Running Head: U9A1 1

Policy Recommendation Briefing:

Israeli style airport interviews: Appropriate for America?

Fall Term 2015

U9A1 2

Introduction and Definition of the Problem

Airport security continues to be a “security theater” as Bruce Schneier (2009), would

suggest. Airport security in the U.S. is expensive, inconvenient and largely useless. It is termed

“theater” by Schneier and others because it makes people feel safer but does very little to

actually improve their safety. While the U.S. has invested billions in airport security and

displayed virtually all of it where everyone can see, including a potential terrorist, it is of little

value. A more reasonable approach to security in the airline industry would be to focus on

passengers rather than on items in much the way that Israel targets certain passengers for

intensive interviews. Airport security is a strategy and tactics example that has gone bad.

Protecting passengers and property is the strategy but the tactics employed focus on what is

being carried by passengers rather than on the passenger himself; items do not commit terror,

people do.

The practice being used that is suggested

The concept of using Israeli style intensive interviewing of airline passengers in the U.S.

has been raised by many. It is often dismissed as impractical because of the scale of airline

passengers in the U.S. compared to that of Israel (Stewart & Mueller 2014). Indeed the U.S. has

ten times as many passengers as Israel in a given year and hundreds more airports (Poole, 2003).

It has also been argued that the political climate of the U.S. and Israel are vastly different

with Israel on a heightened alert level all the time due to being surrounded by hostile

neighboring countries. Israel uses ethnic profiling as one of many criteria to conduct extensive

interviews on passengers (Hasisi, 2012). In the U.S. it would not be politically correct to use

ethnic profiling as a stand alone criteria.

U9A1 3

However nobody argues that Israeli airport security is ineffective, completely the reverse,

most argue that Israeli security is the gold standard by which all others are to be judged. Their

interviews of passengers begin even before a passenger reaches the airport with a checkpoint

outside the perimeter. Guards initially ask a few questions to determine if there is any suspicion

about the passengers. Unloading baggage at the curb there are more Israeli security guards

watching for odd behavior or odd packages. Once inside the airport, passengers are screened

based on ethnicity, behavior, how their ticket was purchased, where they are going and where

they have been as well as whom they were talking to in the airport. Any passenger that seems to

be a “risk” is given secondary intensive interviewing with questions designed to illicit responses

that are incompatible or inconsistent (Seidenstat, 2004).

The viability of the practice in the US

The U.S. has invested time and money into their current security measures and the public

has grudgingly accepted the new practices because they have no choice and according to

Schneier (2009), there was little research conducted on what would be the best tactic to ensure

security and with the U.S. view that every passenger is a potential terrorist, security measures

have relied heavily on technology. There is almost no evidence that the current system has

prevented a terror attack on an airliner. The TSA missed 95% of the items that were banned on

flights even with their technology (Schneier, 2009). So it seems all the money invested in

technology is not doing its job anyway. That money could be better spent training TSA security

by Israeli standards to detect “risk” passengers and to interview them further.

There is a logical and intelligent solution to the current system. In all actuality the odds

of a terrorist trying to bring down a commercial airliner again is very low (Schneier 2009), as

compared to other targets that are much easier such as a shopping mall full of holiday shoppers.
U9A1 4

Would Americans accept Israeli style interviewing instead of the useless routines in

airports today? Some would say that productivity could be increased by speeding passengers

through airports and by adding flights with the time saved so changing current security to

selective interviews of select passengers might be welcome (Gkritza, Niemeier & Mannering,

2006). Concentrating on certain individuals is correct policing. A traffic enforcement analogy

would that we don’t have to stop every vehicle on the highway, just the one that fits a profile.

Conclusion

What is advocated is to be resilient, to not over react, to not inconvenience the general

public, not to place armed guards around every airport or historic structure because to do so

demonstrates that we, as a civilized society, have lost the war with terrorists. The one terror act

that occurs, while reprehensible, is only the catalyst for a new wave of societal inconveniences

and expenses that transform a civilized society into cowering puppies and perhaps that is the real

goal of terrorism, to terrorize society long after an attack. In defying them this victory, society

can show its resilience and its fortitude to continue in the face of those who would attempt to

destroy or disrupt any civilized nation.

