PLATO 'S PHI LOSOPHY OF S C I E N C E .

ANDREW DAVID GREGORY.

DEPARTMENT OF THE HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY AND COMMUNICATION OF

SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

SUBMISSION FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D.

 ProQuest Number: 10018566

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

uest.
ProQuest 10018566

Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
ABSTRACT

This th e s is in v e s tig a te s P la to 's views on th e n atu re o f th e n a tu ra l

world, and how we ought t o in v e s tig a te and e x p lain i t . C r itic a l
questions a re whether P lato was a n tip a th e tic to th e in v e s tig a tio n of
n a tu re , A e th e r h is views were overly te le o lo g ic a l, v^ether h is
methodology was a n ti-e irp iric a l and discouraged c a re fu l observation and
th e e f f e c ts , b e n e fic ia l o r otherw ise, o f h is emphasis on mathematics. A
c e n tra l contention o f t h i s th e s is i s t h a t th e re were s ig n if ic a n t changes
to P la to 's views on th e s t a b i l i t y o f th e cosmos and th e re la tio n s h ip of
mathematics t o th e ph y sical world, and t h a t th e se changes were
s ig n if ic a n t events in th e h is to ry o f science. I t i s argued t h a t th e re
are a ls o im portant co -o rd in ate o n to lo g ical and epistem ological changes
from th e middle p erio d , and t h a t P lato produced p h ilo so p h ic ally and
h is to r ic a lly in te re s tin g answers t o many of th e questions t h a t must be
faced by any r e a l i s t conception o f scien ce. In t h i s th e s ta tu s o f the
Timaeus i s a c r i t i c a l . I t i s argued t h a t P la to 's s ty le o f w riting
philosophy i s based on h is views on knowledge, and t h a t he i s n o t so
much concerned to p resen t us w ith dogma as t o puzzle u s, o ffe r us
frameworks f o r th e so lu tio n o f problems and draw us in to considering
th ese problems fo r o u rselv es. This approach i s applied to th e Timaeus
and i t i s argued t h a t i t p re se n ts a s e r ie s o f hypotheses about
cosmology, mind and th e epistem ic s ta tu s of th e p h y sical world fo r us to
judge th e worth o f, many o f th ese representing advances on th e middle
p eriod views. One r e s u lt here i s g re a te r epistem ological optimism and
g re a te r s t a b i l i t y in th e n a tu ra l world than some accounts o f th e Timaeus
allow . I t i s argued th a t t h i s approach enlivens th e Timaeus, allows i t a
l a t e d a tin g , narrows th e gap in s ty le w ith th e o th e r l a t e works and has
im portant im p licatio n s f o r our a p p re cia tio n o f P la to 's philosophy of
scien ce.
CONTENTS

Acknowledgements. 5

References and A bbreviations. 6

In tro d u ctio n . 7
Notes. 12
01; P la to 's Philosophy of W riting Philosophy. 13

1) Philosophy and L ite ra ry S ty le . 13

2) P la to 's Problem with W riting. 15
3) Some Aspects of P la to 's L ite ra ry S ty le . 17
4) R e fle x iv ity and P la to 's Views on W riting. 20
5) The Question o f th e 'U nw ritten D o c trin e s'. 23
6) In te rp re tiv e S tra te g ie s . 24
7) Conclusions. 27
Notes. 28

02: Methodology in th e Meno and Phaedo. 33

1) S o crates' Autobiography and th e Deuteros Pious. 33
2) The Deuteros Pious and R eco llectio n . 38
3) R ecollection and Concept Formation. 41
4) R eco llectio n and Foundation. 43
5) Teleology and Coherence in th e Phaedo. 46
6) R eco llectio n , Hypothesis and Meno's Paradox. 51
7) The Fate o f R ecollection. 54
8) Conclusions. 56
Notes. 58
03: Astronomy and Observation in th e Republic. 65
1) Two Worlds and th e C ontinuity of P la to n ic In v e stig a tio n . 66
2) O bjections t o th e C ontinuity of P la to n ic In v e s tig a tio n . 69
3) An A ltern a tiv e Analysis o f Republic 529c-530d. 72
4) Astronomical Data and Observation in P la to . 75
5) Conclusions. 79
Notes. 81
04: Reading th e Timaeus. 87

1) Some I n i t i a l Problems. 87
2) The Timaeus and Parmenides' Poem. 90
3) P la to 's View of Parmenides. 94
4) The S tru ctu re o f th e Timaeus. 98
5) C onclusions. 102
Notes. 103

05: C e le s tia l Motion in th e Timaeus. 109

1) C e le s tia l Motion in th e Republic and th e Timaeus. 109

2) C e le s tia l Motion in th e P o litic u s , Philebus andLaws. 114
3) N ecessity and th e 'Wandering C ause'. 117
4) N ecessity and C au sality . 120
5) Cosmological Change a s a Dating C rite rio n . 122
6) Moral and P o litic a l Degeneration. 124
7) Owen*s Arguments Concerning Cosmology and P o l i t ic s . 126
8) Conclusions. 129
Notes. 130
06: World Soul, Human Souls and E^istemology in the Timaeus. 140

1) Ihe World S o u l's Opinions. 140

2) Innate A b ilitie s and Common N otions. 143
3) The Ih ea ete tu s and Sophist on False Judgement. 147
4) The Timaeus on Concrete False Judgement. 151
5) The Timaeus on A bstract False Judgement. 154
6) Conclusions. 156
Notes. 158
07: Flux and Language in th e Timaeus. 165

1) Flux, S ta b ility and th e ' S to ic h e ic * T rian g les. 165

2) The S ta b ility o f th e Heavens. 168
3) O bjection 1 - The Theory o f Ageing. 169
4) Objection 2 - The Gold Example. 172
5) Language and S ta b ility . 175
6) Flux in th e T heaetetus and C ratylus. 176
7) Other In te rp re ta tio n s o f th e Gold Example. 178
8) *TVo Worlds' and S ta b ility in th e Timaeus and P hilebus. 180
9) Conclusions. 184
Notes. 185
08: Metaphysics in th e Sophist and Timaeus. 191
1) Sipace, Time and S e lf-P re d ic a tio n . 191
2) P a rtic ip a tio n and P red icatio n in th e Sophist and Timaeus. 196
3) R elatio n al Change in th e S ophist. 200
4) Stylom etry. 203
5) Conclusions. 206
Notes. 207

09: Mathematics and Knowledge in th e Timaeus and Philebus. 214

1) The Generation o f Numbers in th e Parmenides. 214
2) L im it, Unlimited and th e S toicheic T rian g les. 217
3) Physical E n titie s in th e Timaeus and P hilebus. 220
4) The R eceptacle, P re d ica tio n and E xplanation. 225
5) Knowledge o f th e Physical in th e Philebus. 229
6) Knowledge in th e T heaetetus. 231
7) Knowledge o f th e Physical in th e Timaeus. 234
8) Conclusions. 236
Notes. 240

10: P la to 's Philosophy of Science. 244

1) P la to 's Teleology and R e a lis t Conceptions o f Science. 241

2) O bservation and E3ç>eriment. 254
3) The M athématisation o f Nature and In v e stig a tio n . 256
4) The Goals o f the In v e stig a tio n of Nature. 258
5) Conclusions. 260
6) F urther P rospects. 263
Notes. 264

B ibliography. 269
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks in due proportion a re owed to M.M McCabe, who read and consented
on e a r l ie r versions o f c h ap ters two and th re e . Bob Sharpies vAo read and
coirmented on e a r l i e r versions o f chapters th re e and f iv e , and my
su p erv iso r, Piyo R a tta n s i, fo r h is work on t h i s p ro je c t.
REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS.

References t o P lato a re t o th e page numbers o f th e Stephanus e d itio n

(P aris 1578). Quotations o f th e Greek a re taken from the Oxford
C la ssic a l Text e d itio n (Oxford, 5 vols 1900-1907), unless otherwise
in d ic a te d . References to A r is to tle a re t o th e page numbers o f th e Bekker
e d itio n (B erlin 1831).
I use th e follow ing a b b re v iatio n s;

LSJ = Lidd^U, S cott and Jones, a Greek - English Lexicon, 9th e d itio n ,
Oxford 1940.
OCT = Oxford C lassica l Text.

KRS = Kirk, Raven and S chofield, The P re so c ra tic Philosophers, 2nd ed,
Cambridge U.P 1983.

For P lato n ic and pseudo-Platonic works;

A licib iad es I , I I A le .I, I I .
^ o lo g y Apol.
Charmides Chm.
Cle itophon C lt.
C ratylus Cra.
C r itia s C ri.
C rito Cro.
Epinomis Epin.
E p istle s I-X III E p .I-X III.
E rasta i E r.
Euthydemus E td .
Euthyphro Etp.
Gorgias Grg.
Hipparchus Hpc.
Hippias Major H.Maj.
Hippias Minor H.Min.
Ion lo .
Laches La.
Laws Le.
Lysis Ly.
Meno Men.
Menexenus Mnx.
Minos Mi.
Parmenides Rn.
Phaedo Pdo.
Phaedrus Pdr.
Philebus P lb.
P o litic u s P it.
Protagoras P r t.
Republic Rep.
S ophist So.
Theaetetus Tht.
Theages Thg.
Timaeus Tim.
The E.S is th e E le a tic S tranger and th e A.S i s th e Athenian S tranger.
PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

INTRODUCTION

P la to 's views on th e nature o f th e n a tu ra l world and how we ought to

in v e s tig a te and ex p lain i t have provoked some sharply divergent
e v alu atio n s. He has received much c ritic is m , th e main accusations being
t h a t he was a n tip a th e tic to th e in v e s tig a tio n of n a tu re , fe e lin g t h a t i t
could produce no worthvAiile r e s u l ts , t h a t h is views were overly
te le o lo g ic a l, t h a t h is methodology was a n ti-e m p iric a l, t h a t he
discouraged c a re fu l observation and t h a t he e ff e c tiv e ly s u b s titu te d
mathematics fo r physics. Others have p raised him, la rg e ly fo r v to t they
see as h is ro le in th e m athém atisation o f nature and o f scien ce, w hile
some have sought to s tr ik e a balance. My aim in t h i s th e s is i s to
produce a re-nappraisal o f P la to 's philosophy of scien ce, and I s h a ll
attem pt t o c la r if y th e b a s is , n a tu re and ju s t if i c a t io n o f these various
e v alu atio n s. While th ese m atters have o f course received due a tte n tio n
in th e l i t e r a t u r e , I eirploy th re e s tr a te g ie s which w ill hopefully bring
a fre s h p e rsp ectiv e to th ese d ebates.
F i r s t l y , a c e n tra l contention o f t h i s th e s is w ill be t h a t th e re
were s ig n ific a n t changes in P la to 's cosmology between th e Republic and
th e Timaeus. In s h o rt, th e cosmos becomes s ta b le , and a t le a s t some
a sp ects o f i t , including th e motions o f th e heavenly bodies, become
amenable to p re c ise mathematical d e s c rip tio n . Behind t h i s move a re some
in p o rta n t m etaphysical realignm ents. The debate concerning the
development o f P la to 's thought has o fte n centred on th e theory o f forms.
I argue t h a t th e re a re indeed changes h ere, b u t s h a ll be a t l e a s t
eq u ally concerned with th e development o f P la to 's ideas concerning
p h y sical e n t i t i e s . Issu es here a re t h e i r provenance, t h e i r n a tu re , th e i r
s t a b i l i t y , t h e i r a b i l i t y to behave re g u la rly and th e n atu re o f th e
accounts t h a t we can have o f them. So too I s h a ll be concerned w ith ways
in which th e [technai] and P la to 's conception o f th e Good become more
te c h n ic a l and mathematical in t h e i r o rie n ta tio n . M odifications to
P la to 's views on th ese issu es have considerable im p licatio n s fo r h is
philosophy o f science, and l a t e r p eriod P lato may w ell be immune to many
of th e c ritic is m s t h a t might be aimed a t a middle period work lik e th e
Republic.
The second stran d o f ny in te r p re tiv e s tra te g y concerns th e r e la tio n
of P la to 's thought to modern r e a l i s t p o sitio n s in th e philosophy of
scien ce. Such p o sitio n s re q u ire t h a t we make c e r ta in assumptions about
th e n atu re o f th e world and th e n atu re o f in v e s tig a tio n . ^ Whether th ese
assumptions can u ltim a te ly be ju s t if i e d i s n o t a question I s h a ll be
concerned with in t h i s th e s is . N either s h a ll I argue t h a t P la to was
him self a r e a l i s t , as I b eliev e i t i s both h i s t o r ic a l l y and
p h ilo so p h ic ally unhelpful to attem pt t o c h a ra c te ris e a n c ie n t th in k e rs in
th e term s of modern deb ates. R ather, I s h a ll argue t h a t P la to i s
concerned with exploring some o f th e assumptions t h a t a re required to
g e t a r e a l i s t philosophy o f science o f f th e ground, and provides
in te re s tin g answers to key questions concerning th e com prehensibility of
th e u n iv erse, th e re la tio n of mathematics to th e world, and th e reasons
fo r th e reg u lar (or otherw ise) behaviour o f p h y sical bodies. So t o
P la to i s in te re s te d in im portant m ethodological questio n s such a s the
processes by which we form hypotheses and any c r i t e r i a beyond em pirical
adequacy th a t we might employ t o choose between competing hypotheses.
Obviously, th e re a re irre d u c ib le d iffe re n c e s between P la to 's hypotheses
and those of modern science, but v hat P la to has to say here may s t i l l be
rele v an t to modern debates and h i s t o r ic a l l y in te re s tin g in i t s e l f . The
p o in t o f t h i s approach i s n o t t o a ssim ila te P la to to modern science, but
ra th e r to narrow what some commentators have argued i s a yawning chasm
between th e two. For while P la to 's views are perhaps a long way removed
from p o s i t i v i s t , in stru m e n ta lis t o r Bayesian conceptions of science
th e re a re c e rta in in te re s tin g a f f i n i t i e s w ith some modern r e a l i s t
p o s itio n s . I f , in a p o s i t i v i s t frame o f mind, we dism iss P la to 's
d iscu ssio n s o f some o f th e c e n tra l q u estio n s fo r a r e a l i s t view of
science a s irr e le v a n t or m etaphysical, we ris k m issing much of
p h ilo so p h ical and h is to r ic a l i n t e r e s t . ^

The success o f t h i s s tra te g y i s p a r t i a l l y dependent on th e success

of my arguments concerning changes in P la to 's thought o u tlin e d above. In
each case i t i s the p o s itio n t h a t P la to moves to o t h a t shows g re a te r and
more in te r e s tin g a f f i n i t i e s w ith modern r e a l i s t p o s itio n s . There i s a ls o
g r e a t h is to r ic a l i n te r e s t in th e p o s itio n s th a t P la to moves from,
e sp e c ia lly where those p o sitio n s where commonplace in a n c ie n t thought,
or v^ere P la to has been h ig h ly in f lu e n tia l in subsequent developments.
The th ir d p a rt o f my in te rp r e tiv e s tra te g y concerns th e way in
which P la to w rite s philosophy. I argue P la to 's views concerning
knowledge, understanding and w ritin g generate a s p e c if ic s ty le of
w ritin g philosophy, where l i t e r a r y and dram atic fa c to rs in te r a c t w ith
th e arguments h is ch arac ters give t o achieve a s p e c if ic o v e ra ll e f f e c t.
Recognition o f t h i s 'philosophy of w ritin g philosophy* (PWP) explains
many asp ects of P la to 's w ritte n work, and provides a v i t a l key to
in te rp re tin g th e te x t s . The importance o f t h i s i s t h a t a s y e t very
l i t t l e work on these lin e s has been done on th e Timaeus, on any account
a c e n tra l t e x t fo r th e assessm ent o f P la to 's philosophy of scien c e. Here
I s h a ll a tte rrp t to counter a coninon view, su c c in c tly expressed by Sayre,
th a t
"The major dialogues o f th e l a t e r period (with th e exception
perhaps o f th e Timaeus and th e Laws) were constructed to serv e as
d ia le c tic a l instrum ents ra th e r than a s re p o s ito rie s of
d o c t r i n e .

I argue t h a t th e re i s evidence in th e in tro d u cto ry pages o f th e Timaeus,

consonant w ith P la to 's EWP, th a t we should not tak e what Timaeus has to
say as s e t d o c trin e, b u t ra th e r a s a s e t o f hypotheses concerning th e
n ature o f th e world, our r e la tio n to i t , and, more ra d ic a lly , th e s o r t
o f accounts we can have o f i t . Here I argue t h a t we should be suspicious
of tr e a tin g th e epistem ological views t h a t Timaeus expounds a t 27c-29e
as P la to 's own, and t h a t th e analogy subsequently developed between th e
world soul and the human soul functions as a c r itiq u e o f th e se views.
The intended e ff e c t o f t h i s I suggest i s t o draw th e reader in to a
debate concerning flu x , th e natu re o f p h y sical e n t i t i e s and th e ir
r e la tio n t o language, and th e s o r t o f accounts we can have o f the
p h y sical world. The r e s u lt may be a considerable re v isio n o f some middle
p erio d views, and f a r more optimism toward th e r e s u lts o f an
in v e s tig a tio n o f th e n a tu ra l world. This approach considerably enlivens
our reading o f the Timaeus, and h elp s t o lin k i t s d iscu ssio n s w ith those
concerning th e nature o f mind and f a ls e judgement in th e Ih ea ete tu s and
S o p h ist, w ith th e w orries concerning flu x , s t a b i l i t y and language o f th e
Theaetetus and th e C ratylus, and w ith th e mathematical and o n to lo g ic al
concerns o f th e Parmenides and P hilebus. I b elieve my work here solves
se v era l long-standing puzzles concerning th e in te rp r e ta tio n o f th e
Timaeus and P la to 's a ttitu d e t o th e physical world, and in d ic a te s t h a t
th e Timaeus i s considerably more so p h istic a te d and b e tte r in te g ra te d
in to th e general programme of P la to 's l a t e r thought than i s u su ally
allowed.
A fu rth e r problem with th e Timaeus i s i t s d ating r e la tiv e to
P la to 's o th er works. Here I hope to produce two new c r i t e r i a based on
th e changes in cosm ological s t a b i l i t y and th e r e la tio n o f mathematics to
th e world t h a t I argue f o r . These in d ic a te t h a t a group comprising of
th e Timaeus, C r i ti a s , Philebus, Laws and Epinomis a re a l l l a t e r than th e
P o litic u s , perhaps th e l a s t work advocating th e o ld cosmology.^ I a lso
re -a sse ss o th e r arguments fo r d atin g r e la tiv e to my in te rp r e ta tio n of
th e Timaeus. For th e works t h a t d ir e c tly concern t h i s t h e s is , t h i s gives
a r e la tiv e ordering a s follow s;

Protagoras
Gorgias Early p erio d .
Meno
Lysis and o th e rs .

Phaedo
Symposium
Republic Middle period,
Phaedrus

Parmenides
C ratylus
Theaetetus T ra n sitio n a l period.
Sophist
P o litic u s

Timaeus
C r itia s
Philebus Late period.
Laws
Epinomis'

Chapter one d isc u sse s th e g eneration o f P la to 's îWP and i t s im plications

f o r th e in te r p r e ta tio n o f h is works. Chapter two d iscu sses methodology
in th e e a r ly and middle period works, while chapter th re e looks a t th e
ro le envisaged fo r observation in th e astronomy o f the R epublic. Chapter
fo u r d iscu sses how we ought to read th e Timaeus and w ill attem pt to give
an account o f i t s s tr u c tu r e . In chapter fiv e I argue t h a t th e re are

10
iinportant changes in P la to 's cosmological th in k in g , p a rtic u la rly in
r e la tio n to th e heavens, between th e R epublic and th e Timaeus, and
in v e s tig a te t h e i r use a s dating c r i t e r i a . Chapter s ix w ill d isc u ss
changes in episteroology and philosophy o f mind, and chapter seven w ill
d iscu ss th e re la tio n sh ip between flu x , language and cosmology in th e
Timaeus and w ill compare t h i s w ith th e id e a s o f th e C ratylus and
T heaetetus. Chapter e ig h t w ill in v e s tig a te changes t o th e theory of
Forms suggested by th e S ophist and Timaeus- Chapter nine d iscu sses
mathematics and ontology in re la tio n to th e second p a rt o f th e
Parmenides, the Timaeus, th e Philebus and th e v arious re p o rts on P la to 's
Lecture on th e Good, while chapter te n d isc u sse s th e im p licatio n s of my
arguments fo r th e assessm ent of P la to 's philosophy o f science.
A ll tra n s la tio n s from the Greek a re my own, unless otherw ise
in d ic ate d . Greek words w ill appear t r a n s li t e r a te d w ith in square
b rac k ets, e .g [ a i t i a ] . Notes a re arranged a t th e end o f each ch ap ter.
Unless otherw ise s ta te d , a l l references to S ocrates a re to th e c h a ra c te r
of P la to 's dialogues and not th e h i s t o r i c a l f ig u re . The r e la tio n between
th e two i s u n c le a r,^ and w ill not be a major concern o f t h i s th e s is ,
though i t must be sa id t h a t I am probably more s c e p tic a l than most about
id e n tify in g th e opinions and l i f e h is to ry o f th e Socrates of th e
d ialogues w ith th e h is to r ic a l fig u re .

11
NOTES FOR TEÎE INTRODUCTION

01) A p o in t agreed on by both r e a l i s t s and a n t i - r e a l i s t s ; see

re sp e c tiv ly e .g Maxwell (1993a) and Van Fraa ssen (1989).
02) One might argue t h a t much o f th e severe c r itic is m o f P la to 's views
e a r l i e r in t h i s century, e .g Neugebauer (1947) has come from a
p o s i t i v i s t p e rsp ec tiv e , w hile P la to 's defenders in t h i s p e rio d , e .g
Whitehead (1933) have advocated more r e a l i s t views.
03) Sayre (1983) ix .

04) U sually, th e debate about th e dating o f th e Tim. and th e development

of P la to 's thought d iv id e s in to two camps; U n ita ria n / l a t e d a tin g ,
r e v is io n is t/ e a rly d atin g . In t h i s th e s is I explore th e p o s s ib ility th a t
th e Tim. i s l a t e and t h a t i t c o n trib u te s to an ongoing re v is io n of
P la to 's thought as p a rt o f a coherent programme w ith th e 't r a n s i t i o n a l '
and o th er l a t e works.

05) The authorship of th e Epin. and th e Ep.VII a re o f course d isp u ted . I

do n o t propose to d isc u ss th ese m atters in d e ta il , b u t f e e l I should
in d ic a te my p o sitio n h e re . I accept t h a t th e Le. was 'on th e wax' when
P la to died and was subsequently published (and e d ite d ?) by P h ilip of
Opus, who a ls o published th e Epin. Whether he had a g re a te r hand in th e
c re a tio n o f th e Epin, i s an open question, b u t th e work i s c le a rly meant
as an appendix the Le. I t may w ell be t h a t th e Epin. i s 'l e s s P la to n ic '
th an th e Le, and so should be tr e a te d w ith due c are, b u t in itiy view is
reasonably r e lia b le . The p h ilo so p h ical d ig re ssio n o f th e Eÿ>.VII I
b e liev e to be a forgery (see e .g T arrant (1983)), by someone vdio d id not
know o f, or d id not ap p re cia te developments in P la to 's thought a f t e r th e
Republic. I t c o n s titu te s in te re s tin g evidence concerning P la to 's middle
p erio d , but should not be tr e a te d as genuine. For d isc u ssio n see Morrow
(1962), E d elstein (1966), White (1976), T arrant (1983) Brumbaugh (1988)
and Sayre (1988a).

06) See De Vogel (1955) fo r d iscu ssio n h e re .

12
CHAPTER ONE

PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF WRITING PHILOSOPHY

A recen t growth a re a in P la to n ic sch o larsh ip has been th e question o f

P la to 's l i t e r a r y s ty le . ^ The main aim o f t h i s chapter i s t o argue t h a t
underlying th e use of various l i t e r a r y to o ls i s a coherent 'philosophy
of w ritin g philosophy' (IWP), i t s e l f generated by P la to 's views on
knowledge, understanding and le a rn in g , which can account f o r th e use and
fu n ctio n o f each of th ese t o o ls . I f i t i s p o ssib le t o id e n tify such a
PWP, then we ought t o be in a much b e tte r p o s itio n t o consider the
re la tio n o f l i t e r a r y form to ph ilo so p h ical c o n ten t in P la to 's works.

On one account, when philosophers w rite , they ought to c re a te t r e a t i s e s

t h a t ex p ress t h e ir views in th e most c le a r and fo r th rig h t manner
p o ssib le . While they might s t r i v e fo r elegance and w it t h e i r work should
not be l i t e r a r y in th e same sense a s , say, Sophocles or Shakespeare. No
fu rth e r illu m in a tio n o f th e co ntent should be a v a ila b le from an a n a ly sis
o f th e l i t e r a r y framework in which i t i s s e t . Murdoch summarises t h is
view of th e g u lf between l i t e r a t u r e and philosophy, saying th a t
"These two branches o f thought have such d if f e r e n t aims and such
d if f e r e n t s t y l e s , and I fe e l th a t one should keep them a p a rt from one
a n o th e r ... I am terrpted to say t h a t th e re i s an id e a l ph ilo so p h ical
s ty le which has a sp e c ia l unambiguous p lain n ess and hardness about i t ,
an a u ste re u n se lfis h candid s ty le . A philosopher must t r y t o explain
what he means and avoid rh e to ric and id le d eco ratio n . Of course t h i s
need n o t exclude w it and occasional in te rlu d e s ; but v^en th e philosopher
is a s i t were in th e fro n t lin e in r e la tio n to h is problem I th in k he
speaks w ith a c e rta in cold c le a r recognisable v o ice."
We might consider though W iether a l l philosophy, reg a rd less o f i t s
a ttitu d e s t o knowledge, language, or communication ought t o be w ritte n
in t h i s manner. One might argue t h a t t h i s supposed s t y l i s t i c n e u tra lity
is not in i t s e l f something t h a t i s n e u tra l between d if f e r e n t approaches
to philosophy, b u t i s something generated by th e natu re o f th e modern
a n a ly tic a l tr a d itio n . The emphasis on th e minute a n a ly sis of arguments
req u ire s t h a t a s f a r a s p o ssib le we divorce l i t e r a r y form from
a n a ly tic a l co n ten t such t h a t we can concentrate on t h a t a n a ly tic a l

13
co n ten t. Other conceptions o f th e n atu re o f philosophy, though, have led
t o d if f e r e n t s ty le s o f p re se n ta tio n . Spinoza’s views led him t o express
them in th e s ty le o f geom etrical theorems, while th e l a t e r W ittgenstein
coirmented t h a t a good ph ilo so p h ical work could c o n s is t e n tir e ly o f jokes
or o f q u estio n s w ithout answ ers.^ Those who have taken a more ra d ic a l
view might be sa id t o include N ietzsche, Kierke gaard and S a rtre among
th e moderns and H eraclitu s and Parmenides among th e a n c ie n ts . The
fundamental concern here i s t h a t any philosophy t h a t generates views
concerning th e e j^ re s sio n o f philosophy faces th e re fle x iv e problem of
how b e s t t o express i t s e l f .
Our question i s where P lato f i t s in to t h i s , as he gave us dialogues
ra th e r th an t r e a t i s e s , and dialogues in which he p aid g re a t a tte n tio n to
l i t e r a r y f a c to r s .^ i t would be h ig h ly an ac h ro n istic to presume t h a t th e
assumptions t h a t underpin th e s t y l i s t i c n e u tr a lity t h a t a n a ly tic a l
philosophy advocates a re shared by P la to . On such an account P lato
w rite s philosophy dressed in c id e n ta lly in some l i t e r a r y and dram atic
fin e ry , which can be strip p e d o f f and ignored by th e a n a ly tic a l
in te r p r e te r . That i s a p o s s ib ility , b u t i t needs t o be argued fo r on the
b asis o f some account o f P la to 's views on th e expression o f philosophy.^
Any account o f th e way t h a t P lato w rite s w ill have t o reso lv e th e
follow ing q u estio n s. We need to know whether we can tak e any of P la to 's
c h arac ters to speak d ir e c tly fo r him, or whether what he intends to
express depends on a larg e number o f complex l i t e r a r y and dram atic
fa c to rs as w e ll. I f th e l a t t e r i s so, then th e p ain stak in g lo g ic a l
a n aly sis of th e speeches of P la to 's c h arac ters may t e l l us much about
th e n a tu re o f th e prem isses, conclusions and the v a lid ity o f the
arguments they use, but th e re may be much more work to do before we can
a tt r ib u t e any o f t h i s to P la to .
A fu rth e r re la te d d i f f ic u lt y here i s whether P la to 's works a re
re p o s ito rie s of d o c trin e , o r a re meant t o challenge and educate t h e i r
read ers. We might a ls o consider whether P lato has a s p e c if ic answers to
a l l th e problems he r a is e s , or whether h is works a re more open ended
ex p lo ratio ns o f a to p ic , re je c tin g some views a s inadequate, providing
c r i t e r i a fo r prospective answers and frameworks to pursue them w ithin
without a rriv in g a t anything co n crete .^
An account P lato oy s ty le should a ls o be a b le t o ex p la in i t s major
fe a tu re s . We need to know whether th e dialogue form i s something
in tr i n s i c to th e way in which P lato w rite s , v^y P la to uses myth,

14
a lle g o ry and metaphor ra th e r than straig h tfo rw ard ex p o sitio n , why he
uses irony so e x te n siv e ly , v^y so many o f h is works end a p o re tic a lly ,
why he i s so fond o f paradox, and why he d en ig rates w ritin g as a medium
fo r philosophy.
What I s h a ll argue a s t h i s chapter develops i s t h a t P la to 's views
on knowledge, understanding and lea rn in g generate a IWP. Basing i t s e l f
on a model o f o ra l d i a l e c t ic , t h i s PWP generates a s e r ie s of
recoirmendations concerning how philosophy ought t o be w ritte n i f i t i s
to avoid th e p i t f a l l s t h a t P lato a sso c ia te s w ith th e w ritte n word.

II

For P la to , having knowledge a t l e a s t involves being a b le to give an

account o f what i s known. This i s so fo r th e Meno, where we simply need
to give a p ro p rieto ry 'explanatory a c c o u n t', and f o r th e l a t e r works,
where we may have to 'weave to g e th e r ' many accounts. ^ Burnyeat has
suggested t h a t much o f what P la to has to say concerning knowledge and
i t s re la tio n to opinion i s more congenial to th e modern eye i f we reckon
him to be pushing beyond a theory o f knowledge fo r a theory of
o
understanding. I would agree w ith Burnyeat h e re , and would add th a t
much of P la to 's PWP makes b e tte r sense i f we consider h is problem to be
th e tran sm ission o f understanding ra th e r than o f knowledge. As Burnyeat
comments, i t i s one th in g to be to ld , and so in one sense know, th a t
ro o t 3 is i r r a t io n a l , but q u ite another t o understand why th a t should be
so and be a b le to produce an explanation. To understand we need to 's e e '
fo r o u rselv es. Merely lis te n in g to (or indeed reading) an explanation
w ill n o t produce understanding in th e same way t h a t being to ld t h a t ro o t
3 i s ir r a t io n a l w ill produce knowledge. P la to 's problem w ith w ritin g , I
want to suggest, i s how i t can b e st c re a te some understanding in i t s
read ers. For P la to , the b e s t way to 'come to know' , ^ i s by the process
o f q u estio n and answer involved in d ia le c tic . Indeed, in th e Phaedrus
Socrates goes as f a r a s to say th a t
"Only [monois] in o ra l teaching fo r th e sake o f learn in g a re r e a lly
w ritte n in th e soul th in g s which a re d i s t i n c t , coirplete and worthy of
g re a t tro u b le concerning ju s tic e , beauty and goodness." (Pdr.278a)^®
We can compare t h is w ith what he has j u s t s a id , th a t
"Nothing [oudena] ever y e t w ritte n , whether in metre o r in prose,
i s worth g re a t p a in s." (P dr. 277e) ^ ^
What i s i t about th e w ritte n word th a t w orries P la to ? There are

15
i n i t i a l l y two problems re fe rre d to in th e t a l e o f Theuth, th e inv en to r
of w ritin g and Thamus, king o f Egypt a t Phaedrus 274c f f . Theuth claim s
th a t h is invention w ill improve th e memories and th e wisdom o f th e
Egyptians. However, Thamus re p lie s t h a t f i r s t l y , th e invention w ill
ra th e r promote fo rg e tfu ln e s s, as men w ill look to r e c o lle c t from th e
e x te rn a l sig n s o f w ritin g ra th e r than use t h e i r own in te rn a l
reso u rces. ^^ Secondly, he complains t h a t
"You o ff e r stu d e n ts th e appearance o f wisdom, n o t th e tr u e th in g .
For th ey may a rriv e a t t h i s p o in t w ithout proper in s tr u c tio n , appearing
to you t o be w ell-versed, b u t in f a c t ig norant of many im portant m atters
and d i f f i c u l t to be w ith, as they have come to be wise in t h e i r own
c o n ce it and n o t t r u ly w ise." (Pdr.275a)
Why does w ritin g have th ese shortcomings ? S ocrates t e l l s us t h a t
"Writing has t h i s stran g e p ro p erty , in which i t i s very lik e
p a in tin g . For th e products o f p a in tin g stan d before us a s i f a li v e , y e t
i f you ask them something, they are a lto g e th e r solemnly s i l e n t . And so
i t i s w ith w ritte n words. You might b e liev e them to speak w ith some
understanding, but i f you should question them wishing to le a rn t h e i r
account, they always p o in t out one and th e same th in g ." (Pdr.275d)
So books a re incapable o f en te rin g in to th e s o r t of d ia le c tic w ith t h e i r
read ers required f o r lea rn in g . They can give no account o f what they
have to convey i f asked fo r fu rth e r e lu c id a tio n , and can give no defence
o f th e i r p o s itio n i f challenged. These i n a b i l i t i e s mean t h a t books can
only be purveyors of f a c t and d o c trin e ra th e r than o f understanding.
Assuming th a t P la to wishes to gen erate some understanding in u s, i s
w ritin g then a s in g u la rly unhelpful medium fo r him ? The f a c t t h a t P la to
w rote so much, and w ith so much care suggests n o t.^ ^ Perhaps th en th e re
i s a v ia media between t r e a t i s e w ritin g and o ra l d ia le c tic , a s ty le th a t
attem pts t o c re a te a form of d ia le c tic between reader and t e x t , making
w ritin g a worthwhile p h ilo so p h ical a c t iv i t y fo r P la to . I t may be t h a t he
believed t h a t i f th e t e x t i s w ritte n in a s u f f ic ie n tly su b tle manner, i t
can provide answers t o our i n i t i a l questions which lead to fu rth e r
questions on our p a rt ra th e r than t o mere passive acceptance. I f th e
t e x t i s so stru c tu re d t h a t i t has la y e rs o f in creasing p h ilo so p h ic al
s o p h is tic a tio n , perhaps produced by th e complex in te rp la y o f l i t e r a r y ,
dram atic and philosophic f a c to r s , then successive questions may e l i c i t
fu rth e r more so p h istic a te d and s t i l l provoking answers. As we re fin e our
q u estio n s, th e te x t may give us answers t h a t were n o t apparent on a
cursor y reading, and so may be ab le t o give an

16
account of th e i n i t i a l p o sitio n s i t p re s e n ts . Thus th e t e x t may give us
d iffe rin g answers, o f in creasin g le v e ls o f philosophical complexity,
ra th e r than merely saying th e same th in g over a g ain , i f we have been
provoked in to some more p ercep tiv e q u estio n s.
In th e next se c tio n I s h a ll attem pt t o show how P lato employs some
l i t e r a r y / philosophic to o ls t o achieve t h i s o b je c tiv e . A common fa c to r
w ith a l l th ese devices i s t h e i r a b i l i t y to a c t a s a challenge o r a
p h ilo so p h ic al i r r i t a n t t o th e read ers, fo rcin g them t o go away and do
some th in k in g fo r them selves, and to re tu rn to read th e t e x t a t a
d if f e r e n t le v e l o f so p h is tic a tio n .

Ill

I t i s ty p ic a l o f P lato to force an ap p aren tly exhaustive dilemma, and

th en to show t h a t none o f i t s arms a re a ccep tab le, leaving us w ith an
impasse, in [ap o ria ].^ ^ That leaves us w ith se v e ra l questions t o ask; is
th e dilemma t r u ly exhaustive, a re th e arguments from th e prem isses
v a lid , and a re th e conclusions re a lly unacceptable ? Paradigm cases here
a re th e Laches, with la c h e s' and N ic ia s' p h y sical and in te lle c tu a l
conceptions o f courage, and th e C ratylus w ith i t s c o n v en tio n a list and
n a tu r a li s t accounts of naming. P lato o fte n achieves a p o ria i by
presen tin g somewhat extreme and overdrawn a lte r n a tiv e s , re s u ltin g in
paradox o r o th er d i f f ic u lt i e s .^ ^ The a p o re tic conclusion throws th e onus
onto th e reader to s o r t o u t th e hidden assumptions in th e arguments as
given, to re fin e our concepts and to re tu rn t o th e argument of th e t e x t
w ith a more s o p h istic te d view to t r y o u t. The ta sk o f th e reader i s then
perhaps to s te e r a course between th e presented a lte rn a tiv e s hoping to
a rr iv e a t a theory which meets th e o b jectio n s raised a g a in st both. If
we care about philosophy, ap o ria w ill not l e t us r e s t , and w ill not l e t
us accept th e i n i t i a l reading o f a work.
So to o th e re i s paradox. As McCabe has argued, one might contreist
th e s o r t o f paradox t h a t p o in ts to an u n lik e ly tr u th (no-one does wrong
w illin g ly ) w ith those t h a t a re lo g ic a lly v ic io u s, perhaps due to t h e ir
se lf-re fe re n c e , such a s th e l i a r p a r a d o x . B o t h have t h e i r uses fo r
P la to , th e f i r s t i n challenging our in tu itio n s and req u irin g us to
form ulate e x a c tly what i s wrong with e ith e r th e paradox o r our
in tu itio n s . The second type has two in p o rta n t fe a tu re s he can employ.
F ir s tly , such paradoxes appear capable o f defending them selves; a s s e rt
t h a t th e l i a r paradox i s tr u e and i t w ill t e l l you t h a t i t i s f a ls e , and

17
vice v e 20 A second im portant a sp ect o f th e se paradoxes i s t h a t i f
r s a .

they a re genuine, th ey fo rce a s h i f t in p h ilo so p h ic al le v e l in o rder to

reso lv e them, as th e l i a r paradox req u ires a move t o m etalanguages. ^ In
both cases th e readers a re forced t o do some work to s o r t o u t t h e i r own
o p in io n s.
There i s a ls o P la to 's use o f iro n y , and th e d iscu ssio n here has
o fte n been hamstrung by th e tendency to t r e a t i t a s a b in ary , on/ o ff
p h e n o m e n o n . 22 Taken t o an extrem e, one could c h a ra c te ris e t h i s in term s

o f th e two masks o f th e th e a tr e . When Socrates wears th e tr a g ic ,

n o n -iro n ic mask, he gives us P la to n ic d o c trin e . When Socrates wears th e
comic, iro n ic mask, a l l he says i s tongue-in-cheek and i s n o t to be
b eliev ed . Now of course i t i s p o ssib le fo r irony to operate in t h i s
manner, b ut P la to 's irony i s o ften more su b tle and complex, ra re ly being
a sim ple d e n ia l o f th e e v id e n t, and can have a d e fin ite ph ilo so p h ical
purpose. 23 I t can focus our a tte n tio n on th e am biguities of c e rta in
words and phrases, and may be th e l i t e r a r y analogue fo r provoking
p h ilo so p h ical reasoning of Republic 523a f f . There, when we look a t th e
th re e f in g e rs , we a re forced to use reason t o resolve our percep tio n of
what i s la rg e in one context and not so in o th e rs . When irony focuses
our a tte n tio n on am b ig u itie s , we a re forced t o reason in o rder to
resolve th e am b ig u ities, doing some p h ilo so p h ical work in order to be
a b le to produce a c o n s is te n t account. Thus irony can be a ph ilo so p h ical
i r r i t a n t , something t h a t provokes us t o p h ilo so p h ical enquiry.
Much has been w ritte n about P l a to 's use of iriyth and a lle g o ry , but
here I s h a ll focus on j u s t two a sp e c ts. F i r s t l y , myths a re not bound by
t r u t h . We do n o t expect them to be l i t e r a l l y tr u e , b u t to be
e n te rta in in g t a l e s , or in more se rio u s co n te x ts, to be illu m in a tin g . 25
P la to can e x p lo it t h i s to p re se n t suggestions which req u ire our a c tiv e
2fi
p a rtic ip a tio n to decide ju s t how clo se t o th e t r u th th ey a re . Another
a sp ec t of myth i s t h a t i t i s not bound by p rin c ip le s o f economy, a s are
p h ilo so p h ical argum ents.2^ Myths can have a s many outlan d ish b easts as
th ey l ik e , and P l a to 's ph ilo so p h ical myths a re o ften p r o f lig a te in t h e ir
o n to lo g ical commitment. 2® As McCabe has argued, th e parsimony of th e
arguments o f th e main t e x t and th e o n to lo g ic al g en ero sity o f the myths
may fu n ctio n a s c ritiq u e s of each o th e r .2^ The question we th e readers
may be provoked in to asking i s whether th e parsimony o f th e main t e x t is
adequate t o provide explana tio n and understanding, and whether th e
m yth's g e n e ro sity , while providing more illu m in a tio n , i s in some ways
o tio s e . One problem here i s th e Timaeus,

18
which i s v ir tu a lly a l l myth, but P la to 's devices work a t many le v e ls and
i t may be t h a t th e Timaeus a s a v^ole o ffs e ts o th er works. In
p a r tic u la r , one might c o n tra s t th e Timaeus's p ro flig a c y concerning Forms
and teleo lo g y w ith th e absence of both from th e T heaetetus.
I t w ill be up to u s, th e read ers, t o decide how much ought to be
salvaged, and up t o us to pare down extravagancies in to a more
economical form. T his process w ill perhaps draw us in to some s o r t of
d ia le c tic w ith th e t e x t , and w ith P la to 's work o v e ra ll as we ask
d if f e r e n t questions o f i t in so rtin g o u t how iryth, a lle g o ry and metaphor
r e la te t o th e arguments presented in th e main body of th e t e x t and to
our own views.
A llegories and metaphors too w ill always challenge our
p h ilo so p h ical s e n s i b i l i t i e s as one must always ask where and why these
rep re se n ta tio n s break down. With th e a lle g o rie s o f th e Republic, or th e
r 31
'f i s h s eye view' o f th e myth o f th e Phaedo, we can a ls o ask how th ese
r e l a te to th e s tru c tu re o f th e argument in th e work a s a vAiole. Does
P la to use th e methods he proposes, and what i s to be le a r n t from t h is
32
? That again involves examining th e t e x t a t a d if f e r e n t le v e l.
We a ls o need t o consider th e c o n tra st which P la to o fte n draws
between [spoude], 'z e a l, e arn estn ess, se rio u sn e ss' (LSJ) and [paidia]
'c h i l d 's p la y , s p o rt, p astim e' (LSJ), along w ith i t s cognate verb
[ p a i z e i n if
] . 3 3 a n a ly sis of P la to 's EWP is c o rre c t, a work should not
m y

be w ritte n se rio u sly a t a prima fa c ie le v e l, b u t should be sp o rtin g ,

p la y fu l and suggestive such t h a t i t draws i t s readers in to contem plation
o f i t s deeper le v e ls , t o consider th e se rio u s thought behind th e p la y fu l
w ritte n word.
Now while P lato does not have a fix ed ph ilo so p h ical term inology,
some term s tend t o b u ild up c e r ta in resonances, [paid ia] and i t s
cognates i s one o f th e s e , I would suggest. Note fo r in stan c e how the
myth o f th e P o litic u s i s introduced. I t i s a road th a t may a ffo rd us
some amusement, [paidian] ( P l t . 2 6 8 d 8 ) a n d th e E le a tic Stranger t e l l s
young Socrates
"But give your f u l l a tte n tio n to t h i s s to ry , j u s t a s ch ild ren do;
fo r you have n o t e n tir e ly outgrown such games [paid ias ] ^^. " (Plt.268e)
Given th e use of myth o u tlin e d above, th e re i s a fu rth e r c o n tra s t t o be
drawn between th e r e la tiv e ly serio u s nature o f th e main t e x t a g a in st th e
more p la y fu l extravag<incies of myth, as I suggest i s signposted h ere.
This i s im portant a s th e [p aid ia] d e sc rip tio n occurs se v e ra l tim es in

19
l a t e r P l a t o . I t i s p o ssib le t o r e la te a l l o f th e l i t e r a r y to o ls
discussed above to t h i s c o n tra s t o f se rio u sn ess and p lay fu ln ess. The use
of irony f i t s w e ll, p la y fu lly giving us am biguities t o s o r t out fo r
o u rselv es, and P la to could be thought t o be p la y fu lly te a sin g h is
readers by leading them in to se rio u s a p o ria and te s tin g them with
paradoxes. This p lay , though, has a se rio u s in te n t, t o lead us in to
ph ilo so p h ical enquiry in p u rs u it of an adequate th eo ry t h a t w ill allow
us to m aintain our in te lle c tu a l in te g r ity .
A ll t h i s i s by way o f suggesting t h a t th e re a re two dialogues going
on when we read P la to , between th e c h a ra c te rs in th e dialogue, and
between P la to and h is re a d e rs. By various p la y fu l s t y l i s t i c devices,
P lato hopes to provoke us in to th e se rio u s business of in v e stig a tin g th e
thought t h a t l i e s behind th e i n i t i a l p o s itio n s t h a t h is c h a ra c te rs adopt
in th e t e x t , so generating some d ia le c tic between th e reader and th e
t e x t and ho pefully helping t o generate some understanding in h is
re a d e rs.

IV

Opposing th e p o in t t h a t P lato seems to tak e g re a t care in composing h is

d ialogues i s th e seemingly irre c o n c ila b le f a c t t h a t P la to s ta te s , in
w ritin g , t h a t nothing w ritte n i s worthy of g re a t p a in s . How should we
approach t h i s paradox ? Consider th e way in which P la to 's IWP ought to
be presented in w ritin g . I t s p rin c ip le s should apply re fle x iv e ly , and
t h is can be seen in th e Phaedrus. In lin e w ith th e dilemma s tra te g y ,
P lato overdraws th e c o n tra s t between o r a l d ia le c tic and w ritin g to th e
p o in t v^ere paradox occurs, leaving th e reader in a p o ria . Note the
q u a lif ie r s P lato uses a t 277e f f ; nothing ever w ritte n , only o ra l
d ia le c tic , and t h a t th e c o n tra s t i s thoroughly steeped in the [p a id ia ]/
[spoude] term inology, th e wise man only w ritin g as a 'pastim e'.^® The
re s u ltin g book paradox i s s e l f - r e f e r e n ti a l and h e av ily ^9 in
i r o n i c .

o rder to reso lv e i t we need to s h i f t le v e ls , and t h i s should provoke us

in to c o n sid eratio n o f th e n atu re o f P la to 's w ritin g . We might w ell f e e l
t h a t some books a re indeed lik e p a in tin g s, bu t o th e rs a re more h e lp fu l
in giving an account o f them selves; but what i s i t about them th a t
allow s t h is ? The challenge to th e reader i s to s o r t o u t the
re la tio n sh ip between th e w ritte n and th e spoken word such t h a t th e
w ritte n word can have some m e rit in th e rig h t circum stances, and so
avoid th e book paradox, while n o t being th e equal o f o ra l d ia le c tic . The

20
c lo s e s t th e Phaedrus comes t o openly s ta tin g t h i s i s in th e follow ing
passage, where S ocrates says
" I f he has composed th ese th in g s w ith some knowledge o f th e t r u t h ,
and i s a b le to support Wiat he has w ritte n in d isc u ssio n , and has the
power t o dem onstrate in h is own speech th e t r i v i a l i t y of th e se w ritin g s,
then one must say t h a t i t i s n o t from th ese w ritin g s t h a t such a man
should receiv e h is name, but from th e e n q u irie s which have underpinned
them."^® (Pdr.278c)
This passage i s s t i l l paradoxical ( i t i s t r i v i a l w ithout o ra l su p p o rt),
and P lato s t i l l holds a p a rt w ritin g and o r a l d ia le c tic . I f th e author
can c re a te some d ia le c tic w ith h is reader however, and in t h a t way
tra n sm it something o f th e e n q u irie s t h a t have underpinned h is w ritin g ,
then h is work becomes n o n - tr iv ia l.
The g re a t elegance o f P la to 's IVîP is then th e re fle x iv e manner in
v^ich i t i s expounded. The theory which says n o t to t r u s t th e w ritte n
word b u t t o examine th e thought t h a t l i e s behind i t i s i t s e l f not to be
tru s te d a s a w ritte n theory b u t only a s th e thought behind the
re so lu tio n o f th e w ritte n paradox th a t expresses i t . So while w ritin g
w ill never be th e equal of o ra l d ia le c tic , i t i s n o t n e c e ssa rily a
w orthless a c t iv i t y . One im p licatio n o f t h i s i s t h a t we cannot a tt r ib u t e
th e book paradox in i t s fu lly -fle d g e d form to P la to . Like th e views of
N icias and Laches or Hermogenes and C raty lu s, i t i s employed as a to o l
to provoke th e reader t o in v e s tig a te th e t e x t a t a d if f e r e n t le v e l.
One q uestion t h a t we can now attem pt t o answer i s whether th e
dialogue form i s i n tr i n s i c to th e way t h a t P la to f e e ls he ought t o w rite
p h ilo so ï^ y . The key question i s t h a t of d ia le c tic between reader and
t e x t . In r e la tio n to t h i s , th e dialogue form may not be necessary, as
th e re may be o th er l i t e r a r y genres which w ill allow th e c re a tio n o f th e
s o r t of e f f e c t th a t P la to r e q u i r e s . T h e r e a re though asp ects o f th e
dialogue form which a re d e a r y very amenable to P la to 's designs.
One minor p o in t i s t h a t th e in te rlo c u to rs a re o fte n asked fo r t h e i r
a sse n t o r d is s e n t t o c e rta in stag es o f th e argument, allow ing the
readers t o agree or disag ree w ith them and so to become to some e x te n t
p erso n ally involved in th e o u t c o m e . T h i s device i s a ls o u se fu l in
h ig h lig h tin g what th e c ru c ia l admissions in any argument a re by
involving th e in te rlo c u to r a t th e key p o in ts , and much can a ls o be
conveyed by th e c h a ra c te r and th e re a c tio n o f th e in te rlo c u to r.^ ^ So too
P la to 's freq u e n t use o f th e second person can resound beyond the

21
page and d ir e c tly challenge us t o give our re p lie s and to bear th e
consequences of our adm issions.
The r e a l advantage o f dialogue, though, i s t h a t i t gives fre e r e i n
t o devices such a s s e ttin g , c h a ra c te ris a tio n and dram atic in te rp la y
between th e c h ara c te rs t h a t P lato uses to c re a te fu rth e r depths of
meaning and in s ig h t. He o ften makes th e c h a ra c te rs o f th e dram atis
personae re le v a n t to what th ey argue fo r and to th e arguments they
u s e . 45 Laches, the b l u f f , simple s o ld ie r argues fo r a 'g u t-re a c tio n '
account of bravery, w hile th e weak-willed i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t N icias argues
fo r a p u rely in te lle c tu a l a cc o u n t.46 Running beneath th e su rface i s an
assumption o f personal in te g r ity : n o t merely th e i n te lle c tu a l in te g r ity
th a t p revents someone holding two opinions which c o 4? but a more
n f l i c t ,

h o l is ti c p ersonal in te g r ity which demands t h a t a p e rso n 's 'words and

deeds' be in accord. 48 I h is complementarity i s common both in Greek
l it e r a t u r e and in P la to , and s e ts th e reader a challenge; form ulate a
theory where words and deeds a re in harmony, including your own. 49 This
a p p lie s to th e way t h a t P la to c o n d u c ts h is d ialogues, to o ; does the
deed o f p re se n ta tio n match th e words of a theory ? In th e Phaedo,
re c o lle c tio n must be re c o lle c te d , and th e method o f hypothesis is
presented as an h y p o t h e s i s . I n th e T heaetetus, c h a rac ter gives
examples; i f Theodorus i s an e x p e rt, and T heaetetus i s a b le t o le a rn and
to make f a ls e judgements, then any adequate theory of knowledge must
c a te r fo r th ese phenomena.
Another im portant fe a tu re o f th e dialogue form i s t h a t th e in te rn a l
dialogue can serve a s a model f o r th e e x te rn a l one. That i s , th e e ff e c ts
th a t Socrates has on h is in te rlo c u to rs may be a model fo r th e e f f e c t
t h a t P la to i s try in g to have on u s. In th e T heaetetus, S ocrates s ta te s
in h is clo sin g speech t h a t Theaetetus w ill be a g e n tle r person fo r
having some o f h is naive conceptions o f knowledge re fu te d , and we might
suppose t h a t P lato wishes t o have t h i s e f f e c t on h is readers too.^^ As a
general h e u r is tic , we might look fo r ways in which th e in te rlo c u to rs a re
a ffe c te d and consider i f th e t e x t i s intended to e f f e c t us s im ila rly .
Given th e S o c ra tic emphasis on in te lle c tu a l and personal in te g r ity , i t
should not s u rp ris e us t h a t P lato w rites in a way th a t in te g ra te s and
harmonises p h ilo so p h ic al content w ith l i t e r a r y and dram atic form - h is
cn
work has an analogous a r t i s t i c in te g r ity .

22
We might wonder how f a r t h i s approach to w ritin g philosophy pervades
P lato ' s works. At Phaedo 102d3 S ocrates says "But t h i s i s t o ta lk l ik e a
book". This has caused some puzzlement among th e coim ientators. However,
consider what ta lk in g l ik e a book i s in th e Phaedrus. I t i s to
in fle x ib ly retu rn th e same answer over and over again whatever th e
q u estio n , n o t explaining y o u rse lf any f u rth e r. Here S ocrates has spent
th e l a s t tw enty lin e s t e l l i n g us over and over t h a t people a re s h o rt or
t a l l because o f shortness o r t a lln e s s , in a r e p e titiv e manner which does
no fu rth e r explaining as i t proceeds. In th e P rotagoras, Socrates
c r i t i c i s e s P e ric le s and oth er S ophists, saying th a t
" If you p u t some question t o one o f them, they a re j u s t lik e a
book, lacking th e a b i l i t y e ith e r t o answer your question o r t o ask
questions them selves, and i f you question even a sm all p o in t of what
th ey have s a id , j u s t a s th in g s made of b rass rin g fo r a long time when
stru c k , unless you se iz e them, th ese o ra to rs s tr e tc h out t h e i r speech
f o r a wearisomely long time^^ upon being questioned." (Prt.329a)
Now while I would not want to suggest t h a t P la to had th e f u lly
a rtic u la te d theory of th e Phaedrus a t t h i s stag e o f h is development, i t
i s c le a r t h a t some o f th e same themes a re h ere.^^
A fu rth e r question we need t o address i s th e m atter of P la to 's
supposed 'unw ritten d o c tr in e '. In order t o account fo r P la to 's
d e n ig ra tio n of w ritin g , h is Lecture on th e Good, and A r i s t o t le 's re p o rt
o f P la to 's o n to lo g ical views a t Metaphysics 987b f f , fo r which th e re
does n o t appear to be any c o u n terp art in P la to 's w ritte n work, the
Tubingen school and o th e rs have suggested th a t P lato had an organised
o r a l d o ctrin e which he tau g h t in the Academy b u t a t no tim e committed to
w r itin g .55
F ir s tly though, my a n a ly sis of P la to 's FWP would suggest t h a t any
'u n w ritten d o c trin e ' ( i f d o c trin e i t be) i s t o be found in P la to 's
w ritte n w orks.5^ Not a t th e prima fa c ie le v e l, but a t a secondary le v e l
and beyond where a deeper a n a ly sis o f th e argument and th e in te ra c tio n
of l i t e r a r y , dram atic and p h ilo so p h ical fa c to rs a c t a s a c ritiq u e o f th e
id ea s a ire d a t th e prima fa c ie le v e l. I t i s th e use o f t h i s fa c e t of
w ritin g , I have argued, th a t allow s P la to to escape h is own w ritte n
s t r i c t u r e s a g a in s t th e w ritte n word.
Secondly, I would agree w ith Sayre t h a t th e views t o be found in
th e rep o rts of P la to 's Lecture on th e Good and A r i s t o t le 's Metaphysics

23
may be found, i f we look c a re fu lly enough, in th e P h i l e b u s . ^7 This i s a
m atter I s h a ll take up in g re a te r d e ta il in ch ap ter n in e. F u rth er, I
would agree w ith some p o in ts made by Cherniss concerning th e so le
unambiguous referen ce t o th e 'u n w ritten d o c trin e ' in A r is to tle .
F ir s tly , i f P la to believed h is o r a l communications t o be paramount, one
would expect A ris to tle t o r e f e r to th ese ra th e r than th e dialogues in
h is re p o rts on P la to . However, in c o n tra s t to many referen ces to the
dialo g u es, th e re i s only one t o th e 'so -called * unw ritten teach in g s,
\«Æiich i s made in a way t h a t suggests th e reference was in some way odd.
I t may, as Cherniss su g g ests, simply be a reference t o th e Lecture on
th e Good,^^ or perhaps A ris to tle Was conversant w ith what I have argued
i s P la to 's FVJP.^^ Secondly, where o ra l and w ritte n views a re supposed to
d iv erg e, A r is to tle c a l l s a tte n tio n t o a p o in t o f agreement between the
'u n w ritten d o c trin e ' and th e Timaeus. T h ird ly , one would expect,
although we do no t fin d t h a t th e re would be a general agreement among
62
those who had access to th e natu re and co n ten t of th e o r a l teach in g s.
That we can fin d th e g i s t o f th e 'u n w ritten d o c trin e s ' w ithin
P la to 's works i s an im portant p o in t. I t meshes w ell w ith iry a n a ly sis of
P la to 's FWP, and i t allow s us to t r e a t th e evidence of A r is to tle in a
much more even handed manner. We a re no t forced to say, w ith C herniss,
t h a t while A ris to tle was a c lo se asso c ia te of P la to he completely
m isin te rp re ted c ru c ia l areas o f P la to 's t h o u g h t . N o r a re we forced
in to th e p o s itio n t h a t i f P la to reserved h is re a l philosophy f o r o ra l
d isc u ssio n , th a t we can only r e a lly study P lato through th e re p o rts of
A r is to tle and o th ers vAo may have had access to th e o ra l d o c t r i n e . W e
can in f a c t ta k e th e middle ground here and accord A r i s t o t l e 's evidence
some weight while tak in g th e usual care t o guard a g a in st A r is to tle 's
tendency t o in te r p r e t o th er peoples views in terms o f h is own system of
thought.

VI

I have argued th a t P la to 's re a l in te rlo c u to rs a re h is re a d ers, and th a t

e f f e c ts experienced by h is c h a ra c te rs a re o fte n e f f e c ts t h a t P lato
intends to have on us. I f so , then th e follow ing passage s e ts some
problems f o r th e in te rp r e ta tio n of P la to . S ocrates has been describing
th e views o f Protagoras and H e ra c litu s, and goes on t o say
So "These views, T heaetetus, do they seem p le a sa n t to you, and do you
fin d th e i r t a s t e g ra tify in g ?

24
Th " I, a t l e a s t , d o n 't know, S ocrates. For I am not a b le t o understand
you, vAiether you say th e se th in g s from your own b e lie f o r to t e s t me."
So "You f o rg e t, my frie n d , th a t I know nothing o f th e se th in g s and nor
do I claim any o f them as my own, as I am barren o f th e o rie s , being
merely a midwife singing over you, providing fo r you so t h a t you may
t a s t e fo r y o u rse lf each o f th e th e o rie s o f th e w ise, u n t il I can help
lead your own opinion o u t in to th e l i g h t ." (Th.157c)
I f th e purpose o f th e dialogues i s rn^eutic, then perhaps th e question
th a t P lato would have us ask i s what do we th in k ra th e r than what does
P la to t h i n k . M e r e l y to possess P la to 's opinion would be o f no help in
coming to understand; we would be no b e tte r o f f than some of P la to 's
ch arac ters who a re mere c o lle c to rs of o th er p e o p le 's opinions.
This leav es us w ith th e d i f f ic u lt y o f deciding how we should read
h is te x t s . On th e one hand, we might read them as a id s in a process of
coming to understand. Following Cohen and Keyt we might c a l l t h i s the
p ro sp ectiv e model o f in te rp re ta tio n .^ ® They focus on a s lig h tly
d if f e r e n t problem, o f how we can supply th e prem isses which a re m issing
from some o f P la to 's arguments. Some of th ese we might be ab le t o supply
by 'extending th e context ' , from elsewhere in th e P la to n ic corpus or
from Greek c u ltu re . Some we may not be ab le t o supply a t a l l , and so
Cohen and Keyt d is tin g u is h between apparent and re a l enthymemes.®® I f we
a re confronted w ith a re a l enthymeme, ought we to supply th e b e st
prem isses which a re a v a ila b le t o u s, or ought we to a tte rrp t t o fin d o u t
what P la to would have considered th e m issing prem iss t o be ? Sim ilar
co n sid eratio n s apply when P lato leaves h is readers in a p o ria . The
pro sp ectiv e model o f in te p re ta tio n accep ts th e challenge and continues
th e process o f p h ilo so p h ical in v e s tig a tio n t h a t P la to begins and
e ff e c tiv e ly t r e a t s th e dialogues a s p iec es of contemporary philosophy.
There i s no question o f a r ig h t or a wrong in te rp re ta tio n h e re , merely
stro n g e r and weaker ways o f supplementing th e dialogues and so improving
our own understanding.^®
On th e o th er hand, we might want t o know what P la to thought, as f a r
as we can re c o n stru c t such a th in g . Following Cohen and Keyt we might
term t h is th e re tro sp e c tiv e model, and i t might be thought t o function
in an analogous way to th e reco n stru ctio n o f a damaged t e x t . There may
be epistem ological d i f f i c u l t i e s w ith t h i s re c o n stru ctio n , but we do n o t
doubt t h a t th e re was something w ritte n which renders our conjectures
tru e or f a ls e . I t would be wrong to reckon t h a t t h i s analogy a p p lies

25
e x a c tly , however. I t i s u n lik e ly th a t P la to was aware o f every m issing
prem iss, and i t may w ell be t h a t in some cases where P la to leav es h is
readers in a p o ria he was in ap o ria h i m s e l f . I n th e se c a se s, i t would
seem th a t we have t o c o n stru c t ra th e r then re c o n stru c t. However, Cohen
and Keyt argue t h a t any re a l enthymeme, by d e fin itio n , i s one t h a t
cannot be supplied from extending th e c o n tex t. They conclude th a t we
th e re fo re have no guide a p a rt from our own conception o f what i s
reasonable. I agree w ith Cohen and Keyt t h a t one cannot avoid th e
d i f f i c u l t i e s here by suggesting th a t P la to 's w ritin g s a re e n tir e ly
n o n -a s se rto ric , or by denying t h a t th e re a re r e a l enthymeroes or a p o ria i
in th e sense th a t we can always supply a s p e c if ic , determ inate answer by
extending th e c o n te x t.^3 However, t h is does not e n t a i l t h a t we have
nothing to guide us on what s o r t o f answer P lato might accep t.
F ir s tly , P lato has some high le v e l b e lie f s which w ill allow us t o
g enerate a s e t of c o n s tra in ts on candidate answers. At th e h ig h est le v e l
one might begin w ith n o n -co n trad ictio n , e ith e r a s expressed in th e
Republic o r in the many comments on in te lle c tu a l in te g r ity . One can
th en apply more of P la to 's g en eral b e lie f s t o lim it th e f i e l d of
can d id ates. As th ese b e lie f s w ill apply to a l l p ro p o sitio n s, I suggest
t h a t th e re a re no r e a l enthymemes o r a p o ria i in th e sense t h a t th e re a re
none which w ill leave us e n tir e ly to our own devices in in te r p r e ta tio n .
Secondly, when P la to leav es h is readers in ap o ria , he does not leave
them w ithout resources. There w ill o fte n be re je c te d p o s itio n s , c r i t e r i a
f o r any candidate answers to s a t is f y , phenomena t o be accounted f o r , and
frameworks fo r fu rth e r in v e s tig a tio n . So fo r any 'r e a l ' enthymeme o r
a p o ria we can a t th e very l e a s t sev erely lim it th e p o s s i b i l i t i e s and
discover some o f P la to 's s tr u c tu r a l th in k in g .^5 This may e n ta il looking
beyond what h is c h a ra c te rs say, and to th e thought t h a t u n d e rlie s i t .
Such th in g s a re a c c e ssib le though; i f we can determine P la to 's FWP, t h i s
g iv es us a la rg e clu e t o determ ining o th er p a rts o f h is thought.
I t should be ev id en t t h a t P la to 's EWP does n o t lic e n c e a
d e c o n stru c tio n ist reading vdiere th e reader c re a te s th e meaning o f th e
te x t.^ ^ ïh e PWP might be likened to th e a n a ly sis o f t r u th in th e
S ophist. There, P lato s te e r s a course between th e twin p e r i l s o f th e
r ig id account o f th e l a t e le a rn e rs and an o u trig h t re la tiv ism where
anything i s tr u e . So to o w ith th e e f f e c t he t r i e s t o c re a te w ith h is
d ialogues. I f P lato c o n stra in s t h e i r range to o t ig h t l y they w ill become
in f le x ib le and non-explanatory l ik e th e p a in tin g s o f th e Phaedrus, while
i f any reading i s allowed th e re w ill be no d isc rim in atio n between

26
readings and hence no coining know, i f we cannot judge one reading to be
b e tte r th an any o th er.
So, when attem pting to determ ine what P la to thought, we must extend
th e co n tex t a s f a r a s p o ssib le , and generate as many c o n s tra in ts as we
can on th e type o f p o sitio n t h a t P lato might have h e ld .^ ^ These
s tr a te g ie s may s t i l l underdetermine th e range o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s . We might
then invoke a p rin c ip le o f c h a rity , allowing P lato th e b e s t p o sitio n
c o n stru ctab le on th e evidence a v a ila b le to u s. This c h a rity , though,
must be tempered w ith some parsimony and we must ta k e care to
d is tin g u is h between th e b e s t p o s itio n th a t could be held and th e b e st we
might reasonably a ttr ib u te to P l a t o . T h i s then i s th e general
in te r p r e tiv e s tra te g y t h a t w ill be followed by t h i s th e s is .
When we attem pt to a sse ss anyone's c o n trib u tio n to th e h is to ry and
philosophy o f science, i t i s w ell t o d is tin g u is h th re e s o r ts of
q u estio n s. F i r s t l y , how w ell d id they address and re a c t t o th e problems
o f t h e i r age and those they s e t themselves ? Secondly, d id they
in flu en ce l a t e r th in k e rs and was t h i s a b e n e fic ia l influence ? T hirdly,
vy^at did they have to say t h a t i s o f use to us today ? In t h i s th e s is I
s h a ll la rg e ly but n o t e x clu siv ely concerned w ith th e f i r s t of th ese
q u estio n s, and so in Cohen and K eyt's terms w ith a re tro sp e c tiv e
a n a ly s is . P la to , though, sees one o f h is problems as influencing o th er
people v ia h is dialogues, so t h i s question to o w ill be given some
co n sid era tio n , as w ill th e r e la tio n between P la to 's thought and c e rta in
r e a l i s t p o sitio n s in modern philosophy o f science.

V III

P la to , th en, has a h ighly d is tin c tiv e FWP. This i s generated, I have

argued, by th e d e sire t o c re a te a form o f d ia le c tic between th e reader
and th e t e x t , modelled on o ra l d ia le c tic , such t h a t th e reader may come
to understand through proper d ia le c tic a l education ra th e r than be th e
mere possessor of o th er p e o p le 's opinions. P la to 's thought may o ften
have to be tea se d out from behind th e p o sitio n s t h a t he gives to h is
c h a ra c te rs. Paying due a tte n tio n to P la to 's EWP w ill prove to be highly
f r u i t f u l in re la tio n t o many passages concerning P la to 's philosophy of
scien ce. So too I s h a ll argue t h a t i t has a c r i t i c a l ro le to play in
assessin g th e n ature o f th e Timaeus. In th e next chapter I s h a ll d isc u ss
some of P l a to 's e a r l ie r views on methodology, a s expressed in the
Phaedo, where we w ill fin d th e PWP to be h ig h ly p e rtin e n t.

27
NOTES TO CEÎAPTER ONE

01) See e .g Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary vol 1992,

and Griswold (1988).

02) Magee (1978), p265.

03) See Malcolm (1984), p27-8.

04) Another question i s my own p o s itio n . While I hope t o reach some
understanding of P l a to 's s ty le , h is i s n o t a view th a t I u ltim a te ly
sh are. This chapter i s an attem pt a t a 'c o ld , c le a r ' a n a ly sis of th e
reasons P la to may have had f o r adopting h is s t y l e . My p o sitio n
throughout t h i s th e s is i s t h a t o f an a n a ly tic a l philosopher tak in g on
board some o f th e techniques o f herm eneutics and l i t e r a r y c ritic is m
because o f th e s p e c ific n atu re o f th e su b je c t m atter.

05) Cf. Nussbaum (1986) p16, "P la to , th e main c re a to r o f th e s ty le th a t

Murdoch d e s c r ib e s ... believed t h a t th e 'p l a i n ', 'h a rd ' s ty le expressed a
d e f in ite e th ic a l conception and t h a t fa ir n e s s to a d if f e r e n t conception
required a d if f e r e n t s t y l e ." While I agree w ith Nussbaum h ere, I attem pt
a more g en eral account of P l a to 's p o sitio n .

06) None o f th e se p o s s ib i l i ti e s need be exclusive o f th e o th e rs .

07) Others might d isa g ree , c itin g the [arche anupothetos] o f the Rep. or
th e elements o f S o crates' dream o f th e Tht. as th in g s known but
[alo g o s]. I s h a ll argue a g a in s t these views in c h .2, 6 and 7.
08) See Bumyeat (1980) p186 f f , c f . Annas (1981), Bumyeat (1981)
p97-139, Mackenzie (1988) p22 f f .
09) I .e come to understand.
10) A general p rin c ip le running throughout P la to 's w ritin g s , and
emphasised in th e Pdr; c f . 276e and 278c, and So.230d. See Chr.166c and
Grg.482a f f on th e impersonal natu re o f t h i s approach. Note a ls o t h a t a t
Pdr.268c a man i s n o t a doctor merely because he has read something from
a book; a knowledge (understanding) of th e natu re o f th e su b je c t i s
required ra th e r then mere sn ip p ets o f inform ation.

11) Following Mac enzie (1982a), I term t h i s th e 'book p arad o x '.

Although t h i s i s th e most e x p l i c i t form ulation, o th er passages echo th e
d i f f ic u lt y , e .g Pdr.275d.

12) See my c h .2 fo r th e importance o f rely in g on o n e 's own resources.

13) Otherwise tru e judgement would c o n s titu te knowledge, i f a l l th a t

were required fo r knowledge were an acquaintance w ith th e f a c ts ; c f .
Tht.187a-201c, Men.97a f f .

14) I f we a re t o b e liv e Dionysius of H alicarnassus in h is On L ite ra ry

Composition, P lato p a in sta k in g ly wrote and re-w rote each o f h is works.

15) The follow ing accounts of asp ects of P la to 's s ty le a re n o t intended

t o be exhaustive e ith e r o f th ese asp ects o r of P la to 's s ty le , merely
picking out th e fe a tu re s which a re re le v a n t t o th e s o r t o f e ff e c t t h a t

28
P lato wishes to c re a te given h is PWP.

16) These examples a re on a dialogue le v e l, b u t t h i s stra te g y occurs

fre q u e n tly in in d iv id u a l arguments a s w e ll.

17) An in te r e s tin g in stan c e h ere is Plb.28c3 where S ocrates adm its to

'overplaying h is own c a n d id a te '; c f . my d iscu ssio n o f [p a id ia ].
18) Cf. So.251a, where we must fend o ff both arguments a t once,and
fo rce a passage between. Owen's ' P a rity Assumption' (see h is (1970)
pi 08), th a t a so lu tio n here must illu m in a te both, can be u se fu lly
employed in r e la tio n t o o th e r such P la to n ic cru x es.
19) See Mackenzie (1982a) p64.
20) Cf. Mackenzie (1982a) p71/2.

21) One might compare such a s h i f t of le v e ls w ith P la to 's various

metaphors f o r th e c o g n itiv e a sce n t o f th e philosopher, esp. in the Sym.
and Rep.

22) Cf. e .g Burnet (1911) p i 08 and Murphy (1936) p41.

23) Cf. Mackenzie ( 1988) p i 7 f f , V lastos (1991) c h .1 .

24) Via th e Rep. we might again lin k an a sp ec t of P la to 's FWP, here

iro n y , w ith c o g n itiv e a sc e n t.
25) We might expect some myths sim ply to be e n te rta in in g t a l e s (see e .g
Tolkien's rep u d iatio n o f any a lle g o r ic a l meaning in h is work in the
p reface to th e second e d itio n o f Lord o f th e R ings), and o th e rs t o c a rry
some meaning (e.g B ib lic a l p a ra b le s ). Some might be both and can be read
on se v e ra l le v e ls (e.g O rw ell's Animal Farm). I use myth h ere very
broadly to cover se v e ra l genres o f f i c t io n .

26) See here e sp . S o c ra te s' comnents a t Rep.506e f f ; h is account of sun,

l in e and cave w ill ' resemble a c h ild o f th e good', and w ill 'owe an
account o f th e p a r e n t'; but beware, he sa y s, l e s t he ' in a d v e rte n tly
ch ea t you o f th e in te r e s t due on th e a c c o u n t'.
27) Cf. McCabe (1993) p48 f f .

28) One might consider here how th e myths of th e Pdo, Rep, and P i t .
'f l e s h o u t' th e bare bones o f th e philosophy and cosmology o f th e main
p a r ts of th o se d ialo g u es, or how the Tim. p resen ts us w ith se v e ra l
conceptions o f te leo lo g y .

29) One might lin k t h i s to th e dilemma s tra te g y o u tlin e d above; on th e

one hand, P la to g iv es us th e o v erly parsim onious account t h a t f a i l s to
e x p la in , on th e o th er he gives an o v erly generous account.

30) There i s a questio n h ere a s to whether the Tim. (w ith th e C ri. e tc )

i s in e f f e c t an abandoned p ro je c t containing re je c te d th e o rie s (so
Owen), o r i s a coherent p a r t o f an in te g ra te d l a t e r period s tra te g y . As
in d ic ate d in th e in tro d u c tio n , I favour th e l a t t e r view, which I s h a ll
argue f o r in l a t e r c h ap ters.
31) See Pdo.109d f f . Again, Socrates denies knowledge o f th e se m atters

29
(c f. Rep.506e f f ) , saying t h a t "To co n fid en tly s t a te t h a t a l l th ese
m atters a re such as I have described them, i s n o t f i t t i n g fo r a man of
in te llig e n c e " (Pdo.114d), and comments t h a t 't h i s or something lik e it*
i s tr u e .

32) Cf. Bumyeat (1991) p i 27 on how th e Tht. p resen ts i t s e l f .

33) In p o rta n t examples o f the [p a id ia ]/ [spoude] c o n tra s t a re a t
Rep.545d, So.241a f f , Plb.28c, 30e, Le.688bc.
34) Cf. So.234c and 242c, which w ill be discussed more f u lly in c h .4.
35) Reading [p aid ias] w ith Burnet, Campbell, Dies and Skemp a g ain st
v ario u s a lte r n a tiv e s ; c f . Skemp (1952) p i 44.
36) Esp. a t Tim.59cd, as I s h a ll d isc u ss in d e ta il in c h .4.

37) One m ight note how o ften P la to uses 'shame* and re la te d terms vAien
an argument runs in to d i f f i c u l t i e s ; c f . Chr. 169c and La. 196b.

38) Pdr.276d " F ittin g ly , i t i s f o r th e sake o f a pastim e [paid ias

ch arin ] t h a t t h a t he w ill sow seeds and w rite in th e garden o f l e t t e r s ,
when he w r i t e s ... Much b e tte r i s th e serio u s [spoude] treatm en t o f th ese
m atters, t h a t i s whenever someone employs th e method o f d ia le c tic " ; c f .
Pdr.276bc, 277e, 278a.

39) Iro n ic in th e sense argued fo r e a r l i e r , ra th e r than a s a simple

negation of what i s s a id ; c f . F e rra ri (1987) c h .7.

40) One might compare passages a t Tht. 152c, 155d, 180c, 184a which
suggest t h a t th e w ritin g s of Protagoras do n o t have some hidden meaning
while th o se o f H e rac litu s, the a n cien t p o ets and Parmenides do; see my
c h .4.

41) E.g th e Tim. i s h ard ly a dialogue, although a s I argue in c h .4, i t

c e r ta in ly d isp lay s many asp ects of P la to 's FWP.
42) Cf. Mackenzie (1982a) p69.
43) The f i r s t p a r t o f th e Pm. i s perhaps a good example o f t h i s . Another
advantage of dialogue i s t h a t th e re i s no compunction to immediately
s ta te what you b eliev e and then defend i t . I t i s p o ssib le t o begin w ith
naive b u t p la u s ib le p o sitio n s h eld by th e c h a ra c te rs , when much may be
le a r n t by a d e ta ile d d iscu ssio n o f why such p o s itio n s a re inadequate;
c f . B um yeat' s reading o f th e Tht, esp. (1991) p234.

44) Cf. Mac enzie (1982b) on Parmenides' use o f th e second person and
i t s r e la tio n t o d ia le c tic .

45) Ihe Plb. has Philebus ('lo v e boy') and Protarchus ( 'f o r o rd e r')
tak in g s id e s in a d iscu ssio n o f p lea su re .
46) See L a .18Id f f and 182d f f re sp e c tiv e ly , and th e ensuing d isc u ssio n .
47) This i s p o ssib ly most fo rc ib ly expressed a t Grg.482b, where P lato
has Socrates say "I a t l e a s t , my good s i r , b e liev e i t much b e tte r to
have my ly re o r any chorus I might lead out o f tune and d isco rd an t, and
fo r most men t o d isag ree w ith me and to c o n tra d ic t what I have t o say,

30
ra th e r th an t h a t I , who am but one, should d isa g ree w ith or c o n tra d ic t
m yself"; c f . Robinson (1950) p i 5/6. See McKim (1988) p36 f f fo r
d iscu ssio n o f th e id ea t h a t some o f th e arguments given t o Socrates a re
psychological ra th e r th an lo g ic a l in n a tu re and a re intended to prey on
th e b e lie f s o f th e in te rlo c u to rs ra th e r than be w a te r-tig h t p ro o fs.

48) Note f o r in stan ce how Laches' assessm ent of S te sila u s (La.183d f f )

and Socrates (La. 188e f f ) are based on t h e i r deeds not t h e i r words, and
v ice versa w ith N icias (c f. La.187e f f ) . Cf. La.193e f o r th e importance
o f harmony between words and deeds.
49) The c o n tra s t o f [logos] and [ergon] was common in Greek l it e r a t u r e
as w ell a s in P la to , e ith e r as words vs deeds o r claim vs f a c t; c f .
Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 338, Sophocles, E le c tra 59, 358, 625, 1360,
Oedipus Tyrranus 517, 864, E uripides, A lc e stis 339, E le c tra 893, O restes
287, Herodotus, H istory 2.65, Thucydides 1.128.3, 2 .4 0 .1 , 2.43.2. In
P la to , c f . C rt.52d, Mnx.244a, Grg.461d, P rt.325d, Pdo.100a, Rep.382a,
382e, 492d, 498e, 563a, Pdr.240e, Tim.19e, Le.679d, 717d, 769e, 885b,
907d.

50) See Pdo.72e f f esp. 73b, and 96a f f re sp e c tiv e ly , and my next
chapter fo r a f u l l d iscu ssio n .

51) See Tht.210b f f .

52) I would agree w ith e .g O 'B rien 's (1963, p i 35) assessment of th e
Laches, v^ere he says t h a t i t i s "A balanced work o f a r t , in which
c h arac ter and a c tio n illu m in a te th e thought, and th e thought i s in tu rn
a judgement on th e c h a ra c te rs ." Cf. Pdr.264c on l i t e r a r y u n ity .

53) A lte rn a tiv e ly 'over a long co u rse' i f we tak e [dolichon] in i t s

o th e r sense o f a lon g -d istan ce race course.
54) The [p a id ia ]/ [spoude] c o n tra s t fo r in stan ce crops up a t Rep.545d.

55) See e .g Robin (1908), Franck (1923), Stenzel (1959), Findlay (1974),
Kramer (1959), (1964), (1966), Gaiser (1963), (1980); c f . V lastos
(1963).

56) See above on whether P la to 's works a re d id a c tic o r m aeutic.

57) See Sayre (1983) p78 f f .

58) See Cherniss (1944) p71 f f .

59) See A r is to tle Physics 209b14.

60) I am happy to accept w ith Cherniss (1944) plO and Sayre (1983) p80
t h a t th e re was a Lecture on th e Good, b u t th e re i s no evidence th a t
th e re was more than one le c tu re o r t h a t th e re was an organised o r a l
d o c trin e .

61) See here A r is to le 's comments a t R hetoric 1409.

62) There i s g re a t disagreem ent here between A ris to tle and e a rly
coirmentators on both P lato and A ris to tle . See Sayre (1983) p84 f f .
63) See Cherniss (1944) p58/9.

31
64) See here Sayre (1983) p78.

65) Here I would agree w ith Fine (1992) t h a t i t i s f a ls e t o assume t h a t

A ris to tle "Aims t o record and c r i t i c i z e arguments to which P la to i s
stra ig h tfo rw a rd ly committed" (p i3). R ather, he gives a n a tu ra l and
l i t e r a l reading to some of P la to ’s comments and re c o n stru c ts arguments
with th e a id o f A ris to te lia n assum ptions; we g e t th e n , not a simple
record of P la to 's views but what A r is to tle tak e s t o be a n a tu ra l
co n stru ctio n o f h is views.

66) Given P la to 's FWP i t wouldbe o f l i t t l e o r nohelp i f someonec a lle d

P la to occurred a s a c h a ra c te r, as we wouldhave to t r e a t h is views with
ju s t a s much suspicion a s everyone e l s e 's ; c f . Frede (1992).
67) Cf. Meno and Phaedrus in t h e i r eponymous dialogues.

68) See Cohen and Keyt (1992).

69) See Cohen and Keyt (1992) p i 74.

70) Ih ere i s nothing fo r our hypotheses t o correspond to and to be
c o rre c t o r in c o rre c t in v irtu e o f such correspondence.

71) Ih a t i s , behind a l l th e arguments t h a t a dialogue p resen ts us th e re

may be no d o c trin e fo r us to f e r r e t o u t, no d e f in ite p o s itio n t h a t a
dialogue i s try in g to guide us towards.
72) See Cohen and Keyt (1992) pi 75.
73) With every th in k e r th e re a re r e a l gaps in t h e i r thought, where they
are genuinely unaware of or unclear on some m atter, and we have no
grounds fo r excepting P la to .

74) See Rep.436b fo r (something lik e ) a law of n o n -contradiction (though

see Jordan (1984) fo r an extended d isc u ssio n ), and Grg.482b fo r
in te g r ity involving not c o n tra d ic tin g o n e se lf.

75) As I s h a ll argue in th e next ch ap ter, in rep ly to Meno's paradox

P lato has a g re a t deal to say on how we should conduct our e n q u irie s.

76) This might be argued f o r on oth er grounds, of course.

77) This may a ls o be co nstrained by hypotheses concerning P la to 's

development.

78) Cf. Cohen and Keyt (1992) p i 76 f f , and p i 96.

32
CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY IN THE MENO AND PHAEDO

This chapter w ill examine th e methodologies proposed in th e Meno and th e

Phaedo f o r enquiry in general and t h e i r in p lic a tio n s f o r the
in v e stig a tio n o f n a tu re . A c e n tra l question here w ill be whether P lato
adheres t o th e theory of [anamnesis] o r re c o lle c tio n , f o r i f so, th e re
w ill be im portant ram ificatio n s fo r th e in v e s tig a tio n o f n a tu ra l
phenomena. R ecollection i s introduced in th e Wteno, fu rth e r explored in
th e Phaedo, and mentioned again in th e Phaedrus. Two views on i t s
life s p a n a re f i r s t l y th a t P la to never abandoned re c o lle c tio n , th e re
being no e x p lic it argument a g a in st i t or statem ent o f i t s re je c tio n ,^
and secondly th a t w hile anamnesis i s i n i t i a l l y in p o rta n t, i t s influence
wanes and i t i s t a c i t l y fo rg o tte n in th e more so p h istic a te d d iscu ssio n s
of epistemology o f th e c r i t i c a l p erio d . Here 1 s h a ll argue fo r a more
ra d ic a l p o s itio n , th a t anamnesis i s argued a g a in st and re je c te d in th e
l a t t e r p a r t o f th e Phaedo, and t h a t th e method o f h y pothesis, which is
sometimes supposed to be compatible w ith re c o lle c tio n , aims to remedy
some o f i t s d e ^ 1 s h a ll f i r s t discuss th e natu re o f S o crates'
f i c i e n c i e s .

'autobiography' and th e [deuteros p io u s], th e 'second voyage' . 1 examine

th e idea t h a t th ese passages p re se n t us w ith c r i t e r i a w ith which to
judge p h ilosophical th e o rie s , and in v ite us t o apply th e se t o a choice
between anamnesis and hypothesis. 1 then explore t h i s a p p lic a tio n , in
conjunction w ith some o f th e h in ts and examples t h a t P la to gives us in
h is t e x t , and d iscu ss th e m ethodological ram ific atio n s o f th e argument.

At Phaedo 96a f f , P la to has Socrates recount h is experiences of

enquiring in to th e question o f why th in g s should come to be and pass
away. S ocrates f i r s t t e l l s o f h is youthful in fa tu a tio n and subsequent
disenchantment with [p eri phuseos h is to r ia n ] , th e 'enquiry concerning
n a 3 He then hears of th e works of Anaxagoras, and hoping to fin d
t u r e ' .

te le o lo g ic a l ex p lan atio n s, rushes to read h is books, b u t i s

disappointed. Unable to fin d o r be tau g h t th e s o r t o f explanations he
re q u ire s, S ocrates s e ts out on h is deuteros p io u s.^ There a re seme
standard questions concerning th e deuteros pious th a t 1 s h a ll be
in te re s te d in h ere. Does te le o lo g ic a l explanation p lay any p a rt in i t ,

33
is i t a second b e s t approach, and what does P lato have in mind as th e
[protos p io u s], the 'f i r s t voyage' ?
The p ro to s pious has been id e n tifie d w ith th e views of th e
[physioiogoi] which in te re s te d Socrates in h is youth. This
in te rp re ta tio n immediately runs in to a major d i f f i c u l t y , however. The
deuteros pious appears t o involve both th e method o f hypothesis and th e
theory of Forms. I t would seem u n lik ely th a t P lato would have Socrates
d escrib e th ese a s a second b e st to th e philosophy o f th e physioiogoi.
There a re two standard s tr a te g ie s fo r d isso lv in g t h i s te n sio n . The f i r s t
i s to suggest t h a t th e deuteros pious d e sc rip tio n i s iro n ic and so i s
not to be taken s e rio u sly . The second i s to p o stu la te t h a t th e protos
pious i s some u n a ttain a b le id e a l, r e la tiv e to which th e deuteros pious
i s a second b e s t.^
What I want to suggest in stea d i s t h a t S o crates' autobiography i s
p rim a rily a d iscu ssio n of ontology and e x p lan atio n .^ The question t h a t I
b e liev e i s being posed i s . What i s the minimum number o f e n t i t i e s we
must p o stu la te in order to have a theory th a t w ill do a l l th e explaining
th a t we req u ire o f i t The issu e i s a balance between o n to lo g ical
parsimony and explanatory rich n ess. The deuteros pious may then be a
second attem pt a t t h i s balance - one t h a t i s e x p la n a to rily ric h e r, but
re q u ire s a g re a te r o n to lo g ic al commitment.
I f t h i s balancing a c t i s proposed as a ph ilo so p h ical programme, one
way o f proceeding i s t o begin w ith a minimum number o f e n t i t i e s , to
examine how they are e x p la n a to rily d e fic ie n t, and then t o b u ild a ric h e r
ontology s p e c ific a lly designed t o remedy th e se inadequacies. T his, I
o
suggest, is what we fin d in S o crates' autobiography. F ir s tly , we a re
given th e parsimonious ontology o f th e physioiogoi. Their world c o n sists
o f p h y sical o b je c ts and proximate causes only. The puzzles which
Socrates cannot solve a t Phaedo 96d f f may seem a ra th e r odd c o lle c tio n .
Undoubtably, p a rt of th e function o f th ese puzzles i s to h elp us
form ulate what i s an adequate e x p lan atio n .^ Why, though, does Socrates
mention some c le a rly inadequate explanations in each case ? One fa c to r
th a t t i e s th e se d e fic ie n t attem pts to g eth er i s t h a t they a re a l l couched
so le ly in terms o f p h y sic al o b jec ts o r causes, and a re th e only s o r t of
explanation a v a ila b le i f we a re r e s tr ic te d to th e ontology of th e
physioiogoi. This then i s an argument from th e explanatory d eficien cy of
such an ontology fo r some more e n t i t i e s t h a t w ill enable us to produce
adequate explanations.

34
 I t i s a ls o in te re s tin g to note th e parsimonious natu re o f th e
account of mind t h a t i s on o ff e r h e re . Among the q uestions th a t Socrates
asked him self in h is youth a re
" Is i t blood w ith which we th in k , or a i r , or f i r e , or i s i t none o f
th ese ? I s i t th e b rain [ho engkephalos] v^ich g ra n ts th e sen satio n s of
h earin g , s ig h t and sm ell, are memory and opinion produced from th e s e ,
and i s i t from memory and opinion acquiring s t a b i l i t y t h a t knowledge i s
produced ?" (Pdo.96b)
Note th e use o f [ho engkephalos], b ra in , ra th e r than P la to 's usual [he
psuche], mind/ soul h e re . In lin e w ith th e p h y sio io g o i's ontology, a l l
th e proposed so lu tio n s here a re p h y s ic a lis t ones. They a re a ls o e x te rn a l
and cau sal explanations; knowledge h ere i s a s t a te t h a t occurs due to
th e cau sal e f f e c t o f p erceptions e v en tu ally c re a tin g s ta b le opinions.
For P la to though, as we saw in th e previous c h ap ter, such a process
could only account fo r th e a c q u isitio n o f inform ation ra th e r than of
understanding, a s ta te which req u ire s a more a c tiv e and independent
account o f mind. So too P lato w ill n o t accept t h a t s ta b le 'memory and
opinion' i s t o be equated w ith knowledge, unless perhaps t h a t s t a b i l i t y
i s one c re ate d by th e m astery of explanatory a c c o u n t s , a g a i n req u irin g
a more a c tiv e account of mind. Given th e physioiogoi ' s ontology though,
th ese a re th e only s o r t o f explanations t h a t they can o f f e r . 12 Some s o r t
of eirpiricism i s going to f i t w ell w ith t h i s prograitme, and t h i s i s
allu d ed to when Socrates re fe rs back to h is youthful experiences and
says th a t
"I was a fr a id th a t I might t o t a l l y b lin d my so u l,^ ^ looking a t
th in g s w ith my eyes and endeavouring t o grasp them w ith each of my
se n se s." (Pdo.99e)
We might expect more generous accounts in a l l th ese a re a s when some new
e n t i t i e s a re p o stu la te d . F ir s tly , however, th e d isc u ssio n tak e s a detour
v ia Anaxagoras. Socrates i s e x cite d by th e prospect o f te le o lo g ic a l
explanations on hearing t h a t Anaxagoras b e liev e s t h a t in te llig e n c e
o rders e v e r y t h i n g . H e i s disappointed though, and says
"My wonderful hopes came t o ru in , sin ce proceeding w ith my reading
I perceived a man n e ith e r making use o f (h is) in te llig e n c e , nor
assigning to i t any reason fo r th e order o f th in g s, but giving the
reason as a i r , a e th e r, w ater and many o th er absurd th in g s ." (Pdo.98b)
I ta k e i t t h a t P la to has two o b jectio n s to Anaxagoras h e re . F ir s tly ,
Anaxagoras gives explanations couched in th e same inadequate, e n tir e ly

35
p h y sical term s as those o f th e p hysioiogoi. Secondly, he p o stu la te s an
e n ti t y which does no e x p l a i n i n g . T h i s might be seen a s a
proto-Ockhamite o b jec tio n , t h a t Anaxagoras i s m ultiplying e n t i t i e s
beyond n e c e ssity .
This has an im portant fu n ctio n a s a c o n tra s t t o th e lessons o f th e
p h y sio io g o i' s ontology. The reader has now been armed w ith th e c r i t e r i a
w ith which to judge any fu tu re p roposals; are th ey too parsimonious and
e x p la n a to rily d e fic ie n t, o r a re they to o p r o f lig a te , w ith e n t i t i e s t h a t
are in e f f ic ie n t or even non-explanatory ? In lin e w ith P la to 's FWP, th e
coming d eu teros pious may be P l a to 's proposed balance o f e n t i t i e s and
ex p lan atio n s, but th e readers a re being given th e to o ls to judge t h i s
m atter f o r them selves, and t o extend t h i s programme t o o th e r re la te d
questions ra ise d in th e Phaedo.
Socrates makes i t c le a r in discussing Anaxagoras t h a t he i s
in te re s te d in te le o lo g ic a l explanations
"Considering th ese th in g s , I was d elig h ted to th in k I had found in
Anaxagoras a tea ch e r o f th e reason fo r th in g s in accordance w ith my own
way o f th in k in g . I thought t h a t f i r s t l y he would t e l l me, whether th e
e a rth i s f l a t o r round, and having to ld me t h i s , he would e x p lain th e
reason and th e n e c e ssity , s ta tin g the n ature o f th e b e tte r and why i t i s
b e tte r fo r th e e a rth to be a s i t i s ." (Pdo.97d)
The p o in t here i s t h a t explanations couched s o le ly in term s of p h y sic al
e n t i t i e s and causes a re a ls o d e fic ie n t in t h a t they a re incapable of
generating te le o lo g y . Let us c a l l th e puzzles a t 96d f f concerning
a d d itio n , t a l l n e s s , e tc , th e formal puzzles and th e above problem a t
Phaedo 97d th e te le o lo g ic a l puzzle.
I t i s im portant t o recognise v^ich e n tity w ill produce th e
p o s s ib ility o f te le o lo g ic a l ex p la n atio n s. ^^ Closing th e f i r s t p a r t of
h is autobiography, and having bemoaned th e f a c t t h a t no-one has given
him proper te le o lo g ic a l ex p lan atio n s, Socrates says
"They do n o t t r u ly b e liev e t h a t i t i s th e good [agathon] and proper
which binds and holds everything to g e th e r. I would most g lad ly become
anyones stu d e n t concerning such a reason and how i t p re v a ils ; b u t sin ce
I was deprived o f t h i s , n e ith e r ab le to fin d i t miyself nor to le a rn i t
from any o th e r, would you l i k e , Cebes, fo r me t o dem onstrate how I
worked o u t and c re ate d fo r myself a second voyage in search of
explanation ?" (Pdo.99c)
What one would expect i f P lato i s follow ing th e programme I have
suggested i s t h a t some more e n t i t i e s w ill now be p o stu la te d , designed to

36
remedy the d e fic ie n c ie s of th e views a lread y examined, and t h is th a t we
fin d r ig h t a t th e beginning o f th e deuteros p i o u s . S o c r a t e s says
"I hypothesize th e re to be something b e a u tifu l i t s e l f by i t s e l f and
s im ila rly a good [agathon] and a larg e and a l l th e o th e rs ." (Pdo.100b)
That th e se new e n t i t i e s a re designed to h e lp solve th e formal puzzles is
u n co n tro v ersial. At 100c f f , Socrates goes through th e d i f f i c u l t i e s
introduced a t 96d f f and shows how we can now have some adequate
explanations which c i t e Forms as explanatory e n t i t i e s . In a d d itio n
though, an e n tity th a t might h elp w ith th e te le o lo g ic a l puzzle, the
[agathon], i s a ls o hypothesised.^® I t seems t h a t , co n trary to th e view
o f some coirmentators, te le o lo g ic a l explanations a re immediately back on
th e agenda. What I contend here i s th a t ju s t a s th e formal puzzles of
96b f f a re given s o lu tio n s in terms of th e newly hypothesised e n t i t i e s
of 100b a t lOOd f f , so th e te le o lo g ic a l puzzle o f 97d f f i s given a
s o lu tio n in terms o f the [agathop] a t 108e f f . This i s a claim which I
s h a ll defend in d e t a i l l a t e r in t h i s c h ap ter. For th e moment, a l l I
re q u ire i s th a t th e deuteros pious hypothesizes a ric h e r ontology in
order to provide some b e tte r ex p lan atio n s, and whatever th e case with
th e [agathorn], t h i s i s so w ith formal ex p lan atio n s.
Now consider th e r e la tio n o f th e deuteros pious to th e proposed
p ro to s p io u s. The deuteros pious i s more p ro flig a te o f e n t i t i e s than the
p ro to s p io u s, but i s a ls o more e x p la n a to rily s u f f ic ie n t. This i s th e key
to th e ambiguity of th e deuteros pious d e s c rip tio n . When we consider the
natu re o f th e deuteros p io u s, th e re i s a sense in which i t i s a second
b e s t r e la tiv e to the p ro to s pious, in req u irin g g re a te r o n to lo g ical
commitment, but a ls o a sense, in term s of explanatory adequacy, in which
i t i s b e tte r . The deuteros pious i s a ls o secondary in term s of
ex p o sitio n in term s of th e prograirme t h a t I suggest P lato i s engaged in
h e re , and secondary in terms o f th e chronology o f th e metaphor of
S o c rate s' autobiography, w ithout n e c e ssa rily being a second b e s t.
Now l e t us consider irony in r e la tio n to t h i s passage.
In chapter one, I argued th a t P la to n ic irony i s not a b in ary , on/ o ff
phenomenon and th a t th e dichotomy o f th e se rio u s Socrates giving us
P lato n ic d o c trin e a g a in st th e iro n ic Socrates who i s not t o be believed
i s too s in p le . R ather, P la to 's irony can focus our a tte n tio n s on
am b ig u ities, forcing us to do some reasoning fo r ourselves in o rder to
a rr iv e a t a c o n s is te n t account. I f t h i s i s so, then i t f i t s my a n a ly sis
of th e deuteros pious very w ell. The deuteros pious i s p resented as

37
sim ultaneously a b e s t and a second b e s t, and th e irony focused on t h i s
d e sc rip tio n fo rc e s us to s o r t o u t in e x a c tly which se p a ra te resp ec ts the
deuteros pious i s b e st and second b e s t.^ ^ vfe a re led to consider th e
o n to lo g ic al c o st o f explanatory adequacy.

II

Now l e t us tak e up a second stra n d o f in te rp re ta tio n , by examining the

deuteros pious d e sc rip tio n as an epistem ological metaphor. One meaning
o f th e phrase i s to ta k e t o th e oars v^en th e re i s no wind to move the
s h 20 Thus when th e easy methods which we hope w ill bring us to our
i p .

d e stin a tio n w ithout doing any work ourselves f a i l , we must make headway
by our own a c tiv e e f f o r t s , 'row our own boat* i f you lik e . I t i s worth
noting th a t when S ocrates introduces th e deuteros pious a t 99c f f he
uses th e middle voiced verb [poiesomai] a t 99d%, carrying t h i s sense of
c re a tin g f o r o n e self. This philosophy o f s e lf - r e lia n c e v^en e x te rn a l
a u th o r itie s f a i l has im portant im plicatio n s fo r anamnesis and
hyp o th esis, I s h a ll argue.
The deuteros pious metaphor can be cashed in se v era l d if f e r e n t but
re la te d ways. One sense might be th a t v^en we cannot be ta u g h t, we must
a c tiv e ly seek knowledge o u rselv es, and here again we ought to bear in
mind P la to 's views on th e transm ission o f understanding. This has deep
resonances throughout P la to 's work, from th e re la tio n o f th e S o cratic
elenchus to th e e j ^ r t s , t o th e i ^ l o g y , to Meno's paradox, through to
91
th e Theaetetus and th e c ritic is m o f P rotagoras. Like using th e s a i l s ,
being tau g h t i s e a s ie r , b u t should t h i s f a i l to provide understanding,
then we must tak e to th e oars and play an a c tiv e p a rt o u rselv es. Note
th e r e la tiv e o n to lo g ic al commitments h e re ; being tau g h t req u ire s only a
passiv e account o f mind and a cau sal account of th e transm ission of
knowledge, l ik e t h a t o f th e physioiogoi a t Phaedo 96b, w hile the
deuteros pious req u ires a more a c tiv e account of mind.
One can a ls o consider t h i s m etaj^or in th e follow ing manner. I f
sense perception i s inadequate fo r what we re q u ire , then we must have
recourse t o ^2 This can be thought o f both in term s of a
r e a s o n .

d e fin itio n o f knowledge and methods fo r th e a c q u is itio n o f knowledge.

Again, t h is has deep resonances w ith P la to 's o th er works, most notably
oo
w ith th e middle books o f th e Republic and th e T heaetetus.
The framework t h a t th e deuteros pious gives us then looks something
lik e t h i s . We need an epi^^^fology and an account o f mind t h a t w ill allow

38
us access to th e Forms. I f a parsimonious account should f a i l , then we
must look f o r a ric h e r account, j u s t if i e d by i t s g re a te r explantory
ric h n e ss, or f a ilin g on grounds of p ro flig a c y . In th e f i r s t in sta n c e , we
m ight ta k e t h i s a s an a s s a u lt on th e empiricism o f th e physioiogoi, as
such an approach w ill n o t allow us access t o th e F o rm s.H o w e v e r, we
might a ls o be led t o compare th e re la tiv e m e rits o f re c o lle c tio n and the
method o f hypothesis.
Anamnesis could be thought to have th re e fu n c tio n s. F i r s t l y , i t
might be a theory of concept a c q u is itio n , giving an explanation o f how
we come to have ideas which a re not given in , or a re n o t d ir e c tly
d e riv a b le from sense experience. Secondly, i t could be thought o f as a
means o f a rriv in g a t some b a sic unimpeachable t r u th s , such t h a t i t i s a
means o f f o u n d a t i o n .T h i r d l y , anamnesis i s e x p lic tly introduced as a
re so lu tio n of Meno's p a r a d o x . ^6
In a l l th ese cases re c o lle c tio n p urports t o ex p lain how i t i s t h a t
th e mind acq u ires some o f i t s c o n te n ts. Consider, though, th e way in
which re c o lle c tio n fu n ctio n s. In th e Phaedo, anamnesis explains th e
minds co n ten ts e x te rn a lly and c au sa lly ; we have sense p ercep tio n s and
then re c o lle c t what we acquired in our p re -c a rn a te e x iste n c e . There i s
no c re a tiv e ro le fo r mind h ere, as what we a cq u ire comes to us
pre-form ed. Nor does i t seem th a t th e mind makes a c tiv e judgements about
what i s re c o lle c te d ; re c o lle c tio n then req u ire s only a parsimonious
account o f mind. The method o f hypothesis on th e o th er hand suggests
th a t we c re a te and judge some o f th e contents of our minds o u rselv es. 27
In terms o f th e deuteros pious metajAior, anamnesis i s th e e a s ie r , given
p ath which ex plains th e contents of th e mind by e x te rn a l a c tio n on a
r e la tiv e ly passive mind. I f t h i s s o r t o f explanation should f a i l t o be
adequate, then we might look to th e method o f hypothesis which req u ire s
a more a c tiv e account o f mind. I f my a n a ly sis of S o c rate s' autobiography
and th e deuteros pious i s c o rre c t, then th e re should be a balancing of
th e o n to lo g ic al commitment o f th ese th e o rie s a g a in s t t h e i r explanatory
adequacy. This may not be e x p lic itin th e t e x t ; i t may be up to th e
re a d ers, primed w ith th e parsimony and p ro flig a c y c r i t e r i a t o do much of
th e work them selves.
We might expect t h i s to be th e case fo r se v e ra l reasons. P la to 's
EWP suggests t h a t in o rder t o come to know, we must work th in g s o u t fo r
o u rselv es, ra th e r than p a ssiv e ly accept what i s given us by the t e x t .
Here then i s a challenge fo r us; given th e c r i t e r i a p resen ted , which i s

39
the b e tte r theory and why ? Another fa c to r here i s th e harmony of words
and deeds in th e way in which th e two th e o rie s a re presented to us. I f
a l l learn in g i s re c o lle c tio n , then th e only way we th e readers can le a rn
about re c o lle c tio n i s by re c o lle c tin g i t . P la to i s q u ite aware o f t h i s ,
both in th e Meno and in th e P h a e d o .S i m i l a r l y , in p resen tin g a method
o f hypothesis vhich r e l i e s on an a c tiv e mind making s e l f - r e l i a n t
judgements, P lato p resen ts us w ith an hypothesis which we must pass
judgement on o u r s e ^0 The fundamental question fo r us to decide upon
l v e s .

i s vdiether anamnesis i s e x p la n a to rily adequate, and i f n o t, whether

th e move to hypothesis and a ric h e r account o f mind i s j u s t if i e d by i t s
a b il i ty to produce b e tte r ex p lan atio n s.
Is th e re some fu rth e r in d ic a tio n , though, th a t we a re meant t o read
th e t e x t in t h i s way ? Slaving s ta te d t h a t c e rta in knowledge i s e ith e r
iirpossible o r very d i f f i c u l t t o acquire in t h i s l i f e , Simmias says t h a t
" I t i s necessary t o do one o f th e follow ing th in g s concerning t h is
m atter; e ith e r to le a rn or fin d o u t th e way of th in g s , o r, i f t h i s i s
im possible, taking th e b e st and l e a s t re fu ta b le o f human accounts, to
embark on i t as i f on a r a f t and s a i l through l i f e 's dangers, i f i t i s
n o t p o ssib le to pass through s a fe r and le s s tro u b led on some more s ta b le
v e sse l, some d ivine account." (Pdo.85c)
What i s t h i s d iv in e account ? Most commentators suggest some form of
Orphic o r Pythagorean d o c t r i n e .A n o t h e r p o s s ib ility though is
anamnesis, which could be thought in some ways to fu n ctio n lik e div in e
'i 'i

re v e la tio n . I f so , then Simmias poses what I have argued i s th e key

qu estio n ; Can we re ly on anamnesis or must we tak e th e h ard er, more
s e l f - r e l i a n t route o f hypothesis E a rlie r in th e Phaedo we have been
s p e c if ic a lly reminded o f th e d iscu ssio n o f anamnesis in th e Meno.^^
There, i t i s one of [ ta th e ia pragmata] (Men.81a6), and S ocrates has
heard o f i t from c e rta in p r ie s ts and p r ie s te s s e s , who have
"Given thought t o t h e i r a f f a i r s and a re alone a b le to give an
account o f them. So speak Pindar and many o th er p o e ts, as f a r a s they
a re d iv in e ." (Men.8lab)
The 'd iv in e acco u n t' d e sc rip tio n may then be an a llu s io n to th e way theit
anamnesis i s described in the Meno.
Another view might tak e i t t h a t Phaedo 99d f f i s an example of
re c o lle c tio n , t h a t having been given th e con d itio n s f o r re c o lle c tio n the
deuteros pious then gives us an answer (Forms) and proceeds in th e term s
o f th e Meno to give us some s o r t of [ a i t ia s logismos ]. On t h i s account

40
hypothesis and re c o lle c tio n a re not se p a ra te th e o rie s , but our
hypotheses e ith e r lead t o an a c t of re c o lle c tio n o r c o n s titu te
re c o lle c tio n . I f so , though, th e coirmitment to p re -c a rn a te knowledge
c a rrie d by re c o lle c tio n must give us something more than th e method of
hypothesis does alone, or re c o lle c tio n would be o tio s e . As I s h a ll argue
in th e n ex t se c tio n though, hypothesis a c tu a lly g iv es us ra th e r more
than re c o lle c tio n , and a l l th e fun ctio n s o f anamnesis a re taken over and
performed b e tte r by th e method o f hypothesis. I s h a ll a ls o argue th a t
th e t e x t h elp s th e reader t o pose some o f th e key questions by giving
examples o f phenomena t h a t must be accounted f o r by both th e o rie s .

