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Knowledge, Ignorance, and Uncertainty: An Investigation from the


Perspective of Some Differential Equations

Article  in  Expert Systems with Applications · April 2022


DOI: 10.1016/j.eswa.2021.116325

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Knowledge, Ignorance, and Uncertainty: An Investigation from the
Perspective of Some Differential Equations
Fujun Hou1, Evangelos Triantaphyllou2, 3, *, and Juri Yanase4

1: School of Management and Economics 2: Division of Computer Science & Engineering


Beijing Institute of Technology Louisiana State University
Beijing, China, 100081 Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA
Email: houfj@bit.edu.cn Email: etriantaphyllou@yahoo.com

3: Department of Medicine 4: Complete Decisions, LLC


Section of Hematology & Med Oncology Baton Rouge, LA 70810, USA
School of Medicine http://www.completedecisions.com
Tulane University Email: jurijuriy@aol.com
New Orleans, LA 70112, USA

*: Corresponding co-author

Please cite this paper as follows:


Hou, F, E Triantaphyllou, and J Yanase, (2022), Knowledge, Ignorance, and Uncertainty: An
Investigation from the Perspective of Some Differential Equations. Expert Systems with
Applications. Vol. 191, 1 April 2022, 116325. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2021.116325

First available online on December 2, 2021. This preprint is available on researchgate.net

December 22, 2021


Abstract:
People use knowledge on several cognitive tasks such as when they recognize objects,
rank entities such as the alternatives in multi-criteria decision making, or for classification
tasks of decision making / expert / intelligent systems. When people have sufficient
relevant knowledge, they can make well-distinctive assessments among entities.
Otherwise, they may exhibit some uncertainty. This paper establishes two differential
equations, of which one is for the interaction between the knowledge level and the
uncertainty level, and the other is for the interaction between the ignorance level and the
uncertainty level. By solving these two differential equations under certain boundary
conditions, one can derive that the proposed knowledge level indicator is equivalent to
Wierman's knowledge granularity measure up to a constant (exactly, ln 2). Moreover, the
knowledge level indicator and the ignorance level indicator are found to be in a
complementary relationship with each other. That is, more knowledge implies less
ignorance, and vice-versa. The results of this study bridge a critical gap that exists in the
understanding of the concepts of knowledge and ignorance.

Key words: knowledge; uncertainty; Wierman's knowledge granularity measure;


differential equations.
1
1 Introduction
The notion of knowledge is of great help for recognition as a famous motto puts it
"Knowledge enables you to add a pair of eyes." There are also two other terms related to
knowledge, of which one is ignorance, and the other is uncertainty. Ignorance means a lack of
knowledge. Good knowledge results in good recognition. On the contrary, absence of knowledge
means ignorance which may lead to uncertainty in recognition. In this paper the notions of
knowledge, ignorance and uncertainty are all entities that can be measured mathematically by
nonnegative numbers. We will use the notation 𝐾𝐾, 𝐼𝐼, and 𝑈𝑈 for the level of knowledge, the level
of ignorance, and the level of uncertainty, respectively. The above are important aspects in the
design of modern expert and intelligent systems (Anjaria, 2020; Yalcin et al., 2021).

Moreover, in order to proceed with the modelling approach proposed in this study the
following reasonable assumptions are made:
• Assumption I: People are in enthusiasm for acquiring knowledge to get to know the
world around them, and the process of acquiring knowledge is a continuous one.
• Assumption II: The more knowledge people possess, the less uncertainty their
recognition will have.
• Assumption III: The more the uncertainty of the people’s recognition is, the more
likely it is that the people will seek knowledge when making a better recognition.

The above assumptions are rational for ordinary people because they are consistent with
some famous quotes related to the concept of “knowledge”:
• "All men by nature desire knowledge" (Aristotle (384 BC - 322 BC), Metaphysics),
and "The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition
of it" (Laurence Sterne (1713-1768)).
• "Knowledge is power" (Sir Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626)).
• "To be conscious that you are ignorant is a great step to knowledge" (Benjamin Disraeli
(1804 - 1881)), "Perplexity is the beginning of knowledge" (Kahlil Gibran (1883 - 1931)),
and "The beginning of knowledge is the discovery of something we do not understand"
(Frank Herbert (1920 - 1986)).

