MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS.

GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997

FACTS:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic
partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to
accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale
may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
 
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.

RULINGS:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.

a. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law

of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

b. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the

right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
 and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

c. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce
such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. The Court agree.

a. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to

heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
b. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the
present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
c. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of
the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

3. It is not premature.

a. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match
the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm
 the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would
be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
b. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines
are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or
with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.

4. There was grave abuse of discretion.

a. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino

group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government
be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or
gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people.
The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would
rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let
the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down
the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

b. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative
but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only
with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well.
The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of
the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
 
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the
sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
 REV. ELY VELEZ PAMATONG VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not
supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that
the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service"
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him
since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all
the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

NO. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the
privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of
the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a
different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures
that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the
provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of
legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written,
the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-
ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.
Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to

limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are
found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As
long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the
equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt
from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for
office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral
exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough.
To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll
body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a
senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand
of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the
COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section
69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus
more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution
(Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the
Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the
election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

Obiter Dictum Law and Legal Definition. Obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta) is an

opinion or a remark made by a judge which does not form a necessary part of the court's
decision. The word obiter dicta is a Latin word which means “things said by the way.”

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET

AL vs THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
[G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.]

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760.

There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the
revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels;
that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose fees per annum for
motels; that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel (OMKA) , motel, or lodging house to
refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or
other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a
lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given
name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with
the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his
residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification
that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in
the presence of OMKA

That the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or
common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it
unlawful for the OMKA of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as
the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent
conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party,
in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once
again a transgression of the due process clause.

In the answer, after setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and
that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is
to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power.

The trial court ruled based on evidence or the lack of it, on the authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that “the challenged Ordinance
No. 4760 would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.” Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.

RULING:

The validity of the ordinance must be upheld.

The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of
invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts
and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise
of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize
prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any
business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And
taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process contention is
likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. In
this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down
prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling
out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION OF. — An ordinance, having

been enacted by councilors who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality or city and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action, must be presumed to
be valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property
rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its
face, the necessity for evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar,
there being no factual foundation laid for overthrowing Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void
on its face, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face,
which is not the case here. No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the
lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside
POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. — Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
a manifestation of a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals.
As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers extending as it does “to all the
great public needs.”

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note included as
annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
motels, which “provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit”
and thus become the “ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers.”

LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. — Municipal license fees can be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.
Licenses for non-useful occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in taking the
amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this
class of cases. Aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone [1922], 42 Phil,, 818, 828).

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for
the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class
motels, P4,500 yearly. this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the
American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state’s police
power.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. — The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the
City of Manila making it unlawful for OMKA of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as
transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of
conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION V. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance
No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses,
Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).”
The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and
charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a
day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta.
Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several
hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business
interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate
exercise of police power.

RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of
the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was
made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to
dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,

When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they
contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to
enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix
penalties for the violation of ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the
right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and
it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments
that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police
power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method.
The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities.
There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in
general.

Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

HELD:

NO. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as
such, it is unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr
ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association,
Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those
decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under
the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating
public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments.
This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels
and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted.
At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and
regulate the lives of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City
of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:

1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

2. must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6. must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is
evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government
units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare
clause.

POLICE POWER is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of
the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be
analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the
only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to
property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the
petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons
who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental
rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities
with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion
of it should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded
recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.

The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could
in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work
would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures
would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from
their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and
even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives
of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their
patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than
twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.

PBMLO V. PBMCI
51 SCRA 189

FACTS: 
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration
in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a
meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against
the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. 

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of
their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally. 

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers
may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves
to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the
rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the
‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. 

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?

HELD: 

NO. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable,
as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity."
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and
of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when
exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed.”
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCITY V. ATIENZA
545 SCRA 92 (2008)

Corona, J.

The Supreme Court denied the motions for reconsideration filed by the Department of Energy
and oil giants Chevron, Petron, and Shell; and reiterated its March 7, 2007decisionordering the
Manila City mayor to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 directing the removal of theterminals from
Pandacan by the said oil companies. The said Ordinance reclassified portions of the Manila
districts of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial anddirectedcertain business
owners and operators, including the three oil giants to cease and desist from operating
their businesses there.

