Week 6 Case Digests

1. People vs. Hilvano

G.R. No. L-8583

July 31, 1956
Digested by: Vethy Veth → QC: Ponfi
Topic: Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions- Art. 177

Facts:

● On September 22, 1952, Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar departed

for Manila on official business. He designated the defendant Francisco Hilvano,
councilor, to discharge the duties of his office.

● On the same day, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre went to the municipal building;
and having found Hilvano acting in the place of the Mayor, he served written
notices to the corresponding municipal officers, including Hilvano, that he, as
the Vice-Mayor was assuming the duties of the absent mayor.

● Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that he had been designated by the Mayor.

● The Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary informing the

latter of the controversy and the latter replied that under sec. 2195 of the
Revised Administrative Code it was the Vice-Mayor who should discharge the
duties of the Mayor during the latter's temporary absence. And also sought
the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal with a reply that the Vice-Mayor had the
right to the office.

● Shown this official pronouncements, Hilvano still refused to surrender the

position, which he held for about a month, appointing some policemen,
solemnizing marriages and collecting the corresponding salary for mayor.

● Hilvano was convicted of usurpation of public authority under Art. 117 of the
RPC as amended by R.A. No. 379.

Issue: WON the defendant committed usurpation of authority (YES)

Ruling: Hilvano committed usurpation of authority. The defendant upon contention

that he could not be charged for he was a councilor, court held that there is actually
no reason to restrict the operation of Article 177 to private individuals only. For one
thing it applies to "any person"; and where the law does not distinguish, (the Court)
should not distinguish.

In the beginning he might have pleaded good faith, invoking the designation by the
Mayor; but after he had been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the
opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the
position. He was rightfully convicted.

Dispositive: The penalty imposed on him should be modified, in accordance with

the recommendation of the Solicitor General. He is sentenced to an indeterminate
term of 4 months of arresto mayor to two years of prision correccional. So modified,
the appealed judgment is affirmed with costs against appellant.
Notes:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall
knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of
any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government
or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to
do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods.
2. Miranda vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R No. 154098

July 27, 2005

Digest: ANDRADE → QC: Ponfi

Topic: Usurpation of authority or official functions-Art. 177

Facts:

1. The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda (Mayor Miranda), then

mayor of Santiago City, Isabela under preventive suspension for six months
for alleged violations of R.A 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees).
2. Subsequently, Vice Mayor Navarro filed a complaint with the Ombudsman
alleging that Mayor Miranda committed acts which are in violation of Article
177 of the RPC- the felony of usurpation of authority or official functions.
3. Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer
and in good faith on November 1997 even if his suspension ran from July
1997 to July 1998.
4. He averred that on the day he reassumed office, he received a memorandum
from the DILG to vacate his office and he immediately complied the same.
5. On October 1998, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Information against Mayor Miranda for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC.
6. On November 2001, the prosection filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion
to suspend Mayor Miranda based on Section 13 of R.A 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).
7. Miranda opposed the motion on the ground that the offense of usurpation of
authority or official functions under Art. 177 of the RPC is not embraced by
Section 13 of R.A No. 3019 which only contemplates offenses which involve
“fraud upon government or public funds or property”.

Issue: WON the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions involves “fraud
upon government or public funds or property” found in Section 13 of R.A 3019.
(YES)

Ruling: The Court finds no reason to disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A 3019 as two types of offenses:
(1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving
public funds or property.

Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, nothing in R.A 3019 evinces any
legislative intent to limit Section 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or
property. The phrase “any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
or property” is clear and categorical. To limit the use of “government” as an
adjective that qualifies “funds” is baseless. The word “public” precedes “funds” and
distinguishes the same from private funds. To qualify further “public funds” as
“government funds”, as petitioner claims is the law’s intent, is plainly superfluous.
The Court is bound by the rule that a statute should be construed reasonably with
reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions should not be given a meaning
that is inconsistent with its scope and object.

R.A 3019 should be read to protect the State from fraud by its own officials.
Moreover, when accused-mayor appointed persons in various positions, he indirectly
dealt with the city's funds as those persons appointed will be given their respective
salaries, benefits and other monetary consideration which will be paid wholly or
mainly out of the city's funds. Additionally, when he performed acts pertaining to the
Office of the Mayor, i.e. approval of vouchers, and payment of other expenses which
is subject to proof, he likewise indirectly dealt with the funds of the city. Miranda,
willfully and knowingly, during the effectivity of his suspension barged into the City
Hall, issued orders and directives and performed functions as City Mayor, he was
sending the unwritten yet visible message that he was authorized to do and function
as such. . . ." We hold this as a fraud upon government resulting in the chaos or
confusion albeit temporary, as the employees would be in a quandary whom to
follow or obey.

DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DISMISSED there being no

showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing its
Resolution of 4 February 2002, preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days.

Additional Notes:

Alleged acts done by the mayor:

(a) issued a memorandum addressed to Navarro advising her that he was assuming
his position as City Mayor; (b) gave directives to the heads of offices and other
employees; (c) issued Office Order No. 11-021 which authorized certain persons to
start work; and (d) insisted on performing the functions and duties of Mayor despite
Navarro's requests to desist from doing so without a valid court order and in spite of
the order of Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez directing him to cease from reassuming the
position.

The dissenting opinion, however, says there was no fraud. It holds that "it would be
fraud of public funds if these public officials just collected their salaries without
service to the government." It further asserts that "fraud upon government" must be
read so as to require that malversation of funds was committed.

This is a complete volte face from its claim that Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 covers
two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud upon the government; and (2)
any offense involving public funds or property. What is more, adopting the
dissenting opinion's line of reasoning would render superfluous the phrase "fraud
upon government" as malversation is subsumed by "any offense involving public
funds or property."
3. People vs. To Lee Piu

G.R. No. 1152

September 26, 1916

Blancs → QC: Ponfi

Topic: Using Fictitious Name & Concealing true name (Art. 178)

Facts:

● The appellant To Lee Piu was charged with using a false name.
● He came to the Philippine Islands in 1911 and presented a section six
certificate wherein his name appears to be To Lee Piu.
● Thereafter, he attached an application for a passport the name Toribio Jalijali.
Said application was accompanied by the affidavits of two witnesses and by a
baptismal certificate showing that a person by that name was born in the
Philippine Islands in 1878.
● On the trial there was no denial of the fact that appellant signed the name
Toribio Jalijali to the application for a passport.
● According to the defendant, he was born in the Philippine Islands as Toribio
Jalijali. He went to China at an early age. Feeling doubtful as to his ability to
prove his right to reenter, he applied to the American consul at Canton for a
section six certificate.
● The charge is prosecuted on the theory that To Lee Piu is the appellant's
correct name and that the name Toribio Jalijali is false.

