32. Martinez v.
HRET 189034 January 11, 2010 "(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
"Section 69. Nuisance candidates. -- The Commission may motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process
in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which
the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the
true will of the electorate."
Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987"
provides in Section 5 thereof:
"SEC. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. --
(a) A verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance
candidate under Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally
or through duly authorized representative with the Commission by any registered
candidate for the same office within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.
"(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall
issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition
and its enclosures, if any.
"(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons
within which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition,
serving copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be
raised as affirmative defenses.
"(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear
the case and receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In
lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers
together with affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence.
The hearing officer shall immediately submit to the Commission his findings,
reports, and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of such
submission of evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within five (5)
days from receipt thereof.
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed
by the Supreme Court.
"(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available
means, disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court to the city
or municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors and the general
public in the political subdivision concerned." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
By their very nature, proceedings in cases of nuisance candidates require prompt
disposition. The declaration of a duly registered candidate as nuisance candidate results
in the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The law mandates the Commission and
the courts to give priority to cases of disqualification to the end that a final decision shall
be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is
sought.15 In many instances, however, proceedings against nuisance candidates
remained pending and undecided until election day and even after canvassing of votes
had been completed.
33. Dela Cruz v. COMELEC 192221 November 13, 2012
COMELEC being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over
the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters
falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. In this case,
19 
Resolution No. 8844 issued by COMELEC clearly contravened existing law and
jurisprudence on the legal effect of declaration of a candidate as a nuisance candidate,
especially in the case of nuisance candidates who have the same surnames as those of
bona fide candidates.
SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number
of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption of office.
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation of
ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason
to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the following rules,
bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the voter’s
will:
xxxx
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment
shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and
not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as
Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be false).
Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for
which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination
of the true will of the electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68
(giving money or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials
performing electoral functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving
or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160
22 
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of
the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also
been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the
voters were informed of the COMELEC’s decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate
34. Lanot v. COMELEC 164858 November 16, 2006
 Under Section 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a decision or resolution of a
Division in a special action becomes final and executory after the lapse of fifteen days
following its promulgation while a decision or resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
becomes final and executory after five days from its promulgation unless restrained by
this Court. The COMELEC has the discretion to suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate during the pendency of a disqualification case when evidence of his guilt is
strong.33 However, an order suspending the proclamation of a winning candidate against
whom a disqualification case is filed is merely provisional in nature and can be lifted
when warranted by the evidence. 34
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. —
It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party,
or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity
except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political
conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the
commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential election. (Emphasis supplied)
What Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits is "an election campaign or
partisan political activity" by a "candidate" "outside" of the campaign period. Section 79 of
the same Code defines "candidate," "election campaign" and "partisan political activity" 
35. Quinto v. COMELEC 189698 February 22, 2010
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or
the Fair Election Act,17 which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code 18 and
rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official
as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for
which they are running,19 an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected
office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting
his seat.
Section 55. Political Activity. — No officer or employee in the Civil Service including
members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political
activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or
influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein
provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his
views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of his
candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided, That public officers and
employees holding political offices may take part in political and electoral activities but it
shall be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them
to any of the acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes
intervention by civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities an
election offense, viz.:
SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxxx
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. — Any officer or employee in the civil
service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense
forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or
which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election
campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve
public order, if he is a peace officer.
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation
of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be
mistaken.
36. Sinaca v. Mula 135691 September 27, 1999
The rule on substitution of an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party who dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy is governed by Sec. 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code which provides: chanrob1es virtual
If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections
not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and ‘mid-
day of election day, said certificate maybe filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case
of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.  certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal
chanro
manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political creed or lack of
political creed. 13 It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public
office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and
that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he
belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election
purposes being as well stated.
37. Talaga v. COMELEC 196804 October 9, 2012
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any
person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a COC, viz:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by
1aw library the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. 
