THE MARSHALL MANIFESTO

"In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble
terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince
whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the
ruler of a free people."

-Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776

"Unlimited authority or use of power, or a government which exercises such power

without any control or limits."

-Definition of tyranny

Fundamental principles of Due Process include; 1) written notice; and, 2) an opportunity for
hearing. These two concepts are key legal principles to distinguish between a Constitutional
Republic and tyranny.

Written notice means, laws -- in the form of published codes and regulations -- which have been
adopted in accordance with established procedures. The concept of "notice" embodies the
principle that no person should be punished, or denied rights, without being first informed of
nature of the law they're being charged with violating.

Whenever an individual or small group of individuals issues ever-changing edicts without

complying with notice and hearing requirements, they are acting in the role of tyrants.

Analogy

If you allow a babysitter to take your child to the playground, you may tell them that your child
can play on any equipment they want within the playground's fenced area. You may exclude
certain equipment, like, perhaps, the sea-saw. But everything else -- within the playground
perimeter -- is approved. You have given your baby sitter "broad authority" with some specific
exclusions. If you later learn that the baby-sitter let your child play outside the fenced area, then
they would have violated your rule.

Alabama Attorney General Steve Marshall likes to be perceived as "protecting citizen rights" but
in truth, he has done more to protect and promote government mandates and government
overreach as it concerns COVID-19 policies within the state.

SCHOOL MANDATES
Through a pattern of legal proceedings, memorandums, opinions and correspondence, Alabama
Attorney General, Steve Marshall, has consistently taken a pro-mandates, pro-government stance
as it concerns policies and "mandates" implemented ostensibly in response to COVID-19.

Steve Marshall has repeatedly perverted the law to try and pull the wool over the eyes of
concerned parents opposed to draconian school policies, and employees facing termination from
employment, to give the false impression that the law supports these measures.

Steve Marshall would have you believe that a city school board can force your child to undergo a
medical treatment under the school "dress code" policy. Yes, face masks, vaccinations -- and
testing for infections -- constitute medical procedures under Alabama law.

In response to an Alabama citizen seeking help from the AG's office related to school board
policy that requires students to wear face masks in class, Marshall submitted the following
response:

School boards have broad authority to regulate dress codes and to take steps to promote a
healthy school environment.

"The general administration and supervision of the public schools of the educations interests
of each county … shall be vested in the county board of education." Ala. Code § 16-8-8; see
also id. § 16-11-9 (providing similar for city boards of education). This authority has been
construed broadly. “[T]he courts will not seek to control the exercise of the broad discretion
given by the legislature to the county boards of education. All legal intendments are indulged
in favor of the orders of such boards, and the orders are due to be upheld unless the invalidity
is clearly shown by those challenging the order." Hargett v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 374
So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Ala. 1979); see also Clark v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 410 So. 2d 23,
27 (holding “that while there is no specific statutory grant of authority to local boards of
education to operate day care centers, there is authority for such activity under the broad
grants of power” provided to the boards by the Legislature); Herbert v. Demopolis Sch. Bd.
of Educ., 73 So. 321, 323 (Ala. 1916) (recognizing that “police regulations in aid of the
preservation of public health” should not be “interfere[d] with” even where municipal
authorities act under “general, not specific, delegation[s] of power"). “This principle prevails
even though in the exercise of discretion there may have been error or bad judgment.”
Mullins v. Bd. of Educ. of Etowah Cty., 29 So. 2d 339, 341 (Ala. 1947).

Office of Constituent Affairs

For Attorney General Steve Marshall
Wednesday, July 28, 2021

Environment means "the conditions that surround someone or something." As it concerns a

school environment, it means the premises (i.e., facility).
Contrary to Marshall's far-fetched claim, no school in Alabama has adopted a dress code that
includes a requirement to wear face masks. Absent a clear requirement, adopted by the board, no
school can just start requiring face masks and claim it's part of the dress code. AG Marshall
knows this legal fact well. Yet, he though he could "fool" parents by just making the claim.

In fact, in Texas where a school board attempted to implement a face mask requirement under
the school dress code, the District Court for Lamar County, Texas, issued a restraining order
against the school board. The court stated:

"The law is clear, and this superintendent knows this, yet he has no issue continuing to waste
precious state resources on impossible lawsuits instead of providing for his students,"
Attorney General Paxton said. "This temporary restraining order is just the first step in
restoring order to our great state and ending this disruption from rogue local officials."