To eliminate this security theater in airports and to use intensive interviews on only

certain passengers that fit a certain profile would be a better investment and a better tactic in the

overall strategy to protect commercial air travel.

U9A1 5

Reference

Gkritza, K., Niemeier, D., Mannering, F., (2006). Airport security screening and changing

passenger satisfaction: an exploratory assessment. Journal of Air Transport

Management,

12 (5), 213e219.

Hasisi, B. (2012). Ethnic profiling in airport screening: Lessons from Israel 1968-2010.

American Law and Economics Review, VO NO, 2012, 2-44.

Poole, R. (2003). A Risk Based Airport Security Policy. Reason Public Policy Institute.

Retrieved from http://development.reason.org/wp-

content/uploads/2003/05/359408528b992e7d0804df1b590dd424.pdf

Schneier, B. (November, 2009). Beyond security theater. Retrieved from

https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2009/11/beyond_security_thea.html

Stewart, M. & Mueller, J. (2014). Cost benefit analysis of airport security: Are we too

safe? Journal of Air Transport Management, 35, 19-28.

Seidenstat, P. (2004). Terrorism, airport security, and the private sector. Review of Policy

Research, 21(3), 275-291.

U9A1 6

Appendix A

Comparative Analysis

Whats so great about Israeli Airport Security?

---Well they don’t take naked pictures of you.

Introduction

Since September 2011, airport security in the United States has become more intense.

The terrorist attacks that utilized commercial jetliners that day proved the vulnerability of the

country because security was not as thorough as it could have been. Then the shoe bomber and

the underwear bomber came along and while both terrorists were stopped, there was another

knee jerk reaction to airport security. U.S. airport security is now cumbersome, inefficient in

terms of productivity and still falls far below that of Israeli security techniques. This paper will

review the evolution of Israeli airport security and its possible application in the U.S.

Israeli motivation for its style of airport security

Israel has a unique geographical situation in that it is surrounded by Arab states who are

hostile towards Israel and there is a need to be cautious about passengers who may hope to do

harm to one of its airliners and to the nation. There is a history of suicide bombers who have

attacked border posts and other targets in Israel and the fear is justified that this could happen to

a commercial airliner. Politically Israel can not afford to be politically correct if it is to protect

itself.
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Given that Israel has a lower number of passengers than the U.S. their system of security

procedures is easier to conduct. Multiple interviews, behavior profiling as well as racial and

ethnic profiling are all part of their process and deemed to be appropriate considering the

violence the country has seen from its Arab neighbors. Its culture is fully aware of the ongoing

threats and relies on a heighted level of awareness all the time but with a special awareness of

those from particular backgrounds who have historically been involved in violence.

Israeli airport security is based in human judgment and intuition whereas U.S. security is

based on procedure, policies and treating everyone equally. That may not be the best approach

with airport security when there is a profile of a terrorist. Police criminal profiling for example

is not racial profiling and in airports just because someone of a certain ethnic appearance is

questioned is probably because that person fits the profile and the decision was not based solely

on ethnic heritage. Profiling is based on many factors, behavior, how a ticket was purchased,

where the person is coming from and going to as well as any history that may present itself in

the passenger database.

Feasibility of Implementation in the U.S.

As stated, Israeli security relies heavily on human judgment and intuition and Israel has a

large pool of trained personnel for the task from their military. In order to implement such a plan

in the US there would first need to be armies of interviewers because of the sheer number of

passengers. Israel has about 6.4 million passengers yearly compared to the 762 million

passengers U.S. airports serve. This is one of the main arguments against implementing the

Israeli system. The cost of adding enough interviewers would be very high but then where is the
U9A1 8

research that discusses how this would create a huge employment opportunity and of thousands

more tax payers?

Utilizing a profiling system in the US would be difficult because of civil rights laws but

then random searches and seizures are common in airports and passengers have learned to live

with that. Giving up an infant’s formula because it’s a liquid or a favorite key chain novelty

because its in the shape of a gun; one only has to walk by the bin of confiscated items at the

airport and ponder whether anyone could have actually taken down an airline with one of these

trinkets.

