2019 IEEE 6th Asian Conference on Defence Technology (ACDT)

Bali, Indonesia, November 13-15, 2019

Dynamic High-Performance Decision-Making in

Air Defense System Operation
Nadana Ayzah Azis Augie Widyotriatmo Arwin Datumaya Wahyudi Sumari
Instrumentation and Control Research Instrumentation and Control Research Department of Electrical Engineering
Group Group State Polytechnic of Malang
Bandung Institute of Technology Bandung Institute of Technology Malang, Indonesia
Bandung, Indonesia Bandung, Indonesia Faculty of Defense Technology
nadana.ayzah2@gmail.com augie@tf.itb.ac.id Indonesia Defense University
Sentul, Bogor, Indonesia
Endang Juliastuti Yul Yunazwin Nazaruddin arwin.sumari@yahoo.com
Instrumentation and Control Research Instrumentation and Control Research
Group Group
Bandung Institute of Technology Bandung Institute of Technology
Bandung, Indonesia Bandung, Indonesia
yuliast@tf.itb.ac.id yul@tf.itb.ac.id

Abstract—Decision-making in critical situations which are One of the most critical decisions that must be done
time-constraint and high-impact requires comprehensive carefully is a decision in critical situations. Such situation is
information and a careful process. Such situations are always a decision that should be taken by a commander of an air
faced by an air defense commander who has the responsbility defense system. Consider an air defense system of a nation,
to secure the national airspace from any intruder which tries to
that is, a complex system which commonly consists of air,
enter the airspace anytime from anywhere. In a critical
situation where an unknown or unregistered object enters the land, and sea sensors and weapon systems as depicted in
airspace, the air defense commander has to make the right Fig.1 as an example. An air defense system is under
decision based on the data and the information from its command of an air defense commander and it commonly
subordinates at the soonest time. An air defense system is a consists of several air defense sector command which watch
combination of sensors, weapons, command and control (C2), each sector command’s airspace.
intelligence systems, communications, and personnel that forms
Command, Control. Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
operating under a designated air defense commander. Because
of its criticality in time and precision in decision, in this study
we proposed a solution to help the process of decision-making
in the air defense system by modeling the dynamics of decision-
making by using social network approach based on modified
Friedkin-Johnsen model. We found that this model is helpful
for an air defense commander in making a decision accordingly
to the information received from his subordinates, and shortens
the data processing in the decision-making process. Some air
defense decision-making scenarios with different sensory
apparatus configurations are also presented to show how it
works in a dynamic situation and its high- performance in
delivering a better decision.
Fig. 1. A simple example of air defense system.
Keywords—Air Defense System, C4ISR, decision-making,
opinion formation, social network Air defense system command is a combined defense
I. INTRODUCTION forces from three services that is, the army, the navy, and the
airforce. Commonly, the air defense forces are equipped with
Decision making has been an important thing since early warning surveillance or a tracking radar with an
humans were born and also an inseparable part of their daily advanced Command and Control (C2) system, fighter jets as
life. Decision-making is done in any situation, at anytime, the interceptor, warships as the sensors and weapon systems,
anywhere, and at any level whether in strategic, tactical, or guided missiles, and anti-air artillerry as well as groun-to-air
operational, from the simple things to the complex ones. missiles. This system can handle the threats robustly and
Decision-making and also its process cannot be done efficiently set the right weapons to weaken the target. Air
arbitrarily bearing in mind that the results of a decision will defense system operates 24/7. As its task and function, air
affect subsequent actions and impacts which should be defense system command protects the national airspace from
considered in advance. Decision-making must be right and any air violation and tresspassing of unknown or
precise on target, that is why the information used to build unregistered flying objects whether by mistake or by
the decision must be valid and correct. Decision-making in a intention. These objects can be any flying object such as
time-constraint and high-impact situation requires military fighter jet, military transport aircraft, commercial
comprehensive information and a careful process. airline, unmanned vehicle, helicopter, or other forms of
flying object which are indicated endangering the

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sovereignty of the national airspace. Suppose there is an
unknown flying object, sometimes we call it as target X,
detected trying to enter or already within the national
airspace, the commander of the air defense system has to
make the right and precise decision based on the data and the
information delivered from its subordinates in a time-
constraint manner. Incorrect and imprecise decision will give
big impact because it races with time, especially when the
target X has evil intention and is bringing deadly weapons.