Ill

One major problem w ith anamnesis i s t h a t i t cannot give an account of

e rro r in concept form ation. I f anamnesis i s th e re c o lle c tio n o f th e s e t
of concepts acquired during th e p re -c a rn a te e x iste n ce o f th e so u l, and
i s an exhaustive account o f concept f o r m a t i o n , t h e n no-one should
acq u ire an in c o rre c t concept, th e re should be no disagreem ent about
concepts, and no-one should have two form ulations of a concept. Yet a l l
o f th ese seem to be undeniable phenomena, and one might push t h i s a
l i t t l e fu rth e r and suggest t h a t we should have no conception o f what an
in c o rre c t conception might be, and c e rta in ly no example o f one. One of
th e in te r e s tin g aspects o f th e Phaedo i s t h a t we a re given sev eral
examples o f th ese d i f f i c u l t i e s . At Phaedo 84c f f S o crates, Simmias and
Cebes d iscu ss th re e conceptions o f th e s o u l, im m ortality, attunem ent and
cloak and weaver. Each understands th e other's conception, and two of
th ese views must be wrong. Note a ls o t h a t Simmias and Cebes a re fe rv e n t
supporters o f th e theory of re c o lle c tio n and so must b e liev e themselves
37
to have re c o lle c te d th e concepts o f so u l t h a t they a re defending.
One a tte n p t to avoid th ese d i f f i c u l t i e s i s to suggest th a t we form
some concepts by hypothesis and a b s tra c tio n , but t h a t c o rre c t concepts
a re formed by anamnesis. The tro u b le w ith t h i s i s t h a t anamnesis i s
alread y looking o tio s e . I f we can hypothesise, we can presumably
hypothesise c o rre c t conceptions as w ell a s f a ls e ones. Once we p o stu la te
an a c tiv e fa c u lty of mind t h a t can form concepts we have no need o f
anamnesis, though i t may s t i l l be a means of v e rif ic a tio n , and I s h a ll
d iscu ss th e d i f f i c u l t i e s w ith t h i s s h o rtly .
I f anamnesis involves n o t only th e re c o lle c tio n o f concepts such as
e q u a lity but a ls o explanations which c it e th e se e n t i t i e s , fu rth e r

41
d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e . Meno 98a t e l l s us t h a t our opinions become knowledge
V(Æien they a re bound by an [ a i t ia s logism os], an explanatory account, and
th a t t h i s process i s re c o lle c tio n . I f re c o lle c tio n i s an exhaustive
account though, how i s i t t h a t we acq u ire in c o rre c t or m ultiple
competing ex p lan atio n s, and how i s i t t h a t disagreement occurs ? Another
d i f f ic u lt y becomes apparent a t t h i s sta g e . Perhaps one might be a b le to
c o n stru c t a th eo ry in which anamnesis remained i n f a l l i b l e and e rro r was
lo cated elsewhere fo r simple m istakes. We might r e c o lle c t c o rre c tly , but
through some o th er mental e rro r mis-match th e explanans and
explananda.^® E rrors in producing badly formed ex p lan atio n s, such as
th o se o f th e physioiogoi, seem to be f a r more d i f f i c u l t to give any
account o f , as they cannot be re c o lle c te d .^ ^ To ex plain th e e x isten ce of
such explanations we w ill re q u ire some m ental cap acity f o r th e ir
in v en tio n , one t h a t would a ls o be ab le to produce w ell formed
ex p lan atio ns eind so render anamnesis o tio s e . I tak e i t t h a t one of. the
p o in ts of S o c rate s' autobiography i s to show th a t we do indeed produce
badly formed ex p lan atio n s. At Phaedo 96b f f , S ocrates in h is youth,
Anaxagoras and th e physioiogoi a l l c o n s is te n tly produced such inadequate
ex p lan atio n s, and believed them t o be tr u e , even v^en given a l l the
proper co n ditions fo r re c o lle c tio n .
The q uestion o f why one person re c o lle c ts and another does not i s
a ls o a se rio u s th e o re tic a l worry. I f anamnesis i s something which
happens to u s, i t should happen eq u ally to a l l o f us in any given
s itu a tio n . Presumably we have a l l seen many in stan ces of ju s tic e , some
of us have thought hard about th e n ature o f ju s tic e , but only a very few
have a c tu a lly re c o lle c te d th e c o rre c t concept. Anamnesis then a lso
req u ires some s o r t o f account o f th e d if f e r e n t s tru c tu re s an d / or
a c t i v i t i e s o f our minds, in o rder t o account fo r th ese phenomena.
Here we must address th e q u estion o f a p o ssib le gap between th e
contents o f our minds and th e world. Anamnesis has th e b u i l t in
advantage t h a t our re c o lle c tio n s a re going to match th e world p re c is e ly .
Hypothesis may explain how we e r r in acquiring concepts and
ex p lan atio ns, b u t i s i t by anything more than luck t h a t we ever
hypothesise c o rre c tly ? The p ric e fo r an explanation o f a m is f it between
our minds and th e world i s t h a t we now re q u ire an explanation o f how
they could ever come in to accord. I s h a ll argue l a t e r t h a t P la to has a
g re a t d eal t o say about t h i s in r e la tio n t o th e o rie s o f t r u t h and to
Meno's paradox. For th e mcanent, l e t us note something common t o both

42
anamnesis and hypothesis, th a t fo r P lato q u a litie s inhere in th in g s and
impinge upon u s . ^ with anamnesis in th e Phaedo, t h i s i s used as an
l

i n i t i a t o r o f th e process; we perceive p a r tic u la rs and a re reminded of

th e knowledge we had in our p re-c arn a te e x iste n c e . Hypotheses a re not
created ex n ih ilo , th e a c tiv e mind having a good s ta r tin g p o in t in our
p ercep tio n s from which to c o n stru c t hypotheses which have a reasonable
chance of being c o rre c t.

IV

L et us now consider th e second fun ctio n o f anamnesis, a s a means of

foundation. The problem o f founding a p h ilo so p h ical system on some b a sic
in d u b ita b le tr u th s i s how one j u s t i f i e s th ese tr u th s . I f the
ju s tif ic a tio n s a re no t to be reg re ssiv e o r c ir c u la r , then th e
foundations must be in tu itiv e ly c o rre c t o r s e lf-v e rify in g . What i s i t
then t h a t guarantees th e t r u th o f what we have re c o lle c te d ? The a b i l i t y
o f th e re c o lle c to r to give an explanatory account w ill n o t do as we w ill
always req u ire an account o f th e account to make i t known, c re a tin g a
re g re ss . Any c r ite r io n appealed to by anamnesis w ill have t o be
something i n tr i n s i c , as anything e x tr in s ic could eq u ally w ell be
appealed t o by hypothesis.
The d i f f ic u lt y now i s not how we acquire f a ls e concepts and
ex p lan atio n s, b u t how we can d is tin g u is h them from th e c o rre c t ones.
I n i t i a l l y , one might t r y to account fo r t h i s by suggesting th a t a l l our
f a ls e b e lie f s occur pre-anam nesis, and t h a t th e process of re c o lle c tio n
s o r ts our hypotheses, v e rify in g th e c o rre c t ones. The problem i s deeper,
though, in d isc rim in atin g between p re - and p o s t- re c o lle c tio n s t a te s .
What i s i t t h a t t e l l s us t h a t we have su c c e ssfu lly re c o lle c te d ?
Process co n sid eratio n s w ill n o t h e lp h e re . I f a l l change of opinion
were anamnesis, we might have a c r ite r io n , th e move from p re - to p o st­
re c o lle c tio n s ta te s being so s i g n a l l e d . Y e t t h i s cannot be so , as not
every change o f opinion moves t o a c o rre c t o p i n i o n . N e i t h e r w ill th e
a b i l i t y to g ive an account d is tin g u is h p re - and p o s t- re c o lle c tio n
s t a t e s , as we can give a p la u sib le account o f many f a ls e b e lie f s ,
b eliev in g them to be tru e .^ 4 The fundamental problem here i s t h a t we
cannot t e l l from th e n atu re o f th e process of re c o lle c tio n when th a t
process i s complete.
Perhaps, though, th e re i s something i n tr i n s i c to th e content of
what we r e c o lle c t t h a t t e l l s us we have su c ce ssfu lly re c o lle c te d . That

43
which we r e c o lle c t may a c t upon us to c re a te a s p e c ia l s ta te o f
c e r ta in ty . However, we may be in e rro r about t h i s s t a t e , and we can give
no ju s t if i c a t io n o f our p o s itio n , or we s l i p back in to th e reg re ss; and
how do we know th a t we a re in a f in a l s t a t e of c e rta in ty , i f previous
s ta te s have betrayed us ? An example which appears to address t h i s
problem i s th e in te r je c tio n a t Phaedo 88c f f . Phaedo had been completely
convinced by th e argument t h a t th e so u l i s immortal, i . e believed
him self to have re c o lle c te d i t . Yet now th e arguments o f Cebes and
Simmias seem stro n g e r, and Phaedo wonders i f he i s a competent judge, as
h is supposed s t a te of c e rta in ty has been betrayed. E checrates i s a lso
worried as he was convinced by S ocrates, d e sp ite th e th eo ry of soul as
attunem ent having a 's tra n g e h o ld ' on him, i . e being one t h a t appeared
to him to be re c o lle c te d , and i s now w orried by th e o b jectio n s of
Simmias and Cebes. However, S ocrates i s about t o demolish th e attunem ent
theory and r e in s ta te th e im m ortality of th e so u l. What i s shaken here i s
th e n o tio n t h a t anamnesis can provide any foundation, i f we cannot t r u s t
our sp e c ia l s ta te s of c e rta in ty . In th e previous chapter I argued th a t
th e e f f e c ts th a t S ocrates has on h is in te rlo c u to rs a re e f f e c ts th a t
P lato wishes to have on u s. So h ere; i f we th e readers had a sp e c ia l
s t a t e of c e rta in ty concerning any o f th e p o sitio n s t h a t now seem in
doubt or have been re fu te d , then our f a i t h in sp e c ia l s ta te s of
c e r ta in ty should have been shaken to o .^ ^ That leaves us having to decide
upon th e tr u th o f any th eo ry fo r o u rselv es, sim ila r perhaps to the
p o sitio n o f Socrates a t Phaedo 99d when he introduces th e deuteros pious
a s a r e s u lt o f h is own mental c r e a tiv ity .
Anamnesis does p u rp o rt to provide a foundation though, however
flawed. Does th e method o f hypothesis manage to provide any foundation
a t a l l ? Socrates says t h a t
"When i t i s necessary to give an account of t h i s h y pothesis, you
could do so in a sim ila r manner, hypothesising again another hypothesis,
whichever o f th e higher ones seems b e s t, u n t il you a rriv e a t something
adequate [ t i hikanon]." (Pdo.10Id)
The question here revolves around th e stre n g th of th e [ t i hikanon].
Adequacy can be ad hominem, t h a t i s s u f f ic ie n t to see o ff v^oever you
happen to be arguing a g a in st a t th e tim e, or s im p lic ite r, immune t o a l l
arguments t h a t might p o ssib ly be brought a g a in st i t . What I want to
suggest here i s th a t P la to wants more than ad hominem su ffic ie n c y from
th e method o f hypothesis, in order to produce an a lte r n a tiv e method of

44
foundation t o anamnesis, and th a t t h i s i s c lo s e ly linked to th e reasons
why P la to re q u ire s te le o lo g ic a l explan atio n s. L et us begin by asking why
P lato might want t h i s te le o lo g y . F i r s t l y , one might suggest t h a t i t has
something t o do w ith th e P la to n ic / S o c ratic e th ic a l programme, t h a t i f
we can have ' f o r th e b e s t ' explanations which r e la te t o r e a l asp ects of
th e world, t h i s might open a rou te towards e th ic a l a b so lu te s. Secondly,
P lato c e r ta in ly believes t h a t people do in f a c t a c t fo r th e b e s t and
t h a t t h i s i s something t h a t cannot be explained away in term s o f some
s o r t o f p h y s ic a lis t reductionism . T eleological explanations might then
'sav e th e phenomena' of our in te n tio n a l and moral a c tio n s . T hirdly, ' f o r
th e b e s t' explanations might be ab le to produce th e b a s is fo r a
coherence theory o f t r u th . Reference t o th e l in e a lle g o ry o f the
Republic i s p o ssib ly th e b e s t way of e x p lic a tin g t h i s . Here I follow
Fine in la b e llin g th e four se c tio n s L1-L4, a s c e n d i n g . A t L3 we form
hypotheses based on th e o rig in a ls o f th e p hysical world and proceed to
deduce conclusions from t h e s e . F i n e has argued t h a t th e re a re a t l e a s t
two co n d itions fo r knowledge fo r P la to , what she terms KL, th a t
knowledge must be based on th e a b i l i t y to give a [lo g o s], and KBK, th a t
knowledge must be based on something known, t h a t we must a ls o know the
explanatory account.^® For Fine, P lato i s a c o h e re n tis t a t L3. To
s a tis f y KL and KBK, she argues, we have a la rg e , v irtu o u s and
explanatory c ir c le o f hypotheses and conclusions. These hypotheses and
conclusions m utually support each o th e r, and we come to know both
sim ultaneously. At L4 we reach th e term inus; th e re i s nothing more
fundamental f o r the [arche anupothetos] t o be explained in terms o f. I t
is now th a t we must have recourse t o coherence and system atic
explanation to s a tis f y KL and KBK.^^ The f i r s t p rin c ip le and everything
t h a t i s u ltim a te ly explained by i t can now lean on each o th er fo r mutual
support, forming an explanatory c ir c le a s larg e a s th e world. The reason
th a t L4 g iv es us something b e tte r than L3 i s th a t L3 g ives us piecemeal
accounts ranging over in d iv id u a l branches of knowledge, while L4 o ffe rs
a synoptic account. Furthermore, th e usual in te rp re ta tio n i s t h a t the
[arche anupothetos] i s th e [idea to u agathou], the Form o f th e Good. We
a re th en attem pting to g enerate coherence and system atic explanation by
showing how everything r e la te s to th e good. Now, i f we a re ta lk in g of
p a rtic ip a tio n in th e Form o f th e Good, we a re ta lk in g of ' f o r th e b e s t'
or te le o lo g ic a l explan atio n s. A gainst th e fo u n d a tio n a list view th a t th e
KI/ KBK reg ress must term inate w ith some b a sic b e lie fs

45
th a t a re not ju s tife d in term s o f o th er b e lie f s , but a re s e l f - j u s ti f e d
o r s e lf-e v id e n t, th e re i s th e c o h e re n tist view t h a t accounts may c ir c le
back on them selves, but t h a t i f th e c ir c le i s la rg e enough and
explanatory, then i t i s v i r t u o^0 One im portant reason why P lato wants
u s .

te le o lo g ic a l explanations then i s in o rder t h a t they m ight form the

b a sis fo r a c o h e re n tist a lte r n a tiv e to foundationalism .

Now, one might say, t h i s i s a l l very w ell fo r th e Republic, but where i s

th e evidence fo r te le o lo g ic a l explanations and a coherence theory of
tr u th in th e Phaedo ? E a r lie r, I suggested th a t P lato hypothesises th e
e n tity required fo r such explan atio n s, th e [agathon], a s th e deuteros
pious g e ts under way. One might argue t h a t i f P la to makes no use o f t h i s
[agathor\], then he i s prey t o th e same o b jec tio n t h a t he deploys a g a in st
Anaxagoras, th a t o f p o stu la tin g an e n tity which does no explanatory
work. One might rep ly t h a t perhaps P la to leav es t h i s on one sid e f o r th e
moment, to employ i t in th e Republic and l a t e r in th e Timaeus. However,
i t may be th a t j u s t a s th e formal puzzles were given so lu tio n s in terms
of th e newly hypothesised e n t i t i e s , so th e te le o lo g ic a l puzzle i s
resolved a t Phaedo 108e f f , and so the Phaedo lay s th e b a s is f o r the
more developed p o sitio n o f th e Republic. Socrates says t h a t
"I am now persuaded th a t , f i r s t l y , i f th e e a rth i s round and in the
c en tre o f th e heavens, then i t req u ires n e ith e r a i r t o prevent i t
f a llin g nor any o th e r n e c e s s ita tio n o f t h i s s o r t, b u t th e uniform ity of
th e heaven i t s e l f in every way and th e equipoise o f th e e a rth i t s e l f i s
s u f f ic ie n t to r e s tr a in i t . For something which i s equipoised and i s
placed in th e middle o f something homogenous cannot y ie ld to being moved
a sid e in any way, but w ill remain s t e a d f a s t . ( P d o . l O S e )
Concerning th e Phaedo passage, Sedley has argued t h a t P la to gives only a
te le o lo g ic a l explanation, dispensing with any m ateria l o r mechanical
compulsion, while Lennox has argued t h a t t h i s passage t e l l s us only how
th e e a rth i s kept s t a b l e . H e r e I argue t h a t P lato gives us both
te le o lo g ic a l and m a te ria l explan ations.
That Socrates discusses th e shape, p o sitio n and s t a b i l i t y of th e
e a r th , th e th re e th in g s mentioned fo r explanation a t 97d f f can hardly
be a coincidence, e sp e c ia lly as Socrates a ls o comments t h a t h is theory
has no need o f a i r to p revent th e e a rth from f a l l in g , perhaps a
reference back to 99b where he a tta c k s th e vortex and 'kneading-trough'

46
t h e o r i e s . N o t e t h a t a t 97d Socrates expected to hear "The reason and
th e n e ce ssity [ten a it i a n k a i te n ananken]" (Pdo.97d). The language here
is s tr ik in g ly sim ila r to t h a t o f th e Timaeus which i s q u ite c le a r on
whether te le o lo g ic a l explanations ought t o replace a l l o th ers or work in
harmony w ith t h e m . H a v i n g described how human e y esig h t fu n ctio n s,
Timaeus then says
"All th ese a re among th e a u x il ia ry a i t i a [ s u n a i t i o n ] w h i c h god
uses in th e se rv ic e o f in s ta n tia tin g th e id ea o f th e b e s t, a s f a r as i s
p o ssib le . Yet they are supposed by a g re a t number o f people t o be not
th e a u x il .ia ry a i t i a i b u t th e a i t i a i o f a l l t h in g s ... b u t i t i s not
p o ssib le fo r th ese th in g s to have reason o r i n te l li g e n c e ... n e c e ssa rily ,
th e lo v er o f in te llig e n c e and knowledge must f i r s t pursue th e a i t i a i
which have an i n te llig e n t n a tu re , and only secondly those which a re
changed by o t h e r s . ( T i m . 4 6 c )
One can fin d se v era l o th er statem ents o f t h i s p o s itio n in th e Timaeus,
where th e se two types o f a i t i a i a re re fe rre d t o a s th e 'n ecessary '
(N -a itia i) and th e 'd iv in e ' (T - a i t i a i ) . After th e passage a t 46c
Timaeus then goes on to t e l l us why i t i s fo r th e b e s t t h a t human beings
have e y esig h t. The two types o f a i t i a i then answer t o two d if f e r e n t
s o r ts o f q u estio n s. I f we ask how i t i s t h a t phy sical phenomena occur,
th e ap p ro p riate re p ly , according to th e Timaeus, w ill be t o c i t e
N - a itia i. I f we ask why i t i s b e s t t h a t ph y sical phenomena occur, or why
th e universe i s arranged in a c e r ta in manner, we ought t o rep ly w ith
T - a itia i.^ ^ I t i s t h i s l a s t question t h a t th e Phaedo i s s p e c if ic a lly
in te re s te d in . At 99c, P la to 's com plaint i s t h a t th e physioiogoi may
have attem pted to explain how th e e a rth remains s ta b le , but th ey have
done so inad ^quately and have n o t explained why th e universe should be
arranged in t h a t manner in th e f i r s t p la c e .
Now, as Sedley has argued, th e p o s itio n and shape o f th e e a rth
jo in tly c o n s titu te s u f f ic ie n t conditions f o r i t s s t a b i l i t y . I f th e
s t a b i l i t y o f th e e a rth i s something good, which would seem c le a rly t o be
th e c ase, then we can ex p lain i t s p o s itio n and shape by reference to
t h i s end; th e e a rth i s so shaped and so placed because t h a t allow s i t to
be s ta b le and th a t i s a b e tte r s ta te o f a f f a i r s than any o th e r.
Whether th e re a re some N - a itia i on o f f e r here to o depends on how
stro n g ly we ta k e ' I t req u ire s n e ith e r a i r . . . nor any o th er n e c e s s ita tio n
o f t h i s s o r t ' a t Phaedo 108e5. This might ru le out N - a itia i a lto g e th e r.
However, i t may merely ru le out any n e c e ssita tio n o th e r than th e

47
equipoise o f th e e a rth and th e uniform ity of th e heaven. I f so , th a t
leav es us f r e e to ta k e th ese fa c to rs as N - a itia i and a s an explanation
in term s of th e p h y sical p ro p e rtie s o f th e e a rth and o f space o f how th e
e a rth r e ta in s i t s s t a b i l i t y . The job o f in te llig e n c e working w ith the
good in mind i s to ex p lain th e p ro v id e n tia l ordering o f th e universe and
n o t how i t fu n ctio n s, such t h a t n e ith e r in te llig e n c e nor th e good have
any ongoing cau sal e f f i c a c y . I f we wish to tak e th e comments
concerning th e ro le o f in te llig e n c e in ordering th e universe l i t e r a l l y ,
then what we a re given i s an explanit'on o f why in te llig e n c e arranged th e
m atter o f th e universe such t h a t th e e a rth was equipoised and in the
c e n tre . This was so in order t h a t th e e a rth could be s ta b le , as th e
N - a itia i would now fu n ctio n in such a way t h a t th e e a rth would be unable
to move in any d ire c tio n . I f t h i s i s so , then P lato does provide a
so lu tio n t o th e te le o lo g ic a l puzzle, and does employ te le o lo g ic a l
explanation and th e [agathon], in th e f i r s t s te p t h a t w ill lead him to
th e f u l l blown te le o lo g ic a l cosmology o f th e Timaeus.
I f i t i s th e case t h a t P lato advocates a coherence theory of t r u th
in th e d euteros pious, then t h i s may shed some l i g h t on one o f th e
p eren n ial d i f f i c u l t i e s a sso c iated w ith th e method o f hypothesis, th e
meaning of [sumphonein] a t Phaedo 100a5 f f . ^ ^ Socrates says t h a t
"Therefore t h i s i s th e way I have begun, hypothesizing in each case
whichever account [logos] I consider to be th e h e a lth ie s t
[errom enestaton], and whatever seems to me t o agree [sumphonein] w ith
t h i s , I p o s it as being tr u e , and whatever does n o t, as not tr u e , whether
concerning th e reason f o r o r any o th er e n tity ." (Pdo.100a)
The problem here i s t h a t th e lo g ic a l re la tio n which [sumphonein] denotes
w ill work w ell f o r one arm o f t h i s procedure, b u t n o t th e o th e r, vAiether
we ta k e t h i s re la tio n t o be entailm ent or consistency. With e n ta iIment,
a l l t h a t i s e n ta ile d by a tr u e hypothesis i s tr u e , but many th in g s not
so e n ta ile d a re a ls o tr u e . F u rth e r, as G entzler p o in ts o u t, th e s e t of
p ro p o sitio n s n o t e n ta ile d by our hypothesis w ill contain p a irs of
negations, and i t cannot be reasonable t o p o s it both members of th ese
p a ir s a s f a l s e . ^4 with consistency, a l l th a t i s in c o n s is te n t w ith a tru e
hypothesis i s f a ls e , but many th in g s t h a t a re c o n siste n t w ith i t a re
a lso f a ls e . I t may a lso be th e case t h a t while B and C a re c o n siste n t
w ith our hypothesis A, they a re not c o n siste n t w ith each o th e r. Socrates
a lso says t h a t he can dem onstrate th e im m ortality of th e so u l using t h i s
method; but consistency w ill merely leave us w ith a s e t

48
of a s s e r tio n s , not a p r o o f . S u c h con sid eratio n s have led some to
conclude t h a t we cannot read [sunçAionein] uni v o cally through Socrates*
a c c o u n t . R o b i n s o n comments t h a t
"Both our in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e metaphor o f accord and d iscord
have run in to grave p a ra d o x ... There i s no th ir d in te r p r e ta tio n . We have
to choose between consistency and d e d u c ib ility as th e meaning of
'accord*. The b e tte r i s consistency, a s th e paradox to which i t lea d s i s
much le s s than to which d e d u c ib ility lead s.
However, i f P la to has in mind a coherence theory o f t r u t h then th e
problem d isso lv e s, [sumphonein] simply means 'c o h e re s*, and i t i s
d e f in itio n a lly tr u e in a coherence t r u th system t h a t whatever coheres i s
tru e and whatever does not i s not.^B G entzler gives th e follow ing
d e fin itio n of coherence;
"A p ro p o sitio n P coheres w ith Q i f and only i f P i s c o n siste n t w ith
Q and stan d s in a s u ita b le in ductive o r deductive r e la tio n to Q."^^
G entzler then ra is e s th e worry t h a t th e re w ill be an i n f i n i t e s e t of
p ro p o sitio n s t h a t a re c o n siste n t w ith P but which do n o t stand in a
s u ita b le in ductive o r deductive re la tio n to P, and so must
(unreasonably) be reckoned f a l s e . H o w e v e r , t h i s may ignore an
in p o rta n t te le o lo g ic a l dimension t o coherence fo r P la to . I f th e world is
te le o lo g ic a lly s tru c tu re d , and our explanations a re t o be isomorphic
w ith t h i s s tru c tu re , then only explanations which r e f l e c t t h i s teleo lo g y
w ill ev en tu ally fin d t h e i r way in to a f u lly system atised explanatory
s t r u c t u r e . T h i s would ru le o u t many of th e p ro p o sitio n s t h a t G entzler
i s concerned about. We w ill see th e importance o f t h i s in re la tio n to
Meno's paradox in th e next se c tio n , and in l a t e r chapters I s h a ll argue
t h a t one o f th e ta s k s t h a t th e Timaeus and Philebus a re engaged in i s
ex p lic a tin g p re c is e ly what th e im plications o f P la to 's teleo lo g y a re fo r
th e s o r t o f hypotheses we ought t o 7^ Of course, th e re may be
a c c e p t .

some accounts which a re c o n s is te n t, seemingly s u ita b ly te le o lo g ic a l and

have n ot y e t been shown to stand in a s u ita b le r e la tio n . Here G entzler
may be c o rre c t in suggesting th a t [sumphonein] and [diaphonein] a re
c o n tra rie s and not c o n tra d ic to rie s , such t h a t we only r e je c t a s f a ls e
th o se accounts which do n o t s u ff ic e te le o lo g ic a lly o r do n o t stand in a
s u ita b le r e la tio n , reserving judgement on o th e rs.
There a re two p o in ts o f tr a n s la tio n which bear on th e arguments
h ere. One issu e could be p u t lik e t h i s . The broader th e conception o f
th a t vdiich has t o do th e cohering, perhaps th e e a s ie r i t i s to see how

49
such coherence could work. While i t i s p o ssib le t o argue t h a t
p ro p o sitio n s may cohere, i t i s perhaps e a s ie r to se e how accounts might
generate coherence. The question then posed i s how we should tr a n s la te
[logos] a t 100a4. The narrow tr a n s la tio n , given by Robinson, is
'p ro p o s itio n ', where I have favoured th e broader 'a c c o u n t'. There i s of
course a problem of c ir c u la r it y h ere, o f tr a n s la tio n and ph ilo so p h ical
in te r p r e ta tio n . However, i t may be p o ssib le t o t i l t th e sc a le s in favour
of my reading by referen ce t o o th e r re le v a n t usages. I f one th in k s in
term s o f th e Meno, then knowing something means being ab le t o [logon
d id o n a i], g en erally rendered 't o give an account' , which suggests more
than a p ro p o sitio n . S im ila rly , a t 101d6 in th e Phaedo, when one has to
[logon didonai] o f a hypothesis, one would expect more than a sin g le
fu rth e r p ro p o sitio n . I t may w ell be t h a t hypotheses a re complex to o ,
involving more than one p ro p o sitio n . I f so, then Phaedo lOld, where we
a re meant to examine th e consequences of an hy p o th esis, whether they
agree w ith one another o r not makes more sense. While one p ro p o sitio n
cannot have c o n tra d ic to ry consequences, complex hypotheses can, as
evidenced by th e f i r s t p a r t o f th e Parmenides. Here i s a fu rth e r p o in t
on which I disagree w ith G entzler, who r e s t r i c t s h er d iscu ssio n of
coherence to p ro p o sitio n s.^ *
A re la te d p o in t i s how to tr a n s la te and in te r p r e t [errom enestaton],
a ls o a t 100a4. Robinson here tr a n s la te s 's tr o n g e s t ', which working
w ith in a correspondence theory of tr u th i s f a i r enough. However, LSJ
give 'i n good h e a lth , vigorous, s t o u t ', and I have tra n s la te d
'h e a lth ie s t ' . W ithin a coherence theory o f t r u th based on re la tio n s h ip
to th e [agathon], t h i s has im portant connotations, o f s e le c tin g the
account most lik e ly to cohere w ith ' f o r th e b e s t ' ex p lan atio n s. One
m ight t r y to ju s tif y a reading of 'h e a lth ie s t ' by referen ce to the
p r o lif e r a tio n o f [agathoA] and i t s d e riv a tiv e s in P la to 's d iscu ssio n .
P ut to g e th e r, th ese two p o in ts o f tr a n s la tio n provide a sharp c o n tra s t,
between th e 's tro n g e s t p ro p o sitio n ' and th e 'h e a lth ie s t acco u n t', th e
l a t t e r according w ell w ith th e a coherence t r u th reading o f t h is
passage.
To summarise th e main theme o f t h i s argument. I f P lato employs
te le o lo g ic a l exp lanations in th e deuteros pious, and th e se explanations
are used to produce a coherence theory of t r u th , then he has no need o f
anamnesis e ith e r a s a c r ite r io n o f t r u th o r a s a means o f foundation.

50
 VI

Let us now consider th e t h ir d proposed function o f anamnesis, as a

so lu tio n to Meno's paradox. The paradox i s s e t o u t a s follow s
(Meno) "How w ill you search fo r t h i s th in g , S ocrates, not knowing a t
a l l what s o r t o f th in g i t i s ? For what s o r t o f th in g t h a t you do not
know w ill be proposed in your search ? Or even supposing t h a t you should
meet w ith t h i s th in g , how w ill you know t h a t i t i s t h i s th in g which you
do n o t know ?"
(Socrates) "I understand th e s o r t of p o in t you make, Meno. But d o n 't
you see what a conten tious argument you introduce h e re , t h a t i t i s not
p o ssib le fo r a man to search fo r e ith e r t h a t which he knows or t h a t
which he does no t know ? I t i s n o t p o ssib le fo r him to search fo r what
he knows, as he knows i t , and th e re i s no need to search fo r such a
th in g . N either can he search fo r what he does not know, a s he does not
know what s o r t o f th in g he se ek s." (Meno 80d)
How good a s o lu tio n t o t h i s paradox i s anamnesis r e la tiv e to th e method
of hypothesis ? The f i r s t d i f f ic u lt y i s th a t re c o lle c tio n merely pushes
th e process of learn in g de novo back one s ta g e , w ithout explaining i t .
A ll we a re to ld i s t h a t somehow our disembodied soul communes w ith th e
Forms in our p re -c a rn a te e x iste n ce . Secondly, much o f Meno's o rig in a l
challenge i s s t i l l unanswered. Anamnesis does not t e l l us which o f th e
th in g s we do not know to propose in our search. Nor does i t t e l l us how
we w ill know th a t something i s th e answer we want when we come across
i t . The im plication seems to be th a t we w ill make some s o r t o f in tu itiv e
leap ; the problems w ith t h i s have been discussed above.
Here we might a ls o d isc u ss a problem which G entzler fin d s in the
P h a e d o . S h e i s worried t h a t th e re w ill be an i n f i n i t e number of
consequences of our hypotheses th a t we ought t o check, and th a t
"Perhaps P la to d id not assume a c le a rly defined d e cisio n procedure
f o r r e s tr ic tin g them t o a manageable number; ra th e r he took i t fo r
granted th a t h is audience would have an i n tu i t iv e , i f rough idea o f th e
d iffe re n c e between th e lo g ic a l consequences of our hypotheses th a t were
worth considering and those t h a t were n o t.
The problem here l i e s w ith G e n tz le r's account ra th e r than w ith P la to ,
fo r a s I suggested in th e previous se c tio n , G entzler overlooks th e
c ru c ia l te le o lo g ic a l dimension t o coherence in th e Phaedo. I t i s t h is
teleo lo g y t h a t provides th e d ecisio n procedure h e re , allow ing us to
id e n tify th e c ru c ia l consequences o f any hypothesis. This i s im portant,

51
fo r a s G entzler n o t e s , a sim ila r problem a ris e s in modern science a s
any theory has an i n f i n i t e number of em pirical im p licatio n s and c le a rly
we cannot be expected to t e s t a l l o f them. So too one might suggest t h a t
th e re a re problems in modern philosophy o f science t h a t a re re la te d to
Meno's paradox. S c ie n tis ts form and s e le c t fo r te s tin g hypotheses which
a re m athem atically sim ple and e le g a n t. Can t h i s procedure be
ra tio n a lis e d and j u s t if i e d ? I f we have competing hypotheses i s th e re a
ju s t if i a b le d ecisio n procedure f o r choosing between them beyond
em pirical adequacy ? S c ie n tis ts in a l l f i e l d s , but in th e o r e tic a l
physics e s p e c ia lly , seek th e u n ific a tio n o f hypotheses in to a system atic
and coherent grand theo ry; can t h i s process be j u s t if i e d i s h a ll
re tu rn to th ese questions l a t e r v^en I have fu rth e r discussed some of
th e assumptions t h a t P lato in v e s tig a te s concerning th e com prehensibility
o f th e p h y sical world. I s h a ll a ls o d isc u ss th e re la tio n s h ip between th e
te le o lo g ic a l s o r t of answers P la to suggests fo r th e a l l i e d problems
ra ise d by Meno's paradox and those advocated by r e a l i s t conceptions of
scien ce. For th e moment though, l e t us consider what hypothesis has to
say in answer to Meno's paradox.
Hypothesis appears to tak e th e problem of learn in g de novo
s e rio u sly . A coherence theory o f t r u th a l l i e d to te le o lo g ic a l
explanation generates c r i t e r i a fo r knowing t h a t one has th e rig h t answer
when one comes acro ss i t . Equally im portantly, hypothesis has something
to say about what s o r t o f th in g t h a t we do n o t know we should
propose in our in v e s tig a tio n . I f my in te rp re ta tio n of Phaedo 100a is
c o rre c t, then we should be p u ttin g forward 'h e alth y a c c o u n ts', th a t i s
suggestions which a re lik e ly t o cohere w ith oth er ' f o r th e b e s t'
ex p lan atio ns. A good example o f t h i s i s Phaedo 108e and th e question of
th e e a r t h 's shape and p o s itio n . P la to does n o t have S ocrates propose any
shape or p o sitio n h e re , but ones which a re lik e ly to produce coherence,
'h e a lth y ' suggestions framed w ith ' f o r th e b e s t' explanation in mind.
Think back now to my e a r l ie r d iscu ssio n o f th e f i t between th e m ind's
co n ten ts and th e world. There I suggested t h a t th e p ric e f o r th e p re c ise
f i t given by anamnesis was th e i n a b i l it y to account fo r any m is f it. The
converse problem fo r hypothesis was t h a t any f i t i t might generate
seemed to be a m atter o f extreme good lu ck , but t h a t th e perception of
in h ere n t q u a litie s would give an i n i t i a l guide t o our th e o ris in g . So too
th e re would be a problem w ith knowing when we have achieved a f i t . Here
we can add an im portant h e u ris tic fo r bringing th e contents of our minds

52
in to a f i t w ith th e world/ namely th a t we can i n i t i a l l y narrow our
hypotheses down to th o se t h a t a re 'healthy* and seem lik e ly t o cohere
w ith our o th er ' f o r th e b e s t' ex p lan atio n s/ and ev en tu ally make
d ecisio n s on t h e i r t r u th by how w ell they cohere w ith our system. The
method o f hypothesis i s then a f a r b e tte r so lu tio n t o Meno's paradox
th an anamnesis.
I f McCabe i s c o rre c t in arguing t h a t th e conclusion o f th e Lysis i s
aporetiC /80 and th a t th e teleo lo g y th e re f a i l s because th e t e l i c o b je c t
cannot be explained and so chains o f explanation cannot be properly
term inated/ then perhaps we can sketch th e development o f P la to 's
thought on th ese m atters lik e t h i s . Having recognised some o f the
shortcomings o f re c o lle c tio n a s an answer to Meno's paradox/ in r e la tio n
t o th e term in atio n o f enquiry and of what we ought to propose in th a t
enquiry/ P lato tu rn s to te le o lo g y . The L ysis then examines teleo lo g y
w ith in th e framework o f a correspondence theory o f tr u th / but comes to
an a p o re tic conclusion. The Phaedo then begins to in v e s tig a te teleo lo g y
w ith in th e context o f a coherence theory o f tr u th / and provides the
f i r s t shoots o f th e full-blow n theory of th e Republic. Having found an
answer to Meno's paradox t h a t i s v a s tly more promising than
re c o lle c tio n / anamnesis i s then je ttis o n e d . Given th e framework of th e
Phaedo/ of balancing e x tra o n to lo g ic al commitment a g a in st explanatory
adequacy/ t h i s w ill be so even i f hypothesis c o sts more o n to lo g ic a lly .
The d iffe re n c e between th e two th e o rie s in t h i s re sp e c t i s probably not
la rg e . Indeed/ viewed in is o la tio n / one might f e e l t h a t a s anamnesis
commits us t o th e p re -e x isten c e o f th e so u l/ t h a t hypothesis i s a more
parsimonious th eo ry . Here we need to tak e a broader vieW/ though and to
d is tin g u is h between what could be c a lle d 's p e c if ic ' and ' re -u s a b le '
commitment/ depending on whether th e e n t i t i e s p o stu la te d a re u sefu l
e lse v ^ e re . For in stan ce/ anamnesis i s committed t o th e p re-c arn a te
ex isten ce o f th e soul and to some s o r t o f mechanism by which we could be
sa id t o r e c o lle c t. However/ a s th e p re -c a rn a te e x iste n ce o f th e soul may
be scxnething t h a t P lato wants irre s p e c tiv e o f th e debate between
an&mMsis and hypothesis/ t h i s cannot count a g a in st anamnesis in th e same
way t h a t something s p e c ific to i t can. S p e c ific commitments t h a t th e
method o f hypothesis can p are away a re th e mechanism by which anamnesis
works and any sub-conscious p a rt o f th e mind th a t a c ts a s th e rep o sito ry
f o r th e knowledge l o s t t o our conscious mind a t b i r th . On th e oth er
hand/ one might suggest t h a t v ir tu a lly a l l o f th e commitment of

53
hypothesis to a more a c tiv e conception o f mind w ill be re -u sa b le . The
p o in t about th e Phaedo, perhaps, i s t h a t t h i s i s where such a concept of
an a c tiv e mind i s f i r s t argued f o r . The d iffe re n c e in commitment between
anamnesis and hypothesis may be r e la tiv e ly sm all; th e g a in in
explanatory richness though i s la rg e , and anamnesis i s not seen again in
a favourable l i g h t in P la to 's works.

VII

One might o b je c t t h a t although i t has been shown t h a t on th e c r i t e r i a

o ffered in th e Phaedo hypothesis i s th e b e tte r th eo ry , P la to makes no
e x p li c i t statem ent o f t h i s m atter, and does n o t even have any e x p lic it
d iscu ssio n o f t h i s in h is t e x t . Is i t then proper t o a tt r ib u t e t h i s
change of opinion fo r th e reasons given here to P la to ? I f my a n a ly sis
of P la to 's FWP in th e f i r s t chapter was c o rre c t, then t h i s i s probably
so . We must look to th e thought th a t l i e s behind th e w ritte n word and to
th e challenges i t may be s e ttin g i t s read ers. One o f th e challenges of
th e Phaedo i s th a t P la to p re se n ts us w ith two ra d ic a lly d if f e r e n t
th e o rie s o f how th e mind acquires i t s contents and w ith th e c r i t e r i a
w ith which to judge th e se th e o rie s , and then leaves i t up to us t o do
th e fu rth e r th in k in g . For once, th e arguments come down c le a rly in
favour of one a lte r n a tiv e , and P la to 's shunning o f anamnesis in l a t e r
dialogues would seem to show t h a t t h i s i s h is conclusion to o .
One might o b je c t t h a t my s tra te g y imports th e concerns o f the
Phaedrus back in to th e Phaedo. However, I th in k i t i s uncontentious t h a t
P la to was in th e business of c re a tin g d ia le c tic between reader and te x t
long before he e x p lic itly discussed th e m atter in th e Phaedrus. As
argued in th e previous chapter Phaedo 102d3 w ith i t s referen ce to
'ta lk in g l ik e a book' may in d ic a te t h a t some o f th e w orries a ire d in th e
Phaedrus were alread y concerning P la to when he wrote th e Phaedo, and my
a n a ly sis o f th e place o f irony in P la to 's EWP seems to f i t th e Phaedo
very well.®^ I t i s q u ite p o ssib le then t h a t P la to i s asking us to choose
between anamnesis and hypothesis independently o f h is own conclusions.
A fter a l l , unless we work out th e reasons to p re fe r one theory fo r
o u rselv es, we w ill n o t r e a lly understand which theory to p r e f e r . That
f i t s th e dram atic frame o f th e Phaedo p e rfe c tly . J u s t a s i t i s
enphasised t h a t we should n o t accep t re c o lle c tio n unless we re c o lle c t
th e theory,®^ P lato p resen ts th e method o f hypothesis a s a hypothesis
t h a t we must judge th e worth of ourselves.

54
 One might a ls o o b je c t t h a t some o f th e arguments used to c re a te
d i f f i c u l t i e s fo r anamnesis import m atters which only su rfa ce in the
Theaetetus and S ophist, p a r tic u la rly a concern w ith e rr o r and fa ls e
judgement. We might d is tin g u is h though between a concern w ith the
lo g ic a l s tru c tu re o f f a ls e judgement i t s e l f and w ith producing an
epistemology v^ere f a ls e judgement i s a p o s s ib ility . The Phaedo, I
su g g est, i s concerned w ith th e l a t t e r but n o t th e form er. The l a t e r
d ialogues have a f a r more so p h istic a te d p o s itio n , and w hile i t would be
wrong to import t h i s so p h is tic a tio n o r concern w ith th e s tru c tu re of
f a ls e judgement back in to th e Phaedo, t h is does not mean t h a t P la to was
not concerned in t h a t dialogue w ith accomodating e r r o r .
An a l l i e d o b jectio n might be th a t my approach to th e Phaedo leaves
th e 'c r i t i c a l ' dialogues w ith to o l i t t l e t o be c r i t i c a l o f . C ertain ly my
view narrows th e gap in s ty le and concerns between th e Phaedo and the
Theaetetus and S ophist, but does not close i t . This I tak e t o be a
p o s itiv e move, as I b e liev e t h a t th e d is tin c tio n between th e 'c r i t i c a l '
and 'dogm atic' dialogues has o ften been overdrawn. I t seems u n lik e ly
t h a t P lato suddenly ex n ih ilo found a concern w ith falsehood and e rro r
in th e T heaetetus, or suddenly began to view w ritin g as a means to
challenge h is readers in th e Phaedrus. There i s more p o s itiv e th e o risin g
in th e Phaedo, but t h i s i s not to say th a t th e re i s none in th e
T heaetetus and S ophist, nor to say t h a t th e re i s n o t c r itiq u e and
challenge to th e reader in th e Phaedo. The d iffe re n c e in s o p h istic a tio n
i s another m atter, and i s undeniable.
A d if f e r e n t o b jectio n to th e demise o f anamnesis in th e Phaedo
might be concerned about th e damage such a re je c tio n would do to some of
th e arguments fo r th e im m ortality o f th e soul presented p r io r to 96 f f .
As long a s th e f in a l argument goes through though, perhaps t h i s i s not
too much o f a worry as th e u ltim ate conclusion o f th e im m ortality of th e
so u l i s reached. That both o f th e se th e o rie s can e x p lain th e im m ortality
of th e so u l i s perhaps a c r ite r io n o f th e i r explanatory adequacy.
F in a lly , one might o b je c t t h a t anamnesis i s mentioned in the
Phaedrus, and t h i s i s su re ly a l a t e r dialogue than th e Phaedo. My
contention h ere though i s t h a t again anamnesis i s e ffe c tiv e ly argued
a g a in st. The argument, which runs under th e su rfa ce o f th e discu ssio n o f
w ritin g , goes a s follow s. As we saw in th e previous ch ap ter, in order
fo r someone t o properly be sa id to come to understand, they must undergo
a process of d ia le c tic , and be a b le to give an account o f what they
know.®^ Otherwise, they w ill only appear to be knowledgeable when in

55
f a c t they a re not.®^ E ith er re c o lle c tio n i s a leap from t h i s p ro cess, or
i t g iv es us nothing more than d ia le c tic and hypothesis does, and i s thus
o tio s e . I f we a re to give an account o f what we lea p to r e c o lle c t, then
ag ain re c o lle c tio n does n o t provide us w ith anything t h a t hypothesis and
d ia le c tic do n o t. I f n o t, then when we r e c o lle c t, we w ill n o t be wise
but w ill merely have th e appearance of wisdom. The Phaedrus comes to
bury anamnesis, not to p ra is e i t .

V III

One worry we might have about P la to 's a ttitu d e to science i s t h a t h is

Socrates i s h ighly c r i t i c a l o f th e whole o f [p eri phuseos h is to r ia n ] .
However, i s i t th e in v e s tig a tio n of n atu re t h a t P la to o b je c ts to , o r i s
i t th e way in which th e physiologoi go about such a ta s k ? My argument
has been t h a t P lato considers th e p h y s ic a lis t ontology o f the
physiologoi t o be incapable o f producing adequate explanations of th e
phenomena. In order to have adequate explanations we need to p o stu la te
some more e n t i t i e s , and in order to ex plain how our minds came by th ese
e n t i t i e s and th e explanations they allow , we need ric h e r accounts of
knowledge, epistemology and th e mind than th e physiologoi w ill perm it.
The c o n p la in t then i s about explanation ra th e r than su b je c t m atter or
in te r e s t; note t h a t many of th e n a tu ra l phenomena t h a t th e physiologoi
a tte irp t to e x p la in a re given new, and on P la to 's account, adequate,
explanations in th e new s c h e m e . I t might be argued, though, th a t w hile
P la to may be in te re s te d in explaining some n a tu ra l phenomena, he
proposes to do so in a thoroughly u n s c ie n tific manner and in t h i s way
turned h is back on scien ce. S ocrates says t h a t he t i r e d of
"Looking a t th in g s w ith my eyes and endeavouring to grasp them w ith
each of my se n ses. So I thought I must ta k e refuge in accounts, and
in v e s tig a te in th ese th e t r u th o f r e a l i t i e s ." (Pdo.99d)
I s t h i s then t o be an in v e s tig a tio n devoid of em pirical in p u t ? That
would be a very strong reading o f t h i s passage, to which th e re a re
p la u s ib le a lte r n a tiv e s . P la to 's o b jectio n has been t o th e ontology of
th e p h ysiologoi, and th e empiricism th a t he b eliev e s goes along w ith i t .
We might th en read t h i s a s an o b jec tio n t o a purely e m p iric is t approach,
such t h a t what i s advocated i s t h a t while we might begin w ith
observation we move on t o th e o risin g , and i t i s in t h a t th e o risin g th a t
we discover th e tr u th o r otherw ise o f our hypotheses. This i s something
t h a t I s h a ll argue fo r in th e next ch ap ter. In t h i s ch ap ter though I
hope to have e sta b lish e d th a t th e theory of re c o lle c tio n had a sh o rt

56
life s p a n , being re je c te d in th e Phaedo. We can now concentrate on th e
im p licatio n s o f th e method o f hypothesis fo r s c i e n t if i c method.

57
NOTES TO CBIAPTER TWO

01) See e .g Cornford (1935) p5, "Anamnesis i s accepted by a l l p a rtie s

and l a t e r reaffirm ed (92a); nor i s any doubt ever c a s t upon i t in
P la to 's o th er works"; c f . p i 29.

02) Sayre (1983) p i 88-193 a lso argues t h a t re c o lle c tio n i s re je c te d in

th e Pdo, though fo r d if f e r e n t reasons. Cf. Sayre (1988a) and Moline
(1988).
03) Burnet (1911) p99 comments t h a t "This i s th e o ld e s t name fo r what we
c a ll 'n a tu ra l s c ie n c e '" ; c f . Gallop (1975) p234 n.56 and Hackforth
(1955) p122.
04) See Pdo.99d. Throughout I s h a ll tr a n s la te [ a i t ia ] as 're a so n ' or
'e x p la n a tio n ' ra th e r than 'c a u s e '; on t h i s see V lastos (1969a) p76 f f /
th e l i t e r a t u r e on cau se/ because and th e r e la tio n o f [ a i t ia ] to [to d ia
t i ] in A r is to tle , e .g Hocutt (1974), Moravscik (1974), S orabji (1980),
Annas (1982a), and note t h a t P lato too uses [ a i t ia ] and [to d ia t i ]
interchangably, e.g Pdo.96a "I was very in te re s te d in th e kind of wisdom
known a s n a tu ra l sc ien c e ; i t seemed to me to be e x c e lle n t to know th e
reasons [ a i t ia s ] fo r each th in g , v^y [d ia t i ] each should come to be,
why [dia t i ] i t should cease to be, and why [dia t i ] i t e x is ts " , so a ls o
Pdo.98c, 99a, 100c and 101b. See too Frede (1980) p129 f f on th e use of
[ a i t ia ] g e n e ra lly .

05) P la to 's irony though i s more complex; see my ch. 1 and below. Three
p o s s ib i l i ti e s canvassed f o r th e p ro to s pious on a n o n -iro n ic al
in te rp re ta tio n have been Anaxagoras' teleo lo g y , teleo lo g y of any s o r t,
and d iv in e ly revealed knowledge ; c f . th e discu ssio n s of Bostock (1986),
Burnet (1911), Crombie (1963), Gallop (1975), Goodrich (1903) + (1904),
Hackforth (1955), Huby (1959), Murphy (1936), Robinson (1956), Rose
(1966), Sayre (1969), Shipton (1979), Williamson (1904).
06) I cannot dem onstrate in a w a te rtig h t manner t h a t t h i s i s P la to 's
o v e ra ll s tra te g y in t h i s passage o r t h a t he intended a l l th e subsequent
p o in ts I b ring fo rth to be p a r t o f t h a t s tra te g y . My in te rp re ta tio n
might then be charged w ith th e in te n tio n a lis t f a lla c y . My reading though
makes good and p h ilo so p h ic ally in te re s tin g sense o f th e passage, and
th ere a re to o many p o in ts where P la to appears to be follow ing t h is
s tra te g y fo r i t to be mere coincidence. The general s tra te g y a lso meshes
w ell w ith P la to 's EWP, and th e g eneral p a tte rn o f argument i s one t h a t
recu rs in P la to 's work.

07) One might argue t h a t th e f i r s t p a r t of th e Rn. c r i t i c a l l y reviews

th e Pdo. 's answers h e re , and one might a lso view th e b a tt l e o f th e Gods
and G iants a t So.246a f f as a rep lay of Pdo.96c f f .

08) Whether t h i s passage has anything t o do w ith th e h is to r ic a l Socrates

is another m a tte r; see Hackforth (1955) p127 f f fo r d isc u ssio n .

09) Some c r i t e r i a o f adequacy here a re t h a t th e possession o f a property

ought n o t to have two opposite ex p lan atio n s, as when both d iv isio n and
a d d itio n a re c ite d as reasons fo r something being two, nor should a
sin g le explanation ex plain th e possession o f opposite p ro p e rtie s , as
when 'a head' i s c ite d a s th e reason fo r one person being sm all and
another being la rg e , nor should th e explanation c i t e th e opposite o f th e
58
p roperty; scxnething cannot be la rg e by v irtu e o f something sm all. Cf.
Fine (1987) pBS f f , Mackenzie (1988) p41 f f .

10) Cf. McCabe (1993) p52/3. When P lato develops a model o f mind in th e
Tim, a key p o in t i s t h a t our m ental rev o lu tio n s should m aster our
p e rc ep tio n s, ra th e r than vice v ersa; see e .g Tim.44a and compare th e
sim ila r moral in ju n c tio n a t Tim. 42b t h a t t o liv e ju s t ly we should be
master o f our emotions ra th e r than th ey o f u s; c f . Tim.77bc on mental
a c tiv ity and p a s s iv ity .

11) Cf. Men.97d f f on opinions and Daedalus' sta tu e s ; opinions need to

be 't i e d down' w ith acceunts.
12) E a rlie r in th e Pdo, we have had th e in siste n c e on th e e x isten ce of
soul and t h a t knowledge req u ires more than p ercep tio n . The physiologoi
might have in c re asin g ly complex accounts o f a p assiv e mind, but t o g ra n t
an a c tiv e one would go beyond th e parsimonious framework o f t h e ir
ontology.

13) [he psuche] re tu rn s in place o f [ho engkephalos].

14) Throughout I s h a ll tr a n s la te [nous] as ' in te llig e n c e ' , though i t

might eq u ally w ell be tra n s la te d as 'm ind'.

15) Cf. McCabe (1993) p54.

16) P lato i s very much a r e a l i s t about explanation; proper explanation
must r e f e r to something r e a l, and explanations must be isomorphic w ith
th e s tru c tu re o f th e world. So in order fo r th e re t o be te le o lo g ic a l
ex p lan atio n s, th e re must be some good o u t th e re in th e w orld. In
response to th e question how i s i t t h a t something i s b e a u tifu l, th e
Phaedo's s a fe answer t e l l s us th a t " I f anything i s b e a u tifu l o th e r than
th e b e a u tifu l i t s e l f i t i s so fo r no o th er reason than because o f i t s
p a rtic ip a tio n in t h i s b e a u tifu l ; and t h i s s im ila rly a p p lie s to
everything" (Pdo. 100c). So fo r anything to be gcxxi, or 'f o r th e b e s t ',
th e re must be a Gocx3 f o r i t to p a rtic ip a te in ; c f . Grg.SOSe.

17) Why does P lato p o stu la te Forms, though ? Jordan (1984) d eals w ith
t h i s q u estio n a t len g th . I agree w ith him t h a t one of P la to 's main
m otivations here i s to d eal w ith th e compresence o f o p p o sites, and a ls o
t h a t in o th er places P la to i s w orried by th e diachronic flu x of
p a r tic u la r s , a c o n sid eratio n which generates more Forms than th e f i r s t .
The n a tu re o f t h a t flu x w ill be a q uestion fo r l a t e r c h ap ters.
Although I w ill argue t h a t one o f th e im portant analogues t h a t P la to
uses fo r th e p a rtic ip a tio n o f p a r tic u la rs in Forms i s th e r e la tio n of
geom etrical diagrams to geom etrical d e fin itio n s , and t h a t l a t e r P lato
in te r e s tin g ly r e je c ts t h i s analogue fo r one o f th in g s t h a t have number/
number, along w ith Crombie (1963 v o l.I I ) p284 f f and Nehamas (1975) I do
n o t b e liev e t h a t such co n sid eratio n s led P la to to p o stu la te Forms.

18) I agree w ith Wiggins (1986) p3 a g a in st V lastos (1969a) p82 n.15 on

th e tr a n s la tio n of Pdo.99c. The a o r i s t ten se [estereth e n ] ' I was
deprived ' of teleo lo g y does not p reju d ice any fu tu re venture - th e
reading V lastos argues f o r , th a t S ocrates i s fo r a l l tim e deprived of
teleo lo g y req u ires a p e rfe c t te n s e , i . e [esterem ai].
19) P la to 's o th er uses of [deuteros pious] a ls o f i t w ith t h i s s o r t of
a n a ly s is . At Plb. 19c we fin d th a t " I t i s e x c e lle n t f o r th e wise man to

59
know everything, but th e [deuteros p io u s] would appear t o be no t t o be
ig n o ran t o f o n e se lf." That obviously has strong and in te re s tin g
resonances w ith much o f what I have been arguing fo r in th e Pdo. Less
loaded b u t s t i l l worth noting i s P it.3 0 0 b , where th e E.S says "On
account o f t h i s , fo r those who e s ta b lis h laws and c o n tra c ts , th e
[deuteros pious] i s t o ensure t h a t n e ith e r one nor many people ever
v io la te them".

20) So Menander (frag 241); see Hackforth (1955) pi 37.

21) A sub-theme here i s paying fo r th e t u it i o n o f a Sophist a g a in st our
own a c tiv e search.

22) As emphasised e a r l i e r , e .g Pdo.65 f f .

23) One th in k s esp. o f th e 's ig h tlo v e r s ' of Rep. book V, and th e th re e
fin g e rs o f Rep.523a f f .

24) I t a ls o has o n to lo g ical requirem ents which mesh w ell w ith i t s o th er

sense o f a s a second attem pt a t th e balance of ontology and explanation.
In order to g e t th e second voyage launched, we need some account o f an
a c tiv e , in ventive mind which can in s tig a te such an in v e s tig a tio n .

25) Ihese a re roughly sim ila r to th e p o sitio n s S cott (1987) terms 'K'
and 'D '. I am not w orried th a t, as S c o tt comments, 'tremendous problems
are caused by try in g to make anamnesis an explanation o f concept
form ation' (p366), as I b e liev e i ) 'tremendous problem s' a re caused by
'D' and by tr e a tin g anamnesis as a so lu tio n to Meno's paradox to o , and
i i ) P la to holds anamnesis only b r ie f ly , moving on to th e more
s a tis f a c to r y method o f hypothesis.
26) See Men.81 a f f .

27) I t a ls o req u ire s t h a t we c re a te a way o f judging t r u th fo r ourselves

and a way of c re a tin g knowledge.
28) Cf. Men.81e and Pdo.73b.
29) Cf. my comments on [poiesomai] a t Pdo.99d3.

30) Note t h a t from Phaedo 95e-99d Socrates t e l l s us o f h is negative

experiences; how he observed th in g s, canvassed various opinions, and
came to r e a lis e t h a t none o f them were adequate. A ll th e conditions fo r
su c ce ssfu l re c o lle c tio n a re h e re , and we might ejç)ect S ocrates to say a t
99d f f what he re c o lle c te d . What he says though, i s t h a t he turned to a
method which he 'c re a te d fo r h im self' and begins to hypothesise.

31) The key question perhaps i s have we, th e readers re c o lle c te d , or do

we have t o indulge in some a c tiv ity in judging hypothese o u rselv es.
32) Cf. e .g Burnet (1911) p81, Hackforth (1955)plO I.
33) The 'd iv in e account ' would be both th e theory o f re c o lle c tio n and an
in stan ce o f i t s e l f ; see above on re c o lle c tin g re c o lle c tio n .
34) I t i s worth noting th e s im ila rity o f th e n a u tic a l metaphors between
Pdo.85c and 99cd; c f . Shipton (1979).

60
35) See Pdo.73e f f .

36) Cf. Men.8 Id, Pdo.72e, 76a + 91e where i t i s e x p li c i t ly s ta te d t h a t

a l l learn in g i s re c o lle c tio n . I am happy t o d is tin g u is h d if f e r e n t types
of learn in g ( i . e learn in g how from learn in g th a t) and to exclude some
from anamnesis, b u t th e im p licatio n o f th ese passages i s t h a t i f
something i s learned by re c o lle c tio n then i t i s e x c lu siv ely so learn ed .

37) The c le a r e s t statem ent o f t h i s i s a t Pdo.91e.

38) One might ra th e r a n a c h ro n is tic a lly i l l u s t r a t e t h i s in term s of th e
av iary model o f the T ht. R ecollection m ight populate th e a v ia ry , and
e rro r would then be our grasping o f th e wrong b ird . Note, however, th a t
to produce t h i s p u ta tiv e explanation we must introduce mental s tru c tu re
and a c t iv i t y .
39) As we must have known th e c o rre c t, w ell formed explanations in our
p re -e x isten c e we ought n o t to be re c o lle c tin g badly formed ones a t a l l .

40) Anamnesis could perhaps ex p lain t h i s in term s o f d iffe re n c e s in

passive mental s tru c tu re and so avoid conceding th e a c tiv e mind th a t
hypothesis needs. An a lte r n a tiv e might be t o appeal to d iffe re n c e s in
th e examples o r in p ercep tio n between people, b u t a s each experience is
only a 'rem inder' and does not have t o be e n tir e ly accu rate t h i s may not
g e t us very f a r .

41) This i s th e case a t l e a s t fo r th e middle period works.

42) I f we ta k e th e Men. account, th e process i s arrogance - aporia -

re c o lle c tio n , so we might tak e th e re so lu tio n o f a p o ria a s a c r ite r io n
o f having re c o lle c te d .

43) E.g, th e vac i l l a t i o n o f Phaedo and Echecrates a t Pdo.88c f f between

S o c rate s' and t h e i r own accounts o f th e so u l. S im ila rly , n o t every move
from a fe e lin g o f ap o ria to euporia can be a sso c iated w ith gaining
knowledge.

44) E.g, Simmias and Cebes give accounts o f th e so u l as attunem ent and
a s th e r e la tio n between cloak and weaver.

45) Here we see th e importance o f th e personal natu re o f P la to 's

e x tr a - te x tu a l d ia le c tic ; th e reader must f i r s t b e liev e and then be
disabused to come to d i s t r u s t sp e c ia l s ta te s of c e rta in ty .
46) See Fine (1990) p98 f f .

47) See Rep.51 Ob.

48) See Fine (1990) p106 f f .

49) In th e next chapter I discuss and r e j e c t th e view t h a t P la to invokes

knowledge by acquaintance a t t h i s p o in t.
50) Cf. Fine (1991) p109.
51) One p o in t o f in te r e s t here i s P la to 's use o f [p ip te in ] and
[k lin e in ]. [p ip te in ] has connotations s im ila r t o th e English verb to
f a l l . I t can be used o f a c i t y , o f a government, or o f a s o ld ie r in

61
b a ttle (LSJ). I t c a rrie s then a sense o f downfall o r demise a s w ell as a
sense of dropping. P la to 's w orries here m y go beyond what they are
u su ally in te rp re te d to be, th a t i s th e more elem entary M ilesian problem
o f vAy an unsupported e a rth does not drop, to th e more so p h istic a te d
problem o f why th e e a rth d o e sn 't f a l l a p a rt, i f nothing holds i t
to g e th e r, [k lith e n a i] i s a ls o in te r e s tin g ly ambiguous as [k lin e in ] can
tak e th e sense o f 'd e c lin e ' in stead o f 'be moved a s i d e ', e sp e c ia lly i f
used in th e middle voice.

52) See Sedley (forthcoming) and Lennox (1985).

53) P o ssib ly th e th e o rie s of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. See Sedley
(forthcoming) on th ese p o in ts .
54) There a re o f course dangers o f anachronism in working back from th e
Tim. to th e Pdo, bu t here I b eliev e th e Tim. makes e x p li c i t something
th a t i s im p lic it in th e Pdo.

55) See Tim.45b f f .

56) See Tim.76d fo r a s im ila r use and c o n tra s t o f [s u n a itia ], and c f .
Plt.281c4-d11, 287b9-289c8. Note a ls o t h a t P la to o ccasio n ally uses
[hupereteo] and i t s cognates fo r [ s u n a itia ] , e .g Tim.46c7, 70d6, 75e4,
and c f . Plt.290b2, 290b4, 304e1, 308d5.
57) The Greek of th e phrase which follow s t h i s passage i s q u ite s p e c ific
about th e re being two types o f a i t i a ; [le k te a men amphotera ta to n a ito n
gene].
58) In p a r tic u la r a t Tim. 69a f f .

59) One might argue t h a t in th e Pdo. N -a itia i a re tr e a te d as no s o r t of

explanation a t a l l , c itin g Pdo.99a, where S ocrates says " I f anyone were
to say t h a t w ithout having such th in g s a s bones and nerves and so f o r th ,
I could n o t have acted as I thought proper, they would speak th e t r u th .
But to say t h a t i t i s on account of th ese th in g s [dia ta u ta ] th a t I do
what I do, and th a t I a c t w ith in te llig e n c e b u t n o t through a choice of
what i s b e s t, would be an exceedingly c a re le ss way of ta lk in g . For t h a t
would be to f a i l t o d is tin g u is h between something which i s a re a l a i t i a
[to a itio n t o i o n ti] on th e one hand, and t h a t w ithout which an a i t i a
could be an a i t i a in th e o th e r" . This passage i s only p ro b le m tic i f i t
is held to enunciate a general p rin c ip le o f explanation, ra th e r than one
t h a t p e rta in s only to in te n tio n a l a c tio n s , a s th e c o n tex t here
in d ic a te s , drawing a p a r a lle l between in te n tio n a l human a c tio n s and th e
te le o lo g ic a l ordering o f th e cosmos (see Pdo.98c), w hile n o t enquiring
how th e cosmos fun ctio n s (see Pdo.98a f f ) . F u rth e r, elsewhere in th e
Phaedo S ocrates uses a i t i a t o r e f e r t o n o n -te le o lo g ic a l ex p lanations; in
th e myth d escrib in g th e s tru c tu re o f th e underworld, Socrates says t h a t
"The reason [ a i t ia s ] t h a t a l l th e stream s flow in and o u t o f here is
t h a t t h i s liq u id can fin d n e ith e r bottom nor re s tin g place" (Pdo.112b,
c f . Pdo.110e2 fo r a sim ila r use o f a i t i a ) . I s S ocrates then g u ilty here
of 'an exceedingly c a re le ss way o f ta lk in g ' ? Only i f N -a itia i a re
in s u f f ic ie n t answers t o both how and v^y q u estio n s.

60) See Sedley (forthcom ing). The e a r t h 's equipoise seems to be th e key
h e re , ra th e r than i t s shape; an unbalanced sphere could have reason to
move. That th e e a rth i s a sphere would seem to beihe l i k e l i e s t reading
of [peripheres] h ere, but Morrison (1959) ra is e s doubts, though; c f .

62
Calder (1958), Rosenmayer (1959), and G uthrie vol IV p336 n .1 .

61) See here Sedley (forthcoming) fo r a f u l l d isc u ssio n , and c f . Lennox

(1985).

62) I argue t h i s in more d e ta il in c h .5.

63) Cf. th e d iscu ssio n s o f Robinson (1953), Sayre (1969), Bostock
(1986).

64) See G entzler (1991) p266.

65) See Robinson (1950) p i 28.

66) See e .g Robinson (1950) p129-131, Bostock (1986) p169.

67) Robinson (1953) p127, c f . Sayre (1969) p15-28.

68) Where P la to wants to express lo g ic a l consequence he u su ally employs

[sum bainein]; c f. Grg.479c5, 496e5, 508b3, Pm.136a8, 136b3, 142b3,
So251.e5, Plb.22a7. In what follow s I might be accused o f a ssim ila tin g
th e Rep. and Pdo. to o c lo s e ly , b u t note th a t [sumghonein] and
[homolegein] ra th e r than [sumbainein] are used in th e Rep. esp in
d iscu ssio n o f th e lin e alegory.
69) G entzler (1991) p268.

70) See G entzler (1991) p270.

71) Here I would disag ree w ith G entzler (1991) p269 n.10 when she
suggests th a t [sumphonein] denotes a non-syirroetrical r e la tio n . I f what I
have argued in th e previous se c tio n concerning an ex haustive, system atic
explanatory c ir c l e i s c o rre c t then [sumphonein] should be sym m etrical,
though th e path o f inference from a to b may be d if f e r e n t and
considerably sh o rte r than from b t o a .

72) In p a r tic u la r th e consequences fo r th e mathematical s tru c tu re o f our

hypotheses r e la tiv e to t h a t o f th e world.
73) In th e f i n a l p a rt o f th e Tht. one might argue t h a t [logos] means
account ra th e r than sin g le p ro p o sitio n ; see e .g Fine (1979b) p366 f f .
74) See G entzler (1991) p269 f f .

75) E.g, [ameinon] a t Pdo.97e, [ b e l t i s t i s t o s ] a t 97c + lOld.

76) See G entzler (1991) p271 f f , p275.

77) G entzler (1991) p271.

78) See G entzler (1991) p271 n.15.

79) See Maxwell (1984) c h .9, (1993a) and (1993b) fo r a r e a l i s t view of

whether e rrp irica l adequacy can be th e only c r i t e r i a by which we form,
s e le c t, t e s t and judge th e o rie s .
80) See Mackenzie (1986b).

63
81) So too th e evidence o f P rt.329a predates th e Pdo; see my ch. 1.

82) Pdo.73b, c f . Men.81e.

83) Pdr. 278a i s th e c le a r e s t statem ent of t h i s , and c f . Pdr.270e, 278c
and So.230d.
84) I .e th ey w ill have knowledge b u t n o t understanding.

85) The Tim. o f course proposes explanations fo r v ir tu a lly a l l ph y sical

phenomena.

64
CHAPTER THREE

^TRONOMY AND OBSERVATION IN THE REPUBLIC

The main aim o f t h i s chapter i s to explore th e methodology proposed by

th e middle books o f th e Republic and i t s im p licatio n s f o r the
in v e stig a tio n o f n atu re . The c e n tra l question here w ill be what ro le any
em pirical in p u t has in th e method o f hypothesis, and astronomy in
p a r tic u la r , given th e remarks a t Republic 529c f f . For th e purposes of
t h i s c h ap ter, I wish t o concentrate la rg e ly on th e evidence o f the
Republic and some o th er middle period works. One reason fo r t h i s i s t h a t
i f P la to d id a t some stage d e n ig rate or p ro sc rib e o bservational
astronomy, then th e purported evidence i s s tro n g e st h e re , a t Republic
530b. As c r i t i c s o ften focus on t h i s passage, i t i s worth in v e stig a tin g
whether t h i s charge can be repudiated on th e b a sis of th e Republic
alo n e. There a re two fu rth e r reasons fo r t h i s approach. F ir s tly , i f
th e re i s a s ig n ific a n t change in th e n atu re o f c e l e s ti a l motion between
th e Republic and th e Timaeus, as I s h a ll argue in chapter fiv e , t h i s may
a ls o a f f e c t th e ro le fo r observation in th e Timaeus and l a t e r works.
Secondly, th e re i s c le a r ly a se rio u s re-exam ination o f th e n ature of
knowledge in th e T heaetetus, which may re v ise some o f th e th e o rie s of
th e Republic. Any evidence from th e l a t e r dialogues then would need to
be subjected to d e ta ile d sc ru tin y before i t could be adduced in a
d iscu ssio n o f th e R epublic's astronomy.
In th e f i r s t se c tio n o f t h i s chapter I consider some th e o r e tic a l
asp ects of P la to 's science in g en eral, and argue t h a t he envisaged a
process which in te r r e la te s se n sib le s and i n t e l l i g i b l e s , th e
in v e s tig a tio n o f each being necessary b u t n o t s u f f ic ie n t t o achieve th e
o v e ra ll aim. I s h a ll be p a r tic u la rly concerned to d isc u ss t h i s in
r e la tio n t o th e 'two w orlds' (IW) in te rp re ta tio n of P la to . In se ctio n
two, I analyse th e infamous passage a t Republic 529c f f concerning
astronomy and th e education o f th e guardians. I s h a ll argue t h a t th e re
is no ban on observation h e re , but in stea d an a ffirm a tio n o f th e need
f o r an i n i t i a l em pirical approach. I contend t h a t t h i s makes good sense
of th e in te rn a l s tru c tu re o f t h i s passage, and o f i t s re la tio n s t o o th er
p a rts o f th e Republic. The r e s u lt o f t h is d iscu ssio n i s t o leave the
Republic with a more reasonable conception o f astronomy and science than
has sometimes been allowed in th e l i t e r a t u r e .

65
I c h a ra c te rise th e ÏW in te rp re ta tio n a s th e view t h a t fo r P lato four
d is tin c tio n s a re co-extensive, and divide what th e re i s in to two
d is jo in t s e ts .^ On th e one hand th e re i s t h a t which i s i n t e l l i g i b l e ,
s ta b le , knowable and in co rp o re al, w hile on th e o th e r th e re i s th a t which
is se n sib le , changing, opinable and p h y sic a l.^ The f i r s t s e t of e n t i t i e s
a re sa id t o be, while th e second a re always in a s t a t e of becoming. Two
p o sitio n s on P la to 's science which have been adopted, and a re re la te d to
a TW view of P la to , a re t h a t science d e als s o le ly w ith i n te l li g i b le
o b je c ts ,3 and so excludes o bservation,^ or t h a t i t d e als s o le ly w ith
p h y sical o b je c ts, and so aims no higher than opinion o r a 'lik e ly
s t o r y '. 5 These p o sitio n s have t h e i r resp ec tiv e ways o f dealing w ith
P la to 's comments on astronomy a t Republic 530b. The f i r s t p o s itio n reads
them as a statem ent of methodology, a ttr ib u tin g an ex clu siv ely a p r io r i
approach to P la to . We ought to 'proceed by means o f problem s' and ' leave
th e th in g s in th e heavens a lo n e ' i f we a re t o pursue th e 'r e a l science
o f astronomy ' . ^ The second p o sitio n emphasises th e problem which
Sim plicius rep o rts P la to as having s e t:
"Which hypotheses o f uniform, c irc u la r and reg u la r motion a re ab le
to save th e p lan e ta ry phenomena ?"^
This i s taken as th e problem th a t we a re to proceed w ith a t Republic
530b6, th e r e s t o f t h a t passage being read as an e x h o rtatio n t o study
o
th e r e a l and n o t th e apparent motions o f the v is ib le heavens.
One way o f supporting e ith e r o f these p o sitio n s would be to argue
th a t P lato considers th e re to be a demarcation fo r s c i e n t if i c enquiry a t
th e border o f th e two realm s. Science fo r P lato would then have t o deal
e x clu siv ely with one or o th er o f th e se w orlds.^ My main s tr a te g ic
concern in t h i s se c tio n w ill be t o argue th a t P la to allow s and indeed
emphasises a continuous progress in th e co g n itiv e asce n t o f th e
philosopher, from se n sib le s t o i n te l li g i b le s . So to o he b e liev e s th a t
subsequently the i n te l li g i b le s may inform us about th e se n s ib le s . I f
t h i s i s so , then th e re can be no demarcation f o r in v e s tig a tio n between
th e two worlds, and n e ith e r o f th e types of p o s itio n o u tlin e d above can
be c o r r e c t . C o n s i d e r follow ing passage from th e Symposium, where
Diotima i s in stru c tin g S ocrates about love:
"This i s th e c o rre c t way of proceeding or being le d in m atters of
love; beginning w ith p a rtic u la r instan ces of beauty, fo r th e sake o f th e
higher beauty one must always ascend, as i f employing ris in g s t a i r s ,

66
from one b e a u tifu l body to two, and from two to a l l , and from b e a u tifu l
bodies t o b e a u tifu l ways of liv in g , and from t h i s t o th e beauty of
lea rn in g , and from here to th e u ltim ate h igher study, which i s concerned
w ith th e higher beauty i t s e l f and nothing e ls e , so t h a t f i n a l ly one may
know what beauty is."^ ^ (Smp.211b)
Let us c a l l t h i s in v e s tig a tio n 'e r o t i c s '. The key p o in t here i s t h a t th e
border o f th e two realms does n o t form th e demarcation between e ro tic s
and n o n -e ro tic s. The in v e s tig a tio n begins w ith se n sib le s and ascends to
th e i n te l li g i b le s a s p a r t o f th e same d is c ip lin e . This i s e n tir e ly in
accord w ith th e Republic. Concerning in v e stig a tio n thought of in term s
o f th e l in e a lle g o ry , S ocrates says
"In one d iv isio n th e mind i s compelled [anankazetai] to in v e s tig a te
by using th e o rig in a ls o f th e v is ib le order in t h e i r tu rn a s images, and
has to base i t s search on hypotheses and proceed from them ." (Rep.51 Ob)
The fo rce w ith which t h i s i s expressed i s in te r e s tin g . The mind is
coirpelled to in v e s tig a te in t h i s manner, ru lin g out any oth er method o f
accessing th e i n te l li g i b le s . This stro n g ly suggests t h a t in v e stig a tio n
fo r P lato i s th e ascen t o f th e lin e , including th e tra v e rsin g o f th e
border o f th e two worlds, ra th e r than th e exclusive pro p erty o f any one
se c tio n . I f so , then in d iv id u a l in v e stig a tio n s a re b e tte r conceived o f
as dynamic, v e r tic a l a sc e n ts, ra th e r than s t a t i c , h o riz o n ta l p o sitio n s
19
on th e lin e . There can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t th e general epistemology
11
and methodology s e t o u t here i s intended t o be applied t o astronomy.
There a re se v e ra l oth er passages which a re h e lp fu l h e re . These can be
grouped under two headings; those which show th a t an em pirical approach
i s in s u f f ic ie n t, and those t h a t show i t t o be necessary. I t i s o ften
p o ssib le to p a ir th ese w ithin one work, e .g Phaedrus 268a f f , where we
le a rn t h a t a knowledge o f p r a c tic a l m edicine, rh e to ric and music is
necessary, which we can compare w ith Phaedrus 270b, where we fin d th a t
to possess a [techne] one must have more than [eirp e iria], an 'e rrp iric a l
k n ack ', one must in f a c t understand th e natu re o f what i s involved, here
th e body o r th e so u l.
On t h i s view of in v e s tig a tio n fo r P la to then th e re i s an e s s e n tia l
errp irical p a r t o f th e process. Obviously th ere a re r e s tr ic tio n s h e re ,
fo r w hile e rrp iric a l enquiry i s necessary f o r th e i n i t i a l stag es o f th e
lin e , i t i s f u t i l e fo r th e higher p a r t s . ^^ Hence we fin d passages which
decry i t s use f o r t h is l a t t e r purpose, b u t not b lanket bans.
Also irrportant i s th e subsequent descent of th e l in e . Socrates

67
speaks as i f to h is f u l ly educated guardians, t e l l in g them th a t they
must descend in to th e a lle g o r ic a l cave, and t h a t th ey w ill
"See f a r b e tte r than th o se in t h a t p la c e , and w ill know each of
th e se images, what i t i s and what i t i s o f, because you have seen th e
tr u th concerning beauty, ju s tic e and goodness." (Rep.520c)
That i n te l li g i b le s can h e lp inform us about se n sib le s shows the
supposed demarcation t o be passable in both d ire c tio n s , 'upwards' from
th e se n sib le s and subsequently 'downwards' from th e in te llig ib le s .^ ^
This passage a ls o suggests a second s tra te g y by which we might undermine
th e supposed dem arcation, which i s t o argue t h a t P la to i s not in f a c t
committed to IW. In r e la tio n to th e l a t e r dialogues, t h is may w ell be a
highly p r o fita b le lin e o f thought, as I s h a ll argue in l a t e r c h ap ters.
Whether i t can be successful fo r th e Republic though i s open t o doubt.
That we can opine i n te l li g i b le s does not breach IW s t r i c t u r e s , i f we
ta k e i t t h a t i t i s p o ssib le to have knowledge in a d d itio n t o opinion of
in t e l l i g i b l e s , but t h a t t h i s i s not th e case fo r s e n sib le s . Conversely
we can p erceiv e o r th in k about s e n sib le s , but cannot perceive
i n te l li g i b le s . At Republic 506c Socrates has b e lie f but n o t knowledge of
th e Form o f th e Good, w hile a t 523a f f we reason about our c o n trad icto ry
1A
percep tio n s o f our fin g e rs . This weaker c o n stru al o f TW meets a l l th e
'u n a ttr a c tiv e consequences' of F in e 's stro n g e r c o n stru a l, according to
which th e re can be no b e lie f concerning Forms. ^^ These consequences lead
Fine to r e je c t TW fo r th e Republic. Where c o g n itiv e s t a te s are
c o rre la te d w ith o b jects (e.g 511de), on my view th ese a re maximal s ta te s
to which we may progress from lower ones. 20 Thus we can come to know
in te l l i g i b l e s in th e manner o f th e Meno by attac h in g an explanatory
account, though th e Republic has a more so p h istic a te d view of t h i s
p ro cess, and so th e Republic does not ' ra d ic a lly r e j e c t th e Meno's
account of k n o w l e d g e 'R a t h e r than reading Republic 520c a s giving us
u n re s tric te d knowledge o f s e n sib le s , i t may t e l l us no more than t h a t we
can know what a p a rtic u la r se n sib le i s ( th is i s an image o f Beauty) and
what i t i s of (we can know Beauty i t s e l f ).^^ Knowledge o f se n sib les
themselves m ight s t i l l be e lu s iv e . The analogues f o r th e r e la tio n of
Forms and p a rtic u la rs t h a t P lato employs in th e Republic suggest t h a t
se n sib le s a re im perfect r e la tiv e to Forms, and t h a t th ese d e fic ie n c ie s
a f f e c t statem ents about them. In astronomy we a re to ld th a t i t would
be fo o lis h to seek t r u th in th e v is ib le s t a r s , as they a re physical and
so undergo d e v ia tio n s w ith th e r e s u lt t h a t th e re i s no c o n stan t r e la tio n
between t h e i r p e r i o d s . I f th e re i s no ex act and

68
c o n siste n t t r u t h , then fo r P lato th e re can be no knowledge. What might
be p o ssib le however i s knowledge o f th e ranking o f se n sib le s in o rd er of
t h e i r approximation to th e re le v a n t known id e a l, once we know what t h a t
id e a l i s . This would be im portant in p o l i t i c s , because i f the guardians
w ith t h e i r knowledge o f a b s tr a c t ju s tic e can c o rre c tly rank a ctio n s as
more o r le s s ju s t , they can d eriv e t h e i r r ig h t t o ru le from th is
a b i l i t y . I t i s a ls o p o ssib le t h a t knowledge o f th e Forms would allow
us improved opinions o f se n sib le s and a b e tte r understanding o f t h e i r
fu n ctio n in g , w ithout allow ing us knowledge o f them.

II

One o b jec tio n to my p o s itio n here could be based on th e a sso c ia tio n of

th e methodologies of astronomy and geometry. I f geometry i s e n tir e ly a
p r i o r i , then so i s astronony, and i f astronomy i s a t l e a s t p a rtly
e n p iric a l then so i s geometry. However, while geometry a t th e moment i s
pursued through i n te l li g i b le s , th e lin e a lle g o ry makes i t c le a r a t
se v era l p o in ts (e.g 510b, 51Ode) th a t we access t h i s le v e l in geometry
only by ascending from th e se n sib le v ia th e contem plation of diagrams. 26
So while fo r P la to th e re may be concepts which a re not given by
p ercep tio n , th ese cannot be acquired p rio r t o o r independent of
experience. Although not d ir e c tly expressed by P la to , we might a ls o
allow him th e follow ing co n sid era tio n . Only a few of th e most elem entary
o f p ercep tio n s a re required to make us enquire in to th e natu re of
number, 27 while geometry req u ires more, and more s p e c ific perceptions
fo r us in v e s tig a te th e re le v a n t i n te l li g i b le s , and so on in a continuum
v ia astronomy and h a r m o n y .S o while astronomy and geometry share th e
same b asic methodology i t would be wrong t o equate th e two d ir e c tly as
astronomy w ill req u ire a much broader em pirical base. As a stro n m y may
be a t a d if f e r e n t stag e o f i t s development, i t may re q u ire a d if f e r e n t
p re s c rip tio n fo r i t s fu tu re p u rs u it, such t h a t we cannot w ithout fu rth e r
co n sid eratio n impose recommendations fo r geometry onto astronomy. This
i s perhaps th e key to u nravelling P la to 's p o sitio n in th e Republic, th a t
many o f h is comments a re dependent on th e c u rre n t s t a t e of development
of a given d is c ip lin e . P lato may a ls o have in mind an account o f th e
g en esis and development of d is c ip lin e s . The evo lu tio n of geometry from
land measuring to a b stra c tio n t o diagrams and then t o i n te l li g i b le s i s
2Q
something w ell th eo rise d by th e lin e a lle g o ry .
A d if f e r e n t s o r t of o b jec tio n to my p o s itio n , espoused by
V l a 30 might c it e th e follow ing passage from th e Phaedrus and
s t o s ,

69
argue t h a t while th e re a re necessary e rrp irical p re lim in a rie s, th e
d is c ip lin e i t s e l f i s an a p r io r i m atter w ith i n t e l l i g i b l e o b je c ts .
Socrates (hypoth etically) says t o a man vAo b e liev e s t h a t he has a
knowledge o f harmony because he can s tr ik e th e h ig h e st and low est
p o ssib le notes
"My good s i r , anyone intending to become s k ille d in harmony must
know th ese th in g s, b u t nothing prevents someone a t your sta g e from being
w ithout th e s l i g h te s t knowledge o f harmony. You know th a t which of
n e ce ssity must be stu d ied before harmony, b u t n o t th e theory of
harmony." (Pdr.268e)
I f we were t o accept t h i s , we would need to d is tin g u is h th e d is c ip lin e
name, e .g 'astronom y', re fe rrin g only t o th e i n te l li g i b le p a r t o f the
in v e s tig a tio n , and th e whole in v e s tig a tio n , including th e necessary
em pirical phase. The n atu re o f th e in v e stig a tio n would be unaffected, as
merely to give a name to i t s i n te l li g i b le p a rt does not e s ta b lis h a
demarcation fo r t h a t in v e s tig a tio n . One would then have t o d iscu ss which
of th ese we ought to r e f e r to as P la to 's astronomy. However, as P lato in
g en eral r e f e rs to th e whole in v e s tig a tio n by th e d is c ip lin e name, we
should not accept t h i s o b jec tio n . Symposium 211b and Republic 511b
stro n g ly suggest t h a t th e whole in v e stig a to ry process i s grouped under
th e d is c ip lin e name, and passages a t Republic 526e and 530d th a t we
s h a ll examine in th e n ext se c tio n w ill h elp t o confirm t h i s .
According to some accounts, th e re i s a d isc o n tin u ity in th e
c o g n itiv e a sce n t o f th e philosopher in th a t P la to invokes
n on-propositional 'knowledge by acquaintance' e ith e r fo r th e Forms in
g en eral o r th e Form o f th e Good in p a r tic u la r. However, I would agree
w ith S o rab ji and o th ers t h a t th e thinking t h a t th e Republic req u ire s is
p r e p o s itio n a l.^ The c r i t i c a l passage appears to be th e follow ing, where
S ocrates says
"Don't you c a ll a man a d ia le c tic ia n i f he can grasp an account of
th e being o f each thin g ? And i s n 't anyone in so f a r a s they cannot give
an account t o themselves or o th e rs , lacking in understanding ? . . Is t h i s
n o t so fo r th e Good, to o ? Someone vho cannot d is tin g u is h th e Form of
th e Good from a l l o th er th in g s w ith an account, and b a tt l e through a l l
counter arguments, advancing r e a l ra th e r than apparent counter
arguments, holding to h is account in th e journey through a l l these
th in g s , can such a person re a lly be sa id to know th e Good i t s e l f or
anything e ls e t h a t i s good ?" (Rep.534b)

70
I t would seem th a t p ro p o sitio n s a re required throughout t h i s account of
th e ta sk s o f th e philosopher. However, th e re a re some o b jectio n s t o be
faced. F i r s t l y , while one might re a d ily see why knowledge by
acquaintance cannot be tran sm itte d in w ritin g , i t i s n o t so apparent why
t h i s should be so fo r p ro p o sitio n ^ knowledge. As argued in chapter one
however, P la to 's PWP i s concerned w ith th e transm ission of
understanding. One may read a d e fin itio n in a book, but not r e a lly
understand t h a t d e fin itio n u n t i l one has been through th e process
described a t Republic 534b. The apprehension o f th e Good i s of course
likened to seeing th e sun, a non-propositional experience. However,
P lato i s being m etaphorical h e re , and i t may be t h a t , as Sorabji
su g g ests, P la to i s describing th e fe e lin g of r e a lis a tio n t h a t one has
when one f i n a l ly comes upon a d e fin itio n a l formula t h a t one can give a
p re p o s itio n a l defence o f a g a in st a l l counter argum ents.^4 chapter s ix
1 s h a ll argue th a t vAen P la to develops a model of mind in th e Timaeus he
does so in a way th a t allow s p re p o sitio n a l thought about anything th a t
th e mind may encounter. One might a ls o lin k th e p re p o sitio n a l
in te rp re ta tio n here to my e a r l ie r discussion o f anamnesis. V lastos
reckons 'th e g rav e st flaw ' in th e theory of Forms t o be th e notion th a t
a v isio n of th e Forms provides i n f a l l i b i l i t y .^ ^ Sim ilar problems
concerning anamnesis and foundation were discussed in chapter two. On
th e p re p o s itio n a l account though, what provides i n f a l l i b i l i t y i s th e
production o f an account which can see o f f a l l counter arguments, and as
we saw in th e previous ch ap ter, we ju s tif y claim s about th e Form of th e
Good in term s of coherence and explanatory power. Equally im portantly,
i t i s th e process leading to th e comprehension o f a whole su b je c t t h a t
produces understanding.^^
F in a lly , one might attem pt t o ju s tif y th e view th a t fo r P lato
science d e a ls ex clu siv ely w ith one o r o th er o f the 'two w orlds' by
applying th e demarcation c r i t e r i a o f modern science t o a IW
in te r p r e ta tio n of P la to , and declaring whatever f a l l s on th e science
sid e o f t h i s a p p lic a tio n t o be P la to 's s c i e n c e .W h i l e such a
'Whiggish' h isto rio g rap h y i s ju s tly out o f favour, such an approach is
im p lic it in some o f th e o ld er l i t e r a t u r e . Leaving m ethodological
co n sid eratio n s on one sid e , a c lo s e r a n a ly sis shows t h a t t h i s p a th f a i l s
to achieve i t s o b je c tiv e . While i t may i n i t i a l l y seem p la u sib le t h a t
modern d is tin c tio n s between physics and metaphysics or s c i e n t if i c
knowledge and general opinion would f a l l a t th e border o f th e two

71
realm s, t h i s i s not in f a c t so . The f i r s t o f th e se d is tin c tio n s might be
thought to generate th e view t h a t fo r P la to science d eals only w ith th e
p h y sical and so aims no higher than opinion. Consider though th e
mathematics which d escrib e th e motions o f th e heavenly bodies. These are
c le a r ly w ith in th e sphere o f modern science and as such a re a ph y sical
ra th e r th an a m etaphysical m atter. For P la to , however, they are
'a c c e s sib le t o reason and i n t e l l e c t , but n o t t o e y e s ig h t' (Rep.529c)
The modern demarcation does n o t then sep ara te L2 and L3, b u t ra th e r one
might argue f a l l s clo se t o P la to 's d is tin c tio n between L3 and L4. I t i s
perhaps vhen P lato suggests th a t we should go beyond considering the
mathematics o f th e heavens to consider th e re le v a n t te le o lo g y , in an
a tte n p t t o discover why i t i s good t h a t th e heavens should be a s they
a re , th a t h is in v e s tig a tio n becomes m etaphysical ra th e r than physical in
modern term s.
Secondly, we can consider th e s ta tu s o f modern science as
k n o w le d g e .N o w while th e contents of modern science may w ell be a
p riv ile g e d s e t of b e lie f s , most could n o t a s p ire t o being knowledge in
th e sense sp e c ifie d fo r L3 and L4.^^ i n l y i n g P la to 's c r i t e r i a here to
modern science would c re a te an absurdly high b a rr ie r ru lin g out much of
what i s reasonably accepted as s c i e n t if i c knowledge, while applying
modern c r i t e r i a to P la to would admit much o f th e opinion of L2, ra th e r
than sep arate L3 and L2.

Ill

L et us now consider Republic 528e-530d. P la to 's c r i t i c s have made much

of t h i s passage, while o th ers have h eld t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o produce
a coherent in te rp re ta tio n o f i t a s a vhole.^^ The c o n tex t here i s
c r u c ia l, and I must diasagree w ith Crombie vho suggests th a t
" I f th e re i s anything about s c i e n t i f i c method in th e Republic, i t
w ill be in th e curriculum fo r th e fu rth e r education o f h is ru le rs which
P lato la y s down in book 7."^^
The epistem ological a lle g o rie s have alread y given us a general
methodology, which as we have seen, c e rta in ly a p p lie s t o astronomy. At
521c th e re i s a marked change o f d ire c tio n . Socrates sw itches to
discu ssin g how th e guardians o f th e id e a l s ta te might be produced,
comments t h a t what i s a t issu e i s th e conversion o f th e mind 'from a
kind o f tw ilig h t to th e tr u e day' (Rep.521c5), and then says th a t
" I t i s necessary th e re fo re t o a s c e rta in what s o r t of stu d ie s have
th e power t o e f f e c t t h i s ." (Rep.52I d 0)

72
The question now i s how we might employ a d is c ip lin e fo r s p e c ific
ed u catio n al ends ra th e r than how we might pursue an i n v e s t i g a t i o n . * 4

This means t h a t we must be very cautious in drawing any conclusions

concerning s c i e n t if i c method h ere. As a shorthand I w ill r e fe r to
'teach in g astronomy' and 'in v e s tig a tin g astronomy' re sp e c tiv e ly .
Socrates says
" I t i s necessary to consider whether th e g re a te r and more advanced
p a r t o f th e su b je c t, i f taken fu rth e r, has th e e f f e c t of making i t
e a s ie r t o grasp th e Form o f th e Good.. . I t i s u se fu l i f i t compels th e
contem plation of being, ra th e r than becoming." (Rep.526e)
The method o f P lato n ic education i s then t o encourage th e guardians to
consider th e i n te l li g i b le s . Note th a t only p a r t o f th e whole su b je c t has
t h i s e f f e c t. Socrates a ls o employs a d is tin c tio n between astronomy as
i t i s used now in p h ilo so p h ical education and how i t ought t o be so
used. At 529b he c r i t i c i s e s th e c u rre n t use o f astronomy, and a few
lin e s l a t e r , Glaucon says
"But how did you say i t i s necessary to le a rn [manthanein]
astronomy, as opposed to th e manner in which they le a rn [manthanousin]
i t now, i f i t i s to be u se fu l fo r th e stu d ie s we recommend ?" (Rep.529c)
I t i s im portant here t o tr a n s la te [manthanein] as 't o le a r n ' ra th e r than
as 't o s tu d y ', which would introduce an ambiguity t h a t i s not in th e
46 study i s ambiguous between le a rn and research ( i .e teaching and
G r e e k .

in v e stig a tin g astronomy) in a way in which [manthanein] i s n o t.^? i t i s

t h i s sentence, in conjunction w ith 526e, which s e ts th e term s fo r the
discu ssio n t h a t i s to follow . The aim i s to determine what p a rt of
astronomy d e als w ith th e i n t e l l i g i b l e and so ought to be used in
p h ilo so p h ical education, in d is tin c tio n to th e c u rre n t curriculum . How
we ought to teach astronomy i s t o be derived from how we ought to
in v e s tig a te astronomy, and co n tra sted with how i t i s tau g h t now. This
accords w ell w ith th e broader r e la tio n o f th e two se c tio n s we have
examined; how to educate th e guardians i s being derived from th e e a r l i e r
epistem ological d iscu ssio n .
F ir s tly , Socrates considers th e s ta tu s of c e l e s t i a l bodies, which
though they may be th e b e s t and most p re c ise of v is ib le th in g s, a re
in f e r io r to th e tr u e e n t i t i e s , th e o r b its which th e r e a l speeds in tru e
number and p a tte rn move r e la tiv e t o each o th e r, which a re a c c e ssib le to
reason b u t not e y e 4® The s ta r s a re likened to a diagram, as w ell
s i g h t .

drawn as might be, b u t s t i l l having in h eren t shortcom ings, which we

73
ought to use a s in geometry. We do n o t examine a diagram hoping to
d iscover any p re c ise tr u th s , but consider th e i n te l li g i b le s which th e
diagrams e x p r e s s . I n lin e w ith th e prograirme o f 526e and 529a,
S ocrates has separated th e se n sib le and i n t e l l i g i b l e p a rts of
astro n o m y .E 3 av in g s e t up th e ap p ro p riate d is tin c tio n s , he then draws
th e concomitant conclusion;
" I t i s by means o f problems, then, t h a t we s h a ll proceed w ith
astronomy as we do geometry, and we s h a ll leave th e th in g s in the
heavens alo n e, i f we propose by re a lly p artaking in astronomy to make
u se fu l in ste a d o f u se le ss th e understanding t h a t i s by n atu re in the
so u l." (Rep.530b)
The key question here i s whether 'proceed w ith astronomy' re fe rs to
in v e s tig a tin g o r teaching astronomy, o r bo th . Consider th e s tru c tu re ,
wording and placement o f t h i s sentence. I t i s th e culm ination o f th e
d iscu ssio n o f astronomy in r e la tio n to education, and a s such should be
completing th e programme o f 526e and 529c. I f i t r e fe rs only to teaching
astronomy, then i t gives an ap p ro p riate answer t o th e questions ra is e d .
I f we a re to use astronomy properly fo r education we must use th e
i n t e l l i g i b l e p a r t o f th e in v e s tig a tio n , th e problems, as opposed t o the
se n sib le p a r t, and not d iv e rt our stu d en ts w ith o b serv atio n s, as
p h ilo so p h ical educators do n o w . T h e ' i f clause i s s p e c if ic a lly and
ex clu siv ely ed u catio n al, and th e co n d itio n al s tru c tu re allow s us t o draw
a c o n tra s t w ith how astronomy i s tau g h t now and how i t ought to be
in v e stig a te d .^ ^ C ru c ia lly , th e attem pt t o d eriv e how to teach astronomy
from how t o in v e s tig a te astronomy in term s o f th e p a r t / whole
re la tio n sh ip implied a t 526e makes sense on t h i s reading. For th e
s tru c tu re o f th e passage to work, in v e stig a tin g astronomy must involve
something more than teaching astronomy. I t may a ls o be s ig n if ic a n t t h a t
P lato uses [ean] h ere, meaning 't o leave alo n e, t o leave be o r to heed
n o t' (ISJ) a t 530c1, ra th e r than th e stro n g e r phrase [ch a ire in e a n ],
meaning 't o renounce' (LSJ), a s he does in o th er c o n t e x t s . [ E a n ] f i t s
th e c o n tra s ts here p e rfe c tly ; we leave observation o f th e heavens on one
sid e fo r education, but not fo r o th er purposes, where one might expect
[ch a ire in ean] i f P lato were renouncing observation e n tir e ly .
The c ru c ia l p o in t made by t h is c a re fu lly constructed and placed
sentence i s t h a t astronomy as i t i s tau g h t now and as i t ought t o be
in v e stig a te d do involve examining th e ph y sical heavens - t h i s sentence
im p lic itly affirm s ra th e r than e x p lic itly denies t h i s - in d is tin c tio n
to how we ought to use astronomy in p h ilo so p h ical education, v^en we

74
should leave th e p h y sical heavens alo n e, and only consider th e
in te lle c tu a l problems.
I f what I have argued in th e f i r s t two se c tio n s of t h i s chapter i s
c o rre c t, then t h is makes good sense in terms o f th e methodology
suggested by th e epistem ological a lle g o rie s ju s t te n Stephanus pages
e a r l i e r , and P la to has taken g re a t p ain s to p lace h is comments here in
th e co n tex t o f t h a t methodology. I t i s thus p o ssib le t o ap p re cia te th e
d is tin c tio n between in v e stig a tin g and teaching t h a t P la to i s showing us
in t h i s passage. I f we ignore t h i s , then much of th e s tru c tu re o f t h i s
passage o tio s e . An a d d itio n a l advantage o f t h i s reading i s t h a t i t does
not req u ire us to a tt r ib u t e any gross exaggeration o r overstatem ent of
p o s itio n to P la to .^5
We ought a ls o to consider th e se c tio n on harmony which immediately
follow s t h i s passage, p a r tic u la rly as Socrates says th a t
"As our eyes a re framed fo r astronomy, so a re our e a rs fo r harmony,
and th ese two a re in some way kindred d is c ip lin e s ." (Rep.530d)
This sentence i s e ith e r h eav ily iro n ic or affirm s t h a t sense perception
has a ro le in both o f th ese d is c ip lin e s , i f our eyes and e a rs a re framed
fo r them. Presumably much of what i s sa id about th e methodology fo r
harmony a p p lie s to astronomy and vice v ersa. The key t o t h i s se c tio n i s
again th e q uestion t h a t i s being asked. Socrates says t h a t we must
m aintain th e p rin c ip le s t h a t have already been la id down, and th a t
"We must prevent those we s h a ll n u rtu re from ever attem pting to
le a rn [manthanein] in an im perfect manner, one t h a t does not always
bring them t o vdiere i t i s necessary fo r them to go, j u s t as we were
saying concerning astronomy." (Rep.530e)
The q u estio n then i s e s s e n tia lly o f th e same n atu re as in th e astronomy
se c tio n . I t i s not p rim a rily how we should in v e s tig a te harmony, but what
p a r t o f harmony i s s u ita b le fo r use in th e education o f th e guardians,
although th e re i s n a tu ra lly some consideration o f th e former in order to
d eriv e th e l a t t e r , as th e re was correspondingly in th e astronomy
se c tio n . The comments on harmony a re then amenable t o th e same s o r t of
in v e s tig a tio n versus teaching a n a ly sis a s those on astronomy.

IV

One might argue th a t w hile th e Republic has a ro le fo r observation,

because i t s p h y sic al e n ti t ie s do n o t behave in a reg u la r manner, i t
discourages c a re fu l and prolonged em pirical in v e s tig a tio n . As Shorey
comments though,

75
 "That th e s ta r s in t h e i r movements do n o t p e rf e c tly express th e
exactness o f m athematical conceptions i s no more than modern astronomers
say.
I t i s im portant to recognise t h a t th e re a re two explanations a s to why
t h i s should be so . According to P la to , phy sical bodies a re not capable
of reg u lar behaviour and a re lik e ly to 'deviate* from any id e a l
p r o j e c t i o n . A s Sorabji n o tes,
" If th e heavenly motions do n o t conform to mathematics, t h i s shows
t h a t th e re i s something wrong w ith th e bodies, n o t th e mathematics. This
is co n trary to th e s p i r i t o f those who b eliev e t h a t n a tu re obeys
ex cep tio n less laws.
The modern explanation though would s ta te t h a t w hile bodies do p e rfe c tly
obey laws which p e rta in t o them, th e re a re problems of complexity and
is o la tio n . Once we p o stu la te e .g an inverse square g r a v ita tio n a l law,
w ith a fo rce propagating t o in f in ity , then we need t o include every
massive p a r tic le in th e universe in our c a lc u la tio n s i f we want complete
p r e c i s i o n . S o while P la to and modern science have d iffe rin g
explanations o f non-ideal behaviour, they agree t h a t i t e x is ts , y e t
no-one would charge modern science w ith holding a viewpoint which
discourages c a re fu l observation o f th e phenomena. One might a ls o note
th a t while A ris to tle h eld th a t mathematics could not provide p e rfe c t
d e sc rip tio n s of massive bodies in motion, t h is d id n o t prevent him
undertaking d e ta ile d em pirical in v e s tig a tio n s. I t might be suggested
t h a t th e moderns have had g re a t success in closing th e gap between
(apparent) anomaly and th eo ry . That i s undoubtably tru e ,^ ^ but th e
a n c ie n ts to o would have had success h ere, and we have l i t t l e knowledge
of what they would have regarded as a serio u s anomaly. One might a ls o
argue th a t modern chaos th e o rie s and recognition o f th e b u tte r f ly e f f e c t
a c tu a lly p a in t a somewhat bleaker p ic tu re o f what in v e s tig a tio n might
achieve than middle period P la to o r th e eincients in general might have
accepted, but again we do n o t ta k e th ese ideas as a discouragement to
d e ta ile d o bservational work.
These a re not m atters t h a t I wish to dw ell on fo r long however, as
I s h a ll argue th a t by th e Timaeus P la to had changed h is views on the
r e la tio n o f mathematics to th e world in general and to th e motions of
th e heavens in p a r tic u la r , such t h a t th e question of v^ether P la to would
have discovered Uranus becomes r e d u n d a n t . I merely wish t o suggest
t h a t P la to 's middle period th e o rie s do n o t n e c e ssa rily r e s u lt in the
disparagement o f d e ta ile d observ atio n al work.

