LEX PATRIAE

Review Center

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Special Lecture
Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales

ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES OR AGENCIES

An administrative agency is a body, other than the courts and the legislature, endowed with quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial powers for the purpose of enabling it to carry out laws entrusted to it for enforcement or execution.
In Metro Construction Inc., vs. Chathau Properties Inc., 365 SCRA 697, the Supreme Court defined a quasi-judicial
agency or body as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.
Manner of Creation
1. by constitutional provisions (Office of the President, COMELEC, COA, CSC);
2. by legislative enactment (NLRC, SEC, NAPOLCOM); and
3. by authority of law (EIIB, TFA).

The President can validly reorganize his office even without congressional authority because the
Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) has empowered the President continuing authority to reorganize his office in
order to achieve economy and efficiency.
Thus, the EIIB is subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize. As far as bureaus, agencies
or offices in the executive department is concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate
the function of a particular office, or certain law may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measure.(Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718)
The equal protection clause was violated when the Philippine Truth Commission singled out only the
officials and employees of the Arroyo Administration but not the other officials of previous administrations who are
similarly situated. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, GR No. 192935, December 10, 2010)
A. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE OR RULE-MAKING POWER
Nature and scope of the power
The legislative power has been described generally as the power to make , alter and repeal laws. The
details and manner of carrying out the law are left to the administrative agency charged with its implementation – in
this sense, the rules and regulations promulgated by an administrative agency are the product of delegated power to
create new or additional legal provisions that will have the effect of law. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute
and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the
government. (Abellar vs. CSC, 442 SCRA 507) The grant of express power to formulate implementing rules and
regulations must necessarily include the power to amend, revise, alter or repeal the same. (Yazaki vs. Torres
Manufacturing, Inc. vs. 493 SCRA 86)
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules or
regulations. Delegated rule-making power has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to increasing
complexity and variety of public functions. In the exercise of delegated legislative power, administrative bodies have
no discretion to determine what the law shall be. They have merely the authority to fix details in execution or
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Thus, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Administrative
Order No.308 as it did not merely implement the Administrative Code. It established a national computerized
identification reference system which requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies, the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy against dossier-gathering by the government, and choices of
policies. It deals with a subject that should be covered by law. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141)
The express grant of rule-making power to an administrative agency necessarily includes the
power to amend, revise, alter or repeal the same. It is a standard provision in administrative rules that prior
issuances of administrative agencies that are inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or modified.
(Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III,535 SCRA 265)
Kinds of administrative rules and regulations
1. Legislative regulation
a. Supplementary or detailed legislation, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
LEGISLATIVE REGULATION affects the substantial rights of the general public and has the force
and effect of a law.
b. Contingent regulation
 (1)
2. Interpretative legislation or internal rules, e.g., BIR Circulars
INTERPRETATIVE RULE merely clarifies the meaning of a pre-existing law by inferring its
implication. the court may review the correctness of the interpretation of the law given by the administrative
body, and substitute its own view of what is correct to that of the administrative body. It does not have to be
published because it is not a law itself.
INTERNAL RULE is only an instruction from a higher officer to a lower officer within the same office
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties. It has
no effect of law because no clear legal right which can be invoked by a third person emanates from it. It
does not have to be published to be effective.

Subordinate Legislation
This is the power of administrative agency to promulgate rules and regulations with force and effect of a law
on matters of their own specialization. Administrative authorities are vested with the power to make rules and
regulations because it is impracticable for lawmakers to provide general regulations for various varying details of
management. (PNOC vs. CA, 457 SCRA 32)
As subordinate legislation, the power to make rules and regulations so passed by administrative agencies
are only of the nature of implementing rules and regulations, which are tested by their conformity to the standards set
by, and their ability to carry out the legislative intent contained in the primary law.
In Commission on Internal Revenue vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., 496 SCRA 176, it was held that Revenue
Regulations No 2-94 is still subordinate to RA7432 and in cases of conflict, the implementing rule will not prevail over
the law it seeks to implement. Thus, the said regulation is null and void for failing to conform to the law it sought to
implement. Administrative rules, regulations and orders have the efficacy and force of law so long as they do not
contravene any statute or the Constitution.
