by the forces of the army which was present in
peacetime. But this law ceased to act in the last century when war began
to be preceded by (or the initial period of war began to comprise
chiefly ) mobilization and deployment of large armies for waging a big
war, and when the economy of the warring states was shifted to military
rails.
In the fifties the " first law of war” arose because, under conditions of a
nuclear missile war, the outcome of a military engagement could be pre
determined by just the first massive nuclear strikes. But this war will have
determining significance only under conditions of a war waged with
unlimited employment of all means of conflict. Undoubtedly, in a nuclear
missile war not only the " old " laws of armed conflict will operate under
new conditions, but also new laws, including those which are still un
known to us.
Armed conflict is distinguished by exceptional complexity, the multi
lateral nature of ties, and its contradictory nature. Its laws are deeply
concealed and are understood in the course of a long, difficult, contradic
tory process of cognition . By virtue of this, our knowledge of the laws of
armed conflict always is relative and limited concretely to historical con
ditions. In peacetime this limitation is aggravated even more by virtue of
the relative value of the practice of troop and command and staff exercises
and maneuvers, since they are conducted without a real enemy and
possess a number of other elements of conditionality. However, this does
not at all mean that laws of military science do not contain fully reliable
knowledge of the elements of absolute truth .
Discovery of laws is not an end of science itself. Its highest task is to
serve practice and help accomplish practical activity on an ever higher
level. “ Laws of the external world ... are the foundations for man's
efficient activity ,” 14 wrote Lenin ,
By changing objective conditions it is possible to direct, change, or
prevent the action of laws. In accordance with the interests of practice ,

" Lenin, Filosofskiye tetradi (Philosophical Notebooks), Gospolitizdat, 1947 ,

p 161,

65
it is possible to accelerate or, on the other hand, retard the action of
some law or aggregate of several laws.
As has been remarked , a majority of laws operate only under specific
conditions. Knowing this, it is possible to change conditions in such a
way that the law acts in our favor or brings us the least harm . For ex
ample, friction retards the movement of a body; in order to weaken the
effect of the law of friction, bearings have been invented which sharply
reduce the friction of surfaces. However, not all laws of nature yield to
such a regulation of their action . For example, mankind is still helpless
to prevent earthquakes, thunderstorms, tides of the sea, to change the
time of a solar eclipse, etc.

Imperialist wars are the result of the action of objective laws of im

perialism . This basis of wars is also preserved at the present time, inas
much as there still exist imperialist countries. However , as stated in the
resolution of the 20th CPSU Congress, there is now no fatal inevitability
of wars. The forces for peace, headed by the camp of socialism , are so
powerful at present that they are in a position to prevent war and ensure
a firm and lasting peace . This is what it means to " curb ” a law and
prevent it from acting.
Laws of nature are either used by us in the form in which they operate
and without our interference, or those conditions are created for the
action of the law of nature so that it works” for us. In the latter case
we already control the action of the law . An absolute majority of laws
act only under specific conditions. By changing the conditions of action
of the law and boldly managing these conditions, we can not only use the
law as it is, but also consciously change the results of its action. For
example , by changing pressure we can increase or decrease the tempera
ture at which liquid boils. N. G. Chernyshevskiy wrote that “ nature is
passionless toward man ; it is neither his enemy nor his friend : it is some
times a convenient, sometimes an inconvenient field for his endeavor .” A.
Einstein remarked once that nature is complex , but not ill-intentioned .
The use of laws of armed conflict differs profoundly from the use of
laws of nature, since the enemy always has the most evil intentions.
The activity of people is a necessary condition for the use of laws
of society. This activity enters the action of the law itself as a necessary
point.
The laws of armed conflict, in contrast to laws of nature , are imple
mented through the activity of people and through the activity of armed
forces and troops having equipment, possessing awareness and will, and
setting certain goals for themselves. The use of laws of armed conflict
does not mean a passive adaptation to their demands. Inasmuch as the

66
laws have force under certain conditions, we have to influence these
conditions to attain victory .
In a combat situation many conditions yield to change — concentration
and dispersal of troops, combat formations, the number and quality of
weapons and combat equipment, etc. By changing conditions, people thus
change the sphere and force of action of laws of armed conflict and
direct this action into the channel necessary to them . M. V.Popov remarks
that herein lies one of the most important forms of use of laws of
armed conflict. Its other form is a conscious choice of one out of many
possibilities arising in the process of military actions. In the practice of
waging war both of these forms act in close cooperation .
“ The practical activity of people in armed conflict,” writes Doctor of
Philosophical Sciences Col M. V. Popov , “ is more successful as it cor
responds increasingly to objective laws. On the other hand, the action
of laws receives a broader range and takes place more intensively when
the conscious activity of people creates favorable conditions for this.
This once again confirms the fact that the action of laws of armed
conflict is manifested through the decisions of generals and the military
operations of troops, i.e., through the practical activity of people .
It must be kept in mind that there never can be an absolute coincidence
of the action of laws of armed conflict and the activity of people. Although
the laws of armed conflict act with the force of necessity , constant devia
tions take place along the path of their manifestation as a result of
the intrusion of the effects of other laws.” 15
The use of laws of armed conflict demands great knowledge and art,
since they are extremely complex and cannot be represented in the form
of simple mathematical formulas. If we employ Engels' term with regard
to the economic laws, they are very “ elastic” and the action of some laws
of armed conflict “ criss -cross with the simultaneous action of other laws."
The laws of armed conflict are realized by means of a crossing of different,
opposing tendencies, in a complex and rapidly changing interweaving,
making a way through an innumerable mass of the most diverse chance
happenings , i.e., not directly and immediately, but in zigzags, through
exceptions and chance happenings, dominating in the final account the
course of combat actions. 16
Not one of the laws of armed conflict acts in isolation, separate from
the others. The action of some laws intertwine with the action of others.

15
*M. V. Popov, Sushchnosť zakonov vooruzhennoy bor’by ( Essence of the Laws
of Armed Conflict), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1964, p 119.
16
16 See Marksizm - leninizm o voyne i armii (Marxism -Leninism on War and the
Army), 4th ed. edited by N. Ya. Sushko and S. A. Tyushkevich , Voyenizdat,
Moscow , 1965, pp 350–354 .

67
Any phenomenon of war may be properly understood on the basis of
research of the aggregate action of different laws of armed conflict under
those concrete conditions in which it arose . M. V. Popov showed that the
action of a particular law is manifested in different ways. Those laws which
have favorable conditions for their action obtain predominant influence,
while those which have no favorable conditions for their action are
manifested weakly or do not show themselves at all. In some cases the
action of several laws coincides , while in others particular laws set them
selves in opposition to others.17
The complexity and exceptional diversity of manifestation of laws of
armed conflict under the unique conditions of each battle, engagement,
or operation find their expression in the boundless multitude of large and
small , important and secondary phenomena of war.
Practice is a criterion for the truth of laws of science. Inasmuch as
it is possible to practically carry out only that which corresponds to the
objective laws of reality, this means that we must study these laws and
act not against them , but in accordance with them .
Here is what Army Gen A. A. Yepishev says about the significance of
considering the demands of laws of armed conflict in developing military
policy by the party :
“ It is a great art to develop a proper policy and a correct political
line. Having mastered this art to perfection , guided in everything by
Marxism -Leninism and applying it creatively, the party considers the fol
lowing in developing military policy :
a. The character and content of the age , correlation of class forces
in the world arena, and the country's international position .

b. The objective patterns and conditions of development of Soviet

society , and the tasks before it;

The peculiarities and character of wars of a given epoch , nature

of a possible armed encounter between socialism and imperialism caused
by the latter's aggressive policy and action ;
d. Military, economic, and other capabilities of imperialist aggressive
states, and the goals which they strive for by means of war ;
e. Demands of laws and patterns of armed conflict, deciding factors
of the course and outcome of war, level of development of military affairs
at each given stage, and the appearance of new means, forms, and
methods of armed conflict ;

f. Capabilities of the Soviet state for victorious conduct of wars in

defense of its freedom and independence .

17
See Popov, p 102.

68
 A thorough consideration and deep analysis of all these external and
internal factors is the most important principle which guides the party and
its central committee in determining military policy and deciding ques
tions of strengthening of the country's defenses. Observance of this
principle ensures realism and scientific grounding of the military policy
of the CPSU .” 18
Scientific foresights an important form of practical use of laws of
nature and society. Along with description and explanation , this is one
of the most important tasks of science. A scientific law is the fundamental
tool of foresight. It is possible only on the basis of knowledge of the
objective laws of nature and society. G. V. Plekhanov wrote that scienti
fic foresight is likely if, on the basis of experience, we “ establish a certain
law which makes it possible to foresee scientifically the course of develop
ment of history.” 19
Lenin pointed out the direct tie between foresight and cognition of
laws. He remarked : “ ... the tie of induction with analogy -- with surmise
(scientific foresight ) ” 20 and “ transition of a conclusion by analogy
( about analogy) to a conclusion of necessity ...” 21 i.e., to a law .
The ability to foresee is of great importance for the activity of military
personnel. Without foresight it is impossible to determine the prospects
for development of military affairs , successfully conduct military de
velopment, or correctly organize the education and training of soldiers.
However, foresight of military actions represents an extremely complex
process . This is explained not only by insufficient study of the laws of their
development, but also by the exceptional complexity of their manifestation .
Thus, laws of armed conflict are the theoretical foundation for foresight in
a battle or operation.22
Knowledge of the laws of armed conflict has great importance for the
scientific control of troops. Mar SU M. V. Zakharov notes : " Conscious
application of the objective laws of development of military affairs in
their practice — this is what the scientific activity of military personnel is.
. . . Scientific management of armed conflict presumes a knowledge and
comprehensive consideration of the laws of materialistic dialectics and
mastery of Marxist-Leninist methodology , which provides the only true
key to resolution of all problems of military affairs and all practical tasks.”
“ In order to carry out the scientific management of troops at all levels
it is necessary to have a profound knowledge and correct application in
ractice of laws ofdevelopment of military affairs and of laws determining
the course and outcome of war; and themost effective and complete use of

18 A. A. Yepishev, “ Vital Basis of Soviet Military Development,” Krasnaya

zvezda, 30 November 1967.
19 G. V. Plekhanov, Sochineniya , Vol. 2 , p 67.
20 Lenin , Filosofskiye tetradi, p 154.
21 Ibid ., p 155.
22 See L. S. Semeyko , Predvideniye komandira v boyu (A Commander's Fore
sight in Combat), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1966 , pp 50–54 .

69
the moral-political, economic, and scientific -technological capabilities of
our country for strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces and ensuring their
high combat readiness.” 23
The objective laws of armed conflict are the objective foundation for
the subjective — the conscious, creative , purposeful, expedient activity of
soldiers, officers, and generals. Their cognition makes possible a deep
understanding of the motive forces and tendencies of armed conflict and
its inner dynamics. This is the means of cognition of conditions and
factors on which the attainment of victory depends. The most important
significance of cognition of laws also lies in the fact that it arms people
with knowledge of the principles of military art and methods of military
operations.
The authors of a major theoretical work entitled Marksizm -leninizm o
voyne i armii (Marxism -Leninism on War and Army) did well in re
vealing the importance of a knowledge of laws of armed conflict:
“ Knowledge of laws of armed conflict, a study of them by Soviet military
personnel, and observance of them in developing plans for combat
operations ensures an opportunity to defeat an enemy for sure . Knowledge
of these laws protects against mistakes and arbitrariness in actions and
against adventurism . It makes it possible to foresee the course of military
events. It opportunely prepares measures preventing enemy actions and
protects against adaptation to spontaneous situations and against making a
fetish of chance . It permits making bold decisions, advancing clear, great
goals, controlling the course of armed conflict, and imposing one's will on
the enemy.” 24
The laws of armed conflict are valid for both warring sides. They
are not class laws, since they exist objectively, are passionless toward
goals, and toward particular estimates of people , and of themselves give
neither victory nor defeat. War, as we know , is a bilateral process and
both sides attempt to achieve victory in armed conflict. However, this
not only does not preclude, but even presupposes the existence of Soviet
military science and bourgeois military science, which are distinct in
their class essence , ideological content, and methodological foundations. A
serious difference also lies in the fact that Soviet military science , which
is not bound by the fetters of idealism and metaphysics, has considerably
greater possibilities for cognition and use of objective laws.25
Recognition of the common character of objective laws also is far from

* M. V. Zakharov , O nauchom podkhode k rukovodstvu voyskami (On the Sci

entific Approach to Control of Troops), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1967, pp 17, 18 .
24Marksizm -leninizm o voyne i armii, pp 348, 349.
25 See S. N. Kozlov, M. V. Smirnov, I. S. Byaz', and P. A. Sidorov , O sovetskoy
voyennoy nauke (On Soviet Military Science ), 2nd ed ., Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1964 ,
pp 74–78 .
N. P. Prokop’yev, O voyne i armii (On War and the Army), Voyenizdat, Mos
cow , 1965, pp 203-211.

70
signifying the denial or ignoring of a difference in political goals and in
the nature of war from both sides.
The laws of armed conflict seriously differ from laws of economic
development of social formations in that the former operate to an equal
degree for both hostile sides, while the latter are internal laws. Develop
ment of a world socialist system and a world system of capitalism takes
place , as was noted in the CPSU program , “ according to directly opposite
laws."
To investigate the essence of laws of armed conflict it is very impor
tant to reveal their correlation with laws of materialistic dialectics. The
laws of materialistic dialectics are the most general laws. They are a
reflection of the most essential ties and relationships of the material
world . In contrast to laws of armed conflict, as well as to laws of natural
and social sciences, their action is not limited by place and time. Ac
cording to these laws all matter develops in any of its forms and shapes.
Inasmuch as matter exists eternally , the laws of dialectics also are
eternal.
The laws of materialistic dialectics extend to all phenomena of armed
conflict, and equally to all phenomena of nature and of human society
and thought. But they do not operate in isolation or apart from laws of
war, but in inseparable connection with them . Moreover, inasmuch as the
laws of dialectics and laws of armed conflict concern the very same ties and
relationships, and the very same processes, the laws of dialectics are not
manifested independently and directly , but they operate through the
laws of war and armed conflict, being particular laws with regard to them .
For example , the law of unity and struggle of opposites, in the scienti
fic revelation of the content and action of which Lenin saw the essence
of the dialectical concept of development, acts in military affairs through
all laws of war and armed conflict and , in particular , through the law of
war which determines the course and outcome of war, victory, and
defeat, depending on the correlation of strictly military forces of the
warring sides. Here the enemies themselves act as opposites in the develop
ment of military affairs. The struggle between enemies for attaining
superiority in forces and for winning victory is expressed , in particular,
in a composition to create a more sophisticated weapon and to accumu
late it; in a drive for greatest destruction of enemy forces and preserva
tion of friendly forces in the course of military operations; in rivalry in
development of military art, military training and skill of troops, etc. The
struggle between enemies for superiority in forces is also embodied in
the interrelationship between means of attack ( striking) and means of
defense . This interrelationship includes one of the sources of constant
improvement of means of armed conflict and means of their use. In
the process of armed conflict there constantly arise other contradictions
which differ in character, such as between weapons and combat equip
ment on the one hand and the methods and forms of armed conflict on

71
the other. The relationship between defense and attack , between fire and
movement, etc., is contradictory . Soviet military science, employing the
dialectical method, reveals the contradictions in a timely manner and
determines the ways and means for overcoming them .
The action of the dialectical law of mutual conversion of quantitative
and qualitative changes in military affairs is manifested especially clearly
also through the aforementioned law of war and through the law of
armed conflict, which determines the dependence of methods and forms
of armed conflict on the material basis of a battle and operation . In
military affairs this law of material dialectics acts specificaily by virtue of
the peculiarities of development of military affairs. These peculiarities con
sist, first of all, in the fact that a quantitative and qualitative definiteness
of armed forces represents a very complex totality of very many
extremely diverse elements; secondly, in the fact that quantitative and
qualitative changes in military affairs arise and are made not of them
selves, but only on the basis of achievements of production , technology ,
and science ; and thirdly , in the fact that changes in military affairs are a
result of sociopolitical causes.
The revolution in military affairs is the most profound expresson of
the law of mutual transition of quantitative and qualitative changes. The
dialectical method helped our military science make correct conclusions
stemming from this revolution on the development of the armed forces,
their training , and developing new methods and forms of armed conflict.
The third law of dialectics is the law of denial of the denial. It
also acts in military affairs through the laws of war and of armed
conflict. Here it acts, not in isolation , not apart from other laws of
dialectics, but together with them and on their basis . Any concrete
phenomenon is not eternal, but is transient, because there acts within
it the law of unity and struggle of opposites. Its appearance and disap
pearance is carried out only through a spasmodic transformation of in
ternal quantitative changes into fundamental qualitative changes .
Acting, for example , through the law of war, which determines the
dependence of the course and outcome of war on the correlation of
economic, scientific , and technical capabilities of the warring sides, the
law of denial of the denial reveals tendencies of development of military
affairs and its progressive, ascending, and spiraling character. The law
of denial of the denial establishes an interrelationship between preceding
and subsequent stages in the development of military affairs , between
the old and withering and the new and arising. This law teaches us to
examine phenomena of military affairs in their progressive development,
and cautions against numbness and stiffness of military thinking.
Becoming apparent through specific , particular laws (such as the laws
of armed conflict) , and being organically connected with their entire
content, the laws of dialectics still have their own special content which
permits them to be spoken of as independent laws. Dialectical and his

72
torical materialism serves as a theoretical basis for Soviet military science .
Knowledge of the laws as well as of categories of materialistic dialectics
and their correlation with laws of war and armed conflict permits , first
of all, in the area of military affairs, creation of a scientific impression
of phenomena of war as a whole. It forms a scientific world outlook
and permits successful struggle against hostile ideology in military
science. Secondly, the laws and categories of materialistic dialectics serve
as a methodological basis for military -scientific research . Thirdly, they
arm us with a scientific method of revolutionary transformation of
reality.
The tie of military science and social science is not one -sided . Being
under the influence of social sciences, military science at the same time
itself has an effect on them . Study of the laws of armed conflict permits
a deeper understanding of the general laws of social development, the
patterns of class struggle , and the ways and methods of building
communism .
Historical materialism has enormous significance for Soviet military
science in world outlook and methodology. On the basis of general laws of
development of society being revealed by historical materialism , we
decide questions of armed conflict, proceeding in the final account from
the material conditions of the life of society and from dependence of the
processes of armed conflict on laws of economic and political life of
society .
The laws of armed conflict are interrelated also with laws of political
economy, since the objects which are studied by military science and
political economy are in close interrelationship and interdependence. This
dependence consists of the following: economy is the material base of
creation of means for waging war; the economic system of society
determines the causes and political character of war; economic relation
ships act through politics and ideology to determine the morale of the
populace and army. Military economics studies the specific character of
actions of general economic laws in war conditions, but this specific
character is determined chiefly by laws of armed conflict and principles
of military art. Therefore, military economics becomes in a certain
sense an independent division of military science and simultaneously of
political economy.
Laws of armed conflict have a close tie also with the laws of scientific
communism , knowledge of which has great ideological-political and
methodological significance for military art.
Juridical laws, which also operate in military affairs, represent a
special case ofmanifestation of objective laws. They can neither be set in
opposition to objective laws nor identified with them . Objective laws of
society and armed conflict exist regardless of juridical laws and may
manifest themselves independently. On the contrary, juridical laws are
established by the state and bear a clearly expressed subjective nature.

73
However, they are not subjective arbitrariness. There is an objective
content in juridical laws, since their appearance in one way or another is
caused by concrete objective economic relationships. Marx remarks on
this subject that “ the content of this juridical, or volitional, relationship
is provided by the economic relationship itself.” 24 Juridical laws may
answer the demands of objective laws or may oppose them . In the
latter case the actions of individuals may correspond to juridical laws,
but be in contradiction with objective laws.
Significant works on the laws of war and armed conflict appeared here
in the postwar period . Great results have been achieved in the scientific
development of this theme as of this time. However, the interests of
strengthening the defenses of our country and the entire socialist camp
require the conduct of further total research in the field of laws of war
and armed conflict, conducted by a broad front of representatives of all
fields of science .
In this book it appears advisable, for a proper clarification of the
essence of laws of war and armed conflict and of their correlation with
principles of military art and the content of certain laws and the
most important principles, to provide a brief analysis of the characteristic
erroneous or disputatious theses concerning laws expressed in works pub
lished in this country in recent years.
Some works mention among laws of war the dependence of victories
and defeats, not on the correlation of forces, but simply on the military,
economic, and moral factor or on level of development and use of all
economic , moral-political, and military capabilities of a state. This is
an example of imprecise interpretation of the laws, since war is a
bilateral process and presumes the presence of two opposing sides. The
one who wins is not the one with all the necessary factors or indicators,
but the one who has achieved a preponderance or superiority over the
enemy in these factors or indicators and who has achieved their favorable
correlation . This means it is important not only to have available con
siderable forces and means, but also to achieve a favorable correlation
of forces, not only from a quantitative , but also from a qualitative aspect.
Lenin examined the course and outcome of war as a process which is
determined by the general correlation of military -economic and moral
political capabilities of the enemies. The correlation of forces of the sides
is the objective basis of armed conflict.
The book by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent Col P. I.
Trifonenkov, Ob osnovnykh zakonakh khoda i iskhoda sovremennoy
voyny (On the Fundamental Laws of the Course and Outcome of Con
temporary Warfare ) (Voyenizdat, 1962 ) , places well- founded stress on
this correlation of particular indicators. The author includes as the
fundamental laws of war the following: law of dependence of the course
and outcome of war on the correlation of military capabilities of the
26 Marx and Engels, Vol. 23, p 94 .

74
enemies ; law of dependence of the course and outcome of the war on the
correlation ofmilitary-economic capabilities of the warring states ; law of
dependence of the course and outcome of war on the correlation of moral
political capabilities of warring sides .
Some authors identify the concept of war and armed conflict, which
leads to errors in definition of the content and statements of laws of
armed conflict. Meanwhile , war is a more comprehensive and broader
phenomenon than armed conflict. Armed conflict makes up the chief
content of war and the decisive form of its conduct, but the warring
sides also use other means and forms of struggle : economic, diplomatic,
ideological, scientific -technological, etc., which cannot be ignored .
Although economic, political, diplomatic , and ideological struggle is
also conducted before a war, with the state of war beginning only with
the outbreak of armed conflict, these forms of struggle change and take
on new content with the beginning of a war. It is very important to take
into consideration that with the appearance of a front there simultaneous
ly also arises a rear of the warring sides, the role of which is especially
great. If war is only armed conflict, then it should be managed by a mili
tary leadership . But as we know , a military command manages only
military operations and is itself subordinated to the government. Gov
ernments carry out the management of war as a whole . This means that
with a narrow understanding of war only as armed conflict we ignore not
only all other forms of struggle, but also the military -political management
of war implemented by the government, as well as the work of the
country's rear.
To this should be added that not just any armed conflict can be con
sidered a war. Without a political goal the most fierce battle, in the
words of Lenin , will not be a war, but simply a fight. From this it can
be seen that the thesis of the identification of war with armed conflict is
incorrect, leads to a denial of the class nature of war, and considers
changes only in one of the spheres of social life, ignoring other qualitative
changes in the life of society occurring under conditions of war.
As a result of an identification of concepts of war with armed
conflict, some authors do not see the difference between laws of war
and laws of armed conflict and the spheres of their action . They include
among laws of armed conflict all laws of war, including those which
are studied , not by military science, but by Marxist-Leninist theory and
other sciences, including economic and technical sciences , such as the
laws of dependence of the course and outcome of war on its political
goals, on the correlation of economic capabilities of combatants, on
the sociopolitical system , on the political-moral state of the populace,
on the level of development of science , etc.
Another group of scholars , while far from identifying armed conflict
with war, still expand the sphere of action of laws of military science to
the extreme. These authors usually divide the laws of military science

75
into three basic groups or orders. They relegate the most general laws of
war to laws of the first order. These laws are studied by the Marxist
Leninist teaching on war and the army. These authors place among
these laws the law of dependence of war and its conduct on politics ; the
law of dependence of the course and outcome of war on the correlation of
forces (economic ,moral-political, scientific, military ) of the combatants,
as viewed in its dynamics with consideration of the character of political
goals: law of dependence of the course and outcome of war on the corre
lation of moral-political forces and capabilities of the combatants.
Laws of the second order, according to the works of this group of
authors, express the essence of military operations of varying scale and
character. These laws include the law in accordance with which the
methods of conduct of military operations and their course and outcome
depend to a decisive degree on the amount and quality of weapons,
combat equipment, troop personnel, the skill of controlling them ; and also
the law which states that the effectiveness of troop combat activity de
pends on the correlation of the methods employed with the goals
(missions) set and the situation at hand .
The authors understand laws of military science of the third order to
be laws which express essential ties and relations arising as a result of a
mass employment of contemporary military equipment and of conven
tional and nuclear weapons by the combatants. These laws are part of
the content of individual branches of military science and of the cor
responding military -technical disciplines.
Such research is of considerable interest, but it is totally impossible to
concur with the point of view of the authors on classification of laws
inasmuch as all phenomena of military affairs have been relegated by
them to military science. It has been shown above that this is an
erroneous point of view . Moreover, following the laws of logic , it would
be possible to assert that the authors relegated even the Marxist-Leninist
teaching on war and the army to military science , since they relegated
the most general laws of war studied by the Marxist-Leninist teaching
on war and the army to laws of military science of the first order. How
ever, in reality , none of these authors take what is of course a groundless
position . It is simply that their views on classification of laws under such
a statement of the question are not always coordinated with each other.
Soviet military science relies on the general laws of war, which are
studied by Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, as being
its theoretical foundation . However, this does not provide a basis to
relegate the general laws of war studied by other sciences to the laws of
military science .
Along with those really existing , some authors relegate to the laws of
military science the ties and relationships operating in production and
society , especially two laws: production does not of itself or automatically
determine the quality and combat attributes of armed forces, but only

76
creates the possibilities and conditions to have these qualities ; production
has unequal opportunities to create various means of armed conflict; it
can provide somemeans in the amount and with the quality required by
the conditions of conduct of armed conflict, while others it is in no
condition to provide either in quantity or in quality, or in either of these
indicators. These theses, which are of themselves correct and very im
portant, nevertheless are not laws of military science. They only reveal
the essence of other objective laws and the deep processes characterizing
the thesis which Engels stated on the dependence of all phenomena of
armed conflict on production . These theses also cannot be statements
of laws of military science because production is not an objective of
military science.
Interpreting the laws of military science in an extremely expanding
sense, with a shift of action of many of them into the sphere of production
and into the development of armed forces, and not as objectively existing
laws of armed conflict which have been understood and have received
recognition , thus crowding the specific nature of armed conflict itself into
the background, the authors commit one more mistake: they lay pri
mary stress on the condition and attributes of the armed forces, and
to a lesser degree on the internal essential, stable ties and relationships
appearing in armed conflict among phenomena of military operations or
their attributes , which is incorrect for formal considerations as well.
One of the characteristic mistakes committed is the relegation to the
category of laws by individual authors of principles, rules, and even
simply theoretical theses and recommendations such as the demand
for deep formation of defense , the need to combine offense and defense ,
for activeness of operations, etc. There occurs an abundance of “ laws"
to which are sometimes added not only the most essential ties, relation
ships, and dependencies in phenomena of war and in the very essence
of these phenomena, but also phenomena lying on the surface, and even
normative rules. Such mistakes most often are caused by a simplified
impression of forms of manifestation of objective laws and an insufficient
development of methods of their identification . Objective laws, especially
in the military field , make their way through an infinite number of all
types of chance happenings. Meanwhile, laws of phenomena do not lie
on the surface, but must be revealed , using the scientific method for
this .
In some works it is even asserted that a law of conduct of combat
operations in a future war is fire of destructive force, movement, and
maneuver of men and weapons. Here the laws of armed conflict have
been confused with characteristic features and phenomena of war. This
is a result of a false understanding of a law . Laws of armed conflict
are not characteristic features and not the manifestation of objective ,
essential ties, but are themselves objective, essential, necessary , and
general ties.

77
 Some authors are engaged in a search for so -called “ laws of victory ”
and pile up complicated, far -fetched , multistoried formulations . It was
already noted above that laws of armed conflict have an objective
character. They exist and operate independently of the consciousness
of people . Laws of war are passionless toward goals and toward particular
estimates of people and of themselves provide neither victory nor defeat.
Doctor of Philosophical Sciences M. V. Popov remarked wittily on this
score that laws of war are to an equal degree both “laws of victory ”
and " laws of defeat.” Laws of armed conflict are not norms of com
pulsory actions of people in war. Neither formulas nor recipes of victory
provide understanding of the laws of armed conflict, but the possibility
of profound understanding of the motive forces and tendencies of armed
conflict, its inner dynamics, and an objective basis for conscious activity
of people, i.e., warmaking.
The publication in recent years of such major works as Sushchnosť
zakonov vooruzhennoy bor’by (Essence of the Laws of Armed Conflict )
( 1964 ) by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences M. V. Popov, Metodologi
cheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki (Methodological Problems
of Military Theory and Practice ) ( 1966 ) under the editorship of candi
dates of philosophical sciences and docents Maj Gen N. Ya. Sushko
and Lt Col T. R. Kondratkov, and the 4th edition of the capital work
Marksizm -leninizm o voyne i armii (Marxism -Leninism on War and
the Army) ( 1965) under the editorship of candidates of philosophical
sciences and docents MajGen N. Ya. Sushko and Col S. A. Tyushkevich,
facilitated the successful solution of a number of important problems
of laws of armed conflict.
M. V. Popov divides the system of laws of war into three groups.
To the first group of laws he relegates those expressing a dependence
of the course and outcome of war on the economies of warring powers,
their sociopolitical system , political-moral state of the populace and
army, level of development of science, and amount and quality of
weaponry.
The second group of laws includes those expressing a dependence
of methods and forms of armed conflict on the political content of the
war, on attributes of weapons and combat equipmnet, means of com
munication and transportation , terrain , season , etc.
M. V. Popov includes in the third group of laws of war a large number
of essential ties and relationships which are internal for armed conflict.
These are laws of operations on a strategic, operational, and tactical
scale , and laws of combat operations of different combat arms and
branches of the armed forces .
The second and third groups of laws form the laws of armed conflict,
according to Popov.
M. V. Popov provided the following statement of the fundamental
law of warfare: “ The political content of war has a deciding influence

78
 on the overall character of armed conflict, on the methods and forms of
its conduct, and on the employment of particular types of weapons.
In other words, the political content of war determines the character
of armed violence in it." 27
There is no doubt that the political content of war has an important
- -

effect on the morale of troops, on the general character of armed conflict,

and on methods and forms of combat operations. If the imperialists
unleash a new world war against the community of socialist states, it
will become a fierce and intense struggle of opposite social forces and
a class war on an international scale. This will predetermine the extreme
decisiveness of political and military goals of the sides and the active ,
destructive, and annihilating character of combat operations.
The dependence of armed conflict on politics is a law which expresses
the internal, necessary, and steadfast tie between politics and armed
conflict, which is the chief means of war as a whole. Therefore Marxism
Leninism demands that the resolution of all special military problems
be subordinated to political goals set before the Soviet Armed Forces
by our government, the Communist Party, and its Central Committee .
Conduct of each war is always determined under all circumstances by
the politics of the warring sides, and so military strategy , operational art
and tactics, and consequently the course of armed conflict, never represent
something independent of politics.
Popov provided a profound analysis of the dependence of armed
violence in war on its political content. The given law is also very
important, but in our view , it still cannot be called the fundamental
law as Popov believes. He writes ; “ The essential relationship between
political and armed violence in war is its fundamental law , because
its action permeates all processes of armed conflict from the largest
strategic operation to the exploits of the individual soldier. This law
comprises the pivot about which the action of other laws of war and
armed conflict unfold .” 28 Nevertheless, production and economic condi
tions also have great influence on the methods and forms of combat
operations . We will recall the well- known conclusion by Engels: “ Noth
ing depends so much on economic conditions as the army and navy .
Weapons, personnel, organization , tactics, and strategy depend primarily
on the level of production achieved at a given moment and on the
means of communication.” 29 “Military tactics,” remarked Lenin , “ de
pends on the level of military technology .” 30
The political content of war has an effect on the methods and forms
of combat operations through the moral condition of the soldiers.
However, the morale of soldiers and officers is determined not only

27
Popov, p 53.
28 Ibid ., p 54.
29 Engels, Anti-Dyuring (Anti-Duering), Gospolitizdat, 1948, p 156 .
30 Lenin , Vol. 13, p 374 .

79
by the political content of war, but also by a vast complex of other
factors such as the country's sociopolitical system , the people's political
moral state, level of propaganda work in the army, quality and quantity
of weapons, course of armed conflict, etc.
Popov rightfully notes that armed conflict, being the fundamental
means of resolving political tasks, also possesses a certain independence
with regard to the political content of war. This independence acts in
different ways in military operations of differing scales. It is manifested
more in the field of tactics and operational art and less in the field of
strategy. The most important strategic decisions are determined primarily
by the political considerations, with consideration for the availability
of means of armed conflict and other military capabilities. However ,
decisions of an operational and especially a tactical nature as a rule
stem from purely military considerations.
The relative independence of armed conflict on a tactical scale acts
most clearly. Popov illustrates this by instructive examples from the
experience of war, where division commanders (not to mention regi
mental and podrazdeleniye commanders ) made a decision based on
the concrete situation , and not for some special political goals. But
this does not correspond to the author's demand on the fundamental
law — to permeate all phenomena of armed conflict, from the combat
actions of podrazdeleniya to the largest strategic operations.
To the above must be added that victory by one combatant and the
defeat of the other is determined primarily by an objective correlation
of available military , military -economic, moral-political, and psycholog
ical forces and capabilities. These forces and capabilities of each com
batant in the final account are derivatives from the method of production ,
the condition of productive forces, and the character of production
relationships. The political goals of war themselves are determined
fundamentally by production relationships.
Thus, weapons, military equipment, and the political content of war
play an important role in creating new methods and forms of conflict,
but not directly, but through the personnel of an army. Under some
historical conditions the chief role in creation of new methods and
forms is played by weapons and combat equipment, while in others it
is played by personnel of the army. In the work Metodologicheskiye
problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki the statement is made: “ Revolution
ary transformations of military affairs in France in the period of the
bourgeois revolution of 1789–1793 were a result primarily of creation
of a mass army manned by representatives of classes of French society
having a revolutionary sentiment, although a certain role was also
played by the invention of a more sophisticated weapon (rifle with
curved butt and an artillery piece with lighter carriage ) . Now scientific
technological progress is a decisive factor for fundamental transforma

80
tions in military affairs. As a result of this progress, a fundamentally
new nuclear missile weapon has been created .31
Thus, this theoretical work ( one of its authors is also M. V. Popov)
covers the presence of a tendency for an increasing influence of scientific
technological progress and nuclear weapons on military affairs.
It is interesting to note that, in spite of the presence of the effect
of the political content of war on the character of armed conflict, the
methods and forms of combat operations of both warring groupings,
even with the diametrically opposed political goals of war, may in a
number of cases be more or less identical. For example, in the Great
Patriotic War the methods of employing tank and rifle troops of the
Soviet Army and of fascist German soyedineniya had no fundamental
distinction in a number of cases : the character of armed conflict often
was one of maneuver; both sides employed offense under some condi
tions and defense under others as the fundamental forms of combat
operations.
What has been set forth allows us to assert that although the given
dependence exists objectively, it can hardly be called a fundamental
law of war since it is not the fundamental or the most general dependence
of all phenomena of armed conflict, nor does it permeate all ties and
dependencies in war. It is right to relegate this dependence simply to
an important though not fundamental law .
Popov has provided a deep analysis of the law of dependence of the
general character of armed conflict and the methods and forms of its
conduct on weapons and combat equipment. He considers it , as with
the fundamental law , a law of war as a whole and a law of armed
conflict at the same time.
Popov includes the following as laws of armed conflict: course and
outcome of battle (or operation ) depend on the correlation of combat
power of those armed forces which take an immediate part in it; the
need for concentration of the main troop efforts on decisive axes; mili
tary operations on an operational-tactical scale are subordinated with
the force of necessity to interests of strategy, which in turn depends
on the results of particular battles and engagements ; in any battle ,
engagement, or operation that opposing side receives an advantage which
is able to forestall the enemy in deploying its forces into combat forma
tions and operational formations and beat him to the punch at the
beginning of active combat operations.
The first of these laws of armed conflict is stated very well, in our
view . The formulation of the remaining laws of armed conflict are far
from the best, and some are even debatable .
As the question is stated generally , military operations of an opera

Metodologicheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki (Methodological Prob

lems of Military Theory and Practice), edited by N. Ya. Sushko and T. R.
Kondratkov, Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1966 , p 122.

81
tional-tactical scale are really subordinated to the interests of strategy .
However, this tie does not possess the stability, recurrence, or univer
sality which are needed to elevate it to the rank of a law . The history
of military art provides numerous examples of the conduct of battles,
and sometimes even operations, which occurred by virtue of necessity
(and not just due to mistakes of the commanders) in local interests,
with no connection whatsoever with the interests of strategy , and some
times even in spite of those interests. This was especially characteristic
for combat operations in the withdrawal, in moving out of encirclement,
and sometimes on the defense . From the point of view of strategy , it
was often more advisible in the past war to preserve our forces and
means by moving them back to a new position , while at the same time
the interests of combat demanded standing to the death on some nameless
hill . We will stress that this contradiction is far from typical and char
acteristic. It is more characteristic to have a harmony of interests, and
not the oppostion of all three components of military art. However,
there are sufficiently many exceptions here to express doubt as to the
existence of such a law . Besides , there is one other “ Achilles heel"
in this statement of the law : it takes insufficient consideration of the
change in interrelationship and interdependence of strategy , operational
art, and tactics under contemporary conditions.
In wars of the past, battle was the sole means of defeating the enemy
and achieving victory, since operational and strategic leadership had
nothing but tactical forces directly subordinate to it as means for
defeating the enemy. In the final account the outcome of operations,
campaigns, and the war as a whole was decided by the aggregate of
many battles. This correlation did not suffer fundamental change even
with the appearance of strategic aviation and pilotless means of combat
during World War II, which were used by the high command directly,
since they were not such a powerful means of defeat which could exert
decisive influence on the attainment of the war goals.
With the appearance of nuclear missiles , the interconnection of the
components of military art changed radically. With the mass employment
of strategic means of defeat directly subordinate to it , the high command
is capable of deciding major strategic missions independently of results
of engagements and battles of the ground forces .32
Doubt is raised by the formulation, and perhaps even the rightfulness,
of the law on advantage in being first to deploy. He who deploys first,
of course , received advantages. This thesis is in itself correct, but it
does not characterize deep processes of armed conflict. It remains vague

2 See S. I. Krupnov, Dialektika i voyennaya nauka (Dialectics and Military

Science), Voyenizdat, 1963, p 91; Krasnaya zvezda, 8 April 1964 and 25 August
1964 ; Problemy revolyutsii v voyennom dele (Problems of Revolution in Military
Affairs), Voyenizdat, 1965, pp 105, 122, 127, 131, 140, 141; Istoriya voyennogo
iskusstva (History of Military Art ), Moscow , 1966 , p 612.

82
as to how this advantage will influence the course and outcome of a
battle or engagement. A platoon or company almost always will forestall
an enemy regiment in deployment, but this as a rule does not have
substantial effect on the outcome of the battle , let alone the operation .
Although it is very important to forestall the enemy in deployment
at the beginning of active combat operations for attaining victory , es
pecially in a meeting battle or engagement, this cannot be declared
an essential relationship which invariably involves a very specific result
under certain conditions, i.e., it cannot be considered a law . In the
Battle of Kursk in the past war the enemy began active combat opera
tions-- an offensive -- but the victory was won by the Soviet Army. One
can cite many such examples .
The following law is also debatable : “ the need to concentrate main
troop efforts on decisive axes.” From the viewpoint of formulation it
would be better to speak of the dependence of the course and outcome
of conflict on concentration of efforts on the main axis at the decisive
time. But this is not the chief thing. Almost all authors who consider
the concentration of efforts to be a law of armed conflict cite the following
statement by Lenin : “ To have an overwhelming preponderance of forces
at the decisive moment on the decisive point — this ‘law of military
success is also a law of political success. . . 33 But for Lenin the word
“ law ” as applied to military success is placed in quotation marks, i.e.,
used not in the direct meaning, but conditionally. In other words, Lenin
did not regard this as a law of armed conflict.
F. Engels called the “ uneven distribution of troops laterally for the
purpose of concentrating forces on the decisive point for the main
attack ” 34 a great tactical principle, and he was absolutely right! This
principle follows from the law of armed conflict on the dependence of
the course and outcome of battle ( or operation ) on the correlation of
combat might of the forces which are taking a direct part in it, and
from the law of war on the correlation of available , strictly military
forces.
A concentration of efforts is not a law , since it does not reflect the
necessary ties and relationships or the stable and repetitious attributes
and aspects of armed conflict. Concentration of efforts in itself still
does not decide the outcome of a battle ( or operation ) . To achieve
success it is required not only to have a concentration of effort on the
main axis, but to create there a preponderance of forces over the enemy,
and not just a preponderance of forces, but a completely specific pre
ponderance necessary for defeat of a given enemy. Even a concentration
of sufficient forces on the axis of main attack in the past war did not
lead to success, but became a cause for defeat in those cases where
forces were removed from those axes where they could not be removed,
33 Lenin Vol. 40, p 6 .
,
34 Marx and Engels, Vol. 14, p 355.

83
 and especially when the overall ratio of forces of the sides was unfavor
able and surprise of operations had been lost. The presence of numerous
exceptions to the action of the “ law ” of concentration does not provide
a basis to call this thesis a law possessing inevitability and stability of
action . However, the laws of armed conflict and war, from which the
given principle stems, operate to the full extent even under those condi
tions where a concentration of efforts leads to negative results.
In the work Marksizm -leninizm o voyne i armii (Marxism -Leninism
on War and Army) 35 the extremely complex interrelationships under
which military phenomena exist, both among themselves and with the
overall course of historical development, are arbitrarily placed into four
very important groups of patterns:
a . Expressing the dependence of the outbreak of wars, their goals,
and also the political leadership of wars on economic and political condi
tions;
b. Expressing the dependence of the course and outcome of wars on
the correlation of forces ( economic, scientific, technological, moral, and
. strictly military ) of the warring states and of their coalitions ;
c . Expressing the course and outcome of armed conflict (the patterns
of armed conflict ) ;

d . Determining the development and replacement of methods of

conducting military operations.
The authors include the following as laws of armed conflict: law of
proportionality among goals (combat missions) and forces and means
to be employed in their relation with forces and means of the enemy,
with consideration of factors of time and space ; law of dependence of
success on creation of a superiority of forces at the decisive moment
on decisive axes ; law of dependence of course and outcome of armed
conflict on nuclear missiles ; law of interaction and unification of all
branches of the armed forces and combat arms; the law according to
which a successful offensive is possible only with consolidation of posi
tions captured , drawing up of reserves and rears, adjustment of lines
of communication , and regrouping of forces; law of dependence of success
of attack and total defeat of the enemy on forcefulness , continuity, and
high rates of attack and on continuous pursuit of the enemy.
As it appears to us, the authors of this major theoretical work , which
is of great scientific importance , did not succeed in avoiding some short
comings and debatabie interpretation of questions on laws on armed
conflict. This concerns more than just the “ law ” of superiority of forces
on decisive axes, doubts of the correctness of which are given above .
This work looks at a “ fragmentation ” of laws of armed conflict, an
excessive narrowing of the sphere of their action , and a reduction of

35 Fourth edition , edited by N. Ya. Sushko and S. A. Tyushkevich , Voyenizdat,

1965 .

84
them to “ laws” of forms of combat operations. The work also relegates
a portion of the “ laws” of the offensive to laws of armed conflict. From
this position it would also be possible to find “ laws” of defense, but the
authors do not do this for fully justifiable reasons. The laws of armed
conflict are essential ties which manifest themselves in armed conflict
itself among phenomena or characteristics of military operations. The
sphere of action of laws of armed conflict is armed conflict itself, and
not just its individual parts. We are convinced that it was not by chance
that Lenin , in directing attention to the importance of consolidating
captured postions in the attack , drawing up reserves and rears, adjusting
lines of communication , and regrouping forces,36 did not call this a law .
This is a very important rule for the conduct of an attack , but it is far
from being a law of armed conflict. The very same can be said regarding
the " law ” of forceful, continuous attack under high tempos. This also
is an important rule, but if we speak of high rates of combat operations
in general ( both on the offense and defense ) , then this is a principle
of military art.
In spite of the decisive importance of nuclear weapons and the depen
dence of the course and outcome of armed conflict on them , it is evident
ly inadvisable to distinguish this as an independent law . These depen
dencies are reflected in the laws set forth below : in the law of war on
correlation of available, strictly military forces of the combatants; in
the law of armed conflict on the dependence of its forms and methods
on the material basis of the operation ; and in the law of armed conflict
on the dependence of the course and outcome of a battle (or operation )
on the correlation of combat might of those armed forces which are
taking an immediate part in it. These laws completely exhaust the essen
tial, necessary, and repetitious ties and relationships concerning the
dependence of the course and outcome of armed conflict on nuclear
weapons.
In addition to resolution of a wide range of problems, the work
Metodologicheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki devotes much
attention to laws of war and armed conflict.
The work provides concrete statements only for the basis law and the
following two laws of armed conflict :
a . There is a most essential tie between the characteristics of weapons
and combat equipment and the methods and forms of armed conflict;
b . At any given moment in its development, any battle or operation
takes shape in favor of that opponent, the troops of which possess
greater combat power.37
These formulations reflect objectively existing, necessary, and stable
ties of phenomena and processes of armed conflict. With regard to

36 See Lenin , Vol. 36 , p 176 .

" See Metodologicheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki, pp 102–104.

85
the basic law of war, its content and wording coincide with those cited
in the book by M. V. Popov, Sushchnosť zakonov vooruzhennoy bor’by
(Essence of the Laws of Armed Conflict ) , and are unfortunately debat
able , as was shown above.
This digression into the most important works which examine laws
of war and armed conflict attests to the fact that there still has not been
success in attaining uniform views on questions of the content and
wording of concrete laws of war and armed conflict. A majority of works
examine the most diverse and often completely dissimilar laws, often
with no distinction drawn between the laws of war, armed conflict, and
military science , and these concepts themselves sometimes interblend.
Some authors also mix up laws of armed conflict and principles of
military art. The classification of law also suffers from errors in some
works. It is the urgent task of our science to achieve a standardization
of such a classification . This question is resolved by many authors in
different ways. Various works divide laws into groups, subgroups, series,
levels, categories, the most general laws, specific laws, as well as laws
of war, of military science , and of armed conflict. Their division does
not always have sufficient grounds : usually it is too complex, and some
times even confusing, which strongly complicates an understanding of
the laws and observance of their demands.
At times a dissimilar approach is permitted toward the objective
content of a concept. As a result there is a confusion of laws of armed
conflict with principles of military art, the concepts of war and armed
conflict, the concepts of laws of war and laws of military science , poten
tial, and factor, etc. Lenin cautioned us: “We must clarify a concept
precisely if we wish to conduct a discussion .” 38 These words of Lenin
have great importance under contemporary conditions as well, since
with the rapid development of military affairs certain concepts and cate
gories are filled with new content and new concepts and categories arise.
This must be considered , as concepts and categories are levels and bases
of cognition. Insufficient attention toward them may lead to erroneous
conclusions.
The possible duration , methods, and forms of unleashing and con
ducting a future war in many cases are not taken into consideration
or are considered insufficiently in expounding the laws of war and
laws of armed conflict. As a result of this the economy, level of develop
ment of productive forces, and correlation of forces (economic, scientific ,
technological, moral, and strictly military) are often examined in the
old way, with stress on the possibility of their build -up in the course
of war.
Even under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons the course
and outcome of war are determined in the final account by the economy
of the society and method of production , but not by what the economy
38
38 Lenin , Vol. 30 , p 93 .

86
will provide for war in wartime, but primarily by what it provides and
is capable of providing in peacetime. It is not by chance that the military
leaders of imperialist states determined the duration of the initial period
of war to be approximately three days. Using a nuclear strike (the main
mass of prepared nuclear warheads) during this period , the military
leaders of imperialist states hope to predetermine the outcome of the
war in their favor. ( See Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva (History of Military
Art ] under the editorship of A. A. Strokov , Moscow , 1966 , p 610.) There
is also an increase in the role of military art, especially strategy , and
in the importance of expertise and timeliness of combat use of the main
means of conflct, since mistakes in this area may lead to fatal conse
quences and there may not be time to correct them . This means that
the decisive importance of superiority over the enemy in correlation
of available forces and means must find expression in the content and
wordings of laws of war and armed conflict.
What has been set forth attests to the need to bring theoretical views
on laws of war and armed conflict to a uniform , scientifically grounded
understanding with consideration of the changed conditions of preparing
and conducting combat operations.
To regulate the classification of laws we propose to arbitrarily divide
the exceptionally complex , necessary , and essential interdependencies
in which the phenomena of war finds themselves into two systems, with
consideration for the aforementioned definitions of the concepts of
“ laws of war,” “ laws of armed conflict,” and “ laws of military science.”
These systems are the laws of war and laws of armed conflict. As was
noted above, the laws of armed conflict which have received cognition
and recognition are laws of military science. The laws of war are investi
gated by Marxist-Leninist teaching and by many other social and tech
nical sciences. Military science takes account of the demands of these
laws and relies on them since armed conflict depends on political and
economic factors, the morale of the people , etc.
The laws of war and laws of armed conflict closely interact, intertwine,
and penetrate each other mutually, each in its own system as well as
between systems. Therefore , a division of them into systems or groups
bears an arbitrary or relative character. By virtue of this, some laws
of war are in a certain sense also laws of armed conflict, since they not
only determine the course and outcome of war as a whole, but also have
a direct or inderect influence on the development of combat (military)
operations. On the other hand, the laws of armed conflict are to one
degree or another also laws of war, the more so as armed conflict com
prises the chief content of war.
The very system of laws of war has a complex structure which until
now has been almost unexplored . It is especially important to establish
the correlation of a group of laws of this system , which are studied
by the Marxist-Leninist teaching, with laws of armed conflict. This

87
correlation is determined by the character of the correlation of the two
aforementioned systems of laws, as set forth above . At the same time, it
can be made more concrete as the correlation of general laws and par
ticular laws.
In our literature the problem of correlation of general and particular
laws has not yet received complete resolution . In examining this question
some of our authors commit errors of a dual nature . The first mistake
consists of reducing particular laws to general laws or , to the contrary ,
of asserting that general laws can be manifested only through particular
laws, but that they never act independently. The other mistake lies in
separating general laws from particular laws and in asserting that they
are not interconnected and operate independently of each other.
It seems to us that in armed conflict general laws (the laws of war)
are manifested both through particular laws ( the laws of armed conflict) .
and also directly . For example , the law of war, which determines the
course and outcome of war depending on the correlation of available ,
strictly military forces of the combatants , is manifested chiefly through
the first law of armed conflict, which determines the dependence of
methods and forms of armed conflict on the material foundation of
the battle, the operation , and the war as a whole , since it is the avail
ability of strictly military forces, especially nuclear weapons , at the
beginning of the war which determines the methods and forms of its
conduct in the first days of the war.
At the same time, the law of war which determines its course and
outcome depending on the political content of war and the correlation
of moral-political and psychological capabilities of the people and the
army of combatants is manifested both directly and through the laws of
armed conflict. General laws are not manifested through particular laws
in those cases where they concern different ties and relationships .
Thus, the laws of war operate both through the laws of armed con
flict and also independently , in inseparable tie with particular laws and
penetrating each other mutually , but not at all forming two parallel
series which do not intertwine or have common points of contact. The
laws of war and laws of armed conflict cannot be reduced to one and
the same, but at the same time they must be examined alone.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the most characteristic thing of that
group of laws of war studied by the Marxist-Leninist teaching is their
action through the laws of armed conflict ( general through particular ),
since fewer examples are known of the independent action of these gen
eral laws . We draw such a conclusion on the basis of knowledge available
at a given time. Therefore, examples of the independent action of general
laws do not guarantee that with time the corresponding particular laws
still unknown to us will not be discovered for them .
Groups of laws of war studied by other sciences operate both through
laws of armed conflict as well as independently. This interdependence

88
-

has been investigated poorly until now , but it stems from the patterns
of development of matter and may be reinforced by proof in an analogy
with laws of natural sciences and of social development.
Below is given in very brief form the content of some laws of war
and laws of armed conflict and their wording. The detailed content of
these laws is not set forth here, since this goes beyond the framework
of this work. It is natural that these several laws cannot encompass
the entire diversity of essential ties and phenomena of war and armed
conflict. They are given here only for the purpose of subsequent identifi
cation of the correlation of laws of armed conflict and principles of
military art and for a more profound understanding of the essence of
principles of military art.
It is appropriate to note that the wordings given below are far from
adequate for laws. However, this does not signify that these laws are
not genuine. In the 19th century it was erroneously believed that the
wording of laws of mechanics was adequate . It turned out, however ,
that the real field of applicability of these laws was more narrow . "It
became necessary to limit it to bodies moving with a velocity which was
rather low in comparison with the speed of light. A law cannot be identi
fied with a single one of its historical wordings. We never can be sure
that a given formulation is really adequate. It is the task of formulations
to provide the content of a law at a given period of its development.
We suggest that in particular four laws, expounded below , be included
as laws of war .
The first law of war is that the course and outcome of war waged
with unlimited employment of all means of conflict depends primarily
on the correlation of available , strictly military forces of the combatants
at the beginning of the war, especially in nuclear weapons and means
of delivery .
This law objectively exists and will have decisive importance in a
world war, if an aggressor begins one with the massive employment
of all means of warfare, including strategic nuclear weapons. Reliance
on available forces in such a war comes from the fact that it may not
be long in duration , since the outcome of a military engagement in it
may be predetermined by the very first massive nuclear strikes.
With the mass introduction of nuclear missiles into the armed forces
of imperialist states, Soviet military science arrived at the concluson
that war can be begun by available groupings of troops, and not by
previously mobilized armed forces, and that the beginning of a war
can have a decisive effect on the outcome.
Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy wrote that a world thermonuclear war
may be short-lived and we must strive to destroy an aggressor in a short
period of time. (See R. Ya. Malinovskiy's Bditeľno stoyať na strazhe
mira (Stand Vigilantly on Guard of Peace ], pp 26 , 27.)
The USA and other NATO countries arrived at the conclusion that

89
in a future war it will be difficult to perform a strategic deployment
of armed forces. Therefore they took steps to have armed forces in
complete combat readiness in peacetime. It was envisaged that with
them it would be possible to unleash a war unexpectedly and achieve
strategic success in a very short period . (See Istoriya voyn i voyennogo
iskusstva [History of War and Military Art], 1970, pp 528 , 529.)
The USA developed a military industry on an enormous scale and
maintains “ partial mobilization in the military and industrial fields."
( J. Tompkins, Oruzhiye tret’yey mirovoy voyny [Weapons of World War
III], Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1969, pp 20 , 233.)
Victory in war will be formed not so much from the sum of particular
successes, but as a result of the effective application of a state's maximum
power at the very beginning of armed conflict. The simultaneous defeat
of the armed forces, including strategic nuclear means, and enemy
installations of economic potential to attain war goals in a short time
this is what was advanced to the fore in 1959 .
A new world war, if it is not prevented , historically will be devoid
of prospects for the imperialists. Victory in a future war will be on the
side of states of the world socialist system who are defending a just
cause and who possess vast military , economic, moral-political, and
psychological capabilities and the support of workers of all countries.
From this law come a number of the most important principles of
military art, including the principle of surprise and concentration of
main efforts at the decisive place at the decisive time.
It is important to stress that the correlation of forces both in this
law and in all other cases must be characterized not only by quantitative,
but also by qualitative indicators. The quality of the armed forces is
above all the capability to accomplish practically missions of defeating
the enemy. Quality of troops is organically connected with their quantity .
However, if there are major shortcomings in the quality of troops, it is
impossible to make up for them by a simple increase in numbers. At
the same time, the advantage may lie with that opposing side which
possesses a fewer number of troops, but which is capable of using them
better thanks to higher quality. The quantitative and qualitative specifics
of armed forces represent a very complex aggregate of a great many
extremely diverse elements.
Quality of the armed forces as a whole is determined by the character
of the social system , politics of the given state, and level of development
of productive forces, science, and technology . The qualitative specifics
of troops include their class composition , national traditions, morale ,
the political awareness of soldiers in particular, physical condition, mili
tary skill of personnel, quality of armaments, state of military science
and military art, organizational abilities and personal military attributes
of commanders and military leaders. The state of their combat readiness

90
is one of the important elements characterizing the qualitative specifics
of armed forces in contemporary warfare .
Nevertheless , in spite of the great importance of quality of troops,
only the qualitative and quantitative indicators together provide an
integral characterization of the armed forces. Quantitative changes give
rise to changes in the qualitative specific of troops. Both of these indica
tors constantly interact and determine each other. For example , con
temporary complex combat equipment may be used at full capacity only
in the presence of a certain number of personnel possessing high combat
qualities. There is also nothing which can compensate for an absence
of nuclear weapons. Historical experience shows that superiority in
number of troops always acted as one of the most important premises
for victory over the enemy.
For successful realization of the combat might of armed forces, there
is decisive importance in military art, the creative and organizational
capabilities of commanders, the activity of higher political and state leader
ship of the country and the military leaders, and their capability to create
an overwhelming preponderance of available forces on the decisive axis
for accomplishment of the most important missions.
In past wars there were many cases where a state suffered defeat
even when there was a correlation of available, strictly military forces
favorable to that state. Thus, England, France, and Poland together
surpassed fascist Germany in forces at the moment of its attack on
Poland by 11/2 the number of divisions, almost double the number of
aircraft, and over 5 times the number of large military warships . The
potential was at hand for the defeat of Germany by the western countries .
However, ruling circles of England and France , who were nourishing
anti- Soviet plans and calculations, did not organize appropriate resistance
to the fascist aggression . Their armies suffered serious defeat at the
beginning of World War II. This was aided by major operational-strategic
mistakes by the supreme command of the allied armies.
The above attests to the extremely great importance of this law .
However , it is still impossible to make it absolute. The area of applic
ability of the law being analyzed is above all world war, if it begins
with the unlimited employment of all means of warfare. However, under
other conditions the role of this law is reduced sometimes even to a
secondary one, conceding first place to other laws, especially those
which have been called the second , third , and fourth laws of war in
this work (the importance of these laws is not defined , of course ; the
numbering is given only for considerations of ease of exposition ) .
The second law of war is that the course and outcome of war de
pends on the correlation of military potentials of the combatants.
Military potential expresses the maximum capability of a state to
maintain and improve armed forces, increase their combat power, man
them with trained personnel, and supply them with contemporary mili

91
tary equipment and all forms of allowances in peacetime and especially
during wartime 39 Being a derivative of economic conditions and scientific
and moral-political potential, military potential directly expresses the
defensive might of states ( or coalitions) and acts as its most important
aspect .
The content of this law is well revealed in the work by P. I. Trifonen
kov entitled Ob osnovnykh zakonakh khoda i iskhoda sovremennoy
voyny (On the Fundamental Laws of the Course and Outcome of Con
temporary Warfare ) ( 1962 ) , and in other works . We will show here
only the conditions under which the given law finds application .
The statement by R. Ya. Malinovskiy cited above concerning the
possibility of a short- lived war stems from the fact that enormous capa
bilities of nuclear missiles and other means of warfare permit attaining
war goals in a relatively short time. Therefore it is necessary to develop
and improve the means and methods of armed conflict with an eye to
attaining victory over an aggressor primarily in the course of a fleeting
war. This will be aided by massive nuclear missile strikes delivered for the
purpose of destroying the aggressor's means of nuclear attack and a
simultaneous mass destruction of vital installations comprising the
enemy's military, political, and economic might, as well as for crushing
the will to resist and obtaining victory in the shortest time possible .
However, the war also could drag out, which will require a prolonged
and extreme effort from the army and the people.40 Therefore it is
necessary to be ready for a protracted war as well and to prepare
human and material resources for this eventuality .
In some conjectural methods by which war is unleashed , it may assume
a protracted character, with its course and outcome depending on the
correlation of military potentials. An important role will be played by
changes in the correlation of forces and potentials in the course of the
war .
The third law of war is that the course and outcome of war depends
on its political content.
The fourth law of war is that the course and outcome of war depends
on the correlation of moral-political and psychological capabilities
of the people and armies of the combatants.
Each of these laws individually has been researched in a number of
the aforementioned works, in the book by Maj Gen S. K. Il'in entitled
Moralnyy faktor v sovremennoy voyne ( The Moral Factor in Contem
porary War) (Voyenizdat, 1967) , and in other works . Therefore we
will examine here only some aspects of the aggregate effect of these
laws and several individual questions having immediate importance for
principles of military art. One of these questions is the psychological

30 See Marksizm - leninizm o voyne i armii, p 296 .

Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskusstva (History of Wars and Military Art), Mos
cow , Voyenizdat, 1970. p 490 .