Ethnic profiling solely based on that criteria is not appropriate in U.S. society but other

criteria such as behavior, travel history, and ethnicity do make it more appropriate. Airport

security should be about screening and filtering passengers that are true risks and concentrating

on those passengers. This would make the entire process of traveling more efficient by

eliminating the time needed to go through x-ray machines, body scanners, wanding, pat downs

and image scanners.

Conclusion

While there are arguments for and against increased security practices and of

implementing Israeli style security even if only in larger airports, the cost factor is always the

biggest obstacle. America will have to ask itself is the increased labor cost worth the improved

security that concentrates on the appropriate target? Is it better to incontinence and humiliate

average passengers just to be politically correct? What is the cost of losing an airliner full of

passengers after it is deliberately crashed into a national monument by a terrorist to make a

political statement?
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Reference

Hasisi, B., & Weisburd, D. (2011). Going beyond ascribed identities: The importance of

procedural justice in airport security screening in Israel. Law & Society Review, 45(4),

867-892.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.AIR.PSGR

Hainmüller, J., & Lemnitzer, J. M. (2003). Why do Europeans fly safer? The politics of airport

security in Europe and the US. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(4), 1-36.

Appendix B

Cost Benefit Analysis

Introduction to Comparative Homeland Security

This paper compares the security measures in place at airports in the U.S. and

Israel. Efforts to protect the public from terrorist acts in airports and onboard aircraft are

different in the U.S. compared to Israel. It is important to compare how effective and

cost efficient security procedures are in different settings. There are a multitude of

methods to stage a terror attack although since September 2001 (9/11), it is generally

agreed among security professionals that hijacking an airliner for a suicide attack is one

of the least likely scenarios because of reinforced cockpit doors and most importantly the

awareness of passengers and crew and their determination to fight back (Poole, 2003). It

is therefore suggested in this paper that there are essentially only two security methods

necessary; the first is interviews with every passenger that is deemed a risk and the

second cost nothing at all and that is the awareness and willingness of flight crew and
U9A1 10

passengers to attack a terrorist or even an unruly passenger to save an aircraft. Other than

that the only way to prevent a terror attack in the skies is to have every passenger fly

naked.

Prior to 9/11, hijacking an airliner in the U.S. meant it was going to land safely

and passengers would only wait it out in Havana, but when a jet was used as a projectile

in 2011, the concept of a hijacking changed and so did the concept of security. The U.S.

basically threw everything that had into airport security thinking that another 9/11 was

coming. In reality since that method has been used and is now much more difficult, it is

more likely that terrorists will either move on to other targets or find a path of least

resistance in the airline industry. Therefore a reassessment of security and its cost to

benefit is in order.

Israeli Airport Security

The U.S. has layers of security based mostly in technology while Israel bases

their security in human hands and secondarily relies on technology. Hasisi (2012),

explains that Israeli airport security is the benchmark that other airports and governments

look to for comparison. Even before passengers arrive at the airport they are checked by

guards as their vehicle approaches. Then passengers are checked again at curbside and

watched by trained personnel for any cues that would suggest suspicion. In this way,

Israel security is appropriating resources on those passengers that are deemed suspicious

or a potential risk instead of wasting time with every passenger as the U.S. does. While

every passenger at an Israeli airport is screened, many are passed through with little delay

because they do not fit the profile of a risk passenger. Intensive interviews are conducted
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with any passenger that behaves suspiciously or who fits a profile or who has travelled to

countries that may indicate a type of passenger that is a risk. The U.S. subscribes to the

policy that deems every passenger is a risk passenger. This is a waste of time and money

and while it is expensive to train screeners to interview passengers they way that Israel

does, it could be more cost effective that the current procedures especially given that

airlines are probably not a favorite target any longer.

Cost vs Benefit of interviewing passengers

The Israeli airlines El Al has shown that there is not a necessity to rely on

technology such as full body scanners and there is no need to deprive infants of their

milk in a bottle nor for passengers to remove belts and shoes all this contributes to the

“hassle factor” in airports that slows down lines, reduces the number of flights and in

many cases reduces passengers who would prefer not to go through the process as well as

reduces worker productivity by staying in the airport instead of getting to a destination

(Gkritza, Niemeier & Mannering, 2006).