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral
race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the two
remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, thuswise:
30 
x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the
other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions
also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
CoC
38. Cerafica v. COMELEC 205136 December 2, 2014
If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate
of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than
mid-day of election day of the election.
If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated
by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section
shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of
candidacy.
Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state,
among others, the date of birth of the person filing the certificate. Section 78 of the
Election Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has
committed false material representation, a verified petition to deny due course to or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed at any time not later than
25 days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy.
39. Jalosjos Jr. v. COMELEC 193237 October 9, 2012
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that
he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public
office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a
14 
criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate
of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a
false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the 15 
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand,
under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that
"the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A
person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he
is eligible to so run.
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once
the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does
not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his
jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his perpetual special
disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately
executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction
becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run
for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible
perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of
conviction became final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means
that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that
Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"
means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications
and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As this Court held in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer to "qualifications
17 
or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run
for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a
certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as
expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
40. Jalosjos v. COMELEC 205033 June 18, 2013
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a
legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict
from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch,
but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the
law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to
run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the
Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The disqualification of a convict to run
for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a
competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the
conduct of elections.
41. Villafuerte v. COMELEC 206698 February 25, 2014
Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of the COC
required under Section 74 must refer to material matters in order to justify
the cancellation of the COC. What then constitutes a material
misrepresentation? In case there is a material misrepresentation in the
certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to
Section 78 x x x The certificate of candidacy of a candidate for Chairperson of the SK must be cancelled on
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation
mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed
by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the
right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.
Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a “material
representation,” the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions
applying Section 78 of the Code. 8 cralawlawlibrary
x x x
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation
contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective
office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences
imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running
or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of
such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon
just any innocuous mistake.
x x x
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under
Section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other
words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s
qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not intended to
mislead, or deceive the public as to one’s identity is not within the scope of
the provision.9 ChanRobles
for the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to
prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation
involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks
election, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal
qualification necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local
Government Code.1
42. Garvida v. Sales 122872 September 10, 1997
the ground that s/he had exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the
SK. Section 428 of the LGC requires that an elective official of the SK must be at least 15
years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his/her election. The requirement
that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy; and, if he lacks the
age on the day of the election he can be declared ineligible.
43. Codilla v. COMELEC 150605 December 10, 2002
PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF
QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for
lack of qualifications or possessing same grounds for disqualification, may be
filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of voting
age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political
parties against any candidate who in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of.
2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; cralawlibrary
2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed
by the Omnibus Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e,
k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office.
x           x          x
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of
P20.00, the offices concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a
docket number which must be consecutive, according to the order of receipt
and must bear the year and prefixed as SPA with the corresponding initial of
the name of the office, i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01-001;
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned
shall issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the
petition and its enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons
within which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the
petition in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy thereof upon the petitioner.
Grounds for Motion to Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the
parties shall submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidences including their position paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the
filing of the answer. The hearing officer concerned shall submit to the Clerk of
the Commission through the fastest means of communication, his findings,
reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the
hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the
: red
case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and
recommendation of the hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the
Commission shall immediately docket the case consecutively and calendar the
same for raffle to a division;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign
the same to a member who shall pen the decision, within five (5) days from
the date of consultation." cralaw virtua1aw library
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional
Election Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together
with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days
from the filing of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to
afford the respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations in
the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with this requirement,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the summons
together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when
service has been completed
44. Munder v. COMELEC 194076 October 19, 2011
The Comelec has the constitutional mandate to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election." 16 It has the power to create its own
rules and regulations, a power it exercised on 11 November 2009 in promulgating
Resolution No. 8696, or the "Rules on Disqualification of Cases filed in Connection with
the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections." Section 4 thereof provides
for the procedure to be followed in filing the following petitions: 1) Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy; 2) Petition to Declare a Nuisance
Candidate, and 3) petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Section 68 of the Election
Code and petition to disqualify for lack of qualifications or for possessing some grounds
for disqualification.