Requisites for valid exercise of rule-making power
1. the rule must be issued under the authority of law or its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. the administrative issuance must be within the scope and purview of the law; or authority given by the
legislature
Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th month Pay Law is void,
because it unduly expanded the concept of basic salary as defined in PD 851. Basic salary is the rate of pay
for a standard work period exclusive of additional payment as bonuses and overtime. The DOLE order
included the commission paid its sales representatives in the computation of the 13th pay due them. (Boie-
Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. De la Serna, 228 SCRA 329)
The HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 5 of RA7742 and Section 13 of
PD 1752. However, rules and regulations which are the products of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the
object and purposes of the law, and not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by law. (Romulo, et al vs. HDMF, GR No. 131082, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 37)
It is elementary in statutory construction that an administrative circular cannot supersede,
abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. Hence, the Local Budget Circular issued by the Department of Budget
outrightly prohibiting local government units from granting allowances to judges whenever such
allowances are also granted by the national government, violates Section 447 (a) (1) (xi) of the Local
Government Code. (Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180)
It is well settled that rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create
new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity, with
the standards prescribed by law. (Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, GR No.
179579, February 1, 2012)
3. the rule must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, including public participation,
filing and publication; Interpretative rules and those merely internal in nature are not required to be
published and filed with the UP Law Center. (ASTEC v. ERC, GR No. 192117, September 18, 2012) As a
general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules and regulations promulgated to
govern future conduct. (Abella vs. CSC, 442 SCRA 507); and
4. the rules must be reasonable (KMU vs. Director-General, NEDA, GR No.167798, April 19, 2006) .
Additional requisites if rules contain penal sanctions
1. Law itself must declare as punishable the violation of administrative rule or regulation (People vs. Maceren,
79, SCRA 450); and
2. Law should define or fix penalty therefor.
In Perez vs. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, 492 SCRA 638, the Supreme Court cited two
requisites for an administrative regulations to have force and effect of penal law, to wit:
1. the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself,
2. the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
(2)
Publication, filing and effectivity
a. Publication is essential to the effectivity of any law or regulation as a requirement of due process.
Publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents
of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. (Philippine
International Trading Corp. vs. COA, 309 SCRA 177)
b. What must be published: rules and regulation of administrative agencies which have the force and effect of
law. All legislative rules and regulations, not only those of penal character, must be published. (Tanada vs.
Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446)
c. Where published: Either in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation. (EO 200, amending Art.
2 of the Civil Code) Hence, DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM pursuant to Sec. 23 of RA
6758 is of no force and effect due to the absence of publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. (PITC vs. COA, supra)
d. How published: In full, not just the title but the entire rule, if it is to serve the purpose of due process.
e. Filing: administrative rules and regulations must be filed with the National Administrative Register (UP Law
Center) as required by Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII, EO 292.
f. Effectivity: If a rule or regulation does not provide for a date of effectivity, it shall become effective 15 days
after publication. If it provides otherwise, then the period provided applies, but in no case before publication.
Exception: in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule.
Necessity of Publication. DOLE Order No. 16-91 and POEA MC Nos. 30 and 37, suspending temporarily the
deployment of OCW’s abroad until better working conditions are made by employers, while recognized as valid
exercise of police power as delegated to the executive department, were declared legally invalid, defective and
unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register. (Philippine
Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298)
Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees
which may be collected from applicants, has not yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register,
the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. An Administrative Circular that was never filed with the NAR cannot
be used as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions. The fact that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 is
addressed only to specified group-namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away
from the ambit of the ruling in Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, which is clear and categorical – administrative rules
and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. (Philsa International Placement and Service Corporation vs. Secretary of DOLE, 356 SCRA 174)
Since the Electric Cooperative Election Code applies to all electric cooperatives in the country, and it is not
a mere internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinate, then it should comply with the
requirements of the Civil Code and Administrative Code of 1987 relative to the publication requirement. (Nea vs.
Gonzaga, 539 SCRA 388)
Publication Not Necessary. Memorandum Order No. 20-87, which provided for the automatic review of the
decisions of the Collector of Customs if it is adverse to the government, does not require publication. It is merely in
the nature of an internal rule, since it is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to
his subordinates. (Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs, 180 SCRA 591)
Where petitioners challenged the validity of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 30-67, which interpreted
the Tobacco Inspection Law, on the ground that it was not published in the Official Gazette, the Supreme Court ruled
the same is for the internal administration of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It also interpreted the law. No
publication is necessary for its validity. (La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. CA, 134 SCRA 29)
In Veterans Federation of the Philippines vs. Reyes, 483 SCRA 526, the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of Department Circular No. 04 despite its lack of publication, the same being an internal regulation. It is meant to
regulate a public corporation under the control of the Department of National Defense, and not the public in general.
What has been created as a body corporate by RA 2640 is not the individual membership of the affiliate
organizations of the VFP, but merely the aggregate of the head of the affiliate organizations. Consequently, the
individual members of the affiliate organizations who are not public officers, are beyond the regulation of the circular.
Sections 2, 3, and 6 of the assailed circular are additionally interpretative in nature. They add nothing to the law.