It is known that knowledge has the property of granularity (Wierman, 1999). However,
in order to conduct a study based on the proposed differential equations, we assume that the process
of acquiring knowledge by people is a continuous one. This consideration is reflected in
Assumption I.

2 Background Information
It is widely agreed that people employ knowledge to recognize objects. The term
‘knowledge’ can be defined in numerous ways (for a review, please refer to Alavi and Leidner
(2001)). In this paper, we adopt the view of Alavi and Leidner (2001). That is, “knowledge is the
result of cognitive processing triggered by the inflow of new stimuli.” We also take into account
the views of Carlsson et al., (1996) and Stanley (2002), in which knowledge is related to the
2
cognition capacity of human beings, with the potential for influencing people's future actions.
Obviously, sufficient knowledge always leads to good recognition. Otherwise, uncertainty arises.
Regarding this study, the most relevant literature on uncertainty and knowledge is
attributed to Shannon (1948) and Wierman (1999). Shannon’s information entropy has found
many applications in the field of expert systems. For instance, it has been used to examine the
objective weights in TOPSIS (Wang & Lee, 2009; Chen, 2021), and for measuring consensus in
group recommender systems (Yalcin et al., 2021). Shannon introduced his entropy formula for
measuring uncertainty based on three assumptions (Shannon, 1948). That is, the Shannon entropy
is not deduced from any mathematical model. This is also the case for Wierman’s work (Wierman,
1999). Wierman constructed his knowledge measure based on several axioms.
This paper investigates the issues of knowledge and ignorance from a novel perspective.
In particular, it establishes some differential equations, from which one can obtain Wierman’s
knowledge formula. Moreover, this paper shows that these results satisfy a crucial complementary
relationship.

3 A Differential Equation Model of Knowledge


According to Assumptions I and II, the influence of knowledge on uncertainty can be
described by the following formula:
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
< 0.
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
That is, when uncertainty increases (decreases), then the level of knowledge decreases (increases).
Similarly, the influence of ignorance on uncertainty can be described by the following formula:
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
> 0.
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
According to Assumption III, the relation of knowledge and uncertainty, as well as the
relation of ignorance and uncertainty at its simplest form can be (but does not have to be) written
as follows:
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, (1)
and
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏, (2)
respectively, where 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏 are two non-zero constants. In particular, a takes a negative value,
and b takes a positive value. Equation (2) indicates that the greater the uncertainty is, the larger the
rate of change of uncertainty over ignorance is. This is a reasonable deduction from Assumption
III, since greater uncertainty promotes people’s higher desirability for knowledge, and more
knowledge implies less ignorance.
Equations (1) and (2) are two first-order ordinary differential equations. Therefore, their
general solution formulas are given as follows:
ln 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑐𝑐1 , (3)
and
ln 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 + 𝑐𝑐2 , (4)
respectively, where 𝑐𝑐1 and 𝑐𝑐2 are two constants. These constants can be either positive or
3
negative.
If the boundary conditions were known, then the solutions to the previous equations could
be known as well. One may observe that equations (1) and (2) represent continuous processes.
However, in what follows we will consider some particular cases where 𝑈𝑈 will take integer values.

4 Measuring Knowledge and Ignorance Levels in Cognitive Processes


An equivalence relation is a basic relation that is closely related to human cognition. In a
cognitive process, one may say, for instance, “This entity is equal to that one” or “These two
entities are different”, and so on. This kind of assessments indicate that people have made
distinctions under an equivalence relation even if they might not explicitly realize this. An
equivalence relation over an entity set corresponds to a partition of the entity set into mutually
exclusive and exhaustive subsets, and vice-versa. That is, the partition is comprised of disjoint
equivalence classes. Under this setting, two entities are equivalent to each other if and only if they
belong to the same equivalence class (Raymond, 1965).
Consider an equivalence relation denoted as “∼” which is defined on a finite set comprised
of m distinct entities denoted as 𝑋𝑋 = {𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑥𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 }. The notation 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 means that 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 are equivalent to each other. Let [𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ] be the equivalence class which corresponds to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,