Therefore a dynamic high-performance decision making
process is very urgent to assist the air defense commander.
Several models and technologies in decision- making process
have been proposed for obtaining such strategic decisions.
An integrated air defense system is a combination of
sensors, weapons, C2, intelligence systems,
communications, and personnel operating under a designated
commander [1] which form a Command, Control.
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system. Technology in the air
defense system progresses greatly in several years to provide
a sophisticated computer-based software system that can help
the commander in the decision making process. C2 system in
the process of decision- making often utilizes Observe-
Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop invented by US fighter
pilot John Boyd in 1960s. Based on some models from
various perpectives, a decision- making loop model called
Sense-Inference-Decide-Act (SIDA) cycle was developed in
2009 [3] as depicted in Fig.
2. SIDA was designed to mimic how human brain works to
generate knowledge and uses it for making decision [3].
Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) architectures are also
becoming popular along with OODA loop as it can enhance
the capability of the intelligent software system
development.
Fig. 2. The process of desicion-making in SIDA [4].
Air defence system on land consists of two components,
they are the mobile pieces in the air and composite
installation on the ground [5]. The concern of the air defense
system is to build an effective denial of any invader
(including aircraft, missiles, drones, etc) with remote
detection and allocation weapon for engagement [5]. The air
defense system consists of multiagent system of sensory
apparatus to protect an area or a state. Usually, the air defense
system has more than one layer of protection. For early
warning, the air defense system relies on the early warning
radars that track the position of a target at a long distance
such as 300-400 km. If target X is detected, the radars team
carry out the identification to target X based on target’s
velocity, bearing, and altitude data during the target tracking
to estimate what kind of target it is, which can be aircraft,
helicopters, tactical ballistic missiles, Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV), etc. In some situation, target identification
can be done by using target Radar Cross
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Section (RCS) which can obtain more precise estimation.
The estimation identity or type of target X is transmitted to
the higher hierarchy of air defense system namely, air
defense C2 center for decision and action.
If the air defense commander is sure with the target
estimation identity or type of target X from his subordinates,
then he can instruct a proper combination of weapon systems
which will be dispatched to the location of target X for
subsequent operations such as intercept or force down. In
some situations, the estimation identity or type of target X
causes ambiguity and therefore the air defense commander
needs a way to ensure it. For this purpose, he will instruct to
dispatch the available air force assets from the closest air
forces base to target X. These assets can be fighter jets or
weaponized UAVs. All dispatched assets have to be
weaponized to anticipate unfriendly response from target X.
If target X is suspected jet fighters, they will never be flying
alone and there has to be a formation flight with a least three
jet fighters. That is why a timely and precise decision in a
dynamic and critical situation is a mandatory for an air
defense commander. This kind of decision can be obtained if
it is supported by a high-performance decision making
method and system such the one we proposed in this paper,
namely modified Friedkin-Johnsen model as described in
[6].
For this research, we represent sensory apparatus as
agents which will form a multiagent system in air defense
system operation. Meanwhle the collected and processed
data which becomes information delivered by each agent to
the C2 center is called as agents’ opinions and are modeled
with the addition of social inputs. The social input described
here is the input from an agent when its sensors detects a
target which may be known objects which are already
registered in the C2 center’s database or unknown flying
objects (target X). The input from i-th agent will influence
other agents which then leads to a consensus among all
agents. This consensus will help the air defense commander
in decision-making process to obtain the right and precise
decision regarding the situation he is facing in such critical
time. This situation only occures when the sensors detect
target X which automatically cannot be identified by the
system because it is not registered in the database.