They do not affect substantive rights of any person, whether he is a party to the case at bar or not.
Notice and Hearing Not Necessary. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of rules and regulations promulgated to govern future conduct. (Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. DFA, 502
SCRA 295)
B. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
Quasi-judicial power is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Where a
power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of
functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory. (Patalinghug vs. COMELEC, 543 SCRA 175)

(3)
Investigation and adjudication distinguished
INV: mere ministerial and may be delegated by an officer to a hearing officer who shall receive testimonial,
documentary and other evidence and submit findings of facts and recommendations.
ADJ: it involves decision-making which is discretionary in nature and cannot be delegated; the decision remains
with the agency, except when the law expressly allows the same.
Award of damages
Powers of administrative agencies are limited and usually administrative in nature. In case of injury or
inconvenience suffered by a person because of breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence, the proper
forum for him to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages should be in the courts and not in
administrative agencies. Being a creature of the legislature, administrative agencies can exercise only such
jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. (RCPI vs. Board
of Communications, L-43653, L-45378, November 29, 1977)
Exceptions. However, the NHA (now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board) has been conferred by
PD 1344, the competence to award damages including attorney’s fees which are recoverable either by agreement of
the parties or under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. (Solid Homes vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72) And so with the
National Labor Relations Commission in labor cases, by virtue of the provisions of the Labor Code.
Imposition of fines and penalties
Rules penalizing certain acts are valid only if the primary law pursuant to which the rule was issued also
provides that the act be penalized. But if the primary law does not make the act criminal, then the rule which makes it
criminal is void. (People vs. Maceren, 79, SCRA 450) The penalty for such violation must also be provided by the
statute itself. (Perez vs. Refillers Association of the Philippines, 492 SCRA 638)
Power to grant immunities from criminal and civil prosecutions
The rule is that administrative bodies in the performance of their quasi- judicial functions cannot grant
criminal and civil immunities to persons unless the law explicitly and specifically confers such prerogative or power.
However, insofar as the Presidential Commission on Good Government is concerned, it is conferred such power
under Sec. 5 of EO No. 14. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 72)
Likewise, the Commission on Human Rights, in the course of its investigation, may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. (Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483)
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
A. PROMULGATION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
Filing. Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of
every rule adopted by it. Rules in force not filed within three months from the date of effectivity of this Code shall not
be the basis of any sanction. (Book VII, Sec. 3) (See also Philsa International Placement and Service Corporation vs.
Secretary of DOLE, 356 SCRA 174)
Publication. The University of the Philippines Law Center shall publish a quarterly bulletin setting forth
the text of rule filed with it. (Book VII, Sec. 5) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act subject to a penalty
shall be published in full. [Book VII, Sec. 6 (2)]
Public Participation. If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, published notice
of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their view, [Book VII, Sec. 9 (1)]
B. ADJUDICATION
Notice & Hearing; Records of Proceedings. In any contested case, all parties shall be entitled to
notice of hearing. The notice shall be served at least five days before the date of the hearing. [Book VII, Sec. 11(1)]
The parties shall be given an opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. [Book VII, Sec. 11 (2)] The
agency shall keep an official records of its proceedings. [Book VII, Sec. 11 (3)]
Two necessary conditions
1) Jurisdiction and
2) 2) Due Process
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of quasi-judicial bodies (administrative
authorities.) Without jurisdiction, their acts are void and open to collateral attack. Any decision rendered without
justification is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time even on appeal. The only exception is where the
party raising the issue is barred by estoppel. (Solid Homes vs. Payawal, supra)
Procedure before a quasi-judicial body
In the administration of the quasi-judicial power of a body, the strict rules of evidence are not applicable.
However, in disregarding the rules of evidence, the body should be guided by the criteria of fair play, justice and
accountability. A reading of Section 1, Article III on Bill of Rights of the Constitution, the observance of due process in
all cases either judicial, legislative or administrative must not be denied to any person. Administrative proceedings
are not strictly bound by formal rules of evidence, but the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still
subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirements of due process. (Limbona vs. Limbona, 404 SCRA 6)
(4)
Rules of procedure; rationale; how interpreted
The quasi-judicial body may promulgate its own rules of procedure as they may see them fit and proper to
govern their proceedings, provided they do not increase, diminish or modify substantive rights, and subject to
disapproval by the Supreme Court. The adoption of certain rules of procedure by a body is necessary to govern their
proceedings on cases filed before them for disposition. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system
that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence rules of
procedure must be faithfully followed except only for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. (PNOC-EDC vs. Veneracion,
509 SCRA 93)
Rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining
just, speedy and inexpensive determinations of the respective claims and defenses.
Subdelegation of authority
Nature. Subdelegation of authority is the transmission of authority from the heads of agencies to
subordinates.