76
 While P la to was a th e o re tic ia n ra th e r than a p ra c tis in g s c i e n t i s t ,
another q u estio n here i s h is a ttitu d e t o o bservational stu d ie s c a rrie d
out by o th e rs. One approach to th e question o f whether A ris to tle had
s u f f ic ie n t em pirical support fo r h is astronom ical th e o rie s i s to
c a re fu lly comb through th e De Caelo and o th e r works in search of
passages v^ere A r is to tle c it e s em pirical d a ta in support o f h is views.
The conclusion o f such a search might w ell be t h a t A r is to tle was a t
l e a s t somewhat a rb itr a r y and s e le c tiv e in h is use o f examples. However,
A ris to tle was e s s e n tia lly a th e o re tic a l «i^tronomer who took over a
tr a d itio n from Eudoxus and C allippus. In doing so he would have been
absorbing th e la rg e body of data t h a t provided th e b a sis fo r th ese
th e o rie s , and then improving th e f i t between theory and d a ta . Indeed, on
more than one occasion A ris to tle re fe rs t o r e s u lts obtained by many
years of observation by Egyptian and Babylonian astronom ers.
We might tak e roughly th e same lin e w ith P la to , as he to o i s a
th e o re tic ia n ra th e r than a g a th e rer of d a ta . As he i s perhaps the
p ro g en ito r o f th e tr a d itio n t h a t A ris to tle l a t e r tak es on board, we
cannot deploy q u ite th e same argument in h is case.^^ We need some more
d ir e c t evidence t h a t he took over a body of d a ta , and t h i s I suggest i s
provided by th e Epinomis and Timaeus. In th e Epinomis we a re to ld th a t
"The f i r s t t o observe th ese bodies was a non-Greek. T rad itio n
nurtured those who f i r s t took th ese th in g s to mind, due t o th e
excellence o f th e summer season which both Egypt and S yria adequately
p o ssess, and revealed to t h e i r s ig h t, so we say, they always beheld th e
s t a r s to g e th e r ... These observations have since dissem inated everywhere,
and have been shown to be tr u e by th e t e s t o f tim e." (E^in.987a)
I f we a re t o b eliev e th e E p i n o m i s , i t would seem th a t P lato was w ell
aware of d e ta ile d Egyptian astronom ical observations, and was fulsome in
h is p ra is e o f t h e i r accuracy. I t i s worth noting t h a t in th e Timaeus,
w hile P la to does n o t r e f e r d ir e c tly to astronom ical records, he p ra is e s
th e Egyptians fo r having th e most a n cien t and comprehensive records,
and a t Laws 967b he i s f u l l o f p ra is e fo r those vho have acc u ra tely
stu d ied th e heavens. As th e Timaeus, Laws and Epinomis a re l a t e r works
th an th e Republic, P la to 's a ttitu d e here may rep re se n t a change of mind.
However, according to my arguments in t h i s chapter i t need n o t; the
Republic does not condemn o r d en ig rate o bservational astronomy, b u t has
a firm view o f i t s p o sitio n as th e necessary s ta r tin g p o in t fo r
in v e s tig a tio n and o f th e lim ita tio n s o f a purely em pirical approach.

77
 At th e end o f se c tio n two o f t h i s ch ap ter, I suggested t h a t i f we
compare th e in v e s tig a tio n o f n atu re suggested by th e l in e a lle g o ry w ith
modern science i t would appear t h a t P la to 's conception i s somewhat
broader as modern scien c e, which appears t o operate between th e borders
of L1/L2 and L3/L4. At th e lower end o f th e lin e t h i s d iffe re n c e does
n o t seem to be c r i t i c a l . In f a c t , modern science uses th e s o r t o f images
P la to consigns to L1, making i t a s broad in t h i s d ire c tio n a s P la to , but
does n o t recognise any s ig n if ic a n t epistem ological d iffe re n c e between L1
and L2. I t may indeed use LI methods in preference t o L2 w ith su p erio r
r e s u lts to more d ir e c t o bservational methods; e le c tro n microscopy and
rad io astronomy seem good examples here.^®
What though o f th e o th e r end o f th e l in e and th e r e la tio n of L4 to
modern science ? A tough minded in stru m e n ta list might t e l l us t h a t th e
job o f science i s merely to produce m athem atically framed th e o rie s which
account fo r th e evidence; anything e ls e i s th e ta s k of th e
m etaphysician. I f we accep t t h i s , then much of L4 i s going to be ruled
out as u n s c ie n tif ic . However, more generous and more r e a l i s t p o sitio n s
in th e philosophy o f science bring some aspects of L4 in to p lay . I t
might be argued th a t two o f th e key p ro je c ts o f modern th e o r e tic a l
physics a re th e u n ific a tio n o f quantum mechanics and r e l a t i v i t y , and th e
u n ific a tio n o f th e electrow eak, strong nuclear and g ra v ita tio n a l fo rc e s.
Science on t h i s account has a d riv e towards th e o re tic a l u n ific a tio n .
P lato has th e grander design o f drawing to g eth er a l l are as of human
in v e s tig a tio n , but th e d riv e toward a u n ified th e o r e tic a l s tru c tu re i s
p la in enough.
According to Republic 517bc, th e l a s t th in g we encounter on th e
i n te lle c tu a l journey envisaged by th e epistem ological a lle g o r ie s i s the
Form of th e Good. I t may be t h a t we a re to equate t h i s w ith th e [arche
anupothetos], th e unhypothesised f i r s t p rin c ip le , or perhaps as Fine has
argued th e Good i s 'beyond bein g ' and i s to be found in th e s tru c tu re o f
th e world and our knowledge o f i t .^ ^ Whatever th e p re c ise outcome h e re ,
one might worry t h a t t h i s i s then a fundamentally te le o lo g ic a l v isio n ,
and t h a t th e re l i e s a se rio u s discrepancy w ith modern scien ce. However,
as I s h a ll argue in l a t e r ch ap ters, i f we ta k e in to account some o f the
assumptions concerning th e com prehensibility o f th e universe and th e
o rie n ta tio n o f enquiry t h a t a re made in order to g e t r e a l i s t conceptions
in modern philosophy of science o ff th e ground, t h i s gap may not be as
la rg e as i t might a jp e a r a t f i r s t s ig h t. I wish t o delay d iscu ssio n here
though fo r two reasons. F i r s t l y , th e account of

78
in v e stig a tio n given in th e Republic i s a q u ite general one o r even,
given the mainly p o l i t i c a l and e th ic a l su b je ct m atter o f th e work,
s lig h tly skewed toward an e th ic a l conception. I t may be t h a t when P lato
has th e in v e s tig a tio n o f nature more s p e c ific a lly in mind t h a t he
employs a more te c h n ic a l and mathematical conception o f th e Good.
Secondly, i t may be th e case t h a t P lato ' s conception o f th e Good
undergoes some change and becomes more mathematical in l a t e r works,
p a r tic u la r ly in th e Philebus. These are m atters th a t I s h a ll examine in
l a t e r c h ap ters, p a rtic u la rly in r e la tio n to th e Timaeus, th e Philebus,
and th e various re p o rts on P la to 's Lecture on th e Good.

I f th e arguments o f t h i s chapter a re c o rre c t, we need t o rea ssess th e

R epublic's c o n trib u tio n to th e development o f s c i e n t if i c methodology in
term s o f a necessary i n i t i a l em pirical approach followed by a move to
th e co n sid eratio n of th e re le v a n t i n te l li g i b le s a s p a r t of th e same
d is c ip lin e . This gives P la to a p o te n tia lly much more reasonable
methodology fo r in v e stig a tio n ,^ ^ in terms of observation followed by
a b s tra c tio n and m athém atisation, than has been allowed fo r in much of
th e l i t e r a t u r e up to now.
While t h i s may rep resen t progress on h is predecessors,^^ we must
72
not g e t o v e r-e n th u sia s tic , fo r as Lloyd has argued, i t would be wrong
to a ssim ila te P la to to G alileo o r even Archimedes. M athématisation fo r
P lato a t t h i s stag e o f h is development i s p rim a rily a s te p on th e road
to th e co g nition o f th e Form o f th e Good, and n o t t o th e q u a n tific a tio n
of th e p h y sical world. F u rth e r, i t would seem t h a t in th e Republic a t
l e a s t th e p h y sical realm i s n o t amenable to p re c ise mathematical
a n a ly s is . We might a ls o be c r i t i c a l o f th e way in which hypotheses a re
su b je c ts fo r d isc u ssio n , n o t em pirical te s tin g , even i f they are
i n i t i a l l y based on o bservations.^^ Nor ought we to be b lin d to th e
(p o sitiv e and negative) e ff e c ts of P la to 's fundam entally te le o lo g ic a l
approach, involving th e d riv e towards a u n ified th e o re tic a l s tru c tu re .
Such then i s th e p o s itio n o f th e Republic. In th e follow ing
chapters I s h a ll argue t h a t th e re a re im portant changes t o some o f th ese
views. In p a rtic u la r I s h a ll argue th a t IW i s dropped, t h a t th e heavens
become amenable to p re c ise mathematical a n a ly sis, t h a t th e re a re changes
in P la to 's notion o f th e Good, h is notion of [techne] and h is view of
th e ir r e g u la r behaviour o f bodies. Such changes may have s ig n ific a n t
im p licatio n s f o r our assessm ent of P la to 's philosophy o f science.

79
 As I hope to have shown in t h i s ch ap ter, i t i s not th e case t h a t
P la to advocated th e banning of observation from astronomy in the
Republic. While th e re may be th in g s to be sa id about th e p re c ise ro le
and emphasis P la to gives t o observation, he d id n o t propose an
in v e s tig a tio n t h a t was devoid o f em pirical in p u t. I f so , then we must
r e j e c t some assessm ents of P la to ' s astronomy. For in sta n c e , Neugebauer
comments t h a t
"His advice to astronomers to replace observations by speculation
would have destroyed one o f th e most im portant c o n trib u tio n s o f the
Greeks to th e exact scien ces.
The lin e , taken by many commentators, th a t P la to was a d is a s te r in th e
development o f astronomy and s c ie n tif ic method because he wished to ban
o b servation, must be re je c te d . We ought a lso to be suspicious of
assessm ents which a tt r ib u t e an a c c id e n ta l p o s itiv e c o n trib u tio n to
P la to , while remaining g e n erally c r i t i c a l . Two p o sitio n s here a re t h a t
P la to 's c a l l fo r hypotheses o f uniform c irc u la r motion to save the
heavenly phenomena p o s itiv e ly influenced Eudoxus and follow ing
astronom ers, o r t h a t h is emphasis on th e ro le of mathematics was
im portant in th e development o f scien ce, but t h a t he otherw ise held a
deplorable methodology which denigrated observation. Such evaluations
need to be c a re fu lly reconsidered in th e l ig h t o f th e arguments o ffered
in t h i s c h ap ter.

80
NOTES TO CEîAPTER TEîREE

01) Cf. Fine (1990) p85, Stokes (1992) p103.

02) At t h i s p o in t in P la to 's career I do not b eliev e t h a t s p a tio /
tem poral co n sid eratio n s a re a c h a ra c te risin g issu e here (though they are
l a t e r ; see my c h .7 and 8 ), and I would d isag ree w ith V lastos (1964,
1969a) t h a t P la to 's concern i s to sep arate a p r i o r i and a p o s te r io ri o r
necessary and contingent; se e here Jordan (1984) p i 2-14, 24-25, 70-72.

03) E.g Mueller (1981) p i 04, comments t h a t "Plato assumes every science
t o be th e study o f some kind o f re a l b u t non-sensible o b je c ts " . There is
v aried opinion on what th e se o b je c ts might be. See Mourelatos (1981a)
p63 n.2-10 fo r some p o s s i b i l i t i e s here.
04) E.g "Science then i s only concerned w ith r e a l i t i e s independent of
sense-p erception; se n sa tio n , observation and e j^ r im e n t a re e n tir e ly
excluded from i t " . Heath, (1913), p135, c f . p139. So too M itte ls tra s s
(1962), pi 17; c f . Shorey (1935 vol II) p i 87, n .c , and Lloyd (1968) p78
n .1 -9 fo r fu rth e r examples of t h i s view.

05) This p o sitio n might c i t e Tim.27c-29e in support, e .g Lee (1955)

p311, comments concerning lin e se c tio n L2 th a t "In th e Timaeus, P lato
includes th e n a tu ra l sciences in t h i s subsection, a s they can never
reach u ltim ate t r u th , being concerned w ith th e changing world".

06) The f i n a l phrase here i s tra n s la te d in a manner which i s sym pathetic

to t h i s p o s itio n ; l a t e r I discuss whether t h i s i s th e b e s t rendering.
Here one might a ls o emphasise th e a b s tra c t d e fin itio n o f astronomy given
a t Rep.528a and 528e, as th e study of s o lid s in motion, w ith i t s c lo se
lin k s t o a rith m e tic , plane geometry and s o lid geometry in th e curriculum
fo r th e guardians.
07) Sim plicius mentions t h i s challenge tw ice, a t A r is to te lis De Caelo
Commentaria 2.12, Heiberg e d itio n 488.18-488.24 and again a t
492.31-493.05 (quoted h e re ), w ith a s l i g h t reform ulation o f th e wording.
Sim plicius quotes h is sources as Eudemus and Sosigenes, though th e re i s
some doubt on t h i s m atter; see V lastos (1975b) ^ p e n d ix L pi 10.

08) See e .g Burnet (1924) p i 84/5.

09) These p o sitio n s on P la to 's science a re o f course n o t exhaustive o f

th o se t h a t have been taken, b u t they have been i n f lu e n tia l. Furthermore,
th e assumptions t h a t th ey make concerning IW and th e demarcation o f
enquiry fo r P la to occur im p lic itly o r e x p lic itly in many oth er views of
P la to 's science (see e .g Cornford (1937) p29, who argues t h a t th e re i s
no 'scien c e of N ature' fo r P la to a s th e re can be no ex act t r u t h in our
account of th e o b jec ts o f p h y sics, which f o r Cornford a re those o f th e
lower p a r t o f th e l in e ) .

10) Nor any o th er p o s itio n , such a s t h a t o f Cornford, which r e lie s on

r e s tr ic tin g s c i e n t i f i c enquiry fo r P la to t o one o f th e two realm s. Which
p o sitio n here commentators have adopted has sometimes depended on t h e i r
view o f modern science; see my next se c tio n on th e s o r t of
h isto rio g rap h y which may have led to th e genesis of th e se p o s itio n s .

11) One lin k w ith th e Rep. here i s [epanabasmois ] a t Sym.211c3, matching

81
th e a llu s io n o f a sce n t; c f . Rep.511b5“6, where hypotheses a re [hoion
e p ib a se is t e k a i hormas].

12) I t i s im portant n o t to prejudge th e 'h o riz o n ta l/ v e r tic a l ' debate

when tr a n s la tin g th e names of l in e se c tio n s; e .g by rendering
[epistem e], used to r e fe r to th e upper p a rts o f th e l in e , as 's c ie n c e '.

13) When astronomy i s discussed l a t e r , i t s methodology i s equated w ith

geometry; c f . Rep.511b, 529de.

14) See V lastos (1980) pi 1 f f h e re . Cf. Grg.465c f f and 500e f f where

id e n tic a l d is tin c tio n s a re drawn between [en p eiria] and [techne]
concerning rh e to ric and medecine, and see Grg.465a and 501a on th e
requirem ent t h a t to be in possession o f a [techne] one must be a b le to
give a r a tio n a l account. For n ecessary / in s u ffic ie n t p a ir s in l a t e r
works, see e .g Tim.47a and 9Id, Plb.SSe and 56a, and Le.719e-720d.
15) See e .g Rep.523a f f , where some perceptions provoke us to
p h ilo so p h ic al reasoning ; c f . th e a lle g o rie s o f l in e and cave, where the
se n sib le world and our perceptions a re th e s ta r tin g p o in t.

16) E.g Rep.510b Where th e in v e s tig a tio n disposes o f images.

17) Ep.VII stro n g ly supports t h i s view (though see my e a r l ie r comments

on a u th e n tic ity ) . 342b d istin g u ish e s name, account, image, and
knowledge, and s ta te s t h a t th e f i r s t th re e a re th e necessary means fo r
a tta in in g th e fo u rth ; c f . 342d. At 343d we fin d th a t we must "Work
between a l l o f th ese fo u r, passing up and down over each". Thus we need
to grasp th e image ( i . e th e p h y sical m an ifestatio n , c f . 343a3 f f ) in
order to access th e i n t e l l i g i b l e s , and as we must pass 'up and down'
between a l l fo u r in in v e s tig a tio n , th e re can be no demarcation a t the
border o f th e two w orlds.

18) Thus we ought to read 'knowable' as 'opinable and knowable', and

'o p in ab le ' as 'only o p in a b le '. So too 'i n t e l l i g i b l e ' and 'p e r c e p tib le '.
This i s not to suggest t h a t we can reason about se n sib le s in th e
s tro n g e st sense, as t h e i r d e fic ie n c ie s prevent us having knowledge of
them, but su re ly we can th in k about them, or bring them before th e mind
by some o th er route than p ercep tio n , perhaps by memoryo r im agination.

19) See Fine (1990) p85, c f . Stokes (1993) p132.

20) Thus we can f i r s t opine i n te l l i g i b l e s and then know them. Cf. my

h o riz o n ta l/ v e r tic a l and dynamic/ s t a t i c d iscu ssio n o f th e lin e .
21) Fine (1990) p85 draws t h i s consequence i f we a tt r ib u t e her TW view
to th e Rep.

22) Fine (1990) p86 takes Rep.520c to c o n tra d ic t h e r c o n stru a l o f 1W.

23) See esp . Rep.510ab, where th e analogue lin k s th e two c e n tra l

se ctio n s o f th e lin e a lle g o ry .

24) See Rep.529d-530b. I discuss th ese m atters in g re a te r d e t a i l in

c h .6.

25) One might argue t h a t fo r P la to th e re a re no j u s t a c ts to be known,

82
a l l a c tio n s being both ju s t and u n ju st, so t h i s i s th e most we can
expect from th e guardians. See Rep.479a f f , and c f . Fine (1990) p87, who
i s w orried t h a t i f th e guardians only have opinions o f se n sib le s lik e
everyone e ls e , then they a re no more f i t t o ru le .
26) See a ls o Rep.526e, where a d iv is io n i s made in geometry along th e
i n t e l l i g i b l e / se n sib le d is tin c tio n fo r th e purpose o f determ ining which
p a rt w ill be u se fu l fo r education, suggesting t h a t th e re i s a se n sib le
p a r t of geometry, however sm all in r e la tio n t o o th e r d is c ip lin e s . In a
much l a t e r work, Plb.SSe f f i s c le a r on t h i s ; when we remove th e
t h e o r e ti c a l / mathematical element o f any [techne], we a re s t i l l l e f t
w ith th e [em peiria], however sm all t h a t may be.
27) See Rep.S23a f f , esp. S24e, where any c o n tra d ic to ry p erception w ill
fo rce th e mind to consider u n ity , p lu r a lity , in d iv id u atio n and counting.
28) This i s p o ssib ly in p lie d by th e o rder o f th e su b je c ts in the
curriculum ; note th e fu ss Socrates makes to g e t t h i s r ig h t a t Rep.S27d.

29) So to o mathematics a t Rep.S23a f f , c f . Tim.47ab.

30) See V lastos (1981b) plO f f . V la sto s' p o sitio n here might be re la te d
to h is view t h a t th e c o n tra s t P la to i s in te re s te d in i s a p r i o r i / a
p o s te r io r i o r n ecessary / co ntingent, a view I r e je c t; see ray note 2.

31) One might c i t e Pdr.268e here.

32) See e .g Cornford (1932), Ryle (1939) p i 36-141, Runciman (1962)

p40-45.
33) See e .g Fine (1979) p70-80, (1990) p i l l f f , Annas (1981) p280-284.

34) See S orabji (1983) p143.

35) See V lastos (1965b) p57, c f . S orabji (1983) p143.
36) Cf. e .g Annas (1981) p281, Fine (1990) p i l l f f .
37) There a re two ways o f in te rp re tin g t h i s approach. The stro n g er view
i s t h a t t h i s defin es what i s science in P la to . A weaker view i s th a t
t h i s merely d efines P la to 's a ttitu d e to modern scien ce.

38) One could generate many s im ila r examples of P la to n ic i n te l li g i b le s

which would be in v e stig a te d by modern physics.

39) Though as I argue l a t e r , t h i s i s n o t a s c le a r c u t a s i t f i r s t

appears.
40) The aim here i s to generate th e view t h a t fo r P la to science d eals
w ith knowledge, so according to IW i t d e a ls ex clu siv ely w ith
i n te l li g i b le o b je c ts . One can then attem pt to generate a n ti-e m p iric a l
m ethodological consequences.

41) H iis i s e sp e c ia lly so i f we reckon, w ith e .g Popper, t h a t s c i e n t if i c

knowledge can be d istin g u ish ed from th e c e r ta in knowledge of
mathematics, and mere opinion, y e t i s a p ro v isio n al account su sc e p tib le
to change.

83
42) See Croitibie, (1963, vol I I ) p i 91, c f . Lloyd, (1968) pBO.

43) Crombie, (1963 vol I I ) p37.

44) Or how we might t r a i n astronom ers.

45) This passage affirm s t h a t a su b je c t s tra d d le s th e two worlds, as a
c o n tra s t i s drawn between i t s more and le s s advanced se c tio n s along t h i s
d is tin c tio n , but both a re p a r t o f th a t d is c ip lin e .
46) Cf. e .g Lee (1955).
47) Both an eminent p h y s ic is t and a secondary school c la s s 'study*
p h y sics, b ut one researches and th e o th er le a rn s .
48) See Rep.529c7-d5.

49) See Rep.529d7-530b2, and 510b-511c fo r p a r a lle ls w ith th e lin e and

th e treatm en t of geometry; see here Mourelatos (1981a) p37 f f .
50) Note t h a t th e re i s no ban on observation h e re , where in v e s tig a tio n
i s being d iscussed; we a re to use th e v is ib le heavens a s a model, as in
th e lin e a lle g o ry .

51) See Rep.531c3 fo r c la r if i c a t io n a s to th e n atu re o f th ese problems,

where we ascend to consider 'which numbers a re concordant, which a re
n o t, and in each case why'.

52) I t p ick s up Rep.521c f f which s e ts th e ed u ctio n al purpose o f th e

v^ole se c tio n , as w ell as 526e and 529a.
53) A p o in t o rig in a lly made by Dicks (1970), p234 n39; c f . V lastos
(1981b) p3. Some o th er in stan ces of [ch a ire in ean] as meaning to
renounce, a re a t P rt.3 4 8 a, Pdo.63e, 101c-h3 (see Brandwood (1976) fo r a
f u l l l i s t ) . Even t h i s stro n g er phrase i s n o t always t o t a l l y d ism issive.
D icks' explantion of t h i s passage i s unconvincing. He comnents ((1970)
pi 09) "There had been accumulating during th e f i f t h and s ix th c e n tu rie s
B.C a mass o f crude, but none th e le s s p r a c tic a lly u se fu l observ atio n al
m a te r ia l.. . What was now needed was fo r astronomers to s i t down and do
some hard thin k in g on about astronom ical th e o r y ... That i s p re c ise ly
what P la to re a lis e d , and t h i s i s why he urged th e astronom ers to
concentrate on th e mathematical sid e o f t h e i r s u b j e c t ... to th e e x te n t
even of c a llin g a temporary h a l t to the mere accum ulation of more
ob serv atio n s". There i s no mention by P lato o f any (temporary or
otherw ise) h a l t to observation. Dicks a c c id e n ta lly provides th e b e st
argument a g a in st h is own p o s itio n . At Tim.39c, where we a re to ld th a t
"Men have n o t pondered th e p eriods o f th e oth er s t a r s . . . thus men do not
name them nor in v e s tig a te th e mathematical re la tio n s between them", he
comments ((1970) pi 30) "Evidently in Greek astronomy a s known to P lato
very few p lan e ta ry observations had been made". I f so then P lato can
h ard ly have been c a llin g fo r a temporary h a l t to observation in th e Rep.

54) A fu rth e r m atter o f tr a n s la tio n here concerns th e phrase [ontos

astronom ies metalambanontes] a t 530c1. Shorey (1935) tr a n s la te s "Have a
p a rt in th e tr u e science o f astronomy", and V lastos (1981b) p3, "By
doing re a l astronoiry". The sentence then becomes one about in v e stig a tin g
ra th e r than teaching astronomy, so carry in g th e im p licatio n o f banning
observation from i t . The more n a tu ra l reading though i s to tak e the

84
adverb [ontos] w ith th e verb [metalambanontes], giving *r e a lly p artak in g
in astronomy' , ra th e r than 'partak in g in re a l astronoiry'.

55) E.g Heath (1913), p139, " I t may be t h a t , when P la to i s banning

sense-perception from th e science o f astronomy in t h i s uncompromising
manner, he i s consciously exaggerating"; c f . Shorey (1935 vol II) p i 87,
Lloyd, (1968) p80/ 81.

56) Cf. Tim.47a f f on th e b e n e fits of eyesight and hearing. One would

need t o invoke th e s o r t o f on/ o f f account o f irony th a t I re je c te d in
c h .1 to deny a ro le fo r sense perception h e re .

57) The same comments about th e tr a n s la tio n of [manthanein] in t h i s s o r t

of context apply here a s a t Rep.529c.

58) Shorey (1935 vol II) p186, c f. (1927) p i 72/3, and Lloyd (1968) p80.
For A r is to tle 's view, see De Caelo 270b11 f f .

59) See esp. [ p a r a la tte in ] a t Rep.530b2.

60) Sorabji (1980) p61/2.

61) We a ls o need to invoke th e sp e c ia l and general th e o rie s of

r e l a t i v i t y fo r t o t a l accuracy, o r even to ex p lain some apparently
anomolous phenomena lik e th e advancing p e rih e lio n o f Mercury.
62) A r i s t o t le 's view i s t h a t th e more m atter or motion involved, th e
le s s we can expect mathematical p re c isio n ; see e .g Metaphysics 995a15
and 1078a14. However, a s th e heavens were fo r him composed o f a e th e r,
they did move in a p re c ise manner. One might argue t h a t A ris to tle did
n o t in f a c t engage in a d e ta ile d observational study of m atter in
motion, but my p o in t i s ra th e r t h a t he did engage in such stu d ie s in
oth er f ie ld s vAere both m atter and motion a re involved.

63) There a re s t i l l some v a st discrepancies in some cases though; th e

most noto rious perhaps being th e te n -fo ld d iffe re n c e between the
o b serv atio n al and th e o re tic a l estim ates of th e amount o f m atter in th e
universe.

64) P ertu rb atio n s in th e o r b it o f Neptune led astronomers to p o s it

another p la n e t, Uranus. Would P la to have ignored th ese p e rtu rb a tio n s as
expected r e a l anomalies ? In th e middle period perhaps, but n o t in th e
Tim, I s h a ll argue; c f . Shorey (1935 vol II) p184 n .c , and Adam (1902)
on Rep.530b.

65) See here my c h .5 on th e r e la tio n between P la to and Eudoxus.

66) See my e a r l i e r comments on th e a u th e n tic ity o f th e Eÿ)in.

67) See Tim.22dff ; as much o f th e subsequent discourse concerns

astronoiry, t h i s may be h ig h ly s ig n if ic a n t. This suggestion hopefully
illu m in ates th e Tim. passage whether th e Epin. i s genuine o r n o t.

68) One might a ls o note th a t modern v is ib le spectrum astronomy makes use

of re fle c tin g te le sc o p e s, such t h a t we a re studying m irror images o f th e
heavens. A ll t h i s seems s l i g h tl y u n fa ir on P la to , a s in g eneral i f we
have only the naked eye we a re b e tte r o ff with d ir e c t ra th e r than
in d ir e c t observation.

85
69) See Fine (1990) p97, p99.

70) As opposed to th e methodology fo r th e education o f th e guardians.

71) How much o f an advance P la to rep re se n ts here i s p a r t i a l l y dependant
on th e so p h is tic a tio n o f th e Pythagoreans on t h i s m atter, something t h a t
I s h a ll in v e s tig a te in l a t e r ch ap ters.

72) See Lloyd (1991), p330.

73) One might d istin g u is h between contexts of discovery and
j u s t if i c a t io n , accepting t h a t P la to allow s some ernpirical in p u t to the
former b u t n o t to th e l a t t e r . This i s n o t e n tir e ly c le a r c u t though; one
reason fo r doubting a hypothesis might be i t s i n a b ility t o accord w ith
th e phenomena w ithout being able to give an account a s to why i t does
n ot (c f. Rep.602e), and th e elenchus does allow th e use of concrete
examples.

74) See Rep.531d.

75) Neugebauer (1908), p152. Cf. Sambursky (1956) p45, Adam (1902) p125,
Bulmer-Hiomas (1984) p i 07, M ourelatos' (1981a) notes on p63/4 and Shorey
(1935 vol I I ) p187 n .c fo r fu rth e r references to assessm ents o f P la to 's
astronomy.

86
CHAPTER FOUR

READING THE TIMAEUS

The c e n tr a l question fo r t h i s chapter i s how we ought t o read P la to 's

Timaeus. Can we tak e i t t h a t Timaeus a c ts a s P la to 's spokesman or
mouthpiece, d e li /ering us unmediated P lato n ic d o c trin e , o r, as I
suggested in chapter one, a re th e re some more complex fa c to rs re la tin g
to P la to 's PWP th a t we ought t o tak e in to account I s h a ll argue fo r
th e l a t t e r , which I b e liev e opens up some r ic h in te r p re ta tio n a l
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . We might s t a r t from th e supposition t h a t P la to wrote
works which were intended t o be l i t e r a r y and p h ilo so p h ical vAioles. That
i s , they have an o v e ra ll purpose and coherence, and a l l th e p a rts of
t h a t whole have some function w ithin i t . I f so then i t would seem th a t
some p a rts o f th e Timaeus a re s ig n ific a n tly under-explored. For
in stan c e, in C ornford's commentary th e f i r s t te n pages o f t e x t a re given
two paragraphs of d isc u ssio n , where l a t e r on we can fin d t h i s r a tio
rev ersed .^ One might introduce another supposition h e re , t h a t P la to 's
in tro d u c tio n s a re v i t a l l y iirp o rtan t fo r th e o v e ra ll in te rp re ta tio n o f a
d ia lo g u e .4 I t i s not enough, perhaps, to analyse th e arguments of th e
main body o f th e t e x t , we must a lso understand t h e i r l i t e r a r y and
p h ilo so p h ical context w ithin th e s tru c tu re o f th e whole work, e sp e c ia lly
as t h i s co ntext may c ru c ia lly a f f e c t th ese arguments. One ta s k o f t h is
chapter th en i s to attem pt to lin k th e in tro d u c tio n w ith th e main p a rt
o f th e Timaeus and to t r y to show how i t c o n trib u te s to th e o v e ra ll
purpose and s tru c tu r e .

Let us begin w ith Timaeus ' speech a t 27c-29d. This i s g en erally believed
t o be a statem ent of P la to 's c u rre n t epistemology which s e t s up the
nature of th e main account t h a t Timaeus i s about t o embark on. However,
i f t h i s speech i s meant t o rep resen t P la to 's views, i t has some very
stran g e fe a tu re s . A discussion o f th ese in co n g ru itie s w ill hopefully
shed some l i g h t on th e te n pages th a t lead up t o t h i s passage. Timaeus
s ta te s t h a t
"In every m atter i t i s of g re a t importance t o s t a r t a t th e n a tu ra l
beginning. Thus concerning both th e lik e n e ss and th e paradigm, one must

87
make th e follow ing d is tin c tio n , th a t accounts of them w ill be o f th e
same fam ily [sungeneis] a s th e th in g s they expound. T herefore accounts
of t h a t which i s s te a d f a s t, firm , and i s c le a rly apprehended w ith th e
mind a re s te a d fa s t and unchanging, and so f a r a s i t i s p o ssib le f o r them
to be ir r e f u ta b le and undefeatable a s b e f its such accounts, they must
n o t f a l l sh o rt o f t h i s . On th e o th er hand, t h a t which has been copied
from th e model, being a lik e n e s s, w ill have accounts t h a t possess
lik e lih o o d , standing in an analogous r e la tio n t o th e previous accounts.
Em phatically, whatever i s re la te d as becoming i s t o being, i s a ls o
re la te d as opinion i s t o t r u th ." (Tim.29b)
My f i r s t concern here i s th e d is tin c tio n drawn between th e natu re o f th e
accounts concerning th e p h y sical and th e i n t e l l i g i b l e . Why should we
accept t h a t accounts w ill be [sungenes], 'o f th e same k in d ' as what they
ex p lain The Phaedo would seem to e x p lic itly r e je c t such a p rin c ip le
of ex p lan atio n , v^ether we th in k o f i t in terms o f e n t i t i e s c ite d in
explanation or th e s ta tu s of t h a t explanation. At Phaedo a t 96 f f , th e
i n t e l l i g i b l e e n t i t i e s a re p o stu lated in order t h a t they might be c ite d
in e3Ç>lanations of p h y sical phenomena.^ There i s a sense here in which
th e i n te l li g i b le must be re la te d to th e p h y sical, a s th e explanans must
f i t th e explcinandum, but th e Forms could hardly be thought to be
[sungenes] w ith what they a re supposed t o be e x p la in in g .^ This i s
e s p e c ia lly so i f one o f th e major m otivations behind th e theory o f Forms
is to p o stu la te c o g n itiv ely s ta b le e n t i t i e s in order t o resolve th e
coirpresence of o p p o sites. There i s a ls o no suggestion in th e Phaedoth a t
any account o f why one th in g i s la rg e r than another w ill be only a
'l i k e l y account' because i t d eals w ith the physical world. The cases of
two men and two horses a re tre a te d equally w ith two numbers, te n and
eight.® Timaeus seems here t o be making a ra d ic a l se p aratio n o f th e
i n t e l l i g i b l e and th e s e n sib le and t o be denying an explanatory lin k from
one to th e other.®
I t i s notable t h a t Timaeus does not re a lly argue fo r h is p o sitio n
a t 27a-29c, b u t ra th e r s ta te s i t in a manner t h a t leaves open many
q u estio n s. We have th e stran g e and unsupported [sungenes] s t r i c t u r e . We
a ls o have th e word play of [eikones] and [e ik o ta s], 'lik e n e s s ' and
' l i k e l y ' a t 29c2. Why should we accept t h a t an account of a lik e n ess can
i t s e l f only be lik e ly ? And why should we accept th e formula th a t
follow s, th a t as becoming i s re la te d to being so i s opinion re la te d to
tr u th ? There a re obvious echoes o f th e Republic h ere, b u t no grounds
fo r being convinced o f Timaeus' claim s.

88
 There a re a ls o o th er passages in th e Timaeus which c a s t doubt on
Timaeus' p o s itio n h e re . Consider th e way in which Timaeus o fte n has
tro u b le stic k in g to h is methodology, and note in p a rtic u la r he t e l l s us
t h a t h is account of geom etrical atomism is [k ata to n orthon logon k ai
k ata to n e ik o ta ] , 'i n accordance w ith th e c o rre c t account a s w ell as th e
lik e ly ' (Tim.56b). One then wants to know what t h i s c o rre c t account i s ,
how Timaeus has access to i t and what th e im p licatio n s a re fo r th e
epistemology which Timaeus espouses a t 27c f f .
The lik e ly sto ry a ls o generates an in te re s tin g paradox. We a re to ld
a t Timaeus 37b9, in language which i s highly rem iniscent of 27a-29c,
th a t th e world soul can have opinions and b e lie f s about th e p hysical
which a re tr u e and s ta b le . ^^ Now th a t e n ta ils two th in g s , th a t th e re
cannot be anything in tr a c ta b le in th e nature o f th e p h y sic al, o r in the
nature o f opinion, th a t prevents th e form ation o f such opinions. The
lik e ly s to ry then i s t e l l i n g us t h a t i t is lik e ly t h a t th e b a sis fo r
giving t h i s s o r t of account - th a t because o f th e n atu re of th e p h y sical
world a s a lik e n e s s, i t w ill only admit of a lik e ly sto ry - is
in c o rre c t. The analogy between th e world soul and human soul th a t i s
then developed goes on to suggest t h a t th e epistem ological d i f f i c u l t i e s
th a t we face a re due t o th e natu re o f our minds ra th e r than th e natu re
11 12
o f th e world, and a re tr a c ta b le ra th e r than in tr a c ta b le .
These m atters I s h a ll consider in d e ta il in c h ap ters s ix and seven,
but fo r th e moment I ju s t want to in d ic a te how one can c a s t doubt one
th e no tio n t h a t 27a-29c i s a l l th e Timaeus has to say on epistemology.
What I want t o suggest here i s a ra d ic a l departure from th e way th a t
t h i s passage has u su ally been read. Perhaps i t no more rep resen ts
P la to 's c u rre n t epistemology than say th e views of N icias and Laches
rep re se n t h is views on courage o r those of C ratylus and Hermogenes
rep resen t h is views on naming. That Timaeus ' view s u p e r fic ia lly looks
l ik e something P la to has advanced in e a r lie r works, and here one th in k s
of th e Republic in p a r tic u la r , does not e s ta b lis h i t as P la to 's c u rre n t
view. S everal o f th e l a t e r dialogues seem t o a llu d e t o , and then go on
to c r i t i c i s e e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n s . A s noted in th e f i r s t ch ap ter, P la to 's
s tra te g y i s o fte n to p re se n t h is readers w ith some extreme views, none
of which prove acceptable on fu rth e r a n a ly sis. I t i s then th e job o f th e
read er to s t e e r a course between th e various p e r i l s t o a rriv e a t an
adequate th eo ry . One can perhaps d iscern t h i s s tra te g y w ith Timaeus '
epistemology. The q u estio n t h a t i s being posed to th e reader here might
look something lik e t h i s . I f we accept t h i s ra d ic a l

89
sep aratio n o f reason and sen satio n and t h e i r o b je c ts , do we have an
adequate epistemology and ontology ? I f we do n o t, then what i s th e
re la tio n sh ip between th e se fa c to rs ? One a sp ect o f t h i s may be a
c r itiq u e o f some of P la to 's e a r l ie r views. Another may be t h a t i t i s
a ls o an a tta c k upon, or perhaps a development of th e views of some
p re s o c ra tic p h ilo so p h ers. One might then ask who, p r io r to P la to , made a
ra d ic a l se p ara tio n o f reason and sense perception and t h e i r o b je c ts an d /
o r believed t h a t explanans and explananda a re [sungenes]. More
a c c u ra te ly , we might ask who P la to believed to hold such views. Two
prime candidates here a re Parmenides and H e ra c litu s, and th e re a re two
ways of s e ttin g up th e c o n tra s t t h a t I suggest i s th e c e n tra l
epistem ological theme o f th e Timaeus. The f i r s t , w hile adm ittedly
somewhat sp e c u la tiv e , i s ric h in i t s im plicatio n s fo r th e in te rp re ta tio n
of P la to 's l a t e r works, and sees P la to as tak in g up a d iscu ssio n t h a t
(he b e liev e s) was s ta r te d by Parmenides. The second i s somewhat more
orthodox in c o n tra stin g a Parmenidean account o f th e i n te l li g i b le w ith a
H eraclitean account of th e se n s ib le , though s t i l l ra d ic a l in th e sense
t h a t i t sees P la to as probing and c r i t i c i s i n g such a p o s itio n , ra th e r
than accepting i t .

II

L et us begin by noting c e rta in a f f i n i t i e s between Parmenides ' poem and

Timaeus ' speech. Both sep ara te th e o b je c ts o f reason and se n satio n ,
reckoning th e se to be coordinate w ith what i s knowable and what i s
opinable, and both req u ire explanations t o be [sungenes] w ith what th ey
e x p l a i n . W e might a ls o compare Timaeus' repeated use o f [eikos] to
d escrib e th e s ta tu s o f any account o f th e physical w ith Parmenides'
sim ila r usage a t F r.8 /6 0 .^^ Both Parmenides and Timaeus draw a
d is tin c tio n between th e v e ra c ity of what they have j u s t sa id and th e
nature o f th e account they are about to g iv e , and both aim to provide
th e b e s t account o f th e phy sical world t h a t i t i s p o ssib le fo r
m o r t a l s . I f Timaeus 27c-29d a llu d e s to Parmenides' poem, what might
P l a to 's purpose have been ? Here I must touch b r ie f ly on what may have
been Parmenides' in te n tio n s . McCabe has argued th a t th e purpose of
Parmenides' poem i s n o t so much t o argue f o r a stro n g monism, b u t ra th e r
to q u estion th e re la tio n sh ip between reason and sen satio n by s e ttin g up
a r a d ic a l d isju n c tio n o f th ese elem ents and exploring th e d i f f i c u l t i e s
fo r both a lte r n a tiv e s .

90
 I t i s u n co n tro v ersial t h a t Parmenides i s unhappy w ith th e way of
seeming, w ith undiscrim inating sense p ercep tio n , b u t th e way of being
a ls o seems h ig h ly paradoxical. As McCabe has argued, th e co ntext of th e
poem i s d i a l e c t ic a l , w ith th e conversation between th e Goddess and
Parmenides couched in th e second person. D ia le c tic a l a ls o in t h a t th e
poem seems t o argue w ith us - th e use o f th e second person seems to
reach beyond th e t e x t and address th e re a d e rs, and challenges us t o s o r t
o u t th e d i f f i c u l t i e s raised.^® The c o n tex t then i s a p l u r a l i s t one, of
th e two minds assumed f o r d ia le c tic t o occur. Yet th e way of being
cancels out t h i s co n tex t, t e l l in g us th e re i s only one t h i n g , a n d
cancels o u t a l l o f th e d iscrim in atio n s used t o e s ta b lis h i t , fo r i f
th e re i s only one homogen^ os e n ti t y then th e re a re no d is tin c tio n s t o be
made. Thus th e [a le th e ia ] to o becomes w ild ly paradoxical.^®
The c e n tra l questio n o f th e poem perhaps revolves around th e verb
21
[k rin e in ], to d iscrim in ate or judge. The th in k e rs d iscrim in ate between
[a le th e ia ] and [doxa], and re je c tin g th e testim ony of our senses argue
r a tio n a lly t h a t only th e one e x is ts . The [a k rita phula] (F r.6 /7 ), th e
' undiscrim inating horde*, f a i l t o d isc rim in ate between being and
not-being, and wander [d ik ra n o i], two headed, tru s tin g t h e i r
p ercep tio n s, and convinced t h a t th e p ath i s backward tu rn in g . The
problem posed could be p u t lik e t h i s . I f we do no t d isc rim in ate, i f we
simply p u t our f a i t h in what sense p ercep tio n t e l l s u s, then we w ill
have a h o p elessly c o n trad icto ry account o f th e world. I f , on th e o th er
hand, we in d iscrim in a te ly d isc rim in ate, and ignore th e evidence of our
senses com pletely, then we cancel o u t our own context and our own
id e n tity . One of Parmenides' problems, th en , i s a m eta-question, about
judging judgements; How many and what s o r t of d iscrim in atio n s should we
make ? This i s in tim ately re la te d t o a second q uestion; I f t h i s ra d ic a l
d isju n c tio n o f reason and perception lead s t o unacceptable conclusions,
what i s th e i r proper re la tio n ? This might lead us t o another c ru c ia l
q u estio n ; How much of sen satio n can we t r u s t , upon what c r i t e r i a , and
how a re we t o do t h is w ithout lo sin g lo g ic a l coherence ?
What I want t o suggest here i s t h a t i f t h i s was th e way th a t P lato
viewed Parmenides, then h is use o f a ra d ic a l se p ara tio n o f reason and
sense perception and t h e i r o b jec ts a t Timaeus 27c f f may not be a
statem ent endorsing a strong IW d o c trin e b u t a way o f s e ttin g up a
discu ssio n o f th e proper r e la tio n o f th ese elem ents. I f t h i s i s th e
case, then we should expect other p a rts o f th e Timaeus to break out of

91
th e 'IW epistemology. We might a ls o expect a discu ssio n o f th e n atu re of
th e p h y sical world and i t s epistem ological s ta tu s , and an account o f th e
nature o f our minds and t h e i r place in th e p h y sical world. So too we
might expect some o th er passages t o n o tio n a lly support 27c-29e, perhaps
developing some o f th e views im p lic it in t h a t p o s itio n t o broaden th e
co n tex t o f th e d isc u ssio n and to sharpen th e c o n tra s ts t h a t P la to i s
o ffe rin g u s. T his, as I s h a ll argue a t length in th e follow ing c h ap ters,
i s indeed vÆiat we fin d . I f how t o d isc rim in ate or judge i s a c e n tra l
concern o f Parmenides' poem, we may be ab le t o draw another s ig n ific a n t
p a r a lle l w ith th e Timaeus. At th e c lo se o f Timaeus' in tro d u cto ry speech,
he says
" I f th e n , S ocrates, on a g re a t many m atters concerning th e Gods and
th e g en eration o f the universe we should not be a b le to give what i s due
[apodounai] in term s o f accounts which a re in every way e n tir e ly in
agreement w ith them selves and p e rfe c tly e x a c t, do no t be su rp rise d . But
i f our rendering i s in f e r io r to none in lik e lih o o d , t h i s must p le a se ,
remembering t h a t both I who speak and you th e judges [hoi k r i t a i ] are
human, such t h a t concerning th ese th in g s we should g lad ly accept th e
lik e ly s to ry , as b e f its t h i s , and n o t seek any f u rth e r." (Tim.29c)
The use of [hoi k r i t a i ] has perhaps a double resonance w ith Parmenides'
poem. F ir s tly , [k rite s ] i s a cognate of [k rin e in ], and secondly t h i s is
addressed in th e second person, [hoi k r i t a i ] might merely be th e o th ers
p re se n t, S o crates, Hermocrates and C r itia s , or perhaps th e use o f th e
second peson may be in v itin g us, th e re a d e rs, to a c tiv e ly do some
judging o u rselves.
Resonances w ith P la to 's e a r l i e r works should a ls o make us h ighly
suspicious of v^ether we ought t o a tt r ib u t e th e epistemology espoused
here to P la to . Should we 'g la d ly accept a lik e ly account' , or would
P la to 's Socrates of Meno 81d and 86bc c a s tig a te t h i s as a 'la z y '
approach, lik e ly to sto p men searching ? Would th e Socrates of Gorgias
482b so g lib ly accept any account th a t does n o t agree w ith i t s e l f ?
Wouldn't th e Socrates o f Phaedo 90b f f r e je c t Timaeus a s an
[a n tilo g ik o s ], one who does n o t p u t s u f f ic ie n t t r u s t in th e power of
argument ? That P lato uses [apodounai] a t Tim.29c8 i s perhaps in d ic a tiv e
o f h is a ttitu d e h ere. His usual phrase fo r 'g iv e an a c c o u n t', from the
Meno onwards i s [logon d id o n a i]. [apodidomi], however, c a rrie s th e sense
of 't o give what i s d u e '; i s Timaeus then f a ilin g to give what i s due ?
That depends on what I suggest i s th e c e n tra l question t h a t i s raised

92
here, and t h a t we a re being in v ite d to ponder; What i s due in term s of
accounts o f th e p hysical ?
P la to 's rep ly to Parmenides a t Sophist 243 f f i s one t h a t d e als in
metaphysics and sem antics. Perhaps th e Timaeus complements t h is by
taking th e o th er arm o f Parmenides' challenge, and d isc u sse s th e
epistem ological questions concerning th e r e la tio n o f reason and
sen satio n , o f what i s p o ssib le in term s o f an account o f th e p h y sic al,
th e cosmological questio n o f what th e world i s lik e in r e la tio n t o th a t
epistemology, and th e question o f th e n atu re o f th e mind and where i t
f i t s in to t h i s scheme.
Now, one need not be committed to t h i s a s an in te rp re ta tio n o f th e
h is to r ic a l Parmenides. A ll th a t I req u ire i s t h a t t h i s i s roughly how
P lato sees Parmenides, and t h i s i s something I s h a ll argue fo r in th e
next se c tio n o f t h i s ch ap ter.
There i s a second way of s e ttin g up t h i s a n tith e s is which i s le s s
dependent upon giving P lato such a ra d ic a l view o f th e n a tu re of
Parmenides' poem. A second fig u re who P la to b e liev es th in k s th a t
accounts a re [sungenes] w ith t h e i r explananda i s H e ra c litu s. 2 3 Whether
t h i s i s an accu rate p ic tu re o f th e h is to r ic a l H erac litu s i s another
m atter, but th e Theaetetus c e r ta in ly takes t h i s lin e about H eraclitean
flu x , and here we can, i f we wish, a tt r ib u t e to P la to th e more orthodox
view of Parmenides as arguing fo r a stro n g monism. The c o n tra s t of
Timaeus ' speech a t 27c-29e i s then between a Parmenidean account of
reason and th e i n t e l l i g i b l e and a H eraclitean account o f sen satio n and
th e p h y sic al. This lead s us back towards more fa m ilia r t e r r i t o r y , but I
s h a ll s t i l l argue t h a t t h i s i s not P la to 's p o sitio n and t h a t th e l a t e r
contents o f th e Timaeus sharply c o n tra st w ith t h i s scheme.
The c o n sid eratio n o f H eraclitean themes a t Timaeus 27c f f i s
e n tir e ly c o n siste n t w ith th e way th a t I b eliev e P la to sees Parmenides
and with th e purpose t h a t I have suggested t h a t P lato has h e re . One
problem t h a t P la to w ill have i s how t o account fo r th e f a c t t h a t th e
world appears to be in flu x . To do t h i s he w ill have t o breach th e
[sungenes] s t r i c t u r e , or f a l l fo u l o f th e s o r t o f arguments a g a in st
u n statab le flu x o ffered by th e Theaetetus. He w ill have t o produce a
flu x which i s d escrib ab le and manageable, and as I s h a ll argue in
chapter seven, t h i s he achieves. Let us f i r s t tak e a ste p back, though,
and see i f i t i s p o ssib le t o argue th a t P la to views Parmenides in th e
manner I have in d ic ate d .

93
 Ill

We might begin by conparing P la to 's FWP with th e s ty le t h a t Parmenides

employs. One can immediately see c e r ta in a f f i n i t i e s h e re . On any account
of h is purpose in w ritin g , Parmenides makes f u l l use o f myth, paradox
and a p o ria .^ ^ His choice o f p o etry as a medium allow s him c e rta in
l i t e r a r y r e s o n a n c e s .T h e s e though a re s u p e rfic ia l s i m il a r it i e s . The
key q u estio n i s whether P la to believed Parmenides wrote d o c trin e in
flowery language or whether he used th ese l i t e r a r y devices a s a means to
challenge h is read ers. There i s one passage from th e Theaetetus which
may be h ig h ly in d ic a tiv e o f P la to 's views in t h i s re sp e c t. Socrates says
of Parmenides
"He seemed to me t o have a depth of mind th a t was e n tir e ly noble. I
am a fra id t h a t we may n o t understand h is words, and th a t we may be l e f t
even fu rth e r behind in understanding h is thought." (Tht.183e)
T his suggests t h a t fo r P la to th e key to understanding Parmenides'
thought l i e s behind th e t e x t , not in what i s given inm ediately. As w ith
P la to , v ^ at i s concealed may be a p o sitiv e viewpoint o r i t may be a
problem, w ith a suggested framework fo r i t s so lu tio n .
We might a ls o consider th e c h a ra c te ris a tio n of Parmenides and Zeno
in th e Parmenides and th e dram atic frame of t h a t work. There i s a
c e r ta in oddness about what each o f th e main c h a ra c te rs argues f o r in
t h is dialogue, given th e orthodox account of Parmenides a s a strong
m onist, and Zeno a s h is su p p o rter. P la to does no t have Parmenides argue
fo r strong monism, but ra th e r has him i n s i s t on consistency and rig o u r.
Zeno s ta te s t h a t th e purpose o f h is t r e a t i s e i s t o argue a g a in st
p lu ralism ,
"To show th a t th e hypothesis t h a t many th in g s e x is t s u ffe rs s t i l l
more rid ic u lo u s consequences than th e theory t h a t th e one e x is ts , i f
examined in s u f f ic ie n t d e t a i l ." (Rn.128d)
This though c a r r ie s th e im p licatio n t h a t th e hypothesis t h a t th e one
e x is ts a ls o lead s to absurd r e s u l ts , y e t Parmenides ra is e s no o b jectio n
h ere.^^ Socrates a ls o o ffe rs a knock down argument a g a in st any defence
pp
o f stro n g monism by Zeno
So. "Is t h i s th e purpose o f your arguments, nothing o th er than to
contend a g a in s t a l l t h a t i s sa id th a t what e x is ts i s not many ? And you
tak e each o f your arguments to be a proof of t h i s , such t h a t you believ e
th e number o f proofs you give t h a t what e x is ts i s not many a re as many

94
as th e arguments you have w ritte n down ? Is t h a t your meaning, or have I
n o t understood you c o rre c tly ?"
Ze. "But no, you have understood b e a u tifu lly th e whole in te n t of th e
t r e a t i s e . " (Pm.127e)
The p o in t t h a t i t i s ra th e r odd to have two independent arguments
t h a t th e re i s only one th in g . Yet Zeno concurs w ith t h i s and
Parmenides again does n o t ra is e a w h i s p e r .C o n s i d e r a ls o Parmenides'
speech a t th e conclusion o f th e f i r s t s e c tio n o f th e Parmenides, vAere
he says t h a t
"Looking a t a l l th ese d i f f i c u l t i e s and o th ers lik e them, i f scxneone
w ill n o t allow jîêie e x iste n ce i f ideas o f th in g s or w ill not d efin e some
one id ea in each case, he w ill have nothing on which he can f ix h is
thought, n o t allow ing t h a t each id ea o f th in g s i s always th e same, and
in t h i s way he w ill d estro y th e power o f d i a le c tic ." (Rn. 135b)^^
This i s h ardly th e p o s itio n o f a strong m onist. However, i t i s
c o n siste n t w ith th e p o sitio n t h a t I argue f o r . Parmenides a s P lato
p o rtra y s him i s deeply concerned w ith th e re la tio n s h ip between the
i n te l li g i b le and th e se n sib le . His dominant purpose i s to provide an
account o f t h e i r re la tio n s h ip t h a t i s c o n siste n t and rigorous while
m aintaining im portant fe a tu re s of th e p e rc e p tib le world. Hence h is
tren c h an t c ritic is m o f a l l th e proposed re la tio n sh ip s between
p a rtic u la rs and Forms t h a t th e youthful Socrates comes up w ith.
Now consider some o f th e dram atic elem ents o f th e Parmenides,
p a r tic u la r ly in r e la tio n to th e T heaetetus. Why, fo r in sta n c e , does
P la to have S ocrates t a lk d ir e c tly to Parmenides, b u t n o t to Protagoras
32
in th e Theaetetus ? I am assuming here t h a t h is t o r ic a l l y th e re was no
meeting between S ocrates and Parmenides, and so th e Parmenides i s not
a h i s t o r ic a l or s e m i-h isto ric a l acc o u n t.^4 v to t I want t o suggest here
i s t h a t P la to b eliev es Parmenides to have w ritte n in accordance w ith
P la to 's PWP, such th a t Parmenides' philosophy remains in a sense a liv e
and something t h a t can be d ia le c tic a lly engaged w ith. S ocrates in th e
Phaedrus t e l l s us th a t
" I t i s fo r th e sake o f a pastim e t h a t t h a t he w ill sow seeds and
w rite in th e garden of l e t t e r s , \«hen he w rite s , t h i s being la id up a s a
sto re o f rem inders, both a g a in st th e o n set o f fo rg e tfu l old age, and as
a track ^^ fo r a l l those who follow him, and he w ill be pleased to watch
th e growth o f th ese ten d er t h in g s ... b u t in ray opinion, much b e tte r i s
th e se rio u s treatm ent o f th e se m atters, th a t i s whenever someone eitploys
the method of d ia le c tic , and taking a s u ita b le so u l,

95
p la n ts and sows words o f wisdom, which a re ab le t o defend themselves and
t h e i r p la n te r, and a re not barren bu t a re pregnant w ith seed, whence
o th er tr u th s a re brought f o r th in o th er minds, rendering th ese seeds
immortal, and making t h e i r possessor happy, a s f a r a s i s p o ssib le fo r
humans." (Pdr.276d)
In chapter one I argued t h a t fo r P lato w ritin g can ta k e on some o f th e
c h a r a c te r is tic s of o r a l d i a l e c t ic and so achieve some o f th e same g o als.
A w ell w ritte n work might then achieve some s o r t o f iirm o rtality fo r th e
thought th a t l i e s behind i t . Now, i f P la to believed t h a t Parmenides did
and Protagoras did not w rite in t h i s manner, then a t a l i t e r a r y le v e l,
t h i s might be symbolised by th e way th a t P la to has S ocrates engage the
long dead Parmenides in conversation, but not P r o t a g o r a s . p i a t o 's
c h arac ters Parmenides and Protagoras then might be seen a s symbols fo r
t h e i r re sp ec tiv e philo so p h ies. One, observing th e importance of
d ia le c tic and having been w ritte n in accord w ith P la to 's FWP i s s t i l l
a liv e and can be d ia le c tic a lly engaged w ith, while th e o th e r, f a ilin g in
th ese m atters, has died w ith i t s p ro g en ito r.
Let us explore some p o in ts of s im ila r ity between th e Parmenides and
th e T heaetetus in r e la tio n t o th e Phaedrus. Both have th e old engaged in
teaching philosophy to th e young by means of o ra l d i a l e c t ic . Parmenides
i s 65, while Socrates i s 69 or 70.^^ Theaetetus i s 16, and i f t h i s
p a r a lle l i s stro n g , th e Socrates o f th e Panrenides may w ell be 16 to o .
op
That would give a dram atic d ate o f 454 fo r th e Parmenides, four years
e a r l i e r than i t i s u su a lly taken to be.^^ Theaetetus i s p raised as a
good stu d e n t and p o te n tia l philosopher, and S ocrates i s p raised in much
th e same s o r t o f terms f i r s t by Zeno and then Parmenides. I t i s
iirp o rtan t t h a t Socrates chooses Theaetetus c a re fu lly . He questions
Theodorus on who th e most promising young men a re - Socrates i s seeking
a s u ita b le so u l fo r h is d i a l e c t ic . So to o in th e Parmenides. Socrates is
an em inently s u ita b le s o u l, and Parmenides i s re lu c ta n t t o go through
th e gymnastics he p re s c rib e s , only being w illin g t o do so in f ro n t o f a
sm all and s e le c t a u d i e n c e . T h i s i s an im portant c o n tra s t with
P rotagoras, a man \Ao w ill accept any p u p il as long a s he can pay.^^
There i s a ls o a close p a r a l le l between th e mental 'gym nastics'
Parmenides recommends and th e natu re o f th e exam ination t h a t Socrates
gives T heaetetus. Note a ls o th e a llu s io n to th e Phaedrus in S o crates'
clo sin g speech in the Theaetetus
"So i f a f t e r t h i s you should attem pt to become pregnant w ith o th er

96
thoughts, T heaetetus, i f t h i s happens, you w ill be f i l l e d w ith b e tte r
thoughts because of our p re se n t in v e s tig a tio n , w hile i f you remain
b arren , you w ill be g e n tle r and le s s troublesome to be w ith [hetton
barus t o i s sun ousi], prudently not believ in g y o u rse lf to know th a t which
you do n ot know." (Tht.210b)
Compare Phaedrus 275a, where th o se who have le a r n t by reading alone a re
described a s as only appearing to be wise and as [chalepoi su n e in a i],
'd i f f i c u l t t o be w ith ' . Throughout th e p a rt o f th e Theaetetus t h a t
d eals w ith P rotagoras, th e re i s an eirphasis on th e d e stru c tiv e
consequences t h a t th e measure d o ctrin e would have on th e process of
d i a l e c t ic . For in stan c e, S ocrates says th a t
"I say nothing o f how much rid ic u le myself and my a r t of midwifery
would deserve, as w ell a s th e whole business of d ia le c tic to o , I th in k .
To in v e s tig a te and t e s t in discu ssio n each o th ers fan c ies and opinions,
vAen each a re c o rre c t, would be sheer and u t t e r nonsense, i f th e Truth
of Protagoras i s tr u e , and i s not u tte re d p la y fu lly [paizousa] from th e
innerm ost sanctuary o f h is book." (Tht.161e)
The f i n a l c o n d itio n al c lau se here i s h ighly in te re s tin g . I t would seem
t o ask ; I s th e re anything more to P ro tag o ras' book than i s given on th e
su rface ? In d is tin c tio n to th e comment on Parmenides t h a t we looked a t
e a r l i e r , th e answer appears t o be no.*^ In chapter one I suggested th a t
P la to 's w ritin g s a re a s o r t of 's e rio u s p la y ', and th a t [paid ia] and i t s
cognates b u ild up c e rta in resonances in P la to 's works. Here i t s use may
be h ig h ly s ig n if ic a n t. The q uestion being asked might be phrased; I s th e
measure d o ctrin e a piece o f se rio u s p la y , from whose paradoxical
consequences we are meant to go on to some deeper a n a ly s is , o r i s t h is
a l l t h a t Protagoras has to say ? The im plication i s c le a r ly th e l a t t e r ,
hence th e absence of Protagoras from th e d isc u ssio n . We might u se fu lly
d eal w ith an o b jectio n to my approach to th e Timaeus h e re , to o . S urely,
someone might say, c itin g Timaeus 59cd, P la to regards giving accounts of
p h y sical phenomena as an amusement, a p le a sa n t d iv ersio n What P la to
a c tu a lly has Timaeus say i s t h a t providing accounts o f th e phenomena
w ill be p le a sa n t, and t h a t anyone doing so
"W ill be c re atin g in h is l i f e a pastim e [paidian]^^ both s u ita b le
and prudent."(Tim .59d)
Now t h a t , on my reading o f P la to 's conception o f [p a id ia ], i s a very
p o s itiv e th in g to say. J u s t a s th e 's e rio u s p la y ' of P la to 's myths is
supposed to lead us to th e contem plation o f th e p h ilo so p h ical issu e s

97
involved, so too th e attem pt t o form hypotheses which f u l ly account fo r
th e phenomena may lead us somewhere u se fu l. I s h a ll re tu rn t o t h i s theme
in l a t e r c h a p te rs, here I merely want t o t i e in P la to 's use o f [p aidia]
a t a c ru c ia l ju n ctu re in th e Timaeus w ith i t s use in o th e r la te
dialogues and i t s th e o re tic a l d iscu ssio n in th e Phaedrus.
I t i s a ls o im portant t h a t T heaetetus and Theodorus have read,^® or
a t l e a s t a re acquainted w ith th e contents of Protagoras* book,^^ as they
to o a re s u ita b le so u ls vho a re n o t in sp ire d by t h e i r c o n ta ct with
Protagoras to defend h is p o s i t i o n . N o t e in c o n tra s t t o t h i s th e way in
which Zeno i s happy t o defend Parmenides. Socrates c re a te s a defence of
Protagoras h im self, but he does t h i s in th e in te r e s ts of ju s tic e , and
n o t through any in s p ira tio n he has gained by reading Protagoras * work.^^
F in a lly , co nsider, th e stran g e appearance o f P ro tag o ras' head a t
Theaetetus 171d. A fter th e s e lf - r e f u ta tio n argument, Socrates says
" I f immediately hence he [Protagoras] should emerge a s f a r as h is
neck, he would accuse me o f much fo o lish n e ss, and in a l l lik e lih o o d you
too f o r agreeing, before he would be gone again, sinking down and making
o f f ." (Tht.171d)
The p o in t o f t h i s ra th e r odd image i s probably about d i a l e c t ic ; th a t
Protagoras w ill n o t sta y and argue th e m atter i s symbolic o f the
C O
im p licatio n s t h a t P lato argues h is philosophy has fo r d i a l e c t ic . Even
i f we could re s u rre c t P rotagoras, h is measure d o c trin e would s t i l l
sabotage proper debate, and i f th e measure i s a l l he has l e f t u s, th e re
can be no d ia le c tic w ith h is p h ilo so p h ical h e rita g e , hence th e absence
of Protagoras from th e T h e a e t e t u s . I f I am c o rre c t h e re , th e c o n tra s t
between th e treatm en t of Parmenides and Protagoras i s q u ite s tr ik in g .
A ll t h i s then i s t o argue t h a t in P la to 's view Parmenides was n o t a
siirple purveyor o f strong m onist d o c trin e . R ather, according to P la to ,
he wrote in a manner analogous to P la to 's own FWP, and lead s us to
question th e re la tio n s h ip between th e se n sib le and th e i n t e l l i g i b l e ,
se n sa tio n and reason, and our minds and th e world. I f t h i s i s so , then
Timaeus ' speech a t 27c-29d may be s e ttin g up sim ila r questions fo r th e
r e s t o f th e Timaeus to in v e s tig a te and to provoke i t s read ers in to
fu rth e r thought.

IV

We now have a working hypothesis fo r th e questions which a re going to

hold th e Timaeus to g e th e r. Let us go to th e te n pages which precede

98
Timaeus' epistem ological speech t o see i f we can give some account of
t h e i r co n ten ts in th e se term s. The opening lin e s o f th e Timaeus a re
So "One, two, th re e , but where, dear Timaeus, i s th e fo u rth o f our
g u ests o f y esterday, our h o sts o f today ?
Ti "Scxne i ll n e s s has b e fa lle n him, S ocrates; fo r he would not
w illin g ly be absent from our g ath e rin g ."
So "Then i s n 't th e p a rt o f f i l l i n g in fo r th e absent one th e work of
you and your frie n d s ?" (Tim. 17a)
I f we ta k e th e use o f th e second person here a s s ig n if ic a n t and
e x tr a - te x tu a l, then t h i s immediately s e ts up a d ia l e c t ic a l context in
which i t i s th e reader who must supply th e p a rt of th e m issing fo u rth
man. But what i s i t t h a t we a re to supply ? Here th e incomplete nature
of th e synopsis of th e Republic given by Socrates may be in d ic a tiv e . We
a re given a re c a p itu la tio n o f th e moral and p o l i t i c a l theory o f the
Republic, but s ig n if ic a n tly not o f th e epistemology and philosophy of
mind of Books V, VI and V II, nor o f th e cosmology of Book V II. This may
then a c t as a s e ttin g o f th e a g e n d a .W e a re warned t h a t i t i s going to
be up to us t o th in k about th e issu es discussed in th e Republic which
are n o t mentioned in th e synopsis. I f we a re to c a rry through t h is
id e n tif ic a tio n o f th e m issing fo u rth person and th e m issing p a r t o f th e
synopsis of th e Republic, we should a lso note t h a t th e m issing man has
f a lle n i l l . Might we ta k e t h i s a s an in d ic a tio n t h a t P la to b eliev es some
of th e views expressed in th e Republic need re v isio n ? I t i s q u ite in
P l a to 's s ty le , a f t e r a l l , t o anthropomorphise arguments in t h is
m a n n e r . I s h a ll t r y to show in d e ta il in follow ing ch ap ters t h a t th e
Timaeus does d eal w ith th e issu e s suggested by t h i s agenda and th a t
th e re a re im portant rev isio n s to th e R epublic's view of th ese m atters.
In o u tlin e , f i r s t l y I s h a ll argue t h a t th e re a re some im portant
cosmological changes. The cosmos becomes s ta b le , and th e motions of th e
heavenly bodies become p e rf e c tly re g u la r. This may be in d ic a tiv e o f a
deeper m etaphysical change concerning th e re la tio n o f mathematics to th e
world. I argue t h a t th e Timaeus develops a theory o f flu x which allow s
th e world enough s t a b i l i t y to underw rite t h i s view of th e heavens. I
a ls o argue t h a t th e analogy th e Timaeus develops between th e world soul
and human so u ls produces an epistemology which challenges both th e
Republic and Timaeus 27c-29e, as w ell a s introducing a new model of mind
which accords w ith t h i s new epistemology. Put to g e th e r, th ese p o in ts
amount t o a major re v isio n o f th e views o f th e Republic.

99
 A fter th e synopsis o f th e Republic we come to th e myth of Solon.
S ocrates wishes to h ear an account o f th e s t a t e o f th e Republic in
a c tio n . At 19b f f Socrates compares h is d e sc rip tio n o f th e id e a l s ta te
w ith a p a in tin g d ep ictin g anim als; in both cases, he says one wants to
see th e su b je c t in a c tio n . This seems to be an a llu s io n t o Phaedrus 275d
and th e d iscu ssio n o f th e natu re o f w ritin g . The fu n ctio n o f t h i s , I
suggest, i s to throw doubt on both myth and w ritin g as v ehicles fo r
p h ilo s o p h y .W e have seen how P lato intends to avoid th e problems he
p erceiv es w ith w ritin g ; i s myth a good v eh icle fo r him ? What P lato
argues a t Timaeus 19b f f i s t h a t some s o r ts of myth a re u se fu l but
o th e rs a re n o t. This i s a m atter of g re a t importance a s th e main body of
th e Timaeus i s a w ritte n myth.^® The problem here i s exacerbated by th e
f a c t t h a t a t both beginning and end, Solon's myth i s described as wholly
tru e .^ ^ What i s th e natu re o f th e w arrant fo r i t s t r u th ? Several
c r i t e r i a a re suggested during th e rryth, a l l of which a re e x te rn a l t o the
read er. They a l l c a l l upon th e reader to accept th e myth on someone or
something e l s e 's a u th o rity . That on i t s own might make us su sp icio u s,
knowing P la to 's preference fo r s e lf -r e lia n c e . Indeed, a l l th e c r i t e r i a
allu d ed to here a re ones t h a t P la to has given us grounds t o be
suspicious o f in e a r l i e r works. At Timaeus 20d, we a re asked to accept
th e myth because Solon i s wise and o ld . Yet su re ly we have seen enough
of th e f a te o f th e 'e x p e rts ' in th e e a rly dialogues not t o p u t our t r u s t
in th e testim ony o f an eminent man, whatever h is credentials.^® At 2Id
S o lo n 's sources a re questioned, and a t 23a we fin d t h a t th e source i s
th e a n cien t w ritin g s o f th e Egyptians. The Phaedrus, however, has warned
us n o t to simply accept th e w ritte n word, whatever i t s provenance, and
th e referen ce here to Egypt may be a fu rth e r a llu s io n t o th e Phaedrus in
a d d itio n to Timaeus 1 9 b . A t 26a f f a d iff e r e n t ta c k i s taken. Perhaps
th e s to ry i s tru stw o rth y because i t i s w ell remembered, o r even because
i t i s re c o lle c te d . However, a t 19a Socrates fin is h e s h is synopsis of th e
Republic, on which he should be th e ex p ert, having discoursed the
previous day. He s ta te s t h a t t h i s completes th e c o n te n ts, and asks i f
Timaeus agrees t h a t t h i s i s a complete l i s t o f th e c o n te n ts, which he
does. As we have seen though, t h i s synopsis i s f a r from complete;
memory, then, i s n o t t o be tr u s te d . Of re c o lle c tio n , I w ill say l i t t l e
more h e re , having tre a te d i t a t length e a r l i e r . There i s an a llu s io n to
th e arguments a g a in st re c o lle c tio n in th e Phaedrus a t Timaeus 26c;
re c o lle c tio n i s lik e a

100
p ain tin g in th e mind, presumably a p a in tin g which in th e usual manner
can give no account o f i t s e l f .
The o v e ra ll e f f e c t o f Timaeus 19b-27a i s then t o make us suspicious
o f a l l e x te rn a l a u th o r itie s in judging a myth and to make us re ly on our
own in te r n a l
c r i t e r ^2 How then a re we to t r e a t w ritte n myths i f we
i a .

cannot tak e on t r u s t what they t e l l us ? Perhaps we should t r e a t them as

hypotheses, or as sources o f p h ilo so p h ical ideas which we can make
judgements and d iscrim in atio n s about before we accept o r r e j e c t them,
ra th e r than sources o f p h ilo so p h ical d o c trin e . Myths a re perhaps
re p o s ito rie s of raw m a te ria ls fo r us to mine and subsequently decide th e
value o f . N atu rally , we should extend th e lesso n s of th e nyth of Solon
on how to t r e a t myth t o th e r e s t o f th e account o f th e Timaeus. Thus we
should not ta k e what Timaeus gives us as sim ply P la to n ic d o c trin e , but
a s a source o f provoking id eas to make our own d isc rim in atio n s about.
A ll th e more so when Timaeus i s described as [onta astronom ikotaton
hemon], our b e s t a s t r oAoner, when we have j u s t been warned n o t t o accept
any e x te rn a l a u th o rity , whatever i t s c re d e n tia ls , but t o judge fo r
o u rse lv e s.
We might a ls o consider th e c o n tra s t between th e myth of Solon and
th e main account, as w ell as w ith the myth o f th e C r itia s . The myths of
Solon and C r itia s have in common t h a t th ey a re p urely h is to r ic a l and
fa c tu a l and have nothing to provoke p h ilo so p h ical thought. The only
d iscrim in atio n we can make i s to judge them tr u e or f a ls e , and they may
be e ith e r f o r a l l we can t e l l . Here one might r e c a ll S o c rate s' comments
on th e myth o f O rethuia and Boreas in th e P h a e d r u s .S o c r a t e s i s not
in te re s te d in cashing o u t th e myth th a t Boreas abducted O rethuia in to a
question o f was she pushed or d id she f a l l , because t h i s w ill not h elp
him w ith th e Delphic in ju n c tio n to know h im self. Note a ls o t h a t th e re
a re no c r i t e r i a here fo r judging th e m atter one way o r th e o th e r. Nor i s
Socrates in te re s te d in th e t a l e s of monsters t h a t a re th e baggage of
t h i s myth.^^ The myth t h a t Timaeus gives us i s a d if f e r e n t m atter
though. There a re p len ty of c r i t e r i a on which to judge th e contents of
th is myth, and i f I was c o rre c t e a r l i e r about th e s tru c tu re o f Timaeus*
opening epistem ological speech then one o f th e c e n tra l problems i s how,
why, and in what manner we should d isc rim in a te .^ ^ Timaeus' t a l e a ls o has
a g re a t d eal t o t e l l anyone about them selves, i f i t i s th e case t h a t one
of i t s c e n tra l themes i s th e n atu re and c o n ten ts of th e human mind and
t h e i r r e la tio n t o th e w orld. Considering t h i s c o n tra s t between the

101
myth of A tla n tis and Timaeus' d isco u rse, we might r e c a ll S o c rate s' words
in th e Phaedrus
"I in v e s tig a te myself ra th e r than th e se th in g s , to see i f I am a
more complex and fearsome b e a st than Typhon, o r a g e n tle r and more
single-m inded c re a tu re , who has by nature a le s s puffed up f a te
appointed by God.^^" (Pdr.230a)
The c e n tra l m ythical account o f th e Timaeus then i s p h ilo so p h ic a lly
in te r e s tin g , in d is tin c tio n to th e myth o f Solon and A tla n tis , because
i t gives us something th a t we can make p h ilo so p h ical d iscrim in atio n s
about and w ill t e l l us something about th e n a tu re of ourselves by
discu ssin g th e place o f th e mind in th e c o s m o s . ^8 Not only t h a t , but th e
framework t h a t th e myth i s s e t in , and c o n tra sts between th e co n ten t of
th e myth and th a t framework w ill lead us t o question th e n atu re o f th e
judgements t h a t we make about th e myth. As w ith Parmenides' poem, th e re
i s another le v e l o f a n a ly sis a t which we must d isc rim in ate about th e
d isc rim in atio n s we employ.

In conclusion, then, th e Timaeus i s not a v e h ic le of P la to n ic d o c trin e

b ut a s e t o f views, some we may a scrib e t o P lato and some n o t, t h a t we
must judge th e philosophi c a l worth of o u rselv es. Running through the
Timaeus th e re i s a c o n tra s t of th e 27c-29e viewpoint and passages
developing and rephrasing i t a g a in st oth er suggestions a s to how th e
in te l li g i b le and th e se n s ib le , reason and perception and our minds and
th e world r e la te to each o th e r, and i t w ill be th e ta s k o f th e follow ing
chapters to develop and in v e s tig a te t h i s c o n tra s t. This reading o f th e
Timaeus has th e advantage o f being in lin e w ith P la to 's FWP, of making
some sense o f th e re la tio n between th e in tro d u c tio n and th e r e s t of th e
work, of giving th e whole work some coherence, and o f narrowing th e gap
in s ty le and concerns w ith o th er l a t e works. I t a ls o opens up se v era l
very in te re s tin g in te rp r e ta tio n a l p o s s ib i l i ti e s . I f th e epistemology of
27c~29d i s not P la to 's c u rre n t one, what i s suggested by th e r e s t o f th e
Timaeus and how do th e d iscu ssio n s o f flu x and th e p lac e o f th e human
mind in th e universe f i t in w ith t h i s ? What a re th e im p licatio n s fo r
P l a to 's philosophy o f science ? The next chapter w ill re tu rn to
astronomy, and w ill argue t h a t th e re i s a fundamental s h i f t in P la to 's
a ttitu d e t o th e motions o f th e heavenly bodies and to th e ph y sical world
in g en eral between th e Republic and the Timaeus.

102
NOTES FOR CEÎAPTER FOUR

01) See e .g Dicks (1970) p116 " I t seems c e rta in t h a t he was merely a
convenient mouthpiece fo r P la to 's own views". P a rt of ray p lan here i s to
narrow th e gap between th e way we read th e Tim. and th e o th er l a t e r
d ialo g u es; c f . my in tro d u c tio n and Sayre (1983) ix .

02) Cf. My c h .1 and Pdr.264c.

03) See Cornford (1937), and c f . Taylor (1927), who gives 13 pages to
P l a to 's f i r s t 10 (Stephanus), and l a t e r 17 pages to th re e lin e s . As
r a tio s , Cornford devotes 11/ 350 pages to th e f i r s t te n Stephanus pages
o f th e Tim. (most o f which i s th e t e x t i t s e l f ) , and Taylor 13/ 604, as
a g a in st 10/ 75 in th e Tim.

04) See Pdr.264c on th e importance o f a l l th e p a rts of a l i t e r a r y

composition f i t t i n g to g e th e r a s a coherent vAiole.

05) [sungenes], 'o f th e same sto c k , descent or fam ily ' (I£ J ).

06) Cf. Pdo.96d and lOOe. Men and horses a re la rg e because they
p a rtic ip a te in th e la rg e .

07) Some sp ecu latio n h e re . One theme in P la to i s t h a t th e explanans must

be both p ro perly re la te d to , and properly d istanced from the
explanandum, in order to be adequately explanatory. Too c lo se and th e
ex planation t e l l s us to o l i t t l e (c f. th e n o n -id e n tity assumption in th e
Rn; see my c h .8 ), too f a r and th e explanation f a l l s f l a t . Here, th e use
of [sungenes], 'o f th e same fam ily ', may in d ic a te t h a t th e p o s itio n th a t
P lato i s p resen tin g us w ith here i s p u llin g th e explanans too c lo s e .
I n te r e s tin g ly , we may see th e converse, again expressed in term s of
fam ily r e la tio n s , when we a re to ld t h a t th e rec ep ta cle i s apprehended
w ith 'b a s ta rd ' reasoning. In c h .9 I s h a ll argue t h a t some versions of
th e rec ep ta cle t h a t we a re presented w ith (I believ e P la to d e lib e ra te ly
giv es us se v era l) f a i l t o be properly re la te d t o th e phenomena th a t
occur in them and so become non-explanatory. In ch.1 I argued t h a t P lato
sometimes overdraws p o s itio n s in order t o c re a te some d i f f i c u l t i e s fo r
th e rea d er, who i f they solve th e d i f f i c u l t i e s and move t o read th e t e x t
a t a d if f e r e n t le v e l o f so p h is tic a tio n w ill come to understand b e tte r .
So h e re , I suggest; the question being ra ise d by t h i s process i s . What
i s th e proper r e la tio n between explanans and explanandum v^en we are
ta lk in g o f p h y sical phenomena ?

08) See Pdo.96d, and th e so lu tio n a t lOOe f f . I t i s sometimes suggested

t h a t th e myth o f th e Pdo. i s a 'l i k e l y s to r y ' in th e manner o f th e Tim.
However, while Socrates in th e Pdo. does not claim c e rta in ty fo r h is
t a l e , th e re i s no suggestion t h a t a l l t h a t can be achieved i s a lik e ly
s to ry , merely t h a t t h i s i s an hypothesis t h a t would tak e an in o rd in a te
amount o f tim e to prove; see Pdo. 108d + 114d.

09) C ertain ly Timaeus e f f e c ts a ra d ic a l se p aratio n o f reason and sense

p ercep tio n and t h e i r o b je c ts a t th e beginning o f h is speech " I t is
p o ssib le , in my opinion, to f i r s t l y make th e follow ing d is tin c tio n . What
i s i t t h a t always i s and never becomes, and what i s i t t h a t always
becomes and never i s ? The one i s apprehended by th e i n t e l l e c t with
reasoning, and i s always th e same, th e o th e r in tu rn comes t o be
believed by opinion w ith unreasoning se n sa tio n , always coming to be and
103
passing away, but never r e a lly e x istin g " (Tim.27d); c f . Frede (1988) p40
on t h i s m a tte r. Here [logos] seems ambiguous between reason and account,
perhaps d e lib e ra te ly on P la to 's p a r t , to make us th in k of th e re la tio n
between th e two; c f . Cornford (1935) p206 n .1 . There a re a ls o a f f i n i t i e s
here wih th e p o sitio n argued a g a in st by th e f in a l argument o f th e f i r s t
p a r t o f th e Pm. (133b-134e). Does th e Rn. c r i t i c i s e th e Tim. o r does th e
Tim. use t h i s epistemology as a s ta r tin g p o in t fo r i t s discu ssio n ? I
suggest th e l a t t e r .

10) When th e world soul perceives something p h y sical [doxai k ai p i s t e i s

g ignontai bebaioi k a i a le th e s ] , Tim.37b9. Cf. 29b6 and 29c3, which t h is
appears to c o n tra d ic t.
11) See Tim.43a f f , esp. 43e.
12) See e .g Tim.47b f f .

13) For in sta n c e , one might consider th e way t h a t th e Rn. c r i t i c i s e s th e

Forms o f th e Pdo, (see esp. Pm. 129a f f ) how th e Tht. examines the
'knowledge i s tru e judgement w ith an account' p o sitio n o f th e Meno (Cf.
Men.97a f f and Tht.200d f f ) , and how th e C rt. explores naming in
re la tio n to Pdo. 103e. More p rovocatively, we might look to th e
d e sc rip tio n o f the ' Friends o f th e Forms' a t So.248a f f , o r th e r e la tio n
between th e b a tt l e o f th e Gods and Giants and S o c rate s' autobiography in
th e Pdo, a s suggested in c h .2. Ch.8 w ill d isc u ss p o ssib le l a t e r
rev isio n s to th e middle period theory of Forms.
14) Cf. esp. Parmenides F r. 1/28 f f and Tim.29b.

15) Parmenides F r.8 /6 0 , "I t e l l you th e e n tir e arrangement a s seems

lik e ly , so t h a t no opinion of m ortal men w ill ever surpass you".

16) See Parmenides F r.8/50 and c f . Tim.29c f f .

17) C f. F r.8/60 and Tim.29c, and passim comments in th e Tim. t h a t t h i s
i s th e most lik e ly account. See a ls o here Sayre (1983) p240 f f on some
cosm ological a f f i n i t i e s between th e two works.

18) See Mackenzie (1982b) p1-3.

19) Cf. Archer-Hind (1888), p8, "Again th e E le a tic s a re bound to deny

not merely th e p lu r a lity of o b je c ts , b u t th e p lu r a lity o f su b je c ts as
w ell. What th en a re th e se conscious p e rs o n a litie s , which seem so re a l
and so se p a ra te , and which y e t on E le a tic p rin c ip le s must, so f a r as
th e i r p l u r a l it y and t h e i r sep aratio n i s concerned, be an id le dream ?".

20) See Mackenzie (1982b) p3-6.

21) See Mackenzie (1982b) p6 f f .

22) A recu rrin g theme in th e next few chapters w ill be t h a t th e Tim. and
th e So. sh are a d iv is io n of labour in answering some o f th e problems
ra ise d by th e Rn.
23) See Tht. 181d f f .

24) See A r is to tle Metaphysics 1078b16 f f on P la to 's e a rly H eraclitean

in flu e n ce s.

104
25) Contrary to most commentators, I would suggest t h a t Parmenides'
s ty le i s conscious and w ell chosen; Cf. M aaonzie (1982b) p7, Barnes
(1979) piss, KRS (19SS) p241.
26) C f. Maci^enzie (1982b) p7 on t h i s m atter.

27) Parmenides has ju s t a rriv e d (Rn. 127d) before th e exchanges between

S ocrates and Zeno; see Barnes (1982) p23S on t h i s m atter.

28) I would argue t h a t P la to 's view of Zeno i s sim ila r t o h is view of

Parmenides. R ather than being a defender o f strong monism, he fo rc e s us
to consider our p o sitio n by arguing a g a in st a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . That
makes him (in P la to 's view) a defender of Parmenides' method (though not
n e c e ssa rily o f h is 'd o c tr in e ', i f he has any). Thus we can reco n cile
Zeno's use of red u ctio arguments fo r a l l arms o f exhaustive dilemmas
w ith a defence o f and a sso c ia tio n w ith Parmenides. Cf. Dies (1923),
Frankel (1942), Solmsen (1971), V lastos (197Sb).
29) Cf. a s im ila r argument a t So.244b f f .

30) I t i s o f course a ls o very stran g e th a t S ocrates has th e middle

period theory of Forms a t h is d isp o sal a t such a young age.

31) Cf. So.2S9e f f .

32) At th e tim e t h a t P la to composed th ese dialogues a l l th re e would have
been long dead; Parmenides in the 440's on th e usual d a tin g , Protagoras
around 420 (see G uthrie vol I I I , p262), Socrates in 399, w hile th e
dialogues would have been composed some tim e in th e e a rly 360's . P lato
could have Socrates t a l k w ith both, e ith e r , or n e ith e r; so why t h is
p a r tic u la r combination ?

33) The meeting i s not a tte s te d by any independent a n cien t source. I

would tend t o agree w ith Cornford (193S) p i "To suppose t h a t anything
remotely resembling th e conversation in t h i s dialogue could have
occurred a t t h a t date would make a nonsense o f th e whole h is to ry of
philosophy in th e f i f t h and fo u rth c e n tu rie s" .

34) I f th e dialogue i s f i c t io n a l , then we cannot a tt r ib u t e motives to

h is to r ic a l c h a ra c te rs , but must a tt r ib u t e motives t o P la to 's c h aracters
and u ltim a te ly to P lato h im self; t h i s i s a s ig n ific a n tly d if f e r e n t
m a tte r.
35) What i s w ritte n may be a 'tra c k fo r o th ers to fo llo w ', in th e
language o f th e Pdr, b u t i t i s p o ssib ly n o t th e vAole of P la to 's
thought. The word here tra n s la te d as tr a c k , [ichnos], has im portant
fu rth e r m etaphorical senses o f a clu e o r a t r a i l to follow . LSJ give 'a
tra c k , fo o tste p : metaph. a tra c k , tr a c e , mark, c lu e '.

36) I ta k e i t a s u n controversial t h a t th e Tht. and Rn. a re meant t o be

read in f a i r l y close conjunction. See T hesleff (1982) p1S2 f f , 1S7 f f
and pi 88 fo r a d isc u ssio n and fu r th e r referen ces on th e d a te s and
r e la tiv e sequence of th e Rm. and Tht. Note to o t h a t th e Rn. and Tht.
have sim ila r in tro d u cto ry dram atic fram es, and th e Tht. i s concerned
with th e death o f both T heaetetus (in tro d u ctio n ) and Socrates
(co n clu sio n).

37) See Pm.127b fo r Parmenides' age, and Tht.210d fo r S o c ra te s', where

10S
as he i s about to face th e charge o f Meletus he must be 69 o r 70.

38) The re le v a n t inform ation i s th a t S ocrates was born in 470, and i s

described as [sphodra neon] (Rn.127c) and [neos] (Rn.130e1 and 135d),
and in referen ces to t h i s dialogue as [panu neos] (Tht.183e8) and [neos
on] (So.217c7). We a re a ls o to ld th a t t h i s i s th e year o f a g re a t
Panathenaia (Pm. 127b), which were held every four y e a rs. The usual
argument fo r 450 i s t h a t 20 i s about th e youngest Socrates could be in
o rd er to p la u s ib ly have such a conversation w ith Parmenides. However, i f
Socrates i s 16 t h i s would s h i f t th e dram atic d a te back e x ac tly one
olynpiad to th e g re a t Panathenaia of 454, and gives a b e tte r sense to
[sphodra neon] and [peinu neo s], which I th in k suggest an age somewhat
younger than 20. T heaetetus i s described a s a [meirakion] (Tht.142c,
143e, e tc ) or a s [neos] (Tht.142c, 148c, e tc ) interchangeably, while a t
So.237a he i s a [p a is ]. I t may a ls o be re le v a n t t h a t a t So.237a th e E.S
says "When we were your age, my boy, th e g re a t Parmenides argued t h i s
from beginning to end". This may suggest t h a t 16 i s th e c o rre c t age to
be su b jected to such arguments. The 'we' may re fe r to o th e r members of
th e p re se n t company, i . e S ocrates, carrying th e im p licatio n t h a t he was
th e same age a s Theaetetus when he met Parmenides. Antiphon a ls o stu d ied
th e dialogue when he was a [meirakion] (Pm. 126c6). While th e se arguments
are h ard ly d e c isiv e , 454 has a t l e a s t as much in i t s favour a s 450.

39) This suggestion w ill a f f e c t th e d a tes of Parmenides and Zeno, i f we

a re t o g enerate th ese from t h i s dialogue. I t i s sometimes argued, e .g
KRS (1983) p240 th a t as P la to gives ex act ages and has no reason t o do
so, th a t i t i s lik e ly t h a t h is chronology i s c o rre c t. However, he gives
approximate ages, Parmenides being 'about 65' (Pm.127b) and Zeno being
'n e a rly 40' (Rn.127b), and one reason fo r giving approximate r e la tiv e
ages independant of c o rre c t chronology may be to emphasise a m aster/
p u p il re la tio n s h ip between them. A lte rn a tiv e ly , th e re i s th e dubious
testim ony of i ^ l l o d o r u s (See Burnet (1892), p i 69 f f ) , vdio gives
Parmenides' f l o r u i t and Zeno's b ir th a s 504-500, but t h i s seems to be
based so le ly on th e notion t h a t Zeno was Parmenides' p u p il, vAo was
Xenophanes' p u p il, whose f l o r u i t i s given a s 544-540, th e foundation of
E lea, and t h a t p u p ils a re born in th e f l o r u i t o f th e m aster.

40) Cf. T h t.144 f f and 210c and Pm.128c, 130a, 130e and 135d.
41) See Pm.136e and 137b.
42) Cf. Tht.161de and 179a. A fu rth e r im p licatio n o f t h i s may be t h a t
while Parmenides and S ocrates know v^o to speak t o and vÆio t o be s i l e n t
w ith, Protagoras does n o t. Cf. Pdr.276a, where Socrates comments "The
word ^ i c h i s w ritte n w ith knowledge on th e mind o f th e le a rn e r, is
capable o f defending i t s e l f and knows before whom i t i s necessary to
speak o r be s i l e n t " .
43) Cf. Rm. 135d f f and th e a llu s io n s to gymnastics and w re stlin g w ith
words and accounts a t T ht. 162b and 169a, and th e s e ttin g o f th e dialogue
around a [gumnasion] may be intended to emphasis t h i s . Note a ls o t h a t
th e E.S r e f e rs to th e t r i a l undergone by T ht. and about t o be undergone
by th e young Socrates in th e So. as 'gym nastics' a t P it.2 5 7 c .
44) There i s a ls o a strong p a r a l le l between th e a g ric u ltu r a l metaphors
of th e Pdr. (the gardante ho p la n ts seed and n u rtu res i t t o f r u itio n )
and th e midwifery imagery o f th e Tht. I n te re s tin g ly , when Socrates
d escrib es him self as a midwife o f id e a s, h is f i r s t i l l u s t r a t i o n i s

106
a g ric u ltu r a l (Tht.149de), about s o i l , seeds and h a rv e stin g , perhaps an
a llu s io n to Pdr.276b f f , th e passage concerning th e farm er who knows how
and when to sow h is seed. Theaetetus i s of course a ls o *pregnant' w ith
'w ind^ggs ' which must be p roperly d e a lt w ith. I t i s S ocrates who has
p rev io u sly made Theaetetus pregnant a t a d ista n c e ; see (H it.148e).

45) Cf. Tht.152c and 155d fo r sim ila r comments on P rotagoras, Tht.183e
fo r th e d is tin c tio n w ith Parmenides. Cf. B um yeat's comments (1991) p314
n.40 on [bathos] a s having resonances of composure as w ell as depth in
d is tin c tio n to th e H eraclitean s, and Tht. 180c on th e p ra c tic e o f th e
a n c ie n ts .
46) See e .g Sayre (1983) p240, and c f . Lloyd (1968) p83/4.

47) Following B u rn e t's t e x t h ere.

48) I tak e i t t h a t Tht.144e f f e s ta b lis h e s Theodorus a s a s u ita b le so u l,

a s he is 's k ille d in astronomy, mathematics, music and i s widely
educated' .

49) I t i s h ig h ly lik e ly t h a t Theaetetus and Theodorus have read

P ro tag o ras' book, though th e Greek does not make t h i s e n tir e ly c le a r .
When Socrates asks i f th ey know of P ro tag o ras' views, [anagignoskein] a t
152a can mean e ith e r 't o know a c c u ra te ly ' or 't o read ' (c f. 170a). At
th e very l e a s t Theaetetus and Theodorus a re w ell acquainted w ith th e
co n ten ts of P ro tag o ras' book.

50) A good example o f Theodorus' reluctance i s 162a, where he says 'He

was my f rie n d , S ocrates, as you j u s t s a id . T herefore I would n o t favour
th e re fu ta tio n o f Protagoras through my own adm issions, but n e ith e r do I
wish t o oppose you co n trary to my own opinion ' . Hardly th e view o f a man
in sp ired by P ro tag o ras' w ritin g s ! Cf. Tht. 168e, where Socrates says to
Theodorus " I t i s not j u s t I alone v^o must defend your deceased frie n d
in every p o ssib le manner, w hile you do noth in g ." Note to o t h a t a s a
frie n d , he i s someone Protagoras would have had o ra l communication w ith,
and y e t i s s t i l l uninspired by P rotagoras' views.

51) S ocrates t e l l s us th a t "This might not be so, my frie n d , i f indeed

th e fa th e r o f t h i s t a l e were s t i l l a liv e , fo r he would have much t o say
in i t s defence. Now we a re abusing h is orphan. For n o t even those who
Protagoras appointed i t s guardians, such as Theodorus h e re , a re w illin g
t o come t o i t s defence. In th e in te r e s ts of ju s tic e , we s h a ll venture to
defend i t ourselves" (T ht.164e).

52) See here a ls o Bumyeat (1976) p31 f f on seme o f th e im p licatio n s fo r

id e n tity through tim e f o r th e Protagorean/ H eraclitean th e s is .

53) There may be a fu rth e r p o in t being pushed here concerning th e way

t h a t P ro tag o ras' epistemology has been tie d t o a H eraclitean ontology.
For th e measure d o ctrin e to be tr u e , th e world would have t o c o n s is t of
a s e r ie s of d is c r e te in d iv id u a l in s ta n ts , about which each measurer
makes a judgement before th e world changes again. I f th e re i s no
tem poral c o n tin u ity , then th e re i s nothing t h a t holds bodies to g eth er
through tim e, such t h a t th ey are only a c o lle c tio n o f p ro p e rtie s , which
could q u ite p o ssib ly come a p a rt a t th e next in s ta n t. The p o in t f o r th e
image o f P ro tag o ras' head popping out of th e ground to u t te r an
o b jec tio n and then be away again may be th a t we g e t only th e rele v an t
p a rt o f Protagoras fo r an in s ta n t.

107
54) One might compare th e treatm en t o f Protarchus and Philebus in th e
Plb; th e a e sth e te Philebus ( 'lo v e r boy* ?) makes a c o n trib u tio n only
when i t p lea se s him (note h is s h o rt a tte n tio n span and P la to 's
c h a ra c te ris a tio n o f p leasu re w ithout in te llig e n c e ) while Protarchus
( 'f o r o r d e r ' ?) conducts th e d iscu ssio n w ith S ocrates.

55) See Owen (1953) g en erally on s im ila r itie s between th e Rep. and the
Tim, and esp. p330 n.1 on th e s tr ik in g s im ila r itie s between Tim. 18b3 and
Rep.419a10.
56) E.g Tht.203de, where an argument tak es to i t s h e e ls and escapes, as
S ocrates and T heaetetus have not been watching i t p ro p erly ; p o ssib ly an
a llu s io n to Men.97d f f and th e lik en in g o f arguments to th e s ta tu e s of
Daedalus.
57) Cf. Lloyd (1991) p342/343.

58) Contra V lastos (1939) p380, who argues t h a t th e myth of th e Tim.

should be tr e a te d d if f e r e n tly from P la to 's oth er myths, as "The Timaeus
uses none o f th e devices by which a l l o f th e se disavow th e s c i e n t if i c
serio u sn ess of major se c tio n s o f t h e i r accounts".

59) Cf. Tim.2Id and 26d.

60) We have a ls o seen Socrates upbraid Phaedrus fo r being in te re s te d in

th e pedigree o f a myth ra th e r than i t s content; see esp. P d r.275 be, c f.
V lastos (1939) p380.

61) Cf. Pdr.274a f f .

62) See Pdr.229b f f .
63) C f. Crm. 165 f f on 'know y o u rs e lf'.
64) See Pdr.229d f f .
65) I b eliev e th e re to be p a r a lle ls w ith th e deuteros pious of th e Pdo,
which a ls o throws us onto our own resources, as discussed in c h .2.

66) Note fo r in stan ce t h a t Timaeus i s d is in te re s te d in th e genealogy of

th e Gods a t Tim.40e f f .

67) Tÿpho was a monster w ith one hundred heads, so I tr a n s la te

[haplousteron] a s single-m inded, [atuphou] a t 230a6 i s the
a lp h a -p riv a tiv e from [tuphos], v an ity , and a pun on a-Œÿpho.
68) This same argument i s a ls o , I suggest, what allow s S ocrates to
launch in to myth in th e middle o f th e Pdr, d e sp ite h i s e a r l i e r rude
comments about myth; i t i s a myth concerning th e n a tu re o f humans and
t h e i r r e la tio n to th e world, and one t h a t we can make some philo so p h ical
d isc rim in atio n s about.

108
CEÎAPTER FIVE

CELESTIAL MOTION IN THE TIMAEUS

The main aim o f t h i s chapter i s to argue t h a t in th e Timaeus th e motion

o f th e heavenly bodies i s reg u la r and amenable to p re c ise mathematical
d e sc rip tio n , con trary to P la to 's e a r l i e r view as expressed in th e
Republic. This i s im portant both a s a m atter of P la to n ic sch o larsh ip ,
where i t has been c o n tro v e rsia l, and as an episode in th e h is to ry of
scien ce. P la to 's t e l i e f in th e reg u la r and c irc u la r motion o f the
heavenly bodies s e ts th e stag e fo r astronomy fo r th e next two m ille n ia ,
so th e development o f h is views i s o f some i n te r e s t. This change in
cosmology perhaps a ls o gives us a new c r ite r io n fo r th e re la tiv e dating
of P la to 's works. I s h a ll argue t h a t th e l a s t expression o f the Republic
view comes in th e P o litic u s , and th a t those works t h a t share th e
Timaeus' view, th e C r itia s , Philebus, Laws and Epinomis might a l l be
dated l a t e r . I s h a ll a ls o argue t h a t i t i s p o ssib le t o d isc e rn a change
in P la to 's a ttitu d e to th e in e v ita b ility o f p o l i t i c a l , s o c ia l and moral
degeneration, and th a t t h i s may be linked to th e cosm ological changes. I
argue th a t my group of l a t e r dialogues disown th e in e v ita b le
degeneration o f th e e a r l i e r works and d isc u ss Owen's arguments
concerning cosmology and p o l i t i c s fo r an e a rly d atin g o f th e Timaeus.

The key passage in th e Republic concerning th e re g u la rity of c e l e s ti a l

motion i s th e follow ing. Socrates asks
"Won't th e tr u e astronomer be s im ila rly persuaded v^en he gazes
upon th e movements of th e s t a r s ? He w ill hold th a t th e a r c h ite c t o f th e
heavens and what i s in them has constructed th ese th in g s as b e a u tifu lly
as i s p o ssib le fo r such works. But concerning th e proportion o f n ig h t to
day, o f th ese to month, of month to year, and o f th e oth er s t a r s to
th ese and each o th e r, w ouldn't he consider i t absurd to expect th ese
th in g s always t o behave in th e same manner and never t o dev iate
[ p a r a la tte in ] in any way, as they a re p hysical and v is ib le , and absurd
too to seek by every means t o grasp th e t r u t h aEx)ut them ? (Rep.530a) ^
The p o s itio n o f th e Republic seems q u ite c le a r on whether th e re i s a
constant re la tio n sh ip o f th e periods of th e s t a r s t o each o th e r, and

109
hence whether th e re i s reg u lar c e l e s t i a l motion. We cannot expect
p h y sical and v is ib le e n t i t i e s always t o behave in th e same manner and
not to d e v ia te .2 We can fin d sim ila r though more general comments in th e
myth o f th e P o litic u s ,^ and th e Phaedo to o appears t o adopt
s u b s ta n tia lly th e same p o s itio n . There th e myth draws a p a r a l le l , which
* Æ
we might term th e 'f i s h 3 ey e' view of th e world. J u s t a s a f is h might
look up and see th e sun and s t a r s through th e w ater, and b e liev e th e sea
to be th e tr u e heaven, only to be disabused i f they were t o p u t t h e i r
heads above w ater, so we, liv in g in th e hollows o f th e e a rth liv e in a
murkier world than th e tr u e heaven. E xactly what lesson we a re t o draw
about th e n atu re o f th e heavens and o f astronomy i s u n clear, though i t
may w ell be t h a t we see th e same s o r t of b lu rred and unstable image of
th e heavens a s a f is h would see o f th e world i f i t were t o look up
through tu rb u le n t w aters.
One might a ls o argue t h a t P lato i s committed to a degenerating
cosmology. The c le a r e s t statem ent o f t h i s occurs in th e myth o f the
P o litic u s a t 273b f f , where we a re to ld t h a t th e p h y sical world has a
tendency t o degenerate from i t s c u rre n t s t a t e t o one o f t o t a l d iso rd e r.
So to o th e passage a t Republic 529d f f can be read as saying th a t not
only do th e p la n e ts n o t follow m athem atically p re c ise o r b its , b u t th a t
th e i r o r b its a re a ls o c o n tin u ally decaying. I have tra n s la te d
[p a ra la tte in ] a t 530b3 as 't o d e v ia te ' b u t i t i s worth noting i t s
resonances as given by LSJ, 'to change o r a l t e r a l i t t l e , esp. fo r th e
w o rse ... to pass a sid e , tu rn from th e p a th , t o d e v ia te , v a ry ' . ^ One
might see such a degeneration a s an expression o f th e general p rin c ip le
enunciated a t Republic 546a t h a t "All th in g s th a t come to be must a ls o
decay", where i t i s used to underpin a d e sc rip tio n o f in e v ita b le s o c ia l
and p o l i t i c a l degeneration. One can fin d sim ila r language of corruption
and decay in th e myth o f th e Phaedo, where S ocrates t e l l s us th a t
"This e a rth and th e stones and th e whole region have been corrupted
and eaten away, a s th in g s in th e sea a re by s a l t w ater." (Pdo. 110a)
One in te rp re ta tio n o f th e Timaeus has i t in agreement w ith th e
Republic on th ese m a tte rs. Burkert comments t h a t in th e Republic, P la to
"Was s t i l l o f th e opinion t h a t r e a l e x actitu d e was im possible in
th e p h y sical world, so t h a t th e tr u e astronomer should not depend on
sense perception but busy him self w ith p u rely id e a l magnitudes and
movements. In th e Timaeus, to o , P la to speaks w ithout h e s ita tio n o f the
'w andering' of th e p la n e ts .

