Nagaland’s insurgency

Keywords- Mon, Konyak, AFSPA, Naga National council, Naga Federal Government,
NSCN(IM), NSCN(K), 16 point agreement, peace mission, shillong accord, ceasefire
agreement, framework agreement, NNPG, Article 370, Nagalim, Mr. Ravi, Mr. AK Mishra,
grey area, BP Jeevan Reddy Committee, Second Administrative Reforms Commission of
2007, Hegde Commission

1. Introduction
There are no words to communicate the shock and anguish over the killing of 14 regular
citizens in Mon locale of Nagaland, home of the Konyak Nagas. The death of 13 regular
citizens by Armed Forces in Nagaland has brought back the discussion on AFSPA (Armed
Forces Special Powers Act) and contentions encompassing it. They lost their lives in firing
by para commandos of the Indian Army situated in Jorhat. As per data accessible, this was
planned as a snare on what Army knowledge had shown was a gathering of agitators
moving in the area.This insight, or the way that the Army commandos would react to it, was
not imparted to either the nearby police or the Assam Rifles situated nearby. This
occurrence brings back the dread of the barrier on Naga talks following quite a while of
harmony talks. Nagaland revolt is the most seasoned insurgency of the nation and seeing its
impact on other states of North East India ,it is very important to understand this issue by
tracing its background and decoding its complexity.

2. Background of Naga Insurgency

The Nagas are a hill people belonging to the Indo-Mongoloid family. The Nagas are not a single tribe but
an ethnic community who live in the state of Nagaland and its neighbourhood. The Nagas are a hill
people belonging to the Indo-Mongoloid family..

2.1 Pre Independence insurgency

❖ The Naga Hills became part of British India in 1881.

❖ The effort to bring scattered Naga tribes together resulted in the formation of the Naga
Club in 1918.
 ❖ The club aroused a sense of Naga nationalism.
❖ The Naga club rejected the Simon Commission in 1929 and asked them “to leave us
alone to determine for ourselves as in ancient times”.
❖ The club transformed into the Naga National Council (NNC) in 1946.
❖ Under the leadership of Angami Zapu Phizo, the NNC declared Nagaland as an
independent State on 14th August, 1947, and conducted a “referendum” in May 1951
to claim that 99.9% of the Nagas supported a “sovereign Nagaland”.

2.2 Post Independence insurgency

❖ On March 22, 1952, Phizo formed the underground Naga Federal Government (NFG)
and the Naga Federal Army.
❖ The government of India sent in the Army to crush the insurgency and, in 1958, enacted
the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act.
❖ Nagaland achieved statehood in December 1963. Nagaland was formed out of the
Naga Hills district of Assam and the then North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) province
(now Arunachal Pradesh).
❖ In 1975, under the Shillong Accord, some factions of NNC and NFG (Naga Federal
Government) agreed to give up arms.
❖ A group of about 140 members led by Thuingaleng Muivah, who was at that time in
China, refused to accept the Shillong Accord and formed the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980.
❖ Muivah also had Isak Chisi Swu and S S Khaplang with him.
❖ Isak Chishi Swu (11 November 1929 – 28 June 2016) was the chairman of the
Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). He along with Thuingaleng Muivah
and S. S. Khaplang were instrumental in the creation of NSCN on 31 January 1980 after
opposing the ‘Shillong Accord’ signed by the then Naga National Council (NNC) with the
Indian government.
❖ Shangwang Shangyung Khaplang (April 1940 – 9 June 2017) was a Burmese leader
of National Socialist Council of Nagaland, an insurgent group that operates to establish
Greater Nagaland (or Nagalim), a sovereign state bringing all Naga-inhabited areas of
Myanmar and India under one administrative setup.
❖ In 1988, the NSCN split into NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) after a violent clash.
 ❖ While the NNC began to fade away, and Phizo died in London in 1991, the NSCN (IM)
came to be seen as the “mother of all insurgencies” in the region.
❖ The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM) — one of the
largest Naga groups – signed a ceasefire agreement with the Centre in 1997.