Rationale. This is permissible in administrative proceedings because subdelegation of power is dictated by
sound management principles and the exigencies of the service. By subdelegation of authority which is demanded by
administrative efficiency, the leaders in the hierarchy of an organization must be able to concentrate their attention
upon a larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time free, as much as possible, from the
consideration of a smaller and far less matters of details unless by provision of law it is withheld. (American Tobacco
Co. vs. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287)
Concept of due process
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the
right to due process in investigations and hearings. (CSC vs. Lucas, 301 SCRA 560)
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied in administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
(Arboleda vs. NLRC, 303 SCRA 38 and Adiong vs. CA, 371 SCRA 373)
Where the party has the opportunity to appeal, or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of,
defects in procedural dues process may be cured. (Autencio vs. Manara, 449 SCRA 46)
Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also and perhaps even many times more creditably
and practically through pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed
satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or ruling. (Garcia vs. Pajaro, GR
No. 141149, July 5, 2002)
Administrative due process is recognized to include the right to:
A. Procedural Due Process
1. Notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person’s legal right;
2. Reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence
in his favor;
B. Substantive Due Process
3. A tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of
competent jurisdiction;
4. And a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. (Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489;
Fabella vs. CA, 282 SCRA 256; Domingo vs. Ryala, 545 SCRA 90 )
Notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, but in the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of
notice and hearing, except when it involves revocation of a license. (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of
the Philippines, 283 SCRA 31)
General Rule. Due process in administrative context does not require trial type-proceedings similar to those
in the courts of justice. (UP Board of Regents, vs. CA, 313 SCRA 404) Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated to due process in its strict judicial sense since it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard
before the case against him is decided. (Ocampo vs.Office of the Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 17; Ledesma vs. CA,
541 SCRA 444) A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process –
it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of
the controversy and to present evidence on which a fair decision can be based. (Melendres vs. COMELEC,
319 SCRA 262)
 The requirement of hearing is complied with as long as there is opportunity to be heard, and to
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense, and not necessarily that an actual hearing
was conducted. (Busuego vs. CA, 304 SCRA 473)
(5)
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also perhaps many times more creditably and predictable
than oral argument, through pleadings xxx. A formal type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing. (Barot vs. COMELEC, 404
SCRA 352) It is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an agency to resolve a case based
solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties affidavits of witnesses may
take the place of their direct testimony. (Lastimoso vs. Asayo, 539 SCRA 381)
Where the litigants are given the opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there
is no denial of procedural due process. (Domingo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 313 SCRA 311; Ablera vs. NLRC 215 SCRA
476) A party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of denial of due
process. (Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, supra) There can be no denial of due process where a party had
the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed do so. (DBP vs. CA, 302 SCRA 362; Tiomico vs. CA, 304
SCRA 216)
Exceptions. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to
profound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. (Artezuela vs. Maderazo, 381 SCRA 49)
Violation of due process is a personal defense that can only be asserted by the persons whose rights have
been allegedly violated. (Napere vs. Barbarona, 543 SCRA 376)
In judicial proceedings, when from a consideration of the pleadings it appears that there are ISSUES OF
FACT which cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits, and no trial is had, there is denial of due
process. Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitute a denial of due process if, from a consideration
of the pleadings, it appears that there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits.
(Robern Devt Corp. vs. Quitain, 315 SCRA 150)
In quasi-judicial proceedings, the counterpart rule is that when an ADJUDICATIVE FACT IS AT ISSUE, a
trial-type hearing ought to be held. (Mabuhay Textile Mills Corp. vs. Ongpin, 141 SCRA 437)
Evidence in quasi-judicial proceedings
As a matter of general rule, quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence
governing court proceedings. They are given macro leeway in hearing and considering a variety of material evidence
and the receipt and consideration of incompetent evidence do not constitute a denial of due process. However, the
exemption from strict rules of evidence does not empower a quasi-judicial body to act arbitrarily.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish the administrative liability of a
respondent is substantial evidence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (Mariano vs. Roxas, 385 SCRA
500)
Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material matter. Material
matter means a matter the existence or non-existence of which is provable in action according to substantive
law and the pleadings. Evidence may be said to be relevant when it relates directly to a fact from which, by
the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence of the fact in issue.