See: State of Texas v. Paris IDS, No. 90612, Sept. 2021.

Steve Marshall is precisely the type of "rogue legal official" the Texas Court was referring to,
wasting precious resources on impossible legal arguments and baseless claims.

In the above referenced communication, Marshall refers to Alabama Code, Section 16-11-9, as
authority for school boards to implement the face mask policy. AL Code § 16-11-9 merely states:

"The city board of education is hereby vested with all the powers necessary or proper for the
administration and management of the free public schools within such city and adjacent
territory to the city which has been annexed as a part of the school district which includes a
city having a city board of education."

This is a general authority granted to school boards to administer and manage "free public
schools". Nothing can possibly be read into that provision so broad as to grant school boards
authority to mandate medical procedures -- and Steve Marshall knows this fact.

Marshall then cites some case law to support the proposition that courts should defer to the
school boards in their efforts to carry out the duties and responsibilities bestowed upon them by
the Alabama Legislature. This is meaningless banter in this context. No one challenges the
boards' authority to carry out their duly legislated authority. But, no school has been granted
authority to mandate medical procedures as a condition to attending school.

Next, Marshall proceeds to cite a case from 1916, Herbert v. Board of Education, 197 Ala. 617,
73 So. 321 (1916), in which the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a school policy, implemented
by the Demopolis school board, requiring students to be vaccinated against small pox as a
condition to attending class. In that case, the City of Demopolis had passed, as part of the
Municipal Code, an ordinance that provided the legal foundation for the school boards policy,
adopted to implement the city ordinance. The court noted that the city was granted such authority
by the legislature, specifically related to small pox vaccinations. The court also noted that the
parents should have first taken their objection directly to the school board, instead of first filing a
challenge in the courts. So, the court upheld the school's implementation of "the city's
ordinance;" not, an independent school board's unilateral policy. No similar city ordinance exists
anywhere in Alabama with regard to COVID-19 vaccine, face mask or testing mandates.
Attorney General Steve Marshall knows this well. Yet, he attempted to defend the practice citing
irrelevant, unrelated case law.

The court in Herbert v. Board of Education, specifically referred to the Code of Alabama § 1289
(now, 11-47-132) which states: " All cities and towns of this state shall have the power to adopt
all necessary ordinances and enforce the same to prevent the introduction or spread of
contagious, infectious, or pestilential diseases in such cities or towns and, to that end, may
provide for a system of compulsory vaccination and enforcement of the same."

AG Marshall the proceeds to cite the case of Mullins v. Board of Eduction of Etowah County,
where the issue concerned a proposal to build a school building that was smaller than one being
replaced which had been destroyed by fire. Contrary to the point Marshall attempted to make, the
Court Mullins court noted that" The courts will act … if the acts of county boards of education
are tainted with fraud or bad faith or gross abuse of discretion. The court went on to describe
"abuse of discretion" as

"an arbitrary and unreasonable act or conclusion as to shock the sense of justice and indicate
lack of fair and careful consideration."

Hodges v. Board of Education of Geneva County, 245 Ala. 64, 16 So. 2d 97. For a school to
mandate that children wear face mask, get vaccinated or undergo covid testing constitutes an
arbitrary and unreasonable act that "shocks the sense of justice" and lacks fair and careful
consideration.

Keying off of what Steve Marshall previously wrote, the law firm representing the Madison
School Board responded to parents of Madison City Schools, claiming that school boards across
the state have been given express authority to mandate mask wearing, as follows:

Alabama laws specifically address, and in most cases, limit, the methods by which state and local
government, private companies, businesses, restaurants and school boards can respond to or
implement public health guidance issued by various state and federal agencies.

The attorney went on to claim that:

"Alabama Code Section 16-1-30(b) provides that 'The local board of education shall, upon
the written recommendation of the chief executive officer, determine and establish a written
educational policy for the board of education and its employees and shall prescribe rules and
regulations for the conduct and management of the schools.' The Board's policy with respect
to masking properly falls within its authority to prescribe rules and regulations for the
conduct and management of the schools. The Alabama State Board of Education affirmed the
autonomy of local boards of education to make decisions about use of masks in school when
it adopted the attached resolution at its meeting on December 9."
To the contrary, The Supreme Court of Alabama has addressed the limited areas of authority
that's been granted to the Alabama Board of Education (and by inference, local school boards
within the state).