where [𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ] = {𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 |𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑋𝑋, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ∼ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 }. Clearly, if we have full knowledge about the entities of the
set X, then we will differentiate any one from the others. In this study one may observe that when
knowledge increases, this does not necessarily indicate that the “correctness” of the assessments
will increase too.
In the above setting, each equivalence class will include only one entity as the entities are
assumed to be distinct of each other. On the contrary, if we have no knowledge at all, then we will
not be able to differentiate any entity from each other. In this case, all the entities will be included
in a single equivalence class. Therefore, the cardinality numbers of the equivalence classes reflect
a relationship of the knowledge for recognition and uncertainty. Mathematically speaking if we
define
𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚
𝑈𝑈 = ��|[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]|,
𝑖𝑖=1

then we have 𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1 and 𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝑚𝑚, and the larger the value of 𝑈𝑈 is, the less distinct the
entities will be to the person (analyst studying the entities of the set X). In this case the boundary
conditions of formula (3) will be as follows:
𝐾𝐾 = ln 𝑚𝑚 , if 𝑈𝑈 = 1,

𝐾𝐾 = 0, if 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚.
Thus formula (3) can be transformed into the following:
−𝐾𝐾 + ln 𝑚𝑚 = ln 𝑈𝑈, or:
1
𝐾𝐾 = ln 𝑚𝑚 − ln 𝑈𝑈 = ln 𝑚𝑚 − 𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 ln|[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]|. (5)
The above analysis leads to the following theorem:

4
Theorem 1:
The knowledge level, denoted as K, which corresponds to a cognitive process on m entities
1
{𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑥𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 }, can be computed as follows: K = ln 𝑚𝑚 − 𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 ln|[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]|.

Proof: The uncertainty level for differentiating m entities is defined as follows:


𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚�∏𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1|[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]|.
Therefore, the uncertainty level takes its maximal value m when ∀𝑖𝑖(|[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]| = 𝑚𝑚) and its minimal
value 1 when ∀𝑖𝑖(|[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]| = 1). Accordingly, the knowledge level takes its minimal value 0 when
U is maximal and takes its maximal value ln 𝑚𝑚 when U is minimal. Substituting these two
extreme cases as the boundary conditions into equation (3),
ln 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑐𝑐1 ,
we have:
𝑎𝑎 = −1, and 𝑐𝑐1 = ln 𝑚𝑚.
Thus, we get:
1
𝐾𝐾 = ln 𝑚𝑚 − ln 𝑈𝑈 = ln 𝑚𝑚 − 𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 ln|[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]|.

This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. □

Similar to the previous considerations, the boundary conditions of equation (4) are as
follows:
𝐼𝐼 = 0, if 𝑈𝑈 = 1
� .
𝐼𝐼 = ln 𝑚𝑚 , if 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚
Under these conditions, equation (4) can be rewritten as follows:
ln 𝑈𝑈 = 𝐼𝐼, or:
1
𝐼𝐼 = ln 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 ln|[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]|. (6)
By combining equations (5) and (6) we get:
𝐾𝐾 + 𝐼𝐼 = ln 𝑚𝑚. (7)
When the boundary conditions of equation (4) are considered, the following theorem can be
derived.

Theorem 2:
The sum of the knowledge level, denoted as K, and the ignorance level, denoted as I, which
correspond to a cognitive process on m entities {𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑥𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 }, can be computed as follows: K +
I = ln 𝑚𝑚.

Proof: When we combine equation (5),


𝐾𝐾 = ln 𝑚𝑚 − ln 𝑈𝑈,
and equation (6),
𝐼𝐼 = ln 𝑈𝑈,
we get:
𝐾𝐾 + 𝐼𝐼 = ln 𝑚𝑚,
5
which concludes the proof of Theorem 2. □

Because 1 ≤ 𝑈𝑈 ≤ 𝑚𝑚 , we have 𝐾𝐾 ∈ [0, ln 𝑚𝑚] , and 𝐼𝐼 ∈ [0, ln 𝑚𝑚] . Theorem 2 implies a


complementary relationship which exists between 𝐾𝐾 and 𝐼𝐼. This complementary relationship
indicates that "the more knowledge we have, the less the ignorance is." For illustrative purposes
of the above concepts, we next consider Example 1.