It is estimated that Israel spends about $90 million per year on airport security

(Hasisi, 2012) and it is well known that they have an impeccable safety record. While

there has not been a hijacking in the US since 9/11, there remains the possibility but

using interviews not only would catch risk passengers but could provide valuable

intelligence as well about such a passenger that could be used by other agencies. If the

cost of airport security was transferred to the passenger and efficiency in the airport was

improved using interviewers only on those passengers deemed a risk then it could be
U9A1 12

conceivable that there could also be an increase in the number of flights that an airline

could add (Holguin-Veras, Xu, & Bhat, 2012).

If every passenger ticket included a $25 fee assuming 650 million passengers per

year the collection would be $16 billion and if the security agents in airports now were

also trained in the way Israeli interviewers are trained and an additional army of 60,000

agents were added it would cost about $4.5 billion year. If this figure were added to the

$2 billion spent on current TSA screeners that Stewart and Mueller (2014), report, the

total would be $6.5 billion leaving a net profit from the passenger fees of $9.5 billion

which could be used to modernize, update or improve current airport security features.

Additionally Increased efficiency of passengers estimated at one hour less time in airport

for each passenger and assuming 50% are business flyers and earn an average pay of $15 per

hour with 325 million business travelers multiplied $15 hour the increased productivity would be

$4.8 billion per year.

Conclusion

While estimated costs for interviews are high, the concept is to use behavioral

cues as well as other information gathered to narrow and focus on those passengers

considered to be a risk. Since the chances of another terror attack utilizing commercial

airliners is improbable, there is little need to inconvenience the flying pubic with

intrusive procedures. Training security professionals to be aware of behavioral cues and

how to interview passengers in the Israeli method is a much better way to control

passengers who might try to harm a flight. This will also speed up efficiency in airports

and could potentially increase worker productivity since passengers will to have to waste
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time in airports. Passengers will also pay for the increased security with nominal $25

passenger fee per ticket leaving a surplus to be used for other airport expenditures.

Reference

Gkritza, K., Niemeier, D., Mannering, F., (2006). Airport security screening and changing

passenger satisfaction: an exploratory assessment. Journal of Air Transport

Management,

12 (5), 213e219.

Hasisi, B. (2012). Ethnic profiling in airport screening: Lessons from Israel 1968-2010.

American Law and Economics Review, VO NO, 2012, 2-44.

Holguin-Veras, J., Xu, N., Bhat, C., (2012). An assessment of the impacts of inspection

times on the airline Industry’s market share after September 11th. Journal of Air

Transport Management, 23 (1), 17e24.

Poole, R. (2003). A Risk Based Airport Security Policy. Reason Public Policy Institute.

Retrieved from http://development.reason.org/wp-

content/uploads/2003/05/359408528b992e7d0804df1b590dd424.pdf

Stewart, M. & Mueller, J. (2014). Cost benefit analysis of airport security: Are we too

safe? Journal of Air Transport Management, 35, 19-28.

Appendix C

Bench Marking Analysis

Introduction

There has been debate about the feasibility of using Israeli style interviews in American

airports. Many dismiss the concept as being too expensive due to the much higher number of

passengers in the U.S. as compared to Israel. There has also been debate about the political
U9A1 14

feasibility given the civil rights and privacy laws of the U.S. as compared to Israel. This paper

briefly reviews the benchmarks of providing this level of security in American airports.

Political Feasibility

After September 2001 (9/11), the U.S. government initiated new protocols for security in

airports in fear of another 9/11 style attack. Reassuring the public that their security was

paramount in the air meant more scrutiny of passengers without regard to race, ethnic

background, age or gender but this added inconveniences and longer lines in the airport. There

has been much more emphasis on items carried onto an aircraft than there has been in the person

who carries them (Poole, 2003).