ISSUE:WON the accused-appellant should be convicted of the crime of using a

false name (YES)

RULINGS: The accused-appellant should be convicted of the crime of false

name. The appellant used the name of another person for the purpose of
deceiving the Government: to obtain a passport. His only supporting
document to his claim was a certificate of baptism of an infant named Toribio
Jalijali, born in Santa Cruz, Manila, in April, 1878.

But originally, when he came to the Philippines he stated that:

1) He came to the Philippine Islands as a Chinese person traveling for curiosity

and pleasure; and 2) He so represented himself to the American consul at
Canton and, by that representation, obtained a section six certificate.

The name Toribio Jalijali was a false name for he presented himself to the
American consul at Canton, as not Toribio nor Toribio Jalijali, but To Lee Piu, thus
clearly implying that he belonged to the family or tribe of To, and, therefore, was
not of Philippine origin or birth. The Christian name, while being the speci􏰄c and
individual name, is of no value whatever for identification purposes.

To Lee Piu was the name by which the appellant was known in China. It is the
name he gave to the American consul and it is the only name he gave. He alleged
 that he was born in China in October, 1878, and applied for a certificate which is
required of Chinese persons only. One of the most important duties of American
officials engaged in permitting the entry of Chinese persons into American
territory is to establish and preserve the identity of the particular individual to be
admitted to protect the territory of the United States from an invasion of Chinese
laborers.

Appellant testified in the Chinese language by means of a Chinese interpreter. He

showed no familiarity with the Spanish language or with any of the Philippine
dialects; and the trial court said, with reference to his personal appearance, that
"so far as could be judged from all surface characteristics the defendant is in
truth and in fact a Chinese person as he describes himself in the Philippine
Carnival certificate is alone suffcient to show that the defendant's statements are
unworthy of credence, that his claim that he was born in the Philippine Islands is
false, and that the name Toribio Jalijali now claimed by the defendant is false and
assumed.

Additional Notes (not in case but from book):

Under Art. 178 of the RPC there are two acts that are punished in this art. Namely 1)
Using a fictitious name and 2) Concealing the true name

Elements of using fictitious name:

a) To conceal a crime
b) To evade a judgement
c) To cause damage to public interest

Elements of concealing true name:

a) Offender conceals his true name and other personal circumstances
b) The purpose is to conceal is in order to conceal his identity
4. People vs. Estrada

G.R. Nos. 164368-69

April 2, 2009

Digested by: Burce → QC: Ponfi

Topic: Using fictious name and concealing true name – Art. 178

Facts:

● That on or about 04 February 2000, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada

opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and signed as "Jose Velarde" in the
account opening documents in the presence of two PCIB officers Clarissa G.
Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato as well as two of his staff Aprodicio
Lacquian and Fernando Chua.
● Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several transactions as
evidenced by the several transactions a certain Baby Ortaliza, who at the
time was employed on the of the Vice President and later on in the Office of
the President when Estrada occupied these positions when the deposits were
made, by depositing several checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-
62502-5 under the account name "Jose Velarde" from October 1999 – July
200 (total of 12 times).

Issues:

WON Estrada is liable of violation of Art. 178 (NO)

Held:

● No, Estrada did not violate Art. 178 because "Jose Velarde" was not
used publicly.
● The Court held that the People’s claims that the presence of two other
persons who are not bank officers – Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua –
when Estrada’s signed the bank documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a
"public" use of an alias has no merit.
● The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of
libel – that mere communication to a third person is publicity. Our close
reading of Ursua – particularly, the requirement that there be intention by
the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited above – tells us
that the required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere
communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be
considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or
place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held
liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held
himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name.
In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
● “To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as
Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily
indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose
Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public
who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that
transpired in Malacañan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of
Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence,
 while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of
friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus,
Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde
to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua
were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s
alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for
these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s representations to
these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of
intention of publicity.”
● The nature of the transaction affords Estrada a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening
of a trust account – a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely
confidential in nature.
● In Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, when we said that R.A. 1405 is broad enough to
cover Trust Account No. 858.

We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized
zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of
signing the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the opening
of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was
already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed
the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the
obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is
essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied
in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy
and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction
was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.

Notes:

Art. 178. Using fictitious name and concealing true name. — The penalty of
arresto mayor and a fine not to exceed 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall publicly use a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a
crime, evading the execution of a judgment or causing damage.

Any person who conceals his true name and other personal circumstances shall
be punished by arresto menor or a fine not to exceed 200 pesos.
5. U.S. vs Soliman
G.R. No. 11555
January 6, 1917
Digested by: kjapz; QC: Bonifacio

Topic: Art. 181; False testimony favorable to the defendant/Accused

testifying in his own behalf

FACTS:

● Soliman testified in his own behalf during a previous criminal case in which he
and several others were charged with estafa.
● He falsely testified that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of
the said charge, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt,
had not been executed voluntarily, and that it was procured by the police
through the use of force, intimidation, and prolonged torture.
● The presiding trial judge in the previous criminal case then acquitted Soliman
on the ground that there was room for reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
WON Soliman is liable for false testimony favorable to the defendant. (YES)

RULING:
An accused person may testify under oath in his own behalf, and if he declares
falsely as a witness in his own cause, like any other witness, he incurs the penalty
by which false testimony in criminal matters.

The right of an accused to testify under oath is secured to him, not that he may be
enabled to introduce false testimony into the record, but to enable him to spread
upon the record the truth as to any matter within his knowledge which will tend to
establish his innocence.

When, as in this case, an accused person voluntarily goes upon the witness stand
and falsely imputes to some other person the commission of a grave offense, he
should be called to account in a criminal action for perjury upon the complaint
of the person against whom such false charges are made.

Disposition: The judgment of conviction in the court below is affirmed.

NOTES:

• Article 319 of the [old] Penal Code (Now Article 181 of the RPC) – Any person
who shall give false testimony in favor of a defendant in a criminal case shall suffer a
penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in
its medium degree and a fine of not less than three hundred and seventy-five and
not more than three thousand seven hundred and fifty pesetas, if the case were for
a felony, and the penalty of arresto mayor if it were for a misdemeanor.

