Energy Policy 63 (2013) 449–457

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Conceptual proposals for measuring the impact of international

regimes on energy security
Michael Sander n,1
Research Center Siegen, Hagener Straße 139, D-57072 Siegen, Germany

H I G H L I G H T S

International regimes mitigate political risks for energy supply and must be considered.

The paper proposes two concepts to measure energy regime effectiveness.

The OPS-variant measures output, the IRDB-variant measures structure effectiveness.

The paper offers a preliminary feasibility test for the concepts.

Finally, it suggests further roads for research.

art ic l e i nf o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The paper proposes two concepts to assess the effect of international regimes on energy security. Existing
Received 17 May 2012 indicators focus mainly on state-level factors, excluding international influences. International relation
Accepted 29 July 2013 scholars on the other hand see a clear connection between international regimes and stable energy
Available online 4 September 2013
relations. International regimes stabilise energy relations by providing frameworks for negotiations,
Keywords: defining, controlling and sanctioning compliance and allowing the actors to engage in package deals.
Energy security The researcher needs to include these factors in a complete assessment of political energy security risks.
Regime effectiveness As first step, the paper uses the effectiveness of control mechanisms as basis for such consideration. It
Energy governance refers specifically to international arbitration as the most important control mechanism in international
energy relations. The simplest measurement option is the share of a county's energy imports covered by
a certain regime. The paper applies the Oslo-Potsdam-Solution to account for outcome effectiveness.
It applies a variant of the International Regimes Data Base protocol to account for effective regime
structures. In a last section, the paper proposes some possible paths for future research.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction: why to assess regime effectiveness
Energy security is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon.
Different ways of thinking about energy security lead to different
definitions which in turn consider different aspects out of their
specific focus. These definitions encompass topics as diverse as for
example climate change, social development or piracy and terror-
ism (see Sovacool, 2011: 3–6).
This paper aims to improve our understanding of the crucial
international governance dimension of energy security by
n
Tel.: +49 271 740 3847.
E-mail address: michael.sander@uni-siegen.de
1
I want to thank the two anonymous reviewers for Energy Policy, especially
reviewer 1, as well as Annika Fischer and Wolfgang Fischer from the Institute for
Systems Analysis and Technology Evaluation at Forschungszentrum Jülich (IEK-STE)
for their feedback on earlier versions of this paper. I also want to thank IEK-STE and
the Research Center Siegen for their support.
proposing some venues for its systematic consideration in political
risk assessments. In this context, it understands energy security
narrowly as security of energy supply. Largely following Winzer's
recommendation (Winzer, 2012), it refers to security of energy
supply as continuos supply of energy commodities at stable prices.
This includes the price dimension despite warnings against such
“subjective severity filters” (Winzer, 2012) in order to capture the
whole range of regime effects on security of energy supply. Due to
its focus on political actors and political regulation of energy
systems, this paper situates its definition of “energy security”
within a political security-oriented perspective on energy or what
Jewell and Cherp called the “sovereignty mind-set” (Cherp and
Jewell, 2011a: 332; Cherp and Jewell, 2011b: 206).
One important school within this mind-set regards political
security of energy supply as a zero-sum game for control over
scarce energy resourcs with the potential to escalate up to full-
scaled military conflicts. However, this article situates itself within
another important substream of political energy security research