Primarily Israeli airport security uses ethnic profiling and background checks. This

means that Arab men are the most likely to be on the business end of an Israeli intensive

interview (Hasisi, 2012). Due to American law, ethnic profiling is unacceptable and a Civil

Rights violation so while some people of a certain ethnic background may be subjected to

secondary screening, it must be tempered so as to not attract attention that would make it seem

deliberate and that would be difficult if TSA stopped every ethnic looking person.

Economic Feasibility

It is quite true that using intensive interviews on all passengers would be too expensive to

justify (Poole, 2003), if only “risk” passengers who display certain criteria were interviewed and

if an additional fee were placed on passenger tickets to cover this expense, then it could be

economically feasible and it would be justifiable if there were no more attempts to use aircraft in

a terror attack.
U9A1 15

However correlation and causation are two different things so as we look at air safety

today, just because there have been no more terror attacks with aircraft does not mean that the

current airport security system is effective. Conversely just because intensive interviews are

applied on certain passengers it can not guaranteed that there will not be another terror attack

using a commercial aircraft. One aspect that is rarely considered in aviation security are the

private craft that can be chartered and used in a manner that was seen on 9/11 and airport

security would not be as involved in private craft in the way they are with commercial flights

(Seidenstat, 2004).

Necessity
While increasing scrutiny of certain passengers that fit a “risk” profile is still and always

will be a necessity, it is probably not a necessity to use Israeli style tactics on most passengers

since not all fit a “risk” profile. The al-Qaeda style strike of 9/11 is unlikely to be used again

because of three main reasons: reinforced flight deck doors, air marshals, and passengers who

will fight back. Indeed in two of the latest attempts to bring down a commercial airliner (the

shoe bomber and the underwear bomber) were foiled by the other passengers (Stewart &

Mueller, 2014). Perhaps there should be a shift away from the assumption that an airliner will be

brought down from inside the cabin and more likely by placing an improvised explosive device

(IED) into checked baggage or cargo as witnessed recently with the bombing of a Russian

airliner where terrorists allegedly used an IED inside a soda can (Aboulenein & Noueihed,

2015). However some passengers will need to undergo a more thorough interview if they present

unusual behavior or unusual circumstances such as no baggage.

Conclusion
U9A1 16

Israel cites an aversion to discussing all of their security practices and rightfully so.

There is a risk with divulging your security procedures in that a terrorist can use this information

to discover weaknesses and exploit them. A single trip to an American airport reveals most of

the security procedures in place. The use of Israeli style screening is a possibility in the U.S. and

is being used to a limited degree but it could be expanded. Politically it would be difficult to use

ethnic profiling as a stand alone criteria (Akram & Johnson, 2001) but could be used with at

least one additional criteria such as recent travel to states known to support terrorism.

Economically, the best way to pay for such a program is through a passenger fee

collected from the sale of airline tickets. It will be an expensive endeavor costing somewhere

around double the current cost of airport security but current airport security is focused on items

rather than passengers. There does seem to be a necessity to secondary screening of some

passengers and intensive interviews of those who seem to exhibit unusual or suspicious behavior.

Reference

Aboulenein, A., & Noueihed, L. (Nov 18, 2015). Islamic State says 'Schweppes bomb'

used to bring down Russian plane. Retrieved from

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/19/us-egypt-crash-islamicstate-photo-

idUSKCN0T725Q20151119#Eh0AEmY3zwEZrObR.97.

Akram, S. M., & Johnson, K. R. (2001). Race, civil rights, and immigration law after September

11, 2001: The targeting of Arabs and Muslims. New York University Annual Survey of

American Law, 58, 295.

Hasisi, B. (2012). Ethnic profiling in airport screening: Lessons from Israel 1968-2010.

American Law and Economics Review, VO NO, 2012, 2-44.

U9A1 17

Poole, R. (2003). A Risk Based Airport Security Policy. Reason Public Policy Institute.

Retrieved from http://development.reason.org/wp-

content/uploads/2003/05/359408528b992e7d0804df1b590dd424.pdf

Stewart, M. & Mueller, J. (2014). Cost benefit analysis of airport security: Are we too

safe? Journal of Air Transport Management, 35, 19-28.

Seidenstat, P. (2004). Terrorism, airport security, and the private sector. Review of Policy

Research, 21(3), 275-291.