92
preparation of troops, about which contradictory judgments often are
expressed . Analysis of the aggregate effect of these laws is especially
important, since the firmness of morale of the people and the army
depends primarily on the character of the socio -economic system and
political goals of a given war. The socialist system and just character of
war stemming from it are a source of high morale of armies of socialist
countries. The army of an exploiting society which is waging a predatory
war can have only a flimsy morale based on deception of the masses ,
bribery , and the rousing of base instincts. This conclusion from the
many centuries history of wars is also confirmed by data of the dirty
aggressive actions of American invaders in Vietnam .
The political goal of war has a direct influence on the moral forces
of a people and army. Lenin remarked : “ Conviction as to the justness .
of a war and recognition of the necessity to sacrifice one's life for the
good of one's brothers raises the spirit of soldiers and forces them to
endure unprecedented hardships.” 41
Further increase of the role of the factor of morale in contemporary
warfare is an objectively existing pattern . Proper evaluation of the role
of the moral factor is a fundamental question having both a theoretical
as well as a great practical significance, since on this depends the resolu
tion of many tasks of military construction , and primarily the moral
political and psychological preparation of the people and army.
The moral factor represents a unity of the morale of the people and
army, the state of which depends to a decisive degree on the character
and goals of war and the degree to which the people understand them .
Lenin gave a definition that the moral factor in its essence represents
a moral- political factor, at the basis of which lie the character of social
and state order and the socio -economic relations of people ; that all
elements of the moral factor are under the guiding, determining influence
of ideology, which nourishes the spiritual life of society and the morale
of the people.
It is accepted to take the moral factor of Soviet society to be a
manifestation of social awareness which characterizes the spiritual
ability of the popular masses to resolve major social, political, and eco
nomic tasks facing the country . As applied to war, the moral factor
signifies the spiritual ability of the people and army to endure stead
fastly any difficulties and deprivations and the most severe tests of war,
not to lose the will to win , and to ensure the defeat of the enemy.
The existing danger that imperialists will unleash an aggressive war
against the Soviet Union and countries of the socialist commonwealth
demands that we be constantly ready for any trials which may arise,
that the people and army have a firm moral spirit, moral-political and
psychological steadfastness , bravery , and fearlessness. It demands a
further strengthening of the moral-political and psychological condition

" Lenin , Vol. 41, p 121.

93
ing of all the Soviet people and the formation of a person who combines
within himself high ideals , efficiency , moral purity, and physical per
fection , who is able to assume the resolution of complex and responsible
problems of building and defending communism and to handle them
successfully
Under those conditions there has been a sharp rise in the importance
of moral spirit in the people and army in peacetime, inasmuch as the
degree of combat readiness of the Armed Forces depends on it. And
the security of the Soviet State and fate of the building of communism
depend in a most direct manner on the level of combat readiness of
the troops. In its turn , the continuous maintenance of combat readiness
of the Armed Forces at the highest level comprises an important condi
tion for firming up the moral steadfastness of the army and people in case
of nuclear war.
As a result of this, the moral load on personnel increases even in
peacetime, the more so as many servicemen under conditions of employ
ment of nuclear weapons become directly accustomed to accomplishing
strategic missions in wartime. The moral spirit of the people and army
must be constantly at the highest level in peacetime, since there may not
be time for building up moral spirit in the people and army with the
onset of war.
In spite of the fact that the sources of moral spirit of the people and
army are the very same elements from which the economic, political, and
spiritual life of the country derive , the moral capabilities of any imperial
ist state may vary within broad limits, depending on the political goal of
the war, especially at its beginning.
Depending on the relationship of the mass to this goal, the moral
capabilities of an imperialist state change , although its social nature
remains unchanged . If the masses recognize the political goal of war as
just, the moral capabilities of a state rise , while in the opposite case
they are reduced . Such is the general pattern , and so the question of the
moral capabilities of states must be resolved in connection with the
political content of the wars organized by them . Here it should be
kept in mind that the dependence of the moral state of peoples and armies
on the economic system is not at all automatic . There also does not
exist an automatic dependence between the attitude of masses toward
a war and the political goal of that war. At each historical stage the
moral forces of states are determined , as Lenin said , by the correlation
of actual forces of all classes in all states .42
What has been set forth attests to the closest tie of the political content
of war with the moral spirit of the people and army.
Moral-political capabilities of a people and army should desirably be
examined in the correlation between the warring sides. In our view , the
arguments cited above in favor of examining not simply military and

42 See Lenin , Vol. 44 , p 300 .

94
conomic forces, but the correlation of them between the warring sides,
extend also to the field of moral capabilities. In the fourth law of war
we have also included the correlation of psychological forces and
capabilities, since they are in a close connection with moral-political forces
and capabilities and their importance in contemporary warfare has risen
sharply.
In revealing the essence of the moral factor, Lenin proceeded from
the fact that this is a deeply social, class, concrete sociopolitical phe
nomenon , and that this concept includes ideological, moral, and psycho
logical elements in their close interdependence and interconditionality .
From the Leninist theses about the essence of the moral factor and
about the correlation of man and technology it follows that formation
and strengthening of the moral factor have two aspects — moral-political
and psychological; that in accomplishing moral-political and psychological
preparation of the populace and troops we decide the task of further
strengthening their moral spirit and improving their moral-political and
psychological qualities; and, finally, that firmness of moral spirit and the
spiritual steadfastness of soldiers are inseparably connected with their
knowledge of combat equipment and weapons and an ability to use them
under varying conditions of the combat situation.
In case of nuclear warfare the psychological preparation of the populace
will have an unusually great significance because in case of outbreak of
nuclear warfare, the entire populace of the warring sides will be plunged
into the crucible immediately, at the very beginning . It will immediately
become the subject and object of themost fierce and unprecedented armed
conflict, the course and outcome of which will be inseparably connected
with how the people conduct themselves and what force of spirit, degree
of courage, steadfastness, heroism , endurance, discipline, and efficiency
they are capable of displaying. The populace will have to endure unfore
seen deprivations and at the same time hold out and ensure the vital
activity of the rear , the most important power centers, and systems for
control of the national economy, and resolve successfully a large complex
of specific measures under completely new and most complex conditions
of wide employment of nuclear weapons.
The significance of moral-political and psychological preparation of
troops has also risen sharply under contemporary conditions.
Mar SU A. A. Grechko notes that a war, if unleashed by the im
perialists, will not only be an opposition of equipment and weapons . War
is waged by people, and man remains the deciding force in armed con
flict. Therefore, along with weapons and combat equipment, the spiritual
preparedness of man will take its place on the scales of victory . The
course and outcome of combat operations depend largely on how
greatly the soldiers surpass the enemy in moral-political and psychological
aspects. In order to attain victory over a strong enemy, we must un
doubtedly master complex weaponry to perfection and be able to employ

95
it with greatest effectiveness under the difficult conditions of a combat
situation . At the same time, now as never before there has been an
increase in the role ofmoral- psychological training of soldiers. The ability
to overcome any difficulties, suppress within themselves the feeling of
fear, concentrate spiritual and physical forces to preform the assigned
task ; and steadfastness, independence, resolve, and an inexorable will to
win — these are the qualities which must be instilled in Soviet soldiers.43
The moral-political preparation of personnel is taken to mean bringing
up soldiers in a spirit of Marxist-Leninist outlook and communist ideals
and arming them with an understanding of state interests, the policy of the
CPSU and Soviet Government, and the essence and goals of war in
defense of the socialist homeland , and forming moral principles of be
havior in every soldier, sailor, sergeant, and officer under peacetime con
ditions and in a combat situation. This concept is generally recognized .
However, psychological preparation often is understood in an expanding
interpretation , identfiying it with the entire process of combat and political
training or, to the contrary , this concept is narrowed and reduced
exclusively to volitional conditioning.
By virtue of this it will be appropriate to cite a statement by Army
Gen A. A. Yepishev on this score. He states that the psychological
preparation of Soviet soldiers in contemporary warfare must be under
stood to be the formation in personnel of psychological steadfastness, i.e.,
those psychological qualities which reinforce their abality to perform
combat missions and operate in strenuous and dangerous situations of
contemporary warfare in complete accordance with communist convictions
and moral principles of behavior; and the purposeful development and
improvement of soldiers' psychology and their capability of successfully
enduring the most severe tests of war or any moral and physical load ,
of displaying self-possession , steadfastness, bravery , and courage at
difficult and critical moments while skillfully using combat equipment
and weapons.
The chief task of psychological preparation of troops consists of
instilling in soldiers a psychological readiness to perform combat missions
in the most comlpex combat situation , a readiness for selfless actions in
combat right up to self-sacrifice , a trust in the victory of Soviet weapons,
a readiness to overcome any hardships of the combat situation, and an
ability to successfully withstand the neuropsychological loads under
conditions of employment of new means of warfare, including those which
are still unknown.
Psychological preparation of troops and the populace may be success
fully accomplished only on the basis of moral- political training , the high
patriotism and ideological conviction of the Soviet people, devotion to the
43
See A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense and Mar SU , " Speech at a
reception in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of military academies,” Krasnaya
zvezda, 9 July 1968 .

96
party's cause, the combat skill of personnel, and their discipline and ex
ecution . Psychological preparation is inseparably connected with and
mutually conditioned by moral-political preparation . By virtue of this it
is proper to employ the term moral- psychological preparation of troops. A
leading role in this preparation is played by moral-political preparation .
Psychological preparation is accomplished in the process of working out
the general tasks of combat and political training, in the course of
soldiers' entire service , and also in the resolution of a number of in
dependent tasks in special exercises .
The close dependence of moral-political capabilities of a people and
army on the political content of war was shown above. By virtue of the
fact that the psychological capabilities of a people and army are in
separably connected and interconditioned with the moral-political factor,
they are in just as close a dependence on the political content of war .
The third and fourth laws of war have a direct effect on literally all
principles of military art and are their most important objective basis .
The high moral-political and psychological preparation of personnel was
one of the deciding factors which ensured the success of major operations
of the Red Army. The noble liberating goals of war , boundless love for
the Soviet Motherland, and a burning hatred for the enemy gave birth
in our troop personnel to a high feeling of Soviet patriotism . This in turn
gave rise to a mass heroism of soldiers, officers, and generals , gave rise
to a high activeness of troops in all forms of combat operations, and
facilitated the achievement of surprise in our operations, the disruption
of a surprise enemy attack or a lessening of its results, accomplishment
of brilliant maneuver by our trops, an increase in their mobility , com
pletion of a planned massing of forces and means, and maintenance of
close interworking and the combat effectiveness of the troops.
The moral uplift created thanks to the ideological and organizational
activity of the Communist Party, which gave birth to a powerful of
fensive impulse in the troops, aided in the skillful use of first-rate Soviet
military equipment and development of a spirit of creativity and innova
tion in application of the most expedient methods and forms of conflict,
since the soldiers make use of the weapons and their physical and spiritual
forces in combat more effectively as their state of morale increases.
Concerning certain other laws of warfare , our literature has examined
and recognized a number of other laws.
One of these laws is the law which determines the dependence of the
course and outcome of war on the correlation of the military-economic
capabilities of the combatants. The military -economic capabilities of a
particular state under contemporary conditions are determined primarily
by the overall level of development of production and by its capability to
produce the necessary numbers of nuclear weapons and the latest high
quality combat equipment. There is also great importance in the stability
and mobility of the economy and the ability of a country to rapidly restore

97
demolished economic ties when there are strikes against its individual
elements, and to rationally make use of all available reserves. To resolve
these tasks it is necessary to have a specific structure of the economy,
a high degree of organization of the economy, scientific management of its
development, and also the ability for the economy to withstand the
enemy's nuclear strikes.
Military -economic capabilities find their expression in the military
economic potential, which includes the economy's capability to ensure the
immediate neds of armed forces are met both in peacetime as well as war
time. This potential is not exhausted by quantitative indicators alone.
It depends on the class nature of the state : an advanced , progressive social
order in the final account objectively contains capabilities for creating
a more perfect organization and achieving military victory than an obso
lete social order . As a result of this , countries with approximately equal
economic capabilities may possess different military -economic potentials.
It must be stressed in regard to another law of war, which determines
the dependence of its course and outcome on the correlation of economic
capabilities of the combatants , that the economy has a treble effect on
the military might of a state. First of all, it places under it a material
and technological base , influencing the composition of the armed forces,
the quantity and quality of armaments, and the supply of all forms of
materiel, combat equipment, and means of communication and transpor
tation . Secondly , the economic order influences the professional structure
of a country's populace and thus the quality of personnel in the armed
forces and technical and special training, especially of officer personnel.
Thirdly , the economy has an immediate effect on construction of the
armed forces and on their structure . All capabilities as well as limitations
in the construction of the armed forces depend on the country's
economy.
Economic potential expresses the capability of a state or coalition to
satisfy all needs of war, both in preparing for it and in the course of the
war. The military -economic potential is thus a component of economic
potential. The law of dependence of the course and outcome of war
on the correlation of the economic capabilities of the sides is more
general than the preceding law , which defines this dependence on the
correlation of military -economic capabilities.
The law defining the dependence of the course and outcome of war on
a correlation of levels of scientific potential of the combatants is acquiring
great importance .
It is accepted that the scientific potential of a country or coalition is
understood to be the level and rates of development of scientific think
ing achieved and the ability of such thinking to quickly and effectively
resolve fundamental problems of development of society and science itself.
Until comparatively recently this concept included only the natural
and technical sciences. Authors of the fourth edition of the work Mark

98
sizm -leninizm o voyne i armii (Voyenizdat, 1965 ) showed convincingly
that resolution of practical tasks of social development, problems of war
and peace, and a state's military might depend on the level and rates
of development of science to a decisive degree. They had grounds for
noting that scientific potential encompasses all sciences on nature and
society, including military science. This thesis is fundamental importance.
It means that military science is connected in a specific manner with all
other sciences, and that a necessary condition for successful management
of the course of military operations is a knowledge not only of laws of
dialectical and historical materialism , war, and armed conflict, but also
of laws of natural and mathematical sciences. Further development of
military affairs is impossible without use of the achievements of themathe
matical, natural, technical, and social sciences . At the same time, military
science acts as a lever which sets in motion all other elements of military
potential. In the interests of strengthening the defenses of our country ,
military science often assigns tasks to other sciences and provides them
with incentives for development. It studies the patterns of development of
military affairs in all its aspects and acts as the most important factor for
strengthening the defenses of our country .
The laws of war are closely interconnected with laws of armed con
flict, as has been noted . Below we set forth briefly the content of one of
the most important laws of armed conflict, which we have called the first
law .
The first law of armed conflict is: methods and forms of armed
conflict depend on the material basis of the battle and operation .
The material basis of the battle and operation is understood to mean
the forces and means of armed conflict, i.e., armaments , combat equip
ment, and the people who use these armaments and combat equipment.
People and equipment express the main content of the concept “ forces and
means of conflict.” The great expert in military affairs, F. Engels, on the
basis of an analysis of a large amount of historical material, arrived at the
following conclusion : “ Nothing so depends on economic conditions as the
army and navy . Armaments, composition , organization , tactics, and
strategy depend primarily on the level of production attained at a given
moment and on means of communication . It is not the 'free creativity of
mind' of generals of genius which operated here in a revolutionary manner,
but the invention of the best weapons and the change in living soldier
material; in the best case the influence of the generals of genius was
limited to the fact that they adapted the method of conflict to the new
weapons and new soldiers .” 44
Thus, the honor of discovery of this law belongs to Engels. Many of
our authors, as noted above, advanced the following wording as a law :
“ The methods and forms of armed conflict depend on weapons and
combat equipment.” This wording in essence is correct, but not at all

Engels, Anti-Duering, p 156 .

99
precise , since it reflects only the influence of means of armed conflict on a
change in methods of combat operations. Meanwhile, the quotation
from Engels states: “... and the change in living soldier material.”
Thus, Engels viewed the influence of better weapons on the methods
and forms of armed conflict in inseparable tie with the training and
morale of personnel. In battle people and combat equipment act in
inseparable unity . This then spurred us to provide a somewhat different
wording and expand the content of this very important law of armed
conflict, since weaponry is connected with the morale of the army in the
closest manner. Of themselves, weapons, no matter how sophisticated
they may be , are ineffective if used by people without initiative, people
who are not inspired by high ideals, and who are devoid of the desire
to get out of combat equipment everything it can provide . On the other
hand, even less sophisticated weapons may prove more effective if
used by people inspired by a desire to fulfill their duty to the Mother
land and use the combat equipment entrusted to them to the end. Under
such conditions, at the same time, all the premises are created for rapid
development and improvement of weaponry . The appearance of new
means of conflict opens up opportunities for resolving the more com
plex tasks of armed conflict. But they are brought to realization by people ,
who must correctly determine the capabilities of the new means, organize
its use, and , finally, use it directly in battle .
Thus, the level of change of military art will depend largely on the
moral- combat qualities of troops, the organizational abilities of the com
mand personnel, and the level of development of military science . History
knows many examples where one and the same combat equipment pro
vided a different combat effort, depending on the social character of
armed forces which used this equipment. The Red Army was defending
the achievements of the proletarian revolution in the Civil War, using
old equipment remaining from the Czarist Army. In spite of the extreme
deficiency of means of warfare , it managed to smash troops of foreign
military interveners and forces of internal counterrevolution which were
much superior to it in weaponry . The forms of armed conflict employed
by the Red Army in using the same equipment employed by the enemy
bore an innovative , advanced character. The new social nature of the
Red Army, which was fighting for Soviet power , determined the es
sentially new features of the methods of waging combat operations which
it used . They were distinguished by maneuver and resoluteness , by a
desire to accomplish missions through the conduct of energetic offensive
operations and wide employment of shock groupings.
We will recall that in speaking of the unprecedented revolutionary
energy of the French people at the end of the 18th century , Lenin
remarks: “ They displayed . . gigantic amounts of revolutionary creati
vity in recreating the entire system of strategy, breaking all old laws and
customs of warfare , and creating in place of old troops a new revolu

100
tionary popular army and a new conduct of warfare.” 45 Engels wrote
that the proletarian revolution creates a special military method , a new
method of warmaking .
Historical experience attests to the fact that a revolutionary army,
even if it employs the existing methods of waging armed conflict, uses
them in a different manner which is considerably more effective, since
it is fighting for just goals and its personnel (“ living soldier material” )
possess an incomparably higher morale.
The Soviet military command proceeded from a consideration of the
high moral qualities of Soviet soldiers and their utter devotion to the
socialist Motherland in developing bold strategic and operational plans
unprecedented in the history of warfare for their scope, in particular
for rates of advance which required for their accomplishment that
soldiers and officers have an enormous exertion of all their forces . The
high morale of Soviet soldiers and their firm psychological condition made
it possible to assign the troops complex missions, the accomplishment of
which involved the overcoming of great hardships.
Realization of the fundamental principles of military art presents in
creased demands on the physical and moral state of soldiers and of
ficers . Troops which do not have a high morale and who possess poor
psychological preparation quickly become exhausted , lose their offen
sive spirit, and are not inclined to bring the exertion of their forces to its
possible limit.
Soviet troops possessed an unquenchable offensive spirit in showing
an unsurpassed ability to retain a stable political-moral state under the
most difficult conditions, while inspired by noble goals of the war. This
offensive spirit multiplied the force of attacks by our troops and aided in
attaining high rates of advance.
The will of people is a most important quality which facilitates the
observance of demands of laws of armed conflict. The will to win is irre
sistible when it rests on conviction as to the rightness of a cause for
which one is fighting, on confidence in the leadership , and on confidence
in one's army.
The sources for the continuous maintenance and strengthening of the
Red Army's morale in the course of the war were its firm ties with the
people, Soviet patriotism , leadership of the Communist Party , a devotion
to the party , and faith in the correctness of its policy .
The high morale of the Soviet Army played an exceptionally great role
in improving its combat mastery. The Soviet Army not only acquired
the needed combat experience in a very short time, but also forestalled
the enemy in mastering the techniques of waging contemporary war.
Our troops conducted bold offensive operations at high rates which
were grandiose in scope, and accomplished decisive maneuver ending in
the encirclement and destruction of major enemy groupings .

* Lenin , Vol. 32, p 80 .

101
 The unsurpassed moral-combat qualities of the Soviet troops made it
possible for our command personnel to fully display their organizational
capabilities in conducting major offensive and defensive operations and
skillfully using the most important principles of military art. The or
ganizational capabilities of command personnel in the army have a very
great importance for attaining victory in a battle or operation. The
appearance of new , more sophisticated means of warfare only opens up
possibilities for victory; however, realization of such opportunities is
up to the people who have to correctly determine the capabilities of the
new means, organize its use , and employ it in battle with greatest
effectiveness. This will depend chiefly on the organizational capabilities
of command personnel and on the level of development of military art.
The availability of combat equipment of itself cannot successfully
resolve the problem of using the chief principles of military art to defeat
the enemy. In addition to contemporary combat equipment there must
be present an advanced military theory determining the correct scientific
use of this equipment, and an ability on the part of commanders who
have mastered this advanced military theory to find the most effective
forms and methods of using all the forces and means under concrete
conditions of a given operation .
The actions of Anglo -American troops in World War II serve as a con
vincing example of the fact that it is not enough to have a large number
of modern combat equipment for best use of the principles of military
art and achievement of success. For example, in spite of an almost
total motorization and high degree of mechanization , an abundance of
combat equipment, as well as weak enemy resistance , the rate of advance
of their field armies was considerably lower than the rate of advance of
attacking troops in the most importantoperations of the Soviet Army. The
actions of the troops were not very active and the results of operations
were considerably below what was possible for those conditions.
In the Great Patriotic War the organizational capabilities of command
personnel of our army, determined by the nature of the Soviet social
and state system , were one of the chief factors which led to skillful use of
the principles of military art and the advanced methods and forms of
armed conflict.
The successful conduct by our troops of operations which were
grandiose in missions and tempos attests to the high level of development
of Soviet military art and to its indisputable superiority over the military
art of the enemy and other armies of the capitalist countries. In the course
of war, the Soviet command personnel assimilated combat experience
critically, overcame the shortcomings in theoretical and practical training,
developed new forms and methods of warfare against the enemy as
applicable to the concrete conditions of the situation , and developed and
used in a new way the principles of military art. The victory by our people
in the past war is simultaneously a great historical victory of Soviet

102
military science and of its bearers — the command personnel of the
Soviet Army.
Contemporary warfare presents particularly high demands on the
organizational capabilities of the command personnel.
It stands to reason that any commander must reckon with objective
conditions and proceed from them . He must correctly consider the
conditions, the condition of the people and of the combat equipment
of friendly and enemy troops, and the entire aggregate of the given
situation .
Consequently, the course of combat operations depends also to a great
extent on the commanders and their theoretical and practical training .
In a battle or operation the activity of commanders and staffs has an
extremely important significance for unswerving fulfillment of the demands
of objective laws and for skillful application of the most advisable
methods of warfare .
The influence of troop morale and state of training and the level of
training and organizational abilities of command personnel was mani
fested in the Great Patriotic War with all its force. It will be manifested
even more strongly in a nuclear missile war, during which the importance
of these factors will increase immeasurably .
The moral-psychological forces of soldiers will be subject to a spe
cial test under conditions of nuclear bursts, while conducting combat
operations in zones of contamination , etc. Under these conditions, suc
cess in a battle or operation will depend on the profound and com
prehensive training of military personnel and the training and educa
tion of personnel of the army. Success will be attained by the one who
surpasses the enemy in mastery of the troops , in quality of command
personnel, and in level of development of military theory and military
art .
The increased influence of moral-psychological training of troops on
the course and outcome of operations in a nuclear missile war is ex
plained by a number of circumstances . Massive employment of nuclear
weapons will lead to enormous losses, which may have a negative
effect on soldiers ' psychology . It would be incorrect to completely exclude
such phenomena as fear of atomic weapons, panic , confusion , or a feel
ing of doom . Therefore, Soviet soldiers must be prepared for the fact
that, regardless of any losses from enemy nuclear strikes , they will have
to act vigorously and attack with maximum tempo , breaking the resist
ance of the enemy, who will also suffer enormous losses.
The increase in the influence of troop morale is also caused by the
unique nature of methods of conducting combat operations ; by sharp
changes in the situation ; by the continuity , fierceness , dynamic nature, and
mobility of combat operations ; by attacks along axes without shoulder-to
shoulder contact with one's neighbors, in zones with a high level of radia
tion , and in regions of total destruction ; and by the possibility of effective

103
use of the diverse and very complex modern combat equipment only with a
high degree of efficiency and discipline among the troops. Such condi
tions facilitate the achievement of surprise and the completion of wide
maneuver, and complicate the organization and maintenance of inter
working in the course of combat operations .
Under conditions where the material-technical aspect of military af
fairs has acquired a scale incomparable with that of the past, there may
arise the danger of underestimation of the role of man in modern
warfare. Meanwhile, people fight using any weapon at hand, and they
play a decisive role, since they create weapons and it is they who use
them in battle against an enemy. This situation expresses the real
dialectics of the correlation of people and technology and concerns both
warring sides in any war. Therefore, as stressed by Mar SU M. V.
Zakharov, " in the activity of commanders, political workers , engi
neers, and technicians it is necessary to identify not only the
military -technical side, but also the moral-psychological aspect. These
aspects are connected with each other. The revolution in military affairs
has not only increased the importance of each of these aspects , but
has also required them to have an even greater organic unity.” 46
The skillful application of the most advisable methods of armed
conflict is inseparable both from the act of instilling in a soldier the neces
sary moral- combat qualities and from the increase in combat skill of
soldiers , their mastery of modern combat equipment and weapons , and
preparation of troops in the spirit of active offensive operations and
persistence in winning victory over the enemy.
M. V. Frunze wrote that “ in peacetime, troops must be organized
and educated so as to be able to accomplish missions both of defense
and offense. But primarily they must be prepared for missions of an
active offensive nature , since this is the most important, responsible ,
and psychologically most difficult part of combat missions in general.” 47
In order for troops , commanders, and staffs to be prepared for
application of the most active methods of armed conflict, the troops
must undergo training and education under conditions approximating
combat reality to the maximum , in battle against a strong , technically
outfitted , and crafty enemy, and in a complex situation . This gives the
combat training a strenuous character, develops in personnel the ability
to constantly overcome difficulties and hardships, and permits readying
soldiers physically and psychologically for the most difficult and severe
tests of war.
V. I. Lenin taught that “ intensive military training for a serious war
demands, not an impulse, not a war cry, and not a combat motto, but
prolonged , intense, very stubborn , and disciplined work.” 48
46
Zakharov, p 59.
+7M. V. Frunze, Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Works), Vol. 2 , Voyenizdat,
1957, p 463.
48 Lenin , Vol. 36 , p 325.

104
 The influence of troop morale on increases in combat readiness was
stressed above. In its turn , the maintenance of continuous combat readi
ness facilitates in a decisive manner use of the principle of activeness
and mobility, since troops with high combat readiness are capable if need
-

be to immediately begin accomplishing a combat mission and to destroy

the enemy in a short time.
In connection with an increase in the importance of the principle of
mobility there has been a sharp rise in demands for march training of
troops and for their maneuver capabilities — qualities necessary for
achieving high mobility.
The troops must be prepared for making long movements at a high
speed day or night. They must be practiced in rapid deployment and
commitment to battle from the move and trained in operations in com
bat, approach march , and march formations. A large part in accomplish
ing these missions is played by the moral-psychological preparation of
the personnel.
The moral- political and psychological condition of personnel has enor
mous influence on the operational-tactical thinking of command personnel,
the ability to foresee the course of events, their organizational capabili
ties, the ability to quickly make a decision and organize combat
actions, to use their forces and means in the best manner, to employ the
most advisable methods of combat operations, and to display creative
initiative and independence .
Lenin connected the role of technology, as did Engels, with the
efficiency and discipline of personnel. He wrote: . . The one who wins
out is the one who has the greatest technology , organization , discipline,
and the best machines.” 49 However, the means of armed conflict have
the most revolutionary, decisive influence on methods of combat opera
tions. Lenin noted that “military tactics depends on the level of military
technology — it was Engels who chewed over this truth and placed it in
the mouths of the Marxists .” 50 This same thought was substantiated by
M. V. Frunze as well : “ Any tactics corresponds to a certain historical
era: if the type of weapons changes or technological improvements are
introduced , then at the same time there is a change in the forms of mili
:) 51
tary organization and methods of leading troops.
Weapons are one of the most important and decisive fundamentals
of development of military art. They have a substantial influence on
methods of conducting military operations and war as a whole . The
appearance of new types of weapons increases the combat effectiveness
of armed forces, opens up opportunities for accomplishing new and more
complex tactical, operational, and strategic missions, and thus involves
a change in methods of conducting the battle, operation , and war as a

49
Ibid ., p 116 .
50 Ibid ., Vol. 13, p 374 .
51 Frunze, Sobraniye sochineniy , Vol. 2, Moscow , 1957 , p 43.

105
whole, Significant changes in means of warfare invariably give rise also
to major changes in methods of conducting operations and battles.
Engels wrote: “... The successes of technology , as soon as they be
came applicable and were actually employed in military affairs,
immediately — almost forcibly , and often , moreover , against the will of
the military command — caused changes and even revolutions in the
method of conducting a battle. ...” 52 For example , when the Prussians
attempted to employ company columns in assaulting Saint Priev on 18
August 1870 in spite of the development of firearms, rifled guns and rifles,
the “ column usually crumbled itself under a hail of enemy bullets, in
spite of the fact that the higher commanders fought against this as a
violation of order.” 53 The fundamental changes in army weaponry forced
a change also in methods of troop operations and required the employment
on the battlefield of a new formation in the form of a skirmish line.
The influence of the development of weaponry on methods of con
ducting armed conflict and on military art may show up in a dual man
ner. An improvement in existing types of weapons leads to gradual
evolutionary changes in the methods of conducting combat operations.
However , sharp leaps in the development of weaponry or the appear
ance of qualitatively new means of warfare cause fundamental changes
in methods of conducting armed conflict. This is what happened , for
example, with the appearance of powder and the invention of firearms.
Fire, and not the muscular force of man , became the most important
element of battle , contrary to how it was many centuries before, during
which armed conflict improved only evolutionally. The mass use of
firearms led to the appearance of linear tactics, which made it pos
sible to conduct continuous fire simultaneously by a large number of
soldiers while closing, to deliver a blow with cold weapons without
changing formation , and to ensure the maintenance of discipline even
among unreliable mercenaries.
The use of columns by Rumyantsev, Suvorov, and troops of the
French bourgeois revolution gave them a number of advantages: it in
creased the mobility of troops on the battlefield , the possibility of man
euver, and shock force , and facilitated a massing of forces and means on
the decisive axis and the breakthrough of the enemy's linear formation .
But columns could find successful application only in the period of
smoothbore weapons, which did not possess high effectiveness. Replace
ment of the smoothbore weapons with rifled firearms and guns led to
the disappearance of columns and the appearance of the skirmish line and
a mixed infantry - artillery combat formation.
Later the introduction of machine guns, tanks, and aviation in troops
units had a substantial influence on the character of combat operations.

52
Marx and Engels, Vol. 20 , p 176 .
53 Engels,
Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya (Selected Military Works), Voy .
enizdat, Moscow , 1956 , p 14 .

106
 It should be noted , however, that the degree of influence of new means
of warfare on methods of conduct of combat operations is directly re
lated to the number and quality of these means. New forms of weapons
and military technology employed in small numbers cannot have a sub
stantial influence on the character of combat operations. The revolution
in military affairs caused by the employment of powder did not take
place immediately, but took at least three centuries. This was caused by
the inability of the handicraft production of the era of feudalism to
support the mass manufacture of firearms. It was only with the ap
pearance of manufactories, when the opportunity arose to produce and
employ firearms in mass numbers, that there occurred fundamental changes
in methods of conducting troop combat operations.
Heavy machine guns were used for the first time by the British in
different colonial wars : in the war against Motabele in 1893–1894 , in
Chitran near Afghanistan in 1895, in the Sudan in 1898 , and in the
Anglo-Boer war of 1899–1902 (used by the British and the Boers ).
However, inasmuch as there were very few machine guns at that time,
they did not have a decisive effect on either methods of conducting com
bat operations, or on rates of advance . For the very same reason they
did not have noticeable influence in the Russo - Japanese war of 1904–
1905 , since it caught the Russian Army with only one machinegun com
pany in the Far East and with an insignificant number of machine guns
in the fortresses of Port-Arthur and Vladivostok. Even by the end of the
war, the Rusian Army had only 374 machine guns, and the Japanese
even fewer. And only with the appearance of machine guns in mass
numbers during World War I did they have important influence on the
character of the operation and rates of advance, and they caused the
creation of tanks and employment of the method of massed artillery
fire.
Introduction of machine guns into the armies in mass numbers and
adaptation of artillery pieces for conducting fire from indirect laying
positions considerably increased the fire capabilities of troops and had
substantial influence on the character of the battle and rates of advance.
The greatly increased force of fire led to development of field forti
fications in the form of a system of trenches and caused the appearance
of field positional defense. Troops were in no position to overcome
machinegun fire by previous methods. There appeared a need to break
through the positional defense, which at that time, as a result of the
short range of fire, insufficient power of artillery fire , low maneuverability
of guns on the battlefield , and other factors, was accomplished by the
method of consistent “ gnawing away” at positions and zones of defense
with very low rates of breakthrough (up to several tens of meters a day
in the Battle of Ypres).
An even more complex course of events was observed with the employ
ment of tanks in World War I. When the British for the first time

107
employed 14 tanks in September 1916 in battles on the Sommes River,
this not only did not have any influence on the methods of combat opera
tions, but even almost led to the compromise of this new combat means.
Even with the employment of a considerably greater number of tanks in
subsequent operations of World War I (at Cambray in 1917–379
machines, and in the Amiens operation of 1918 -over 600), the enormous
capabilities of this combatmeans were not sufficiently brought out.
Moreover, an analysis of concrete factors of the influence of tanks
on rates of advance in World War I, for example, may lead to com
pletely unexpected , paradoxical conclusions. For example, in the Battle
on the Marne in September 1914 (at that time there still were no tanks),
the average daily rate of advance of the attackers reached 6 km , but on
individual days increased to 20–22 km a day . In the March offensive
of the Germans in 1918 — they had no tanks — the average rate of advance
was 4–4.5 km a day. However, in the Amiens operation (August, 1918 ) ,
in spite of the participation of over 600 tanks, the allies achieved a rate
of advance of only 3–3.5 km a day. From this fact some could draw
the erroneous conclusion that the employment of tanks led , not to an
increase , but to a reduction in the rate of advance . But this, of course ,
would be a profound mistake. Above all it must be noted that a com
parison of rates of advance of the initial period of World War I with
the rates observed in operations of 1918 is not fully justified , inasmuch
as the first period of the war was at that time maneuverable , while the
operations of 1918 took place under conditions of difficult positional bat
tles and engagements . However, the presence of tanks in combination
with other combat equipment already in that period created the oppor
tunity for a decisive increase in rates of advance . This opportunity was
not realized because the offensive was conducted by methods which pre
cluded the possibility for achievement of high rates. As a rule, the
offensive was not based on surprise in the attack . It was conducted by the
method of consistent “ gnawing away” at defensive positions. The attackers
did not act simultaneously on its depth and did not create obstacles for
the approaching reserves of the defender. Bold maneuver was not
employed . The onslaught did not build up , but slowly died down. As a
result of this , the forces of the defender constantly increased (inasmuch
as the reserves were coming up ), while the efforts of the attacker reduced .
The role of tanks in World War I was degraded to a considerable
extent as a result of their serious technical shortcomings, due to which
they often malfunctioned even before being committed , as a result of
low speeds, which precluded swift maneuver on the battlefield , and im
perfect weapons, which did not permit the tanks to conduct effective
fire fights with enemy artillery .
In addition , due to the limited number of tanks which were employed
in operations of World War I, the rate of advance of combat formations
was determined by the degree of mobility of the infantry — the main

108
combat arm of that time, which comprised the overwhelming mass of
soldiers of all warring armies (in 1914 over 70 percent). The speed of
movement of even infantry reserves of the defense , not to mention the
reserves shifted by rail and motor transport, always exceeded the rate of
advance . The defender built up efforts more quickly on the threatened axes
in comparison to the attacker. Finally there came a balance of forces of
both sides, and the attack ceased .
Experience shows that if new weapons are employed in insufficient
numbers, they not only do not reveal their true capabilities, butman even
give an adverse impression of themselves. This was the case not only
with the tanks, In the past, with a limited employment of any new weapon ,
an attempt was usually made to adapt it to the methods of warfare exist
ing at that time and to stuff the theory and practice of its use into the
framework of established views on the character of armed conflict. Only
as the numbers of this weapon increased and experience of its employ
ment was gained , when it became possible to realize fully its combat
characteristics, were there essential changes in methods of armed con
flict and the new weapon had a corresponding influence on rates of ad
vance and the character of combat operations.
This was also the case with tanks. The tanks were able to exert a
decisive influence on methods of troop operations and rates of advance
only in World Warr II, when they became much more sophisticated and
they began to be used in mass numbers.
The use of a limited number of self-propelled missiles [samolet
snaryad ] against England : 1 World War II by the fascist German army had
no effect on the forms and methods of combat operations. The employ
ment of two atomic bombs also did not play a decisive role in the
capitulation of imperialist Japan , since total victory over Japan was
achieved as a result of the destruction of its Kwantung Army by the
Armed Forces of the Soviet Union .
Until a certain amount of the appropriate combat equipment is ac
cumulated the methods of conduct of armed conflict will not undergo
fundamental changes. Herein the law of dialectics on the transition of
quantity into quality finds its manifestation . The number of new means
needed for a change of methods of combat operations is inversely pro
portional to their combat power. For machine guns this figure reached
hundreds of thousands of units , and for tanks and aviation — several
thousand . The production of several hundred nuclear weapons and
means of delivery at one time caused a need for a fundamental re
vision of methods and forms of combat operations. The number of
nuclear weapons is constantly building up .
The development of nuclear missiles and other contemporary means of
warfare led to fundamental changes in the character of armed conflict as
a decisive armed encounter of two opposite social systems. This pre
determines the decisive nature of the goals of operations and battles

109
...
11
directed toward the total defeat of the opposing enemy as an organized
armed force.
The spatial scope of contemporary operations and battles has in
creased sharply. Thus, while in the past war a battalion advanced across
a front of 500 meters and in the defense occupied an area of up to 2 km
laterally, then under the new conditions it has become possible to operate
in the attack across a front up to 2 km wide and up to 5 km wide on the
defense. Thus, the width of the front of battalion operations increased
2.5—4 times. The depth of the battalion combat mission also increased
several times. There were also considerable increases in the zones of opera
tion of regiments and divisions and in the depth of their missions. Com
bat operations will be conducted not across a solid front, as was the
case formerly, but along individual axes, and they will bear a maneuver
able, intense , and fast-acting character, with rapid and abrupt changes
in the situation .
Many important principles of military art flow from the law of armed
conflict being analyzed . The adoption of new means of warfare and
their correct correlation with previous means permits skillful resolution
of questions of massing forces and means on the axis of main attacks.
Development of military equipment greatly increases the capabilities of
troops to achieve surprise , increases the importance of interworking,
and leads to a change in its forms. At the beginning of World War I,
when there were basically two combat arms operating — infantry and
artillery — the organization of their interworking rarely went beyond the
framework of the infantry regiment. With the appearance of aviation
and tanks this interworking extends to four combat arms— infantry, artil
lery, tanks, and aviation . Here the forms of interworking are complicated
considerably. The organization of interworking finds its conclusion in
the framework of soyedineniya and operational ob ” yedineniya . Further
development of means of warfare is complicating even further the
forms of interworking and its essence.
The important ties and relationships displayed in armed conflict be
tween phenomena of military operations or their characteristics make
up another law of armed conflict, which we have arbitrarily termed here
the second law .
The second law of armed conflict is as follows: any battle or operation
at any given moment of its development takes shape in favor of that
opposing side whose troops possess the greater combat power in com
parison with the enemy.
The effect of the law of dependence of the development of a battle
or operation on the correlation of combat might of troops of the op
posing sides lies in the basis of a multitude of phenomena of armed
conflict. It is , in particular, the objective foundation of principles of
concentration of effort, preservation of the combat effectiveness of

110
 friendly troops, and correspondence of the goal of an operation or
battle to conditions of the actual situation , etc.
This law is stated and well revealed in the work Metodologicheskiye
problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki (Methodological Problems of Mili
tary Theory and Practice ). Therefore , we will limit ourselves only to
the individual additions concerning certain aspects of the content of this
law and the dialectics of the correlation of forces in nuclear warfare .
The combat might of troops is taken to mean the measure of their
ability to deliver attack against the enemy and repulse enemy attacks,
and the degree of their combat readiness. Military potential is directly
embodied in the combat might of the armed forces. In the final account,
combat might is determined by economic, scientific, sociopolitical, and
ideological conditions. Thus, the effect of the given law is closely inter
twined with the effect of literally all laws of warfare and armed con
flict, especially as the course and outcome of armed conflict in the final
account are determined by the overall correlation of forces of the warring
states. However, the course and outcome of any particular battle or
operation are determined primarily by the correlation of forces present
in a given situation . An overall superiority of forces creates the possibility
for attaining victory , but superiority in combat might of the troops
which are directly conducting combat operations creates the foundation
for transforming a possibility into reality . Here the combat operations
on an operational and tactical scale depend to a considerably lesser degree
on the overall correlation of forces of the warring states than do combat
operations on a strategic scale .
The combat might of troops depends on many elements; the quantity
and quality of available nuclear weapons and means of delivery ; tech
nical outfitting; especially the degree of mechanization , motorization ,
and mobility , which is derived from it (as well as from the organic struc
ture); fire power ; numbers and level of manning of personnel, as
well as levels of doses of radioactive irradiation ; the moral-psychological
preparation of soldiers and officers, and their state of training and
coordination ; the condition of military art and the correspondence of
its principles to the character of war ; training of command personnel;
system of control, etc.
Thus, combat power is a unity of material means and the spiritual
forces of the troops, and a unity of their quantitative and qualitative
aspects .
Superiority in combat might of friendly troops over the enemy is
achieved in two ways: by the appropriate influence on elements compris
ing the combat might of friendly troops; and by undermining the enemy's
combat might, chiefly in the course of military operations.
In past wars a change in the correlation of forces or superiority over
the enemy on a particular sector of the front at a certain time was
achieved by increasing the number of friendly forces and means. In the

111
past war the attacking side created a superiority on the axis of main
attack of three or four times that of the defender, or even more. How
ever, the insufficient depth of fire influence on the enemy and limited
effectvieness of means of defeat determined a gradual and stage by
stage change in the correlation of forces from the operational-tactical
to the strategic scale. Winning superiority in forces was achieved
chiefly by the consistent defeat of enemy forces piecemeal. This con
tinued until overall superiority had been won in forces and success had
been achieved on the entire strategic axis . In other words, the correla
tion of forces changed “ from bottom to top.”
Nuclear weapons and the high mobility of troops introduced funda
mental changes in the mechanism of change of the correlation of
forces in the course of combat operations. Thanks to high troop mobility it
became possible to quickly take advantage of the results of nuclear strikes,
move great distances in a short time, deliver attack from the move ,
conduct combat operations at rates surpassing by several times those
achieved in the past war, and break through forcefully to a great depth
into the enemy disposition . Moreover, the absence of a solid front and
the presence of breaches, intervals, and gaps in the combat alignment of
troops create favorable conditions for delivering swift and unexpected
strikes against the flanks and rear of an enemy grouping, and for
rapid changes in the situation. By virtue of this, the situation on the
contemporary battlefield changes not by hours, but by minutes and even
seconds, and not only quickly , but abruptly.
The abruptness of changes in the situation is expressed in the quali
tative change in composition of the grouping and correlation of forces
as a result of delivery of nuclear and powerful fire strikes, the rapid
approach of reserves, and the landing of assault parties; and, as a
result , in the abrupt shift in character and methods of operations, in the
transition from one form of combat operations to another, in the shifting
of efforts in the shortest time possible , in the assignment of new missions
to troops, and in a change in combat formations. The employment of nu
clear weapons permits changing the correlation of forces and means
almost instantaneously on a particular axis or sector, and to change it
unexpectedly , by leaps, and to the entire depth of the enemy disposition .
The movement of nuclear weapons to the forefront as the chief
means of changing the correlation of forces and as the most important
means of destroying the enemy does not signify that other means of
destruction are ignored . Materialistic dialectics orients us to consider the
peculiarities of the interaction of the chief, decisive element with the less
important, secondary ones, depending on the concrete conditions. By
virtue of this we must recognize the important role also of the fires of
conventional means, which permit reliable suppression of the enemy and
thus also a change in the correlation of forces in one's favor and creation

112
 of favorable conditions for defeating the enemy by a swift blow of tanks
and motorized rifle podrazdeleniya .
Another important factor of a change in correlation of forces in a
-

battle or operation is the maneuver of troops , surprise, activeness of

operations and skill of commanders, and the capable use of the most
important principles of military art.
The history of military art shows that correct consideration of the
correlation of forces and means at hand by the beginning of war, opera
tion , or battle is the basis for determining the actual goals of war, the
operation , or the battle, as well as the methods for achieving them . The
law under analysis thus had determining influence on the principle of
correspondence of the goal of an operation or battle with conditions of
the actual situation and on the principle of concentration of efforts.
Mistakes in estimating the correlation of forces and means of the sides
led to a situation where troops were assigned unrealistic goals of battle
or operation . The final result of this was the failure of battles and opera
tions, the unjustified loss of troops , and sometimes their defeat.
We will show this in an example of World War I. At the beginning of
the war the overall correlation of forces of the warring sides was 1: 1 . In
the Western Theater of War Germany had 86 infantry and 10 cavalry
divisions, while the allies had 85 infantry and 12 cavalry divisions. In the
Eastern Theater of War Germany and Austro -Hungary deployed 51
infantry and 17 cavalry divisions against Russia. Russia had 54 infantry
and 17 cavalry divisions. This correlation of forces did not presage a
rapid attainment of the goals of war and attested to the inevitability of
prolonged and exhaustive warfare. But such conclusions were not drawn.
In accordance with the views reigning on the eve of the war it was
thought that the war would bear a maneuverable and fleeting character.
It was proposed to win victory by one powerful and comparatively short
attack .
However, as early as 1914 , after a brief period of maneuver, and in
spite of the desires and efforts ofmilitary leaders, the war developed from
one of maneuver into one of position and took on a protracted nature .
A new problem unexpectedly arose for both warring sides — a break
through of the solid and heavily reinforced front of defense . Military
leaders did not know the methods for accomplishing it, and the solution
was made more difficult also by the fact that in preparing for the war
they had not created the necessary strategic reserves or needed stock
piles of combat means, and the rear was not prepared to support troop
combat operations in the course of a protracted war. A crisis of military
art and a positional dead end arose. The searches for a way out of it
cost millions of human lives and gave rise to enormous costs of means of
warfare .
The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed , to an even greater
degree than that of World War I, the direct relationship of success of

113
an operation or battle with the correlation of forces and means in gen
eral and on axes of attack in particular. It also revealed the tendency
for an increase in the degree of superiority of the attackers over the
defenders on sectors of a breakthrough , especially in artillery, avia
tion , and tanks. In the majority of operations of the Great Patriotic War
in which the assigned goals were completely achieved , the correlation
of forces and means was favorable for us. In the presence of a decisive
superiority over the enemy there is assurance of attaining the goals of
an operation with great probability, and the negative effect of any change
occurrences is precluded . The greater was the attacker's superiority
in forces and means, the quicker he attained the goal of the battle
and operation and high rates of advance, while the goals of the battle
or operation themselves bore a more decisive character. The experience
of past wars shows that the requisite degree of superiority of an attacker
over a defender may be reduced in case the attacker achieves surprise
in his operations or even just surprise in fire strikes. All this attests to
the fact that this law also has an influence on principles of mobility ,
high tempos of combat operations, activeness, and surprise .
The deciding factors which determine the quantitative significance of
the correlation of forces and means are the ability of opposing troops to
deliver a defeat to the enemy and preserve their own forces, means,
and positions. The chief role here is played by means of destruction,
but means of protection also have a substantial influence , i.e., degree
of protection of an objective for destruction , as well as its size and the
range of fire. Therefore , in determining the correlation needed for achiev
ing success we have to consider the quantity and qualitative characteris
tics not only of one side's means of destruction, but also the other side's
means of protection (degrees of protection ), as well as the size of attack
objectives and the range of fire. Therefore the given law has a deter
mining influence on the principle of preservation of the combat effective
ness of friendly forces .
The level of military art and organizational abilities of commanders
have great influence on the necessary correlation of forces and means.
Their high level ensures the greatest effectiveness of employment and op
erations of forces and means and permits accomplishment of combat
and operational missions with the minimum necessary forces and means.
The capabilities of the system of troop control also have an effect
on the quantitative importance of the correlation of forces and means
needed to perform a mission . Continuous and effective control will
bring the determination of the correlation of forces and means of the
combatants to the level actually necessary and will ensure their most
rational use . And vice versa, a lag in capabilities of means of warfare
will not allow total and effective use of the potential capabilities of
means of destruction , or organization of effective protection against
similar enemy means.

114
 The moral-psychological preparation of personnel displays its influ
ence on the correlation of forces and means in the degree of stress
which troops are capable of withstanding in performing a combat mis
sion, in the degree of relative permissible injury with which troops still
retain combat effectiveness , and also in the creative initiative and desire
to find new methods and ways of accomplishing combat missions and
employ means of warfare most effectively. Good combat training of
troops facilitates the accomplishment of combat missions with fewer
forces and increases the duration and degree of combat stress on personnel.
In analyzing the correlation of forces and means, one of the factors
of the situation always considered included distances, space, territory,
geographic situation , and climatic and meteorological conditions. Nu
clear weapons introduced substantial changes into an estimate of the
role and significance of this factor. In this regard the statements of
French general Galois, published in the West German journal Kampf
truppen (1967, No 5) , are characteristic . Galois remarks that previously
the most important criterion of the combat might of a state was the
total size of the population . Only the presence of a large population
permitted creation of powerful armed forces, who remained invincible
as long as the force of the attack depended on the number of soldiers,
each of whom possessed insignificant energy of destruction . At the pre
sent time an insignificant number of soldiers is in a position to employ
a force of unlimited destruction . Several submarines equipped with
nuclear missiles can destroy in a matter of several minutes almost all
the material values of the largest state. These submarines are served , in
Galois's words, by two or three hundred men aboard and by 50,000
technical personnel at bases.
The size of a territory had great military importance . When Napoleon
tried to capture Moscow , the importance of great expanses became quite
clear to him . At the present time, new types of weapons cut across
continents and oceans in a matter of several minutes. Galois believes
that it is completely of no import for the USA whether a target is located
in Siberia or in the Ukraine, or for the Soviet Union whether a target
is in Florida or California, because the difference in time needed to
cover the distances between these points comprises only a few minutes.
Thus, says Galois, great distances have lost their strategic importance .
The geographic situation of a state very often provided it with stra
tegic advantages. For example, the USA , protected on three sides by
oceans, could conduct military operations in any region of the world
(especially during World War II) without being subjected to the danger
of immediate attack on its territory by the enemy. New technological
achievements are eliminating these advantages. A country's geographic
situation has lost its importance .
The moral factor, i.e., the fighting spirit of troops, had a decisive
significance. In the future, as Galois believes, the defense and security of

115
a state can be ensured by a small, elite guard standing constant combat
watch on the sea and in the air, without interruption of the peaceful living
of one's country's population .
Finally, the influence of climatic and meteorological conditions on
military operations has lost its importance as well. The new weapons, in
Galois's words, do not depend on the state of the atmosphere . “General
Winter” has losts its significance .
Many of Galois's statements cited here do not withstand criticism . His
entire concept is built on the supposition that the USA has decisive sup
eriority over the USSR in nuclear weapons and strategic means for their
delivery . Proceeding from this assumption , the American leaders planned
to achieve political and military goals by nuclear blackmail and threats
of unleashing a general nuclear war. The NATO alliance planned to
employ nuclear weapons in any military conflict with the USSR . The
possibility for conducting local wars was examined in less developed
regions of the globe, beyond the bounds of Europe. The adventuristic
nature and scientific insolvency of such a strategy lay in the overestimate
of forces and capabilities of the USA and an underestimate of the
economic, technical, scientific , and military capabilities of the socialist
countries.
Growth of the power of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries
led to a failure of this strategy , dissipated the myth of the military super
iority of the USA , and left the imperialists with no hopes for victory in a
world nuclear missile war. They began to understand that our Armed
Forces can destroy any aggressor who dares unleash a world nuclear
missile war, even under conditions most unfavorable to us. This led the
imperialist leaders to revise their strategic concepts, and to create the
“ strategy of flexible response.” This strategy provides for the conduct
not only of a world nuclearmissile war, but also — and perhaps primarily
limited wars with or without the employment of nuclear weapons. This
has been the official strategy of the USA since 1961.
Not daring to unleash a world nuclear missile war , the imperialist
states are striving to achieve their reactionary goals by use of local,
limited wars. In the last 20 years the imperialists unleashed 18 such
wars (in Vietnam , Korea, Laos, Burma, Cuba , the Congo , Algeria , the
United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq , and other places).
The armed forces of imperialist states are undergoing changes in their
organization , weaponry, and outfitting so as to ensure the accomplish
ment of missions not only in a world nuclear missile war, but also in
local wars .

In spite of the fact that the basic efforts of imperialist states are
directed toward preparation for all -out nuclear war, the development of
so -called conventional armed forces is being given a great deal of
attention . This is noted in their quantitative growth and especially in
those qualitative changes which have occurred abroad.

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 As shown above, for conduct of contemporary warfare, it is neces
sary to have not “ a small elite guard ,” as Galois asserts , but a massive,
large army. This concept of Galois's does not find confirmation in the
practice of development of armed forces in the largest states.
There is really an end to the former invulnerability and inacces
sibility of the USA as determined by its geographic position with the
introduction of nuclear missiles into the troops. There has been a
change in the previous geographic concept of distance. Since the middle
of the fifties practically any point of the globe has been accessible. And
nevertheless, the degree of mutual separation of the opposing sides
will have substantial influence on the methods of combat operations.
It is quite obvious that some forces, means, and methods are needed to
attack an enemy situated thousands of kilometers away , while others
are needed for an attack of adjacent regions. In the latter case it is
easier to conduct reconnaissance and to destroy enemy targets with
operational-tactical missiles and tactical aviation . Finally , the nearby
regions can be captured quicker by ground forces. Things are more
difficult in acting against an enemy located a considerable distance
away. Great distances demand special precision and reliability of de
livering means of destruction to the target.
However, even in operations in continental theaters the spatial fac
tor cannot be dropped from calculations. Here too the extent of a theater
will have great influence on the character of combat operations. For
example , a high degree of technical outfitting permits the attacking
troops to cover distances quicker, but at the same time it requires
more complex and precise calculations, different methods of movement,
and thorough consideration of the physical-geographic conditions of the
theater. Here space manifests itself as the expanse of territory , as
concrete terrain .
The enormous destructive might of nuclear weapons demands a con
siderable dispersal of troops, combat means, and rear area installations.
By virtue of this the importance of size of territory of states, theaters,
and areas of military operations sharply rises in spite of the assertions
of Galois. This is recognized by former United States Secretary of
Defense McNamara . In an interview with Life , he was forced to de
clare that “ the Soviet Union will be in a position to destroy the United
States after it takes on itself the first powerful blow from the United
States.” Not one country with a small, thickly populated territory pos
sesses such a capability . It simply can not only lose the material basis
for waging war, but can also be transformed into a lifeless desert after
the very first massive thermonulcear attacks .
One cannot, as does Galois, fully deny the influence under con
temporary conditions of climatic, meteorological, and physical-geographic
conditions. Although their significance is not so very great as before ,

117
they have, as before , great influence on the combat operations of
troops and also on methods of employing nuclear weapons.
Conventional forces and means of warfare will find application in
battle . Success on the battlefield will be achieved by the bold use of all
types of armed forces and combat arms. Therefore such objective fac
tors of combat reality as the nature of terrain , natural obstacles, and
climatic conditions have not lost their importance completely.
Terrain relief forces the troops in each instance to apply their own
special methods of operations. It requires the introduction of serious
constructive changes in weapons and combat equipment and in specific
methods of their use in a battle or operation . It gives rise to new
forms of organization of chasti and soyedineniya which are most adapted
to the corresponding conditions of the terrain . That which is applicable
and advantageous for average broken terrrain often is completely un
suitable under mountainous or desert conditions or the conditions of
forest-swamp and lake regions .
The same thing can be said of the influence of climatic conditions
on troop combat operations, organization , and weapons. The severe
climate of the Polar regions with a prolonged winter full of snows and
a unique alternation of day and night presents one set of demands on
troops, while the dryness and heat in waterless deserts or mountainous
regions of the south present completely different ones .
And finally, a few words on “General Winter ” and “ General Frost.”
The time of year as well as time of day affect the troops of both war
ring sides equally . Meanwhile in the West, in an attempt to somehow
soften the impression of the defeat of fascist troops in the Battle of
Moscow , they tried to explain it by the severity of the Russian winter.
As a matter of fact, the cause of the defeat of the fascists were the
selfless and heroic actions of our troops, which essentially bordered on
the limits of their capabilities. In the course of attack the Soviet troops
showed exceptional political awareness , energy, offensive passion , and
a high military valor in fulfillment of combat missions. It was this , and
not the severe winter or “General Frost,” as some foreign falsifiers of
history attempt to assert, which led to the defeat of the fascists at
Moscow . The Russian winter set in at the very time of our counter
offensive . The severe frost and deep snow in December and January
did not ease , but complicated maneuver of Soviet troops and reduced
the rates of their advance in the course of the counteroffensive . In a
great many cases these very conditions saved the Hitlerite troops from
total defeat.
During the November offensive of the fascist German troops, which
was conducted in considerably more favorable conditions of the weather
( the winter had not yet set in , there was not considerable snow cover,
while the slight freeze bound the autumn mud), such as on the Dmitrov
and Solnechnogorsk axes, they advanced an average of no more than

118
4–5 km a day . However, our troops , who attacked under incomparably
more difficult conditions of a severe winter, achieved double the average
rate of advance -- 10–12 km a day. It is necessary to take into account
here that a Hitlerite shock grouping consisted of tank and motorized
soyedineniya, while the Soviet troops basically had rifle chasti.
Under contemporary conditions the dependence of combat operations
on time of year and day has reduced by virtue of the development of
means of warfare, the high mobility of troops, and their outfitting with
modern equipment, but it has not completely disappeared . Therefore
the commander takes these factors into account as well in his estimate of
the situation .
Soviet military science takes account of the influence of the factor
of space on the correlation of forces and means to a considerably
deeper extent and more successfully, not estimating it in general, but
concretely, as distances which must be crossed and as territory on
which forces and means must be maneuvered, and as quite specific
terrain of forthcoming combat operations with all its peculiarities. Proper
use of distance and the size of territory of a theater or area of combat
operations, along with speed and time, may appear as a supplementary
factor of force in the correlation of forces and means participating in
a battle or operation . Skillful use of this factor is one of the founda
tions for determination of the need for forces and means for attaining
superiority over the enemy and for selection of methods of attaining
assigned goals .