"However broad may be the powers of the State Board of Education, we think it clear that the
authority to exercise general control and supervision over the county boards of education
does not include the authority to exercise the powers and authority which the Legislature has
specifically conferred upon such local boards."
In re Opinion of the Justices No. 180, 276 Ala. 239, 241, 160 So.2d 648, 650 (1964). Conversely,
city and county school boards cannot implement any policy beyond the express authority grated
either directly to the boards or to the State Board of Education. And, the legislature of Alabama
has not granted any such express authority to either.

Hence, contrary to claims made by the Madison City Board's counsel, Alabama Code Section 16-
1-30(b) does not authorize the State Board of Education to grant to local school boards the power
or authority to practice medicine, however noble the intent may be.

In Alabama, the "practice of medicine" means to "diagnose, treat, correct, advise or prescribe for
any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, physical or
mental, real or imaginary, by any means or instrumentality". See Ala. Code § 34-24-50(1).
Forcing children to wear face masks, to address concerns about the spread of disease (according
to the beliefs held by the BoE) clearly constitutes the practice of medicine.

The Legislature of Alabama has not given the State Board of Education authority to practice
medicine. Clearly, the Madison School Board is practicing medicine by prescribing face masks
for the purpose of furthering it's medical opinion about matters related to health and safety. In
other words, the Madison Board of Education is making independent health decisions for
students, including those students who oppose the mandated medical treatments. Forcing
children to undergo medical treatment constitutes unlawful exercise of police powers; a power
the Legislature of Alabama has not conferred upon school boards at any level within the state.

MUNZA V. IVEY

In 2020, Alabama Governor Kay Ivey issued a state-wide order that included a face mask
mandate, combined with shutting down small, locally-owned businesses. Following issuance of
the Order, citizens of Alabama filed suit against the Governor, challenging, in particular, the face
mask mandate. AG Steve Marshall aggressively defended the governor's clear abuse of authority
and face mask mandate in court. Marshall, again, gave a perverted interpretation of the limited
authority granted to the State Health Director and Governor, and asked the court to dismiss the
case based on "sovereign immunity" -- without ruling on the merits, which the court ultimately
did. Munza v. Ivey, 1200003, (Ala. Mar. 2021).

"Despite the plaintiff’s allegations that the order was illegal, Marshall wrote in the filing that
Ivey and Dr. Harris had the authority to issue such an order. The judge agreed and dismissed the
case." https://www.alreporter.com/2020/08/12/judge-dismisses-lawsuit-against-statewide-face-
mask-order/

MARSHALL SUPPORTS FACE MASK MANDATES

In an article published in AL.COM, Marshall's office brags about "providing guidance" to

"numerous" cities and local authorities in adopting face masking requirements once the state-
wide mandate was lifted.

https://www.al.com/news/2020/07/alabama-cities-left-to-go-it-alone-as-governor-urges-but-
doesnt-require-masks.html

Attorney General Steve Marshall on Saturday sent a memo to all law enforcement in Alabama
informing them of how they can legally enforce the health order.

"While the unprecedented nature of this pandemic and the government’s evolving response seem
to demand some restraint related to criminal enforcement of this order, if a violator has been
made aware of the health order and the refusal to comply presents a threat to public health and
safety, the penalties of Section 22-2-14 are available as an enforcement tool," Marshall wrote in
the memo.

MARSHALL - MISSING-IN-ACTION ON FACE MASK POLICY

https://www.isidewith.com/candidates/steve-marshall/policies/healthcare/covid-mask-mandate

MARSHALL GIVES GREEN LIGHT TO EMPLOYER VACCINE MANDATES

In July, 2021, Steve Marshall issued a Public Notice, in which he states:

"Though governmental entities may adopt policies that apply to unvaccinated individuals,
such as mandating masks or proof of negative COVID test results, under this provision—
because proof of vaccination cannot be required—these policies could not be enforced
against those who choose not to provide their immunization status."

And,

"Though institutions of education may adopt policies that apply to unvaccinated students,
such as mandating masks or proof of negative COVID test results, under this provision—
because proof of immunization cannot be required as a condition of attendance—these
 policies could not be enforced against those who choose not to provide their immunization
status.