0301-4215/$ - see front matter & 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.07.127
450 M. Sander / Energy Policy 63 (2013) 449–457
that views international energy relations as positive-sum coordi-
nation games between actors with different but compatible pre-
ferences. See also Finon and Locatelli (2008) and Correlje and van
der Linde (2006) for a closer assessment of these two schools,
which more or less resemble what Ciuta describes as the “logic of
war” and the “logic of subsistence” (Ciută, 2010: 129–134).
Several indicators exist to measure the different dimensions of
energy security (see for example Winzer, 2012; Kruyt et al., 2011,
2009 for overviews). Only few of them explicitly consider political
factors. None of these cover explicitly cross-border factors like
international regimes or transnational cooperation.
Some indicators try to determine political risks through con-
clusion by analogy to other more or less connected policy areas.
Frondel et al. use the OECD risk classification to account for the
probability of politically motivated energy supply disruptions
(Frondel and Schmidt, 2008, 2009; Frondel et al., 2009). Löschel
et al. also refer to the OECD classification, but use it only as a proxy
to illustrate an ex-post indicator for energy security (Löschel et al.,
2010). The OECD developed its system to account for the default
risk of external credits (OECD, 2011).
Jansen et al. take a more general approach in accounting for
overall political stability in an energy exporting country, using the
Human Development Index as a base. The HDI is calculated on the
basis of four indicators that measure health, education and living
standard. The authors assume that a higher HDI score implies
higher political stability and hence a lower risk for a disruption of
supplies (Jansen et al., 2004). The HDI excludes factors as the
internal structure of (energy) markets or the political process in
energy. Hence neither the resource control of certain actors nor
the adaptability of exporting countries in case of a crisis is
measured. This might result in an underestimation of existing
risks as some autocratic countries with a (semi-)monopolised
market structure, most prominently Russia, figure comparatively
high on the HDI. For example, Algeria (0.713; rank 93.) figures
lower than Russia (0.788; rank 55.), which would make the latter
the more secure energy trading partner according to the indicator
(UNDP, 2012). Actually, from the two countries it was only Russia
that repeatedly caused disruptions in EU energy supply. Hence, the
somewhat paradox order of the two countries points to the
general danger of excluding national and international political
factors or market structure from the assessment of international
(energy) risks.
The HDI also excludes the risk of international conflicts with
participation of the member state. This is another source for
possible flaws. Israel, for example, figures very highly on the HDI
(0.9; rank 16) (UNDP, 2012) and should therefore be regarded as
stable and secure energy supplier. This assessment of Israel's –
hypothetical – role as energy supplier ignores the highly unstable
and conflict-prone regional environment of the Middle East.
The International Country Risk Guide (ICGR) of the Political Risk
Services Group (PRS)2 measures stability along political, economic
and financial dimensions. The editors of the ICRG value the
different indicators for political stability following a subjective
assessment of several pre-set questions. These cover inter alia
government stability, investment climate, democratic accountabil-
ity and the risk of internal and external conflicts (The PRS Group,
2011). Both the earlier version of the IEA indicator (Blyth and
Lefevre, 2004) and Gupta (2008) apply the ICRG to account for the
political stability of energy exporting countries. The IEA later
replaces the ICRG with the World Wide Governance Indicators of
the World Bank (Lefevre, 2009; International Energy Agency,
2
The PRS Group is a private consultancy in New York that specializes in the
assessment of political risks. The ICRG is one of their main products and is available
under http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx.
2007), which is also used by Cabalu (2010). Most recently, the
IEA published a model to assess short-term energy security
(MOSES) that classifies states according to the external and
internal risks they face and their potential external and internal
resilience against the effects of realised risks (Jewell, 2011a).
MOSES refers to the OECD political stability indicators to assess
political risks from supplying states, which it includes as a
secondary assessment item for crude oil and natural gas (Jewell,
2011a: 11)3.
The WGI tries to capture perceptions of six different indicators,
namely voice and accountability, political stability and the absence
of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law and control of corruption. The authors gather data on these
indicators from surveys by firms, country analysts, nongovern-
mental organisations and commercial business information provi-
ders, including the PRS Group (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The WGI
therefore covers fewer aspects than the ICRG and only considers
secondary sources. It does however integrate a greater amount of
information including the ICRG and could hence be considered the
more effective instrument to assess political instability. Kruyt et al.
(2009) note that for both Jansen et al. (2004) and the IEA indicator,
the relation between political and market-based indicators is
arbitrary. They see the results of Gupta to be more robust due to
her application of Principle Component Analysis (Kruyt et al., 2011).
All these indicators locate political risks in certain properties of
the supplying state, most generally in its stability. Hence, impor-
tant influences on energy security remain excluded, which could
lead to flawed assessments in some cases. Even thorough, sub-
stantial and exhaustive syztematizations of the whole energy
security complex only mention the national and the global level
of geographical thread extension (e.g. Winzer, 2012).
Due to this situation, existing instruments exclude crucial risks
and influences on energy security, leading to potentially flawed
assessments. This might contribute to the general lack of confidence