Essence and Significance of Principles of Military Art, Their Cor

relation With Laws of Armed Conflict, and Use in a Combat
Situation

The term “ principles” (from the Latin principium — a beginning,

foundation ) means the fundamental, initial theses of any teaching or
the fundamental ideas or rules in accordance with which practical ac
tivity takes place in a specific field . From the Latin term itself it follows
that principles are the fundamental ideas by which people are guided in
a particular field of their practical endeavor .
The principles of military art are the basic ideas and most important
recommendations for the organization and conduct of a battle, an
operation , or a war as a whole. The principles of military art are not
some isolated theoretical theses, but central, basic generalizations suita
ble for practical application in all the basic forms of troop combat
activity and encompassing fundamental directions of the possible mani
festation of military art which determine success in a battle or opera
tion. Therefore , they cannot be reduced to the level of ordinary
numerous rules, theses, and norms, as some authors do.
The essence of the principles and their origin have been interpreted
since ancient times in different ways by metaphysicians and dialecticians,
idealists and materialists. Metaphysicians considered the principles to

119
be eternal and unchanging. However, the dialecticians showed that a
change in the objective reality leads invariably to a change in prin
ciples and to a throwing off of outmoded and development of new
principles, i.e., that principles are historic . The stability of the wording
of some principles does not at all prove their immutability. This is
only a stability of the form of their expression . However, with regard
to their content, this always changes in accordance with changing condi
tions of the conduct of a war. For example, the principle of concentration
of basic efforts on the main axis now has a different meaning, even
in comparison with the meaning it had during World War II. It is filled
to a considerable degree with new content. There is an influence on
the formulation of principles of contemporary military art by such factors
as the revolution which took place in military affairs, the presence of
nuclear weapons and means of delivering them to the target, the change
in correlation of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism , the
sociopolitical character of a possible world war, and its peculiarities
and methods of conduct, the increased role of strategy in contemporary
warfare , the goals of war, military doctrine of a state , etc.
Idealists reject the objective material basis of principles. They view
them either as ideas having a supernatural, divine origin , or as a
priori forms of manifestation of human intelligence and the correspond
ing activity of people independent of experience, The materialists,
especially F. Engels, proved that principles, being ideas, nevertheless
stem fromí objective laws, have an objective basis, are abstracted from
nature and human history , and are not arbitrary constructions of the
human mind .
Engels wrote that principles are not the starting point of
research , but its concluding result. These principles are not applied to
nature or to human history , but are abstracted from them . It is not
nature or humanity which conform to principles, but the opposite ,
principles are reliable only so long as they correspond to nature and
history .” 54 N. G. Chernyshevskiy said it well about principles:
Whosoever has not understood principles in all logical completeness
and consistency not only has confusion in his head , but nonsense in
his affairs.” 55
At one time Napoleon noted : " Every science should contain known
principles and develop certain general ideas in them is all the force
and significance of the matter) which provide a special view on the
world .” There is not a single social science in existence which would
not invest the results of its investigations in specific principles and
rules. Without principles and laws one cannot create the majestic
edifice of science . Knowledge of these laws and principles provides
the key to an explanation of reality , to the construction of theories,
and consequently, to scientific prediction and practical use of scientific
Marx and Engels, Vol. 20, 34 .
* N. G. Chernyshevskiy, Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy, Vol. 9 , p 355.

120
knowledge in preparing combat operations and in the course of such
operations.
The principles of military art are a reliable basis for the commander
to make correct decisions. Observance of the principles can keep a
commander from mistakes and direct him on the right path .
Science without broad generalizations or without principles is noth
ing more than an organism without a head . Denial of principles in
military science which are formulated on the basis of known objective
laws of warfare and armed conflict is essentially a slipping down to
positions of subjectivism in military science.
The principles of military art are a consequence of the reflection in
people's heads of demands of laws of warfare and laws of armed
conflict and of those conditions under which it is conducted and under
which the armed forces operate . Engels noted that the principles are a
logical consequence of the essence of these conditions.56 Therefore the
more precisely that demands of objective laws and the conditions
under which they operate are realized, the more correct are the prin
ciples.
The principles of military art are set forth in manuals , regulations ,
orders, and directives. They reflect the demands of the laws of war
and the laws of armed conflict from the viewpoint of the missions to be
accomplished by troops under contemporary conditions, and they are of
great help to commanders of all levels in understanding these laws
and using them in practice. The objective basis of the principles of
military art is the action of specific laws of war and laws of armed
conflict. The interrelationship and correlation of principles and laws is
very complex and does not lie on the surface of phenomena . Several
principles of military art may follow from the action of one law of
armed conflict or war. For example , the principles of surprise, mas
sing, and others stem from the law of war which states that the
" course and outcome of contemporary warfare conducted with the
unlimited employment of all means of warfare depend primarily on
the correlation of available , strictly military forces of the warring sides
at the beginning of the war, especially in nuclear weapons and means
of their delivery.” Some principles have as their basis the action of a
number of laws of armed conflict. For example, the principle of in
teraction stems from the aggregate effect of several laws. The laws
which state that the “ course and outcome of war depend on its political
content” and “ the course and outcome of war depend on the correla
tion of moral- political and psychological capabilities of the people and
army of the warring sides,” have a noticeable effect on all principles
of military art.
The laws of war, laws of armed conflict, and principles of military
art are closely interrelated . However, their identification and mixing is

58 See Marx and Engels, Vol. 8 , 2nd ed., p 100

121
a crude mistake. This is particularly characteristic for bourgeois scholars.
Sometimes some of our authors stand on the verge of identification .
Such identification either causes an underestimation of the objective
basis of conscientious activity of commanders and an overestimation
of their volitional actions, or, to the contrary, an understanding of
the conscientious activity of people.
M. V. Popov also directed attention to the differences between laws
and principles. " If the laws of military science ,” he writes, “ are knowl
edge of objective, essential ties and relations in phenomena of armed
conflict, then principles of military art are knowledge of the methods
and forms of troop combat actions with consideration for and on the
basis of the action of laws of armed conflict. In the content of the
principles is present not only a reflection of the objective conditions of
armed conflict, but also the result of creative, transforming activity
of human intelligence.
The fundamental distinction of any principle of military art from
the laws of military science is that a principle is not only a concept
which states the presence of a certain essential tie in phenomena of
armed conflict and expresses its basic content, but also an idea , con
clusion , and recommendation on the methods of troop combat opera
tions. ” 57
Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Col I. A. Grudinin , as well as
Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Col S. I. Krupnov, assert that the
laws and principles of armed conflict are objective and exist independ
ently of the consciousness of people.58 I. Vazhentsev correctly noted in
this regard : “ The laws of military operations really do exist independ
ently of the will and desire of people , which cannot be said for the
principles of military art. The content of principles is objective and
does not depend on the consciousness of people , but there are no
principles in objective reality itself . Man deduces them with the help
of abstract thinking and consciousness. Consequently, without con
sciousness there also are no principles, and in this sense they are
subjective."
Principles are formulated by people as a result of an understanding
of reality . There are no principles outside the consciousness of people.
They are deduced by man with the aid of abstract thinking and in
this sense are subjective . Principles are ideas, which always remain in
the sphere of awareness. They are secondary in relation to objective
laws of war and laws of armed conflict. However, having a subjective
aspect connected with the form of their expression , principles at the
57
Popov , p 125 .
58 See I. A. Grudinin , Voprosy dialektiki v voyennom dele (Questions of Dialectics
in Military Affairs), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1960 , p 127 .
S. I. Krupnov, Dialektika i voyennaya nauka (Dialectics of military Science),
Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1963, p 91.

122
same time are also objective in the sense of their content inasmuch
as by their content they reflect the demands of objective laws. The
degree of their authenticity depends on the depth of penetration into
phenomena and processes of armed conflict. Principles formulated with
out comprehensive and profound analysis of objective laws may be
artificial and false .
Thus, proceeding from the superiority of content in relation to form ,
one can assert that genuine principles of military art flowing from the
laws of war and armed conflict are primarily objective, but at the
same time are also subjective. False principles which do not reflect
objective conditions of armed conflict in their content are wholly sub
jective .
Bourgeois military science has devoted serious attention for a long
while to principles of military art or, as they are called , principles of
war. A majority of contemporary bouregois scholars believe the prin
ciples to be eternal and unchanging. A field manual of the U.S. Army
(FM 100–5 ) , published soon after World War II, states that the prin
ciples of war are the basic immutable rules determining the methods of
waging war. This assertion also remained in subsequent FM 100-5
publications, especially those of 1949 and 1954. The connection be
tween laws of armed conflict and principles of military art are ignored
by many contemporary bourgeois military theoreticians. They do not
deduce the principles of military art from objective laws of armed
conflict or from objective reality, but believe them to be the manifes
tation of characteristics of the human mind and a product of the
creative genius of generals. This is explained by the limitation of
bourgeois military theoreticians, by their fear to admit the presence of
objective laws of social life, the action of which in the final account
determines the inevitable fate of capitalism and the victory of socialism ,
by the idealistic world outlook of bourgeois military scholars, and by
the metaphysical nature of their approach to principles of military art.
Many contemporary bourgeois military theoreticians either completely
reject laws of war and principles of military art, or they consider them
only as logical rules, thus denying the objective character of laws.
American professor B. Brodie declares that the principles of military
art represent only “ common sense statements” which are applicable to
any human activity, that “ such principles are too abstract and too
59
general to be very useful for guidance in war.
British military theoretician I. Haymont writes: “ Throughout all
history weapons and the methods of their use have suffered change,
but the basic principles of waging war remained as before. Even the
appearance of nuclear weapons, radio , and radiotechnical means did

5® B. Brodie, Strategiya v vek raketnogo oruzhiya (Strategy in the Missile Age),

Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1961, p 52 .

123
not influence the time-tested principles of war, but only changed the
relative importance of each of them .” 60
The French general Jacquot writes that strategy “ is the continuous
and patient adaptation of certain eternal principles to a given level of
development of technology and to political conditions of the concrete
moment. 9 61
The very same metaphysical viewpoint is held by Reinhardt, Kintner ,
and other contemporary bourgeois military theorieticians.
An overwhelming majority of contemporary bourgeois scholars draw
no distinction between principles of military art and laws of armed
conflict. This proceeds from Clausewitz , who believed that a principle is
the very same law for action, but not in its formal, final sense .
The problem of distinction and interconnection of laws of armed
conflict and principles of military art in bourgeois military science has
not been posed in a genuine manner. Contemporary bourgeois military
theoretical thinking, which is permeated in its methodological basis by
idealism and metaphysics, is characterized by a vividly expressed
agnosticism and by the denial of natural ties and relations in phenomena
and processes of armed conflict. For example, D. Eisenhower believed
that the military leader operates in the sphere only of the hypothetical,
while attainment of genuine knowledge of the situation was impossible.
In the book Crusade in Europe General Eisenhower writes : " When the
troops went into battle there began the reign of hopes for everything
which might happen if fate didn't constantly smile on us.” F. O. Mikshe
also declares that half of the strategic and tactical situations are not
subject to the action of laws and so cannot be understood . “ These
factors which do not lend themselves to accounting,” he writes, “ can
be understood only intuitively, and much depends on chance , good luck ,
initiative , and a more sophisticated organization .” 62 In trying to sub
stantiate the fruitlessness of efforts of the military leader to reflect the
situation of military operations, British generai Hamilton , in investigat
ing the role of the commander -in -chief, refers directly to Kant's thesis
about the incapability of human reason to understand the essence of
things .
Such are the most characteristic statements of contemporary foreign
authors. These views attest to the fact that by virtue of the insolvent
methodological foundations, idealism , metaphysics , and agnosticism of
bourgeois military science, it has not succeeded in correctly revealing
the nature , essence, and character of principles of military art. The
bourgeois scholars are especially far — both in personal theoretical works
60
Irving Heymont, Takticheskaya razvedka v sovremennoy voyne ( Tactical Re
connaissance in Modern Warfare), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1963, p 12.
61 P. E. Jacquot, Periferiynaya strategiya i atomnaya bomba (Peripheral Strategy
and the Atomic Bomb), IL , Moscow , 1956 , p 132.
62 F. O. Mikshe, Atomnoye oruzhiye i armii (Atomic Weapons and Armies), IL ,
Moscow , 1956 , p 33.

124
as well as in official manuals and regulations — from establishment of a
true dialectical correlation between laws of armed conflict and prin
ciples of military art.
However the stern demands of war force bourgeois military scholars
to be particularly realistic , to seek out the patterns of armed conflict
and understand them , to develop mathematical methods of researching
military affairs, to introduce automated control systems, and to resolve
practically various important problems of armed conflict. A number of
contemporary bourgeois scholars pose the question of the existence of
laws of war and speak against the eternal and unchanging nature of
principles of military art.
Thus, Hitlerite general Manteuffel declares that defeat in World War
II was most often suffered by those who violated the laws of total
warfare.63 His associate, Gen Tippelskirch , writes that the failure of
plans of the fascist command is explained by the fact that it ignored
“ immutable laws of war.” 64 American Brigadier General D. 0. Smith
assumes that “ in a majority of cases the laws according to which
mankind develops are cognizable, and they underlie the principles of
military art. Moreover, many aspects of warfare bear a purely physical
character and are subject to precise scientific laws.” 65
It must be noted that these foreign authors, after coming to recog
nize the presence of laws of war, were in no condition to reveal their
essence or the mechanism of action , to pose problems of practical use, and
to suggest a scientific classification . They directed their main efforts at
investigating the principles of military art.
Smith expressed completely correct thoughts about the dependence of
principles on the situation . He was for rejecting " the veneration of
constant principles, since such veneration leads to stagnation of thought
and to established stereotypes. Principles are used for rationalistic
explanation of desires, and not as instruments of logic . Establish
ment of constant principles of war has become just as unsuccessful a
task as determination of constant principles of management. All these
principles depend on the situation in which they are employed , and
can be examined only in connection with it . . . . Before choosing any
kind of principle, one must thoroughly study the overall situation .” 66
British Air Force Vice Marshal E. J. Kingston -McCloughry admits
that he appearance of missiles considerably changed the tactical prin

ciples of ground forces,” and requires “ the unification of tactical prin

63 See Itogi vtoroy mirovoy voyny (Results of World War II), IL , Moscow , 1957,
p 614 .
84 Ibid ., p 88.
$5 D. O. Smith , Voyennaya doktrina SSHA (U.S. Military Doctrine), IL , Moscow ,
1956 , p 13.
as Ibid ., pp 191-193.

125
ciples and methods of combat training and standardization of weapons
and equipment” 67 at the NATO level.
Many bourgeois military theoreticians stress the importance and com
plexity of employing principles of war in practice. Some of them (Col
Reinhardt, Gen John Hull, and others) refer in this regard to the
words of Eisenhower that “ the fundamental principles of strategy are
so simple that they can be understood even by a child . But even the
most brilliant staff officers must apply a maximum of efforts in order
to apply them properly to a given situation .” 68 It is stressed that in
making any decision, tactical or strategic , one must proceed from a
specific group of principles which may be in mutual contradiction .
Therefore it is pointed out that one must be able to weigh them and
estimate them , and that in many instances it is necessary to be guided
by one principle to the detriment of another .
There are some contemporary bourgeois scholars who deny the great
importance of principles of military art.
British General Boucher makes an appeal to reject all manuals and
regulations, and suggests that they be discarded on the basis that
military operations more and more are characterized by mobility and
short duration . American Maj Gen G. Howze in Army (October 1957 )
declares: “ There are no rules in war.” Maj F. Ali, a representative of
the armed forces of Pakistan , says that in a world thermonuclear war
“ there is no place either for strategy , for tactics, or for principles.”
Such extreme statements possibly are evoked by the fact that as a
result of the revolution in military affairs the content of previous prin
ciples has already ceased to correspond to new conditions. In the
metaphysical approach to the essence of principles of military art as
to eternal and unchanging laws, this may lead one to the thought of
their general unsuitability under new conditions. In addition , such state
ments are a result of an improper understanding by their authors of
the character of military operations in a future war. In the opinion of
some of them , the actions of ground forces will be given an in
significant place in future warfare , and their role will be reduced to
the performance of occupation functions.
Soviet military science did not share such a point of view . A future
world war will undoubtedly be waged by massive , multimillion -man
armed forces. In spite of the decisive role of nuclear weapons in battle ,
operation , and war as a whole, ultimate victory over an enemy can be
achieved only as a result of using all branches of the armed forces
and combat arms on the basis of their close interaction . Ground forces

87 E. Kingston -McCloughry, Aspekty strategii (Spectrum of Strategy ), Voyenizdat,

Moscow , 1966 , pp 94, 100 .
68
Quoted from the book by M. A. Mil'shteyn and A. K. Slobodenko, O
burzhuaznoy voyennoy nauke (On Bourgeois Military Science ), Voyenizdat, Mos
cow , 1957 , p 158 .

126
continue to be not only obligatory , but also a very important com
ponent of the Armed Forces.
A majority of official military leaders of bourgeois countries believes
that in spite of the enormous destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons,
in a future war they will not get by without mass armies, including
significant ground forces. Many concrete facts attest to this . We know ,
for example, that of the five million men in armed forces of NATO
countries at the beginning of the sixties, 3.2 million were in the ground
forces. England, the FRG , and other NATO countries have significant
ground forces.
On the whole, the military doctrine of the USA , in addition to pro
viding for an increase in nuclear might, assumes a considerable strength
ening and development of ground forces in order to be ready to wage
any aggressive wars, large or small, world or local, nuclear or con
ventional.
As a result of this, the majority of foreign military scholars recog
nize the increase in the role of military art in modern warfare and of
it principles.
Being ideas, principles do not directly create material forces capable
of defeating an enemy. However, the importance of principles of
military art is hard to overestimate. Principles of military art embodied
in practice act as motive factors of armed conflict. To achieve victory
over the enemy one cannot act without proceeding from the principles of
military art. Here the degree of significance of the principles depends on
the skill of their application . Principles of military art embody the
solution to the problem of necessity and freedom in armed conflict.
Skill in use of the principles in a concrete situation is the art of leading
troops. This art embodies not only principles, but also the talent,
knowledge , and practical experience of the commanders.
A principle, in Clausewitz's figure of speech , “ is a genuine point of
support and a lodestar for the actor.” 69 The commander's ( or com
mander-in -chief's) decision is the more correct and there are more
chances for winning victory as the demands of objective laws and
principles of military art stemming therefrom are more fully considered .
The activity of commanders at all levels is not absolutely free and
of their will. Their decisions and actions are determined by objective
necessity. But this does not mean that a commander is totally not free
to choose a particular version of an action . He is free to the extent that
he knows well the goals of the operation or battle, the combat situation ,
and the laws and principles of armed conflict. Engels pointed out that
" freedom of will means . . nothing more than the ability to make
decisions with a knowledge of one's business .” 70
Armed conflict is a process which is continuously directed by com

** Clausewitz, O voyne (On War), Vol. 1, Gosvoyenizdat, Moscow , 1937, p 146 .

70
Engels, Anti-Duering, p 107.

127
manders of all levels. The commander is not powerless in the face of
the action of objective necessity . Having recognized the necessity and
making his decision with a knowledge of his work and with considera
tion of the demands of principles of military art and the situation at
hand , he acts freely and acquires freedom in accomplishment of the
combat mission . G. V. Plekhanov wrote: “Until the personality has
won this freedom by courageous effort of philosophical thinking, it
still does not fully belong to itself and with its own moral torment
pays the shameful tribute to the external necessity opposing it.” 71
Consequently , in order for a commander to act freely, he must make
his decision in accordance with the situation and the principles of
military art, and in accordance with the concept of action of the senior
commander. The commander's actions are not free in the sense that he
is forced to make one of several versions of a decision stemming from
a concrete situation . The freedom of his will finds expression in his
most expedient actions and in his ability to accomplish purposeful
activity in accordance with the principles of military art.
One of the works stress that “ if the laws of military science merely
state the presence of essential ties in phenomena of armed conflict,
then the principles of military art contain not only a reflection of the ob
jective action of laws of armed conflict, but also the result of active
creative activity of human intellect, and the conclusion on how one
must act in order to win victory. Therefore there is enormous practical
significance in mastering the most important principles as well as the
numerous particular rules of troop combat actions set forth in manuals
and regulations.” 72
Knowledge of the principles of military art has great importance also
because it facilitates flexibility in commanders ' thinking and develops an
ability to proceed from the data of a concrete situation and arrive at
one's own correct conclusions. There is also confirmation of this in
statements by Goethe : “ He who connects his own reasoning with correct
basic concepts will never encounter difficulties in applying these prin
ciples to an individual case .”
The principles of military art are our valuable scientific fund which
can provide a starting idea in resolving any question of the organiza
tion and conduct of combat operations . Principles of themselves do not
determine victory or defeat, but like beacons for navigators, they
indicate those directions to follow in order to count most confidently on
success .
Skillful use of the principles of military art, with strict conformity
to the situation , is a necessary premise for the display of intelligent
initiative and creativity in a battle or operation . This has always

11 Plekhanov, Izbrannyye filosofskiye proizvedeniya (Selected Philosophical

Works ), Vol. 2 , Gospolitizdat, 1956 , p 308.
Metodologicheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki, p 115 .

128
played an important role in military affairs. Under contemporary condi
tions this role has increased even more .
Of great importance for attaining success is not only , and even not
so much a knowledge of principles of military art, as an ability to use
them and make decisions based on the complex aggregate of demands
of the principles and the concrete situation . We will stress here that
the principles of military art are starting points for decision, but not
the decision itself. In the latter case they would become stereotypes
and groundless recipes for victory. But to make a correct decision is
only half the battle. One must be able to accomplish a decision which
has been made , and this demands great art and a firm knowledge of
principles. The entire difficulty is that one must remain in fact true
to acquired principles in execution . Poor execution may ruin the most
excellent plan .
Thus, the value of principles depends to a considerable degree on
the art of their application . And herein lies one of the most important
difficulties of military affairs . Their application is a complex matter
requiring great art and a thorough analysis of concrete and often
contradictory data on the situation , possibly not in a “ pure form ” but
in the aggregate, with a certain “ struggle of motives,” based on concrete
circumstances. Napoleon noted in this regard that knowledge of grammar
alone cannot teach us to put together a song from the Iliad or compose
a tragedy of Corneille .
How difficult it is in the reality of combat to observe the demands
of principles of military art, which are at times not only contradictory ,
but directly opposite , can be shown in the example of Napoleon . Being
a talented general and having an excellent understanding of the essence
of the principle of concentration of forces, nevertheless he was forced ,
to please the demands of the principle of ensuring an operational line ,
to assign a third of his forces in the campaign of 1797 to cover
friendly lines of communication against Austrian troops stationed in
the Tyrol. In the campaign of 1800, while moving against the lines of
communication of Melas, Napoleon left half of his army on the left bank
of the Po . In the War of 1812 Napoleon was operating along three
different operational lines and brought only a fourth of his “Grand
Army” to the Borodino field (130,000 men ), leaving three- fourths
of his troops to support an operational line of 1,100 verst (around
1,173 km ), and in fact not achieving this support. Often Napoleon's
violation of the principles of military art took place with impunity for
him , but only in those instances where his enemies violated them even
more .
There are not so many principles of military art, but their practical
application opens a vast field for a multitude of combinations. Even the
most experienced commanders and great generals made mistakes, and
we call those the best who made the fewest. It is a great art to

129
choose from among a large number of combinations the optimum one,
having overcome vacillation , the struggle of motives, and doubts. The
part of using principles which deals with execution is the most difficult .
In this part it is impossible to give ready decisions for every oc
casion ; this would kill any creativity and would bring the actions of
commanders to stereotypes and recipes for victory . But firm knowledge
of principles gives the creativity of a commander starting points and
a base for making the correct decision . This is possible with a firm
knowledge of the principles of military art on the one hand and of
the situation on the other, and with the skillful application of their
demands, which usually contradict one another. However, superiority
here belongs to the situation : it is the situation which finally, in the
last instance , decides the question of the application of a particular
principle of military art in each concrete case .
In his time Lloyd wrote (though it is true , with the aim of proving
the deciding influence of terrain on combat operations): “Military
art has much in common with poetry and eloquence . Many know
the basis of these latter, but few possess real talent. Many works have
been written on all the rules , but they remain cold and boring, since
they are devoid of that divine fire by which a work of genius is
recognized . The same thing can be said regarding military art. Many
are well acquainted with its principles, but when it becomes necessary
to apply them in practice, they turn out to be groundless. They grab
for their notebooks and are unpleasantly surprised when forests, moun
tains, rivers, and ravines spoil their plans.” 73
war the situation commands, but this subordination to the condi
tions of the situation cannot be understood in the sense of obedience or
an absolute cult. The call of the situation must creatively and skillfully
take account of the aggregate demands of principles of military art.
Without this, the creativity of a commander would be blind or ad
venturistic . The truly scientific creativity of a commander is expressed
above all in the fact that he applies the demands of principles and
the norms of regulations and manuals, comforming strictly with the
situation , noticing in time the contradictions which have arisen be
tween the demands of principles and reality , and finding the best
method of solving them . The principles of military art act as regulators
of the creativity of a commander, protecting him from arbitrary rule
and adventurism , and directing him onto the path of making the cor
rect decisions. The principles help creativity, but should not take its
place or replace it. They should inspire the commander, but not sup
press his initiative. No precise mathematical formulas for converting
principles of military art into concrete actions exist, nor can there be
any. It was Peter I who included in the Ustav voinskiy (Military

73
Quoted from the book by V. A. Moshnin , Voyennyye otkliki (Military Re
sponses), St. Peterburg, 1902, p 66 .

130
Regulations) a paragraph demanding the conduct of military opera
tions in conformity with circumstances, and not to hold to the Ustav
" as a blind man to a wall.”
Scientific creativity presumes not a fatal or slavish , but a conven
tional subordination to the situation . The intelligent, willful commander
who is full of initiative and who completely considers the demand of a
situation in a certain sense himself can become the ruler of the situa
tion , using the slightest possibilities for changing it to his favor and to
convert an extremely unfavorable situation into a very favorable one.
We were lucky to be witness to several cases in the past war where
the enemy bypassed our tank chasti and created an extremely difficult
situation for them , but the bold maneuver of our chasti to the rear of
the enveloping enemy in the final account placed him in a critical
situation himself. Truly, “ the enveloper was himself enveloped .”
Leyer made a very good statement about principles: “ Principles are
unusually simple in their foundation (although they are also unusually
generous in consequences); there is nothing easier than to understand
them and embrace them with the mind . But along with this, military
history attests to their contant violation . All this shows that it
is not enough to embrace them with the mind; it is insufficient just
to perceive them externally , but it is necessary to turn them into a
practical motive of activity, i.e., master them so much as to always
act in their spirit , even without thinking of them , and for this we need
prolonged work and the persistent and stubborn operation of thought
in their direction . It is necessary to repeat them in life more often ,
and in military history, in this wisdom of the ages. . . . It is necessary
to give oneself to them with all one's inner being, endure them , suffer
them , develop them out of oneself , and not repeat them only from
someone else's words. And only then do they turn into our firm
property .” 74
All great generals of ancient times, in Napoleon's words, did great
things only because they followed the rules and natural principles of
art, striving for strict conformity with the means used and the goal which
was set. They had success because , in using the principles, they never
ceased to create a genuine science out of war. The French architect
Viollet-le -Duc , in speaking of the principles in a general understanding,
wrote: “ . . . If we master a principle, any creative work is possible,
even easy , and goes its correct course , methodically, providing as
results if not masterpieces, then good and worthy works. . " 75 French
philosopher and materialist C. Helvetius even remarked that “ knowledge
of some principles easily compensates for ignorance of some facts .”

Leyer, Strategiya (Strategy), Part 1, St. Peterburg, 1898 , pp 201, 202.

** Viollet-le -Duc, Besedy ob arkhitekture (Conversations On Architecture), Vol.
1, Moscow , 1937 , p 181.
** C. Helvetius, Ob ume (On the Mind), Moscow , 1938, p 147.

131
H. Balzac remarked that “ principles are the axis about which move the
hands of a political baroineter.” In the words of D. Paxton ( 1803–
1865), principles have won more victories than cavalry and chariots.
The principles of military art cannot be used in isolation from each
other . They must be taken together and used in the number and to the
extent so as to conform to the situation . Each principle is an individual
link in the overall chain . To achieve victory it requires skillful use of
the entire chain or complex of principles which ensure the accomplish
ment of combat missions in a given situation .
The chief thing which distinguishes an average commander in a
combat situation from a capable one and a capable one from a gifted
one is the art of using principles, the art of employing subordinate
chasti and soyedineniya . The history of military art provides us with a
number of brilliant examples of how , relying on specific principles and
using them skillfully, talented generals and commanders destroyed the
enemy with equal, fewer, and even considerably fewer forces. And this
in no way contradicts the second law of armed conflict, since a numerical
deficiency in troops was compensated in these cases by their high
quality and by the art of the commanders. It was Peter I who on the
day of the Battle of Poltava pronounced the splendid words : “ Intel
ligence and art win more than a great number.” Rumyantsev noted :
“ To defeat great forces with a small number — this is art and special
glory.” The Russian Army headed by Rumyantsev usually won victories
over an enemy army several times superior to the Russian troops in
numbers (Ryabaya Mogila , Larg, Lagul, and others). The combat
deeds of A. V. Suvorov provide even more brilliant examples of the
skillful application of principles of military art and the defeat of
superior enemy forces.
The numerous victories of the troops of Suvorov won almost always
by lesser forces are outstanding examples of Suvorov's “ eye, swiftness,
and impact,” a vivid illustration of Suvorov's strategy of winning “ not
by numbers , but by ability ,” and a consequence of troop activeness
and high combat spirit unprecedented for those times. Survorov attached
decisive importance to the steady strengthening of this spirit. It is also
a consequence of the troops ' excellent training under conditions closest
to a combat situation , where every soldier “ understood his maneuver”
and was confident of himself and of overall victory. A large part in
these victories was played by Suvorov’s application of new and higher
forms of military art, the general's great innovative spirit, the maneuver
of troops on the battlefield , which Suvorov took to the highest limit
for its time, the build - up of the attack at the decisive point of an
attack , and the very skillful application of principles of military art to
a concrete combat situation. Suvorov demanded the creative application
of principles of military art, not transforming them into stereotypes, but
correctly using the situation in one's own interests. The general, wrote

132
Suvorov , “ never is carried away by the concurrence of circumstances,
but subordinates them to himself, always acting according to the rules
of his own unremitting perspicacity .” In this regard he is favorably
distinguished from Napoleon , in whose military system many very
important theses became stereotyped and brought on failures.
Reactionary military circles spread the story that the basis of Suvor
ov's victories was " good luck so often tested .” In exposing this story ,
Suvorov wrote : “ I was fortunate because I commanded fortune.”
Another time he said : “ One time good luck , another time good luck !
Goodness sake! Sometimes ability as well.” This " ability ” of Suvorov's
was based on a firm knowledge of the principles of military art and
their skillful application and on the fact that, in Suvorovs' own words,
he made decisions “ with reason, art, and responsibility .” It is necessary
to note that in the battle at the Rymnik River in 1789, victory by
the 25,000 -man army under Suvorov's command over the 100,000
man Turkish Army was achieved thanks to Suvorov's skillful use of
the superiority of the moral-combat qualities of his troops, the em
ployment of skillful maneuver, activeness , resoluteness, massing of
troops, and defeat of the enemy piecemeal.
During the Great Patriotic War The Red Army defeated at Stalingrad
an enemy grouping which was on the whole numerically equal. As a
result of bold and skillful regroupings performed in accordance with
the counteroffensive plan , the Soviet command created a decisive
superiority both in personnel and in combat equipment on sectors of
main attack groupings of fronts . An even greater superiority in forces
was achieved on axes of attack of armies.
With a lack of overall superiority in forces on our part, we had supe
riority in the art of command and in quality of troops, who were being
inspired to military exploits by the noble, liberating goals of a sacred
war against fascist invaders. Our troops, who had accumulated combat
experience in preceeding battles, surpassed the enemy in the skill of
conducting combat operations under difficult and complex conditions
of the situation in the fall of 1942 through the winter of 1942–1943.
The skillful, creatively bold creation of shock groupings on the axis
of main attacks by means of purposeful regrouping of forces while
preparing a counteroffensive is an outstanding example of operational
expertise . Our troops at first delivered powerful blows against the
enemy's weakened flanks, then followed the swift advance of our shock
groupings, which brilliantly accomplished a massing of forces and
means. This attack was crowned by the encirclement and defeat of
the fascist German troops.
In the Ostrogozhsk -Rossosh'offensive operation (January 1943),
troops of the Voronezh Front defeated piecemeal an enemy equal
in strength (21 divisions) by delivering three cleaving blows and with
the exceptionally skillful use of principles of mass, maneuver, and

133
activeness . Thanks to skillful maneuver, the Soviet command was able
to achieve the necessary superiority in men and means over the enemy
on decisive axes by boldly weakening secondary sectors and axes in
a short period of time, under difficult conditions of wintertime, and
secretly from the enemy. Concentration of superior forces and means
of axes selected for attacks was one of the most important causes for
the successful conclusion of this operation.
The Great Patriotic War provides us with a number of examples of the
skillful defeat of the enemy with fewer forces and on the scale of
podrazdeleniya, chasti, and soyedineniya of the Red Army. For example ,
skillful application of principles of surprise, interworking, and activeness
was shown by a composite company of the 985th Rifle Regiment of
the 226th Rifle Division under the command of Capt M. A. Zuyef
while taking a strongpoint in Tunskirch on 5 April 1945.
The company had 60 submachine gunners with seven tanks. The
strongpoint was defended by an enemy infantry battalion with the
support of 7-8 guns placed on the east edge for direct laying and five
tanks used as mobile fire points. When necessary the tanks were used
for counterattacks. In spite of the limited time which the newly -formed
company of submachine gunners had to prepare for combat, all ques
tions of interworking among the company's platoons as well as with
tanks and artillery were thought out and coordinated in detail, as a
result of which the attack took place in an organized manner from
beginning to end . Instructive in this regard were the coordinated ac
tions of the left and right groups into which the company had been
broken . The right group pinned down the enemy's men and weapons by
forcefully rushing into the eastern edge of Tunskirch . This made it
possible for the left group to move to the flank and rear of the
enemy, who had massed by that time in the center of Tunskirch . Then
the company's submachine gunners and the tanks quickly completed the
defeat of the enemy and dug in firmly in Tunskirch together with the
approaching rifle battalion . As a result of the battle for Tunskirch ,
several dozen enemy soldiers and officers were killed and 83 taken
prisoner. In addition , five operational tanks, seven 75-mm guns, and
120 rifles and submachine guns were captured . Only a few men were
wounded in the company of submachine gunners. There were no
losses in tanks on our side. The success of this battle was ensured by
the surprise and forcefulness of the attack and the boldness and co
ordinated actions of the submachine gunners and tank crews. Capture
of the enemy strongpoint in Tunskirch considerably improved the
tactical situation of the division in its base of operations.
The rifle company commanded by Capt V. I. Petrovskiy, part of
the 1067th Rifle Regiment of the 311th Rifle Division, skillfully em
ployed the principles of activeness, surprise, and interworking in suc
cessfully defeating superior enemy forces defending the strongpoint of

134
Salas in August 1944. In a brief fifteen -minute battle , the company
captured a strongpoint which was strong and favorable for the
enemy, and destroyed in it an enemy superior in numbers . In so doing,
the company suffered only a few men wounded . In this battle the
well organized interaction of rifle podrazdeleniya with the artillery
deserves attention . With its fire , the artillery ensured the successful
defeat of the enemy by the rifle company. To destroy the enemy, the
rifle company made skillful use of rifle and machine gun fire both
during the artillery fire assault and in the course of battle for the
strongpoint. The thoroughness and secrecy of preparation ensured sur
prise in the company's attack . The enemy in the strongpoint was
caught unawares and was not able to offer our podrazdeleniya any
organized resistance. Prisoners captured in this battle bore out that they
had known nothing of the attack we had been preparing on the strong
point and that it was unexpected for them .
The 3rd Battalion of the 572nd Rifle Regiment of the 233rd Rifle
Division under the command of Sr Lt V. M. Plotnikov on 24 September
1944, in a battle for an enemy strongpoint in Tekiya, also defeated
superior enemy forces. With 183 men , the battalion took a well
equipped strongpoint defended by around 400 soldiers and officers of
the “ Brandenburg” 2nd Motorized Regiment, took over 200 men
prisoner, and captured five barges with military equipment, six guns,
17 machine guns, six vehicles, and over 200 rifles and submachine guns.
Success in this battle was facilitated to a considerable extent by the
battalion commander's correct decision , based on thorough reconnais
sance of the enemy and on a determination of the most vulnerable
places in the enemy defense. The enemy was half surrounded by the
enveloping maneuver of a rifle platoon to the southern outskirts of
Tekiya and by the simultaneous attack of the battalion's main body
from the north . Having imposed battle on the Hitlerites under condi
tions unfavorable for them , our podrazdeleniya completed the enemy's
defeat by forceful actions. Thus the strongpoint of Tekiya, which was
well reinforced and prepared for defense , was taken by our troops as
a result of decisive maneuver and active, bold actions by personnel of
3rd Battalion .
An example of skillful use of the principles of activeness, mobility,
and interaction was shown by the ski battalion of the 83rd Rifle Division
of the Karelian Front under the command of Maj B. N. Fedoseyev .
On 13 May 1944 this battalion defeated a reconnaissance detachment
of the 6th Infantry Division (SS ) which was superior to it by twice
the number in a battle in the vicinity of Lake Nizhneye. Podrazdeleniya
of the battalion conducted the battle of a forceful tempo, actively, with
out letting the initiative out of their hands. The battalion's success was
facilitated to a considerable extent by the fact that all the officers,

135
sergeants , and enlisted men knew the enemy's tactics. In particular,
battalion personnel knew that the fascists feared encirclement and did
not withstand a simultaneous attack from front and flanks. Therefore
the battalion commander ordered the 2nd Company to attack the
enemy from the front and the 1st Company to envelop the enemy
from the northeast and destroy the enemy with a blow to the flank in
coordination with the battalion's reconnaissance platoon . As a result of
skillful performance of the plan of the battalion commander, the enemy
was smashed and began to retreat in a westerly direction in disorder ,
leaving his killed and wounded on the battlefield .
The 85th Rifle Regiment of the 325th Rifle Division also broke
through the prepared defense of superior enemy forces in the vicinity of
Pobeten in April 1945. In the given case an absence of superiority
in forces over the enemy was compensated by the high degree of
activeness of our forces, precise coordination , broad maneuver of men
and weapons, great effectiveness of artillery fire, thorough preparation
and high morale of our troops .
It is important to note that the skillful realization of the demands
of the principle of concentration of troop efforts on decisive axes per
mitted us to attain the assigned goals of battles and operations with
fewest losses in personnel. For example, in the counteroffensive at
Moscow in December 1941 during the Great Patriotic War our armies did
not have clearly delineated sectors of breakthrough and attacked with
low tactical densities of up to 0.8–1 battalion , 3–10 guns and mortars,
and one tank per kilometer of zone of attack . In the counteroffensive
at Kursk in July 1943 there were 2.8–6 or more battalions, 128–160
or more guns and mortars, and 11-25 tanks concentrated per kilometer
of the sector of breakthrough . In operations of the third period of
the war, tactical densities per kilometer of sector of breakthrough were
even higher, within the range of up to 4.5 .- 8.1 and more battalions,
140–240 or more guns and mortars, and 12–25 or more tanks.
Just what is the relationship of losses to the massing of men and
weapons ? There can be only one answer: the most direct and clearly
expressed relationship . If we take the medical losses in armies in the
counteroffensive at Moscow in percentage of the initial strength of the
armies to be arbitrarily one, then in the counteroffensive at Kursk they
did not exceed 0.6 , on the whole in the second period of the war they
comprised 0.25 , and in the third period they were reduced to 0.15 .
The rates of advance and troop losses also were inversely propor
tional.
An analysis of the size of losses and expenditure of supplies of tank
armies in nine operations of the Great Patriotic War attests that in an
attack with a tempo of 20–50 km per day the overall losses in per
sonnel were a little over three times less, and in tanks were almost
11/2 times less than with a tempo of advance of 4-10 km per day.

136
 Table 1.--Expenditure of Supplies of Tank Armies Per 100 Km
of Advance

(Experience of the Great Patriotic War)

Rate of 16-45 Rate of 4.5-13
Forms of Expenditure km /day km / day
Expenditure of ammunition ,
units of fire 0.25 1.5
Expenditure of diesel fuel for
T -34 Tank 0.7 2

Rates of advance have an even greater effect on the specific con

sumption of supplies per 100 km of troop advance. As can be seen in
Table 1, with high rates of advance of tank armies the specific con
sumption of ammunition was decreased by six times, and that of diesel
fuel by three times .
The experience of combat operations of combined- arms armies also
attests to a reduction in losses with an increase in rates of advance.
Let us turn to the experience of two operations of Thirty -Ninth
Army in 1944. In an operation conducted in February , Thirty -Ninth
Army was attacking with a tempo of 0.5 km per day, and in the
Vitebsk Operation – 9 km a day . At the higher rates of advance in
the Vitebsk Operation , losses in personnel of Thirty-Ninth Army were
six times less than in the operation conducted in February, and losses
of tanks were 20 times less.
Rates of advance are not the only factor determining troop losses.
The latter depend on many causes and conditions, but rates of advance
play a most important role .
In a future war the swift and deep wedging of podrazdeleniya ,
chasti, and soyedineniya of attacking troops into the enemy's defense
will lead to its dismemberment into isolated centers of resistance and
to an elimination of the front line in the former sense . There will
occur a unique intermingling of attacking troops with the enemy. This
will undoubtedly reduce the danger of destruction of first echelon
troops not only by nuclear weapons, but also by air and even artillery
strikes. Crossing zones of radioactive contamination on the terrain at
high rates of speed sharply reduces the dose of irradiation of personnel
and preserves their combat effectiveness.
It must be added that with high rates of advance there is a con
siderable increase in losses by the defending enemy. The swift wedging
of attacking troops into the defense interrupts control and disorganizes
the enemy, as a result of which the combat effectiveness of his troops
is reduced and favorable conditions are created for his encirclement,
capture, and defeat piecemeal. For example , in the Vitebsk Operation
Thirty -Ninth Army (the commander-in - chief was Gen I. I. Lyudnikov)
was advancing at a comparatively high rate for those conditions, and

137
had smashed five enemy divisions. In the Visla -Oder Operation the
Fourth Tank Army captured twice the number of soldiers and officers
while advancing at a rate of 30–33 km per day than with a rate of
advance of 10–13 km a day. As a rule, with high rates of advance
there was an increase in the number of captured vehicles, artillery ,
and tanks .??
Thus, skillful realization of the demands of the principle of mobility
and high tempos of combat operations in the Great Patriotic War led to a
sharp reduction in troop losses and material costs in battles and opera
tions . This was, of course , with all else equal, since the tempos of
combat operations , just as the concentration of men and weapons,
are not, of course, the only factors which determine troop losses. The
latter depend on many things and conditions, including the degree of
resistance and state of training of enemy troops and the skill of com
manders.
Our best generals and commanders always strived for a victory " with
little blood.” Mar SU K. K. Rokossovskiy wrote in his memoirs : “ It is
a pity and bitter to lose soldiers at the beginning of a war. But it is
thrice more a pity and bitter to lose them on the threshold of
victory — to lose heroes who had gone through terrible trials, had
strode thousands of kilometers under fire, and had risked their lives for
312 years in order to win peace for their native land with their own
hands. . The commanders and political workers received a categori
cal order: ensure performance of the mission with minimum losses ;
save every person !” 78
The desire to preserve personnel is a characteristic feature of the
majority of outstanding generals. For example, Kutuzov wrote : “ It was
not difficult to defeat them (the French - V . S.) , but it was neecssary
99 73
for us to defeat them more cheaply .”
History shows that the skillful application of principles of military
art always led to victory with comparatively small losses. We will give
a few examples.
The well organized surprise attack , flank attack , and unexpected
maneuver of Hannibal's troops in the Battle of Lake Trasimeno (217
B.C.) led to a total rout of the 40,000 -man army of the Romans with
insignificant losses for the Carthaginians.
In the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C., Hannibal's 50,000-man army
smashed the 86,000 -man army of the Romans . Roman losses reached
48,000 men in killed alone. The Carthaginians suffered 6,000 killed.
Hannibal achieved such a brilliant success thanks to a concentration

" See Arkhiv MO SSSR , fond 323, opis' 4756c, delo 163 , list 30-41.
78
K. K. Rokossovskiy, Soldatskiy dolg ( A Soldier's Duty ), Voyenizdat, Moscow ,
1968 , p 303.
19 M. I. Kutuzov, Sbornik dokumentov (Collection of Documents ), Vol. 4 , Part
2 , p 39.

138
of elite infantry and strong cavalry on the flanks, which led to en
circlement of the superior enemy forces.
In a battle at the village of Lesnaya in 1708 a Russian light corps
( korvolant) headed by Peter I defeated superior forces of the Swedish
corps of Levengaupt. The latter lost 8,500 killed while the Russians
lost 1,000 killed . This engagement is of considerable interest inasmuch
as it is an example of independent operations of a large korvolant,
of its maneuver and activeness, of the interworking of infantry with
cavalry , and of the defeat of an enemy piecemeal.
In the Battle of Poltava in 1709 the Russian Army totally de
feated the army of the Swedish King Karl XII. On the battlefield
were left 9,234 dead Swedes and 19,000 were taken prisoner. The
Russian Army suffered 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded . The causes
for such a splendid victory were widely revealed in the work by A. A.
Strokov. He notes that the victory at Poltava was the result of a long
and persistent material, organizational, and tactical preparation of the
Russian Army, and the result of a well thought out and skillfully
accomplished strategic plan . The Russian Army showed high combat
qualities and tactical superiority over the enemy. The organization of
a forward position with redoubts, a three -hour battle at this position, the
isolation of Ross ' column from the main Swedish forces and its defeat,
as well as the defeat of the Swedish reserve detachment — all these are
new phenomena in tactical art. The victory of the Russian Army was
won not by a superiority in forces (ballations of the second line, except
for two or three , did not enter the battle), but by its high combat
qualities and ability. Peter I imposed on the Swedish Army his desired
method of conducting the battle, as well as the path of retreat for
its remnants. Marshal Moritz of Saxony, who studied this battle in
detail, exclaimed : “ This is how , thanks to skillful measures, it is
possible to force fate to take your side.” 80
Secret concentration , surprise attack , activeness, “ eye , swiftness, and
impact,” and courage led to a situation where 7,000 Russians and
18,000 Austrians headed by Suvorov defeated a 100,000 -man army of
Turks at Rymnik in 1789. The Turkish losses were 10,000 killed or
drowned in the disorderly flight across the rivers Rymnik and Buzeo .
Allied troops lost 1,000 men .
French losses in the three -day battle at Trebbia in 1799, as well as
due to pursuit, reached 18,000. The Russo -Austrian troops of Suvorov
lost around 6,000 men . The French Army was defeated thanks to in
novation and the outstanding art of our great general, the activeness
of his troops, their brilliant maneuver on the battlefield , and destruction
of the enemy piecemeal.
In the battle at Nov ’ in 1799 Suvorov showed a classic model of a

$0 See A. A. Strokov, Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva, Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1955,

p 502 .

139
demonstration of the main attack on a secondary sector of the front
with the aim of drawing off enemy forces and destroying him with the
surprise actions of the main body on the decisive axis . Results of the
engagement: total defeat of the French , whose losses were 16,000–
17,000 killed , wounded , and captured . Losses of the allied troops were
8,000, of which 2,000 were Russian .
The Jassy -Kishinev Operation of 1944 is an example of winning
victory over the enemy with comparatively few sacrifices.
The Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts lost 12,500 men while the
enemy was deprived of 18 divisions as a result of encirclement and
destruction . 81 In prisoners alone the Soviet troops captured 208,600
enemy soldeirs and officers. This is graphic evidence of the high level of
Soviet military art and the combat mastery of our commanders.
The Jassy -Kishinev Operation was characterized by surprise, the
enormous penetrative force of the initial attack, high rates of advance,
wide use of mobile means, and precisely coordinated interworking of
combat arms and branches of the Armed Forces. This operation went
down in the history of Soviet military art as a remarkable example of
rapid encirclement of an enemy and just as rapid a defeat. Moreover, this
was under conditions of a mountain -forest theater of military operations,
where the enemy had powerful fortified regions.
In contrast to other operations for encirclement during the Great
Patriotic War, in the Jassy-Kishinev Operations the fronts did not
dissipate their efforts on main and secondary axes, but each of them
in the beginning delivered one extremely powerful blow . The secondary
attacks were delivered only after a breakthrough of the defense on the
main axis, with the use of the breach already formed for expanding
the front of attack.82
The Soviet Army suffered comparatively few losses in battles to defeat
the troops of imperialist Japan (9 August- 2 September 1945 ) . Losses of
the Japanese Army were over 677,000 , including 594,000 captured .
Losses of the Soviet Army were around 32,000.83 Our troops seized
great trophies. Such success was achieved thanks to our troops' absolute
numerical and qualitative superiority over the Japanese , the achieve
ment of surprise in time, in form , and in scope of operation, the close
interworking of ground forces, navy, and aviation , and the mobility of
operations and high rates of advance , especially of the Sixth Tank Army.
The average daily rate of advance of this army was 80 km , and on
some days of the operation it reached 160 km . This was in spite of
the difficulty of operating in mountain - desert terrain — on the Bolshoy
Khingan . The Soviet troops skillfully created high densities of men and

81 See Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva , edited by Strokov, Voyenizdat, Moscow ,

1966 , p 465 .
Si Ibid .
$3 Ibid ., p 514.

140
weapons on axes of main attacks, especially when breaking through
fortified regions.
To our great regret, the past war also provides us with examples of
individual battles and operations in which our troops suffered consider
able losses. The causes of this are many . One of the most important
is ignoring of the demands of principles of military art, their crude viola
tion , and their unskilled realization .
For example, during the attack by Fifth Army during the period
from 16 through 27 October 1944 , it suffered considerably greater losses
in comparison with other combined -arms armies and other operations by
this same army. In 12 days the army advanced 30 km , with an average
daily advance of 2.5 km . With each day of the operation the rate
of advance dropped. On 17 October troops of this army advanced 4-10
km , on the 18th 3–6 km , on the 19th 2.5 km , on the 20th and 21st 2 km
each day , on the 23rd , 24th , 25th , and 26th one km daily, and on the 27th
0.5 km . In the course of the attack not a single enveloping maneuver
was made with the aim of encircling the enemy. The enemy consistently
organized a withdrawal of 1–2 km from one position to another, not
encountering effective counteraction from our troops. There was no con
tinuous reconnaissance. This allowed the enemy to set up numerous
ambushes and inflict considerable losses to our troops from them . Our
tanks would first separate from the infantry beyond the prescribed dis
tance, then , to the contrary, would lag behind it. The control of troops
often was interrupted . A tendency prevailed for the decentralized use of
tanks equally across the entire front. Some commanders tried to use self
propelled artillery pieces like tanks. The main enemy centers of resistance
were overcome, not by a maneuver to the flank and rear , but by head
on attack . The infantry was not trained in techniques of clearing mines.
Army troops were not trained in nighttime operations, and they had
no advance at night. What the lack of reconnaissance in the operation
led to can be judged in the example of the 2nd Guards Tank Brigade.
In the period from 17 through 25 October 1944 it lost 36 tanks knocked
out or turned up by the fire of enemy tanks and self-propelled pieces
from ambushes. This was 70 percent of the brigade's total losses during
the advance.84 Fortunately, this example is not characteristic for our
troops. Nevertheless, we considered it necessary to cite it here for “ learn
ing from mistakes,” as a vivid illustration of the significance of military
art, especially in comparison with typical positive examples from the
combat practice of our army cited above .
The Battle of Moscow , especially the counteroffensive of our troops
in the winter of 1941–1942, is of special interest from the viewpoint of
growth in combat mastery of our commanders and troops as a whole,
enrichment of the initial experience of skillful realization of the demands

84 See Arkhiv MO SSSR , fond 241, opis' 13834, delo 74, list 96-107, 151, 152.

141
of principles ofmilitary art, analysis of the shortcomings in their use , and
development of measures to eliminate these shortcomings. This battle
had historic importance . It was successful and developed into a general
offensive of the Soviet Army across a front up to 2,000 km from Leningrad
to the Black Sea . As a result of the counteroffensive at Moscow , our
troops defeated enemy shock groupings targeted against the envelopment
and capture of the capital and threw them back a distance up to 250
km , thus removing the direct threat to Moscow . The enemy suffered heavy
losses. In the zone of the Western Front alone the Hitlerites lost 72,000
killed , and together with wounded , captured , and frozen , the total was
around 250,000 . On the whole , in the Battle of Moscow the fascist
German troops suffered colossal, irreplaceable losses: around a half
million killed , dead from wounds, captured , or seriously frostbitten ;
around 1,300 tanks; around 2,500 guns ; over 15,000 trucks and a great
many other weapons and combat equipment. This battle was decisive
military event, the first serious defeat for the fascist army and retreat of
its troops. The Battle of Moscow had great military, political, and
international significance .

In this battle Soviet military art successfully withstood the test on

the battlefields and took a considerable step forward . Soviet strategy ,
operational art, and tactics at the most difficult period of the struggle ,
in spite of shortcomings and mistakes, on the whole were able to resolve
the tasks before them , and the experience gained was used for
further development of our military art and of our Armed Forces.
In the course of the Battle of Moscow our commanders succeeded in
eliminating in a short time the serious shortcomings in use of the basic
principles of military art. These shortcomings were in evidence in the
combat operations of our troops at the beginning of the war, and also in
part when the Red Army shifted into the counteroffensive . It is true
that, as applied to the Battle of Moscow , these were “ shortcomings in
growth ,” aggravated by serious objective conditions and circumstances,
a limited number of men and weapons, the absence in fronts and armies
of large mechanized and tank soyedineniya , enemy dominance of the
air, our troops' lack of experience in conducting large offensive opera
tions, and others.
We will indicate the most characteristic directions of growth in the
art of our commanders in use of the principles of military art in the Bat
tle of Moscow and measures to eliminate detected shortcomings carried
out by our troops.
At the beginning of the war , some commanders without sufficient
experience in organizing offensive operations and battles distributed
men and weapons evenly across the front in shifting to the offensive ,
thus violating the demands of the principle of concentration of men
and weapons on the main axis . In a number of cases commanders
tried to organize an offensive simultaneously on several axes without

142
having sufficient forces for this. This led to a dissipation of men and
weapons across the front and did not permit creation of the necessary
superiority over the enemy on the axis of main attack.
Instead of concentration of the main forces and means on the decisive
axis , armies sometimes operated with individual divisions placed in a
chain . This was especially characteristic of ob ” yedineniya of the cen
tral sector of the Western Front. The operations they conducted in
December 1941 ended in failure: Fifth Army made an insignificant
advance with a rate of 1.6 km per day , while Thirty- Third and Forty
third armies turned out to be in no condition to break the enemy's
resistance and had no success .
An insignificant superiority in men over the enemy on axes chosen
for delivery of strikes was one of the important reasons for the low
rates of advance , since exploitation of initial success usually was para
lyzed by counterblows of enemy operational reserves. Under these con
ditions, the overcoming of enemy resistance and defeat of his groupings
could be achieved only with a build -up of efforts by committing new
soyedineniya to the engagement. However, the limited number of men
and weapons in attacking armies had decisive influence on the com
position of their second echelons and reserves. In the first offensive
operations armies as a rule did not have second echelons, while the
reserves were small. Instead of the massed use of the reserves on the
axis of main attack , they were dispersed across a broad front or were
committed by chasti, from the move, and without necessary preparation .
The headquarters attentively analyzed the available shortcomings and
took timely steps to eliminate them . On 10 January 1942 a directive
letter of the headquarters signed by I. V. Stalin and A. M. Vasilevskiy
demanded a shift from linear disposition of divisions to creation of
shock groups, and from artillery preparation to an artillery offensive. Ac
tions of shock groups and organization of artillery offensives led to a
considerable increase in tempos of breakthrough of the enemy's tactical
zone of defense and the rates of the advance as a whole . Narrow sectors
of breakthrough began to be assigned to armies, and, in a number of
instances , less broad zones of advance . Separation of sectors of break
through in the front and in armies and delivery of attacks by armies
only on one axis permitted them to mass their men and weapons decisively
and achieve a deciding superiority over the enemy on the main axis .
The fact that armies and fronts still did not have large mechanized
or tank soyedineniya also had a negative effect on the use of principles
of military art and on the course of the first offensive operations by our
troops. This reduced the shock force of Soviet troops and their rates
of advance. Tanks were dispersed in individual battalions and brigades .
Moreover , the combined -arms commanders often distributed the tanks
in small groups to rifle chasti and podrazdeleniya . This hindered the
purposeful use of armored troops for developing tactical success into

143
operational success with the aim of swift completion of encirclement
and total defeat of enemy groupings. However, to repulse the attacks
by Soviet troops, the enemy used tanks in compact groupings and thus
achieved superiority . On 22 January 1942 the Headquarters of the
Supreme High Command issued an order which demanded that tank
brigades and separate tank battalions be employed in combat as a rule
at full strength and in close interworking with infantry, artillery , and
aviation . The order prohibited the commitment of tanks to battle with
out preliminary reconnaissance or commander's reconnaissance. This
order marked the beginning of the mass use of Soviet armored troops .
In the first offensive battles the air force was also used with insuf
ficient purpose by the Soviet command, but by the beginning of the
counteroffensive of the Red Army at Moscow Soviet aviation was
employed en masse. In the course of battles there was interworking
of aviation both within fronts as well as between adjacent fronts, with
its centralized control on the part of the Headquarters of the Supreme
High Command. However, as the general offensive of the Red Army
developed , the air force of fronts began to act only within the zones of
their fronts .
Finally it should be noted that one of the causes of incompleteness
of certain operations and the low rates of advance was the mistakes
committed by the superior command in estimating the offensive cap
abilities of our armies and the capabilities of the enemy for resistance ,
and the incommensurability of men and weapons with those goals which
were set before the troops. Often these goals exceeded in their scale
the capabilities of our obʼyedineniya and their available men and weap
ons. All this was a result of the violation of the principle of conformity of
the goal of the operation or battle to the conditions of the actual
situation .
A lack of combat experience was often reflected in a violation of the
demands of the principle of interworking. The interworking of tanks,
infantry, and artillery was organized hastily in a number of instances ,
without consideration for the terrain conditions or their effect on the
use of combat arms in battle . A large part in eliminating this short
coming was played by instructions of the Headquarters to commanders
in - chief of fronts and separate armies dated 24 September 1941, espe
cially the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense ] Order No 325 dated
16 October 1942 , which provided a number of important instructions
precisely regulating the combat employment of tank soyedineniya and
chasti and the fundamentals of their interworking in combat.
NKO Order No 306 , which eliminated shortcomings in alignment of
combat formations of the infantry, was of great importance in the
development of principles of combat art and their use . The order noted
that combat formations were being too densely echeloned in depth . For
example, a rifle division usually had only eight rifle companies out of

144
27 in the first echelon , and the remaining 19 companies were deprived
of the opportunity to use their weapons in the attack .
In accordance with Order No 306 , the combat formations of rifle
troops (from company to division ) in the offensive were to be formed
into one echelon with a small reserve. The skirmish line became the
basis of the infantry combat formation . This allowed fuller use of the
infantry's weapons, delivery of a more powerful first blow on the enemy,
quicker breakthrough of the main zone of his defense, and thus a re
duction in losses of attacking troops. The basic provisions of this order
were fixed in the Infantry Combat Regulations (BUP -42). However, it
must be noted that the rejection of echelonment of combat formations
in the regiment and division was temporary and occasioned by the shal
low formation of the enemy defense , its characteristic centers of re
sistance, and lack of developed fortifications.
Thus, in the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet
Supreme High Command employed in different stages of the armed
conflict as it gained combat experience the most expedient forms and
methods of conducitng combat operations. Thanks to this, as well as to
the creative initiative of Soviet troops in the first 1 1/2 years of the
war, a major step forward was made in development of principles of
military art and their practical use.
An outstanding role in development of the principles of military art
belongs not only to the Supreme High Command, but also to all
commanders and troops of the Red Army.
As events developed , commanders of all echelons attentively analyzed
the mistakes seen in the actions of our troops and took steps to eliminate
them . By 9 December 1941, the directive of the commander-in -chief of
the Western Front, Army Gen G. K. Zhukov, categorically prohibited
troops from being drawn into protracted frontal engagements and pre
scribed the creation of strong shock groups with tanks, submachine gun
ners, and cavalry and their envelopment of the enemy for an attack
against his rear.
Army Gen Zhukov on 13 December 1941 demanded “ forceful con
duct of the pursuit, without disengaging from the enemy. Make wide
use of strong forward detachments to capture road junctions and de
files and to disorganize the enemy's combat and march formations.”
It was categorically prohibited to conduct frontal attacks of the enemy's
reinforced points. In this case it was ordered that the first echelons
bypass them and continue the attack , leaving the destruction of the
enemy in fortification to following echelons. The commander-in -chief
of the Southwestern Front, Lt Gen P. A. Kurochkin , in the course of
the very first day of the offensive on 9 January 1942, ordered the
commander-in -chief of Third Shock Army not to hold up at individual
populated points to do battle, but to bypass them , move to their rear ,
and make better use of the advantages which the enemy's scattered

145
front gave us.85 On 13 January Lt Gen Kurochkin ordered the com
manders -in -chief of Third and Fourth Shock Armies : “ You are conducting
the battles for individual points incorrectly . . . . Instead of a deep en
velopment of the populated points, you are surrounding them directly ,
thus binding your main body and anesthetizing them .” 86
These measures of the Soviet command played a large part in im
proving the art of using the principles and in their subsequent develop
ment.
The relationship of troop losses to the level of military art and the
skillful use of its principles was established long ago . In an interesting
investigation by F. Surin there is a statement: “ Losses were decreased on
that side where the leader was more talented and skilled , with all
else being equal. . . . The side which lagged behind the enemy in
strategic and tactical training and in art suffered heavy losses and
permitted the enemy to finish or win the campaign quicker with least
losses.” 87
It appears useful to cite here some of Surin's conclusions about mis
takes in empioyment of principles of military art on the part of the
command which led to serious losses in personnel. In spite of the fact
that these conclusions were made in the last century, such mistakes
took place in wars of the Twentieth Century as well. Surin wrote :
“ The commander who acts out of daring strives to 'take the bull by
the horns ,' and does not advise his troops to take cover and wait for a
long time for the fire preparation , or to avoid useless battle, but sends
three regiments with bayonets against the entire enemy army, which is
excellently armed and dug in . . . He easily acquires the fame of being
resolute , courageous, and energetic . . . . To the contrary, if instead of a
frontal bayonet attack , the military leader forces the enemy to move off
without battle (for example, by means of an envelopment and opera
tions against the enemy's lines of communication ), then he is deprived
of the opportunity to write citations with attacks for effect and the
taking by combat of a mountain or village needed by no one, and at the
same time he loses the chance to receive an award or a good reputation .”
F. Surin wrote that “ every mountain , village, or position occupied
by the enemy was assaulted , besieged , and attempts made to capture
them only because the enemy had lodged there , although goals could
have been attained by bypassing such places and leaving them under
the supervision of rear area troops.”
In peacetime, notes Surin , the sergeant-major ability, efficiency, and
ability to get off one's hands an inspection, parade, guard mount, or
ceremonial march should not give the reputation of a good general or

85 Ibid ., fond 221, opis ' 70435, list 62 .

88 Ibid ., list 66 .
87 F. Surin , Umen'sheniye ubyli na voyne sredstvami voyennogo iskusstva (Re
duction of Losses in War by Means of Military Art), Kazan', 1878, pp 11, 12 .