Ordinance No. 8027, approved by Manila City Council on November 28, 2001 and effective December
28, 2001, reclassifies portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial tocommercial and directs the owners and
operators of businesses to cease and desist from operating their businesses within 6 months from the ordinance’s
effectivity. Among the businesses in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of Chevron, Petron, and
Shell. Chevron, Petron and Shell, questioned the validity of the said ordinance. They argued that they are
fighting for their right to property alleging that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to]relocate. Are the
contentions of the oil companies tenable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO. The Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a measure enacted pursuant to the delegated
police power of local government units “to promote the order, safety, and health, morals, and
general welfare of the society.” It explained that “based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or [local government unit] LGU’s
exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former should
prevail.” (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., February 13, 2008)Ordinance
No. 8027 visit fellester.blogspot.com was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of
the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of  the
World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents
of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

NOTES:

In 2007, the SC ruled that the Local Government Code imposes upon Mayor Atienza, to “enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it
has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. (GR
No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., March 7,2007)In 2008, The Supreme Court
denied the motions for reconsideration filed by Chevron, Petron, and Shell, and instead reiterated
its March 7, 2007 decision.(GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., February 13,
2008)In 2009, the SC recently denied with finality the second motion for reconsideration of the
three big oil players. The Court stressed that the second motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading pursuant to sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. It said that it already passed
upon the basic issues in its February 13, 2008 resolution and noted that the arguments of the oil
firms were a mere rehash of their arguments raised in the first motion for reconsideration. (Min.
Res., GR No.
156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., April 28, 2009
CANLAS V. NAPICO HOME OWNERS
G.R. No. 182796, June 5, 2008

FACTS:

The petitioners seek the issuance of a Writ of Amparo. They claim that they were
deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in
our Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of
filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They
claimed that fraudulent and spurious land titles were issued by certain Land Officials.
These Land Officials should be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances
of these fraudulent and spurious titles, now, in the hands of the Private Respondents.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the writ of amparo applies in this case.

RULING:

The petition is dismissed.

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ
shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not
included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for
which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available.

WRIT OF AMPARO

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO.

G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919

FACTS:

February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25. That said
resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917. December 4, 1917, the provincial governor
of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2. Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not
fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in
accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria
have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be
punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. That the undersigned has not
information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is
so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act
No. 2711. It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial
board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao,
a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by
the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as
required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court
is called upon to decide.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said law is constitutional.

RULING:

By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this
section of the Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term “non-
Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it
was intended to relate to degrees of civilization.

The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to
geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade
of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law
could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting
through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the
public interest.

When to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the
police power, and it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in
the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides
promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in
general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development
of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And
these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police
power.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was
neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one
cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and
the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not
been followed.
To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there
exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”

Delegata potestas non potest  delegari is a principle in constitutional and administrative

law that means in Latin that "no delegated powers can be further delegated."
Alternatively, it can be stated delegatus non potest delegare ("one to whom power is
delegated cannot himself further delegate that power").

WRIT OF MANDAMUS
A writ of mandamus lies to compel a judge to issue a writ of execution when the
judgment had already become final and executory and the prevailing party is entitled to
the same as a matter of right.

Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that

 
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a  duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
 excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or
at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.

MANDAMUS is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in

the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board,
or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed or from operation of law. (Abaga v. Panes, G.R. No. 147044, August 24, 2007, 531
SCRA 56, 61-62.)

CERTIORARI
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Certiorari. Certiorari is a Latin word meaning "to be
informed of, or to be made certain in regard to". It is also the name given to certain
appellate proceedings for re-examination of actions of a trial court, or inferior appeals
court.

Certiorari under Rule 45 and 65  Distinguished

As a consequence of filing this special civil action for certiorari in place of an
ordinary appeal under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner
Salvacion went against the fundamental precepts of procedural law.

The Revised Rules of Court specifically provides that an appeal by certiorari from

a judgment or final order or resolution of the Sandiganbayan is by verified
petition for review on certiorari and shall raise only questions of law. Specifically,
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dictates that:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal

by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.

Note that what is being assailed in this original action are the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 23 February 2006 and 4 August 2006 reversing the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to hold respondent Manlapas liable to
stand trial for violation of Section 3, paragraph (f) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, and ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 28111.  There is no
question that these Resolutions already constitute a final disposition of Criminal
Case No. 28111, for after ordering the dismissal of said case, there is nothing
more for the graft court to do therein.  These Resolutions, therefore, are fit to be
subjects of an appeal to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45.

However, the present Petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court. Under Rule 65, a party may only avail himself of the special
remedy of certiorari under the following circumstances:

SECTION 1.  Petition for Certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.