This study presents a solution to help the process of
decision-making in the air defense system operation. The
approach in this study is by modeling the dynamics of the
social network because agents live in social environment.
Some prior studies had proposed models of a social
network’s dynamic [2,4,7,8]. By utilizing the so-called
“opinion formation” model, the decision can be made as a
result of the data assimilation of the sensory apparatus [9].
Prior reviews about decision-making process modeling in air
defense system also had been presented in [1], [5], and [9-
10]. This paper also compares some scenarios of air defense
system configuration to discover the best scenario yielding
the best decision. The paper is organized as follows. Section
II explains the pre-preliminaries concepts, notations, and
theories related to opinion formation (agents, graph,
matrices, and the model). Section III describes the process of
the air defense system. Section IV, the paper presents a case

of several scenarios of the decision-making process and
discussion. Finally, conclusions are stated in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Opinion, Agent, and Matrix Form
The social network is a structure consisting of several
agents that interact with each other described by dyadic ties.
The agent is the smallest part of this structure. The agent can
be a person, community, institution, software agent,
hardware agent, system, or sensory apparatus depends on the
context of the topics [4]. The dyadic ties describe the
interaction or communication between the agent. Agent and
the dyadic ties cannot be separated as it is a result of social
agent interaction. Opinion can be described as a cognitive
orientation towards some objects such as issues, events, or
individuals) [7]. The opinion of an agent or individual will
evolve throughout time and interaction. Many studies had
proposed the model of opinion [2], [7], and [7-8]]. The
models quantify the opinion in a certain range e.g., [0,1] or
[-1,1]. The model describes the dynamics of the agent’s
opinion. Models of social networks are divided into two
major groups, namely macroscopic and microscopic models.
The macroscopic model focuses on subgroup among the
social network, while the microscopic one focuses to
investigate each agent’s opinion [4].
The dynamic of the opinion is affected by other agents’
opinions and social events in the society. Opinions from
other agents will be weighted to describe the influence of the
agents. The weight of the agents may differ from one agent
to others. The bonding in society is described by a graph.
Definion 1 (Graph). Graph is a pair described as
G = (V , E) , where V = {V1,...,V2} , n describes the
number of the agent. The elements vi are called as the nodes
of graph G and E presents to the edges or arcs [8].
The influence or connection among the agents is defined
by a weight of some real positive value. The graph can also
be represented as a matrix. The graph is depicted in Fig. 3.
Definition 2 (Matrix). Consider a graph G = (V , E) , a
non-negative matrix W = (wij )i, j∈V is applied to G . It also
can be said that W is a matrix for G if (i, j) ∈ E when
wij > 0 and (i, j) ∉ E or otherwise [8]. wij is a
weighting factor of agent i to agent j. The sum of of
weighting factor of an agent to another agent is 1.
Λ2 = diag(b1, b2 ,..., bn ) , where a and b describes the
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Fig. 3. Graph representation [8].
Definition 3 (Stochasticity and substochasticity). The
nonnegative of matrix W is said as stochastic if the sum of
all rows is 1 and is said as substochastic if the sum of the row
is less than 1 [8].
B. The Friedkin-Johnsen Model (FJ Model)
The first model of opinion formation is presented by
French-De Groot and it is called as Frenceh-DeGroot model.
Consider there are n agents in society. Their initial opinion
are stated as x1, x2 ,..., xn . Assume that the matrix of the
interaction between agent i and j , wij , so at some interaction
k, the French-De Groot model is described as follows:
xi (k +1) = w xj (k)
ij
(1)
Notice that wij describes how the agent j’s influence
toward agent i. High value of wij describes that agent j has
high influence to the agent i, and vice versa. The high value
of wii means that agent i is highly believe his own opinion.
The Friedkin-Johnsen model [11] gives a little
modification to the French-DeGroot model. They introduced
another variable, that is u as a prejudiced opinion. They also
defined a diagonal matrix Λ = diag(λ1, λ2 ,..., λn ) where
λ1 ∈[0,1] is described as a susceptibility of agent i to social
process in society. The Friendkin-Johnsen model is shown as
follows:
xi (k +1) = ΛWxj (k ) + (1− Λ)u (2)
C. The Modified Friedkin-Johnsen Model
Definition 4 (Social Input). Social input is a publication
of input so that it will give impact in a social network such
apologize, clarification, investigatiom, help, etc in order to
control the public opionion in society.