146
 good commander . With the views not existing, wrote Surin , it would
be necessary to regard Napoleon as incapable for line service because
he was unable to employ and know , for example, the regulations for
a battalion exercise of his infantry. In an attempt to conduct such an
exercise, Napoleon created such disorder and confusion that he became
disconcerted and left the training field after ordering the battalion com
-

mander to “ untangle it .” Surin stated that in drill there was less esteem
for military talents and broad military understanding then for sergeant
major type merits having nothing in common with rational preparation
of troops for combat or with the immediate and chief purpose of troops.
We will add for our part that in the 20th century, in addition to people
possessing “ sergeant-major type merits,” there were also commanders
who began at times to make their career, possessing capabilities for
construction and outfitting of barracks, training fields, classrooms, motor
pools, housing , etc. Of course, these abilities are needed in peacetime,
but they should not become above abilities for controlling troops in a
battle or operation . In the Czarist Army there was also an effect on ad
vancement in service by the noble origin of officers, blood relation
ships, and personal relations with senior commanders. For example,
sons and other relatives of major military leaders almost automatically
and considerably faster than their contemporaries — become generals ,
although of course knowledge is not passed on by inheritance .
By virtue of the above, with the beginning of each big war many
peacetime military leaders turned out to be incapable of commanding
troops in battle or in an operation and in their places came other more
capable officers and generals . Such an “ overestimation of values” took
place in the past far from smoothly and did colossal damage to the
combat effectiveness of troops . It also led to unjustified sacrifices and
losses. In a future nuclear war such a “ tradition ” would summon con
sequences considerably more serious than in past wars.
Use of the principles of military art under contemporary condi
tions advances, in our view , a new and important criterion — that of
economic effectiveness . In other words, one of the indicators of the
skillful use of principles of military art is the accomplishment of combat
and operational missions with consideration for the effectiveness of
expenditures, i.e., as cheaply as possible. We stress “ as possible ,” because
in a combat situation in some cases a number of other criteria , especially
the time factor (expenditure of time on accomplishing a mission),
may be more important than cost effectiveness.
We will give one example (the figures are arbitrary ---without regard
for concrete models of armaments and combat equipment). Let us
assume that in the course of an attack a commander has obtained re
connaissance information about an enemy launcher which has occupied
a launch position , and that it is possible to have the launch of a nuclear
missile from it within 18 minutes from the time the reconnaissance data

147
was received . This launcher can be destroyed by the fire of one of
the artillery battalions, but they are moving and are able to open fire,
let us say, in 20 minutes. It can be destroyed by the strikes of several
fighter-bombers, but according to the conditions of combat readiness
and the distance of the airfield at the given moment, they can deliver
a strike in 22 minutes. It can be destroyed by a missile with a large
yield nuclear warhead from a launcher . In the given situation let us
assume its readiness for launch is in 16 minutes, but a small - yield
nuclear burst is sufficient to destroy the enemy launcher. There is also
a missile with such a warhead, but its launch is possible , let us assume,
in 27 minutes. Let us assume that it takes one hour for a special de
tachment to move to the area of the enemy launch position to destroy the
launcher, and that it takes two hours to drop an airborne team for
the very same purpose. At the given time the commander has no other
men or weapons to destroy the enemy launcher .
The commander's decision to destroy the enemy launcher with a
nuclear missile by means of a strike by our large -yield nuclear missile in
16 minutes in this situation would be economically ineffective , but fully
expedient, since the enemy missile could be destroyed before its launch
only by our nuclear strike, albeit of excess yield .
This arbitrary example is , however, sooner the exception than the
rule, since the cost aspects of accomplishing combat missions now move
to one of the important spots by virtue of the extremely high cost of
combat equipment and weapons and the tendencies for sharp cost
increases ( Table 2 ).

Table 2 .--Dynamics of Price Increases for Certain Types of

Combat Equipment
(Thousands of West German Marks) *
Type of Combat Equipment Years
1939-1945 1962-1963 end of sixties
Fighter aircraft 200 5,000 15,000
Medium tank 400 1,000 2,500

* According to data of the journals Bundeswehr, Wehr und Wirtschaft, Sonder

dienst, and other West German sources .

It is evident from the table that the cost of fighter aircraft under
contemporary conditions has increased in comparison with the World
War II period 75 times, and that of a tank by over 6 times. Even within
the limits of six years of this decade the cost of an aircraft has risen
three times, and that of a medium tank by 2 1/2 times. The cost of a
nuclear weapon it incomparably higher than that of conventional com
bat equipment.
In connection with the increase in prices of conventional forms of
weapons there has also been a sharp price increase for the material

148
technical outfitting of soyedineniya. According to the American journal
Aviation Week and Space Technology (1964, No 11), the cost of
material-technical outfitting of an infantry division rose from 19 million
dollars in 1945 to 111 million in 1964, i.e., almost sixfold .
There were cases in past wars where , as a result of poor organization
of the attack , ignoring of the demands of principles of military art,
irresponsible attitude toward one's duties, and the lack of talent of some
officials , entire divisions were put out of commission and lost a consid
erable number of personnel and all their combat equipment in a period
of a few hours. Sometimes in such cases military leaders “ drove” another
division into the attack right after the first division , with the same fatal
outcome, although success could be achieved by suppressing the enemy
with fire, by maneuver, by regrouping troops, or by attacking on a new
axis after its thorough preparation . There are many such examples in
the history of World War I and II. Such an " attack ” is inadmissible
above all from the viewpoint of preserving personnel, but along with
this, under contemporary conditions one cannot ignore the cost of losses
of combat equipment— 182 million dollars in a tank division and 155
million in a mechanized division (Table 3) .

Table 3 .--Cost of Initia ! Outfitting of Contemporary Divisions

(in millions of dollars ) *

Type Division Cost of Initial Outfitting

Air Assault 282
Tank 182
Mechanized 155
Infantry 111
Parachute Assault 76

* According to data of the FRG journal Wehr und Wirtschaft, No 2 , 1966 .

Let us look at another example of a lesser scale : one kilogram of

bombs now costs 2 dollars. A heavy bomber drops 30,000 kiiograms of
bombs or more. One American author, in describing the combat opera
tions of American aggressors in Vietnam , laments that a strike which
misses the target from just one heavy bomber leads to the nonuseful loss
of $60,000 .
In analyzing the data of tables 2 and 3 one must keep in mind that
a change in prices for weapons and combat equipment in capitalist
countries is affected not only by technical-economic, but also by
socio -economic causes (such as the dominance of monopoly capital).
However, in connection with the revolution in military affairs and con
siderable complication of weapons systems, there is a general tendency
for them to become more costly . According to data of the foreign press,
over two -thirds of all military expenditures now goes for equipment
and weapons in connection with this fact.

149
 It is interesting to note that the need for analyzing the effectiveness of
expenditures in accomplishing combat missions stems, though very in
directly , from the law of economic construction . Here is what the CPSU
Program has to say about this law : “Main attention in all levels of plan
ning and management of the economy must be focussed on the most
rational and effective use of material, labor, and financial resources and
natural riches, and on elimination of superfluous costs and losses . The
achievement of the greatest results with the least expenditures in the
interests of society -- such is the immutable law of economic construc
tion ." 88
In contemporary battle or operation the commanders, especially in
the senior echelons, often may have different versions for accomplishing
missions, particularly for the destruction (or capture ) of certain objectives,
such as : a nuclear strike of a certain yield , an air strike (with nuclear
bombs, conventional bombs, aircraft cannon , aircraft rockets ) , by artil
lery fire with the expenditure of a certain amount of ammunition , by
capture of a certain region with forward detachments, by airborne
landings , by chasti of the first echelon , etc.
The successful accomplishment of missions in a battle or operation
with the least losses in personnel and least economic costs is an indicator
of high military skill and skillful use of the principles of military art.
Only in the necessary cases will a commander be forced , in a certain
situation , to consciously accomplish missions with increased economic
costs, as has already been stressed . This will be fully justified when
there are no other ways to forestall and defeat the enemy, ensure
victory for our troops, and maintain their combat effectiveness .
The dissemination of a systems approach and employment of the
theory of utility in the solution of practical tasks is beginning to have
important help for the commander in the optimum solution to the question
of accomplishment of a combatmission not only successfully, but economi
cally effectively .
A universal measure (of estimative criteria) is created for proper
comparison and unambiguous estimation of various possible versions of
actions on the battlefield which are characterized by several indicators.
It is most expedient to use utility as this measure — a generalizing
quantitative characteristic which is a function of particular indices of
effectiveness. Its numerical indicators depend on specific characteris
tics used as indicators of effectiveness , and usually not coinciding with
them . For example , with a utility ( V ) of assigning 100 tanks (NT = 100)
to perform a combat mission V ' = f (N'T) = f ( 100 ) = 100 , then the utility
of assigning 150 tanks N'r = 150 may often be V " = f ( 100 ) = 115 , but
hardly V " = (150) = 150 .
Skillful use of the principles of military art under contemporary con
ditions presumes the optimum (best) planning of combat operations,
88
Programma KPSS (CPSU Program ), Gospolitizdat, Moscow , 1964, p 85.

150
rational use of men and weapons in a battle or operation , and attain
ment of victory with least expenditures in human lives, material means,
and time. The resolution of these tasks is eased by employing mathema
ticalmethods in military affairs : statistics, probability theory , game theory ,
mathematical programming, theory of queueing, mathematical modeling,
network planning and control, theory of retrieval, theory of decision
determination , and others.
The application of mathemattical methods is capable of helping a
commander primarily in seeking out answers to the following groups of
questions:
1. What is the expected result of actions under the present plan for
use of assigned men and weapons ?
2. What kind of detail of men and weapons is needed to achieve the
given result with consideration for enemy counteraction ?
3. What kind of optimum plan of operations for available men and
weapons must there be ?
The focal point in preparing a solution and developing a plan of
operations (combat operations), and also in making decisions in the
course of combat operations, lies with the calculation tasks related to
determining the correlation of forces with consideration for their quantity
and quality, determining damage with the employment of a given amount
of combat means, estimating enemy counteraction , and determining
the detail of combat means for obtaining a given amount of damage ;
and it also lies with tasks of optimum planning and target distribution ,
tasks of conducting and overcoming air defenses, and others.
However, mathematical methods may be employed only in a quanti
tative evaluation of a situation which is forming. They are not capable
of encompassing such very important qualitative indicators as a com
mander's knowledge of the principles of military art, his will and
experience, his decisiveness, initiative , and degree of training, the
moral-psychological condition of the troops, etc. In addition , predictions
obtained by mathematical methods usually are correct only in an
average, for a great number of similar actions. These methods con
sider only presumed , and not actual enemy actions. By virtue of what
has been stated , mathematical methods cannot be made into a fetish
or elevated to the absolute.
Nevertheless, without clarification of the quantitative correlations
of factors operating in armed conflict it is impossible to understand its
patterns or seek out optimum methods of operations, especially in
confused and complex situations.
In order to judge concerning the art of using principles of military
art in a particular battle or operation, one can take advantage in part
of a system of criteria of effectiveness of control.
The criterion of effectiveness is taken to mean an indicator which ,
by its numerical value, we ( or an electronic computer ) can draw a

151
conc.usion about how good is a result which has been attained or a
decision which has been made. Such a criterion permits a judgment about
the effectiveness of employing combat means or about the relative
value of different versions of decisions in a battle or operation .
As a criterion of effectiveness it is expedient to use , depending on
the concrete conditions, the correlation of losses of the sides (mathe
matical expectations of losses ) ; correlation of forces of the sides ;
relationship of lost means to achieved results, by means of which it is
possible to estimate for example, the economic advisability of particular
measures; and a number of others.
If several criteria are chosen in an investigation , they are united in
some generalized criterion , or one of the criteria which answers the set
goal to the greatest extent is considered the chief one , and the remain
ing are secondary.
The time of fulfillment of a mission can be a secondary , but never
theless a very important and relatively independent criterion in mili
tary tasks. As a matter of fact, even an optimum distribution of men
and weapons among attack objectives loses all meaning if the attack is
not delivered at the given time. Therefore optimization of target dis
tribution according to any selected main criterion must be done only
within the framework of time set aside for delivering the attack .
The above attests eloquently to the fact that application of mathe
matical methods in military affairs provides the commander with a
reliable basis for best use of the principles of military art, even though
it does not guarantee such use.

Classification of Principles of Military Art

In our literature the principles of military art are often called prin
ciples of military science. In our view , this is a vexing inaccuracy ,
since military art is only a component of military science . However, to
confuse part with the whole means to fall into error .
Military science, being a system of knowledge about the nature,
essence, and content of armed conflict, and about the forces, means,
and methods of waging combat operations with armed forces and
their thorough support, studies the objective laws of armed conflict,
develops questions of the theory of military art, questions of develop
ment and preparation of the armed forces, and their military-technologi
cal outfitting, and also analyzes military -historical experience . As a
result of such magnitude of the subject of military science and its
complexity , it forms a vast system of principles. The system of principles
of Soviet military science includes the following : sociopolitical principles
of Soviet military development; organizational principles of Soviet mili
tary development; principles of educating and training the troops;
principles of military art, and others.
The principles of the entire system as a whole, with relative in

152
dependence , are closely connected with each other, as well as with
principles of statewide and party development.
In the system of principles of military science a very important place
belongs to principles of military art. Military art has its own principles
and its own theory, otherwise it would not be an art. There is still no
uniformity in our military press with regard to a classification of prin
ciples.
I. A. Grudinin distinguishes general and specific principles of mili
tary art. Among the general principles he includes those “ operating in
all wars,” such as the concentration of superior forces on the axis of
main attack , interaction, combat support, surprise .
Grudinin includes among specific principles of military art those
which “ reflect the peculiarities of a particular war, the level of de
velopment of productive forces, science, military technology , etc. They
act relatively briefly and objectively as long as there exist the peculiarities
of the particular war which gave them life. When these conditions
disappear, the principles of military art to which they gave rise also
lose their significance.” 89 According to Grudinin , specific principles
are , for example , principles of using tank and airborne forces .
This classification cannot be recognized as perfect, since even “ gen
eral principles of military art” also can , as was shown above, not only
develop their inner content, but can also wither away entirely or arise
at a specific historical stage. Their seeming immutability is only a
form ; the content, however, can change radically . At the bases of the
classification must lie the content, and not the form . But even the
form of expression of principles can change. For example, the prin
ciple of " concentration of forces” has become, under contemporary
conditions, the principle of “ concentration of efforts.”
Maj Gen Kh. Dzhelaukhov , in classifying the principles of military
art, divides them into two types — general and particular. General
principles are those "which possess universal attributes and have a
relationship with all the basic elements of armed conflict.” Here Dzhe
laukhov has in mind above all principles in effect for all forms of
military ( combat ) operations — the offense, defense, etc. He includes
among these principles the massing of men and weapons, conformity
of forces and means to the assigned missions, deep echelonment of
forces and means, surprise , activeness, the principle of a partial victory,
the principle of one-man management, and others. Among the parti
cular principles Dzhelaukhov includes those which are valid only for
some one form of military ( combat ) operations, as well as principles
of particular forms of troop combat activity ; reconnaissance , com
munications, etc.
The statement of the principles of forms of military ( combat) opera
tions as suggested by the author gives rise to doubt. Dzhelaukhov
89
Grudinin , p 112 .

153
named two such principles: exploitation of victory and consolidation
of captured territory. But both these principles are valid also for the
offense and the defense , and only the forms of their manifestation
change . For example, exploitation of victory in the offense may be
reflected in a resolute and relentless pursuit of the enemy, and in the
defense by the restoration of a lost position after a successful counter
attack , or by inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and forcing him to
give up the attack.
Thus , neither Kh. Dzhelauknov nor anyone else succeeded in actually
formulating concrete principles of forms of military (combat) opera
tions. And this is not by chance. It is our conviction that they simply
do not exist, since principles of military art are understood to be not
individual particular theses, but central, fundamental generalizations
stemming from the objective laws of war and suitable for practical use
in all basic forms of combat activity of troops. The principles. of
military art thus are valid for all forms of military ( combat) operations.
As has already been noted, only the forms of their manifestation change .
However , the specific nature of different forms of military (combat )
operations finds additional reflection in rules .
On the basis of already established views on the classification of a
system of principles of Soviet military science, we suggest a comparatively
simple classification of its most important component— the overall
system ofprinciples ofmilitary art (see Diagram 1 ) .
The system of principles of Sovietmilitary science includes:

a . Sociopolitical principles of Soviet military development ;

b . Organizational principles of Soviet military development;
c. A general system of principles ofmilitary art;

d . Principles of education and training of troops.

The general system of principles of military art consists of two large
groups : basic principles of military art and particular principles of
military art. The basic principles of military art include those valid
for all three of its component parts — general tactics, operational art,
and strategy , e.g., surprise, concentration of efforts, activeness, etc.
Statements of the principles of tactics, operational art, and strategy
usually are completely identical. However, a specific scope is included
in setting forth the content of a principle. If the content of a particular
principle is set forth on a tactical scale, then this will be a basic prin
ciple of tactics; when this same principle is set forth on an operational
or strategic plane it will be a basic principle of operational art or
strategy respectively. It is fully possible to expound a principle for all
three components of military art. In this case it will be a basic principle
of military art.
The role and significance of a particular principle may change de
pending on the scale of actions. For example, the principle of simultaneous

154
 of
Principles
of
System
Science
Soviet
Military

Sociopolitical Organizational General

system of
Principles
of
principles of
principles principle
of s and
education
Soviet
military Soviet
military art
military training
development development

art
military
of
Principles of
principles
Particular
perational
otactics
g,for
( eneral art
military
art
strategy
,a) nd

cof ombat
military
)(Principles of
form
each
Principles
of
branch
each
for
operations of
form
and
support
arm
combat
and
forces
armed combat
activity

General Specific General Specific

principles principles principles principles

Diagram
1

155
pressure on the enemy to the entire depth of his operational formation
found a real basis in strategy and moved to one of the primary places
of importance with the appearance of nuclear missiles. Before this
only aviation was able to exert influence on strategic reserves and
objectives in the deep rear, but its strikes were insufficiently effective
and it suffered heavy losses in actions against deep objectives.
A small number of V – 2 rockets outfitted with conventional ex
plosives and employed in World War II was not able to lead to a change
in the character of battle or operation . Under new conditions the
employment of strategic nuclear means is a new phenomenon which
changes radically the character of armed conflict in warfare. The
simultaneous action of these means against economic, administrative
political, and military objectives located in the deep rear of the war
ring sides turns their territory from the very beginning of a war into
an arena of active military operations. Consequently , deep rear ob
jectives on which a country's vital activity depends become centers
of basic military efforts of armed conflict in strategy .
In operational art this principle is not the main one, but it still plays
an important part. In tactics its importance drops from the top to the
bottom as there is a decrease in the range of means of destruction and
means of reconnaissance .
Therefore both tank and motorized rifle battalions will primarily
suppress the enemy with whom they are in immediate contact. As a
result of this, the sphere of action and role of the principle of simul
taneous action on the scale of podrazdeleniya is strongly limited .
The scale of principles of military art will find precise reflection
in the exposition of their content and use .
The second component of the general system of principles is a group
of particular principles of military art consisting of several large sub
groups: particular principles of strategy, particular principles of opera
tional art, particular principles of tactics, principles of combat (mili
tary ) operations of branches of the armed forces and combat arms,
and principles of forms of support to combat (military ) operations and
forms of combat activity ( control, communications, etc. ) .
We include among the particular principles of strategy, operational
art, or tactics those which are valid only for one of these components
of military art. These particular principles are not examined in this
work .
Subgroups of principles of combat (military) operations of branches
of the armed forces and forms of support and of combat activity are
divided correspondingly into principles of combat (military ) operations
of each of the branches of the armed forces and combat arms, of forms
of support and of combat activity ; and those in turn consist of prin
ciples in common with those of military art and specific principles
suitable only for a particular combat arm , form of support, etc.

156
 Let us explain this in an example of principles of the rear. Some
of the principles of the rear, such as concentration of basic efforts on
the main axes of troop operations, and interworking, are close to the
corresponding principles of military art. But there also are specific prin
ciples of rear support which are a scientific generalization of the most
improved and effective practice of the rear, and recommendations for
actions of rear chasti and establishments under corresponding condi
tions of the conduct of combat operations. Rear area service specialists
include the following among such principles :
a . Conformity of the organization of the rear with the character of
armed conflict and methods of conducting combat operations;
b . Need for advance creation and echeloned placement of reserves;

c . Responsibility of higher echelon for delivery of supplies to lower

rear area elements;
d . Full use of all forms of transport;

e. Accomplishment of repair -restoration work in areas with the

greatest outage of weapons and equipment;
f. Maximum approach of medical forces and means to areas of
massive medical losses ;

g . Use of local means.

We will note that all the specific principles are very close to the
rules and requirements of regulations. There are also rules in the area
of strategy , operational art, and tactics. The rules must be accurately
distinguished from principles as fundamental, guiding ideas and as very
important recommendations on methods and forms of combat operations
encompassing the fundamental directions of possible manifestation of
military art.
Rules are worked out by military science on the basis of laws of
armed conflict and principles of military art. They are the result of
generalization of the combat experience of the last wars and of the
combat training of peacetime. The effect of the rules is more limited
in time in contrast to principles. Rules are revised very often and are
replaced by new ones, sometimes even after every major exercise or
with the appearance of new regulations. Rules include practical recom
mendations on the procedure for preparing, organizing, planning, and
conducting an operation or battle , and operational-tactical norms such
as the front of advance, width of the sector of breakthrough , etc.
Rules change not only with the development of methods and forms of
conducting a battle, but even with the adoption in the arsenal of
individual, single models of weaponry and combat equipment, and
also with a change in tables of organization and equipment of chasti
and soyedineniya.

157
 Principles of military art officially recognized in the U.S. Army
include the following nine: 90
1. Goals and Missions. Any operation must be directed toward the
achievement of a specific and realistic goal. The ultimate goal of war is
the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and crushing of his will to
resist. Every operation must facilitate the achievement of the ultimate
goal. Troops must be assigned those intermediate missions , fulfillment
of which will ensure the rapid accomplishment of the ultimate mission
with a minimum loss of men and materiel.
2. The Offense . The offensive is undertaken with the aim of attain
ing decisive results and preserving freedom of actions. Offensive ac
tions allow a commander to seize the initiative and impose his will on
the enemy, keep up the tempo of the operation , direct the course of
combat actions, take advantage of the enemy's weak sides and the
quickly changing situation, and react to events which develop un
expectedly . In some cases the commander must resort to the defense ,
although the defense must be viewed only as a temporary form of
troop combat actions having the goal of creating favorable conditions
for moving into the attack or economizing men and materiel on axes
where it is not planned to achieve a decisive result. Even on the
defense the commander must strive to take advantage of any op
portunity to seize the initiative from the enemy and shift into a
decisive attack .
3. Concentration . A maximum number of men and means which are
available must be concentrated at the decisive moment. Superiority
over the enemy is a result of the appropriate combination of individual
elements of combat power. Proper application of the principles of
concentration together with other principles of warfare may allow a
defeat to be inflicted on numerically superior enemy forces.
4. Economy of Force . The skillful and economic use of combat
power will help the commander accomplish the mission assigned him
with a minimum expenditure of men and means. One must be guided
by this principle in deciding the question of a concentration of men
and means on specific axes. Economy is the proper distribution of
men and means for performance of both the main and secondary
missions ( conducting an attack with a limited goal, defensive and
withdrawal operations and deception operations) in order to concen
trate the main effort on the decisive axis .
5. Maneuver. Maneuver is a component of combat power. Maneuver
of men and means facilitates the exploitation of success, retention of
freedom of actions, and reduction of vulnerability. Maneuver is the
constant change in location of troops so as to prevent stereotypy in
forms of waging combat.

See Mil'shteyn and Slobodenko, pp 158 , 159.

158
 6. Unity of Command . The decisive use of all the combat might of
troops demands unity of command. Unity of command ensures the
unification of efforts of all troops through coordination of their actions
to accomplish the overall mission . Coordination of troop actions may
be achieved through mutual agreement among equal commanders
in -chief on the basis of instructions from the senior commander.
7. Combat Security of Troops. Troop combat security is of great
importance for preservation of combat might. Combat support includes
measures necessary for protection of troops from an enemy surprise
attack , for ensuring the troops have freedom of action , and for keeping
their measures secret.

8. Surprise . Surprise can radically change the correlation of forces to

one side or the other. Through surprise one can achieve success which
pays for the efforts spent to ensure it. Surprise is the attack against an
enemy at a time, in a place, or in such a manner for which he is not
prepared . It is not so important to catch an enemy unawares as it
is to deprive him of the opportunity to quickly take countermeasures.
9. Plans. The compilation of precise and simple plans facilitates
the successful conduct of combat operations. In the presence of other
similar factors, preference is given to the simplest plan .
A clear and simple exposition of orders and instructions facilitates
their correct understanding and best realization .
The reader obviously has already directed attention to the fact that
the enumerated principles were formulated earlier in works of Clause
witz, Jomini, and other military theoreticians of the past. This is
admitted by American general D. 0. Smith : " All nine principles set
forth in the Combat Training Manual (published on 23 December
1921) ... rest directly on the concepts of Jomini and Clausewitz , ...
and are almost fully borrowed from the Franco -German theore
ticians.” 91 We will add that since 1921 these principles have passed
without essential change from manual to manual of the U.S. Army.
There were no fundamental differences expressed in the list and
content of principles between the regulations of the U.S. Army and the
works of individual American authors. The majority of military au
thors limit themselves to revealing these very principles. Exceptions to
this are rare. For example , Gen G. M. Bandl believes that there is a
total of five principles of warfare : offensive, simplicity , goal, super
iority, and troop combat support. He relegates the remaining prin
ciples to doctrine.
American Commander B. Keener states in an article published in the
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings for November 1967 that the majority of
principles ( eight out of 12) set forth in the Manual of U.S. Naval

91 Smith , pp 69, 70 .

159
Operations are erroneous. In his opinion , these are the erroneous ones :
simplicity, control, offense , exploitation of success, mobility , con
centration , economy of force, preservation of personnel.
B. Keener reduces the proof of the erroneous nature of these prin
ciples to enumeration of several historical examples where the realiza
tion of the principles was accompanied by failures or, on the contrary ,
ignoring of their requirements did not hinder success. The methodology
of such proof does not stand up to criticism , since the author attempts
to subvert rules with solitary examples which are exceptions in the
history of military art. It is impossible to prove anything with one or
two examples. “ An example is not a proof. Any comparison leaves
much to be desired ,” 92 wrote V. I. Lenin . The phenomena of war are
very diverse , and as a result it is possible to find confirmation for
almost any thesis, which often itself is absurd . Solitary examples can
only elucidate, i.e., create a better understanding of individual theoreti
cal theses and be used for analogy with developed theory . Theory
is drawn not from individual examples, although well chosen examples
can convincingly confirm the vitality of a theory.
Keener did not analyze the individual historical facts he cited and
so fell into another pitfall — he did not consider the mechanism of the
action of principles. Each principle is used not of itself, not in isolation ,
but in a complex intermeshing with other principles and rules, and
always in a concrete situation .
But it is not just the solitary instances, but the numerous ones which
of themselves do not comprise that worthy of the name of science .
These are no more than a pile of bricks from which one still has to
build the edifice of science . Science is not born of an analysis of a
multitude of facts. Only on the basis of an analysis of objective laws
and objective reality can we approach the definition of principles .
In criticizing Keener we hardly wish to take up a defense of the
viewpoint of American manuals and regulations against which he is
speaking and which , of course , is not identical with our views. This
criticism of Keener is given here because its erroneous methodology
of proofs is very widespread in the midst of bourgeois military in
vestigators.
in rejecting a majority of principles of military art recognized in
official regulations and instructions of the U.S. Army, Keener offers
his list of principles of military art: assignment of a realistically ac
complishable mission ; correct distribution of forces; coordination ; initia
tive ; inventiveness.
Keener correctly poses the question of assigning troops a realistically
accomplishable mission , although this is not a new question. However ,
the American author's statement of the principle is given too narrowly ,

62 Lenin , Vol. 44, p 417 .

160
without consideration of the correlation of men and means of the
enemies and conditions of the operational (combat ) situation .
Keener states his second principle in place of the principle of concen
tration and the principle of economy of force. The idea of uniting
these principles is correct, but such an attempt is made intuitively,
without grounds. In addition , under contemporary conditions it is more
proper to speak not of the distribution of forces and means, but of the
distribution of efforts at the decisive place at the decisive time.
He includes coordination as a principle quite properly, like many
other authors of the past and of our time. But Keener understands the
content of this principle after the old way, only as a coordination of
men and means. Meanwhile, under contemporary conditions we speak
not only of coordination, but of joint efforts of branches of the armed
forces and combat arms, with the decisive role being with nuclear
weapons.
The author places initiative and inventiveness among the principles
under the pretext that they are applicable in all cases, under all condi
tions of the situation . In the author's opinion , inventiveness is necessary
also to retain the initiative. The following statement by Amercan officer
Keener is characteristic : " At the present time in Vietnam our enemy is
widely employing inventiveness and therefore is maintaining the intia
tive. ”
The five principles formulated by Keener are, in his words, “ almost
immutable laws, independent of time, place , and type of weapon .” It
appears that the author had to place initiative and inventiveness
among the principles of military art in an attempt to prove the eternal
and unchanging nature of the latter. The metaphysical approach to
the essence of principles of military art led the author in the final
account to a departure from the very concept of " principle.” Having
begun his list of principles actually with some fundamental theses of
military art, he ended it with the necessary qualities of a contemporary
commander, such as initiative and inventiveness. Keener included under
inventiveness not only a commander's ability to think up something
new and his resourcefulness, but even cleverness, imagination , and
capability for taking a risk . Obviously sensing the groundlessness of
such a mechanical connection of heterogeneous qualities in one term ,
Keener essentially reduced all this to the principle of surprise.
In British military literature ten principles or rules of waging war
usually are enumerated . These include selection and confirmation of a
goal, coordination , offensive combat operations, freedom of action ,
concentration of forces, economy of efforts, surprise , combat security of
troops, maintenance of a healthy morale, and control of the rear.
French military science usually counts a total of three principles :
flexibility, concentration of efforts, and surprise .
There are several works in Soviet military press publications which

161
enumerate the principles of military art. Some of these formulations
have been given above. A majority of the authors of the corresponding
books and articles in the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) count
seven principles : concentration , dispersal, coordination, surprise , ac
tiveness of actions and persistence in achievement of the assigned
goal, continuity , and comprehensive support of the battle . In these
works is laid a good foundation for further research in this field . They
take a correct, scientifically grounded direction . However , they contain
debatable theses as well which concern the wording and content of the
three principles of military art.
Doubt is raised above all by the rightfulness of including among prin
ciples of military art dispersal, continuity , and comprehensive support
of battle. Dispersal of troops in battle is the reverse of the principle of
concentration of efforts and should be viewed in inseparable connec
tion with its as a value of the allowable and advisable limits of con
centration . With regard to the dispersal of troops outside of battle, this
is not a principle of military art but one of the demands presented to
troops. Such a demand was also presented to troops earlier with the
aim of reducing losses from artillery fire and air strikes , and also for
considerations of providing for the troops, placing them , deploying
them into combat formation , etc. In connection with the great destruc
tive effects of nuclear weapons, the significance of troop dispersal has
risen sharply, but has hardly turned it into a principle of military art or
a guiding tenet for the organization and conduct of military opera
tions .
Continuity of operations cannot be viewed as an independent prin
ciple. On the one hand, it is an expression of a peculiarity of con
temporary combat and of its nature; on the other hand , questions of
continuity are closely connected with the principle of activeness of com
bat operations and are an indicator of activeness. Continuity of combat
operations is connected no less closely with the principle of mobility and
high tempos of combat actions. It is one of the methods of achieving
such tempos . Therefore, continuity should best be viewed as part of the
content of the principle of activeness and the principle of mobility .
The authors include in the content of the principle of “ comprehensive
support of combat,” reconnaissance, protection against weapons of
mass destruction , security, air defense, camouflage, and engineer, rear
area , and other forms of support. Even this long list of forms of
support itself attests to the fact that it cannot be the content of one
principle of military art.
In the past some scholars such as Leyer formulated the principle of
security , but gave it another content — assurance of security of the
operational line. In speaking about this principle, Napoleon had in
mind “ ensuring oneself of the greatest possible chances for success.”
In a letter to Massena dated 28 June 1809, he said : “ One should not

162
give battle if there are not 70 chances out of a hundred for success.
Napoleon also said the following : “ an undertaking is already well con
sidered if two -thirds of the chances are calculated , and the other third
random .”
Thus, the major generals and scholars of the past placed a com
pletely different content into the principle of support — that which we
now regard to a considerable extent under the principle of conformity
of the goal of the operation or battle to the conditions of the actual
situation and the combat qualities, capabilities, and condition of the troops.
Subsequently some authors began to include in the content of the principle
of support the forms of support. This was to some degree justified as
long as the forms of support were few . However, even the World War I,
in our opinion , questions of support became the content of many
particular principles of forms of support. To relegate them to one of the
principles of military art is a misunderstanding leading to a conglomerate
of diverse truisms snatched from different fields of combat activity, and
truths which are too abstract and too general to elevate them to the
status of a principle or for them to serve as a useful guide in battle
or in an operation .
This is not the sole case of confusion in which inattentive regard
for semantics and terminology is guilty to some degree. We will give
three examples connected with principles of military art.
In the first quarter of the 20th century some military writers began
to include a completely new meaning in the principle of military
support — combat and operational forms of support. This could happen
because these authors did not look into what the theoreticians and
generals of past centuries.understood by the word assurance [ obespec
heniye ]. For the latter, the word meant to make possible, real, and
indisputable .
An even more striking error occurred with the principle of economy
of force. The problem is that the word “ economy” in the past century
had a broader meaning than in our time. It was used not only in the
sense in which we understand it now , but also as a harmony of parts
of some kind of system , as a synonym for organization and intelligent
expenditure of something.93 Speaking in modern language , this concerns
an optimum , but not at all absolutely limited , expenditure of means.
Therefore the principle of economy of forces in military affairs pre
viously was understood to be their skillful grouping in time and space de
pending on the importance of the objectives. A majority of scholars con
sidered the principle of economy of force to be a particular case of the
principle of concentration . And they were right. In analyzing the principle
of concentration of forces, Engels wrote that economy of force in the

» See Russkiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar (Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary ), pub

lished by Professor I. N. Berezin of St. Peterburg University , St. Peterburg, 1879,
p 330.

163
form in which it was accomplished in combat formation by Epaminodas
was taken by Alexander to such a combined application of different
types of troops which Greece with its negligible cavalry never would
have been able to achieve.94
Meanwhile, some modern authors who attach to the word “ economy”
only the present meaning have begun to understand the principle of
economy of force to mean reserving a large portion of them for con
ducting combat operations in subsequent periods of the war. Even some
groups of authors with the very highest qualifications did not succeed in
avoiding this mistake .
Something similar happened also with the principle of local victory .
Major generals and scholars of the past (including Napoleon as well)
as a rule did not draw an essential distinction between the principle of con
centration and the principle of local victory . “ Superiority of forces on
the decisive point at the decisive moment,” wrote N. P. Mikhnevich , " is
that very principle of local victory to which all great masters of the busi
ness are obligated for their victories." 95 Professor A. I. Verkhovskiy
wrote : “ The question of the principle of local victory, i.e., concentration
of forces at the decisive point, was recognized as the basic guiding line
ensuring victory.” 96
However, in some works the principle of local victory is understood
in another sense . For example, in one of these works it is stated about
this principle : “ It was considered an immutable fact that general victory
in war is formed from a multitude of local victories on different fronts
and in different spheres of combat operations.” Here there occurred a
unique substitution of concepts: the correct theoretical thesis of itself is
groundlessly relegated to the principle of local victory, which has a dif
ferent content. Of course , the concepts of dialectics are flexible and
mobile . The content, and sometimes the form of principles changes, but
to operate with them without need , not in a generally accepted sense ,
but with another meaning, must be disputed every time, otherwise this
can confuse the readers.
It must be said that the authors of one of these works suggest to
make such changes in the content of principles of economy of force
and local victory in the erroneous interpretation stated above which
actually lead to the elimination of these principles. This work says of
the principle of economy of force : “ It is obvious that, when the very
outcome of war depends largely on the amount and effectvieness of
application of efforts at the very beginning of the war, it hardly becomes
reasonable to count on using potential capabilities of a state and reserve

* See Marx and Engels, Vol. 14, p 355.

85 N. P. Mikhnevich , Strategiya, Book 1, St. Peterburg, 1911, p 64 .
98
Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voyennykh trudakh
1917–1940 (Questions of Strategy and Operational Art in Soviet Military Works
of 1917–1940 ), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1965, p 265 .

164
a large portion of the forces for conducting combat operations in sub
sequent periods of the war.
The work notes the following with regard to the principle of local
victory : earlier it was considered an immutable fact that general victory
in war is formed from a multitude of local successes on different fronts
and in different spheres of combat operations. Now , however, when
strategic means of armed conflict under the direct subordination of the
main commands, permitting the achievement of decisive results in win
ning victory in war often even without the participation of forces and
means of tactical and operational echelons, speak in favor of the thesis
that now local successes may be determined by successes of an overall
strategic character. Such statements appeared in the fifties in many
foreign articles and books as well.
All the above attests to the fact that it is not advisable to relegate
support [ obespecheniye ] to the principles of military art, while it is
desirable to view the principles of local victory and economy of force as
components of the principle of concentration of efforts.
On the basis of works of prominent Soviet military authors mentioned
in this chapter, with consideration of the works of generals and theoreti
cians of the past, it became possible by the end of the fifties to provide a
list of the most importantmodern principles of military art.
In connection with the adoption of nuclear weapons and other means
of warfare , the basic principles of military art in the fifties began to
include :

a . Mobility and high rates of combat operations;

b . Concentration of main efforts and creation of superiority in forces

and means over the enemy at the decisive place and at the decisive
time;

c . Surprise ;
d . Combat activeness ;

e . Preservation of the combat effectiveness of friendly forces ;

f. Conformity of the goal and plan of the operation (battle ) to the

conditions of the actual situation ;

g . Coordination .

The enumerated principles have become the most important ones,

although of course, they cannot encompass the entire diversity of
combat activity . Even, now , and moreover, as there is further develop
ment of means of warfare and military art, other principles can be
formulated .
For example, the principle of simultaneous action upon the enemy to
the entire depth of his deployment and upon objectives of the deep rear
has acquired an increasingly realistic basis with the adoption of nuclear
weapons. The range of nuclear missiles and their enormous destructive

165
force permit delivery of irreplaceable losses and defeat not only on
troops, but also on objectives of the deep rear. The importance of this
principle steadily grew with the introduction of nuclear weapons and
longer range means of warfare .

166
Chapter 3— Summary of the Basic Principles of

Operational Art and Tactics (Accord

ing to Views of 1953–1959)

As we know , it is accepted to identify three stages in the develop

ment of the USSR Armed Forces and Soviet military art after the Great
Patriotic War. (See Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva , edited by A. A.
Strokov , Moscow , 1966 , pp 590—592).
In the first postwar phase of 1945–1953, our Armed Forces and
military art developed on the basis of advantage taken of the very rich
experience of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, and of the
more sophisticated (conventional) weapons and combat equipment,
which reinforced the firepower, mobility, and shock force of troops.
In the second phase, which began at the end of 1953, the Soviet
Armed Forces switched to training in the conduct of war under the
conditions of employment of nuclear weapons. This phase is connected
with the improvement, stockpiling, and adoption in the Armed Forces of
nuclear weapons,missiles for various purposes, and other diverse technical
means of conflict. During these years a revolution took place in military
affairs, as well as fundamental qualitative changes in means of armed
conflict and methods of their employment (in military art ), and in de
velopment of the Armed Forces .
In 1960 began the third phase of the postwar period . In this phase
qualitative transformations in the Army and in military affairs con
tinued .
The content of the principles of operational art and tactics in this
chapter is examined on the basis of views of the second phase , in the
course of which they suffered the most substantial changes . In some
instances statements of Soviet and foreign military specialists are given
which were published somewhat later, but which also concern the given
phase .

Mobility and High Tempos of Combat Operations

Mobility and high tempos of combat operations bring success in a
battle or operation .

167
 The combat operations of our tank and mechanized corps and the
engagements of tank armies in the Great Patriotic War revived mobility
in a scale previously unseen . However, the development of mobility
and high tempos of combat operations into the most important principle of
operational art and tactics must still be relegated to the second phase
of the postwar development of the Soviet Armed Forces, i.e., to the time
of total motorization of our troops, a high degree of mechanization , and
their broad outfitting with nuclear weapons .
In the words of J. Tompkins, the USA is experiencing a revolution in
combat mobility. He notes that at the beginning of the Kennedy ad
ministration 26.2 days were required to move a division to the Far East
using all available aircraft. However , in Exercise “ Big Lift,” conducted
in 1963, the personnel (15,700 men ) and light weapons and equipment
(550 tons) of one armored division were moved.
The U.S. Army began to devote particular attention in this period to
the development of Army Aviation , especially helicopters, which , in the
opinion of Tompkins and many other American authors, are the basis of
ground mobility . However, they consider the basis of strategic mobility
to be airborne movements. (See J. Tompkins, Oruzhiye tret'yey mirovoy
voyny [Weapons of the Third World War ), Moscow , 1969, pp 10–15,
48–64 .) Nevertheless, in the mid fifties the U.S. Army also developed
other important ways to increase the mobility of troops and the high
tempos of combat operations.
Troops possessing sufficient mobility are capable of conducting mobile
combat operations at high tempos. We understand troop mobility to be
their high maneuverability and their capability for full use of combat
power for rapid accomplishment of the assigned mission with maximum
effect and for the immediate and most expedient reaction to any events
or changes in the situation .
Troop mobility cannot be reduced , as many native and foreign authors
do it, to a simple form of mobility in the sense of an ability to rapidly
move over terrain , although this undoubtedly continues to remain a most
important indicator of mobility and a necessary premise for its achieve
ment.

Many other attributes are characteristic of mobility in addition to an

ability to move and the capability of combat and transport vehicles
to operate under any terrain conditions. Of these , we should first of all
name the capability for the rapid and most effective accomplishment of
the combat mission , and for maneuver and reaction to any change in
the situation, even the most abrupt one; high troop activity; their “ ease
of control” ; flexibility in using firepower; the capability to quickly
identify targets for delivering strikes against the enemy; flexibility of
thinking of the commanders ; precision in organizing control, and material
and technical support; and the ability to op rate at the necessary moment

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and at the necessary place faster than the enemy, and unexpectedly
for him .
The principle of mobility is closely connected with principles of con
centration of efforts , surprise , combat activity, and preservation of the
combat effectiveness of one's troops. Moreover, it has deciding influence
on the realization and implementation of demands of the aforemen
tioned principles, inasmuch as troops who do not possess high mobility
will hardly be able to amass superior forces and means in a timely manner
at the necessary place , achieve surprise , or conduct active combat opera
tions while retaining their combat effectiveness for a long while .
The objective basis of this principle are the laws of armed con
flict: the law of dependence of methods and forms of armed conflict on
the material basis of battle , the operation , and warfare; and the law of
dependence of any battle or operation on the correlation of combat
might of the sides.
It is necessary to stress in particular the close connection of mobil
ity and firepower of troops. Rapid and most effective performance of
a combat mission in nuclear warfare is possible only by troops equipped
to a sufficient degree with nuclear missiles, and only highly mobile troops
can take opportune advantage of results of fire suppression of the enemy.
If one considers that in both our literature and foreign military lit
erature terms are also used such as “mobility in supply,” “mobility of
the rear,” “ mobility of control,” “ mobility in staff work ,” etc., then one
sees clearly the incorrectness of attempts of many authors to examine
mobility only as movement.1
Based on the above , we can consider that mobile operations are
those in which troops have performed an assigned task with maximum
effect, having displayed high maneuverability , having fully taken advan
tage of their combat might, and immediately and most expeditiously
reacting to all events and changes in the situation .
Tempos of combat operations are also inseparably connected with
troop mobility . By this we mean the tempos at which the troops operate ,
build up their efforts, and parry the foreseen and current efforts of the
enemy for the most rapid and successful accomplishment of the missions
assigned for the operation or battle.
In an offensive battle or operation the basic indicator of tempos of
troop operations are the tempos of attack , by which we mean the
average daily advance of troops in the course of an attack , or in over
coming an enemy's defense -- the average advance of troops in kilo
meters per hour of combat.
Troop mobility is a necessary premise for an attack at high tempos .
Only those tempos of attack can be considered high which , with the
existing means of warfare, ensure the achievement of goals of offensive

* Detailed polemics on this question are set forth in the article by the author of
these lines in the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, dated 21 September 1960.

169
operations in the minimum possible time and with most complete re
sults .
The mechanization and motorization of troops and their abrupt in
crease in firepower in connection with the adoption of nuclear weapons
played an especially important role in raising the mobility of troops
and the tempos of their operations and in developing mobility into
a most important principle of military art. In the mid -fifties it became
clear that only highly mobile troops would be able to preserve themselves
from annihilation by the enemy's nuclear weapons and be capable to
quickly and secretly massing on the chosen axes, delivering powerful
blows to a great depth and a high tempos, quickly shifting efforts from
one axis to another, and rapidly overcoming zones of radioactive con
tamination .
Increased demands have begun to be placed on mobility . Earlier it
was used in the interests of performing the assigned mission with maximum
effect and of taking full advantage of combat might above all for rapid
concentration of troops on the axis of main attack , for creation of a
shock grouping with a high density of infantry, tanks, and artillery
on a narrow sector of front, and for breakthrough of the enemy's defense
and forceful advance into the depth . However, with the introduction of
nuclear weapons,mobility must ensure in addition the rapid dispersal of
troops and that character of their operations in which they would be least
subject to destruction by nuclear weapons. In the mid -fifties there also
was a sharp increase in the role of maneuver and troop maneuverability.
In reality, the employment of qualitatively new means of warfare, which
determines the rapid and abrupt changes in the situation, disabling of
individual elements of troop formations, the appearance on the axis of
troop advance of vast zones with high levels of radiation , the necessity
of dispersing troops over a large area and massing them quickly in the
allowable proportions for delivering a joint blow against the enemy
all this will require a broader and swifter maneuver of forces and means
than before, for which only highly mobile troops may be capable.
The shifting of efforts from one axis to another and the reinforcing
of particular troop groupings began to be achieved primarily by the rapid
retargeting of missile means employing nuclear warheads. However , in
many cases this alone may be insufficient. Therefore , in the course of an
attack , as a rule the maneuver of nuclear blows began to be combined
with the maneuver of men and weapons, including the second echelons.
The great spatial scope of combat operations, an absence of solid
fronts, attack along axes, and the wide employment of airborne landings
also demanded high troop mobility . Demands began to be placed on
troops to be highly active and convenient to control, to be capable of
accomplishing decisive , rapid operations which were bold to the point
of daring, to react immediately to any changes in the situation , and to
use their firepower flexibly .

170
 It became obvious that troop mobility is a necessary condition for
attaining success in combat. It can ensure a numerical and fire superiority
over the enemy on important axes, even if the overall number of enemy
troops is greater. In a certain sense, the power of troops thanks to
mobility is increased , since mobile troops are capable of quickly and
secretly massing on selected axes, delivering powerful blows to a great
depth and at high tempos, crossing zones of radioactive contamination
swiftly, shifting efforts from one axis to another quickly , and dispersing
for the purpose of protection against enemy nuclear strikes.
At the end of the fifties, Liddell Hart expressed the idea that the
opportunity for successful resistance by the western powers depended
above all on high strategic and tactical mobility, which would allow them
to surpass the enemy in maneuverability.
Many foreign authors consider mobility to be the key to success in
modern operations. American General James M. Gavin , speaking about
mobility in his book War and Peace in the Space Age (New York , 1958),
wrote: “ I know no other problems of our military program which de
serve greater attention now ."
General Gordon Rogers, remarking on the significance of mobility,
stated in August 1960 : “ In the entire system of combat training we will
lay stress as before on instilling in personnel the most important quality
of mobility in thinking.”
J. Tompkins believes that “ firepower and mobility are the basic mili
tary factors and perhaps the most important of them is mobility.”
General Fuller remarks: “ One very rarely succeeds in developing
flexibility of thinking in wartime, and then it is only people gifted with
the qualities of genius. . . . Because of an inclination for dogmatism
enormously more armies have been lost, more engagements have been
lost, and more lives destroyed than for any other reason .'
High tempos of combat operations, and primarily tempos of attack ,
have just as important a significance in a battle or operation. Increasing
the tempos of combat operations became a characteristic feature of
operations. The desire to achieve high tempos of combat operations is
explained by their immeasurably increased importance in a battle or opera
tion . The need to increase tempos of combat operations was caused
primarily by the fact that the means of combat of the fifties permitted
delivering defeat to enemy groupings to the entire depth of his opera
tional deployment, but much time is still required for advancing the
attacking troops into the areas where long-range weapons have hit.
High tempos of advance ensure the rapid surmounting of defensive
lines and zones of the enemy which have been struck , deprive the enemy
of the opportunity of maneuvering from the depth and laterally with
the aim of building up efforts on the decisive axis and closing breaches
in the defense , and they also do not permit him to move his surviving
chasti and combat equipment out from under the blows of attacking

171
troops. For example, the high tempos of attack of the fascist German
troops in the initial period of World War II very often deprived
soyedineniya of French and British troops of the opportunity to take
up lines favorable for defense in a timely manner and dig in on them .
The enemy usually captured these lines from the move. The forceful
advance of fascist German troops at the beginning of the war led to a
situation where allied reserves which had moved up to the front line
from the depth were committed to a battle or engagement piecemeal,
as they approached . As a result , the enemy, with more compact groupings
on the axes of main attacks received the opportunity to deliver defeat
with fewer forces to larger forces of allied groupings acting in a scattered
fashion .
In addition , due to the high tempos of attack of fascist German
troops, the allied troop groupings, which were inferior to the enemy in
mobility , could not be moved from under his blows in time. This usually
involved great losses in personnel and combat equipment.
In overcoming a prepared defense, high rates of attack create condi
tions for a very rapid conclusion of the defeat of the opposing enemy,
facilitate surprise in actions and retention of the initiative in the course
of combat, and also substantially hinder the enemy in employing nuclear
weapons against attacking troops. The defender under these conditions
does not have time to take measures directed toward delay and disrup
tion of the attacker's blows. The higher the rates of attack , the greater
are the chances to win victory over the enemy in a short time, and
the greater the scope of the operation. And vice versa , with a low tempo
of attack, the enemy has time in the course of the operation to reinforce
his defensive positions and zones, to regroup and bring up new men and
means to the threatened sectors .
Rapid and continuous attack facilitates a rapid shift of basic efforts
of the attacker into the operational depth . A breakthrough of the first
and second defensive zones leads to a breakthrough of the entire system of
the enemy's defense and creates favorable conditions for committing
to the engagement or battle the reserves ( second echelons) and for
developing tactical success into operational success. The subsequent non
stop advance of attacking troops ensures a successful forcing of water
obstacles, the capture of enemy defensive lines and important objectvies
echeloned in depth from the move, and also the defeat of his re
serves piecemeal at the time of their movement or location in assembly
areas .
The importance of high tempos of attack under modern conditions
rises still more because now a very important factor of the situation is
radioactive contamination of the terrain . The higher the rate of attack ,
the less that troop personnel receive radiation.
Thus, high rates of attack permit neutralizing many strong aspects of
a modern defense, but this does not exhaust their significance . As shown

172
in Chapter Two, with high rates of advance and effective neutraliza
tion of the enemy by fire, the attacker suffers fewer losses in personnel
and equipment. With an increase of rates of attack , a further decrease
in losses occurs .
It should be added that with high rates of attack there is a considerable
increase in losses to the defender. The rapid wedging of attacking troops
into the defense disrupts control and disorganizes the enemy, as a result
of which there is a reduction in his troops' combat effectiveness , and
favorable conditions are created for his encirclement, capture , and defeat
piecemeal.
The attack of ground forces at high tempos ensures timely advantage
taken of results of their first massive retaliatory nuclear strikes and facil
itates the disorganization of the enemy's economy, state and military con
trol, the disruption of his mobilization measures and deployment, the
undermining of the enemy's nuclear might, the destruction of his troops
of the first echelon , the seizure of the strategic initiative, and the with
drawal of entire states from the war in a matter of a few days.
Recognizing the important significance of high tempos of advance for
the attacker for disrupting the mobilization measures of NATO countries,
foreign military authors express the following thought: NATO can create
the forces sufficient to delay an attacker only one month after the
beginning of mobilization . According to the evidence of F. O. Mikshe,
" considerable reinforcements from the USA will be able to be committed
to action in Europe no earlier than after an eight-week period . In
spite of all the successes of technology, a comparatively small amount of
light forces can be moved across the Atlantic by air .” 3 Thus, high
tempos of attack may lead to a disruption of the mobilization deploy
ment of the enemy army, of the massing of forces necessary for a suc
cessful defense , and of the approach of reserves from other continents .
A high tempo of advance of troops reduces the danger of their destruc
tion by the enemy's nuclear strikes. Rapid penetration into the enemy's
deep rear moves the troops into the areas where his long-range means
of nuclear attack are based and forces these means to change positions
under threat of capture, which will not allow the enemy to deliver massive
retaliatory nuclear strikes . With high tempos of attack , the enemy is de
prived of the time needed for occupying launch positions and for
preparing for launch , since this time is rather lengthy. For example,
it requires 6–10 hours for preparation for a second launch of the Corporal
guided missile, and up to four hour for the Redstone.
Mobility of combat operations of defending troops allows them to build
up efforts opportunely on the threatened axis, disrupt enemy measures
to develop his attack, deliver heavy losses on him , destroy his means of

* See Liddell Hart, Ustrasheniye ili oborona ? (Deterrence or Defense ?), Voyen
izdat, Moscow , 1962, p 127.
* Wehr und Wirtschaft, 1960 , No 3 .

173
nuclear attack in a timely manner (before launch ), and force the enemy
to give up the attack .
The above provisions do not exhaust the importance of high tempos
of combat operations under conditions of employment of nuclear weap
ons and other contemporary means of warfare. However, they show
to a sufficient extent that high tempos became a most important objective
necessity by the end of the fifties, and one of the deciding factors
determining the successful outcome of an operation or battle. The ability
to create and fully exploit all opportunities for increasing tempos of
attack is a guarantee of success, as well as an indicator of maturity and
expertise of commanders and staffs.
Considering the decisive importance of mobility for combat opera
tions it general and for achieving high tempos of combat operations in
particular, it was very important to outline the ways for increasing
the mobility of troops under those conditions. In the fifties they arrived
at the conclusion that an increase in troop mobility could be achieved
primarily by increasing their ability to move, by strengthening the .
moral-combat spirit of troops, and by increasing the mobility of control,
mobility of the rear, and mobility of engineer troops.

Increasing the Ability of Troops to Move

By the ability of troops to move we understand their ability for

rapidly shifting both before the beginning of an operation and in the
course of the operation . Its importance was difficult to overestimate
inasmuch as troop movements began to comprise a large part of com
bat operations and maneuver began not only to precede an attack , but
also to constantly accompany it and literally permeate it, i.e., it became
a content of combat operations.
L. Varvarzhovskiy writes about World War II: “ During the war ap
proximately 40 percent of the time was taken up with moving troops,
about 30–35 percent for combat operations, and around 25–30 percent
for rest, reinforcing, reforming, etc.” It should be noted that these
figures are for rifle and infantry soyedineniya. The proportion of move
ments in the combat activity of our tank and mechanized corps was
considerably higher.
In connection with substantial changes in the armament and out
fitting of armies in the fifties, large corrections were introduced into
this correlation and troop movement comprises a large part of combat
operations. It follows from this that the importance of troop mobility
will increase sharply under contemporary conditions.
The decisive significance of troop mobility for the success of combat
operations was repeatedly stressed in the statements of bourgeois au
thors as well. Thus, one of them , writing in the journal Army Combat
Forces (September 1955), said : mobility is a basic requirement and
most valuable quality of tanks and APCs. The comparative mobility of
forces of both warring sides is a deciding factor in modern warfare .