For a petition for disqualification, the law expressly enumerates the grounds in Section
68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 as amended, and which was replicated in Section 4(b) of
Comelec Resolution No. 8696. The grounds stated by respondent in his Petition for
Disqualification – that Munder was not qualified to run for not being a registered voter
therein – was not included in the enumeration of the grounds for disqualification. The
grounds in Section 68 may be categorized into two. First, those comprising "prohibited"
acts of candidates; and second, the fact of their permanent residency in another country
when that fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate according to the law.
45. Tagolino v. HRET 202202 March 19 2013
The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a
candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this
case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny
due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions
between the two are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a
candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; 24 or (b) his or
her commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts
under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other
penal laws.25 In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
(2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spending in one’s
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting,
receiving or making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of
the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261, paragraphs
d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc, sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision
(Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a
party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or
she had already been elected. 35
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically
considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because
of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In
other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as
prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she
is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought
by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding
under Section 78 of the OEC36 is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the
material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a
person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false
representation of the same in the CoC
46. Penera v. COMELEC 181613 November 25, 2009
The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain
the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an
initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall
be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A
fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her
signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper
security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the
services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political
parties and deputized citizens’ arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early
deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized
for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in
enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the second
sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:
xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
47. Garcia v. COMELEC 170256 January 25, 2010
Paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution empowers the COMELEC to
"investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices." This
prosecutorial power of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881,17 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.
It is well settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses
rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion.18
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 provides for the requirements for published or printed election
propaganda, thus:
Sec. 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and Broadcast Election Propaganda − 4.1.
Any newspaper x x x or any published or printed political matter and any broadcast of
election propaganda by television or radio for or against a candidate or group of
candidates to any public office shall bear and be identified by the reasonably legible or
audible words "political advertisement paid for," followed by the true and correct name
and address of the candidate or party for whose benefit the election propaganda was
printed or aired.
xxxx
4.3. Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political
party shall not be printed, published, broadcast or exhibited without the written
acceptance by the said candidate or political party. Such written acceptance shall be
attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC as provided
in Subsection 6.3 hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Paragraphs 4.1 and 4.3, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 are reflected in Section 13 (3) and
Section 14 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. 22
To emphasize, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 requires that print advertisements donated to
a candidate shall not be published without the written acceptance of the said candidate,
which written acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and submitted to
the COMELEC.
48. Abes v. COMELEC L-28348 December 15, 1967
OMELEC is the constitutional body charged with the duty to enforce all laws
relative to elections, duty bound to see to it that the board of canvassers
perform its proper function. Pertinent rulings of this Court have since defined
Comelec’s powers in pursuance of its supervisory or administrative authority
over officials charged with specific duties under the election code. It is within
the legitimate concerns of Comelec to annul a canvass or proclamation based
on incomplete returns, or on incorrect or tampered returns; annul a canvass
or proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers
either because it lacked a quorum or because the board did not meet at all.
Neither Constitution nor statute has granted Comelec or the board of
canvassers the power, in the canvass of election returns, to look beyond the
face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.
Petitioners argue that the canvassing should be stopped. But nothing in the
petition herein would indicate that the returns were falsified after they left the
hands of election inspectors or that the returns are not genuine. The petition
stresses the existence of other irregularities. For Us now to give our stamp of
approval to the petition to suspend canvass and proclamation is to stop both
Comelec and the board of canvassers: the first, from performing its
constitutional and legal duty to administer the election laws and supervise
elections; and the second, from discharging its legal obligation to canvass the
returns and proclaim the elected candidates. And worse, to suspend
canvassing and proclamation at this late date may result in a vacuum in office
of Quezon City elective officials after the term of the present incumbents shall
have ended on December 31, 1967. Some such eventuality must be
prevented. Canvassing and proclamation must proceed.