The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  It cannot be
legally used for any other purpose.  Its function is only to keep the inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  It may
issue only when the following requirements are alleged in the petition and
established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction, means that

an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, a board or an officer is not
authorized, and is invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the
conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of
it are wanting. “Without jurisdiction” means lack or want of legal power, right or
authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or
with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise
authority.  [Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 784-785
(2003)]

Contrasting the two remedies, a petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a
special civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary process for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the two remedies are distinct,
mutually exclusive, and antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is
proper if the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in law. A petition for review, on the other hand, seeks to correct errors of
judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer. When a court, tribunal, or
officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the
decision on all other questions arising from the case is an exercise of that
jurisdiction.

Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely
errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors
of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari. For if
every error committed by the trial court or quasi-judicial agency were to be the
proper subject of review by certiorari, then trial would never end and the dockets
of appellate courts would be clogged beyond measure. [Sebastian v. Hon. Morales,
445 Phil. 595, 608 (2003)]

Although petitioner Salvacion made general allegations in her Petition

for Certiorari that the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a closer scrutiny of her
arguments would reveal that she is actually challenging the Resolutions dated 23
February 2006 and 4 August 2006 based on purported errors of judgment, and
not jurisdiction. It is irrefragable that the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in Criminal Case No. 28111. 
Petitioner Salvacion utterly failed to convince this Court that the graft court
abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions – grave enough to have
ousted it of jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28111 for which she may avail
herself of the special remedy of certiorari.

It is equally elementary in remedial law that the use of an erroneous mode of

appeal is cause for dismissal of the petition for certiorari.  A writ of certiorari will
not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved party.  By its
nature, a petition for certiorari lies only where there is “no appeal,” and “no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  [Nippon Paint
Employees Union-Olalia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159010, 19 November 2004,
443 SCRA 286, 291] A remedy is considered “plain, speedy and adequate” if it
will promptly relieve the petitioners from the injurious effects of the judgment
and the acts of the lower court or agency. [Chua v. Santos, G.R. No. 132467, 18
October 2004, 440 SCRA 365, 374]  In this case, appeal was not only available but
also a speedy and adequate remedy. [National Irrigation Administration v. Court of
Appeals, 376 Phil. 362, 372 (1999)]  The availability to petitioner Salvacion of the
remedy of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 from the resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a petition
for certiorari.
And while it is true that in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules
of Court and in the interest of substantial justice [Oaminal v. Castillo, 459 Phil.
542, 556 (2003)], we have, before [Id.], treated a petition for certiorari as a petition
for review on certiorari, but only when the former was filed within the
reglementary period for filing the latter.  Regrettably, this exception is not
applicable to the present factual milieu.  The present Petition for Certiorari was
filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review, and
without any reason being offered therefor.

Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension. – The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or
of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in
due time after notice of the judgment. x x x.

A party litigant wishing to file a petition for review on certiorari must do so

within 15 days from receipt of the judgment, final order or resolution sought to
be appealed. In this case, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 23 February
2006, denying the motions for reconsideration of both petitioner Salvacion and
the People, was received by petitioner Salvacion on 22 August 2006. The instant
Petition was filed only on 17 October 2006; thus, at the time of the filing of this
Petition, 56 days had already elapsed, way beyond the 15-day period within
which to file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Procedure; and even beyond an extended period of 30 days, the maximum
period to be granted by this Court had one been actually sought by petitioner
Salvacion.  As the facts stand, petitioner Salvacion has already lost the right to
appeal via Rule 45.

Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort

on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply
with the rules. [Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 389
Phil. 644, 656 (2000)] Herein, petitioner Salvacion’s recourse to this Court is bereft
of any explanation, meritorious or otherwise, as to why she failed to properly
observe the rules of procedure.
Allowing appeals, although filed late in some rare cases, may not be applied to
petitioner Salvacion for this rule is, again, qualified by the requirement that there
must be exceptional circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules. [Bank of
America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr.,  G.R. No. 73210, 10 February 1994, 230 SCRA 9,
15  citing Alto Sales Corp. v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, 274 Phil. 914, 925-
926 (1991)] We cannot find any such exceptional circumstances in this case and
neither has petitioner Salvacion endeavored to allude to the existence of any.
This being so, another fundamental rule of procedure applies, and that is the
doctrine that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional, so that failure to do so renders the questioned
decision final and executory and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to
alter the final judgment, more so, to entertain the appeal. [Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 542, 551 (2003)]