The fact that administrative bodies are not bound by technical rules of procedure in adjudicating cases does
not mean that basic rules of proving allegation should be entirely dispensed with – any decision based on
unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process. (Aya-ay Sr. vs. Arpaphil Shipping Corporation,
481 SCRA 282)
Power to issue subpoena and cite for contempt
Subpoena. As a general rule, the power to issue subpoena and cite a person in contempt is not inherent to
an administrative agency and thus depends on a statutory grant. To allow administrative bodies to issue subpoenas
without express legislative authority violates the doctrine of separation of powers. The usual procedure is for these
administrative bodies to apply to a court for an order enforcing anadministrative order or subpoena. EO 292 grants
administrative agencies in general the power to issue subpoenas by requiring the attendance of witnesses or the
production of documents. (Book VII, Sec. 13), but only as an incident of their power to investigate.
The power of an agency to issue a subpoena is not confined solely to quasi-judicial functions as this will
nullify the investigatory function of the agency An administrative subpoena differs from a judicial subpoena. Its
purpose is not to prove a pending charge but to discover evidence on the basis of which a charge may be filed if the
evidence discovered so justifies. A subpoena may be enforced if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the
demand is not too definite, and the information is reasonably relevant. (Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99)
Contempt. The power to punish persons for contempt is essentially a judicial power. The power to punish
contempt must be expressly granted to the administrative body; and when so granted may be exercised only when
the administrative body is actually performing quasi-judicial functions. The COMELEC, SEC and the Insurance
Commissioner are granted these powers by special statutory grant. The COMELEC has the power to cite for
contempt, but this power may be exercised only while the COMELEC is engaged in the performance of quasi -
judicial functions. (Guevara vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269) However, the Commission on Human Rights, an
agency without quasi-judicial power, in cases of violation of its rules of procedure may cite a person for contempt in
(6)
accordance with the Rules of Court. ( Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483) Likewise, the authority to conduct hearings or
inquiries and the power to hold any person in contempt may be exercised by another agency not conferred with
quasi-judicial power, the Cooperative Development Authority but limited only in the performance of its administrative
functions. (CDA vs. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative Inc, 382 SCRA 552)
Form and promulgation of quasi-judicial determination
Form and Content. Every decision of an agency shall be in writing and shall state the facts and the law on
which it is based. (Book VII, Section 14) The mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requiring courts to
state clearly and distinctly the facts and the legal basis of their decisions is equally applicable to administrative
bodies. (Naguiat vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 564 and Pilipinas Kao Inc. vs. CA, 372 SCRA 548))
In order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision should not be simply
limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to the
record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal assessments and
conclusion on the case. (People vs. Baring, GR No. 137933, January 28 2002)
Rationale. This vital requirement is similarly required to give basis for all their decisions, rulings or
judgments pursuant to the Administrative Code whose roots may also be traced to the constitutional mandate. This
practice would better enable the courts to make an appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive portion
of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions of law by the tribunal
that rendered the decision. (Id.)
Likewise, the requirement is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution, and of fair play. It is
also designed to enable an appellant to pinpoint the possible errors of the tribunal for review by a higher tribunal. It
also gives assurance to the parties that in reaching judgment, the tribunal did so through the processes of legal
reasoning.
The decision shall become final 15 days after receipt of the party unless an administrative appeal or judicial
review is perfected. One motion for reconsideration, which shall suspend the said period, may be filed. (Book VII,
Section 15, EO 292)
Administrative determinations where notice and hearing are NOT necessary for due process
1. Grant of provisional authority for increased rates (only pursuant to quasi-legislative power), or to engage in a
particular line of business;
2. Summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of a delinquent taxpayer;
3. Cancellation of a passport where no abuse of discretion is committed by the Foreign Secretary;
4. Summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the immediate safety of persons or property.
5. Summary sequestration of ill-gotten wealth by the PCGG.
6. Preventive suspension of a public officer pending investigation.
CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
Opportunity to be heard
A decision is void for lack of due process, as when a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. A
void judgment never acquires finality. (The Summary Dismissal Board vs. Torcito, GR No. 130443, April 6, 2000)
Right to Formal Investigation
In an administrative disciplinary case against a lawyer where no hearing was conducted pursuant to Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court ordered an administrative case remanded to the IBP for further
proceedings. A formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be done away with except for valid
and cogent reasons. (Baldomar vs. Paras, 348 SCRA 212)
The right of petitioner Governor to formal investigation as spelled out in Administrative Order No. 23 was not
satisfied when the complaint was decided on the basis of position papers. Under the order, he has the right to appear
and defend himself in person or by counsel, the right to confront the witnesses against him and the right to
compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence. (Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA
279)
Likewise, the 1999 Uniform Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Commission guarantees the right to
formal investigation to a respondent employee in the career service. But such right is applicable only to administrative
cases filed with the Civil Service Commission. (Medina vs. COA, 543 SCRA 684)
Right to Assistance of Counsel
The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing conducted
by the investigating authority is not part of criminal prosecution. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of
a custodial investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies
only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
(Remolana, vs. CSC, GR No. 137473, August 2, 2001)
 In Ledesma vs. CA, 541 SCRA 444, reiterated its ruling in Remolana that counsel’s participation is
a proceeding similar to that of a courtroom trial is not required – it is sufficient that he is allowed to submit in
writing his observation on the investigation.