Example 1:
Suppose that there is a set X comprised of five distinct objects. That is, 𝑋𝑋 =
{𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜3, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜4, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5}. Two persons, say Adam and Beth, were asked
to assess the weights of these objects. They reported their weighing results as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Data for the illustrative example (assessed weights of the 5 objects)
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ∗ Adam Beth
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1 60 60.2
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2 63 62.8
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜3 63 63.1
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜4 61 61.1
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5 61 61.1

Weighed in grams.

We use Theorem 1 to measure these two persons’ knowledge levels in their recognitions of
the objects’ weights.
The equivalence classes deduced from Adam’s weighing results are as follows:
[𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1] = {𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1},
[𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2] = {𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜3},
[𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜3] = {𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜3},
[𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜4] = {𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜4, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5}, and
[𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5] = {𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜4, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5}.

By using Theorem 1, Adam’s knowledge level can be calculated as follows:


1
𝐾𝐾 (Adam) = ln 5 − ln (1 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2) ≐ 1.0549.
5

The equivalence classes deduced from Beth’s weighing results are as follows:
[𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1] = {𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1},
[𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2] = {𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2},
[𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜3] = {𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜3},
[𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜4] = {𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜4, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5}, and
[𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5] = {𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜4, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜5}.

Similarly with above, by using Theorem 1 Beth’s knowledge level can be calculated as follows:
1
𝐾𝐾 (Beth) = ln 5 − ln (1 × 1 × 1 × 2 × 2) ≐ 1.3322.
5
6
From the above one can see that Beth has a higher knowledge level than Adam. This result is
consistent with our intuitive perception of the data shown in Table 1.
The next question is to determine the relative difference of two knowledge levels, such as
the ones by Adam and Beth in the previous example. The previous values depend on the
cardinality m of the compared entities. Thus, the previous values need to be normalized so one
may compare them across various set sizes. Given that the maximum value of the knowledge
level is equal to ln 𝑚𝑚 (i.e., ln 5 in this example) while the minimum value is equal to ln 1 (i.e.,
0), one can express the relative knowledge difference of two decision makers X and Y, denoted as
DK(X, Y), as follows:
�𝐾𝐾(𝑋𝑋) −𝐾𝐾(𝑌𝑌) �
DK(X, Y) = ln 𝑚𝑚
.
Since m is always greater than 1, the previous ratio can always be defined.
In the previous illustrative example, the relative knowledge difference between Adam and
Beth is equal to 0.1723. Instead of weight, one can consider any other measurable aspect, such as
length, surface, volume, monetary value, temperature, and so on.
Remark: Similar to the practice in utility theory, as a knowledge measure, K’s maximal
value can be set arbitrarily (only if it is larger than its minimal value). However, as it is shown
in Section 5, if we set the K’s maximal value (i.e., when U=1) as ln 𝑚𝑚, the derived formula is
related to an existing fundamental development, i.e., Wierman’s knowledge granularity measure.

5 The Relationship Between the Proposed Knowledge Level and


Wierman’s Knowledge Granularity Measure
As before, assume that 𝑋𝑋 is a finite set comprised of m entities. That is, 𝑋𝑋 =
{𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑥𝑥2 , ⋯ , 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 }. Let 𝐁𝐁 be a partition of 𝑋𝑋, and 𝐁𝐁 = {𝐵𝐵1 , 𝐵𝐵2 , ⋯ , 𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛 }, where 𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑚𝑚. Let 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 be

the cardinality of partition block 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 , and thus 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 = �𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 �. We have 𝑚𝑚 = |𝑋𝑋| = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1�𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 � = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 .
The knowledge granularity measure (in bits), denoted as G(B), is defined by Wierman (1999) as
follows:
𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏
𝐺𝐺(𝐁𝐁) = − ∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 log 2 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗.
Let [𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ] denote the partition block (i.e., equivalence class) which corresponds to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 .
Then, the above formula can be rewritten as follows:
𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏 1 𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏 1 |[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]|
𝐺𝐺(𝐁𝐁) = − ∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 log 2 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 = − 𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 ∑𝑘𝑘=1
𝑗𝑗
log 2 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 = − 𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 log 2 𝑚𝑚
, or:
1
𝐺𝐺(𝐁𝐁) = log 2 𝑚𝑚 − 𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 log 2 |[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]|. (8)
One can see that equation (8) is quite similar to the formula of Theorem 1, which defines
the level of knowledge. This is described explicitly next as Theorem 3.