of policy makers in complex indicators, partly due to the neglect of
more qualitative factors (Cherp and Jewell, 2011b: 209). It also
obstructs the consideration of essentially international and transna-
tional factors in scenario-based energy security assessment of
possible future development paths (see for example Jewell, 2011b:
2 on the preferability of quantitative indicators for scenario formula-
tion). Existing indicators also fail to offer quantitative data for
statistical research on energy governance. Hence, research on energy
security falls back behind comparative research programs, especially
on environmental governance.
Regime effectiveness has a great influence on the conduct of
international energy relations and is therefore a necessary element
for any comprehensive assessment of security of supply (see for
example Dannreuther, 2011a). It also allows shifting the level of
analysis in energy security from the currently dominating state
centred perspective to the international level. That should allow
for more appropriate risk assessments, since political security of
energy supply is an inherently cross-border4 concept – trade
behaviour of or in one state affects the security of another – and
many important influences – e.g. transnational business coopera-
tion, general relations between these states and transit states and
indeed regimes – are situated on the transnational and interna-
tional level. To assess cross-border factors is therefore not only
important in order to allow more comprehensive policy oriented
research. It is also an important step in analysing and comparing
the effects of different regimes on energy security (see for example
3
Jewell also lists political stability of suppliers as risk factor for coal imports,
but does not use it in her assessment due to lack of historical evidence for its
relevance (Jewell, 2011a: 29).
4
From here on, I use the term “cross-border” to refer to both international and
transnational relations simultaneously.
 M. Sander / Energy Policy 63 (2013) 449–457
Young, 2001), which is currently one of the most important and
(still) underdeveloped topics in energy research (Florini and
Sovacool, 2011).
From an IR perspective, the state-centred perspective of current
indicators largely corresponds to the neo-realist paradigm that
dominates – often implicitly – many studies on international
energy security (see Dannreuther, 2011b). The systematic assess-
ment of regime effectiveness would allow considering factors
derived from the liberal paradigm of international relations and
hence widening our conceptual perspective on international
energy policy. Liberal scholars agree with neo-realists that states
are important actors but also see an important role for transna-
tional relations and international regimes, which might overcome
coordination problems and enable lasting cooperation. Concerning
energy, liberal authors argue for strengthening the role of market
forces and international law to govern international energy rela-
tions in a cooperative way. They also call for improved consumer–
producer cooperation in order to maximise the absolute gain of a
stable trade relation (typical representatives for this school are
Goldthau and Witte (2009) and Wenger et al. (2009). Currently,
these factors are mostly disregarded in quantitative energy secur-
ity assessments.
Therefore, this paper describes possible venues for the sys-
tematic incorporation of international regime effectiveness in
energy security evaluations by proposing some assessment con-
cepts and potential roads for their future development. In doing so
it contributes to the research agenda on energy security by
providing a methodological approach to capture systematically
the effects of international regimes (also see Cherp and Jewell,
2011b: 211). The rest of the paper is set out as follows: In Section 2,
the influence of international regimes on energy security is
described. Section 3 and 4 propose some ideas and preliminary
tests on potential quantification concepts. Section 5 concludes the
paper and suggests some directions for further research.
2. Regimes and energy security: what to assess
2.1. General effects of international energy regimes
According to the seminal definition by Krasner, international
regimes are “…sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules
and decision making procedures, around which actors' expecta-
tions converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner,
1982).5
Research on energy security considered international regimes and
transnational interdependencies early on. Most notably, Keohane
developed his new institutionalism on an analysis of, among others,
the global regime of oil (Keohane, 1984). Nevertheless, political
science research on energy security became dominated by an –
often implicit – neo-realist paradigm that focused on the relative
(economic) power of national states and geo-political conflicts rather
than transnational business relations or international rule-making.
Meanwhile, even an essentially neo-realist scholar as Klare
(Dannreuther, 2011b) acknowledged the impact of regimes and
institutions, when he calls for “market mechanisms” or “multilateral
agreements” as instruments to reduce the level of conflict in
international energy systems (see for example Klare, 2001).
5
In a report to the EU's Polinares project on international resource security,
Dannreuther applies the term “regime” in a broader sense than this article, referring
to the general structure of global political–economic relations. In this view,
international regimes as defined by Krasner serve as intervening variables between
the physical and economic characteristics of an energy carrier and these over-
arching structures (Dannreuther, 2011a). However, in this article I only consider
explicit regimes as defined by Krasner.
451
Only recently, scholars of energy security revived systematic
analysis of international regimes, starting from a fundamental
critique of the predominant neo-realist perspective. Most studies
concluded that current energy systems are insufficient in addres-
sing the challenges to global energy systems, given the urgency
and complexity of the transformation required (see for example
Cherp et al., 2011; Goldthau and Witte, 2009; Goldthau and
Sovacool, 2012; Florini and Sovacool, 2011). Different authors