174
With the proper use of mobility at the right time and in the right place,
one person or one tank is worth two , four , or even ten men or tanks.
The decisive importance of mobility , especially of tank troops, for
achieving success of an operation or battle is explained by the fact that
swiftness and maneuverability are the main features of combat opera
tions by these forces. These two qualities have enormously greater
significance than armor protection . They give the tank weapons ex
ceptional combat qualities. Under conditions of employment of nuclear
weapons, swiftness and maneuverability of tank troops not only retain
their importance, but become even more important. Great importance is
also acquired by an increase in mobility of missile launchers, APCs,
artillery systems, and vehicles .
Increasing the ability of troops to move is one of the most important
ways to raise the mobility of troops, and so the rates of attack.
In the fifties the ability of troops to move was increased by giving them
a great many tanks and helicopters, by achieving air transportability of
troops, by improving organizational forms, and also by better personnel
training, especially for driver -mechanics and drivers .
Increasing the ability of tanks to move and their proportion among
the troops. The ability of tanks (APCs, vehicles) to move is characterized
by maximum and average speeds of movement, cross-country ability ,
and range under various conditions of movement. The ability of
vehicles to move in turn depends on their specific capacity, unit pres
sure on the ground, and also design features.
Foreign designers strive in every way possible to increase the mobility
of tanks. To this end , work is being conducted in several directions.
After the war tank construction achieved considerable results. There
was an especially noticeable desire on the part of the Bonn revanchists
to outfit their army with a more sophisticated tank than the American
M –60, and they succeeded in this in many indicators. The effort of
foreign designers are directed primarily toward increasing the mobility
of tanks, inasmuch as herein are hidden still considerable unused
possibilities for increasing the tempos of combat operations.
The practical skills of driver-mechanics are of great importance. It
has been established as a result of experimental research that the
difference in average speeds of movement of tanks approaches 25
percent depending on the skill of the driver -mechanic. Consequently it
is necessary to continue theoretical and experimental explorations to
identify the most rational techniques for driving tanks and to introduce
them into the practice of troop combat training.
It is also important to note that the newest European tanks as a rule
have night vision devices and rubber-metal tracks and possess great
range .
The importance of increasing tank mobility increases substantially as
a result of the fact that it is the tank troops who determine troop

175
mobility and the tempos of their attack . The degree of mechanization of
chasti and soyedineniya itself is an important indicator of their mobility .
Therefore the proportion of tank troops in modern armies steadily
increases.
The motorized rifle and tank divisions of the Soviet Army in the
fifties had more tanks than the mechanized and tank corps of the
Great Patriotic War or than the mechanized (motorized infantry) di
visions of any NATO country , although the level of their mechanization
is also very high . It is characteristic that a mechanized division in the
U.S. Army is being introduced for the first time. Before there were
only armored and infantry divisions in the U.S. ground forces. The
infantry divisions had 27 heavy tanks before December 1946 , and now
there are 130 tanks in the U.S. infantry division . There is a char
acteristic increase in the number of tanks in the U.S. armored division
as well. Before December 1946 its TO & E called for 195 medium
tanks, after December 1946 there were 216 , and according to the
TO & E of 1956–1958 there were 306 .
Thus the shock force of U.S. ground forces has been considerably
increased by outfitting them with tanks. The development of mechaniza
tion is also observed in the ground forces of other countries of NATO .
The number of tanks in armies of NATO countries has risen by about
11/2 times.
The ground forces of the Soviet Armed Forces possess enormous
tank power. Many thousands of first-rate tanks are organized into
strong, mobile tank soyedineniya and chasti.
The presence of a considerable number of tanks and APCs among
our troops makes them capable of delivering deep strikes against
enemy groupings at high tempos . It noticeably increases their ability
to move , their steadiness against means of mass destruction , and the
capability of making effective use of the results of their nuclear strikes ,
of swiftly developing the attack in the operational depth , and of
crossing zones with high radiation levels.
The organizational structure has a deciding influence on troop mobility.
Army Gen S. M. Shtemenko notes that " the organizational deployment
of our tank and motorized rifle troops took in all the best that had been
accumulated by the combat experience of the past war and postwar
development. Now tank and motorized rifle soyedineniya and chasti
possess great firepower and shock force, and sufficiently flexible maneuver
ability and control ability . The motorized rifle division has considerably
fewer personnel in comparison with the very same division at the end
of the Great Patriotic War. However, the might of its volley of fire
without consideration for missile weaponry has increased more than
fourfold , and the number of tanks has risen considerably . There is
no doubt that the organizational structure of tank and motorized rifle

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soyedineniya will be improved in the future as new combat equipment
appears."
Improvement in the organizational structure of troops in the direction
of increasing their firepower and the proportion of tanks is steadily
improving the material base of mobility .
Increasing the mobility of missile troops. In spite of the great ca
pability of missiles to maneuver fire with the employment of nuclear
warheads — which in a number of cases may successfully replace the
maneuver of men and weapons — the mobility of missile troops has
essential significance for achieving mobility of troops and high tempos
of attack .
The tactical mobility of missile troops is determined , as noted in
foreign sources, by a number of technical and organizational condi
tions, of which the tactical characteristics and specifications of means
of traction play a most important role. The means must be capable of
moving missile equipment over a considerable distance in short periods
of time, and have sufficient load -carrying capacity, long range, and
high cross-country ability. The wide introduction of undercarriages with
high cross -country ability and load -carrying capacity can facilitate this.
A rather high mobility of missile troops can be achieved by employing
aircraft and helicopters to move them .
Along with the achievement of high mobility of missile chasti, there
is great significance in increases in other indicators of their maneuverabil
ity , especially those such as time needed for deployment and opening
fire.
The mobility of missile troops also depends on personnel training and
on their expertise, on the field training of missilemen , on their ability
to ensure high mobility and maneuverability of missile equipment, and
on a high state of combat readiness for operations under difficult condi
tions of a maneuverable nuclear missile war. For this the missilemen
must be trained above all for making marches over great distances
with retention of constant combat readiness. They must be trained in
accurate strikes in short periods of time after deploying the missiles
right from the march. The element of time along with accuracy in
delivering a strike remains the deciding factor of successful combat
employment of missile troops.
Increasing the mobility of APCs and vehicles. Total motorization of
troops and a high quality of means of mechanical traction are a nec
essary condition for achieving mobility and high tempos of attack .
APCs and army vehicles must possess no less cross -country ability in
comparison with tanks under conditions of no roads, the spring thaws,
or when moving over swampy sectors , fresh snow , sand, or ploughed
land. They must be capable of crossing trenches, foxholes, pits, and

* S. M. Shtemenko, “Ground Forces in Contemporary Warfare and Their Com

bat Training,” Krasnaya Zvezda, 3 January 1963.

177
other obstacles on the battlefield . They must be amphibious and air
transportable .
Some authors such as the West Germans assume that further im
provement of APCs will go along the line of creating an infantry combat
vehicle (see the journal Truppenpraxis, No 9 , 1963). Many see this
in the form of an armored (closed and sealed ), mobile , amphibious
vehicle with high cross -country ability and holding an infantry squad .
In addition to developing infantry combat vehicles , light guns or
machine guns are being mounted on ordinary APCs abroad . The gun
or machine gun armament has been put even now on all American
APCs, the British “ Saracen ” APC , the French “ Sahara ,” the Swiss
“ Pirat,” and others.
The broad adoption by armies of large -load vehicles with high cross
country ability, of transport and special types, of trailers and semitrail
ers with active axles, as well as trailer trucks, observed in the fifties
in many countries, ensured a sharp reduction in the number of vehicles
in troop units, a reduction in the need for drivers, a reduction in ex
penditure of fuel per ton - kilometer, a reduction in the length of columns
and the load on front roads, and a reduction in the need for repair fa
cilities.
Increasing the mobility of artillery. Towed field artillery is not
always in a condition to support the uninterrupted fire support of troops
attacking at a high tempo due to its low mobility, low maneuver
qualities, and attachment to roads . A lagging behind of artillery in the
course of an operation causes a weakening of fire support to attacking
forces, a slowing of tempos of advance , and incomplete use of the
results of nuclear strikes .

A number of foreign works stress that the mobility of guns and

mortars used to accompany tanks and infantry must be approximately
the same as for tanks. Only on this condition will the artillery of
chasti and soyedineniya be able to successfully perform its missions and
facilitate the achievement of high tempos of attack .
As many authors note , one of the ways to increase the mobility of
artillery is to shift field artillery to self-propelled undercarriages, i.e.,
create self-propelled artillery capable of assuming missions being per
formed by field artillery and not inherent to tanks . It is this artillery
which is becoming the basic artillery means of tank and mechanized
soyedineniya in the armies of a number of countries . Replacement
of guns on mechanical draft by self-propelled guns is one of the basic
trends in the development of modern tube artillery in armies of capitalist
countries. The proportion of self-propelled artillery is constantly growing.
All field artillery is self-propelled in armored and mechanized divisions
of the American Army, in the French “ 1959 division ,” and in the
motorized infantry division of the West German Army. Many models

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.
of self-propelled artillery of medium caliber are being made amphibious
(such as the American M108 and M109 howitzers ).
With consideration for the nature of modern combat operations of
podrazdeleniya, chasti, and soyedineniya , of the place of artillery in
their combat formations, and the tactical and operational purpose of
artillery, models of self-propelled artillery on the whole are being made
armored or semiarmored . The adding of armor to self-propelled units
permits them to move directly in the combat formations of infantry
and increases their capabilities under conditions of massive use of
nuclear weapons and in crossing zones of radioactive contamination .
Achieving air-transportability of troops and creation of army and
troop aviation . In addition to the enumerated ways of increasing the
mobility of troops in the fifties, one other important indicator began to
be considered — that of air-transportability .
Achieving air-transportability of missile weaponry , tanks, APCs, and
all other combat equipment became a radical method of increasing
troop mobility . The great spatial scope and relatively short duration of
operations, the presence of extraordinarily powerful means of destruction ,
and the difficulty of performing ground troop movements greatly hinder
the conduct of major regroupings of troops on land . They can be
replaced by maneuvering the fire of nuclear weapons or by moving
tank and motorized rifle troops into the necessary region by air .
In the fifties people arrived at the conclusion that the massive use
by an enemy of nuclear weapons may lead in a short period of time to
considerable losses in personnel and combat equipment, and to the
destruction of stores of all types and of routes of movement. All this
required the use of military transport aviation to deliver new chasti
and soyedineniya and material and technical means.
The Americans have long ago begun to give such aviation not only
to the field army commander, but also to soyedineniye commanders,
believing this to be a necessary condition for achieving high tempos of
attack . In the USA the concept of “ airmobile operations ” has even
been accepted . These are the actions in which ground forces and their
weaponry needed to perform the assigned mission are moved by air
with transport aviation belonging to their unit or attached to them .
These operations are characterized by swiftness in moving troops by
air within an area of combat operations, which permits avoiding a
crossing by troops of artifical and natural barriers .
The broad employment of aviation for maneuvering men and weapons
in the course of combat operations contains considerable potential
for increasing troop mobility and the tempos of their attack because all
forms of ground , sea , and river transport cannot ensure the speed of
movement required under modern conditions, being too vulnerable .
The daily flight of transport aviation exceeds by 10–20 times the
distance traveled by rail and automotive transport. In the experience

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of foreign armies, the speed of movement of motor transport columns
along good roads rarely exceeds 30 km /hr. However, helicopter col
umns can move with a speed of 200 km / hr and more . Over short
distances helicopter chasti are capable of making 3–4 trips in one day .
The time factor has assumed exceptional importance in combat. And
it is quite obvious that air movement of troops has begun to provide
a large gain in time. For example, it required 4 hours to move one
podrazdeleniye by transport aircraft 600 km in one trip . Some time
later, this same podrazdeleniye make à march of around 600 km in
two days . The gain in time in moving podrazdeleniya by air with
helicopters rises sharply with an increase in the length of the ground
route. For example, there is no gain in time in moving podrazdeleniya
by air for a distance of 50 km (in the presence of passable roads).
Approximately 3 hours are gained at a distance of 100 km , 8 hours
at 200 km , 16 hours at 300 km , and 26 hours at 400 km . This
calculation took account not only of the average speeds of movement
of columns, but also the time for assembly and deployment, for moving
to the airfield , and for loading and unloading the helicopters .
Possessing an advantage in swiftness of massing forces, one can take
the initiative and gain the opportunity to crush the enemy piecemeal,
counteract in a timely manner bis measures to disrupt or slow down the
attack , and quickly commit to the battle or engagement additional
forces with the aim of developing tactical success into operational suc
cess. In this regard there arose the necessity to move troops and their
weapons by air.
The greatest potential capabilities with regard to increasing mobility
were uncovered in the use of transport aviation and in the achieve
ment of full air-transportability by combined-arms soyedineniya .
Air movement of troops began to find wide employment not only on
a tactical scale, but on an operational-strategic one as well.
It became obvious in the fifties that moving troops by air would be
come just as commonplace as the use of motor vehicles and tanks.
Air movements permit a reduction in the gap between the power and
mobility of troops. In this regard , one of the main demands placed on
troops was to adapt for air movement all combat and supporting
soyedineniya and chasti of the army together with their weapons and
gear.
The air-transportability of heavy combat equipment began to be
achieved by design improvements and by reduction in weight, as well
as by creation of the appropriate types of aircraft and helicopters.
The Soviet Union has remarkable aircraft in military transport avia
tion . The large inventory of the best aircraft in the world of the Civil
Air Fleet is a powerful reserve of our military transport aviation .
Our designers, engineers , and workers achieved outstanding gains

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in creating modern helicopters. The excellent qualities of Soviet heli
copters are known far beyond the borders of our Motherland .
The Ka– 18 mail and passenger helicopter designed by N. I. Kamov
is used for various types of shipments and also as a first aid helicopter.
This is a four- place craft which is excellently outfitted . This heli
copter is not called the “ air automobile ” for nothing. The Ka - 26 heli
copter has two piston engines of 325 hp each . It can carry different
cargoes on a special platform or on external suspension , and it can
take six passengers a distance of 400 km in its suspended cabin with
a speed of 150 km /hr. The Ka--25K multi -purpose helicopter has the
most diverse missions: construction -assembly work , geological survey,
aerial photography, rescue operations, the shipment of large -size cargoes
weighing up to two tons, the delivery of 12 passengers on collapsible
seats or four wounded persons on stretchers with an accompanying
person , etc. The Ka-25K is the best helicopter-crane in world heli
copter construction .
As early as 1956 world records for speed and altitude were set with
the Mi- 4 helicopter. It raises 1200-1600 kg of usefui cargo or 8–12
soldiers with TO & E weapons into the air. It is capable of flying day
or night, in snow or rain , and under the most difficult meteorological
conditions.
The largest helicopter in the world is the Mi- 6 . In a short tine a
number of world records for cargo -capacity and speed were set with this
giant helicopter . The Mi- 6 can transport 70–80 persons, over 12 tons
of cargo , bulldozers, tractors, APCs, etc.
The Yak - 24 helicopter, called the “ flying boxcar,” also possesses good
characteristics. It can transport cargo weighing up to four tons, two
GAZ -69 vehicles, prefabricated houses, different models of weapons,
combat equipment, etc.
The helicopter-cranes and heavy helicopters designed for transporting
heavy cargoes over distances of 100 km or more have begun to play
an important role in raising troop mobility. They can be employed to
transport APCs (and even tanks, with an increase in cargo capacity)
over obstacles, to erect bridges , and to transport various equipment
and supplies on the battlefield . All this placed in the hands of the
commanders new opportunities for reaching high tempos of combat
operations.
At the end of the fifties attention was attracted by reports in for
eign papers about the creation of flying machines on an air cushion of
the “ Hovercraft” type, which were capable of moving at a height of
3–4 meters with 20 soldiers and their gear aboard , i.e., around 2 tons
of cargo. This vehicle may cause the appearance of a new form of
military and civil shipments and find wide use in operations of a future
war. One of its main advantages lies in the ability to transport troops
and equipment over great distances with a relatively small engine and

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insignificant fuel expenditure. Thanks to its hedge-hopping flight, this
craft can avoid detection by enemy radars . It is also capable of trans
porting troops and cargoes within the country faster than rail or motor
vehicle transport.
According to a report by the West German journal Soldat und Technik ,
the American firm of Bell System has developed an air cushion vehicle
called the “ Bell CK5.” It has a speed of 108 km /hr and is armed with
two heavy machine guns and a grenade launcher. The engine is a
1150 hp gas turbine.
The American journal Product Engineering wrote that one U.S. firm
is developing an air cushion vehicle which will have a speed of 480
km / hr. Field tests of such a craft are planned for the beginning of
1970 .
Some American firms are developing flying automobiles and tanks.
The journal Soldat und Technik reports that the French firm of Bertin
is successfully developing a terraplane — a combination of a wheeled
automobile and a flying air cushion vehicle. In moving over dry land
both axles of the terraplane are set in motion by two 45 hp engines,
which allows it to develop a speed up to 80 km /hr. For flight of air
cushion there are four 160 hp engines. The cross -country ability of the
terraplane will be very high , and the useful load-capacity will be over two
tons .
Foreign specialists believe that the appearance of various flying
combat equipment will lead to creation of supermobile units which
are fully air-transportable and capable of crossing without difficulty
contaminated zones, forest masses , swamps, ravines, rivers , etc. The
presence of a sufficient number of such units along with the overall
development of combat equipment and military art will cause signifi
cant changes in the nature of the attack and methods of its conduct.
Various types of flying apparatus will become one of the main meatis of
transport for maneuvering reserves and supplying troops. They carry
the embryo of a considerable increase in the mobility of troops and
tempos of the attack .
However, the achievement of air-transportability of troops and heavy
combat equipment is still insufficient. Foreign military specialists pre
sume that for the successful solution to the problem of broad opera
tional and tactical movements of troops and cargoes by air in preparing
for and in the course of an operation, it is also necessary to introduce
flying apparatus more widely directly into the troop units, i.e., create
army aviation .
One can follow the trend of an increasing number of helicopters and
aircraft located directly in soyedineniya and ob” yedineniya in an
example of the U.S. Army. Before 1946 the U.S. infantry division had
10 liaison aircraft, and in 1957 it had 22 aircraft and 28 helicopters.
In the fifties, as we know , we conducted a number of exercises in

182
which in particular military transport aviation , helicopter chasti , air
borne troops , and conventional motorized rifle podrazdeleniya operating
as airborne landing parties took part. These exercises were an im
pressive demonstration of the remarkable achievements of Soviet air
craft construction and a vivid display of the high degree of mastery
by our troops, who handle sophisticated equipment to perfection .
Operations by airborne landing parties, including helicopter land
ings, became a widespread phenomenon in the Soviet Army. They
completely answered the operational-tactical views of the conduct of
modern combat.
As it is asserted abroad , the importance of helicopters is not limited
to the capability of divisions to make airborne landings with their
forces in shorter periods of time or to deliver important cargo by air
transport. Different modifications of helicopters are viewed not only as
transport and landing means, but also as combat vehicles, because in the
fifties they began to be outfitted with launchers for very low yield
nuclear weapons, guided antitank projectiles, recoilless rifles, and other
weaponry .
Armed helicopters can operate as accompanying fire means for tanks
and for infantry on APCs. They can conduct reconnaissance, disrupt
the movement of enemy reserves, attack as part of forward detachments
and advance guards, cover the flanks and rear of friendly forces , and
destroy enemy reconnaissance podrazdeleniya.
As can be seen from the above , since the fifties army aviation has
become a component of the ground forces of a number of armies of
capitalist countries. It began to be adapted for the fire support of
troops for whom it was operating.
In the opinion of foreign military specialists, the basic shortcomings
of helicopters are their high vulnerability and weak armament. How
ever, the Americans are attempting to compensate for these shortcomings
both by developing new types of helicopters and by improving the
tactics of their employment.
According to reports in the foreign press, one of the trends in the
development of helicopters is the creation of combat helicopters as
special weapons systems.
In the opinion of some foreign military specialists , combat heli
copters can successfully destroy and neutralize objectives for troops
operating on the ground. For accomplishment of these missions, combat
helicopters are attached by platoons ( 3–4 machines ) or by companies
( 12–15 machines) to tank and infantry battalions and brigades .
In case of heavy fire, the helicopters depart and call in fighters or
artillery to suppress the weapons.
The effectiveness of using helicopters in combat lies in the im
mediate dependence on their organizational subordination . Along with
the introduction of helicopters into the TO & Es of combined -arms

183
soyedineniya, the question has arisen abroad concerning the organiza
tion of qualitatively new combined -arms soyedineniya , not only organic
ally adapted to air movement, but also to fighting from armed heli
copters, or “ aerial APCs.” West German authors call these soyedineniya
" air -mechanized ,” while the Americans term them airmobile or air
assault units.
The alternation of air movement with ground operations and the
delivery of massive assaults from the air comprise the basis of new
tactics of contemporary combat and will make it highly mobile. These
tactics facilitate the accomplishment of missions with limited forces
across a wide front, and the conduct of mobile operations under condi
tions of destruction, obstructions, fires , contaminated areas , and inunda
tion .
The development of air assault soyedineniya has begun to be ex
amined as the most important part of the process of airization
[ aerizatsiya ] which has taken place abroad since the end of the
fifties . The essence of this process lies in the technological and organiza
tional adaptation of troops to movement by air and in the wide in
troduction and varied use of flying apparatus in ground forces and
other branches of the armed forces.
The armed helicopter may turn out to be a means of fundamental
change in the nature of ground combat. Although the helicopter is
not ideally adapted for this role, it nevertheless possesses those char
acteristics which most ensure superiority in mobility. Helicopter chasti
are beginning to be employed abroad for the accomplishment of tasks
performed by tank troops in World War II, i.e., for the development of
success and as a mobile reserve . They can accomplish such missions
in coordination with ground chasti and soyedineniya, and sometimes
even independently .
The above allows one to draw the conclusion that in the period under
examination the attack began to be conducted not only on tanks and
APCs, but also on helicopters , and to be developed along basic
directions. For the conduct of such an attack not only airborne troops,
but also conventional podrazdeleniya began to be used. This unique
attack by air is a new phenomenon in military art of the end of the
fifties.

Mobility of Troop Control

Mobility of troops largely depends on the methods of their control.

The great dynamic nature of troop combat operations in the attack , the
massive employment of nuclear weapons by both sides, swift and
abrupt changes in the situation , and the participation of different com
bat arms and branches of the armed forces — all this demands a sharp
increase in mobility of troop control. A most important indicator of

184
mobility of control is the ability of commanders and staffs to com
prehend a complex situation quickly and deeply, make the most
advisable decision without delay, bring it to the attention of subordinates
in the shortest time, and continuously and firmly direct the actions of
troops in the interests of successful accomplishment of the combat
mission .
Using mathematical methods, it is possible to obtain quantitative
estimates of the mobility of control. This task has been resolved by intro
ducing the concept of critical time Tc. This is understood to be the
time after which the troop operations will not lead to the assigned goal
in general or to the effectiveness which was expected and planned . By
using this indicator it is possible to answer the question what it means to
control efficiently. This means to see that the sum of the time spent on
the control cycle, Tcon, and the time needed by the troops to perform
an order received , T., is less than the critical time, i.e., the following
inequality must be observed : Tcon + T. < Tc.
Based on this, a formula of efficiency of control was proposed :
Tcon < T. – T ..
If this inequality is fulfilled , then it can be boldly stated that control
is being accomplished efficiently, and in this case it is not difficult to
find a time reserve which the control agency possesses in the given
process. If the inequality is violated ( Tcon < T . - T.) , then from the
quantitative estimate of control efficiency one can find a way to raise
it to the required level. Indeed , Tcon T + T2 + T3, where T1, T2,
and Tg are the time of receipt, processing , and transmission of informa
tion respectively. By reducing one of these indicators it is possible to
attain that value of Tcon in which there will be fulfillment of the
inequality Tcon < T. - T ..
It is possible to unite the actions of a large number of troops with
diverse combat equipment and weapons and direct them to the
accomplishment of a common mission only with centralized troop con
trol. Under contemporary conditions a rigid centralization of control
permits the senior commander to determine the outcome of the battle
as a whole at the necessary moment by concentrating the fire of nuclear
weapons as well as that of other forces and means.
However, the experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that
centralization of troop control provides positive results only in the
struggle for the tactical zone of defense, but with the move into the
operational depth it binds the initiative of lower commanders.
The highly maneuverable character of contemporary combat opera
tions, the swift and abrupt changes in the situation , and great dispersion
of troops demands that all officers and generals display broad initiative,
independently make bold decisions in the spirit of the senior com
mander's concept which are appropriate to the situation at hand and
which facilitate the quickest attainment of the common goal.

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 The best results can be obtained by centralization of control within
strictly requisite limits, by broader decentralization , and by increasing
the autonomy and independence of podrazeleniay and chasti. However,
there must always be assurance of the possibility of establishing a
rigidly centralized troop control in the hands of the senior commander
at criticalmoments of battle .
The methods of accomplishment also have a direct effect on the
efficiency of control.
Methods of troop control must meet the increased combat and maneu
ver capabilities of troops to the full extent and he employed in accord
ance with the conditions of the situation at hand, the nature of missions
to be performed, and methods of operations. Therefore, stress has
begun to be placed not on personal contact with subordinates, but
on leadership from a distance, from control points and through a staff.
The military commander has begun to resemble more a scientist at the
control panels and radio station consoles than a general of the manu
factory period who drew the reserve cavalry regiment into the attack
behind himself at minutes of crises in combat .
The outfitting of staffs with the appropriate technical means played
a large part in increasing mobility of control.
In connection with the high maneuverability of troops, the transient
nature of combat operations, rapid and abrupt changes in the situation,
the ever increasing significance of the struggle for winning time, and a
number of other factors, those abroad, especially in the U.S. Army, have
begun to switch as an experiment to full automation of control of men
and weapons. This is achieved by the wide employment of electronic
computers (EVM ), television apparatus, photographic and radar sys
tems, security apparatus (which is a sort of attachment to means of
communication ), automated systems of launching and controlling guided
missiles and projectiles, and automated means of communication .
To increase the mobility of control they have begun to improve the
existing control system and are bolder in introducing equipment which
has already undergone a check and is fully reliable. In particular, they
have begun to seek out new and more efficient methods of operation for
commanders and staffs, attain a reduction in time spent on organization
and preparation of the battle or operation , and develop in officers the
skills and qualities needed in modern combat.
In analyzing these skills and qualities, Mar SU M. V. Zakharov ar
rived at the following conclusion : under conditions of nuclear warfare
commanders and chiefs at all levels will be required to orient themselves
in the situation with extraordinary rapidity , have the ability to make the
necessary calculations, make decisions in the shortest time possible,
assign the mission , and supervise its execution . The commander will
be deprived of the opportunity to confer and hear various briefings. The
situation will require from him a bold , immediate , and independent de

186
cision on all questions and the issuance of clear, precise orders. The
slightest delay with decision -making, the slightest inability to organize ,
or an absence of firm will, courage, and resolve may lead to a situation
where the commander will have nothing to control or command.5
The time periods for preparation of an attack have begun to be re
duced by improving methods of working out decisions, formulating them
and giving them to the troops , and simplifying the content and reducing
the amount of documentation . In addition, this began to be facilitated
by the timely preparation of supplied and technical means needed for
conducting combat. A perceptible gain in time began to be provided
by simultaneous planning at several levels.
It is very important to ensure a rapid delivery of instructions to subor
dinates in the course of an attack , especially when it is necessary for a
sharp change in missions assigned the troops. Under contemporary con
ditions this will be an ordinary phenomenon .
The outfitting of control points with contemporary control vehicles has
acquired great importance. Command posts have become highly mobile
and capable of providing for troop controlwhile moving.

Mobility of the Rear

Mobility of the rear plays an important role in increasing the mo

bility of troops and the tempos of their operations. Mobility of the rear
lies in its high ability to move, its flexibility, and its maneuverability , and
in the capability to support troops fully and in a timely manner in a
inaterial, technical, and medical sense throughout the entire operation.
Mobility of the rear of the Soviet Armed Forces increases with each
passing year. The rear possesses a high ability to move and the capability
of lifting a considerable amount of supplies, keeping them on wheels, and
making long marches together with the troops. For example, rear area
chasti and podrazdeleniya of the fuel supply service provide the troops
with all types of fuel under any tempos of their advance. For this they
have all the necessary technical means by which they fuel and refuel
the combat and transport equipment in short time periods, and in
necessary instances they can deliver fuel to the troops through pipe
lines or transport it by air.
The use of air transport has acquired great significance for increasing
the mobility of the rear. Even in the last war in some operations this form
of transport played an important role in moving troops and their ma
teriel support. For example, during the time of preparation and conduct
of an operation by the Transbaikal Front in the summer of 1945 , air
transport moved around 16,500 soldiers and officers, up to 2,800 tons of
fuel, and 2,000 tons of other cargo . In the Manchurian Operation avia
tion moved 940 tons of cargo 700–1,000 km for the Sixth Guards Tank

See M. V. Zakharov, Mar SU , “On One-Man Management and One-Man

Managers,” Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 October 1962 .

187
Army alone. There is no doubt that without the timely movement of
these cargoes the Sixth Guards Tank Army would not have been able
to advance with an average daily tempo of 82 km . Analysis of this
operation shows that this army's tempo of advance could have been
even higher, exceeding 100 km per day, if aviation had supported the
uninterrupted supply of fuel in the necessary amount.
An objective need arose for moving supply cargoes by air transport on
large scales and over considerable distances. In combat operations mili
tary transport aircraft and helicopters are becoming continuously oper
ating transportmeans.

Mobility of Engineer Troops

The mobility of troops and high tempos of combat operations depend

to a considerable degree on the organization of rapid surmounting of
natural obstacles, engineer obstacles, and areas of destruction on the
part of the troops, on the successful assault crossing of water obstacles,
and also on the preparation and maintenance of a sufficient number of
routes for maneuver, supply , and evacuation . In this regard there is a
steady rise in the mobility of engineer troops in order for them to be ca
pable of swiftly and effectively fulfilling the requirements of troops con
ducting combat operations in accordance with the situation at hand.
The importance of mobility of engineer troops has risen even more ,
since as a result of the massive use of nuclear weapons on the battlefields
and in rear areas there will be vast zones of radioactive contamination .
Populated points, bridges, and road junctions will be destroyed in areas
of nuclear blasts. Huge obstructions will be formed and fires will arise
in populated points and forests. A considerable portion of water
sources will be subjected to destruction and contamination. In a number
of cases the passability of terrain off the roads will be limited to a con
siderable extent. In this regard the amount of engineer work necessary
as a minimum for successful accomplishment of combat missions and for
attaining high tempos will increase immeasurably. Many of the most com
plex missions of engineer support to high tempos of advance cannot be
accomplished without the direct participation of well trained , well out
fitted , mobile engineer troops.
It is possible to attain high mobility of engineer troops by the very
same ways which are characteristic of combined-arms podrazdeleniya
and chasti . There is special importance in outfitting these troops with the
most sophisticated equipment, increasing the mobility of all engineer
vehicles, making wide use of aviation for performing various military
engineer missions, mechanizing engineer work to the maximum , and
perfecting methods of performing engineer missions in a short period of
time.
A large part is played by independence of ground forces with regard

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to engineer support to combat. For this purpose podrazdeleniya of en
gineer troops are organizationally part of such forces .
However, to increase the mobility of engineer support it began to be
considered necessary to achieve a high degree of independence of all
podrazdeleniya , chasti , and soyedineniya of combat arms in order for
them to cross natural obstacles, contaminated areas, and areas of de
struction without outside help . This began to be attempted by a further
increase of sappers in the combat arms, by outfitting them with mounted
and towed guns, and by improving the engineer training of all personnel
of chasti and soyedineniya .
Engineer troops of the Soviet Army are equipped with the best as
sault crossing and pontoon -bridge means in the world . They meet the
demands of support for assaults on water obstacles at high tempos. The
troops also are outfitted with heavy -duty vehicles, the employment of
which permits performance of complex and laborious missions in short
periods both in supporting a swift advance of friendly troops and in de
fending them againstmass destruction weapons .
By use of engineer measures it is possible to reduce to a minimum the
influence of unfavorable natural conditions of the terrain on rate of
advance and paralyze enemy attempts to intensify this influence. The
rapid clearing or making of passages in mine fields and other obstacles,
repair of roads and bridges, construction of cross -country routes, in
cluding in areas of mass destruction , and preparation of crossings — all
this increases to an enormous degree the possibility of preserving and
developing a high rate of advance .

Methods of Troop Operations in Achieving High Rates of Advance

Troop mobility began to assume high tempos of combat operations

and the creation of necessary prerequisites for such tempos. In order to
realize these prerequisites, certain conditions were necessary. One of the
main conditions for the growth of tempos of combat operations, in ad
dition to an increase in troop mobility and improvement in the basic
means of destruction , was the theoretical development and practical
adoption of those methods of conducting combat operations which ensure
the most effective use of all men and means for routing the enemy and
attaining the planned goals in the shortest possible time. The most effec
tive use of this principle depends on a number of interrelated factors.
Among the latter were included first of all the troops' moral-combat
spirit, the scope of employment of nuclear weapons, combat training of
the troops, level of development of military art and quality of command
ers, the commanders' ability to realize these factors and employ the
most expedient methods of conducting combat operations providing for
the attainment of high tempos of combat operations. There is a sub
stantial effect from the composition and grouping of the enemy and the

189
degree of his stubbornness and activeness. Along with this, the tempos
of combat operations depend on skillful use of all the remaining prin
ciples of military art, especially concentration , surprise , interworking ,
activeness, and also on support to combat operations, nature of the
terrain , condition of weather, and time of year.
At the end of the fifties the following began to be included among
the most important methods of troop operations directed toward at
taining high rates of advance : reliable neutralization of the enemy by
fire and timely exploitation of results of nuclear strikes (for which it
was recommended to make wide use of airborne landings and forward
podrazdeleniya , have tanks in the first echelon , and attack swiftly in
approach march formations and columns without the infantry dismount
ing from APCs); the conduct of maneuverable combat operations along
axes ; swift crossing of zones of radioactive contamination ; and nonstop
assault crossings of water obstacles.
It is necessary to note that the aforementioned methods cannot be
separated from the remaining elements of combat operations. It is
necessary to view the attainment of high tempos and continuity of com
bat operations in the totality with the nature , goals, and content of com
bat operations as a whole . Therefore the given methods are char
acteristic of troop operations in general. However, they simultaneously
facilitate the attainment of high tempos and continuity of combat opera
tions and in this sense are methods of attaining high rates of advance .
This principle is closely interwoven with the principles of surprise, inter
working, and retention of combat effectiveness, and with many par
ticular principles-- reconnaissance , control, support, etc.
Reliable neutralization of the enemy by fire and timely exploitation
of results of nuclear strikes. The attack at high tempos began to be
attained primarily by neutralizing the enemy with powerful fire. Nuclear
weapons became a decisive means of destroying and neutralizing the
enemy. This is the main means by which the attack is prepared and the
way is cleared for its conduct by the troops .
Skillful employment of nuclear missiles began to allow the delivery
of major losses on the enemy in a short time, complete destruction of
his most important objectives and groupings, and thus creation of a
favorable correlation of forces for oneself. It is obvious from this that
one of the most important conditions for attaining high rates of advance
lies in the skillful employment of nuclear weapons .
At the same time, the struggle against enemy means of nuclear at
tack acquired primary importance for attaining high rates of advance .
This struggle is conducted with the use of a number of important par
ticular principies. The employment of nuclear weapons in itself is also
accomplished according to particular principles — suddenly and en masse ,
to the entire depth of the enemy's combat deployment, with the aim of

190
destroying important objectives, tank , artillery, and motorized infantry
groupings, major command posts, junctions of lines of communication ,
and rear area objectives.
In a number of cases it was recommended that " nuclear barriers ” be
created on tactically favorable lines ( rivers , junctions of lines of com
munications, defiles ), i.e., zones of demolition and radioactive contam
ination for prohibiting the approach of enemy reserves to the battlefield
and their maneuver.
Surprise began to be achieved primarily by selecting the most favor
able time and position of objectives for delivering strikes, by using
new means and methods of delivering nuclear weapons to targets, and
by the constant readiness of forces and means to deliver nuclear strikes.
Massive use of nuclear weapons permits attaining important results
in short periods of time: achieving very effective neutralization of the
enemy defense on avenues of attack of troops and to the entire depth of
its deployment; attaining an abrupt change in the correlation of forces
to one's favor; disrupting the enemy's control of his troops ; limiting
the maneuver of enemy men and means, hindering his restoration of
combat formations and elimination of aftereffects of a nuclear attack ;
depriving him of the opportunity to deliver a retaliatory blow and
maneuvering nuclear weapons to the threatened axis. The simultaneous
destruction of troops of the main grouping and of enemy reserves will
not allow him to accomplish a timely maneuver and use his actions to
counter the attack by our troops.
Disorganization and breakdown of the entire system of enemy de
fenses will ensure the attacker of a decisive preponderance of forces
and will create for him favorable conditions for attaining high rates of
advance . There will not be a requirement for concentrating on the main
axis such an enormous mass of troops as was the case in the last war.
It was suggested , for reliable neutralization of the enemy, to use
other means of fire destruction, particularly artillery , aviation , and tanks ,
in combination with nuclear weapons.
Skillful employment of nuclear weapons in combination with artillery,
aviation , and the fire of tanks permits delivery of a decisive defeat on
the enemy on the axis of attack and creation of favorable conditions
for friendly troops to advance swiftly into the depth of his defense and
move into operational space .
Reliable suppression of the enemy to the entire depth of his deploy
ment creates the possibility for swiftly overcoming his defense and de
veloping the attack at very high tempos. To realize this possibility it is
necessary to make timely use of results of nuclear strikes against enemy
objects. There is a requirement to cut to a minimum the gap in time
between the nuclear strikes and the move of attacking troops into the
areas of breaches formed in the enemy's defense .
The enormous fire and shock power of Soviet ground forces, their

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total motorization, and the ability to exploit quickly and effectively the
results of employment of strategic means provide an opportunity to
conduct deep operations with themost decisive goals and at high tempos.
The problem of exploiting results of nuclear strikes is being given
much attention in the foreign military press as well . In the book The
Pentomic Division (1958), T. Mataxis and S. Goldberg wrote that the
need for taking advantage of results of nuclear strikes had been recog
nized by all.
In 1953 the American journal Armor wrote: “ Enemy units, shaken
and scattered after the blast, must be destroyed before they are able to
restore their combat effectiveness to any effective degree .” Consider
able attention to this problem was given also by the American officer
M. Worley in the book What's New in the U.S. Army (1958 ) . French
General Piuloche demands: " It is necessary to ensure that our forces
are in a condition to take advantage of neutralization of enemy troops
by nuclear means for his subsequent destruction by conventional wea
pons.”
They began to find a solution to the task of timely exploitation of
the results of friendly nuclear strikes in the landing ( or dropping) of
airborne parties right after these strikes, in the employment of tank
podrazdeleniya and chasti in the first echelon for rapidly shifting them to
the areas of the nuclear burst, in the wide use of forward podrazdeleniya ,
and in the swift attack in approach march formations and columns
without dismounting the infantry from the APCs. Combat operations
will begin simultaneously within the entire depth of disposition of the
opposing enemy grouping.
A realistic technical base appeared in the fifties for broad employ
ment of tactical and operational airborne landings.
Airborne troops began to possess very sophisticated means of com
bat. They can be landed to a great depth and can widely maneuver not
only during the air movement, but also after landing on the ground ,
and conduct active independent and highly maneuverable operations
in the enemy rear.
In the interests of increasing the rates of advance , tactical airborne
landings will be employed with the plan of supporting them directly
by ground forces or with consideration of the possibility of a linkup of
troops with them before the enemy is able to organize their destruction .
According to the views of American military specialists, the combat
composition of airborne landing parties, calculated on a rapid linkup
with troops attacking from the front, can be from an infantry company
to an airborne division . It can be assumed that greatest employment
will be of airborne landings of a reinforced infantry battalion of an
airborne or infantry division .
A number of foreign works note that in connection with the develop
ment and adoption of army transport aviation as part of the ground

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forces, the possibility has appeared for landing airborne parties at the
decision not only of the field army commander, but also of commanders
of army corps and divisions .
In the views of foreign armies, tactical airborne landings usually
are made to a depth of 20–60 km or more from the front line of friendly
forces. In so doing, the landing party links up with troops attacking
from the front in 5–24 hours . Tank troops are usually assigned to link
up with the landing party .
In the opinion of foreign military specialists, of the wide range of
missions to be performed by tactical airborne landings , the greatest
importance for timely exploitation of results of nuclear strikes and in
creasing rates of advance lies with the following: capture and holding
of areas against which nuclear strikes have been made until the approach
of attacking troops, and disruption of enemy measures to eliminate the
aftereffects of a nuclear attack ; attacking the enemy from the rear in
coordination with troops operating from the front; capture or destruc
tion of enemy nuclear weapons; capture and holding of important ob
jectives and areas in the depth of the enemy's defense ; preventing or
delaying the approach of his reserves; capture and holding of river
crossings ; disorganization of the control of troops and interruption of
normal operation of rear area agencies; seizure of bases of operation
on maritime shores; capture of mountain passes, airfields, road junc
tions, etc.
The degree of importance of a particular one of the above missions
to be accomplished by an airborne landing party depends each time on
the concrete situation . However , there is no doubt that one of the
most important missions is to prevent the enemy from restoring his
defenses after nuclear strikes and disrupt his measures aimed at elimi
nating the aftereffects of these strikes . This is so since the destruction in
a very short time of enemy chasti shaken by a series of nuclear blasts
and forestalling his reserves in moving into these areas create for the
attacking troops, figuratively speaking, a green light in a nuclear corri
dor. In order to achieve this the landing ( or drop ) of an airborne
party must be made as quickly as possible after the nuclear blasts.
As is noted in many foreign works, the landing (or drop ) of parties
into an area of a nuclear air burst is possible , depending on the con
ditions of the radiation situation , 15–25 minutes after delivery of the
nuclear strikes. By landing (dropping ) an airborne party 15–25 minutes
after a burst, there is assurance of an opportunity to avoid considerable
losses during the landing, to capture the designated area before the
approach of enemy reserves, and to prevent them from closing the
breaches formed as a result of the nuclear strikes .
There is no doubt that the use of airborne landings for purposes of
consolidating results of the employment of nuclear weapons is one of
the main ways to increase rates of advance .

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 In the fifties airborne landings acquired the importance of a con
necting link between nuclear strikes against the enemy and the influ
ence on him of soyedineniya attacking from the front. Here there was
assurance of the most effective exploitation of results of nuclear strikes
and a narrowing of the enemy's opportunities to employ his nuclear
missiles. But the role of airborne landings is not limited to this.
An attack by an airborne landing party against enemy defensive
positions from the rear in coordination with troops operating from the
front undoubtedly will lower his resistance and steadfastness and may
cause panic in his ranks.
The seizure and holding of tactically favorable lines, areas, or ob
jectives by a landing party in the enemy rear creates favorable condi
tions for initiation of a îneeting engagement and for conducting it at a
high tempo to destroy a retreating enemy in a short time.
The prevention or delay of the approach of enemy reserves by an
airborne landing party facilitates the rapid development of an attack by
the first echelon and forestalling the enemy in taking up defensive
zones or other important lines in the operational depth .
Airborne landings can be used very effectively to increase the rates
of advance of the main grouping as it assaults water obstacles. Airborne
landings are capable of capturing intact bridges, sectors of terrain on
the opposite river bank, organizing places for assault and ferry cross
ings of motorized infantry, etc. To prevent the approach of enemy
reserves to assault crossing sectors it is possible simultaneously to land
parties in the deeper rear of the enemy. All this affords not only a rapid
forcing of the water obstacle, but also swift development of the attack
on the opposite bank without halts (pauses), which is of no small
importance under modern conditions.
The capture of headquarters, control points, communications cen
ters and means, unloading stations, warehouses, etc., by airborne land
ing parties will lead to a disruption of control over enemy troops and
to interruptions in the operation of the enemy rear.
Even the very potential for landing or dropping a large number of
airborne parties will force the enemy to hold a considerable portion of
his troops scattered in the depth in readiness to battle the landing par
ties. This dispersion of enemy forces and means will also favor the
development of the attack at high tempos and the destruction of enemy
groupings piecemeal. In a war involving the wide employment of nu
clear weapons, airborne landings will play a very important role in the
9
form of “ airborne infantry .”
Tank troops, with their high tactical mobility on the battlefield , and
airborne landing parties, possessing operational mobility in the ar, sup
plement each other well.
The problem of a maximum reduction of the gap in time between
nuclear strikes and the blows of ground forces was resolved by delivery

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of heavy attacks by tank troops operating on the most important axes
of the airborne landings. Above all the tank troops attempted to move
to a great depth into the area which was taken under attack by mis
sile troops and farther beyond this area to seize key objectives, prevent
the enemy from collecting his thoughts , separate the enemy reserves,
and force him to commit them to combat piecemeal as they approach
the battlefield . Meanwhile the penetration into the enemy's deep rear
moves the tank troops into the areas where his long-range means of
nuclear delivery are based and forces them to change position under
threat of capture. This will not permit the enemy to deliver massive
retaliatory nuclear strikes.
According to their combat characteristics, tanks are better able to
withstand the effects of nuclear weapons, possess high cross -country
ability and speed of movement off the roads, and are capable of ac
complishing rapid maneuvers and delivering an attack to a great depth .
They can also quickly cross zones of enemy radioactive contamination .
With the fire from their guns and an armored blow , tanks are able
to wipe from their path surviving remnants of resisting enemy troops ,
deliver forceful attacks against their flanks and rear, and move to a
great depth without halting.
Advancing day and night without stopping, tank troops quickly will
penetrate into the enemy's deep rear and lead the remaining forces
of attacking troops behind them . In offensive operations, tank troops
will be the force which will rush to the ultimate goals of the planned
operations in the shortest time along routes laid by nuclear weapons.
All this permits drawing the conclusion that it is the tanks which can most
effectively take advantage of the results of friendly nuclear strikes.
Operations of tank troops of the first echelon have become forceful.
Neither exposed flanks nor the actions of individual enemy groupings
in the rear are a basis for reducing the rate of advance in the opera
tional depth . Moreover , the rate of advance has to increase , since as
a result of the powerful effects of modern weapons against the entire
depth of disposition of enemy forces and the crushing initial blow of
tank troops breaches form in the enemy defense, the main elements
of his deployment will be so neutralized that they will be incapable
of stubborn resistance or for rapid and effective maneuver on the
battlefield, control over his troops is disorganized , his groupings are
splintere into parts, and coordination between them is disrupted.
All this will create conditions for smashing enemy groupings piece
meal and crossing a large space in a short time.
Much is said in foreign military works about the advisability of
using tanks in the first echelon . For example, the American newspaper
Army Times wrote : “ Tanks, which are the best means for rapid
exploitation of results of nuclear blast if terrain does not limit their
operations, must operate to this end.” Such a point of view is also

195
held by West German authors, who for purposes of rapid realization
of results of nuclear strikes propose to use tanks troops in the first
echelon in view of their high mobility and armored protection . It is
characteristic that one of the main missions of the tank brigade of
the West German Army is exploiting the results of friendly nuclear
strikes. The very same opinion is held in Italy : “ Tank troops, which
earlier were committed to exploit success after a breakthrough of the
enemy's defense , under conditions of use of nuclear weapons
are proposed to be used in the first echelon immediately after delivery
of nuclear strikes. ” 6
Forward podrazdeleniya may be assigned for swift exploitation of
results of nuclear strikes and for keeping the attack at a high tempo.
Not entering combat for individual strongpoints or with advancing
enemy reserves, they must force their way into the depth of the
defense through areas of nuclear bursts, intervals, and gaps in the
enemy's combat formations, and also through sectors where his re
sistance is weaker, and capture the areas or objectives indicated from
the move (independently or in coordination with airborne landings ).
Experience shows that forward podrazdeleniya sometimes in addition
can provide substantial assistance to tactical airborne landings by rein
forcing them soon after the landing or drop or by drawing off enemy
reserves on themselves . In its turn , the success of airborne landings ,
or even their very presence, has a favorable effect on the actions of
these podrazdeleniya .
The Great Patriotic War provides numerous examples of successful
operations by forward podrazdeleniya in the operational depth of the
enemy defense with a tempo of up to 80 km a day, and sometimes even
more. Skillful use of active , resolute operations of such detachments
ensured a swift breakthrough of the enemy's defense to the entire
depth , the development of the attack at high tempos , a sharp change
of the situation in our favor, and achievement of success of the battle
and the operation as a whole .
With the introduction of nuclear weapons into the arsenal, the
operations by forward podrazdeleniya began to have even greater im
portance . New means of warfare and a qualitatively different nature
of troops create more favorable conditions for wide use of such
podrazdeleniya and substantially increase their combat capabilities.
Their skillful employment can facilitate a very significant increase in
rates of advance .
Skillful combination of actions in combat and approach march forma
tions and columns and the attack by infantry on APCs, wide use of
means of movement on the battlefield , a reduction in time taken to
deploy from the move from columns into an approach march or combat

* Taktika sovremennogo obshchevoyskovogo boya ( Tactics of Contemporary

Combined-Arms Combat), Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1961, pp 107, 108 .

196
formation and to form up into march columns— all this has great
importance for timely exploitation by troops of the results of nuclear
strikes and for increasing rates of advance .
By moving in columns, chasti and podrazdeleniya obtain the possi
bility of taking maximum advantage of their mobility and forestalling
the enemy in his actions. Of course , on encountering an enemy who
offers organized resistance from prepared lines, there will be a require
ment to deploy chasti of the first echelon into combat or approach march
formations due to lack of a possibility of neutralizing him with nuclear
weapons .
To attain high rates of advance it is necessary for motorized infantry
to move behind the tanks on APCs with increased cross -country ability ,
and not only before the battle begins, but during it as well. The use
of APCs for combat operations will make it possible to eliminate the
gap between the capabilities of tanks and motorized infantry in attaining
high rates of advance .
Rates of advance when motorized infantry is fighting from APCs
are increased not only thanks to an increase in the speed of its move
ment across the battlefield , but also because, being protected from small
arms and machine gun fire and fragments of shells and mines, the
motorized infantry suffers fewer losses. APCs reduce to a considerable
degree the destructive effect of nuclear weapons. In particular, they
fully protect personnel from light radiation and weaken by several
times the effects of radioactive radiation .
The well known protection of infantry on APCs from the destructive
factors of nuclear weapons permits the attacker to more reliably
neutralize with nuclear bursts the enemy directly opposite him without
fear of destroying his own troops .
By moving on APCs right after the tanks, motorized infantry can
attack in close coordination with them . The presence of radios on the
APCs facilitates maintaining coordination of the motorized infantry with
other combat arms and attached podrazdeleniya. In addition , in such
a method of operations, motorized infantry has great opportunities for
maneuvering both reserves and first echelon podrazdeleniya on the
battlefield, better preserves the physical energy of its personnel in
combat, and can employ not only its own weapons but those of the
APCs, including even when it is forced to attack on foot.
The above considerations permitted drawing the following conclusion
by 1959 : the attack must be made primarily on tanks , APCs, and
helicopters. An attack on foot will be a rare occurrence . The fire
and maneuver operations of troops on machines now rule on fields
of battle .
It is possible to have the infantry dismount from the APCs only on
encountering enemy strong points which have not been neutralized ,

197
when there is no opportunity to destroy them another way , and also
when it is necessary to take difficult sectors of terrain .
Conduct of maneuverable combat actions along axes. Maneuverable
combat operations of troops along axes have begun to have decisive
importance in attaining high rates of advance, as opposed to the
methodical breakthrough of the past. Combat operations of ground
forces are characterized by great spatial scope , extraordinary dynamic
action , swift development along individual axes, and the wide em
ployment of different forms of maneuver. There will be no solid
fronts . Combat will take on an extremely intensive character. The
opposing sides have begun to attempt to carry out the main tasks by
a decisive attack, as a result of which there will often be meeting
engagements and battles.
Under conditions of nuclear weapons employment, the significance
of maneuver has sharply increased , since it has become necessary for
rapid exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes, delivery of attacks
against the enemy's flank and rear, the build -up of efforts on the most
important axes, delivery of anticipatory attacks against the enemy,
the shift of efforts from one axis to another , replacement of podrazdele
niya and chasti which have been subjected to nuclear attack , and
also for crossing zones of contamination and areas of destruction .
In many cases movements and maneuver have become the main
content of troop combat operations.
The chief role in accomplishing maneuver belongs to fire. Now the
force of fire has risen so greatly that it becomes possible to use
powerful fire strikes to achieve destruction of the enemy to his entire
depth and thus ensure the nonstop advance of troops at high tempos .
In a number of instances the maneuver of nuclear strikes can even
replace the maneuver of men and means.
The attack has begun to be accomplished by delivery of fire strikes
to a great depth in combination with the continuous movement of
tanks and motorized infantry exploiting the results of the fire for
rapid completion of the defeat of an enemy neutralized by nuclear
weapons and for swift advance into the depth .
Tactical maneuver is employed on the battlefield in the most de
cisive forms — in the close or deep envelopment or in a combination of
the two.
The frontal attack has become an effective form of maneuver made
for the purpose of creating breaches in the enemy's combat formation
and premises for employing even more active forms of maneuver
the close or deep envelopment. As a rule , the frontal attack begins
with the delivery of powerful nuclear strikes, which considerably fa
ciliates solving the problem of a breakthrough .
The content of maneuver has changed radically. Troops performing
enveloping actions have obtained the possibility of not having fire

198
contact (by conventional means) with troops attacking from the front.
They have begun to support only tactical interworking.
The bypassing of the main enemy groupings in contemporary combat
may be employed considerably more often than in the past. The attack
has begun to be conducted along axes with great gaps, primarily with
tanks, APCs, and helicopters, in the presence of exposed flanks. Under
these conditions the deep enveloping maneuver has begun to be under
taken by the most diverse groupings of troops with the aim of resolving
both tactical as well as operational missions.
Maneuver will also find use when it is necessary to quickly replace
an ineffective element of the combat formation and for bypassing
terrain sectors with high radiation levels or areas of heavy destruction .
The air movement of troops has begun to be widely employed in the
course of an attack for reinforcing tank groupings which have penetrated
into the operational depth , for forestalling the enemy in a build -up
of men and weapons on a decisive axis , for the maneuver of reserves,
for reinforcing groupings which have suffered heavy losses, for crossing
zones with high radiation levels, etc.
One of the important ways for achieving high tempos of an attack
has been the use of new methods of operation . The critical revision of
old methods and means, thinking in new terms, rejection of stereotypy,
and the intelligent initiative of commanders at all levels -- all these are
reliable sources for raising the rates of advance.
In the course of combat training in the fifties, our troops began to
develop new and very progressive methods of operation : swift advance
along independent axes; combat under conditions of a difficult radiation
situation ; alternation of brief meeting engagements and dashes into the
depth of the enemy defense; advance without awaiting the final de
struction of enemy troops; continuous operations under any terrain
conditions, day or night; the attack of tanks without accompanying
infantry ; independent tank operations in the deep enemy rear.
In connection with the troops being outfitted with nuclear weapons,
the best results began to be attained not by a methodical advance , but
by a daring dash along the axes of the greater portion of the forces
right after nuclear strikes, the daring combination of actions in combat
and approach march formations and columns, and by the capability for
prolonged maneuver operations with a considerable separation from the
main grouping, with exposed flanks and a threat from the rear. The
troops have completely new qualitative characteristics, which must be
skillfully used in the interests of achieving high rates of advance and
overall success .
The attack along axes has become the chief method of troop combat
operations, especially in developing the attack . Its essence lies in the
rapid and unqeual penetration by attackers into the depth of defense
through breaches formed in the enemy's combat formations by nuclear

199
strikes, as well as through unoccupied and poorly defended intervals
in his defenses for attacking the hostile grouping in the flank and
rear. The possibility and advisability of employing such a method of
combat operations are determined by the wide use of nuclear weapons,
the fundamental change in organization of troops and in views on the
conduct of a defensive operation and battle, and also by the absence,
as a rule , of a solid front of defense.
The presence of considerable intervals between defending podrazde
leniya, chasti, and soyedineniya of the enemy has begun to create
favorable conditions for attacks along axes and for accomplishing
wide maneuver for the purpose of delivering forceful strikes against
the flank and rear of enemy strong points and for destroying his
groupings piecemeal.
The unfolding of combat operations along axes across a very wide
front with an unequal and rapid advance of combat formations creates
a real opportunity for skillful maneuver of forces and means and for
the fullest use of high troop mobility and the results of friendly nuclear
strikes .
The conduct of combat operations on other than a solid front per
mits conducting the attack at high tempos with equal or even fewer
forces and means. Rapid penetration into the depth of disposition of
the enemy along selected axes, dismembering his defense into several
isolated sectors, and the development of combat operations across a
wide front and to a great depth all hinder the enemy in his maneuver
of reserves and employment of nuclear weapons. His use of long-range
artillery and aviation , especially at night, also is substantially limited .
The survivability of troops in an attack along axes is also increased
thanks to the possibility for their maximum dispersal along the front
and in the depth . This method of combat operations permits not only
employing the most diverse forms of maneuver, but also changing
comparatively easily the axes of strikes in the course of the attack and
quickly shifting efforts into the depth .
An attack along axes corresponds to the greatest degree to the ac
tions of troops under conditions of a difficult radiation situation , since
it is desirable to cross zones of contamination having high radiation
levels in march columns at maximum speed .
An advantage of no little importance in such an attack also lies in
the fact that it is easier to achieve surprise and employ different meth
ods of moving into the attack .
The concept of continuity of the attack (or of combat operations) is
closely tied with tempos of combat operations.
Continuous development of the attack has begun to be achieved as
follows: by performing a number of measures and employing different
methods of troop operations, in particular the creation of a superiority
in fire, forces, and weapons on decisive avenues ; by the timely build -up

200
of the force of the troops ' attack and rapid development of the planned
success; by maintaining constant interworking; by relentless pursuit of
the retreating enemy; by around -the-clock conduct of the attack ; and
by organization of combat with the defender's reserves and surviving
enemy groups remaining in the rear of the attacking forces.
The achievement of continuous action is facilitated by the high rates
of advance because this reduces the effectiveness of the enemy's em
ployment of nuclear weapons, facilitates his destruction piecemeal,
provides an opportunity to forestall his intentions to take up a defense
on favorable lines or deliver counterblows, etc.
Continuity of attack in its turn facilitates the increase in its over
all tempos inasmuch as it precludes pauses and prolonged breaks and
ensures the nonstop pursuit of the retreating enemy, constant combat
against his nuclear delivery means, etc.
The achievement of high tempos and continuity of combat opera
tions has begun to depend largely also on the troops ' swift crossing of
zones of radioactive contamination , areas of destruction and inundation ,
and the non -stop forcing of water obstacles.
The ways and methods for increasing mobility are diverse . Ideas for
ensuring high mobility encompass both the organization , armament,
and outfitting of troops as well as development of the corresponding
questions of military art, theory, and the practice of combat training.

Concentration of Main Efforts and Creation of the Necessary

Superiority in Men and Weapons Over the Enemy at the Decisive
Place at the Decisive Time (Concentration of Efforts )

To attain victory over the enemy one must not dissipate his forces
and means equally across the entire front, but the main efforts must be
concentrated on the most important axis or sector and at the right
time in order to form there the necessary superiority over the enemy in
men and weapons .
Use of this principle has played a deciding role in a majority of the
battles and engagements for centuries. The ability to achieve a con
centration of main efforts and create the needed superiority in men and
weapons over the enemy at the right place at the right time is the
most generalizing indicator of the high level of military art of com
manders and commanders-in - chief. This principle has several names
which we give here to avoid a certain confusion : superiority of forces;
massing; concentration of superior forces at the right place at the right
moment; the principle of particular victory ; the principle of shock
effect; and Bernhardy attached to it his designation of " the law of
numbers.” As applied to the particular case of the distribution of forces
in a theater of military operations or on a battlefield , this principle is
known by the name of the principle of economy of force . There is no
sense in separating the economy of force as an independent principle.

201
 We did not give this principle a different wording by virtue of the
fact that under contemporary conditions its content has undergone
considerable changes. Now , without changing their positions, missiles
with nuclear war heads can deliver nuclear strikes of enormous might to
any distances. Under these conditions the excessive massing of men
and combat equipment or over-crowding of combat formations ceases to
be necessary and , moreover, becomes dangerous. It is obviously inore
correct to speak primarily not of the massing and concentration of
forces, but of concentration of main efforts on the main axis by means
of maneuvering the trajectories of missiles.
T. Mataxis and S. Goldberg in the book The Pentomic Division
wrote in 1959: “Massive employment of nuclear weapons will come
to replace the massive employment of personnel in an attack.” As
a U.S. journal wrote in August 1956 , concentration now is more a
concept of time than of space . U.S. Army Lt Gen Eddleman wrote
in February 1957: “ The concentration of troops and supplies in pre
paring to break through the enemy defense, as this was done during
99
World War II , will be tantamount to suicide.”
As A. Lathrop wrote in the June issue of Military Reveiw in 1959,
massing is achieved by a considerably greater concentration of fire
support means than ever before. However in armed conflict not only
missiles with nuclear warheads , but also conventional weapons, will be
employed . Therefore it will still be necessary to concentrate some quan
tity of conventional forces and means. This presumes not simply a
massing and concentration , but creation of superiority in forces and
means over the enemy on the decisive axis, since war is a two-way
process. For victory it is necessary to have a superiority in forces and
means over the opposing enemy.
Concentration of troops occurs through the action of the law of armed
conflict on the dependence of the course and outcome of a battle or
operation on the correlation of combat power of the forces which are
taking a direct part in it, and of the first law of warfare . The second
aspect of this principle - dispersal of troops — stems from the law of the
dependence of methods and forms of armed conflict on the material
basis of a battle, operation , or war. The wording of this principle
has retained its outer form for an extraordinarily long time. This gave
occasion , but not the basis, for asserting the “ eternal and unchanging
nature” of certain principles of military art. The insolvency of such a
viewpoint of the metaphysicists and idealists of the past was shown
above. However, even in our time individual statements appear, some
times of prominent authors of interesting scientific works , which can be
interpreted in two ways with regard to the changeability of the prin
ciples. There is a need , therefore , to show briefly the evolution of this
principle .
This principle did not appear immediately with the birth of military

202
art. Moreover, it was formulated for the first time only in the 19th
century by Rumyantsev, Suvorov, Napoleon, and also Jomini in his
analysis of the Battle of Lieten (1757).
There was a time when the attack was made in a line with equal
distribution of forces across the entire front. Then engagements rep
resented an enormous spontaneous and disorderly aggregate of individ
ual duels by horsemen and soldiers.
This principle was used practically for the first time by the Theban
general Epaminondas in the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. Epaminondas
had 7,000 men and his enemy, the Spartan King Cleombrot, had
11,000 (see Diagram 2a ). Epaminondas was faced with the difficult
task of defeating an enemy with superior forces. For this Epaminondas
employed a new form of warmaking. He rejected the then dominant
tactic of a frontal attack by forces equally distributed across a front
and for the first time in the history of military art employed a new
combat formation , the basis of which was the principle of concentration
of superior forces on the axis of the main attack . On his left flank ,
on the decisive sector of the battle, the Theban general set up a
superiority in forces, i.e., he became the stronger. While on the right
flank and in the center the depth of the combat formation consisted
of eight ranks, here on the left flank a striking fist was formed — a
column 50 ranks deep . Epaminondas' plan was as follows: break
through the Spartan combat line with a powerful battering ram at its
strongest sector, on the right flank. This plan was skillfully implemented :
Epaminondas' shock column broke through the phalanx of Spartaris
with a strong assault, and in spite of courageous resistance, they were
routed .
In 362 B.C., in the battle of Boeotian forces against the Spartans
at Mantinea , Epaminondas improved on this principle of military art
even more. Here is how Xenophon (430-355 B.C.) described this
battle : “ Epaminondas moved his army forward as a narrow unit, like
a warship , assuming that in the place where he succeeded in breaking
through the line of the enemy's disposition , he would deal a final
defeat to the entire hostile army. . . . Having won victory in the place
where he had cut into the ranks of the enemy, he set to flight the
997
entire hostile army."
F. Engels, who was investigating the military history of the ancient
Greeks, wrote that Epaminondas first discovered the great tactical prin
ciple which has decided almost all regular engagements right up to our
days: unequal distribution for forces across the front with the aim of
concentrating forces for the main attack on the decisive point.' 7A
Subsequently the forms, methods, and means of implementing this
principle changed with the development of means of warfare and

* Xenophon , Greek History , Leningrad, 1935 , p 198 .