110
C ertain ly th e re a re th in g s to be sa id in favour o f t h i s s o r t of
p o s itio n . The p la n e ts a re o fte n re fe rre d t o by th e use of [p lan es], 'a
wanderer*, and i t s cognates. ^ We might wish t o equate t h i s usage of
[planes] w ith t h a t a t Timaeus 48a9, where we a re to ld of [te s planomenos
eidos a i t i a s ] , th e 'wandering cause* which prevents th e complete
expression of reason in th e universe. So w hile reason might wish the
heavenly bodies to move in an o rd erly manner, th e d ic ta te s of th e
compromise w ith n e c e ssity to which a l l p h y sical e n t i t i e s a re su b ject
ensures th a t they move ir r e g u la r ly . Thus [planes] a ttr ib u te s d iso rd e rly
motion to th e heavens. However, I b e liev e t h a t th e re a re considerable
d i f f i c u l t i e s w ith t h i s view. Instead I s h a ll argue t h a t c e l e s ti a l motion
in th e Timaeus i s e n tir e ly re g u la r, and t h a t the [planes] d e sc rip tio n is
used in two sep arate ways. In th e context of astronomy i t merely
d istin g u is h e s th e fix ed s t a r s from those bodies vAiich move in complex
o r b its and so 'wander * across th e sky, while in o th er contexts i t
c a r r ie s th e a ttr ib u tio n of d iso rd e rlin e s s .
F ir s t consider th e use of [planes] in th e context of astronomy. At
34a Timaeus t e l l s us t h a t th e demiurge gave to th e universe
"A motion proper to i t s body, th a t of th e seven motions which i s
b e s t su ite d t o reason and in te llig e n c e . Therefore he made i t move in a
c ir c le , revolving of i t s e l f uniform ly and in th e same p la c e , and he took
from i t a l l tr a c e o f th e oth er s ix motions® and kept i t fre e from t h e ir
wanderings [kai aplanes a p eirg aseto ekeinon]." (Tim.34a)
There i s then a t l e a s t one motion which i s [aplanes ] . ^ F urther, a t 40b
Timaeus d istin g u ish e s between 'th e s ta r s which do not wander' [hos
aplane to n a stro n ] (40b4), and th e p la n e ts 'which tu rn and as such
wander ' [ta de trepomena k a i planen to ia u te n ischonta] (40b6). This i s
ra th e r awkward fo r th e p o sitio n I have sketched, according to which
th e re should be no [aplanes] c e l e s ti a l m o t i o n . W h a t though of th e
bodies vhich do have [planes] motion ? Concerning th e o r b its o f the
p la n e ts , Timaeus t e l l s us th a t
"Men do n o t name them nor in v e s tig a te th e mathematical re la tio n s
[summetrountai skopountes arithm ois] between them, so t h a t they do not
know th a t th e wanderings of th ese s t a r s c o n s titu te tim e [chronon onta
t a s touton p la n a s], a s they possess immense complexity and form
asto n ish in g p a tte rn s ." (Tim.39c)
Now, i f th e wanderings o f th e p la n e ts c o n s titu te tim e, and these
wanderings a re ir r e g u la r , then tim e w ill be ir r e g u la r. Thus [planes]

111
cannot a tt r ib u t e ir r e g u la r ity of motion when ap p lied to th e heavenly
bodies; more lik e ly i t merely d istin g u ish e s th e mobile hands o f the
c e l e s t i a l clock (the p la n e ts) from th e s t a t i c numerals (the fixed
s ta r s
I t i s illu m in atin g to compare t h i s passage w ith Republic 530a. Both
t a l k o f how th e motions o f th e heavenly bodies r e l a te t o tim e, b u t here
th e emphasis on th e d ev iatio n s o f p h y sic al bodies and th e consequent
ir r e g u la r ity of c e l e s t i a l motion has been l o s t . In stead , i t seems th a t
most men, including perhaps th e younger P la to , have been led a s tra y by
th e immense complexity o f th e heavens and have n o t pro p erly in v estig ate d
th e mathematical re la tio n sh ip s between th e s t a r s . Note fo r instance th e
d iffe re n c e between th e [summetria], 'p ro p o rtio n s' a t Rep.530a8 vdiich
d e v ia te , and th e p re c isio n of th e [summetrountai arithm ois]
'comnensurates in number' th a t we a re t o in v e s tig a te a t Tim.39c8.
I f P lato d id not a t any stage countenance an ir re g u la r flow of
tim e, then h is conception of what c o n s titu te s time may a ls o have
changed. In order to judge t h a t c e l e s ti a l time i s irr e g u la r we need some
independent access t o ab so lu te tim e. How t h i s i s done i s l e f t
u nspecified in th e Republic, but i t i s c le a r t h a t ab so lu te tim e th e re
cannot be c o n stitu te d out o f th e motions o f th e p la n e ts . I t may w ell be
th a t P lato had not considered th ese d i f f i c u l t i e s a t th e tim e o f w ritin g
th e Republic and had no c le a r ideas concerning th e n a tu re o f absolute
time or how we might gain access to i t . 12
One might t r y to grasp th e n e tt l e h ere though, and argue th a t
perhaps fo r P la to , w ith h is view of th e im perfection o f th e physical
world, time does n o t flow in a p e rfe c tly reg u lar manner. While th e re i s
1 -5
no e j ^ l i c i t statem ent on t h i s m atter, th e re a re some p o in ts which
weigh h eav ily a g a in st such a view. Timaeus t e l l s us t h a t th e demiurge
"Intended to c re a te a movable image o f e te r n ity , and a t th e same
tim e as ordering th e heavens, he made from th e e te r n ity t h a t re sid e s in
u n ity an e te rn a l image moving according to number [ k a f arithmon
io u s in ], t h a t which we have c a lle d tim e." (Tim.37d)
Now, although tim e may be le s s p e rfe c t than t h a t which i t i s an image
o f, t h i s does n o t e n ta il t h a t i t s flow i s irr e g u la r . The c o n tra s t here
between s t a b i l i t y in u n ity and motion according t o number i s s u f f ic ie n t.
A ll t h a t i s required i s t h a t tim e flows while e te r n ity stands s t i l l ,
and th e phrase 'moving according t o number' would suggest t h a t time
flows in an o rd erly manner.

112
 The comments of A ris to tle , or ra th e r th e lack o f them, may a ls o be
in d ic a tiv e of P la to 's thought h e re . A ris to tle begins h is d iscu ssio n of
time in th e Physics with h is usual h is to r ic a l survey and c ritic is m of
h is predecessors. He s ta te s th a t
"Some have id e n tifie d tim e w ith th e rev o lu tio n o f th e whole, and
o th ers w ith th e sphere i t s e l f . " (Phys.218b)
A r is to tle i s thought to be re fe rrin g to P lato and th e Pythagoreans
re s p e c tiv e ly . ^^ His general c ritic is m i s th a t tim e, while in tim ately
re la te d to motion should n o t be id e n tifie d w ith motion. He s ta te s th a t
"Time i s not motion, but t h a t by which we can q u an tify m o tio n ...
Not only do we measure motion in terms o f tim e, b u t tim e in terms of
motion to o , because they a re defined by each o th e r. For tim e determ ines
th e q u a n tity of motion and motion the q u a n tity o f tim e." (Phys.219b f f )
A ris to tle a ls o gives us what i s perhaps th e f i r s t surviving e x p lic it
statem ent o f th e uniform ity o f time
"Time i s a lik e everywhere and in re la tio n to a l l th in g s . F u rth er,
change i s always f a s te r or slow er, but tim e i s n o t. For f a s t and slow
a re defined in terms of tim e, f a s t being more movement in le s s tim e,
slow being le s s in more, b u t tim e cannot d efin e tim e, being n e ith e r an
amount nor a type of i t . " (Phys.218b)
Now while A ris to tle has been more than happy t o c r i t i c i s e P la to and h is
o th er predecessors in t h i s se c tio n o f th e Physics, th e re i s no c ritic is m
o f them on t h i s p o in t. Had P la to advocated a non-uniform flow o f tim e in
th e Timaeus we might w ell expect to fin d some c ritic is m o f i t , e ith e r in
18
th e Physics, o r elsevhere in A ris to tle , but we do n o t.
One can c o n stru ct a sim ila r ex s i l e n t i o argument f o r th e re la te d
m atter o f th e reg u lar motion o f th e heavenly b o d ies. ^^ In th e De Caelo
A r is to tle i s again c r i t i c a l of P la to and o t h e r s , b u t s t a t e s , w ithout
any c ritic is m of P la to 's views th a t
"The revo lu tio n o f th e heavens i s th e measure o f a l l m otions,
because i t alone i s continuous, uniform and e te r n a l." (De Caelo.287a)
Other a n c ie n t sources a re a ls o unanimous in th e view t h a t th e Timaeus
advocates reg u la r c e l e s ti a l motion. 21
A fu rth e r consideration i s th e s t a b i l i t y of th e s o la r system and
th e n atu re o f th e g re a t y ear. Timaeus t e l l s us
" I t i s e n tir e ly p o ssib le t o grasp th e exact amount of tim e elapsed
a t th e completion o f th e p e rfe c t y e a r." (Tim.39d)
I f th e re i s a s p e c ific amount o f tim e between th e grand conjunctions,

113
then c e l e s t i a l motion must be re g u la r, or we a re l e f t w ith th e h ighly
improbable a lte r n a tiv e t h a t th e irre g u la r motions somehow cancel each
oth er o u t. In t h a t case, th e g re a t year would lo se i t s sig n ific a n c e a s a
sig n o f th e r a tio n a l ordering o f th e u niverse. I f th e g re a t year rec u rs,
and th e re i s no suggestion in th e Timaeus t h a t i t does n o t, then
c e l e s t i a l motion must be re g u la r and th e s o la r system s ta b le and fre e
from any degeneration.
One might a ls o n o te, in r e la tio n to t h i s passage, th e way in which
in th e Timaeus we can make p re c ise c a lc u la tio n s about th e v is ib le
heavenly bodies in d is tin c tio n t o th e p o sitio n o f th e Republic 530a f f .
The g eneral id ea t h a t th e v is ib le heavens a re amenable t o c a lc u la tio n
p r o lif e r a te s throughout th e Timaeus, as does th e id ea t h a t events
occur in th e physical world [ k a f arithm on], 'according t o number'.
One must a ls o ta k e in to account th e f a c t th a t Timaeus t e l l s us th a t
th e rev o lu tio n s of th e mind o f God, the v is ib le m an ifestatio n s of which
a re th e motions o f heavenly bodies, a re e n tir e ly unwandering [pantos
a p la n e is] (47c3), while our own mental o r b its wander [peplanemenas ]
(47c3). We can compare t h i s w ith Timaeus 40b, v^ere [planes] and
[aplanes] are used o f th e p la n e ts and th e fix ed s ta r s re sp e c tiv e ly .
E ith er P la to has made an o v e rsig h t, or [planes] i s being used in two
d if f e r e n t sen ses. Outside o f i t s s p e c ific use in astronomy of
d istin g u ish in g p la n e ts from fix ed s t a r s , [planes] again tak es on i t s
sense o f d is o rd e rlin e s s , but here we a re to ld th a t th e motions of th e
heavens a re not d iso rd e rly .

II

One o b jec tio n to t h i s p o s itio n might ask how i t i s t h a t a s th e ph y sical

world i s supposed t o be an im perfect copy, th e re can be p e rfe c tly
reg u lar c e l e s t i a l motion. F i r s t l y , we need to consider th e d ifferen c e
fo r P la to between id e a l and uniform motion. I f we were t o d escrib e th e
usual Newtonian scenario to P la to , of a body moving in a s tr a ig h t lin e
a t a co n stan t v e lo c ity u n less acted upon by e x te rn a l fo rc e s , would he
consider such motion to be p e rfe c t ? The answer t o t h i s , I argue, i s no.
In th e Laws th e Athenian Stranger asks "What i s th e n atu re of ra tio n a l
motion ?" (Le.897d), and answers h im self, saying
"R ational motion a c ts in one way, and i s uniform, re g u la r, in one
p la c e , around th e same c en tre and in r e la tio n to th e same th in g s , and in
accordance w ith one reason and p lan ." (L e.898a)

114
This gives us s ix c r i t e r i a fo r ra tio n a l motion, to which we can add some
more from th e hierarch y of motions discussed a t Laws 893b f f , such as
th e p rin c ip le t h a t th e b e s t s o r t o f motion moves i t s e l f and i s not moved
by o th e rs . I t i s c le a r from t h i s th a t we can remove some o f the
q u a lific a tio n s fo r p e rfe c tly ra tio n a l motion w ithout lo sin g re g u la rity
o r uniform ity, as they a re necessary b u t n o t s u f f ic ie n t co n d itio n s. Thus
th e u n iv o c a lity of 'r e g u la r ' and 'p e r f e c t' can be broken. This appears
t o be th e course t h a t th e Timaeus t a k e s . T h e motion o f th e whole
u niverse i s one o f uniform ro ta tio n e n tir e ly f re e from th e o th er six
m otions. Consider how th e motion o f th e fix ed s ta r s rela te s t o t h i s .
Timaeus t e l l s us th a t w hile they have tr a n s la tio n a l motion due to
obeying th e motion o f th e same
"With regard to th e o th er fiv e m otions, they a re m otionless and
s t i l l , in o rder t h a t each might a t t a i n th e g re a te s t p o ssib le
p e rfe c tio n ." (Tim. 40a)
One can show th e re g u la rity of t h i s tr a n s la tio n a l motion in two ways.
F ir s tly , i t i s equated w ith the motion o f th e same, and secondly, we
a re to ld t h a t i t c o n sists of only one o f th e s ix motions t o the
exclusion o f th e oth er f iv e . 2 7 Such motion i s le s s p e rfe c t than t h a t of
th e universe a s a vhole in th e hierarch y of m otions, b u t t h i s is
achieved by coitplexity ra th e r than irre g u la rity .^ ® So to o w ith th e
p la n e ts . Their motion may be le s s p e rfe c t than t h a t o f th e fixed s t a r s ,
but t h i s i s because t h e i r paths a re more corrplex, being su b je ct to th e
motion o f th e d if f e r e n t as w ell a s t h a t o f th e same.^®
The Timaeus does n o t, un lik e th e Laws, s p e c if ic a lly condemn the
d e sc rip tio n o f th e p la n e ts as [p la n e ta ], because o f th e ambiguous use of
t h i s term . One p o in t o f i n te r e s t concerning th e condemnation in th e Laws
is t h a t i t reads lik e a stro n g ly worded c la r if i c a t io n o f a m atter on
which P lato may have f e l t t h a t he was m isunderstood. The Athenian s ta te s
c a te g o ric a lly th a t
"The usual opinion concerning th e sun, moon, and o th e r p la n e ts ,
t h a t they a t some time wander [p la n a ta i], i s n o t th e case; p re c is e ly th e
opposite i s tr u e . For each of th e se bodies always tr a v e l on one p ath ,
and n o t many, although t h i s may n o t seem so ." (Leg.822a)
This passage shows t h a t th e Laws to o operates w ith th e id ea o f reg u lar
c e l e s t i a l motion, as i s borne o u t in se v e ra l places.®®
So to o th e Philebus assumes th e re g u la rity of c e l e s t i a l motion.
That th e universe has a so u l, and th a t th e y e ars, seasons and months a re
arranged by in te llig e n c e a re emphasised a t Philebus 30a and 30c

115
resp ectiv ely .^ ^ Philebus 30d t e l l s us t h a t a kingly soul i s behind t h i s
in te llig e n c e , and t h a t th e re a re o th ers which carry o u t sim ila r
fu n ctio n s. That i s very much in lin e w ith th e Timaeus p o s itio n , where
th e demiurge c re a te s th e order o f th e world, and then has le s s e r
op
daemons, whose embodiment a re th e heavenly bodies, mark out tim e. This
i s im portant because we a re to ld t h a t p a in and p lea su re a re t o be
equated w ith d e te rio ra tio n and r e s t o ^3 and, in lin e w ith th e
r a t i o n ,

general te n o r o f th e Laws, t h a t i t would be q u ite u n f ittin g f o r th e Gods

to experience pleasure o r p a i n . 34 i f so then th e heavenly bodies cannot
s u ffe r any d e te rio ra tio n and hence, l ik e th e Timaeus b u t u n lik e the
Republic, t h e i r motions ought t o be e n tir e ly r e g u l a r . ^5 one might a ls o
coitpare th e general te n o r o f th e remarks a t Philebus 28-33 w ith those of
th e Laws 967 f f . There i s th e same emphasis on th e o rder o f th e heavens
and th e sup position t h a t th e s t a r s have so u ls, and th e same d e n ig ratio n
of previous th in k e rs who thought otherw ise.
This change t o a more s ta b le cosmology may be in d ic a tiv e o f a
deeper re th in k of some m etaphysical issu e s on P la to 's p a rt concerning
how mathematics r e la te to the motions o f th e heavens. One might suggest
here two q u ite d if f e r e n t analogues f o r t h i s re la tio n s h ip . F i r s t l y , th e re
i s th e r e la tio n between th e definition o f a geom etrical e n tity and any
diagram of i t t h a t we might draw. Secondly, th e re i s th e re la tio n
between a number, and any group o f th in g s t h a t has t h a t number. The key
d iffe re n c e between th ese two i s t h a t while a geom etrical diagram must
d e v ia te from th e re le v an t d e fin itio n , a group has i t s number p re c is e ly .
Now i t i s f a i r l y c le a r which of th ese analogues i s in p lay in th e
R epublic's d iscu ssio n o f astronomy. F i r s t l y , P la to has S ocrates t e l l us
th a t we ought to t r e a t th e heavens a s i f they were a w ell drawn
diagram. Vfe might admire th e s k i l l o f th e craftsm an who created such a
th in g , b ut j u s t as we w ouldn't examine a drawing to 'le a r n th e tr u th
about equal and double' (Rep.529e), so w ith th e heavens. That i s a
reasonable and uncontentious p o in t. However, t h a t analogue i s then
applied to th e re la tio n between th e motions of th e heavens and t h e ir
mathem atical d e sc rip tio n s , w ith th e r e s u l t t h a t th e heavenly motions a re
then im perfect in s ta n tia tio n s of some id e a l, and so th e re i s no con stan t
r e la tio n between th e p eriods o f th e heavenly bodies.^® That, to th e
modern eye a t le a s t , i s an e rr o r . Our thinking i s t h a t bodies p e rfe c tly
express th e mathematical laws which govern them. I f we look to th e
l in e a lle g o ry , i t may w ell be t h a t t h i s analogue i s used q u ite g en erally
fo r th e r e la tio n o f th e i n t e l l i g i b l e to th e se n s ib le .

116
 However, as P la to changes h is mind on th e re g u la rity of c e l e s ti a l
motion, i t i s p o ssib le t h a t he a ls o moves t o th e second analogue fo r the
re la tio n o f mathematics to th ese m otions, one t h a t would c e rta in ly
b e tte r underpin such a cosmology. Admittedly d ir e c t evidence o f such a
change o f analogue i s sp a rse , but th e c o n tra s t t h a t th e Philebus a t
l e a s t i s in te re s te d in i s between th e a rith m e tic o f th e philosophers and
th a t o f th e masses, th e former working w ith pure numbers, th e l a t t e r
'w ith two arm ies and two b u lls and two extrem ely sm all o r extremely
la rg e th in g s ' The Philebus a ls o suggests t h a t t h i s analogue i s th e
ap p ro p riate one fo r many o th er f ie ld s o f s t u d y . I f t h i s second
analogue i s in place f o r th e re la tio n of mathematics to th e motions of
th e heavens in th e Timaeus, then t h a t would explain th e move t o reg u lar
motion, and i f i t i s in place q u ite g e n erally , i t would ex p lain th e
Timaeus' constant in siste n c e t h a t events occur [ k a f arithm on].

Ill

One o b jec tio n here to th e notion t h a t th e heavens move in a regular

manner in th e Timaeus i s th e problem of th e r e la tio n o f reason and
n e c e ssity . We a re to ld th a t
"The generation o f t h i s universe was th e bringing to g eth er o f a
combination o f n e ce ssity and in te llig e n c e . In te llig e n c e ruled n e ce ssity
by persuading her to lead th e g r e a te s t p a r t of th e th in g s th a t were
generated towards th e b e s t. I t was in t h i s way, through n ece ssity
subm itting to s e n s i b l e p e r s u a s i o n , th a t t h i s universe was in th e
beginning brought to g e th e r. I f t h i s was th e manner o f i t s g eneration,
then r e a lly speaking one must bring in th e way in which th e wandering
a i t i a a c ts ." (Tim.48a)
What does P lato mean by n e ce ssity though, and how i s i t t h a t n e c e ssity
can be 'persuaded' by anything ? P lato speaks of n e ce ssity
acc oirplishing th in g s o f chance and d i s o r d e r . ^4 As reason only scores a
p a r t i a l v ic to ry over n e c e ssity , th e re i s then some re s id u a l chance and
d i s o r d e r .N o w i t seems stran g e t h a t n e c e ssity should be a sso ciated
w ith th ese th in g s . However, one might ta k e both chance and d iso rd e r in
two sep ara te senses, depending on what th ey are c o n tra sted w ith. An
event might be sa id t o occur by chance because th e re i s no causal chain
th a t lead s to i t s occurence, c o n tra stin g chance w ith cau sal determinism.
However, one might a ls o c o n tra s t chance w ith human design. I f we were to
b lin d ly throw p a in t a t a canvas, i t would be mere chance i f anything
good were th e r e s u lt, though no cau sal chain need be broken i f such an

117
event were t o o c c u r . S i m i l a r l y perhaps, i f th e n e c e ssity th a t Timaeus
speaks o f produces anything of worth t h i s i s chance in th e absence of
any te le o lo g ic a l design ra th e r th an in th e sense o f any breach of causal
connections.
We can ta k e th e same s o r t o f approach w ith d iso rd e r. The order t h a t
i t could be c o n trasted w ith might be t h a t o f p h y sical law, o r t h a t o f a
te le o lo g ic a l arrangement of th e phenomena. The ordinary era is s io n of
l ig h t , fo r in stan c e, might be law -lik e but d iso rd e rly , r e la tiv e to the
stim u lated eir is s io n o f l ig h t and i t s ordering in to a la s e r beam.47 ^
a n c ie n t analogue here might be th e id ea t h a t th e p rin c ip le s of m ilita ry
s tra te g y apply to a l l groups of men, but some groups a re w ell ordered
w hile o th e rs a re disordered rab b les. This i s im portant as P la to o ften
uses [ta x is ] and i t s cognates, w ith i t s connotations of drawing up in to
a good m ilita ry order in th ese co n tex ts. I f we then ta k e i t t h a t th e
p a r t i a l v ic to ry of reason over n e ce ssity i s th e p a r t i a l in s ta n tia tio n of
te le o lo g y , then th e re i s not a problem w ith p e rfe c tly reg u lar behaviour
by p h y sic al bodies.
This would ru le out th e 'homogeneous,' in te rp r e ta tio n , whereby a l l
m atter i s persuaded t o behave in a reg u lar manner 'f o r th e most p a r t '.
However, one might c it e Timaeus ' d iv isio n o f h is account in to th e works
of reason and n e c e ssity , and sep aratin g th e c e l e s ti a l and the
t e r r e s t i a l , argue t h a t while some m atter behaves in a re g u la r manner n o t
a l l o f i t does. The awkward question then i s . I f th e demiurge has the
a b i l i t y to make some m atter behave re g u la rly , and wishes fo r th e world
to be as good a s p o ss ib le , v ^ at i s i t t h a t prevents him from making a l l
m atter behave re g u la rly ? I t seems to me t h a t th e re i s no s a tis fa c to ry
answer to t h i s question.
I t may be t h a t th e attem pt to com pletely in s ta n tia te th e good
produces a s e t of c o n flic tin g demands which cannot be jo in tly met. A
good example o f t h i s might be th e question o f th e human s k u ll, discussed
a t Timaeus 75bc. In order fo r us to have acute p ercep tio n , th e sk u ll
ought t o be a s th in as p o ss ib le . In order fo r i t t o p ro te c t our b rain s
and ensure a long l i f e , i t should be a s th ic k a s p o ss ib le . S im ilarly a t
75e th e re must be sane fle s h around th e s k u ll fo r th e purpose of
tem perature c o n tro l, b u t as l i t t l e a s p o ssib le so as n o t t o o b stru c t
p ercep tio n . I f we th in k of n e c e ssity in t h i s manner, then reason can
only persuade i t a s f a r as lo g ic a l p o s s ib ility w ill allow .
Cornford has raised two general o b jec tio n s to th e p o sitio n t h a t I

118
have been advocating. F i r s t l y , t h a t as n e c e ssity i s equated w ith th e
'e r r a n t cause* i t ought n o t t o be equated w ith re g u la r behaviour.
However, as I have argued above fo r 'chance* and 'd is o r d e r ', behaviour
may be e r r a n t r e la tiv e t o te le o lo g ic a l ordering ra th e r than reg u la r b u t
purposeless b e h a v io u r .S e c o n d ly , Cornford questions how reg u lar
behaviour can be persuaded in any manner. The im portant th in g to
recognise here i s th a t th e demiurge performs a once and fo r a l l a c tio n
v^en he o rd ers th e world from i t s prim o rd ial chaos. There i s then no
question o f a ghostly hand in te rfe rin g w ith causal sequences a f t e r th e
i n i t i a l o rd ering. The persuasion o f n e ce ssity l i e s in t h i s i n i t i a l
orderin g . I f th e demiurge does not bother t o order th e m atter o f th e
u n iv erse, th en anything good t h a t occurs in th e subsequent development
52
of th e cosmos w ill be p urely due t o chance. However, i f m atter i s
arranged such th a t good w ill r e s u l t from th e law -lik e development o f th e
i n i t i a l c o n d itio n s, n e ce ssity i s perhaps 'persuaded' by reason to
produce something good. I f th e demiurge n o t only arranges th e p o sitio n s
of th e m atter in th e universe b u t a ls o determ ines th e shape o f th e
fundamental p a r tic le s , then fu rth e r c o n s tra in ts e n te r th e p ic tu re . I f
th e shape o f th ese p a r tic le s must be th e most a e s th e tic a lly p leasin g ,
and th e shape o f th e p a r tic le s c o n trib u te s t o th e p ro p e rtie s t h a t they
p o ssess, then th e demiurge i s saddled w ith some more c o n s tra in ts on what
a reasoned arrangement o f th e p a r tic le s may be a b le t o achieve.
As Cornford p o in ts o u t, i t i s im portant t h a t we do not make th e
demiurge om nipotent. On my account, th e demiurge i s lim ite d by causal
n e c e ssity , which he can persuade only by a lte r in g th e i n i t i a l conditions
of th e system, and lo g ic a l p o s s ib ility which prevents him from
in s ta n tia tin g c o n flic tin g demands o f th e good.
One might a ls o o b je c t t h a t my lin e o f in te rp re ta tio n a ttr ib u te s too
much in th e way of re g u la rity and s t a b i l i t y t o th e ph y sical world o f the
Timaeus, and by allowing reason so much sway, renders to o much of th e
p h y sical world comprehensible. I f we can only have a 'l i k e l y account' of
th e p h y sical realm, one o f th e key reasons t h a t t h i s i s so may be t h a t
m atter i s incapable o f p e rfe c tly reg u la r behaviour. This i s a p o in t
which I re a d ily accept in r e la tio n to an orthodox in te rp re ta tio n o f th e
Timaeus' epistemology. However, in th e next chapter I s h a ll argue th a t
th e Timaeus has ra th e r more to say on epistemology than orthodox
accounts allow , and t h a t t h i s accords w ell w ith my account of reason and
n e c e ssity .

119
 IV

A fu rth e r consequence o f th e reg u la r behaviour o f bodies in th e Timaeus

i s a strengthening o f th e connections between e v e n t s . I n th e Phaedo,
P la to has Socrates make some strong claim s. For in stan c e, he t e l l s us
"What i s snow w ill never, according to what we sa id b efo re, admit
th e h o t and s t i l l be what i t was, snow, and a ls o h o t, bu t a t the
approach of th e h o t w ill g e t out of th e way or p e ris h ." (Pdo.103d)
So to o w ith th e converse, t h a t f i r e w ill never adm it th e cold and s t i l l
be f i r e order to make him self c le a r e r , Socrates gives a fu rth e r
. 5 7 i n

example, t h a t o f th re e and oddness, which i s tr e a te d on a p ar w ith th e

snow and cold and f i r e and h e at e x a m and th e r e la tio n here i s
p l e s , 5 8

e x p lic itly spoken o f a s n e ce ssity a t Phaedo 104d.^^ There has been some
debate a s to vrfiether P la to reduces p h y sical t o lo g ic a l n e c e ssity a t
h e re , though as a l l agree t h a t th e follow ing passage from th e Timaeus
concerning th e n ature o f f i r e and i t s r e la tio n to h e a t d eals with
p h y sical n e c e ssity I s h a ll not pursue t h a t m a t t e r .T im a e u s says
"Let us consider why we say t h a t f i r e i s h o t. We may in v e stig a te
t h i s by n o ticin g th e div id in g and c u ttin g e f f e c t t h a t i t has on our
bodies. That i t has th e property o f sharpness i s something we nearly a l l
p erceiv e. As fo r th e th in n e ss o f i t s sid e s and th e sharpness of i t s
an g les and th e sm allness o f i t s p a r tic le s and th e speed o f i t s motion,
by v irtu e o f a l l o f which i t i s e n e rg e tic and d iv is iv e , always c u ttin g
keenly whatever i t encounters, these must be accounted fo r by re c a llin g
th e o rig in o f i t s shape, and i t i s ra th e r t h i s and no o th e r property
th a t d iv id e s up our bodies in to sm all p ie c e s and which n a tu ra lly gives
i t th e q u a lity we c a l l h e at and supplies i t s name." (Tim.6Id)
That f i r e should have th e p ro p e rtie s a ttr ib u te d t o i t here i s by no
means necessary, a p o in t which th e Timaeus q u ite hap p ily adm its.
However, S orabji has argued t h a t i f fo r P lato p h y sic al bodies a re
incapable o f p e rfe c tly reg u lar behaviour th en th e re can be no question
of cau sal n e c e s s itie s , and in c e rta in works, such a s th e Republic, i t i s
unquestionable t h a t t h i s i s P la to 's p o s itio n . He comments t h a t th e
co n ten t of Republic 530b
"Is co n trary to th e s p i r i t o f those who b e liev e t h a t n ature obeys
ex cep tio n less laws, and vAo would seek ever t o improve mathematical
II g o
form ulae, to approach c lo se r to th e laws.
S o rab ji f u r th e r argues t h a t P la to d istin g u ish ed phy sical from lo g ic a l

120
n e c e ssity more sharply than a modern philosopher would as he asso c iated
n e c e ssity w ith the 'wandering cause' in th e Timaeus, and Sorabji
a sso c ia te s t h i s wandering with passages from th e Republic (530b) and th e
P o litic u s (269de) which imply th a t bodies behave i r r e g u l a r l y . ^ 3

Now, i f th e arguments o f th e previous se c tio n s have been c o rre c t,

in t h a t a t l e a s t fo r th e heavens th e Timaeus does not p o s tu la te any
d ev ian t behaviour, and t h a t n e ce ssity and th e 'wandering cause' ought
not to be a sso c iated w ith such behaviour, then c le a r ly th e re a re sane
im portant consequences fo r P la to 's philosophy o f scien c e. F ir s tly , the
Timaeus i s w ithin S o ra b ji's s p i r i t of b e lie f in natu re obeying
ex cep tio n less law s. As suggested e a r l i e r , t h i s i s alm ost c e rta in ly th e
way t h a t th e astronom ical tr a d itio n a f t e r P la to took th e challenge
rep o rted by Sim plicius t o devise a system o f re g u la r c ir c u la r motions to
f i t th e motions of th e heavens. Secondly, i t would appear t h a t not only
i s P la to in te re s te d in exploring th e p o s s ib i l i ti e s o f a cosmology which
p o stu la te s reg u lar behaviour, boir ^ a ls o concerned w ith explaining why
th e re should be such behaviour. As V lastos remarks, th e physical
philosophers who had preceded P lato had b elieved t h a t , as Leucippus p u t
i t "Nothing happens a t random, b u t everything by reason and
n e c e ssity . A ris to tle a ls o informs us t h a t Democritus argued th a t
n a tu ra l ex planation reduced to "Things always a re o r happen thus" and
f e l t t h a t "There i s no sense in looking fo r a reason fo r t h a t which
always h a p p e n s N o w of course th e re i s a modern debate to o on whether
th e r e g u la r itie s of natu re ought to be tr e a te d simply as de fac to
u n ifo rm itie s, or explained as th e consequence o f re a l d is p o s itio n a l
p r o p e r t i e s . P l a t o in th e Timaeus appears to be g e ttin g to g rip s w ith
th e key problems t h a t have to be solved in o rd er t o adopt a r e a l i s t
p o sitio n h e re . While i t i s somewhat a n a c h ro n istic to d isc u ss P lato in
term s of laws, one might f e e l t h a t he obeys th e s p i r i t o f Van Fraassens
in ju n c tio n , from th e o th er sid e o f th e debate;
"Do n o t re ly on such a conception as Law w ithout in q u irin g whether
th e re i s any t h a t could p lay th e required ro le ." ^ ^
At Timaeus 6Id above and in th e Timaeus g e n e ra lly , P la to r e lie s on the
a ttr ib u tio n o f d is p o s itio n a l p ro p e rtie s t o m atter t o ex p lain reg u lar
behaviour, and more stro n g ly , th e necessary connection between ev en ts.
As w ith th e Phaedo, we need not see t h i s a s a reduction o f ph y sical to
lo g ic a l n e c e s s i t y . R a t h e r , we might e x p lic a te th e p h y sical n e c e ssity
holding between events in terms o f th e lo g ic a l n e c e ssity holding between

121
th e p ro p o sitio n s t h a t describe th o se e v en ts, although P la to would not
express th e m atter in th o se term s.
Again, one might o b je c t t h a t t h i s account allow s more
c o irp reh en sib ility to th e p hysical realm than th e epistemology of Timaeus
27c-29e would seem t o allow . That may w ell be so, and I s h a ll pursue
t h i s m atter in follow ing c h ap ters.

L et us now consider th e consequences o f using t h i s change in cosmology

as a c r ite r io n fo r th e r e la tiv e d ating o f P la to 's d ialogues. The l a t e s t
work which operates w ith th e o ld cosmology i s arguably th e P o litic u s .
This dialogue p resen ts us w ith a nyth where th e cosmos i s su b je c t t o two
c y c le s . F ir s tly , th e re i s th e reig n of C ronos where God guides the
ro ta tio n o f th e heavens. When a t th e appointed time he relin q u ish es h is
c o n tro l, th e motion o f th e heavens rev erses and th e reig n of Zeus
ensues. I t i s made c le a r t h a t we a re c u rre n tly liv in g under th e reig n of
Zeus.^0 The c e n tra l passage fo r my discussion i s th e follow ing, where
th e S tranger d escrib es th e f a te o f th e world in th e reig n of Zeus
"In th e beginning i t remembered th e teaching o f i t s c re a to r and
fa th e r most a cc u ra te ly , though t h i s even tu ally d u lle d . The reason fo r
th is was th e p hysical element in i t s c o n s titu tio n , which had been in i t
from th e e a r l i e s t sta g e , and partook of g re a t d iso rd e r before the
universe came to be in i t s p re se n t ordered c o n d itio n .. . When th e world
n u rtu res w ith in i t s e l f liv in g th in g s under th e guidance o f th e helmsman,
i t produces l i t t l e e v il and much good. However, when i t becomes
separated from him, i t fa re s b e st during th e tim e immediately a f t e r the
re le a s e , but as time proceeds and i t grows fo r g e tf u l, th e old condition
of d iso rd e r gains sway more and more, and towards th e conclusion o f time
l i t t l e good and much of i t s opposite flo u ris h e s , and th e re i s danger of
th e d e stru c tio n o f th e world and those in i t . " (Pit.273b)
That t h i s change a f f e c ts th e heavenly bodies i s a tte s te d a t P o litic u s
269a ff.^ ^ We have then a cosmology where th e motions o f th e heavens
w ill become p ro g ressiv ely more c h a o tic . That in general i s con trary to
th e p o sitio n o f th e Timaeus, in p a rtic u la r th e notion o f th e 'g re a t
y e a r ' . We might a ls o note some s p e c ific p o in ts of d iffe re n c e in
support o f t h i s .
The Timaeus i s adamant t h a t th e cosmos, once c re a te d , can function
in a s ta b le manner w ithout any a tte n tio n from i t s c re a to r and can only
be d isso lv ed by an a c t o f h is w ill.^ ^ In th e P o litic u s though e ith e r

122
God must p e rp e tu a lly guide th e cosmos or i t degenerates o f i t s own
in h e re n t n a tu re , and i s only saved from sinking in to *an endless se a of
unlikeness* by th e a c tiv e in te rv e n tio n o f God.^^ While th e P o litic u s
t e l l s us t h a t th e cosmos i s mounted on a p iv o t, th e Timaeus i s adamant
t h a t i t i s n o t . W h i l e in th e Timaeus th e cosmos i s now [ageron k ai
anosos], 'a g e le ss and u n ailin g * , in th e P o litic u s God has to make th e
world [athanaton k ai ageron], 'undying and a g e le s s ' in re c re a tin g th e
reig n of G ronos a f t e r th e c u rre n t 7^ c y c l e .

A f u r th e r co n sid eratio n here i s th e n atu re o f tim e. I f the

P o litic u s i s operating w ith th e conception o f tim e found in th e Timaeus
th en tim e i s going t o become in cre asin g ly c h ao tic along w ith th e motions
of th e p la n e ts . As we a re liv in g in th e degenerating cycle i t i s more
lik e ly t h a t P la to i s s t i l l operating w ith th e R epublic's conception of
tim e, a fu rth e r p o in t in favour o f d ating th e P o litic u s before th e
77
Timaeus.
I f then we read th e P o litic u s myth a s giving us some s o r t of
statem ent of P la to 's c u rre n t cosmological th in k in g , i t would seem th a t
on t h i s c r ite r io n we ought to d a te th e P o litic u s a s pre-Timaeus. The
main o b jec tio n here might be whether we ought t o read th e myth so
l i t e r a l l y . 78 one might argue th e main t h r u s t of th e t a l e i s p o l i t i c a l

and n o t c o s m o l o g i c a l , 78 and we do n o t, fo r in sta n c e , tak e every d e ta il

o f th e geography o f th e Phaedo myth o r th e cosmology o f th e myth of Er
e n tir e ly se rio u sly or a sc rib e th e se views d ir e c tly to P la to .
F ir s tly though, my p o sitio n does n o t req u ire t h a t we accept a l l th e
d e ta ils of th e P o litic u s myth, merely th a t we tak e some o f th e
underlying p rin c ip le s which a re used to c o n stru c t i t as being in d ic a tiv e
fiO
of P la to 's c u rre n t views, as we would do w ith P la to 's o th er myths. My
argument i s t h a t th e P o litic u s shares some assumptions concerning
cosmology and time w ith th e Republic and th e Phaedo. I t i s highly
s ig n if ic a n t t h a t when P la to re-u ses th e myth of Chronos to make some
p o l i t i c a l p o in ts (Le.713 f f ) , i t i s s trip p e d o f i t s cosmology.®^ I t i s
a ls o im portant t o note th e manner in which th e myth i s introduced. The
Stranger asks young Socrates to
"Give your f u l l a tte n tio n t o t h i s s to r y , j u s t a s c h ild re n [paides]
do; fo r you have n o t e n tir e ly outgrown such games [p a id ia s]. " (P lt.268e)
Now, given what I have argued e a r l ie r about th e resonances of [p aidia]
and i t s cognates in r e la tio n to P la to 's IVîP, we might expect some
's e rio u s p la y ' in th e coming t a l e . We a re n o t meant t o tak e th e myth
l i t e r a l l y , b u t th e re a re im portant p o in ts t o be gleaned from looking a t

123
th e s tru c tu re o f what i s said.® ^ That s u its iry in te rp re ta tio n p e rfe c tly ;
we can ignore some o f th e cosmological d e ta ils , b u t i t i s th e p rin c ip le s
behind th e c o n stru ctio n o f th e myth t h a t a re in p o rta n t, and th ese
suggest th e P o litic u s i s pre-Timaeus.®^ As discussed e a r l i e r , th e notion
o f a degenerating cosmology may be a q u ite general one ly in g behind
P la to 's thought up to th e P o litic u s .
Whatever th e outcome h e re , th e Phaedo, Republic and P o litic u s share
th e p o s itio n t h a t th e motions o f th e v is ib le heavens w ill be irre g u la r
and w ill n o t be amenable to exact mathematical a n a ly s is , and t h a t i s
co n trary to th e view o f th e Timaeus, Philebus, Laws and Epinomis.

VI

In a d d itio n to th ese changes concerning cosmology and tim e, i t may a lso

be p o ssib le t o d isc e rn a change in P la to 's a ttitu d e t o th e in e v ita b ility
of p o l i t i c a l , s o c ia l and moral (PSM) degeneration. In th e myth of th e
P o litic u s , th e E le a tic Stranger t e l l s us th a t
"From th e one who brought i t to g e th e r, th e universe has received
only good, b u t from i t s previous s t a te i t re ta in s in i t s e l f and
engenders in th e liv in g c re a tu re s a l l th e harshness and in ju s tic e t h a t
has i t s o rig in in th e heavens. When th e world n u rtu res w ith in i t s e l f
liv in g th in g s under th e guidance o f th e helmsman, i t produces l i t t l e
e v il and much good. However, when i t becomes separated from him, i t
fa re s b e st during th e tim e immediately a f te r th e re le a s e , but a s time
proceeds and i t grows fo r g e tfu l, th e o ld condition of d iso rd e r gains
sway more and more, and towards th e conclusion of tim e l i t t l e good and
much o f i t s opposite flo u ris h e s ." (Pit.273c)
That seems to be a s c le a r a statem ent a s p o ssib le o f an in e v ita b le PSM
d e c lin e . We might compare t h i s w ith Republic 546a f f where P la to has
Socrates d escribe th e in e v ita b le descent from th e id e a l s ta te through
tim ocracy, o lig arch y , and democracy t o tyranny.®® One problem w ith t h i s
d e sc rip tio n i s t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t to judge P la to 's a ttitu d e here a s he
deploys th e [p a id ia / spoude] c o n tra st fa m ilia r from our d iscu ssio n of
P la to 's EWP.®^ One reading of t h i s p iece of 's e rio u s p la y ' might be t h a t
we should n o t tak e th e d e ta ils of each so c ie ty and th e passage from one
to another to o l i t e r a l l y , but should be concerned w ith th e general
c h a ra c te r types o f each so c ie ty and th e tendency fo r so c ie ty to
OQ
degenerate.
We should perhaps d istin g u is h between a d e te rm in istic d e c lin e ,

124
where each sta g e i s o f n e c e ssity worse than th e prev io u s, and one where
w hile th e re a re fa c to rs which unchecked w ill cause a so c ie ty t o d e c lin e ,
conscious human a c tio n may, a t l e a s t tem porarily, counteract them. ^9
P la to I suggest i s committed to th e l a t t e r , such t h a t when we look a t
o th er works we w ill have t o look fo r an absence o f corrupting fa c to rs
ra th e r than mere evidence t h a t so c ie ty can make some temporary p rogress.
L et us now consider th e p o s itio n o f th e Laws. At 769d f f , the
Stranger t e l l s us t h a t le g is la tio n ought t o be w ritte n down and duly
airmended i f found wanting in p ra c tic e , " I f th e ordering o f th e p o lis i s
always to improve and to in no way decline" (Le.769d). The im plication
here would seem to be t h a t not only can th e re be p ro g ress, b u t t h a t the
f a te o f th e c i t y l i e s in i t s own hands, ra th e r than being su b je ct t o any
degenerating fo rc e s. One o f th e key p o l i t i c a l questions asked by the
Laws i s o u tlin e d by th e Stranger a t 676b f f , where he says
"Sometimes la rg e r s ta te s have come to be from sm aller ones, and
sometimes sm aller from la rg e r, and worse s ta te s have come to be from
b e tte r and b e tte r from w o rs e ... We must attem pt to understand, i f i t
l i e s w ithin our power, th e reason fo r such change."
The r e s t of Laws Book I I I i s then devoted t o answering t h i s question.
Various fa c to rs a re analysed h ere; a t 688c ignorance and vice a re
d i s c u s s e d , a t 691a, fin a n c ia l a c q u isitiv e n e ss, a t 697c a lack of
92
communal s p i r i t , a t 704d geographical fa c to rs . Yet a t no stag e in Book
I I I , o r anywhere e ls e in th e Laws, i s any explanation in term s o f an
in e v ita b le degeneration c ite d o r allu d ed t o . Indeed, th e p o in t of t h i s
in v e s tig a tio n seems t o be t o argue t h a t a l l o f th e causes o f p o l i t i c a l
degeneration a re e ith e r avoidable or tr e a ta b le .
A fter t h i s d isc u ssio n th e S tranger introduces a c y c lic a l theory of
h is to ry where a f t e r periods of in creasin g s o c ia l s o p h istic a tio n mankind
i s reduced t o a p rim itiv e and r u r a l e x isten ce by severe flooding. There
i s no sense o f an in e v ita b le d eclin e here though, or o f a d ecline
a lte rn a tin g w ith a more p o s itiv e phase. I t i s h ighly s ig n if ic a n t t h a t in
t h i s context when th e myth o f C: ronos make a reappearance a t 713a
f f , i t i s shorn o f any commitment t o in e v ita b le degeneration.
In th e Laws th en , we do n o t fin d any in e v ita b le PSM degeneration of
th e kind we fin d in th e myth o f th e P o litic u s . How much o f a change th a t
is from th e Republic depends on how se rio u sly we tak e th e passage a t
545d f f . Even i f the Republic i s n o t committed t o an in e v ita b le d e c lin e ,
th e re i s an im portant change o f tone in th e Laws which cannot be f u lly
accounted fo r by reference to th e d if f e r e n t su b je ct m atter.

125
 As fo r th e Timaeus, a l l th e passages which concern p o l it i c s a re to
be found in th e opening myth, and as I argued in chapter fo u r, these
have various l i t e r a r y and philo so p h ical functions t o serve which mean
t h a t we should n o t tak e them t o be in d ic a tiv e of P la to 's views. The
Timaeus does have some in te r e s tin g p o in ts to make about moral d e c lin e ,
however. Our so u ls, analogously t o th e world so u l, a re made up o f two
rev o lu tio n s.^ ^ Our in te lle c tu a l w elfare i s re la te d to how uniformly our
in te l le c t u a l revo lu tio n s move, which i s dependent on whether we tak e the
tro u b le to m aster our incoming p ercep tio n s, or a re m astered by them.
S im ila rly , th e key moral in ju n c tio n fo r humans concerns th e r e la tio n of
th e emotions and th e i n t e l l e c t . Timaeus t e l l s us concerning men and
t h e i r emotions th a t " I f they have mastery over th e s e , then they w ill
liv e ju s tly , but i f they a re mastered by them, u n j u s t ly " ( T i m .4 2 b ) .
While humans vAio do n o t tak e th e tro u b le to m aster Wiat impinges on them
may become c o rru p t, th ere i s no sense o f any i n e v ita b ility h ere, or of
any in cre asin g d iso rd e r in th e world th a t lead s to th e corruption of
m o rtals. In c o n tra s t to th e P o litic u s , where th e world in e v ita b ly
becomes a more corrupting p lac e, and where humans can do l i t t l e about
t h i s , th e Timaeus appears to provide a le v e l playing f i e l d fo r m ortals
t o determ ine t h e i r own f a t e . One might u se fu lly compare Timaeus 86d ad
f in w ith th e P o litic u s in th e way th a t i t analyses moral degeneration as
something t h a t i s th e so le re s p o n s ib ility o f th e in d iv id u a l so u l,^ ^ and
i t i s n o tab le t h a t a t Timaeus 87b f f t h a t tr e a ta b le moral shortcomings
are r e la te d to p o l i t i c a l and s o c ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s .
I t i s in te re s tin g t h a t th e P o litic u s t i e s to g e th e r th e two concepts
of cosm ological and PSM s t a b i l i t y or degeneration, and t h a t in th e l a t e r
dialogues where we fin d cosmological s t a b i l i t y we fin d PSM s t a b i l i t y
to o . I f th e d riv in g force behind such degeneration i s cosmological o r
m etaphysical, changes here might ex p lain th e move to PSM s t a b i l i t y .

VII

In arguing t h a t on c e rta in c r i t e r i a th e Timaeus p o st-d a te s the

P o litic u s , I am taking up one sid e o f th e o ld Owen-Cherniss
controversy.^^ In t h i s se c tio n I propose t o to d eal only w ith th e
n o
evidence re la te d to astronomy and p o l it i c s . .
Owen argues t h a t th e re i s no Eudoxan influence in th e Timaeus and
t h a t t h i s im plies an e a rly d a tin g .^9 F ir s tly , th e re i s th e question of
th e [en an tia dunamis], th e 'c o n tra ry power' a t 38d5, introduced to

126
account fo r th e motion o f Mercury and Venus r e la tiv e t o th e Sun.
Whatever i t s ex act n a tu re , i t appears to be an ad hoc m odification to
th e system. As Eudoxus* system d id not re q u ire such an excrescence i t i s
a reasonable assumption t h a t P la to was n o t conversant w ith i t a t th e
tim e o f w ritin g th e Timaeus. However, th e re has been a tendency towards
an a l l o r nothing approach to th e in flu en ce of Eudoxus, and we need to
be somewhat suspicious o f t h i s . One p o s s ib ility i s t h a t Eudoxus
influenced th e composition o f th e Timaeus before he had developed h is
f u l l system. Such an influence might range frcan convincing P lato t h a t i t
was th e o r e tic a lly p o ssib le t o account fo r a l l th e motions o f th e heavens
using uniform c ir c u la r motion, to th e p o s s ib ility t h a t th e Timaeus
rep re se n ts a Eudoxan prototype which was l a t e r refin ed in to th e theory
t h a t we now know v ia A ris to tle .
There i s a ls o some doubt a s to Eudoxus' d a te s. C itin g Apollodorus,
Owen p laces Eudoxus' death a t 356-353, and s ta te s t h a t he must have
produced h is system w ell before t h i s , as he l e f t Athens fo r Cnidus some
years before h is death. The e f f e c t of a l l t h i s i s to push back th e
d a te of composition o f th e Timaeus, in Owen's opinion to perhaps before
in?
369 and th e composition o f th e Theaetetuf, However, G isinger places
Eudoxus' death in 342, and both de S antillana^^^ andL*5Serre^^* give
337, a l l re je c tin g th e n o to rio u sly u n re lia b le testim ony of Apollodorus
on which Owen r e l i e s . W h i l e i t may be 'commonly agreed' th a t Eudoxus
came to th e Academy in 3 6 8 , t he a lte r n a tiv e d atin g s allow fo r Eudoxus
to have form ulated h is f u l l theory a f t e r P la to composed th e astronom ical
107
passages in th e Laws or even a f t e r h is death in 348.
Concerning th e phrase [p le th e i men amechanoi chromenas,
pepoikilmenas de thaum astos], 'bew ildering as they a re in number and o f
s u rp risin g ly in tr i c a t e p a t t e r n ' (Tim.39d1/2), Cornford has argued
"P lato must have been acquainted w ith th e system of Eudoxus... The
t o t a l o f twenty seven spheres would c e r ta in ly make a p a tte rn which would
bew ilder a layman.
Owen though argues t h a t [plethos amechanon] i s f a r to o strong a phrase
even fo r 27 m otions, which a re in e f f e c t only twelve a s th e motion of
sane o f th e spheres a re common to se v era l p la n e ts . 110 Another
p o s s ib ility here however i s t h a t ra th e r than re fe rrin g t o th e underlying
motions, t h i s phrase may simply re fe r in ste a d to th e apparent m otions,
which do indeed 'possess immense complexity and form astonishing
p a tt e r n s '. I f so , then one cannot draw any conclusions about a Eudoxan
in flu en ce h ere.

127
 Owen i s in c lin ed to fin d some Eudoxan influ en ce in a move from
ir r e g u la r t o reg u la r c e l e s t i a l motion between th e Timaeus and the
Laws.^ ^^ However, I have argued a t length t h a t t h i s change occurs
between th e Republic and th e Timaeus.
From th e evidence t h a t we have, i t i s not c le a r whether o r how
Eudoxus influenced P la to . I f h is influence i s a s Owen suggests, then i t
was c e r ta in ly pre-Timaeus. Even i f he d id n o t influ en ce th e composition
of th e Timaeus, th e doubts concerning h is dates mean t h a t we cannot draw
any firm conclusions about th e d a te o f t h i s work.
Let us move on to Owen's arguments concerning ' Second Thoughts on
Government. ' Owen argues t h a t th e P o litic u s moves on from th e p o l i t i c a l
theory of th e Republic on se v era l p o in ts which a re mentioned in th e
in tro d u c tio n to th e Timaeus, and th a t
"The Timaeus, since i t adopts w ithout comment th e se superseded
11o
th e o rie s , was w ritte n before th e P o litic u s ."
These p o in ts concern th e posession o f p riv a te pro p erty , m arriage, and
whether i t i s p o ssib le to la y down once and fo r a l l th e b e s t s e t of
law s. In chapter fo u r though I argued t h a t th e fu n ctio n o f th e f i r s t
p a rt of th e Timaeus i s to remind us of th e Republic and to s e t an agenda
fo r th e re v isio n o f p a rts o f i t . Thus i t i s not c le a r in the
re c a p itu la tio n o f th e Republic whether th e Timaeus advocates th ese
p o in ts or merely mentions them t o o rie n ta te us r e la tiv e to th e Republic.
One can a ls o argue, as G ill has done,^^^ th a t th e A tla n tis myth
co n tain s some thoughts on p o l it i c s vAiich a re cognate w ith the
developments o f th e P o litic u s ra th e r than w ith th e Republic. For
in sta n c e , w hile th e b e s t r u le r in th e Republic i s c h a ra c te rise d by h is
knowledge o f th e F o r m s , i n th e P o litic u s h is knowledge i s defined
more in stru m e n tally , in terms of v^ether he makes th e c ity b e tte r or
worse, and th e comparison o f s t a te c r a f t and weaving s tre s s e s th e
a b i l i t y o f th e statesm an w ith th e m a te ria ls he has a v a ila b le ra th e r than
h is re la tio n s h ip to some e x te rn a l m o d e l , a s in th e Republic.
On th e su b je c t o f th e d iv in e shepherds o f th e P o litic u s cw cwc,
C r itia s , I have l i t t l e to say t h a t has not already been sa id by G ill.^ ^ ^
The d iv in e shepherds have d if f e r e n t fu n ctio n s in each myth, completely
c o n tro llin g human a f f a i r s in th e P o litic u s but only providing th e
i n i t i a l p o l i t i c a l c o n s titu tio n from v^ich men can d e v ia te i f they choose
in th e C r i t i a s . ^^0 Indeed, i t may be t h a t as G ill has argued th e C ritia s
myth r e f e r s t o and c o rre c ts th e P o litic u s myth. The

128
P o litic u s has th e Gods guiding men in an u n d iffe re n tia te d manner, where
th e C r itia s draws a d is tin c tio n between how men fo rce anim als t o comply
and Gods attem pt to *s t e e r ' men by r e a s o n .
Owen has a ls o argued t h a t th e theory of language o f th e C r itia s i s
one t h a t has been superseded by th e C ratylus and th u s t h a t th e Timaeus
p re -d a te s t h i s work. However, as G ill has pointed o u t, i t i s not
c le a r whether th e C r itia s a t 107b a c tu a lly advocates a p i c t o r ia l theory
of language or merely employs an analogy between w ritin g and p a in tin g ,
s ta tin g t h a t some th in g s a re harder t o d e p ic t than o th e rs in both media.
I f th e l a t t e r i s th e c ase, then th e C ritia s shares seme o f th e concerns
o f th e P o litic u s , and as Owen concedes, th e tendency t o compare language
with p a in tin g continues in o th er dialogues reckoned to be l a t e r than th e
C raty lu s.
One might a ls o consider whether th e C ritia s p re se n ts us w ith a
theory of language o r a theory of l i t e r a t u r e , t h a t i s whether the
reference to p ain tin g here i s one t h a t looks to P la to 's FWP of th e
Phaedrus ra th e r than th e d iscu ssio n of naming and language o f the
C r a t y l u s . I f my argument of chapter four was c o rre c t in lo ca tin g
a llu s io n s t o th e FWP a t th e beginning o f th e Timaeus and seeing the
C r itia s as re la te d to t h a t , we might expect some fu rth e r such a llu s io n .
Owen's p o l i t i c a l arguments fo r an e a rly date fo r th e Timaeus a re then
not convincing.

V III

The g en eral conclusion o f t h is chapter i s f a i r l y e v id e n t. The Timaeus,

lik e th e C r itia s , Philebus, Laws and Epinomis but u n lik e th e Phaedo,
Republic and P o litic u s advocates a s ta b le cosmology and c e l e s ti a l motion
which i s reg u lar and amenable t o ex act mathematical a n a ly s is .
Underpinning t h is may be a change of view o f th e r e la tio n of mathematics
to c e l e s t i a l motion and to th e world in g en eral. On t h i s b a sis we have a
new argument fo r th e r e la tiv e d atin g of P la to 's l a t e r dialo g u es. There
is a ls o some evidence t h a t th e l a t e r dialogues have a d if f e r e n t a ttitu d e
to th e in e v ita b ility of PSM decay, which may be linked t o th e s h i f t to a
more s ta b le cosmology.
The s t a b i l i t y of th e heavens in th e Timaeus ra is e s some in te re s tin g
q u estio n s. What a re th e im plications o f th e re being e x a c titu d e in a t
le a s t one a sp ect of th e phy sical world ? What i s th e epistem ological
s ta tu s o f th ese s ta b le heavens ? I t would seem t h a t in th e f i r s t place

129
we can know t h a t th e heavens a re s ta b le and in th e second t h a t we a re
a b le to make some p re c ise c a lc u la tio n s concerning th e heavenly
b o d i e s . 126 Perhaps, th en , th e astronomy of th e Timaeus shares some of

th e optimism o f th e T heaetetus and th e Philebus towards knowledge o f th e

se n s ib le . There a re two d i f f i c u l t i e s w ith t h i s , though, both o f which
re q u ire considerable d isc u ssio n . The vAiole account o f th e world given by
Timaeus i s presented as a myth or lik e ly s to ry . Is i t n o t then th e case
t h a t th e th eory t h a t th e heavens move re g u la rly i s i t s e l f only lik e ly ,
such t h a t our c a lc u la tio n s can only be a s lik e ly as t h a t theory ? As
argued in th e previous c h ap ter, whether we should e n tir e ly b elieve what
Timaeus t e l l us a t 27a-29dçopen t o q u estio n . One can c e r ta in ly p o in t to
p la c e s in o th e r dialogues where th e re g u la rity o f th e heavens is
a sse rte d w ithout th e *lik e ly s to r y ' q u a lif ie r , most notably Laws 822a f f
and 966e ff.1 ^ 7 epistemology of th e Timaeus w ill be th e su b je c t of
ch ap ters s ix and nine.
There i s a ls o , though, th e question o f flu x . There might be two
problems h e re . F ir s tly , one might worry a s th e Theaetetus does about how
th in g s t h a t a re in ra d ic a l flu x can be known. Secondly, one might worry
how i t i s t h a t th e heavens can have reg u lar motion and be s ta b le i f th e
th in g s t h a t c o n s titu te them a re in ra d ic a l flu x . In chapter seven I
s h a ll argue t h a t th e flu x o f th e Timaeus i s n o t n e arly so ra d ic a l a s is
o ften supposed.
What I hope to have e sta b lish e d in t h i s chapter though i s a simple
f a c t about th e Timaeus, which i s t h a t th e motions o f th e heavenly bodies
a re reg u la r and s ta b le . Given t h a t p iece o f inform ation, we can then
address some o f th e many other questions t h a t a r is e concerning the
Timaeus knowing t h a t we must account fo r t h i s f a c t.

130
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

01) Agreeing w ith V lastos (1981b) p22 n.17 a g a in st Cornford (1941) and
Duhem (1906a) t h a t [auton] must mean 'about them* ra th e r than 'i n them'
which would req u ire th e d a tiv e [a u to is ], and a g a in st Shorey (1935 vol
I I ) pi 86 n .a t h a t th e f i n a l clau se i s n o t a 't r a i l i n g anacoluthon ' .

02) Cf. S o rabji (1980) p61/2.

03) See P lt.2 6 9 d e, 273b f f .

04) See Pdo.109c f f .
05) I t i s notable t h a t w hile [ p a r a la tte in ] occurs here and in th e P i t ,
i t i s ab sen t from th e Tim, (except a t 22d1 in S olon's myth, th e s ta tu s
of which we saw in c h .4) and th e C ri, Plb, Le. and Epin.

06) B urkert, (1972) p324, c f . Heath (1913) p171, M ittle s tra s s (1962)
p130 f f , Owen (1953) p325 f f .

07) E.g, Tim.38c6, 39d1, 40b6, and 43b3. LSJ gives 'a wanderer, reamer,
r o v e r '. The cognate verb [planao] has a sso c ia tio n s of 't o m islead, to
lead in to e r r o r '.

08) The s ix motions a re up, down, l e f t , r ig h t, backwards and forw ards.

09) For [aplanes] LSJ give ' not-wandering, f ix e d '.

10) One might t r y to argue t h a t th e c ru c ia l d iffe re n c e between th e fix ed

s t a r s and th e p la n e ts i s t h a t th e former a re liv in g c re a tu re s and th e
l a t t e r a re n o t, but Tim.38e makes i t c le a r t h a t th e p la n e ts liv e to o .
The fix ed s t a r s of course have p h y sical bodies, 'c re a te d fo r th e most
p a rt from f i r e ' (Tim.40a3).

11) See a ls o Tim. 38c, "From t h i s reasoning and thought by God concerning
th e g en eratio n o f tim e, in o rder t h a t tim e should come t o be, th e sun
and th e moon and th e fiv e o th er s t a r s , which have th e name 'w anderers'
[p la n e ta ], came in to being t o determ ine and guard th e numbers o f tim e",
and c f . 40b.

12) Cf. th e c l a r i t y of th e Tim. on th e se p o in ts , where a t 47a we a re

to ld t h a t "Sight of day and n ig h t, of months and th e cycle o f th e years
has procured fo r us number and th e concept o f tim e".

13) There i s one d ir e c t comment on th e n a tu re o f tim e a t Epin.991c; "We

must grasp th e exactness o f tim e, how p re c is e ly i t marks a l l th e events
throughout th e heavens".

14) Cf. My l a t e r argument concerning 'p e r f e c t ' and 'r e g u la r '.

15) So th e re i s no th e o r e tic a l reason why tim e should be irre g u la r fo r

P la to . On th e co n tra ry , as p a rtic u la rs in th e Tim. a re both in tim e and
in space, and space has no c h a r a c te r is tic s so t h a t i t w ill not d i s t o r t
what i t receives (see Tim.50e f f and my c h .8 ), i f being in tim e i s
analogous t o being in space, tim e too should be fe a tu re le s s so t h a t i t
does n ot d i s t o r t what i s in i t .

131
16) This i s r e ite r a te d a t Tim. 38a9 vÆiere we a re to ld t h a t tim e 'c ir c l e s
around according t o number'.

17) Cf. S im p liciu s' references to Eudemus, Theophrastus and Alexander,

a t In De Caelo 700.18.

18) Whether A ris to tle i s q u ite c o rre c t here in saying t h a t P lato

id e n tif ie s tim e w ith th e motions o f th e heavens i s another m atter. I
would agree w ith Cherniss (1944) p418 and n.349, and V lastos (1964) p409
f f , t h a t th e key phrase i s t h a t th e s ta r s 'mark o f f and preserve the
numbers o f tim e ' (Tim.38c6), and so im p lic itly d istin g u is h clock and
tim e as measure and measured.
19) One must beware o f th e lim its of such ex s i l e n t i o arguments, but
vdiere A r is to tle would have known P la to 's view, and would have been keen
to c r i t i c i s e , they have some v a lid ity . Note fo r in stan ce th e
p r o lif e r a tio n of c ritic is m s o f th e Tim. in th e De Caelo.

20) See e .g De Caelo 280a28 f f .

21) See th e evidence c o lle c te d by Cornford (1937) p89f f .

22) E.g th e uses of 'c a lc u la te ' a t Timaeus 47c2 and 40d1.

23) Cf. Tim.37d, 38a9, 38c, and note th e a d d itio n of [arithm os] a t 39c8
in comparison to Resp.530a8.
24) Cf. o th er uses of [planes] in th e Tim, a t 19e4 to describe th o se who
'wander ' from c it y t o c it y , a t 43b4 to s im ila rly d escrib e our mental
rev o lu tio n s, and in some b io lo g ic a l co n tex ts describing th e random
wanderings going on in our bodies, o f phlegms a t 86e7, o f atomic
p a r tic le s a t 88e2, and o f th e womb in women a t 91c 4.

25) There might be a worry here about reading th e views o f th e Le. back
in to th e Tim, but th e Tim. advocates s im ila r, i f not q u ite so w ell
expressed o r developed id eas; see e .g Tim.34a, 89a.
26) I f th e motion of th e same i s th e e q u iv alen t o f th e motion o f th e
universe a s a vdiole, then from Tim.34a t h a t must be a reg u lar motion.
27) Note t h a t th e motion o f th e whole i s reg u lar b u t n o t p e rfe c t, too;
i t f a i l s t o be s e lf -g en e ra tin g . See Tim. 34a.

28) While we would regard t h i s as m athem atically in c o rre c t, as we would

reso lv e th e c ir c u la r motion o f th e s ta r s on th e same in to two normal
lin e a r m otions, th e sense i s c le a r enough; the fix ed s ta r s have only th e
tr a n s la tio n a l motion iitparted by th e same.
29) The exception here would appear t o be Venus and Mercury, as Timaeus
t e l l s us a t 38d th a t "The morning s t a r and th e s t a r sacred to Hermes he
placed in an o r b it equal in speed to t h a t o f th e sun, but posessing a
co n trary power [enantian dunamin] t o i t , whence i t i s t h a t th e sun, the
s ta r o f Hermes and th e morning s t a r overtake and a re overtaken by each
o th e r" . There has been a g re a t d eal of debate on th e ex ac t natu re of
th is 'c o n tra ry power' (c f. Proclus In Timaeum 221d f f . Heath (1913) p166
f f , Cornford (1937) 108 f f , Dreyer (1953) p68 f f , Dicks (1970) p123 f f ) ,
which would seem to be an attem pt to account fo r th e f a c t t h a t Venus and
Mercury a re always t o be seen in th e v ic in ity o f th e sun. A ll I req u ire

132
is t h a t t h i s 'c o n tra ry power' a c ts in a re g u la r manner.

30) E.g L e.897b f f , or 967a vÆiere th e A.S t e l l s us th a t "Even a t th a t

tim e a sense o f wonderment emerged concerning th e heavenly bodies, and
those who stu d ied them a c c u ra te ly suspected what i s now indeed b elieved,
t h a t i f th ey were so u lle s s and lacking in in te llig e n c e , they would not
be amenable t o wonderful c a lc u la tio n s [logism ois] o f such accuracy." Cf.
my previous notes on c a lc u la tio n and number.

31) One might f e e l t h a t Plb.30c (and E^in.983c) a re d e lib e ra te ly

evocative o f Rep.530ab.

32) See Tim.40a f f and 40b f f .

33) See e .g Plb.32d.
34) At Plb. 3Id i t i s emphasised t h a t p a in occurs when th e harmony o f th e
liv in g being i s d isru p te d . One might th in k here o f th e way in which both
th e P lb. and th e Tim. describe th e universe a s a liv in g being, and th e
way t h a t th e Tim. t a l e s g re a t care t o emphasis th e harmony th a t
c o n s titu te s i t s body, esp. a t Tim.35a-37d.
35) At P lb. 43a f f th e id ea t h a t nothing i s fre e from th e processes of
d e te rio ra tio n and re s to ra tio n i s ra ise d in language t h a t i s rem iniscent
o f th e d iscu ssio n s of H eraclitean flu x a t T h t.179-183 and C r t .439-440.
Socrates d e lib e ra te ly avoids discu ssio n o f th e t r u th o f t h i s theory by
suggesting t h a t th e re a re some changes t h a t a re so sm all th a t we do not
perceive them, and hence we sometimes f e e l t h a t we a re in a s t a te t h a t
does n o t involve d e te rio ra tio n o r re s to ra tio n .

36) Ih ere i s no question t h a t th e Epin. advocates reg u la r c e l e s ti a l

motion; see e .g E^in.982b-d, 983c, 987a, 991c.
37) See Rep.529e f f .
38) See Rep.530a f f .

39) Cf. my c h .3.

40) See esp . Rep.510d f f where t h i s analogue i s used as th e model fo r

th e r e la tio n between se c tio n s L2 and L3 o f th e lin e .

41) See Plb.56d f f . That th e Plb. i s concerned w ith p a rtic ip a tio n i s

cogently argued by Sayre (1983) pi 19 f f .
42) See Plb.57d.

43) [emphronos] can mean se n sib le both in th e sense o f a liv e and in th e

sense of reasonable or prudent.
44) E.g Tim.46e.

45) See Archer-Hind (1888), Taylor (1928), Cornford (1937) and Morrow
(1950) fo r fu rth e r d iscu ssio n h ere.

46) There a re p o ssib ly some conservative assumptions concerning a r t in

p lay h e re ; 'good' in th e sense a e s th e tic a lly p lea sin g , perhaps.

133
47) One must be c a re fu l o f anachronism h e re , as P la to never expresses
h is views in term s of laws.

48) See e .g Tim.30a5 e t passim.

49) Cf. S o rabji (1980) p207.
50) The 'wandering' of th e wandering cause in my view merely c o n tra sts
i t s purposeless and undirected a c tio n w ith t h a t o f te le o lo g ic a l/
in te n tio n a l a c tio n .

51) See e .g Tim.42d f f , where th e demiurge i s sa id to be blam eless fo r

anything th a t may happen a f t e r th e i n i t i a l o rdering; c f . Rep.380c f f .
52) I .e as in my example, i f we throw a bucket o f p a in t a t a canvas.

53) See Tim.6 Id f f on th e shape and p ro p e rtie s o f f i r e . I s h a ll d isc u ss

th e co n stru ctio n o f th e fundamental p a r tic le s in ch. 7 and ch. 9.

54) See Cornford (1937) p165.

55) See e .g Tim.27c-29e.

56) Assuming t h a t re g u la rity i s p o stu la te d throughout th e ph y sical

w orld, not j u s t in th e heavens.
57) "So too f i r e , when approached by th e cold w ill e ith e r withdraw or
p e ris h . I t w ill never endure receiving th e cold and s t i l l be what i t
was. F ire , and a ls o c o ld ." (Pdo.103d).

58) See Pdo.103e-104b.

59) "You know, of course, th a t whatever th e Form of th re e occupies must
of n ece ssity [anankezei] be not only th re e b u t a ls o odd" (Pdo. 104d).

60) Cf. V lastos (1969a) p104, S orabji (1983) p206-208. Fine (1987) p8.
61) See esp. Tim.54a f f , where Timaeus says t h a t i f anyone has a b e tte r
account, he w ill no t begrudge him th e p riz e .

62) S o rab ji (1980) p61/2.

63) See S orabji (1980) p61/2, 206-208.

64) Leucippus Frag.B I, V la sto s' tr a n s la tio n (1969a) p i 06.

65) A ris to tle Physics 252a31-b2, V la sto s' tr a n s la tio n (1969a) p i 06.

66) See e.g Van Fraassen (1989) and Maxwell (1993b) re sp e c tiv e ly .
Maxwell (1993b) p90 s ta te s t h a t " I t i s le g itim a te t o to in te r p r e t
(appropriate) ph y sical th e o rie s a s a ttr ib u tin g n e c e ssita tin g p ro p e rtie s
to p o stu la te d p hysical e n tite s - p ro p e rtie s in v irtu e o f which th e
e n t i t i e s must, o f n e c e ssity , obey th e laws o f th e th eo ry ".
67) Van Fraassen (1989) v i i i .

68) I would argue t h a t th e 'brin g in g on' re la tio n i s not one of

cau satio n b u t one o f su fficen cy , and would agree w ith Fine (1987) t h a t

134
th e s a fe ty of th e 's a fe answer' c o n sists in providing necessary cind
suffic(g/\t c o n d itio n s, w hile the 'c le v e r answer' provides merely
sufficAC^fc c o n d itio n s. This su ffic ie n c y might be founded on se v era l
d if f e r e n t re la tio n s depending on s p e c ific cases, and i t i s in te re s tin g
th a t P la to gives us se v e ra l d if f e r e n t examples h e re . The presence of
th re e may be s u f f ic ie n t fo r ('b rin g o n ') oddness because i t i s lo g ic a lly
necessary t h a t th re e i s odd. The presence o f fev e r may be s u f f ic ie n t fo r
sickness because fev e r i s a species o f th e genus sickness (As S orabji
(1980) p206 n.77 p o in ts o u t, t h i s i s th e way t h a t A ris to tle
(Top.123b35-36) t r e a t s fe v e r and sick n ess, and P la to appears to t r e a t i t
s im ila rly a t Tim.86a f f ) . F in a lly , th e presence o f f i r e may be
s u f f ic ie n t fo r h e a t because th e r e la tio n between f i r e and h e a t i s one of
cau sal n e c e ssity .
69) See here Maxwell (1968) and (1993b) p91 f f .

70) The E.S comments "You have heard o f th e l i f e under Chronos,

S o crates, but th e t a l e o f l i f e under Zeus, t h a t o f th e c u rre n t s t a t e ,
you a re a liv e to experience y o u rse lf", (P it.2 7 2 b ). Note th e emphatic
[ton nuni] in stea d o f [ton nun] a t 272b2.

71) We might a ls o in f e r t h i s from P la to 's g en eral conviction t h a t th e

s ta r s have ph y sical bodies and th e m yth's statem ent t h a t a l l p hysical
bodies degenerate.

72) The p re d ic ta b le recurrence o f th e g re a t year i s a sig n o f th e

cosmological s t a b i l i t y o f th e Tim. C ertain ly one cannot, as Adam does
(1902 vol I I ) p297/8, equate th e g re a t year o f th e Tim. w ith th e periods
of God's h e lp and God's ab stin an ce. The g re a t year could be achieved in
th e reig n o f Chronos, (th ere i s though no mention o f th e grand
conjunction, and i t i s n o t th e c r ite r io n by vÆiich t h a t age comes t o an
end, c f . P it.269c and 272d), but could only be achieved by chance, i f a t
a l l , in th e reig n of Zeus vhen th e p la n e ts move in cre asin g ly
c h a o tic a lly , and co n trary to Tim.39c f f , th e tim e between conjunctions
would be u npred ictab le.
73) See e .g Tim.34a on motion and c f . Plt.269d-270b, and Tim.32c, 38b,
and 41a on in d is s o lu b ility .

74) See P it.273b f f .

75) Cf. P lt.270a9 and Tim.33d9, a p o in t made by Brumbaugh (1961a) p523,

although h is concern i s w ith models ra th e r than uniform motion. Tim.34a
i s a b e tte r passage fo r my purposes. I t i s perhaps worth noting t h a t
p r io r to th e Tim. P la to always has th e cosmos supported; a p iv o t in th e
P i t , th e sp in d le o f n e ce ssity in th e myth of Er (Rep.616b).

76) Cf. Tim.33a9 and P lt.273e4.

77) See above fo r arguments t h a t in d ic a te t h a t i t i s h ig h ly u n lik e ly
t h a t P la to ever advocated ir r e g u la r tim e.

78) One qualm t h a t might be ra ise d here i s whether any astronomer could
accep t th e cosmology o f th e myth. This depends on how much d e v ia tio n is
alread y supposed to have occurred and how quickly th e r o t i s supposed to
s e t in . Ancient Greek astronomy s t i l l had t o resolve many anomalies
concerning th e motions o f th e heavens, which could be equated w ith th e
d e te rio ra tio n t h a t had already occurred. That d e te rio ra tio n might a ls o

135
be very slow. Here I mast disagree w ith Skenp (1952) pi 47 on a m atter of
tr a n s la tio n , [p o lla s periodon muriados] a t P lt.270a8 i s su re ly n o t h is
'thousands o f re v o lu tio n s' but something ra th e r stro n g e r, lik e 'many te n
thousands o f re v o lu tio n s '. I f we make th e reasonable assumption t h a t one
ro ta tio n o f th e universe i s one day ( th a t i s th e lik e ly im plication of
P it.2 6 9 a coupled w ith 269bc f f ; c f . Tim.39c), then one thousand
rev o lu tio n s w ill be approxim ately th re e y e a rs, and te n thousand
approxim ately t h i r t y (or around 'one gen eratio n of m en'). P it.2 6 9 b ,
272de, and 274de each make i t c le a r t h a t we a re dealing w ith a time
s c a le t h a t encompasses many gen eratio n s.

79) The myth i s introduced to i l l u s t r a t e a p o in t in th e hunt fo r th e

d e fin itio n o f th e statesm an, see P lt.268de.
80) See e .g Pdo. 109a f f , where th e 'f is h e s eye view' i s indeed
in d ic a tiv e of P la to 's c u rre n t epistemology.
81) This re tu rn i s a ls o im portant in ru lin g out e n tir e ly a lle g o ric a l
in te rp re ta tio n s o f i t in th e P i t . The Le. draws th e s o r t o f p o l i t i c a l
morals one might e3ç>ect from th e myth, which a re in lin e w ith th e E .S 's
comments a t P it.275b.

82) We should be approaching th e main body of th e t e x t in th e same way,

although perhaps n o t to th e same e x te n t. I ta k e th e p o in t o f th e E .S 's
comments to be P la to 's way of saying be even more c a re fu l than you usual
when you read t h i s myth.

83) One might make th e case t h a t th e P i t . i s t r a n s it i o n a l , ra th e r than

th e l a s t use o f th e old cosmology. Perhaps th e two cycles o f th e myth
r e f le c t P la to 's f i r s t d is s a tis f a c tio n w ith degeneration, and a t P it.2 8 4 a
f f th e re i s th e concern w ith m ensuration t h a t we fin d in both Tim. and
P lb, and some o f th e Pythagorean o n to lo g ic al themes which w ith Sayre I
s h a ll argue in l a t e r ch ap ters a re ty p ic a l o f th e Tim. and Plb. a re t o be
found in th e P i t . to o .

84) See Rep.529d, 530ab, 546a f f , Pdo.110a.

85) There i s a ls o a p o ssib le argument here concerning th e a u th e n tic ity /

d atin g o f th e Ep.VII. At 343c f f th e author o f t h a t work makes th e
fa m ilia r c o n tra s t between th e d e fin itio n o f a c ir c le w ith any
rep re se n ta tio n o f i t . He goes on to s ta te t h a t such an analogue a p p lie s
q u ite g e n e ra lly . That i s th e p o s itio n o f th e pre-Tim. works, so e ith e r
th e Ep.VII p re-d a tes th e Tim. or i s in whole o r p a rt a fo rg ery .
86) I t may no t be an acc id e n t t h a t P la to mentions Hesiods theory of
m etals a t Rep.546e f f when discussing h is own theory of decay; c f .
Popper (1945 v o l.1 ) p219 n .5 .

87) P la to has Socrates say "Shall we, lik e Honer, pray to th e Muses to
t e l l us how a fa c tio n f i r s t began th e tro u b le , and b eliev e t h a t in th e i r
tr a g ic s ty le they speak as i f in e a rn e s t [hos de spoude] employing high
flown language, though they te a se and p lay w ith us a s i f we were
c h ild re n [hos pros paidas hemas paizousin] ?" (Rep.545d).

88) So Taylor, (1939) p25 f f . The passage i s open to se v e ra l

in te r p r e ta tio n s , though note t h a t th e standard middle period view th a t
"All th in g s t h a t come to be must a ls o decay [genomenoi p a n ti phthora
e s tin ] " (Rep.546a) i s being pushed here and would be a s u ita b le d riv in g

136
fo rce fo r p o l i t i c a l and s o c ia l co rru p tio n ; c f . Adam (1902 vol II ) p202,
who asks "What was th e o rig in a tin g cause of degeneration ? P lato fin d s
th e cause, not in anything p e c u lia r t o th e Id ea l c i t y , but in a law
which p re v a ils through th e v^ole of Nature - th e law t h a t everything
created i s doomed to decay".
89) Those f a c to r s , as in th e P i t . may become stro n g e r w ith tim e. Taylor
(1939) has q u ite reasonably likened t h i s passage t o a medical t e x t book
d e sc rip tio n o f a term in al i lln e s s ; i t d escrib es th e ty p ic a l stages an
unchecked ailm ent w ill progress through, vA ile in an a c tu a l case th e re
may be many com plicating fa c to r s . Here conscious a c tio n by a doctor may
slow th e d e c lin e , teirp o rarily check i t o r even te n p o ra rily improve th e
p a tie n ts co n d itio n , w ithout removing th e underlying cause o f t h e i r
u ltim ate d e c lin e and demise.
90) Popper though would d isa g ree ; he coninents t h a t "P lato summed up h is
s o c ia l experience, e x a c tly as h is h i s t o r i c i s t predecessor had done, by
p ro ffe rin g a law of h i s t o r ic a l development. According to t h i s la w .. . a l l
s o c ia l change i s co rru p tio n or decay o r degeneration", (1945 vol I) p i 9,
c f . p37. This seems f a r too strong though; both P la to 's w ritin g (e.g
Rep.473b, 502b f f . L e.676b f f , 769d7/8) and h is p ra c tic e , i f we a re to
b eliev e th e Ep.VII (and i t may be he case t h a t only th e d ig ressio n i s a
fo rg e ry ), show considerable optimism t h a t a c tu a l s o c ie tie s can (a t l e a s t
tem porarily) be improved ra th e r than merely stopped from decaying.

91) As P la to once more invokes th e [spoude/ p a id ia ] c o n tra s t a t

Le.688bc, we must beware o f h is 'se rio u s p la y ' as w ith Rep.545d f f .

92) The A.S hopes t o ro o t o u t ignorance and v ices by an adequate

education system (See books I , I I + V II), and t h e i r a re various
s t r i c t u r e s aimed a g a in st fin a n c ia l a c q u isitiv e n e ss. No c itiz e n may
possess gold or s ilv e r (Le.741e f f ) , one fam ily may possess only one
land h o ld in g, which i s n o n -tran sferab le (741b f f ) , and th e re a re s t r i c t
lim its on p ersonal w ealth.

93) I t i s perhaps worth noting t h a t in th e Rep. th e d e clin e begins w ith

in c o rre c t breeding (Rep.546a f f ) ; the Le. to o d isc u sse s t h is (L e.775c
f f ) b ut does not connect poor breeding w ith any in e v ita b le d e c lin e .
94) See Tim.4Id f f . These m atters w ill be discussed in more d e ta il in
th e n ex t ch ap ter.
95) The language o f m astery/ being m astered here i s p re c is e ly th a t of
th e d isc u ssio n o f th e r e la tio n o f i n t e l l e c t , th e rev o lu tio n s and
p ercep tio n . Cf. Tim.44a where we fin d a s im ila r use o f [k ra te in ], 'to
ru le , m aster, hold sway o v e r' (LSJ).
96) E sp ecially iirportant here i s Tim.90d f f , where we a re to ld th a t th e
goal in l i f e i s t o r e c tif y th e disordered rev o lu tio n s in our heads,
because by doing so we w ill a tt a i n th e b e s t s o r t o f l i f e . I can fin d no
in d ic a tio n t h a t th e P lb. e n te r ta in s th e id ea o f any PSM degeneration.

97) See Owen (1953) and Cherniss (1957a).

98) I d eal here w ith th e p a r t of Owen's paper s u b title d 'Eudoxus' and
subsequently w ith 'Second Thoughts on Government'

99) See Owen (1953) p325.

137
100) P lato may even be giving us a sim p lifie d sketch o f th e f u l l Eudoxan
th eo ry , e sp e c ia lly i f h is main i n te r e s t i s elsevÆiere, in th e comparison
between th e world soul and th e human mind.

101) Owen (1953), p325.

102) G isinger (1921) p5/6.

103) De S a n tilla n a (1949) p248-262.

104) L asserre (1966) p137-142.

105) ^ ^ l l o d o r u s ' p ra c tic e o f equating th e high p o in t o f someone's

achievement w ith th e age o f f o rty i s of course highly dubious - here he
may have asso c iated Eudoxus* acme w ith h is temporary presidency o f th e
academy in 367/6; see Skemp (1967) p i 42/3. There i s a ls o th e problem of
accomodating th e evidence o f P lin y (N atural H istory XXX, 3), who ta lk s
of Eudoxus d atin g Z oroaster as liv in g 6,000 years before th e death of
P la to , implying t h a t Eudoxus o u tliv ed him.

106) Owen (1953) p325.

107) For some fu rth e r conjectures on Eudoxus and P la to , see Dicks (1970)
p143 n.210.

108) Cornford' tr a n s la tio n (1937) pi 16. [amechanos] could not be

Archer-Hinds ' in c a lc u la b le ' , given th e emphasis in th e Tim. on the
heavens being amenable to c a lc u la tio n , but as Shorey (1927) pi 75 p o in ts
out more 'in c re d ib le ' or 'w onderful'.
109) Cornford (1937) pi 16.
110) Owen (1965) p326. See A ris to tle Metaphysics 1073b f f fo r an account
of Eudoxus' system. Owen i s c o rre c t to p o in t out t h a t i f we a re only
considering th e 'wandering' s t a r s , Cornford i s wrong to suppose t h a t
Eudoxus required 27 m otions. Contra Owen, though, i t i s not c le a r th a t
Tim. 39c r e fe rs only to th e fiv e p la n e ts ra th e r than th e seven unfixed
s ta r s ( i . e p lan e ts + sun and moon); in f a c t Tim.38c seems to imply the
l a t t e r . He i s rig h t to suppose t h a t Eudoxus req u ires 20 motions fo r
th e se fiv e , b u t i f we include sun and moon then 26 a re required.
S im ila rly , th e re a re 12 and 14 motions re sp e c tiv e ly i f we consider only
independent m otions, a s some a re shared. One could a ls o add t h a t th e re
must be doubts as to whether th e Tim. was w ritte n w ith th e layman in
mind, so C ornford's argument fo r Eudoxan influ en ce here i s unconvincing.

111) See Owen (1953) p326.

112) Between th e P i t . and th e Tim. to be p re c is e .

113) Owen (1953) p332.

114) See G ill (1979) p152 f f .

115) Cf. Rep.484c f f , 500b f f , 520c, and 540a f f .

116) See P it.2 9 3 a f f .
117) See P lt.3 0 9 a f f .

138
118) Cf. Rep.484c f f and 500b f f .

119) See G ill (1979) p155 f f .

120) Compare th e way t h a t th e Athenians m aintain th e c o n s titu tio n la id
down fo r them and do n o t a l t e r t h e i r environment (Tim.24c, C ri.109c,
IlOe f f ) w ith th e way t h a t th e people o f A tla n tis a l t e r th e i r s
(C ri. 113c, 115c, 118c) and how th e war i s blamed on t h e i r f a ilu r e to
m aintain t h e i r c o n s titu tio n (Cri.119c f f ) .
121) See G ill (1979) esp. p i 57. P la to 's use o f th e metajAior o f ste e rin g
in both myths t i e s them to g eth er t ig h t l y . I agree w ith G ill t h a t th e
C ri. can be read as c o rre ctin g th e P i t .
122) See Owen (1973) and Crt.422a f f , esp. 424-425.

123) See G ill (1979) p151.

124) See Owen (1973) p147, and c f . So.234 f f , P lb .39 f f and L e.769 ff.

125) See Pdr.273c f f , b u t esp. 275d f f .

126) See e .g Tim.40c, 47c2 on c a lc u la tio n and astronomy.

127) So to o one may fin d much o f th e Tim.' astronomy w ithout the 'l i k e l y
s t o r y ' q u a lif ie r s in th e Epin.

139
CHAPTER SIX

WORLD SOUL, HUMAN SOULS AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE TIMAEUS

In th e previous ch ap ter, I suggested th a t th e reformed cosmology might

lead us t o b e liev e t h a t th e Timaeus shares some o f th e optimism towards
knowledge o f p e rc e p tib le e n t i t i e s t h a t i s shown in th e Theaetetus and
th e Philebus. One problem w ith t h i s though i s th e epistem ological
pessimism o f Timaeus 27c-29d. The aim of t h i s chapter i s t o in v e s tig a te
whether t h i s i s a l l t h a t th e Timaeus has to say on t h i s m atter.
E a r lie r, I c a lle d in to question whether we should b lith e ly accept
views of Timaeus 27c-29d as P la to 's own. Here I s h a ll argue t h a t the
analogy developed between th e world soul and human so u ls provides an
a lte r n a tiv e and more o p tim istic epistemology, one t h a t in places
d ir e c tly c o n tra d ic ts t h a t o f 27c-29e. In lin e w ith my arguments of
chapter fo u r, i t i s one t h a t re -th in k s th e r e la tio n of reason and
se n sa tio n , and one which w ill t e l l us much about th e kind o f c re atu re s
we a re and what our p lac e in th e universe i s .
In th e process of developing t h i s analogy, th e Timaeus gives us a
model o f th e mind and o f f a ls e judgement. So f a r , I have argued t h a t on
cosmological grounds we might date th e Timaeus a f t e r th e P o litic u s , and
so a f t e r th e T heaetetus and S ophist. The T heaetetus, however, has much
to say about th e n ature o f th e human mind, th e p o s s ib ility of 'common
n o tio n s ', th e n ature and p o s s ib lity o f fa ls e judgement, and o ffe rs us
th e wax ta b l e t and a v iary models. The Sophist to o gives us much of
in te r e s t concerning negation and th e n atu re o f fa ls e judgement. A
fu rth e r question t h a t t h i s chapter w ill address i s whether th e models of
mind and f a ls e judgement p u t forward in the Timaeus a re p rim itiv e or
so p h istic a te d r e la tiv e t o th e Theaetetus and th e Sophist.

Let us begin w ith th e question o f what th e world soul can know and what
i t can form opinions about, and how i t acq u ires th ese s t a te s . Having
described th e c o n stru ctio n o f th e world so u l, Timaeus goes t o to say
"Therefore, a s soul was blended o u t o f i t s th re e c o n stitu e n t p a r ts ,
sameness, d ifferen c e and [o u s ia s ]^ ... whenever she has co n tact with
something t h a t has e ith e r dispersed or undivided [ousian], she i s s e t in

140
motion throughout the whole of h e rs e lf and s ta te s what t h is thing is the
same a s and what i t is d iffe re n t from, and what p rec ise re la tio n of
lo catio n , manner and Ci/n€> e x istin g thing bears to thing th a t
becomes or i s always th e same. This account i s tru e of being and
becoming, and in re la tio n to both th e same and the d iffe r e n t, is c arrie d
w ithin th e s e lf moved w ithout speech or sound.^ Whenever t h is occurs
concerning th e se n sib le th e c ir c le o f the d iff e re n t announces th is to
the whole of the soul and opinions and b e lie f s which are secure and tru e
occur [doxai kai p is te is gignontai bebaioi k ai a le th e is ] . On the other
hand, where th e ra tio n a l^ is concerned and the smoothly running c ir c le
of the same declares t h is , in te llig e n c e and knowledge of necessity
r e s u lt." (Tim.37a)
The f u l l epistem ological im plications of t h is passage have been
considerably underestimated in the lite r a tu r e on the Timaeus. ^ I f the
world soul can have opinions concerning the physical which a re both
secure and tru e , then th ere cannot be anything in tra c ta b le in the nature
of the physical, or th e nature of opinion, which prevents the formation
of such opinions. There may be d if f ic u ltie s fo r u$ mere m ortals, but
th a t i s a d iffe re n t m atter, and one th a t lo cates the problems with us
rath er than with the physical world or with opinion i t s e l f . Timaeus goes
on to give us an account of the formation of the human soul and i t s
c a p a c itie s, and gives us an an aly sis of how i t i s th a t human beings are
able to form fa ls e judgements.
Having created a race of demigods to be the souls of th e heavenly
bodies,^ the demiurge then gave them the job of helping in th e c reatio n
of m ortals.^ The demiurge once more blends together sameness, d ifference
and [ousia], though t h is time not as uniformly as before,^ and divides
O
th e re su ltin g mixture in to the appropriate number of so u ls. Though not
e x p lic itly sta te d , i t would seem th a t he a lso performs th e same a c ts of
dividing in to s tr ip s and binding in to c ir c le s th a t he does with the
world so u l, such th a t our souls c o n sist of the two revolutions.^ He then
tu rn s th ese over to the demigods, Wio proceed to fashion a body fo r
each.^0 Having been implanted in physical bodies su b ject to in flu x and
e fflu x , mortal souls a re then su b ject to sensations,^^ to d e sire mingled
with pleasure and pain, to fe a r, anger and other e m o t i o n s . A s we saw
in chapter fiv e , the fundamental moral in junction i s then to master
rath er than be mastered by our e m o t i o n s . T h e c ru c ia l differen ce
between our souls and th a t of the world soul can be put lik e t h is . The
revolutions of the same and the

141
d if f e r e n t t h a t make up th e world soul a re re g u la r, s ta b le and
im p e r tu r b a b l e .T h is makes th e world soul p e rfe c tly r a tio n a l, and a l l
o f i t s judgements o f sameness and d iffe re n c e a re c o rre c t. However, when
our so u ls a re bound in to our bodies, th e rev o lu tio n s a re d isru p ted , they
p artak e in a l l s ix m o t i o n s , a n d th e in flu x o f sen satio n s fu rth e r
d iso rd e rs t h e i r m otions, such t h a t i n i t i a l l y th e two rev o lu tio n s b arely
hold t o g e t h e r . i t i s because o f th e im perfection o f our mental o r b its
th a t vdien they encounter some e x te rn a l e n tity
"They la b e l i t th e same as or d if f e r e n t from something co n trary to
th e t r u th , falsehoods and s tu p id ity occurri^." (Tim.43e).
What i s remarkable about t h i s model o f mind and fa ls e judgement i s how
o p tim istic Timaeus i s about th e p o s s ib ility o f human beings b e tte rin g
them selves. At 44a f f Timaeus t e l l s us t h a t a t f i r s t we a re h ardly judge
anything c o rre c tly , though w ith tim e and e f f o r t as th e o rb its s e t t l e
"They announce both th e same and th e d if f e r e n t c o rre c tly , so
rendering th e i r possessor in te l li g e n t . I f he now takes p a r t in some
c o rre c t n u rtu re of education, he becomes p e rfe c t and e n tir e ly sound in
m i n d , h a v i n g escaped th e g re a te s t o f m aladies. " ^^ (Tim.44a f f )
This a l l looks very prom ising. I f we can t r a i n ourselves pro p erly , then
i t would seem th a t we too can have some opinions concerning th e phy sical
world which a re both secure and tr u e . Astronomy, according to Timaeus is
going to have a larg e p a rt to p lay in t h i s , fo r he t e l l s us th a t
"God devised and gave us v isio n in o rder t h a t we might observe th e
ra tio n a l rev o lu tio n s o f th e heavens and use them a g a in st th e revolutions
o f thought t h a t a re in u s , which a re lik e them, though those a re c le a r
and ours confused, and by learn in g thoroughly and p artaking in
c a lc u la tio n s c o rre c t according t o n atu re, by im ita tio n o f th e e n tir e ly
unwandering revolutions of God we might s t a b i l i s e th e wandering
rev o lu tio n s in o u rselv es." (Tim.47b)
This passage has considerable sig n ific a n c e in in d ic a tin g one o f th e
c h ie f ways in which we may improve th e s t a b i l i t y o f th e revolutions
which c o n s titu te our m i n d s . N o t e a ls o t h a t th e process of looking a t
71
th e heavens w ill lead t o th e s t a b il i s a ti o n o f a l l of our rev o lu tio n s,
which might suggest t h a t th e tr u e and s ta b le opinions t h a t we a re able
to form concerning th e se n sib le world may be converted in to knowledge,
i f observation i s going t o even tu ally lead to th e s t a b ilis a tio n of our
r a tio n a l o r b it as w ell.^ ^ Why astronomy has a sp e c ia l s ta tu s fo r P lato
i s a q u estion th a t I s h a ll attempt t o answer in ch ap ters seven and nine.

142
 Let us now conpare Timaeus 37a f f w ith 29b f f . At 29b6 f f th e
iirp lic a tio n was o f a [sungenes] matching o f secure [bebaios] accounts
w ith secure e n t i t i e s , and o f 'l i k e l y ' accounts w ith lik e n e sse s. At 37a
f f though, th e re e x is t [doxai k a i p i s t e i s ] which a re both [bebaios k ai
a le th e s ] in d ir e c t c o n tra d ic tio n o f both th e l e t t e r and s p i r i t of
27c-29d.23 F u rth er, given th e analogy developed between th e world soul
and human so u ls i t i s p o ssib le fo r us, i f we t r a i n ourselv es p roperly
and have m astery over our p ercep tio n s, to have t h i s s o r t o f opinion.
That to o i s co n trary t o th e s p i r i t o f th e clo sin g p a r t of Timaeus '
opening speech which t e l l s us t h a t we who a re human in n atu re should be
ready t o accep t a lik e ly account and seek no fu rth e r.
The lik e ly account has now generated a very in te re s tin g paradox.
The lik e ly sto ry i s t e l l i n g us t h a t i t i s lik e ly th a t th e b a sis fo r
giving t h i s s o r t o f account - t h a t because o f th e n a tu re o f th e phy sical
world as a lik e n e s s, i t w ill only admit of a lik e ly s to ry - i s wrong. I t
i s lik e ly t h a t th e lik e ly sto ry re fu te s i t s e l f . This ought to give us
considerable m isgivings about whether we can t r e a t th e views expressed
by Timaeus a t 27c-29e as P la to 's own, f o r th e passage a t Timaeus 37a f f
i s n ot an is o la te d example which we can ex p lain away as a s l i p by th e
au th o r. The human psychology developed in analogy w ith th e world so u l is
c a re fu lly worked o u t and i s one o f th e c e n tra l themes of th e Timaeus.
A ll t h i s , I suggest, i s e n tir e ly concordant w ith th e account o f the
s tru c tu re o f th e Timaeus th a t I argued fo r in chapter fo u r. There I
fch€..
suggested t h a t both th e dram atic context and th e contents of ^Timaeus
epistem ological foreward should lead us to be cau tio u s about a ttr ib u tin g
i t s views to P la to . Here we fin d two o f i t s most dubious a sp e c ts, th e
[sungenes] s t r i c t u r e fo r explananation and th e p e ssim is tic a ttitu d e t o
enquiry, under a tta c k . What i s more t h i s i s being done in th e context
o f a myth which w ill t e l l us much about ourselves and our r e la tio n to
th e w orld, and which tak es up th e agenda s e t in th e in tro d u c tio n .

II

One might g ather from th e account o f th e co n stru ctio n o f th e world so u l,

in th e way t h a t th e demiurge mixes to g eth er p o rtio n s o f sameness,
d iffe re n c e and [ousia] th a t each of th ese a re being tre a te d as complete
p re d ic a te s . That i s , i t would appear t h a t i t i s le g itim a te to say of
something th a t ' i t i s same' perhaps in v irtu e o f th e sameness i t
posses ra th e r than saying ' i t i s th e same as x '. However, other
passages seem to t r e a t sameness and d iffe re n c e a s incomplete

143
p re d ic a te s . Why should th e re be t h i s apparent d is p a r ity ? I t might be
t h a t P la to has not y e t p roperly d istin g u ish ed p ro p e rtie s and r e la tio n s ,
and only apparently t r e a t s sameness and d iffe re n c e a s re la tio n s .
Another suggestion i s t h i s . As a l l o f th e coitplete uses a re in the
passages concerning th e co n stru ctio n o f th e world soul and human so u ls,
perhaps t h i s i s a m etaphorical means o f a ttr ib u tin g something to those
s o u l s . A s Timaeus goes on to t e l l us t h a t whenever th ey encounter
anything, both th e world so u l and humans make judgements o f what th a t
th in g i s th e same as and what i t i s d if f e r e n t fra n , perhaps what i s
being a ttr ib u te d i s an in n ate a b i l i t y to make judgements o f sameness and
d if f e r e n c e .29 What though of th e use o f [e in a i] here ? I f i t s treatm ent
i s s im ila r t o t h a t o f sameness and d iffe re n c e , then perhaps P lato
reduces what he considers to be a tw o-place operator (the 'is* of
id e n tity and p red ic atio n ) t o a one-place operator (which then looks lik e
but i s not th e ' i s ' of ex isten ce) in order t o a tt r ib u t e another in n ate
a b i l i t y , perhaps t h a t o f forming statem ents o f id e n tity and
p r e d i c a t i o n . T h i s i s even more fundamental, fo r in order to be ab le to
form judgements o f re la tio n s o f sameness and d iffe re n c e we req u ire the
a b i l i t y to form such p ro p o sitio n s.^^ I f t h i s i s so , i t would explain
why, though so u ls a re c o n stitu te d from sameness d iffe re n c e and [ousia],
Timaeus only speaks of making judgements of sameness and
d iffe re n c e , a s in doing so we a re a ls o employing th e a b i l i t y a ttrib u te d
by [ e i n a i ] .32
P lato may have had se v era l reasons fo r introducing such innate
a b i l i t i e s . I f , by t h i s time, he has re je c te d anamnesis w ith i t s
re c o lle c te d knowledge, he may f e e l th e need to p o stu la te some
fundamental in n ate a b i l i t i e s in order to be a b le t o e x p lain learning ab
i n i t i o . The Timaeus model avoids scxne of th e notorious d i f f i c u l t i e s
concerning v ^ a t th e new born c h ild can know or perceiv e according to th e
account o f re c o lle c tio n a t Phaedo 73-75. According to th e Timaeus, we
a re a b le to make judgements about our sense p ercep tio n s s tr a ig h t away,
although th ese w ill be ra th e r poor due t o th e confused i n i t i a l s ta te of
our mental rev o lu tio n s. One advantage o f th e Timaeus account i s t h a t i t
allow s fo r i n te lle c tu a l development, in th e sense o f an in crease in our
co g n itiv e powers a sso ciated w ith th e steadying of our mental revolutions
as w ell as th e mere gain o f knowledge allowed by re c o lle c tio n .
I t i s a ls o worth noting in re la tio n t o th e argument t h a t I o ffered
in chapter th re e concerning acquaintance w ith th e Forms, th a t P la to 's

144
f i r s t concern in developing t h i s model o f mind i s w ith propos i t io n al
thought. He does n o t provide an in n ate a b i l i t y fo r acquaintance, o r the
r e - c a ll o f any p re-c arn a te knowledge. With anything we encounter, we a re
a b le to form p ro p o sitio n s re la tin g to sameness and d iffe re n c e . P la to is
perhaps not giving us an exhaustive account o f functioning of th e mind,
e sp e c ia lly a s in l a t e r works he allow s t h a t we may th in k p ic to r ia lly .3 3
R ather, he i s allow ing us t o th in k proposi tio n a lly about anything t h a t
i s brought before th e mind. One might a ls o note in r e la tio n to my
arguments in chapter two t h a t P la to develops a very a c tiv e and
independent account of th e mind.^^ As we have seen, th e two key
in ju n c tio n s in th e Timaeus a re th a t our minds should have mastery over
our percep tions so t h a t we can become w ise, and over our emotions so
t h a t we can become good.
We might a ls o consider t h i s theory of in n ate a b i l i t i e s in r e la tio n
to th e 'common id e a s' o f th e T heaetetus. S ocrates and T heaetetus have
th e follow ing interchange
So "Through what does th e a b i l i t y fun ctio n which rev eals to you what
i s common [koinon] t o a l l th in g s, th a t which you name i s o r i s n o t, and
o th ers which we were asking about ju s t now ? What organs w ill you assig n
f o r a l l o f th e se , through what does th e p ercep tiv e p a r t o f us perceive
each of th ese ?
Th "You mean being and not being, lik e n ess and unlik en ess, sameness
and d iffe re n c e , and one and th e o th ers numbers a s applied to them .. . I
d o n 't know what to say, S ocrates, except t h a t i t seems t h a t th e re i s n 't
a s p e c ia l organ fo r th e se a s th e re i s fo r o th e rs, b u t th e soul i s i t s
own instrum ent examining what i s common in a l l th in g s ." (T h t.185c)
The theory of re c o lle c tio n would undoubtably have a t a l e to t e l l here
about th e a c q u isitio n o f th ese common id e a s. One o f th e in te re s tin g
asp ects o f th e Timaeus i s th a t P lato p re se n ts us w ith a highly
parsimonious theory of th e in n ate a b i l i t i e s of th e mind. The Theaetetus
mentions se v e ra l common id e a s, such a s u n ity and p l u r a l i t y , l i k e n e s s
and u n l i k e n e s s , b e a u t i f u l and ugly, good and bad,^® as w ell as
sameness and d iffe re n c e . Now, a more generous i n n a tis t might make th e
a b i l i t y to apply a l l o f th ese in n ate c a p a b ilitie s . The Timaeus though
g ra n ts only th e l a s t two, which in conjunction w ith th e a b i l i t y to thimk
propos i ti o n a ll y , might be thought t o be foundational. The Timaeus
suggests t h a t we form some of our a b i l i t i e s to make judgements from
a b stra c tio n from what i s given in percepetual experience. For in sta n c e ,
we a re to ld th a t

145
 "Sight o f day and n ig h t, of months and th e cycle o f th e years has
procured fo r us number and th e concept o f tim e, and has a ls o led us to
seek th e n atu re o f th e u niverse. From th ese we have derived philosophy,
th e g re a te s t g i f t o f th e Gods to m o rtals." (Tim.47a)
I t i s presumably by applying our judgements o f sameness and d iffe re n c e
to our observations of th e heavens t h a t we acquire th e concepts of
number and tim e t h a t we can subsequently apply t o o th er p ercep tio n s.
S im ilarly perhaps w ith our knowledge o f sameness and d iffe re n c e . I t i s
presumably by applying our in n ate a b i l i t i e s to form judgements of
sameness and d iffe re n c e t h a t we come to some conscious knowledge of
sameness and d iff e re n c e .^2
There i s a ls o an im portant p o in t here to be made about th e re la tio n
o f p e rcep tio n and opinion in th e Timaeus. I t has been argued t h a t the
Theaetetus q u ite rig h tly d istin g u ish e s between p ercep tio n , opinion and
knowledge. The Timaeus, so th e argument ru n s, wrongly c o n tra sts
knowledge w ith e ith e r opinion o r perception in a way t h a t suggests th a t
i t i s making th e same c o n tra s t in each case, as does th e Republic.
Thus th e Theaetetus must p o std ate th e Timaeus. The p o s itio n o f the
Theaeteus, I take i t , i s t h a t f i r s t we have p ercep tio n s, we then apply
our judgements, and f i n a l ly we a rriv e a t an opinion concerning them.
Consider, though, th e way in which th e world soul fu n ctio n s, and by
im p licatio n human so u ls to o . Timaeus 37a f f makes i t c le a r t h a t the
world soul f i r s t encounters an o b je c t, i t then determ ines a l l i t s
re la tio n s o f sameness and d iffe re n c e and only then a rr iv e s a t an
opinion. The Timaeus not only follow s th e Theaetetus on t h i s m atter, but
th e d iscu ssio n might be thought t o develop some o f th e themes th e re .
A fu rth e r im portant fe a tu re o f th e account of mind in th e Timaeus
i s th e way t h a t th e s tru c tu re and a b i l i t i e s o f th e mind r e la te to th e
s tru c tu re o f th e world. The world i s made up of th in g s t h a t a re th e same
a s and d if f e r e n t from o th er th in g s . The world o f th e Timaeus i s a lso
stru c tu re d in tim e and space, and i s organised by th e demiurge [kat*
arithmon] Our minds have a f a l l i b l e a b i l i t y to judge sameness and
d iffe re n c e , and a re a b le t o acquire th e concepts o f tim e, space and
number. The im plicatio n s of t h i s fo r whether we can have knowledge
concerning th e physical world I s h a ll postpone u n til we have discussed
th e flu x o f th e se n sib le world, and I merely note here t h a t th e re i s
an in te r e s tin g concordance between th e s tru c tu re o f th e world and th e
nature of our judgements about it.^ G

146
 Ill

Let us now consider what th e Timaeus has to say on mind and fa ls e

judgement in r e la tio n t o th e T heaetetus and Sophist. The d iscu ssio n of
th e problem o f f a ls e judgement in th e Theaetetus begins from th e
assumption t h a t th e re a re only two c o g n itiv e s t a te s , o f knowledge and
ignorance, w ith o th er a lte rn a tiv e s l e f t on one sid e fo r th e moment.
Assuming t h i s exhaustive d isju n c tio n , S ocrates then p re se n ts and re je c ts
four p o s s ib i l i ti e s fo r f a ls e ju d g e m e n t.T h e s e a re t h a t

1) You cannot f a ls e ly judge t h a t something you know i s something e ls e

you know.