• [From the book of Reyes] It would seem that the ruling in the Soliman case
should apply only when, as in that case, the defendant voluntarily goes upon the
witness stand and falsely imputes to some other person the commission of a grave
offense. If he merely denies the commission of the crime or his participation therein,
he should not be prosecuted for false testimony.
6. U.S. vs. Aragon
G.R. No. L-2709
December 28, 1905
Digested by: Jane; QC: Bonifacio

Topic: Art. 182; False Testimony in civil cases

FACTS:
● In a civil case between E.H. Warner and Isidro Aragon (Aragon as a tenant
allegedly failed to pay owner Warner of a land for years 1899-1903), the
accused, assistant for the Justice of Peace of Singalong was summoned as a
witness to appear before the Justice of the Peace court of Manila and after
having been duly sworn he testified.

● Questions like “Do you know Pasay estates” and other estates were asked and
also if he was the justice of peace for Singalong (in here, he said that he was
just an assistant but then he was asked if he was the acting judge during that
time in which he affirmed.) Also, if he has a recollection of the Augustinian
Fathers and of Montilla as the administrator of the Pasay estate, and if there
were suits brought by Mr. Montilla for forcible entry and detainer, and if he
has a recollection of Father Benito as the administrator of Hacienda of Pasay.

● His answers were that he did not remember, or that he had no recollection
concerning those facts.

● The inferior court found him guilty of the crime of giving false testimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inferior court erred in finding the defendant guilty of the
crime of giving false testimony. (YES)

RULING:
● The prosecuting attorney proved the existence of the facts with reference to
which the defendant was questioned, but failed to prove that the statements
of the defendant with reference to those facts were false. The mere fact that
the defendant had to do in the year 1896 with certain facts and relations was
not sufficient to prove that he stated a falsehood when he stated in
December, 1904, that he had "no recollection with reference to such facts or
relations."

● The evidence adduced during the trial fails, in our judgment, to show
that the defendant testified falsely or gave false testimony as was charged in
the complaint. In order that a defendant may be convicted under article 321
(now Art. 182 of the RPC) of the Penal Code for giving false testimony, the
following facts must be shown:

1. The testimony must be given in a civil cause.

2. The testimony must relate to the issues presented in said cause.
3. The testimony must be false.
4. The false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to
be false.
5. Such testimony must be malicious and given with an intent to affect the
issues presented in said cause.

● The evidence adduced during the trial of this case is not sufficient to show
that the defendant committed the crime charged in the complaint.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The judgment of the inferior court is reversed and the
said cause is hereby ordered to be dismissed.

Additional Note: "Falso testimonio" under Spanish law corresponds to "false

swearing" under English law. False swearing, under the English law, is committed by
a person who swears falsely before any person authorized to administer an oath
upon a matter of public concern, under such circumstances that the false swearing
would have amounted to perjury if committed in a judicial proceeding.
7. ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC., vs.
The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150, HON.
ZEUS ABROGAR, VIOLETA BAGUIO and LORELEI IRA
G.R. No. 137010 August 29, 2003
Digested by: JA D Callera; QC: Bonifacio

Topic: Art. 182, False Testimony in civil cases

FACTS:
● Herein petitioner Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity) filed with
the City Prosecutor of Makati a criminal complaint for False Testimony in a
Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private
respondents Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira.
● In the information, it was said that the above-named accused, knowingly
gave false testimony upon a material fact in Civil Case, relative to a
complaint for Collection of sum of money, torts and damages filed by Ark
Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Inc.) against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc.
(NFMA, Inc.), in which one of the principal issues was whether or not payment
of the claim of ARK, Inc. has been made by NFMA, Inc.
● The said accused while testifying for NFMA, Inc., testified on direct testimony,
by way of a sworn statement, and while under oath on the witness stand, to
the damage and prejudice of ARK, Inc.

ISSUE: WON the testimonies of private respondents in the civil case are false is a
prejudicial question. (YES)

RULING:
To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the
Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must concur:
1. the testimony must be given in a civil case;
2. the testimony must relate to the issues presented in the case;
3. the testimony is false;
4. the false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the
same to be false; and
5. such testimony must be malicious and given with and intent to affect
the issues presented in the case.
There is no doubt that the first two requisites are extant in this case. The records
show that Ark Travel filed a complaint for collection of sum of money, torts and
damages against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMAI). They executed their
respective sworn statements and testified before the trial court that NFMAI has no
outstanding obligation with Ark Travel as the same had been paid in full.

The existence of the last three requisites is quite dubious. The falsity of the
subject testimonies of private respondents is yet to be established. It is
noted that at the time of the filing of the criminal complaints, the civil case filed by
Ark Travel is still pending decision. Ark Travel has yet to prove the validity of its
monetary claims and damages against NFMAI.
It is only after trial that the RTC can assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony
and correspondingly render a decision. Thus, the civil case is so intimately connected
with the subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
respondents in the criminal cases. In other words, whether or not the
testimonies of private respondents in the civil cases are false is a
prejudicial question.

Hence, pending determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies of private

respondents in the civil case, the criminal action for false testimony must be
suspended.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders dated October 2, 1998

and November 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE
insofar only as said court, acting as an appellate court, considered Criminal Cases
Nos. 200894 and 200895 as withdrawn.

The Orders dated June 10, 1998 and July 21, 1998 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati (Branch 67) in Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895 are likewise
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

In lieu thereof, the said Metropolitan Trial Court is directed to SUSPEND the criminal
proceedings until after the final decision in Civil Case No. 95-1542 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 137). No costs.

8. People vs. Angangco

G.R. No. L-47693
Oct. 12, 1943
By: KCatantan (Digest extracted from the book)

Facts:
● In connection with an investigation concerning anomalies in the administration
of the estate of a deceased person, accused Angangco defined certain
signatures in writing and later it was sworn to by him before a notary.
● When the papers of the case were forwarded to the City Fiscal and the latter
examined accused Angangco under oath about the same signatures, he
repudiated his statement contained in his affidavit.
● When prosecuted for perjury, accused Angangco contended that the phrase
"in case in which the law so requires" appearing at the end of the first
paragraph of Art. 183 refers to the affidavit or any statement under oath, so
that if the sworn statement is not required by law to be made, no perjury is
committed.
Issue: WON accused Angangco committed perjury (YES)

Held: The contention is without merit. The term "requires" in the phrase mentioned
should have a permissive — not mandatory — effect so as to make the said phrase
read: "in cases in which the law so authorizes."

Hence, it is not necessary that there be a specific provision of law requiring the
affidavit to be made in the particular case.

It is sufficient that the oath had been administered with a view of carrying into effect
a legal purpose intended. In the instant case, the investigating officer administered
oath to the accused undoubtedly with a view of being assured of the veracity of the
latter and thus be furnished with foundational evidence with which to proceed
against Juan L. Quintos in his suspected acts of embezzlement of the estate of the
deceased.

Note: No available full text of this case from the internet, and even case digests too.
Maybe because this case is an unpublished case (info from Reyes book).