propose either a stronger role for governance clubs as the G8
and the G20 (Lesage et al., 2010) or the establishment of an
International Energy Stability Board (Victor and Yueh, 2010).
While these studies shared a global perspective on energy
regimes, others looked at the motives and policies of individual
states. One study concluded that both oil and gas importers and
exporters base their decision to join an international organisation
in energy on the membership of (other) important exporters
(Baccini and Thurner, 2011). This result concurred with the finding
that transnational integration was stronger between different
upstream companies than between upstream and downstream
firms (de Graaf, 2011). Another study interpreted the development
of the regime complex in energy as the result of growing
dissatisfaction of powerful regime members with an insufficient
regime performance (Colgan et al., 2011). The authors assessed
this performance in the form of (oil) prices. But it is possible to
extent their central point to volume disruptions. One member of
this research group later traced the origins of IRENA to the
dissatisfaction of domestic interest groups, who engaged in
institutional hedging strategies against the dominance of conven-
tional energy companies in the IEA (Van de Graaf, 2013).
An analogy to the research on international environmental
regimes potentially allows drawing further insights on the effects
of regimes. According to several studies, the centrality of a state in
the network of international environmental regimes increases
both the likeliness of its entry into further regimes and its own
sustainability record (Ward, 2006; von Stein, 2008). It is plausible
to assume that the same mechanisms apply to the energy sector.
On a regional level, several studies applied the theory of
external governance to analyse the EU's attempts to export its
energy market rules. They concluded that a combination of
conditionality and active involvement of the Commission is most
effective in establishing international rules for energy. They also
agreed that the existence of a strong external actor with the
capability to influence actions of regime members – specifically
Russia – severely impedes the effectiveness of external rule
transfer (Hofer, 2007, 2008; Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2009; also
see Oliva and Sorbello, 2012).
2.2. Dispute settlement by international energy regimes
International regimes facilitate cooperation by providing a
framework for negotiations, controlling compliance and sanction-
ing non-compliance and by allowing for package deals between
different areas of cooperation (Keohane, 1984). Of these instru-
ments, formal controlling and sanctioning mechanisms are most
easily evaluated by analysing the respective provisions in the
governing documents of international regimes. International arbi-
tration is the most important instrument for dispute resolution in
energy (Martin, 2011). Therefore, at this point, this paper proposes
to use expressions of opportunities for and effectiveness of
international arbitration as values for assessing different energy
regimes.
The proposed assessment procedures concern primarily
regimes that govern a relationship between energy exporters
and importers. They consider important regional and sectoral
organisations as IEA and OPEC only insofar as they govern trade
relations. But since this is not their main task – their core logic is
452 M. Sander / Energy Policy 63 (2013) 449–457
one of “common defence” rather than “common security” – they
are not in the focus of the proposed procedures (see for example
Florini and Sovacool, 2011; Victor and Yueh, 2010 for an overview
over the structural cleavages between regional and sectoral energy
organisations in the current energy governance system).
Global multilateral regimes include the WTO and the Energy
Charter Treaty. The WTO provides the parties to a conflict with a
clearly institutionalised sanction mechanism, namely the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism laid down in Art. 23 of GATS and in the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, annexed to GATT 1994 (World
Trade Organization, 1994a, 1994b).
The Energy Charter Treaty differentiates between conflicts
between an investor and a member state on the one hand and
between two member states on the other. Contracting parties that
fail to resolve their conflict diplomatically may submit the matter
to an ad hoc tribunal, set up in The Hague and governed by the
UNCITRAL rules. Investors on the other hand may choose to submit
the conflict to either the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, to the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce or to an ad-hoc committee under the
UNCITRAL rules ((Energy Charter Secretariat, 2004) also see
(Konoplyanik and Wälde, 2006)). Hence both the WTO and the
ECT offer mechanisms to resolve disputes and sanction non-
compliance in fields that are important for international energy
relations, namely trade, transit and investment.
Regional agreements that include dispute settlement provi-
sions are the main instrument of the EU's external energy
diplomacy (Lavenex, 2009). Most prominently, both the European
Economic Area and the Energy Community oblige their members to
implement EU law into their national legislation. Both agreements
also give the competence to control this implementation and
sanction non-compliance to the European Court of Justice, whose
decisions are binding for the parties (European Union, 2011;
Energy Community Secretariat, 2011). The EU's extra-regional
agreements regularly include dispute settlement agreements at
least for state–state disputes. This extension of EU rules beyond
the Union's borders is most effective in the preparatory stages of
an agreement and in absence of competing governance providers
(Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2009). However, even the formal expan-
sion of these rules and especially of the EUCJ's decision compe-
tences stabilise international energy relations and reduce the risk
of non-cooperative behaviour (Lavenex, 2011, 2009).
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are the most important
agreements for transnational investments and the investment
provisions of the ECT draw strongly on modern BIT variants
(Konoplyanik and Wälde, 2006). Most importantly, BITs regularly