In order to describe the social input that happens in
society, a additional variable is added to the ordinary FJ
model. The modified FJ models is stated in (3).
x (k +1) = Λ Wx (k ) + Λ s + Λ u, (3)
i 1 j 2 3
where Λ3 = 1− Λ1 − Λ2 and Λl , l = 1, 2, 3 are nonnegative
diagonal matrix. Λ1 = diag(a1, a2 ,..., an ) ,
susceptibility of the agent i towards the society and social
input.
 III. AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM OPERATION
The national defense of a nation or state consists of
ground force (army), naval force, and airforce componemts.
To organize all components, a state defense system is
created. In such system, decisions regarding the efforts on
maintaining and sustaining the state defense are made. Every
information from all subordinates in every force will affect

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the decision that the commander will make. So it is necessary
to make a model and algorithm to help the commander in
making the decision in such complex system. One
components in a state defense system is air defense command
which is a combined forces formed from three services. Air
defense command runs an air defense system and is
responsible for its 24/7 operation in defending the nation or
state airspace from any air violation or tresspassing of
endangering flying objects or target X.
As stated in Section I, reference [3] also developed the
decision-making loop model called the SIDA systems that is
Sense-Inference-Decide-Act cycle in a framework called
C4ISR. In the first stage of C4ISR, the sensory apparatus
such as drones, radars, satellites, UAVs, etc, gather all the
information related to state defense [4]. The next state in
C4ISR is the interference and decision formulation. At this
step, the model of opinion formation is utilized. The
information from the sensory apparatus is collected and
applied to the model to obtain the final consensus as a basis
for the commander in making the decision. After the
consensus is achieved, the commander or national leader has
to decide what to do. The last stage of the C4ISR is act, which
is the stage when the commander executes the decision such
as sending the troops. This action will affect the field
situation in positive or in a negative way. From the effects of
the action applied to the field, C4ISR starts to sense again the
situation, and this cycle repeats.
In this study, the concept of SIDA C4ISR is adopted. The
case that is used is the air defense of an area. The air defense
system consists of several layers of protection with different
agents. Commonly, an air defense system is divided into
three layers. The first layer or the most outer layer is called
as area air defense which is protected by fighter jets.The
second layer is called as terminal air defense which is
protected by guided missile, and the last one is point air
defense which is protected by anti-air artillery. The use of
UAV as an unknown object observer is not common, but
modern combat UAVs can fly like fighter jets and is
equipped with sophisticated weapons. So it is valuable to
involve this kind of weapon system into our scenarios.
Consider a case when air defense system detects target X
entering the national airspace in a certain area. The
information from the radar team is then sent to the C2 center.
If the detected object is unknown, then C2 center will
dispatch jet fighters or UAVs to carry out visual observations
to ensure the identity of the detected object. Commonly, in
the time where UAV is not a part of weapon systems and not
as weaponized and high-performance as today, C2 center
always dispatches jet fighters considering their high speed so
they can reach at the target X’s coordinate in a short time
followed with intercepting the object. Another one important
is the jet fighters can directly do engagement with the target
X if it shows hostility.
Dispatching a team of UAVs as the forward observer to
identify target X is a challenge but it is worth to try in our
scenarios. Using UAVs in an air defense system are aimed to
reduce the risk of personnel loss because of air engagement
with hostile target X. Back to our scenario, the C2 center
dispatches a UAV agent to the coordinate sent by the early
warning radar of the target X’s location. Its task is
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only to identify what the object is whether it is a jet fighter
or a groups of fighter jets flying in a formation, a helicopter,
a private aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles, commercial
airplanes, or military air transporters, etc. Such agent is
chosen to anticipate if target X is hostile and attacks the
agent. If this happens, we only loose a weapon system but
not the personnel which is invaluable. If the agent confirms
that target X is indicated hostile and shows hostility, the
agent then sends the information to the C2 center. Having
this information, the C2 center then dispatches the jet fighters
according to the information delivered by the two agents, the
UAV and the radar. In the opposite situation, the C2 center
will not dispatch any agent and only carries out continuous
monitoring the situation of the national airspace.