Should you find the full text, please share it with me/QC assigned. Thanks!
9. People vs. Cruz

GR.No. L-15132

Topic : False testimony in other case and perjury in solemn affirmation

QC: Urmeneta

Facts:

● Rufo Cruz, was a private person and applicant for Civil Service Examination
(Patrolman)
● The accused filled up the blanks in Philippine Civil Service Form No. 2, by
stating and making it appear in said document that he had never been
accused, indicted or tried for violation of any law, ordinance or regulation
before any court, when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew, that
these statement or fact is false and untrue, because he had been accused and
tried in Criminal Cases Nos. 522, 542 and 547 of the Justice of the Peace of
Cainta, Rizal, thus making untruthful statement in the narration of facts.
● The application was signed and sworn to by him before the municipal mayor
of Cainta, Rizal. Said application contained a number of question, No. 6 of
which reads:
○ Have you ever been accused of, indicted for or tried for the violation of
any law, ordinance, or regulations, before any court, or have you ever
been charged with or tried for any breach or infraction of military,
naval, or constabulary tribunal or other authority
● To said question, the accused answered:
○ "No, I have never been accused of any sort whatsoever."
● He was first charged with the crime of falsification of documents.
● However, the counsel for the defense, contends that the crime committed by
the accused, as stated in the application form itself is perjury.

Issue:

WON the accused is guilty of perjury. (YES)

Ruling:

During the trial of the case, it was however, shown that the accused made his
answer to question No. 6 knowing fully well that he had previously been charged or
criminally indicted before the Justice of the Peace Court of Cainta, Rizal, for the
crimes of "atentado contrala autoridad" (Crim. Case No. 522, filed up July 23, 1931),
"lesiones menos graves" (Crim. Case No. 542, filed on March 13, 1933), and
physical injuries (Crim. Case No. 547, filed on October 19, 1933).The case for
"lesiones menos graves" was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, while the
other two were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The court agreed with the defense that the crime committed is perjury. The offense
as defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is the willful and corrupt
assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law
on a material matter.

Note:

"atentado contrala autoridad" - attack against authority

“lesiones menos graves” - less serious injuries

10. People vs. Ignacio

G.R. No. L-18332

April 30, 1963

Topic: False Testimony in other case and perjury in solemn affirmation - Art. 183
QC: Urmeneta

Facts:

● Genoveva P. Alano and others filed against Estanislao Ignacio y Marcelo and
others (accused herein), an action for partition of a parcel of land situated in
Parañaque, Rizal and docketed as Civil Case No. 4399.

● Plaintiffs in this civil case claim that they are co-owners of defendants of the
5th parcel of land described in paragraph 9 of the complaint.

● While said civil case was still pending, defendants filed an application for
registration under Act No. 496 of several parcels of land, including among
them the 5th parcel of land mentioned above.

● An information for perjury was, at the instance of Genoveva P. Alano, filed by

the assistant city fiscal of Manila against the defendants.

● The charge for perjury is premised on paragraph 4 of the application for

registration filed by the accused wherein they state that they do not know of
any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the parcel of
land in question, or that any other person has any interest therein, legal or
equitable.

● The Solicitor General argues that in making such a statement the accused
deliberately stated a falsehood, as they very well knew that in Civil Case No.
4399, the plaintiffs therein, complainants in the criminal case, claim
ownership of the parcel of land sought to be registered by the defendants.

Issue:

WON the accused have deliberately made false assertions. (NO)

Ruling:

The accused believed in good faith that their opponents' claim was groundless and
invalid, and that there was, therefore, no need to mention the existence of such
claim in their application for registration. The fact that the civil case brought by their
opponents, the complainants in the criminal case, was dismissed, confirms the
correctness of appellees' belief that their opponents had no valid claim to the land
applied for.

On examining the information closely, the Supreme Court finds that there is no
allegation therein that the accused knew that the supposed claim of the
complainants was a material fact or matter to be stated in their application. Before a
person can be held guilty of perjury it is necessary that such person must be alleged
to have known that that matter required to be stated, was a material matter. There
is no allegation in the information in th that the acis case that the accused knew that
the mention of the claims of the complainants was a material matter necessary to be
stated in their application. The information being defective in that respect, the
accused-appellees cannot be held guilty of perjury thereunder.

Dispositive:

We find that the motion to quash was correctly sustained. The order quashing the
information is, therefore, hereby affirmed.
11. Union Bank, Desi Tomas vs. People (Read the highlighted part only.)

G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 20123

By: Shira G.
QC: Urmeneta
Topic: Art. 183 – False Testimony in other case and perjury in solemn affirmation
Facts:
● Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for deliberate
and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati
City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and sworn to
were not true.
● The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of
money replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
● Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against
Forum Shopping.
● Accordingly, she was charged in the second complaint that she did not commence any
other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
● Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing two grounds:
○ 1st: she argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City
court not the MeTC-Makati City that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.
○ 2nd: she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because:
■ (a) the third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood – was not alleged with particularity without specifying what
the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in
another tribunal or agency;
■ (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court
when the second complaint was filed; and
■ (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the
allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false
affidavit.
● The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruled that the allegations in the
Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.
● The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and
set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

1. WON perjury is committed. (Yes)

2. WON the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City,
where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court.

Ruling:
1. Yes. In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC
for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article
183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized
to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.
 (d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against
Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City.
Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum
Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
Information to have been made in Makati City

The third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have
been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City. The information indicates that the petitioner
has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another
tribunal or agency, accused knowingly well that said material statement was false.

The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.

The court find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the
crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-
Makati City.

2. MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and court to try the perjury case against
Tomas.

The crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of
the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit
since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the
crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, the venue is at the place where the testimony under oath
is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the
place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of
the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all
cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of
merit.

Note: The case is more applicable to the venue of action, which is for Criminal Proceeding.
For Criminal Law, the case only determines whether perjury was committed.
12. In the Matter of Anonymous Complaint for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Perjury committed by Judge E. Contreras

Digested by: Dom

Topic: Article 183; False testimony in other case and perjury in solemn affirmation

Note: Not sure about the issue. No explanation on the provisions that is related to
our topic this week. The case is silent about the RPC articles.(kung ganon,
masskipan ka naliwat ada lods :’( nyahahahaha)

Facts:

● Respondent Judge Contreras, in his application for a position in the Judiciary,

failed to disclose in his Personal data sheet that a previous administrative case
was filed against him when he was the 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
● While he was then a Provincial Prosecutor, he was admonished for simple
misconduct in OMB-ADM-1-94-1040 for exerting undue influence in causing
the arrest of a certain Carlito Nudo despite proof that the latter has posted a
bail bond duly approved by the court.
● In the PDS dated 24 January 2010 and September 2013, filed with the JBC in
connection with respondent Judge Contreras' application for the post of Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, he answered " YES" to
the question:
○ "Have you ever been charged with violation of any law, decree,
ordinance, administrative issuance, or regulation by any court,
prosecution office, tribunal, or any other government office, agency or
instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign country?".
● He maintained that during the Judicial and Bar Council's (JBC) interviews, he
had been disclosing information relating to the cases filed against him with the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB). Also, Judge Contreras claimed that in
administrative cases, admonition is not a penalty but merely some advice.