2) You cannot f a ls e ly judge t h a t something you do n o t know i s something

e ls e you do n o t know.

3) You cannot f a ls e ly judge t h a t something you know i s something you do

n ot know.

4) You cannot f a ls e ly judge t h a t something you do n o t know i s something

you know.

I s h a ll re f e r to th ese as type 1 - 4 m is id e n tific a tio n s . One might w ell

agree w ith S ocrates here,^^ given th e b ifu rc a tio n between absolute
knowledge and ignorance, and th e assumption J1, th a t

J 1 . I f something i s to be th e o b je c t of a judgement, i t must be known.

I t i s hard to see how we could make any judgement a t a l l about th in g s we

a re e n tir e ly ignorant o f , w ith types 2, 3 and 4, while w ith type 1 i f we
know something a b so lu te ly i t i s hard to see how we e r r . The necessary
condition fo r making a f a ls e judgement, th a t we know both p a r tie s ,
appears t o a ls o be a s u f f ic ie n t condition th a t we do not m istake one fo r
th e o th e r. Socrates claim s a t Theaetetus 188c t h a t th ese a re a l l th e
forms t h a t f a ls e judgement can ta k e , and so given th e know/ not know
b ifu rc a tio n , f a ls e judgement i s im possible. Now, we might agree t h a t
th e se a re a l l th e forms t h a t f a ls e judgements o f id e n tity could ta k e ,
but d isag ree t h a t t h i s exhausts a l l p o ssib le judgements. In p a r tic u la r ,
we might be in te re s te d in statem ents o f p re d ic a tio n as w ell a s those of
id e n tity , in m isdescriptions as w ell as m is id e n tific a tio n s . There i s a

147
question a s to whether P lato a t th e tim e o f w ritin g th e Theaetetus had
y e t made th e d is tin c tio n between id e n tity and p re d ic a tio n . I f he had,
then perhaps th e re i s a d iv is io n o f labour between th e Theaetetus and
th e S ophist, th e former dealing w ith m is id e n tific a tio n and th e l a t t e r
w ith m isdescription.^®
One way to t r y to break th e impasse here i s to tak e a sem antic
approach. While we might agree t h a t we cannot judge th a t which we a re
e n tir e ly ignorant o f , i t might be argued t h a t th e necessary condition
f o r a m istake, t h a t we know something, i s n o t a s u f f ic ie n t condition fo r
us g e ttin g a l l our judgements about t h a t th in g c o r r in stead of
e c t .

simply knowing th e o b je c t of our judgement, we might d if f e r e n tia te our

knowledge in to d if f e r e n t th in g s we know about t h i s o b je c t. We may then
know enough to bring i t before th e mind w ithout th e t o t a l knowledge
needed to exclude e rro r in judgement of a l l i t s a sp e c ts. With id e n tity
statm ents in mind, we might a ls o want t o invoke F re g e's d is tin c tio n
between sense and reference a s a b a sis fo r d istin g u ish in g what we th in k
o f from what we th in k o f i t a s, allow ing id e n tity statem ents t o be both
tru e and inform ative, and not simply t r i v i a l l y or a n a ly tic a lly tru e or
f a ls e ; conpare 'th e morning s t a r i s the morning s t a r ' w ith the 'morning
s t a r i s th e evening s t a r '.
This i s not th e route t h a t th e Theaetetus ta k e s , however. R ather,
i t t r e a t s t h i s a s an epistem ological problem and suggests other means
fo r th e mind to grasp something besides knowledge and ignorance. Instead
of d istin g u ish in g d if f e r e n t senses o f p ro p o sitio n s w ith th e same
referen ce, d if f e r e n t sem antic routes from words to th in g s , th e
T heaetetus proposes d if f e r e n t epistem ic routes by vAiich something may be
brought before th e mind.
Socrates introduces th e wax block model o f th e mind a t Theaetetus
191c f f , along w ith two assunptions, th a t we cannot f a i l to know
something we do in f a c t know and th a t lea rn in g , coming to know, is
p o s s ib le . We come to know vAien a p ercep tio n i s im printed onto our wax
block, and our knowledge l a s ts as long as t h a t im print l a s t s . The a tta c k
w ill focus on type 3 m is id e n tific a tio n s , allow ing t h a t we may f a ls e ly
judge t h a t something we know i s something we do n o t know i f th e unknown
elem ent i s brought before th e mind by percep tio n ra th e r than by th e
memory/ knowledge o f th e in p r in t on th e wax block. Thus th e wax block
model proposes two epistem ic ro u te s, p ercep tio n and memory/ knowledge.
This means replacing p rin c ip le J1 with th e more generous one J2 ,

148
J2 . I f something i s to be an o b je c t o f a judgement, i t must be e ith e r
known or perceived.

Now we can m istake th e man we do n o t know but p erceive fo r scxneone we do

indeed know, breaking th e p ro h ib itio n on type 3 m is id e n tific a tio n s .
Other types o f m is id e n tific a tio n a re s t i l l ru led o u t, however.
The wax block model i s re je c te d though, because i t cannot account
fo r m isid e n tif ic a tio n s where both th e term s a re iirp ercep tib le item s,
such as n u m b e rs .W e a ls o need then th e d is tin c tio n between concrete
and a b s tr a c t id e n tif ic a tio n s , where th e former deal w ith p e rc e p tib le
e n ti t ie s and th e l a t t e r w ith i n te l li g i b le e n t i t i e s .
One might a ls o note some fu rth e r d i f f i c u l t i e s w ith th e wax block
model. F i r s t l y , by what mechanism i s i t t h a t we acquire our memory/
knowledge, th e im prints on our wax block in th e f i r s t place How,
w ith in th a t , do we i n i t i a l l y pick o u t p a r t of our p ercep tu al f i e l d , such
as a man, and t r e a t i t as a su b je c t of knowledge ? By what fa c u lty of
th e mind do we compare our memories w ith our c u rre n t perceptions ? Some
advantages of th e Timaeus account of th e mind here i s t h a t i t t e l l s us
how learn in g and judgement occur ab i n i t i o , how we can d iscrim in ate
w ith in our p erceptual f ie ld and how we can make compar tiv e
judgements. Secondly, one might worry whether t a l k of matching
psychological e n t i t i e s such as th e im prints on th e wax block with
perceptions r e a lly give^us an answer to th e problem of
m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .O n e may f e e l th a t i t s u b s titu te s th e re la tio n of
matching, which holds between in p rin ts and p ercep tio n s fo r th a t of
id e n tity which holds between th in g s in th e world, or term s in a
p ro p o sitio n . The Timaeus model t r e a t s thought much more propos itio n a lly ,
and so avoids t h i s worry.
The a v ia ry model i s introduced w ith a d is tin c tio n between having
and possessing. 58 A man w ith an a v ia ry might possess th e b ird s t h a t a re
in sid e i t , bu t only be sa id to have a b ird vAien he has i t in h is hand.
So to o w ith knowledge; i f we can possess sane knowledge w ithout a c tiv e ly
making use o f i t , so t h a t we can be sa id to possess b u t n o t have i t ,
then our minds may be lik e a v i a r i e s . When we a re young, Socrates goes
on, th e av iary i s empty, and learn in g i s th e process o f acquiring b ird s
and sh u ttin g them up in th e a v i a r y . B i r d hunting (learning) then has
two a sp e c ts. F i r s t l y , we might seek t o acquire a b ird fo r th e sake of
possession, the i n i t i a l a c t of lea rn in g . Secondly we might seek fo r th e
sake o f having, grasping a b ird alread y in th e

149
a v ia ry , hoping to a c tiv a te th e knowledge t h a t we p a ssiv e ly possess.
True judgement occurs when we g rasp th e c o rre c t b ird , f a ls e judgement
when we p u ll o u t th e wrong one.^^
The a v ia ry then attem pts to break th e impasse on fa ls e judgement by
allow ing us to possess knowledge th a t we do n o t a c tiv e ly use a l l th e
tim e, such t h a t we can th in k of some a b s tra c t e n t i t i e s w ithout being
sa id to know them. This gives us th e more generous p rin c ip le , J3 , th a t

J3 . I f something i s to be th e o b je c t o f a judgement, i t must e ith e r be

perceived, be a c tiv e ly thought o f using o n e 's knowledge (had), or
thought about unknowingly (possessed).

With t h i s we can perhaps break th e p ro h ib itio n on type 3 a b s tra c t

m is id e n tific a tio n s . We can now have both term s of an id e n tity statem ent
b efore th e mind, but can be th inking o f a t l e a s t one o f them
unknowingly.^^
However, t h i s proposed so lu tio n very quickly runs in to tro u b le .
False judgements, th e av iary t e l l s us, occur when when we have knowledge
of one o f th e term s of an id e n tity statem ent but only possess knowledge
o f th e o th e r. Thus a b s tr a c t e n t i t i e s can be brought before th e mind
w ithout being a c tiv e ly known. E rror occurs because in our a tte n p t to
have knowledge o f th e second term , we se iz e th e wrong b ird , and so e rro r
concerns s o le ly th a t which i s not a c tiv e ly known. But e rro r in id e n tity
statem ents i s in fe c tio u s; i f we f a ls e ly judge a to be b we a ls o f a ls e ly
judge b to be a . That means t h a t we a ls o make an e rro r about th e f i r s t
term , and t h a t i s something which we a c tiv e ly know, th a t we have
knowledge o f This objectio n might a ls o be thought t o b ite on th e wax
block model, vtdiere we compare th e memory th a t we do know w ith the
percep tio n t h a t we do n o t.
Considering i t to be im possible t h a t we e r r about something we
know, Theaeteus suggests t h a t th e re may be p ieces o f ignorance as w ell
as p ieces of knowledge fly in g around in sid e th e a v ia ry . The person who
p u lls o ut a p iec e o f ignorance w ill b eliev e i t t o be a p iece of
knowledge in ste a d . How though do we explain t h i s fu rth e r fa ls e judgement
which i s required t o e x p lain th e f i r s t one ? E ith er we face th e four
p o s s ib i l i ti e s fo r f a ls e judgement w ithout th e d is tin c tio n between
possessing and having knowledge, in which case th e a v iary is
superfluous, or we use i t again t o c re a te a fu r th e r a v ia ry , when th e

150
same arguments w ill apply and an i n f i n i t e reg ress w ill b e generated.
Thus both th e wax block and th e av iary models a re abandoned.

IV

Our q u estio n now i s whether th e Timaeus ' model of mind and fa ls e

judgement avoids th e p i t f a l l s of th e T heaetetus. Firstly#r l e t us tak e
stock of our resources. C e rta in ly , we a re w ell provided f o r in term s of
epistem ic ro u te s. An im portant p o in t here i s t h a t ju s t a s the Theaetetus
s p l i t s a p a rt p erception, judgement and b e lie f th e Timaeus seems to go a
ste p fu rth e r in p u llin g a p a rt th e i n te lle c tu a l analogue o f p ercep tio n ,
which I s h a ll c a l l apprehension, and knowledge. As we have seen, j u s t as
th e world soul must apply judgements concerning sameness and d iffe re n c e
to th e p h y sical e n t i t i e s t h a t i t encounters before i t a tt a i n s tru e
b e lie f s , so i t must apply th ese t o what i t in te l le c t u a l l y apprehends
b efore i t a tt a i n s knowledge. That seems t o imply fo u r ep istem ic ro u te s,
namely p ercep tio n , tru e opinion, in te lle c tu a l apprehension and
knowledge.
Also a t our d isp o sa l a re some f a l l i b l e in n ate a b i l i t i e s which a t
Timaeus 44a a re linked to th e occur ft o f e rro r and falseh o o d s. We
might u se fu lly compare t h i s passage w ith th e S ophist, in p a rtic u la r
where th e E le a tic Stranger says
"When statem ents about you s t a te as d if f e r e n t what i s th e same and
what i s n o t as what i s , i t i s very lik e ly t h a t th e occurrence o f such a
combination o f verbs and nouns re a lly and tr u ly c o n s titu te s fa ls e
statem en t." (So.263d)
Timaeus says t h a t i f th e rev o lu tio n s t h a t c o n s titu te our minds are
d istu rb ed , then
"Whenever they encounter some e x te rn a l o b je c t, whether i t be o f th e
c la s s o f th e same o r th e d if f e r e n t, then they la b e l i t th e same as or
d if f e r e n t from something co n trary to th e t r u th , falsehoods and s tu p id ity
occurn Aj " (Tim.43e)
The Timaeus then seems to be in rough agreement w ith th e Sophist on what
c o n s titu te s f a ls e statem ent and judgement.
Our f i r s t q uestion r e la tiv e to th e T heaetetus i s vdiether the
Timaeus can give us an a n a ly sis o f concrete m isd escrip tio n . On th e b a sis
of Timaeus 43e, i f we a s s e r t t h a t something i s th e same as something
when i t i s d if f e r e n t, or vice v ersa, we have a m isd escrip tio n . Given
t h a t we can m isdescribe concrete e n t i t i e s in t h i s way# then the

151
p o s s ib ility of concrete m is id e n tific a tio n follow s. The Timaeus, I
suggest, provides two ro u tes h ere.
F i r s t l y , even i f our in n ate a b i l i t i e s fo r judgement a re functioning
c o rre c tly , i f we m isperceive something we a re going t o end up
m isdescribing i t . For in sta n c e , two o b je c ts may appear equal in s iz e
when they d i f f e r , or v ice -v e rsa , due to some t r i c k o f p e rsp ec tiv e .
Because o f th e re s u ltin g m isperception we may then m isdescribe th ese
o b je c ts , even though we describ e our perceptions o f them c o rre c tly , and
as a r e s u l t m isid en tify them. In th e Republic P lato has Socrates say
"The same magnitude through our eyes does n o t appear to be equal
clo se up and f a r aw ay... th e same th in g s appear bent and s tr a ig h t when
placed in and out of w ater, o r th e concave appears convex due to th e
e rro rs of our eyes concerning shading, and th e re a re c le a r ly a l l s o rts
of confusions lik e t h i s in our so u ls." (Rep.602d)^®
One can form ulate an example a s follow s. Take a s tic k bent a t an angle
equal to th e re fra c tiv e index o f w ater. Then imagine two p resen ta tio n s
w ith th e s tic k and observer so arranged t h a t in th e f i r s t th e s tic k in
water appears to be s tr a ig h t, and in th e second appears t o be bent to
tw ice th e angle of re fr a c tiv e index. Then p re se n t th e observer with
th re e s tic k s , a s tr a ig h t one, th e o rig in a l one and one bent a t tw ice th e
angle o f th e o rig in a l and ask them t o id e n tify which o f th e se th re e
s tic k s was p re se n t in which p re s e n ta tio n . Because th ey m isperceive th e
s tic k s th ey w ill m isdescribe them in th e f i r s t two p re se n ta tio n s, and so
they w ill m isid e n tify th e s tic k s in th e t h ir d .
The Timaeus wants to say something more than t h i s , however, and th e
manner in which i t does so may help to dem onstrate th e in tim ate
connections between th e d iscu ssio n o f th e T heaetetus and th e proposed
model o f mind in th e Timaeus. J u s t before our passage a t 43e, Timaeus
t e l l s us o f th e d isru p tio n s su ffe red by our mental rev o lu tio n s, and says
th a t th e e f f e c t o f th ese d isru p tio n s
"Is lik e when scxneone s e ts themselves upside down, w ith t h e i r head
a g a in st th e ground, holding th e i r f e e t a l o f t by pushing them a g a in st
something. In t h i s case rig h t and l e f t both o f th e s u ff e re r and o f any
onlookers w ill appear t o be reversed to th e o th er p a rty ." (Tim.43e)
On t h i s b a s is , we make some in c o rre c t a ttr ib u tio n s of sameness and
d iffe re n c e . At Timaeus 46a f f , we a re to ld t h a t m irrors can a ls o make
l e f t appear r ig h t and vice v e r s a . T h e e s s e n tia l p o in t here i s t h a t in
a d d itio n and analogously to t r ic k s o f p ersp ec tiv e and re v e rsa l which may
m islead u s, because th e rev o lu tio n s in us a re im perfect our

152
judgements of sameness and d iffe re n c e a re f a l l i b l e . That allow s us to
form in c o rre c t judgements concerning th in g s t h a t a re n o t p e rc ep tu a lly
d ecep tiv e. This generates a second source o f m isdescriptions which
g re a tly extends th e number o f p o ssib le scenarios vÆiere they may occur,
allow ing each o f our perceptions to be m isdescribed.
I t i s in te re s tin g t h a t th e T heaetetus a llu d e s t o th e same s o r t of
example a s th e Timaeus in i t s d iscu sssio n o f f a ls e judgement, though
w ithout drawing th e same conclusion. In th e d isc u ssio n o f th e wax block
in th e T heaetetus, Socrates t e l l s us th a t
"The p o s s ib ility o f f a ls e judgement remains in th e follow ing
m anner... i t may be t h a t I am in e rr o r su ffe rin g as s ig h t i s a ffe c te d by
a m irro r, l e f t changing in to r ig h t. In such a case oth er judging and
f a ls e judging happen." (Tht.193c)^^
One p o in t on which th e Timaeus might be thought to advance beyond th e
T heaetetus and th e S ophist i s in providing a model o f th e mind which is
consonant w ith th e epistem ological and semantic in s ig h ts of th e
T heaetetus and S ophist and allow s p la u s ib le f a ls e judgements and
statem ents to occur.
How might t h i s deal w ith th e standard exanple from th e T heaetetus,
t h a t of m istaking a person in th e d is ta n c e , who i s in f a c t say
Theodorus, fo r T heaetetus ? The Timaeus account would suggest t h a t
e ith e r we m isperceive th e person in th e d ista n c e , o r th a t we misjudge
our perception o f them, in e ith e r case making an e rr o r in our
a ttr ib u tio n s o f sameness and d iffe re n c e . On th e b a sis o f t h is
m isd escrip tion we m isid en tify th e person in th e d istan c e a s Theaetetus
71
in ste a d of Theodorus.
Thus we have two sources of e rro r t h a t w ill lead us to p la u s ib le
m is id e n tif ic a tio n s .N o w i f we describe c o rre c tly an o b je c t t h a t we
m isperceive, th e re i s of course a sense in which we do not m isdescribe
i t , though a s th e d e sc rip tio n w ill n o t be accu rate i t must be a
m isd escrip tio n . S im ilarly w ith m isd escrip tio n s and m is id e n tific a tio n s ;
we c o rre c tly id e n tify our m isdescription w ith something, though not th e
o b je c t we a re d escrib in g . Thus our e rro rs of m is id e n tific a tio n a re
p la u sib le and not c ra s s . We may thereby have id e n tity statem ents which
a re f a ls e , b u t a re not m an ifestly f a ls e , and c arry some genuine
inform ation. They a re o f th e form a = b (the man in th e d istan c e i s
S o c rate s), and a re p la u s ib le because our e r r o r of m isd escrip tio n , caused
by m isperception or misjudgement o f p ercep tio n , occurs before we come to

153
consider such a statem ent. In lin e w ith what Socrates has to say a t
Theaetetus 190b f f though, judgements lik e 'th e odd i s even* or 'a horse
is a cow' a re s t i l l im plausible, th e s o r t o f th in g t h a t 'no-one in t h e i r
rig h t mind o r o u t o f i t ' would judge to be so .^ ^ I t may o f course be th e
case th a t we can d e lib e ra te ly m isid e n tify in t h i s way, or perhaps
d e lib e ra te ly m isdescribe.^^ However, I tak e i t t h a t P la to 's main concern
i s t o ex p la in how convincing cases of m isdescription a r is e where we
b eliev e ourselves to have acted to th e b e s t o f our a b i l i t y but have in
f a c t been (c o rre c tly ) describing a m isperception, in c o rre c tly judging a
p ercep tio n , and then (c o rre c tly ) id e n tify in g a m isd escrip tio n .

The wax block model o f th e Theaetetus was re je c te d because although i t

might d eal with cases of m is id e n tific a tio n where perception i s involved,
i t could n ot deal w ith th e m is id e n tific a tio n o f im perceptible a b s tra c t
e n t i t i e s . Our next ta sk then i s to see what th e Timaeus model may have
to say on t h i s m atter. The Timaeus as we have seen espouses a d if f e r e n t
and perhaps s t i l l more generous approach to judgements, and gives us J4 ,

J4 . I f something i s t o be th e o b je c t o f a judgement, i t must e ith e r be

perceived, opined, in te lle c tu a lly apprehended o r known.

The q u estion i s how much d iffe re n c e does t h i s p rin c ip le make in a

treatm ent o f a b s tr a c t m is id e n tific a tio n ? One th in g here seems c le a r,
which i s t h a t in te lle c tu a l apprehension i s meant t o be in some ways an
analogue o f p h y sical p ercep tio n . This suggests t h a t we should approach
th e problem o f a b s tra c t m is id e n tific a tio n along s im ila r lin e s to the
so lu tio n o f concrete m is id e n tific a tio n .^ ^ F ir s tly , th en , i s a b s tra c t
m isd escrip tion p o ssib le and i f so how i s i t p o ssib le ?
The a n a ly sis of m isdescription in th e Sophist and th e Timaeus i s
in d if f e r e n t to whether i t s o b je c ts a re a b s tr a c t o r co n crete. A
m isd escrip tion along th ese lin e s would be th e in c o rre c t a ttr ib u tio n of
sameness and d iffe re n c e t o an a b s tr a c t e n tity .
So how do a b s tra c t m isdescriptions come about ? Again, we might
s p l i t t h i s in to e x te rn a l and in te rn a l f a c to rs . We might misapprehend
because we h ear an illu s o r y but convincing argument, t h a t i s th e re is
something deceptive about what we encounter. One might th in k here o f th e
comment th a t Socrates makes about Zeno in th e Phaedrus

154
 "Don't we know th a t th e E le a tic Palamedes has an a r t of speaking
such t h a t th in g s appear t o be l ik e and u n lik e , one and many, s t i l l and
y e t moving ?" (Pdr.261d)
That, I suggest, i s an i n te lle c tu a l analogue o f a m isperception. Another
im portant passage in t h i s context i s S ophist 234b f f . Here an analogy i s
drawn between a deceptive drawing, which may appear a t a d istan c e t o be
vdiat i t re p re se n ts, and th e s o r t o f arguments p u t forward by the
S o p h ists, which may deceive those who a re s t i l l young and a re ' standing
a t a d istan c e from th e t r u th o f th e m a t t e r A s w ith th e c o rre c t
d e sc rip tio n of m isperceptions, we might then c o rre c tly d escrib e a
misapprehension and a rriv e a t an a b s tra c t m isd escrip tio n . The second
ro u te h ere i s an analogue o f th e in c o rre c t d e sc rip tio n o f th e th in g s
t h a t we c o rre c tly p erceiv e. One im portant fa c to r o f th e Timaeus' model
of mind i s t h a t we apply our c a p a c itie s fo r judgement to th a t which we
in te lle c tu a lly apprehend, and because th e c a p a c itie s a re f a l l i b l e we may
make e rr o r s in a ttr ib u tin g sameness and d iffe re n c e t o th e id eas t h a t we
a re try in g to grasp. There a re se v e ra l E nglish phrases which seem
p a r tic u la r ly apposite to th e s o r t o f se n sib le analogues t h a t P lato uses
fo r i n te lle c tu a l apprehension. When we come acro ss an idea but g e t i t
wrong, thin king in r e la tio n to th e example o f Timaeus 43e, we might say
th a t we got th e idea 'upside down' or 'th e wrong way round', or perhaps
th in k in g in r e la tio n to Republic 602d f f th a t we g o t the 'wrong end of
th e s t i c k '.
The example o f a b s tra c t e rro r given in th e Theaetetus t h a t t h i s
model of mind and fa ls e judgement has t o deal w ith i s 7 + 5 = 11. I
would suggest t h a t th e re i s one way a g re a t d eal o f s im ila r ity in th e
way t h a t th e T heaetetus t r e a t s concrete and a b s tra c t m is id e n tific a tio n s .
With concrete m is id e n tific a tio n s , perception i s tre a te d f a i r l y
tra n s p a re n tly ; what we perceive goes s tr a ig h t in to th e term s o f th e
id e n tity statem ent, w ith l i t t l e d iscu ssio n o f th e p ro cess. Now th e
equation 7 + 5 = 11 can be thought o f in two ways, as

1 ) 7 + 5 (=12) = 11

2) 7 + 5 (=11) = 11.

The f i r s t p re se n ta tio n t r e a t s th e l e f t hand sid e o f th e equation as

tra n sp a re n t and concentrates on how we might ever th in k t h a t 12 = 11.
This i s th e way t h a t th e Theaetetus d iscusses th e problem, and i s in

155
some ways analogous to i t s treatm ent of concrete m is id e n tific a tio n .^ ^
(2) on th e o th er hand suggests th a t we ought t o concentrate on th e l e f t
hand sid e o f th e equation and consider ways in which we might come to
b eliev e th a t 7 plu s 5 equals 11. Now w hile th e Timaeus does not go
through t h i s or any sim ila r problem, th e d iscu ssio n o f th e so u l i s very
suggestive o f ways in which we might go about solving problems h e re . In
lin e w ith h is PWP, P lato i s perhaps suggesting frameworks fo r th e
so lu tio n o f problems which we th e readers must employ ourselves in order
to f u lly understand both th e framework, th e problem and th e s o lu tio n .
I f we a re to follow through th e analogue w ith how concrete
mis id e n tific a tio n s were d e a lt w ith , then e ith e r we misapprehend or
m isdescribe our apprehension o f th e elements o f th e l e f t hand sid e of
th e eq u atio n . There would seem to be l i t t l e t h a t i s in tr i n s i c a l ly
deceptive about 7 and 5 th a t might provide an analogue of m isperception,
though as T heaetetus p o in ts out t h i s example i s meant t o apply to a l l
n u m b e r s ,a n d we might w ell be ab le to th in k of some more complex
Q1
numbers which do have deceptive p ro p e rtie s . More lik e ly th e e rro r i s
ou rs, such t h a t vhen we come to th in k of 7, 5 or 7 + 5 we muddle our
a ttr ib u tio n s of sameness and d iffe re n c e and end up w ith th e answer t h a t
7 + 5 = 1 1 , w ithout th e thought t h a t 12 = 11 e n te rin g our heads. Here we
do n ot ex p lain one misjudgement by another, as w ith T h eaetetu s' pieces
of ignorance, but give a mechanism by which th e i n t i t i a l m istake is
made. This explanation i s then invulnerable to th e reg ress argument t h a t
f i n a l ly wrecks th e av iary model.
The model o f mind advanced in th e Timaeus seems to be so p h istic a te d
r e la tiv e t o th e arguments o f th e T heaetetus and th e S ophist. Here may
l i e some fu rth e r arguments fo r a l a t e dating o f th e Timaeus. That th e
Timaeus o ften gives us th e r ig h t resources in th e rig h t context w ithout
any argument or d iscu ssio n might w ell be taken t o imply th a t th e Timaeus
was composed a t a l a t e r d a te . I f th e Theaetetus follow s th e Timaeus, i t
seems very odd t h a t i t avoids a discussion o f f a ls e judgement in terms
o f sameness and d iffe re n c e and t h a t i t e n tir e ly ignores th e model o f the
mind advanced in th e Timaeus. As I have suggested, one o f th e most
in trig u in g asp ects o f th e Timaeus i s t h a t in i t s a ttr ib u tio n o f in n ate
a b i l i t i e s to judge sameness and d iffe re n c e i t may develop th e d iscussion
of ccmraon n a tu re s a t T heaetetus 184-186.

VI

The main aim o f t h i s chapter has been t o develop th e epistemology

156
im p lic it in th e analogy between th e world soul and th e human so u l. This
epistemology c o n tra d ic ts t h a t of Timaeus 27c-29e on th e p o in ts t h a t in
chapter four I argued we should be most suspicious o f, th e [sungenes]
s t r i c t u r e f o r explanation and th e p e ssim is tic view o f in v e s tig a tio n .
What i s more, th e suggestion t h a t both th e world soul and, given proper
n u rtu re, ourselves can have s ta b le and tr u e opinions o f p h y sical m atters
undercuts th e very b a sis fo r t e l l i n g a lik e ly s to ry , t h a t one can only
expect a lik e ly account o f a lik e n e ss. E ith er we accep t t h a t th e Timaeus
i s ho p elessly confused, o r, as I suggested in chapter four we t r e a t i t
as challenging us w ith new hypotheses which i t i s up to us to judge th e
worth o f . C e rta in ly we cannot simply dism iss t h i s a lte r n a tiv e
epistemology a s i t i s so in tim ately bound up w ith th e Timaeus* account
of th e mind. That account, I have argued, i s one t h a t i s so p h istic a te d
r e la tiv e t o th e S ophist and T heaetetus.
This a lte r n a tiv e epistemology i s c lo se ly linked to th e new ideas on
th e re g u la rity of c e l e s ti a l motion. 82 One im portant asp ect o f t h i s i s
th a t one cannot argue a g a in st my attem pts to show t h a t th e world o f th e
Timaeus i s a considerably more reg u lar and coup rehens ib le place than th e
worlds p o stu lated in e a r l ie r P la to t h a t t h i s new com prehensibility
o u ts trip s th e somewhat p e ssim istic epistemology of t h a t work. On th e
co n trary , th e new epistem ological suggestions seem e n tir e ly consonant
with such a world. How much more o p tim istic t h i s a lte r n a tiv e
epistemology i s i s a question I s h a ll re tu rn to in chapter nine, as
th e re a re o th e r im portant m atters to be in v e stig a te d before any proper
conclusions can be drawn h ere.
F ir s tly , we need to know more about th e n atu re o f flu x in th e
Timaeus. Orthodox accounts here might be thought both to support the
orthodox epistemology and provide problems fo r th e id ea t h a t th e heavens
move in a re g u la r and s ta b le manner. In th e next chapter I s h a ll argue
th a t th e flu x p o stu lated by th e more so p h istic a te d hypotheses in th e
Timaeus i s n o t as ra d ic a l as i s sometimes thought. The next chapter
shares a d iv is io n of labour w ith i t s successor to some e x te n t. In i t I
argue t h a t a g a in s t th e e a r l ie r ŒW view, P la to allow s some s t a b i l i t y and
being to p a rtic u la rs . In th e follow ing chapter on developments in th e
theory of Forms, I argue t h a t l a t e r works complement t h is by allowing
fo r c e rta in s o r ts of changes to th e Forms, again breaching th e
s tr ic tu r e s of TW.

157
NOTES TO CEIAPTER SIX

01) See my next se c tio n on th e tr a n s la tio n o f [ousia] h ere.

02) Cf. Tht.189e f f , So.263e f f and Plb.37 f f on th e re la tio n of judging
as s i l e n t statem ent and statem ent a s spoken judgement.
03) See my d iscu ssio n of [logos] in th e Tim. in c h .4.
03) There i s a question here a s to whether t h i s 'p air* re fe rs to
in te llig e n c e and knowledge o r to (opinions and b e lie fs ) and
(in te llig e n c e and knowledge); see Cornford (1937) p96 n . 1.

04) None o f th e major commentaries accord t h i s passage any sp e c ia l

sig n ific a n c e , although i t would seem to make a very im portant statem ent
about th e n atu re o f th e world soul and by im p licatio n about th e nature
of th e p h y sical world. I t i s in te re s tin g to note r e la tiv e t o th e Tht.
(esp. 201c ad fin ) t h a t even i f th e world so u l can determ ine a l l the
re le v a n t r e la tio n s of sameness and d iffe re n c e c o rre c tly , i t s t i l l does
n o t have knowledge but only a tr u e and s ta b le opinion.

05) As described by Timaeus a t 37d-40d, where he concludes "Therefore

l e t t h i s be s u f f ic ie n t fo r us, and l e t our account o f th e n atu re o f the
v is ib le and generated gods come to an end" (Tim.40d).
06) See Tim.41c f f .
07) See Tim.4Id f f , and fo r th e previous mixing o f th e world soul 35a
f f . This non-uniform mixing might be used t o account fo r innate
d iffe re n c e s in in te llig e n c e , though note in what follow s t h a t everyone
has an equal chance t o b e tte r them selves and t o be good, such t h a t the
demiurge i s blam eless fo r any of th e woes t h a t subsequently b e fa ll
mankind; c f . Tim.42d. One might a ls o compare t h i s w ith T ht. 194a f f , the
d e sc rip tio n o f how v a ria tio n s in th e composition o f our wax blocks may
account fo r v a ria tio n in learn in g and re te n tio n a b i l i t i e s and in th e
a b i l i t y to form tru e and f a ls e opinions. P lato c le a r ly wants a model o f
mind th a t w ill allow explanations o f personal i n te lle c tu a l d iffe re n c e s.

08) See Tim.41e f f . The ap p ro p riate number o f so u ls i s one per s t a r .

09) As i t i s not mentioned vAio performs t h i s p ro cess, 1 th in k we have to

assume i t i s done by th e demiurge.
10) See Tim.42e f f , a passage t h a t 1 s h a ll examine in d e ta il in th e next
ch ap ter a s i t i s ric h in im plicatio n s fo r th e n atu re o f flu x in th e Tim.

11 ) Our sen satio n s a re due to motions in our bodies which a re s e t up by

i t s co n tact w ith f i r e , e a rth , w ater and a i r impinging on th e so u l; see
Tim.43c f f .

12) See Tim.42a f f . As w ell as d e s ire , fe a r and anger, m ortals a re

su b je c t to "All such emotions a s follow w ith them, and a l l t h a t a re o f a
co n trary n a tu re ."
13) See Tim.42b.

14) Cf. Tim.34a, 47c, 90cd. Cf. my arguments in c h .5; th e motions of th e

158
heavenly bodies c o n s titu te th e world so u l, which i s p e rfe c tly ra tio n a l
and iirpertubable, th e motions o f th e heavens a re p e rfe c tly reg u la r.

15) See Tim.43b.

16) See e .g Tim.43d. Note th e world soul immediately begins in te llig e n t
l i f e , Tim.36e, a s i t s rev o lu tio n s a re i n i t i a l l y p e rf e c t u n lik e those of
newly born humans.

17) The Tim. suggests both t h a t th e re i s a n a tu ra l tendency fo r th e

o r b its to s e t t l e down (Tim.44b) and t h a t i t i s our job to h e lp them do
so as f a r a s i s p o ssib le (Tim.44c), by m astering ra th e r th an being
m astered by our p e rcep tio n s. Note how t h i s r e la te s t o th e moral
in ju n c tio n o f Tim.42b; i f we can m aster our emotions we can become ju s t,
i f we can m aster our p e rc ep tio n s, we can become r a tio n a l.
18) This tr a n s la tio n o f [holokleros hugies t e p a n telo s] as 'p e rfe c t and
e n tir e ly sound in mind' i s j u s t if i e d by comparison w ith th e s t a t e o f the
n eg lig en t who have to re tu rn to Hades (see follow ing n o te ), who a re l e f t
[a te le s k a i a n o etes], 'unperfected and lacking in in te llig e n c e '.

19) But woe b e tid e th e in d o le n t; Timaeus continues "Should he be

n e g le c tfu l, he liv e s a lame e x iste n ce , he re tu rn s to Hades unperfected
and lacking in in te llig e n c e " (Tim.44d).

20) The iirportance la id on astronomy here a s th e su b je c t which w ill

bring our minds c lo s e r to th e id e a l o f th e world soul may go a long way
to explaining th e c e n tra l and otherw ise somewhat d isp ro p o rtio n a te ro le
th a t astronomy i s given in education in th e Epin; bu t c f . Tim.90cd fo r
comments sim ila r to those found in th e Epin, and Le.966e f f .

21) Cf. Tim.90cd where a sim ila r theme i s expressed. There i s o f course
an irrportant p a r a lle l and c o n tra s t here w ith Rep. V II; in both P lato
f i r s t t r e a t s ey esig h t and then moves to draw conclusions about h earing.
In th e Tim. he continues "Again, th e same account a p p lie s t o both sound
and h earin g , as they were given by th e gods w ith th e same in te n t and
purpose" (Tim.47c). Cf. esp. Rep.530d, "As our eyes a re framed fo r
astronomy, so a re our e a rs fo r harmony, and th ese two a re in some way
kindred d is c ip lin e s " .
22) Note th e p lu ra l [ta s en hemin peplanememas ]. This might r e f e r t o th e
seven o r b its o f th e d if f e r e n t, b u t th e general sense o f th e passage
would seem to p o in t to i t re fe rrin g to both th e same and th e d if f e r e n t.

23) The theme of [b eb aio tes], 'f i x i t y ' or 's e c u r ity ' p lay s an im portant
p a rt in l a t e r P la to ; c f . P l b .l l e , 14c, 15b and 62b, So.250c, th e
d iscu ssio n o f th e C rt. concerning th e f i x i t y of names (and the
d ig ressio n o f Ep.V II), and Mac<enzie (1986a) p141/2. I s h a ll discu ss
t h i s in more depth in c h .7 vAien we come t o examine th e n a tu re o f flu x
and what s o r t o f names should be applied to th e th in g s t h a t a re in flu x .
24) Though not co n trary to th e s p i r i t o f th e Grg, Men, and Pdo
concerning in v e stig a tio n in g e n e ra l; see my c h .4.

25) So to o the 'a s being i s t o becoming so t r u th i s t o o p in io n '

s t r i c t u r e comes under a tta c k ; my c h .9 w ill d isc u ss t h i s more f u lly .

159
26) When th e world soul in te r a c ts w ith anything, i t announces in te r n a lly
'vAat i t i s th e same a s and d if f e r e n t from, in what respect* (Tim.37a9);
c f . Tim.44a2 where human so u ls judge th in g s wrongly to be [tauton t o i
k a i th a te ro n to u ], 'th e same a s and d if f e r e n t from*.
27) I t might be argued t h a t So.255c f f e x p lic itly d istin g u ish e s between
one and two p lace p re d ic a te s , although I tend to th e view t h a t the
d is tin c tio n th e re i s between th e *is * of id e n tity and th e *is * of
p re d ic a tio n ; c f . Owen (1971) and Reeve (1985) p54/5, Cornford (1935)
p282-5, Malcolm (1967) p143 n.2 4 . Cf. Bostock (1986) p49-51 and 181-3 on
p ro p e rtie s and r e la tio n s in th e Pdo.
28) For complete uses, see Tim.35a and passim, fo r incomplete see
Tim. 37a and 44a.
29) See Tim.37a f f , 44a f f .

30) At Tim.35a, I suggest [e in a i] is being used e x is te n tia lly , th e p o in t

being to mark o f f soul a s something t h a t i s n e ith e r p h y sic al nor
in d iv is ib le nor incapable o f re a l change a s th e Forms a re (see c h .8 on
r e a l vs *Cambridge * change in P la to ). I t s use a t 35b however may be of
th e 'condensed two-place * type so a ttr ib u tin g an in n ate a b i l i t y to th e
world so u l. A le s s sp e cu la tiv e , but le s s in trig u in g view i s t h a t we a re
a ttr ib u te d an a b i l i t y to judge e x iste n c e .

31 ) P la to t r e a t s thought and judgement a s i f they have th e lo g ic a l

c h a r a c te r is tic s o f speech and a s s e rtio n ; c f . Tht. 189a f f , So.263e f f ,
Burnyeat (1991) p84/5.

32) On t h i s account P lato recognises th e r e la tio n a l n atu re o f sameness

and d iffe re n c e and t h e i r incomplete use i s a m etaphorical way of
a ttr ib u tin g to us an a b i l i t y to make judgements of them.

33) See e .g Plb.38c5 f f and th e d isc u ssio n of what we can see a t a

d is ta n c e ; note though t h a t P la to 's concern th e re i s to develop accounts
of what we can v is u a lis e .

34) See my c h .1 on th e drawbacks of p ic tu re s a s discussed in th e Pdr.

35) Perhaps th e c le a r e s t statem ent o f t h i s i s a t Tim.77bc, where we fin d

t h a t th e t h ir d kind o f soul seated in th e m id riff, in d is tin c tio n t o th e
rev o lu tio n s in our heads, "Inasmuch a s i t continues t o be e n tir e ly
p a ssiv e , and does not revolve o f i t s e l f or rep e l e x te rn a l motion i t has
no cap acity f o r reasoning about i t s own experiences."

36) I sid e w ith Cooper (1970) p i 23 f f a g a in st Cornford (1935) p102-109

t h a t th e main c o n tra s t a t Tht. 184-186 i s between p ercep tio n and
judgement ra th e r than o b jec ts o f opinion (se n sib les) and o b je c ts of
knowledge (Forms).

37) While re c o lle c tio n may t e l l us how we acquire knowledge o f sameness

and d iffe re n c e , i t i s notable t h a t i t has l i t t l e to say about the
a p p lic a tio n o f th ese to our p ercep tio n s; p o ssib ly because re c o lle c tio n
i s re je c te d before P la to comes t o a d is tin c tio n between p ercep tio n and
opinion and th e requirement t h a t we apply common id eas t o perception
before we can have b e lie f .
38) See Tht.185a, 185c.

160
39) See Tht.185b, 185c.

40) See Tht.186a.

41) Cf. Epin.978b f f , which i f anything i s even c le a re r and more

f o r th r ig h t on t h is m atter.

42) I do n o t want to suggest t h a t Timaeus i s giving us an exhaustive

account o f th e mind h e re , merely one o f i t s ra tio n a l fu n ctioning.
43) See Bostock (1988) p i 47 f f , esp. p i 49. Bostock connects th e optimism
o f th e T ht. w ith a change o f a ttitu d e t o being, becoming and flu x . The
Tht. according to Bostock a tta c k s th e flu x o f th e Tim. and allow s being
t o impermanent o b je c ts , th u s allow ing knowledge o f them. In c h .7 and 9 I
s h a ll argue t h a t th e flu x o f th e Tim. i s not a s ra d ic a l as i s o ften
supposed, and allow s being to p h y sical e n t i t i e s .
44) See my c h .5 on t h i s m atter.

45) See my c h .7. In c h .9 I a ls o d isc u ss th e r e la tio n o f th e recep tacle

to th e s o r t o f th inking t h a t th e world so u l does.

46) I t would seem th a t A ris to tle took th e main t h r u s t o f P la to 's account

o f th e so u l to be along th ese lin e s to o . In h is c ritiq u e of P la to 's view
o f th e soul in th e de Anima, he s ta te s t h a t "In th e same manner P la to in
th e Tim. c o n stru c ts th e so u l out o f th e elements [ek to n sto ic h e io n ].
For he b e liev es t h a t lik e i s known by lik e , and t h a t th in g s a re formed
from th e se elements [ek to n archon]" (De Anima.404b16, c f . 406b25 f f ).
Cf. So.254a f f .
47) See Tht.188a f f . Theaetetus b eliev es th e re t o be no th ir d
a lte r n a tiv e anyway, p o ssib ly because he has alread y id e n tifie d knowledge
cind tru e judgement.
48) See Tht.188b f f .
49) See Bumyeat (1991) p75 here on th e re la tio n between t h i s p rin c ip le
and one m aintained by R u ssell.
50) See Bumyeat (1991) p72/3, (cf p 79/80), and c f . W illiams (1972),
Fine (1979b), and Owen (1971). I f P lato has not made t h i s d is tin c tio n ,
then perhaps i t i s th e work of th e So. to s o r t t h i s m atter o u t. I s h a ll
argue t h a t th e model of mind and f a ls e judgement advanced by th e Tim.
c a te rs fo r both m isid e n tif ic a tio n s and m isd escrip tio n s.

51) The a tta c k th u s focuses on p rin c ip le J1, and on to what e x te n t we

must know something before i t can be an o b je c t o f our judgement.

52) See S o c rate s' long speech a t Tht.192a f f .

53) See Tht.195e f f .

54) C f. Burnyeat (1991) p92.

55) See Tht.209b f f on discrhi^^ tio n . I f I am c o rre c t t h a t re c o lle c tio n

i s re je c te d , i t i s no su rp ris e t h a t the model of mind in th e Tim. pays
g re a t a tte n tio n to learn in g ab i n i t i o and to providing a model o f
in te lle c tu a l growth.

161
56) Cf. Bumyeat (1991),p96.

57) Cf. Tim.37b, Tht.189e f f . So.263e f f and Plb.37 f f , on a statem ent

being a spoken judgement and a judgement a s i l e n t statem ent t o o n e self.
58) See Tht.197b.

59) See Tht.197c f f .

60) See Tht.197e f f .
61) See Tht.198cd.
62) See Tht.199b.
63) I t i s worth noting t h a t t h i s attem pted so lu tio n i s s t i l l very f a r
from th e modern approach which might analyse our knowledge o f something
in to d if f e r e n t asp ects and d is tin g u is h between what we know and what we
know i t a s. The p o s itio n i s s t i l l t h a t i f we a c tiv e ly know both term s of
an id e n tity statem ent, then i t i s n o t p o ssib le fo r us to make an e r r o r ,
l ^ e 1 m isid e n tif ic a tio n s , where we might f a ls e ly judge t h a t something
we know i s something e ls e we know are s t i l l ru led o u t.

64) See Tht.199cd.

65) See Tht.200b f f .
66) The Tim. as we have seen tak es th e common l a t e r period lin e t h a t a
statem ent i s a spoken judgement and a judgement a s i l e n t statem ent made
to o n e se lf.
67) There i s of course a debate here between Cornford (1935, 1937), Owen
(1953) and Chern i ss (1957a + b) on th e o rder o f th e So. and Tim. Owen's
c e n tra l p o in t ( 1953 p328/9 ) i s t h a t i t can be proved th e a n a ly sis of
negation o f th e So. had not been worked out by th e tim e t h a t th e Tim.
was composed, as th e te n e t on which th e S o .'s account o f negation i s
based i s "Contradicted unreservedly by Timaeus* a s s e rtio n t h a t i t is
ille g itim a te to say [to me on e s t i me on]" (Tim.38b2-3). According to
Owen, th e So. argues th a t 'i n th e only sense which can be c o n siste n tly
allowed to [me o n ]' t h i s i s a wholly c o rre c t th in g to say. However,
Timaeus does n o t say t h a t such a use i s ille g itim a te , b u t ra th e r t h a t i t
i s in accu rate [akribes] (38b3), and t h a t i t i s not f i t t i n g a t th e moment
t o enquire c lo se ly [d ia k rib o lo g e isth a i] (38b5) in to these m a tters. I t is
a ls o n o t c le a r t h a t P la to 's reference here i s to th e p re c ise use of
th ese words, a s in th e So. I agree w ith Cornford (1937) p98 n.3 t h a t [ta
to ia d e ] a t Tim.38a9 is remotely governed by [legomen] a t 37e5, such t h a t
a l l th e follow ing ' in a c c u ra te ' phrases may be those of 'we sa y ' common
usage, ra th e r than th e S o .'s p h ilo so p h ical p re c isio n , which i t may not
f i t t i n g to pursue a t th e moment. The Tim. 's a tt i tu d e t o negation i s not
c le a r from t h i s passage or any o th e r. Perhaps though one might argue
along th e follow ing lin e s . The S o .'s a n a ly sis o f negation i s undertaken
s p e c if ic a lly in order to be a b le to sp ecify th e n atu re o f f a ls e
statem ent (see So.240a f f ) , such t h a t t h i s presupposes th e a n a ly sis of
negation in term s of d iffe re n c e . The Tim, being p rim a rily concerned w ith
th e n atu re of mind ra th e r than o f negation, p ick s up th e So. 's a n a ly sis
of f a ls e statem en ts, and by im plication th e a n a ly sis of negation t h a t i t
presupposes. That i s hardly c lin ch in g , b u t th e re i s l i t t l e evidence

162
e ith e r way to decide th e Tim. 's a ttitu d e t o negation r e la tiv e to th e So.

68) Cf. P lb .42a, v^ere d if f e r e n t d ista n c e i s sa id t o a f f e c t the

judgement o f s iz e leading to fa ls e judgements, Plb.38c where we may
m istake a carving fo r a shepherd, and So.234b f f on drawings seen a t a
d istan ce t h a t may deceive. A p o in t I s h a ll re tu rn t o i s t h a t th e se a re
tr a c ta b le d i f f i c u l t i e s ; a s th e Rep. goes on to p o in t o u t, we have
measuring, numbering and weighing to obviate th e se d i f f i c u l t i e s ; c f . my
c h .5 on th e d iffe re n c e s between th e Rep. and th e l a t e r dialogues on th e
a p p lic a tio n o f number to th e world.
69) One might note t h a t th e same confusions caused by m irrors (reversed,
Tim.43 and 46a, or upside down, Tim.46b) have t h e i r analogues in the
d isru p tio n s o f th e motions o f th e same and d if f e r e n t, which a re "At one
tim e reversed, a t another sideways, and a t tim es upside down" (Tim.43d).
70) Cf. So.266c f f , where th e m irror image example occurs again, t h is
tim e in th e d iscu ssio n o f images t h a t follow s th e so lu tio n to the
problem o f f a ls e statem ent and judgement.

71) Cf. Plb.38c.

72) One might compare here th e sources of e rro r in th e Tim. w ith
Tht.194c f f which d iscu sses th e way in which the q u a lity o f th e wax may
lead to e r r o r . The Tht. does not discu ss deceptive p e rcep tio n s, however,
and th e in te re s tin g th in g about th e Tim. i s t h a t th e sources of e rr o r by
m isperception and m isdescription due t o th e im perfection o f our mental
rev o lu tio n s i s applied to th e a b s tr a c t as w ell a s th e concrete.
73) A key p o in t o f t h i s a n a ly sis i s t h a t we a re n o t required to make an
a b s tra c t m is id e n tific a tio n in o rder to make a m isd escrip tio n . That i s ,
we do n ot m istake s tr a ig h t fo r bent and s u b s titu te one fo r th e o th er in
our thought; th e sources o f e rr o r a re lower down th e co g n itiv e lad d er.
Thus e rro r in th ese p la u sib le id e n tity statem ents i s not in fe c tio u s ,
because in a sense th e re i s no e rro r h e re . Nor i s th e Tim. model prone
to one o f th e o b jectio n s a g a in st th e wax block model, t h a t of
s u b s titu tin g th e matching o f psychological e n t i t i e s , p ercep tio n s and
im p rin ts, fo r th e re la tio n o f id e n tity .

74) On th e Tim. model, a d e lib e ra te m isdescription would have t o occur

a f t e r our i n i t i a l perception and judgement.
75) In lin e w ith h is FWP, P la to i s more suggestive than e x p li c i t h e re .
What follow s i s an a tte irp t to in v e s tig a te th e im p licatio n s of tr e a tin g
in te lle c tu a l apprehension analogously to p ercep tio n in r e la tio n to
e r r r o r . P lato provides th e to o ls , and sometimes i t i s up t o us to do th e
spadework.

76) Cf. So. 253d f f ; the job o f d ia le c tic i s to d isc e rn which Forms
interm ingle and which do n o t. One a ls o th in k s of Simmias and Cebes a t
Pdo.85e f f , both o f whom a re m errily engaged in m isdescribing an
a b s tr a c t e n tity , namely th e so u l.

77) Cf. e .g L e.663b.

78) This may be why th e suggestion o f Tht.193c r e la tin g to m irro rs, e tc ,
in r e la tio n t o e r r o r does not g e t us f a r in th e Tht.

163
79) See e .g Tht.196a f f

80) See Tht.196b.

81) Larger p o s itiv e in te g e rs allow more room fo r m istakes, according to

Theaetetus (Tht. 196b). In a d d itio n , one m ight th in k o f some more complex
mathematical e n t i t i e s which might w ell be thought t o have some deceptive
p ro p e rtie s ; square ro o ts (e sp e c ia lly i r r a t io n a l ones), negative numbers,
complex numbers, l e t alone such o d d itie s a s e and p i .

82) Perhaps in e x tric a b ly linked a s th e e n tir e ly ra tio n a l thoughts o f th e

world so u l a re th e c e l e s ti a l m otions.

164
CEÎAPTER SEVEN

FLUX AND LANGUAGE IN THE TIMAEUS

As in d ic ate d e a r l i e r , one se rio u s o b jectio n t o th e theory th a t th e

Timaeus advocates re g u la r and s ta b le c e l e s ti a l motion i s th e question of
flu x . Put b lu n tly , how can th e heavens be s ta b le when everything
p h y sical i s su b je c t t o an apparently ra d ic a l flu x ? Here I s h a ll argue
th a t th e flu x o f th e Timaeus i s not so ra d ic a l as i s sometimes supposed,
and allow s f o r th e temporary, and in th e case o f th e heavens, the
permanent s t a b i l i t y of p h y sical e n t i t i e s . In lin e w ith ray view of
P la to 's PWP, I argue t h a t th e Timaeus d e lin e a te s se v era l p o s s ib i l i ti e s
and provides us w ith some c r i t e r i a fo r candidates t o f i l l , leaving us to
do some o f th e work ourselves ra th e r than giving an o u trig h t statem ent
of cosmology. ^ My account o f flu x w ill lin k up w ith my account o f th e
Timaeus ' a lte r n a tiv e epistemology v ia th e questions of language and
explanation. This i s a process t h a t P lato seems to be provoking; the
theme th a t b rin g s th e se elem ents to g e th e r i s th e r e la tio n o f s ta b le
accounts to s ta b le language to s ta b le e n t i t i e s . I a lso d e al w ith some
fu rth e r m atters re la tin g t o th e r e la tiv e d atin g o f th e l a t e r works.

L et us begin w ith a d is tin c tio n which th e Theaetetus makes between two

s o rts of change. Socrates says t h a t
"What I want t o enquire i s t h i s ; do they say th a t th e re i s only one
kind of change,^ o r, as i t seems to me, th a t th e re a re two ? .. Do you
c a l l i t change vÆien something exchanges one place f o r another, o r spins
around in th e same place ? . . . Let t h i s then be one form of change. But
when something remains in th e same p lace, but grows o ld ,^ or becomes
black in ste a d of w hite o r hard in ste a d o f s o f t, or undergoes any other
s o r t o f q u a lita tiv e change [ a llo io s is ] , i s n 't i t r ig h t t o say th a t t h i s
i s another form of change ? .. There a re then two forms of change, change
of q u a lity [ a llo io s is ] and change o f p o sitio n [phoran]^." (Tht.181c)
Given t h is d is tin c tio n , we might a ls o d is tin g u is h between two q u ite
d if f e r e n t th e o rie s of how th in g s change. I s h a ll term th ese th e o rie s of
fundamental flu x and o f fundamental s t a b i l i t y . The issu e which d iv id es
th e two i s whether th e most b a sic elements out o f which th e world is
c o n stitu te d a re su b je c t to q u a lita tiv e change o r n o t.

165
 A theory of fundamental s t a b i l i t y p o stu la te s some b a sic e n t i t i e s
which do n o t undergo any q u a lita tiv e change, and lo c a te s a l l q u a lita tiv e
change w ith complexes o f th ese b a sic e n t i t i e s . Take a p o ssib le 'O' le v e l
physics view o f th e w orld. According to t h i s th e re a re th re e types of
elementary p a r t i c l e s , e le c tro n s, protons and neutrons, which a re th e
exhaustive p h y sical c o n stitu e n ts of more complex e n t i t i e s such a s atoms
and m olecules. These elem entary p a r tic le s change v e lo c ity and p o s itio n ,
and e n te r in to bonding re la tio n s w ith each o th e r, but do n o t undergo any
q u a lita tiv e change them selves. Complex e n t i t i e s which a re ensembles of
th e se b a sic p a r tic le s on th e o th er hand, such a s atoms or molecules or
clouds on a windy day may indeed be sa id to be in q u a lita tiv e flu x .
A theory o f fundamental flu x denies t h a t th e re a re any b asic
e n t i t i e s which a re not su b je c t t o q u a lita tiv e change. The p o sitio n
ascrib ed to H eraclitu s in th e Theaetetus i s c le a rly one o f fundamental
flu x .^ Socrates poses a h y p o th etica l question fo r th e H eracliteans
So "Do you hold t h a t everything changes in both ways, changing both in
place and in q u a lity [pheromenon t e k ai alloioumenon ], or t h a t some
th in g s p artak e of both, and some only one o f th e two ? ..
Th "By Zeus, I d o n 't know what t o say; I suppose th ey would say b o th ."
So " I f they did n o t, my frie n d , then i t would seem t h a t th in g s are
both in motion and standing s t i l l , and i t would be no more c o rre c t to
say t h a t a l l th in g s move than a l l th in g s stand s t i l l . . . then sin c e i t is
necessary fo r them to change, and since i t i s not p o ssib le fo r something
n o t t o change in every way, a l l th in g s a re always su ffe rin g a l l kinds of
change." (T h t.18Id)^
So to o , one might argue, the flu x described in th e C ratylus i s a
fundamental one.^ I have no disagreem ent w ith t h i s , but I s h a ll argue
t h a t th e flu x described in th e Timaeus i s one o f fundamental s t a b i l i t y .
A second way of s e ttin g up th e c o n tra s t here would be t o employ a
d is tin c tio n t h a t th e S ophist uses between change r e la tiv e to i t s e l f and
change r e la tiv e t o o th er things.® This would bring us c lo se t o Irw in 's
d is tin c tio n between asp ect (a-) change and s e l f (s-) change. The
follow ing arguments a re intended to e s ta b lis h t h a t in th e Timaeus th e re
a re some e n t i t i e s which undergo no change o f q u a lity , no change in
re la tio n to themselves and no s-change a s defined by Irwin.®
The f i r s t ta s k i s t o lo c a te th e b a sic en. t i t i e s . Timaeus says
concerning e a rth , a i r , f i r e and w ater t h a t
"No-one has as y e t revealed t h e i r gen eratio n , but we speak a s i f we

166
know what f i r e and each of them a re , p o stu la tin g them as th e b a sic
p rin c ip le s [archas] o f th e p h y sical u niverse, although i t i s n o t f i t t i n g
fo r them to be in any lik elih o o d compared to s y lla b le s , even by a man of
l i t l e in s ig h t." (Tim.48b)
This might be read as a re je c tio n o f th e l e t t e r s and s y lla b le s analogy
vAich ccxnmonly occurs in l a t e r P la to . However, i f th e two most b asic
types o f tr ia n g le t h a t Timaeus p o s tu la te s a re taken a s th e l e t t e r s , and
th e atomic faces they go to make up are th e s y lla b le s , then th e atoms
w ill indeed not be s y lla b le s , although th e l e t t e r s and s y lla b le s analogy
may s t i l l a p p l y . T h i s view i s supported by Timaeus 54d6, 55aS, 55b4,
57c9 and 61a7, where th e two most b asic types o f tr ia n g le a re re fe rre d
to by th e su b sta n tiv e [to s to ic h e io n ]. This i s im portant a s [stoicheion]
c a r r ie s th e general sense of 'th e sim p lest component p a r t ' (LSJ), and a
more s p e c if ic sense in P lato o f l e t t e r a s opposed to [su lla b e ],
12
's y l l a b l e '. I s h a ll r e fe r t o th ese two b a sic types of tr ia n g le s as th e
's to ic h e ic t r i a n g l e s ', and th e compound tr ia n g le s t h a t a re atomic faces
as 'complex t r i a n g l e s '.
One might o b je c t t h a t although Timaeus ta lk s of th e s to ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s as th e [archai] o f th e more complex tr ia n g le s , he a ls o goes on
to t a lk of higher [a rc h a i]. At 48c3 he speaks of "the [arche] or
[arch ai] o f e v e r y t h i n g " , a n d l a t e r , re fe rrin g to th e theory of
sto ic h e ic tr ia n g le s he says th a t
"These we hypothesise [hupotitheroetha ] as th e p rin c ip le [archen] of
f i r e and o f th e o th er b o d ie s ... b u t th e p rin c ip le s [archas] o f these
which a re higher [anothen] are known only to God and whoever i s frie n d ly
to him." (Tim.53d)
These h igher p rin c ip le s need not r e fe r t o some more b a sic physical
e n t i t i e s , however. I t i s notable th a t Timaeus r e f e r s here to higher
[a rc h a i], p rin c ip le s or s ta r tin g p o in ts , ra th e r th an t o fu rth e r
[ s to ic h e ia ]. At th e term in atio n o f explanation in term s of a n a ly sis by
decomposition in to p h y sical elem ents, one option fo r P la to i s to sw itch
to a t e l e clerical a n a ly s is . These higher [archai] then may be
te le o lo g ic a l explanations of why th e sto ic h e ic tr ia n g le s a re a s they
a re . One in te re s tin g aspect of th e passage a t Timaeus 53d i s t h a t th e
use of [hupotithem i] and [anothen] i s highly rem iniscent of Phaedo 10Id,
the lin e a lle g o ry of th e Republic, and th e defence o f hypotheses by
higher hypotheses. ^^ One need h ardly s tr e s s t h a t th e Phaedo and th e
Republic a re not looking fo r fu rth e r physical hypotheses a t t h i s p o in t.

167
The f i n a l clau se concerning th e man frie n d ly to God might a ls o suggest
some in te n tio n t o invoke explanations in terms o f th e Good. When we look
a t th e s o r t of arguments t h a t Timaeus uses t o ju s tif y h is choice of
s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s t h i s i s b o rm o u t. At Timaeus 54a f f , we a re to ld
th a t w hile th e iso c e le s tr ia n g le has but one form, th e scalene has many
and we must p o stu la te th e f a i r e s t , and te le o lo g ic a l language permeates
t h i s e n tir e se c tio n . I t i s lik e ly then t h a t th e s to ic h e ic tria n g le s a re
th e most elem entary c o n stitu e n ts o f th e ph y sical world o f th e Timaeus,
w ithout being th e u ltim ate explanatory [a rc h a i].
Are th e sto ic h e ic s su b je c t t o any q u a lita tiv e change ? For th e
th eo ry of change o f Timaeus 53c f f to work, no change in th e s to ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s i s required and none i s mentioned. Q u a lita tiv e p h y sical change
i s analysed s o le ly in term s of th e composition o f s to ic h e ic in to complex
tr ia n g le s and th ese in to atoms, and th e converse decom position. ^^
Timaeus 54c f f i s im portant in t h i s co n te x t. We a re to ld t h a t w hile a i r ,
f i r e and water may transm ute in to each o th e r, they may not transm ute
in to e a rth , and vice v ersa, as th e f i r s t th re e a re constructed from
scalene tr ia n g le s while e a rth i s made from th e is o c e le s . Now i f th e re
were some fu rth e r c o n stitu e n ts t h a t th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s could be
broken down in to , then one could decompose, e .g , f i r e in to complex
tr ia n g le s in to sto ic h e ic scalenes in to c o n s titu e n ts , and recoitpose in to
s to ic h e ic is o c e le s ', the square complexes of th e s e , and then e a rth , and
vice v ersa. 1ft Now th e re a re o th er types of q u a lita tiv e change a p a rt from
decomposition, b u t th e re i s no evidence in th e Timaeus to suggest th a t
th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s a re su b je c t to any s o r t of q u a lita tiv e change.

II

I f i t i s th e case t h a t th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s o f th e Timaeus a re
q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le , then th e re a re some in te re s tin g consequences. The
theory o f human ageing t e l l s us t h a t th e bonds which hold the
c o n stitu e n ts o f our bodies to g e th e r have th e power t o l a s t only fo r a
c e r ta in tim e, and t h a t a s th ese begin to f a i l , so we s l i p in to
d ecrep itu d e. ^^ The s o r t o f flu x to which th e atoms and complex tr ia n g le s
a re su b je c t i s n o t then th e ra d ic a l flu x which would have them
possessing a q u a lity a t tim e t and not possessing i t a t t + 1, but a
ra th e r g e n tle r v a ria n t. This i s im portant because i t allow s th e ph y sical
world a la rg e measure o f s t a b i l i t y , how much depending on how strong th e
'power to la st* i s . In r e la tio n t o t h i s , i f we examine what th e Timaeus

168
has to say on how human beings and th e heavens a re produced, we fin d
something very in te re s tin g indeed. Timaeus 42d f f t e l l s us t h a t th e ta sk
appointed to th e demigods i s to fashion th e bodies o f human beings. We
a re th en informed th a t
"Taking th e immortal element o f m ortal c re a tu re s , im itatin g t h e i r
own fash io n er, and borrowing from th e cosmos p o rtio n s o f f i r e , e a rth ,
water and a i r on th e condition t h a t t h i s loan 5 K«uld be rep aid , they
cemented to g eth er what they had taken, though not w ith th e in d isso lu b le
bonds [a lu to is desmois] w ith which they themselves were h eld to g e th e r,
but w ith w ell co nstructed bonds in v is ib le because o f t h e i r sm allness,
they fused them in to one mass, c re a tin g out of a l l th ese one body fo r
each, thus clo th in g th e rev o lu tio n s o f th e immortal soul in bodies
su b je c t to eg ress and i n g r e s s . ( T i m . 4 2 e )
So w hile th e c o n stitu e n ts of our bodies a re p u t to g e th e r w ith d isso lu b le
bonds, those o f th e demigods have in d isso lu b le bonds. Our bodies w ill be
su b je c t t o a g e n tle flu x , w hile those o f th e demigods w ill be e n tir e ly
exempt from flu x in term s of q u a lita tiv e change. The embodiment of th ese
demigods though i s in th e heavenly bodies. E a rlie r in h is d isco u rse,
Timaeus to ld us of th e generation o f th e p la n e ts , and s ta te d th a t
"When each o f th e bodies required t o h e lp in th e production o f time
had been brought in to i t s proper motion, as generated liv in g c re a tu re s
having t h e i r bodies bound w ith liv in g bonds and having le a r n t t h e ir
d u tie s , they moved according to th e motion o f th e d if f e r e n t." (Tim.38e)
Now one might attem pt t o draw a d is tin c tio n here between th e p la n e ts as
liv in g c re a tu re s and th e fix ed s ta r s a s demigods, but in f a c t th e two
term s a re used interchangeably o f each. Timaeus 40b ta lk s o f th e fix ed
s ta r s as liv in g c re a tu re s w hile 40cd ta lk s of th e p la n e ts a s demigods.
The s t a b i l i t y o f th e heavens i s guaranteed by th e q u a lita tiv e s t a b i l i t y
of th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s a ll i e d w ith th e 'in d isso lu b le bonds' w ith
which they a re bound to g e th e r. Through th e mechanism o f th e v a ria b le
d u r a b ility of th e bonds between th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s and between more
complex e n t i t i e s , t h e Timaeus' theory can then account fo r any degree
o f q u a lita tiv e flu x a t th e p ercep tu al le v e l, up t o and including the
t o t a l s t a b i l i t y o f th e heavens.

Ill

One o b jec tio n t o th e id e a t h a t th e sto ic h e ic tr ia n g le s undergo [phora]

but not [ a llo io s is ] might be based on th e theory of ageing o f Timaeus 81

169
f f . According to t h i s , ageing and n a tu ra l death a re t o be explained by
th e gradual d e te rio ra tio n and consequent lo ss o f fu n ctio n o f the
p a r tic le s which c o n s titu te th e body. One in te rp r e ta tio n i s t h a t i t i s
th e q u a lita tiv e change o f th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s t h a t i s a t th e ro o t of
t h i s s o r t o f d e te rio ra tio n . I s h a ll argue t h a t th e re i s an a lte rn a tiv e
(and b e tte r ) in te rp re ta tio n h e re , v^ereby a t most i t i s th e bonds
between s to ic h e ic tria n g le s which d e te r io ra te . Timaeus begins h is
d isc u ssio n o f ageing by saying th a t
"When th e o rg an isatio n [s u s ta s is ] of th e whole animal i s new, th e
tria n g le s [trig o n a] which c o n s titu te th e atoms being 'f r e s h o f f the
s to c k s ' [ek druochon], they have strong jo in s between one another [pros
a l l e l a ] ." (Tim.81b)
I t i s im portant t h a t th e bonds t h a t Timaeus i s describing here a re [pros
a l l e l a ] . These must be bonds which bind e ith e r s to ic h e ic o r complex
tr ia n g le s to each o th e r, ra th e r then any bonds in te rn a l to th e s to ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s . That th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s undergo change in t h e i r bonding
22
re la tio n s does not e n ta il t h a t th ey undergo any change o f q u a lity . We
a re subsequently to ld th a t
"When th e bonds of th e tr ia n g le s loosen due t o having contested
many b a ttle s in a g re a t amount o f tim e ... f i n a l ly th e bonds f i t t i n g the
tr ia n g le s of th e marrow to g eth er no longer hold o u t a g a in st t o i l , but
se p a ra te ." (Tim .81c)
23
At t h i s p o in t death occurs. I f th ese bonds a re [pros a l l e l a ] , then th e
ageing process can tak e place w ithout any q u a lita tiv e change o f the
s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s .
Returning to 81b, one might tak e th e view t h a t a s th e tr ia n g le s a re
'f r e s h o f f th e s t o c k s t h e y have been newly c re ate d . However, i f we
b u ild a wooden boat th e wood does n o t undergo any change qua wood; i t is
merely reorganised from loose tim ber t o a bo at.^^ The wood may then be
'f r e s h o f f th e sto c k s' w ithout having undergone any q u a lita tiv e change
in i t s e l f , and so too perhaps w ith anim als and s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s . The
verb th a t P la to uses in t h i s context may support t h i s approach. This is
[su n istem i],^^ which has more o f a sense o f ordering t h a t which i s
alread y e x is te n t than of c re a tio n de novo. I t i s notable t h a t t h is verb
i s used in th e e a r l i e r d iscu ssio n o f atanism fo r th e form ation o f atoms
and complex tr ia n g le s out of complex and s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s
re sp e c tiv e ly ,^ ^ where no change in th e s to ic h e ic tria n g le s i s required
or mentioned.

170
 Even i f we were to tak e [ek druochon] as sig n ify in g some
q u a lita tiv e change, i t i s n o t c le a r t h a t i t i s s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s th a t
do th e changing. I f th e r e f e r m t o f [trig o n a] a t 81b6 i s complex
tr ia n g le s , th e se can pass in to and ou t o f e x isten ce w ithout p reju d ice to
th e s t a b i l i t y o f th e stoicheics.^® The c o rre c t re fe re n t o f [trig o n a] i s
a problem which runs through th e e n tir e d iscu ssio n o f ageing. C ertain ly
th e re a re some uses here t h a t can only be references t o complex
tr ia n g le s , e .g Timaeus ta lk s of "The p u re s t type o f tr ia n g le s , smoothest
and o i l i e s t " (Tim.82d). As th e re a re only two types of s to ic h e ic s , and
they could not be described as smoother o r o i l i e r than one another, t h is
must be a reference to complex t r i a n g l e s . S o to o a t 8Id, where we a re
to ld t h a t th e process of n u tr itio n involves th e tr ia n g le s o f th e body
c u ttin g and a ssim ila tin g incoming t r i a n g l e s . That i s fin e i f th e
referen ce i s t o complex tr ia n g le s , but c u ttin g up s to ic h e ic s , a s argued
in th e previous se c tio n , i s lik e ly to lead to a breach of th e ru le t h a t
e a rth cannot transm ute t o a i r , f i r e or w ater and vice v ersa.
Now i t may be t h a t th e referen ce of [trig o n a] s lip s between
sto ic h e ic and complex tr ia n g le s . However, in th e e a r l i e r d iscu ssio n of
how th e complex tr ia n g le s a re formed from th e sto ic h e ic s a t Timaeus 53c
f f , P lato always has Timaeus c a re fu lly mark th e d is tin c tio n between th e
two, opening each d iscu ssio n o f th e s to ic h e ic s w ith an e x p lic it
reference t o t h e i r n a tu re . As some of th e references of [trig o n a] in
th e d isc u ssio n o f ageing a re c le a r ly to complex tr ia n g le s , and th e re i s
a t no p o in t any d is tin c tio n drawn between th ese references and any
o th e r, one might conclude t h a t a l l th e references of [trig o n a] in th e
d iscu ssio n o f ageing a re to complex tr ia n g le s .
We now have two to o ls which work in harmony fo r analysing
statem ents such as
"For p la in ly in th e beginning th e tria n g le s [trig o n a] of each animal
a re organised [s u n is ta ta i] w ith th e power t o l a s t only up t o a c e rta in
tim e." (Tim.89c)
In a l l likelyhood [sunistem i] re fe rs to th e o rg an isatio n o f e x is te n t
p a r tic le s , and [trigona] t o complex tr ia n g le s . So i t i s complexes of
s to ic h e ic s which undergo q u a lita tiv e change, which i s consonant w ith th e
id e a t h a t i t i s the [pros a l l e l a ] bonds t h a t a re su b je c t to temporal
lim ita tio n s .
On t h i s in te rp r e ta tio n , th e 'biochem ical' processes of ageing and
n u tr itio n a re merely sp e c ia lise d cases o f th e more g eneral 'chem istry'

171
th a t i s discussed a t Timaeus 53c f f . They require no more than th e
d iv is io n and re c o n s titu tio n o f atoms and coiiplex tr ia n g le s . In t h is
resp ect one might note th e s im ila r ity of th e b a ttlin g imagery between
Timaeus 53c f f and 81b f f , as w ell a s th e sim ila r uses of [sunistem i]
I f th e th e o rie s o f ageing and n u tr itio n re q u ire something beyond the
general th eory of chem istry, one would expect t h i s to be marked and
discussed. There i s i s no mention of change in th e s to ic h e ic tria n g le s
and good reason in th e ban on th e transm utation o f th e scalene and
iso c e le s tr ia n g le s t o b e liev e t h a t no such change occurs.

IV

A d if f e r e n t o b jectio n might base i t s e l f on th e 'gold exanple' of Timaeus

50b f f . Timaeus t e l l s us th a t
" I f someone were t o mould a l l th e shapes out of gold and w ithout
stopping remodel each o f th ese in to th e r e s t , then i f he should p o in t
one o f them out and ask what i t i s , by f a r th e s a f e s t answer in tr u th
would be t h a t i t i s gold, bu t a s f o r th e tr ia n g le and th e oth er fig u re s
th a t occur, i t would be wrong to describe them as having being, as they
change even as we s t a t e them, and we should r e s t content i f they
w illin g ly receive th e d e sc rip tio n o f th e su ch lik e w ith some s a fe ty . The
same account a p p lie s concerning th e natu re o f th a t which receiv es a l l
bodies. I t must always be c a lle d th e same; fo r i t has no a b i l i t y
whatsoever t o d e p art from i t s own c h a ra c te r, sin c e i t receiv es a l l
th in g s and in no way whatsoever tak e s a shape lik e t o any of th e th in g s
t h a t e n te r in to i t . In n atu re i t i s la id down a s a m atrix fo r
everything, changed and p attern ed by th e th in g s t h a t e n te r i t , and on
account o f th e se a jp e a rs t o be d if f e r e n t a t d if f e r e n t tim es." (Tim.50b)
I f we read t h i s such t h a t th e s to ic h e ic tria n g le s a re on a par w ith th e
th in g s moulded out of gold, then th e re a re obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r a
theory which s ta te s t h a t they a re q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le . However, i t i s
n o t necessary t o read th e gold example in t h is manner, and i t is
irrportant to note t h a t th e ideas o f atomic su b -stru c tu re and sto ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s have y e t t o be introduced. Perhaps, in lin e w ith what I have
argued about P la to 's FWP, we might tak e th e gold exaitple a s a framework
f o r a n a ly sis ra th e r than a s a d i r e c t statem ent of cosmology.
F ir s tly l e t us p lace th e gold exanple in i t s co n tex t. Timaeus
introduces th e problem o f th e r e la tio n of language t o th in g s t h a t a re in
f l ux, i n i t i a l l y taken to be e a rth , a i r f i r e and w ater by saying th a t

172
 "Speaking o f each of th e s e , to say which ought r e a lly to be termed
w ater ra th e r than f i r e , and \iAich by any name ra th e r than each and a l l ,
so as to employ language which i s sound and secure, i s hard [p isto kai
bebaio c h re sa sth a i lo g o i, chalepon]." (Tim.49b)
The problem we face in attem pting to c o n stru c t a secure logos i s t h a t
th e elem ents t h a t we r e f e r t o a re always changing in to one another.
Along w ith o th e rs , I take t h i s to be a problem concerning id e n tify in g
r ef er ences. I f we id e n tify some s tu f f a s w ater, and i t changes in to
a i r , should we now id e n tify th e same s t u f f a s a i r ? I f we do, what
happens to any d is tin c tio n between th e elements - what name, ' ra th e r
than one and a l l ' ought t o be applied t o each ? So in ste a d of c a llin g
something [to u to ], ' t h i s ' , we should c a l l i t [to to ia u to n ], 's u c h lik e ',
and th e gold example i s supposed t o e x p lic a te t h is c o n c l u s i o n . A t t h i s
p o in t th e re seems t o be a general agreement on P l a to 's in te n tio n s . Zeyl
comments th a t
"All coirmentators agree t h a t P lato intends to show (a) th a t th e
c o n stitu e n ts o f th e physical world ("phenomena") a re caught up in
co n stan t change (as i s fo rc e fu lly argued in th e case o f th e 'elem ents'
a t 49b7-c7) and (b) t h a t t h i s f a c t n e c e s s ita te s a reform in th e use of
c e rta in lo cu tio n s as re fe rrin g ex p ressio n s." 3 7
One might g e t th e iirpression from Zeyl ' s remarks t h a t fo r P la to th e
phenomena a re a l l th a t i s in th e ph y sical world, and t h a t th e elements
of 49b f f a re th e b a sic c o n stitu e n ts o f th e phenomena. This may be so
fo r th e four element theory of 49b f f , but i s not th e case fo r 53c f f
where th e elem ents a re decortposed to s to ic h e ic tria m g le s, which a re f a r
below our p ercep tu al th re sh o ld s, such t h a t th e re i s more t o th e ph y sical
38
world th an th e phenomena.
I t i s irrportant here to note th e d ifferen c e s between th e th e o rie s
presented a t Timaeus 49b-50c and 53c f f . Indeed, one might argue th a t
they a re two sep arate th e o rie s . In th e theory of 49b-50c, th e re i s no
mention o f any atomic su b -stru c tu re , and v^en describing the
transm utation o f th e elem ents, Timaeus says t h a t
"We se e , so we suppose, w ater congealing and becoming sto n es and
e a r t h . . . and th u s, i t appears, they pass in to each oth er in a cycle of
b ir th ." (Tim.49c)
In th e l a t e r th eo ry , what we suppose we see here i s co n trad icted by the
ban on th e transm utation o f e a rth and th e o th er e l e m e n t s . T h e s e
d ifferen c e s may have a bearing on P la to 's in te n tio n s h e re . He may w ell

173
wish to show th a t th e phenomena a re in some type o f flu x , requiring a
reform of our referen ces t o them, w ithout being committed t o a theory of
fundamental flu x . The p o in t being d riven a t by th e f i r s t theory may then
be a co n d itio n al one; i f we equate changing phenomena, such a s th e four
elem ents, w ith th e u ltim ate c o n stitu e n ts o f th e world, then we w ill be
unable to make any id e n tify in g refe ren c es. This may be a c ritic is m of
c u rre n t fo u r element t h e o r i e s , a n d may be pushing a th e o r e tic a l p o in t
about fundamental flu x . I f so , then th e l a t e r in tro d u c tio n o f atomic
su b -stru c tu re may be an attem pt to r e c tif y th ese d i f f i c u l t i e s by
p o stu la tin g s t a b i l i t y a t a lower le v e l, one w ell below th e th resh o ld of
human p e r c e p t i o n . T h i s p o in t i s made sharper by th e comment a t Timaeus
48b t h a t no-one ought to tak e such th in g s a s f i r e a s th e u ltim ate
c o n stitu e n ts .^ ^ Here Timaeus 49e7 f f i s of g re a t importance to o , as i t
t e l l s us t h a t only th a t which th e fo u r elem ents a re created from o r a re
d issolved in to may be re fe rre d to a s [to u to ]. I f th e s to ic h e ic tria n g le s
a re th e u ltim a te c o n stitu e n ts , and a re q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le , then lik e
th e gold they may be re fe rre d to a s [to u to ]. I f so , then we may be ab le
t o re-read th e gold example w ith th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s a s th e gold and
atomic faces and atoms as th e shapes modelled o u t o f them.
There i s a f u r th e r term t o t h i s equation though, as o rig in a lly the
gold was an analogue fo r th e re c e p ta c le , such t h a t th e gold = re fe ro n t
of [to u to ] = th e recep tacle = s to ic h e ic t r i a n g l e s . I would suggest
t h a t P la to o ffe rs us two v isio n s o f th e re c e p ta c le , f i r s t l y a s an
amorphous s u b s tra te , and secondly as th e space w ith in which p h y sical
phenomena o c c u r . T h i s i s something I s h a ll d isc u ss in more d e ta il in
ch ap ter n in e. P la to , I suggest, uses th e rec e p ta c le in d if f e r e n t ways
fo r th e two versions of atomism (four elements vs s to ic h e ic tria n g le s )
t h a t he p re se n ts us w ith.^^ I f we tak e up th e l a t t e r hypothesis, then i t
may be t h a t th e rec ep ta cle co n tain s a plenum o f s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s out
of which a l l p hysical e n ti t ie s a re co n stru cted . The a c t o f ordering th a t
th e demiurge performs i s then t o c re a te w ell formed complex tr ia n g le s
and atoms from th e ch ao tic motions of th e s to ic h e ic t r i a n g l e s . I f then
we do n o t t r e a t th e gold example a s a d ir e c t cosmological statem ent, we
fin d th a t th e Tim»t.us sup p lies us w ith a very in te re s tin g a lte rn a tiv e
account o f th e s tru c tu re o f th e p hysical world, one v^ere th e u ltim ate
c o n stitu e n ts a re q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le and may be re fe rre d to as [to u to ].
In th e next se c tio n I s h a ll a tte n p t t o lin k t h i s a lte r n a tiv e account to
Timaeus' second epistem ological hypothesis and to

174
examine some fu rth e r asp ec ts which might m otivate us t o read th e gold
example in th e manner th a t I have suggested.

One might be concerned t h a t th e e x iste n ce o f e n t i t i e s which a re both

p h y sical and q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le breaches th e exhaustive d isju n c tio n
t h a t Timaeus makes a t 27c-29e between th a t which i s in co rp o real,
i n t e l l i g i b l e , and unchanging, of which we may have a s ta b le account, and
th e lik e n e sse s o f th e i n t e l l i g i b l e , which a re p h y sic a l, se n sib le and
fo rev er changing, of which we may only have a ' l i k e l y ' account.4?
However, we have seen t h a t th e Timaeus has a second epistem ological
hy p o th esis, based on th e analogy of th e world soul and th e human so u l.
As in th e T heaetetus, P la to i s perhaps concerned w ith th e questio n of
what th e world must be lik e in order fo r our account o f epistemology to
be true.^®
In th e previous chapter we saw th a t th e world soul c o n s is ts of th e
rev o lu tio n s o f th e same and th e d if f e r e n t, which move e n tir e ly
re g u la rly . This renders th e world so u l e n tir e ly r a tio n a l, and when i t
makes judgements o f sameness and d iffe re n c e th e se a re always correct. ^0
At 37a f f we a re to ld th a t v^en th e world so u l encounters anything
p h y sic a l, 'opinions and b e lie f s t h a t a re both tr u e and s ta b le occur
There cannot then be anything in tr a c ta b le in th e n atu re o f th e physical
t h a t prevents th e form ation o f such opinions. 5 2 We humans may have
d i f f i c u l t i e s h ere, b u t t h a t lo c a te s th e problem w ith us ra th e r than w ith
th e w orld, something I in v e stig a te d in th e previous ch ap ter.
Now, i f th ese s ta b le and tr u e opinions a re expressed
p ro p o s itio n a lly , th e re must a ls o be some r e la tio n between language and
th e p h y sical t h a t perm its such o p i n i o n s . ^4 in chapter th re e I argued
t h a t P l a to 's account o f th e ascen t o f th e philosopher in th e lin e
a lle g o ry i s one t h a t deals e x clu siv ely w ith propositi th in k in g . It
would seem highly lik e ly t h a t th e world soul th in k s proposi tio n a lly to o ,
b ut h ere a re two arguments to support t h i s c o n je ctu re. F i r s t l y , th e
world so u l makes judgements o f sameness and d iffe re n c e concerning
everything t h a t i t encounters. The standard p o sitio n in l a t e r P la to i s
t h a t statem ent i s spoken judgement and th a t judgement i s s i l e n t
statem en t, and we have no reason t o doubt t h a t t h i s a p p lie s h e re . That
gives (judgemental) thought th e same p re p o s itio n a l n atu re a s statem ent.
Secondly, in th e previous chapter I argued t h a t P la to wishes to

175
a ttr ib u te some in n ate a b i l i t i e s t o us v ia th e n o tion t h a t th e world soul
i s constructed from p o rtio n s o f sameness, d iffe re n c e and [o u sia ]. I
suggested t h a t t h i s might a tt r ib u t e dn in n ate a b i l i t y to form statem ents
o f p re d ic a tio n and id e n tity about anything t h a t i s encountered. I f so,
then th e world s o u l's thought, and our own to o , i s fundam entally
proposi tio n a lly s tru c tu re d .
I f t h i s i s th e case, and i f we can have [ale th e s k a i bebaios]
opinions concerning th e p h y sic al, then th e re must be something physical
t h a t has s u f f ic ie n t s t a b i l i t y t h a t i t can p roperly be c a lle d [touto]
ra th e r than [to ia u to ]. Note t h a t a d iscu ssio n o f what i s [bebaios] lin k s
both th e ep istem ologies, th e passage on reference t o p h y sical e n t i t i e s
a t 49bff, th e d iscu ssio n o f th e rec ep ta cle and th e gold exairple.^^ In
th e previous se c tio n I argued t h a t i t i s p o ssib le t o re-re ad th e gold
example equating th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s w ith th e gold. Here we fin d a
reason why we should attem pt t o do t h is ; i f th e epistemology re la tin g to
th e account of th e world soul i s c o rre c t then th e re must be sane s ta b le
p h y sic al re fe re n ts . F u rth er, i f a l l o f th e world s o u l 's physical
judgements a re c o rre c t, then t h i s s t a b i l i t y must e x is t a t a q u ite
fundamental le v e l. There i s more t o be sa id on th e re la tio n s h ip o f the
type o f th in k in g t h a t th e world soul does in r e la tio n t o th e s tru c tu re
o f th e w orld, p a rtic u la rly in r e la tio n t o th e re c e p ta c le , and th e s o r t
of ro le t h a t i t might p lay in p red ic atio n and explanation. Before we can
d isc u ss t h i s f u lly though, I have much to say about th e n atu re o f the
re c e p ta c le , i t s r e la tio n to th e phenomena t h a t occur in i t , and the
fu r th e r a n a ly sis o f th e s to ic h e ic t r ia n g le s . Chapter nine w ill tak e up
t h i s discu ssion a f t e r we have seen th e ro le t h a t th e rec ep ta cle may play
in th e c re a tio n o f th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s .

VI

I t has been argued t h a t th e T heaetetus p o std a te s and c o rre c ts the

Timaeus' view on th e re la tio n o f flu x and l a n g u a g e . I t i s su re ly tr u e ,
th e argument goes, t h a t i f everything i s in ra d ic a l flu x , then we cannot
su c c e ssfu lly re fe r t o anything a t a l l , and t h i s i s a b e tte r p o sitio n
th an th e 'lame p le a ' of Timaeus 49d f f t h a t we can r e f e r to th e four
elements as 'th e s u c h l i k e H o w e v e r , as we have seen th e Timaeus has a
f u r th e r account o f th e r e la tio n between th e u ltim ate physical
c o n s titu e n ts , flu x and language. This does not seem to be vulnerable to
th e c ritic is m s o f th e type o f flu x ascribed to H eraclitu s

176
in th e Theaetetus and th e C ratylus. In th e T heaetetus, Socrates and
Theodorus have th e follow ing exchange concerning th e H eraclitean
p o sitio n and i t s re la tio n to language
So "Let us ask them, a re a l l th in g s changing and in flu x ? . . Have they
both kinds of change t h a t we d istin g u ish ed , of p lace and o f q u a lity ?"
Tho "Of course; they must i f they a re t o be com pletely in change."
So " I f th ey only underwent change o f p la c e , and not o f q u a lity , then
we would be a b le to say v ^ a t th e flowing th in g s t h a t change p o sitio n
a re . Could we speak in t h i s manner
Tho "We could."
So "But sin ce n o t even t h i s sta y s s t i l l , what flows flowing w hite, but
changing, so t h a t th e re i s a flu x o f t h is very th in g a ls o , th e
w hiteness, and a change o f co lo u r, l e s t i t be convicted o f stay in g
s t i l l , i s i t p o ssib le t o name a colour w ith th e r e s u lt t h a t i t is
c o rre c tly named ?"
Tho "But how could one c o n triv e t h a t , Socrates ? Or indeed fo r anything
e ls e o f t h i s s o r t , i f i t always s lip s out from under us as we speak,
being in flu x ?" (Tht.182c)
The flu x described in t h i s passage i s a very ra d ic a l one indeed. Not
only a re th e re no p h y sical e n t i t i e s which a re f re e from q u a lita tiv e
change, but everything changes in every resp ect a t every successive
in s ta n t, 'l e s t i t be convicted o f standing s t i l l ' . The passage t h a t i s
supposed to c re a te problems fo r a la te datin g o f th e Timaeus i s th e
follow ing one
So " I f everything i s changing, every answer t o any question i s eq u ally
c o rre c t, both to say 'th u s ' and 'n o t t h u s ', o r i f you wish, 'becomes',
i f we a re n o t to employ any expression t h a t w ill brin g them to a
s t a n d s t i l l ."
Tho "You speak t r u ly ."
So "Except t h i s , Theodorus, I sa id 'th u s ' and 'n o t t h u s '. I t is
necessary, though, n o t even to say 't h u s '. For 't h u s ' would no longer be
changing, and nor would 'n o t t h u s '. Indeed, th e re i s no motion in
't h i s ' , e ith e r . Those ^ o hold t h i s theory must e s ta b lis h some oth er
phrase w ith which to express i t , as by t h e i r own hypothesis they now
have no words, unless 'nohow' i s allowed. That might be th e most f i t t i n g
expression fo r them, as i t i s in d e f in ite ." (Tht.183a)
At Timaeus 49b-50c th e fo u r elem ents a re in flu x , and th e re i s th e worry
about naming th e elements which a re p e rp e tu a lly changing in to one

177
another. Even here though th e re m y be s ig n if ic a n t d iffe re n c e s frcan th e
T heaetetus. While th e elem ents a re in flu x t h i s m y n o t n e c e ssa rily be
th e 'change in a l l resp ec ts a t a l l tim e s' p o sitio n o f th e Theaetetus but
th e g e n tle r a lte r n a tiv e of 'i n some re sp e c t a t a l l t i m e s T h e r e i s
a ls o th e recep tacle which i s fre e from q u a lita tiv e change and m y be
c a lle d [touto].GO These d iffe re n c e s m y account f o r th e d if f e r e n t
a ttitu d e s taken by th e T im eus and th e T heaetetus a s to vÆiether th in g s
in flu x can be su c c e ssfu lly re fe rre d to a t a ll.G I
The theory o f 53c f f i s a q u ite d if f e r e n t m t t e r though. Here we
have q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s , ensembles of which m y
have temporary or permanent s t a b i l i t y . C learly th e g e n tle flu x which
a ff e c ts most p e rc e p tib le e n t i t i e s here i s a f a r cry from th e ra d ic a l one
o f th e T heaetetus, and th e Theaetetus ' comments on how we can r e f e r to
item s in flu x can h ardly be ap p lied d ir e c tly h ere.
I f we a re to tak e i t th a t both th e p o s itio n o f th e Thgoe&teus and
C ratylus and t h a t of th e Tim eus a re P la to 's own c u rre n t views, then i t
i s c le a r , I th in k , which i s th e su p e rio r, and i f we follow th e argument
through, th e chronologically l a t e r p o s itio n . However, I have been
counselling a l l along t h a t we should tak e g re a t care before ascrib in g
any p o sitio n advocated by P la to 's c h arac ters to P la to , and in t h i s case
I th in k i t i s f a i r l y c le a r t h a t th e d e sc rip tio n o f flu x in the
Theaetetus and C ratylus i s P la to 's perception o f and perhaps extension
of H e ra c litu s' p o s i t i o n . The second theory of th e T im eus from 53c f f ,
on th e o th er hand, m y give us something c lo se to P la to 's th in k in g . I t
i s s t i l l presented somewhat e l l i p t i c a l l y , and th e re i s work fo r th e
read ers t o do them selves, b u t th a t , perhaps, i s what we ought to have
come to expect by now. P lato p resen ts us w ith a framework in th e flu x o f
th e T im eu s, a way o f analysing th e p hysical world t h a t re ta in s both
phenomenal flu x and some fundamental s t a b i l i t y t h a t allow s language some
g rip on th e world.

VII

There has of course been some considerable debate concerning th e gold

example and th e question o f th e Tim eus ' a ttitu d e t o how we should r e fe r
to p h y sical phenomena. The key passage in th e T im eus i s th e follow ing,
which has been th e su b je ct of much debate concerning both i t s
tr a n s la tio n and in te r p re ta tio n . T im eus t e l l s us th a t
"Whatever we perceive a s always changing in to something e ls e , lik e

178
 f i r e , in each case we should not c a l l f i r e 't h i s ' but 's u c h lik e ' [me
to u to a l i a t o to io u to n e k asto te prosageurein p u r]." (Tim.SOd)
The c e n tr a l debate concerns th e phrase [me to u to a l i a t o to iouton
hekastote prosageurein p u r]. The t r a d itio n a l reading i s t h a t [touto]
' t h i s ' and [toiouton] 'th e su c h lik e ' a re competing p red ic a te s fo r th e
su b ject [p u r], f i r e . The phrase then concerns ways in which to sp e cify a
tr a n s ie n t phenomenon lik e f i r e , one ap p ro p riate and one in ap p ro p riate.
The a lte r n a tiv e reading tak es [touto] and [toiouton] t o be competing
su b je cts fo r th e p red ic a te [p u r], th e sense now being t h a t words such as
f i r e which we now apply t o tr a n s ie n t phenomena a re b e tte r applied to
more s ta b le e n t i t i e s .
There were two major concerns over th e o ld reading. F i r s t l y , th e re
was th e apparent disco rd between th e Timaeus and th e Theaetetus on t h is
m atter, th e former saying th a t we can use 's u c h lik e ' fo r th in g s in flu x ,
th e l a t t e r denying t h i s . As we have seen though, t h i s i s illu s o r y ; th e
Timaeus and th e Theaetetus a re concerned w ith d if f e r e n t types of flu x ,
and i t i s only on th e assumption t h a t they a re n o t t h a t th e discord
a r is e s . Secondly, th e re was th e worry th a t we could only re fe r to th in g s
in th e p h y sical world a s th e su ch lik e. On my in te rp r e ta tio n though, as
th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s do not undergo any q u a lita tiv e changes, they can
be re fe rre d t o as 't h i s ' w ith re sp e c t t o t h e i r q u a litie s , as can any
ensemble of th e s to ic h e ic tria n g le s which does not undergo any
q u a lita tiv e change. The T heaetetus i s in agreement w ith th e Timaeus on
th is p o in t as we have seen.^^
The a lte r n a tiv e in te r p re ta tio n , taking [to u to ] and [to io u to ] as
competing su b je c ts fo r th e p re d ic a te f i r e has generated d i f f i c u l t i e s in
i t s e l f . T h i s view was pioneered by C herniss,^^ p o ssib ly w ith th e aim
of defusing th e argument concerning flu x fo r d atin g th e Timaeus before
th e T heaetetus. C herniss' p o sitio n though generates o b jectio n s in te rn a l
to th e Timaeus. At 48e f f a th re e fo ld d is tin c tio n i s made between Forms,
a second c la s s and th e re c e p ta c le . Cherniss req u ires t h a t th e second
c la s s be one o f h is 's e l f - id e n t ic a l c h a r a c te r is tic s ' ra th e r than o f the
phenomena. Yet immediately p rio r to and follow ing t h i s d iv is io n , P lato
ta lk s o f f i r e and th in g s lik e f i r e , requiring us to suppose t h a t he
suddenly and w ith no in d ic a tio n o r warning s h i f t s t o ta lk in g about some
q u ite d if f e r e n t e n t i t i e s . Cherniss has a ls o been c r i t ic i s e d fo r
introducing a fo u rth s e t of e n t i t i e s in a d d itio n t o Forms, phenomena and
re c e p ta c le , where P la to has Timaeus i n s i s t on only th re e .

179
 Lee accepted th e general form of C herniss' tr a n s la tio n bu t d iffe re d
on th e fo u rth category, p o stu la tin g s p a tia lly lo c a liz a b le p a rtic u la rs
i n s t e a d . This avoided some o f th e undesirable s h i f t s in meaning, but
s t i l l l e f t fo u r c ateg o ries o f e n t i t i e s in ste a d o f th re e . Both Lee and
Cherniss attem pt to resolve th e supposed c o n flic t between th e Timaeus
and th e T heaetetus, b u t in doing so su b je c t th e Timaeus to some to rtu o u s
in te r p r e ta tio n . As argued above, th e key to resolving th e d if f ic u lty
h ere l i e s in recognising t h a t w hile th e T heaetetus ta lk s o f a ra d ic a l
H eraclitean flu x , th e Timaeus does n o t. Given t h a t we can resolve th e
d i f f ic u lt y in t h i s way, much o f th e impetus behind th e Cherniss p o sitio n
i s l o s t , and th e re i s l i t t l e t o recommend i t otherw ise.

VIII

I f th e arguments o f t h i s chapter have been c o rre c t, then th e Timaeus'

most in te r e s tin g hypothesis concerning th e u ltim ate c o n stitu e n ts of th e
p h y sical world c le a r ly breaches th e s t r i c t u r e s of IW, vdiether we take
t h i s to be th e strong or weak in te rp re ta tio n o f th e views of th e
R epublic, or th e view th a t Timaeus s e ts out a t 27c-29e. As w ith th e
a lte r n a tiv e account o f epistemology, th e c o n tra s t between d if f e r e n t
p a rts of th e Timaeus i s q u ite s tr ik in g . For in stan ce we a re to ld th a t
" I t i s p o ssib le , in my opinion, f i r s t l y to make th e follow ing
d is tin c tio n . What i s i t t h a t always i s and never becomes, and what i s i t
t h a t always becomes and never is ? The one i s apprehended by the
i n t e l l e c t w ith reasoning, and i s always th e same, th e o th er in tu rn
comes to be believed by opinion w ith unreasoning se n sa tio n , always
coming to be and passing away, but never r e a lly e x is tin g ." (Tim.27d)
Timaeus 28bc goes on t o emphasise t h a t a l l th in g s t h a t have body a re
perceptible.70 However, the s to ic h e ic tria n g le s a re ph y sical e n t i t i e s
bs.
which a re q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le , which can reliablyj^called [to u to ], and
form more complex e n t i t i e s , which depending on th e natu re o f th e bonding
between th e se tr ia n g le s , may be tem porarily or permanently s ta b le . I t is
a ls o in te r e s tin g to note t h a t th e s to ic h e ic tria n g le s a re a c c e ssib le to
reason alo n e. As even th e atoms a re below our p ercep tu al th re sh o ld s, and
can only be sensed as agglom erations, so a f o r t i o r i a re th e conplex and
s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s . The l a t e r a to m istic hypothesis o f th e Timaeus
appears as much a t odds w ith th e IW nature o f Timaeus ' speech a t 27c-29d
a s i s th e a lte r n a tiv e epistem ological hypothesis. The f in a l question
concerning TW i s whether th e Timaeus's a lte rn a tiv e accounts storm i t s

180
f in a l b a stio n , th e question o f whether we can have knowledge o f a t l e a s t
some p h y sic al e n t i t i e s . This question goes somewhat beyond th e rem it of
t h i s c h ap ter, and as i t i s perhaps b e tte r discussed in conjunction w ith
th e Philebus, I s h a ll postpone treatm en t t o ch ap ter n in e. We can do one
piece o f iirp o rtan t groundwork fo r t h a t discu ssio n here though,
e sp e c ia lly a s i t shows a fu rth e r breach of IW in th e Timaeus.
In se c tio n four o f t h i s chapter I argued t h a t th e th r u s t o f P la to 's
arguments a t 49a-53c, and th e gold example in p a r tic u la r , draw us t o the
equation t h a t th e gold = re fe re n t o f [touto] = th e rec ep ta cle =
s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s on th e q uestion of v hat can be re fe rre d t o as
[to u to ]. One can a ls o use t h i s equation t o probe th e question o f being
and becoming, e sp e c ia lly a s th e gold example t e l l s us t h a t th e shapes
t h a t a re moulded in th e gold must not be ascrib ed being, as they 'change
even as we mention them' The c r ite r io n fo r being h ere, as a t 27d,
appears to be 'always being th e sam e'. The s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s , being
q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le , would seem to q u a lify fo r t h i s e p ith e t. The
Timaeus then g iv es us grounds f o r believing t h a t some p h y sical en. ti t i e s
might be sa id to be, ra th e r than e x is t in a p e rp e tu al s ta te o f becoming,
co n trary to Timaeus 27d f f . One fu rth e r im p licatio n of 27d f f i s th a t
th in g s e ith e r p e rp e tu a lly change o r they a re p e rp e tu a lly s ta b le ; nothing
comes t o be s ta b le . This statem ent has been used t o generate a d ating
argument, as i t would appear t h a t th e T heaetetus, S ophist, Philebus and
Laws a l l abandon t h i s p rin c ip le and allow some s o r t of being to th in g s
t h a t come to be, and so i t has been argued th a t th e Timaeus must
p re -d a te a l l o f th ese w o r k s . I n th e S o p h ist's b a ttle o f th e Gods and
G ian ts, we fin d th a t both [to on] and [to pan] must c o n sist both of r e s t
and c h a n g e . The Theaetetus shares th e usual l a t e P lato prem iss t h a t
th e re can only be knowledge of what i s , and from i t s ro u tin e examples of
what we may know, we can in fe r t h a t th e th in g s of t h i s world have some
s o r t of b e in g .7^ In th e P hilebus, th in g s come in to being v ia th e
im position of determinacy on th e in d eterm in ate,7^ a ty p ic a l example
being a q u a n tific a tio n o f tem perature on a q u a lita tiv e sc a le o f h o tte r
and c o ld e r .76
We ought here to d is tin g u is h between two types o f coming in to
being. The stro n g view i s t h a t something comes in to a s ta b le s t a te , and
remains permanently in t h a t s t a t e . On th e o th er hand, something may come
in to a tem porarily s ta b le s t a te , and subsequently undergo some fu rth e r
c h a n g e . 77 The s o r t of coming in to being envisaged by th e key passages

181
in th e Philebus and Laws would appear to be o f th e l a t t e r kind. In th e
P hilebus, i t should be c le a r t h a t vhat comes in to being, e ff e c tiv e ly a
tem perature, i s u n lik e ly to e x is t fo r a l l tim e w ithout change, although
i t may be tem porarily stable.^® So too w ith th e Laws. At 894a we a re
to ld th a t
"By means of t h i s change and a lte r a tio n everything comes in to
b eing. While i t remains unchanged, i t r e a lly e x is ts , but when i t changes
to another s t a te i t i s com pletely corrupted."
I would agree w ith Bostock here v^en he comments th a t
" I f we ask what ground th e Theaetetus has fo r i t s more l ib e r a l
attitude t o being, th e answer must presumably l i e in i t s re je c tio n o f the
H eraclitean theory of flu x ."
The Timaeus a ls o has a cogent a lte r n a tiv e to fundamental flu x , and t h is
s o r t of coming in to being i s e a s ily achieved by th e Timaeus ' theory of
s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s . Consider th e theory of ageing, fo r in sta n c e . There
we a re to ld t h a t th e complex tr ia n g le s vhich c o n s titu te our bodies are
brought to g e th e r a s assemblages of sto ic h e ic s w ith th e power t o l a s t fo r
80
a c e r ta in amount o f tim e. Thus th ese tr ia n g le s a re tem porarily sta b le
and come in to being in th e sense sp e c ifie d by th e Philebus and Laws.
Indeed, th e passage in th e Laws which follow s a d iscu ssio n o f change by
c o llis io n , may w ell have been w ritte n w ith th e (sub-) atomic theory of
th e Timaeus in mind. Even i f we want e n t i t i e s which a re permanently
s ta b le coming in to being, th e Timaeus i s n o t found wanting. The heavenly
bodies a re permanently s ta b le , and a re u ltim a te ly s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s
t ie d to g eth er w ith in d isso lu b le bonds. Yet a s th e heavenly bodies a re
brought to g e th e r so t h a t tim e may come in to e x iste n c e , they must have
come to be.
An even stro n g er p a r a lle l w ith th e Philebus may be th e question of
th e i n i t i a l ordering o f th e universe c a rrie d out by th e demiurge. At
Timaeus 53b we a re to ld t h a t a t one stag e th e universe was devoid of
reason or measure, and t h a t th e fo u r elem ents, although possessing some
tra c e s of t h e i r c u rre n t natu res where 'i n such a s t a t e a s one would
expect in th e absence of God' (53b3). The demiurge then began by marking
out th e elements 'by means of Forms and numbers' (53b4). C learly the
elements come in to some s o r t of determined s t a b i l i t y , and hence some
s o r t of being. We should t r e a t t h i s passage w ith some caution a s i t i s
th e l a s t gasp o f th e fo u r elem ent theory, th e theory o f sto ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s and atomic su b -stru c tu re being introduced d ir e c tly a f t e r t h i s .