IV. CASE STUDY
The mechanism of the air defense system in dealing with
situations occured in national airspace from the early
warning until the engagement of agents to target X in
airspace has been explained in the previous section. In this
section, the simulation of the opinion model for air defense
system operation decision making is presented. The
simulation of opinion model will be presented with three
different scenarios.
A. The Hierarcy of An Air Defense System Network
A simple hierarchy of an air defense system used in this
study is shown di Fig. 4. There are nine agents where six
agents namely, radar, UAV, and fighter jet act as sensory
apparatus, while the other three ones act as information
inferencing fusion agents in this scheme. Jet fighter agent
always flies in formation of three aircraft. It is a standard
procedure in air defense system in case of there might be an
air engagement with the detected object. The agents are
teamed up as three teams. These agents will gather the
information related to the national airspace situation, and
deliver the comprehensive information to the air defense
commander as the basis for making decision.
Fig. 4. An example of hierarcy of an air defense system network.
The first team consists of three early warning radars
which also function as ground control intercepting radars,
namely Radar 1, Radar 2, and Radar 3. The first team
monitors the national airspace dynamics and collects
information about all flights which pass through it. They also
monitor any indication of flight which try to violate or
violates or passes through the national airspace without
having permission from our authority. This team tracks every
object that enters the airspace area. The information from the
first team will be the basis for the air defense commander to
decide what the next step should be taken in the case the
detected object is not identified and may be hostile.
Information detected by radar form a detected object consists
of elevation or altitude, speed or velocity, and range, which
from these data the first team commanders
may be able to identify the type of target X. To ensure that
his identification is correct, he sends a report to the air
defense commander.
Based on the first team commanders’ reports, the air
defense commander will give instruction to the second team
commander to dispatch his agents, namely the UAV to do
direct visual observation. At this stage, the UAVs are sent to
identify the type of target X whether it is a threat or not.
When the second team confirms that it is a threat and shows
hostility more over it is weaponized, the air defense
commander will instruct the third team commander to
dispatch his agents to not only reconfirm the type of the
threats but also to be prepared in air engagement which may
occur. When target X is reconfirmed as a threat and hostile,
the third team’s agents will intercept the object and after
reporting the situation to air defense commander, the agent
will do necesssary measurement such as force down, or do
air engagement to drive it out from the national airspace.
B. Simulating Air Defense System Operation using Opinion
Formation Model
The model of opinion formation in the air defense system
operation as explained previously is simulated using three
different scenarios. Suppose there is target X approaching the
border of national airspace. The first scenario is a scenario
with the hierarchy as depicted in Fig. 4 but without the second
team. So the agents involved in the simulation are four agents
namely, Radar 1, Radar 2, Radar 3, and Jet Fighters. The
simulation’s result of the first scenario is shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. The simulation results of Scenario 1.
The initial condition of the four agents was 0 as there was
no information about t approaching the national airspace. In
minute 5, Radar 2 detected target X approaching the national
airspace. Radar 2 then gave social input to society and
affected other agents. As a response, the opinion of the
remaining radars which in the range of target X increased. At
this stage, the jet fighters has not had opinion yet because
they were still on the ground while waiting for instructions
from the air defense commander. To identify target X based
on the opinion of the radars in the range, the air defense
commander dispatched the jet fighters to do direct visual
observation. In minute 20, the jet fighters dispatched by the
third team commander and confirmed that target X was a
threat and hostile. In our scenario, 0 indicates target X is safe
while 1 indicates that target X is very dangerous and hostile.