Issue: Whether or not there was dishonesty on the part of respondent Judge leading to
perjury. (YES)

Ruling:

A careful perusal of the wording of the question "Have you ever been charged?" would
show that it solicits an answer that pertains to either past or present charge, whether it
was already dismissed or not. Judge Contreras should have known fully well the
consequences of making a false statement in his PDS. Being a former public prosecutor
and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are
followed to the letter. His being a judge makes the act all the more unacceptable.
Clearly, there was an obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a
member of the judiciary.

The Court found him guilty of dishonesty and penalized him with suspension from
the service for one year without pay, taking into account that he had been in the
government service for more than 30 years and it was his first offense as a member
of the bench.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, Judge Jaime E. Contreras is hereby found GUILTY of DISHONESTY and
is SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year without pay, to take effect upon the
finality hereof, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.
13. U.S. vs. Catajay

GR NO. 2785

AUGUST 23,1906

DIGESTED BY: GULA; QC: Masamong

TOPIC: Offenses against decency and good customs

FACTS:

● The accused committed the act complained at night, in a private house, and at the
time when no one was present except the accused, the mistress of the house and one
servant.
● Respondent was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of Public Scandal in
violation of the provisions of Article 441 of the Penal Code which states that degree of
publicity is an essential element of the crime defined and penalized therein that the
acts complained of resulted in a grave public scandal.

ISSUE:

● WON the trial court erred in finding respondent guilty of the crime of Public Scandal
(No)

HELD:

The Supreme Court of Spain held No.

The acts complained of were committed at night, in a private house, and at a time when no
one was present except the accused, the mistress of the house, and one servant ; such
circumstances do not constitute that degree of publicity which is an essential element of the
crime defined and penalized in article 441 of the Penal code.

However, there can be no doubt that the accused committed the offense defined and
penalized in No. 2 of the article 571 of the Penal Code, which corresponds with the above-
mentioned number 2 of article 586 of the Penal Code of Spain, and provides that a penalty of
from one of ten days’ arrest and a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas shall be imposed upon —
Those who, by exhibiting prints or engravings, or by means of other acts, shall offend against
good morals and custom without committing a crime."

DISPOSITION: Since this is a lesser offense that the one charged in the complaint, and is
included therein, we find him guilty of a violation of the provisions of the said article and,
reversing the sentence of the trial court, we impose upon the accused, Jose Catajay, the
penalty of the ten days’ imprisonment (arresto), and the payment of a fine of 125 pesetas,
and the costs of the trial in both instances. After the expiration of ten days from the date of
final judgment let the cause be remanded to the lower court for proper procedure. So
ordered.

14. U.S. vs. Samaniego & de Perez

G.R. No. L-5115

11 April 1906
TOPIC: Art. 200 - Grave Scandal (Art. 441 - Public Scandal)
Digested by: Kuya Allen
QC: Masamong

FACTS:
● An information was filed against defendants accusing them both of adultery.
● The defendants were arrested under the said information and were confined in
Bilibid, doctors expressed their opinion that Juana Benedicto de Perez was
mentally deranged. They were tried on the charge of adultery but the trial
court believed that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the conviction of
either of the defendants, and they were both acquitted.
● Prosecuting attorney filed a new information charging them with the crime
defined in article 441 of the Penal Code.
● The trial court rendered a decision guilty of the crime charged, condemning
the defendant Samaniego to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree and ordering the defendant Juana Benedicto de Perez confined in an
asylum for the insane until the further order of the court.
● On February 12, the court made an order to reopen said case "for the purpose
only, " as expressed in the order, " of receiving evidence as to the publicity of
the acts charged in the complaint." Additional evidence was taken and used by
the court as the basis for a further judgment in the action. This was done over
the objections and exception of the defendant's attorneys.
● In attempting to prove the adultery alleged in the information, the prosecution
presented as witnesses: Caridad Perez, daughter of the defendant Juana;
Rafael Perez, a student of medicine, 18 years of age, son of the defendant
Juana; Concepcion Perez, 12 years of age, daughter of the defendant Juana;
together with the cochero of the family, all of whom lived with the accused,
Juana, and her husband.

ISSUE: WON the defendants are guilty of violating Art. 441 of the Penal Code
(Public Scandal). (NO)

RULING:
The acts complained lack many of the elements essential to bring them within the
purview of the article of the Penal Code invoked by the prosecution. Every act that
was in public fails entirely of those qualities which offend modesty and good morals
by "grievous scandal or enormity." A married woman who habitually appeared in
public places with her paramour, frequented suspicious places, vacant houses, etc.
did not violate this article, because the acts were not committed in public places or
within the public knowledge or view.

DISPOSITION: The judgments of conviction of the trial court are reversed, the
defendants acquitted and their discharge from custody ordered.

NOTES:
● 2nd information filed by the prosecuting attorney (08 Jan 1908): That on and for many
weeks prior to the 27th day of November, 1907, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands. the
said Juana Juana Benedicto De Perez was a married woman, and that the said Manuel
Samaniego knew that she was married and united in the bonds of matrimony with and was the
legitimate consort of Jose Perez Siguenza; that during the period of time above expressed the
said Manuel Samaniego and Juana Benedicto de Perez, willfully, illegally, and criminally and
 scandalously, without having any matrimonial tie between them, habitually appeared together
in public places and frequented together places of recreation, suspicious places, vacant houses,
and houses of bad repute, in the daytime as well as in the nighttime; and lewdly and indecently
went to the bed together in the house of the husband of the said Juana Benedicto de Perez
during the late hours of the night, dressed only in their night clothes, and in decorously,
indecently, and immodestly embraced each other and caressed each other in the presence of
the family, children, and servants of the said husband of Juana Benedicto de Perez; all with
public scandal and with scandal to the community, and with shame and humiliation to the
husband and family of the said Juana Benedicto de Perez.