TA See Marx and Engels, Sochineniya, XIV , 355 .

203
 A.Massing of forces by Epaminondas in the B. Massing of forces and means by Frederick !!
Battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.) by deploying troops in an " oblique combat
formation "

Sacred
Thebans detachment
7,000 50 ranks
(Embalon )
8 ranks Infantry

도
12 ranks

Peloponnesian allies Spartans Advance guard

Spartans 11,000 ( grenadiers )
Cavalry
C. Massing of forces and means in offensive
operations of the Great Patriotic War
Enemy

Density per km D. Concentration ofmain effort in nuclear

Air Army of front of warfare
CD break through :
1

guns & mortars

2 - 130-250
óńI

3 tanks- 80-120
NPP tanks - 20-30
4
Division per 1.6-0.7 km
5
Ő

6 - o
-UD
7 gi
8 -ID
or gratis00
00

9
T
)

o O
o

Correlation of men and

weaponson break through
sector:
In battalions -
5-10 : 1
In guns & mortars -
6-12 : 1
In tanks and SAU
4-10 : 1 OC

Diagram 2 (key on following page)

204
military art. The infantry was for Epaminondas the exclusive subject
of concentration . But as early as the wars of Alexander of Macedonia
a combined massing of different combat arms was used — cavalry in
combination with infantry. Greece with its insignificant cavalry could
never have achieved this.?B
Subsequently, over more than 20 centuries, the principle concentra
tion of forces was subjected to numerous changes . The sphere of its
action was limited in some cases, expanded in others. Its content ac
quired new features. It was combined anew with its opposite tendencies,
etc.

KEY : 14Second echelon of front; 2 – Mobile front group ; 3 - Second echelon

of army; 4 - Second echelon of rifle corps ; 5 – Mobile army group; 6—
Second echelon of rifle division ; 7 – Subgroup of the army artillery group;
8 — Divisional artillery group; 9 — Tanks for direct infantry support.

Frederick II created a superiority in forces on the planned axes by

an “ oblique attack ” an “ oblique combat formation ,” and by an attack
in echelons. Its essence reduced to one of the wings moving forward
while the other was delayed . The attacking wing was considerably
reinforced and an attempt was made if possible to envelop the enemy
front from the flank or even from the rear (see Diagram 2b ). In it
self , the oblique deployment still was not able to lead to victory ,
nor did it provide any particular advantage . An advantage was ob
tained only when the attacking wing was considerably more powerful
while the wing moving in an echelon to the rear tied up more of the
enemy forces . Here the attacker came up to the enemy with such
swiftness that the enemy was not able to take countermeasures.
In the large battle with the Austrians at Lieten in 1757, Frederick
II with 40,000 men defeated the enemy's 60,000 -man army by forming
the troops into an oblique combat formation and creating a considerable
superiority in forces against the left wing of the Austrians. The enemy
left wing was smashed by the Prussians before it could be reinforced
from the right flank. This determined the success of Frederick's troops.
It should be noted that the lack of initiative and passive nature of the
Austrians also influenced the outcome of the battle . If instead of waiting
in their defensive positions, they had opportunely delivered the same
kind of offensive blow against the Prussians filing past them , they
could have won the battle .
The oblique combat formation was subsequently transformed by
Frederick II into a stereotype and panacea for all disasters and
vicissitudes of war. However , in an encounter with Russian troops,
the Prussian Army and Prussian military system suffered defeat. The
Russian Army won a victory at Gross Jaegersdorf (1757), Kunersdorf
( 1759 ), took Berlin ( 1760), and the Kolberg fortress ( 1761).
The Battle of Kunersdorf is of greatest interest from the viewpoint of
TB lbid .

205
use of the principle of mass by an oblique deployment of forces. With
an oblique attack , the Prussians created a numerical superiority on
the axis of main attack and thanks to this captured the left flank of
the Russians and took Muehlberg Hill. But the commander-in -chief,
Gen P. S. Saltykov, kept moving up from the right flank and the
reserve troops which had not yet been engaged until the offensive
energy of the Prussians weakened .
In the final account the Russian regiments under the personal leader
ship of P. A. Rumyantsev, who headed the troops in the sector under
attack , overran the Prussian infantry with a bayonet attack and set it
into a panicky flight. The battle ended with the total defeat of the
Prussian Army.
The Russians did not hold dogmatically to the linear combat forma
tion . Moreover, they had studied Frederick's way of enveloping from
the rear so well that a portion of the forces was disposed immediately
to the west, with their front to Russia , and when Frederick went around
the Russian Army he found himself right before a front of the Russians.
In Clausewitz's expression , the king himself fell into the noose of his
own system of an oblique combat formation .
In the campaign of 1761, Rumyantsev , commanding a corps which
was operating against the Kolberg fortress, for the first time em
ployed a column not only for a march movement and for maneuvering
on the battlefield , but also for attacking the enemy. This innovation per
mitted Rumyantsev to achieve a considerable superiority in forces on
the chosen axis. This new column or shock tactic was developed and
brilliantly applied by A. V. Suvorov , the great master of a massing of
forces on the main axis .
Suvorov's statements in substantiation of this principle have come
down to us . Suvorov taught: “ If you go to defeat the enemy, multiply
the troops, empty the posts, and remove lines of communication . Having
defeated the enemy, restore as circumstances allow , but chase him
until he is crushed. For if you are peripatetic (from the Greek word
meaning stroll — V.S.), then it is best not to be a soldier.” “ Never
dissipate forces for preservation of various points.”
These demands of Suvorov were in sharp contradiction to the cordon
strategy and linear tactics dominant in the 18th century , which led to
a dispersal of forces in the theater of military operations and their
equal disposition on the battlefield . Independently of each other, Rum
yantsev and Suvorov showed examples of employment of the principle
of massing artillery against a sector being attacked . Meanwhile, bour
geois historiography believes that this principle was employed for the
first time by Napoleon .
In the plan for war with Turkey drawn up by Suvorov in 1793
it states that three-fourths of the 3rd Corps “must remain always con
centrated so as to defeat the infidels in the field .” For this Suvorov ad

206
vises razing the fortresses taken from the Turks if storehouses are not
set up in them . In the Polish Campaign of 1794 Suvorov gave in
structive examples of a consecutive concentration of forces for defeating
the enemy piecemeal, and did this before Bonaparte did .
In instructions to Austrian Gen K. Gadik in 1799, Suvorov wrote:
I am obligated to direct your attention to the military truth that the
cordon line always can be overrun: at his will , the enemy rushes
forces against one point while the defender, remaining still in uncertainty ,
has his forces dissipated . For this reason I see with dissatisfaction the
breaking up of your corps. . . I would like to see all routes and
paths occupied , not to defend each of them , but only to observe ; for
this just light forces are sufficient; but the main forces must be held
together so as to await at some point the enemy attack or go toward him
and cut him off. Thus the troops win time and manage to uncover the
foe's intentions before he attacks.” 8
Two weeks later, in a circular instruction to corps commanders, Suvorov
remarks : " For the overall attack I consider it necessary to remind you of
the precaution -- necessary in all cases — of holding all you forces as much
as possible together , so as not to make the attack itself a failure
through the useless fractionation and voluntary weakening of them .”
There are other documents as well in which Suvorov recommended
not to forget the basic principle of military art — to operate with total
forces , and also to take advantage of the enemy's confusion by making a
surprise attack against him .
Suvorov considered the concentration of forces on the axis chosen for
an attack to be an important principle of military art, but not the sole
factor of victory. Although Sovorov strived to concentrate on the
battlefield forces superior to the enemy, he was not disturbed by those
instances where the enemy had enormously greater forces numerically.
At Stolovichi ( 1771) he defeated 4,000 of the enemy with 1,000, at
Kozludzhe ( 1774 ) with 8,000 he defeated 40,000 Turks, and in the
Battle of Rymnik (1789 ) with 25,000 (7,000 Russians and 18,000
Austrians ) he utterly defeated 100,000 Turks. Suvorov successfully
assaulted the Izmail fortress, which had a garrison of 35,000 , with 30,000
men ( 1790 ) . On the Tidon River ( 1799 he fought against 22,000 with
15,000 and two days later at Trebbia , with 22,000 against 33,000 .
Before the Battle of Rymnik , the Prince of Coburg pointed to the
enormous numerical superiority of the Turks. Nevertheless, Suvorov
insisted on the need for an urgent attack , since with such an inequality of
forces only a rapid , bold attack promises success, and added with a
smile : " Still, there are not so many of them as to blot out the sun .” 9

* A. V. Suvorov, Dokumenty (Documents), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1953, IV , 267,

268 .
9
See A. Petrushevskiy, Generalissimus knyaz' Suvorov (Generalissimo Prince
Suvorov), St. Peterburg, 1884 , I, 351.

207
Finally, in answer to an objection by the Austrian prince , Suvorov de
clared that if he didn't share his veiws, then the Russians would attack
the Turks with only their own troops and he, Suvorov , hoped to defeat
them ( 7,000 against 100,000 !).
In giving battle with fewer forces, Suvorov believed that “ swiftness
and surprise replace numbers.” However, even in these cases Suvorov
did not at all ignore the principle of concentration of superior forces at
the decisive point, but employed it skillfully. The Russian forces were
disposed unevenly across the front and operated not as a solid mass,
but in individual groups reinforced with a strong reserve. In place of
a frontal attack , Suvorov's troops delivered the main attack against the
decisive point of the Suvorov's troops delivered the main attack against
the decisive point of the enemy's position . On the axis of the main
attack the greater part of the troops were concentrated . Individual mili
tary groups coordinated among themselves, and their attacks were
prepared by massed artillery fire. In a majority of cases defeat of the
enemywas planned to be piecemeal.
In the Italian campaign in the battles at Adda ( April 1799 ) , the
French , having overall superiority in forces, were defeated by the
Russo -Austrian forces thanks to the fact that Suvorov had concentrated
superior forces on the axis of main attack , while he set out screens on
secondary axes. Any of the screens could if necessary have been rein
forced with 25,000 men .
Beginning with the Battle of Zemapp (1772 ) , the French also widely
employed a concentration of men and weapons, which became possible
thanks to deployment into columns .
Napoleon also skillfully created a superiority on the decisive axis.
“ The essence of strategy,” he said , “ is to have more forces than the
enemy at the point at which you attack or on which you are being
attacked , though you have a weaker army.”
Even if Napoleon entered an engagement with fewer forces than the
enemy, in this instance too he proceeded from an assumption that
lesser forces will suffer defeat from greater forces. With a numerically
superior enemy before him , Napoleon , in his own words, threw his
troops into an attack against one of the enemy flanks, shattered it, and,
taking advantage of the enemy's confusion , delivered attacks against
other points of his combat deployment. Thus a defeat was inflicted
piecemeal and with superior forces. The victory won by the French
Army was, in Napoleon's words, “ nothing more than a victory of the
stronger over the weaker."
In his memoirs Napoleon remarked : “ During the revolutionary war
( or more precisely, before the revolution of 1789-1794 – V.S .) they held
to an incorrect system : fractionize your forces, send columns to the
right and columns to the left, which is a crude mistake . It was the
opposite system which gave me so many victories, since on the eve of

208
an engagement, instead of dissipating my divisions in various directions,
I kept drawing them in to that point which I wished to take. It was
there thatmy army was massed and easily overturned that which opposed
it and which was naturally weaker .”
It should be noted that it was easier for Napoleon to mass superior
forces on the axis ofmain attack than for Suvorov , because Napoleon in
almost all the engagements he entered had an overall superiority in
forces over the enemy. Suvorov , however , with the exception of two or
three engagements, created a superiority on the decisive point with overall
forces fewer than those of the enemy.
In contrast to Suvorov , in certain cases Napoleon considerably ex
ceeded the limits of a reasonable degree of concentration. Napoleon's
desire to operate en masse became a sort of mania for him after the
campaign of 1807. He concocted monstrous deployments into columns
which comprised entire divisions, and disposed deployed battalions and
regiments one after the other, which transformed them into a clumsy mass
which was not very mobile and was poorly controlled , and which suf
fered excessive losses to enemy fire .
The massing of artillery was a new phenomenon in the content and use
of the principle of concentration of efforts in the wars of the 18th
and 19th centuries.
In the Battle of Palzig ( 12 July 1759) in the Seven Years War
eight batteries containing 186 guns operated on the Russian side . These
guns were disposed in two lines across a front of about three kilometers.
Seven batteries operated in the first line. Aswe see, there were 50–55 guns
per kilometer of front in the first line in this engagement.
In the Battle of Kunersdorf ( 1 August 1759) the Russians massed
230 guns across a front of around 5 kilometers.
In the Battle of Borodino on 26 August 1812 Kutuzov had 640 guns,
of which he committed over half across a front of 4–5 km , and left
306 guns in reserve , in readiness to take part in the engagement. Such
massing of artillery created an overall density of 130–150 guns per
kilometer of front, of which 60–70 were in the first line.
At a critical moment in the Battle of Leipzig on 4 October 1813 the
Russians committed 112 guns moved out of the reserve on a narrow
sector of the front in the center of their army. The fire of these guns
devastated the ranks of the main grouping of Napoleon's troops. This
in essence created a turning point in the engagement.
In the armies of Western Europe the mass use of artillery in en
gagements was successfully carried out by Napoleon . Napoleon for the
first time used a concentration of artillery at Toulon in 1793, where as a
result of a three- day artillery preparation , a 45 -gun battery ensured the
success of infantry and drove off a British squadron . In 1805 at Auster
litz Soult's attack was supported by 42 guns. In the engagement at

209
Preussisch Eilau an attack against the right flank of the Russians was
supported by 150 guns placed into one battery.
In his article “ Artillery ,” Engels pointed out that “ the action of artil
lery in combat was intensified thanks to its skillful application . Napoleon
committed a certain number of light guns attached to infantry divi
sions in order to begin a battle , force the enemy to reveal his strength ,
etc., while the mass of artillery was kept in reserve until the decisive
point of attack was determined . Then enormous batteries were immedi
ately formed which operated jointly against this point and which thus
prepared for the final attack of infantry reserves with their awesome
cannonade. In the Battle of Friedland there were 70 guns and at
Wagram there were 100 guns formed thusly into a row . In the Battle
of Borodino a battery of 80 guns prepared Ney's attack at Semenovs
99 10
koye.”
In this brief description Engels gives the characteristic features of
the mass employment of artillery, consisting of a concentration of the
main body of artillery on the axis ofmain attack so as to exercise decisive
influence on the outcome of battle .
The concentration of artillery in wars of the second half of the
18th century and the beginning of the 19th century was manifested with
greatest force in major and decisive engagements. The best results were
achieved with the help of artillery , which was in reserve and advanced
to the most important point only when the moment had come for a de
cisive attack .
After Kutuzov and Napoleon smoothbore artillery was not employed
in field engagements in such a massive amount as in the first decades of
the 10th century .
The Crimean War of 1853–1856 , during which rifled guns were
employed with what was for that time a considerable range , showed
that putting smoothbore artillery into batteries with many tens of guns,
as was done under Napoleon , was inadvisable due to enormous losses of
artillery crews.
Thus the massing of smoothbore artillery on the battlefield at this
stage in the development of equipment became practically not only
inadvisable, but even injurious. Important changes again took place in
the content of the principle of concentration of efforts. With the adoption
of rifled guns, which found application on broad scales in the Franco
Prussian War of 1870-1871, artillery again began to be employed
en masse , which was especially clearly seen in World War I.
Beginning in 1915 and up to the end of 1917, the densities of
artillery constantly increased and approached 161 guns per kilometer of
front of attack . On the remaining sectors the artillery densities did not
exceed 12–15 guns per kilometer. Here the width of the front of attack

10 Engels, Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya (Selected Military Works), Voy

enizdat, 1941, I, 268 .

210
had a tendency for reduction , while the number of heavy guns in
creased .
The mass use of artillery in a number of engagements of 1916--1917
supported major tactical successes. However breaches in the defense
made by artillery could not be exploited by the attacking side. The loss
of surprise caused by a long artillery preparation of many hours or even
many days and an insufficient troop mobility of the attacker led to a
situation where as a rule the defender managed to take countermeasures
to restore the defense . Therefore military specialists of the combatants
arrived at the conclusion that the principle of mass use of artillery did
not ensure the necessary success. This was a unilateral and shallow con
clusion . It stands to reason that of itself the massing of artillery does
not guarantee victory, but the conditions for its achievement are created
by artillery by its employment in close interworking with other combat
arms and the skillful application of all other principles of military art.
In November 1917 at Cambrai the allies organized and successfully
carried out a tank attack without preliminary artillery preparation . In
March 1918 at Picardy it was the Germans, and in the summer of the
same year at Chateau- Thierry , Amiens , and on other sectors of the front
it was the allies who conducted successful operations with a brief (3—5
hour) artillery preparation , employing a total of 90–125 guns per kilo
meter of front.
These tactical successes led to a situation where the principle of
surprise began to be moved to the foreground in the attainment of victory .
The concentration of artillery did not obtain further development.
The commander of the Southwestern ront, Gen A. A. Brusilov , showed
in the offensive operation of 1916 an outstanding example of skillful
massing of men and weapons in combination with observance of the
demands of the other principles of military art. Not having an overall
superiority in men and weapons over the enemy, Brusilov decided to
achieve success by careful preparation of the attack , the massing of
men and weapons on the chosen sectors of breakthrough , and surprise
in the attack . Bymassing men and weapons the Russian command created
a superiority over the enemy in the sectors of breakthrough of 2–21/2
times for infantry and 11/2-2 times for artillery. Maximum artillery densi
ties did not exceed 20 guns per kilometer of front. However , the Rus
sian artillerymen , having a limited number of guns and shells, did not
conduct fire against areas , but against targets.
The brilliant success of the Southwestern Front was achieved not
through a numerical preponderance over the enemy, but as a result of
careful preparation , concentration of men and weapons on sectors of
breakthrough , the use of surprise , close interworking of all combat
arms, and employment of a new form of breakthrough of a positional
defense - a simultaneous splintering attack on a number of sectors of a
front.

211
 A new point in the use of the principle of concentration of efforts during
World War I was the concentration of tanks in an operation by the
British Third Army at Cambrai in 1917. ( The first employment of tanks
in battles on the Sommes River in 1916 gave insignificant results, since
only 18 tanks took part in the battle there. ) In the Cambrai operation,
thanks to well conducted operational camouflage, the British succeeded
in secretly concentrating in the planned area a strong attack grouping:
eight infantry divisions , one cavalry corps , 1,009 guns, 378 combat and
98 auxiliary tanks, and 1,000 aircraft. Taking advantage of the action
of principles of concentration of efforts and surprise , the British troops
broke through all three positions of the German defense in 10 hours and
advanced to a depth of up to 10 kilometers. However, at that time there
still was no success in finding the means and methods of developing the
tactical breakthrough into an operational one. In repulsing the counter
attacks by the Germans, the British withdrew to their initial positions . In
itself, the principle of concentration of efforts even in combination with
the principle of surprise did not lead to operational success .
The principle of concentration of efforts received considerable devel
opment in the period of foreign military intervention and civil war,
especially in 1919–1920. At this time our armies, operating on the main
axis, had narrower zones. For example, the Turkestan Army attacked
in a zone of 100–120 km in conducting the Ufa Operation in May -June
1919. The First Horse Army had a zone of 65 km in breaking through the
front of While Poles at Kiev on 5 June 1920. The width of the zone
of attack of Fifteenth Army in the July operation of the Western Front
was 35 km . Here the army commanders obtained an opportunity of
assigning one or two divisions to the reserve, thus creating in essence
second echelons in the operational deployment of the armies.
The birth of a fundamentally new element of the operational deploy
ment of an army— the mobile group — facilitated achievement of a high
concentration of men and weapons. The appearance of mobile groups
in armies relates to the time of the general offensive of the Eastern
Front against Kolchak in the summer of 1919. In Third Army the
cavalry chasti and podrazdeleniya of rifle divisions were placed into an
army cavalry group which made a daring raid on the rear areas of the
enemy and captured many important populated points and objectives.
Beginning in the summer of 1919 the mobile groups also appeared in
fronts ( 3rd Horse Corps of Gay , First and Second Horse Armies ) .
Thus, the creative application of the principle of concentration of
efforts and a transition to operations by shock groupings led to the
creation of necessary densities of men and weapons, and also facilitated
a considerable increase in the depth of operational deployment of armies
and fronts by the assignment of reserves and creation of second echelons
and mobile groups .

In the Great Patriotic War the principle of concentration of efforts

212
received further development. In the first months of the war an absence
of experience on the part of our commanders sometimes led them to
stretch their forces evenly across the front to avoid the risk of weakening
auxiliary groupings , thus not creating a decisive superiority over the enemy
on any one sector .
Some commanders attempted to organize an attack simultaneously on
several axes without having sufficient forces for this. This led to a dis
sipation of men and weapons across the front and did not allow the
creation of a necessary superiority over the enemy on the axis of main
attack . In place of concentrating the main forces and weapons on
the decisive axis, the attack was sometimes delivered by individual divi
sions disposed on line.
An insignificant superiority in forces over the enemy on axes chosen
for attacks was one of the important reasons for low tempos of attack ,
since development of the initial success usually was paralyzed by counter
blows of the enemy's operational reserves. Under these conditions the
overcoming of enemy resistance and defeat of his groupings could be
achieved only with a buildup of efforts by committing new soyedineniya
to the engagement. However, the limitation of forces and weapons in at
tacking armies had a deciding influence on the composition of their
second echelons and reserves. In the first offensive operations of the
Great Patriotic War armies as a rule did not have second echelons, while
reserves were small in size . Besides this, reserves were used improperly
at times: instead of their mass use on the axis of main attack they
were dispersed across a broad front or were committed piecemeal, from
the move , without the necessary preparation .
One of the reasons for low densities of men and weapons at the
beginning of the past war was an absence of major mechanized and
tank soyedineniya in fronts and armies. This reduced the shock force
of Soviet troops and the tempos of their advance. Moreover, combined
arms commanders often dispersed tanks in small groups with rifle chasti
and podrazdeleniya . This interfered with the purposeful use of armored
troops for developing a tactical success into an operational one at high
tempos.
In the course of the summer campaign of 1941, in connection with
heavy combat losses as well as a relocation of a portion of industry to
the east, the tank inventory of the Red Army was sharply reduced .
Tanks began to be used in small groups as NPP [infantry direct sup
port ]. This demanded a change in the organizational forms. By a direc
tive of the General Headquarters in July 1941, mechanized corps were
disbanded . Ten separate tank divisions were formed on their base . But
in August 1941 the formation of tank divisions was also rejected and
only separate tank brigades, regiments , and battalions continued to be
formed .
However, the lack of major soyedineniya of tank troops necessary

213
for creation of sufficient densities of men and weapons and exploitation
of the success of the operation at high tempos and to a great depth was
felt sharply in the course of the counteroffensive at Moscow . There
fore , in the spring of 1942, when the situation had improved with the
output of armored equipment, along with preservation of the then existing
forms of organization (brigade, regiment, battalion ), they began forming
major scyedineniya and obʼyedineniya of armored and mechanized
troops--tank corps and tank armies — and in September 1942 the crea
tion of mechanized corps. From then on the Soviet Army had a powerful
means of exploiting success and achieving high tempos of attack . The
composition of mobile groups had an effect on the operational densities
of our troops. Before May 1942 mobile groups of armies and fronts
usually consisted of one, two, or three cavalry divisions and one tank
brigade and did not have great penetrating force. With the second half
of 1942, when the Soviet Army began to receive a large number of tanks,
the army and frontal mobile groups made up of from one to two or
three tank or mechanized crops permitted creation of high operational
densities needed for exploitation of success in the operational depth
and achievementofhigh rates of advance.
Not only the presence of mobile groups, but also the operational
deployment of the army and the composition of its second echelons and
reserves had an immediate influence on densities of men and weapons.
Armies without a strong second echelon and mobile group were not
able to build up the forces of the first echelon opportunely on the axis
of main attack . The attack of these armies, even though successfully
begun, gradually became dulled, the rates of advance dropped , and opera
tional goals often were not attained. The limitation of forces of our
army ob ” yedineniya and their weak concentration on the decisive axis
determined the shallow , single - echelon deployment of armies in a
majority of operations in the first period of the war. From approximately
January 1942 the armies began to deploy their forces more often into two
echelons and the composition of echelons became stronger. This was
provided by a buildup of the force of the attack of the first echelon
and development of the attack in the operational depth at higher
tempos.
By the end of the first period of the war an increase in density of
men and weapons was also achieved by narrowing the sectors of
breakthrough .
In the counteroffensive at Moscow the armies did not have clearly
expressed sectors of breakthrough and delivered attacks usually on two
axes. The width of the army's zone of attack varied within the limits
of 30–100 km , and, as has already been mentioned , ob” yedineniya
operated as separate divisions deployed on line.
In the course of battles and engagements our commanders at all
echelons continuously improved their combat skills. The General Head

214
quarters (GHQ) also attentively analyzed the shortcomings present and
took timely steps to eliminate them . In January 1942 the GHQ demanded
a shift from linear disposition of divisions to creation of shock groups
and from artillery preparation to an artillery offensive. The actions of
shock groups and organization of an artillery offensive led to a con
siderable increase in densities of men and weapons, in the rates of
breakthrough of the tactical zone of enemy defense, and in rates of
advance as a whole. Armies began to be assigned narrow sectors of
breakthrough , and in a number of instances narrowers zones of advance.
The assignment of sectors of breakthrough only on one axis permitted
them to decisively mass their men and weapons and attain a decisive
superiority over the enemyon the main axis ( Table 4 ) .
The mass delivery of new combat equipment to the Soviet forces led
to an increase in the combat composition of the army and permitted
elimination of the former superiority of the fascist German army in

Table 4. - Massing of Men and Weapons on the Axis of Main

Breakthrough

Attacks in Army Operations of the Great Patriotic War

launchers
Density per km of sector of main attack

Artillery
sector

Rocket
76mm
Tanks & self

(from
,km

propelled
rifle
Per
kDiv

Name of Operation artillery

and
,m

)up

Total
and Date Conducted

NPP

1
Klin (Dec 1941) 30 - Ya 80 7 10 1
Gzahatsk (Jan 1942 ) 20 - Ya 20 8 1.5 44 9 12 5
Kharkov (May 1942) 6 - Ya 80 18 3 38 7 25 1
Bolkhov (July 1972 ) 61 - Ya 80 10 2 76 11 33 15
Rzhev -Sychevka 31- Ya 19 9 1.5 108 1329 47
(Aug 1942)
68

Counteroffensive on 5 TA 35 14 3 12 | 27 4
the Volga (Nov
1942)
Bolkhov (July 1943) 11 GV 36 14 1.3 185 21 46 10
1

Belgorod -Khar’kov 53 - YA 7 7 154 11 / 41 7

(Aug 1943)
Orsha (June 1944) 11 GV 35 10.5 1.1 181 22 46 35
Yassy- Kishinev 37 - YA 9 6 1.5 242 17 52 31
(Aug 1944)
East Prussian (Jan 2 OD 17 6 0.7 276 3072 65
1945 )
Visla -Oder (Jan 1945) 69 - YA 55 7 0.9 252 27 | 73 30
5 GV 13 13 1.4 185 13 49
Berlin (April 1945) 8 GV 13 7 1.0 268 29 83 52
3 GV 28 9 1.6 215 11 50 20

NOTE : The table has been taken from the book Obshchevoyskovaya armiya v nastuplenii
(Combined -Arms Army in the Offensive ), edited by Professor Army Gen P. A. Kurochkin ,
Voyenizdat, 1966 , p 34.

215
numbers of tanks, aviation , and other weapons. This to a considerable
extent increased the capabilities of our troops in achieving the necessary
operational densities.
In the most important operations of the summer and fall of 1943 the
combat composition of the armies was as follows: 7–12 or more rifle
divisions and attached tank (mechanized ) corps — an average of 1,850
guns and mortars and a large number of other men and weapons. Such
a considerable combat composition allowed the armies to have a deep
operational deployment.
A deep deployment of shock groupings in the presence ofmajor mobile
soyedineniya in the second echelon of fronts (tank armies ) was supported
by strong aviation . Thus the shock groupings possessed great penetrating
force and an ability to affect the enemy to a great depth and to build
up forces in the course of an operation . This provided for high rates of
advance.
The need to mass men and weapons also was occasioned by a change
in the character of enemy defense . After the defeat of fascist troops at
Stalingrad the fascist German forces began to dig deeply into the
ground : the enemy shifted to a solid trench defense with wide employment
of barriers. Troops making a breakthrough of such a defense were
faced with the need for a more resolute massing of forces and means
on the axis of main attacks, an increase in tactical densities, and a
contraction of zones of attack and sectors of breakthrough .
The concentration of forces and shock means on the decisive axis took
on broader scope in the second period of the war ( 19 November 1942
to the end of 1943) than in preceding operations. In operations of the
second period of the war combined -arms armies attacked in zones of
from 30 to 60 km . There were considerable deviations in width of
zones of attack from this average norm only in Fifth Guards Army ( 16
km ) and First Guards Army ( 145 km ). The armies broke through the
enemy defense in one sector 10-18 km wide .
A contraction of zones of attack of armies and sectors of breakthrough
and the bold concentration of forces and means on the axis of main
attack led to a considerable increase in operational densities.
While in the counteroffensive at Moscow there were 2.5 km of front,
40–45 guns, and five tanks per kilometer of front per rifle division in
Sixteenth Army of the Western Front, in an operation to defeat the
Italo -German troops on the Middle Don (in December 1942 ) First
Guards Army had 3.5 km of front, 70 guns and mortars, and 100
tanks per km of front per rifle division . In the counteroffensive at Kursk
the operational density of the Fifth Guards Army of the Voronezh Front
comprised 1 1/2–2 km per rifle division and 230 guns and mortars and up
to 70 tanks per kilometer of front.
The concentration of forces and means was facilitated by a further
development of engineer troops. While in offensive operations of the

216
 first period of the war two to three sapper companies were concentrated
--

per kilometer of front of breakthrough , in 1943 there were four to five

such companies per kilometer.
The decisive massing of forces and means on the axis of main at
tacks permitted Soviet forces to have a superiority in personnel and equip
ment of 2–3 times on sectors of breakthrough in the winter campaign
of 1942–1943. In counteroffensives on the Oryol and Belgorod -Kharkov
axes in the summer of 1943 we achieved an even greater superiority
over the enemy: 6–9 times in artillery and 3–7 times in tanks. Such
operational densities and superiority over the enemy permitted breaking
through the enemy defense deployed laterally and in depth with a system
of trenches and connecting passages, mine fields, barbed wire and other
antitank and antipersonnel obstacles, at comparatively high tempos .
The concentration of forces and means was aided by further improve
ments in organizational forms of soyedineniya and obʼyedineniya . The
corps organization of combined - arms soyedineniya was restored in the
Ground Forces, thanks to which the tactical use of troops in combat was
improved . Combined -arms armies were strengthened , and single-arm
tank armies were created . The amount of artillery in rifle divisions and

Table 5. — Tactical Densities in Rifle Corps in Offensive Operations

of the Great Patriotic War
Density per km of Sector
of Breakthrough
Sector of Tanks &
Zone of Break self
Name of Operation and Attack , through , Guns & propelled
Date Conducted Corps km km Rifle Bn. Mortars 1 artillery
Counteroffensive 36 GV . SK 3 3 9.0 128 25
at Kursk , July 9 GV.SK 9.5 6 2.8 164 11
1943 16 GV . SK 22 7 3.9 156 25
8 GV . SK 4 4 6.7 221 16
Belorussian , June 5 GV. SK 6 4 5.5 134 24
1944 36 GV. SK 5.5 5.5 4.9 138 13
35 SK 5 4 4.5 139 32
41 SK 7 5 4.8 143 10
18 SK 7.5 5 3.6 180 17
Lrov -Sandomierz , 15 SK 4 4 6.7 240 3.7
July 1944
Yassy-Kishinev 104 SK 5.5 5.5 5.0 173 2.3
Aug 1944 66 SK 3 3 9.0 213 5.0
Visla -Oder, Jan 89 SK 4.5 4.5 6.0 148 13
1945 29 GV . SK 3.5 3.5 5.1 272 23
73 SK 4.0 4.0 6.8 263 9.5
32 GV. SK 5.8 5.8 3.6 140 12
Berlin , April 1945 79 SK 5.0 2.5 4.8 342 25
4 GV . SK 2.5 2.5 7.2 251 44
32 GV . SK 2.6 2.6 8.1 338 13
1 From 76mm caliber and higher.

217
combined -arms and tank armies increased greatly and its density rose
( see Table 4 ) .
In operations of 1945 the combat composition of 83 percent of the
combined - arms armies was brought to nine divisions or more (three
rifle corps). In addition to combined - arms soyedineniya , the army of
1944–1945 usually included one or two gun artillery brigades, a tank
destroyer artillery brigade , an antiaircraft artillery division, two or three
tank brigades ( or regiments ), a combat engineer brigade, and chasti
of other special troops. In some cases a tank or mechanized corps was
attached to the army .
This combat composition of armies allowed for their deep operational
deployment. In the overwhelming majority of cases armies had a second
operational echelon made up of a rifle corps or mobile group of a tank
(mechanized ) corps , and sometimes both . In addition, armies often had
a reserve composed of one or two rifle divisions.
Mobile groups were strengthened in their makeup. In 1945 mobile
groups of fronts usually consisted of two tank armies and less often of one
tank army. The presence of mobile groups made up one or two
tank ormechanized corps in the operational deployment of armies became
a common occurrence in operations of 1945.

Table 6 .-- Densities of Forces and Means of Rifle Divisions in

Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War Per Kilometer
of Zone of Attack

Average Density
Name of Operation Tanks & self
and Date Attack , km Guns & propelled
Conducted Division Zone of Rifle Bn . mortars 1 artillery
Counteroffensive at 365 SD 11 0.8 4.5 1.0
Moscow ,
Dec 1941 371 SD 10.5 0.9 3.0 1.0
Stalingrad, Nov 169 SD 5.5 2.2 40 15
1942
Bolkhov , July 12 GV. SD 2.6 3.5 218 17
1943 83 GV. SD 2.1 4.3 150 16
11 GV . SD 2.1 4.3 145 10
Yassey-Kishinev, 206 SD 2.0 4.5 257 17
Aug 1944 180 SD 2.0 4.5 278 20
Visla -Oder, 132 SD 1.4 6.4 125 25
Jan 1945 94 GV . SD 2.5 3.6 218 30
89 GV. SD 3.0 3.0 187 15
27 GV. SD 1.75 3.4 277 17
82 GV . SD 1.75 3.4 293 17
East Prussian , 54 GV . SD 3.0 3.0 125 11
Jan 1945 44 GV . SD 1.7 5.3 156

1 From 76mm caliber and higher.

NOTE : In compiling the table partial use was made of data from a monograph by Candidate
of Military Sciences Docent Col P. M. Petrus', " The Development of Tactics of Offensive
Combat by a Rifle Division in the Great Patriotic War," izd . VAF, 1958 .

218
 Such a deep operationaal deployment ensured a buildup of forces in
the course of the operation , retention of a superiority of forces and
means right up to fulfillment of the assigned mission , and conduct of the
operation at a high tempo . It also facilitated a concentration of forces
and means on the chosen axes .
A further concentration of forces and means on the axis of main
attacks had a noticeable influence on achieving high rates of advance.
Fifty to eighty percent of the combined -arms soyedineniya , up to
60-80 percent of the artillery and 90-100 percent of tanks and aviation
of the front were concentrated on sectors of breakthrough of the front
comprising from three to fifteen percent of the entire width of the front
zone. Such a concentration of forces and means on the axis of main
attack gave our troops a superiority over the enemy of 3–6 times in
infantry, 3–10 times in artillery, 4–10 times in tanks, and 2--10 times in
aviation , and also ensured the achievement of high operational densities
( see Diagram 2C ) .
In the most important offensive operations of 1944-1945 one division
had 1.6–0.7 km of front on the axis of main attack . There were 130–250
guns and mortars, 25–123 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces , in
cluding up to 30 NPP tanks per kilometer of front (see tables 5 , 6 , and
7) .
An increase in operational densities was achieved , along with other
methods, by a further contraction of zones of attack and sectors of
breakthrough . In all major operations of 1944–1945 the width of the
sector of breakthrough of a combined - arms army varied usually within
the range of 6–9 km and only in one case went to 13 km ( see Table 4 ) .
The mass employment of tank soyedineniya and ob ” yedineniya
played an especially large part in achieving victory . It was these units ,
with the support of aviation , which became the deciding force in rout
ing the enemy.
Mobile groups of armies made up of tank or mechanized corps
were employed enormously more often in operations of 1944-1945
along with front mobile groups (usually one or two tank armies) than
in previous campaigns.
The commitment of mobile groups of armies and of the front into
the breach led to a considerable increase in troop density and created
favorable conditions for attaining operational surprise in the depth of
the enemy's defense and for routing his approaching reserves piece
meal.
Forces and means were also skillfully massed in tactical echelons
(see tables 5 and 6 ).
It is evident from Table 5 that in the majority of operations of
1944–1945 a density of from 4.8 to 7 or more battalions was created
in rifle corps per kilometer of sector of breakthrough .
One of the indicators of the art of massing forces and means prac

219
ticed by our officers and generals is the change in density of NPP tanks
(see tables 4 , 5 , and 6 ).
It is evident from tables 4 , 5 , and 6 that the density of NPP tanks
per kilometer of main attack sector increased during the years of war
from one to 30 units . However, in a majority of instances it com
prised 15-25 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces and was clearly
insufficient. This forced the commitment of tank or mechanized corps
to the engagement for completing the breakthrough of the tactical zone
of the enemy's defense , or even the commitment of tank armies or the
attachment of a portion of their tanks to reinforce the rifle soyedineniya
of the first echelon .
The concentration of artillery in the course of the war increased
from operation to operation both in the quantitative as well as the
qualitative sense . Testimony to this is the increase in overall opera
tional densities from 20-60 guns, mortars, and rocket artillery com
bat vehicles per kilometer of sector of breakthrough in the winter
campaign of 1941/42 to 300–350 in the concluding operations of the
war ( of which 250–300 were of a caliber 76 -mm or higher).
The growth in densities of artillery was caused by a change in the
character of the enemy's defense as well as by improvements in
the methods of penetrating a deeply echeloned defense at a high tempo .
It was ensured by an ever increasing number of artillery equipment
arriving at the front as well as by increased skill on the part of com
manders and staffs at all levels .
The density of forces and means in rifle divisions is shown in Table 6 .
It is evident from Table 6 that with their organic and attached means,
rifle divisions set up considerable tactical densities of forces and means
per kilometer of zone of attack , including also in rifle battalions. The
latter was achieved by assigning the divisions narrow zones of attack.
Development of the principle of massing artillery on main axes of
ob” yedineniya or soyedineniya is characterized by the following indi
cators. While in the first offensive operations of 1941–1942 up to 50–
60 percent of the artillery was concentrated on sectors of breakthrough
comprising 30–50 percent of the entire zone of the ob ” yedineniye , sub
sequently 70–90 percent of all artillery was massed on sectors of break
through , which now comprised 6–30 percent of the entire zone. This
took place as a result of a sharp weakening of passive sectors, the inclu
sion of from 90 to 100 percent of available RVGK [Reserve of the
Supreme High Command ] artillery in the main grouping, and the de
cisive call upon artillery from troops of the second echelon and reserve
to take part in artillery preparation and to support the attack without
changing firing positions.
The increase in artillery densities objectively created premises for
successful solution to the important problem of ensuring the simul
taneous neutralization by artillery fire of all the most important objec

220
tives or targets in the enemy's defense on the sector of breakthrough
and on the flanks.
Aviation was also skillfully massed during the past war, which led to
the creation of high aviation densities on axes of main attacks of armies
and fronts (Table 7 ) .
Along with the increased art of its employment, this massing of avia
tion was also facilitated by an overall ratio of aviation forces which
was favorable for us. For example, in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad
the ratio was 1.2 : 1, in the Belorussian Operation it was 4.2 : 1, and in
the L’vov-Sandomierz Operation it was 4.4 : 1 in our favor. This sig
nificant superiority over enemy aviation permitted maintaining air dom
inance.
The massing of engineer troops was also skillfully carried out. For
example, the operational density in sapper companies per kilometer
of front in the Seventh Guards Army in January 1944 was 7, but in
the Berlin Operation it rose to 18 (Fifth Guards Army). The increase
in operational densities was facilitated by a quantitative and qualita
tive increase in engineer troops, an improvement in the methods of their
employment, and their very significant reinforcement of combied -arms
armies. For example, in the Eighth Guards Army in the Visla -Oder
Operation there were 91 sapper companies .
The massing of forces and means is closely dependent on the selec
tion of avenues of main attack and sectors of breakthrough ( concen
tration of main effort) . Choice of the axis of main attack was done
each time by our officers and generals in a creative manner, depending
on the concrete conditions. The predominant attempt was to deliver
an attack against a weak place in the enemy's defense with the aim of
rapidly moving to the rear areas and flanks of his main shock grouping
and to that terrain which ensured the employment of all combat
arms, primarily tank troops, to exploit success. However, there were
instances where, based on the situation, the main attacks were also
delivered against strong sectors of the enemy's defense, especially when
breaking through his defense from bases of operations, as well as on
terrain which was unfavorable for the attacker. This eased the achieve
ment of surprise in an attack by our troops on the chosen axis. Under
these conditions the success of the operation or battle was achieved
primarily by an even more decisive concentration of men and weapons.
Not only regroupings of troops onto chosen axes, but also their maneu
ver in the course of an operation or battle had an influence on the con
centration of effort in the war years . Frontal attacks permitted the
defending enemy to concentrate his fire on the most important sectors,
inflict losses, and repulse the attacks by advancing troops. In the first
period maneuver was accomplished chiefly only through second echelons
of rifle chasti and soyedineniya attacking in the first echelon of armies.
The maneuver of rifle soyedineniya at the expense of secondary axes

221
was almost not done due to a fear for their flanks. The maneuver of
tanks, artillery, and engineer troops was very weakly accomplished .
Such maneuver was not always able to lead to a sharp increase in degree
of concentration of men and weapons or to a decisive change in
correlation of men and weapons in our favor.
In subsequent years our troops' opportunities to accomplish maneu
ver increased considerably . This was due to a deeper deployment of
combat formations of divisions and corps which attacked in the first
echelon , and increase in depth of operational deployment, and strength
ening of artillery groups and reserves of armies, as well as the experience
of conducting offensive operations gained by the commanders . Our com
manders began to remove men and weapons boldly from secondary
axes and mass them on the main axis . Instances also became common
where in the course of an attack the axis of the main attack changed
and was shifted to where success had been achieved. There, too ,
were shifted the main forces and means and high densities were created .
Indicative in this regard , for example, is the battle of the 121st Rifle
Division for bases of operation on the Seym River in the vicinity of
the city of Rylsk in August 1943. The division commander delivered
the main attack with forces of the 574th and 383rd rifle regiments,
but their actions were not successful. However, the 705th Rifle Regi
ment operating on a secondary axis managed to capture a base of opera
tions for the attack . The division commander decided to leave one

Table 7. - Average Aviation Densities on Axes of Attack of the

Fronts

Aircraft Density per Kilo

Operation and Fronts meter of Breakthrough Sector
Belorussian
First Belorussian Front:
Rogachev Axis 96
Parichi Axis 53
-
- -
-

Second Belorussian Front 45

Third Belorussian Front:
Bogushevsk Axis 43
Orsha -Minsk Axis 93
L’vov -Sandomierz
First Ukrainian Front (Rava -Russkaya and
L'vov axes) 129
Yassy- Kishinev
Second Ukrainian Front 57
Third Ukrainian Front 58
Visla -Oder
First Belorussian Front 57
73
-

First Ukrainian Front

Berlin
First Belorussian Front 126

222
rifle company in the zone of attack of the 574th and 383rd regiments
and to regroup the remaining forces of these regiments into the zone
of the 705th Regiment. This led to the creation there of high densities
of forces and means and determined the success not only of his own,
but of neighboring divisions .
The commander of Eleventh Guards Army in the Belorussian Opera
tion regrouped onto a secondary axis, as soon as success was apparent
there , four divisions from the main axis. By a decisive concentration
of forces and means the army accomplished a breakthrough of the
enemy defense in a short time.
The commander of Sixtieth Army, Gen P. A. Kurochkin , committed
the second echelon of the 15th Rifle Corps (148th Rifle Division ), its
artillery and antitank reserve , and a mobile obstacle detachment to
repulse a counterblow by the enemy in the course of a breakthrough of
a defense on the L’vov Axis in July 1944. An artillery -antitank reserve
(iptabr [antitank artillery brigade ]) and one antitank regiment of Sixtieth
Army, as well as a self-propelled artillery brigade of Third Guards
Tank Army, which was committed in the zone of Sixtieth Army, were
moved onto this same axis. The commander of Sixtieth Army con
centrated the fire of all artillery situated in indirect firing positions
against the enemy tank grouping. In addition, on order of the front
commander, the Second Air Army delivered a number of mass strikes
against enemy tanks, making 7 bomber and 111 ground assault sorties.
The rapid maneuver of all forces and means (rifle soyedineniya,
artillery , tanks, engineer troops, and aviation ) ensured not only the
successful repulse of a strong enemy counterblow , but also the sub
sequent successful commitment of Third Guards and Fourth Tank
Armies for exploitation of success in the operational depth . Such maneu
ver of forces and means was typical of a majority of army operations
of the third period of the Great Patriotic War.
Development of the defense in the past war also went in part along
the path of ever increasing concentration of effort on axes of expected
enemy attacks. In the initial period of the war broad zones had to be
defended . As a result of insufficient outfitting of rifle soyedineniya and
chasti with weapons and a lack of combat experience in many com
manders, the practice was for an equal distribution of forces laterally
and a shallow deployment of the defense . As a rule, the defense was
set up by separate centers of resistance poorly outfitted in the engi
neering sense , with insufficiently covered intervals and flanks. The
enemy easily broke through such a defense and developed the success
in depth almost unhindered .
With an increase of forces and means our troops more and more
shifted to the principle of unequal distribution of efforts in the defense.
The main means began to be concentrated in those areas, the reten
tion of which determined the stability of the defense as a whole, and

223
on those axes where one could most probably expect the enemy to
deliver his main attack .
The density of weapons, especially artillery, steadily increased . The
tactical density of artillery on important axes by the end of the war
began to reach 50–70 guns per kilometer of front. In this regard , be
ginning with the second period of the war, the basis for the system of
fire in the defense became the fire of artillery and mortars in combina
tion with machine - gun and small arms fire and the use of engineer
obstacles.
The commanders of fronts and armies also resolutely concentrated
forces and means in the second (from 19 November 1942 to the end
of 1943) and third (from the beginning of 1944 to 9 May 1945)
periods of the war. For example, in the Battle of Kursk , on the axis
of possible enemy attacks the Central Front deployed 56 percent of
the rifle troops in a zone 95 km wide comprising 31 percent of the
entire front, and concentrated 30 percent of rifle divisions, up to 50
percent of all artillery, and up to 35 percent of all tanks of the front
in the zone of Thirteenth Army, comprising a little over 10 percent
of the entire front. This concentration of forces and means in the
zone of Thirteenth Army and the disposition on this same axis of the
second echelon and reserves of the front permitted setting up a very
high density of troops and equipment for a defensive operation : one
division per 2.6 km of front, 105 guns and mortars and up to 28 tanks
per kilometer of front.
The defense was made insurmountable by the bold and skillful con
centration of the main forces and means on the most important axes,
and the enemy was not able to achieve the assigned goals.
Concentration of forces and means on the most important axes was
a decisive condition for the stability of the defense .
Thus, the history of military art attests to the fact that skillful use
of the principle of concentration — which to an equal degree relates to
strategy, operational art, and tactics — made it possible to surpass the
enemy in forces and means on the decisive axes without having over
all superiority over him at times .
Depending on the level of development of combat equipment and
methods of armed conflict, the subject of concentration in different
epochs was at first personnel, and finally comprised shock forces and
means as part of major groupings on land, sea , and in the air .
By 1960 the talk was not so much about the concentration of forces
and means as of the concentration of effort, which meant above all
nuclear strikes and the fire of contemporary powerful means of de
struction ,
Many foreign authors also arrived at the very same conclusion. Their
statements were quoted previously in the section entitled " Historical
Method of the Principles of Military Art” and in this chapter.

224
 The principle of concentration cannot be taken as the sole method ,
let alone a recipe for winning victory . Just the concentration of forces
and means on specific axes will not lead to victory, and in many in
stances to the contrary, it may involve unjustified losses and may limit
the results of actions of troops or even lead to failure.
The basic causes for failure of certain offensive operations of World
War II lay in the fact that although there was a concentration of forces
and means in them , the operations were conducted without considera
tion of all conditions of the situation , according to stereotypes well
known to the enemy. As a result the defending side had an opportunity
to guess the plan of the attacker, make a maneuver of his own forces
and means , and concentrate them opportunely on threatened axes, thus
disrupting the attack .
It became clear in the fifties that for a decisive defeat of the enemy
in the chosen area it is not obligatory at all to concentrate on a limited
space a large number of forces and means . For this purpose it is sufficient
to concentrate the fire of powerful weapons disposed over a large area.
This is even more beneficial in that the concentration of forces has
become very dangerous due to the presence of the same powerful
weapons in the enemy arsenal. It has already become impossible to
maintain that the concentration of forces and means on the decisive
axis, i.e., achievement of the necessary quality through quantity, regu
larly will lead to success. A large concentration of troops will most
often create a lucrative target for the enemy and may sooner lead to
failure . Therefore , under the new conditions, this principle receives a
different content and acquires another form . Under conditions of em
ployment of nuclear weapons the achievement of success has begun to
be tied with a concentration of efforts ( above all, of nuclear missiles
and fire ) (see Diagram 2D ) .
Thus, in connection with the outfitting of troops with nuclear mis
siles, the given principle has begun to operate differently : it will be
expressed in the concentration of nuclear strikes on the main axes ,
which will be done obviously not by a concentration of missile launchers
on narrow sectors, but by maneuver of missile trajectories from the
depth and from the flanks. Here special importance has been acquired
by the trend opposite to concentration — dispersal. Before the appear
ance of nuclear missiles the limits of troop dispersal on the battlefield
were determined chiefly by the probability of the soldiers being hit by
the fire of small arms and the effective casualty radius of a single shell,
mine, or bomb. In view of this, dispersal was calculated not so much
on protection of an entire unit as such , as on protection of the in
dividual soldier, and it was employed primarily in small podrazdeleniya
and among them . Lateral contact between podrazdeleniya and chasti
in a battle was maintained , while regiments, divisions, and corps oper
ated essentially as compact masses.

225
 By the end of the fifties , in connection with the area nature of the
destructive effects of nuclear weapons, the dispersal of troops acquired a
different content, and its importance rose sharply . The dispersed posi
tion of troops became their ordinary state not only in the zone of com
bat actions, but even far beyond the limits of this zone.
The limits of possible dispersal of forces and means depending on
the conditions of the situation can vary .
In the general case it began to be considered advisable to have that
dispersal on the battlefield which precluded the simultaneous de
struction of iwo adjacent troops organisms of the corresponding type
with one nuclear blast, the yield of which would be sufficient for the
destruction of each of them separately . However, depending on the
size of the podrazdeleniye and conditions of accomplishment of the
combat mission , that dispersal can also be employed which precludes
more than one podrazdeleniye of the corresponding type from being
knocked out by one nuclear blast.
Under conditions of nuclear missile warfare, the dispersal of troops
does not eliminate the need for their concentration at the necessary
place at the right time for delivering powerful attacks. However, in
determining the strength of these attacks, one must not exceed the maxi
mum allowable degree of dispersal. The concentration of a large body
of troops on relatively narrow sectors of the front, as happened in the
last war , would be fraught with serious consequences in a nuclear mis
sile war. And there will be no need for this, inasmuch as there will
be a change in the nature of the defense and its density will be reduced
considerably , i.e., the number of forces and means per kilometer of
front will be reduced .
In connection with the outfitting of troops with nuclear weapons, the
outcome of battle can be decided primarily by a concentration of fire
of all arms and above all by the delivery of nuclear strikes, which can
almost instantaneously change the correlation of forces and means to
one's favor on a chosen axis or sector. In addition , the great range of
missiles makes it possible to deliver powerful nuclear strikes while
missile launchers are far back in the depth , and the total motorization
of troops ensures a rapid concentration of their efforts when
podrazdeleniya are located across a relatively large area . Consequently ,
a concentration of effort on the most important axis under the new
conditions is achieved by different means and methods than was done
before .
In addition to this , the concentration of forces and means has taken
on immeasurably greater importance in time than in space . Moreover,
concentration in space now represents a great danger and can be done
only for a short time, quickly , and resolutely. A concentration ex
tended over a long interval of time may be quickly disrupted by
nuclear strikes of the enemy and will not give the proper effect. It

226
must be kept in mind here that the possibilities for concentrating
forces in time now have greatly increased in connection with the in
creased mobility of troops .
Thus, by the end of the fifties it became clear that success or defeat
in a battle or operation from the first to the last days of a war will be
determined not only by a superiority in forces and means over the
enemy, but also by a high speed in the actions of troops and in em
ployment of nuclear weapons, as well as by the intelligent use of time.
In other words, the effect of the principle of concentration of efforts is
closely interwoven with the principle of mobility , activeness , and sur
prise . The strength of the attack and swiftness and surprise of actions
acquire decisive importance and are a characteristic feature of the prin
ciple of concentration of efforts under contemporary conditions.
Concentration has come to bear not so much a quantitative as a
qualitative character.
While in all past wars the concentration of forces and means on
decisive axes was achieved by drawing together personnel and equip
ment and compacting them on a relatively limited sector , since the end
of the fifties this could also be achieved by massing the strikes of nuclear
missiles .
So as not to allow the defender to seize the initiative with the help
of commitment of reserves and the mass employment of nuclear
weapons, the attacker began to build up his efforts opportunely on the
decisive axes, concentrating there sufficient forces and means through
second echelons and reserves and by a bold regrouping of a portion of
the forces of the first echelon from secondary sectors.
The principle of concentration of efforts in defensive combat began
to find the same kind of employment as in the offense . In determining
the degree of concentration of forces and means one must always be
guided by the interests of stability of defense . By virtue of the overall
limitations of his forces and means, the defender in a majority of cases
will seek to achieve superiority only on those sectors where counter
blows and counterattacks are delivered .
The basic method of concentrating the efforts of defending troops
has become the delivery of nuclear strikes, the concentrated , massed ,
and barrage fire of artillery and tanks from indirect firing positions,
and air strikes. However, this turns out to be insufficient for accom
plishing many missions of defensive combat. Therefore the concentra
tion of forces and means on threatened axes in the course of a defensive
battle is also achieved by maneuvering second echelons, reserves, and
also troops removed from passive sectors of the front.
Concentration of efforts depends on the combat deployment of troops
and on the skillful selection of the axis ofmain attack .
Under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons, the organi
zation of active operations on a broad front from the very beginning

227
of the attack most corresponds to these conditions. The advantage
delivering attacks on a number of axes had become obvious by the end
of the fifties. Such actions make it easier to achieve surprise and create
for the enemy unfavorable conditions for the use of his reserves and
means of destruction . Separate troop groupings which maintain inter
action among themselves will operate within the limits of the general
axis of the attack . The difference in composition of troops operating on
the axis of the main attack and on other axes probably will be less
sharply expressed than was formerly the case . The main troop grouping
will be distinguished more in the qualitative sense than in numbers. All
this considerably complicates the use of the principle of concentration
of efforts, but does not reduce its importance a bit.
The words of Lenin about the principle of concentration remain com
pletely in force even for contemporary conditions. In setting forth the
main conditions for success of an armed uprising, he wrote : “ . It
is necessary to gather a great preponderance of forces at the decisive
" 11
place , at the decisive moment.
In another of his works, Lenin again pointed out that to achieve
victory it is necessary “ to have an overwhelming preponderance of forces
at the decisive moment at the decisive point. This ‘law ' of military
successes is also a law of political success, especially in that fierce, seeth
ing war of classes which is called revolution .”:12
However, the significance of this principle cannot be made into a
fetish . The concentration of efforts on the main axis may create the
chance of winning victory, but does not guarantee it. The possibility for
a sufficient concentration nevertheless to a considerable degree depends
on the overall superiority over the enemy in forces and means. Statis
tics show that in the 18th and 19th centuries, out of 20 wars there
were 14 instances where the one who was superior in forces and means
won and only six where the weaker won . But this weaker one com
pensated for his insufficient numbers by quality .
Mar SU B. M. Shaposhnikov stressed that “ all engagements, begin
ning with 1870 , were won by a preponderance of forces.” 13 In the
past war the stronger side usually won . Only the Moscow and Stalingrad
operations were conducted under conditions of overall operational
equality of forces and means of the combatants . Superiority in forces
and means, both qualitative and quantitative , remains the basis for
victory. Efforts on the decisive point depend on available forces and
means.
However, this dependence does not necessarily have to stem from
a superiority on all counts, both numerical strength and weaponry.
Earlier, in an analysis of the content of the second law of armed con

11 Lenin , Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy , 5th ed ., XXXIV , 383.

12 Ibia ., XL , 6 .
13 B. M. Shaposhnikov, Mozg armii (Brain of the Army), I, 85 .

228
flict, the fundamental changes in the mechanism of change in correla
tion of forces in the course of military actions were shown which had
been introduced by nuclear weapons . Based on this law , in those cases
where it will be impossible to achieve overall superiority over the enemy,
for example in personnel, the lack of such superiority will be made up
by the quality of troops and by their superiority in combat power, the
indicators of which were enumerated in Chapter Two. Qualitative su
periority has acquired great importance . It has become easier to make
up for a lack of numbers of troops with nuclear weapons, especially
if troops possess high morale .
But in this case , too, on the axis of main attack it is necessary to
ensure , if not the decisive , then a sufficiently favorable correlation with
the enemy in personnel as well, although the “mania of numbers ” which
infected many generals in the past has no scientific basis in our era .
A high degree of art is required for skillful use of the principle of
concentration . The art of concentrating superior forces at the decisive
point and their skillful use are based most often on a proper evaluation
of the points themselves, on the employment of forces on the correct
axis, and on a resolve which ignores what is unimportant in favor of
the more important and which makes it possible to keep forces together.
“ The correct estimate of one's enemies,” wrote Clausewitz , speaking of
victories won thanks to a concentration of forces and means, “ the risk
to leave only insignificant forces temporarily in front of them , the energy
of forced marches, the daring of lightning attacks, heightened active
ness which great people display at a moment of danger — these are the
true reasons for such victories. " 14
A. V. Suvorov expressed this thought in a briefer and more precise
manner: “ Visual estimate, swiftness, and onslaught.”
The skillful concentration of efforts is an indicator of great art,
profound penetration into the enemy's plans and understanding of the
situation , and expertise in choice of a key position or that grouping of
enemy troops, the defeat of which would lead to his loss of stability in
the defense . Victory will not be won with an incorrect accomplishment
of this task and expenditure of troop efforts to win secondary goals.
Moreover, the history of military art knows examples where, as a result
of an improper concentration of efforts , the attacker suffered defeat
from the defender's main body, which had maintained its combat effec
tiveness. A miscalculation in concentration of efforts or unskilled ac
complishment of it under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons
conceal a considerably more dangerous embryo of defeat, since a de
fending enemy possesses high mobility and great fire power.