include provisions for international settlement both for state–state
disputes and investor–state disputes. Empirical studies found that
any pending arbitration registered in the past two years reduces FDI
inflow by nearly 86 billion US$ and any decision against a govern-
ment or any settlement between the parties by 300–350 billion US$
(for this paragraph see Allee and Peinhardt, 2011).
International and transnational dispute settlement mechan-
isms become increasingly pervasive on the global regional and
bilateral level. They also cover more and more aspects of interna-
tional and transnational energy relations and can credibly threat
sanctions against non-compliance. Due to their growing empirical
importance, comprehensive energy security assessments need to
include these regimes.
3. Conceptual ideas to assess energy regime effectiveness
Assessing energy security requires prior clarification of the
spatial and substantial boundaries of the system under considera-
tion, the respective mind-set concerning its future development
and the subjective perspectives of the researcher/policy maker,
including the priority of issues (Cherp and Jewell, 2011a).
This paper understands energy security narrowly as security of
supply, defined as the absence of political and economic risks to
energy resource imports. Environmental and social dimensions of
energy security are excluded. The proposed assessment proce-
dures refer to a given country or a group of countries and their
relations to energy suppliers as their geographical boundary,
including the countries' relations or the sum of their relations to
energy suppliers. The substantial boundary is the import portfolio
of a given energy carrier. The rationale of the following discussion
falls into what Cherp and Jewell named the “sovereignty” mind-set
of the future, since it sees the major vulnerabilities of the energy
system arise from the collusion of the “interests, intentions” and
actions of social actors. It differs slightly from the account of Cherp
and Jewell by seeing the key threat not in the rise of “malevolent
powers” (Cherp and Jewell, 2011a) but in inefficiently solved
dilemmas of common interests.
One assessment option is to consider the share of a
country's imports of a given energy source or carrier that is
governed by a certain regime. If one assumes that any regime
that allows sanctioning non-cooperation has a certain stabiliz-
ing effect on international energy relations, then an import
portfolio with a higher share of institutionalized trade relations
should ceteris paribus be more stable than a portfolio with a
lower share.
This paper offers two further ideas on how to assess system-
atically energy regime effectiveness. The first proposal is the Oslo-
Potsdam solution (see Hovi et al., 2003a for a description of this
solution and Young, 2003; Hovi et al., 2003b for a discussion). This
solution expresses effectiveness in the term
APNR
ð1Þ
CONR
where AP is the actual performance of a regime, NR is the
hypothetical situation without the regime, and CO is the collective
optimum, i.e. the ideal solution for the problem the regime
addresses. To use the Oslo-Potsdam solution (OPS), one has to
establish two counterfactuals, namely NR and CO. The authors of
the solution propose different approaches to this task, including
expert interviews, simulations or simply referring to the status-
quo ante before the regime was established (Hovi et al., 2003a).
This paper sees a combination of expert interviews and simulation
as the best option to establish counterfactuals for qualitative
factors and evaluating the development of regime effectiveness
over a certain period. However, the time and resource require-
ments to establish and apply such a research tool are considerable.
Using the ratio of unresolved to resolved conflicts with the sum
establishing the value for NR might offer a – not unproblematic –
preliminary solution.
Another question concerns the selection of values for the
variables. Concerning volume risks, either the number of conflicts
or the number of realized disruption risks are optional values for
assessing regimes. The number of resolved cases before a formal
international dispute settlement body could serve as a dummy
variable for the number of avoided conflicts. The data is imperfect,
not only because it omits any conflicts that were resolved by
negotiations or in another forum, but also because it ignores the
overall reduced level of conflict that results from the general
functions of regimes as facilitating communication or increasing
generalised trust. Therefore, this formula can only serve as a
preliminary instrument to assess effectiveness until a comprehen-
sive counterfactual is established by expert interviews and simula-
tion. Also, there is currently no database that includes all energy-
related conflicts for a given relation. Therefore, the researcher has
to gather the necessary data from several sources.
 M. Sander / Energy Policy 63 (2013) 449–457
The OPS considers actual regime output to measure effective-
ness. Alternatively, an attribute-based approach focuses on the
process dimension by comparing actual regime structures to an
ideal type most-effective regime.
This paper proposes to use the data protocol of the Interna-
tional Regimes Data Base (IRDB) to quantify energy regime effec-
tiveness (Breitmeier et al., 1996). Out of the IRDB's 130 factors, it
suggests 13 that are most applicable to quantify formal regime
structures. These include the explicit or tacit nature of a regime,
the binding or non-binding effect of its rules, the precision of its
rules, its depth, the (non-)existence of an independent secretariat,
the types of decision it makes, the rules by which it decides and
the bodies that decide formally, the actual involvement of these
bodies in decision-making, the existence of external bodies,
reporting procedures and review processes concerning regime
implementation and the question, if the formally agreed bodies
are actually in operation.
The data protocol formulates specific questions to assess the
characteristics of each factor. The IRDB then assigns distinct
numbers to these characteristics, but uses them only as coding
instruments. To use them as quantified expressions of regime
effectiveness is therefore somewhat of a conceptual stretch. While