Nothing in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution will imply authority for
Comelec to annul an election. So, too, did the Revised Election Code withhold
from Comelec the specific power to annul an election. The boundaries of the
forbidden area into which Comelec may not tread are also marked by
jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek annulment of an
election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is a principle
emphasized in decisions of this Court. Expressive of this rule is the following
culled from Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149, 155-
156." . . the power vested in the Commission to enforce and administer all
laws relative to the conduct of elections and to insure free, orderly, and
honest elections... is preventive only and not curative also; that is to say, it is
intended to prevent any and all forms of election fraud or violation of the
Election Law, but if it fails to accomplish that purpose it is not the
Commission on Elections that is charged with the duty to cure or remedy the
resulting evil but some other agencies of the Government ..." In the more
recent case of Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, L-25349, Dec. 3, 1965,
this Court bolstered jurisprudence on this point by reiterating that Comelec’s
powers are "essentially executive (`enforcement’) and administrative
(`administration’) in nature."
cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no constitutional or legal precept that empowers the Comelec to
direct a new election after one had already been held. All that there is in the
statute books is Section 8 of the Revised Election Code which empowers the
President to postpone an election fixed by law upon recommendation of the
Comelec, but this refers to postponement before elections, and not a remedy
thereafter.
49. Abayon v. COMELEC 181295 April 2, 2009
Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code fixes the period within which to file an election
contest for provincial offices at ten days after the proclamation of the election results, to
wit:
Section 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city
offices. - A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa or any regional, provincial and city official shall be filed with the Commission
by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the
same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
However, this ten-day period may be suspended, as Section 248 of the Omnibus
Election Law provides:
Section 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation.-- The filing
with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any
candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest
or quo warranto proceedings.
Jurisprudence makes it clear that the mere filing of a petition denominated as a pre-
proclamation case or one seeking the annulment of a proclamation will not suspend the
ten-day period for filing an election protest. It is required that the issues raised in such a
petition be restricted to those that may be properly included therein.
The Court pronounced in Dagloc,23 and quoted in Villamor v. Commission on
Elections,24 that:
Not all actions seeking the annulment of proclamation suspend the running of the period
for filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto. For it is not the relief prayed
for which distinguishes actions under [Section] 248 from an election protest or quo
warranto proceedings, but the grounds on which they are based
The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects,
appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same
returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234,
235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were
canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved
candidate or candidates.
The enumeration is restrictive and exclusive. Thus, in the absence of any clear showing 

50. Villamor v. COMELEC 169865 July 21, 2006
As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for
the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo
warranto.12 The filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of
one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass
upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. 13 The reason is that once
the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition
for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself
and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of
authority.14
Under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), 22 the trial court cannot entertain
a motion for reconsideration of its decision in an election contest affecting municipal
officers filed by the aggrieved party. However, the latter may appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now COMELEC) within five days after the receipt of a copy of the
decision. Likewise, Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
implementing the abovementioned Section 256 provides:
Sec. 19. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. – The decision of the Court shall
be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties.
It shall become final five (5) days after its promulgation. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained
51. Lloren v. COMELEC 196355 September 18, 2012
The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case requires two different
appeal fees, one to be paid in the trial court together with the filing of the notice of appeal
within five days from notice of the decision, and the other to be paid in the COMELEC
Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of appeal.
Section 10(c), Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC pertinently provides as follows:
Section 10. Contents of the protest or petition.—
xxxx
c. An election protest shall also state:
(i) that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
had been voted for the same office;
(ii) the total number of precincts in the municipality;
(iii) the protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested precincts per the
Statement of Votes by Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified, an
explanation why the votes are not specified; and
(iv) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral
frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts. 
52. Rosal v. COMELEC 168253 March 16, 2007
mere allegations cannot suffice to convince this Commission that switching of ballots has
occurred, absent any positive and direct evidence in the form of fake ballots themselves
being found among genuine ballots. Regardless of any technical examination that may
have been conducted or testimonial evidence presented, as emphatically moved by the
protestee but denied by the Commission, the best proof of the alleged substitution of
ballots is the ballots themselves. And the process by which this proof is established is by
way of an evaluation of the ballots by the Commission itself during its appreciation of the
revised ballots.