3. History of Peace Process

❖ In June 1947, Assam Governor Sir Akbar Hydari signed the Nine-Point Agreement
with the moderates in the NNC but the main leaders of the movement like Phizo were
not taken into confidence and hence Phizo rejected it outrightly.
❖ A 16-point Agreement followed in July 1960 leading to the creation of Nagaland on
December 1, 1963. In this case, the agreement was with the Naga People’s
Convention that moderate Nagas formed in August 1957 during a violent phase and
not with the NNC.
❖ In April 1964, a Peace Mission was formed for an agreement on suspension of
operations with the NNC, but it was abandoned in 1967 after six rounds of talks.
❖ On November 11, 1975, the government signed the Shillong Accord, under which
this section of NNC and NFG agreed to give up arms.
❖ However, a faction within the group refused to accept the Shillong Accord and formed
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland in 1980.
❖ In 1997, The NSCN-IM signed a ceasefire agreement with the government to stop
attacks on Indian armed forces. In return, the government would stop all counter-
insurgency offensive operations.
❖ In 2015, Framework Agreement was signed between the Government of India and
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), to end the insurgency in the state
of Nagaland. GOI recognised the unique history, culture and position of the Nagas and
their sentiments and aspirations.
❖ An agreement on the political parameters of the settlement was worked out with the
Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs), in 2017.
❖ The peace talks between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM could not yield a
peace agreement by October 31 2019, the government’s deadline for concluding an
accord. The negotiations seemed to have reached a stalemate.
4. Naga Insurgency – Concerns

4.1 Defying a lasting solution

● Rooted in the politics of sub-nationalism, complexities of regional geopolitics and the

evolving dynamics of counterinsurgency tactics, the Naga insurgency has defied a lasting
solution.
● The much-touted peace accord is yet to be achieved, despite the Centre’s push to have it
concluded by 2019.

4.2 Suffering for the general populace:

● The Naga insurgency has seen violent splits, ugly divisive tribalism, fratricidal feuds and

untold sufferings for the general populace.

4.3 Law and order situation:

● Law and order is a major area of concern in the state with armed gangs who question the

sovereignty and integrity of the nation wielding considerable influence.

4.4 Cultural of extortion

● The armed gangs have been engaging in extortion and syphoning off funds meant for

development work. These illegal collections by armed groups have been an issue for

several years.
 4.5 External support factor:

● India’s adversaries (China and Pakistan) have provided the Naga insurgents with vital

external support at one point in time and this threat of external aid amounts to a major

challenge to India’s internal security.

5. Obstructions to Peace settlement

5.1 Non-negotiable aspects to India

● Recognition of Naga sovereignty, integration of all Naga-speaking areas into a

greater Nagaland, a separate constitution and a separate flag are demands that the
Indian Government may find difficult to fulfil.
● The Indian Government is willing to allow for regional autonomy within the
framework of the Indian Constitution
● Non-flexibility of the NSCN-IM on the issue of a separate Naga national flag and
Naga Yezhabo (constitution) have delayed the peace settlement.

5.2 Internal divisions among Naga groups

● Internal divisions in the Naga society threaten to delay a final agreement. While the
NNPGs want a solution for Nagas within Nagaland, the NSCN-IM seeks integration
of Naga-inhabited areas beyond the geographical boundary of Nagaland.
● Also, other Naga groups namely the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) have
already promised a settlement with or without the NSCN (IM).

5.3 Distrust

● Realising that the NSCN (IM) cannot be the sole representative of the Nagas, in 2017
other Naga underground factions were also brought to the negotiating table, lowering
the prestige of the NSCN (IM).
● Today there are seven of these factions under an umbrella organisation, the Naga
National Political Groups (NNPG), taking part in the negotiations.
● The Central government’s move to bring in other Naga armed groups on board the
peace talks, though well-intentioned, had a negative effect on the process. It bred
 suspicion about Delhi exploiting divisions within the Nagas on tribal and geopolitical
lines.