● The legal husband’s testimony - He testified that Juana, after having lived with him for more
than twenty years, and having borne him more than five children, expressed the desire to
separate from him on account of the physical abuse and ill treatment which she had received
and was receiving at his hands. He testified further that he himself desired to terminate his
marital relations with her and that he wanted a divorce; and, as a preliminary step to that end,
we obtained her arrest at the hands of the police, who, at his request, conducted her in a patrol
wagon publicly through the streets of the city of Manila to an asylum for the insane, where she
was detained and imprisoned against her will. He declared further that the reason why he thus
humiliated and disgraced her and deprived her of her liberty was his ardent desire to save her
soul; that, in ordering her arrest and reclusion, he was acting under the advice and counsel of
various lawyers and doctors. He further testified that, after her arrest, she many times implored
him to give her back her liberty and permit her to return to her family; and that, during one of
such supplications, she admitted to him that the defendant Samaniego was her friend, but, at
the same time, denied that he had ever taken advantage of that friendship in any way
whatever.

● Testimonies of the witnesses

○ According to the testimony of these witnesses, the kitchen and the toilet of the
house are situated on the ground floor. Here the cochero slept in a bed called
by the family a bench. This was the only bed in the lower part of the house
which could possibly be used for any purpose.
○ Conchita’s testimony - On the night of November 06, 1907, Juana Benedicto
de Perez, accompanied by her daughters, attended a dance given by a friend.
The other accused, Samaniego, was also present. Juana and her daughters
returned home late at night. There were then present in the house the
accused, Juana Benedicto de Perez; her three daughters, Caridad, Rosario, and
Conchita, and a friend of Conchita; her son Rafael; a younger son, Manolo; and
the cochero. When the mother and the daughters were preparing for bed,
Conchita discovered that there was a stranger in the lower part of the house
and by her cries brought the household to the spot. She declares in her
testimony that when she first saw the stranger he was near the cochero's bed
and while she was watching the movements of the stranger, her mother went
below and appeared to be talking with him; that not for a moment did she lose
sight of her mother during all the occurrence.
○ The cochero testified that the stranger was Samaniego and that he came first
to the cochero's bed and talked with him a while, but afterwards the cochero
went to sleep, and later, on hearing the cries of Conchita, he saw Samaniego
trying to conceal himself in the kitchen and also observed that Juana Benedicto
de Perez, was going up and down the stairs.
○ The married daughter, Caridad, who was not at the dance, testified that,
when Conchita informed the family that a stranger was in the lower part of the
house, she awoke her brother Rafael, who accompanied her below, where they
found the defendant Samaniego, dressed only in his drawers; that she gave
him a blow in the face and ordered him immediately to leave the house; that
he asked her pardon and requested permission to put on his clothes; that
permission to do so was refused and she and her brother ejected him from the
house by force and later the cochero handed him his clothes over the wall.
○ Caridad also testified that Samaniego was once at the house and talked with
her mother though the window from the street, and on that occasion her
mother delivered to him a pawn ticket; that once when she and her mother
were in a carromata on the streets the defendant approached them and spoke
to her mother. The testimony of Rafael shows that one morning, as he was
returning from the hospital in Quiapo, he saw the defendant Samaniego on
foot near the carromata of his mother in the Botanical Garden talking to her.
○ Luisa Avesilla testified that the accused, Juana Benedicto de Perez, pais the
board of Samaniego for three months in a restaurant where she was cashier,
and that on one occasion Juana ate with Samaniego in the restaurant. On that
occasion she was accompanied by her grandson.
○ The cochero testified that he frequently had as passengers in the carromata
the two defendants; that on one occasion he had waited for them while they
went to a house in Calle Cervantes, and on another occasion they had gone
into a house on Calle Malacañang, the witness supposing that the house was
unoccupied because the accused, Juana, had told him that she was looking for
a house to rent; that the witness at no time observed anything improper in the
conduct or deportment of the two defendants. There is no proof that these
were places of bad repute or that any of them were unoccupied.
15. Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA

G.R. No. 119673

July 26, 1996

Topic: Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and

indecent shows- Art. 201

Digested By: Francis Lamoste

Facts:

● Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992

petitioner, Iglesia ni Cristo, submitted to the respondent Board of Review for
Moving Pictures and Television (Board for brevity) the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series
as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute
an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.",
because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its
“attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.
● Petitioner asserts that the Board acted with grave abuse of discretion and
without jurisdiction in x-rating them and requiring them to submit VTR tapes
of their program.
● The respondent invoked its power under a presidential decree in relation to
Art. 201 of the RPC.

Issue:

● WoN Respondent Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the
airing of the petitioner's religious program series in question, for the reason
that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are
indecent, contrary to law and good customs and violating Art 201 of the RPC
(YES)

Ruling:

The ruling of the lower court states that the Petitioner's TV program series Nos. 115,
119, 121 and 128 was x-rated because of its "unbalanced interpretations of some
parts of the bible." In sum, the respondent Board x-rated the said series because of
petitioner's controversial biblical interpretations and its "attacks' ' against contrary
religious beliefs. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that the said
"attacks'' are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.

The Court reversed the ruling of the appellate court.

● Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior
restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains
speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with
furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. It failed in the case at bar.The evidence shows that the
respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for "attacking" other religions,
especially the Catholic church. An examination of the pieces of evidence show
that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
dogmas and tenets of other religions. This ruling clearly suppresses
 petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against
another religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. Even a side
glance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds
to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television program.
The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the
respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against the
hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the
letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.In x-rating the TV program of
the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger
rule.

It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to
the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time,
place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact
cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil
apprehended cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case
at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is
known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can
determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law.

Dispositive:

Petition was partially GRANTED. The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated March 24, 1995 was affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the
respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,"
but reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the action of the respondent
MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121.
16. Fernando vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 159751

11 April 1906
TOPIC: Art. 201 - Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and
indecent shows
Digested by: Kuya Allen
QC: Masamong

FACTS:
● Police officers served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who, according to the
prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The
police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and
ten (10) different magazines, which they deemed pornographic.
● Petitioners waived their right to present evidence and opted to submit the
case for decision. The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his
guilt, but convicted Fernando and Estorninos guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and confiscated the VHS tapes and the nine (9) magazines utilized as
evidence.
● Fernando contends that since he was not charged as the owner of an
establishment selling obscene materials, the prosecution must prove that he
was present during the raid and that he was selling the said materials. He also
contends that the appellate court’s reason for convicting him, on a
presumption of continuing ownership shown by an expired mayor’s permit,
has no sufficient basis since the prosecution failed to prove his ownership of
the establishment. Estorninos, on the other hand, insists that he was not an
attendant in the Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself.
● The OSG counters that owners of establishments selling obscene publications
are expressly held liable under Article 201, and petitioner Fernando’s
ownership was sufficiently proven. As the owner, Fernando was naturally a
seller of the prohibited materials and liable under the Information. The OSGl
also maintains that Estorninos was identified by Barangay Chairperson
Socorro Lipana as the store attendant, thus he was likewise liable.