the specificity of the questions and the distinct assignment of
numbers and characteristics justify this preliminary approach,
some modifications are necessary to utilise the IRDB-based data
for the proposed assessment procedure. Where the data protocol
assigns higher values to a more effective regime characteristic
than to a less effective, I reversed this order. This was necessary to
align the codings with the general orientation of most assessment
instruments for political energy security risks, where higher values
reflect a higher risk rather than higher security.
In some cases the data protocol allowed mentioning more than
one characteristic for a single factor – for example in the case of
types of decisions or formal decision making bodies. Here, I
calculated the sum of applicable characteristics and subtracted it
from the highest possible value plus one. The results varied
between one and the highest possible value with one reflecting
the most effective regime structure. I also established categories in
order to assess the existence and type of external bodies and
divided the factor “review process” into the two aspects “informa-
tion gathering” and “assessment and sanctioning”, leading to a
final set of 14 factors. Table 1 gives an overview over these
modifications.
The researcher could assess regime effectiveness either indivi-
dually or use it as input to more comprehensive analyses. By
including both national and international risk factors, the latter
option is useful to assess the overall political risk in an energy
relation.
Most authors (see for example Blyth and Lefevre, 2004; Lefevre,
2009; Gupta, 2008; Löschel et al., 2010) use a modified Hirsch-
man–Herfindhal index to assess political risk factors. In the
formulation of Lefevre, this index runs6:
ESMCpol ¼ ∑iðrin sij2 Þ ð2Þ
Here, r is the political risk-rating of an exporting country and s is
the share of an energy carrier in the importing country's primary
energy consumption. Including a regime effectiveness coefficient
into this equation offers a straightforward way towards a compre-
hensive political risk assessment.
6
Andrew Stirling repeatedly suggested replacing the HHI with the mathema-
tically stronger Shannon-index (Stirling, 1998, 2010). The new formula would then
read: ESMCpol ¼ Σ(rin(sijnln sij)).
453
4. Two preliminary applicability tests
I tested the basic feasibility of the proposed concepts including
the availability of required data by applying them to two rudi-
mentary assessments. However, the following illustrations only
represent very rough and preliminary applicability tests for the
concepts.
Firstly, I applied the OPS concept to Germany's gas import
portfolio in 2009. I chose this year, because it was the last time
when all of the country's gas imports were covered by an
international regime with formal dispute settlement provisions.
Using it as point of reference allowed me to apply the indicator's
OPS variant in a comprehensive assessment of a complete import
mix. The regimes in question were the Energy Charter Treaty that
governed trade with Russia and the EU energy regime that applied
directly to imports from the Netherlands and via the EEA agree-
ment to imports from Norway.
For the ECT conflict data, I referred to the list of arbitration
cases on the homepage of the Energy Charter Treaty Organisation
and the Annual reports of the European Court of Justice as well as
the EU's Court of First Instance. These courts cover not only all
energy-related aspects of EU law but also control the implementa-
tion of EU law within the European Economic Area (EEA) that
includes all EU member states as well as the EFTA members Island,
Norway and Lichtenstein. Together, these regimes governed all gas
imports of Germany until October 18, 2009 when Russia ended her
provisional application of the Energy Charter Treaty. To calculate
the OPS concept for the Energy Charter Treaty, I excluded all cases
that began later than 2009, since it is too early to judge their
results. Nine of the remaining 25 cases were still unresolved at
time of writing either due to revision or annulment procedures or
due to lack of a decision on the original claim. All cases in the latter
group are pending for more than 5 years, which lend additional
support to a negative judgement of the respective arbitration
procedures. Thirteen of the 16 successfully resolved cases ended
with an award. Settlement agreements between the parties con-
cluded the other three cases. I also considered the three disrup-
tions of Russian gas supplies as failures of the ECT, leading to an
absolute number of 12 unresolved conflicts. Calculating with these
numbers, OPS-based regime effectiveness for the ECT reached a
normalised value of 0.43. This lies close to the IRDB-based
effectiveness value for the ECT of 0.45.
I referred to the annual statistics of the European Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance/General Court to assess the
EU's energy regime effectiveness. These documents included data
on new, pending and resolved cases as well as the average time
required to resolve a case. Using this data posed a delineation
problem, since the EU courts resolve all cases before them in one
way or the other. But assigning a perfect effectiveness value to the
EU regime would probably overstate the case. Therefore, I used the
sum of the average annual numbers of pending cases as proxy
value for NR and the sum of the average annual numbers of
resolved cases for AP. For both variables, I used the sum of the
respective values for the European Court of Justice and the Court of
First Instance. I also used the general case data, due to the
insufficiently low numbers of energy-related cases. Calculating
on this basis led to a normalised regime effectiveness of 0.44.
I tested the concept's usability as input in comprehensive
assessments at the example of Lefèvre's ESPAI, which measures
the physical availability risk component of resource concentration
as the share of primary energy consumption that is covered by
pipeline-bound gas imports (Lefevre, 2009: 1640). Referring to the
data of the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Technology
(BMWi, 2013), I calculated Germany's 2009 ESPAI to be approxi-
mately 26 or 0.26 normalised. This very low value reflects the
overall share of gas in Germany's primary energy consumptions.
454 M. Sander / Energy Policy 63 (2013) 449–457