Theorem 3:
The knowledge level, denoted as K, of a partition on a finite set is equivalent to Wierman’s
knowledge granularity measure, denoted as G(B), up to a constant (exactly, ln 2). That is, the
following relation is true: 𝐾𝐾 = ln 2 × 𝐺𝐺(𝐁𝐁).

7
ln 𝑑𝑑
Proof: Consider Theorem 1 and equation (8). Next, by using the transformation log 𝑐𝑐 𝑑𝑑 = ln 𝑐𝑐

for changing the base of logarithmic expressions, the following result is derived:
1 1
𝐾𝐾 = ln 𝑚𝑚 − 𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 ln|[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]| = ln 2 × �log 2 𝑚𝑚 − 𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑖𝑖=1 log 2 |[𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ]|� = ln 2 × 𝐺𝐺(𝐁𝐁).

This completes the proof of Theorem 3. □

6 Application to Measuring the Knowledge Levels of An Individual’s


Ordinal Preferences
In this section, we apply the previous results to the measurement of an individual’s knowledge
levels in ordinal preferences. An interesting outcome is that, when the individuals are in consensus,
the collective ranking is associated with equal or more knowledge than the knowledge levels
associated with the rankings by any of the individuals. This is what intuition dictates here too.

6.1 Weak order, preference maps and consensus


A weak order, which allows for the possibility to express an indifference relation between
alternatives, is widely used in group decision making (see, e.g., Arrow, 1950; Sen, 1966; and many
others). In general, such orderings allow for the following possibilities:
(1) For any two alternatives x and y either one is preferred to the other (denoted as ‘x ≻ y’, if
x is preferred to y), or x and y are of indifference (denoted as x∼y); and
(2) for any three alternatives x, y, and z, if x∝y and y∝z, then x∝z, where the symbol ‘∝’ means
‘is preferred to or indifferent with’.
In other words, the previous ordering scheme is highly flexible as it can express any
possibility of preferences by the experts. In this paper, we assume that the individuals’ preferences
are weak orderings ranging over a finite set of alternatives. We also assume that if some alternatives
are in a tie, then these alternatives will be tied together and will be assigned to some (exactly, the
number of alternatives in the tie) common positions.
For instance, consider the ordinal ranking: 𝐴𝐴1 ~𝐴𝐴2 ≻ 𝐴𝐴5 ≻ 𝐴𝐴3 ~𝐴𝐴4 . Alternatives A1 and
A2 are in a tie and either one may be assigned to rank 1 or 2. Alternative A5 is assigned to rank
3, while alternatives A3 and A4 are in a tie too. Thus, either alternative A3 or A4 may be assigned
to rank 4 or 5.
We denote by {𝐴𝐴1 , 𝐴𝐴2 , ⋯ , 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 } a finite set of m alternatives and by {𝐸𝐸1 , 𝐸𝐸2 , ⋯ , 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 } a
finite set of n experts, where 1 < 𝑚𝑚, 𝑛𝑛 < +∞. For convenience, we let M = {1,2, ⋯ , 𝑚𝑚} and
N = {1,2, ⋯ , 𝑛𝑛}. A weak ordering over the alternative set is a ties-permitted ordinal ranking of
the alternatives, which can be represented by a preference map. We remark that the preference map
was originally named as ‘preference sequence vector’ by Hou (2015a) and later as ‘preference map’
by Hou and Triantaphyllou (2019). The later term is adopted in this paper.

8
Definition 1 (Hou, 2015b):

A preference map (for short, PM) 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = [𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ]𝑚𝑚×1 , which corresponds to a weak ordering over
the alternative set {𝐴𝐴1 , 𝐴𝐴2 , ⋯ , 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 }, is defined by
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = {|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 | + 1, |𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 | + 2, ⋯ , |𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 | + |𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 |}, (9)
where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the alternative 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ’s predominance set denoted by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = {𝑘𝑘|𝑘𝑘 ∈ M, 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 ≻ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 }, and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
is the alternative 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ’s indifference set denoted by 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = {𝑘𝑘|𝑘𝑘 ∈ M, 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 ~𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 }.