(7)

Administrative appeal and review

Pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party litigant can seek judicial
intervention, he must exhaust all means of administrative redress available under the law, subject to the exceptions
provided for by law or jurisprudence.
Nature of the Right to Appeal. Right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right- it is a statutory
privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. (Dela Cruz vs.
Ramiscal, 450 SCRA 449). Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be made to a
higher or superior administrative officer or body.
By virtue of the power of control of the President over all executive department, the President, by himself or
through the Department Secretaries (pursuant to the “alter ego doctrine”), may affirm, modify, alter, or reverse the
administrative decision of subordinate officials and employees. Unless otherwise provided by law, an appeal from a
decision of an agency may be taken to the Department Head (Book VII, Sec. 20, EO 292) The President has the
power to review decisions of department heads pursuant to the President’s power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. (Land Car, Inc. vs. Bachelor Express, 417 SCRA 307)
Reglementary Period and General Administrative Appeal Procedure. shall be perfected within fifteen days
after receipt of the copy of the decision by filing with the agency a notice of appeal, serving copies of it upon the
prevailing party and the appellate agency, and paying the required fees. If motion for reconsideration is denied, the
movant shall perfect his appeal within the remainder of the period for appeal. If the decision is reconsidered, the
aggrieved party shall have fifteen days from receipt of the reversal within which to appeal. [Book VII, Sec. 20 (2), EO
292] The appellate agency shall review the records and may on its own initiative receive additional evidence (Book
VII, Sec. 22, EO 292). The appellate administrative agency may conduct additional hearings in the appealed case, if
deemed necessary. But just like in the appellate courts, appellate administrative bodies may only pass upon errors
assigned. (Diamonon vs. DOLE, GR No. 108951, March 7, 2000)
Effect of Pendency of Appeal; Finality of Decision. Appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless the
law otherwise provides or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal. (Book VII, Sec. 21, EO 292) The
decision of an administrative agency shall become final fifteen days after receipt of a copy of the parties. (Book VII,
Sec. 23, EO 292)
Denial of Substantive Due Process. But a cabinet secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in
reviewing his decisions as Director of the Bureau of Mines. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
officer may not be a farce, the reviewing officer must be other than the one whose decision is under review. Being
human, he would not admit he was mistaken in his first view of the case. Petitioners were deprived of due process
when the Secretary reviewed his own decision. (Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 261)
Appeals from the decisions of the NAPOLCOM should be lodged first with the DILG and then with the CSC.
An appeal is not a natural but a statutory right, and one who seeks to avail oneself of it must comply with the statute
or the rule in effect when the right arose. (Miralles vs. Go, 349 SCRA 596) Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
However, under exceptional circumstances delay in the filing of appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial
justice. Where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities
may be disregarded in order to resolve the case.
Licensing procedure under EO 292
Except in cases of willful violation of laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health or safety
require otherwise, no license may be suspended or revoked without notice and hearing. [Book VII, Section 17(2)]
(Underscoring supplied))
Thus, the administrative order of the Philippine Ports Authority which provided that all licenses of harbor
pilots shall be for a term of one year only subject to yearly renewal after an evaluation of performance will unduly
restrict the harbor pilots to practice their profession before their compulsory retirement. Under the order, their
appointment ipso facto expire at every year. Renewal is dependent on evaluation of performance after the
license have been cancelled. Pilotage as a profession is a property right. Before harbor pilots can earn a
license to practice their profession, they have to pass five examinations, each followed by training and
practice. Their appointment allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of seventy. This is a
vested right. The pre-evaluation cancellation makes the order unreasonable. It is a deprivation of property
without due process. (Corona vs. UHPAP, 283 SCRA 31)
Where the license made a timely and sufficient application for renewal, the existing license shall not expire
until the application has been finally determined by the agency. (Book VII, Section 18, EO 292)
Fixing rates, wages, prices; double nature of rate-fixing
The grant of the power to fix rates, wages and prices is allowed because this function usually requires
technical knowledge which the legislature does not have. But the administrative agency cannot further delegate this
to another entity. (Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, 239 SCRA 386) Rate fixing calls for the technical
examination and specialized review of specific details which the court are ill-equipped to enter – such matters are
primarily entrusted to the administrative or regulating authority. (MERALCO vs. Lualhati, 510 SCRA 455)
Generally, the power to fix rate is a quasi-legislative function. But if the rate is applicable only to an
individual, then the function becomes quasi-judicial. When an administrative body performs rate-fixing in a quasi
judicial capacity, the valid exercise of this power demands previous notice and hearing. The rate fixing order, even if
temporary, is not exempt from the requirements of notice and hearing (PHILCOMSAT vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218)
(8)
The function of prescribing rate by an administrative agency may either be legislative or an adjudicative
function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.