Clausewitz , On War, Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1941, I, 184, 185.

229
Surprise

Use of surprise brings success in a battle or operation . Surprise has

been a most important principle of military art since olden times. The
employment of nuclear weapons has considerably increased the role and
importance of surprise. At the end of the fifties the conclusion was
reached here and abroad that the unexpected employment of nuclear
weapons, mass air strikes, and artillery fire and the accomplishment of
a swift attack by troops would make it possible to inflict heavy losses
on the enemy, crush the morale of his troops and disorganize them ,
sow confusion, disrupt control, and thus successfully accomplish one's
mission . (See Istoriya voysk i voyennogo iskusstva [History of Troops
and Military Art]) Moscow , 1970, p 511.)
In this same period ruling circles of the USA began to consider that
a surprise attack on the USSR and other socialist countries was the
most advantageous method of unleashing a world war. In this regard
there was a sharp increase in the urgency of working out the problem
of disrupting an enemy's surprise attack in all the components of mili
tary art (See Istoriya voysk i voyennogo iskusstva , p 528 ).
Surprise consists of the attempt to begin and resolutely conduct mili
tary operations unexpectedly for the enemy with the most expedient
grouping of fully combat effective troops against the weakest or the
strongest but poorly trained enemy groupings on that axis and at that
time when they least expect it, by virtue of which they are incapable
of offering organized resistance and are forced to fight in a situation
extremely unfavorable for them .
This principle stems from the aforementioned first and second laws of
war and the first and second laws of armed conflict. It is closely con
nected with the principle of combat activeness, mobility, and inter
working
Lenin more than once stressed the enormous importance of surprise in
armed conflict, demanding that the enemy be attacked “where and
when he least expected it.” 15 He wrote that " in warfare one does not
inform the foe when an attack will occur.” 16 During preparations for the
armed uprising in October 1917 Lenin wrote : “ One must try to catch
the enemy unawares and seize the moment when his troops are scat
tered . ” 17

The goal of surprise actions consists of dumbfounding the enemy and

catching him unawares when he is least prepared to parry an unex
pected attack , paralyzing his will to resist, depriving him of the op
portunity of taking quick effective countermeasures, and thus resolutely
routing even his superior forces with least losses for friendly troops.

15
Lenin , VI, 176 .
16 Ibid ., XXI, 399 .
17 Ibid ., XXXIV , 383.

230
 Commanders -in - chief and commanders at all levels and at all eras
have attempted to achieve surprise in operations and battles. The prob
lem of achieving surprise always was the focus of attention of military
theory and practice . The entire history of wars attests to the constant
attempt by the warring sides to seek out the most effective means,
methods, and techniques for preparing and carrying out surprise opera
tions. Therefore the ability to achieve surprise and as a result of this
achieving a rapid defeat of opposing enemy groupings with equal or
even fewer forces has always been recognized as a most important
criterion in evaluating the level of military expertise.
All past wars, and especially the Great Patriotic War, have shown
convincingly the great significance attached to the delivery of surprise
attacks. Obʼyedineniya , soyedineniya , and chasti subjected to a surprise
attack have suffered defeat in the majority of instances, even with
numerical superiority . Those commanders-in -chief and commanders who
have acted unexpectedly have achieved a material, and especially im
portant, a moral superiority over the enemy on a given axis which ,
though temporary, was decisive. As a result of this they seized the
initiative and created conditions for rapid success with fewer forces.
The following example is very instructive. During the counteroffen
sive on the Volga in the winter of 1942 the 24th Tank Corps com
manded by Maj Gen V. M. Badanov broke into the operational depth
of the fascist German troops under conditions of a severe , snowy winter
and in five days of forceful attack moved forward 240 kilometers.
The German command had expected nothing of the sort and the corps'
actions were completely unexpected for it. Having delivered an attack
against the rear of the Italian Eighth Army, at dawn on 24 December
the corps, unexpectedly for the enemy, captured the large station of
Tatsinskaya and cut the very importantmain rail line . A large airfield
was located nearby. The lightning attack of the corps was so unexpected
that not one German plane managed to take off. In this area enemy
staffs and rear areas were smashed , 350 aircraft, 50 guns, and 15
tanks were destroyed , and enormous stores of ammunition , fuel, food,
as well as many different weapons in trains were captured . This created
such a manifest threat that the left flank of the German Army Group
“Goth ” would be enveloped and a strong attack would be delivered
against it that the Hitlerite command was forced to hurriedly throw the
11th Panzer and 306th Infantry divisions against the Soviet tank corps
as well as a portion of other troops intended to reinforce the Tormosin
grouping.18 Thus the surprise actions by the corps played an enormous
role in winning the success of the entire operation .
During the years of the Great Patriotic War Soviet troops repeatedly
achieved strategic, operational, and tactical surprise after accumulating

18 See Bitva za Volgu (Battle for the Volga ), Stalingradskoye knizhn. izd ., 1958 ,
pp 158, 159.

231
very rich experience in employing the varied methods of attaining it .
In preparing and conducting operations , from year to year the Soviet
command perfected the methods of achieving surprise, each time ap
proaching this question creatively, considering all conditions of the
situation , holding to no sterotype, but relying on preceding experience
and good knowledge of the operational and tactical techniques em
ployed by the enemy. The Soviet command displayed great flexibility
and inventiveness, as a result of which the enemy was led astray and
Soviet troops achieved major results.
The experience of the past war showed once again that with all else
being equal surprise combat actions make it possible to achieve the
greatest results with a minimum expenditure of forces, means, effort,
and time.
The importance of surprise steadily rises with the development of
means of armed conflict. The effect of the moment of surprise is limited
by the time necessary for the side which has been subjected to the
surprise action to manage to take the necessary countermeasures and
seek out means of counteraction . In World War I, even when surprise
was achieved, its result could not be used to the full extent for rapid
development of the operation , since the corresponding means were not
yet available for this . In the Great Patriotic War the unexpected mass
commitment to the breakthrough of tank armies and the employment of
large numbers of aviation led to the achievement of major operational
and strategic results. Surprise achieved by chasti and podrazdeleniya
of all combat arms under conditions of wide employment of powerful
nuclear weapons, tanks, aircraft, and airborne landings , with the sharply
increased tempo of combat operations and a lack of solid fronts, now
has acquired incomparably greater importance than before. Its role is
especially great in brief operations and battles where the time factor is
of decisive importance . Surprise blitzkriegs with nuclear weapons, avia
tion , and tank groupings may be irresistible for the enemy on a parti
cular axis.
The increase in the role of surprise in operations and battles has
been caused by the fact that under conditions of very rapid develop
ment of combat operations enemy groupings often generally will not
manage to take steps to eliminate the consequences of surprise attacks
made against them . In these cases surprise may be the deciding factor
in achieving total success.
An analysis of the character of combat actions by chasti and podraz
deleniya set forth in works of Soviet and foreign authors at the end of
the fifties shows that rapid surprise attacks which caught the enemy
unawares were able to disable a considerable portion of his personnel,
weapons, and combat equipment. As a result of the stunning effects of
surprise attacks by nuclear and conventional weapons and decisive
offensive operations by troops , the enemy's combat capabilities are

232
sharply lowered and the correlation of forces changes immediately . He
may panic and his morale will be crushed . In a vague situation his
overall and particular systems of control are disorganized to a greater
extent, and the will of his commanders and the regular activity of
staffs are paralyzed to a considerable degree . As a result of this, the
enemy's commanders and staffs are incapable of organizing timely and
effective counteraction . They have to hastily make on -the -spot changes
in their previous plans without clarifying the condition and status of
the sides properly . The changes at times will not correspond to the
situation at all. They will have to assign new missions to troops under
conditions of unceasing influence by the side which delivered the strike
unexpectedly.
It is fully obvious that under such unfavorable conditions it will be
very hard for the enemy troops to quickly adjust to any kind of regular
combat activities. It is necessary to determine the measures to counter
the surprise attack , as well as seek the necessary forces, means, and
methods for this, hastily and with insufficient thought on the matter.
All this leads to a situation where countermeasures very often are
ineffective.
The experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that the duration of
the effect of surprise depends on how well troops are prepared for
unexpected actions, how well they are disciplined, trained , and supplied
materially and technically, and how high their morale is . Soviet troops ,
who had the advantages of these qualities in comparison with the fascist
German troops, had a prolonged influence of the factor of surprise on the
enemy.
Sometimes in a combat situation the enemy may commit a crude
mistake or make an omission where, by taking advantage of it, our
troops can deliver an attack against him . But the probability of em
ploying surprise operations based on such a random occurrence is
extremely low . Consequently, it is practically impossible to count on
attaining success through chance, surprise actions. The operation and
battle began to be planned with consideration for achieving a pre
conceived , carefully prepared and ensured surprise which will be the
result of a purposeful, creative activity. This surprise began to appear
as a fully natural phenomenon which , with observance of the necessary
demands and assurance of the appropriate conditions, should occur
with a high degree of probability . This means it is possible to count
on the success of surprise actions only on condition of their prior
planning ,preparation , and timely implementation .
It is necessary to consider that the enemy, too, in his turn will
strive to achieve surprise, to keep his troops constantly in a state of high
combat readiness, to conceal his concepts and plans carefully , to con
ceal his troops, especially means of mass destruction, and also to do
everything to avoid surprise attacks by the opposing side.

233
 The foreign military press, especially the American press, began to
devote particular attention to the problem of surprise with the appear
ance of nuclear missiles. The journal Military Review writes frankiy
that surprise has been and will remain the key to victory, that it can
fundamentally change the correlation of forces to one side or another.
Surprise must be examined as the result of a strictly thought out,
creative , carefully organized , and very active work by commanders and
staffs as well as by troops. Surprise must be based on good knowledge
and understanding of the conditions of the combat situation and on a
grounded foresight of its possible development.
The presence of first-rate weapons and combat equipment, good troop
training and high moral-combat qualities , and the availability of the
necessary information on the enemy -- all this comprises merely the ob
jective prerequisites for achieving surprise in a forthcoming operation or
battle. However, in order to successfully realize them for delivering
surprise attacks against the enemy there will be a requirement in each
case for display of high operational-tactical expertise by command
cadres, the initiative of all personnel of the troops to be used , and the
art of organization and implementation of surprise actions.
Under conditions of employment of nuclear missiles, it has become
important, as never before, to be able to deliver surprise attacks against
an enemy, to take advantage of confusion and panic among his troops

-
decisively and rapidly , and deprive them of the possibility of organizing
effective resistance.
The desire for surprise has begun to permeate all decisions for the
conduct of operations and battles. In all cases the goals pursued by
our troops in an operation or battle , the directions and time of attacks,
the composition of forces and means to be used , and methods of
operationsmust be unexpected for the enemy.
The degree of expertise of commanders must be so high that in each
concrete situation they can make the best of all possible decisions which
ensures the achievement of surprise to the greatest extent.
Any optimum decision cannot help but be based on the idea of
actions which are unexpected for the enemy. However, with the in
troduction of nuclear weapons into arsenals, such actions become possible
only if command cadres possess high technical training. Without a good
knowledge of the design , capabilities, and methods of combat employ
ment and nuclear, missile, and other recent weapons and equipment it
is simply impossible to count on its skillful surprise employment against
a technical strong enemy. In addition , in the era of nuclear missiles
and radioelectronics the attainment of surprise very often will be im
possible without performance of the most precise calculations. This is
required for making the decision not only for delivering a surprise
nuclear attack with operational or tactical missiles, but also for dropping
or landing any airborne party in the enemy rear, for sending out a

234
forward detachment, for making a secret, rapid maneuver, forcing a
water obstacle, etc. In combat operations which are quickly over, with
the wide employment of the latest complex technology, only a techni
cally well trained commander-in -chief or commander who does not
permit even the slightest of omissions and who acts swiftly and precisely
can find the best methods of surprise actions each time.
The high expertise of commanders is still insufficient for achieving
surprise. The new material-technological base for the conduct of com
bat operations and their high tempos and sharply increased spatial
scope have increased considerably the role of staffs. Decisions for an
operation or battle must be made in the shortest possible time and
must be the most expedient ones which provide for the employment of
surprise actions. But this requires a rapid and most precise analysis
and estimate of a great many factors. Even in the last war such work
was more than could be handled by just the commanders. A great deal
of it was performed by staffs. In preparing data for decision -making
and planning the operation or battle, staff officers naturally will advance
concrete and original proposals and recommendations to achieve sur
prise . Now the staffs have an even greater responsibility, inasmuch as
for the achievement of surprise it is necessary to conduct an entire
complex of various measures which are mutually linked .
Thus the high level of training of all commanders- in -chief, com
manders , and staff officers is a most important condition for assuring
surprise of operations.
The ways and methods of achieving surprise are very diverse . In
1954–1959 they were developed in great detail in the works of Soviet
authors . Depending on the concrete conditions of the situation, surprise
may be achieved by leading the enemy astray with regard to one's
intentions, by secrecy in preparation and swiftness of troop operations,
by broad use of nighttime conditions, by the unexpected employment of
nuclear weapons and other means of destruction , by delivering a force
ful attack when and where the enemy does not expect it, and by em
ploying methods of conduct of combat operations and new means of
warfare unknown to the enemy.
Surprise is incompatible with stereotype. Stereotype contradicts the
very essence of surprise . If one has succeeded in deceiving the enemy
once , then he will not allow himself to be deceived a second time by
the very same technique . Therefore there is a continuous search for
newer techniques and methods for achieving surprise .
The experience of war shows that warring sides quite often have
tried to employ new types of weapons to this end which are a surprise
for the enemy or are little known to him . Each side secretly develops
new means of warfare in order to employ them unexpectedly. History
knows many examples how the employment of a new weapon initially
gave considerable success because the enemy, caught unawares and not

235
knowing the combat capabilities of this weapon , was for some time
incapable of effective counteraction. This was the case with the em
ployment of military toxic chemical substances, tanks, rocket artillery ,
new antitank means, minefields, and many other types of weapons
and technicalmeans.
By 1959 nuclear missiles had become the basic types of the most
powerful weapons. Of course , they cannot be considered as means of
warfare which are unknown to anyone. However, by virtue of the
enormous power, great range , and exceptionally quick action of nuclear
weapons, they can be used to deliver extremely effective surprise at
tacks. At the same time one has to consider also that if nuclear attacks
are made against troops who have previously foreseen the possibility
of their use in given areas and who have taken appropriate defensive
measures (especially concealed maneuver ), then the effectiveness of
such attacks will be reduced to a minimum , and sometimes they may
be made against empty areas. This means that a high degree of art is
needed also for delivery of surprise nuclear strikes .
The wide surprise employment of nuclear weapons and the various
means of delivery will be one of the characteristic features of future
operations and battles in a nuclear war. The sides will attempt to em
ploy this weapon against important objectives unexpectedly at any time.
One also has to consider that in the postwar period a great many new
and diverse nonnuclear means of warfare have also appeared in the
arsenals of the armies of economically developed countries which can
be employed very successfully for delivering surprise attacks against an
enemy.
Thus, the appearance of new means of warfare has immeasurably
broadened the possibilities of achieving surprise . However there is no
new , albeit very sophisticated , technology which of itself is capable of
having a surprise effect on an enemy. It is necessary above all to have
a technically correct and tactically competent employment in order to
deliver surprise attacks with any weapon . In other words, there is a
requirement for a scientifically based military theory providing the most
expedient recommendations for the effective surprise employment of
ever more complex means of warfare in an operation or battle.
The mass introduction of new weapons into an army usually cannot
remain secret for long for the other side. Therefore sooner or later
the monopoly on the new weapon is lost and the level of technical
outfitting begins to even out. In addition , new means of warfare , and
in mass numbers, are impossible to create often and quickly. In this
regard, the sides have begun to take other paths concerning the attain
ment of surprise along with searches for new weapons and their sophisti
cation .
The first path consists of a secret build -up in numbers of available

236
weapons, which in due course may lead to the attainment of surprise
with their mass employment on the most important axes.
The second path is a search for the most skillful and original meth
ods for the unexpected use of available weapons. Among troops on whom
the creation of a new weapon does not depend there are very broad
possibilities in creative exploration directed toward achieving surprise
by employing unusual methods for using combat equipment in the
arsenal. The enemy knows full well that each type of weapon is usually
designed to accomplish strictly defined combat missions. And if a partic
ular combat means suddenly begins to be employed effectively in a
totally unusual manner, with another purpose, then this will be a sur
prise for the enemy.
The Great Patriotic War showed that this way of achieving surprise
can be very effective. The use of antiaircraft artillery for direct laying
against ground targets, of rocket artillery from open firing positions, and
of heavy guns for firing with direct laying, the crossing of tanks over
rivers with thin ice owing to the freezing of crossings and crossing of
tanks along the bottoms of rivers, the construction of log paths for tanks
to cross swampy sectors, the construction of wooden bridges with the
flooring below the surface of the water, and the employment of anti
aircraft searchlights for blinding enemy troops— all this and much more
serves as a clear confirmation of this.
It is very important to seek new and original techniques for employing
available types of weapons and combat equipment. New , nonstereotyped
methods of employing weapons and equipment must always be viewed as
an important way for achieving surprise in contemporary operations
and battles — a way accessible to all.
A third way to achieve surprise is for commanders and staffs to
employ methods which are new or unexpected for the enemy in the
organization and conduct of an operation or battle . It is newness in
methods of their preparation and conduct which opens the broadest pos
sibilities for employment of surprise actions under any conditions of
the combat situation . This is a constant and genuinely inexhaustible
source for achieving surprise .
The Great Patriotic War was rich with a multitude of examples of
creative search for new or little known ( and thus unexpected for the
enemy ) methods and techniques of organization and conduct of opera
tions and battles, which ensured the attainment of greatest operational
and tactical surprise and as a result, the decisive defeat of the enemy
with equal or even fewer forces.
In offensive operations surprise was achieved by a choice of axes of
main attack or sectors of breakthrough unexpected for the enemy, by
the secret regrouping of troops, by concentrating shock groupings and
occupying an initial position for an attack , and by employing the most
diverse methods of fire preparation . For successful development of of

237
fensive operations there was great significance in the unexpected force
ful attack along axes and from the move, and in conducting the attack
and pursuit at night and at a high tempo permitting anticipation of the
enemy in occupying intermediate lines. Troops achieved great success
by resorting also to the surprise maneuver of fire, forces, and means.
The wide employment of forward detachments and airborne and naval
landings was also very effective for a surprise penetration into the
enemy's operational depth and delivering attacks against him from the
rear and the flanks.
In offensive operations and battles the achievement of surprise was
based primarily on the organization of a strong, flexible , and well con
trolled system of fire of all types. Such a system of fire permitted de
livering surprise fire strikes against the enemy, setting up fire traps, and
conducting a counterpreparation unexpected for the enemy. Skillfully
created engineer obstacles and forward and switch positions played a
large part in achieving surprise . An enemy who had wedged in was
successfully destroyed by carefully prepared counterblows and counter
attacks made from unexpected axes .
The aforementioned and many other methods of achieving surprise
which were successfully employed in the past war can also be effectively
employed under contemporary conditions with a critical approach and
the introduction of the appropriate corrections. In nuclear warfare their
creative use with consideration of the features of employment of all new
means ofwarfare very often may lead to a very great success.
The experience in achieving surprise acquired by Soviet troops in the
past war has largely retained its value and instructiveness. Therefore
one must not forget it, but study it attentively. One must consider
that any “ old ” method of operations can also be a surprise if it is
employed skillfully and in accordance with the situation at hand. How
ever, a simple mechanical repetition of previous methods of achieving
surprise is unquestionably inadmissible . History knows many examples
of how simple copying of previous successfully employed techniques led
not to surprise, but just the opposite, even to failure . The reason is that
the enemy attentively analyzes the methods of surprise actions which
have been employed and develops the appropriate countermeasures
against them . Therefore actions which are a surprise for the opposing
side can be achieved only as a result of creative pondering and ap
propriate modernization of previous methods of actions as applicable to
the new combat situation .
However, merely the critical use of experience of past wars is far
from sufficient. One must have a constant creative search for con
temporary, completely new methods of achieving surprise in an operation
or battle . Nuclear missiles, aviation , helicopters, the increased fire and
shock force of troops, their high maneuverability and mobility have
sharply increased the combat capabilities of troops and permit an

238
exceptionally broad employment of the most diverse methods of surprise
actions. But for this the commanders - in -chief, commanders, and staffs
will have to think through , evaluate , and resolve an enormously greater
number of questions than before . Moreover, for purposes of surprise
they will have to overcome considerably more difficulties.
The most original solutions and employment of seemingly completely
unexpected methods of achieving surprise may not provide the desired
effect if there is not proper assurance of their practical implementation .
A deciding condition for ensuring the achievement of surprise has
begun to be considered the ability to hide from an enemy conducting
constant and active reconnaissance the presence of new weapons and
equipment, the concept and plan of an operation or battle , groupings
of forces and means which have been created , their missions, axes,
time of beginning and methods of actions prescribed . All commanders,
staffs, and troops are obliged always to take all steps to deprive the
enemy of an opportunity to collect data relative to the actual location
and condition of our troops, especially nuclear missiles, aviation , tank
groupings, and control points.
The assurance of secrecy of operations has begun to be achieved as
a result of an entire complex of interwoven measures having the purpose
not only of depriving the enemy of information about friendly troops,
but also of leading him astray with regard to their incapabilities and
planned actions. Secrecy has begun to be achieved by keeping in strict
secrecy all data of interest to the enemy, as well as by using all pos
sible means, methods, and techniques of camouflage, and definitely the
use of military cunning . Demonstrations and misinformation find wide
employment.
It has become very important to have a good knowledge of and
properly evaluate the enemy, make skillful use of favorable terrain
conditions, skillfully determine the best time for operations, making all
possible use of night and other conditions of limited visibility, uncover
the enemy plans opportunely, and effectively counteract his attempts at
surprise actions.
In the interests of achieving surprise there is a requirement for an
objective, trustworthy estimate of one's possibilities. Surprise actions are
more and more based on the technically intelligent use of capabilities
of new weapons and combat equipment. Only troop personnel — people
who master weapons to perfection and possess high moral-combat quali
ties — can fully take advantage of available capabilities and successfully
realize the concepts of commanders and staffs in achieving surprise .
The past war demonstrated a great many vivid examples where surprise
was achieved primarily thanks to these very qualities of Soviet troops .
Straining all their spiritual and physical forces, displaying high expertise,

239
utter patriotism , and mass heroism , they often achieved that which the
enemy considered generally impossible.
In striving to achieve surprise in one's actions, it is at the same time
necessary to take all steps to preclude the enemy from employing it.
This is achieved by constant reconnaissance, timely and comprehensive
support to combat operations, a high vigilance on the part of troops
and their constant combat readiness, and a capability for rapidly counter
ing the enemy
The principle of surprise is closely interwoven with the principle of
mobility and activeness. Mobility and activeness of operations are the
basis for surprise and increase by many times over the effectiveness of
surprise attacks of troops . The principle of surprise is also closely con
nected with the principle of concentration of efforts , since the basis for
success of a surprise attack in contemporary combat is the massive
employment of nuclear weapons in combination with an attack by troops
with a force which will be sufficient for timely and effective use of
results of the surprise attack and the enemy defeat.

Combat Activeness

Success in a battle or operation is achieved by that side which , with

all else equal, acts more actively and resolutely , takes the initiative,
and holds it firmly .
The objective basis of this principle is the law of war on the influence
of the political content of the war and the correlation of moral-political
and psychological capabilities of the people and army of warring coun
tries, and the law of armed conflict on the dependence of methods and
forms of armed conflict on the material basis of battle , the operation ,
and the war.
The significance of this principle sharply rose in 1954–1959 in con
nection with the outfitting of troops with nuclear weapons and other
more sophisticated means of warfare , and in connection with the de
cisive political goals and acute class character of war.
A future nuclear war, if imperialists manage to unleash it against
countries of the socialist community, will in its social essence be a deci
sive armed encounter between countries of two opposite world social
systems — the capitalist and socialist.
“ In case the imperialist aggressors nevertheless dare unleash a new
world war,” states the CPSU Program , “ peoples will no longer stand for
a system which plunges them into devastating wars. They will sweep
away and bury imperialism .” 19
The sharp class character of war, which precludes any possibility of
any sort of compromises, predetermines the extreme decisiveness of its
political goals, which in combination with the specific features of con

19 CPSU Program , Izd . Pravda, 1961, p 59 .

240
temporary means of warfare will determine the exceptionally active and
decisive character ofmilitary operations.
The activeness of combat operations is determined , on the one hand,
by the opportunities opened up by new means of warfare , and on the
other, by the demands of strategy and operational art, directed toward
maximum use of results of employment of these means for successful
accomplishment of missions stemming from the political goals of armed
conflict.
Activeness is seen in the goals of a battle and methods of their
attainment, in the ability of commanders to make bold decisions and
insistently put them into effect, in the energetic, decisive , selfless ac
tions of troops, and in their desire to win victory through total defeat of
the foe. The high moral-combat qualities of personnel of the Soviet
Army, the powerful means of warfare which they possess, as well as
the advanced character of our military science ensure the Soviet troops
a real opportunity to achieve the most decisive goals of combat opera
tions. However, in order for these goals to be achieved , all personnel
of our army must be imbued with a steadfast will to win , they must
have an excellent knowledge of and skillfully employ the weapons
entrusted to them , display high activeness , daring, persistence, and
initiative, constantly strive to impose their will on the enemy, and , by
keeping the initiative in their hands, destroy or capture him .
The principle of combat activeness demands flexible employment of
various types of combat actions, with the decisive role belonging to the
attack . Lenin repeatedly pointed out that only through resolute offensive
actions is it possible to win victory and the war. Lenin considered the
chief goal of attack to be not the pushing back of the enemy, not the
occupation of territory, but the total defeat of enemy troops. Lenin be
lieved that all possible development of a planned success and bringing it to
total victory was a most important condition for a successful attack. During
the civil war years he demanded that “ from the petty and particular, our
attack be transformed into a massive , enormous one, leading the victory
to the end .” 20
Recognizing the attack to be the basic and decisive form of armed
conflict, Lenin also devoted much attention to the defense, but he viewed
it not as a goal in itself, but as temporary actions forced by the situation
and subject to the overall interests of defeat of the enemy. He demanded
the display of a maximum of steadfastness, stubbornness, and selfless
ness in the defense . However, in those instances where the situation was
especially unfavorable , Lenin admitted the possibility of withdrawal.
Here he demanded that the withdrawal be done in an organized manner.
M. V. Frunze noted that only the one who finds within himself the
resolve to attack will win . A side which only defends is inevitably doomed

20 Lenin , XXXIX , 245 .

241
to defeat. “ The tactics of the Red Army,” he said , “have been and will
be permeated with activeness in the spirit of bold and energetically
conducted offensive operations. This stems from the class nature of the
workers and peasants army and at the same time coincides with the
demands of military art.” 21 In speaking of the demand of military art,
Frunze had in mind that the offensive provides a number of purely
military advantages with regard to seizing the initiative, achieving surprise ,
crushing the enemy's will, etc. At the same time, Frunze recognized
the possibility, under certain conditions, of shifting to the defense, and
sometimes to a withdrawal, viewing it as one of the aspects of a future
attack .
An attack , a bold movement forward , raises the morale of troops and
multiplies their efforts . “ The attack itself,” pointed out Frunze, " strength
ens the attacking side and gives it more chances for success.” 22 At the
same time the attack always has a negative effect on the moral-psycholog
ical condition of the opposing defending troops, since “ this alone reveals
a will which is stronger.” 23
However, this does not at all preciude the recognition of the defense
as well. But in a majority of cases it is a forced and temporary form of
combat actions. Although victory over an enemy is achieved only by a
resolute attack , the defense was employed in the past and will un
doubtedly find employment in a future war. Lenin noted that “ such
wars which began and ended with an utter victorious offensive have
never occurred in world history , or happened only as exceptions.” 24
This remark by Lenin is correct both for war of the past as well as
for contemporary conditions. However, in the history of military art
the question of the relationship of the offensive and defensive, of active
offensive operations and passive maneuvering, was decided in different
ways .
Henrich Lloyd (1729--1783), for example , in his Voyennyye i politi
cheskiye memuary (Military and Political Memoirs), asserted that
war must be won by skillful maneuvering, without engagement, by
exhausting the enemy until he admits himself to be conquered , and
military actions must be reduced to an attack on his operational line.
Maneuver itself in the 17th and 18th centuries was very limited, since
wars were conducted according to the five -march system , the essence
of which was that the army conducting military operations could not be
farther than five marches from the base stores for fear of disrupting
supply . Under those conditions, in a majority of cases maneuver was
fruitless also because the generals had comparatively small mercenary

21 M. V. Frunze, Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Works), Voyenizdat, Mos

cow , 1950, p 206 .
22 Ibid ., p 193.
23
Ibid ., p 191.
24 Lenin , XLIV , 209 .

242
armies, the training and upkeep of which was very costly, and personnel
were unreliable in the moral-combat sense, and so the generals avoided
bloody engagements. By virtue of this system of manning, the troops
did not possess considerable reserves, and replacement with new mercen
aries was fraught with great difficulties.
The results of such maneuvers were usually negligible. Nevertheless,
in individual cases there was success at that time in achieving the goals
of the war by just maneuvering onto the enemy's lines of communication .
For example, the great French general Turenne (1611–1675) in the
campaign of 1672 by skillful maneuver cleared the entire right bank of
the Lower Rhein of the enemy. In subsequent campaigns, to achieve
more decisive results, Turenne shifted to maneuver with the goal of
giving battle when the situation demanded .
Nevertheless, Prussian theoretician Henrich Buelow (1757–1807)
continued to refute the principle of combat activeness. “ One must only
get involved in a battle which is not stubborn,” repeated Beulow , “ avoid
engagements, and rely on maneuver.” According to Buelow , the ob
ject of an operation is not the enemy army, but his stores and lines of
supply. Buelow overlooked the fact that troops created by the French
bourgeois revolution obtained food from local means ( according to
a system of requisitioning) and their lines of communication were not
so vulnerable. Ignoring the experience of forced marches and decisive
engagements of Suvorov , Kutuzov , and Napoleon or viewing them
through the prism of his theory , Buelow did not understand the pro
found improvements in military art which had taken place before his
eyes , nor did he notice the birth of a new strategy of destruction which
advanced as the sole goal the destruction of the enemy army. Even a flank
envelopment of the enemy or à flank position were in Buelow's under
standing a fist raised in the air for a blow , but not the blow itself; a simple
threat, but not its realization .
Napoleon called the strategy of Buelow senseless, and condemned his
principles as unrealistic, as the result of a lack of knowledge about war.
" If you wish to learn the method of subjecting a stronger army to defeat
by a weak army,” remarks Napoleon, “ then study the principles of this
writer. You will obtain an impression of military science. He prescribes
to you the opposite of what must be learned .”
Suvorov adhered to the principle of active, offensive combat actions
with the most decisive goals. In an era where combat actions were
characterized by indecisiveness, sluggishness , and a shackling ofmaneuver,
while decisive importance was attached to the element of terrain , Suvo
rov assigned as the main goal of actions not the capture of any points
of fortresses, as was required by principles of cordon strategy, but the
destruction of enemy forces. He considered defeat of enemy personnel
the main goal even when besieging fortresses. Suvorov wrote : “ This
method of actions must always be observed by our troops, and they

243
must follow the rule as much as possible of defeating the enemy in the
field before undertaking a siege.” 25
He demanded acting in no way other than offensively . Suvorov said
that “ the true rule of military art is to attack the enemy directly from
his most sensitive side, and not assemble after timidly going by round
about roads and thus making the attack itself extremely complicated ,
when thematter can be resolved only by direct, bold offense .” 26
Suvorov not only preferred offensive actions to all others, but per
sistently inculcated in his troops an offensive tendency as the main one
which was a guide in all instances of military practice . He created a
special cult of offense. If any of the soldiers moved forward in forma
tion , the others formed up on him , he was not made to backstep . An
evening up on the advanced ones was always prescribed . In combat
Suvorov's regiments attacked the enemy without awaiting the approach
of all troops: “ The head doesn't await the tail; the latter will always
make it in due course.”
Suvorov took a negative attitude toward defensive actions, calling the
defense “ foul.” “ The very name defense,” he wrote, “ already proves
weakness, and so it incites timidity .” In a letter from Suvorov to Captain
Vagner in 1771 he states : “ Secours (help , support — V.S .), danger, and
other words which are fanciful to opinions serve old ladies who fear to
descend from the stove so as not to break a leg , and serve the lazy ,
luxurious, and nearsighted ones for foul defense , which , whether good
or bad in the end , is still called gallant by storytellers.”
However Suvorov was not on unconditional enemy of any kind of
defense in all cases or the enemy of engineering matters. In Poland
and on the Danube Suvorov demanded that troops set up in garrison
strengthen the points occupied . After the first raid on Turkutay, Suvorov
withdrew his chasti to Negoyeshti, which he planned to fortify carefully.
In those rare cases when Suvorov had to conduct a defense, he operated
exceptionally actively, shifting into a counterattack at the first opportunity
with the aim of destroying the enemy. Such was the case at Kinburn ,
the defense of which at that time undoubtedly occupied one of the
first places among world examples.
Suvorov prohibited even thinking about retreat (retrograde ). The
word retreat was pronunced venomously, in a sing-song voice . “ I protected
the hearing, sight, and souls of my soldiers from any form of retreat,
said Suvorov . Recommending “ attack plutongs ” 27 for troop training,
Suvorov added : “ Although there are also withdrawal plutongs, it is

25
Suvorov, 1952 , III, 259.
Suvorov v soobshcheniyakh professorov Nikolayevskoy akademii generalnogo
shtaba (Suvorov in Reports of Professors of the Nikolayevskiy Academy of the
General Staff), Book 1, St. Peterburg, 1900 , p 8 .
27 A plutong was the podrazdeleniya into which a battalion was divided for per
forming volley fire.

244
only in the interpretation that they are not for withdrawal, but only
to adapt the legs to proper movements.” In Nauka pobezhdať ( The
Science of Winning) Suvorov demands: “ Withdrawal plutongs ? It is
best not even to think about them . Their influence on the soldier is
very dangerous, and so don't think about any kind of retreat in the
infantry and cavalry .” 28 Suvorov's combat commandment was : “ A step
backward is death ; I will allow two, three, or ten forward .”
However Suvorov did not entirely demand the destruction of the
enemy everywhere, on every encounter with him , although many so
believe . In the Italian campaign Suvorov pointed out to Gen Gadik that
all paths and ways must be occupied, not for their stubborn defense , but
only for surveillance, in order to give time for the concentrated main
body to get headed toward the enemy where required . Suvorov wrote
to Baron Kray that “ there is no shame to concede a post to an enemy
superior in numbers. On the contrary , herein lies the military art of with
drawing in time without losses. A stubborn resistance to hold any post
would cost dearly , while subsequently it would still have to be given
up to a superior enemy. A post which has been conceded can be oc
cupied again , while the loss in personnel is irreversible . Often one man
is more costly than the post itself.” 29
Jomini was also an adherent of active combat operations . He stressed
that “ the method of doing great things consists of dismembering and
destroying the enemy army. . . . States or provinces will surrender them
selves if there are no more organized forces for their cover,” and that
after the defeat of an enemy army it must be " pursued to the last
opportunity , forcing it to retreat in diverging directions ; finally , give it no
peace until it is destroyed or dispersed .”
Jomini repeatedly noted the advantages of an offensive form of
actions from moral and political viewpoints , and the importance of
seizing the initiative: “ The offense as applied to a simple, brief operation ,
i.e., viewed as an initiative of movements, almost always is profitable ,
especially in strategy . As a matter of fact, if military art consists of
throwing one's forces on a decisive point, then it is understandable that
the first means for applying this principle will consist of seizing the
initiative of actions. Whoever has seized this initiative knows ahead of
time what he is doing and what he wants. He arrives with his masses
at the point where he must deliver the attack . Whoever waits is anticipated
everywhere : the enemy throws himself on individual chasti of his
army; he doesn't know where the foe wishes to direct his effort or the
means which he must use to counter the foe. ” 30

28 See G. S. Nikol'skiy , Suvorovskaya "Nauka pobezhdať ” (Suvorov's “ Science

of Winning” ), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1949, p 37 .
29 A. Petrusheuskiy , III, 185.
30 Jomini, Ocherki voyennogo iskusstva (Essays on Military Art), Voyenizdat,
Moscow , 1939 , I, 93.

245
 Clausewitz also was an adherent of the principle of combat active
ness. He wrote that “ our basic principle is to look on the destruction
of enemy armed forces as the main thing not only in the entire war as
a whole, but in each individual battle . ... We strived to confirm rec
ognition of the universal importance of the principle of destruction of
combat forces." 31
In confirmation of this principle, Clausewitz also expressed certain
other correct thoughts, in particular, concerning the need to strive for
destruction of enemy armed forces and a defeat of his might, which is
achieved only as a result of battle; and that the main goal of engage
ments must lie in destruction of the enemy.
In spite of the convincing statements of such major authorities in favor
of the principle of combat activeness, which found its confirmation in
wars of the 19th century, passive defensive tendencies reigned in a num
ber of countries, especially France, right up until the beginning of our
century .
According to the “ Bonnal doctrine” then accepted in France , before
deciding the question of use of the main body, the commander had
to await clarification of what the enemy was doing. After this he was
to prepare for defense , and then to retaliate for an attack . This viewpoint
was subjected to sharp criticism by a colonel of the French general
staff, Louis Granmezon. To act in this manner, notes Granmezon , means
to degrade the attack to the moral level of defense . Touching then on
the instructions of the regulation on this same question , Granmezon
wrote that the measures provided by the regulation were as much useless
as dangerous, that it was necessary to fight “ the senselessness of general
advance guards,” that the precautions recommended by the regulation
inevitably reduce to a situation where there will remain no means for
anything other than attacks a bit at a time. “ In truth we no longer
attack ,” wrote Granmezon , “ we counterattack , but this transforms the
attack into defense or , if you like, into active defense . One is the
same as the other in the sense of chances for defeat.” According to
Granmezon , the directions of the regulation meant the almost total
atrophy of the concept of attack .
This criticism of official French views was substantiated and fully
deserved . But Granmezon advanced the attack as the sole form of war
making, and brought offensive strategy to complete rejection of any
kind of defense , thus falling into the other extreme. He demanded
" setting in motion all one's forces immediately, without consideration ,” 32
conducting the attack without security, without reserves, and even without
reconnaissance. For this he suggested deploying one's army into one line,
without flank security . Adventurism is clearly seen in these views. It

31
Clausewitz , p 222.
32
Granmezon , “ Two Reports Made to Officers of the General Staff,” St. Peter
burg, 1912 , p 17 .

246
found expression in Granmezon's aphorism : “ In the attack the best
assurance is imprudence.”
Granmezon said about defensive combat: “ This is an act of the
lowest order which cannot count on victory .” Total rejection of defense
attested to Granmezon's lack of understanding of the conditions of wars
of his time, the scope , duration , and intensity of which constantly grew .
Granmezon's views soon were reflected in new regulations and
manuals of the French Army. The French Army, states one of these
manuals, “ permits no other law in the conduct of operations except for
attack .” 33 All French literature on the eve of World War I demanded
indiscriminate attack and total rejection of any defense . Persons interested
in questions of defense risked soiling their reputation and , according to
A. Boucher , they were looked upon as people who had a " screw loose .” 34
However, calls for such decisive offensive actions were in contrast
to the real capabilities of the French Army. At that time Germany was
stronger than France . As a consequence of this, as Professor Strokov
notes, uncertainty showed through in the French war plan , which
provided for attack , but which gave the strategic initiative to the
enemy from the beginning of the war . This plan in essence was a passive ,
waiting one.35
On the eve of World War I Prussian theoretician F. Bernhardy spoke
out correctly about the principle of combat activeness (calling it a prin
ciple of extreme energy ). “ To always strive with extreme energy for
greatest victory,” he wrote , “ is the first principle of warmaking, and that
general who does not satisfy this demand will never achieve the highest
conqueror. 36 The principle of extreme energy of actions, he
glory of conqueror.”
adds, is correct not just for the general, but must be law for every indi
vidual commander if we wish to achieve the highest results everywhere .
Destruction of enemy armed forces, said Bernhardy, is the highest trophy
of victory . One must act offensively. The superiority of the offense has
increased under contemporary conditions.
Theoretical views on the question of the “ strategy of exhaustion ” and
the “ strategy of destruction ” had an influence on formation of the
principle of combat activeness. The most prominent adherents of the
“ strategy of exhaustion ” were German historian Hans Delbrueck and ,
in the Soviet Union , Professor A. A. Svechin . Here is what Delbrueck
1

says about the essence of this strategy : “ Someone thought up the term

133 Nastavleniye dlya starshikh voyskovykh nachalnikov frantsuzskoy armii

(Manual for Senior Troop Commanders of the French Army), St. Peterburg,
1914 , p 54.
* See A. Bouchet, Osnovy podgotovki velikoy voyny (Foundations for the Prep
aration of the Great War), Moscow , 1927 , p 99 .
35 A. A. Strokov, Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva (History of Military Art), Voy
enizdat, Moscow , 1967, p 266 .
* F. Bernhardy, Sovremennaya voyna (Modern Warfare ), St. Peterburg, 1912,
II, 153.

247
 'strategy of exhaustion or the 'bipolar strategy ' for this form of strategy,
i.e., that under which a general chooses from moment to moment whether
to go for the planned goal by engagement or by maneuver, so that
his decisions constantly vacillate between two poles of maneuver and
engagement, inclining first to one and then the other.”
“ This strategy is contrasted to another, which is entirely directed
toward attacking the hostile armed forces, defeating them , and sub
jecting the conquered to the will of the victor — this is the strategy
of destruction .” 37
The strategy of destruction , in Svechin's definition , strives to end the
war with a crushing blow on the order of Napoleon's actions.
The strategy of exhaustion,” according to Svechin , lies in constant
exhaustion and weakening of the enemy.
Svechin , in contrast to Delbrueck, in some of his statements did not
set the categories of exhaustion and destruction in such sharp opposition .
He considered them “not white and black , but white and nonwhite,”
noting that a certain form of exhaustion borders on the strategy of
destruction . Svechin noted that the changing intensity of armed conflict
is characterized by a large number of gradations of exhaustion and in
destruction reaches its limit. Unfortunately, these correct thoughts were
expressed by Svechin in one of his little noted comments. His basic
work itself, Strategiya ( 1926 ), is built on the opposition of these cate
gories , which cannot be justified even my methodological considerations.
The one-act crushing attacks of Napoleon had long since moved into
the field of history. “ Destruction ” and “ exhaustion” as strategic forms
in both world wars supplemented each other and changed in the course of
military operations .
A wide discussion developed about Svechin's work . This aided in
strengthening the offensive basis in Soviet military doctrine and in
further developing the principles of combat activeness, initiative , and
decisiveness of actions, which was partially reflected in the aforementioned
statements by M.V. Frunze .
Since that time, Soviet military science, relying on the instructions
of Lenin , has considered the offense as the basic form of combat actions,
since only by a decisive offense conducted at a high tempo and to a great
depth is total defeat of the enemy achieved .
The offense has indisputable advantages over other forms of combat
actions. The chief one is that the initiative belongs to the attacker in
choosing the axis, time, and methods of delivering attacks against the
enemy, which makes it possible to impose one's will on him and thus
achieve a decisive victory .
By possessing the initiative of actions, the attacker, in accordance with

* Hans Delbrueck ; Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva v ramkakh politicheskoy

ekonomii (History of Military Art Within the Framework of Political Economy),
Gosvoyenizdat, Moscow , 1938 , IV , 182.
--

248
a specific concept, of his own will, and opportunely creates a grouping
of forces and means and thoroughly prepares the conditions of success .
He possesses wider opportunities for delivering surprise attacks, for
swift use of results of the employment of nuclear weapons against the
enemy and the benefits of the situation which takes shape, and also
for timely execution of maneuver in the course of battle.
Very important advantages of the offense stem from the fact that
combat actions are shifted to territory occupied by the enemy. In moving
into the enemy disposition , the attacking troops capture or destroy his
means of nuclear attack , stores of nuclear weapons, and bases, and thus
reduce his opportunities for employing weapons of mass destruction .
They also seize conventional weapons and combat equipment of the
enemy as well as supplies, take personnel prisoner, and use the re
sources of the territory they have occupied . At the same time the enemy
is deprived of a portion of his military -economic potential.
However, Soviet military science never has discarded the possibilities
of the defense. It is objectively impossible to do away with defense. It is
inevitable in any war and on the most diverse scale. But our science
recognizes not passive , but active defense . The basic efforts of such
a defense are directed toward maximum reduction of the enemy's
offensive capabilities , inflicting heavy losses on him , disrupting his of
fense, and creating conditions for shifting of the defending troops to
decisive offensive operations.
The given principle of operational art and tactics finds its expres
sion in practice in constant influence on the enemy with an uninterrupted
build -up of the force of attacks , in anticipating the enemy in destruction
by fire , in delivering attacks and executing maneuver, and in making
use of favorable conditions of the situation for imposing one's will on
the enemy in all forms of combat actions.
In examining this principle it is important to direct attention pri
marily on its application in different forms of combat actions — in the
offense, defense, and meeting engagement (or battle).
The fact that the offense is active in its own essence does not require
special proof. Activeness in the attack is manifested primarily in the
destruction of the enemy by powerful fire in combination with a forceful
advance. The attacker has the initiative, constantly imposes his will
on the enemy, with skillful actions achieves a decisive victory over
the enemy and his total destruction or capture , and takes his territory .
It is for this reason that military theory devotes greatest attention to
the attack as the basic form of military actions.
The display of activeness in the attack is facilitated to a consider
able extent by the fact that the opposing side , being on the defense , is
shackled to a decisive degree in its choice of forms and methods of
actions. Seizure and maintenance of the initiative permits imposing
battle on the enemy on those axes and in those areas which are favor

249
able to the attacker. The presence of relative freedom in choice of axes,
time of attacks, and their force permits the attacking troops to employ
such active forms of maneuver as cleaving the enemy grouping along
the shortest axis, and deep or close envelopment with a move to the
flanks and rear of the enemy with his subsequent encirclement and
destruction or pursuit. The attacker, having an advantage in nuclear
weapons, it capable of delivering a decisive defeat to the chief grouping
of the defender in the shortest time, and then completing his destruc
tion by the forceful actions of tank and motorized rifle troops.
Activeness of the defense comprises a most important demand on it.
This of course does not mean that defense can be just as active as
the offense . A shift to the defense signifies rejection of a considerable
portion of active forms of combat actions which the offense possesses.
At the same time, defense is not the equivalent of passiveness. Passive
ness never brings success. It dooms troops to defeat beforehand. How
ever, the defense is capable of accomplishing the chief missions of partic
ular chasti and soyedineniya, consisting of delivering a significant defeat
to the attacker , disrupting or repulsing his attacks, and holding the
occupied terrain . Moreover, the defense is capable of creating favorable
conditions for a subsequent shift to the offense, i.e., it can return maxi
mum combat activeness to the troops.
The attainment of goals of the defense is possible only with the
conduct of active combat operations. The chief forms of a manifestation
of activeness in the defense are delivery of a decisive defeat on the
main attacking enemy grouping with all forces and means of warfare ,
and above all with nuclear weapons; the conduct of decisive counter
attacks by forces of second echelons (reserves) and defending troops of
the first echelon ; the bold maneuver of troops from some axes to others.
The active defense of our troops at Moscow , Stalingrad, in the Kursk
bulge , at Balaton , and in other regions during the Great Patriotic War
ensured the accomplishment not only of operational-tactical, but also
major strategic missions facing the Soviet troops .
In a meeting engagement both sides set for themselves decisive offen
sive goals and seek to attain them on the very same axes . As of the
moment the meeting engagement begins, they may possess equal op
portunities for achieving success , but victory goes to the one who dis
plays the greater activeness , manages to seize the initiative , and holds
it firmly in the course of the engagement or battle.
The forms of manifestation of activeness in a meeting engagement or
battle above all are anticipation in the decisive actions of troops — in
fire destruction of the enemy, in completion of a favorable maneuver,
especially to the flanks and rear of the enemy, and in deploying troops
and delivering attacks. Active operations here are characterized by extreme
decisiveness and swiftness of reaction to a constantly changing situation .
A lack of information about the enemy cannot serve as the reason for

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rejection of bold actions. Beginning with the initiation of combat opera
tions by forward chasti or the delivery of the first nuclear strikes against
an oncoming enemy grouping and right down to the shift by one of the
sides to the defense or retreat, i.e., within the framework of the meeting
engagement or battle , the sides will strive to display a maximum active
ness with the aim of seizing the initiative and defeating the attacking
enemy by frontal offensive actions.
Obviously it will not be erroneous to assert that the true art of
commanders and staffs at all levels in the conduct of active combat opera
tions cannot be so clearly manifested anywhere as in a meeting en
gagement. The attacker here has an enemy before him who is not
restricted by the situation as he is in the defense, but who is very active
and strong. Therefore the meeting engagement represents the most
difficult and complicated form of offensive combat actions. A victory in
this goes to the one who, with all else equal, possesses the greater active
ness and resolve.
And finally , about withdrawal. In making a withdrawal activeness
also finds wide application . In the opposite instance , withdrawal is trans
formed into a panicky flight with all the consequences stemming there
from . Individual counterattacks , the placement of fire barriers on the
paths of the attacker or the pursuing enemy, the firm holding of con
secutively occupied lines by rear guards, leading the enemy astray by
diversions, setting up ambushes, obstacles, and destruction on the axes
of the enemy attack — all these are forms in which the activeness of
troops is manifested in a withdrawal.
Constant readiness to conduct decisive and active combat actions and
a high offensive spirit are characteristic features of Soviet armed forces.
And this is natural, inasmuch as in the final account high activeness of
troops has class roots. Active operations on the battlefield demand a
maximum straining of spiritual and physical forces of troops, and the
readiness to give all one's energies always will be higher in that army
which defends just goals. But for an army which is conducting an
unjust, predatory war activenessmay be high as a rule under conditions of
a favorable situation , especially when this army wins easy victories.
This of course does not mean that combat activeness is ensured auto
matically for Soviet troops and the troops of other socialist countries by
the very nature of the social and state system . Activeness must be
persistently instilled in our military cadres in the process of military
training and education . Only on this condition will it be successfully put
into effect on battlefields under the most difficult conditions.
Activeness is unthinkable without display of initiative both by organs
of control and by the troops.
M. N. Tukhachevskiy said it well about the significance of initiative
and activeness for troops and staffs: “ In rapidly developing offensive
battles the best method for interaction is to press the enemy boldly ,

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unrestrainedly , and with initiative. When all commanders have been
brought up in that spirit, when the clerk's method of ‘awaiting instruc
tions' has been overcome as shameful, then in spite of all the com
plexity and confusion of a short-lived developing battle , it takes on
offensive harmony where every chasť , going around the resisting enemy,
shoves forward an adjacent unit which is lingering, etc.”
“ Initiative and the desire to crawl into any crack in the enemy's com
bat formation must be the main qualities of every commander.”
“ Initiative, daring, and the greatest persistence are demanded of com
manders and all soldiers in a contemporary defensive battle as well.
The basis of a stubborn defense is the ability to fight and repulse the
enemy when the front of defense has been broken , when enemy de
tachments have penetrated into the depth of the defense, and when
overall control in a defensive battle has been interrupted .” 38
Actions of initiative of commanders and staffs of all levels are an
important component of the art of controlling troops and an invariable
condition for the conduct of active combat actions. In operations of
nuclear warfare based on the use of nuclear weapons and the forceful
actions of troops, initiative in control of troops acquires prime impor
tance . In the course of operations and battles there is a requirement
for exceptional swiftness in delivering nuclear strikes and the need arises
for immediate exploitation of results of these strikes for deep penetration
into the enemy disposition at high tempos. The great fire and shock
power of troops and their high maneuver capabilities will require the
manifestation of broad initiative in choice of methods of actions by
troops under conditions of a complete , intense , and abruptly changing
situation . Lack of initiative on the part of subordinates, lack of resolve,
and awaiting instructions from above may lead to a loss of time, and the
time factor now largely will decide the outcome of both individual
episodes of armed conflict and the outcome of battle and operation as a
whole .
An increase in the role of initiative in the control of troops stems
also from such a specific phenomenon of contemporary operations as the
possibility of totally disrupting the system of troop control by simultane
ous or consecutive disabling of a number of control points and com
munications centers of varying levels. This possibility did not exist in the
past, inasmuch as it was not ensured by the use of conventional weapons.
Now , however, many chasti and podrazdeleniya can be left in a short
time without control by a superior instance with simultaneous disruption
of communications with adjacent units as a result of enemy nuclear
strikes. Development of means of fighting radioelectronic means in
creases this possibility to a significant extent. Under these conditions
the surviving control organs and points will have to display a maximum

38 M. N. Tukhachevskiy , Izbrannyye proizvedeniya , Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1964,

II, 231, 232.

252
of initiative and independence in troop control. Understanding the goal
of the combat operations and the concept of the senior commander, as
well as being oriented beforehand about their possible missions in the
course of further actions, they will be able to make grounded decisions
and persistently seek their accomplishment without ceasing active com
bat actions.
The situation is well known where incomplete information about the
situation does not release the commander of his obligation for making a
timely decision . The worst of all is not to decide on anything or to
decide late . The one to be rebuked is not he who under difficult condi
tions of a situation has made a decision , although not necessarily the
best one, but he who, fearing responsibility, did not make any decision
at all and thus placed the troops in an extremely difficult position and
did not ensure fulfillment of the assigned mission . Tukhachevskiy wrote
that “ the commander must know that for a failure of his chast as a
result of his bold actions — and failures cannot be precluded in warfare
he will be greeted , not by rebukes and an investigation , but by general
sympathy and moral support.” 39 This fundamental thesis most corre
sponds to the nature of operations in a nuclearmissile war, in which bold
decisions full of initiative will find widest application . Therefore under
present conditions it is necessary to instil in every way possible in
commanders and supervisors at all levels a style of creative leadership
of troops, and accustom them to make bold decisions under the most
difficult conditions of a situation .
The development of initiative and creative independence of military
cadres in peacetime must be facilitated by the entire system of combat
and operational training, and political education work directed at instill
ing in commanders and staff, workers a spirit of innovation. Officers
and generals with initiative must be supported in every way. Everything
new and useful in their actions must become the property of others.
Activeness in combat operations presumes above all a seizing and
holding of the initiative and imposing one's will on the enemy. This is
achieved by application of the most diverse methods of combat opera
tions, the basis of which must be anticipation of the enemy in fire
destruction , in delivering forceful attacks, and in executing maneuver.
Anticipation in destruction by fire in a battle must be understood to
mean not only anticipation in time— who is first to deliver a nuclear
strike or to open fire — but chiefly anticipation in the result of nuclear
strikes and fire — who is first to achieve decisive destruction of the
enemy.
Of decisive importance is the destruction of means of nuclear de
livery of the enemy. Successful accomplishment of this mission will allow
not only seizing the initiative , but also firmly holding it in the course of
combat actions.

39 Ibid., I, 68.

253
 Anticipating the enemy in destruction by fire presumes the immediate
reaction of means of warfare to detection by reconnaissance of the most
important enemy targets, and above all means of nuclear attack , artil
lery, tank groupings, air defense means, and control points.
Anticipation in delivery of forceful attacks by tank and motorized
rifle troops has always played an important part in winning the initiative
on the battlefield . Under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons
the role of anticipation has become even greater. The high mobility
of troops ensures their rapid deployment and delivery of attacks from
the move. In maneuver forms of combat operations there will often occur
a deployment of troops from march formations into combat formations
with the aim of once and for all breaking the enemy's resistance with
decisive blows. After accomplishment of particular combat missions
troops will continue a forceful advance in march formations . Frequent
change of forms and methods of combat operations will demand high art
in delivering anticipatory strikes at a favorable moment for changing
the situation in one's own favor and for seizing the initiative .
As a result of wide use of nuclear weapons , both sides will suffer
considerable losses. Troops which have retained combat effectiveness
will strive to immediately take advantage of the results of nuclear
strikes. Under these conditions, anticipation in delivery of attacks by
tank and motorized rifle troops often will decide the outcome of combat
actions if the results of employment of nuclear weapons by both sides
are approximately identical. The side which is first to begin to exploit
these results will be able to impose its will on the enemy, who has
still not fully put himself in order after the nuclear strikes or who is still
not ready for offensive operations.
In light of what has been said , there is also an increase in the role
of anticipation in executing troop maneuver. It ensures both the delivery
of anticipatory fire (nuclear) strikes with a faster deployment of weapons
in favorable areas as well as delivery of anticipatory attacks by troops.
The employment of various methods of combat actions may have the
goal of an immediate or subsequent seizure of the initiative. Thus a
shift into an attack is equivalent to immediate seizure of the initiative in
combat operations, inasmuch as the attacker imposes his will on the
defender from the very beginning of the attack . From this standpoint
a shift to the defense is a rejection of initiative in a battle or operation.
However, the shift to the defense pursues far-reaching goals — to repulse
the attack of superior enemy forces, inflict considerable losses on him ,
hold the positions occupied , and create conditions for a subsequent
shift into the offense . In other words, a shift to the defense foresees
only a temporary rejection of the initiative, and its chief goal is a
subsequent seizure of the initiative with a renewal of the attack . We
know , for example, that in the Battle of Kursk the Soviet High Com
mand knowingly rejected anticipating the enemy in shifting to the attack

254
so that, having given the enemy this opportunity, it could grind his
strategic groupings in the course of defensive operations and then de
liver a crushing blow against them . Such a decision is even more re
markable in that our troops were fully capable of shifting to the attack
first, and the premeditated defense was not a sign of their weakness.
Seizure and firm maintenance of the operational-strategic initiative
were planned subsequently and really were achieved in the course of
the armed conflict which developed in the Kursk bulge.
In the final account, any decision on the employment of particular
methods of combat operations is calculated on seizure of the initiative
immediately or subsequently .
Each decision must be deeply substantiated with consideration of the
actual combat situation . Without question , the immediate seizure of
initiative and its firm maintenance for the entire duration of the operation
or battle is preferable . But in a number of instances reliance on a
subsequent seizure of the initiative may be also proper. The concrete
situation will dictate to the commander the choice of particular methods
of operations and the forms of manifestation of activeness and seizure
of the initiative.
M.N. Tukhachevskiy pointed out that “ the situation is too diverse in
order to apply specific rules to it once and for all.” 40 This thesis also
relates completely to the principle of combat activeness in its broad
sense .
Combat activeness presumes that the basic form of combat operations
by our troops will be the attack , since it is of decisive importance in
achieving victory over the enemy. Only a decisive attack conducted at
high tempos and to a great depth ensures total victory over the enemy.
The goal of the attack lies in the total defeat of the defending enemy
and capture of vital areas of his territory . This goal is achieved by
destruction of means of mass destruction and the enemy's main group
ings with nuclear weapons, the fire of other means, and also the forceful
advance to a great depth of tank and motorized rifle troops inter
working with aviation and airborne landings, and the bold move to the
flanks and rear of the enemy and destruction of him piecemeal. How
ever this far from signifies that our troops will attack always and
under all conditions. On a tactical and operational scale it will sometimes
be necessary to shift to the defense or even withdraw . The principle of
combat activeness in this sense is closely interwoven with the principle of
correspondence of the goal and concept of an operation or battle with
conditions of the actual situation . In setting forth the content of the
latter, examples are cited where continuation of an attack would verge on
an adventure and could involve a catastrophe.
Combat activeness is also manifested in the choice of that decisive form
of combat operations which leads to total destruction or capture of the

40 Ibid ., p 141.

255
enemy. 1ne most decisive form of combat actions in the Great Patriotic
War was the encirclement and subsequent destruction of enemy group
ings. Beginning with the counteroffensive at Stalingrad at the end of
1942, the operations of our troops for encirclement took on ever increas
ing scope . In the third period of the war they became a typical form
of combat operations by the Soviet Army. Suffice it to say that of 130
fascist divisions crushed in 1944, over 70 were destroyed as a result
of just such operations. And still this principle demands flexible em
ployment in accordance with the conditions of the concrete situation .
The history of military art knows individual cases where by virtue of
some special reasons it was unprofitable to complete the encirclement
and destruction of the enemy in a specific region .
This was the case, in particular, in the course of development of
the Visla -Oder Operation in January 1945. At the end of January the
situation was such that troops of the First Ukrainian Front had a real
possibility to fully encircle the Silesian grouping of the enemy. How
ever, the front commander-in -chief, Mar SU I. S. Konev, decided not to
surround the enemy. He ordered that a passage be left between the
Third Guards Tank and Fifty -Ninth armies 4–6 km wide and that with
decisive attacks of the remaining forces of Fifty -Ninth and Third Guards
Tank armies from the flanks and of Twenty-First Army from the front
the enemy grouping be kicked out of the industrial region. This plan
was brilliantly accomplished . The decisive attack of our troops from the
east, north , and west forced the enemy to hastily abandon the chief
cities of Polish Silesia and retreat in a northwesterly direction . Subse
quently, in September 1945, Konev explained in one of his speeches
the reasons for such a decision . He said that the Silesian industrial
region represented a solid , enormous city of plants and industrial enter
prises . Battles for encirclement and destruction of 10,000–15,000 fascist
troops within such a region would have led to great destruction of very
valuable plants, mines, and shafts . It was important to preserve this
rich region intact for our Polish friends. In evaluating this decision ,
Konev notes: " There are situations in war when opportunities present
themselves for effective completion , from the standpoint of the front, of
a particular operation , but this may not correspond to overall interests.
There are higher state interests, and in the given instance they dictated
the appropriate decision of the operation .”
But was this a deviation from the principle of combat activeness ?
No! This is rather an example of its flexible use , since all necessary steps
were simultaneously taken for encirclement and destruction of the enemy
in the forests southwest of the industrial region . The enemy grouping
which was shoved outwas totally destroyed in these forests.
A. V. Suvorov was a resolute enemy of the “ golden bridge.” But
in the battle of the Rymnik River Suvorov ordered giving one of the

256
Turkish units the “ golden bridge,” since this was expedient in view of
the concrete circumstances which had taken shape.
In 1954–1959 nuclear weapons became the chief means of destruc
tion of an enemy, including one who is in the rear and on the flanks
of attacking troops. By virtue of this, encirclement of an enemy in the
previous sense has begun to contradict the demands of the principle of
mobility and high tempos of combat operations, since it can lead to a
loss of time and diversion of a significant number of forces and means.
Therefore the move of an enemy who is in the rear and on the flanks
out from under attacks by troops on the offense now may be prohibited
by seizure of the main routes of his withdrawal. This will be encirclement
in the contemporary sense. Rapid destruction of a surrounded enemy
may be accomplished by nuclear strikes, air strikes, and artillery. To
complete the destruction of an enemy it will be sufficient to have attacks
by a portion of the attacker's forces delivered from the flanks, rear, and
front. Sometimes it will suffice for this purpose to put out mobile or
stationary blocking forces on the threatened axes.
The given principle demands the conduct of highly maneuverable,
active combat operations full of initiative under all conditions of the
situation . Tukhachevskiy wrote that commanders of all levels must be
brought up on activeness and inventiveness and on a resolute desire for
destruction of the enemy army. The desire to destroy enemy personnel
forces a commander who is conducting an operation to have nothing or
little to do with acquiring or retaining territory . The art of destroying
enemy armed forces, said Tukhachevskiy, is the main condition for
an economic conduct of war.
The principle of combat activeness is also in inseparable connection
with the principle of surprise , since the latter usually presumes active
operations, with the principle of retention of combat effectiveness of
friendly troops, and with other principles of military art. The principle
of activeness is especially closely connected with the principle of mobility
and high tempos of combat operations. The joint demands of these
principles presume that combat operations which have been begun must
be conducted actively and continuously at any time of year or day ,
in any weather, until the total destruction of the enemy. The principle
of activeness also demands the conduct of a continuous fight against
enemy means of nuclear attack and the timely and most effective use
of friendly nuclear strikes. This also draws both of these principles
together.
The principle of combat activeness also demands the effective use of
success achieved and pursuit of the enemy until his total destruction
( or capture ), continuously, day and night, with total application of all
energy , under any weather conditions, with the use of the greatest
possible number of routes parallel to the axis of withdrawal of the enemy,
formovement to the rear and flanks of his retreating troops .