182
The g en eral idea i s f a i r l y c le a r however, and i f we t r e a t t h i s a s a
framework f o r a n a ly sis ra th e r than a l i t e r a l p iec e o f cosmology then we
can apply i t s p rin c ip le s to th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s . The work of th e
demiurge on th e l a t t e r theory may be the marking out 'by Forms and
numbers' of th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s which then being q u a lita tiv e ly
s ta b le come in to some s o r t of being. A fu rth e r s ig n if ic a n t p a r a lle l with
th e Philebus here i s t h a t o f th e ro le o f th e cosmic in te llig e n c e or
demiurge which in both works i s responsible f o r bringing p re c ise ly
q u a n tifie d e n t i t i e s in to e x iste n c e .
Turnbull has argued th a t P lato p o stu la te s two worlds of becoming in
• 82
th e Timaeus, one being th e p e rc e p tib le and deceptive macro-world, th e
o th e r theifvipierceptible, non-deceptive (according to Turnbull) micro
world o f th e su b a to m ic s tru c tu re . While I have some sympathy w ith
T u rn b u ll's d iscu ssio n o f how sub-atomic s tru c tu re might h elp w ith some
of th e problems of th e phenomenal world, I believ e he i s mistaken on two
m a tte rs. F ir s tly , he suggests t h a t P lato p o stu lated th e non-perceptible
world in order to avoid problems w ith perceptual deception. However,
p e rc ep tu a l deceptiveness, w hile i t does e x ercise P la to , i s never a
se rio u s or in tra c ta b le problem fo r him; a t Republic 602 f f , measuring
and weighing w ill dispose o f th e problems h e re , and as I argued in
chapter s ix , th e a lte r n a tiv e epistemology of th e Timaeus does not
envisage any g re a t d i f f ic u lt y w ith t h is m atter. R ather, as Fine has
argued in rep ly to T u r n b u l l , P l a t o 's problem i s w ith th e compresence
of o p p o sites, and i t i s not c le a r how im perceptible sub-atomic stru c tu re
avoids t h i s d i f f ic u lty ; e .g one complex tr ia n g le may be bigger than
an o th e r, y e t sm aller th an a th ir d . I f my arguments in t h i s chapter so
f a r have been c o rre c t, then th e problems t h a t sub-atom ic s tru c tu re i s
designed to solve a re more t o do w ith flu x . P la to i s concerned to
ex p lain how i t i s t h a t some th in g s in th e phenomenal world change, while
o th e rs appear t o be tem porarily s ta b le , and o th e rs even permanently
s ta b le . So to o he i s concerned w ith how we can r e f e r t o e n t i t i e s which
a re undergoing change. In order t o do t h i s , he allow s some measure of
being to p h y sical e n t i t i e s and so breaks w ith IW. I t i s here t h a t I most
ra d ic a lly disag ree w ith Turnbull, and b eliev e him t o be pushing in the
wrong d ire c tio n ; fo r he p o stu la te s two worlds o f becoming, n e ith e r of
which he a tt r ib u t e s any measure of being t o , and so reckons on th re e
worlds a lto g e th e r. On h is account P lato breeds more worlds t o solve h is
problem s, w hile on mine by allow ing some being to p h y sical e n t i t i e s , and

183
as I s h a ll argue in th e next c h ap ter, some change fo r i n t e l l i g i b l e s ,
P la to i s moving in th e o th er d ire c tio n

IX

The main aim o f t h i s chapter has been t o argue t h a t even given th e

Timaeus' account o f flu x , th e heavens a re e n tir e ly s ta b le and a re
amenable to p re c ise mathematical d e sc rip tio n . The Timaeus again appears
to be providing more than one hypothesis. On th e more so p h istic a te d of
th e s e , th e re a re two types o f tr ia n g le s which a re th e u ltim ate
c o n stitu e n ts of th e ph y sical world, which while th ey undergo locomotion
do n o t undergo any q u a lita tiv e change. According t o th e stre n g th o f the
bonding between th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s , composite e n t i t i e s may
tem porarily or permanently s ta b le . Thus th e flu x o f th e Timaeus i s by no
means a s ra d ic a l as i s scxnetimes supposed, and th e re may be s t a b i l i t y
and re g u la rity in th e heavens. The Timaeus' a lte r n a tiv e account o f flu x
can be linked to th e a lte r n a tiv e account of epistemology by th e common
th rea d o f th e d iscu ssio n o f e n t i t i e s , names and explanations t h a t a re
[b eb aio s]. The e x isten ce o f q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le p h y sical e n t i t i e s a ls o
c le a r ly breaches th e TW s t r i c t u r e s of Timaeus' in tro d u cto ry speech. So
too they a f f e c t two arguments concerning r e la tiv e d a tin g . F i r s t l y , th e
Timaeus, lik e th e T heaetetus would seem t o r e je c t a ra d ic a l, H eraclitean
flu x . I f so , then th e re i s no need to d a te th e Timaeus before th e
T heaetetus. Secondly, th e Timaeus does n o t adhere t o th e exhaustive
b ifu rc a tio n o f [genesis] and [ousia] as i s sometimes argued. That
impermanent bodies may be organised in to tem porarily or permanently
sta b le ones accords w ith th e [genesis e is ousia] view of o th er l a t e
d ialogues such a s th e S ophist, Philebus and Laws. The f i n a l question fo r
th ese developments in P la to 's views i s whether th e re can be knowledge of
a t l e a s t some asp ects o f th e phy sical world about u s , which w ill be one
of th e main su b je c ts o f chapter n in e . F i r s t l y , however, having argued
t h a t P la to introduces g re a te r s t a b i l i t y in h is theory o f p hysical
e n t i t i e s and so breaches TW s t r i c t u r e s , I s h a ll argue t h a t P lato
in tro d u ces some types of change in to h is theory of Forms, a ssa u ltin g TW
from a d if f e r e n t d ire c tio n .

184
NOTES TO CE3APTER SEVEN

01) Cf. my c h .4 on th e natu re and s tru c tu re o f th e Tim.

02) [k in e sis] i s o fte n rendered as 'm o tio n ', but I p re fe r change as
[k in e sis] i s q u ite g en eral, covering change in n atu re a s w ell as change
o f p o s itio n .

03) I tak e 'grows o ld ' here to e n t a i l scxne s o r t o f change and decay

ra th e r than mere tem poral e x iste n ce .
04) Reading [phoran] ra th e r than [periphoran] a t Tht.181b6 with Bum et.

05) L et us fo r s im p lic ity here except th e account v^ich d e scrib e s th e

flu x from change in i t s e l f , to avoid th e problems t h a t P la to a sc rib e s to
H e ra c litu s, and r e s t r i c t our flu x to th e p hysical world. One can allow
change in to th e account in a lim ite d way, as long as i t i s ordered
change, a s then one can ta k e as many d e riv a tiv e s w ith re sp e c t to tim e as
a re required to produce a tem porally in v a ria n t d e sc rip tio n . The higher
o rd er account i s then fre e from change as long as one i s not bound by an
'ev ery th in g , whatever i t i s , i s in flu x ' clau se.

06) Cf. Tht.182c f f

07) Cf. Crt.439b f f . See my se c tio n VI below.

08) Change in th e Sophist w ill be discussed in th e next c h ap ter.

09) See Irwin (1977). On p4 he gives th e follow ing d e fin itio n o f a - and
s-change "x s-changes i f f a t tim e t1 x i s F and a t tim e t2 x i s not F,
and X i s not in th e same condition a t t2 as i t was a t t 1 . . . x a ch an g es
i f f X i s F in one a sp ec t, not F in another, and x i s in th e same
co ndition when i t i s F and when i t i s not F ."

10) Cf. e .g Tht.202e f f , P lt.2 7 7 e f f , Plb.18b f f .

11) Timaeus introduces th e d is tin c tio n between atoms, atomic planes and
th e two b a sic types o f tr ia n g le s a t 53d f f , and we a re to ld th a t 'A ll
tr ia n g le s have t h e i r o rig in in two t r i a n g l e s '.

12) [sto ich eio n ] a ls o c a r r ie s a sense of 'a f i r s t beginning, f i r s t

p rin c ip le or elem ent' (ISJ) which may be im portant h e re . I t i s
in te re s tin g t o note o th e r resonances of [s u lla b e ]; LSJ gives 'T hat which
i s h eld to g e th e r, esp. sev eral l e t t e r s forming one sound'.

13) See Tim.54d f f on how s to ic h e ic s form complex tr ia n g le s .

14) ' Everything' here i s [tou p a n to s], P la to 's usual phrase fo r th e

p h y sical u niverse.

15) I t may be t h a t P lato i s try in g to provoke h is readers in to

considering th e consequences o f equating u ltim ate p h y sical elements w ith
explanatory f i r s t p rin c ip le s ; c f . perhaps S o c rate s' dream in th e Tht. In
c h .9 I s h a ll d isc u ss th e math em atical and o n to lo g ical [archai] o f the
s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s .

16) Cf. th e use o f [anothen] (see Pdo.101d7, Rep.514b2 + 518b4) and

185
[hupotithem i] (see Pdo. 10Id f f , Rep.510b f f ) , and th e Rep. on lin e and
cave, esp . 511a5 vAiere th e soul must [ton hupotheseon anotero ekbainen].

17) At 59c, Timaeus i s q u ite confident t h a t a l l phenomena can be f u lly

explained in t h i s manner. I t i s perhaps im portant t h a t while we are
given an account o f th e r e la tiv e a b i l i t i e s o f th e atoms to c u t up what
they encounter (c f. Tim.56b, 56d), we a re not given such an account of
th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s .

18) I f th e s to ic h e ic tria n g le s came a p a rt 'a t th e j o i n t s ', we might g e t

one e q u ila te r a l p lu s some le fto v e rs out o f two is o c e le s . We might have
six sid e s from two broken iso c e le s which might reform to give us one
e q u ila te r a l p lu s some le fto v e rs which might form a d if f e r e n t s iz e of
e q u ila te r a l. I f th e s to ic h e ic s come a p a rt in some o th er way, then
f u r th e r transm utation may be p o ssib le . While th e Tim. s p e c ifie s how
atoms and complex tria n g le s decompose, i t does not do so fo r th e
s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s ; we might tak e t h a t a s an in d ic a tio n t h a t they a re
not supposed to decompose in to fu rth e r ph y sical elem ents.

19) See Tim.8 1b f f , and esp.89bc.

20) There have been some very strange tr a n s la tio n s of t h i s passage,
e sp e c ia lly th e phrase [ a lia d ia sm ikroteta a o ra to is puknois goirphois
sunte K.ontes ]. There i s no need to take [gomphos] l i t e r a l l y as a b o lt or
r i v e t used to hold to g e th e r a sh ip , a s i t can mean any s o r t of bond in
g en eral. Other passages which t a l k of such bonding would in d ic a te t h a t
P la to co n siders th ese bonds t o be im m aterial, so I th in k i t i s b e st to
give him some m etaphorical leeway h ere. Otherwise, one ends up w ith th e
a b su rd ity o f welding w ith r iv e ts o r b o lts ; Cornford (1937) p i 48 gives
'welding them w ith a m ultitude o f r i v e t s '; c f . Archer-Hind (1888) p i 47;
one no more welds w ith r iv e ts o r b o lts than one would conjugate a noun
or d e clin e a verb. Archer-Hind (1888) p i 47 n.15 i s r ig h t t o p o in t out
th e c o n tra s t between [desmos] and [gonphos], th e former having g re a te r
d u r a b ility , [puknos] I have taken in i t s sense o f 'w ell p u t to g e th e r,
w ell made, compact, f a s t s tr o n g ,: hence w ell-co n certed , w ell guarded'
(LSJ). I f th ese bonds a re im m aterial, then t h i s gives a b e tte r sense
than 'many'.

21) There i s a second v a ria b le here in t h a t bonds of th e same d u ra b ility

may l a s t d if f e r e n t amounts o f tim e depending on how much wear and te a r
they are su b je c t t o .
22) In th e 'O' le v e l physics view, th e f a c t t h a t e le c tro n s , protons and
neutrons e n te r in to temporary bonding re la tio n s to c o n s titu te atoms does
not a f f e c t t h e i r q u a lita tiv e s t a b i l i t y .
23) W ithout th e [pros a l l e l a ] c lu e a t Tim.8 1b i t might be thought th a t
th ese two referen ces a re to some s o r t of in te r n a l bond, e sp e c ia lly as
[h riza ] i s a ra th e r curious usage. Contrary t o t h i s however, i t would
seem h ig h ly lik e ly , as Cornford and Taylor have pointed o u t, th a t [he
h r iz a to n trig a n o n chala] of 81c8 i s intended to p ick up and c o n tra st
th e [ischuran men te n su n k le isin auton pros a l l e l a KCKtetai] of 81b9.

24) [ek druochon] was a n a u tic a l metaphor fo r something newly made, lik e
a sh ip 'f r e s h o ff th e s to c k s '.

25) I f someone asks what th e tim ber and then th e subsequent boat a re ,
th e s a f e s t answer I can give i s wood; c f . th e gold example, e tc .

186
26) I£ J give 't o place o r s e t to g e th e r, to combine, to o rg an ise, p ass,
to stand to g e th e r' .

27) Cf. Tim.56e, 81b and 89c.

28) Archer-Hind (1888) notes to p304-306 simply s u b s titu te s 'p a r t i c l e s '
fo r [trig o n a ].
29) This d ir e c tly re la te s to Tim.8Id; both passages d iscu ss th e marrow.

30) Conversely, when we age and th e bonds between our tr ia n g le s become

weak, th e incoming tria n g le s c u t up our own. The verb here i s [tem nein].
31) There i s one d i f f ic u lt y w ith th e in te rp re ta tio n th a t [trig o n a] a t
Tim. 8 1b r e f e rs e x clu siv ely to th e coirplex tr ia n g le s which c o n s titu te
atoms, which i s t h a t n o t a l l atoms a re c o n stitu te d ou t o f complex
tr ia n g le s . This i s th e case fo r a i r , f i r e and w ater o f course, but fo r
th e sm a llest ' iso to p e ' o f e a rth , th e atomic fac es a re squares made of
fo u r s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s . My in te r p re ta tio n req u ire s t h a t t h i s i s a
s l i g h t o v e rsig h t on P la to 's p a r t.

32) See fo r in stan ce Tim.53d [duoin a rc h e ta i trig o n o in ], 54a [duoin

trig o n o in ], 55b and 57c [ton sto ich eo n ], 55e [ton k a t' archas trigonon
hupothenton].

33) That th e tr ia n g le s can 'l a s t up to a c e rta in tim e ' (Tim.89d) might

be a tem poral lim ita tio n , or more lik e ly in view of Tim.8 1b f f , a 'wear
and t e a r ' lim ita tio n . I f we tak e th e reference t o be to complex
tr ia n g le s , n e ith e r req u ire change in th e sto ic h e ic tia n g le s .

34) Cf. Tim.81c f f and 56e where we a re to ld th a t "Whenever a sm all

amount o f f i r e i s enclosed in a la rg e amount o f a i r , w ater o r e a rth ,
moving w ithin t h e i r movements, b a ttlin g and breaking up upon being
d efeated , two u n its o f f i r e a re assembled to make one form o f a i r " . I f
we ta k e th e two images of b a ttlin g to r e fe r to th e same s o r t of p ro cess,
th en i t i s th e atoms being broken in to t h e i r fac es th a t c o n s titu te s old
age, ra th e r than any d e te rio ra tio n in th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s .

35) See e .g Zeyl (1975) p i 27 f f .

36) See Tim. 49d and 50a.

37) Zeyl (1975) p125.

38) See Tim.56bc.

39) See Tim.54c f f . Note th e guarded and o b serv atio n al language h e re ;
'We see [horomen], so we suppose'.
40) Eirpedocles may be a s ig n if ic a n t ta r g e t h e re . Note t h a t P lato
sometimes uses th e Empedoclean (see e .g F r.6 /1 ) [h riza] (e.g Tim.81c6,
84b1, 90a8) in stea d o f [s to ic h e a ].
41) Even th e atoms a re below percep tu al th resh o ld ; see 56bc. As Zeyl
(1975) pi 27 p o in ts o u t, P la to may w ell be a ttac k in g th e ro le o f the
'elem en ts' (e a rth , a i r , f i r e , w ater) as p riv ile g e d b a sic s u b s tra ta , as
on h is view they may transm ute in to each o th e r. This does not mean, as
Zeyl seems to tak e i t , th a t P la to abandons th e id ea o f b a sic su b s tra ta

187
which do n o t transm ute; as I argue, he re in s ta te s ju s t such ‘ele m e n ts',
in th e form o f th e two s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s , bu t a t a lower le v e l.

42) One might a ls o note r e la tiv e to Pdo.105b t h a t P la to essays a 'safe*

answer here (even 's a f e s t ' [asphalestaton] Tim.SObI), and so we might
expect a c le v er answer to be lurking somewhere.

43) Cf. Tim.50a, 50b.

44) Cf. Tim.51a f f , 52b f f , and A ris to tle De Generatione e t Corruptione
329a13 f f . See to o S orabji (1988) p32-36. Note t h a t a t Tim.52de th e
recep tacle moves; thus th e re can be no o b jec tio n t o th e s to ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s being th e ré fé ra n ts of [touto] expressions on th e grounds th a t
they s u ffe r locomotion.

45) We s h a ll see some more uses t h a t th e rec ep ta cle i s p u t t o in ch. 9

46) See Tim.53a f f .

47) Cf. Tim.27d f f , 29b f f . Cf. Frede (1988) p40 on th e sharpness o f th e
d is tin c tio n s h e re .

48) Cf. th e Tht. on th e combined T heaetetu s/ P ro tag o ras/ H eraclitu s

p o s itio n .
49) See Tim.35a f f .
50) See Tim.37a-37c. Our souls s im ila rly have two o r b its (Tim.42b), but
th ese move ir r e g u la r ly (Tim.42c c f . 47bc f o r th e c o n tra s t between the
world so u l and our own), hence we a re only p a rtly ra tio n a l, and we f a l l
in to e rro r when we make misjudgements concerning sameness and d iffe re n c e
(See Tim.43e-44a).
51) The greek here i s [doxai k ai p i s t e i s gignontai bebaioi k ai a le th e s ].
52) This c o n tra d ic ts Tim.27c-29e both in l e t t e r and s p i r i t ; 29b6 ta lk s
of [bebaios] accounts and e n t i t i e s , and 29c3 t e l l s us [ho t i p e r pros
genesin o u sia, to u to p ros p i s t i n a le th e ia ] , 'a s being i s re la te d to
becoming so i s opinion to t r u t h '. Note a ls o t h a t th e account of atomism
a t 53c f f i s described as "In accord w ith th e c o rre c t account as w ell as
th e lik e ly " (Tim.56b).

53) Contrary to th e e a r l i e r epistem ology, Timaeus i s h ig h ly o p tim istic

t h a t th e se a re soluble problems. See Tim.43a f f , esp . 43e. Cf. Tim.29d,
where we must accept th e lik e ly account and search no f u r th e r , and
Tim. 44a-c, 47bc.
54) Cf. Tim.37b, Tht.189e f f , So.263e f f and Plb.37a f f on judgement as
s i l e n t statem ent and statem ent a s spoken judgement. Mac<enzie (1986)
p i 42 comments t h a t "The C ratylus brings in to q uestion th e f i x i t y of
names; th e f i x i t y o f th in g s; and th e s e c u rity o f th e corresponedence
between th e two. The theme o f [bebaiotes] th e re fo re marks th e puzzles of
th e Phaedrus and C ratylus o f f from th e dogmatism o f th e Timaeus". I
d isa g ree ; these m atters a re ra ise d and a re a c e n tr a l puzzle fo r th e Tim;
th e Tim. however p re se n ts us w ith some a lte r n a tiv e s concerning flu x to
juggle w ith.

55) See Tim.29b6, 37b8, 49b5, 49d7, 51d7, 91e1, and c f . C rt.386a4,
386.e l , 437a8.
188
56) See e .g Owen (1953) p322 f f , Bostock (1988) p147 f f .

57) See Owen (1953) p322 f f , Reed (1972) p66 f f .

58) Cf. ray e a r l i e r d iscu ssio n o f flu x .

59) Or perhaps even 'i n sorae resp ec t a t sorae tim e*.

60) The Tira, d if f e r s fro n th e form er, as we have seen, and th e re i s no

in d ic a tio n a t a l l t h a t language i s included in th e flu x o f th e Tim,
which seems to be ex clu siv ely located in th e flu x o f th e fo u r elements
and t h e i r atomic fa c e s.
61) See here G ill (1987) p39 f f .

62) See e .g Bostock (1988) p i 47/8, and c f . Bumyeat (1990)p7-65.

63) See e .g Tht. 182c " I f they only underwent change o f p la c e , and n o t of
q u a lity , then we would be a b le t o say what th e flowing th in g s t h a t
change p o s itio n a re ."

64) There a re two p o in ts concerning th e t e x t and i t s tr a n s la tio n t h a t

m arginally favour th e a lte r n a tiv e in te rp re ta tio n . F ir s t l y , th e old
in te r p r e ta tio n req u ire s th e d e le tio n o f [pur] a t Tim.49d6. Secondly, th e
use of [to to io u to n ], using th e a r t i c l e , t e l l s a g a in st (though does not
ru le out) i t s p re d ic a tiv e use; c f . Cherniss (1954) pi 16.

65) See Cherniss (1954).

66) Cf. Gulley (1960) p63/4. M ills (1968) p154, Zeyl (1975) p134, Mohr
(1978b) p249. One might a ls o note t h a t th e world so u l encounters are
th in g s w ith t h e i r substance e ith e r disp ersed o r undivided (see Tim. 37a
f f ) such t h a t what i t p erceiv es i s bodies ra th e r than q u a litie s .

67) See Lee (1966) p367/8.

68) F urther co n sid eratio n s re la tin g to P la to 's reasons fo r p o stu la tin g
th e recep tacle may a ls o weigh a g a in st th e Cherniss view; t h i s is
discussed in c h .9
69) Cf. ray c h .3.

70) See Frede (1988) p40 on th e s tre n g th of th e c o n tra s t h e re .

71) See Tim.50b.

72) See Owen (1953) p322 f f , Bostock (1988) p146 f f .

73) See So.249cd.

74) In th e Tht. ty p ic a lly a person may be known or perceived (194b), and

knowing a person counts a s a case o f knowledge (201c, 209a).

75) See Plb.26d f f , and c f . 27b and perhaps 54a-d as fu rth e r exairples of
[genesis e is ousian]. This i s only a prelim inary sketch o f how lim it and
unlim ited r e l a te in th e P lb; c h .9 w ill dicu ss th e se m atters more f u lly .
76) See Plb.24a f f . See my c h .5 f o r th e P l b .'s non-committal comments on

189
H eraclitean flu x and th e p o s s ib ility of something being n e ith e r in a
process of g eneration o r d e stru c tio n .

77) R ist (1960) p209 suggests t h a t i f P la to holds t h a t change i s

discontinuous and happens 'i n an i n s t a n t ' , then th in g s may have a form
of impermanent being. T his, while i t might make being and becoming in a
sense com patible, does n o t e x p la in how th e re can be change (to whatever
degree) frcan becoming in to being, which i s c le a rly envisaged in th e Le.
and P lb . F u rth er, i t i s lik e ly t h a t l a t e r P lato (see here my c h .8 + 9)
t r e a t s tim e a s a continuum ra th e r than a s a succession o f d is c re te
in sta n c e s.

78) One might f e e l t h a t th e re i s some c o n tra d ic tio n between th e examples

of [genesis e is ousiafl] and th e d isju n c tio n made a t Plb.59a f f between
[ta onta a e i] and [ta gignomena kai genesomena k ai gegononta]. I agree
w ith R ist (1970 p208) here t h a t i t i s im portant t h a t P la to w rite s [ta
onta a e i ] , th a t which always e x is ts , implying Forms or whatever th e
Philebus has in mind in ste a d . Other th in g s may come in to being b u t as
such a re tim e bound in a way t h a t Forms a re n o t; c f . P lb .S id e.

79) Bostock (1988) pi 47. While agreeing t h a t th e Tht. r e je c ts

H eraclitean flu x , I disagree w ith Bostock as to whether P la to ever held
such a theory (and he c e rta in ly d i d n 't in th e Tim. ! ).

80) See Tim.81b f f , and esp.89c.

81) This w ill be explored in more d e ta il in c h .9.

82) See Turnbull (1988).
83) See Fine (1988b).

190
CEIAPTER EIGHT

METAPHYSICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOPHIST AND TIMAEUS

In th e previous th re e chapters I have in v e stig a te d th e cosm ological and

epistem ological changes t h a t can be found between th e Republic and the
Timaeus. The main aim o f t h i s chapter w ill be t o examine what
a lte r a tio n s t o th e middle period theory of Forms P la to might have made
or suggested. Here 1 s h a ll argue t h a t he undertakes a two-pronged
programme o f re v isio n . In th e Timaeus, he i s p rim a rily concerned w ith
th e s ta tu s o f p a rtic u la rs and w ith t h e i r re la tio n s h ip w ith th e Forms. In
th e Sophist on th e o th er hand he i s in te re s te d in how Forms r e la te to
each o th e r, and w ith th e n ature o f th e Forms them selves. A perennial
problem w ith th e r e la tiv e d atin g o f th e Timaeus i s i t s re la tio n to the
arguments o ffere d in th e Parmenides. The p o sitio n 1 s h a ll argue fo r i s
th a t P la to makes changes to h is conception of both p a rtic u la r s and Forms
such t h a t he i s ab le to circumvent th e o b jectio n s of th e Parmenides. In
s e c tio n one 1 s h a ll argue t h a t th e a n a ly sis o f th e r e la tio n of Forms and
p a rtic u la rs to space and time in th e Timaeus provides some o f th e
groundwork h e re . In th e follow ing se ctio n s 1 argue t h a t th e S o p h ist's
d iscu ssio n o f th e in te r r e la tio n o f Forms a ls o makes advances on th e
middle p e rio d . F in a lly , 1 b r ie f ly consider th e sty lo m e tric evidence fo r
th e r e la tiv e datin g o f th e l a t e r dialogues.

Let us begin w ith th e f i r s t t h ir d man argument (IMA) of th e Parmenides,

o r larg en ess re g re ss , which runs as follows^
Rn "1 b e liev e th e n atu re o f your grounds f o r believ in g each id ea to be
one i s t h i s ; whenever th e re seem to you to be many la rg e th in g s ,
viewing them a l l , th e re appears to be some same one id ea e q u ally shared,
from whence you a re led to th e conclusion t h a t th e la rg e i s one."
So "You speak tr u ly " , he s a id .
Rn "But th e la rg e i t s e l f and th e o th er la rg e s , i f you view them a l l in
th e same manner w ith your mind, w on't some fu rth e r sin g le la rg e appear,
by which th ese many larg es appear la rg e ?
So "That i s lik e ly ."
Rn "Then another idea o f largeness w ill appear, beyond th e larg e

191
i t s e l f which has alread y occurred and th e th in g s t h a t p artak e o f i t ; and
in a d d itio n t o every one o f th e se a fu rth e r d if f e r e n t one, by reason of
which a l l th ese w ill be la rg e ; and each of your ideas w ill most
c e r ta in ly n ot be one, b u t unlim ited in number."
This argument might be reckoned to req u ire th re e e x tra prem isses in
o rd er to a rriv e v a lid ly a t i t s conclusion.^

1. One-over-many (COM). I f any s e t o f th in g s share a given c h a ra c te r,

then th e re e x is ts a unique Form corresponding to t h a t c h a ra c te r; and
each o f th e se th in g s has t h a t c h a ra c te r by p a rtic ip a tin g in th a t Form.

2. S e lf-p re d ic a tio n (SP). The Form corresponding to a given c h arac ter

i t s e l f has t h a t c h a ra c te r.

3. N on-identity. (NX). If anything has a given c h ara c te r by

p a rtic ip a tin g in a Form, i t i s n o t id e n tic a l w ith t h a t Form.

Granted th ese th re e prem isses, a reg ress ensues.^ One p o in t t h a t we

might s t a r t a discu ssio n from i s t h a t fo r a theory o f Forms to function
i t would appear to be unacceptable fo r SP to occur e ith e r in a l l cases
o r in no c ase s.* Accepting u n iv ersal SP would lead to a b su rd ity even
w ithout th e largeness re g re ss. In t h a t case th e re could only be Forms
re la tin g to th e c h a ra c te r is tic s t h a t Forms a re supposed to have,
otherw ise by u n iv ersal SP some Forms would have non-Formal
c h a r a c te r is tic s . ^
However, Forms must have some c h a r a c te r is tic s , and i f they a re to
be sa id to have th ese by v irtu e o f some r e la tio n to Forms, th e re w ill be
a t l e a s t sane Forms where SP w ill have t o be faced. ^ There a re o f course
v ario u s s tr a te g ie s fo r disarming sentences which appear t o be instances
of SP, V la sto s' d is tin c tio n between 'o rd in a ry ' and 'p a u lin e ' p red ic atio n
perhaps being th e most famous.^ What none o f th e se s tr a te g ie s w ill do,
however, i s t e l l us which a re th e r e a l and v^ich th e apparent cases of
SP, and so where and why to apply th ese d is tin c tio n s .
What P la to req u ire s then i s some c r ite r io n which w ill d is tin g u is h
acceptable and unacceptable cases o f SP.® The ta s k of the Timaeus, I
s h a ll suggest, i s to banish some o f th e unwanted case s. The c e n tra l
question here i s perhaps to be a b le to sp ecify p re c is e ly what s o r t of
e n t i t i e s a re involved. This w ill a f f e c t one o f th e key co n d itio n als of
th e larg en ess re g re ss, whether concerning th e la rg e i t s e l f and th e many
la rg e s , we should 'view them a l l in th e same manner w ith our m inds'.^

192
 In th e preceding chapters I have argued t h a t th e p o sitio n t h a t
Timaeus o u tlin e s a t 27c-29e i s undercut by a lte r n a tiv e accounts of
epistemology and flu x , th e o b jec tiv e being to provoke th e readers to
make some judgements f o r them selves. Here I s h a ll suggest t h a t a sim ila r
phenomenon occurs w ith th e Timaeus* m etaphysics.
F ir s t l y , I want to propose an a lte r n a tiv e view o f th e way t h a t th e
Timaeus i s s tru c tu re d , though one t h a t i s compatible w ith th e standard
approach. The orthodox view, as i s perhaps signposted by Timaeus a t
Timaeus 48a i s t h a t Timaeus 30-48 discusses th e works of reason and 48
f f d iscu sses th e works of n e c e ssity . However, as we saw in chapter f iv e ,
th e d iscu ssio n o f astronomy from 30-48 i s in e x tric a b ly bound up w ith a
d isc u ssio n o f tim e. From 48a onwards we a re introduced to th e recep tacle
and to th e geom etrical atomism, and we have a discu ssio n o f p h y sical
e n t i t i e s in space. ^® These two p a rts of th e Timaeus might then be
a lte r n a tiv e ly c h arac terise d as discussions o f th e n atu re o f p a rtic u la rs
in tim e, and in space. What i s common to th ese two d iscu ssio n s i s t h e i r
enphasis on th e homogeneity o f tim e and space. Both tim e and c e l e s ti a l
motion proceed in a p e rfe c tly reg u lar manner, and th e re c e p ta c le / space
i s e n tir e ly c h a ra c te rle s s so t h a t i t does not d i s t o r t v to t occurs in
it."
In chapter fiv e I suggested th a t th e change t o th e more s ta b le and
re g u la r cosmology o f th e Timaeus might be accompanied by a change in the
analogue fo r th e re la tio n between mathematics and th e motion o f th e
heavens, from a geom etrical d efin itio n / re p re se n ta tio n or model/ copy
analogue to one o f number/ th in g s t h a t have number. Here we can perhaps
see some o f th e m etaphysical apparatus being p u t in p lace to support th e
second analogue being applied more g e n e ra lly . In order fo r p a rtic u la rs
to p a r tic ip a te in Forms by way o f th e second analogue, they need t o be
in s ta n tia te d in homogenous, c h a ra c te rle ss space and tim e so t h a t they
a re not d is to r te d .
What th e Timaeus then emphasises in d is tin c tio n t o previous
dialogues i s t h a t p a rtic ip a n ts in Forms a re in space and tim e and as
such a re s p a tio / temporal e n t i t i e s , while Forms e x is t outside o f space
19
and tim e and so cannot be a ttrib u te d s p a tio / tem poral p ro p e rtie s . An
im portant consequence o f t h i s i s th a t Forms can no longer be g en erally
tr e a te d as p a r a d ig m s .T h e Form of anything s p e c if ic a lly s p a tio /
tem poral cannot be p e rfe c tly what i t s p a rtic ip a n ts a re d e fic ie n tly as i t
i s n ot th e s o r t of e n tity th a t can ta k e on s p a tio / temporal p re d ic a te s .

193
 Like th e a lte r n a tiv e epistem ology, t h i s lin e o f thought clashes
w ith Timaeus' speech a t 27c-29e and o th er re la te d passages, which a re
c le a r ly s t i l l committed to a model/ copy re la tio n and to
paradigmatism. ^^ This d iffe re n c e in analogue may underpin d iffe re n c e s in
epistem ological optimism. I f we only have a d e f ic ie n t copy to work w ith,
and we have t o obey th e [sungenes] s t r i c t u r e fo r ex p lan atio n , and th e re
i s s u b s ta n tia l flu x in th e w orld, we might never have more th an a lik e ly
account. However, w ith th e second analogue we have a world where th in g s
occur [ k a f arithm on],^^ where we have a fundamental s t a b i l i t y
underlying a manageable flu x , and vdiere epistem ological problems are
tr a c ta b le and a re located in th e natu re o f our minds ra th e r than th e
n atu re o f th e world.
One might compare th e s p a tio / tem poral c h a ra c te ris a tio n o f e n t i t i e s
in th e Timaeus w ith some o f th e c o n tra s ts th a t we have been previously
o ffered by P la to , e sp e c ia lly those which I suggested c h a ra c te rise th e TW
in te r p r e ta tio n , i . e i n t e l l i g i b l e / se n sib le , knowable/ opinable, s ta b le /
changing, in c o rp o re a l/ p h y sic al. None of th ese on t h e i r own w ill give us
good c r i t e r i a fo r deciding which Forms s e lf-p r e d ic a te and which do n o t.
That Forms a re i n t e l l i g i b l e does not sto p them having p hysical
c h a r a c te r is tic s ; th e Form o f sm all might be p h y sic al, b u t so sm all a s to
be im p ercep tib le. ^^ That Forms a re knowable o r s ta b le does not prevent
th e Form of la rg e from being la rg e . That th e Form of change is
incorporeal gives no grounds fo r ru lin g out t h a t i t i s i t s e l f su b je c t to
change. In p o rta n tly , none o f th ese p a ir s pick out Forms and s p a tio /
tem poral e n t i t i e s as they a re presented in th e Timaeus. In what follow s
2 i s co n ten tio u s, and although we have seen some o f th e evidence t h i s
a s s e rtio n w ill n o t be f u lly discussed u n til th e next ch ap ter.

1) The i n t e l l i g i b l e / se n sib le d is tin c tio n f a i l s as th e Timaeus

p o stu la te s some s p a tio / temporal e n t i t i e s which a re n o t se n sib le . We can
only p erceive agglom erations o f atoms, a s atoms them selves, th e complex
and sto ic h e ic tr ia n g le s a re a l l below human p ercep tu al th re s h o ld s. ^^

2) The knowable/ opinable d is tin c tio n w ill f a i l a s th e Timaeus w ill

suggest t h a t a t l e a s t sane asp ec ts of s p a tio / tem poral e n t i t i e s a re
knowable.

3) The s t a b le / changing d is tin c tio n w ill f a i l because th e Timaeus

p o s tu la te s some s p a tio / tem poral e n t i t i e s , th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s ,
which a re q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le . ^^

194
4) The in c o rp o re a l/ p hysical d is tin c tio n i s perhaps c lo s e s t to
c h a ra c te risin g Forms and p a rtic u la r s in terms o f t h e i r s p a tio / ten p o ral
n a tu re s, b ut i s le s s p re c ise and does not bring o u t th e tem poral
c o n tra s t.

Given th e Timaeus' a n a ly sis, what a re th e im plicatio n s fo r SP ? No Form

o f anything s p e c if ic a lly s p a tio / tem poral can s e lf-p re d ic a te because
Forms a re n o n -sp a tio / tem poral e n t i t i e s . Thus th e Form of ' (s p a tia lly )
la r g e ' cannot s e lf -p re d ic a te because i t i s n o t i t s e l f a s p a tia l e n tity .
To re tu rn t o th e largeness regress of th e Parmenides, we now have very
good reasons f o r not ' viewing th e various la rg e s and th e la rg e i t s e l f in
th e same way' w ith our minds. This deals w ith a la rg e number of
p re d ic a tio n s, and i t i s n o table t h a t in th e Timaeus and th e dialogues
th a t follow i t , th e re i s no longer any suggestion, as th e re was in th e
Phaedo fo r in stan c e, th a t Forms can tak e on any s p a tio / temporal
c h a r a c te r is tic s . 20
We might a ls o consider some oth er asp ects of th e Parmenides in
o rd er to support th e id ea t h a t P la to d id n o t th in k th e o b jec tio n s he
ra is e s th e re a re f a t a l to th e theory of Forms. To begin w ith, th e re i s
th e behaviour of Parmenides and S o crates. At th e c lo se o f th e f i r s t
se c tio n , Parmenides does not conclude t h a t th e theory of Forms has been
re fu te d , b u t t h a t a man of g re a t a b i l i t y might be a b le t o circumvent the
d i f f i c u l t i e s r a i s e d , a n d th a t i f we do no t allow th e e x isten ce of
22
Forms th e power of d ia le c tic w ill be destroyed.
We can r e la te t h i s to two o th er im portant asp ects o f the
Parmenides. F i r s t l y , while Socrates sometimes gives confident re p lie s to
Parmenides' q u e s t i o n s , a t o th er tim es he i s te n ta tiv e , ainswering
[ i s o s ] , 24 'p e rh a p s ', [eoiken],^^ 'so i t seems' or [phainetai houto ge]2G

's o i t would appear' . Parmenides, v^en asked how to go about resolving

th e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t have occurred, recommends some in te lle c tu a l
gymnastics
"You need to do something more than t h i s , to in v e s tig a te not only
th e consequences o f a hypothesis being tr u e , b u t a ls o o f i t being f a ls e ,
i f you wish to become b e tte r tr a in e d ." (Rn. 135e)
The 'you' here may be th e e x tra -te x tu a l second person t h a t in v ite s the
reader to do some of th e work th a t I discussed in chapters one and fo u r.
I t i s in lin e w ith my conception of P la to 's FWP f o r th e Parmenides to
s e t problems fo r th e readers to solve and to propose a framework fo r

195
th e ir solution. 2? The se n sib le place t o s t a r t t h i s process o f negating
hypotheses would be a t th e weakest p o in ts o f th e argument; perhaps those
where Socrates i s most doubtful and has given a te n ta tiv e re p ly . What i s
in te re s tin g about th e combination o f th e se two p o in ts i s th a t Socrates*
te n ta tiv e answers a re o fte n in rep ly to Parmenides' dubious use o f
s p a tio / tem poral metaphors. A good example o f t h i s i s th e d isp u te over
th e metaphors of day and s a i l a t 131a f f . I f p a r tic ip a tio n i s to be in
wholes cind n o t in p a r ts , says Parmenides, and th e whole id ea i s in each
of i t s p a rtic ip a n ts , then t h a t idea w ill become se p ara te from i t s e l f .
S ocrates a tte irp ts t o answer by advancing a tem poral analogy, t h a t a Form
might be lik e a day, "One and th e same in many places a t th e same tim e,
and y e t n o t se p ara te from i t s e l f " (Pm. 131b). Parmenides though
s u b s titu te s a s p a tia l analogy fo r t h i s tem poral one, equating S o c rate s'
move w ith placing a s a i l over many people a t once, and t h i s e l i c i t s a
te n ta tiv e rep ly from S ocrates.
We might a ls o review a c ru c ia l p o in t in th e largeness reg ress h e re .
At 132a, Parmenides in v ite s us to view th e la rg e i t s e l f and the
p a r tic u la r largenesses in th e same manner, when a reg ress w ill ensue.
'L arge' though cannot be univocally p red ic ated of Forms and p a rtic u la rs
i f Forms a re a s p a tia l e n t i t i e s . We might speak of a 'l a r g e ' id ea, but
t h i s ta k e s up no more space than a sm all id ea . S o c rate s' rep ly a t t h is
p o in t i s a te n ta tiv e [eoiken], 'so i t seem s'. The use o f 'la r g e ' as an
example in t h i s argument i s then perhaps n o t a c c id e n ta l, b u t i s meant to
enphasise one o f th e d iffe re n c e s between Forms and p a r tic u la rs , namely
t h e i r s p a tia l and tem poral natures. ^8 I t i s p re c is e ly th ese p o in ts which
th e Timaeus ta k e s up and makes c le a r. In th e next se c tio n we s h a ll see
how th e Sophist too picks up various p o in ts in th e Parmenides and
pursues some a lte r n a tiv e s .
The p o sitio n of th e Timaeus then i s t h a t Forms a re a s p a tia l,
atemporal e n t i t i e s and a s such cannot ta k e on s p a tia l o r temporal
p re d ic a te s . This cannot be th e whole s to ry concerning SP however, as th e
Forms them selves have some c h a r a c te r is tic s , and th e re w ill be some
c h a r a c te r is tic s of Forms (e.g e x iste n ce , sameness, d iffe re n c e , change
and r e s t) which bridge th e s p a tio / tem poral d is tin c tio n . I t i s to t h is
problem and to th e Sophist t h a t I now tu rn .

II

We a re l e f t w ith some Forms which apparently w ill s t i l l s e lf-p re d ic a te .

One lin e o f approach here might be t o t i e p a rtic u la r s i n tr i n s i c a l ly in to

196
space and tim e. Thus th e properly formed question might be. Does th e
Form of 'e x is t s in space and tim e' i t s e l f e x is t in space and time ? To
which th e answer i s c le a r ly no. This i s not an a lte r n a tiv e t h a t P lato
pursues, however. He continues to t r e a t ex isten ce q u ite g e n erally , a s he
does c h a n g e . T h i s may be because o f a problem t h a t rem ains, which i s
how we a re t o e x p lain th e p ro p e rtie s of Forms. The Sophist ra is e s the
question o f how th e F o r m s r e l a t e t o each o t h e r , a n d i t i s suggested
t h a t fo r d ia le c tic t o be p o ssib le some Forms must be p red ic ated of
32
O thers. However, i s th e means o f p a rtic ip a tio n which forms th e b a sis
f o r t h i s p re d ic a tio n th e same a s th e one t h a t p e rta in s between Forms and
p a rtic u la rs ? I f th e answer to t h a t i s no, then t h i s new re la tio n may
have some d if f e r e n t p ro p e rtie s w ith resp e c t to th e prem isses required
fo r th e TMAs to fu n ctio n .
One lin e o f thought here i s t h a t perhaps p re d ic a tio n s between Forms
ought to be based on some more e g a lita r ia n re la tio n (F-F p a rtic ip a tio n )
than th e ra th e r h ie ra rc h ic a l one t h a t r e la te s p a rtic u la rs to Forms (p-F
p a r tic ip a tio n ) , fo r here we a re ta lk in g o f a meeting of e q u als. More
te c h n ic a lly , one would expect such a re la tio n t o be a t l e a s t
non-symmetrical. This must be so , as some p a irs of Forms w ill be
p red ic ated o f each o th er; sameness w ill be d if f e r e n t from d iffe re n c e ,
and d iffe re n c e th e same as i t s e l f , fo r e x a m p l e . T h e r e la tio n o f p-F
p a rtic ip a tio n on th e o th er hand i s c le a rly asynm etrical.^^ P la to 's
language in th e S ophist seems t o in d ic a te t h a t he i s aware o f t h is
p o in t. While he i s q u ite happy to use th e phraseology of p a rtic ip a tio n
when ta lk in g o f F-F p a rtic ip a tio n ,^ ^ he q u ite r ig h tly eschews th e
m etaj^ors he uses fo r p-F p a rtic ip a tio n v^ich imply asym m etricality.
Instead he tends to use metaphors such a s 'communion' or 'b le n d in g ',
which would seem t o in d ic a te t h a t he has a t l e a s t a non-symmetrical
re la tio n in mind. Thus P lato avoids th e problem, p a rtic u la rly acute when
a p a ir of Forms p re d ic a te of each o th e r, o f an asymmetrical re la tio n sh ip
between them th a t p laces them on d if f e r e n t o n to lo g ical le v e ls .
Another d iffe re n c e between blending and ordinary p-F p a rtic ip a tio n
i s t h a t while th e l a t t e r i s c le a rly irre f le x iv e , th e former may be a t
l e a s t non-reflexive.^® I f we tak e th e p-F re la tio n t o be copying, fo r
example, nothing can be a copy o f itself.® ® This f a ilu r e of
s e lf - p a r tic ip a tio n w ill ru le o u t any SP based upon i t . However, i t may
be t h a t th e F-F re la tio n allow s s e lf -p a r tic ip a tio n and so SP in a t l e a s t
some cases; w hile blending may not be an e n tir e ly ap p ro p riate metaphor

197
here (conmunion may be more h e lp f u l), i t avoids th e d is a s te rs o f basing
SP on an asymmetrical p-F r e la tio n . I f SP i s then p o s s ib le , what now
becomes iirp o rtan t in r e la tio n t o th e arguments of th e Parmenides i s th e
qu estio n o f NI.^O
I n i t i a l l y , we had th e statem ent concerning NI th a t f o r p a rtic u la rs
p a rtic ip a tin g in Forms, v^ich V lastos has termed " 'f u ll- s tr e n g th '
n o n -id e n tity " . ^^

(Nig) I f anything has a given c h a rac ter by p a rtic ip a tin g in a Form, i t

i s n o t id e n tic a l w ith th a t Form.

While t h i s i s adequate to make th e f i r s t TMA work, i t i s not c le a r t h a t

P la to i s committed to anything q u ite so stro n g . R ather, he might r e je c t
t h i s and in stea d accept

(NI^) I f any p a rtic u la r has a given ch arac ter by p a rtic ip a tin g in a

Form, i t i s n o t id e n tic a l w ith t h a t Form.

Why might P la to be conmitted to Nig ? Owen has argued th a t P lato i s

conmitted to NI, and s ta te s th a t
"The p o in t i s t h i s . P l a t o ... th in k s (a) t h a t what i s p red ic ated , in
t h i s case man (not th e expression but what i t stan d s f o r ) , i s always
something d if f e r e n t fro n th e su b je c ts of which i t i s p re d ic a te d ; fo r i f
i t were id e n tic a l w ith i t s su b je c ts th ese would become id e n tic a l w ith
each o th e r. P lato i s a man, Socrates i s a man: i f th ese statem ents have
th e form a = c , b = c , a w ill be b and P lato w ill be S o "^2
c r a t e s .

However, as Fine has a r g u e d , P l a t o does not need to accept f u l l

stre n g th NI t o avoid t h i s a b su rd ity . I t i s s u f f ic ie n t to say t h a t what
i s p red icated o f p a rtic u la rs i s not id e n tic a l to th o se p a r tic u la r s , and
i t i s n o t necessary t o argue t h a t nothing may be what i t i s in v irtu e of
i t s e l f . So Owen's argument does not req u ire t h a t P la to be committed to
N ig .

One might a ls o probe th e re la tio n s h ip between expl&A&cion and NI

h e re . I f Forms a re supposed to be explanatory e n t i t i e s , then in order to
provide good explanations, they had b e tte r not be id e n tic a l w ith what
th ey p u rp o rt t o e x p l a i n . ^4 This does not commit P lato to fu ll- s tr e n g th
NI though - i f anything q u ite th e co n trary . The p a rtic ip a tio n of
p a rtic u la rs in Forms i s supposed to ex p lain something about p a r tic u la r s ,

198
not about Forms. To ex plain th e p ro p e rtie s of Forms we might e j ^ c t a
d if f e r e n t le v e l o f a n a ly sis, perhaps involving some new re la tio n s h ip s .
That, I suggest, p o in ts to a c ru c ia l d iffe re n c e between Nig and NI^. The
former attem pts t o e x p lain a property of Forms using th e same
explanation used to explain th e p ro p e rtie s of p a r tic u la r s , while th e
l a t t e r q u ite p ro p erly says nothing about th e n atu re of Forms, only about
th e r e la tio n o f Forms and p a rtic u la rs . That i s a good reason why P lato
should be committed to NI^ and should r e je c t Nig. What o f NI and th e F-F
r e la tio n though ? We might reform ulate th e f u l l -stre n g th NI assumption
fo r blending lik e t h i s

(NIj^) I f any Form has a given ch arac ter by blending w ith a Form, i t i s
n o t id e n tic a l w ith t h a t Form.

Now while t h a t w ill n o t g e t th e a c tu a l f i r s t TMA to work, as t h a t i s

s p e c if ic a lly about th e p a rtic ip a tio n o f p a rtic u la rs in Forms, one could
reform ulate i t to a s s a u lt th e re la tio n sh ip s between Forms. However, one
can a ls o reform ulate a weaker NI assumption, as before

(Nlj^^) I f any Form o th er than t h a t of th e c h ara c te r in question has a

c h a ra c te r by blending w ith a Form, i t i s n o t id e n tic a l w ith th a t Form.

This would save th e theory from any reform ulation o f th e TMA. Now i t may
be t h a t SP i s t o be explained by th e same re la tio n , t h a t of communion,
as a re inter-Form p re d ic a tio n s. I f so , we might amend Nlj^y^ to say th a t
i f something communes w ith i t s e l f i t i s id e n tic a l w ith i t s e l f .
A lte rn a tiv e ly , we might leave NI^^ open in th e same way as we l e f t NI^,
and then p o s tu la te some fu rth e r re la tio n on which to base SP.
I f asked fo r some c r ite r io n by which we can d is tin g u is h which Forms
s e l f -p re d ic a te and vdiich do n o t, th e reply might simply be the
d e fin itio n o f a g re a te s t kind, th a t i t can be p red icated o f a l l o th er
F o r m s . T h a t i s , any Form t h a t can be pred icated o f a l l o th er Forms can
a ls o be p red ic ated o f i t s e l f . *6 Whether t h a t d iv id es Forms in to th e same
two groups a s th e s p a tio / tem poral d is tin c tio n depends on whether th e re
a re s t i l l Forms o f say many, or th r e e , which a re n o n -sp a tio / tem porally
s p e c if ic and cannot be p red ic ated o f a l l o th er Forms.
The Timaeus and th e S ophist th en , w ith t h e i r a n a ly sis o f the
s p a tio / ten p o ra l natures of Forms and p a rtic u la rs in conjunction with

199
th e a n a ly sis of inter-Form p a rtic ip a tio n and p re d ic a tio n , provide th e
to o ls f o r th e c re a tio n o f th e follow ing exhaustive d isju n c tio n .
There a re those Forms which have s p e c if ic a lly s p a tio / temporal
p a rtic ip a n ts which do n o t s e lf-p re d ic a te . I t would a ls o seem t h a t P lato
i s not conmitted to anything more than a weak NI assumption in re la tio n
t o th e p a r tic ip a tio n o f p a rtic u la rs in Forms.
There a re th o se Forms which do n o t have s p e c if ic a lly s p a tio /
teirporal p a rtic ip a n ts which do s e lf -p re d ic a te , i f they can be predicated
of a l l o th er Forms, and perhaps some o th ers t h a t cannot be pred icated o f
a l l o th er Forms and do n o t s e lf-p re d ic a te . Again though, P la to need not
be committed to th e analogous 'fu ll-s tre n g th * NI fo r th e blending
r e la tio n v^ich a c ts a s th e b a sis fo r p re d ic a tio n s among Forms. 4 8° That
renders th e theory of Forms invulnerable t o th e TMA.
The Timaeus then can be dated l a t e r than th e Parmenides. The
q u estion o f whether P lato i s ever committed to o r l a t e r r e je c ts SP, is
n o t r e a lly th e ap p ro p riate one. More im portant i s whether P la to can
develop sane c r i t e r i a to sep arate acceptable and unacceptable cases of
SP w hile keeping th e coherence o f th e theory. That, as I have suggested,
i s a ta s k t h a t th e Sophist and Timaeus tak e up.^^

Ill

The n o tio n t h a t c e rta in Forms a re allowed to s e lf-p re d ic a te in the

Sophist ra is e s some in te re s tin g problems. In Chapter seven I argued th a t
in th e Timaeus P la to a rriv e s a t a new theory o f p a rtic u la r s whereby
c e rta in o f them may have s ta b le natu res while changing t h e i r s p a tia l
p o s itio n s , and I expanded on t h a t view in se c tio n one o f t h i s ch ap ter.
Here I s h a ll argue t h a t P la to in th e Sophist amends th e middle period
theory of Forms in a way t h a t allow s th e Forms t o e n te r in to re la tio n a l
changes, and by doing so circumvents th e f i n a l argument of th e f i r s t
p a r t o f th e Parmenides concerning a strong in te rp re ta tio n of IW and th e
know ability of th e Forms, and th e s ta b le o b je c ts of knowledge/ coming to
know paradox o f th e Sophist.
Consider f i r s t th e way in which sameness and d iffe re n c e , two o f th e
fiv e g re a t k inds, a re tre a te d in th e S ophist. The S tranger says th a t
"But I b elieve you agree^^ th a t e n ti t ie s a re always sa id to be
something e ith e r in r e la tio n t o themselves [auta k a th ' au ta] o r in
re la tio n to o th er th in g s [pros a l i a ] . " (So.255c)
At Sophist 256ab th e S tranger then employs t h is d is tin c tio n to show th a t

200
one th in g can p artak e both of sameness and d iffe re n c e . One th in g may be
both th e same w ith re sp e c t t o i t s e l f [kath* auto] and d if f e r e n t w ith
resp ect to o th ers [pros a l i a ] . Consider now what happens i f th ese Forms
s e l f - p a r tic ip a te . The Form o f th e same could then be sa id t o be th e same
as i t s e l f while th e Form o f d iffe re n c e could be sa id to be d if f e r e n t
from o th e rs . Sameness could acquire i t s d iffe re n c e (from o th ers) by
p a rtic ip a tin g in D ifference, while D ifference could be th e same (as
i t s e l f ) by p a rtic ip a tin g in Sameness. That seems a very happy result.^3
D if f ic u ltie s have a ris e n , however, concerning th e o th er p a ir of g re a t
kinds. Change and R est.^^ For su re ly th e Form of change cannot i t s e l f be
su b je c t t o change ?
One way of resolving th e d i f f ic u lt y here i s to tak e a cue from th e
treatm en t of Sameness and D ifference, and . th e [kath* a u to ]/
[pros a l i a ] d is tin c tio n to Change and R est. Thus we might be ab le to
p re d ic a te both change and r e s t t o one th in g ; i t might be a t r e s t w ith
resp ect to i t s e l f [kath* auto] but changing w ith resp ec t t o o th er th in g s
[pros a l i a ] . S e lf-p a rtic ip a tio n and c ro ss p a r tic ip a tio n would then
produce s im ila rly benign r e s u lts to th e treatm en t of Sameness and
D ifference. One upshot o f t h i s i s th a t Forms may now be allowed t o e n te r
in to r e la tio n a l or 'Cambridge* changes w ithout t h e i r e s s e n tia l s t a b i l i t y
being th reaten ed .
This proposed so lu tio n has c e rta in advantages. F i r s t l y , th e puzzle
concerning how, i f th e o b jec ts o f knowledge a re s ta b le in a l l p o ssib le
resp ects we can come to know them i f our coming to know them involves
some change f o r those o b je c ts , i s resolved. While th e e s s e n tia l nature
of th e o b je c ts o f knowledge remains s ta b le , they may e n te r in to
re la tio n a l changes and become k n o w n . S e c o n d l y , we seem to have come to
a sane re s o lu tio n o f th e problem o f how Change and R est r e la te t o each
o th e r.
The main o b jectio n here i s whether th e t e x t o f th e Sophist allow s
such a re s o lu tio n . Both T heaetetus and th e E le a tic Stranger appear
adamant t h a t Change and Rest cannot be p red icated o f each o t h e r . I
have argued e a r l i e r though t h a t we cannot always a tt r ib u t e th e views
th a t P la to 's ch arac ters advocate to P lato h im self. Theaetetus i s being
led through a la b y rin th of (to him) new arguments so we might expect h is
opinions to a l t e r , and can h ard ly d ir e c tly a ttr ib u te h is views to P la to .
Take fo r in stan ce Theaetetus * i n i t i a l statem ents about th e n atu re of
being, not-being, sameness and d iffe re n c e . When th e Stranger s e ts out

201
th e p u zzles, he has Theaeteteus tw ice s t a t e t h a t being i s th e opposite
[enantion] o f not b e i n g . Y e t when he resolves some o f th e p uzzles, th e
Stranger s t a te s th a t
"When we t a l k of not being, i t seems we do n o t mean th e opposite
[enantion] of being but merely something d if f e r e n t." (So.257b)
As T heaetetus a sse n ts to t h i s , h is views a re then l ia b l e t o change on
c ru c ia l m a t t e r s . T h e E le a tic S tranger, on th e o th e r hand, does not
seem t o th in k t h a t i t i s a general t r u t h t h a t th e g re a te s t kinds a re
re s tin g . In h is c ritic is m o f th e Friends of th e Forms he s ta te s t h a t
change must c h a ra c te rise r e a l being as w ell as becoming, and oth er
arguments he uses would seem to req u ire th e prem iss t h a t Change changes
due t o i t s own n atu re.
That might remove th e te x tu a l o b je c tio n s, but what p o s itiv e reasons
do we have f o r reading th e S ophist in th e way I have suggested ? On iry
reading Of P la to 's EWP, as a m atter o f general s tra te g y P lato w ill
sometimes in d ic a te th e general form o f a s o lu tio n , o r th e way to make
p ro g ress, while leaving some a p o ria i fo r h is readers to be puzzled by.
Here perhaps i s a case in p o in t, and we might tak e Sophist 256ab as
evidence o f t h i s . The E le a tic Stranger ejq)lains h is so lu tio n t o th e
problem o f how sameness and d iffe re n c e may be p red ic ated o f th e same
th in g , and goes on to say
"Therefore even i f Change i t s e l f in sane way partook of R est, i t
would not be absurd to say t h a t i t was a t r e s t ." (So.256k)
Theaetetus r e p lie s t h a t t h i s i s indeed so.^^ That, I suggest, leaves th e
reader w ith th e ta sk o f applying th e general s o lu tio n a s applied to
Sameness and D ifference to Change and R est.
One way in which t h is general stra te g y may work in th e S ophist i s
v ia what Owen has termed the 'p a r ity assumption' . At Sophist 250e f f
th e Stranger comments t h a t sin c e both being and not-being have now
turned o ut t o be eq u ally puzzling, t h i s o ffe rs hope t h a t any so lu tio n to
th e d i f f i c u l t i e s w ill c a s t some l i g h t on both.^^ One might w ell read
t h a t a s an in v ita tio n to th e reader t o apply th e to o ls used in solving
th e problem o f not-being to th e problem of being. To resolve th e problem
o f no t-b eing, th e S tranger employs some new ideas on n e g a t i o n , a
d is tin c tio n between id e n tity and p red ic atio n ,^ ^ and th e [k ath ' a u to ]/
[pros a l i a ] d is tin c tio n t o allow sameness and d iffe re n c e to be read as
'th e same a s ' and 'd if f e r e n t from* resp ec tiv e ly and so allow both to be
p red ic ated o f one e n tity . Now th e puzzle about being runs a s follows.^7

2 02
A) Change and Rest a re conplete o p p o sites.
B) Change and Rest jo in tly and se v e ra lly a re .
C) This i s not to say t h a t Change and Rest a re changing,
nor t h a t they a re re s tin g .
D) Being i s another th in g a p a rt from th ese two,
embracing both Change and Rest .
E) Being i s not Change and Rest both a t once.
F) Being, according t o i t s own n atu re i s n e ith e r changing,
nor a t r e s t .

We a re now in a p o ria , as Being appears to be o u tsid e o f th e opposites

change and r e s t , and so th e Stranger goes on t o conclude t h a t being i s
as f e r t i l e a source o f a p o ria as not Hoeing i s . I t i s noteworthy t h a t th e
p a r ity assumption d ir e c tly follow s t h is ^8
d i s c u s s i o n .

Now (A) i s c le a rly c r i t i c a l t o reaching an a p o re tic conclusion. I t

i s used a t (C) to exclude th e p o s s ib ility t h a t (B) means Change and Rest
a re jo in tly and se v e ra lly changing and re s tin g . Secondly, in conjunction
w ith (F) i t c o n trib u te s to th e a p o re tic conclusion. I f we abide by the
p a r ity assumption, and tak e our cue from th e so lu tio n o f th e problems of
not Hieing, we can deploy th e [k ath ' a u to ]/ [pros a l i a ] d is tin c tio n
ag ain . This tim e though, we use i t t o allow us t o read change and r e s t
r e la tio n a lly , as r e la tiv e to th e th in g i t s e l f or t o o th e r th in g s , and so
n o t as c o n tra d ic to rie s . That w ill then d isso lv e th e puzzle about Being
in much th e same way as th e puzzle about not-being was d isso lv ed .
A f u r th e r advantage o f tr e a tin g Change and R est in t h i s manner is
t h a t i t d isso lv es another puzzle concerning th e g re a te s t kinds. The
E le a tic S tranger a jp e a rs to t r e a t Being, Sameness, D ifference, Change
and Rest as g re a te s t k i n d s . I t i s g en erally thought t h a t th e se a re
what th e Stranger has in mind v^en he ta lk s o f kinds th a t blend w ith a l l
o th er k in d s .H o w e v e r , i f we cannot jo in tly p re d ic a te change and r e s t
t o anything, they cannot both be g re a te s t kinds. Under rry treatm ent
though, they a re jo in tly p red icab le o f everything, including each
o th er and so q u a lify as g re a te s t kinds.

IV

As a l l t h a t I have so f a r argued has placed th e Timaeus, along w ith th e

C r itia s , P hilebus, Laws and perhaps th e E^inomis in th e l a s t group of
works t h a t P la to w rote, we ought a ls o to consider th e sty lo ro etric

203
evidence on P la to n ic chronology. My view here i s t h a t stylom etry can
only ever give us some hypotheses concerning r e la tiv e d atin g th a t we can
look to confirm or disprove by oth er methods, ra th e r than be th e f in a l
a r b i t e r in any d isp u te . P la to n ic stylom etry might be argued t o r e s t on
some ra th e r shaky foundations. F i r s t l y , we have an author who i t would
seem consciously uses various l i t e r a r y s ty le s t o achieve th e
p h ilo so p h ical e f f e c ts he s e e k s . I f so , then any c o rre la tio n between
th e incidence o f a c e rta in t r a i t and th e order of composition o f h is
works i s rendered su sp ect, and doubt w ill be c a s t on any claim t h a t a
s t y l i s t i c development i s unconscious ra th e r than conscious. Secondly, a
common assumption of P lato n ic stylom try i s t h a t th e Laws i s P la to 's l a s t
work, and s t y l i s t i c a f f i n i ty to th e Laws in d ic a te s l a t e n e s s . W h a t we
know about th e Laws i s t h a t i t was s t i l l 'on th e wax' when P la to d ied .
This does not e n ta il t h a t i t was P la to 's l a s t work though; would we
assume t h a t , e .g , unpublished works found in L ,bniz ' desk a f t e r h is
death were a l l w ritte n a f t e r a l l th e published works ? F u rth er, one
might worry whether we ought t o assume t h a t P la to wrote h is works
d is c r e te ly , t h a t e .g only a f t e r th e l a s t word o f th e Philebus was
w ritte n d id he begin t o compose th e Laws. One might argue t h a t in the
case o f th e Laws t h i s does not make to o much d iffe re n c e a s th e Laws i s
c le a r ly l a t e , even i f i t i s not d is c re te ly on i t s own as P l a to 's f in a l
work. However, th e re i s l i t t l e t o say th a t th e composition o f sane of
th e more h o tly contested works d id not overlap. The sty lo m e tric evidence
such as i t i s favours a l a t e datin g fo r th e Timaeus, but I would not
p lac e a g re a t d e al of weight on i t .
F i r s t l y , l e t us look a t th e incidence o f h ia tu s . There a re s ix
works, including a l l rny 'l a t e ' dialogues along w ith th e S ophist and
P o litic u s which avoid h ia tu s to a much g re a te r degree than any of
P la to 's o th er w o r k s . I f we could tak e t h i s t e s t a s a sim ple index of
la te n e s s , i t would provide good evidence fo r a l a t e d ate fo r the
Timaeus. However, i t seems c le a r from th e abrupt sw itch t o h ia tu s
avoidance P la to was conscious o f t h i s s t y l i s t i c t r a i t , and so th e re
could be reasons independent o f chronology why he uses i t in some works
and n o t o th e rs . As Owen argues, th e Phaedrus avoids h ia tu s to some
e x te n t, y e t most would place i t before th e Theaetetus and Parmenides
which do n o t avoid i t a t a ll ,^ ^ so t h i s cannot be an autom atic t e s t of
la te n e ss , and he considers h ia tu s avoidance to be an index of
confidence.^® While i t may be d i f f i c u l t t o come up w ith a r e a lly
convincing account of why P lato should sw itch between h ia tu s avoidance

204
and non-avoidance,^^ th e f a c t t h a t t h i s i s a conscious t r a i t muddies th e
w aters somewhat.
A second t e s t i s t h a t o f prose rhyth; m. Owen c it e s t h i s a s being
both unconscious and favourable to h is d a tin g o f th e Timaeus, but I
d isag rees on both c o u n ts.^0 The sources he c it e s would place th e Timaeus
b efore th e Sophist and P o litic u s , b u t a f t e r th e Parmenides.®^ Prose
rhyth m, l ik e h ia tu s avoidance, i s very much an o n /o ff phenomenon w ith
no tr a n s itio n s r y sta g e s, which would tend to in d ic a te t h a t i t i s a
conscious phenomenon. Moreover, we fin d in th e P o litic u s t h a t one p a r t
i s w ritte n in one rhythmic s ty le , another p a rt in th e o t h e r , a n d
A r is to tle comments t h a t th e new rhyth_ ns were introduced in P la to 's
tim e. The evidence o f prose rhyth; m i s then inconclusive.
Now l e t us next examine two t e s t s v^ich arguably examine
unconscious t r a i t s . F i r s t l y , th e comparison o f ra re words in th e Sophist
and P o litic u s w ith th e Timaeus. Campbell' s stu d ie s here have purported
to show t h a t th e Timaeus was roughly contemporaneous w ith th e Sophist
and P o litic u s . Owen has c r i t ic i s e d t h is work fo r i t s re lia n c e on A s t's
Lexicon Platonicum, which i s incom plete. However, Brandwood has
approved of Campbell's methods, and A s t's Lexicon i s complete enough to
give r e lia b le r e s u lts . Moreover, P rio r has in v e stig a te d t h i s using
Brandwood' s Word I n d e x , a n d has found no s ig n if ic a n t d iffe re n c e from
Campbell's results.®® I t i s hard to see how P la to could have coordinated
h is use of ra re words between dialogues as would be required by th e Owen
th e s is . He would have had to have been conscious t o some degree o f th e
r e la tiv e frequency w ith vhich he used each o f th ese words, and have a
reason fo r undertaking such a ta s k . One might suggest t h a t t h i s i s an
epiphenomenon of oth er s t y l i s t i c changes, such a s h ia tu s avoidance. In
th e Phaedrus though, where to some e x te n t P la to avoids h ia tu s , th e re i s
no c o rr e la tiv e change in ra re words. S im ila rly , th e S ophist, P o litic u s
and Timaeus agree on ra re words w hile d iffe rin g g re a tly on prose
rh y tl m. I f ra re words cannot be shown t o be an epiphenomenon, o r a good
reason fo r t h e i r coordination provided then th e re i s some evidence here
f o r a l a t e d a tin g o f th e Timaeus.
So too w ith synonym frequency. Here i t would seem th a t th e re a re a
s e t o f synonyms whose frequency i s d is tin c tly g re a te r in th e same group
of dialogues t h a t a re picked out by h ia tu s avoidance. Owen's counter
t o t h i s i s t h a t in S o c rate s' speeches in th e Phaedrus P la to uses a s ty le
akin to t h a t o f th e Timaeus, thus showing th a t he can use t h i s s ty le

205
when he w ishes. The problem w ith t h i s i s t h a t presumably Owen must claim
t h a t th e se synonyms a re under conscious c o n tro l. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see
though, as w ith ra re words, why P lato would take th e tro u b le to
coordinate th e use o f th e synonyms he was conscious o f, and hard to
b eliev e t h a t he was conscious o f a l l o f them.®® Again, i t would seem
t h a t synonyms a re n o t an epiphenomenon o f h ia tu s avoidance or prose
rhyth m.®®
These two t e s t s p o in t towards th e Timaeus being coirposed a f t e r th e
Parmenides and th e T heaetetus, and roughly contemporaneously w ith the
Sophist and P o litic u s . The more t h a t P la to has to coordinate such
f a c to r s as ra re words and synonyms between varying s ty le s , w ith l i t t l e
reason to do so , th e le s s p la u s ib le i t i s t h a t he i s in complete
conscious c o n tro l o f t h a t s ty le . The sty lo m e tric evidence then lean s in
favour of th e conclusion t h a t th e Timaeus was composed a f t e r th e
Parmenides. I t appears t o be p a r t o f a group o f s ix l a te d ialogues, and
concerning t h e i r r e la tiv e ordering I would agree w ith B illig and
Brandwood who s t a te t h a t th ese works cannot be ordered r e la tiv e t o each
o th er using sty lo m etric methods.^®

In conclusion then, th e S ophist and th e Timaeus launch a two-pronged

a tta c k on th e theory of Forms as we fin d i t in th e middle period and
introduce a number of re v isio n s intended t o circumvent th e problems
a ire d in th e Parmenides and o th er d ialogues. In th e S ophist, we fin d
t h a t th e Forms a re no longer unchanging in every re sp e c t, b u t e n te r in to
r e la tio n a l changes and become known. The new conception o f p a rtic u la rs
a s s p a tio / tem poral e n t i t i e s a l l i e d w ith th e homogeneity o f space and
tim e and a new conception o f th e r e la tio n between Forms and p a rtic u la rs
allow s th e world o f th e Timaeus t o be one which i s amenable to p re c ise
mathematical a n a ly s is . The gap t h a t TW fin d s i s here s ig n if ic a n tly
closed as Forms to some e x te n t a l t e r and p a rtic u la rs have some
s t a b i l i t y . Whether t h i s s t a b i l i t y i s enough fo r th e storm ing o f th e
f i n a l b a stio n of IW, th e notion t h a t we can only have opinion concerning
p h y sical e n t i t i e s , w ill be th e su b je c t o f th e next ch ap ter. There I
s h a ll examine th e n atu re o f p h y sical e n t i t i e s in th e Timaeus and th e
Philebus and t h e i r re la tio n to developments in P la to 's views on
mathematics in general and th e generation of numbers in p a r tic u la r .

206
NOTES TO CEÎAPTER EIGHT

01) Although I s h a ll follow custom and r e f e r t o t h i s argument a s a TMA,

larg en ess reg re ss i s perhaps more a cc u ra te. 'Man' i s n o t involved h ere,
and 'l a r g e ', i t might be argued, i s a s p e c ific and loaded exanple ra th e r
th an a ty p ic a l in stan c e.

02) I am working here w ith V lastos ' revised v ersio n s o f th e se th re e

prem isses. See Cohen and Keyt (1991) fo r fu rth e r d isc u ssio n o f vdiether
th ese th re e a re form ally com patible. As rny general p o sitio n i s t h a t
P la to i s n o t p erso n ally committed t o th e conclusions o f th e TMA's, and
t h a t th e Pm, in lin e w ith P la to 's EWP, a t l e a s t t o some e x te n t has a
maeutic fu n ctio n , I am n o t too worried about th e q uestion of
incom patible prem iss s e ts h e re .
03) Modern lo g ic ia n s have been concerned w ith fin d in g an i n f in i t e
reg re ss h e re , though P la to i s perhaps more w orried th a t Forms tu rn out
not to be [hen], but [apeiron p le th e s ], in d e fin ite ly many. See here
Sayre (1983) p29 f f .

04) Cf. Moravscik (1963) p52, V lastos (1969b) p337, Malcolm (1991) pi 1.
05) Thus f o r th e middle period theory a s i t occurs in th e Rep, i t may be
fin e fo r th e Form of th e Good to be good such t h a t we d e sire i t and
d ir e c t our in v e s tig a tio n s towards i t , b u t some te n e ts o f t h i s theory are
t h a t th e Forms a re u n ita ry , sta b le and do not possess c o n trad icto ry
c h a r a c te r is tic s . Those c h a r a c te r is tic s a re under th r e a t from th e SP of
Forms such as those o f many and change. See below though on p o ssib le
developments to th e theory.
06) See e .g So.251c f f on th e communion o f Forms, where th e p o in t i s
made t h a t i f something does n o t a sso c ia te w ith th e Form ex iste n ce then
i t w ill n o t e x is t. One problem concerns th e m otivation o f enquiry in th e
Sym. and Rep; i f Good and Beauty a re not (re sp e c tiv e ly or jo in tly ) good
and b e a u tifu l, why would we d e sire them, and so why spend enormous
amounts o f p ain stak in g labour in p u rs u it o f them ?

07) See V lastos (1970) and (1974). See Heinaman (1989) and Malcolm
(1991) p65 f f on oth er s tr a te g ie s intended t o ex p la in away unwanted
in stan ces o f SP, and on whether th e se s tr a te g ie s w ill allow us t o t r e a t
a l l unwanted in stan ces of 'F -ness i s F' as merely apparent cases o f SP.
08) Cf. Malcolm (1991) p42 f f . V lastos (1971) p259 suggests t h a t every
Form has t o be u n ita ry and immobile, such t h a t any candidate sentence
fo r SP ought to be re je c te d as only an apparent case i f i t a ttr ib u te s
d isu n ity or m ob ility t o a Form. See below fo r my disagreem ents w ith
V lastos h e re .

09) One method o f attem pting to disarm t h i s argument i s to argue t h a t as

th e la rg e i t s e l f i s i n t e l l i g i b l e and th e many la rg e s a re se n sib le , the
mind cannot view ( i .e perceive) them in th e same way, so th e argument
f a l l s (see e .g D orter, (1989) p190). That i s a p o ssib le in te rp r e ta tio n ,
but i t y ie ld s a ra th e r t r i v i a l r e s u l t. Perhaps what i s being suggested
i s t h a t i f you alread y have p a r tic u la rs and a Form before your mind, and
you consider them in th e same way, then th e reg ress ensues. The
in te r e s tin g question i s no t an epistem ological b u t an o n to lo g ic al one,
not whether we bring th ese th in g s before th e mind by d iff e r e n t epistem ic

207
routes ( a f te r a l l , as th e Tht. w ill emphasise, we might remember ra th e r
th an p erceiv e th e p a r tic u la rs and rny view of IW in c h .3 does n o t exclude
reasoning concerning p a r tic u la r s ) , but how we consider them as e n t i t i e s
vAen they a re before our minds.
10) See my c h .7 + 9 fo r d iscu ssio n o f th e rec ep ta cle and space.

11) See my c h .5 on tim e, and Tim.50c f f on th e re c e p ta c le / space, and

th e next chapter which w ill suggest t h a t P lato t r e a t s each a s a
continuum.
12) Up to th e Tim, th e re i s no e x p lic it statem ent o f th e aterrporal and
a s p a tia l n a tu re o f th e Forms. While one might f e e l t h a t t h i s i s vaguely
im plied by some th in g s t h a t P la to says e a r l i e r th an th e Tim, i t i s t h a t
dialogue which c h a ra c te rise s Forms and p a r tic u la rs in term s o f space and
tim e ra th e r than t r e a t s t h e i r s p a tio tem poral natu res a s by-products of
o th er ways of c h a ra c te risin g them. Cf. e .g V lastos (1969a) p83 f f whose
l i s t of th e 'c a te g o ria l* p ro p e rtie s of Forms in th e middle period
(immutable, in co rp o real, d iv in e , in se n sib le , a c c e ssib le only by
re c o lle c tio n ) omits (q u ite c o rre c tly fo r t h i s p eriod o f P lato ) any
mention o f t h e i r a s p a t i a l / atem poral n atu re.

13) Given more space I would argue t h a t up to th e Rn. P la to does t r e a t

Forms in general a s paradigms (see e.g V lastos (1954) p248, Vfedberg
(1955) p37/8. Cross and Woozley (1964) p i 80/1, Teloh (1981) p 8 , Malcolm
(1991) p64 f f ) , and t h a t up to th e Pm. he f a i l s t o d is tin g u is h the
u n iv ersal from th e paradigm case (see e .g Wedberg (1955) p i 8 , Gallop
(1975) p95-7, Bostock (1986) p207, Malcolm (1991) p159 f f ) . Why t h is
should be so i s another m atter; sev eral v a r ie tie s of lo g ic o - lig u is tic
e rr o r have been suggested, c f . e .g White (1976), Mates (1979), and f o r a
summary and fu rth e r suggestions see Malcolm (1991) p i 25 f f .
14) See e .g Tim.28b f f .
15) See my c h .5 fo r th e abundant examples of t h i s in th e Tim.

16) See Pdo.lOOe f f (the sm all i s sm all) and Tim.56bc (th ere a re
p h y sical im p ercep tib les).

17) See Tim.56bc.

18) Timaeus provocatively t e l l s us t h a t th e account o f geom etrical
atomism i s "In accord w ith th e c o rre c t account as w ell a s th e lik e ly "
(Tim.56b). Knowledge in th e Tim. w ill be discussed in th e next ch ap ter.

19) F u rth er, some complexes o f s to ic h e ic s a re tem porarily s ta b le , and

some (the heavenly bodies) permanently s ta b le .
20) See Pdo. 102d fo r Large being la rg e and 103e f f fo r Hot being h o t,
e tc .
21) See Pm.134e f f .
22) See Pm.135a f f .

23) E.g, [panu ge] *by a l l means' a t Pm.131a + d, 134a o r [anangke],

'n e c e s s a rily ' a t 132c + e , 134b + c , [adunaton] ' im possible' a t 13Id,
132b.

208
24) E.g a t Pm.131c.

25) E.g a t Pm.132a, 133a, 134b.

26) E.g a t Pm.131c.

27) As he i s about to begin th e second p a rt Parmenides says " If you

wish, sin c e i t seems th a t I must undertake th e labour o f playing t h is
game [pragmateiode p aid ian p a iz e in ], s h a ll 1 begin w ith myself and take
my own hypothesis ?" (Pm.137b). Such games have a 'p la y fu l se rio u sn e ss'
and a re h ig h ly loaded w ith resp ec t to P la to 's EWP.
28) In th e l i g h t o f t h i s , one could ask, i s Beauty b e a u tifu l in th e same
way t h a t any p a rtic u la r in stan ce o f Beauty i s b e a u tifu l ? One might say
t h a t th e re i s a e s th e tic beauty and a more in te lle c tu a l beauty; the
d iffe re n c e between, say, th e beauty of a Constable landscape and t h a t of
th e mathematics o f sp e c ia l r e l a t i v i t y . In which case Beauty might be
s e lf-p re d ic a tiv e in th e in te lle c tu a l sense, and a l l th e Forms might be
in te lle c tu a lly b e a u tifu l by blending w ith Beauty. I f t h a t s o r t of
a n a ly sis works fo r th e Good as w e ll, th a t means we can s t i l l d e sire
Beauty and th e Good because they a re (in a s lig h tly r e s tr ic te d and
in te lle c tu a l sense) b e a u tifu l and good. One problem w ith denying SP fo r
such th in g s i s vAy we would d e s ire them unless they had such
c h a r a c te r is tic s .

29) P lato continues to use [k in e sis] to cover a l l types of change.

30) While th e e n t i t i e s t h a t P la to re fe rs t o in th e So. have some
s ig n if ic a n t d ifferen c e s to th e Forms of th e middle period works (which 1
d e t a i l below), 1 b eliev e t h a t they a re s t i l l recognisably Forms, and
re f e r to them as such.

31) One could t r y denying th e OOM premiss here fo r th e in te r r e la tio n of

Forms, perhaps arguing th a t Forms a re supposed t o e x p lain th e p ro p e rtie s
of p a r tic u la rs and not o th er Forms. Judging by th e So. however, t h i s i s
n o t th e ro ute t h a t P la to ta k e s.
32) See So.260ab, and c f . Rm.135b.
33) Cf. Heinaman (1982) p185 f f fo r a d if f e r e n t view here.

34) The d e fin itio n s t h a t follow a re derived from Hodges' discussion of

he lo g ic o f r e la tio n s , see Hodges (1977) p174-186. A r e la tio n is
symmetric i f fo r every case where an in d iv id u a l a has th e r e la tio n to
another in d iv id u a l b, i t i s a ls o tr u e th a t b has t h a t r e la tio n t o a . I t
i s asymmetric i f fo r every case i t i s f a ls e t h a t b has t h a t re la tio n to
a . I t i s non-symmetric i f i t i s n e ith e r symmetric o r asymmetric. p-F
p a rtic ip a tio n i s c le a rly asymmetric. F-F p a rtic ip a tio n i s presumably
non-symmetric as we must use d ia le c tic t o determine which Forms do and
which do n o t p a rtic ip a te in each o th er; see So.253c.
35) See e .g So.256ab.

36) Or ra th e r c le a rly ought to be an asymmetrical r e la tio n . I t i s

in te re s tin g t o note t h a t a t Pdo.100d5-6 th e p-F re la tio n s h ip is
described as presence, [p aro u sia], or as fo r F-F re la tio n s in th e So,
communion, [koinonia], although he uses [metechein] elsewhere in t h i s
work. Both o f th ese could be construed as symmetrical and re fle x iv e , and

209
I suggest t h a t t o some e x te n t th e more lib e r a l a ttitu d e t o SP of th e
pre-Rn. dialogues may stem from a f a i l u r e t o consider whether
p a rtic ip a tio n i s a syirm etrical r e la tio n o r n o t. One might expect th e
model/ copy metaphor t o e n ta il asym m etricality, b u t th e second TMA uses
reseni)lance a s th e r e la tio n t h a t lin k s model and copy and t h i s , as Owen
(1953) p318 f f has pointed o u t i s a symmetrical r e la tio n . I tak e one of
th e messages o f th e second TMA to be t h a t one ought t o use an
asymmetrical re la tio n fo r p-F p a rtic ip a tio n , something t h a t th e Tim.
with i t s s h i f t o f analogue and c h a ra c te ris a tio n o f p a rtic u la rs as
s p a tio / tem poral e n t i t i e s would agree w ith.

37) E.g th e Greek [ech ein ]/ [m etechein], to have a p a rt in .

38) Again, o r ra th e r th e r e la tio n o f p-F p a rtic ip a tio n ought to be
ir r e f le x iv e . A re la tio n i s re fle x iv e i f every in d iv id u al has th e
r e la tio n t o i t s e l f . I t i s ir r e f le x iv e i f no in d iv id u a l has t h a t re la tio n
to i t s e l f , and no n -reflex iv e i f i t i s n e ith e r re fle x iv e nor ir r e f le x iv e .
Copying and imaging a re c le a rly ir r e f le x iv e , w hile blending may be a t
le a s t n o n -reflex iv e . Again, d ia le c tic w ill be needed to d istin g u is h
in d iv id u a l cases. Note t h a t asymmetrical re la tio n s a re always
ir r e f le x iv e , while symmetrical r e la tio n s a re n o t, a p o in t t h a t may be a t
th e h e a rt o f th e second TMA.

39) I f th e re la tio n i s s p a tio / tem poral in s ta n tia tio n , as perhaps in th e

Tim, then Forms cannot s e lf - p a r tic ip a te e ith e r . In r e la tio n to the
second TMA, i f th e re la tio n i s reserriblance (and model/ copy ju s t a vague
metaphor) then i f th in g s can resemble themselves SP, re tu rn s.

40) Assuming here t h a t P lato w ill be committed to th e OOM aasumption

both fo r p-F p a rtic ip a tio n and fo r F-F p a rtic ip a tio n .

41) See V lastos (1954) p238 f f , and p238 n .2 .

42) Owen (1966b) p207.

43) See Fine (1988b) p383 f f .

44) See my c h .2 fo r arguments h e re .

45) See e .g So.253b f f , 254b f f .

46) The means o f deciding which Forms w ill p red ic a te o f a l l o th e rs and
which w ill n o t i s one of d ia le c tic ; see So.253c.
47) See Pdo.104a f f where *three* i s perhaps tre a te d as a Form. So.256d
perhaps suggests t h a t one and many a re s t i l l tr e a te d as Forms in th a t
work, and c f . Plb.14c f f on one and many.
48) There a re Forms o th e r than th e g re a te s t kinds t h a t a re recognised by
th e So, and e x iste n c e , sameness, d iffe re n c e , change and r e s t may not be
an exclusive l i s t o f th e g r e a te s t kinds; see So.254b f f .
49) I have not discussed th e second TMA or lik e n e ss reg ress (Rm.132d f f )
as e s s e n tia lly th e same assumptions (OOM, SP, NI) a re required f o r i t .
There may be some oth er lessons t o be draw from t h i s argument, though.
That lik e n e ss i s th e re la tio n s h ip used may h ig h lig h t c e rta in th in g s . I t
c a lls in to question th e sym m etricality of th e re la tio n o f p a rtic ip a tio n
(c f. Owen (1953) p319 f f and esp. p319 n .3 , Jordan (1983) p29/30. Dorter

210
(1989) pi 94), and may a ls o ask us to ponder th e d iffe re n c e between
p ro p e rtie s and r e la tio n s . One suggestion t h a t I do n o t have th e space to
pursue here i s t h a t th e second TMA only produces a reg ress i f we t r e a t
lik e n e ss a s a complete p re d ic a te , ra th e r th an an incomplete one. We
might th en look to th e So.and Tim. to see how they t r e a t sameness and
d iffe re n c e a s two p lace p red ic ates - see my c h . 6 .

50) What P la to had in mind in th e e a r l i e r dialogues (see e .g Lys.217d,

Pdo.74b, 100c, 102d, P rt.330d, Sym.211a) where he appears t o be
committed to general SP is d i f f i c u l t to determ ine. Perhaps he did not
have something p re c ise in mind, and was forced t o confront th e se issu e s
and o th ers concerning th e theory o f Forms by th e o b jec tio n s he him self
r a is e s in th e Pm, leading t o th e changes t h a t I have argued we fin d in
th e So. and Tim. See my e a r l ie r note on uni v e rsa is and paradigms.
51) See So.248d f f , and c f . C rt.439e.
52) Following Owen (1970) p i 29on tr a n s la tio n h e re .

53) One d i f f ic u lt y here i s vAiy some Forms should acquire [kath' auto]
p ro p e rtie s in SP and o th ers [pros a l i a ] p ro p e rtie s ; d ia le c tic i s
presumably required to s o r t t h is o u t, and i t may be t h a t two d if f e r e n t
s e lf - p a r tic ip a tio n re la tio n s a re involved.

54) [ s ta s is ] i s th e Greek th a t I render 'r e s t ' h e re ; c f . mycomments on

[k in e sis] in th e previous ch ap ter.
55) See Geach (1969) p71 and Lombard (1978) on ' Cambridge' and
r e la tio n a l change in g en eral, and Mackenzie (1986a) p i 46 f f on th e
importance of Cambridge changes fo r P la to .
56) See So.248d f f and c f . C rt.439e f f fo r a s im ila r puzzle. For a
d iscu ssio n o f th e So. and C rt. on th ese p o in ts see Macv^enzie (1986a)
p i 37 f f .
57) Cf. e .g So.249b, 252d, and 255a.
58) See So.240b and 240d, and c f . Owen (1970) pi 10 n17.
59) Cf. So.257b.

60) Note here t h a t t h i s change o f opinion i s h ig h ly re le v a n t, to o ; i f

Theaetetus changes h is mind on t h i s p a ir of 'o p p o s ite s ', he may a lso
change h is mind on o th e rs.
61) At So.250c f f he argues t h a t Being, of i t s own n a tu re , n e ith e r
changes nor r e s t s , w ith th e im plicatio n t h a t i f Being were id e n tic a l to
Motion i t would move o f i t s own n a tu re ; c f . Reeve (1985) p51 f f fo r
o th e r examples. I t i s perhaps worth noting t h a t th e proposed so lu tio n
does not in one way breach th e s t r i c t u r e s of So.251d6, which ru le s out
Motion re s tin g [pantapasin], 'i n every w ay', and vice v ersa.

62) This in te r p r e ta tio n has th e advantage t h a t th e re i s no need to emend

th e t e x t a t t h i s p o in t, as Heindorf and Cornford f e e l th e need t o do
(See Cornford 1935 p286 n .3 ).
63) See Owen (1970) p 108 f f .

211
64) See S o.250e "Since being and not-being partake eq u ally in
p e rp le x ity , th e re i s now some hope t h a t i f one can be brought t o l ig h t
e ith e r dimly or c le a r ly , then so may th e o th e r".
65) See So.257b f f .

66 ) See So.254e f f , esp 256ab.

67) See So.250a f f .

68 ) See So.250e.

69) See So.255e f f .

70) See So.252c f f .
71) See e .g So.254bc.
72) Cornford (1935) p286/7 n.3 fo r in stan ce argues a g a in st o th er views
th a t "Reference t o e a r l ie r statem ents a sse rtin g t h a t Motion and R est a re
incom patible excludes such in te rp re ta tio n s " .

73) As Macxenzie (1986a) p i 50 n.67 has pointed out P lato may f o r e f f e c t

d e lib e ra te ly echo th e s ty le o f an e a r l i e r work.

74) See below on Owen's arguments about P la to 's confidence and th e

incidence o f h ia tu s .
75) One might ask why t h i s should be so however, e sp e c ia lly as th e Le.
i s so d if f e r e n t in conception, content and perhaps purpose from the
other supposedly l a t e works.
76) Cherniss (1957a) p344 gives th e follow ing fig u re s fo r th e incidence
o f h ia tu s , a l l fig u re s p er page o f th e Didot e d itio n . So. 0 .6 , P i t . 0 .4 ,
Tim. 1.1, C ri. 0 .8 , P lb .3 .7 , Le. 6 .7 . Other works include Rn.44.1, Lys.
46.0 (H ighest), Pdr. 23.9 (Lowest), Mnx. 28.2, w ith a t y p i c a l incidence
of 35-45 per page.
77) As Cherniss has argued (1957a) p344 f f th e Pdr. o v e ra ll does not
avoid h ia tu s in anything l ik e as marked a manner a s th e l a t e works, but
i t does so more in th e conversation than in th e s e t speeches. That means
t h a t th e fig u re f o r r e a l avoidance w ill be lower, and t h a t i t i s lik e ly
th a t h ia tu s avoidance i s a conscious c h a r a c te r is tic .

78) See Owen (1953) p316.

79) I fin d Owen's suggestion here p o ssib le b u t n o t convincing.

80) B illig gives th e folowing fig u re s S o .I 48.8%, S o .II 65.8%, P i t . I

70.7%, P i t . I I 52.0%, Tim.45.6%, C ri. 52.2%, Plb.78.2%, Le. 77.9%.
Brandwood gives Pm.37.5%, So. (o v era ll) 55.1%, and otherw ise agrees w ith
B illig .

81) Owen i s stra n g e ly s i l e n t on t h i s p o in t; I take i t t h a t he would

argue t h a t th e re i s no s ig n ific a n t d iffe re n c e between th e Rn. and Tim.
h ere, and i t i s only th e p o s itiv e use o f th e se rhyth ms t h a t m atter.
However a 12.5% d ev ia tio n from the 50% norm i s q u ite la rg e ; i f i t i s not
s ig n ific a n t i t throws doubt on how s ig n ific a n t th e o th er fig u re s a re ;

212
c f . Cherniss (1957a) p342/3.

82) In B i l l i g 's fig u re s S o.11 is 236c-260a, while S o .l i s th e r e s t , and

P l t . l i s th e work a s a vAole, P i t . 11 i s th e myth (268d8-274e4) on i t s
own (the fig u re fo r P i t . 11 is t h a t o f C herniss, working w ith B illig * s
c r i t e r i a ) . Brandwood (1958) p328 has shown t h a t B illig g re a tly
o v e rstated th e d iffe re n c e between th e two p a rts o f th e So, and should
n o t have separated them; h is fig u re s a re 52.6% and 58.3% fo r S o .l + 11.

83) See A ris to tle R hetoric 1409.

84) See Owen (1953) p314 and esp. p314 n .2 .
85) P rio r (1985) p183.
86 ) P rio r (1985) p192 n.29. Indeed, as P rio r arg u es, e f f o r ts to exclude
th e te c h n ic a l vocabulary o f th e Tim. may have created a r t i f i c i a l l y low
scores fo r th e Tim. in t h i s t e s t , although he notes t h a t L utoslavski
allowed fo r t h i s , and reached s u b s ta n tia lly th e same r e s u lts .
87) The synonyms a re :

1 [m echriper] a g a in st [heos(per)]
11 [k athaper] a g ain st [hosper]
111 [ontos] ag a in st [ to i o n ti]
IV [a le th o s ] ag a in st [hos a le th o s]
V [delon hos] ag a in st [delon h o ti ]
VI [e pos] ag ain st [e ou]

1 11 111 IV V VI

Republic 0% 3% 18% 20 % 4% 15%

Phaedrus 0% 13% 43% 13% 27% N/A
Parmenides 0% 0% N/A 0% N/A 20 %
The* beus 0% 4% 14% 11% 0% 0%

Sophist 25% 61% 95% 44%

67% 100%
P o litic u s 43% 69% 100% 100% 17% 100%
Timaeus 50% 66 % 100% 89% 80% N/A
C r itia s 50% 71% N/A N/A 100% N/A
Philebus 20 % 77% 100% 100% 38% 100%
Laws 50% 86 % 100% 100% 47% 100%

Their use in works before th e Rep. i s v ir tu a lly n e g lig ib le . The source

i s Mueller (1989) p i 2 f f , who has reform ulated th e work o f R itte r (1910)
p236/7. As Mueller comments, t h i s i s only a sm all proportion o f th e
evidence h ere.

8 8 ) Owen (1953) p314 n .5 , p316/7 contends t h a t P la to was conscious of

h is synonym usage and a lte r e d i t to s u i t v^en he adopted an 'e le v a te d '
s ty le ; th a t may be so fo r some synonyms, but a s comparison w ith th e
synonyms and th e above ta b le shows, i t i s n o t so f o r a l l .

89) Looking a t th e p a irs of synonyms, a p a rt from th e [e p o s ... e ou]

p a irin g they do n o t a f f e c t h ia tu s avoidance, and t h e i r i s no c o rre la tio n
of synonym usage and v a ria tio n s in prose rhythym.
90) See B illig (1920) p250 and Brandwood (1958) p398-400.

213
CEiAPTER NINE

In t h i s chapter I wish to tra c e another stra n d in th e development of

P la to ’s thought, t h i s tim e re la tin g to how numbers a re generated and
defined and how th e to o ls t h a t P lato employs here a re used in th e
o n to lo g ical a n a ly sis o f p h y sical e n t i t i e s . In s h o rt, th e second p a r t of
th e Parmenides sees th e germ ination o f some new mathematical ideas which
come f u lly to f r u itio n in th e Philebus. On t h is m atter I am la rg e ly
follow ing and in agreement w ith th e work of Sayre. ^ However, Sayre dates
th e Timaeus re la tiv e ly e a rly and sees i t playing no p a r t in the
2
development he tr a c e s . Here I s h a ll argue t h a t th e Timaeus p lay s an
irrportant ro le in t h i s sto ry and th a t Sayre i s wrong concerning a key
element in h is in te rp re ta tio n o f th e Philebus.
The Philebus seems q u ite happy w ith th e notion t h a t we can have
some s o r t o f knowledge o f th e world around u s, although perhaps not th e
b e s t s o r t . I t i s irrportant to understand what i t i s about th e Philebus
th a t allow s fo r such optimism. I s h a ll argue t h a t th e Timaeus, though i t
does not make th e same o v e rt coirments as th e P hilebus, contains th e same
b a sis fo r optimismabovtthe p o s s ib ility of knowledge o f th e n a tu ra l world.
Both a re engaged in a p ro je c t of reform ulating Pythagorean notions of
how mathematics r e la te s to th e n a tu ra l world, and th e Philebus a p p lie s
th e advances o f th e Timaeus to p e rc e p tib le q u a litie s as w ell a s to
bodies. I a ls o a tte irp t to draw to g eth er th e th read s of th e
in te r p r e ta tio n o f th e Timaeus th a t I have been arguing fo r f o r th e l a s t
four ch ap ters in re la tio n to chapter f o u r 's arguments concerning i t s
s tru c tu re and purpose.

Sayre has argued t h a t one o f th e purposes o f th e second p a r t o f th e

Parmenides i s to argue a g a in st E le a tic strong monism and fo r a modified
Pythagorean ontology.^ From Parmenides 137c on, we a re presented w ith
e ig h t hypotheses concerning u n ity , [hen]. Sayre considers th e re t o be
two d if f e r e n t types of u n ity in p lay in th e se hypotheses. The u n ity
considered by hypotheses 1 and 6 i s [me p o lla a l i a hen auto e in a i]
(137d2), 'n o t many but one in i t s e l f '. ^ He tak es t h i s to mean t h a t t h i s
u n ity e x is ts in and by i t s e l f w ithout r e la tio n o r referen ce to

214
anything e ls e . I f so, then th e consequences drawn from hypotheses 1 and
6 re a d ily follow . ^ The u n ity considered by hypotheses 2 and 5 on th e
o th er hand i s sa id to have being [ousiaS .. metechein] (142b6),^ and so
has r e la tio n s t o o th er th in g s . The u n ity which perm its no re la tio n s
appears to have a f f i n i t i e s w ith th e One o f Parmenides' poem.^ However,
th e consequences t h a t a re drawn from th e e x iste n ce o f such a u n ity are
h ig h ly damaging fo r th e 'way of t r u th p o sitio n '.®
According to hypotheses 1 and 6 , vAether t h i s u n ity e x is ts o r n o t,
i t has no c h a r a c te r is tic s , such t h a t in c o n tra d ic tio n t o th e p ro h ib itio n
of Parmenides' poem,^ ' i t i s ' i s no more th in k ab le or a su b je c t fo r
in v e s tig a tio n than ' i t i s n o t '. F u rth e r, vÆiether t h i s u n ity i s o r i s
n o t, according to hypotheses 4 and 8 o th er th in g s have no c h arac ters
e ith e r , even apparently. So con trary to Parmenides' poem, o th e r th in g s
a re in d istin g u ish a b le from th e one.^®
P lato a ls o appears to tak e care to deny th a t t h i s one can have any
o f th e c h a r a c te r is tic s th a t Parmenides' poem accords to i t . Hypothesis 1
argues, in th e follow ing o rd er, th a t t h i s one cannot be c h a ra c te rise d by
lim it, shape, p lac e, motion, sameness o r o th ern ess, s im ila rity or
d is s im ila r ity , e q u a lity or in e q u a lity , or tem poral o rd e r. P la to 's
Parmenides then argues t h a t as we cannot a sc rib e p a s t, p re se n t or fu tu re
to t h i s u n ity , i t cannot p artake in being. This being so, he concludes
" I t cannot be named nor accounted fo r nor opined nor known, and
1?
nothing can perceive i t " . (Pm.142a)
Sayre a ls o argues t h a t th e second p a rt o f th e Parmenides defends
two Pythagorean th e se s, t h a t u n ity generates number and t h a t number is
13
in some way c o n s titu tiv e o f se n sib le th in g s . This can perhaps be b e st
seen in hypothesis 2, to which Parmenides moves a f t e r th e breakdown of
hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 begins from th e assumption t h a t i f u n ity
e x is ts , i t p arta k es in being (Pm.142bc). Granted t h i s , Parmenides then
attem pts to show th a t nothing stands in th e way of th e e x isten ce of
number. He argues t h a t i f u n ity e x is ts , i t must partak e of being which
i s not th e same as u n ity i t s e l f (142b6). Hence th e e x is tin g th in g has
two c o n s titu e n ts , u n ity and being. As a p a ir , each o f th e se i s one, and
n e ith e r i s lacking in [apoleipesthon] (142e1) being. Thus each
c o n stitu e n t o f u n ity has two c o n s titu e n ts , u n ity and being, each of
which w ill have two c o n stitu e n ts , and so ad in fin itu m . Thus an [apeiron
p leth o s] 143a2), an 'unlim ited m u ltitu d e ' i s generated. This i s n o t y e t
a number s e rie s though, as each th in g t h a t i s generated lack s u n ity ,
fo rev e r becoming two (142eS).

215
 Parmenides then makes a fre s h s t a r t , in which he t r e a t s both u n ity
and being a s u n itie s (143ab). T heir e x iste n ce though re q u ire s a th ir d
th in g , d iffe re n c e , by v irtu e o f which th ey a re d if f e r e n t from each
o th e r. I f we speak o f any p a ir o f th e s e , we speak o f them as both and so
as two. I f th ese th in g s a re two, then each of them must be one. By
a d d itio n o f another one t o a p a ir , i t becomes a threesome. According to
Parmenides i f th e re a re two u n its then th e re i s tw ice, and i f th re e then
t h r ic e . With th e o p eration of m u ltip lic a tio n he b e liev e s he can produce
any number ( " If th in g s a re so , do you b eliev e t h a t any number could be
l e f t out ?" (Pm.144a2)) . Thus he concludes " If u n ity e x is ts , th ere
must a ls o be number" (Pm.144a4).
Hypothesis 2 has considerably more t o say though, fo r Parmenides
proceeds t o argue t h a t a l l o f th e c h a r a c te r is tic s th a t were denied to
th e u n ity of hypothesis 1 can be applied to th e products of th e u n ity
t h a t p a rta k es in being o f hypothesis 2. As th ese a re the q u a litie s th a t
c h a ra c te rise s p a tio / temporal e n t i t i e s , i t seems t h a t t h i s u n ity not
only gen erates numbers b u t a ls o th e p o s s ib ility o f s p a tio / temporal
e n t i t i e s . There i s here then a two pronged a tta c k on th e c e n tra l te n e t
of Parmenides' poem. F ir s tly , i t i s argued t h a t th e e x iste n ce o f th e one
p o stu lated by Parmenides' poem i s in d istin g u ish a b le from i t s
n o n -ex istence. Secondly, nothing t h a t i s a ttr ib u te d by th e poem t o t h i s
one can be c o n s is te n tly m aintained, not even t h a t t h i s one e x is ts . The
problem posed by th e second p a r t o f th e Parmenides t o anyone defending
th e stro n g monism of Parmenides ' poem i s t h a t th ey can n e ith e r deny th a t
u n ity e x is ts , thus denying i t any c h a r a c te r is tic s , nor a s s e r t t h a t i t
does e x is t w ithout allow ing th e p o s s ib ilty of in d e f in ite ly many numbers
and se n sib le th in g s . As Sayre p u ts i s ,
" If th e arguments a re sound, in o th er words, i t has been shown t h a t
th e E le a tic s a re n e c e ssa rily wrong and th e Pythagoreans might j u s t be
r ig h t.
However, th e re was a fu rth e r d i f f ic u lt y fo r th e Pythagorean programme,
t h a t o f incom m ensurability. Sayre a ls o argues t h a t sig n s of E u c lid 's
g en eral th eory of p ro p o rtio n s, ^^ which i s ap p lica b le t o both
commensurable and incommensurable numbers a lik e , and vÆiose discovery i s
a ttr ib u te d to Eudoxus, may be found in th e Parmenides a t 140c. He
comments th a t
"The c lo se p a r a lle l between Eudoxus' d e fin itio n o f p ro p o rtio n al
magnitudes and Dedekind's d e fin itio n of r a tio n a l numbers has been noted
1fi
by se v e ra l h is to ria n s o f m athem atics."

216
Sayre sees considerable sig n ific a n c e in t h i s fo r th e Philebus, and I
s h a ll argue t h a t in a d d itio n t h i s i s in p o rta n t fo r th e in te rp r e ta tio n of
th e s ta tu s o f th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s in th e Timaeus. F i r s t l y , though,
l e t us look a t th e p o s itio n o f th e Philebus.