Example 2:
To illustrate the above concept, let us consider two ordinal rankings 𝐴𝐴1 ~𝐴𝐴2 ≻ 𝐴𝐴5 ≻
𝐴𝐴3 ~𝐴𝐴4 and 𝐴𝐴1 ≻ 𝐴𝐴2 ≻ 𝐴𝐴3 ~𝐴𝐴4 ~𝐴𝐴5 . According to Definition 1, their corresponding PMs are:
{1,2} {1}
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
{1,2} {2}
(1) ⎢ ⎥ (2) ⎢ ⎥
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(1) = �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 � = ⎢{4,5}⎥ and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(2) = �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 � = ⎢{3,4,5}⎥,
5×1 5×1
⎢{4,5}⎥ ⎢{3,4,5}⎥
⎣ {3} ⎦ ⎣{3,4,5}⎦
respectively. The entries of a PM are sets whose elements indicate the alternatives’ possible ranking
positions. For instance, the first entry of 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(1) (i.e., {1,2}) indicates the possible ranking
positions of alternative 𝐴𝐴1 , the second entry indicates the possible ranking positions of alternative
𝐴𝐴2 , and so on.

Because the entries of a PM are sets comprised of natural numbers, set operations such as
∩ and ∪ can be defined or operated in an entry-wise way for two PMs. Recall that the entry of a
PM is a set which indicates an alternative’s possible ranking positions. Therefore, if the two PMs
of two experts have some nonempty entry-wise intersections then the two experts agree on some
ranking positions for some of the alternatives. This leads to the definition of consensus as
described next.

Definition 2 (Hou, 2015b):


(1) (2) (𝑛𝑛)
Let 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(1) = �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 � , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(2) = �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 � ,…, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛) = �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 � be n preference
𝑚𝑚×1 𝑚𝑚×1 𝑚𝑚×1

(𝑗𝑗)
maps. These preference maps are said to be in consensus if and only if ∀𝑖𝑖�⋂𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ≠ ∅� or,

(𝑗𝑗) (𝑘𝑘)
equivalently, ∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗, 𝑘𝑘�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ≠ ∅�. Moreover, if these preference maps are in consensus,
(𝑐𝑐) (𝑗𝑗)
then their consensus PM is defined as 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐) = �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 � = ⋂𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑗𝑗) = �⋂𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 � .
𝑚𝑚×1 𝑚𝑚×1

For the purpose of an illustration, we consider the two PMs in Example 2. It is easy to
check by Definition 2 that they are in consensus. Moreover, their consensus ranking is as follows:

9
{1,2} {1} {1}
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
{1,2} {2} {2}
(𝑐𝑐) ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐) = �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 � = ⎢{4,5}⎥ ∩ ⎢{3,4,5}⎥ = ⎢{4,5}⎥,
5×1
⎢{4,5}⎥ ⎢{3,4,5}⎥ ⎢{4,5}⎥
⎣ {3} ⎦ ⎣{3,4,5}⎦ ⎣ {3} ⎦
which indicates that the consensus ranking is: 𝐴𝐴1 ≻ 𝐴𝐴2 ≻ 𝐴𝐴5 ≻ 𝐴𝐴3 ~𝐴𝐴4 .
We remark that, the consensus defined by Definition 2 can be applied or be generalized
to many relevant cases, e.g., the case of full consensus (i.e., all the people have consensus in terms
of all the alternatives), or the case of a partial consensus (i.e., only some people have consensus in
terms of some of the alternatives). The interested reader may refer to Hou et al. (2020) for more
details. Furthermore, the PMs and the consensus defined by Definition 2 can also be used to discuss
some other topics in group decision making, for example, group decision making under a fuzzy
environment (Hou, 2016) and a post-consensus analysis in group decision making (Triantaphyllou
et al., 2019; Triantaphyllou et al., 2020).

6.2 Measuring knowledge levels in ordinal rankings


The previous results (in particular, equation (5)) can be used to measure the knowledge
level of an ordinal ranking. We consider this in the following example.

Example 3:
Suppose that there is an alternative set {𝐴𝐴1 , 𝐴𝐴2 , 𝐴𝐴3 , 𝐴𝐴4 , 𝐴𝐴5 } , and a group of experts,
{𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸3} . Assume that the experts provided their weak orderings on the
alternative set as follows:

• Expert1: 𝐴𝐴1 ≻ 𝐴𝐴2 ∼ 𝐴𝐴3 ≻ 𝐴𝐴4 ∼ 𝐴𝐴5 .