ISSUE: WON Fernando and Estorninos were liable for violating Art. 201 of the RPC.
(YES)

RULING:
Yes. Mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give
them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law
is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any
of the forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The law
does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or
exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are
offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present case, the
petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.

The mayor’s permit was under his name (Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair) . Even
his bail bond shows that He lives in the same place. While the mayor’s permit had
already expired, it does not negate the fact that Fernando owned and operated the
establishment. It would be absurd to make his failure to renew his business permit
and illegal operation a shield from prosecution of an unlawful act. Furthermore,
when he preferred not to present contrary evidence, the things which he possessed
were presumptively his.
Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling and
exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Tababan
identified him as the store attendant upon whom the search warrant was served.
Tababan had no motive for testifying falsely against Estorninos and the Court
upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.

DISPOSITION: The Decision of the CA is affirmed.

NOTES:
● Alternate issue:
○ WON the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners’ conviction.
○ Ruling: The Court accords great respect to and treats with finality the findings
of the trial court on the matter of credibility of witnesses, absent any palpable
error or arbitrariness in their findings. No reversible error was committed by
the appellate court as well as the trial court in finding the herein petitioners
guilty as charged.

● In People v. Kottinger, the Court defined obscenity as something which is offensive

to chastity, decency or delicacy.

● To be held liable for violating Art. 201, the prosecution must prove that:
(a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and
(b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials

● The test to determine the existence of obscenity is, whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged
as being obscene may fall. Another test according to Kottinger is "that which
shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency." But, Kottinger
hastened to say that whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the
judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it.
17. Nogales vs. People

G.R. No. 191080

November 21, 2011
Digested by: Ortiz
Topic: Art. 201
QC: Babs

Facts:

● The NBI, led by Special Investigator Garry Meñez, by virtue of a search

warrant in violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended in
relation to R.A. 8792 searched the premises of petitioner, Phil-Pacific
Outsourcing Services Corporation (Phil-Pacific) where they seized and took
into custody several electronic devices including monitors, CPUs and AVRs.
● The RTC issued an order to keep the seized items in the NBI evidence room to
make them available whenever the court required them. Aggrieved by the
issuance of the order, the named persons in the search warrant filed a Motion
to Quash Search Warrant and Return seized Properties, but was denied.
● The CA, in resolving the petition for certiorari filed against the RTC judge,
ordered the release of the seized electronic devices with the condition that the
hard disk be removed from the CPUs and be destroyed, and if the softwares
are determined to be unlicensed or pirated copies, they shall be destroyed in
the manner allowed by law.
● Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the
petition for certiorari.

Issue: WON there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in ordering
the removal and destruction of the hard disks containing the pornographic and
obscene materials. (NO)

Ruling:
The SC held that it may be true that the violation of Art. 201 of the RPC was
dismissed, but it cannot be used as a basis to recover the confiscated hard disks as
they contain obscene or pornographic files.

CA is correct in stating that the removal of the hard disk from the CPU is a reliable
way of permanently removing the obscene or pornographic files. Significantly, Sec. 2
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 969 is explicit (see notes).

The provision directs the forfeiture of all materials involved in violation of the subject
law. P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials
involved in the violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused
was acquitted. Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, the Court holds
that the destruction of the hard disks and the softwares used in any way in the
violation of the subject law addresses the purpose of minimizing if not totally
eradicating pornography. The Court is not unmindful of the concerns of petitioners
but their supposed property rights must be balanced with the welfare of the public in
general.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 19, 2009 Court of
Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that only the CPUs and those
softwares determined to be licensed and used for legitimate purposes shall be
returned in favor of the petitioners. The hard disk drives containing the pornographic
materials and the softwares used in any way in violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, unlicensed or pirated shall be forfeited in favor of the Government and
destroyed.

Notes:
Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. — The disposition of the literature,
films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the
violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be governed by the following rules:

a. Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the government to be

destroyed.

b. Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an acquittal,
the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture, paintings or
other materials and other articles involved in the violation referred to in Section 1
hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed,
after forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary
18. People vs. Hong Din Chu

G.R. No. L-27830 May 29, 1970

TOPIC: ARTICLE 202 – Prostitution
Digested by: Paciencia
QC: Bebeiano

FACTS:

● Hong Din Chu was charged with grave oral defamation. He publicly proffer in
the presence of many people against Mercedes Japco Ong abusive and
slanderous remarks and expression:

'Your daughter is a prostitute and she is a prostitute because you too

are a prostitute,' and other words and phrase of similar import which
insinuations and imputations.

● The accused moved for the dismissal of the information on the ground that, as
it charges defamation consisting of the alleged commission by the
complainant of Adultery that cannot be prosecuted de officio, the case should
have been initiated at the instance of the complainant.

● But the trial court ruled that since the accused was alleged to have imputed to
the complainant, a married woman, the commission of acts of prostitution, the
former, in effect charged the latter with adultery, and the information,
therefore, cannot be filed by the fiscal without the signature of the supposed
offended party.

● From this order of dismissal the prosecution interposed the present appeal,
claiming that the allegations of the complaint charged the accused of having
specifically imputed upon the offended party the commission of the crime of
prostitution, which is a public crime. Hence, even without the complainant's
signature, it is still sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court.

ISSUE:

WON the alleged defamatory remark imputed on the offended party constitute
the commission of a public crime of prostitution or of a private offense that
can’t be prosecuted de oficio. (NO)

RULING:

The information in this case averred that the accused, with the malicious purpose of
impeaching the virtue, honor, character and reputation of Mercedes Japco Ong, a
married woman, uttered against the latter publicly and in the presence of many
people, the remarks — "Your daughter is a prostitute and she is a prostitute because
you too are a prostitute".

It is clear that, while the utterance in effect also imputed on her the commission of
adultery, the offended party being a married woman, that disreputable conduct she
was particularly charged with was the crime, of prostitution, not adultery.
And it may be pointed out that prostitution and adultery are not one and the same
thing; the first is a crime against public morals, committed by a woman, whether
married or not, who, for money or profit, habitually indulges in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct.

Whereas adultery is in the nature of a private offense committed by a married

woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband.

The essential element in prostitution is not simply a woman's entering into marital
relations with a man other than her husband, if she happens to be married, but the
existence of pecuniary or financial gain as inducement to, or consideration for, that
woman's engaging in sexual activities.

Thus, to call a married woman a prostitute is not merely to proclaim her an

adulteress, a violator of her marital vows; it is to charge her of having committed an
offense against public morals, of moral degeneracy far exceeding that involved in
the maintenance of adulterous relations.