257
..Luert tre J vuit.vau CITEUlventss Girlciuly тоорх

In the course of an operation or battle the combat effectiveness of

troops must be constantly maintained at the level which ensures success
ful accomplishment of assigned combat missions.
As we know , the combat effectiveness of troops is understood to mean
the capability of troops to conduct decisive combat operations and fully
accomplish the combat mission to destroy the enemy under any condi
tions. Preservation of combat effectiveness is a most important principle
of operational art and tactics which ensures the attainment of victory in
a battle or operation . If it is violated it is practically inconceivable to
apply all other principles of operational art and tactics, inasmuch as
troops who have lost combat effectiveness cannot conduct successful
combat operations.
The given principle of operational art and tactics stems from the law
of war which determines the dependence of the course and outcome of
war on the moral- political and psychological capabilities of the warring
sides, and also from the first and second laws of armed conflict, which
determine the dependence of methods and forms of armed conflict
on the material basis of a battle or operation and the dependence of the
battle or operation on the correlation of combat might of the sides
respectively. This principle is closely connected with the principles of
activeness , mobility, and surprise. For example, inasmuch as mobile
troops suffer fewer losses, especially from enemy nuclear weapons,
activeness presumes a rapid restoration of combat effectiveness and
renewal of the attack , and surprise involves a disruption of the com
bat effectiveness of enemy troops. Moreover, the surprise of the appear
ance of losses and rapid destruction of entire elements of a combat
formation or troop grouping immediately change the situation abruptly ,
and also create considerable obstacles in the combat activity of troops
who have suffered the losses - obstacles which are difficult to foresee .
The principle being examined is also connected with all the remaining
principles in the sense that the employment of all of them is directed
to one degree or another toward disruption of the combat effectiveness of
enemy troops and preservation of the combat effectiveness of friendly
chasti and soyedineniya .
The problem of preservation of high and constant combat effectiveness
of troops has always been given much attention . As means of warfare
have developed , its solution has become increasingly more complex in
asmuch as with the increase of the combatmight of means of destruction ,
sophistication of methods of combat operations, and increases in their
decisiveness and intensity, the protection of troops against enemy fire
has become steadily more difficult and their losses have accordingly
risen. In this regard more and more attention is being given to the
timely restoration of combat effectiveness of troops and measures of
their protection . There has been a steady increase in the role and

258
number of reserves of all types designed for rapid replenishment of
troop losses. There have been improvements in the means and methods
of troop protection , and, in particular, increasing importance has been
attached to sheltering personnel and combat equipment with armor,
conducting protective engineer measures, etc.
At the same time, employment of only conventional means of de
struction determined the relatively slow increase in troop losses as the
operation or battle developed, and their more or less foreseen distribu
tion among elements of the operational and combat deployment of
troops. Losses were suffered primarily by troops of the first echelon , and
above all by the infantry, but the organizational integrity of soyedineniya
and chasti was not violated . In spite of the qualitative and quantitative
development of conventional means of destruction , the character of
destruction of targets on the battlefield has changed slowly .
A completely different approach to this problem was required in the
period 1954–1959. The wide employment of nuclear weapons will cause
troops to suffer enormous losses which increase by leaps and bounds
in extremely limited time periods, and will cause a fundamental dis
ruption of the organizational structure of troops, control systems, and
security at all levels . The long range of nuclear missile weapons will allow
an enemy to hit troops and targets in the rear simultaneously to the
entire depth of the deployment. It is impossible to preclude the pos
sibility of a practically instantaneous disabling not only of entire podraz
deleniya and chasti, but sometimes even soyedineniya , especially as
a result of the most powerful first nuclear strike by the enemy. A rapid
decrease in troop combat effectiveness may take place in the course of
operations as well if effective measures to preserve it are not taken in
time.
Based on what has been said , the importance of this problem has
grown immeasurably . Preservation of the combat effectiveness of troops
has become impossible to examine as one of numerous important
duties of commanders and staffs, as was done in the past ; it has been
elevated to the level of an independent principle of operational art
and tactics and has come to be included among the basic guiding rules
in troop operations.
Under any conditions of the operation or battle, the combat effective
ness of troops depends on many factors. The most important of them
are that troops are up to strength in personnel and the moral and
physical state of the personnel; that they are up to strength in combat
equipment and weapons and the technical condition of the latter; the
level of training and combat coordination of podrazdeleniya, chasti,
and soyedineniya and their combat experience ; the level of training of
the command and staffs; and support of the troops with supplies. In
accordance with this, preservation of troop combat effectiveness in
cludes the conduct of measures directed toward maintaining all these

259
factors at a level which ensures the troops successful accomplishment
of assigned combat missions.
The measures for preserving troop combat effectiveness have been
divided into four basic groups :
1. Relating to methods of troop combat operations;
2. Relating to protection against weapons ofmass destruction ;
3. Relating to maintaining constant troop combat readiness ; and
4. Relating to restoration of troop combat effectiveness.
The first group of measures involves active operations having as their
goal the disruption or considerable weakening of enemy nuclear strikes.
Among such operations, of prime importance is the fight against
enemy means of nuclear attack . Figuratively speaking, tearing the nu
clear sting from the jaws of the enemy means to ensure the chief condi
tion for preserving the combat effectiveness of friendly troops. For this
we need the conduct of constant reconnaissance of nuclear means,
constant readiness of different forces and means of warfare for im
mediate destruction of detected nuclear targets on the ground and in
the air, and efficient operation of all organs of control.
There is wide employment of forceful troop operations which limit
the enemy's ability to employ means of mass destruction . An attack at
high tempos, maintenance of constant contact with the enemy, and a
deep wedging into his combat formations permit raising the relative
security not only of troops of the first echelon , but of all forces and
means. Such actions by attacking troops will force the enemy to shift
his tactical nuclear means often , and consequently his capabilities to
deliver nuclear strikes are reduced . This will create favorable conditions
for the forceful move of our forward chasti and podrazdeleniya into
areas of launch (firing) positions of enemy nuclear delivery means and
for their subsequent destruction .
There should be wide employment of airborne landings, the chief
mission of which will be seizure and destruction of enemy nuclear means
in the tactical and operational depth .
All means are used to destroy or capture not only the nuclear
weapons carriers themselves, but also the forces and means which
support them (nuclear weapons storage sites, control points, and recon
naissance organs).
Finally, this group of measures has come to include also the operation
of troops performing the functions of support (reconnaissance , secu
rity, etc.) .
The second group of measures relates to the protection of troops
against weapons of mass destruction . In their specific purpose , these
measures probably have the closest relationship to the principle being
examined .
A number of measures for troop protection have come to be known
as operational-tactical measures — dispersal, concealment, periodic change

260
-

of areas of troop disposition , and selection of the most advisable meth

ods of crossing contaminated zones (if they have been created by
the enemy) . These measures have become an inalienable part of troop
activities and those of commanders and staffs. As a rule , they are per
formed by them in any situation . Other measures performed by troops
using special instruments , equipment, and machines, as well as with
the involvement of podrazdeleniya of chemical protection , engineer
troops, and medical and other services, have come to belong to special
measures of protection . These include prediction of zones (areas) of
destruction , of radioactive and chemical contamination , of demolished
objects, inundation and fires; radiation , chemical, and bacteriological
survey and troop warning about contamination ; use of individual pro
tective means, and the protective attributes of combat equipment, trans
port, and terrain ; control of radioactive radiation and contamination ;
special prophylactic measures, etc.
Let us dwell briefly only on the conduct of some of the operational
tacticalmeasures.

Dispersal of troops to maximum permissible limits became a most

important measure in 1954–1959 , ensuring a sharp reduction in effec
tiveness of enemy nuclear strikes. The degree of dispersal of troops will
depend in each case on the situation , in particular, on the nature of
the combat mission to be performed by them , the terrain conditions, con
venience of controlling forces and means, and enemy opportunities for
employing nuclear weapons. However, in all cases the degree of dis
persal of troops must ensure a maximum preservation of their combat
effectiveness when the enemydelivers nuclear strikes.
Preservation of combat effectiveness is also served by concealment
of troops and rear area targets. This includes a large number of meas
ures. These have come to include the use of concealing attributes of
the terrain and conditions of limited visibility, the employment of
organic and other available camouflage means, setting up dummy posi
tions and areas of disposition , the conduct of demonstrative troop
movements, measures of radio , antiradar, and light discipline , and other
measures which hinder the enemy in his determination of targets for
destruction by nuclear weapons.
A periodic shift of areas of disposition of podrazdeleniya , firing
positions, and rear area targets, as well as dispersal and concealment,
may hinder the enemy in choosing targets for delivering strikes and will
force him to deliver them against an empty area . A change in areas of
disposition is done only on order of the senior commander. This has
begun to be done secretly and quickly, otherwise it might place the
troops in an even more difficult situation . The enemy may deliver a
strike during the change itself, i.e., when the troops have left the old
areas and have not yet managed to occupy new ones. Alternate areas

261
 and positions, as well as areas of disposition for rear area targets, are
outfitted ahead of time for the conduct of a periodic change .
Finally , of great importance is the selection of the most advisable
methods of crossing zones of contamination . In the course of combat
operations, troops often will have to cross vast and comparatively small
zones of radioactive contamination . Their skillful crossing may consider
ably lower the degree of radioactive irradiation of personnel and con
tamination of combat equipment and weapons. As a rule , troops cross
zones of contamination from the move , at high speeds, and along those
axes where least irradiation of personnel is assured . If, however, the
crossing of zones of contamination from the move is precluded due to
high radiation levels, and a bypass of the zones involves a great loss
of time, it is possible to cross them after a drop in radiation levels.
Meanwhile, the troops must be dispersed along the routes and be in
areas which ensure good concealment. Before crossing zones of radio
active contamination it is necessary to perform a radiation survey with
the aim of establishing the passability of selected routes.
The third group of major measures involves maintaining a constant
combat readiness of troops. The combat readiness and effectiveness of
troops have much in common, and so some of the measures examined
are also directly connected with execution of the principle of preservation
of the combat effectiveness of troops.
We are speaking of such measures as keeping up a high political
moral and physical state of the personnel, the combat capabilities of
equipment and weapons, the combat coordination of podrazdeleniya ,
chasti, or soyedineniya, and provision of everything necessary for the
troops to fight and live .
Maintenance of a high political-moral state of personnel is a field
of enormous and strenuous work by commanders (supervisors ), po
litical workers, party and komsomol organizations. This work is con
siderably facilitated in the conduct of successful offensive operations by
our troops, but it becomes immeasurably more difficult with abrupt and
unfavorable changes in the situation , especially with the mass use of
nuclear weapons by the enemy. Psychological traumas of personnel are
possible over a vast area outside zones of solid destruction by nuclear
weapons. If the fully determined radii of influence of their main de
structive factors are now sufficiently well know , then the radius of
psychological effects of nuclear strikes in actual reality can have the
most diverse value. In a number of cases it possibly will surpass many
times over the radii of effects of other destructive factors.
From what has been stated comes the need for purposeful psycho
logical preparation of personnel. In addition to instilling in them a cor
rect impression of the power of nuclear weapons, we must strive to en
sure a high degree of stability of personnel against the psychological

262
effects of nuclear blasts, and instil a uniformity of offensive enthusiasm
with the constant habit of performing all measures of protection and a
readiness to act under conditions of enormous overloads involved with
the employment of nuclear weapons.
Very great importance for maintenance of a high political-moral level
and good physical condition will lie in a proper alternation of troop
combat activity and rest and the efficient organization of nourishment
and medical services for personnel. An enormous number of measures
directed at maintaining high troop combat spirit must be performed
constantly and purposefully, and the more complex and strenuous the
combat situation, the more actively they must be performed .
Preservation of the combat capabilities of equipment and weapons is
of very great significance for preserving the combat effectiveness of
troops as a whole. Here we must point out the importance of proper
equipment maintenance, i.e., timely prophylactic inspections, repair,
replacement of unstable parts, observance of periods for general peri
odic maintenance, etc. The combat effectiveness of combat vehicles de
pends not only on their technical capabilities, but also on the ability
of the crew or team to perform other functions if particular specialists
are disabled . In this regard the assurance of full interchangeability of
crew and team members takes on very great importance .
High field training of troops and their combat coordination create
conditions for the timely and correct conduct of all measures directed
at preserving troop combat effectiveness. No proof is needed that poorly
trained troops under conditions of nuclear warfare will suffer immeasur
ably greater losses than troops who have passed the school of intense
combat training.
High troop combat readiness assures them the possibility of rapidly
leaving places of permanent or temporary disposition and moving out
from under enemy nuclear strikes opportunely.
Measures connected with rear area support of troops must not be
viewed unilaterally , i.e., believe that troop combat readiness or effec
tiveness depends only on their timely and complete support by the
superior echelon . Of course there is no doubt as to the importance
of such troop support (from the top down ), but one must not forget
the importance of economic expenditure of forces and means by the
troops themeslves. Intelligent thrift in use of supplies by troops will
have a very positive effect on preservation of the combat effectiveness
of troops as a whole .
Even a brief examination of measures to maintain constant combat
readiness of troops, developed in application to the new conditions in
1954–1959, shows their very closest of ties with the practical execution
of the principle of preservation of the combat effectiveness of friendly
troops themselves. The efforts of the command and staffs of all levels,
directed in peacetime at maintaining constant troop combat readiness,
will be rewarded a hundredfold in the course of war. They create the

263
necessary premises for successful accomplishment of assigned combat
missions.
The fourth group of measures on which the attention of military
science was directed in 1954–1959 is connected with restoration of the
combat effectiveness of troops.
Restoration of combat effectiveness has as its goal bringing surviving
podrazdeleniya and chasti, as well as technical means of armed conflict
which have temporarily lost combat effectiveness as a result of enemy
strikes, back into full combat readiness .
This may include :
1. Forecasting of the radiation and chemical situation ; conduct of
chemical, radiation , and commander's reconnaissance in the zone of
operations and determination of areas suitable for disposition and opera
tions of troops ;
2. Moving troops out of dangerous areas of chemical, radioactive ,
and bacteriological contamination ;
3. Gathering data on the condition of chasti and podrazdeleniya after
enemy strikes with means of mass destruction ;
4. Determining the forces and means which have not suffered from
the strikes, and assigning them combat missions ;
5. Restoring control and moving troops which have been hit into
designated areas ;
6. Partial special processing of troops;
7. Clearing and restoration of routes of movement; extinguishing
fire which are dangerous for the troops;
8. Filling in crews and teams which have lost part of their per
sonnel ;
9. Creating composite podrazdeleniya ;
10. Taking over combat equipment left without crews or teams;
11. Training new crew and team members in necessary skills of using
weapons and other combat equipment.
At first a trend was observed of evaluating the combat effectiveness
of soyedineniya and chasti only according to their strength as a per
centage of that authorized . However, by 1959 this turned out to be in
sufficient for an evaluation of a loss of troop combat effectiveness, and
not only quantitative , but also qualitative indicators appeared .
In evaluating the combat effectiveness of chasti and podrazdeleniya ,
we began to consider not only the overall percentage of losses, but also
the losses and degree of combat effectiveness of podrazdeleniya of tank ,
artillery, antiaircraft, engineer, control points, rear area organs, etc.,
as well as the designation and amount of equipment remaining without
crews or teams.
In 1954–1959 several methods were developed to restore combat
effectiveness. Application of a particular method depended on the size
and character of losses suffered by the troops.

264
 While the troops retained their basic control organs and a large part
of their weapons and combat equipment, the restoration of their combat
effectiveness began to be accomplished within the framework of the
'previous troop organizational structure.
Here the number of active podrazdeleniya and chasti is reduced , and
some of them are transferred to a lower organizational level. In addition ,
it is possible to have a partial replenishment of these chasti and podraz
deleniya with personnel or entire podrazdeleniya .
With heavy losses and with the loss of a considerable portion of
qualitative elements, the need arises for a partial or even complete
organizational realignment of troop organisms. The goal of such a re
alignment is in some way to eliminate the disparity which has arisen in
forces and means and increase the combat effectiveness of chasti and
podrazdeleniya remaining after enemy strikes. Creation of composite
podrazdeleniya is one of the ways to achieve this goal.
In nuclear warfare troop losses in various types of combat equip
ment will be very involved. Vehicles and vehicular radios are disabled
more rapidly and from strikes of a comparatively small number of en
emy nuclear weapons. A considerably greater number of weapons are
needed to destroy tanks and sealed APCs, as well as artillery pieces,
and so for these indicators the combat effectiveness will decrease con
siderably slower.
Each type of combat equipment may be successfully employed on the
battlefield only in the presence of a trained crew or team . However,
man's steadfastness against strikes by nuclear missiles, even when he
uses the protective attributes of his combat equipment, is much lower
than for any type of equipment or weapon . This will cause a consider
able excess of personnel losses over losses of all types of equipment.
The relative losses in personnel of different combat arms and special
troops will be different. In areas of enemy nuclear strikes great accumula
tions of fully operable combat equipment or equipment with slight dam
age are inevitable , where the crews or teams have been disabled . In this
regard , one of the methods of restoring troop combat effectiveness, as
outlined in 1954–1959, was to reclaim the operable combat equipment
which had lost its crews and create composite podrazdeleniya on its
base. The first way to reclaim this equipment is to immediately seek
out and shift crews and teams to the area of losses and perform all the
necessary work to restore combat effectiveness. The second way is to
perform the very same work and reclaim all equipment, but only after
a drop in radiation or contamination levels, i.e., after a considerable
length of time.
The timely move of troops out of areas of radioactive contamination
is of great importance for restoring their combat effectiveness.

265
Conformity of the Goal of the Operation or Battle to
Conditions of the Actual Situation

The goal of the operation or battle must fully conform to the condi
tions of the actual operational ( combat) situation and be commensurate
with the forces and means in their correlation with the enemy's forces
and means and with consideration of the factors of space and time.
This principle obtained considerable development in the period 1954–
1959.
The principle of conformity of the goal of an operation or battle
with conditions of the situation meets the demands of scientific justifi
cation of decisions made in conducting combat operations to the great
est extent. It stems from the demands of the aforementioned four laws
of war , as well as the first and second laws of armed conflict.
Skillful use of this principle permits assurance of successful reali
zation of the actual capabilities of troops in achieving victory. However ,
a violation of this principle is equivalent to abandonment of the demands
of scientific leadership of troops . It is connected with subjectivism in
estimating combat reality , and in the final account verges on adven
turism , which leads it only to disruption of accomplishment of assigned
combat missions, but often to defeat as well.
According to formal signs , this principle could in a certain sense be
relegated to particular principles of control. However it is especially
important for operational art and tactics as a whole, inasmuch as its em
ployment or disregard is directly connected with achieving success or
defeat on the battlefield . Skillful use of this principle is a great art.
Therefore it will be fully correct to place it among the principles of
military art.
The goal of an operation or battle is that end result which must be
achieved in a concrete operational (combat) situation . In the attack
the goal of the operation or battle is defeat of the main opposing enemy
grouping and capture of specific areas (positions) which support further
development of the attack . On the defense this goal consists of dis
rupting the enemy attack , holding occupied areas, and creating con
ditions for a subsequent shift to the attack .
The goal of an operation or battle stems from the content of the com
bat mission assigned by the senior commander and is the basic starting
point for development of the concept of upcoming combat operations.
Observance of the principle of conformity of the goal of an opera
tion or battle with conditions of the actual situation (for brevity we will
subsequently call it the “ principle of conformity” ) presumes a thorough
and profound estimate of the situation , making a substantiated de
cision , and precise organization of support of combat operations and
troop control.
We know that comparison of the grounded conclusions from an eval
uation of all elements of the situation provides an opportunity not only

266
to determine once and for all the concept of the operation and battle,
but also to identify its practicability and based on this assign the troops
combat missions within their powers and skillfully organize their inter
working and control. Consequently, an estimate of the situation is the
starting point in using this principle.
There may be two basic extremes in evidence in an estimate of the
situation — an overestimation of friendly forces and an underestimation
of the enemy, or on the contrary , an underestimation of friendly cap
abilities and an overestimation of the enemy's strength . The first extreme
leads to the assignment of impossible combat missions to the troops,
and this can lead not only to incomplete achievement of the goals of an
operation or battle, but also to a loss of the battle or engagement, and in
the worst case even to the total defeat of one's forces . The second ex
treme (overestimation of the enemy's strength ) usually involves loss
of an actual opportunity to defeat the enemy.
Negative consequences of an erroneous estimate of the situation of
ten may be corrected in the course of an operation or battle . However,
'an attempt at even tardy use of the principle of conformity will require
great efforts by the command at all levels and by the troops. Merely
the clarification or even fundamental change in combat missions, the
new organization of troop coordination, and sometimes even a change
in concept of operation or battle may ensure restoration of the con
formity of the goal to the conditions of actual combat reality. However,
attempts to restore this conformity will far from always be crowned with
success, as shown by numerous examples in military history.
Examples are widely known of the failure of adventuristic plans of
the fascist military command in the past war. One of the important
reasons for the decisive defeat of German troops at Moscow , Stalingrad ,
and Kursk was the violation of this principle . We saw in evidence a clear
overestimation by fascist commanders of the combat capabilities of
the Hitlerite troops and an underestimation of the combat might of the
Soviet Army. In the course of these decisive battles the Hitlerite com
mand was not able to influence the development of events, which was
catastrophic for it.
As an example of skillful use of the demands of this principle , with
consideration for changes in the situation in the course of combat opera
tions, we can cite at the least the operation to destroy a major enemy
grouping surrounded at Stalingrad . According to the initial plan , the
Second Guards Army, located on the approaches to Stalingrad , was also
to have taken part in destruction of the grouping. However, an enemy
counterblow on the Kotelnikovo Axis forced the command to retarget
this army to fight on the outer front of encirclement. The forces and
means available on the inner front of encirclement were clearly in
sufficient for achieving the assigned goals in accordance with the pre
viously outlined concept. In view of this, the operation was halted in

267
good time. A certain amount of time was needed to bring the forces and
means of the Don and Stalingrad fronts into accordance with the
concept of the operation to destroy the surrounded 330,000 man enemy
grouping. A partial regrouping of troops was performed . Missions were
clarified with the troops. Reinforcements were received , and the troops
of two fronts were united into a single Don Front with the aim of better
coordination of their efforts, etc. The shift in time for the final defeat
of the surrounded enemy grouping ensured one additional important
gain : after sucecssful repulse of a counterblow on the outer front of
encirclement, the moral steadfastness , and consequently the combat
effectiveness, of the surrounded troops dropped considerably, although
the enemy resistance continued to be fierce . On the whole , the main aim
was achieved : forces and means of our troops were again brought into
conformity with the goals and refined concept of operation , which en
sured brilliant fulfillment of the mission to destroy a very large grouping
of Hitlerite troops on a decisive axis of the Soviet-German front.
Just this example alone reveals the important demand of the princi
ple of conformity : it is necessary to consider not only the quantitative,
but also the qualitative aspect of the forces and means of both sides.
Consideration only of the quantitative aspect is far from sufficient in
order for the planning to be realistic and scientific, as looking only at
creation of a sufficient degree of superiority over the enemy in the at
tack or a minimum necessary density of forces and means in the de
fense, a quantitative estimate of fire and maneuver capabilities, conduct
of substantiated calculations of time for performance of combatmissions,
etc. It is no less important to carefully consider the qualitative aspect
of forces and means — the degree of their combat training, training of
commanders of all levels, presence of combat experience in soyedineniya
( chasti, podrazdeleniya ), degree of physical and moral readiness of
personnel for performance of combat missions, etc. It is the quality of
troops which permits winning, not in numbers, but in ability . It is pos
sible to have a considerable quantitative superiority over the enemy,
i.e., observe the principle of conformity outwardly, formally, but to
lose the battle or engagement as a result of low combat training of
troops, poorly thought out organization of their coordination or control,
or unsatisfactory rear area support.
It is also necessary to point out another important demand in prac
tical realization of this principle — a demand which touches on assign
ment of combat missions to troops: it is necessary to determine the op
timum , maximum scope of missions with the minimum expenditure of
forces and means. In other words, the troops must be assigned missions ,
the performance of which will ensure fastest accomplishment of the end
mission with a minimum expenditure of forces and means. The plan of
the operation or battle must be strenuous but fully realistic . Insufficiently
strenuous plans will be easily accomplished by the troops, but in so doing

268
the troops may be far from using fully their potential capabilities. On the
other hand , missions which are expanded in scope will be performed by
the troops with an enormous overexertion , which will lead to rapid ex
haustion of their combat capabilities. Therefore it is necessary to strive
for determination of the optimum , maximum scope of missions, i.e., for
a realistically achievable maximum .
Here it is well to recall the words of Lenin about errors of economic
planning which led to difficulties in the supply of fuel for important
branches of the national economy in 1920 : “ The chief mistake of all
of us was until now that we were counting on the best, and from this
fell into bureaucratic utopias. A negligible fraction of our plans were
realized . Life and everyone laughed at the plans. This has to be fun
damentally redone,” 41 i.e., figure out plans based on realistic resources
of the state. Lenin demanded a scientific approach to compilation of
plans for the electrification of Russia as well. He said that “ these will
be broad plans, not taken from fantasy, but strengthened by technology
and prepared by science.” 42 These instructions by Lenin have a direct
relationship to the practical use of the principle of operational art and
tactics under examination .
In the past war these demands were violated more than once .
A characteristic example in this regard is the directive No 3 of the
GHQ dated 22 June 1941 on the counteroffensive of friendly forces.
Mar SU G. K. Zhukov in his memoirs notes : “ In assigning the mission
for the counteroffensive, the GHQ of the High Command did not know
the real situation which had formed by the end of 22 June. The com
mand of the fronts also did not know the situation . In its decision the
High Command proceeded , not from an analysis of the actual situation
and justified calculations, but from intuition and a desire for activeness
without consideration of the capabilities of the troops, which can never
be done in any instance at important moments of armed conflict.” 43
We can also refer to examples which Army Gen S. M. Shtemenko
cites in his recollections. In telling of the defeat of German troops in
the North Caucasus in the beginning of 1943, the author remarks that
the GHQ and the General Staff pointed out opportunely individual mis
takes of our troops command: “ In a note from the General Staff dated
7 January it stated that troops of the group (the Northern Group — V.S.)
are being given unrealistic missions in depth : for example , the Kuban ’
Cavalry Corps was to take Voroshilovsk by 9 January , which was
200 kilometers from the corps location ; Fifty -Eighth Army was given
the mission of crossing over 100 kilometers in two days while engaged
in combat. The missions of Forty -Fourth Army were also unrealistic.

" Lenin , XLIV , 63.

Ibid ., XL , 108 .
* G. K. Zhukov, Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya (Recollections and Reflections),
Izd-vo APN , Moscow , 1969, p 264.

269
At the same time, Ninth Army, which had advanced farthest, was
intentionally delayed in place for three days and was moved into the
99 44
reserve .
We will give an even more characteristic example, described by
Shtemenko. On 1 February 1945 part of the troops of the First Belo
russian Front (commanded by Mar SU G. K. Zhukov) completed a
dash to the west bank of the Oder and captured small bases of operation
in the vicinity of Kuestrin . The operational situation took shape un
favorably for us . Our armies, which had covered up to 500 kilometers
with constant heavy fighting, had regiments consisting of two battalions,
while 22–45 men remained in the companies. It was extremely difficult
with supplies. The troops were experiencing an acute lack of ammuni
tion . German aviation had temporarily seized aerial supremacy. The
extended flank of the First Belorussian Front did not provide Zhukov
an opportunity to create a powerful shock grouping on the main axis. The
enemy succeeded in a short time in changing the correlation of forces
in his favor on the Berlin Axis , especially on its East Pomeranian
flank, and placing our troops in an extremely unfavorable situation .
The fascist German command, taking advantage of the situation which
was unfavorable for the defense of the advanced armies of First Belo
russian Front, planned to cut them off with frontal attacks: to the south
from the vicinity of Arnswalde in Pomerania, and to the north from the
line Glogau -Guben in Silesia . An especially formidable danger of a
counterblow of major enemy forces arose on the right wing of the First
Belorussian Front. Several dozen enemy divisions could appear ad
ditionally on our front.
Shtemenko writes : “ If one considers that many of these divisions had
been brought up to strength by the enemy, while our divisions on an
average then counted 4,000 men each , if one considers all those diffi
culties which we experienced with the shipment of ammunition , fuel,
and other supplies, and also the temporary air superiority of German
aviation , then it becomes quite obvious why it became impossible for
us to continue a nonstop attack on Berlin . This would have been a
crime which naturally neither the Soviet Supreme High Command nor
the General Staff nor the front commanders could commit.” 45
In our time some authors have come to rebuke I. V. Stalin and G. K.
Zhukov for insufficient activeness and decisiveness. They presume that
Berlin could have been taken considerably earlier.
Shtemenko gives them a grounded answer : “ It does not appear to
me to be superfluous once again to recall here the political maneuvers
of fascist Germany . It was at this time that it actively was feeling out
ways to conclude a separate peace with the USA and Britain . Many

4 Shtemenko, Generaľnyy shtab v gody voyny (The General Staff in the Years
of War), Voyenizdat, Moscow , 1968, p 71.
4 Shtemenko , p 322 .

270
of the heads of the Third Reich were weaving an intricate web of
talks in hopes of setting the members of the anti-Hitler coalition to
fighting among themselves, winning time, and gaining from our allies
bargains with fascism behind the back of the USSR . In such a situation,
which placed especial historical responsibility in each decision , it was
impossible to act precipitately . The GHQ, the General Staff, and mili
tary councils of fronts again and again compared our capabilities with
those of the enemy and in the final account unanimously arrived at
the previous conclusion : without accumlating sufficient reserves of sup
plies on the Oder , without being in a position to use the entire might
of aviation and artillery , without having secured our flanks , we cannot
throw our armies into an attack on the capital of Germany. The risk
in the given instance was not appropriate. Political and military con
sequences in case of failure at the concluding stage of the war could
have been extremely difficult and irreversible for us.”
“ First of all it was necessary to disrupt the enemy plans for frontal
attacks from East Pomerania and Silesia and be quicker in dealing de
feat to the fascist German troops concentrated on the flanks.” 46
A temporary shift to the defense on the Berlin Axis permitted the
assignment of considerable forces for defeating the enemy in East
Pomerania . Shtemenko writes that “ on 4 April the elimination of the
enemy grouping in East Pomerania was completed . The danger of dis
ruption of our troops' attack on Berlin by blows at their flank and rear
from this territory of Germany was now completely precluded .”
“ The forced postponement of the Berlin operation , which was im
possible to avoid , guaranteed us indisputable victory . Well prepared and
supported in all respects, this operation took on a really crushing char
acter. Our last blows against the enemy in April-May 1945 were in
evitable as fate itself .” 47
A profound analysis of the situation which took shape in February
1945 on the Berlin Axis is given in the memoirs of Mar SU G. K. Zhukov.
He notes that it would have been possible to ignore the danger of an
enemy flank attack, set two tank armies and three or four combined
arms armies straight against Berlin , and approach it. But with an at
tack from the north the enemy could easily have disrupted our cover
ing force, moved to the crossings on the Oder, and placed the front
troops in the vicinity of Berlin in an extremely difficult position .
“ The experience of the war,” writes Zhukov , “ shows that risk must be
taken , but one cannot dig in . In this regard there is an instructive les
son with the offensive of the Red Army on Warsaw in 1920 , when an
unsupported and incautious advance of troops of the Red Army led to
a serious defeat for our Western Front, instead of to success.” 48 Zhukov
48
44 Ibid ., p 323 .
Ibid ., p 327 .
* Zhukov, pp 608-609 .

271
further draws a valid conclusion : it would be the purest adventure to
undertake a decisive attack on Berlin under those conditions.
These facts of history are a brilliant example of skillful employment
of the principle of conformity of the goal of an operation with conditions
of the actual situation .
Without doubt, cases are also possible where troops are assigned mis
sions which they are fully capable of performing, but the inability of an
inferior command to fully use the combat capabilities of available
forces and means and errors in troop action expressed as a violation of
other important principles of operational art and tactics may lead to
failure .
From what has been said it follows that use of the principle of con
formity must rely on the firm foundation of an objective estimate of all
other elements of the situation as well. There is the most important
significance in the ability of a command at all levels to turn the pos
sibility of victory into reality .
Under conditions of nuclear warfare, in which success on the battle
field will be achieved primarily by the skillful employment of nuclear
weapons, the goals of an operation or battle must be assigned chiefly
based on use of available nuclear weapons and with consideration of
nuclear strikes delivered by forces and means of higher echelons . The
quantitative and qualitative correlation of forces which must be con
sidered in determining the reality of the goal and concept now has to
have as its basic content the correlation of nuclear means. Without this,
any superiority in conventional means of warfare present at a given
moment of preparation or conduct of an operation or battle cannot be
regarded as sufficient, let alone decisive for determining the goal and
concept of combat operations.
Thus, in 1954–1959 the employment of nuclear weapons introduced
a new concept into the principle of conformity of the goal of an operation
or battle with actual conditions of a situation .
The history of warfare is extremely rich in examples which at first
glance appear paradoxical. The weaker often has conquered the
stronger. A battle or operation which appeared to be brilliantly planned
and prepared was not crowned with success, while clearly unrealistic
goals assigned to troops were achieved by them in extremely short
periods of time, etc. Don't these and similar examples contradict the
rightfulness of this principle ?
The answer to this question can only be an unequivocal: no, they do
not. If the weaker conquered the stronger, this meant that a quantitative
deficiency in forces and means was successfully compensated by quality ,
and primarily by the skillful employment of other principles of opera
tional art and tactics. This permits the assertion that in this case the
principle of conformity was fully employed
Ta the employment of nuclear weap'ins the use of this principle will

272
be a considerably more complex affair, inasmuch as one will have to
consider in a short time a much greater number of diverse , contradic
tory factors of the situation . Errors, consisting of unrealistic plans for
the conduct of combat operations, in nuclear warfare will as a rule cost
the troops dearly . The influence of individual random happenings on the
course and outcome of combat operations will be considerably greater
than previously. It follows from this that the reality of goals and con
cept of any operation or battle must now have , to take a term from
technology , an even greater margin of safety than in the past. The
capabilities of all forces and means must be viewed with consideration
of the timely reservation of a specific portion of them . A lack of the
necessary reserves under conditions of nuclear warfare will be a most
important indicator of violation of this principle .
This obligates our military cadres not only to estimate the impor
tance of this principle properly in the theoretical plane, but also be
constantly guided by it in the practice of combat and operational train
ing and in actual combat reality.

Interworking

The success of contemporary combat operations may be achieved

only through the joint efforts of all forces and means participating in
in an operation or battle on the basis of their close and continuous
interworking and fullest use of combat capabilities.
This principle has as its objective basis the aforementioned first and
second laws of armed conflict. It has great influence also on the principles
of formation of the armed forces and control of troops in wartime.
Based on this principle, we must strive on the one hand for harmonious
development of all branches of the armed forces and combat arms, as
much as is necessary for the successful conduct of contemporary com
bat operations, and on the other, for mastery of the art of organization
and constant maintenance of coordination of troops in the course of
an operation and battle. Of itself this coordination does not just appear.
It is a result of great creative and organizational work by commanders
and staffs of all echelons. The organizational capabilities and operational
tactical maturity of commanders and control organs are reflected , as at
a focal point, in the ability to ensure the efficient coordination of troops.
In practice, as a result of coordination , the weak aspects of some
branches of the armed forces and combat arms are supplemented by
the strong sides of others . This achieves the greatest force of an overall
blow against the enemy and his final defeat at a high tempo , in a shorter
time, and with least losses and material expenditures.
The methods of organization of interworking are constantly being
developed depending on changes in weaponry , organization , and char
acter of combat operations both of one's own forces and of enemy
troops. A particularly strong influence on coordination was exerted by

273
 those fundamental changes in military affairs which took place in 1954–
1959 in connection with the adoption of nuclear missiles by the troops
and improvement of conventional means of warfare. There must always
be a creative, innovative approach to the organization of coordination .
Our military history , such as the history of Suvorov's campaigns, is rich
with examples of such an approach to questions of coordination .
Before the Swiss campaign of Suvorov , troop combat operations on
various axes were almost not interrelated . In order to establish coordina
tion it was considered necessary to first assemble all the troops on one
of the axes . This technique conformed neither to the situation nor the
goals which Suvorov assigned his troops. The innovative general decided
to employ a new form of interworking which was based , not on elbow
to - elbow contact, but on organization of troop operations according
to goals , time, and place . Suvorov for the first time under this new
system attempted to organize a uniformity of combat operations on what
was for that time an enormous 250 -kilometer front. In his order to
Rimskiy -Korsakov dated 31 August 1799, Suvorov wrote : “ But if
everything is in the very same situation , then I immediately await
your overall plan of attack by distance , dates, and hours for conduct
of its totality from everywhere by the forces against the various points,
with my approach from St. Gotthard .” 49
The organization of interworking received considerable development
in the course of the Great Patriotic War. At the beginning of the war
coordination basically reduced to the coordinating of combat opera
tions of combat arms and special troops which were part of an
ob” yedineniye or soyedineniye. As soyedineniya of combat arms were
created (tank and mechanized corps, artillery corps and divisions, etc.),
the need arose to organize interworking not only within the combined
arms obʼyedineniya or soyedineniya , but also between soyedineniya
of combat arms (artillery, antitank, tank , and aviation ). At the begin
ning of the war the front commander arranged coordination basically
only between armies, since there were no other obʼyedineniya or
soyedineniya within the front. Mechanized corps and air divisions were
part of combined -arms armies. However, in the second period of the
war (fall of 1942), the front commander had to arrange for the inter
working of combined -arms obʼyedineniya and soyedineniy with artillery
soyedineniya , mobile troops, aviation , air defense ; and also the inter
working of mobile soyedineniya with aviation, air defense , artillery ;
-

artillery with aviation , etc.

1 In the course of the war the depth of organization of interworking
rose. At the war's beginning it was arranged to the depth of the immediate
mission. An increase in range of means of suppression , a growth in the
number of tanks and aircraft, and the need to commit mobile soyedine
niya to a breakthrough required the organization of interworking to a
49
Suvorov, p 319.

274
great depth . In the period 1944–1945 it usually was organized to the
entire depth of the mission of the corps or division .
Organization of interworking on the terrain was preceded by the care
ful coordination by the staff on maps of the efforts of combat arms and
chasti of the combat formation by stages of the battle, by time, and by
place of operation .
Increasing importance was assumed by control on the part of comand
ers-in -chief (commanders) or staff officers. A plan of control began to be
compiled . Under it were checked : timeliness of obtaining missions
and correctness of troop understanding of missions obtained ; course of
preparation of the operation and combat operations ; readiness of troops
for an attack ; organization of interworking ; knowledge of the enemy;
material support to troops and other questions. One of the basic meth
ods of control were flights in aircraft with the aim of checking the
true status of friendly troops on the battlefield and the organization of
concealment in the initial position .
Developing together with the development of military art, by 1959
interworking began to represent a very complex problem . While before
World War I it was necessary to organize interworking between infantry ,
artillery , and cavalry, now it was required to coordinate the efforts of
missile, tank , and motorized rifle troops, air defense troops, artillery,
engineer troops, etc., without mentioning the considerable complication
of missions of interworking forces and means. The appearance of nuclear
weapons and the possibility for mass employment, as well as development
of conventional means of warfare, total motorization and further mech
anization of combined -arms soyedineniya and chasti led to a radical
change in the nature of interworking and predetermined the changes in
its content.
In 1954–1959 military science arrived at the conclusion that, in spite
of the manifold increase in number of means of destruction , final suc
cess of combat operations could be achieved only through the joint
efforts of all forces and means participating in the operation or battle
on the basis of their close and continuous interworking, with the decisive
role being played by nuclear weapons. Any operation or any battle
represents coordinated and interconnected nuclear strikes and the opera
tions of ob ” yedinenyia , soyedineniya , and chasti of various branches of
the armed forces and combat arms executed according to a uniform plan
and directed toward a single goal.
Operational coordination began to consist of the coordinated actions
of operational ob ” yedineniya and soyedineniya which jointly accom
plished one or several interrelated missions. The basic content of inter
working of ob ” yedineniya and soyedineniya of various branches of the
armed forces in an operation began to comprise the coordinated delivery
of nuclear strikes and as effective as possible use of their results. In ac
cordance with this, the organization of interworking began to ensure

275
achievement primarily of these two chief goals. (See Istoriya voyn i
voyennogo iskusstva (History of Wars and Military Art), Moscow , 1970 ,
p 502.)
The essence of interworking in combined -arms combat began to con
sist of coordinated actions of all combat arms and means of destruc
tion by mission, axis , position , and time, as well as the mutual assist
ance of podrazdeleniya in interests of successful fulfillment of the overall
combat mission .
In view of the fact that nuclear weapons are the most powerful
means of destruction , the main element in the content of interworking
began to consist of coordination of troop operations with the aim of most
effective use of their results. At the same time, the necessity was
recognized of close mutual assistance and support by all combat arms
and special troops, ground forces and aviation , as well as adjacent units.
The importance of mutual assistance by adjacent units rose consider
ably in connection with the unevenness of development of combat
operations, the presence of intervals, and the possibility of formation
of gaps in combat formations and uncovering of flanks and rear.
Interworking as a principle of military art includes a number of rules
for its organization and support. In 1954–1959 these began to include
the following :
1. Coordination of troop efforts was to be executed primarily in in
terests of maximum decisive use of results of nuclear strikes against
the enemy. This is a most important rule. It expresses the need for re
ducing to a minimum the gap in time between nuclear strikes and the
move by attacking troops into the areas of breaches formed in the
enemy defense so as not to allow the enemy to eliminate the after
effects of the nuclear strikes and offer organized resistance . In these
same interests conventional means of destruction are also employed
against targets which were not subjected to nuclear strikes.
2. Interworking of conventional forces and means of warfare is to be
organized in the interests of performance of combat missions by combined
arms podrazdeleniya, chasti, and soyedineniya playing a chief part in
accomplishment of the combat mission.
3. Coordination of efforts is to be accomplished with consideration
of the combat qualities and capabilities, the strong and weak points of
chasti and podrazdeleniya of the various combat arms and special troops
participating in battle.
This rule presumes a skillful combination of combat attributes and
capabilities and of strong and weak points of chasti and podrazdeleniya
of the various combat arms and special troops, and a mutual com
pensation for weak sides.
4. Interworking must be based on mutual assistance and interchange
ability of podrazdeleniya and chasti of the combat arms, special troops,

276
and also of adjacent units in interests of fulfillment of the combat
missions assigned them .
The interworking of troops for the duration of an entire battle or
operation must be continuous and flexible . Even a brief interruption
of interworking reduces the force of the blow against the enemy, and if
it is disrupted to a considerable extent then this may introduce dis
organization into the troop operations, reduce their combat capabilities,
and make it easier for the enemy to take countermeasures directed toward
disruption of our troops' performance of their combat mission .
Special importance for maintaining constant interworking is assumed
by the initiative of subordinate commanders . In all cases of disruption
of interworking, they themselves have to attempt to establish contact
with adjacent units and with the senior commander and coordinate mutual
actions without awaiting special instructions for that. This demand is
closely interwoven with demands of the principle of combat activeness.
The questions of interworking, demands placed on it, methods and
content of work to organize interworking, and its maintenance in the
course of combat are covered in more detail in special works.

277
Conclusion

The principles of operational art and tactics bear a historical char

acter. A change in objective reality, primarily in the material basis of
battle or operation , leads inevitably to a change in principles, to dis
carding outmoded ones and developing new ones.
The principles of military art in ancient times began to form spon
taneously. Their development occurred empirically, proceeding from
the most urgent demands of practice , and not on the basis of profound
analysis of objective laws of armed conflict. Science was not in a posi
tion to discover these laws before the appearance of Marxist teaching.
Some principles of tactics and strategy such as the concentration of
forces for the main attack on the decisive point, and surprise , found
application as early as wars of the slave- holding states. However,
theoretically a majority of the principles of tactics and strategy were
developed for the first time only in the feudal era and in the period
of capitalism in works by Rumyantsev, Suvorov , Kutuzov , Napoleon ,
Jomini, Clausewitz , Leyer , Mikhnevich , and other prominent scientists
and generals. It is important to note here that some of the principles,
discovery of which is ascribed usually to Napoleon, in reality were
developed both theoretically and practically, as shown in the first chap
ter, in works and in the combat activity of A. V. Suvorov.
F. Engels, V. I. Lenin , and M. V. Frunze made outstanding con
tributions to the development and elaboration of the principles of
military art. The works of M. N. Tukhachevskiy , B. M. Shaposhnikov,
and V. K. Triandafillov, as well as Instrucktsiya po glubokomu boyu
(Instructions on Deep Combat) ( 1935 ) and the 1936 Field Regula
tions had great influence on development of the principles.
The principles of tactics, operational art, and strategy obtained
their greatest development on the base of the enormous combat experi
ence of the Great Patriotic War and changes in the material basis of
military operations which took place during the war and in the postwar
period, especially in the course of the revolution in military affairs.
The principles of operational art and tactics stem from objective
laws of warfare and armed conflict and have an objective foundation .
They are a result of the reflection in the heads of people of the
demands of laws of war and of armed conflict and of those conditions
under which it is conducted and in which the armed forces operate .
Principles are formulated by people as a result of perception of
reality . There are no principles outside the consciousness of people .
They are deduced by man with the help of abstract reasoning and
in this sense are subjective. Principles are ideas which always remain
in the sphere of consciousness . They are secondary with regard to the
objective laws of war and of armed conflict. However , having a sub
jective side connected with the form of their expression , the principles
at the same time are objective in the sense of their content, inasmuch

278
as it reflects the demands of objective laws. The degree of their validity
depends on the depth of penetration into the phenomena and processes
of armed conflict. Thus, based on priority of content with relationship
to form , one can state that the genuine principles of military art stem
ming from the laws of war and of armed conflict are primarily objective ,
but at the same time are also subjective.
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of principles of opera
tional art and tactics. In striving to attain victory in a battle or operation ,
one cannot act without proceeding from the principles of operational
art and tactics . Of great importance for the attainment of success is
not only, or even not so much the knowledge of principles of opera
tional art and tactics, as the ability to take advantage of them and make
decisions based on the complex aggregate of demands of the principles and
the concrete situation . The fuller that the demands of the principles
are considered , the more correct is the decision of the commander, and
the greater the chances for winning victory . Principles are starting
points for the commander's decision , and not the decision itself. In the
latter case they would be transformed into stereotype and unfounded
recipes for victory .
The ability to carry out a decision which has been made and to re
main true to assimilated principles as they are used demands great
art and firm knowledge of the principles. The executive part of use of
principles is the most difficult. In this part one cannot give ready
decisions for every case . This would stifle any creativity of commanders.
But a firm knowledge of the principles gives the commander's creativity
a fundamental base for making the proper decision , which is possible
with a firm knowledge of principles of military art, on the one hand,
and of the situation on the other, with the skillful application of their
demands, which usually contradict one another. However, the palm is
borne here by the situation. The situation finally, in the last instance ,
decides the question of the application of a particular principle of
military art in each concrete case .
The principles of military art cannot be viewed in isolation from one
another. They must be taken together and use made of those and to
the degree which the situation necessitates. Each principle is an individual
link in the overall chain . To achieve success requires the skillful use
of the entire chain or complex of principles which ensure fulfillment of
combat missions in a specific situation .
Use of the principles of military art under conditions of revolution
in military affairs advanced
affairs advanced aa new and important criterion — cost
effectiveness.
The cost aspects of accomplishment of combat missions were advanced
to one of the important spots due to the extremely high cost of combat
equipment and weapons and an observed trend for its further sharp
rise . In addition , presence in contemporary armies of varied combat

279
equipment and weapons permits accomplishment of many tasks with
different means and methods, the cost indicators of which may sharply
differ .
Skillful application of the principles of military art under modern
conditions presumes the optimum (best) planning of combat actions ,
rational use of forces and means in a battle or operation , and achieve
ment of victory with fewest losses of human lives, supplies, or time.
Accomplishment of these missions is eased by application of mathe
matical methods in military affairs : statistics, probability theory , game
theory , mathematical programming, queueing theory , mathematical mo
deling , network planning and control, search theory , theory of seeking
solutions, and others .
However, the most skillful application of principles of operational
art and tactics under modern conditions and the truly scientific control
of troops is impossible without a knowledge of what lies at the basis of
principles — the laws of war and of armed conflict. Penetration into the
mechanism of their action permits finding the most effective methods of
operations, influencing the conditions under which these laws function,
making the most advisable decisions under the most complex condi
tions of a combat situation , and skillfully putting them into effect.
By changing the conditions of action of laws and skillfully con
trolling these conditions, we can consciously change the results of the
effect of a particular law to our favor and skillfully direct this action
into the channel necessary . People's practical activity in a combat situa
tion can be successful only on condition of its conformity with objective
laws. The laws of war and armed conflict also are a basic tool of foresight
and its theoretical foundation . However, the ability to foresee something
has decisive importance in the activity of military cadres .
The revolution in military affairs and the appearance of new objective
conditions for conducting military operations led to fundamental changes
in the content and formulation of laws of war and of armed conflict,
and to the appearance of new laws. Among the latter the first law of
war will have decisive importance in a world war , if it is begun by
the aggressor with the mass employment of nuclear weapons. This is
that the course and outcome of war conducted with the unlimited em
ployment of all means of conflict depend first of all on the correlation
of avariable strictly military forces of the combatants at the beginning
of the war, especially nuclear weapons and means of delivery. From
this law stems a number of very important principles of operational
art and tactics, including surprise, concentration of basic effort at the
decisive place at the decisive time,mobility of troops , and others.
All other laws of war and armed conflict known to use also received
development.
From the first law of armed conflict come a number of very im
portant principles of operational art and tactics. Adoption of new means

280
of conflict and a proper correlation of new and previously existing
means permits us to skillfully resolve questions of concentration of efforts
on the axis of main attacks. Development of military equipment greatly
increases the capabilities of troops with regard to achieving surprise, and
at the same time it increases the significance of interworking and leads
to a change of its forms.
The appearance of nuclear weapons and high troop mobility in
troduced changes also in the content of the second law of armed
conflict, which defines the course and outcome of a battle or operation
depending on the correlation of combat might of the sides. In past wars
a change in correlation of forces or superiority over the enemy on a par
ticular sector of the front at a specific time were achieved by a nu
merical increase in forces and means. In 1954–1959 nuclear weapons
became the main means for changing the correlation of forces. Em
ployment of nuclear weapons will allow changing the correlation of forces
and means on a particular axis or sector in very short time periods, and
changing them unexpectedly, by bounds, and to the entire depth of the
enemy's disposition .
Development of the material basis of a battle or operation led to the
appearance of certain new principles of operational art and tactics and
to a change in the content of “ old ,” “ classical” principles.
Among the new principles of operational art and tactics in 1954–
1959 decisive importance was acquired by mobility and high tempos of
combat operations, and also by preservation of the combat effectiveness
of friendly troops.
Mobility of operations became the key to success in modern battle
or operation . High tempos of combat actions have just as high a
significance.
A radical method of increasing mobility of troops was recognized
in 1954–1959. This was the achievement of air-transportability of all com
bat equipment and the wide adoption by troops of various flying apparatus
designed not only to transport troops, but also for the immediate sup
port of combat operations, for attacking from the air.
Among the most important methods of troop operations directed
toward achieving high tempos of offense were primarily the following:
reliable suppression of the enemy by fire and timely exploitation of
results of nuclear strikes, for which airborne landings and advance
podrazdeleniya began to be widely recommended for employment, along
with having tanks in the first echelon and advancing forcefully in
approach march formations and columns without dismounting the in
fantry from the APCs; the conduct of maneuverable combat actions
along axes; forceful crossing of zones of radioactive contamination ;
nonstop forcing of water obstacles.
Preservation of troop combat effectiveness in the past was among the
most important duties of commanders and staffs, but was not con

281
sidered a principle of operational art and tactics inasmuch as previous
means of destruction could cause a relatively slow increase in losses and
the organizational integrity of soyedineniya and chasti was rarely dis
rupted .
The wide employment of nuclear weapons in a battle or operation
may lead to enormous losses suffered by the troops and their buildup
by leaps and bounds in extremely limited time periods, and to the
fundamental disruption of the oragnizational structure of troops, of
control systems, and of support both at the tactical as well as the
operational level. It is impossible to preclude the possibility of a practi
cally instantaneous disabling not only of entire podrazdeleniya and
chasti, but sometimes even soyedineniya .
Based on the above, preservation of troop combat effectiveness has
come to be impossible to view as one of the important duties of com
manders and staffs . In 1954–1959 it was elevated to the level of an
independent principle of operational art and tactics and is among the
basic guiding rules of troop actions.
The principle of concentration of effort has retained its very impor
tant significance for the achievment of victory. However, in 1954–1959
its content essentially changed and it began to be manifested somewhat
differently than before. The concentration of large masses of troops
in small areas in nuclear warfare has become inadmissible for con
siderations of security , since in so doing the troops might suffer im
measurable losses from possible enemy nuclear strikes . Moreover , now
there is not a special need for such a concentration .
Under the new conditions the achievement of success has come to be
tied with a concentration of efforts, and primarily of nuclear strikes ,
which can be used to sharply change the correlation of forces and
means to one's favor or a chosen axis or sector. In addition , the long
range of missiles makes it possible to deliver mighty nuclear strikes
while the missile launchers are located deep in the interior, and the
total motorization of troops ensures a rapid concentration of their
efforts while podrazdeleniya are situated over a relatively large area .
Consequently , the concentration of efforts on the most important axis
in 1954–1959 began to be achieved by other means and methods .
The importance of the principle of surprise increases as the means of
warfare develop . Surprise permits anticipating the enemy in delivering
strikes, catching him unawares, paralyzing his will, sharply reducing his
combat effectiveness , disorganizing his control, and creating favorable
conditions for defeating even superior forces.
The ways and methods of achieving surprise are very diverse. Depend
ing on the concrete conditions of the situation , surprise may be achieved
by leading the enemy astray regarding one's intentions, by secrecy of
preparation and swiftness of troop actions, by wide use of night condi
tions, by the unexpected employment of nuclear weapons and other

282
means of destruction, by delivering a forceful blow where and when the
enemy doesn't expect it , and by employing methods of conducting combat
operations and new means of warfare unknown to the enemy.
The principle of combat activeness is expressed in the choice of
goals of a battle and the methods of attaining them , in the ability of
commanders to make bold decisions and persistently put them into ef
fect, in the decisive, selfless actions of troops and their desire to win
victory by total defeat of the enemy, in constant influence on the enemy,
and in the timely use of all favorable conditions of the operational
tactical situation , the combat capabilities of friendly troops, and also the
mistakes and omissions of the enemy for accomplishing the combat
mission .
The principle of combat activeness presumes that, along with strikes
by strategic nuclear forces against military and economic targets of the
enemy, the attack will be a basic form of combat operations for our
troops, since it is of decisive importance in winning victory over the foe.
Only a resolute attack conducted at high tempos and to a great depth
ensures the total defeat of the enemy.
However this principle does not deny other forms of troop combat
activities . For example , in the defense it is expressed in the skillful
delivery of nuclear and fire strikes against the main enemy targets, in
the broad maneuver of forces and means, and in the conduct of resolute
counterattacks and counterblows.
The principle of combat activeness also demands effective use of suc
cesses achieved and the conduct of combat operations constantly day
and night, under any weather conditions, with the total exertion of
forces, until the final defeat of the enemy.
Successful use of the principle of conformity of the goal of an
operation or battle with conditions of the actual situation permit as
surance of successful conversion of the actual troop capabilities into
achievement of a victory in reality. Observance of this principle pre
sumes the comprehensive and profound estimate of the situation , making
a grounded decision , and the precise organization of support to combat
operations and troop control.
The importance of the principle of interworking is explained by the
fact that, in spite of the manifold increase in number of means of
destruction , final success of combat operations may be achieved only
through the joint efforts of all forces and means participating in an
operation or battle on the basis of their close and continuous inter
working, with the decisive role being with nuclear weapons. Any opera
tion or any battle represents the combination of coordinated and inter
related nuclear strikes and the actions of ob ” yedeneniya , soyedineniya ,
and chasti of different branches of armed forces and combat arms
accomplished under a uniform plan and directed toward a single goal.
A profound understanding and skillful use of the laws of war, the

283
laws of armed conflict, and the principles of operational art and tactics in
combat activities comprise the most important condition for achieving
victory in a battle or operation and for successful defeat and destruc
tion of the enemy, including one who is considerably superior in num
bers, especially of personnel.
In connection with what has been set forth , there is a need for some
realignment of the system of commanders training in chasti and soye
dineniya and of the training of officers in military schools . More atten
tion began to be focussed on principles of operational art and tactics.
Certain operational-tactical problems and tasks for combined use of
particular principles began to be practiced . Cost effectiveness began to
be considered in accomplishing combat missions. The laws of war and
of armed conflict began to be studied with all officers and generals,
not only on a philosophical, but also an operational-tactical plane.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974 0-532-028

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