Table 1
Modifications to the International Regime Data Base coding instrument for the proposed concept.

IRDB-Code: Criteria IRDB-Number Substantial meaning Regime effectiveness assessment value

203A: Explicitit of Tacit Regime? 1 Explicit 1

2 Tacit 2

205C: Legally binding rules 0 N/A 0

1 Binding 1
2 Non-binding 2

205D: Precision of rules 0 N/A 0

1 Precise 1
2 Between 1 and 3 2
3 Medium 3
4 Between 3 and 5 4
5 Ambiguous 5

205G: Regime depth 1 Very shallow 5

2 Shallow 4
3 Medium 3
4 Deep 2
5 Very deep 1

209A: Organisation of Secretariat 1 No Secretariat 4

2 Own Secretariat 1
3 Secretariat in External IGO 2
4 Secretariat in External NGO 3

210A: Types of decision made by the regime
1 Establish substantive rules Value is 9 minus sum of decision types
2 Apply rules
3 Ammend core documents
4 Admit members
5 Expell members
6 Accept withdrawal of members
7 Terminate regime
8 Resolve disputes

210B: Decision rules 1 No decision rules 6

2 Unanimity 4
3 Consensus 3
4 Qualified majority 2
5 Simple majority 1
6 Exit rights 5

210C: Decision making bodies 1 Regular conference of parties 1

2 Ad hoc conference of parties 2
3 Standing subsidiary body 3
4 Ad hoc subsidiary body 4

210D: Participation of decision making body 1 Participation in decision making 1

2 Final decision 2

210F: Participation of external bodies 0 No external body 0

1 Independent external body 1
2 Part of IGO 2
3 Part of INGO 2
4 Part of other regime 2
5 Part of IGO and other regime 3
6 Part of INGO and other regime 3
7 Part of IGO and INGO 3
8 Part of IGO, INGO and other regime 4

212A: Reporting procedures 1 No 2

2 Yes 1

212B Review procedure 1 No 212Ba 0

2 Broad assessment Erased
3 Information gathering by third parties 212Ba 3
4 Own information gathering 212Ba 2
5 Broad assessment by supreme decision making body 212Bb 5
6 Broad assessment by other bodies 212Bb 6
7 Review by supreme decision making body 212Bb 3
8 Review by other body 212Bb 4
9 Responses by supreme decision making body 212Bb 1
10 Responses by other bodies 212Bb 2
11 On-site inspections 212Ba 1

310A: Agreed bodies in operation 1 Yes 1

2 No 2
 M. Sander / Energy Policy 63 (2013) 449–457 455

Table 2
Regime effectiveness values for the modified IRDB-concept.

EEA CARIFORUM EU-Russia Early Warning Cotounou EU-Mediteranean EU-GCC Cooperation EU Energy Charter
Mechanism Agreement Agreement Treaty

Explicity of rules 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Legally binding rules 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
Precision of rules 1 2 4 5 3 3 1
Regime depth 1 2 4 5 3 4 1
Organisation of Secretariat 2 2 4 1 4 4 1
Types of decisions made 1 4 7 6 6 6 4
Decision rules 3 5 4 4 4 4 4
Main decision making body 1 1 2 2 3 1 1
Participation of decision 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
making body
Existing of external bodies 2 2 3 0 0 0 3
Reporting procedures 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
Review process: information 2 2 4 4 3 3 3
gathering
Review process: Assessment 2 2 7 2 2 2 1
Agreed bodies in operation 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Average 1.4 2 3.3 2.5 2.4 2.4 1.9
Normalised average 0.37 0.51 0.84 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.49