It appearing from the recital of the information that the alleged defamatory remark
by the accused specifically imputed upon the offended party the commission of
prostitution, which is a public crime that can be prosecuted de oficio.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set aside, and the case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
19. PLANTERAS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 238889, 3 October 2018
Topic: Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act (RA 9208)
Digested by: DDCP
QC: Babs
Intro: Hello po Atty! Congratulations on your new house. The beadle is asking when
is the blessing so he can eat lumpia(HAHAHAHAHAHA grabe ka kuya CIAN!!-Dom).
Anyway po, the facts of the case are as follows.

FACTS
1. The Lodge owned by petitioner Antonio Planteras Jr. was reportedly used by
pimps in offering sexual services of young girls to various customers of the
establishment.
2. On 19 March 2009, policemen conducted a surveillance operation using a
concealed camera. They were able to record Marlyn Buhisan offering girls for sex.
3. Buhisan then led the officers upstairs where they saw Planteras, Jr. at the
reception counter who appeared to be aware and listening to the on-going
negotiation. Planteras Jr. also replied when asked by the officers about the room
rates.
4. Subsequently, an entrapment operation was conducted. Marichu Tawi and
Buhisan offered girls for sexual favors. The undercover officers chose 4 girls
including AAA, a minor (17 yo).
5. Planteras was behind the reception counter when the said negotiation took place
and appeared to be listening to the transaction.
6. The policemen handed over the marked money to Buhisan plus a tip for Tawi.
After the pre-arranged signal, the rest of the team arrived and immediately arrested
Buhisan, Tawi, Planteras, and his wife.
7. Petitioner Planteras was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9208 or
promoting trafficking in persons.
8. RTC convicted Planteras of the offense charged. CA affirmed, hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON Planteras is guilty of RA 9208 or “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act”.

(YES)

RULING: Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. It is indisputable that

Planteras owns and manages the establishment used by pimps, customers and
prostitutes for their illegal activities. Petitioner’s knowledge about the activities that
are happening inside his establishment was also properly established.

Section 5 (a) of RA 9208 states that “To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to
be used any house, building or establishment for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons” is unlawful and considered an act that promotes Trafficking in
Persons. To be convicted of this offense, the accused must (a) knowingly lease or
sublease, or allow to be used any house, building or establishment, and (b) such use
of the house, building or establishment is for the purpose of promoting trafficking in
persons.

In addition, petitioner’s claim that AAA freely engaged in prostitution, thus, no

trafficking in person was committed, is unmeritorious. Knowledge or consent of
the minor is not a defense under RA 9208. The victim's consent is rendered
meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by
perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated May 18,
2018, of petitioner Antonio Planteras, Jr. is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Decision dated
April 24, 2017 and the Resolution March 21, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02077
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of
P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

NOTE:

Trafficking in persons as defined under Section 3(a) of RA 9208:

(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms
of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or the giving, or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for
the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
20. People vs. Bandojo

G.R. No. 234161, 17 October 2018

Topic: Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act (RA 9208)
Digested by: RAM

QC: Babs

FACTS:

● Private complainant, AAA was a minor at the time the crime was committed (17 yrs
old).
● At first, she was asked by her friend if she was willing to accept a raket. But when
Kenny Joy (also the accused and the brother of her friend who asked her if she wants
a raket) told her that it has something to do with having sexual intercourse, she did
not reply. But due to financial problems, and the fact that she needs to help her
parents, she accepted it, and immediately began such raket.
● Months later, AAA was contacted by Kenny Joy once again telling her that the latter’s
friend (Ludivico) needed ladies and she was included among them (now with the NBI’s
entrapment operation).
● Meanwhile, the NBI, after receiving information concerning the prostitution that is
being done through negotiation in the facebook under the account name “Under One
roof”, conducted an entrapment operation.
● So Agent Senora created a facebook account and contacted Ludivico (other accused
appellant) which he learned that the latter is the handler of the ladies who provide
sexual services.
● Ludivico, together with AAA and BBB met with the agent.
● At the hotel room, they introduced themselves to the girls as the NBI, and so Ludivico
and Kenny Joy who were at the coffee shop were arrested.
● The accused were convicted by the RTC for the crime of Violation of Sec. 4(a) in
relation to Sec. 6 (a) (see notes #1) and was later affirmed by the CA.
● Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove that they were engaged in any
activity which would constitute human trafficking. In addition, they maintained that it
was AAA who asked for the raket, and they lacked knowledge that AAA was only 17
yrs old.

ISSUE: W/N the accused are guilty of the said crime.

RULING: YES.

The SC ruled by applying the jurisprudence in people vs Casio (see notes #2) where the
Court defined the elements of trafficking in persons, as derived from Section 3(a) of R.A. No.
9208.

In this case, all of the elements are present.

First, as to the first element and third elements, the testimony of AAA established that it was
Kenny Joy who recruited her to engage in prostitution by offering her rakets where she could
earn money by having sexual relations with clients the latter had found.

As to the second element, while AAA did not immediately accede to the proposition initially
made by Kenny Joy, she eventually yielded and asked for a raket because she needed the
money. It is, thus, apparent that the accused-appellants took advantage of AAA's and her
family's abject poverty in recruiting her to engage in prostitution.
Lastly, AAA's Certificate of Live Birth evidenced the fact that she was born on April 9, 1995
and was only 17 years old, a minor, at the time the crime was committed.

As regards to the consent of the minor, Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 clearly states that
trafficking in persons may be committed with or without the victim's consent or knowledge.

As to the knowledge of the private complainant’s minority, it is still immaterial.

Under Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 9208, Trafficking in Persons automatically becomes qualified
upon proof that the trafficked person is a minor or a person below 18 years of age. Evidently,
knowledge of the accused-appellants with regard to AAA's minority is inconsequential with
respect to qualifying the crime of Trafficking in Persons.

Accordingly, the Court finds that all elements of the crime of Violation of Section 4(a), in
relation to Section 6(a), of R.A. No. 9208 (Qualified trafficking in persons) were duly
established by the prosecution.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The Decision dated May 15, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
08276, convicting accused-appellants Ludivico Patrimonio Bandojo, Jr. and Kenny Joy
Villacorta Ileto of the crime of Qualified Human Trafficking, as defined and penalized under
Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a), of Republic Act No. 9208, is hereby AFFIRMED.

Notes:

1. Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
juridical, to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of Prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified

trafficking

(a) When the trafficked person is a child.

2. A. The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of

persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders."

B. The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another

C. The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the

prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

D. The crime is further qualified under Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 9208 when the trafficked
person is a child.