II

According to Sayre, some o f th e views t h a t P la to expresses in th e second

p a r t o f th e Parmenides a re taken up and developed in th e Philebus, as
20
w ell a s, more c o n je c tu ra lly , P la to 's Lecture on th e Good. S ayre's
hypothesis i s t h a t th e [apeiron p leth o s] v^ich was used t o generate
numbers in th e Parmenides becomes th e more general [apeiron] of th e
P h ileb u s, which under A r i s t o t le 's d e sc rip tio n i s th e in d e fin ite dyad or
21
th e 'g re a t and (the) s m a ll'. On t h i s hypothesis se n sib le th in g s a re
c o n stitu te d from th e [apeiron] and th e Forms. Lacking a re la tio n s h ip to
th e Forms, se n sib le th in g s would be 'u n lim ite d ' both in th e sense of
being innumerably many and being w ithout c h a ra c te r and l im it. This
d u a lity in th e sense of 'u n lim ited ' is a ls o to be found in r e la tio n to
22
th e [apeiron p leth o s] o f th e Parmenides.
The 'godly method' i s then th e method of c o lle c tio n and d iv isio n
expounded in th e P o litic u s and Sophist in conjunction w ith th e
o n to lo g ical tr a d itio n mentioned a t 16c9-10, t h a t th in g s a re c o n stitu te d
from th e one and many, and from th e unlim ited and l im i t. 23 One advantage
of S a y re 's a n a ly sis i s th a t we can give th e same in te rp r e ta tio n to
[apeiron] a t 15b5, 16d6, 16d7, 16e1, 16e2 and 17a2, th a t of in d e fin ite ly
many sin g le th in g s . Another i s t h a t th e godly method now d eals w ith the
c o rre c t 'one and many' problem, of how such u n itie s a s man, ox, beauty
o r th e good, while n o t adm itting g eneration and d e stru c tio n , can
n ev erth eless have p a rtic ip a n ts t h a t do indeed c h a n g e . A fu rth e r
stre n g th of S ay re's view i s t h a t i t accounts f o r th e otherw ise puzzling
remarks both o f A ris to tle and o th e r subsequent coirroentators on th e
Philebus and on P la to 's notorious L ecture on th e Good. Sayre argues th a t
many of th e th eses a ttr ib u te d to P la to by A ris to tle and subsequent
coirmentators, vdiich a re absen t from th e e a rly and middle period works,
can be found in th e Philebus on h is account, thus c u ttin g much of th e
2S
ground from under th e 'e s o t e r i c i s t ' p o s itio n s .
The key p o in t on which G osling, Sayre and iryself a re in agreement,
a g a in st th e view th a t lim it and unlim ited a re a precursor o f A r is to tle 's
form and m atter, or th e view t h a t th e unlim ited i s a s e t of

217
concepts y i s t h a t [to apeiron] i s a general term fo r a range of
phenomena t h a t can be construed in terms o f a mathem atical continuum,
while th e [peras] or lim it determ ines a s p e c if ic p o sitio n on t h a t
continuum.^® According to Philebus 25a a l l th in g s which admit o f 'more
o r l e s s ' a re t o be placed in 'th e sin g le group o f th e u n lim ite d ' , while
everything t h a t 'r e la te s a s number t o number o r measure t o measure' come
under lim it.
The fundamental p o in t of disagreement between Gosling and Sayre
concerns th e c o n s titu tio n o f p h y sical o b je c ts . According to G osling,
P lato in th e Philebus i s concerned w ith th e development of
m athem atically based [technai] and not w ith th e c o n s titu tio n of
o b je c ts .A c c o r d i n g to Sayre, p a rtic u la r o b je c ts come in to being by an
in te ra c tio n of lim it on th e unlim ited, both being o n to lo g ical
principles. Let us consider th e p o sitio n o f th e Timaeus re la tiv e to
th e Philebus on these m atters. Here I s h a ll argue f o r a p o sitio n which
combines asp ec ts of both of th ese views and gives a reasonable account
31
of P la to 's development.
The Parmenides and th e Philebus in conjunction might be argued to
have an account of numbers, of geom etrical e n t i t i e s and o f the
p ro p e rtie s t h a t bodies may have. What they do n o t have i s an account of
p h y sic al body in i t s e l f , o f how i t might be generated, of whether i t has
p h y sic ally in d iv is ib le minimal p a r ts , and i f i t does how th ese might
combine to g e th e r to make up th e physical world as we know i t . These
q u estio n s, I suggest, a re th e province o f th e Timaeus, which answers th e
q u estio n concerning th e generation o f p h y sical bodies in a manner th a t
32
accords w ith th e Philebus.
As we have seen, numbers a re produced by th e p a rtic ip a tio n o f th e
g re a t and th e sm all in u n ity , and a re unique lim its on a continuum.
Given t h a t , as Sayre fre e ly adm its, we can then generate geom etrical
e n t i t i e s . I f we tak e two numbers on th e continuum, we can then d efine
a l in e o f s p e c ific len g th and so we have extension. I f we develop t h is
in to two dimensions we a re then ab le t o generate a l l th e plane fig u re s ,
in to th re e and we can generate a l l o f th e s o lid s . Now, i f i t were
p o ssib le to generate p hysical ra th e r than a b s tr a c t plane fig u re s we
would a r r iv e a t a p o in t vÆiere th e Timaeus could ta k e over w ith an
account of how th e ph y sical world i s c o n stitu te d from two s p e c ific types
o f plane fig u re s , th e scalene and 1505c e le s s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s . Here we
might remember t h a t a t 53de th e Timaeus was ra th e r coy about th e

218
[arch ai] of th e s to ic h e ic t r i a n g l e s . I argued in chapter seven t h a t
t h i s does n o t n e c e ssa rily mean t h a t th e re a re fu rth e r more fundamental
p h y sical c o n stitu e n ts of th e se tr ia n g le s , and i t would seem t h a t a t
th e end o f a n a ly sis by p h y sical decoirposition P la to envisages some
te le o lo g ic a l explan atio n s. I t may a ls o be th e case t h a t th e re a re some
fu rth e r m athem atical/ o n to lo g ical [archai] t h a t r e la te t o th e sto ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s . At Timaeus 53b we a re to ld th a t when th e demiurge o rders th e
universe from i t s prim ordial chaos, a s itu a tio n where a l l t h a t i s in i t
i s devoid o f 'reason and m easure' [alogos k a i am etros] (53a9), he
'b rin g s f o r th an arrangement by means of Forms and numbers [e id e si te
k ai arithmovs] (53b5).^^ Note th e s im ila r ity of language here w ith th e
key passage a t Philebus 25a concerning lim it and unlim ited. There a re
of course d iffe re n c e s between generating a b s tra c t geom etrical fig u re s
and producing a c tu a l sto ic h e ic tr ia n g le s , and here th e rec ep ta cle o f th e
Timaeus may play an im portant p a r t. As we have seen e a r l i e r , the
recep tacle i s e n tir e ly c h a ra c te rle s s, and under one view i s an amorphous
s u b s tra te . I t s c h a ra c terlessn e ss may w ell imply t h a t i t i s a continuum,
as d isc re te n e ss would allow us to p o in t t o d if f e r e n t p a r ts . That may
mean t h a t th e demiurge, vAen he a c ts w ith 'id e a s and num bers', can c u t
up th e rec ep ta cle in th e same way th a t a number lin e can be c u t, and so,
although th e s p e c ific term inology i s n o t used in th e Timaeus, imposes
lim it on th e unlim ited in a manner t h a t i s analogous to th e Philebus. I t
i s worth noting here t h a t Sim plicius in h is commentary on th e Physics
c ite s A ris to tle in h is rep o rt o f P la to 's Lecture on th e good as saying
t h a t th e g re a t and th e s n a il was m atter. We saw in th e l a s t se c tio n th a t
what A ris to tle term s 'th e g re a t and th e sm a ll' i s very lik e ly to be th e
[apeiron] o f th e Philebus, and we have seen to o th e c lo se lin k s between
t h i s work and th e Lecture on th e Good. I f we a ls o remember t h a t
A r is to tle tre a te d th e rec ep ta cle a s prime m atter, as did P la to 's
3ft
companion Hermodorus and many o th e rs, then we have th e equation t h a t
(in one case a t le a s t) th e recep tacle = m atter = [to apeiron] = th e
g re a t and th e sm all. This i s not t o say th a t th e unlim ited i s id e n tic a l
to th e re c ep ta cle; ra th e r, one way o f using th e l i m i t / unlim ited
a n a ly sis i s to t r e a t th e rec ep ta cle a s an unlim ited continuum and to
generate p h y sical bodies from t h i s . Another i s t o t r e a t p a ir s of
a ttr ib u te s of bodies (e.g h o t te r / colder) as continua t h a t may be given
a determ inate value (e.g a tem perature) by th e im position of lim it.
I f t h i s i s so, and th e demiurge can d ivide up th e continuous

219
su b s tra te by means o f P la to 's version o f a Dedekind c u t, then i t may
ex p lain why th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s a re p e rfe c tly tria n g u la r . We might
expect, given th e model o f p a rtic ip a tio n used in th e R e p u b l i c , t h a t i f
th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s a re 'im ages' o f the 'r e a l ' tr ia n g le t h a t they
should be d e fic ie n tly tria n g u la r , y e t th e re i s no suggestion o f t h i s in
th e T i m a e u s . S o perhaps then one o f th e ta s k s of th e Timaeus i s to
in v e s tig a te th e p o s s ib ility o f imposing lim it on a continuum of
amorphous m atter th u s generating s p e c ific a lly shaped ph y sical e n t i t i e s
which a c t a s p hysical sto ich e a, and fu rth e r to see i f such a hypothesis
i s powerful enough to be e x p la n a to rily adequate fo r v ir tu a lly a l l
p h y sical phenomena.

Ill

I f t h i s assessment o f th e Timaeus i s c o rre c t, then i t has considerable

im p licatio n s fo r our view of th e Philebus. F i r s t l y , i t i s c le a r t h a t in
th e Timaeus at l e a s t th e precursors of lim it and unlim ited do have
something to do w ith th e c o n s titu tio n o f o b je c ts , a t a more fundamental
le v e l than th e fo u r element theory o r even th e theory o f sto ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s . I t i s im portant to note here t h a t th e Philebus a t 29a f f
su b scrib es t o th e fo u r element theory; a l l p h y sical th in g s a re made up
of e a rth , a i r f i r e and w ater. I f th e Philebus d ir e c tly succeeds th e
Timaeus, a s seems lik e ly , then i t i s q u ite p o ssib le t h a t i t subsumes th e
Timaeus' a n a ly sis of th e u ltim ate c o n s titu tio n o f th e four elem ents.
F u rth er, as Sayre has pointed o u t,^^ th e re a re fiv e passages (Plb.16c,
25e, 26d, 27 and 27b) which seem to s t a te e x p lic itly th a t lim it and
unlim ited a re c o n s titu tiv e o f p h y sical th in g s, and so G osling's p o sitio n
cannot be e n tir e ly c o rre c t.
However, t h is a n a ly sis of th e Timaeus a ls o generates considerable
d i f f i c u l t i e s fo r S a y re 's p o s itio n . According to him, th e o n to lo g ical
account o f th e Philebus i s more b a sic than t h a t o f th e four element
th eo ry , th e fo u r elements being c o n stitu te d from th e unlim ited and th e
Forms, and i f we use th e four elements in ex p lan atio n s, t h is i s akin to
c itin g say, molecules ra th e r than primary atomic p a r tic le s in modern
p h y sical ex planations.^^ The d i f f ic u lt y here concerns how lim it and
unlim ited go to make up th e four elem ents. Sayre ta k e s th e view t h a t in
th e Philebus, sen sib le th in g s a re no more than an 'assemblage of
q u a l i t i e s ', which do n o t inhere in any body, and th ese q u a litie s a re
c o n stitu te d from lim it and u n l i m i t e d . T h e Timaeus p o s itio n , and one

220
th a t I s h a ll argue t h a t we can p ro fita b ly read in to th e Philebus as
w e ll, i s t h a t in one case th e unlim ited i s an amorphous su b s tra te ( i . e
th e recep tacle) which i s divided in to s to ic h e ic tria n g le s by th e
im position of lim it (by th e demiurge ). Those tr ia n g le s then have
p ro p e rtie s which can be explained in term s of t h e i r s tru c tu re and
motion. So how, using S a y re's scheme, would we analyse th e element f i r e ,
fo r exanple ? Sayre notes t h a t P lato does not give us much help w ith
t h i s problem, and says
"The manner presumably i s not f a r removed from t h a t in which Man
(and Stone, and any liv in g th in g ) i s sa id a t T heaetetus 157c1-2 t o be an
assemblage o f se n sib le q u a l i t i e s " .^5
So a p a r t i c l e o f f i r e can be described a s h o t, having a s p e c ific
ten p e ratu re on th e unlim ited sc a le o f h o t t e r / c o ld e r, and a ls o a s having
len g th , b readth, depth and weight, e tc in th e same m a n n e r . I s f i r e
though merely an assemblage o f i t s q u a litie s fo r P lato ?
My f i r s t objectio n to Sayre i s t h a t i t i s by no means c le a r t h a t
th e p o s itio n ou tlin ed Theaetetus 157c i s one th a t P lato subscribes to .
I t i s p a r t o f th e combined Protagoras - H eraclitu s - Theaetetus p o sitio n
developed to support th e contention th a t knowledge i s p erception.
D irec tly a f t e r th e passage t h a t Sayre c i t e s , th e re i s a passage fa m ilia r
from my d iscu ssio n of P la to 's IVîP in chapter one;
So "These views, T heaetetus, do they seem p lea sa n t t o you, and do you
fin d t h e i r t a s t e g ra tify in g ?
Th " I, a t l e a s t , d o n 't know, S ocrates. For I am not ab le t o understand
you, v^ether you say th e se th in g s from your own b e lie f o r to t e s t me."
So "You fo rg e t, ny frie n d , th a t I know nothing o f th e se th in g s and nor
do I claim any o f them as my own, as I am barren o f th e o rie s , being
merely a midwife singing over you, providing fo r you so th a t you may
t a s t e fo r y o u rse lf each o f th e th e o rie s o f th e w ise, u n t il I can help
lead your own opinion o u t in to th e l ig h t ." (Tht.157c)
Furthermore, a t T heaetetus 157b f f , d ir e c tly before S a y re 's passage and
c r i t i c a l to i t s n a tu re , we a re given views which both th e Philebus and
Timaeus would r e je c t, a s they subscribe t o th e notion of [genesis e is
ousian], namely t h a t th e re i s no being and t h a t everything i s in a s t a te
o f becoming.
Secondly, we ought to consider th e follow ing q u estio n . Are we to
e x p lain h o t and cold in terms o f th e presence o r absence o f f i r e , o r in
term s of a determ ination o f a continuum o f h o tte r and co ld er ? Here we

221
might th in k back to th e Phaedo and my chapter two. To say th a t something
i s h o t because i t possesses a high score on a tem perature sc a le looks
su sp icio u sly lik e th e 's a f e answer* of th e Phaedo, where something i s
h o t because i t p a rtic ip a te s in th e hot.^®
The Timaeus, on th e o th er hand, gives us th e 'c le v e r answer ' , th a t
h eat depends on th e presence o f f i r e . F u rth er, th e Timaeus goes on to
ex p la in how i t i s t h a t f i r e produces h e a t in terms o f th e s tru c tu re and
motion of th e f i r e atom. I f we g e n e ra lise , th e p o sitio n o f th e Timaeus
i s t h a t th e q u a litie s we perceiv e can be analysed in term s o f the
s tru c tu re and motions of p a r tic le s .
A fu rth e r problem w ith S ay re's account i s t h a t he does not consider
p h y sical e n t i t i e s in c o n tra s t to se n sib le e n t i t i e s . We have seen t h a t
th e Timaeus d istin g u ish e s between se n sib le o b je c ts and those which while
p h y sical a re below th e th resh o ld o f human p ercep tio n . I f , as I have
suggested th e Philebus eitploys th e four element theory, a s in d iv id u al
u n its of th ose elements a re iirp e rce p tib le, then th e re a re ph y sical and
im perceptible e n t i t i e s in th e P h i l e b u s . S a y r e ' s view i s th a t
p e rc e p tib le e n t i t i e s a re assemblages o f p e rc e p tib le q u a litie s . I t is
d i f f i c u l t t o see how one might amend S ayre's view to accommodate
im perceptible e n t i t i e s w ithout giving more substance to those e n t i t i e s
than Sayre would wish to allow .
F in a lly , another problem fo r Sayre i s t h a t A r is to tle , on whose
evidence Sayre r e l i e s stro n g ly in oth er m atters, a ls o in te r p r e ts the
g re a t and th e sm all as being m a t t e r . A defence fo r Sayre here might be
t h a t A r is to tle i s imposing h is own categ o ries on P la to in h is
in te r p r e ta tio n , but f i r s t l y t h i s evidence i s intertw in ed w ith oth er
evidence about P la to 's l a t e views th a t Sayre a cc ep ts, and secondly
A r i s t o t le 's in te rp re ta tio n a c tu a lly seems q u ite reasonable r e la tiv e to
P la to 's d isc u ssio n o f th e rec ep ta cle in th e Timaeus.
I t would seem then th a t we need t o c o n stru ct a p o s itio n between
th o se o f Gosling and Sayre, and t h i s I suggest would go a s follow s. The
Philebus tak es over th e a n a ly sis o f th e c o n s titu tio n o f p h y sic al bodies
from th e Timaeus, th e unlim ited ( i . e recep tacle = amorphous s u b s tra te )
combining w ith lim it ( i . e Forms and numbers) to produce th e sto ic h e ic
tria n g le s which then combine to from th e four elem ents common to both
th e Timaeus and P hilebus. Contra Gosling lim it and unlim ited a re then in
a way c o n s titu tiv e o f p h y sical e n t i t i e s , contra Sayre th e se e n t i t i e s
have body and a re no mere assemblage o f q u a litie s . One o f th e ta sk s of

222
th e Timaeus/ I have suggested, i s to in v e s tig a te th e p o s s ib lity t h a t th e
u ltim ate p h y sical c o n stitu e n ts o f th e universe a re amenable to p re c ise
mathematical a n a ly sis. The ta s k of th e Philebus may be t o tak e th e
fu rth e r ste p o f in v e stig a tin g ways in which th e q u a litie s o f those
bodies and th e phenomena which we perceive may a ls o be amenable t o t h i s
s o r t o f a n a l y s i s . T h i s tim e we t r e a t each rele v an t q u a lity as a
continuum which v^en i t in te r a c ts w ith l im it produces a p re c is e ,
measurable q u a n tity .
This i s im portant because o f th e [technai] t h a t can be based on
t h i s p re c isio n . E a rlie r in t h i s th e s is I was c r i t i c a l of P la to because
i t appeared t h a t while he was in te re s te d in th e m athém atisation of
n atu re, he was n o t in te re s te d in e ith e r th e m athém atisation o f science
or th e q u a n tific a tio n o f phenomena. I f I am c o rre c t h e re , however, i t
would seem t h a t in th e Philebus, a t l e a s t a t a th e o r e tic a l le v e l he is
in te re s te d in providing a b a sis fo r both.^S philebus 55e t e l l s us t h a t
i f we a b stra c te d a l l th e mathematical content from a [techne], a l l we
would be l e f t w ith would be [em peiria], an em pirical knack learned by
e x p e r i e n c e . P h i l e b u s 56a f f p ra is e s those [technai] which employ
number and measurement a g a in st those which eirploy guesswork, and
considers them to be c lo s e r to th e tr u th . E a rlie r in th e Gorgias P lato
had reckoned t h a t i t was th e possession o f a ' r a tio n a l account' th a t
d istin g u ish ed a [techne] from mere [ e m p e i r i a ] H e r e we see something
which in th e next chapter I s h a ll argue i s ty p ic a l of P la to 's l a t e r
development, which i s a g re a te r mathematical o rie n ta tio n in
explanation.^® This i s not to suggest t h a t th e e a r l i e r account excluded
mathematics o r t h a t th e l a t e r excludes more d isc u rsiv e accounts, the
su b je ct m atter helping to determine what i s a p p ro p ria te , but ra th e r
th e re i s a s ig n ific a n t change of emphasis.
Running through Philebus 55e f f i s one o f th e key themes o f the
l a t e r works, th e analogue o f number/ th in g s t h a t have number a g a in st
geom etrical paradigm/ re p re se n ta tio n as th e c e n tra l metaphor fo r
p a rtic ip a tio n , th a t may provide th e b a sis fo r t h i s change o f emphasis. 60
That we now have a means o f p re c is e ly quantifying q u a litie s i s an
advance over th e Timaeus, where i t might be argued th a t only m atter and
motion could be so q u a n tifie d . The Philebus then perhaps extends the
range o f [to lo g is tik o n ], th e th in g s amenable to rea so n / calculation.® ^
A fu rth e r asp ect of P la to 's thought in th e Timaeus which f i t s in to
th e programme o f development from th e second h a lf of th e Parmenides to

223
the Philebus i s th e question o f i r r a tio n a l numbers and measurement. The
Pythagoreans tr e a te d geometry a rith m e tic a lly , by attem pting t o t r e a t
geom etrical problems as p a rt of th e theory of n a tu ra l numbers, th a t i s
as numbers composed o f in d iv is ib le m o n a d s . ^2 Thus every geom etrical
length ought t o be e x p re ssib le a s th e r a t i o o f two n a tu ra l numbers. I f
th ese numbers rep resen t a len g th , then i f we ask how long something i s ,
ra th e r than measure th e d istan c e we count th e number of monadic lengths
involved. So to o , according to A ris to tle th e Pythagoreans tre a te d
p h y sical e n t i t i e s a s in some way c o n stitu te d out o f n u m b e r . T h e g re a t
problem f o r th ese p ro je c ts , as noted in se c tio n one o f t h i s ch ap ter,
comes w ith th e discovery of th e i r r a t i o n a l i t y of th e square ro o t of two,
fo r here we have a number/ len g th t h a t cannot be expressed a s a r a t i o of
two n a tu ra l numbers, or a s a m ultip le o f a monadic l e n g t h . T h a t P lato
was aware o f t h i s fo r not only lengths bu t f o r a re a s and volumes to o is
made c le a r by th e A thenian's e x p lic it comments a t Laws 819d f f . ^ ^
I t has been argued, most notably by Popper, th a t in response to
th e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f th e Pythagorean programme P la to advocated
geom etrical ra th e r than a rith m e tic a l means fo r th e d e sc rip tio n and
explanation o f th e world. The p a r t o f th e Timaeus in t h i s was of
proposing a s p e c if ic a lly geom etrical atomism. As i f to emphasise th e
overcoming o f th e d i f f i c u l t i e s dogging th e Pythagoreans, th e sto ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s have sid e s of root two and ro o t th re e . I f I am c o rre c t about
how they a re generated, one can c le a r ly see th e importance o f th e new
conception o f number and th e number lin e t h a t germ inates in th e
Parmenides and comes to f r u itio n in th e Timaeus and P hilebus. I f the
demiurge has P la to 's version o f a Dedekind c u t a v a ila b le when he div id es
up th e re c e p ta c le / s u b s tra te in to sto ic h e ic tr ia n g le s , th e re i s no
reason why he should not employ ir r a tio n a l numbers.
I t may a ls o be th e case th a t E u c lid 's elem ents were more than an
e x ercise in pure geometry, and were intended as an organon o f th e
P la to n ic c o s m o s . P r o c l u s for in stan ce comments t h a t
"Some have thought t h a t th e su b je ct m atter o f th e various books [of
Euclid] p e rta in s to th e cosmos, and th a t they a re intended to help us in
our contem plation o f, and th e o rizin g about, th e universe.
Popper comments t h a t one of P la to 's main c o n trib u tio n s i s th a t
"Ever sin c e , but not b efore, geometry (ra th e r than a rith m e tic )
appears a s th e fundamental instrum ent o f a l l p h y sic al explanations and
d e sc rip tio n s , in th e theory of m atter a s w ell as cosmology.

224
I t i s a ls o notable t h a t P lato gives us a s p e c if ic a lly mathematical
d e sc rip tio n o f a f i n i t e and sm all number o f types o f atom, and attem pts
to ex p lain t h e i r phy sical p ro p e rtie s (the h e a t o f f i r e atoms, e tc ) in
term s o f t h e i r mathematical p ro p e rtie s (acuteness o f angles, e tc ) , in
d is tin c tio n to th e 'hooks and e y e s' men.^^ P lato a ls o p o stu la te s t h a t
th e s e atoms w ill decompose in to a sm all number o f u ltim ate p hysical
c o n s titu e n ts . This i s an idea t h a t has taken over two m ille n ia t o come
to f r u itio n , a s th e corpuscularians o f th e s c i e n t i f i c rev o lu tio n revived
th e hooks and eyes th eo ry , ra th e r than P la to 's .

IV

In chapter seven, having discussed th e r e la tio n o f th e s ta tu s o f th e

sto ic h e ic tria n g le s to th e s o r t of thin k in g th a t th e world soul does, 1
commented t h a t th e re was more to be sa id on th e su b je c t o f th e re la tio n
of th e world souis thinking to th e natu re o f th e re c e p ta c le . Having seen
how th e recep tacle may be re la te d to th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s and th e
phenomena t h a t occur in i t , l e t us tak e up th e d iscu ssio n again.
I t might be argued th a t P lato p re se n ts us w ith four d if f e r e n t views
of th e c o n s titu tio n o f ph y sical e n t i t i e s in th e Timaeus. F i r s t l y , i f we
t r e a t th e passage concerning th e co n stru ctio n o f th e world soul as
ta lk in g about ontology, as w ell as m etaphorically about th e in n ate
mental a b i l i t i e s o f th e world so u l, then we have a m ixture læ d el. The
world soul i s made up of a m ixture o f being, sameness and d iffe re n c e , 71
and we might be intended to extend t h i s t o th e world in general and to
o th er q u a litie s as w ell.^ ^ The demiurge might then a c t on th e world in
73
th e same way a s he makes th e world soul t o c re a te o th er phenomena.
Phenomena would then simply be c o lle c tio n s o f q u a litie s , some p a r t of
t h i s m ixture marked o ff in some way, w ithout inhering in any m atter or
any su b je c t.
An analogous p o sitio n i s th e one defended by Cornford.^^ According
to him, th e rec ep ta cle should n o t be considered t o be m atter, b u t i s
merely th e place in which q u a litie s occur, 'a s f le e tin g images a re seen
in a m ir r o r '.75 The phenomen a again a re mere bundles of q u a litie s which
have no su b je c t and do n o t inhere in anything.
We might compare th ese models w ith th e combined Theaetetus -
Protagoras - H erac litu s p o sitio n o f th e T heaetetus, where th e re is
nothing t h a t holds phenomena to g e th e r. That i s a p o sitio n t h a t 1 have
suggested P la to r e je c ts , and he again ra is e s d i f f i c u l t i e s fo r i t h e r e . 75
I f th e changing th in g s th a t we see a re no more than

225
c o lle c tio n s o f q u a li t ie s , a l l o f which a re su b je c t t o change, th en , as
we saw in chapter seven we can make no id e n tify in g referen ces and so
discu ssio n o f th e p hysical realm i s prone t o c o lla p s e . There must be
something we can r e f e r t o as 'th is * , ra th e r than having t o r e f e r to
everything as 'su ch lik e* . So perhaps C ornford's view i s an advance on
th e m ixture model, w ith th e rec ep ta cle as th e referem t of 't h i s *.
One might a ls o th in k back to another a sp ect o f my e a r l ie r
d iscu ssio n o f th e world Soul. There I suggested t h a t th e b a s is f o r the
s o r t of th in k in g th a t th e world soul does a re statem ents of id e n tity and
p re d ic a tio n . We have seen to o t h a t th e world so u l can have knowledge as
w ell as tru e and s ta b le o p i n i o n s . N o w , i f th e s tru c tu re o f our
knowledge and tr u e opinions i s in some way isomorphic w ith th e s tru c tu re
of th e world, then i t may be t h a t th e world i s stru c tu re d in an o b je c t/
p ro p erty manner t h a t a d is tin c tio n o f s u b je c t/ p re d ic a te r e f l e c t s . One
of th e problems w ith th e two models we have seen so f a r i s t h a t th ey do
n o t allow fo r th e world to be so stru c tu re d ; th e re a re simply
c o lle c tio n s o f q u a li t ie s , but n o t o b je c ts which have p ro p e rtie s . I t i s
d i f f i c u l t , on both o f these models, to see what i t i s t h a t holds a
c o lle c tio n o f q u a litie s to g eth er to make i t a d e fin ite phenomenon; and
i f th e re a re no d e f in ite phenomena, then any proper d iscu ssio n o f th e
p h y sical world w ill be prone to c o lla p se .
The t h ir d model t h a t i s suggested by th e Timaeus might be thought
to tak e some o f th ese p o in ts up, and give us a s u b s tr a te / a ttr ib u te view
to match th e world sou3?s s u b je c t/ p re d ic a te th in k in g . I f we consider th e
recep tacle t o be an amorphous s u b s tra te , as i s suggested by the
metaphors employed a t Timaeus 50c-51b, then p ro p e rtie s w ill a c tu a lly
inhere in something.^® This model a lso has th e advantage o f being b e tte r
a b le to cope w ith change, fo r underlying any change in th e p ro p e rtie s
which come and go i s th e su b s tra te which sta y s ever th e same.^^ Thus
some problems w ith flu x , and in a d d itio n some E le a tic problems
concerning change can be avoided. We now re fe r t o th e s u b s tra te as
' t h i s ' , w hile re fe rrin g t o i t s a ttr ib u te s a s th e 'su ch lik e* .
There i s a problem w ith a l l o f th e se models, however, which we
might d escrib e a s th e lo c a lis a tio n problem. I f a q u a lity occurs in th e
m ixture, in a m irror or in an amorphous s u b s tra te , why should i t be in
any one p a r t as opposed t o any o th e r, o r n o t in a l l p a r ts a t once ?What
i s i t t h a t d istin g u ish e s any one p a rt of th e se models from any o th e r,
80
and allow s one p a r t to have d if f e r e n t q u a litie s from another ?

226
 Here one might wonder how th e recep tacle i s re la te d to th e th in g s
t h a t a re in i t and what s o r t o f explaining th e re c ep ta cle i s supposed to
allow . This i s a l l th e more acute i f th e rec ep ta cle i s simply a
s u b s tra te and nothing more, fo r i t becomes very d i f f i c u l t t o ta lk
a b o u t . A s Timaeus 50c-51b makes c le a r , we can only re fe r th e
rec ep ta cle n eg ativ ely , by ta lk in g o f th e a ttr ib u te s t h a t i t does not
have. The rec ep ta cle so f a r seems to be to o f a r divorced and un related
to anything e ls e fo r i t t o do any proper ex p laining. Here we might go
back t o a p o in t th a t I ra ise d in chapter four concerning th e c o n tra st
between th e [sungenes] 'o f th e same fa m ily ', s t r i c t u r e fo r explanation
of Timaeus 29b, and the 'bcistard reasoning' of Timaeus 52b by which the
recep tacle i s apprehended.®^ I suggested th e re t h a t th e problem we a re
meant to see w ith [sungenes] explanations i s t h a t they a re to o c lo se to
th e explananda t o do any proper ex p lain in g . Here we perhaps see t h a t a
'b a s ta rd ' explanation, one t h a t i s n o t properly re la te d t o i t s
explananda, cannot properly explain e ith e r . 84 One might indeed wonder
how something th a t can only be defined neg ativ ely and so can tak e no
p a rt in any p o s itiv e discourse o r be re la te d to anything e ls e could be
something t h a t would h e lp w ith explanation, even i f i t does provide
something fo r p ro p e rtie s to inhere in and so a c ts a s a co u n terp art to
th e s u b je c t/ p re d ic a te th inking o f th e world so u l.
The fo u rth model th a t we a re presented with i s th e one which I have
examined a t len g th , t h a t o f th e rec ep ta cle i n i t i a l l y tre a te d a s an
amorphous s u b s tra te and a lim itle s s continuum which i s subsequently
divided in to sto ic h e ic tria n g le s by th e im position o f a form of lim it.
The recep tacle subsequently can be conceived as th e space w ithin which
85
th e sto ic h e ic s move around and combine w ith one another.
Here we have some e x c e lle n t lo c a lis a tio n c r i t e r i a . We have no
problem in seeing why one p a rt o f th e world may have d iff e r e n t
p ro p e rtie s from th e next p a rt, how th e re can be d e fin ite phenomena, and
how th ese might change w ithout th e problems of fl ux endangering
d isc o u rse. What i s more, we see th e beginnings o f a new theory o f how i t
i s t h a t bodies have p ro p e rtie s . Instead o f saying t h a t something i s h o t
because i t has a p iec e o f h e a t in i t , o r because th e pro p erty h eat
inheres in i t , we can now analyse h e a t in terms of th e motion and th e
mathematical s tru c tu re o f atoms and sub-atomic p a r t i c l e s as Timaeus
undertakes a t 61d f f S i m i l a r l y , colour i s analysed in to d if f e r e n t
m ixtures o f f i r e p a rticle s.® ^

227
 This i s in p o rta n t when we th in k back to my e a r l ie r d iscu ssio n of
th e n a tu re o f th e world soul and th e way t h a t P la to t r e a t s sameness and
d iffe re n c e in th e Timaeus. There I suggested t h a t P lato only tr e a ts
sameness and d iffe re n c e as one place p re d ic a te s when he is
m etaphorically a ttr ib u tin g some co g n itiv e p ro p e rtie s t o th e world so u l,
and t h a t otherw ise he t r e a t s sameness and d iffe re n c e a s two place
p re d ic a te s .
On th e f i r s t th re e models we have examined h e re , one can see th e
tem ptation to say t h a t i f something i s th e same (as something e ls e ) ,
then e ith e r i t has a p iece o f sameness in i t (mixture model), sameness
i s one o f i t s bundle o f q u a litie s (m irror model), o r i t has th e property
of sameness in th e same way as i t has e .g h e a t or colour (su b stra te
m odel). With th e new model though, t h i s tem ptation i s removed. One might
rep ly th a t although t h i s perhaps makes some p ro g ress, on th e se grounds
P la to might s t i l l t r e a t re la tio n s such a s sameness on a p ar w ith
p ro p e rtie s such as redness. However, i f we a re t o ex p lain p ro p e rtie s in
term s o f th e mathematical s tru c tu re and motion o f p a r tic le s , i t i s hard
to see how one could give a sim ila r a n a ly sis to same as one would to
red . R ather, one might be led to compare mathematical s tru c tu re and
motion as a b a sis fo r a ttr ib u tin g a r e la tio n o f sameness or d iffe re n c e
between p a r tic le s o r ensembles th e re o f.
This new model allow s us to analyse th e world in an o b je c t/
p ro p erty manner t h a t c o rre la te s w ith th e s u b je c t/ p re d ic a te th inking of
th e world so u l. What i s more, th e rec ep ta cle i s no longer something
unmentionable and unrelated t o th e th in g s t h a t a re in i t . The im position
of lim it on th e unlim ited generates th e s to ic h e ic tria n g le s from th e
re c ep ta cle in a reasonably explanatory manner. While on th e second and
th ir d models th e recep tacle was [alogos], here we can give some account
o f i t and i t s contents in terms of more b a sic c a te g o rie s, namely here a
continuum which s u ffe rs th e iitp o sitio n o f numbers, which in th e Philebus
w ill become lim it and unlimited.®^
We should a ls o note in a l l t h i s t h a t th e world soul g e ts i t s
i n i t i a l grasp on something in a s u b je c t/ p re d ic a te manner. This i s by no
means to suggest t h a t t h i s exhausts i t s cognitive powers, fo r i t then
has t o th in k about what i t has grasped. That may allow th e world soul
some te le o lo g ic a lly o rien ted th in k in g , lin k in g i t s s u b je c t/ p red ic ate
p ro p o sitio n s to g eth er in to accounts and weaving th ese to g e th e r to
provide system atic explanations. This i s im portant, e sp e c ia lly as

228
th is model o f th e world lay s emphasis on th e good s tru c tu re o f th e
e n t i t i e s which r e s u lt from th e in te ra c tio n o f Forms and numbers w ith th e
rec ep ta c le , and suggests t h a t th e re i s not only an o b je c t/ property
s tru c tu re , b u t a ls o s t a b i l i t y and te le o lo g ic a l s tru c tu r e a t th e most
fundamental p h y sical le v e l o f th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s .

The Philebus seems q u ite happy w ith th e idea t h a t th e re can be some s o r t

knowledge o f a t l e a s t some p h y sical e n t i t i e s . Following th e discussion
of various types of p le a su re s, we a re to ld
"And so knowledge d i f f e r s from knowledge, on th e one hand
concentrating on th e th in g s t h a t undergo generation and d e stru c tio n , on
th e o th e r on th in g s t h a t do n o t s u ffe r gen eratio n and d e stru c tio n and
are always th e same and s im ila r." (Plb.61d)
Furthermore, th ese lower grades o f knowledge a re accorded some
considerable inportance fo r p r a c tic a l d ecisio n making, as th e follow ing
exchange between S ocrates and Protarchus dem onstrates
So "Let us suppose then t h a t th e re i s a man who understands what
ju s tic e i t s e l f i s , and has an account in accordance w ith h is
understanding, and moreover t h a t he has th e same s o r t o f thoughts
concerning a l l o th er th in g s ."
Pr "Let t h a t be supposed."
So "Now w ill t h i s man have s u ffic e n t knowledge, having account o f th e
d iv in e c ir c le and sphere, but being ignorant o f th e human c ir c l e and
sphere, even i f he employs th ese c ir c le s and o th er ru le s in house
building ?"
Pr "We ought to c a l l i t a rid ic u lo u s s t a t e , S ocrates, fo r someone to
have d iv in e knowledge only."
So "What i s t h i s you say ? Are we to throw th e unstable and impure
s k i l l o f th e f a ls e and c ir c le and ru le in to our m ixture ?"
Pr "N ecessarily, i f we a re to be ab le to fin d th e road homeon each
occas io n ." (Plb.62a)^^
The im portant th in g to note here i s t h a t th e Philebus does not employ
th e s e n s ib le / i n t e l l i g i b l e or p h y s ic a l/ in co rp o real d is tin c tio n s as
c r i t e r i a fo r what can and cannot be known, in c o n tra s t t o o th er works,
and in stead employs m u ta b ility . In th e extreme case s, th e Philebus has
some a f f i n i t i e s with e a r l ie r works. The b e s t s o r t o f knowledge i s had of
those th in g s which a re e n tir e ly s ta b le , w hile th e re can be no knowledge

229
of anything th a t i s e n tir e ly u n s t a b l e . i n between, however, the
Philebus i s w illin g t o allow some knowledge o f th in g s t h a t change, but
show some s t a b i l i t y . As w ith B ostock's coirment on being and flu x in th e
T h eaetetu s,93 i f we ask what allow s t h i s more l ib e r a l a ttitu d e t o
knowledge, th e reply might be a more l ib e r a l a ttitu d e t o being, and in
tu rn to flu x . As we saw in th e chapter seven, i t i s p o ssib le fo r th in g s
t o come in to and pass out of being in th e Philebus, ra th e r than s ta y in
a p e rp e tu al s ta te of becoming. This in tu rn might prompt us to question
th e Timaeus* a ttitu d e to v to t we may have knowledge o f. The a lte rn a tiv e
epistemology, as we have seen, i s f a r more o p tim istic about human
c a p a b ilitie s than th e statem ents of 27c-29e, w hile stopping sh o rt o f an
e x p lic it statem ent of what may be known. Is th e re th en some c r i t i c a l
d iffe re n c e between th e views o f th e Philebus and Timaeus which denies
such optimism to th e Timaeus ? In chapter fiv e we saw th e clo se
a f f i n i t i e s o f these works on th e questions of cosmological s t a b i l i t y and
th e mathematical p re c isio n of th e motions of th e heavens. We saw in
chapter seven t h a t th e Timaeus r e je c ts ra d ic a l flu x , and i s e n tir e ly
happy w ith a notion o f [genesis e is ousiaP]. We can a ls o note from
chapter s ix t h a t th e Philebus operates w ith a s im ila r conceptions of
mind, d iscourse and th e sources o f f a ls e judgement. Other im portant
s im ila r itie s l i e in th e ro le s o f th e demiurge, te le o lo g y , harmony and
in te llig e n c e .^ ^ We have seen th e a f f i n i t i e s between th e unlim ited to th e
rec ep ta cle, between lim it and Forms and numbers. We might a ls o lik e n the
p a tte rn which th e demiurge seeks to impose on th e world w ith th e a c tio n s
o f th e demiurge a s th e Philebus ' s fo u rth c la s s o f what i s responsible
fo r th e in te ra c tio n o f lim it and unlim ited, and th e world o f th e Timaeus
w ith th e Philebus *s th ir d c la s s of m ixture. We even fin d in th e
Timaeus t h a t what i s good always has due measure [to kalon ouk ametron]
(Tim.87c), a p o in t emphasised a t length in th e P hilebus.
As we have seen, th e Philebus subscribes to th e four element
th eo ry , and th e elements in th e Timaeus a re generated by th e a c tio n of
lim it on th e unlim ited continuum o f th e recep tacle viewed as a
s u b s tra te , producing th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s and hence th e four
elem ents. The Timaeus lack s th e fo u rfo ld a n a ly sis a s applied to
p ro p e rtie s though, which allow s us to p re c ise ly q u a n tify and so perform
reasoning/ c a lc u la tio n on them, so perhaps in th e Philebus th e re can be
knowledge o f more th in g s than in th e Timaeus.
One might argue th a t v ^ a t th e Philebus has and th e Timaeus does not

230
is th e method o f c o lle c tio n and d iv is io n . Indeed, one o f th e major ta s k s
o f th e Philebus may be to form ulate th e new cosmology and m etaphysics in
such a manner t h a t th e world i t p o stu la te s i s amenable t o t h i s method o f
in v e s tig a tio n . However, w hile c o lle c tio n and d iv is io n i s n o t e x p lic tly
mentioned in th e Timaeus, i t may w ell be t h a t we do in f a c t see t h i s
method in a c tio n , in te re s tin g ly a t th e p o in t in th e Timaeus th a t most
p refig u res th e l i m i t / unlim ited a n a ly sis of th e P hilebus, namely th e
d isc u ssio n o f phy sical stoiche In th e P h ileb u s' d isc u ssio n of
c o lle c tio n and d iv is io n a t 16c f f , l e t t e r s and s y lla b le s p lay a
prominent p a r t in th e ex p o sitio n , and S ocrates i^ highly c r i t i c a l of
those employing t h i s method who proceed d ir e c tly from u n ity to an
in d e f in ite number w ithout considering th e ste p s between. Timaeus to o i s
h ig h ly c r i t i c a l o f those who d ir e c tly p o s it four elem ents, t e l l in g us
t h a t th e se a re in f a c t n o t even s y lla b le s , l e t alone l e t t e r s . I n
chapter seven I argued t h a t th e f u l l hierarch y here a s f a r a s the
Timaeus i s concerned i s p h y sical phenomena - agglom erations of atoms -
atoms - atomic planes - sto ic h e ic tr ia n g le s . Whichever way up we take
u n ity and in d e fin ite number h e re , i t i s c le a r t h a t th e re a re many
interm ediary ste p s in th e a n a ly sis, and although not c a lle d so in th e
Timaeus, t h i s may be a case o f in v e s tig a tio n by c o lle c tio n and d iv is io n .
So w hile th e a n a ly sis o f th e Philebus may allow more th in g s in the
p h y sical realm to be known, and has th e method o f c o lle c tio n and
d iv is io n e x p lic itly on hand, th e re does n o t seem t o be any fundamental
d iffe re n c e between th e two works t h a t would deny knowledge o f a t l e a s t
some asp ects o f th e n a tu ra l world to th e Timaeus. Whether the
a lte r n a tiv e epistemology of th e Timaeus allow s humans t o generate some
knowledge here i s another q u estio n , th a t I s h a ll come to s h o rtly .

VI

F ir s tly though some remarks on th e r e s u lts of th e T heaetetus' discu ssio n

o f knowledge would seem t o be in o rder. The T heaetetus r e je c ts the
notion t h a t knowledge should be equated e ith e r w ith percep tio n o r w ith
tr u e b e l i e f . I t a ls o discusses th e Meno's contention t h a t knowledge i s
tr u e b e lie f w ith an a c c o u n t . P l a t o appears to hold two p rin c ip le s ,
t h a t knowledge re q u ire s a [logos], (KL),^^ and t h a t knowledge must be
based on knowledge, (KBK).^^^ Such a view must be a b le t o d e al w ith
c e r ta in reg re ss arguments ; to know something we must have an account, to
know the account we must have a fu rth e r account, e tc . According to
S o c rate s' dream a t T heaetetus 20Id f f , th e reg re ss is

231
f i n i t e and term inates w ith b a sic elements which lack accounts. I f they
lack accounts, then they a re unknowable. As f a r a s th e ph y sical world is
concerned, i t i s notable t h a t th e Timaeus argues t h a t th e re a re b a sic
elem ents, th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s , bu t th e se can be given te le o lo g ic a l
and m athem atical/ o n to lo g ical a c c o u n t s . T h e r e i s not then a s p e c ific
problem here w ith th e p hysical world; th e ph y sical 'atoms*, h ere taking
'atom ' in i t s more l i t e r a l sense a s in d iv is ib le fundamental e n tity , can
have accounts as w ell as names, though o f course th e re may s t i l l be a
problem w ith lo g ic a l atomism, which would b e se t any claim to
knowledge.
The Theaetetus next examines th re e in te rp re ta tio n s of [logos]. One,
t h a t i t i s any statem ent i s quickly re je c te d , as i s th e notion t h a t a
s u f f ic ie n t [logos] here would enumerate a l l o f th e elem entary p a rts of
th e known th in g . A ttention then c en tres on th e id ea t h a t to give an
account i s to s t a te th e way in which th e known th in g d i f f e r s from
everything else.^® ^ This notion i s a s s a ile d in two ways. F i r s t l y , as
unique re fe rrin g d e sc rip tio n s a re necessary fo r tr u e opinion, they
cannot be s u f f ic ie n t fo r k n o w l e d g e . ^^6 Secondly, i f we req u ire knowledge
o f som ething's d iffe re n c e from everything e ls e , then our d e fin itio n of
knowledge becomes c ir c u la r ; knowledge i s tru e opinion w ith knowledge of
d i f f e r e n c e . S o th e Theaetetus ends a p o r e t i c a l l y . W h e t h e r P lato
him self was in ap o ria, or merely wished to make h is readers th in k
h a rd e r, i s another m atter o f c o u r s e . V a r i o u s ideas have been proposed
f o r how P lato might him self have resolved t h i s a p o ria , and here I am
la rg e ly in agreement w ith Fine, who suggests t h a t we might attem pt to
elim in ate 'knowledge' from th e d e fin ien s by considering what a knowledge
of d iffe re n c e might amount to .^ ^ ^ Thus Fine gives a revised d e fin tio n of
knowledge as
"Knowledge o f x i s c o rre c t b e lie f about x w ith th e a b i l i t y to
produce accounts properly r e la tin g x t o o th er s u ita b ly in te r r e la te d
o b je c ts in th e same f i e l d .
Here we might consider P la to 's fa v o u rite l e t t e r s and s y lla b le s analogy.
In order to know how to s p e ll, say, Theodorus, i t i s n o t enough siitply
to enumerate th e elements ( l e t te r s ) of 'Theodorus', nor to be ab le
simply to d is tin g u is h i t s l e t t e r s from each o th e r. R ather, what is
112
required i s an a b i l i t y to i n te r r e la te each l e t t e r w ith o th e rs. This
to o i s of course su sc e p tib le t o reg re ss arguments, i f KL and KBK a re
s t i l l in play.^^3 However, as we saw in chapter two, th e reg ress may be
c ir c u la r ra th e r than lin e a r , and i f t h a t c i r c l e i s la rg e and

2 32
inform ative enough, th e reg ress may be v irtu o u s. The d iffe re n c e between
t h i s and say th e view o f th e Republic and e a r l i e r works i s t h a t where
th e Republic req u ire s only one d e fin itiv e account t o convert opinion
in to knowledge, th e in te r r e la tio n model re q u ire s se v e ra l a c c o u n t s .

One e f f e c t o f t h is might be t o b lu r th e d is tin c tio n between tr u e opinion

and knowledge; fo r how many in te r r e la te d accounts do we need to produce
in o rd er t o convert tr u e opinion in to knowledge ? T his though would f i t
reasonably w ell w ith my p ic tu re o f P la to 's development. The Republic,
adhering t o th e old view d istin g u ish e s sharply between knowledge and
b e lie f . The Philebus on th e o th er hand, adhering to th e in te r r e la tio n
model i s happy to allow varying degrees o f knowledge, perhaps re la te d to
th e number and q u a lity of th e in te r r e la tin g accounts we can give.^^^ As
suggested e a r l i e r though, our knowledge may a ls o be re la te d to th e
re la tiv e s t a b i l i t y of i t s su b je c t, and to th e am enability of th e su b je c t
t o reaso n / c a l c u l a t i o n . ^ T h e Timaeus appears as an interm ediary h ere,
p o stu la tin g s ta b le and m athem atically p re c ise s to ic h e ic t r ia n g le s , which
lend t h e i r s t a b i l i t y and p re c isio n to a t l e a s t some asp ec ts o f th e
phenomenal world, most notably th e heavens. The Philebus, I have
suggested, goes a ste p fu rth e r by introducing a means by which we can
t r e a t p ro p e rtie s in a m athem atically p re c ise manner.
One in te re s tin g question here i s whether fo r P la to locomotion i s an
a sp ect o f an o b je c t th a t may be known, th e p o in t being t h a t i t is
p o ssib le to produce an in v a ria n t d e sc rip tio n o f some m otions. 117
C erta in ly in th e Republic th e re i s a c o n tra s t between th e 'i d e a l '
motions of th e heavens, th e 'r e a l speed and slowness in tr u e number and
a l l tr u e p a tte r n s ' (Rep.529d2), v^ich a re th e 'r e a l e n t i t i e s ' (529d1),
and being apprehensible only by 'reason and th o u g h t' (529d4), are
co n trasted as o b jec ts o f knowledge a g a in st th e v is ib le motions which
undergo d e v i a t i o n s . ^ T h a t might be taken to say t h a t th e problem is
not w ith motion p er se , but w ith unpredictable motion which d ev iates
from any in v a ria n t d e sc rip tio n . I have argued though t h a t P la to 's new
p o s itio n in th e Timaeus i s t h a t th e motions o f th e heavenly bodies a re
amenable to p re c ise mathematical d e sc rip tio n . ^^^ So perhaps, in th e
s p e c ia l case o f th e heavens, where th e re i s no decay o f th e bodies, and
no in te ra c tio n with any oth er ph y sical bodies, we can have knowledge of
locomotion. This i s very much a sp e c ia l case though; a l l o th er composite
bodies w ill be su sc e p tib le to decay as t h e i r d isso lu b le bonds su ffe r
more wear and t e a r , and, e s p e c ia lly a t th e micro le v e l, su sc e p tib le to

233
c o llis io n s w ith each oth er t h a t we w ill n o t be ab le t o p re d ic t, such
th a t we cannot produce in v a ria n t d e sc rip tio n s o f t h e i r motions.

VII

L et us now consider vÆiether th e a lte r n a tiv e account t h a t th e Timaeus

generates allow s fo r th e p o s s ib ility of knowledge o f (a t l e a s t sane
asp ects of) th e world about u s. We can approach t h i s m atter v ia two
q u estio n s. In th e Timaeus, i s th e n ature o f th e world such t h a t
knowledge o f i t i s p o ssib le ? Secondly, i s th e n a tu re o f th e human mind
such t h a t i t i s ab le t o a tt a i n such knowledge ?
In ch apter s ix I examined a key passage concerning th e world soul
which a ttr ib u te d i t th e a b i l i t y to form tru e and s ta b le opinions about
120
anything p h y sical t h a t i t encountered. I argued t h a t i f so , then
th e re can be nothing in tra c ta b le about th e n a tu re o f th e p h y sical, or
th e n atu re o f opinion t h a t prevents such opinions being formed. In
subsequent chapters I have argued t h a t th e theory p o stu la tin g
q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le sto ic h e ic tria n g le s as th e u ltim ate c o n stitu e n ts of
th e p h y sical world would indeed allow th e world soul to form such
opinions. 121 These opinions a re formed by an exhaustive a n a ly sis of
122 123
sameness and d iffe re n c e , though as in th e T heaetetus, such an
a n aly sis does n o t amount to knowledge. I s i t p o ssib le though fo r th e
world soul to convert th ese tr u e and s ta b le opinions in to knowledge ?
According to Timaeus 37bc, th e domains of opinion and knowledge fo r
th e world soul a re [to a is th e to n ] 'th e s e n s ib le ' and [to lo g istik o n ]
'th e acco u ntable/ c a lc u la b le ' re sp e c tiv e ly . I t i s n o tab le t h a t a t t h i s
p o in t th ese two c ateg o ries a re n o t a sso ciated w ith o th er d is tin c tio n s
th a t c h a ra c te rise th e IW viev^' o r even w ith each o th e r 's
co u n te rp arts. This leaves open th e p o s s ib ility t h a t th e re a re a t l e a s t
some e n t i t i e s t h a t f a l l under both [to a isth e to n ] and [to lo g is tik o n ].
Their ex isten ce would open up th e p o s s ib ility t h a t opinion concerning
some of [to a isth e to n ] might be converted in to knowledge. In p a rtic u la r
here we might to compare th e [ta lo g is tik a ] , 'th in g s amenable to rea so n /
c a lc u la tio n ' t h a t th e c ir c le o f th e same works w ith a t Timaeus 37b f f
and th e [logism oi], 'c a lc u la tio n s ' th a t we a re t o make a t 47b f f , and we
might a ls o be reminded of Theaetetus 186c, where S ocrates s ta te s th a t
"Knowledge i s not then in th e se n sa tio n s, but in th e process of
reasoning [sullogism oi] concerning them; f o r i t i s p o ssib le t o apprehend
being and tr u th in t h i s manner, but im possible o th erw ise." (Tht.IBGd)

234
I t i s in p o rta n t to consider what th e range o f [to a is th e to n ] i s a s f a r
as th e world soul i s concerned. At Timaeus 37a we a re to ld t h a t th e
world soul makes judgements about everything t h a t i t encounters, whether
t h a t th in g becomes o r i s e te rn a lly th e same. This h ig h lig h ts a
d iffe re n c e between th e world soul and our own, which i s t h a t th e world
so u l does n o t have a percep tu al th re sh o ld . Thus atoms, atomic fac es and
sto ic h e ic tria n g le s a re a l l be p a r t.o f [to a is th e to n ] as f a r a s th e
world soul i s concerned. S to ich eic tr ia n g le s , as I have argued, a re
q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le , m athem atically p re c is e , and may be given an
account in te le o lo g ic a l or m athem atical/ o n to lo g ic al ^^4 i t i s th e
t e r m s .

s t a b i l i t y o f th e sto ic h e ic tr ia n g le s , and t h e i r r e la tio n t o language,

t h a t allow s th e world soul tru e and s ta b le opinions of them when i t
p erceiv es them. In lin e w ith th e T heaetetus, p ercep tio n and tr u e opinion
do n o t of themselves c o n s titu te knowledge. However, we now have
something, namely th e world soufs opinion, which i s in te lle c tu a lly
apprehensible t o th e world so u l. I f th e co n ten ts o f t h a t opinion a re
amenable t o reason, then t h a t i s something which can be worked on by the
world s o u l's ra tio n a l o r b i t. The world soul may then perform
c a lc u la tio n s and in te r r e l a t e accounts such t h a t our tr u e and s ta b le
opinions concerning p hysical e n t i t i e s which a re s ta b le and amenable to
reason may be converted in to knowledge.
What though o f us mere m ortals ? Presumably i f we can form some
tr u e and s ta b le opinions concerning some p h y sical e n t i t i e s which a re
amenable t o p re c ise c a lc u la tio n an d / or may be given a te le o lo g ic a l
account, th en th e p o s s ib ility o f th e conversion of opinion to knowledge
i s open. This brings us back to some of th e m a te ria l o f chapter s ix . The
problem t h a t humans face i s t h a t in d is tin c tio n to th e world so u l, they
have f a l l i b l e in n ate a b i l i t i e s to form judgements o f sameness and
d iffe re n c e , and th ese f a l l i b i l i t e s lead us in t o e r r o r . There were two
causes of such m istakes in th e case o f p e rc e p tib le e n t i t i e s , perceptual
illu s io n s and th e im perfections of our own mental rev o lu tio n s.
Perceptual illu s io n s do n o t appear t o have bothered P la to g r e a tly . Such
th in g s a re mentioned in th e Republic a t 602d f f , but P la to seems q u ite
happy t h a t 'measuring, weighing and co unting' w ill enable us t o avoid
any d i f f i c u l t i e s h e re . While such illu s io n s may lead us in to making
f a ls e judgements, th e re i s g re a t optimism in th e Timaeus t h a t we a re
a b le to c o rre c t such judgements. So to o th e re i s optimism concerning the
p o s s ib ility of c o rre ctin g any im perfections in our own mental
rev o lu tio n s which lead t o e rro r.

235
 One problem fo r humans of course i s t h a t th e re a re some im portant
e n t i t i e s which a re beyond our percep tu al th resh o ld . Unlike th e world
so u l we cannot perceive th e s to ic h e ic t r ^^5
i a n th e behaviour of
g l e s , g g

t h e i r ensembles w ill be more o f a mystery, a s they w ill appear t o be in

f l u x . W e can have a general theory about s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s , but
u n lik e th e world soul we cannot p erceive in d iv id u a lly where they a re ,
what t h e i r motion i s and what t h e i r s ta te o f bonding to anything e ls e
i s . However, we do have percep tu al access t o one s e t o f s ta b le and
m athem atically p re c ise e n t i t i e s , namely th e heavenly bodies. Timaeus has
some very in te re s tin g th in g s to say about how we might use our
observations h e re . He t e l l s us t h a t
"God devised and gave to us v isio n in order t h a t we might observe
th e ra tio n a l revolutions o f th e heavens and use them a g a in s t the
rev o lu tio n s of thought t h a t a re in us, which a re lik e them, though those
a re c le a r and ours confused, and by learning thoroughly and p artaking in
c a lc u la tio n s c o rre c t according to natu re [logismon k a ta phusin
o rth o te to s ], by im ita tio n o f th e e n tir e ly unwandering rev o lu tio n s of God
we might s t a b i l i s e th e wandering revolutions in o u rse lv e s." (Tim.47b)
The use o f th e p lu ra l throughout t h i s passage stro n g ly suggests th a t
both types of our mental rev o lu tio n s a re under d iscu ssio n h e re . To calm
one type re q u ire s tr u e opinion, t o calm th e o th e r re q u ire s knowledge.
The im p licatio n here i s very much in lin e w ith what I argued
th e o r e tic a lly concerning th e world so u l. I f we can a rriv e a t some tru e
and sta b le opinions o f th e heavens, based on our o b serv atio n s, and then
make some c a lc u la tio n s and te le o lo g ic a lly in te r r e l a t e accounts then
hopefully we w ill have sane knowledge which w ill help to calm our
r a tio n a l r e v o l u t i o n . O n e may f e e l t h a t t h i s reads a l o t in to t h is
passage, b u t th e same p o in ts a re emphasised as Timaeus begins h is
summary a t th e end o f th e work, a t 90b f f . I t i s by learn in g th e
harmonies and revo lu tio n s o f th e universe (no account of which could be
given i f i t were n o t fo r th e g i f t o f e y esig h t, according to Timaeus 47a)
th a t we can come to r e c tif y a l l th e revolutions w ith in our heads. I f
t h i s i s c o rre c t, and i t does accord w ell with a l l t h a t I have argued
coAc&ming th e a lte r n a tiv e views t h a t th e Timaeus may be suggesting to
u s, then in c e rta in lim ite d circum stances th e Timaeus does sweep away
th e l a s t p iec e of TW, th e notion t h a t we can only ever have opinion
concerning p h y sical e n t i t i e s .

236
 V III

In chapter four I argued t h a t we perhaps ought n o t t o t r e a t th e Timaeus

as giving us unmediated P la to n ic d o c trin e , considering both P la to 's IWP
and th e n a tu re o f th e in tro d u cto ry pages o f th e Timaeus i t s e l f . To t h is
end I suggested t h a t th e in i t i a l statem ent o f th e stro n g TW view made
by Timaeus might give us grounds to question where th e epistem ological
d i f f i c u l t i e s concerning th e ph y sical world l i e , what i s due in term s of
accounts o f th e phy sical world, and v ^ a t i s th e range and re la tio n of
th e se n sib le , th e i n t e l l i g i b l e , sensation and reason. I a lso argued th a t
th e Timaeus bears some in te re s tin g resemblances to Parmenides' poem, and
th a t given P la to 's IWP and h is a ttitu d e t o Parmenides, t h i s might
in d ic a te t h a t P lato wishes us to pursue c e rta in q u e stio n s, perhaps w ith
some prompting from th e t e x t . I fu rth e r suggested t h a t th e Timaeus s e ts
up an agenda fo r th e d iscu ssio n o f some o f th e views p u t forward in the
Republic, s p e c if ic a lly those on cosmology, epistem ology, philosophy of
mind, th e n a tu re and e x te n t of IW and th e r e la tio n of mathematics to th e
world. As we have seen in th e preceding c h a p te rs, i f we a re w illin g to
look c a re fu lly a t th e Timaeus and countenance th e view t h a t i t has more
to say than th e prelim inary statem ent o f 27c-29e, then th e Timaeus has
much to t e l l us about these m atters.
As 1 have argued in chapter f iv e , th e re a re im portant changes in
cosmology and th e way in which mathematics r e la te to th e w orld. Whatever
approach we tak e to th e Timaeus, one th in g seems c le a r which i s t h a t th e
heavenly bodies move in a s ta b le a re amenable to p re c ise
mathematical d e sc rip tio n . I t would appear t h a t th e re i s a ls o a
s ig n if ic a n t move in P la to 's thin k in g concerning degeneration from the
conceptions o f th e Phaedo, Republic and P o litic u s t o those o f th e
Timaeus, Philebus and Laws; something which, 1 have argued is
accompanied w ith a change in a ttitu d e t o th e i n e v i t a b i li t y of m oral,
so c ia l and p o l i t i c a l d e c lin e . In chapter s ix 1 discussed th e a lte rn a tiv e
epistemology and philosophy of mind o f th e Timaeus, embodied in th e
world s o u l/ human soul analogy. This p laces much g re a te r emphasis on
tr a c ta b le problems w ith our own minds ra th e r than in tra c ta b le problems
in th e n a tu re o f th e p h y sic al. In chapter seven we have seen P la to 's
thoughts on th e u ltim ate c o n stitu e n ts of th e p h y sical world, t h e ir
s t a b i l i t y and t h e i r r e la tio n t o language. What P l a to 's e a r l i e r p o sitio n
here i s i s d i f f i c u l t to d e t e r m i n e , t h o u g h th e Theaetetus too appears
to r e je c t ra d ic a l flu x . The Timaeus ' theory allow s fo r a flu x of

237
p e rc e p tib le o b je c ts , w hile lending th e world an in p o rta n t measure of
s t a b i l i t y . How much in each case depends on th e stre n g th o f th e bonds
between th e s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s , giving conplex e n t i t i e s varying degrees
o f s t a b i l i t y . In ch ap ter e ig h t I suggested t h a t th e S ophist has a
complementary ta sk in in v e stig a tin g re la tio n s between Forms and ways in
which th e Forms might undergo some change, w hile th e Timaeus
in v e s tig a te s th e s p a tio / temporal natu re o f p a rtic u la r s and ways in
which they may e x h ib it some s t a b i l i t y . In t h i s chapter we have seen how
th e Timaeus might f i t in to th e stra n d o f P la to 's m athem atical/
o n to lo g ic al development th a t lin k s th e Parmenides and th e Philebus.
The ŒWp o s itio n , whether i t be th e one o f th e Republic o r th e more
extreme one sketched by Timaeus, c le a rly plays no p a r t in P l a to 's f in a l
conception o f th e way th in g s a re . The f in a l n a il in th e c o ffin i s th e
no tio n , c o v ert in th e Timaeus b u t o v e rt in th e Philebus, t h a t we can
have knowledge o f a t l e a s t some asp ects of th e n a tu ra l world. One
im portant f a c e t of P la to 's development here i s t h a t w hile th e Republic
t r e a t s fo u r d is tin c tio n s , namely knowable/ opinable, i n t e l l i g i b l e /
se n sib le , in c o rp o re a l/ p h y sic al, s ta b le / changeable as making th e same
d iv is io n o f e n t i t i e s , l a t e r works, in p a rtic u la r th e Timaeus, do n o t.
One o f th e advantages o f t h i s in te rp re ta tio n o f th e Timaeus i s th a t
i t makes t h a t work more consonant w ith th e s ty le and concerns o f th e
o th e r l a t e d ialogues. The sty lo m e tric evidence p o in ts to th e Timaeus
being l a t e , and my arguments concerning cosmology and th e r e la tio n of
mathematics t o th e world in d ic a te t h a t th e Timaeus ought to be placed in
a group w ith th e P hilebus, Laws and Epinomis. I hope t h a t oth er
arguments I have developed here make i t more n a tu ra l to p lace the
Timaeus in such a p o sitio n in term s of th e ev o lu tio n o f P la to 's thought.
At th e o u ts e t o f t h i s th e s is , I suggested t h a t i t i s something o f a
quandotry why, i f th e Timaeus i s one o f P la to 's l a t e r e f f o r t s , i t does not
have more a f f i n i t i e s in terms o f s ty le and concerns w ith th e o th e r la te
works. I have argued t h a t i f we ta k e th e Timaeus a s giving us more than
one hypothesis concerning th e n atu re o f th e world and th e s o r t of
accounts we can have o f t h a t world, then i t has some very in te re s tin g
a f f i n i t i e s w ith th e concerns o f th e T heaetetus, th e C ratylus and the
S ophist, as w ell as th e Parmenides. In t h i s chapter I hope t o have shown
t h a t th e Timaeus has a f f i n i t i e s w ith th e second p a r t o f th e Parmenides
and th e Philebus.
This then i s a summary of th e changes in P la to 's thought concerning

238
th e n a tu ra l world t h a t tak e place between th e Republic and th e Philebus.
The im p lications o f th e se changes fo r how we ought t o in v e s tig a te the
n a tu ra l world and what s o r t of r e s u lts we might expect t o generate from
such an in v e s tig a tio n w ill be th e su b je c t o f th e next ch ap ter.

239
NOTES TO CEIAPTER NINE

01) See Sayre (1983).

02) See Sayre (1983) p238 f f and passim.
03) See Sayre (1983) p37 f f . This s i t s w ell w ith my account o f th e Pm;
see my c h .4. For o th er views, see e .g Grote (1875), Taylor (1926),
Cherniss (1936), Cornford (1939), Ryle (1939b), Robinson (1942), Peck
(1953), Brumbaugh (1961b), Runciman (1965), Owen (1972), A llen (1983).
04) The u n ity of hypothesis 6 [oude me metechei o u s ia s ], 'i n no way
p artak es o f e x is te n c e ' (Pm.163c7) and [meden a u to i d e i e in a i] , 'nothing
e x is ts in r e la tio n to i t ' (Pm.164a5); c f . Rn.141e.
05) Here I agree w ith Sayre (1983) p44/5 t h a t th e t r a d itio n a l p a irin g of
hypotheses 1 + 2 , 3 + 4 e tc i s in c o rre c t and v io la te s th e in s tru c tio n of
Pm.135e f f t h a t we should consider fo r th e same th in g th e consequences
of i t s ex isten ce and non-existence. As hypotheses 1 + 6 and 2 + 5
consider sim ila r u n itie s (on th e c r ite r io n o f whether they partak e of
being or n ot) they should be p aired to g e th e r; c f . e .g Owen (1970) p86.

06) The u n ity o f hypothesis 5 i s knowable (Pm.160c7) and [diaphoron to n

a llo n ] 'i s d istin g u ish a b le from o th e r s ', so e n te rs in to re la tio n s h ip s .
07) The One of Parmenides' poem i s e n tir e ly u n d iffe re n tia te d and has no
re la tio n to anything e ls e a s i t i s th e only th in g t h a t e x is ts . So to o
t h is may be c r i t i c a l of Forms i f we conceive o f them a s such u n itie s
(c f. Pm.132a1, 132c6, 135b9), and note t h a t th e conclusion o f t h i s
h ypothesis, t h a t such u n itie s a re unknowable, i s s im ila r t o the
conclusion o f th e f in a l argument o f p a r t 1 a t Pm. 134b f f , and c f . my
c h .8 on sim ila r arguments in th e So. I keep se p a ra te any views put
forward in Parmenides' poem (whether from way of t r u th or seeming) from
any view a ttr ib u te d to th e h is to r ic a l Parmenides ; see my ch. 4 on
Parmenides and P la to 's FWP.
08) The u ltim ate re je c tio n o f t h i s u n ity i s a t Pm.141e9, 'Such a u n ity
can in no way p artak e of being '.

09) See e .g F r.8 /8 ff.

10) Cf. F r8/1, F r7/1, th e One e x is ts , th e o th ers do n o t.

11) See Pm. 137d-141e. Some examples of what th e Pm. may p ick up, in th e
order given;
1. Fr8/26, 8/31, 8/32, 8/43, 8/49.
2. Fr8/43.
3. Fr8/26, 8/29, 8/31, 8/49.
4. Fr8/26, 8/29
5. Fr8/29
6. Fr8/43
7. Fr8/44, 8/49
Concerning (8 ), I disagree w ith Sayre, [eplachthesan] a t 8/26 i s su re ly
lo g ic a l ra th e r than te n p o ra l, e sp e c ia lly as coming t o be and p erish in g
are never anywhere in th e f i r s t p lac e to be driven away by tru e b e li e f .
As a back up (see n.43 p51) he c ite s [p alin ] a t F r.5 ( ' I t i s as one to

240
me where I begin, fo r I s h a ll re tu rn th e re a g a in ') , but again t h i s may
be lo g ic a l sequence in th e d iscu ssio n ra th e r than tem poral sequence in
Parmenides* world. A gainst t h i s we must weigh F r.8 /5 f f which e x p lic itly
denies t h a t th e one e x is ts in tim e.
12) Cf. Pm.164b.
13) Sayre i s not alone in d e te c tin g Pythagorean sympathies h e re ; see
Cornford (1939), Raven (1948), Gosling (1975) (c f. Sayre (1983) p i 44)
and A r is to tle Metaphysics 987a f f where he says "The Pythagoreans s ta te d
t h e t th in g s e x is t by im ita tio n o f numbers, while P la to says i t i s by
p a rtic ip a tio n , thus changing th e name. However, what p a rtic ip a tio n in or
im ita tio n o f th e forms might amount to they jo in tly n e g le c t to
in v e s tig a te " , although see Cherniss (1959) and VLastos (1953) fo r a
co n trary view.

14) U nfortunatly prime numbers cannot be produced in t h i s manner, (c f.

A ris to tle Metaphysics 987b34 v^ere he notes t h is d i f f ic u lt y , and Sayre
(1983) n.50 p280). He needs a d d itio n a s w ell as m u ltip lic a tio n h e re ,
though a s he uses a d d itio n to produce th re e from two and so tw ice and
th r ic e , th e re should be no g re a t problem.

15) Sayre (1983) p61.

16) See Euclid book V, and esp. d e fir^ io n V and p ro p o sitio n 15.

17) Euclid t e l l s us t h a t i t was "The discovery of Eudoxus, th e teach er

of P la to " , (See Heath (1947) pp 112-113).
18) Sayre (1983) p105, c f . Gosling (1975) p166 f f . Sayre gives th e
follow ing e x p lic a tio n o f a Dedekind c u t on pi 06: "A c u t e x is ts between
any two c la s s e s so composed t h a t a l l th e members o f th e f i r s t c la s s (A1)
are le s s than a l l th e members o f th e second (A2). I f A1 contains a
la r g e s t member n (a lte rn a tiv e ly , i f A2 contains n a s a sm allest member),
then t h a t p a ir (A1, A2) demarcates th e ra tio n a l number n . There a re
o th er c u ts , however, e sta b lish e d by p a ir s of c la s s e s such t h a t A1 has no
sm allest member and A2 no l a r g e s t . . . A c u t produced by any p a ir of
c la sse s (A1, A2) such t h a t A1 has no la rg e s t member and A2 no sm allest
member corresponds to an i r r a t io n a l number."
19) See Sayre (1983) p3 f f and passim.

20) See Sayre (1983) p76/77, p149-151.

21) See A r is to tle Physics 187a17, and c f . Metaphysics 988a7 f f and

1091b13 f f , and Sayre (1983) p 9 6ff. Sim plicius (151.7-8) commenting on
A r i s t o t le 's l o s t work 'On th e Good' says th a t A r is to tle recorded P la to 's
notion t h a t th e in d e f in ite dyad was th e g re a t and th e sm all; c f . 453.28
f f where Sim plicius a llu d e s to P la to 's le c tu re on th e good and equates
th e in d e f in ite dyad w ith th e g re a t and th e sm all and w ith [to a p eiro n ].
So to o Alexander, Theophrastus, Porphry; see Sayre (1983) p96 f f .
22) See Sayre (1983) p47-53, 59.

23) The manner in which th e 'godly method' is introduced a t Plb. 16c10

would lead us t o expect a lin k between i t and a c o n s is te n t reading of
[a p e iro n ]; c f . Sayre (1983) p124. As th e 'godly method' has been
responsible fo r everything so f a r discovered (P lb.16c), i t would seen

241
reasonable t o lin k i t to previous m ethodological d isc u ssio n s.

24) See Sayre (1983) p118/9.

25) Sayre (1983) p84-95 (c f. p i 67/8) argues t h a t th e follow ing fiv e

th e se s a re a ttr ib u te d to P la to by A r is to tle in th e f i r s t s ix se c tio n s of
book one o f th e Metaphysics (on o th er a n cien t commentators see p76/7,
149-155); (1) Numbers a re generated by th e p a rtic ip a tio n o f th e g re a t
and th e sm all in u n ity . (2) Sensible th in g s a re c o n s titu te d from th e
Forms and th e g re a t and th e sm all. (3) Forms a re c o n stitu te d from th e
g re a t and sm all and u n ity . (4) The Forms a re numbers. (5) The Good i s
U nity. My only disagreem ent w ith Sayre here i s over (4 ), which I b eliev e
to be an (understandable and perhaps ty p ic a l) mis in te rp re ta tio n on th e
p a r t of A r is to tle .
26) Gosling a ttr ib u te s v a ria n ts of t h i s view to Jow ett (1953), Ross
(1951), Taylor (1956) and Hackforth (1945); c f . Crombie (1963), S trik e r
(1970) and Sayre (1983).

27) See S trik e r (1970) p47 f f .

28) See Gosling (1975) p186-196, and Sayre (1983) p137-144 fo r c ritic is m
o f th ese two p o s itio n s . Gosling p i 96-206 fo r h is own p o s itio n and Sayre
p i 44 f f fo r h is c ritic s im o f Gosling.

29) See Gosling (1975) p i 77 f f , p i 96 f f .

30) See Sayre (1983) p155 f f , p174 f f e t passim . See p144 f f fo r h is

c ritic is m of Gosling.

31) Here I s h a ll argue t h a t while th e Tim. has a g re a t many a f f i n i t i e s

w ith th e P lb, th e Plb has the more develped p o s itio n and should be dated
l a t e r . Contrary to Sayre (1983) p i 87, p238 f f e t passim , I fin d th a t th e
Tim. can be dated l a t e and has a ro le in th e development he tr a c e s .

32) See e .g Sayre (1983) p155.

33) See Sayre (1983) pi 13 and pi 54/5. So to o one can c h a ra c te rise an
in s ta n t o f tim e a s a Dedekind c u t on a tim e l in e ; c f . An. 156d and Sayre
pi 14, and my c h .5 + 8 on th e uniform ity of tim e a s w ell as space.

34) Cf. my d iscu ssio n in c h .7.

35) Cf. A r is to tle de Anima 404b23 and Metaphysics 1086a10 on Forms and
numbers.

36) At Plb.25a we fin d [metroin], [arithmos] and a [logos] d e riv a tiv e . In

c h .5 I noted th e p r o lif e r a tio n o f th e use [arithm os] and [metros] in th e
Tim, something t h a t we fin d too in th e Plb, and indeed th e Epin.

37) See e .g A ris to tle Metaphysics 987b18 f f . Porph^^ (248.1) a lso

re p o rts t h a t Dercylides re p o rts Hermodorus ( i ) as saying t h a t P lato
considered m atter t o e x h ib it 'th e More and th e Less, along w ith the
G reat and th e S m all'. Perhaps, as Sayre suggests t h i s i s influenced by
A r i s t o t le 's view; see below on A r i s t o t le 's in te rp r e ta tio n o f th e Tim.

38) See here Sorabji (1988) p33.

242
39) This too seems to be A r is to tle 's view; c f . Metaphysics 987b18 and
992a11 f o r th e rec ep ta cle and th e g eneration of lin e s and p lan e s, e tc ,
and de Anima 404b15 f f on th e c o n s titu tio n o f p e rc e p tib le e n t i t i e s . Hew
r e lia b le A r i s t o t le 's accounts a re h ere i s another questio n o f course.
40) Cf. itry c h .3 and 5, and see e .g Rep.SIOdff, 529cff, and a lso
Ep.VII.342bc.

41) Cf. P atterso n (1985) p7, Bostock (1986) p87, Malcolm (1991) p i l l .
Whether th e universe o f th e Tim. i s p e rf e c tly sp h e ric a l (P a tte rso n , y es,
Malcom, no) i s a moot p o in t, but hopefully t h i s se c tio n and th e next
w ill answer Malcolm's q u estion, "Why would th e demiurge be su ccessfu l in
f u lly implementing such a s ta tu s fo r th e components of a lower being
such a s e a r th , vÆien... he f a i l s t o a t t a i n s p h e ric ity fo r th e cosmos
i t s e l f ?".
42) See Sayre (1983) p148.

43) See Sayre (1983) p i 42/3.

44) See Sayre (1983) p178.

45) Sayre (1983) p177.

46) See Sayre (1983) p179.

47) S ay re's discussion o f t h i s m atter (1983) p212 f f i s unconvincing as

he d e als only w ith C ornford's long outmoded p o s itio n . See a lso S orabji
(1988) p44-47. There i s o f course a major debate t o be had between
B urnyeat's A and B readings o f t h i s p a r t o f th e Tht. (see h is (1991)).
Here I merely in d ic a te my p referen ce.

48) As I have argued in c h .7, th e Tim. to o i s concerned w ith the vacuity

's a f e ' answers.
49) See e .g Tim.63e f f where s ig h ts , sounds, te x tu re s and sm ells a re
analysed in term s o f th e p ro p e rtie s and motions o f p a r tic le s .
50) See here Sayre (1983), esp. p i 74 f f , though throughout Sayre re fe rs
only to se n sib le and n o t p h y sical e n t i t i e s .
51) I would argue t h a t in a d d itio n to in d iv id u a l u n its of th e four
elements th e re a re t h e i r ph y sical p a rts (complex tr ia n g le s , sto ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s ) which too a re im p ercep tib le. I do n o t p re ss t h i s though, as
Sayre accep ts t h a t th e P lb. employs th e fo u r element theory (see h is
(1983) pi 42/3), though he might wish t o deny th a t th e Plb. version i s
committed t o im perceptible e n t i t i e s .

52) See e .g A ris to tle Metaphysics 988a f f .

53) There i s a ls o independent testim ony on t h is m atter; see my n.37.
54) Perhaps th e Plb. does not give us an account o f th e generation of
o b je c ts, but gives us a means o f thinking about t h e i r q u a litie s v^ich
both resolves th e problem o f th e compresence o f opposites (see here
Plb.25d11 e sp .) and allow s us to p re c is e ly q u an tify th e q u a litie s of
o b je c ts . I t i s worth noting t h a t th e [a p e iro n ]/ [peras] a n a ly sis i s a t
i t s b e st in dealing w ith p o lar p a ir s o f q u a litie s , such a s h o t/ co ld ,

243
th e s o r t o f th in g t h a t as we saw e a r l ie r were a prime m otivation fo r th e
in tro d u c tio n o f th e theory of Forms.

55) Cf. Gosling (1975) p i 53/4, 170-180, 196-205 fo r a discu ssio n o f

[techne].
56) Cf. my discu ssio n o f [techne] and [em peiria] in c h .3.

57) See e .g Grg.465a, 500e.

58) In p a r tic u la r P la to 's conception o f th e Good becomes more te c h n ic a l
and m athem atical.
59) As Gosling comments, t h is lin e o f aproach may commit P lato to a
m athematical science of grammar, a p o in t which Sayre c r i t i c i s e s h is
in te r p r e ta tio n on. There seems to me no major d i f f ic u lt y h e re , though.
Mathematics w ill apply as much a s a su b je c t p erm its, and th e re a re
asp ects of gramnnar t h a t a re m athem atically tr e a ta b le . Secondly, i f P lato
i s in te re s te d in a [techne] o f speech, t h i s c e rta in ly i s m athem atically
tr e a ta b le , as discussed above, as co n tra Sayre vocal sounds can be
tre a te d as lim its on an unlim ited continuum.

60) Cf. iny c h .5 here.

61) Gosling (1975) p155 and p186 has produced a l i s t of p o in ts
concerning methodology and lim it and unlim ited which ought t o be
accommodated by any in te rp re ta tio n o f th e Plb. As in general I follow
Sayre on th e se two concerns, see h is d iscu ssio n a (1983) p268 f f . Sayre
tak es h is main advance over Gosling to be th e accommodation o f th e
se v era l passages which e x p lic itly s t a t e t h a t lim it and unlim ited are
c o n s titu tiv e o f se n sib le th in g s ; see above fo r my p o sitio n h e re . I take
th e main advantages of my view over S a y re 's to be t h a t we need not be
committed to h is view of th e Tht, and t h a t we can in te r e s tin g ly
in te g ra te th e Tim. in to th e development of P la to 's l a t e r thought.
62) See Popper (1952) p75 f f .

63) See e .g A ris to tle Metaphysics987b11-13.

64) P lato i s w ell aware o f th e i r r a t i o n a l i t y of se v e ra l numbers; see
Tht.147c f f , where th e square ro o ts o f th re e , f iv e , and seventeen are
mentioned, along w ith a general term ('oblong numbers') fo r a l l numbers
w ith i r r a t io n a l ro o ts.

65) Cf. a ls o Epin.990d f f on numbers and m odelling.

66) See Popper (1945) p248 n.9 and (1952) p87ff.

67) See Popper (1952) p88.

68) P ro c li Diadochi in primum E u clid is Elementorum librum coirmentarii

p71. Popper's tr a n s la tio n .

69) Popper (1952) p88.

70) See e .g Tim.6Id f f .

71) See Tim.35a f f , 37a f f .

244
72) I would argue t h a t P la to 's EWP and th e s tru c tu re o f th e Tim. in v ite
us t o extend such suggestions fo r o urselves, and then t o re tu rn to th e
t e x t to t r y out th e f u l l views.

73) See here Tim.36b-d on th e op erations th e demiurge performs to c re a te

th e world so u l.
74) See Cornford (1937) p180 f f .

75) Cornford (1937) p181.

76) P lato might a ls o be thought to r a is e d i f f i c u l t i e s fo r th e models of
p a rtic ip a tio n needed to underw rite such views; see e .g th e dilemma of
whole and p a rt and th e analogy of th e s a i l in th e f i r s t p a r t o f th e Rn.
77) See esp. Tim.37b, and Cf. ny c h .6.

78) This of course i s th e way t h a t A ris to tle and o th ers tak e i t ; see
S o rab ji (1988) p32-36.
79) See Tim.50c f f .

80) One a d d itio n a l problem fo r th e m ixture model i s t h a t v a ria tio n s in

th e m ixture a re seen a s an unfortunate accid en t (see Tim. 4 Id where
v a ria tio n s in th e homogeneity of th e m ixture a re used to account fo r
personal i n te lle c tu a l d iffe re n c e s ) , where we need some p o sitiv e
p rin c ip le to d if f e r e n tia te between p a rts of th e m ixture and to give
d if f e r e n t p a rts d if f e r e n t q u a litie s . I t i s worth noting both from the
Rn. and th e Plb. th a t i f th in g s a re no t lim ite d in some way, they become
u n lim ited , and lo se t h e i r s p a tio / tem poral c h a ra c te ris a tio n s .
81) So too w ith C ornford's m irror model.
82) Again, e sp e c ia lly do with C ornford's model, where th e re la tio n
between recep tacle and phenomena seems highly tenuous, and th e
rec e p ta c le cannot even claim t o be th e su b je c t o f which a q u a lity might
be p red icated ; things merely happen in i t in some manner.

83) Tim.51ab recognises th e d i f f i c u l t i e s here to o , worrying how

something t h a t i s in v is ib le , unshaped and a l l re c ep tiv e can partake of
th e i n te l l i g i b l e . No answer i s o ffered t o t h i s problem.
84) Note t h a t a t Tim.50d th e rec ep ta cle i s likened to a mother, th e
'so u rc e ' t o th e fa th e r and what i s engendered between th e two, the
o ffsp rin g .
85) As Cornford (1937) pi 81 p o in ts o u t, th e re c ep ta cle i s sometimes
re fe rre d t o a s th a t 'i n which' [en h o i] th in g s a re made, and so t h a t th e
rec ep ta cle cannot be a s u b s tra te o r m atter. I f we reckon t h a t P lato i s
giving us se v e ra l versions o f th e rec ep ta cle fo r us to juggle w ith and
decide th e worth o f , then th e re i s no need to choose a b so lu te ly ; we can
have an account both o f s u b s tra te and what happens t o t h a t s u b s tra te ,
and th e space t h a t t h a t s u b s tra te may be in .
86) At Tim.6Id f f we a re to ld concerning f i r e t h a t th e "Thinness o f i t s
sid e s and th e sharpness of i t s angles and th e sm allness o f i t s p a r tic le s
and th e speed o f i t s motion, by v ir tu e o f a l l o f v^ich i t i s e n e rg e tic
and d iv is iv e , always c u ttin g keenly whatever i t encounters, th ese must

2 45
be accounted fo r by re c a llin g th e o rig in o f i t s shape, and i t i s ra th e r
t h i s and no oth er pro p erty th a t d iv id e s up our bodies in to sm all p ieces
and which n a tu ra lly gives i t th e q u a lity we c a l l h eat and sup p lies i t s
name". One may f e e l t h a t i t pushes t h i s passage to o hard to fin d th e
idea t h a t a l l q u a litie s can be so analysed, but P la to makes suggestions
fo r us to t r y out g e n erally , and t h i s passage could w ell do se rv ic e as
promoting a general scheme of ex planation.
87) See Tim.67d f f .

88) See Tim.35a f f fo r m etaphorical usages, and Tim.37 and 44a2 fo r what
I have argued in c h .6 a re r e la tio n a l uses.
89) We can then give an account o f number, i f need be, tra c in g i t s
gen eratio n back a s in th e seconsd p a r t o f th e Parmenides.
90) When i t f i r s t encounters something, th e world soul determ ines a l l
i t s r e la tio n s o f sameness and d iffe re n c e and th en i t s c ir c le s spin ( i .e
th in k ) before i t produces knowledge or opinion; see Tim.37a f f , esp.
37b8-c2.

91) According to A r is to tle , P lato thought t h a t "Concrete th in g s [ta

pragmata] a re apprehended in some cases by mind, in o th ers by knowledge,
by opinion, or by se n sa tio n , and th e numbers a re th e forms [eide] of
th ese th in g s [pragmata]" (De Anima 404b26), though c f . Metaphysics
987a32, 1078b11.

92) Plb. 15a t e l l s us th e re a re indeed th in g s t h a t undergo no change (are

exempt from a l l becoming and d e s tru c tio n ). E xactly what th e e n t i t i e s are
a t 15a need not concern us (c f. Gosling (1975) p84, Guthrie (1978) p207.
S trik e r (1970) p78 f f ) , as we merely need t o n ote t h a t they e x is t.

93) See Bostock (1988) p147ff.

94) See esp. Plb.28d f f , and my c h .5 on harmony.
95) Cf. Sayre (1983) p i 35 n.23. Sayre though equates m ixture w ith
becoming in th e Tim. This cannot be q u ite c o rre c t a s th e m ixture o f the
Plb. co n tains th in g s which have undergone [genesis e i s o u sia ], and so
a re no longer becoming. I b eliev e th e equation o f P lb. m ixture = th e
r e s u lt of th e im position o f numbers and Forms on th e rec ep ta cle t o be
c o rre c t, b u t t h a t f o r both th e Tim. and th e P lb. t h i s includes the
r e s u lts of [genesis e is ousia] as w ell as th in g s t h a t a re becoming.

96) See Tim.46bc.

97) Here I agree w ith Fine (1979b) p366/7 and o th e rs t h a t while P lato
speaks o f knowing o b je c ts he tends to speak interchangeably o f knowing x
and knowing what x i s (see e .g Men.78c, T ht.147b), so 'a knows x ' can be
e a s ily transform ed in to *a knows what x i s ' and again to *a knows th a t x
is F '.

98) See e .g Tht.206c9, and c f . Men.97d f f .

99) See e .g Men.75c f f . Rep.533c, and c f . Fine (1990) p107.

100) See e .g Men.98a3, Pdo.76b, 78d, Rep.534b, Sym.202a5.

246
 101) Notable to o t h a t th e Tim. employs th e l e t t e r s and s y lla b le analogy;
c f . e .g Tht.201e1, 202b7 and Tim.48bc, and passim referen ces to th e two
b a sic tr ia n g le s a s sto ic h e a . Note a ls o th e Theaetetus* stran g e claim
t h a t th ese elem ents a re p e c e p tib le , and my comments in c h .7 about th e
move away from p e rc e p tib le sto ich e a in th e Tim.

102) See my c h .7 on names and he sto ic h e ic tr ia n g le s . I tak e i t t h a t th e

te le o lo g ic a l and m athem atical/ o n to lo g ical accounts here would count, as
Fine (1979b) p317 has p u t i t , as logos k , t h a t i s explanations t h a t w ill
h elp to produce knowledge ra th e r than logos s , mere sentences about
elements which may or may not be tr u e .
103) See Tht.206d f f .
104) See Tht.206e f f .

105) See Tht.208c. As noted b e fo re , we might coirpare t h i s w ith Tim.37ab

v^ere even giving an account o f a l l o f th e r e la tio n s o f sameness and
d iffe re n c e , not ju s t th o se t h a t uniquely mark i t o u t, i s in s u f f ic ie n t
fo r knowledge.

106) See Tht.209de.

107) See Tht.210a.

108) Socrates comments "And so , T heaetetus, knowledge i s not p erc ep tio n ,
nor tru e judgement,nor tru e judgement w ith an account" (T ht.210a).

109) See my comments in c h .4 on Tht. 157c and 210c and t h e i r r e la tio n to

P la to 's FWP, and to Pdr.275b.
110) See Fine (1979b).
111) Fine (1979b) p394.
112) See e .g Crt.424c f f , Plb. 18b. Note t h a t in both th e se in stan ces
vAien we produce in te r r e la tin g accounts we have a knowledge o f l e t t e r s
and s y lla b le s .
113) Some have argued t h a t P lato drops KL, or only adopts i t in th e I h t .
fo r a p o re tic purposes, and in stea d b e liev es t h a t we can have some
knowledge o f th e b a sic elements by some form o f non-discursive in tu itio n
(see e .g Robinson (1950) p52-5, Crombie (1963) pi 13 f f , Runciman (1963)
p40). This would be ra th e r stran g e on my p ic tu re o f P la to 's e a r l i e r
development, fo r I have argued in c h .2 t h a t th e ' i n t u i t i o n i s t ' theory of
re c o lle c tio n i s quickly abandoned in favour o f a coherence theory of
tr u th based around th e good; c f. ray c h .6 on proposi tio n a l thought in
P la to g e n e ra lly , and my c h .3 on p ro p o sitio n a l thought in th e Rep.

114) Bostock (1988) p243-250 has argued a g a in st Fine th a t w hile P lato

may l a t e r adopt th e in te r r e la tio n model (p245-248), th e re i s
in s u f f ic ie n t evidence to consider i t to be th e Tht. 's answer to th e
problems ra is e d . As a l l t h a t I req u ire i s t h a t P la to does adopt an
in te r r e la tio n model, whether here o r l a t e r , s h a ll not go in to t h i s
m atter. There i s a ls o a question a s to whether th e in te r r e la tio n model
rep laces KL o r e x p lic a te s i t (see Fine (1979b) p367-9, and n .4 , 16, 20,
22) ; a l l I req u ire here though i s t h a t KL in th e sense o f a sin g le
d e f in itiv e logos i s re je c te d .

247
115) See e .g P lb .6Id, 62a f f .

116) See above on knowing o b je c ts and p ro p o sitio n s.

117) P lato would lack th e mathematical to o ls ( i .e d i f f e r e n t i a l c a lcu lu s)

t o d eal w ith a l l motions b u t should be a b le t o deal w ith most.

118) See e .g Rep 530ab, and see my comments in c h .5 on [p a ra la tte in ] a t

530b3.
119) So to o to c a lc u la tio n , and to te le o lo g ic a l and m athem atical/
o n to lo g ic al accounts.
120) See Tim 37a f f .

121) So to o th e r e la tio n o f th e rec ep ta cle t o what i s in i t allow s th e

world to be stru c tu re d in such a way t h a t th e s u b je c t/ p red ic ate
th in k in g o f th e world soul can g e t a g rip on i t .

122) See Tim.37ab.

123) See Tht.208c f f .
124) The o th er prime candidate here a re th e heavens which a re again
q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le , p e rc e p tib le to th e world soul and amenable to
p re c ise c a lc u la tio n .
125) As w ith my argument concerning th e 'two w orlds' in te rp re ta tio n of
th e Rep. in c h .3, we can o f course opine i n te l l i g i b l e e n t i t i e s and move
on to a knowledge o f them. As f a r a s humans a re concerned, sto ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s a re i n te l li g i b le y e t p h y sic al. Timaeus does not claim
knowledge o f t h e i r s tru c tu re , and w ill welcome anyone w ith a b e tte r
account o f them 'a s frie n d ra th e r than enemy' (Tim.54a).
126) See e .g Tim.49c f f , where 'we se e, so i t ap p ea rs', e a rth
transform ing in to th e o th er elem ents, and nothing appears to s ta y th e
same as th e elements c y c lic a lly pass in to each o th e r.

127) I f t h i s i s so, i t would go a long way t o explaining th e emphasis

t h a t th e Epin. places on th e study of th e heavens.
128) Though i f we a re t o believe A ris to tle Metaphysics 987a32 f f , P la to
was a t l e a s t to some e x te n t influenced by C ratylus and H eracliteanism in
h is youth. For opposing views h e re , see Bolton (1975) who argues th a t
P la to was committed to ra d ic a l flu x up to th e Tht, and Jordan (1984)
p48—66.

248
CEIAPTER TEN

PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

At th e o u ts e t o f t h i s t h e s is , I raised se v e ra l questions concerning th e

ev alu atio n of P l a to 's philosophy o f scien ce. The usual c ritic is m s have
been t h a t P la to was a n tip a th e tic to th e in v e s tig a tio n o f n a tu re , fe e lin g
t h a t i t could produce no worthwhile r e s u lts , t h a t h is views were overly
te le o lo g ic a l, t h a t h is methodology was a n ti-e m p iric a l, t h a t he
discouraged c a re fu l observation, and t h a t he e ffe c tiv e ly su b s titu te d
mathematics fo r p hysics. Against t h i s , th e re i s th e question o f th e
e x te n t and th e value o f h is achievements in th e a tte rrp t to mathematise
n atu re and in v e s tig a tio n . In t h i s concluding chapter I s h a ll examine th e
in p lic a tio n s o f th e arguments advanced in t h i s th e s is fo r our assessment
of P la to 's views concerning th e in v e s tig a tio n o f n a tu re .

One m atter t h a t we a re now in a b e tte r p o s itio n t o d isc u ss i s the

c o n p lain t t h a t while modern science shuns te le o lo g y , P lato was th e
p ro g en ito r and arch-exponent o f te le o lo g ic a l e x p lan atio n , th e Timaeus
being a 'te le o lo g is ^ s m anifesto'. There a re se v e ra l ways in which we
m ight approach t h i s m a tte r. F i r s t l y , th e d is tin c tio n between P la to 's
views and a r e a l i s t conception o f modem science may not be so c le a r c u t
as might appear a t f i r s t s ig h t.
I f we a re to tak e a r e a l i s t approach in th e philosophy of sc ien c e,
th en i t would seem t h a t we need to make c e r ta in assumptions about th e
n atu re o f th e world. ^ The world must be a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y
conprehensible to human beings,^ and i f th e m athem atically framed laws
t h a t modern science seeks express some r e a l i t y , then th e world must both
be law abiding and stru c tu re d in such a way as t o be amenable t o
mathematical a n a ly s is . R elativ e to th e many o th e r lo g ic a lly p o ssib le
u n iv erses, any p o stu lated by a r e a l i s t philosophy of science w ill be in
some sense p ro v id e n tia lly ordered. That may be a good th in g in i t s e l f ,
or merely good fo r human beings.
The s o r t o f universe t h a t P lato p o stu la te s c e r ta in ly has many of
th e se f e a tu re s . In th e Republic, i t i s th e Good t h a t lends coitplete
com prehensibility to th e noumenal realm. ^ I f , as in th e Phaedo th e

249
p h y sical universe i s ordered in accordance w ith th e Good,^ then i t must
provide t h a t realm w ith a t l e a s t p a r t i a l c o n p re h e n sib ility . In th e
e a r l ie r works a s we have seen th e re a re two coitpromising fa c to rs h e re .
F i r s t l y , th e cosmos has a tendency t o degenerate, and secondly ph y sical
bodies w ill n o t always behave in a p e rfe c tly reg u la r manner.^ We have
seen t h a t in th e Timaeus and l a t e r works th ese fa c to rs disappear such
t h a t th e p h y sical world i s a more comprehensible place in l a t e r P la to .
The form ulation o f th e notion t h a t th e world i s a t l e a s t in p rin c ip le
f u l ly comprehensible and t h a t th e key to unlocking t h a t
com prehensibility l i e s in mathematics i s in i t s e l f , one might suggest,
an im portant moment in th e h is to ry of th e philosophy of sc ien c e.^
P la to 's views a re given a stro n g ly te le o lo g ic a l flav o u r by th e f a c t
th a t in th e middle period works th e Good he invokes i s a h ig h ly e th ic a l
and a e s th e tic a l one. Here though, one might ask two q u e stio n s. The
middle p eriod works t h a t t e l l us most about th e Good, th e Republic and
th e Symposium, a re concerned mainly w ith p o l i t i c s and e th ic s on th e one
hand and e r o tic s and a e s th e tic s on th e o th e r,^ and a t b e st only d iscu ss
in v e s tig a tio n in g en eral ra th e r than th e in v e s tig a tio n of n atu re in
p a r tic u la r . Could i t be th e case t h a t when P la to i s concerned
s p e c if ic a lly w ith phy sical in v e s tig a tio n t h a t he uses a d if f e r e n t
conception o f th e Good, one t h a t i s perhaps more mathematical in i t s
o rie n ta tio n ? Secondly, might i t be th e case t h a t P la to 's views on the
Good develop towards a more mathematical conception o f th e Good ? In
t h i s co n tex t A ristoxenus' comments on P la to 's le c tu re 'On th e Good' may
be o f some considerable i n te r e s t. He says t h a t
"Each came expecting t o le a rn something about th e th in g s which a re
g e n erally considered good fo r men, such a s w ealth, good h e a lth , ph y sical
s tre n g th , and a lto g e th e r a kind o f wonderful h agpiness. But when th e
mathematical dem onstrations came, including numbers, geom etrical fig u re s
and astronomy, and f i n a l ly th e statem ent. Good i s one i t a l l seemed to
them, I imagine, u t te r ly unexpected and strange."®
Sayre has argued t h a t th e comments a ttr ib u te d to P la to in h is L ecture on
th e Good can be understood w ith reference to th e views he p u ts forward
in th e Philebus. I t i s e v id en t e a rly on in th e d isc u ssio n o f th e Good
and th e good l i f e t h a t n e ith e r can be equated w ith any one th in g
e x clu siv ely , such a s in te llig e n c e or p lea su re , but must c o n s is t o f a
m ixture. As th e d iscu ssio n draws to a c lo se and th e Good i s brought in to
view, and Socrates comments th a t

250
 " I f i t i s no t w ithin th e power o f one idea t o hunt down th e good,
l e t us grasp i t w ith th re e , beauty, pro p o rtio n and t r u th , and l e t us say
t h a t a l l th e se a s a u n ity among th e elements o f th e m ixture a re most
c o rre c tly h eld resp o n sib le, and i t i s on account o f th e goodness of
th ese t h a t th e m ixture i t s e l f has become good. " (Plb.65a)
At 66a f f S ocrates and Protarchus proceed t o rank in te llig e n c e and
p leasu re a g a in st th e th re e o f t h i s u n ity . F i r s t come 'measure, th e mean
and what i s a p p ro p ria te ' (66a7), second a re 'p ro p o rtio n , beauty,
com pleteness, su ffic ie n c y ' (66b1), th ir d come 'wisdom, in te llig e n c e and
understanding (66b6), fo u rth a re 'knowledge, s k i l l and r ig h t opinion'
(66b8) and f i n a l ly come th e most pure forms of p le a su re . Now we know
from e a r l i e r in th e Philebus th a t measure i s achieved by th e in p o sitio n
of lim it, which i s equ iv alen t to p a rtic ip a tin g in u n ity . So i f measure
i s th e prim ary c o n stitu e n t o f th e Good, then as measure i s p a rtic ip a tio n
in u n ity , so in one sense u n ity might be equated w ith th e Good. This
conception o f th e Good, found in th e Philebus and th e Lecture on the
Good i s c le a r ly d if f e r s from th e p o sitio n o f th e middle p e rio d ,^ and
p re se n ts a more te c h n ic a l and mathematical view o f th e Good. When we
th en t a lk about th e good s tru c tu re and arrangement o f th e un iv erse, we
a re more lik e ly to r e fe r to mathematical notions such a s p roportion and
due measure ra th e r than e th ic a l o r a e s th e tic a l c r i t e r i a . If th is is
c o rre c t, th en i t considerabl y narrows th e gap between P l a to 's teleo lo g y
12
and a r e a l i s t conception o f modern scien ce.
A second problem f o r any r e a l i s t philosophy o f science i s th e
underdeterm ination o f theory by e irp iric a l evidence. As i t i s always
p o ssib le to generate an i n f i n i t e number o f th e o rie s which f i t th e d a ta ,
t h i s evidence on i t s own cannot determine which i s th e 't r u e ' theory. In
p r a c tic e s c i e n t is t s choose th e m athem atically most s in p le and e le g an t
th eo ry , and th e o rie s which a re lik e ly to f i t w ith o th er h ig h -le v e l
th e o rie s t h a t we ho ld . The d i f f i c u l t y fo r th e r e a l i s t i s to give a
ra tio n a l ju s t if i c a t io n fo r such a p ro cess. I f i t i s ra tio n a l to assume
t h a t th e universe i s conprehensible, though, and ra tio n a l to o to propose
ways in which th e universe i s conprehensible, then perhaps we can
g en erate some c r i t e r i a fo r theory s e le c tio n . I f we assume t h a t th e
world has a u n ifie d and sin p le s tru c tu r e , we ought to s e le c t sin p le
hypotheses which w ill a id th e o r e tic a l u n ific a tio n .
In ch ap ter two 1 discussed th e le a r n e r 's paradox o f th e Meno and
argued th a t one o f th e d i f f i c u l t i e s i t poses i s given t h a t we do n o t

251
know th e answer to our problem, then what s o r t o f candidates should we
p u t forward. Now w hile t h i s c le a r ly i s n o t th e same problem a s th e
modern one o f underdeterm ination, i t does bear c e rta in s i m il a r it i e s . We
could produce any number o f candidate hypotheses, and a ls o be a t a t o t a l
lo ss a s to where to s t a r t te s tin g any o f them.
P l a to 's answer t o t h i s in th e Phaedo i s th a t we should p u t forward
th e o rie s t h a t a re 'healthy* and a re lik e ly to cohere w ith our o th er
b e lie f s , and th e c r i t i c a l t e s t s w ill be in r e la tio n to th o se o th er
b e lie f s . As b efo re, th e d iscu ssio n s o f th e Phaedo, Symposium and
Republic have a d i s t in c t ly e t h i c a l / a e s th e tic a l f e e l to them. However,
i f we feed in th e l a t e r , science o rien ted conception o f th e good then
th e coherence c r i t e r i a become more m athem atically o rie n te d . A
p a r tic u la r ly im portant example here i s th e theory o f geom etrical
atomism. Timaeus knows nothing o f sub-atomic s tru c tu re , and has no
p ercep tu al access to such micro e n titie s , y e t produces some p re c ise
matJiematical proposals from th e assumption t h a t th e demiurge w ill have
arranged Idlings in th e b e s t p o ssib le manner.
Another approach to th e Timaeus on t h i s m atter might be to
recognise t h a t P la to 's myths a re o fte n more o n to lo g ic a lly extravagant
th an some o f tdie more hard-nosed arguments t h a t he p re s e n ts . As we saw
in ch ap ter one, McCabe has argued t h a t t h i s may be p a rt o f P la to 's PWP,
s e ttin g up a ten sio n between parsimony and p ro flig a c y fo r th e readers to
in v e s tig a te fo r them selves. ^^ While th e Timaeus may i t s e l f lack a
parsimonious arm in r e la tio n to te le o lo g y , th e re a re o th er l a t e works,
notably th e Theaetetus which can provide th e c o n tra s t h e re . As McCabe
has argued though, th e Timaeus gives us a te le o lo g ic a l o v e rk ill,
invoking both in te n tio n a lis t and n a tu ra l models where ju s t th e one might
be thought adequate. One o f th e challenges t h a t th e Timaeus s e ts i t s
read ers then may be a questio n of How much, and what s o r t o f teleo lo g y
do we re q u ire in order to generate explanatory adequacy ? I f t h i s i s so ,
and we read th e Timaeus a s a challenge ra th e r than a s a sim ple statem ent
of cosmology, then th e re i s considerable scope fo r paring down i t s
p r o f lig a te te leo lo g y .
The p o in t o f th ese arguments i s not t o attem pt t o a s s im ila te P lato
to modern scien ce, as c le a rly th e re a re irre d u c ib le d iffe re n c e s w ith
P la to 's te le o lo g ic a l programme. R ather, they a re an attem pt t o narrow
what some have depicted a s a yawning chasm down t o a reasonable gap on
t h i s m atter. This i s a l l th e more urgent because i f we dism iss P la to 's

252
work as te lo lo g ic a l, and la b e l th e Timaeus a s th e 'teleo lo g ist^s
manifesto* we a re lik e ly to m iss some o f th e a f f i n i t i e s t h a t P la to 's
views bear t o a r e a l i s t conception o f modern scien c e. I t would seem th a t
P la to ask s, and provides in te re s tin g answers to th re e o f th e key
qu estio n s fo r any r e a l i s t philosophy of sc ien c e.
1) I f th e world i s comprehensible, then what i s i t t h a t c re a te s and
su s ta in s t h i s com prehensibility The c la sh o f th e orthodox and
a lte r n a tiv e views p resen t in th e T im eus can be seen a s a debate on th e
q u estio n . I s th e world f u lly conprehensible ? The a lte r n a tiv e account
goes on to propose reasons why th e world i s comprehensible, and can be
seen as answering th e follow ing key q u estio n . I f we can comprehend th e
w orld, then what must th e world, our minds, and th e re la tio n s between
them be lik e fo r t h i s s t a te o f a f f a i r s to occur ?
2) I f th e world i s m athem atically stru c tu re d , then how i s i t so
stru c tu re d ? I f my arguments concerning th e r e la tio n o f P lato to
Pythagoras a re c o rre c t, then P la to 's answer i s th e world i s
g eo m etrically ra th e r than a rith m e tic a lly stru c tu re d . That, as Popper has
noted, i s a c o n trib u tio n t o our conception o f th e universe t h a t has gone
v ir tu a lly unchallenged r ig h t down to th e p resen t day.
3) What c r i t e r i a should we appeal to when we a re framing our hypotheses,
and given a number o f hypotheses which a re e n p ir ic a lly adequate, what
c r i t e r i a should we use t o choose between them ? Which o f them should we
s e le c t fo r fu rth e r te s tin g , and what t e s t s should we s e le c t ? According
to P la to we ought to form 'h e a lth y ' hypotheses w ith th e Good in mind,
and choose th e hypothesis which b e st coheres w ith our o th e r ideas and
our notion o f th e Good. As we have seen, P la to 's id ea o f th e Good
becomes in c re asin g ly te c h n ic a l and m athem atical.
There i s a ls o th e q u estio n o f to what e x te n t i s P la to speaking
m etaphorically when he ta lk s o f God and o f th e Good. He c e r ta in ly would
n o t be th e l a s t fig u re in th e h is to ry o f science to speak in a h ighly
m etaphorical manner h e re . E in ste in comments t h a t
"In t h i s sense alone I am a deeply relig o u s man. I cannot conceive
of a God who punishes and rewards h is c re a tu re s , or has a w ill o f th e
kind th a t we experience in o u rs e lv e s ... I am s a t is f ie d w ith th e mystery
of th e e te r n ity of l i f e and w ith th e awareness and a gliitpse o f th e
m arvellous s tru c tu re o f th e e x is tin g world, to g e th e r w ith th e s triv in g
to comprehend a p o rtio n , be i t ever so tin y , of th e Reason t h a t
m anifests i t s e l f in n atu re.
He fu rth e r says th a t

253
 "Certain i t i s th a t a conviction, akin to relig^^vs fe e lin g , of th e
r a tio n a lity or i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the world l i e s behind a l l s c ie n tif ic
work of a higher o rd er. This firm b e lie f , a b e lie f bound up with deep
feelin g in a superior mind th a t reveals i t s e l f in the world of
n1
experience, represents my conception of God."
Any attem pt to push P lato down t h is path though must of course contend
with Laws X and the s tr ic tu r e s a g ain st a th e is ts .
A second approach to P la to 's teleology i s to place h is views in
th e ir h is to r ic a l context. I t has often been argued th a t th e sig n ifican ce
of the Timaeus, fo r instance, l i e s in i t s being the f i r s t extant
statem ent of a thoroughgoing te le o lo g ic a l c o s m o l o g y . T h e r e can be no
doubting P la to 's influence here which was to spread over the next two
m i l l e n i a . While the o v ertly te le o lo g ic a l world p ic tu re has been
abandoned, as I have suggested above, some of the foundations th a t P lato
la id fo r cosmology and in v estig atio n s t i l l have relevance to modern
r e a l i s t p o sitio n s. One must remember here too th a t P lato did not eschew
mechanical explanations, and th a t as argued in chapter seven, h is
conception of the atomism, advocating the explanation of the atoms
phenomenal p ro p erties in terms of i t s mathematical p ro p e rtie s, a sm all
number of basic types of atoms, and a s n a il number of sub-atomic
p a rtic le s i s considerably closer to the modern view than other a n cien t
atom ists or indeed the 'hooks and eyes' men who f i r s t revived the
ancient idea.