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed
elected by the board of canvassers is the true and lawful choice of the electorate. 20 Such
a proceeding is usually instituted on the theory that the election returns, which are
deemed prima facie to be true reports of how the electorate voted on election day 21 and
which serve as the basis for proclaiming the winning candidate, do not accurately reflect
the true will of the voters due to alleged irregularities that attended the counting of
ballots. In a protest prosecuted on such a theory, the protestant ordinarily prays that the
official count as reflected in the election returns be set aside in favor of a revision and
recount of the ballots, the results of which should be made to prevail over those reflected
in the returns pursuant to the doctrine that "in an election contest where what is involved
is the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the
ballots themselves."22
It should never be forgotten, though, that the superior status of the ballots as evidence of
how the electorate voted presupposes that these were the very same ballots actually
cast and counted in the elections. Thus, it has been held that before the ballots found
in a box can be used to set aside the returns, the court (or the Comelec as the case may
be) must be sure that it has before it the same ballots deposited by the voters. 2
In an election contest the ballots cast by the voters is the primary and best evidence of
the intention of the voters, but the burden of proof is on the contestor to show that the
ballots have been preserved in the manner provided by law and have not been tampered
with, and the fact that the ballots have been in the custody of the proper officers from the
time of the canvass to the time of the recount is only prima facie and not conclusive proof
of their integrity.
In an election contest the rule that as between the ballots and the canvass of them, the
ballots control, has no application where the ballots have been tampered with. The court
must be sure that it has before it the identical and unaltered ballots deposited by the
voters before they become controlling as against the certificate of the election officers of
the result of the canvass.
53. Maliksi v. COMELEC 203302 March 12, 2013
Clearly, Maliksi was not denied due process.  He received notices of the decryption,
1âwphi1
printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. In
addition, Maliksi raised his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc.
The Court has ruled:
x x x. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity
to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to
explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. x x x.28
There is no denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings. 29 It is settled that "opportunity to be heard" does not only
mean oral arguments in court but also written arguments through pleadings. 30 Thus, the
fact that a party was heard on his motion for reconsideration negates any violation of the
right to due process.31 The Court has ruled that denial of due process cannot be invoked
where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. 32
 We have already ruled that the ballot images in the CF cards, as well as the printouts of
such images, are the functional equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the
voters, and may be used in an election protest. It bears stressing that the digital images
of the ballots captured by the PCOS machine are stored in an encrypted format in the CF
cards. "Encryption is the process of encoding messages (or information) in such a way
that eavesdroppers or hackers cannot read it, but that authorized parties can. In an
encryption scheme, the message or information (referred to as plaintext) is encrypted
using an encryption algorithm, turning it into an unreadable ciphertext. This is usually
done with the use of an encryption key, which specifies how the message is to be
encoded. Any adversary that can see the ciphertext, should not be able to determine
anything about the original message. An authorized party, however, is able to decode the
ciphertext using a decryption algorithm, that usually requires a secret decryption key, that
adversaries do not have access to."35
54. Villamor v. COMELEC 169865 July 21, 2006
As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for
the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo
warranto.12 The filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of
one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass
upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. 13 The reason is that once
the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition
for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself
and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of
authority.14
Moreover, not all actions seeking the annulment of proclamation suspend the running of
the period for filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto.15 For it is not the
relief prayed for which distinguishes actions under § 248 16 from an election protest or quo
warranto proceedings, but the grounds on which they are based. 17
Under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), 22 the trial court cannot entertain
a motion for reconsideration of its decision in an election contest affecting municipal
officers filed by the aggrieved party. However, the latter may appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now COMELEC) within five days after the receipt of a copy of the
decision. Likewise, Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
implementing the abovementioned Section 256 provides:
Sec. 19. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. – The decision of the Court shall
be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties.