• Expert2: 𝐴𝐴1 ≻ 𝐴𝐴2 ∼ 𝐴𝐴3 ∼ 𝐴𝐴4 ≻ 𝐴𝐴5 .
• Expert3: 𝐴𝐴1 ∼ 𝐴𝐴2 ≻ 𝐴𝐴3 ≻ 𝐴𝐴4 ≻ 𝐴𝐴5 .

We use Theorem 1 to measure the experts’ knowledge levels. We first write out their preference
maps:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸3
𝐴𝐴1 {1} {1} {1,2}
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
𝐴𝐴2 {2,3} {2,3,4} {1,2}
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
𝐴𝐴3 ⎢{2,3}⎥ , ⎢{2,3,4}⎥ , ⎢ {3} ⎥.
𝐴𝐴4 ⎢{4,5}⎥ ⎢{2,3,4}⎥ ⎢ {4} ⎥
𝐴𝐴5 ⎣{4,5}⎦ ⎣ {5} ⎦ ⎣ {5} ⎦

By using equation (5), the experts’ knowledge levels are computed as follows:
1
• Expert1: 𝐾𝐾 (𝐸𝐸1) = ln 5 − 5 ln (1 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2) ≐ 1.0549.

1
• Expert2: 𝐾𝐾 (𝐸𝐸2) = ln 5 − 5 ln (1 × 3 × 3 × 3 × 1) ≐ 0.9503.

1
• Expert3: 𝐾𝐾 (𝐸𝐸3) = ln 5 − 5 ln (2 × 2 × 1 × 1 × 1) ≐ 1.3322.

10
In addition, when some experts are in consensus, the cardinality number of their consensus
PM will not be more than any cardinality numbers of the PMs of the individual experts. Let 𝐾𝐾 (𝑖𝑖) ,
for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑛𝑛, represent the knowledge levels of the PMs (experts) that are in consensus, and
𝐾𝐾 (𝑐𝑐) represent the knowledge level of their consensus PM. Then we have the following corollary:

Corollary 1:
When the experts’ PMs are in consensus, then the knowledge level of their consensus ranking is
not less than any individual knowledge levels of the experts’ rankings. That is, the following
relation is true: 𝐾𝐾 (𝑐𝑐) ≥ max 𝐾𝐾 (𝑖𝑖) .
𝑖𝑖

For the case in Example 3, the three rankings are in consensus and the consensus ranking is
𝐴𝐴1 ≻ 𝐴𝐴2 ≻ 𝐴𝐴3 ≻ 𝐴𝐴4 ≻ 𝐴𝐴5 , which takes a maximal knowledge value (exactly, ln 5 ) in any
decision problem with five alternatives.

7 A Real-life Case Study and Discussion


In this section, we analyze a reduced version of the real-life case study which was originally
considered by Boroushaki and Malczewski (2010) and later analyzed by Triantaphyllou et al.
(2020). The real-world problem was to select the best location for a new major parking facility
from five candidate locations (indicated as alternative 𝐴𝐴1 , 𝐴𝐴2 , ⋯ , 𝐴𝐴5 ). Four experts (indicated as
𝐸𝐸1 , 𝐸𝐸2 , 𝐸𝐸3 , 𝐸𝐸4 ) were asked to rank the alternatives based on their individual knowledge. Here we
do not focus on the final selection of the alternatives. Instead, we focus on the experts’ knowledge
levels regarding their evaluation of the alternatives. The rankings by the four experts are as follows:
Expert E1: 𝐴𝐴1 ≻ 𝐴𝐴4 ∼ 𝐴𝐴5 ≻ 𝐴𝐴2 ≻ 𝐴𝐴3,

Expert E2: 𝐴𝐴1 ∼ 𝐴𝐴5 ≻ 𝐴𝐴2 ∼ 𝐴𝐴3 ∼ 𝐴𝐴4 ,

Expert E3: 𝐴𝐴1 ≻ 𝐴𝐴5 ≻ 𝐴𝐴4 ≻ 𝐴𝐴2 ≻ 𝐴𝐴3,


Expert E4: 𝐴𝐴1 ≻ 𝐴𝐴5 ≻ 𝐴𝐴4 ≻ 𝐴𝐴2 ≻ 𝐴𝐴3.