As a response, all the agent’s opinion reached a consensus
and stated that target X was truly a
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dangerous threat. From this consensus, the air defense
commander could decide to carry out necessary
measurement to object as previously explained in Section IV
A.
The second scenario of the opinion formation model
simulation is a scenario with the hierarchy as depicted in Fig.
4. The simulation results from the second scenario are
explained in Fig. 6. The initial condition of the nine agents
was 0 as there was no information about target X
approaching the national airspace. In minute 5, Radar 2
detected this target approaching the national airspace. Radar
2 gave social input to society and affected other agents. As a
response, the remaining radar within the range increased as
well as the UAVs opinion. Same as stated before that the
opinion of the fighter did not affect as the radar is less trusted
than the fighter. To follow up the social input from radar 2,
the commander sends the UAV to identify target X. In min-
20, the UAV sent to target X’s location and confirmed that
target X was a threat.
Fig. 6. The simulation results of Scenario 2
The UAV sent social input to society. As a response, all
the agent’s opinion increased and made a consensus at 0.75.
It meant that target X was a threat. In order to make sure the
type of the object, the commander sent the fighter to identify
target X. In min-35, the fighter was sent and confirmed that
target X that was detected was a dangerous object. It made
all the agent’s opinion increased and made a consensus with
value 0.9. From this consensus, the commander could make
a decision to attack the object. Scenario 2 is more safe and
better than scenario 1. Scenario 2 can save the system from
damage loss. Consider if target X is an enemy fighter. When
the fighter was sent by the commander to identify, target X
could attack our fighter. It can be a loss for our nation.
The third scenario of the opinion formation model
simulation is a scenario with the hierarchy as depicted in Fig.
4 but the UAVs and the fighter was sent at the same time.
The initial condition of the nine agents was 0 as there was no
information about target X approaching the area. In min-5,
radar 2 detected target X approaching the area or national
airspace. Radar 2 gave social input to society and affected the
other agent. As a response, the remaining the first team’s
radars increase, as well as the UAVs opinion and the opinion
of the fighters, did not affect as the radars were less trusted
than the fighters. In this scenario, as the response of social
input from radar 2, the commander sent the UAVs and the
fighter altogether at the same time.

Fig. 7. The simulation results of Scenario 3.
As shown in Fig. 6 in min-30 the UAV and the fighters
confirmed that target X approaching the national airspace
was a threat. But it can be seen that the UAV and the fighters
gave different social input. The UAV remained at
0.75 and the fighter remained at 0.9. The opinion of the
fighters were more trusted as the fighters were manned by
human. A human could identify exactly the type of threat.
The UAV was less trusted than the fighters because even
though the UAV could approach closer to the object, UAV
only controlled by the command center from a distance and
the sensor of the UAV might be false.
The social input from the UAV and the fighter did not
make any consensus despite the consensus of the agent from
team 1. The radars made a consensus at around 0.85. This
scenario did not help the commander to make a decision on
how to treat the threat because there were 3 subgroups
opinion about target X. These subgroup opinion occurred
because the UAVs and the fighter had their own highly trust
so they act as a ‘stubborn’ agent.
V. CONCLUSION
This study has proposed a dynamic of high-performance
decision making for the air defense system operation in
protecting national airspace. It has been shown that opinion
of agents in the air defense system operation can be modeled
using modified FJ model. The model is applied in a simple
case of air defense system operation. The dynamic of the
high-performance decision-making process was presented in
different scenarios.
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From the simulation, scenario 1 and 2 resulted in a
consensus so it can be used as a basis for the commander to
make the right decision. Scenario 3 did not result in a
consensus as there was two ‘stubborn’ agents giving their
social inputs at the same time. Scenario 3 was not
recommended for a commander in the process of decision-
making. However, the commander still had to make the
decision wisely and do not depend only from the results of
the algorithm. Experienced, wisdom, and humanity of the air
defense commander will never be replaced by any algorithm
in the process of decision-making. For the next future work,
the decision making for air defense operation by the
commander can be enhanced by using Artificial Intelligence
(AI) based method.
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