Using the share of gas imports instead – all direct German imports
are by pipeline – leads to a considerably higher modified ESPAI of
87. This might better capture some qualitative aspects of security
of supply, e.g. the importance of gas in providing medium and
peak load in Germany's power sector. Combining these results
with the average of the two regime effectiveness values of 0.435,
led to modified risk values of 11.3 or 37.8 respectively.
Naturally, this result serves merely illustrative purpose and the
outcomes for the ECT and the EU regime require substantially
different interpretations: in the first case, ineffectiveness refers to
actual failure to resolve a dispute. In the second case it merely
points to difficulties and obstacles in the proceeding. Therefore,
the illustration proved the basic applicability of the OPS concept to
measure energy regime effectiveness. Nevertheless, establishing
appropriate and sufficient data for an actual application requires
considerably more work.
Secondly, I tested the IRDB-based concept by calculating the
energy security risks for the natural gas imports of the EU in 2011
– the last year for which EU data is available7 (EU 2012). Different
regimes govern each of the Union's gas imports from Norway,
Russia, Algeria, Nigeria, Qatar and other states. I used the IRDB
questionnaire to quantify the characteristics of these regimes. If
more than one regime governed an import relation, I analysed the
strongest regime. Table 2 gives the results of this process. All
information this step required was publicly available on the
homepages of the responsible General Directorates, the EU Exter-
nal Service and the organisations in question. Using this data
allowed to assign rough numerical values to every regime's
effectiveness. For a concentrated assessment, one might use either
the average value itself or the normalised average.
Again, I referred to Lefèvre's indicators to test the concept's
usability as input in more comprehensive assessments. In this case,
I used a modified version of ESMCpol. While the indicator mainly
aims to measure price risks for energy carriers on spot markets
rather than for pipeline bound gas imports, it also includes state-
focused political criteria and hence might serve as foundation for
more comprehensive assessments. For this preliminary applicabil-
ity test, I modified the ESMCpol concept in the following ways:
7
The BP Statistical Review of 2013 offers more recent data, but does neither
include an EU-level assessment nor explicit numbers for each EU member state but
does include a category “Other Europe and Eurasia” for trade movements in LNG
(BP, 2013: 218). This justifies the use of the EU's slightly older but more complete
and more specific data at least for a preliminary applicability illustration.
firstly, I used overall gas supply rather than primary energy
consumption as point of reference. While gas is generally more
substitutable than oil, it nevertheless serves some specific pur-
pose, for example in providing German medium and peak load.
This specificity is perhaps better captured in an energy carrier-
specific assessment rather than in an analysis of the overall energy
system. Secondly, I scaled the World Bank's political indicators to a
range of 0–5 rather than 0–3 to simplify the scaling procedure.
Hence, the highest possible value for the modified ESMCpol is
500.000 rather than 300.000 as in the original version. After
calculating the ESMCpol values, I added the regime effectiveness
values from the IRDB-based assessment as multipliers. Table 3
reports the resulting values from this procedure.
Overall, the IRDB-based concept also proved to be generally
feasible. Nevertheless, a comprehensive assessment requires
quantification of regime effectiveness for all energy governance
regimes based on the modified IRDB data protocol.
Naturally, these examples illustrate only that the two proposed
assessment concepts are generally applicable both for individual
use and in comprehensive evaluations and that required data is
available. The obvious next steps are to develop the concepts
further and especially to test them against empirical cases and in
comparison with other energy security assessment concepts.
5. Conclusion
Moving from this preliminary propositions to full-fledged
assessment concepts requires more and extensive research. The
first step should establish the database required. This is more easy
in the case of the IRDB-based concept. Here, the quantification
instrument exists – albeit in form of a coding system – and
primary data is easily available in the public domain, namely in
the formal treaties and agreements that set up the regimes in
question. Hence, in order to begin with developing and testing
specific indicators, the researcher only needs to translate this
qualitative data for all energy regimes into quantified codes using
the modified IRDB code book. However, future research might –
and probably will – point to the importance of more informal
factors for procedural regime effectiveness.
The task is more difficult for the OPS-based concept. Here, the
researcher needs to establish two plausible counterfactuals – for
an ideal situation and for a situation without any regime. If one
uses the ratio of resolved to unresolved conflicts the task becomes
456 M. Sander / Energy Policy 63 (2013) 449–457
Table 3
ESMCpol and ESMCpol with regime effectiveness.
ESMCpol Overall Average ESMCpol country Overall
country ESMCpol regime values with ESMCpol
values effectiveness regime with regime
effectiveness effectiveness
Russia 2644 4546 3.3 8726 12,194
Norway 1101 1.4 1541
Algeria 533 2.4 1278
Nigeria 56 2.5 139
Qatar 212 2.4 509
seemingly more easy, with the ideal situation being zero unre-
solved conflict and the worst-case situation being the sum of all
conflicts. However, there are several problems with this way of
proceeding. Most importantly, as mentioned before, regimes are
most effective when they prevent conflicts to arise rather than
resolve those they could not prevent. This requires another
approach to quantifying effectiveness in order to capture the
long-term and structural regime effects. A combination of expert
and actor interviews and simulation based on the outcomes of
these interviews seems to be the most appropriate way to do so.
One approach to the interviews might be a comprehensive Delphi
survey (Dalkey, 1969) on the structure and effects of the institu-
tional framework for a given import portfolio. Such a study can be
conducted comparatively fast, if one applies the internet-based
real-time Delphi method (Gordon and Pease, 2006). The inter-
views would – hopefully – offer insights on the structural regime
effects. The simulations would combine these insights with gen-
eral scientific knowledge on regime functions in order to establish
the two counterfactuals. Obviously, this is considerably more
complex than the data requirements for the IRDB-based concept
and constitutes a veritable research agenda in its own right.
Therefore, this paper proposes to start with elaborating the
IRDB-based concept.
If successful, this research process will develop instruments to
assess the impact of international regimes on trade stability within
bilateral relationships. These instruments will mainly focus on
intended short-term volume disruptions that result from eco-
nomic or political disputes but might also cover international
reactions to unintended disruptions which could result, for exam-
ple, from terrorism. It will also be useful in assessing potential
price risks that follow such disruptions. This new instrument will
contribute to other quantitative measurement systems, which it
can supplement either as distinct value in a disaggregated assess-
ment or as input into more complex aggregated formulae. It will
contribute to comprehensive assessments by considering the
impact of international regimes and will therefore significantly
expand existing political risk assessments that focus on national
characteristics.
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