Where the rules and the rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country,
they may partake of a legislative character. But if they apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon finding of
fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Hence, the necessity of prior notice and hearing. (The Philippine
Consumers Foundation vs. Secretary, DECS, 153 SCRA 622)
Res Judicata
Res Judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment,” and lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without
fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. (Khemani vs. Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad, 540 SCRA
83)
Thus, the rule of res judicata forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority
acting within their exclusive jurisdiction. The principle of res judicata is also available in administrative proceedings,
the laudable purpose of which is to put final rest a decision which has become final and executory. (Nasipit
Lumber vs. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93) These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected
parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. (Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary, 190 SCRA 673)
Applicability. The Doctrine of Res Judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings not to the
exercise of administrative powers. (Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264 and Hilado vs. Reyes, 496 SCRA
282)
Exception. However, the doctrine does not ordinarily apply in administrative adjudication relative to
questions of citizenship except when: (a) a person’s citizenship is resolved by a court or administrative body
as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing; (b) with the active participation of the Solicitor
General or his representative; and (c) the finding of his citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court. (Board of
Commissioners, CID vs. dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853)
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and
unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of
such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus the
decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. (Dagan v. Office of the
ombudsman, GR No. 184083, November 19, 2013)

Requisites of judicial review of administrative action

1. Administrative remedies must have been exhausted or the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
2. Administrative action must have been completed or the principle of finality of administrative action.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

General Rule: Before a party can invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have
exhausted all means of administrative redress afforded to him by law. The rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a condition
precedent to taking action in court. (CSC vs. DBM, 464 SCRA 115) Thus, a detainer suit is premature if it fails to
exhaust all administrative remedies, such as compliance with Section 412 of the Local Government Code on the
need for prior barangay conciliation proceedings. (Villadar vs. Zabala, 545 SCRA325) Also, in Catipon Jr. v.Japson,
GR No. 191787, June 22, 2015, it was ruled that where petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to the (CSC)
Commission Proper in accordance with the procedure prescribed in MC 19, the Court of Appeals may not be faulted
for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it.
Applicability. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of
the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither
part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. In Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology, GR No. 156109, November 18, 2004, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners action for damages
inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of
the courts and not the CHED. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where the act of the administrative
agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power. Where the act assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
is issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative functions, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. (Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor, 497 SCRA 581)
(9)
Rationale. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the separation of
powers which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily within
the competence of other department. The legal reason is that the courts should not act and correct its mistakes or
errors and amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. (Lopez vs. City of Manila, 303 SCRA 448)
The courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned
every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case., Indeed, the administrative agency – in this case the
Commission Proper – is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum. (Catipon Jr.
v.Japson,supra) And the practical reason is that the administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and
more speedy solution to disputes. (Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. PCA, GR No. 110526,
February 10, 1998)
Effect of failure to exhaust administrative remedies
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies will not affect the jurisdiction of the courts. Non-compliance with
the doctrine will deprive the complainant of a cause of action which is a ground for a motion to dismiss the case.
However, if no motion to dismiss is filed on this ground, there is deemed to be a waiver. (Rosario vs. CA, 211 SCRA
384 and Baguioro vs. Basa, 214 SCRA 437)
Exceptions to the Doctrine
1. doctrine of qualified political agency, when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter.