It shall become final five (5) days after its promulgation. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained. 
55. Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC 172131 April 2, 2007
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral
Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting the Commission on
Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to
the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). x x x
With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. The use of the word
"sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.
[I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate
who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that
issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it
avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies,
with due regard to the people’s mandate.
56. Rodriguez v. COMELEC 120099 July 24, 1995
Besides, to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our
jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or
ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of
the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in
the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:
A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. (Emphasis ours.)
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that
there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the
time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be
denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
57. De Castro v. COMELEC 125249 February 7, 1997
while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election
protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that
the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings.
An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is
imbued with paramount public interests. 
Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public
interest, wherefore, public policy demands that an election contest, duly commenced, be
not abated by the death of the contestant. We have squarely so rule in Sibulo Vda.  de
Mesa vs. Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October 29, 1966, in the same spirit that led this
Court to hold that the ineligibility of the protestant is not a defense (Caesar vs. Garrido, 53
Phil. 57), and that the protestee's cessation in office is not a ground for the dismissal of the
contest nor detract the Courts jurisdiction to decide the case
58. Navarosa v. COMELEC 157957 September 18, 2003
an election protest is not dismissible if the protestant, relying on the trial
court’s assessment, pays only a portion 13 of the COMELEC filing fee.
However, in Miranda v. Castillo, 14 the Court, reiterating Loyola v.
Commission on Elections, 15 held that it would no longer tolerate "any
mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed
after the promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25, 1997."
Nevertheless, our rulings in Miranda and Loyola are inapplicable to the
present case.
[E]lection contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural
barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective
officials. And also settled is the rule that laws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice
of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an
election case the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means
within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate.
59. Santos v. COMELEC 155618 March 26, 2003
Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment or
order has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil
action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more action or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. For it to exist, there should be (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two
preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. 15
Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won
the elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to
proclaim, it is the court’s decision that should prevail. This was sufficiently
explained in the case of Ramas v. COMELEC 24 in this wise: chanrob1es
All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution
pending appeal was that the immediate execution should be based "upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order." The rationale why such
execution is allowed in election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, 25
"to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge’s decision as that
which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of
canvassers." Thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw
Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as basis of
the right to assume office, subject to future contingencies attendant to a
protest, and not the decision of a court of justice? Indeed, when it is
considered that the board of canvassers is composed of persons who are less
technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart
from their being more apt to yield to extraneous considerations, and that the
board must act summarily, practically racing against time, while, on the other
hand, the judge has benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and of
admittedly better technical preparation and background, apart from his being
allowed ample time for conscientious study and mature deliberation before
rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the
immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the protestees,
notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as
there are, in the sound discretion of the court, good reasons therefor.
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal
would, in the words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC, 26
bring back the ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest"
techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their
efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a
consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate. 27
Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course, instead of dismissing outright, the petition in SPR No. 37-2002
despite the clear showing that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping; and
in setting aside the trial court’s order granting execution pending appeal.
60. Relampagos v. COMELEC 118861 April 27, 995
virtual 1aw library
he COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of
such jurisdiction.
The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697
expressly granted it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the
said law was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election for the regular Batasang
Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral
representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in view of the passage of
library
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang Pambansa,   this 11
Court is then confronted with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697
became functus officio after the 14 May 1984 election of members of the regular
Batasang Pambansa or the selection thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the
latest, and whether it was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code.
The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg.
697 whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of
sectoral representatives.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review the
substance of the challenged resolution.
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the
petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all
too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the
decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five days   from 1 July
16
1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed
before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim
Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the
COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be
deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal,  or on 6 July 1994. On
17
4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On
8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of
the records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial
court was divested of its jurisdiction over the case.   Since the motion for execution
18

pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the
trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion
was filed before the perfection of the appeal.   Accordingly, since the respondent
19

COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.