II

Perhaps the most conmon complaint ag ain st P lato has been th a t he

denigrated observation or even th a t he banned i t e n tire ly from the s o r t
of en q u iries th a t he envisaged. The evidence fo r such a view i s perhaps
stro n g est in th e Republic, a t 53Ob6 in p a rtic u la r. However, I have
argued th a t th e a lle g o rie s of lin e and cave suggest a much more dynamic
approach to in v e stig a tio n , one th a t begins with th e world about us and
involves th e in te r re la tio n of se n sib les and in te llig ib le s , the
in v estig atio n of each being necessary but not s u f fic ie n t fo r us to
master a given d i s c i p l i n e . O n e im portant im plication of th is i s given
a TW view of the Republic, th ere i s no demarcation fo r in v estig atio n
between the two realms. This serves to undermine th e notion th a t P la to 's
science deals so le ly w ith in te llig ib le o b jects and so eschews
observation, and the view th a t i t deals so le ly with physical e n ti t ie s
and so can aim no higher than opinion. We a lso saw in chapter

254
th re e t h a t th e passage a t Republic 529d f f illu m in a te s a d is tin c tio n
between doing and teaching astronomy, and assumes t h a t doing astronomy
n e c e ssa rily involves an em pirical in v e s tig a tio n , or a t l e a s t an
acquaintance w ith th e d a ta .^ ^ I t would seem from comments in th e
E^inomis and Timaeus t h a t P la to was indeed acquainted w ith Egyptian
astronom ical d a ta . I have a ls o argued t h a t P la to 's middle period
a tt i tu d e to th e re g u la r behaviour o f p h y sic al bodies does n o t e n ta il
t h a t he would have been dism issive o f d e ta ile d o b serv atio n al work. As
h is views on t h i s m atter change by th e Timaeus, t h i s i s n o t a major
concern.
I f th ese arguments a re c o rre c t, we need to a sse ss th e R epublic's
views on in v e s tig a tio n (as opposed to th e education o f th e guardians) in
term s o f a necessary i n i t i a l em pirical approach follow ed by a move to
th e co n sid eratio n o f th e re le v a n t i n te l l i g i b l e s a s p a rt o f th e same
d is c ip lin e . This gives i t a p o te n tia lly much more reasonable
methodology, observation followed by a b s tra c tio n and m athém atisation,
than has been allowed fo r in some of th e l i t e r a t u r e . We might be
c r i t i c a l though o f th e way in which hypotheses a re su b je c ts fo r
d isc u ssio n , not em pirical te s tin g , even i f they a re i n i t i a l l y based on
o b serv atio n s. One might d istin g u is h between contexts o f discovery and
j u s t if i c a t io n , accepting t h a t P la to allow s some em p irical input t o th e
former b u t n o t to th e l a t t e r . This i s n o t e n tir e ly c le a r c u t, though;
one reason fo r doubting a hypothesis might be i t s i n a b i l it y to accord
w ith th e phenomena w ithout being a b le to give an account as to why i t
does n o t,^^ and th e S o cratic elenchus allow s th e use o f concrete
oo
examples.
One might w ell argue though t h a t w hile P la to does n o t a t any stag e
ban observation from in v e s tig a tio n , h is a ttitu d e t o observation
g rad u ally becomes more p o s itiv e . This I th in k i s so , and perhaps th e
e a s ie s t th in g t o do here i s to quote in f u l l a passage which I have
discussed in p a r t in o th er c o n te x ts, and compare i t w ith any of th e many
passages in th e Phaedo which a re somewhat disparaging towards sense
p ercep tio n . Timaeus t e l l s us t h a t
"Sight, in my opinion, i s th e cause o f th e g r e a te s t b e n e fit t o u s,
a s n o t a word of our c u rre n t account o f th e universe could ever have
been given i f n e ith e r th e s t a r s , th e sun, nor th e heavens had been seen.
But now s ig h t of day and n ig h t, of months and th e cycle o f th e y ears has
procured fo r us number and th e concept o f tim e, and has a ls o led us to

255
seek th e n atu re o f th e u n iv erse. From th e se we have derived philosophy,
and no g re a te r good has o r w ill come a s a g i f t from th e Gods to m ortal
men. T his, I a s s e r t, i s indeed th e g re a te s t good o f e y e s ig h t... God
devised and gave to us v isio n in o rder t h a t we might observe the
ra tio n a l rev o lu tio n s o f th e heavens and use them a g a in st th e rev o lu tio n s
o f thought t h a t a re in u s, which a re lik e them, though th o se a re c le a r
and ours confused, and by learn in g thoroughly and partak in g in
c a lc u la tio n s c o rre c t according t o n a tu re , by im ita tio n o f th e e n tir e ly
unwandering rev o lu tio n s o f God we might s t a b i l i s e th e wandering ones in
o u rse lv es." (Tim.47a)
Against t h i s th e re i s th e much quoted passage o f Timaeus 68d where
P la to has Timaeus say t h a t i t would be u se le ss to make any experim ental
te s t^ ^ to determ ine th e proportions o f th e c o n stitu e n ts o f c e rta in
co lo u rs. The in p o rta n t thin g here would seem to be th a t we a re to ld th a t
to make such an attem pt would be t o b e tra y an ignorance o f th e n a tu re of
men and God, as God can blend th e many in to one and vice v ersa, b u t no
man can. P la to cannot then be ta lk in g o f how an a r t i s t mixes pigments to
produce a new colour on h is p a le tte . R ather, i t i s more lik e ly he i s
re fe rrin g to th e m ixture o f th e various grades o f f i r e p a r tic le s which
go to make up a c o l o u r . O n e p o s s ib ility here i s t h a t a s n e ith e r God
nor th e world soul have percep tu al th re sh o ld s, they a re ab le to
p e rc eiv e , and in th e case o f th e demiurge manipulate atoms in a way th a t
men cannot. Men a re r e s tr ic te d t o la rg e sc a le agglom erations o f atoms,
and so , w ithout th e in d ire c t techniques t h a t a re a fe a tu re o f modern b u t
n o t a n cien t scien ce, would be hop elessly clumsy in attem pting to
determine th e (sm all) number o f grades o f f i r e p a r tic le s t h a t c o n s titu te
a c o l o u r . I f one i s to a tte n p t to make out an a n ti-ex p erim en tal charge
a g a in st P la to , one w ill need more evidence than Timaeus 68d f f , which
c o n tra sts what God can do a g a in st what men a re capable o f.
P la to 's views on observation a re by no means p e rf e c t from th e
viewpoint o f modern scien ce, but i t should be c le a r t h a t P la to d id not
ban observation from in v e s tig a tio n and t h a t observation came to have a
more prominent ro le in th e w ritin g s o f th e l a t e r p erio d .

Ill

A major contention o f t h i s th e s is has been t h a t th e re was a s ig n if ic a n t

change in P la to 's views concerning cosmology and th e way th a t
mathematics r e la te to th e n a tu ra l world. I f my arguments here have been
c o rre c t, then we may be a b le t o id e n tify two h ig h ly s ig n if ic a n t events

256
in th e h is to r y o f man's in v e s tig a tio n o f th e cosmos. F i r s t l y th e re i s
th e change from th e conception o f a degenerating cosmology t o one th a t
i s e n tir e ly s ta b le . Exactly how widespread th e id ea t h a t th e world,
humans and s o c ie ty were caught up in some slow b u t in e v ita b le decay was
among authors (e.g.Homer, Hesiod), philosophers (e.g.E npedocles) and th e
p u b lic in g eneral i s to o broad an a re a o f sp ecu latio n f o r t h i s th e s is .
We may f a i r l y say though t h a t i t was a reasonably common n o tio n , and
e a r l i e r I noted P l a to 's a llu s io n s to Hesiod in h is d e sc rip tio n of
p o l i t i c a l decay in th e R e p u b l i c . L a t e r P lato though i s unequivocal;
th e s o la r system i s e n tir e ly s ta b le , and th e re i s no-one and nothing to
blame b u t ourselves fo r p o l i t i c a l , s o c ia l and moral decay.
Secondly, th e re i s th e change to th e id ea t h a t th e n a tu ra l world i s
amenable to p re c ise mathematical a n a ly sis. We have seen too how th e
l a t e r P la to ta k e s an i n te r e s t in reform ulating Pythagorean ideas to s u i t
h is own ends. I f t h i s i s c o rre c t, then P lato la id th e b a s is fo r th e
geom etrical world view t h a t we now take fo r granted ra th e r than the
a rith m e tic a l one o f th e Pythagoreans, and la id th e th e o r e tic a l b a s is fo r
a world where p h y sical e n t i t i e s can be measured as w ell as counted. In
t h i s P lato may have done th e h is to ry of science a g re a t s e rv ic e , and
su re ly t h i s i s th e view of P la to t h a t th e l a t e r astronom ers took.
Otherwise, i t would seem strange t h a t th ey stru g g led so long and hard to
account f o r th e phenomena in term s o f e p ic y c le s, e c c e n tric s and equants,
when on th e P la to 's e a r l i e r view o f th e heavens th ey might simply have
tak en a le s s complex s e t of c irc u la r motions to be th e tr u e , underlying
ones, and dism issed any d ev iatio n from th ese by th e observable heavens
a s ab b erations due to th e in tra c ta b le n atu re o f th e phy sical world.
How much P lato makes o f t h i s m athém atisation i s of course a
d if f e r e n t q u estio n . Lloyd has argued t h a t we should beware o f th e
p i t f a l l s o f a ssim ila tio n .^ ^ On th e question o f th e m athém atisation of
physics we should beware of being so generous to P la to t h a t we
a ssim ila te him to Archimedes or even G alileo . Thus Lloyd argues t h a t h is
e a r l i e r work was o v e re n th u sia stic in representing P l a to 's advocacy of
th e m athém atisation o f p h y s i c s . O n t h i s m atter I would wish to agree
w ith Lloyd, a t l e a s t fo r P la to ' middle p e rio d . P la to 's major concern in
th e Republic i s w ith th e cognition o f th e Good, and th e ways in which
mathematics may a id t h i s , ra th e r than w ith th e m athém atisation o f nature
or sc ie n c e . There i s l i t t l e evidence t h a t a t t h i s sta g e P la to was
in te re s te d in th e q u ein tificatio n o f j^enomena, o r t h a t he wished in
g en eral to describ e p h y sical processes by mathematical equations.

2 57
Applying th e converse o f L loyd's argument though, we ought to be c a re fu l
n o t t o a ssim ila te middle period P la to to those p re s o c ra tic s who d id not
envisage an irrportant ro le fo r mathematics, or even, as I have argued,
to th e Pythagoreans.
With th e l a t e r period though, we have a d if f e r e n t s to ry w ith th e
f u l l m athém atisation (and w ith in t h i s géom étrisation) o f n a tu re in th e
Timaeus. F urther to t h i s , P lato a ls o seems to be embarked on th e
m athém atisation o f in v e s tig a tio n and e x p lan atio n . As argued in th e l a s t
ch ap ter, th e re i s a marked d iffe re n c e in th e emphasis given t o ro le of
mathematics in th e [technai] between th e e a rly and middle p erio d s and
th e P hilebus. So too in t h i s chapter we have found t h a t P la to 's views on
th e n atu re o f th e Good undergo some change and become markedly more
te c h n ic a l and m athematical ra th e r then e th ic a l and a e s th e tic a l. I f we
merely look to th e Good o f th e Republic and th e Symposium, we run the
ris k of m issing th e d if f e r e n t emphases of th e Timaeus and P hilebus. I f I
am c o rre c t in arguing t h a t one o f th e ta s k s o f th e Timaeus i s to
p o stu la te m athem atically p re c ise u ltim ate p h y sical e n t i t i e s , and th a t
one o f th e ta s k s o f th e Philebus i s to produce an ontology t h a t in
a d d itio n allow s fo r th e p re c ise q u a n tific a tio n of p ercep tu al phenomena,
and t h a t t h i s allow s a g re a te r ro le fo r mathematics in in v e s tig a tio n and
ex p lan atio n, then perhaps P la to la y s th e p h ilo so p h ical b a s is fo r th e
lik e s of Archimedes and G alileo t o c a rry f u r t h e r . S o w hile L loyd's
assessment may be c o rre c t fo r P la to 's middle p e rio d , perhaps th e l a t e r
works show some fu rth e r pro g ress.

IV

One p ere n n ial worry about P la to 's philosophy o f science i s whether he

believed t h a t th e in v e s tig a tio n o f n ature could y ie ld any worthvAiile
r e s u lts . On some accounts, th e Timaeus s ta te s t h a t such work i s a mere
c h ild is h amusement, th a t here we can only have a lik e ly account, and
can aim no higher than to have u n stab le opinions concerning the
p h y sic al, se n sib le and changeable th in g s t h a t make up th e world about
u s. The q u estio n of what P la to may mean when he uses [paid ia] and i t s
cognates i s something t h a t I have d e a lt w ith a t len g th in my discu ssio n
o f ’P la to 's FWP and i t s r e la tio n t o th e Timaeus. R ather than rele g a tin g
th e Timaeus to a mere harm less d iv e rsio n , i t e le v a te s i t t o a se rio u s
work v^ere we perhaps ought t o be looking beyond th e p la y fu l, suggestive
facade to th e arguments and debates running beneath th e su rfa c e .

258
 Even i f we ta k e th e epistemology o f Timaeus 27c~29e a t face value,
i t i s s t i l l p o ssib le t o make o u t a case t h a t th e in v e s tig a tio n o f nature
w ill produce some worthvAile r e s u lts . As reason has won a t l e a s t a
p a r t i a l v ic to ry over n e c e ssity , th e world has some order and
com prehensibility to i t . While we may only have opinion o f th e p h y sical
w orld, Timaeus o fte n claim s th e account t o be th e b e s t p o ssib le , and of
course th e p h y sical world i t s e l f i s th e b e s t p o s s ib le . Timaeus 68e f f
a ls o t e l l s us t h a t we must seek th e necessary a i t i a i f o r th e sake o f th e
d iv in e , fo r w ithout th e former we w ill n o t be a b le t o come to know th e
l a t t e r , so th e in v e s tig a tio n o f th e ph y sical world has some purpose and
worthwhile r e s u l t. The f a c t t h a t P lato a tte n p ts a thoroughgoing
te le o lo g ic a l treatm en t o f th e p h y sical realm should convince us o f h is
seriousness in t h i s m atter. As Lloyd has a r g u e d , w h a t e v e r P la to f e e ls
to be th e d i f f i c u l t i e s w ith th e p hysical world and w ith i t s co g n itio n ,
i t would be wrong to p a in t so bleak a p ic tu re o f h is views a s to
a ss im ila te him to th e s o r t of view expressed in Parmenides* poem.^^
However, w hile t h i s s o r t o f account may rep re se n t one stra n d of
P la to 's thought in th e Timaeus, a la rg e p a r t o f t h i s th e s is has been
concerned w ith arguing t h a t th e Timaeus has more t o o f f e r concerning th e
th e s o r t of accounts t h a t we might be ab le to give o f th e n a tu ra l world.
We have seen t h a t th e re a re irrportant changes from th e middle period
concerning cosmology and m etaphysics, and th e re i s a ls o th e Timaeus'
a s s a u lt on TW. The Timaeus * v ersio n of IW seems t o req u ire t h a t the
rele v an t p a rts o f four d is tin c tio n s (in c o rp o re a l/ p h y sic al,
i n t e l l i g i b l e / s e n s ib le , s t a b le / changeable, knowable/ opinable) are
coextensive w ith each o t h e r . H o w e v e r , th e Timaeus p o stu la te s e n t i t i e s
which a re p h y sic al b u t n o t se n sib le (atoms, coirplex tr ia n g le s , sto ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s ) , and those t h a t a re p h y sical b u t q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le , both
se n sib le and in se n sib le (heavenly bodies, s to ic h e ic tr ia n g le s ) .
This d is s o lu tio n o f IW opens up th e question o f what we can have
knowledge o f. S ta b ility remains a requirem ent fo r knowledge, so we might
now ask whether ph y sical and se n sib le th in g s have s u f f ic ie n t s t a b i l i t y .
I have argued t h a t th e u ltim ate p h y sic al c o n s titu e n ts , th e sto ic h e ic
tria n g le s a re indeed q u a lita tiv e ly s ta b le . The stre n g th of th e bonds
between th ese tr ia n g le s , in conjunction w ith th e wear and t e a r t h a t they
w ill have to undergo determ ines how long liv e d ensembles of s to ic h e ic
tr ia n g le s w ill be. In th e extreme case o f th e heavenly bodies th e bonds
are t o t a l l y s ta b le and so th e heavenly bodies have complete q u a lita tiv e

2 59
s t a b i l i t y . In between, th e ensembles t h a t c o n s titu te human beings have a
temporary s t a b i l i t y , and so we w ill u ltim a te ly decay and d ie . The g re a t
advantage o f th e theory o f th e Timaeus i s t h a t by p o stu la tin g some
q u a lita tiv e s t a b i l i t y a t th e most b a sic le v e l, w ell below th e th resh o ld
of human p ercep tio n , th e theory can then account fo r both phenomenal
flu x (the cycle o f th e elem ents) and phenomenal s t a b i l i t y (the
unchanging heavens). Taking t h i s in conjunction w ith th e Timaeus* new
views on th e r e la tio n of mathematics to th e world and to cosmological
decay, one might suggest t h a t in r e la tio n to th e problems w ith th e
co g n itio n o f th e p h y sical world th e re i s a re lo c a tio n from in tra c ta b le
d i f f i c u l t i e s w ith th e p h y sical to tr a c ta b le d i f f i c u l t i e s produced by th e
n atu re o f th e human mind.^^ The Timaeus provides us w ith an a lte r n a tiv e
epistem ological hypothesis in th e analogy o f th e world soul and the
human so u l, one t h a t i s f a r more o p tim istic than 27c. I t may w ell be
t h a t th e Timaeus envisages t h a t we can have some knowledge o f the
p h y sical o rd e r, a t l e a s t in astronomy. This knowledge, as th e Philebus
su g g ests, may not be o f th e same s ta tu r e a s some o th e r ty p es, but w ill
be knowledge n e v e rth e le ss. The %)inomis i s even more e n th u s ia s tic about
th e p o s s ib i l i ti e s t h a t may be opened up by th e in v e s tig a tio n o f the
heavens. P la to 's l a t e r p o sitio n then i s t h a t th e in v e s tig a tio n o f a t
l e a s t some n a tu ra l phenomena w ill lead to some knowledge o f those
phenomena. This knowledge may not be o f th e f in e s t s o r t , but according
to th e Philebus i t w ill be an e s s e n tia l p a r t o f th e good l i f e . While
P lato him self may have been a philosopher ra th e r than a s c i e n t i s t , he
can h ard ly have been a n tip a th e tic to th e in v e s tig a tio n o f natu re nor
f e l t t h a t i t could provide no w orthv^ile r e s u lts .

P la to 's most im portant c o n trib u tio n to th e philosophy o f science was

undoubtably h is a tte n p t to mathematise our conceptions o f n ature and how
n atu re should be in v e stig a te d and explained. His ro le here has sometimes
been downplayed, as i t has been argued t h a t he only p a r tly mathematised
n atu re , and d id not mathematise enquiry. While t h i s c ritic is m might be
le v e lle d a t th e middle p erio d , I hope my arguments here have shown t h a t
in th e l a t e r period th e world i s f u lly amenable to p re c ise mathematical
d e sc rip tio n , and t h a t with changes to th e n atu re o f th e Good and th e new
m athematical o rie n ta tio n o f th e [technai] in th e P hilebus, t h a t P la to
envisages a g re a te r ro le fo r mathematics in in v e s tig a tio n and
explcination.

260
 In p r a c tic a l term s, P la to 's g re a te s t c o n trib u tio n was to astronomy,
v^ere h is programme o f explaining th e motions o f th e heavens by re g u la r,
c ir c u la r motion was to s e t th e agenda fo r th e n ext two m ille n ia .
However, we must n o t fo rg e t some o f th e more su b tle th e o re tic a l
c o n trib u tio n s e it h e r . The s h i f t from a Pythagorean a rith m e tic a l
conception o f cosmology t o a geom etrical one was an im portant move in
th e h is to r y o f scien c e. I f i t i s c o rre c t t h a t E u c lid 's elements were
developed a s an organon o f t h i s cosmology, then th e re may have
considerable b e n e fic ia l sid e e f f e c ts a s w e ll.^ ^ So to o P la to took on
what appears to have been a commonly held notion (and one t h a t perhaps
influenced h is e a r l i e r th in k in g ), th a t th e universe i s su b je c t t o a slow
b u t in e v itib le degeneration, and gave us a s ta b le cosmos and so la r
system.
P lato was a ls o a c tiv e ly engaged in answering th e o r e tic a l questions
posed by th e p re s o c ra tic s . The Timaeus, as I have suggested we approach
i t , can be read as an extended m editation on such questio n s as th e
r e la tio n o f appearance to underlying explanation and th e consequences of
p o stu la tin g 'two l a y e r s ', th a t i s an im perceptible m icro -stru ctu re fo r
th e phenomenal w orld, fo r th e s ta tu s of our sense p e rc ep tio n s. So too
th e Timaeus in v e s tig a te s questions concerning flu x , change and s t a b i l i t y
ra is e d by Parmenides and H e ra c litu s. P la to i s a ls o in te re s te d in
developing a m athem atically based atomism in sharp c o n tra s t t o those
proposed by th e presocratics.^® Another p re s o c ra tic problem t h a t I have
suggested excercised P la to was t h a t o f i f p h y sical bodies a c t in a
p e rfe c tly reg u lar manner, why do they do so ? P la to 's answer i s t h a t
bodies possess re a l d is p o s itio n a l p ro p e rtie s in v irtu e of which they
behave a s th ey do.^^
Here we see sanething which I have suggested i s ty p ic a l o f P la to 's
approach. When confronted by some o f th e key q u estio n s in th e philosophy
of scien c e, P lato freq u e n tly opts fo r p r o to - r e a lis t s o lu tio n s . This
p o ssib ly stems from a deeper p h ilo so p h ical commitment t o realism . P la to
might o ften be thought t o be asking ; I f th e re i s knowledge, then what
must we assume about th e world, our minds, enquiry and th e re la tio n s
between them ? In chapter two we saw t h a t while P la to pays due heed to
parsimony, he f e e ls th e need to p o stu la te f u r th e r e n t i t i e s , a c tiv e
minds, and a ric h account o f enquiry and explanation. The assumptions
about enquiry in general a re made q u ite e a rly in P la to 's c a re e r, in
response to Meno's paradox. When we examine th e im p licatio n s of

261
P la to 's te le o lo g ic a l conception o f enquiry fo r th e philosophy of
sc ien c e, we fin d an in te re s tin g p r o to - r e a lis t p o s itio n . He has strong
te le o lo g ic a l g u id elin es fo r th e form ation o f hypotheses, fo r th e
s e le c tio n o f t e s t s f o r those hypotheses, and th e c r i t e r i a beyond
em pirical adequacy t h a t we might use to judge th e s e hypotheses.
The c o n flic tin g accounts o f th e Timaeus and th e development o f th e
l a t e r ontology and cosmology might be thought t o spring from th e
q u e stio n . I f th e re i s , and i f th e re i s n o t some knowledge o f th e n a tu ra l
world, then what assumptions a re we required to make ? The Timaeus then
in v e s tig a te s questions concerning th e u ltim ate p h y sic al c o n stitu e n ts of
th e world, t h e i r s t a b il t y and r e la tio n t o language and how we might
account fo r phenomenal flu x and s t a b i l i t y . So to o i t in v e s tig a te s th e
m athematical s tru c tu re o f th e world as a b a sis fo r te le o lo g ic a l
ex p lan atio n , and considers why i t might be th a t bodies a c t in a reg u lar
manner, i f th ey do so . In each case one might argue, P lato comes up w ith
p r o t o - r e a l i s t so lu tio n s to th e problems h e re . As I commented a t the
o u tse t of t h i s th e s is , t h i s i s not to argue t h a t P la to was in f a c t a
r e a l i s t . R a t h e r , t h i s i s a u se fu l and in te re s tin g way of looking a t
P la to 's c o n trib u tio n to s c i e n t if i c thought. P lato produces highly
te le o lo g ic a l answers to many problems, and th ese a modern r e a l i s t would
r e j e c t a s th e re a re le s s extravaggint ways o f th e o risin g the
com prehensibility of th e universe and providing coherence c r i t e r i a fo r
enquiry. The advantage o f t h i s approach though i s t h a t we can d iscern
th e s o r t o f problems t h a t P lato was try in g to so lv e, and h is general
s tra te g y f o r answering them. I f we a re c a re fu l n o t to throw out P la to 's
p ro to -re a l ism with h is overly te le o lo g ic a l bathw ater, we fin d much
t h a t i s o f p h ilo so p h ical and h is to r ic a l i n te r e s t in P la to 's proposed
so lu tio n s to key problems in th e philosophy of sc ien c e. While P la to 's
conception o f science may be a long way removed from some modern
p o s itio n s , th e re a re some in te re s tin g a f f i n i t i e s w ith modern r e a l i s t
approaches .
As fo r th e more s p e c ific charges a g a in st P la to , I have argued th a t
i t i s simply n o t th e case t h a t P la to c^/ocated a methodology fo r
in v e s tig a tio n t h a t was devoid o f em pirical in p u t, and th e re i s no
evidence t h a t he e ith e r denigrated o r discouraged c a re fu l and prolonged
o b serv atio n al work.
The charge t h a t P lato e ff e c tiv e ly s u b s titu te d mathematics fo r
ph y sics i s in tim a te ly re la te d to th e previous one. I t i s simply not th e

262
case t h a t P la to thought t h a t we could conduct th e in v e s tig a tio n o f
n a tu re in th e same a p r i o r i manner as we would nowadays in v e s tig a te
mathematics, P la to 's g re a t c o n trib u tio n t o science was h is
m athém atisation o f n a tu re , and o f th e [te c h n a i]; b u t as we have seen,
th e [tech n ai] a l l have a c r i t i c a l em pirical component.
F in a lly , i t can hardly be th e case t h a t P la to was a n tip a th e tic to
th e in v e s tig a tio n of n a tu re , fe e lin g t h a t i t could produce no w orthv^ile
r e s u l t s . The Timaeus can be read a s a d isc u ssio n o f th e q u e stio n . What
i s due in term s o f accounts of th e n a tu ra l world ? The a lte r n a tiv e s to
th e view of 27c f f t h a t P lato proposes have considerably more
epistem ological optimism, to th e p o in t where we can have scxne knowledge
o f th e n a tu ra l o rd er, th e prime candidates being th e heavenly bodies.
The a c q u is itio n o f such knowledge w ill help bring our m ental rev o lu tio n s
in to t h e i r proper o r b its , and so a id us t o liv e a good l i f e .^ ^

VI

In ch ap ter one, I argued fo r a p a rtic u la r conception o f th e way t h a t

P la to w rites philosophy. Undoubtably th e re i s more work to be done h e re ,
both in re fin in g t h i s conception of P la to 's IVJP and arguing i t s corner
a g a in st o th er views, as w ell as in applying i t t o th e in te rp re ta tio n of
P l a to 's works. I would not claim to have provided an exhaustive account
of th e in te rp la y of th e various a sp ec ts o f P la to 's IWP in Timaeus, l e t
alone any o f th e o th er works th a t I have touched on more b r ie f ly .
In applying my a n a ly sis o f P la to 's FWP to th e Timaeus, I suggested
t h a t t h i s would open up some in te re s tin g in te rp r e ta tio n a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
I c e r ta in ly cannot claim to have exhausted them h e re , even in th e
lim ite d f i e l d of P l a to 's philosophy o f scien ce. I have concentrated on
astronomy, la rg e ly because i t i s e a s ie r to tra c e s ig n if ic a n t
developments in P l a to 's thought h e re , and because i t i s in p o rta n t t o be
ab le to ex p lain th e sp e c ia l s ta tu s i t i s accorded in th e l a t e r works.
There i s considerable work t o be done on o th e r d is c ip lin e s however, both
as th ey develop in P la to 's thought and as they occur in th e Timaeus, and
indeed th e Philebus. In a d d itio n , th e re a re many o th er p h ilo so p h ical
issu e s re la te d to those I have ra is e d concerning th e a lte r n a tiv e
accounts of ontology, cosmology, epistemology and th e mind t h a t need
re a p p ra isa l. So too th e re i s much to be done in determ ining th e re la tio n
o f th e a lte r n a tiv e p o sitio n s o f th e Timaeus to P la to 's middle period
works and h is oth er l a t e r works. I have argued fo r a l a t e datin g fo r th e

263
T im eus on th e grounds o f changes in cosmology and th e r e la tio n o f
m th e m tic s to th e world. These arguments g enerate a l a t e group
conprising o f th e T im eus, C r itia s , Philebus, Laws and Epinomis. So to o
I have attem pted a b r ie f reassessm ent o f some o f th e o th er arguments
concerning d a tin g r e la tiv e to th e a lte r n a tiv e accounts of th e T im eus.
C lea rly th e re i s more work t o be done h e re , b u t th e notion t h a t th e
T im eus i s both l a t e and forms an in te g ra l p a rt o f P la to 's p o st middle
p erio d development, w ith im portant and in te r e s tin g r e la tio n s to th e
tr a n s itio n a l period works i s c e r ta in ly worth pursuing.
In c o n tra s t to many accounts of P la to 's development, I have
concentrated on P la to 's views concerning se n sib le and p h y sical e n t i t i e s
ra th e r than Forms. Again I would not claim to have exhausted th e
p o s s ib i l i ti e s h e re , and th e re i s fu rth e r work to be done both in
in v e s tig a tin g more o f th e l a t e r dialogues in d e t a i l , and in extending
th e programme to P la to 's e a rly works. The notion t h a t P la to does make
s ig n if ic a n t changes in h is ideas concerning p h y sical e n t i t i e s i s worth
fu rth e r in v e s tig a tio n , fo r as I have attem pted to argue in t h i s t h e s is ,
i t m y give us an im portant handle on P la to 's development. There i s only
so much t h a t one can do in one th e s is , but I hope t o have ra ise d some
in te r e s tin g new lin e s o f enquiry fo r th e study of P la to , and h is views
on th e in v e s tig a tio n o f natu re in p a r tic u la r .

264
NOTES TO CEîAPTER TEN

01) U iis i s something g e n e ra lly agreed upon by both r e a l i s t s and

in s tru m e n ta lis ts ; see e .g Maxwell (1984) and (1993a + b ). Van Fraassen
(1980) and (1989) fo r a view from e ith e r sid e h e re .

02) See Maxwell (1984) c h .9 fo r a d isc u ssio n o f f u l l and p a r t i a l

com prehensibility.
03) See e .g Rep.507a f f .
04) See Pdo.97c f f and ray c h .2.
05) See rry c h .3 and 5.
06) In p rin c ip le f u lly conprehensible, because perhaps in p ra c tic e only
th e world so u l can ap p re cia te th e f u l l co rrprehensibility o f th e world;
fo r humans th e re a re lim ita tio n s of p erc ep tu a l th resh o ld and
coirputational power which w ill prevent a p re c ise knowledge o f th e micro
world. This does not prevent us though from forming p re c ise general
p r in c ip le s , nor as th e P lb. makes c le a r , from having u sefu l imowledge
concerning th e n a tu ra l world. One a sp ect o f t h i s f u l l conprehensibi 1 i t y
a s noted a t th e end of my c h .5 i s t h a t as bodies behave in a reg u lar
manner, th e re may be necessary connection between ev en ts.

07) See here Sayre (1983) pi 73.

08) A ristoxenus, Elements o f Harmony I I , 30-31, G aiser*s tr a n s la tio n .

09) Note t h a t [metro n] and i t s eq u iv a le n ts a re a ls o used in a very

p o s itiv e e v alu ativ e sense in th e Tim.

10) One would lik e to be considerably more s p e c if ic about th e increased

ro le fo r mathematics in in v e s tig a tio n and explan atio n , but u n fo rtu n ately
P la to i s very vague h e re , j u s t giving us th e o r e tic a l o u tlin e s o f a
g re a te r mathematical o rie n ta tio n .
11) Ihe l a t t e r may s t i l l be re le v a n t though (a e s th e tic a l co n sid eratio n s
may be im portant fo r modern s c i e n t is t s to o ; th e re i s c e rta in ly a
d isp o stio n to b e liev e t h a t th e most b e a u tifu l, e le g an t theory ought to
be c o rre c t, including th e o rie s about how th e cosmos i s s tru c tu re d ). One
might here consider t h a t when Timaeus d escrib es th e co n stru ctio n o f th e
world soul (see Tim. 35e f f ), he does so p rim a rily in mathematical terms
of p ro p o rtio n and due measure w ith o th er c o n sid era tio n su b serv ian t.
12) This leaves open th e q u estio n of vdiether th e P lb. (and so too
perhaps th e Tim.) rep resen t a change o f p o s itio n or o f emphasis from th e
middle p e rio d ; I would in c lin e to say both.

13) See h ere Maxwell (1984) p200 f f .

14) T est in th e P la to n ic manner o f searching f o r a higher hypothesis.

15) See McCabe (1993).

16) One might argue t h a t what i s m issing from th e H it. and sabotages i t s
attem pt t o d efin e knowledge i s n o t so much th e theory o f Forms but

265
ra th e r th e assunptions required to generate sane te le o lo g y in order to
g e t coherence t r u t h and/ or system atic in te r r e la te d explanations o f f the
ground. Such a c o n tra s t between Tht. and Tim. req u ires t h a t th e Tim. i s
an in te g ra te d p a r t of P la to 's p o st middle p eriod s tra te g y , something I
hope to have provided arguments fo r in t h i s th e s is .
17) On th e in te n tio n a lis t model, someone fin d s something t o be f o r th e
b e s t, on th e n a tu ra l model something a c tu a lly i s b e s t; see McCabe (1993)
p63/4.

18) As we saw in ch. 5, Van Fraassen (1989) ix considers problems lik e

t h i s t o be c ru c ia l t o any r e a l i s t view o f scien ce.
19) See Popper (1952) p88.
20) E in ste in , (1973) p11.
21) E in ste in , (1973) p262.

22) One might question th e function o f th e Le. h e re . Whatever P la to 's

p ersonal th e o lo g ic a l views may be, he may f e e l t h a t i t i s f o r th e b e st
th a t so c ie ty in general b e liev es in th e Gods, and so follow ing th e Rep,
th e Le. t e l l s a 'noble l i e ' . Again in th e Le. though, th e notion of
God(s) is in e x tric a b ly linked to re g u la r, m athem atically p re c ise
behaviour in th e heavens (c f. e .g Le.820e f f , 891b f f , 966d f f ).
23) Before we condemn P la to , we might consider whether i t was c le a r a t
th e tim e o f w ritin g t h a t th e in v e s tig a tio n of n a tu ra l phenomena would be
b e tte r fu rth ered i f a l l concerned eschewed te le o lo g ic a l ex p lan atio n s.

24) One f o r in stan ce fin d s Leibniz c itin g P la to w ith approval; see

Gallop (1975) p176 and c f . Lennox (1985) p i 96/6 and VLastos (1975) p97.
25) Thus P la to does n o t, as F a rrin g to n 's (1936) p i 27 s t a te s , "S u b stitu te
mathematics fo r physics".
26) See my c h .3 fo r examples.
27) See e .g Rep.602e.

28) That ra is e s th e question of how c lo s e ly th e method o f hypothesis

follow s th e elenchus ; c f . Pdo.lOld and th e method o f th e e a rly
d ialo g u es.

29) Hardly an expression o f th e "P o sitiv e contempt fo r observation" t h a t

Thomson (1948) p i 01 a ttr ib u te s to P la to .

30) The Greek i s [basanon], Tim.68d3. LSJ give 'a t e s t to t r y whether

something was genuine o r n o t . . . enquiry, esp. by t o r t u r e '.

31) A p o in t seemingly e n tir e ly missed by Crombie (1963 vol I I ) p228/9 in

h is in v ec tiv e a g a in st what he sees as P l a to 's attem pt to 's h ie ld h is
theory from f a l s i f i c a t i o n '.

32) I use 'c o lo u rs ' here lo o se ly , as i t may w ell be t h a t th e Greeks had

a d if f e r e n t conception of colour t o our own.

266
33) I would agree w ith Lloyd (1968) p82/3 and (1987) p i 40 n.133 th a t
P la to 's language i s dangerously ambiguous h e re , and he does not
d istin g u is h a s sh arp ly as he might between th e p o ssib le types of
blending.

34) See. Rep.546e f f . P lato i s w ell acquainted too w ith Homer and
Empedocles; indeed Aristophanes* speech in th e Sym. may w ell s a t i r i s e
Empedocles ' views, and as I have argued e a r l i e r , th e Tim. may w ell be
c r i t i c a l of Empedocles * fo u r element th eo ry . Hesiod a ls o crops up a t
Epin.990a as one who i s not a tr u e astronom er, being someone who has
only 'observed s e ttin g s and r is in g s ' ra th e r than stu d ied o r b its .

35) F arrington (1936) p i 27 f f argues t h a t P la to 's view t h a t th e heavenly

p erio d s bear no ex act r e la tio n to each o th er was thoroughly rea ctio n ary ,
as i t was lik e ly to discourage p re c ise observation and th e o risin g . This
may be so f o r th e p o s itio n o f th e Rep. (though as I argued in c h .3, i t
i s n o t n e c e ssa rily s o ), but I hope to have shown t h a t t h i s i s c le a rly
f a ls e fo r th e Tim. and l a t e r works.

36) Lloyd (1983) p334.

37) And so to o the Lecture on th e Good.

38) Koyre (1943) p404 makes t h i s d is tin c tio n in d iscu ssin g P la to 's
in flu e n ce , though stra n g e ly he does n o t apply i t to P la to him self.

39) Astronomy may be an exception here,

40) Perhaps because P la to was a philosopher and a th e o re tic ia n ra th e r
than a p ra c tis in g s c i e n t i s t .
41) They would c it e Tim.59d h e re .
42) Lloyd (1991) p335.
43) On th e standard in te r p r e ta tio n o f th e Tim, I would agree w ith Lloyd
(1987) p i 36 n.117 and Cornford (1937) p29 f f a g a in st Taylor (1928 p59)
f f and Sambursky (1965) pi f f t h a t th e account t h a t Tim. gives cannot be
converted t o a f u lly s a tis f a c to ry one and i s permanently d e fic ie n t.
44) See e .g Tim.27d f f .

45) The problem o f th e compresence o f opposites s t i l l remains however,

and so th e need fo r a re so lu tio n p e r s i s t s ; we have Forms in th e Tim, and
whatever P lato has in mind (Forms or a l a t e r development from Forms) in
th e P lb. The new theory o f how th in g s have p ro p e rtie s in th e Tim. (see
my c h .9 ), analysing them in term s of th e s t r u c t rue and motion of
p a r t i c l e s , as w ell a s th e l i m i t / unlim ited a n a ly sis o f p ro p e rtie s in th e
Plb. may w ell render p a rtic u la rs somewhat le s s c o g n itiv e ly su sp ect.
46) Indeed, even some o f those instrum ental in th e overthrow of reg u lar
c ir c u la r motion fo r th e heavenly bodies, and here one th in k s
p a r tic u la r ly of K epler, would claim a strong P la to n ic in flu en ce.

47) See my c h .9 . Popper (1952) p88 and P ro c li Diadochi in primum

E u clid is Elementorum librum commentarii p71.

48) See my c h .7 on th e re la tio n o f P la to 's atomism to Empedocles' four

element th eory.
267
49) One might note here P la to ’s s a t i r i c a l a tta c k on Enpedocles* views on
e v o lu tio n in Aristophanes* speech in th e Sym.

50) Here P lato might be thought to be confronting another problem t h a t

tro u b led th e p re s o c ra tic s , t h a t o f th e r e la tio n o f conventional to
n a tu ra l t r u th .

51) Here o f course we a re ta lk in g o f P la to n ic hypotheses and t e s t s . One

problem, fo r th e philosophy o f science i s to produce a th e o ris a tio n of
s c i e n t if i c p ro g ress. For P la to , progress in an in v e s tig a tio n might be
equated w ith th e a scen t o f th e l in e in th e l in e a lle g o ry (which as I
suggested in ch. 3, a ls o might provide a model o f a d is c ip lin e s
devlopment and p re s c rip tio n s f o r i t s fu tu re p u rsu a l). S c ie n tific
progress o v e ra ll would be th e o rise d in term s of lin k in g d is c ip lin e s
to g e th e r in th e search f o r th e general th eo ry , and i t s r e la tio n to th e
Good.
52) Though one might note t h a t P lato does in te r p r e t th e o r e tic a l and
unobservable e n t i t i e s r e a l i s t i c a l l y ; e .g th e geom etrical atomism i s no
mere th e o r e tic a l c o n stru c t to account fo r phenomena.

53) As I suspect some of P la to ’s more p o s i t i v i s t / in s tru m e n ta lis t/

nom inalist c r i t i c s have been only too happy to do.

54) See here Tim.44c; those v^o c o rre c t t h e i r rev o lu tio n s become sound
and f a u l t le s s , those who do n o t re tu rn unperfected and unreasoning to
Hades. Cf. Tim.90b ad f i n , esp. 90d. One might sp ecu la te th a t by
lea rn in g what i s good about th e un iv erse, and by strengthening our
m ental o r b i ts , we can b e tte r obey th e in ju n c tio n t h a t in o rder to become
good we must have m astery over our emotions ra th e r than be master^ by
them.

268
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A c k rill, J.L .
(1957) P lato and th e Copula; Sophist 251-9. Journal o f H ellenic Studies
77, 1957, pp 1-6.
(1966) P lato on False B e lie f: T heaetetus 187-200, Monist 50, 1966, pp
383-402.
(1973) Anamnesis in th e Phaedo: Remarks on 73c-75c. Exegesis and
Argument, ed. E.N Lee, A.P.D Mourelatos and R.M R orty, Phronesis
Supplementary Vol 1, 1973, pp 177-195.
Adam, J .
(1902) The Republic o f P lato (2 v o ls ). Cambridge Ü.P, 1902.

A llen, R.E.
(1959) Forms and Standards. P hilosophical Q uarterly 9, 1959, pp 164-167.
(1960) P a rtic ip a tio n and P red icatio n in P la to ' s Middle Dialogues.
P hilo so p h ical Review 69, 1960, pp 147-164.
(1970a) The G eneration of Numbers in P la to 's Parmenides. C la ssic a l
Philology 65, 1970, pp 30-34.
(1970b) P la to 's Euthyphro and th e E a rlie r Theory o f Forms. London, 1970.
(1974) Unity and I n f in ity : Parmenides 142b-145a. Review o f Metaphysics
27, 1974, pp 697-725.
(1983) P la to 's Parmenides. Minneapolis U.P, 1983.

Annas, J .
(1981) An Introductio n to P la to 's Republic. Oxford U.P, 1981.
(1982a) A r is to tle on In e f f ic ie n t Causes. P hilosophical Q uarterly 32,
1982, pp 311-326.
(1982b) Knowledge and Language: The Theaetetus and th e C ratylus, in M.
S chofield and M.C Nussbaum (ed s). Language and Logos: S tudies in Ancient
Greek Philosophy Presented to G.E.L Owen, Cambridge 1982, pp 95-114.
(1992) P la to th e S ce p tic. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,
Supplementary Volume, Methods of In te rp re tin g P lato and His Dialogues,
pp 43-72.

Archer-Hind, R.D.
(1888) The Timaeus o f P la to . MacMillan and Co, London 1888.

Ballew, L.
(1974) S tra ig h t and C ircu lar in Parmenides and th e "Timaeus". Phronesis
19, 1974, pp 189-209.
Barnes, J .
(1979) The P re so c ra tic Philosophers. 2nd e d itio n , 1982, Routledge and
Kegan Paul, London and New York 1982.
(1980) Socrates and th e Jury: Paradoxes in P la to 's D istin c tio n between
Knowledge and True B e lie f, A ris to te lia n Society Supplementary Volume 54,
1980, pp 193-206.

Bedu-Addo, J.T .
(1979) Ihe Role o f th e H ypothetical Method in th e Phaedo. Phronesis 24,
1979, pp 111-132.
(1991) Sense-experience and th e Argument fo r R ecollection in P la to 's
Phaedo. Phronesis 36, 1991, pp 27-60.

B erger, F.R.
(1965) Rest and Motion in th e Sophist. Phronesis 10, 1965, pp 70-77.
269
Bernadete, S.
(1978) Eidos and Diiwesis in P la to 's Statesman. Phoenix 27, 1978, pp
193-226.
(1984) P la to 's T heaetetus. Chicago, U.P, 1984.

B estor, T.W.
(1978) Common P ro p erties and Eponyray in P la to . P hilosophical Q uarterly
28, 1978, pp 189-207.
(1980) P la to 's Semantics and P la to 's "Parmenides". Phronesis 25, 1980,
pp 38-75.
B illig , L.
(1920) Clausulae in P lato n ic Chronology, Journal o f Philosoph 35, 1920,
pp 225-256.
Bluck, R.S.
(1957) Hypothesis in th e Phaedo and P la to n ic D ia le c tic . Phronesis 2,
1957, pp 21-31.
(1975) P la to 's Sophist. Manchester U.P, 1975.

B lu n d ell, M.W.
(1992) Character and Meaning in P la to 's Hippias Minor. Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, Methods o f In te rp re tin g P la to
and His Dialogues, pp 131-172.

Bolton, R.
(1975) P la to 's D istin ctio n between Being and Becoming. Review of
Metaphysics 29, 1975/6, pp 66-95.

Bonjour, L.
(1986) The S tru ctu re o f E irpirical Knowledge. Harvard U.P, 1986.
Bostock, D.
(1978) P lato on Time and Change in th e Parmenides. Phronesis 23, 1978,
pp 229-241.
(1986) P la to 's Phaedo. Oxford U.P, 1986.
(1988) P la to ' s T heaetetus. Oxford U.P, 1988.

Bowen, A.C.
(1988) On In te rp re tin g P la to . P lato n ic W ritings, P la to n ic Readings, ed
C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp 49-65.

Brandwood, L.
(1990) The Chronology of P la to 's Dialogues. Cambridge U.P, 1990.
B risson, L.
(1987) P lato n , L e ttr e s . P a r is , 1987.

Brocker, W.
(1963) Der Philosophische Exkurs in P la to n 's Siebtem B rie f. Hermes 91,
1963, pp 416-425.
(1965) Nachtrag zum Philosophishcen Exkurs in P la to n 's Siebentum B rie f.
Hermes 93, 1965, pp 132.
Brumbaugh, R.S.
(1961a) P lato and th e H istory of Science. Studiem Generale 14/9, 1961,
pp 520-527.
(1961b) P lato and th e One. Yale U.P, 1961.

270
(1988) D igression and Dialogue; The Seventh L e tte r and P la to 's L ite ra ry
Form. P la to n ic W ritings, P lato n ic Readings, ed C.L Griswold, Routledge,
London and New York 1988, pp 84-92.

Bulmer-lhomas, I .
(1984) P la to 's Astronomy. C la s sic a l Q uarterly 34, 1984, pp
107-112.

Burge, E.L.
(1971) The Ideas as A itia i in th e Phaedo. Phronesis 16, 1971, pp 1-13.

Burger, R.
(1980) P la to 's Phaedrus: A Defence o f a Philosophic A rt o f W riting.
Alabama U.P, 1980.
B urkert, W.
(1972) Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism. Harvard U.P, 1972.

B urnet, J .
(1911) P la to 's Phaedo. Oxford U.P, 1911.
(1924) Greek Philosophy: Thales to P la to . London.

Bum yeat, M.F.

(1970) The M aterial and Sources of P la to 's Dream, Phronesis 15, 1970, pp
101- 122.
(1976) P lato on th e Grammer o f Perceiving. C la s sic a l Q uarterly, NS 26,
1976, pp 29-51.
(1980) Socrates and th e Jury: Paradoxes in P la to 's D istin c tio n between
Knowledge and True B e lie f. Proceedings o f th e A ris to te lia n S ociety,
Supp. vol 54, 1980 pp 173-191.
(1981) A ris to tle on Understanding Knowledge. In E B e rti (ed), A ris to tle
on Science : The P o ste rio r A nalytics, Padua U.P, 1981.
(1987) Platonism and Mathematics: A Prelude t o D iscussion. In A. Graeser
(e d ). Mathematics and Metaphysics in A r is to tle , Bern 1987, pp 213-240.
(1991) The Theaetetus o f P la to . H ackett, In d ia n a p o lis/ Cambridge, 1991.

Bury, R.G.
(1897) The Philebus o f P la to . Cambridge U.P, 1897.

C alder, W.M.
(1958) The Spherical E arth in P la to 's Phaedo. Phronesis 3, 1958, pp
121-125.

C allahan, J .F .
(1948) Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, Harvard U.P, 1948.
C a lv e rt, B.
(1970) Forms and Flux in P la to 's C raty lu s. Phronesis 15, 1970, pp 26-47.

C a rte r, R.E.
(1967) P lato and In s p ira tio n . Journal o f th e H istory of Philosophy 5,
1967, pp 111-121.
C herniss, H.F.
(1932) Parmenides and th e Parmenides of P la to . American Journal o f
Philology 53, 1932, pp 122-138.
(1936) The P hilosophical Economy of th e Theory of Ideas, in R.E A llen

271
(ed ). Studies in P la to 's M etaphysics, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
and New York, 1965, pp 1-12.
(1944) A r i s to tle 's C ritic ism o f P lato and th e Academy, Baltim ore U.P,
1944.
(1945) The Riddle o f th e Early Academy. C a lifo rn ia U.P, 1945.
(1957a) The R elation o f th e Timaeus to P la to 's L ater Dialogues. In
Studies in P la to 's M etaphysics, ed R.E A llen, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1965, pp 339-378.
(1957b) Timaeus 38aS-b5. Journal o f H ellenic Studies 77, 1947, pp 18-23.
(1975) The Sources of E v il According to P la to . American P hilosophical
Q uarterly 12, 1975, pp 244-258.

Cherry, R.S.
(1967) Timaeus 49c-50b. Apeiron 2, 1967, pp 1-11.

Clay, D.
(1975) P la to n ic Studies and th e Study of P la to . Arion N.S 2, 1975,
116-132.
(1985) The A rt o f Glaukos. American Journal o f Philology, 106, 1985, pp
230-236.

Clegg, J .S .
(1976) P la to 's V ision o f Chaos. C la s sic a l Q uarterly NS.26, 1976, pp
52-61.
Code, A.
(1983) On th e O rigin o f Some A ris to te lia n Theses about P re d ica tio n . In
How Things Are: S tudies in P red icatio n and th e H istory of Philosophy, ed
J . Bogen and J.E McGuire, R eidel, Dordrecht, 1983, pp 101-133.
(1988) Reply to Michael F red e's "Being and Becoming in P la to " . Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6 pp 53-60.
Cohen, M.
(1971) The Logic o f th e Third Man. Philosojdiical Review 80, 1971, pp
448-475.

Cohen, S.M and Keyt, D.

(1992) Analysing P la to 's Arguments : P lato and Platonism . Oxford S tudies
in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 1992, Methods of
In te rp re tin g P lato and His Dialogues, pp 173-200.
Cooper, J.M.
(1970) P lato on Sense Perception and Knowledge: T heaetetus 184 to 186.
Phronesis 15, 1970, pp 123-146.
Cornford, P.M.
(1932) Mathematics and D ia le c tic in th e Republic V I-VII. Mind 41, 1932,
(I) pp 37-52, ( I I ) pp 173-190.
(1935) P la to 's Theory o f Knowledge. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1935.
(1937) P la to 's Cosmology. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1937.
(1939) P la to and Parmenides. Routledge and Kegan P aul, London and New
York 1939.
(1941) The Republic o f P la to . Clarendon, Oxford 1941.
C ressw ell, M.J.
(1971) P la to 's Theory of C ausality: Phaedo 95-106. A u stra lia n Journal o f
Philosophy 49, 1971, pp 244-249.

272
Crombiey I.M.
(1963) An Examination o f Plato*s Doctrines (2 v o ls ), Routledge and Kegan
P au l, London 1963.

Dampier-Whetham, W.C.
(1948) A H istory of Science. Cambridge Ü.P, 1948.

D avis, M.
(1967) Ihe Statesman a s a P o litic a l Dialogue. American Journal of
Philology 88, 1967, pp 319-331.
Davis, P .J .
(1979) The Fourfold C la s s ific a tio n in P la to 's Philebus. Apeiron 13,
1979, pp 124-134.
Der«'ida, J .
(1972) La Pharmacie de P laton. La Dissem ination, S e u il, P a ris , 1972, pp
69-198.
D esjardins, R.
(1988) Why Dialogues ? P la to 's Serious Play. P la to n ic W ritings, P lato n ic
Readings, ed C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp
110-125.

De S a n tilia n a , G.
(1949) Eudoxus and P la to , I s i s 32, 1949, pp 248-262.
De Vogel, C .J.
(1955) The P resent S ta te o f th e S o cratic Problem. Phronesis 1, 1955, pp
26-35.
De V ries, G .J.
(1969) A Comnentary on th e Phaedrus of P la to . Adolf Hakkert, Amsterdam,
1969.
Dicks, D.R.
(1970) Early Greek Astronomy to A ris to tle . Thames and Hudson, B ris to l
1970.
D ies, A.
(1923) P laton, Parmenide, vol V III Oeuvres Completes, P a ris 1923.
Dombrowski, D.A.
(1981) A tla n tis and P la to 's Philosophy. Apeiron 15, 1981, pp 47-60.
D o rter, K.
(1971) Imagery and Philosoj^y in P la to 's Phaedrus. Journal fo r th e
H istory of Philosophy 9, 1971, pp 279-288.
(1982) P la to 's Phaedo. Toronto U.P, 1982.
(1989) The Theory o f Forms and Parmenides I . In Essays in Ancient Greek
Philosophy I I I , edd J .P Anton and A. Preus, New York S ta te U.P, 1989, pp
183-202.

Dreyer, J.L .E .
(1905) A H istory of Astronomy. 2nd e d itio n , Dover 1953.

273
Duhem, p.
(1906a) la Système du Monde; H isto ire des Doctrines Cosmologiques de
P lato n a Copernic, vol I . Herman, P a ris 1954.
(1906b) The Aim and Strucure o f Physical Theory. O rig in ally La Théorie
Physique, son O bjet e t sa S tru c tu re , tra n s la te d by P. Wiener, from th e
second e d itio n (R iviere, P a ris 1914), Princeton 1954.
(1908) To Save th e Phenomena. O rig in ally *Sozein t a phainomena; E ssai
su r l a Notion de Théorie Physique de Platon a G a lile e ' (Annales de
Philosophie C hrétienne, 1908), tr a n s la te d by E. Doland and C. Maschler,
Chicago 1969.
E d e lste in , L.
(1949) The Function o f th e Myth in P la to 's Philosophy. Journal o f th e
H istory of Ideas 27, 1966, pp 463-481.
(1966) P la to 's Seventh L e tte r. Leiden, 1966.
E in s te in , A.
(1973) Ideas and Opinions. Souveneir P ress, 1973.

Fahmkopf, R.
(1977) Forms in th e Philebus. Journal o f th e H istory of Philosophy 15,
1977, pp 202-207.

F arrin g to n , B.
(1936) Science in A ntiquity. Oxford U.P, 1936.

Ferguson, J .
(1963) Sun, Line and Cave Again. C la s sic a l Q uarterly NS 13, 1963, pp
188-193.
F e r r a r i, G.R.F.
(1987) L istening to th e Cicadas. Cambridge U.P, 1987.
F ie ld , G.C.
(1933) P lato and N atural Science. Philosophy 8, 1933, pp 131-141.
Findlay, J.N .
(1974) P la to : The W ritten and Unwritten D octrines. Humanities P ress, New
York, 1974.

F ine, G.
(1977) P lato on Naming. Philosophical Q uarterly 27, 1977, pp 289-301.
(1978) Knowledge and B e lie f in Republic V. Archiv fu r Geschichte der
Philosogjiie 60, 1978, pp 121-139.
(1979a) False B elief in th e T heaetetus, Phronesis 24, 1979, pp 70-80.
(1979b) Knowledge and Logos in th e T heaetetus, P hilosophical Review 88,
1979, pp 366-397.
(1980) The One Over Many. Philosophical Review 89, 1980, pp 197-240.
(1982a) Owen, A ris to tle and th e Third Man. Phronesis 27, 1982, pp 13-33.
(1982b) A ris to tle and th e More Accurate Arguments. In Language and
Logos, S tudies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G.E.L Owen, ed
M. Schofield and M.C Nussbaum, Cambridge U.P, 1982, pp 155-177.
(1983) P la to and A r is to tle on Form and Substance. Proceedings o f th e
Cambridge P h ilo lo g ic a l Society 209, 1983, pp 23-47.
(1984) S eparation. Oxford S tudies in Ancient Philosophy 2, 1984, pp
31-87.
(1986) Iimianence. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 4, 1986, pp
71-98.

274
(1987) Forms as Causes: P lato and A r is to tle . In A. Graeser (ed).
Mathematics and Metaphysics in A r is to tle , Bern 1987, pp 69-112.
(1988a) P lato on Perception: A Reply to P rofessor T urnbull, 'Becoming
and I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y in P l a to '. Oxford S tudies in Ancient Philosophy 6,
pp 15-28.
(1988b) Owen's Progress. Philosophical Review 97, 1988, pp 373-399.
(1990) Knowledge and B e lie f in Republic V-VII. Companions To Ancient
Thought 1, Epistemology, ed S. Everson, Cambridge Ü.P. 1990, pp 85-115.
F ish , S.
(1972) Self-Consuming A r tif a c ts : The Experience o f Seventeenth Century
L ite r a tu r e . Berkeley U.P, 1972.
F ish e r, J .
(1966) P la to on W riting and Doing Philosophy. Journal o f th e H istory of
Ideas 27, 1966, pp 164-172.
Frank, E.
(1923) P lato und d ie Sogennaten Pythagoreer. H alle an der S a lle , 1923.

F rankel, H.
(1942) Zeno o f E le a 's A ttacks on P lu r a lity . American Jouranl of
Philology 63, 1942, pp 1-25 and 193-206.

Frede, D.
(1978) The F inal Proof of th e Im m ortality of th e Soul in P la to 's Phaedo.
Phronesis 23, 1978, pp 27-41.

Frede, M.
(1967) P radikation und Existenzaussage. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht,
Gottingen 1967.
(1988) Being and Becoming in P la to . Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
6, pp 37-52.
(1992) P la to 's Arguments and th e Dialogue Form. Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, Methods of In te rp re tin g P la to
and His Dialogues, pp 201-220.

Frege, G.
(1960) T ran slatio n s From th e P hilosophical W ritings of G o ttle ib Frege,
edd P. Geach and M. Black, Oxford U.P, 1960.

Furley, D .J.
(1989) Cosmic Problems. Cambridge U.P, 1989.

F ried lan d er, P.

(1958) P lato a s P h y s ic ist. An Introduction to P la to , Routledge and Kegan
P au l, London and New York 1958, c h .14 pp 246-260.

Fujisawa, N.
(1974) Echein, Metechein and Idioms of ' Paradeigmatism ' in PL ato's
Theory of Forms. Phronesis 19, 1974, pp 30-58.

Gadaroer, H.G.
(1980) Dialogue and D ia le c tic : E ight Hermeneutical Studies in P la to ,
tr a n s . P.C Smith, Yale U.P, 1980.
(1988) Reply to N icholas. P. White. P la to n ic W ritings, P lato n ic
Readings, ed C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp
258-266.

275
G aiser, K.
(1963) Platons Ungeschriben Lehre, 2nd ed, S tu ttg a r t U.P, 1968.
(1980) P la to 's Enigmatic Lecture 'On th e Good'. Phronesis 25, 1980, pp
5-37,

G allop, D.
(1963) P lato and th e Alphabet, P hilosophical Review 72, 364-376.
(1975) P la to 's Phaedo. Oxford U.P, 1975.

Geach, P.T.
(1956) The Third Man Again. Reprinted in Studies in P la to 's M etaphysics,
ed R.E. A llen, Routledge and Kegan P aul, London 1965 pp 265-278.
(1969) God and th e Soul. London U.P, 1969.
G i l l, C.
(1979) P la to and P o litic s ; The C r itia s and th e P o litic u s . Phronesis 24,
1979, pp 148-167.

G ill, M.L.
(1987) M atter and Flux in P la to 's Timaeus. Phronesis 32, 1987, pp 34-53.

G isin g er, F.
(1921) Die Erdbeschreibung des Eudoxus von Knidos. S to ich e ia, Heft 6,
1921.
Goodrich, W.J.
(1903) On Phaedo 96a-102a and on th e Deuteros Pious 1. C la ssic a l Review
17, 1903, pp 5-11.
(1904) On Phaedo 96a-102a and on th e Deuteros Pious 2. C la ssic a l Review
18, 1904, pp 381-385.
G osling, J.C .B .
(1960) Republic V: [ta p o lla k a la ]. Phronesis 5, 1960, pp 116-128.
(1969) [doxa] and [dunamis] in P la to 's Republic. Phronesis 13, 1968, pp
119-130.
(1975) P la to : Philebus. Oxford U.P, 1975.

Graham, D.W.
(1990) S ocrates, the C raft Analogy and Science. Apeiron 23, 1990, pp
1-24.

Griswold, C.L.
(1980) Style and Philosophy: The Case o f P la to 's Dialogues, The Monist
63, 1980, pp 530-546.
(1981) Gadaroer and th e In te rp re ta tio n o f P la to . Ancient Philosophy 1,
1981, pp 171-178.
(1986) Self-Knowledge in P la to 's Phaedrus. Yale U.P, 1986.
(1988) P la to 's Metaphilosophy: Why P lato Wrote Dialogues. P lato n ic
W ritings, P lato n ic Readings, ed C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New
York 1988, pp 143-170.

Grote, G.
(1875) P lato and th e Other Companions of S ocrates. John Murray, London
1875.

Gulley, N.
(1954) P la to 's Theory of R eco llectio n . C la s sic a l Q uarterly N.S 4, 1954,
pp 194-213.

276
(1960) The In te rp re ta tio n o f P la to , Timaeus 49d-e, American Journal o f
Philology 81, 1960, pp 53-64.
(1962) P la to 's Theory o f Knowledge. B u tler and Tanner, Frome and London,
1962.
(1968) The Philosophy of S ocrates. London, 1968.
G u th rie, W.K.C.
(1962) A H istory of Greek Philosophy (6 v o ls ), Cambridge U.P 1962-1981.
(1976) R hetoric and Philosophy; The Unity o f th e Phaedrus. P aid eia,
S pecial P lato Issu e, 1976, pp 117-124.
H ackforth, R.
(1952) P la to 's Phaedrus. Cambridge U.P, 1952.
(1955) P la to 's Phaedo. Cambridge U.P, 1955.
(1959) P la to 's Cosmogony. C la s sic a l Q uarterly NS.9, 1959, pp 17-22.
(1972) P la to 's P hilebus. Cambridge U.P, 1972.
Hahn, R.
(1978) On P la to 's Philebus 15b1-8. Phronesis 23, 1978, pp 158-172.
(1980) M aterial C au sality , Non-Being, and P la to 's Hypodoche: A Re-View
of th e Timaeus in Terms of th e Divided Line. Apeiron 14, 1980, pp 59-67.

H alperin, D.M.
(1992) P lato and the E ro tics o f N a rra tiv ity . Oxford S tudies in Ancient
Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, Methods o f In te rp re tin g P la to and His
Dialogues, pp 93-130.
Hamilton, W.
(1973) P lato : Phaedrus and L e tte rs VII and V III. Penguin, 1973.

Hartland-Swann, J .
(1951) P la to a s Poet: A C r itic a l In te rp re ta tio n , Philosophy 26, 1951, pp
3-18 and 131-141.
Has lam, M.W.
(1972) P la to , Sophron and th e Dramatic Dialogue. B u lle tin o f th e
I n s t i tu t e fo r C la ssic a l S tudies 19, 1972, pp 17-38.
Heath, T.
(1913) A ristarch es of Samos. Dover e d itio n . New York 1981.
(1921) A H istory of Greek Mathematics. Oxford U.P, 1921.
(1947) Euclid: The Elements. St.Johns College P re ss, Annapolis, 1947.

Heinaman, R.
(1981) S e lf-P red ic atio n in th e Sophist. Phronesis 26, 1981, pp 55-66.
(1982) Communion of Forms. Proceedings o f th e A ris to te lia n Society NS
83, 1983, pp 175-190.
(1989) S e lf-P red ic atio n in P la to 's Middle Dialogues. Phronesis 34, 1989,
pp 56-79.
Hicken, W.F.
(1957) Knowledge and Forms in P la to 's T heaetetus, in R.E A llen (ed).
S tudies in P la to 's M etaphysics, Routledge and Kegan P aul, London and New
York, 1965, pp 185-198.
(1958) The Character and Provenance o f S o c rate s' 'Dream' in th e
T heaetetus, Phronesis 3, 1958, pp 126-145.
Hocutt, M.
(1974) A r is to tle 's Four Becauses. Philosophy 49, 1974, pp 385-389.
277
Hodges, W.
(1977) Logic. Harmondsworth, 1977.

Holland, A .J.
(1973) An Argument in P la to 's T heaetetus; 184-6. P hilosophical Q uarterly
23, 1973, pp 10-116.

Huby, P.M.
(1959) Phaedo 99d-102a. Phronesis 4, 1959, pp 12-14.

Hume, D.
(1738) A T re a tise on Human Nature. Everyman, London 1955.
Irw in, T.H.
(1974) P la to 's Moral Theory. Oxford U.P, 1974.
(1977) P la to 's H eracleiteanism . P hilosophical Q uarterly 27, 1977, pp
1-13.
(1988) Reply to David. L. Roochnik. P la to n ic W ritings, P lato n ic
Readings, ed C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp
194-199.

Jackson, H.
(1882) P la to 's L ater Theory of Ideas. Journal o f Philosophy 10, 1882, pp
252-298.

Joad, C.E.M.
(1933) P la to 's Theory of Forms and Modern Physics. Philosophy 8, 1933,
pp 142-154.

Jones, W.H.S.
(1948) H ippocrates, vol I . Loeb, Harvard U.P 1948.
Jordan, R.W.
(1984) P la to 's Arguments fo r Forms. Cambridge P h ilo lo g ic a l Society
Supplementary Volume 9, 1984.
Jow ett, B.
(1953) The Dialogues o f P lato (4 v o ls ), 4th ed, Oxford U.P 1953.
Kahn, C.H.
(1974) Pythagorean Philosophy Before P la to . In The P re -S o c ra tic s, ed.
A.P.D M ourelatos, Anchor Books, Garden C ity 1974.
(1981) Some P hilosophical Uses of "to be" in P la to . Phronesis 26, 1981,
pp 105-134.

Ketchum, R .J.
(1978) P a rtic ip a tio n and P red icatio n in th e Sophist. Phronesis 23, 1978,
pp 42-62.
(1979) Knowledge and R ecollection in th e Phaedo. Journal o f th e H istory
of Philosophy 17, 1979, pp 243-253.

Keyt, D.
(1963) The F a lla c ie s of th e Phaedo. Phronesis 8, 1963, pp 167-171.
(1969) P la to 's Paradox t h a t th e Immutable i s Unknowable. Philosophical
Q uarterly 19, 1969, pp 1-14.
(1971) The Mad Craftsman o f th e Timaeus. P hilosophical Review 80, 1971,
pp 230-235.
(1973) P lato on F a ls ity : Sophist 263b. In , Exegesis and Argument, ed.

278
E.N Lee, A.P.D Mourelatos and R.M Rorty Van Gorcum, Assen, 1973, pp
285-305.

Kirk, G.S, Raven, J.E , and S chofield, M.

(1983) The P re so c ra tic Philosophers. 2nd e d itio n , Cambridge U.P 1983.

Klagge, J.C .
(1992) E d ito r's Prologue, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,
Supplementary Volume, Methods of In te rp re tin g P la to and His Dialogues,
pp 1-12.

K line, M.
(1972) Mathematical Thought from Ancient t o Modern Times. Oxford U.P,
1972.
Kosman, L.A.
(1992) Silence and Im itatio n in th e P la to n ic Dialogues. Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, Methods of In te rp re tin g
P lato and His Dialogues, pp 73-92.

Koyre, A.
(1943) G alileo and P la to . Journal o f th e H istory of Ideas 4, 1943, pp
400-428.

Kramer, H.J.
(1959) Arete b e i Platon und A ris to te le s . Heidelberg U.P, 1959.
(1964) R etraktionen zum Problem des Esoterschen P la to n . Museum
Helveticum 21, 1964, pp 137-167.
(1966) Aristoxenus uber Platons [p eri tag a th o u ], Hermes 94, 1966 pp
111-126.

Kuhn, H.
(1941) The True Tragedy: On th e R elationship Between Greek Tragedy and
P la to , Harvard S tudies in C la s sic a l Philology 52, 1941, pp 1-40.
(1942) Ihe True Tragedy: On th e R elationship Between Greek Tragedy and
P la to , Harvard S tudies in C la ssic a l Philology 52, 1941, pp 37-88.
Kung, J .
(1981) A ris to tle on T hises, Suches and th e Third Man Argument. Phronesis
26, 1981, pp 207-247.

L asserre, F.
(1966) Die Fragmente des Eudoxus von Knidos, De G ruyter, B e rlin , 1966.

Ledger, G.R.
(1989) A Computer A nalysis of P la to 's S ty le . Oxford U.P, 1989.

Lee, E.N.
(1966) On th e Metaphysics of th e Image in P la to 's Timaeus, Monist 50,
1966, pp 341-368.
(1967) On P la to 's Timaeus, 49d4-e7, American Journal o f Philology 88,
1967, pp 1-28.
(1971) On th e Gold Example in P la to 's Timaeus, in Essays in Ancient
Philosophy, ed. J .P Anton and G.L Kustas, Albany, N.Y, 1971, pp 219-235.
(1976) Reason and R otation. C ircu lar Movement as th e Model o f Mind
(Nous) in L ater P la to . In Facets of P la to 's Philosophy, Phronesis
supplementary volume I I , 1976, pp 70-102.

279
Lee, H.P.O.
(1955) Ihe Republic. Penguin 1955.
(1965) P la to ; Timaeus and C r itia s . Penguin, 1965.
Lennox, J.G .
(1985) P la to 's Unnatural Teleology. In D.J O'Meara (ed) P lato n ic
In v e s tig a tio n s , Wcishington D.C U.P, 1985, pp 195-218.
Letwin, 0.
(1981) In te rp re tin g th e Philebus. Phronesis 26, 1981, pp 187-206.
Lewis, F.A.
(1973a) Two Paradoxes in th e T heaetetus, in J.M.E. Moravcsik (ed).
P a tte rn s in P la to 's Thought, Dordrecht 1973 pp 123-149.
(1973b) Foul Play in P la to 's Aviary: T heaetetus 195b f f , in E.N Lee,
A.P.D Mourelatos and R.M. Rorty (ed s). Exegesis and Argument: S tudies in
Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory V lasto s, Assen 1973 pp
262-284.
Lloyd, G.E.R.
(1968) P lato as a N atural S c ie n tis t, Journal o f H ellenic Studies 28,
1968, pp 78-92.
(1970) Early Greek Science to A r is to tle . C hatto and Windus, London 1970.
(1978) Saving the Appearances. C la ssic a l Q uarterly 88, 1978, pp 202-222.
(1987) The Revolutions o f Wisdom. C a lifo rn ia U.P, 1987.
(1990) P la to and Archytas in th e Seventh L e tte r . Phronesis 35, 1990, pp
159-174.
(1991) P lato on Mathematics, N ature, Myth and Science. Methods and
Problems in Greek Science, Cambridge U.P, pp 333-351.
Lombard, L.B.
(1978) R elatio n al Change and R e latio n al Changes. P hilosophical S tudies
34, 1978, pp 63-79.
Long, A.A and Sedley, D.
(1987) Ihe H e lle n is tic Philosophers (2 v o ls ). Cambridge U.P, 1987.

MacClintock, S.
(1961) More on th e Stucture o f th e Philebus. Phronesis 6, 1961, pp
46-52.

Malcolm, J .
(1962) The Line and th e Cave. Phronesis 7, 1962, pp 38-45.
(1967) P la to 's A nalysis of [to on] and [to me on] in th e S ophist.
Phronesis 12, 1967, pp 130-146.
(1981) Semantics and S e lf-P red ic atio n in P la to . Phronesis 26, 1981, pp
286-294.
(1985) V lastos on Pauline P red icatio n in P la to . Phronesis 26, 1981, pp
286-294.
(1991) P la to on th e S e lf-P red ic atio n o f Forms. Oxford U.P, 1991.

Mann, W.E.
(1979) The Third Man = The Man Who Never Was. American Philosophical
Q uarterly 16, 1979, pp 167-176
Mates, B.
(1979) Id e n tity and P red icatio n in P la to . Phronesis 24, 1979, pp
211-229.

280
Matthews, G.B.
(1988) A Puzzle in P la to : T heaetetus 189b-190e, in D.F. Austin (ed).
P h ilo so p h ical A nalysis: A Defence by Exaiiple, Dordrecht 1988, pp 3-15.
M attei, J-F .
(1988) The Theater o f Myth in P la to . P la to n ic W ritings, P lato n ic
Readings, ed C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp
66-83.

Maxwell, N.
(1968) Can There be Necessary Connections Between Successive Events ?
B r itis h Jo urnal fo r th e Philosophy o f Science 19, 1968, pp 1-25.
(1984) From Knowledge t o Wisdom. Blackw ell, Oxford 1984.
(1992) What Kind of Enquiry Can Best Help us C reate a Good World ?
Science, Technology and Human Values 17, 1992, pp 205-227.
(1993a, b, c) Induction and S c ie n tific Realism. B ritis h Journal fo r the
PhilosoE^y of Science 44, 1993, pp 61-79, 81-101, 275-305.

McCabe/ Mackenzie, M.M.

(1982a) Paradox in P la to 's Phaedrus. Proceedings of th e Cambridge
P h ilo lo g ic a l S ociety, N.S 28, 1982, pp 64-76.
(1982b) Parmenides' Dileirma. Phronesis 28, 1982, pp 1-13.
(1986a) P u ttin g th e C ratylus in i t s P lace. C la s sic a l Q uarterly 36, 1986,
pp 124-150.
(1986b) Iirpasse and Explanation: from th e L ysis to th e Phaedo. Archiv
fu r Geschichte der Philosophie 88, 1986 pp 15-45.
(1988) The V irtues o f S o c ratic Ignorance. C la s sic a l Q uarterly 38, 1988,
pp 331-350.
(1993) Myth, A llegory and Argument. Apeiron 25, 1993, The Language of
th e Cave, pp 47-67.
McDowell, J.H .
(1969) Id e n tity Mistakes : P lato and th e Logical Atom ists, Proceedings of
th e A r is to te lia n S o ciety , N.S 70, 1969, pp 181-195.
(1973) P lato : T heaetetus. Oxford U.P, 1973.
McKim, R.
(1988) Shame and Truth in P la to 's Gorgias. P la to n ic W ritings, P lato n ic
Readings, ed C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp
34-48.

M ills, K.W.
(1968) Some Aspects o f P la to 's Theory of Forms, Timaeus 49c f f ,
Phronesis 13, 1968, pp 45-70.
M ittle s tr a s s , J .
(1962) Die Rettung d er Phanomene. De G ruyter, B erlin 1962.
(1988) On S o c ratic Dialogue. P la to n ic W ritings, P la to n ic Readings, ed
C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp 126-142.
Modrak, D.K.
(1981) Perception and Judgement in th e T heaetetus. Phronesis 26, 1981,
pp 35-54.

Mohr, R.D.
(1978a) The Formation o f th e Cosmos in th e Statesman Myth. Phoenix 27,
1978, pp 250-252.

281
(1978b) The Gold Analogy in P la to 's Timaeus (50a4-b5), Phronesis 23,
1978, pp 243-252.
(1980a) Image, Flux and Space in P la to 's Timaeus, Phoenix 34, 1980, pp
138-152.
(1980b) Ihe Sources o f E vil Problem and th e [arche kineseos] Doctrine in
P la to , i ^ i r o n 14, 1980, pp 41-56.
(1981) D isorderly Motion in P la to 's Statesman. Phoenix 35, 1981, pp
199-215.
(1986) P lato on Time and E te rn ity . Ancient Philosophy 6, 1986, pp 39-46.
Moline, J .
(1988) R eco llectio n , D ia le c tic , and Ontology: Kenneth. M. Sayre on th e
S olution t o a P la to n ic R iddle. P la to n ic W ritings, P la to n ic Readings, ed
C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp 233-239.
Moravcsik, J .
(1962) Being and Meaning in th e Sophist. Acta Philosophica Fenna 14,
1962, pp 23-78.
(1963) The Third Man Argument and P la to 's Theory o f Forms. Phronesis 8,
1963, pp 50-62.
(1970) Learning as R eco llectio n . In G. V lastos (ed) P lato I :
Metaphysics and Epistemology, New York, 1970, pp 53-69.
(1974) A r is to tle on Adequate Explanations. Synthèse 28, 1974, pp 3-17.
(1978) Forms, Nature and th e Good in P la to 's P hilebus. Phronesis 24,
1978, pp 81-104.
(1982) Forms and D ia le c tic in th e Second Half of th e Parmenides. In
Language and Logos, S tudies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to
G.E.L Owen, ed M. Schofield and M.C Nussbaum, Cambridge U.P, 1982, pp
135-153.

Morgan, M.L.
(1984) Sense-Perception and R ecollection in th e Phaedo. Phronesis 29,
1984, pp 237-251.
(1989) How Does Socrates Solve th e Paradox o f Inquiry in th e Meno ?
Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy I I I , P la to , ed J .P Anton and A.
Preus, New York U.P, 1989, pp 169-182.

Morrison, J .S .
(1959) Ihe Shape o f th e Earth in P la to 's Phaedo. Phronesis 4, 1959, pp
101-119.
(1977) Two Unresolved D iffc u ltie s in th e Line and Cave. Phronesis 22,
1977, pp 212-231.

Morrow, G.R.
(1950) N ecessity and Persuasion in P la to 's Timaeus. In Studies in
P la to 's Metaphysics, R.E. A llen (ed), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
1965, pp 421-438.
(1962) P la to 's E p is tle s . B obbs-M errill, Indianapolis and New York, 1962.
(1970) P la to and th e Mathematicians: An In te rp re ta tio n o f S o c rate s'
Dream in th e T heaetetus, P hilosophical Review 79, 1970, pp 309-333.

M ourelatos, A.P.D.
(1981a) P la to 's "Real Astronomy": Republic 527d - 53Id. Science and th e
Sciences in P la to , ed P. Anton, Buffalo N.Y, pp 33-73.
(1981b) Astronomy and Kinematics in P la to 's P ro je c t o f R a tio n a lis t
E xplanation. S tudies in th e H istory and Philosophy o f Science 12, 1981,
pp 1-32.

282
M ueller, I .
(1981) Ascending to Problems: Astronomy and Harmonics in Republic V II.
Science and th e Sciences in P la to , ed Anton, B uffalo N.Y, pp 103-122.
(1989) Joan Kung*s Reading o f th e Timaeus. Apeiron 22, 1989, pp 1-25.
Murdoch, I .
(1978) Philosophy and L ite ra tu re : Dialogue w ith I r i s Murdoch. In B.
Magee, (ed ). Men of Id eas, New York 1978, pp 229-250.
Murphy, N.R.
(1936) The Deuteros Pious in th e Phaedo. C la s sic a l Q uarterly 30, 1936,
pp 40-47.
Nahnikian, G.
(1955) P la to 's Theory of Sensation, Review of Metaphysics 9, 1955, pp
129-148.
Nehamas, A.
(1973) P red icatio n and Forms of Opposites in th e Phaedo. Review of
Metaphysics 27, 1973, pp 461-491.
(1975) P lato on th e Im perfection o f th e Sensible World. American
P hilosophical Q uarterly 12, 1975, pp 105-117.
(1979) S e lf-P red ic atio n and P la to 's Theory of Forms. American
P h ilosophical Q uarterly 16, 1979, pp 93-103.
(1984) Episteme and Logos in P la to 's L ater Thought, Archiv fu r
Geschichte der Philosophie 66, 1984, pp 11-36.
(1985) Meno's Paradox and Socrates a s a Teacher. Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 3, 1985, pp 1-30.

Neugebauer, 0.
(1947) The Exact Sciences in A ntiquity. 2nd E d itio n , Providence 1947.
(1975) A H istory o f Ancient Mathematical Astronomy. Springer-V erlay,
B erlin 1975.
N ik o lic, M.
(1974) Eudoxus and Dedekind. Boston Studies in th e H istory and
Philosophy of Science 15, 1974.

Nussbaum, M.C.
(1986) The F r a g ility o f Goodness : Luck and E thics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy, Cambridge U.P, 1986.
O 'B rien, M.J.
(1963) The Unity of th e Laches. Yale C la ssic a l S tudies 18, 1963, pp
131-147.
( 1967) The L ast Argument o f P la to 's Phaedo. C la s sic a l Q uarterly N.S 17,
1967, pp 95-106.

Owen, G.E.L.
(1953) Ihe Place o f th e Timaeus in P la to 's Dialogues. Reprinted in R.E
A llen (ed). Studies in P la to 's Metaphysics, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1965, pp 313-339.
(1957a) A Proof in th e P eri Ideon. Reprinted in Logic, Science and
D ia le c tic , ed M. Nussbaum, Duckworth, London 1986 pp 165-179.
(1957b) Logic and Metaphysics in Some E a rlie r Works o f A r is to tle .
Reprinted in Logic, Science and D ia le c tic , ed M. Nussbaum, Duckworth,
London 1986 pp 180-199.

283
(1966a) ïh e Platonism o f A r is to tle , R eprinted in Logic, Science and
D ia le c tic , ed M, Nussbaum, Duckworth, London 1986 pp 200-220.
(1966b) P lato and Parmenides on th e Timeless P re se n t. The Monist 50,
1966, pp 317-340.
(1970) Notes on I s l e 's P la to . Reprinted in Logic, Science and D ia le c tic ,
ed M. Nussbaum, Duckworth, London 1986 pp 85-103.
(1971) P la to on Not-Being, in Logic, Science and D ia le c tic ; C ollected
Papers in Greek Philosphy, ed M.C Nussbaum London 1986, pp 104-137.
Pangle, T.L.
(1980) The Laws of P la to . Chicago U.P, 1980.
Pannekoek, A.
(1961) A H istory o f Astronomy. George Allen and Unwin, 1961.
P a tte rso n , R.
(1985) On th e E te rn a lity of P la to n ic Forms. Archiv fu r Geschichte der
Philosophie 67, 1985, pp 27-45.

Peck, A.A.
(1953) P la to 's Parmenides. C la s sic a l Q uarterly, N.S 3, 1953, pp 126-150.

Peck, A.L.
(1953) P lato and th e [megista gena] of th e S ophist. C la s sic a l Q uarterly,
NS 2, 1953, pp 32-56.
(1962) P la to 's Sophist: th e [sumploke to n e id o n ], Phronesis 7, 1962, pp
46-66.
Penner , T.
(1987) The Ascent from Nominalism, Dordrecht, 1987.

P e tersen , S.
(1973) A Reasonable S e lf-P red ic atio n Premise fo r th e Third Man Argument.
P h ilo so p h ical Review 82, 1973, pp 451-470.

P h ilip , A.
(1981) Recurrence Thématiques e t Topologie dans le "Phedre". Revue de
Metaphysique e t Moral 86, 1981, pp 452-476.
P la ss, P.
(1960) S o c rate s' Method o f Hypothesis in th e Phaedo. Phronesis 5, 1960,
pp 103-115.
(1964) Philosophic Anonimty and Irony in th e P la to n ic Dialogues.
American Jo u rn al of Philology 85, 1964, pp 254-278.
(1967) Play and Philosophic Detachment in P la to . T ransactions and
Proceedings o f the American P h ilo lo g ic a l A ssociation 98, 1967, pp
343-364.
(1969) Ihe Unity of th e Phaedrus. Symbolae Osloeneses 43, 1969, pp 7-38.

Popper, K.R.
(1945) The Open Society and i t s Enemies, vol I , The S pell o f P la to , 5th
e d itio n , Routledge and Kegan Paul London 1966.
(1952) Ihe Nature o f P hilosophical Problems and t h e i r Roots in Science.
R eprinted in C onjectures and R e fu tatio n s, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1972, pp 66-96.

P o st, L.A.
(1963) L e tte r V II. In E.Hamilton and H.Cairns, P la to : The C ollected
D ialogues. Princeton U.P, 1963.
284
P rio r, W.J.
(1985) Unity and Development in P la to 's M etaphysics. Groom Helm,
Beckenham 1985.

P ro clu s.
Conmentaire su r l e Timee (5 v o ls ). A .J F estugiere (ed. ), L ib ra ire
Philosophique, J . V rin, P a ris 1966.
Raven, J.E .
(1953) Sun, Divided Line and Cave. C la s sic a l Q uarterly NS 3, 1953, pp
131-187.
Reed, N.H.
(1972) P la to on Flux, Perception and Language. Proceedings of th e
Cambridge P h ilo lo g ic a l Society 18, 1972, pp 65-77.
Reeve, C.D.C.
(1985) Motion, Rest and D ia le c tic in th e Sophist. Archiv fu r Geschichte
der Philosophie 67, 1985, pp 47-64.

Richardson, H.
(1926) Ihe Myth of Er. C la ssic a l Q uarterly 20, 1926, pp 113-133.

R is t, J.M.
(1960) The Order o f th e L ater Dialogues in P la to . Phoenix 14, 1960, pp
207-221.
(1970) Parmenides and P la to 's Parmenides. C la ssic a l Q uarterly, N.S 20,
1970, pp 221-229.
R itte r , C.
(1910) P lato n , Seine Leben, Seine S c h rifte n , Seine Lehre. Munich U.P,
1910.
Robin, L.
(1908) La Theorie P latonicienne des Idees e t des Nombres d 'a r e s
A ris to te . Presses U n iv e rsita ire s de France, P a ris 1908.

Robinson, R.
(1942) P la to 's Parmenides. C la ssic a l Philology 37, 1942, pp 51-76 and
159-186.
(1950) Forms and E rror in P la to 's T heaetetus. P hilosophical Review 59,
1950, pp 39-73.
(1953) P la to 's E a rlie r D ia le c tic . 2nd e d itio n , Oxford U.P, 1984,
In tro d u ctio n , pp 1-6.
Roochnik, D.L.
(1988) Terence Irw in 's Reading o f P la to . P lato n ic W ritings, P lato n ic
Readings, ed C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp
183-193.
Rose, L.E.
(1966) The Deuteros Pious in P la to 's Phaedo. Monist 50, 1966, pp
464-473.

Rosen, S.
(1979) P la to 's Myth o f th e Reversed Cosmos. Review o f Metaphysics 33,
1979, pp 60-85.
(1983) P la to 's Sophist. Yale U.P, 1983.

285
(1985) P la to n ic Hermeneutics : On th e In te rp re ta tio n o f a P la to n ic
Dialogue. Proceedings o f th e Boston Area Colloquiem in Ancient
Philosophy 1, 1985, pp 271-288.

Rosenmayer, T.G.
(1959) Ihe Shape o f th e Earth in th e Phaedo; A R ejoinder. Phronesis
1959, pp 71-72.
(1960) P la to 's Hypothesis and th e Upward Path. American Journal o f
P hilology 81, 1960, pp 355-366.
Ross, W.D.
(1951) P la to 's Theory of Ideas. Oxford U.P, 1951.
Rowe, C .J.
(1993a) Explanation in Phaedo 99c6-102a8. Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 11, 1993, pp 49-69.
(1993b) P la to : Phaedo. Cambridge U.P, 1993.

Rudebusch, G.
(1985) P lato on Sense and Reference, Mind 104, 1985, pp 526-537.

Runciman, W.G.
(1962) P la to 's L ater Epistemology. Cambridge U.P, 1962.
(1965) P la to 's Parirenides. In S tudies in P la to 's Metaphysics, ed. R.E
A llen , Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1965, pp 149-185.

Ryle, G.
(1939a) P la to 's Parmenides, Mind 48, 1939, pp 129-151.
(1939b) P la to 's Parmenides. In S tudies in P la to 's Metaphysics, ed. R.E
A llen, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1965, pp 149-184.
(I960) L e tte rs and S y lla b le s in P la to , P hilosophical Review 69, 1960, pp
431-451.
(1990) Logical Atomism in P la to 's T heaetetus, Phronesis 35, 1990, pp
21-46.
Sambursky, S.
(1956) The Physical World o f th e Greeks. Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London 1956.
(1965) P la to , P roclus, and th e Lim its o f Science. Journal o f th e H istory
of Philosophy 03, 1965, pp 1-11.
Saunders, T .J.
(1970) P la to : The Laws. Penguin, London 1970.

Sayre, K.M.
(1969) P la to 's A nalytic Method. Chicago U.P, 1969.
(1978) P la to 's Parmenides: Why th e Eight Hypotheses a re not
C on trad ictory. Phronesis 23, 1978, pp 133-150.
(1983) P la to 's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved. Princeton U.P, 1983.
( 1988a) Reply to Jon Moline. P la to n ic W ritings, P la to n ic Readings, ed
C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp 240-246.
(1988b) P la to 's Dialogues in th e Light o f th e Seventh L e tte r. P lato n ic
W ritings, P la to n ic Readings, ed C.L Griswold, Routledge, London and New
York 1988, pp 93-109.
(1992) A M aieutic View of Five Late Dialogues. Oxford S tudies in Ancient
Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, Methods o f In te rp re tin g P la to and His
Dialogues, pp 221-244.

286
S c a ltsa s, T.
(1989) Ihe Logic o f th e dilemma o f P a rtic ip a tio n and o f th e Third Man
Argument, ^ ^ i r o n 22, 1989, pp 67-90.

Sdhleierm acher, F.
(1804) In troductions to P la to 's Dialogues, tra n s W. Dobson, New York
1973.

S c o tt, D.
(1987) P la to n ic Anamnesis R ev isited . C la s sic a l Q uarterly 37, 1987, pp
346-366.

S e lla r s , W.
(1955) V lastos and th e "Third Man". Philosophical Review 64, 1955, pp
405-437.
(1967) V lastos and th e "Third Man": A R ejoinder. Philosophical
P ersp e ctiv es, ^ r i n g f i e l d , 1967, pp 55-72.

S hiner, R.
(1974) Knowledge and R e a lity in P la to 's Philebus. Assen, 1974.

Shipton, K.M.W.
(1979) A Good Second-best: Phaedo 99b f f . Phronesis 24, 1979, pp 33-53.

Shoemaker, S.
(1984) Id e n tity , Cause and Mind, Cambridge U.P, 1984.
Shorey, P.
(1927) Platonism and th e H istory of Science. Proceedings of th e American
P h ilosophical A ssociation 46, 1927, pp 159-182.
(1935) The Republic, 2 v o ls. Loeb C la ssic a l L ibrary, Harvard U.P, 1935
S im p liciu s.
A r is to te lis in De Caelo Coirrnentaria. Ed J.L Heiberg, B erlin 1894.
Skemp, J.B .
(1942) The Theory o f Motion in P la to 's L ater Dialogues. Second e d itio n ,
Adolf M. Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1967.
(1952) P la to ; The Statesman. 2nd e d itio n , B ris to l C la ssic a l P ress,
B ris to l 1987.
Smith, J.E .
(1985) P la to 's Myths a s "Likely Accounts" Worthy o f B e lie f. Apeiron 19,
1985 pp 64-83.
Smith, N.D.
(1992) E d ito r's Afterword: P la to n ic Scholars and Other W ishful Thinkers.
Oxford S tu dies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, Methods of
In te rp re tin g P lato and His Dialogues, pp 245-259.

Solmsen, F.
(1971) The T rad itio n About Zeno o f Elea Re-examined. Phronesis 16, 1971,
pp 116-141.

S o ra b ji, R.
(1980) N ecessity, Cause and Blame. P erspectives on A r i s to tle 's Theory.
Duckworth, London 1980.

287
(1983) Time, C reation and th e Continuum: Theories in A ntiquity and th e
E arly Middle Ages. Duckworth, London 1983.
(1988) M atter Space and Motion; Theories in A ntiquity and th e i r Sequel.
Duckworth, London 1988.

S ten zel, J .
(1959) Zahl und G e sta lt b ei P la to und A ris to te le s . Herman Centner
V erlag, Bad Homburg vor der Hohe, 1959.

Stocks, J.L .
(1911) The Divided Line o f P la to Rep. VI. C la s sic a l Q uarterly 5, 1911,
pp 73-88.
Stokes, M.C.
(1993) P la to and th e S ightlovers o f th e Republic. The Language o f th e
Cave, ed A.Barker and M. Warner, ^ ^ i r o n 25, 1992, pp 103-133.
Stough, C.L.
(1976) Forms and Explanation in th e Phaedo. Phronesis 21, 1976, pp 1-30.
Strang, C.
(1956) P lato and th e Third Man. Proceedings of th e A ris to te lia n S ociety,
Supplementary Volume 37, 1963, pp 147-163.
(1986) P la to 's Analogy o f th e Cave. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
4, 1986, pp 19-34.

S trik e r, G.
(1970) Peras und Apeiron: Das Problem d er Formen in P latons Philebus.
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, G ottingen, 1970.

Szlezak, T.A.
(1979) The Acquiring o f Philosophical Knowledge According to P la to 's
Seventh L e tte r . In A rktouros, H ellenic Studies Presented to B.M.W Knox,
B erlin U.P, 1979, pp 354-363.
Taran, L.
(1971) The C reation Myth in P la to 's Timaeus. In Essays in Ancient Greek
Philosophy, ed J .P Anton and G.L K ustas, pp 372-406.
T arran t, H.
(1955) P la to a s D ram atist. Journal o f H ellenic Studies 75, 1955, pp
82-89.
(1983) Middle Platonism and th e Seventh E p is tle . Phronesis 28, 1983, pp
75-103.
Taylor, A.E.
(1926) P la to : The Man and h is Work. Meridian Books, Cleveland 1956.
(1928) A Commentary on P la to 's Timaeus. Oxford U.P, 1928.
(1939) Ihe Decline and F a ll o f th e S ta te in Republic, V III. Mind, NS 48,
1939, pp 23-38.
(1956) P la to : Philebus and Epinomis. Nelson and Sons, London 1956.
T aylor, C.C.W.
(1969) Forms as Causes in th e Phaedo. Mind 78, 1969, pp 45-59.
Teloh, H.
(1981) Ihe Development o f P la to 's M etaphysics. U niversity Park, 1981.

288
(1971) The "Two-Level Paradoxes" in A risto tle * Reprinted w ith rev isio n s
in P la to n ic S tu d ies, 2nd e d itio n , Princeton U.P, 1981, pp 323-334.
(1972) The Unity o f th e V irtues in th e P rotagoras. R eprinted w ith
re v isio n s in P la to n ic S tu d ies, 2nd e d itio n , P rinceton U.P, 1981, pp
415-458.
(1974) A Note on "Pauline P redications" in P la to . Phronesis 19, 1974, pp
95-101.
(1975a) P la to 's Testimony Concerning Zeno o f E lea. Journal o f H ellenic
Studies 95, pp 136-162.
(1975b) P la to 's Universe. Clarendon, Oxford, 1975.
(1981a) On a Proposed R ed efin itio n of "S elf-P red icatio n " in P la to .
Phronesis 26, 1981, pp 76-101.
(1981b) The Role o f Observation in P la to 's Conception o f Astronomy.
Science and th e Sciences in P la to , ed P. Anton, B uffalo N.Y, pp 1-31.
(1985) 'S o c r a te s " Disavowal o f Knowledge. Philosophical Q uarterly 35,
1985, pp 1-31.
(1991) S o crates. Cambridege U.P, 1991.

Von F r itz , K.
(1971) The P hilosophical Passage in th e Seventh P la to n ic L e tte r and th e
Problem of P la to 's "E soteric" Philosophy. In Essays in Ancient Greek
Philosophy, ed. J .P Anton and G.L K ustas, New York U.P 1971, pp 408-447.
Von Leyden, W.
(1964) Time, Number and E te rn ity in P lato and A r is to tle . Philosophical
Q uarterly 14, 1964, pp 35-52.
W asserstein, A.
(1962) Greek S c ie n tific Thought. Proceedings of th e Cambridge
P h ilo lo g ic a l S ociety, NS 8, 1962, pp 51-63.
W esterink, L.G.
(1976) The Greek Comnentaries on P la to 's Phaedo, 2 v o ls. Amsterdam,
1976.
W aterfield , R.A.H.
(1980) The Place o f th e Philebus in P la to 's Dialogues. Phronesis 25,
1980 pp 270-305.

Wedberg, A.
(1955) P la to 's Philosophy of Mathematics. Stockholm, 1955.

White, N.
(1974) In q uiry. Review of Metaphysics 28, 1974/75, pp 289-310.
(1976) P la to on Knowledge and R e a lity . H ackett, In d ian a p o lis, 1976.
(1988) Observations and Questions about Hans-Georg Gadaroer's
I n te rp re ta tio n of P la to . P la to n ic W ritings, P la to n ic Readings, ed C.L
Griswold, Routledge, London and New York 1988, pp 247-257.

Whitehead, A.N.
(1933) Adventures o f Ideas. The Free P ress, New York 1933.

Wieland, W.
(1982) Platon und d ie Formen des W issens, Gottingen 1982, pp 13-94.

Wiggins, D.
(1971) Sentence Meaning, Negation and P la to 's Problem o f Non-Being. In
P lato n ic S tu d ies, ed G. V lastos, Princeton U.P, 1973, pp 223-267.

290
T revaskis, J.R .
(1960) C la s s ific a tio n in th e P hilebus. Phronesis 6, 1960, pp 39-44.
(1966) The [iregista gena] and th e Vowel Analogy of P la to , Sophist 253.
Phronesis 11, 1966, pp 99-116.

T urnbull, R.G.
(1955) A r is to tle 's Debt t o th e N atural Philosophy of th e Phaedo.
P h ilso p h ical Q uarterly 8, 1955, pp 131-143.
(1978) Knowledge and th e Forms in th e L ater P la to n ic Dialogues.
Proceedings and Addresses o f th e American P h ilosophical A ssociation 51,
pp 735-758.
(1988) Becoming and I n t e l le g i b il i ty . Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 6, pp 1-14.
(1988) Response to Professor F in e 's C ritiq u e o f 'Becoming and
I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ' . Oxford S tudies in Ancient Philosophy 6, pp 29-36.
(1989) The Third Man Argument and th e Text o f th e Parmenides. In Essays
in Ancient Greek Philosophy I I I , edd J .P Anton and A. Preus, New York
S ta te U.P, 1989, pp 203-226.

Van Eck, J .
(1994) Skopein en Logois. Ancient Philosophy 20, 1994, pp 19-40.

Van Fraassen, B.
(1980) The S c ie n tific Image. Oxford U.P, 1980.
(1989) Laws and Symmetry. Oxford U.P, 1989.

Vidal-Naquet, P.
(1978) P la to 's Myth o f th e Statesman, th e Ambiguities o f th e Golden Age
and H isto ry . Journal of H ellenic Studies 98, 1978, pp 132-141.
V lasto s, G.L.
(1939) The D isorderly Motion in th e Timaeus. In Studies in P la to 's
M etaphysics, ed R.E A llen, Routledge and Kegan P aul, London 1965, pp
379-420.
(1954) The Third Man Argument in th e Parmenides. R eprinted in Studies in
P la to 's Metaphysics, ed R.E. A llen, Routledge and Kegan P aul, London
1965 pp 231-264.
(1956) P o s ts c rip t to th e Third Man: A Reply to Mr. Geach. Reprinted in
Studies in P la to 's M etaphysics, ed R.E. A llen, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London 1965 pp 279-292.
(1963) On P la to 's Oral D octrine. P la to n ic S tu d ies, G. V lasto s, 2nd ed,
Princeton U.P 1981, pp 379-398.
(1964) C reation in th e Timaeus: I s i t a F ic tio n ? In Studies in P la to 's
Metaphysics, ed. R.E. A llen, Routledge and Kegcin P au l, London 1965, pp
401-419.
(1965a) Anamnesis in th e Meno. Dialogue 4, 1965, pp 143-167.
(1965b) A Metaphysical Paradox. Reprinted in P la to n ic S tu d ies, 2nd
e d itio n , Princeton U.P, 1981, pp 43-57.
(1969a) Reasons and Causes in th e Phaedo. Reprinted w ith re v isio n s in
P lato n ic S tu d ies, 2nd e d itio n , Princeton U.P, 1981, pp 76-110.
(1969b) S e lf-P re d ic a tio n and S elf P a rtic ip a tio n in P la to 's L ater P eriod.
Reprinted w ith rev isio n s in P la to n ic S tu d ies, 2nd e d itio n , Princeton
U.P, 1981, pp 335-341.
(1969c) P la to 's "Third Man" Argument. Reprinted w ith re v isio n s in
P lato n ic S tu d ies, 2nd e d itio n , Princeton U.P, 1981, pp 342-365.
(1970) An Ambiguity in th e Sophist. Reprinted w ith re v isio n s in P la to n ic
S tu d ies, 2nd e d itio n , P rinceton U.P, 1981, pp 270-322.

289
(1986) Teleology and th e Good in P la to 's Phaedo. Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 4, 1986, pp 1-18.

W illiams, C .F .J.
(1972) R e fe re n tia l Opacity and False B e lie f in th e T heaetetus,
P hilosophical Q uarterly 22, 1972, pp 289-302.

Williamson, H.
(1904) The Phaedo o f P la to . MacMillan and Co, London 1904.
W ittaker, J .
(1968) The "E ternity" o f th e P la to n ic Forms. Phronesis 13, 1968, pp
131-144.
Wright, L.
(1976) T eleological E xplanations. Berkeley U.P, 1976.

Yoh, M.
(1975) On th e Third Atteirpted D e fin itio n o f Knowiadge, Theaetetus
201c-210b, Dialogue 14, 1975, 420-442.

Zeyl, D.
(1975) P la to and Talk of a World o f Flux; Timaeus 49a6-50b5, Harvard
Studies in C la ssic a l Philology 79, 1975, pp 125-148.

291