No appeal need be taken to the Office of the President from the decision of a department head
because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the former. There is greater reason for not requiring prior
resort to the Office of the President in this case since the administrative decision sought to be reviewed is
that of the President himself. (Secretary of Justice vs. Bacal, GR No. 139382, December 6, 2000)
Exception to the exception: where the law expressly provides for exhaustion. Hence, the failure of
the petitioner to appeal the order to the Secretary of Natural Resources to the President was deemed fatal
to the petition. The Supreme Court ruled that even if the respondent was a Department Secretary, an appeal
to the President was proper where the law (Executive Proclamation No. 238) expressly provided for
exhaustion. (Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302)
2. issue involved is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court (Regino vs. Pangasinan
Colleges of Science and Technology, GR No. 156109, November 18, 2004)
3. administrative remedy is fruitless;
4. where there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency;
5. administrative action is patently illegal, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
6. where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction;
7. where there is irreparable injury, or threat thereof, unless judicial recourse is immediately made
8. in land cases, where the subject matter is a private land, including those acquired by purchase or resale to
individuals;
9. where law does not make exhaustion a condition precedent to judicial recourse;
10. where observance of the doctrine will result in nullification of claim;
11. where there are special reasons or circumstances demanding immediate court action;
12. when due process of law is clearly violated;
13. When, in extreme cases, there is no plain, adequate and speedy remedy available except to seek judicial
protection;
14. when the issue is rendered moot and academic (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 318
SCRA 144)
15. when public interest is involved. (Indiana Aeronautics University vs. CHED, 356 SCRA 367)
Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary Resort
The Doctrine of Primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend judicial process
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. (The Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and
Development Corp. GR Nos. 197592 & 202623 November 27, 2013)
 The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after than administrative agency has determined some question or some
aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate
unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions
rendered thereby are null and void. (The Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp. GR
Nos. 197592 & 202623 November 27, 2013; Roxas & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106 and Province of
Zamboanga del Norte vs. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA)
(10)
Effect of Failure to Avail of the Doctrine. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not call
for the immediate dismissal of the case pending before the court. The case is merely suspended until the issues
resolvable by the administrative body are threshed out and fully determined. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184
SCRA 426) Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative
to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with
finality. Thus, complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with damages filed by a subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the quasi-judicial power of the Housing Land Use
Regulatory Board. (Larucom vs. Jacoba, 484 SCRA 206)
The DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION postulates that no resort to courts will be
allowed unless administrative action has been completed and there is nothing left to be done in administrative
structure. (Sta. Rosa Mining vs. Leido, 156 SCRA 1) Because the petitioner did not take an appeal from the
order of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, but went
directly to court, it was held that the court action was made prematurely and the petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. (SSS Employees Association vs. Batha-Velasco, GR No. 108765, August 27, 1999)
An administrative decision must first be appealed to administrative superiors up to the highest level before it
may be elevated to a court of justice for review. The power of judicial review may therefore be exercised only if an
appeal is first made by the highest administrative body in the hierarchy of the executive branch of the government.
Hence, an appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Department Secretary in an administrative
case is the last step that an aggrieved party should take in the administrative hierarchy, as it is a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the petitioner. (Valencia vs. CA, 401 SCRA 666)
A party seeking an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to
obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature
resort to court action. (CIR vs. Acosta, 529 SCRA 177)
Jurisdiction
General Rule: It is the Court of Appeals that is conferred with the power of judicial review over the decisions
of administrative agencies. except COMELEC, COA, Ombudsman in criminal cases in which case the Supreme
Court exercises jurisdiction.
BP 129 provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise “xxx exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution.”
Likewise, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court of Appeals shall have
appellate jurisdiction over awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise
of its quasi- judicial function.
Thus, if a party disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President, he should elevate the matter by
petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter’s exercise of judicial review, pursuant to Sec. 9(3) of BP
129. (Sanado vs. CA, 356 SCRA 546 and Serondo vs. CA, 375 SCRA 167)
As with other administrative agencies discharging quasi-judicial functions, recourse must first be had
through the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the orders, resolutions or
decisions of the following: (1) the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) (Republic vs.
Damayan ng Purok 14, INC., GR No. 143135, April 4, 2003), (2) the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Immigration (Agus Dwikarma vs. Domingo, GR No. 153454, July 7, 2004), (3) voluntary arbitrators (Silver Trading
Co. vs. Semana, GR No. 152456, April 28, 2004), (4) National Labor Relations Commission (St. Martin Funeral
Homes vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494), (5) Secretary of Labor (National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma, 304 SCRA
407), (6) Director of Bureau of Labor Relations (Abbot Laboratories Phil. Vs. Abbot Laboratories Employees Union)
and (7) DOJ Secretary in petitions for review (Public Utilities Department, Olongapo City vs.Guingona, 365 SCRA
467)
Exceptions: The Supreme Court, however, exercises appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions or orders of the COMELEC, Commission on Audit and Ombudsman in criminal cases in
accordance with the Constitution. (Garcia-Rueda vs. Pascasio, 278 SCRA 769)
However, under EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 , and under RA 6770, the Ombudsman Act
of 1989 both of which granted the right to appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the
Board of Investment and the Ombudsman in administrative cases, respectively, were declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court as it expanded the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence. (Fabian vs.
Desierto, GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998.)
Rationale. The provision of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution is intended to give the Supreme Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of
expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.
Under RA 9282, the Court of Tax Appeals exercises appellate jurisdiction over the decisions or ruling of the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Customs Commissioner, BIR, and the Secretaries of the DOF, DA and DTI.
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