Following Definition 1, we obtain the preference maps which correspond to the experts’
preferences. They are the columns in Table 2. In addition, the consensus preference map (according
to Definition 2) is listed as the last column.
Using Theorem 1, we obtain the experts’ knowledge levels as follows:

1
𝐾𝐾 (𝐸𝐸1 ) = ln 5 − ln (1 × 1 × 1 × 2 × 2) ≐ 1.3322,
5
1
𝐾𝐾 (𝐸𝐸2 ) = ln 5 − ln (2 × 3 × 3 × 3 × 2) ≐ 0.6730,
5
1
𝐾𝐾 (𝐸𝐸3 ) = 𝐾𝐾 (𝐸𝐸4 ) = ln 5 − ln (1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1) ≐ 1.6094.
5

11
Table 2: The preference Maps (PMs) that correspond to the experts’ rankings

Experts’ (Decision Makers) PMs Consensus

Alternatives E1 E2 E3 E4 PM

A1 {1} {1, 2} {1} {1} {1}

A2 {4} {3, 4, 5} {4} {4} {4}

A3 {5} {3, 4, 5} {5} {5} {5}

A4 {2, 3} {3, 4, 5} {3} {3} {3}

A5 {2, 3} {1, 2} {2} {2} {2}

From Definition 2, we know that the four experts are in consensus, and their consensus
preference map is the one listed in the last column of Table 2. Moreover, the knowledge level of
the consensus preference map is as follows:
1
𝐾𝐾 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) = ln 5 − ln (1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1) ≐ 1.6094.
5
From the above computational results, one can observe that the higher the knowledge level
is, the more distinctive is the experts’ ranking order. The above results also show that the
knowledge level of the consensus preference map is not less than the knowledge level of any of
the four experts. This observation is a plausible result, and it is derived from Corollary 1. This
observation means that, reaching consensus (as defined in Definition 2) is a process that reduces
the ignorance, while the knowledge increases. Theorem 2 coincides with this observation.
One may use such information to characterize the performance levels of the individual
experts in group decision making. In this type of analysis decision making experts may be clustered
together based on their knowledge levels. This may provide potentially an actionable insight of the
group decision making process, especially if this process is repeated over time. A relevant
approach is the one discussed in (Triantaphyllou et al., 2020).

8 Conclusions
This paper proposes a quantification approach for two important concepts in information
science and systems research. These concepts are the knowledge and ignorance levels as they relate
to a number of cognitive functions.
The quantification approaches are based on some simple and highly intuitive differential
equations. This is the main theoretical contribution of this paper as it is a novel and important
aspect. The theoretical developments in this paper demonstrate that the derived formula for the
proposed knowledge level is related to an existing fundamental development, namely, Wierman’s
measure of uncertainty. The proposed approaches show that, in classification and ranking cases,
Wierman’s knowledge formula can be derived from a certain differential equation under certain
boundary conditions. This strengthens the validity of the proposed quantifications for the concepts
of knowledge and ignorance. A number of theorems and corollaries are derived to comprehensibly
establish the various theoretical results.
12
The results of this paper can be used in areas where it is important to apply the notion of
knowledge and ignorance in the context of cognitive tasks. An application area can be in group
decision making systems where one may be interested to record and monitor over time the
performance of the various experts in terms of their knowledge and ignorance aspects. The graph
theoretic and data mining approaches described in a recent paper by the authors (Triantaphyllou et
al., 2020) can be enhanced by using the new concepts about knowledge and ignorance.
Another potential application is in the area of data mining and classification systems. In
general, any area that deals with cognitive tasks that rely on the concepts of knowledge and
ignorance can benefit by using the theoretical results derived in this paper. Thus, the results of this
study can become an integral foundation for more important developments in the future in many
areas related to information science and expert / intelligent systems.

Acknowledgments: The first author was supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (No. 71571019). The authors of this paper are also very appreciative for the
constructive comments provided by the three reviewers which helped them to improve this paper
significantly.

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