5.4 Speculation

● Speculation among the Naga society is high that the Central government may renege
on the principles of “shared sovereignty” for co-existing as two separate identities, as
was stated in the framework agreement. This has been fuelled by the nationalism
driven policies of the Centre like the abrogation of Article 370 and the call for “one
nation, one constitution”.

5.5 Opposition by neighbouring states

● The demands for greater Nagaland or Nagalim from the NSCN-IM is bound to lead
to a redrawing of the state boundaries in the northeast. The territorial integrity of the
neighbouring states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Manipur are bound to be
affected and hence they are wary of a peace settlement. Manipur has issued a strong
statement against any move which would compromise its territorial integrity.
● ‘Greater Nagaland’ or Nagalim — includes, apart from the present-day state of Nagaland,

other Naga-dominated areas in neighbouring Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and

parts of Myanmar.

The talks were revived after the transfer of Mr. Ravi, with the Centre deputing retired
Intelligence Bureau Special Director A.K. Mishra. The NSCN-IM is demanding a separate
flag and Constitution. Among its other demands are the unification of all Naga inhabited
areas to comprise Greater Nagalim. There are four other groups with whom the Centre has
signed a ceasefire agreement — the NSCN (NK), NSCN(R), NSCN (K-Khango) and NSCN

(Niki Sumi). Now, as we have traced the chronology till present it is pertinent to understand
about AFSPA after the Mon incident, whose removal the whole state of Nagaland is asking.

6. AFSPA

AFSPA enables the military to keep everything under control in "disturbed areas". They have the
position to restrict a get-together of at least five people in a space, can utilise power or even open
fire in the wake of giving due notice on the off chance that they feel an individual is in violation of
 the law. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Bill was passed by both the Houses of Parliament
and it was supported by the President on September 11, 1958. It became known as the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958. The Act came into power with regards to expanding
brutality in the North-eastern States many years prior, which the State legislatures saw as hard to
control. If reasonable suspicion exists, the army can also arrest a person without a warrant; enter
or search premises without a warrant; and ban the possession of firearms.

7. Recent un-fortunes due to AFSPA

● The truth is that long decades of violent insurrections and draconian
counterinsurgency laws, in particular the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act
(AFSPA) 1958, have ensured a climate of impunity among those fighting insurgency.
● In neighboring Manipur, this became evident even in a pocket where AFSPA had
been removed after public agitation following another atrocious rape and murder of a
woman insurgent suspect in 2004.
● Fake encounter killings soared in the area in the years that followed. The intuitive
understanding of those tasked with counterinsurgency duty has come to be that
action towards this cause will have little or no legal consequence.
● What happened at Mon is new evidence of this. It too reeked of the attitude that in
these wild lawless territories, mistakes, even if they spell immense losses to civilian
life, are part of the game.

8. Way Forward

● Any arrangement to be worked out should lead to social and political

harmony, economic prosperity and protection of the life and property of
all tribes and citizens of the states.
● Another way of dealing with the issue can be maximum decentralisation of
powers to the tribal heads and minimum centralisation at the apex level,
which should mainly work towards facilitating governance and undertaking large
development projects.
● Greater autonomy for the Naga inhabited areas in these states can be
provided which would encompass separate budget allocations for the Naga
inhabited areas with regard to their culture and development issues.
● Moreover, the Centre must keep in mind that most of the armed insurgencies
across the world do not end in either total victory or comprehensive defeat, but
in a grey zone called ‘compromise’.
● In regard to AFSPA ,BP Jeevan Reddy committee examining it in relation to

the Northeast in 2005, and the Veerappa Moily report of the Second
Administrative Reforms Commission of 2007, recommended that the Act be
repealed.

● The reports of the Justice Verma Committee (2013) and the Justice Hegde

Commission (2013) supported the need to address the abuses committed

under the AFSPA and end the effective impunity enjoyed by security forces.

● The Supreme Court appointed Hegde Commission (2013) found that all seven

deaths in the six cases it investigated were extrajudicial executions, and also
said that the AFSPA was widely abused by security forces in Manipur.

● A new body should be constituted that would look after the rights of the Nagas in

the other north-eastern states besides Nagaland.