And,

"Note that [the act] cannot be read to prohibit private employers from requiring employees to
vaccinate against COVID -19. While a business may inquire about the vaccination status of a
consumer or request that unvaccinated consumers wear a mask or social distance, the
business may not require proof of vaccination or discriminate against the consumer based on
a refusal to confirm his or her vaccination status.

COVID-19 Vaccinations & Act 2021-493

https://www.alabamaag.gov/Documents/news/AL%20COVID%2019%20Vaccine
%20Guidance.pdf

The language used by Marshall in his July 2021 notice, is precisely the kind of "wiggle-room"
vaccine mandate proponents love. It effectively give the pro-mandate crowd legal guidance on
how to work around the law; a virtual "legal green light".

Steve Marshall: Businesses can require employees to get COVID vaccine

https://www.al.com/news/2021/08/steve-marshall-businesses-can-require-employees-to-get-
covid-vaccine.html

In January, 2022, the CDC announced new quarantine guidelines COVID-19. The policy allows
"fully vaccinated" people to return to work and class after being exposed to someone who tested
positive for covid. And, allows "fully vaccinated" individuals to return to work or school after
only 5 days of self-quarantine after testing positive for covid. Many people thought this was a
step in the right direction, reducing the quarantine time from 10 days to 5. But, the new policy is
actually an underhanded way to allow schools and businesses to impose "tacit" vaccine
mandates. And, as it concerns Alabama, Steve Marshall's guidance serves as a map that schools
and employers can use to navigate around existing law.

Following the CDC announcement, schools across Alabama began implementing new policies
under which vaccinated students may return to school in accordance with the CDC guidelines,
but unvaccinated students were instructed to stay home for five days.

Some employers in the state implemented similar polices, requiring vaccinated employees could
take 5 days off with pay, but unvaccinated employees must take time-off without pay. Just as
Steve Marshall advised, these entities may impose discriminatory testing, masking and isolation
requirements on unvaccinated individuals -- as long as they don't require the individuals to
produce proof of vaccination status. In other words, the schools and businesses are making it
clear that unvaccinated students and employees will be in violation of the entity's policy if they
do not "voluntarily" comply.
===

AL Code § 16-11-9 (2016)

Section 16-11-9
Powers generally.

The city board of education is hereby vested with all the powers necessary or proper for the
administration and management of the free public schools within such city and adjacent territory
to the city which has been annexed as a part of the school district which includes a city having a
city board of education.

(School Code 1927, §198; Code 1940, T. 52, §158.)

"[T]he courts will not seek to control the exercise of the broad discretion given by the legislature
to the county boards of education. All legal intendments are indulged in favor of the orders of
such boards, and the orders are due to be upheld unless the invalidity is clearly shown by those
challenging the order." Hargett v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 374 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Ala. 1979);
see also Clark v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 410 So. 2d 23, 27 (holding "that while there is no
specific statutory grant of authority to local boards of education to operate day care centers, there
is authority for such activity under the broad grants of power" provided to the boards by the
Legislature);

AL Code § 11-47-132 (2019)

Section 11-47-132
Provision for system of compulsory vaccination, etc.

All cities and towns of this state shall have the power to adopt all necessary ordinances and
enforce the same to prevent the introduction or spread of contagious, infectious, or pestilential
diseases in such cities or towns and, to that end, may provide for a system of compulsory
vaccination and enforcement of the same.

(Code 1907, §1289; Code 1923, §2047; Code 1940, T. 37, §493.)

The municipality of Demopolis enacted an ordinance providing that “no child shall enter any of
the public schools of Demopolis who has not been vaccinated.”

Herbert v. Board of Education, 197 Ala. 617, 622, 73 So. 321 (1916)
Besides, the inquiry here presented involves the matter of the delegation to, and the exercise by,
the municipal governing body of a legislative power to preserve and to conserve the health of
their communities (Dunn v. Court of County Revenues of Wilcox, 85 Ala. 144, 147, 4 South.
661), and not a questioning of the propriety or. validity of action taken by a school-board in the
performance of its administrative functions.

Herbert v. Board of Education, 197 Ala. 617, 622, 73 So. 321 (1916)

Herbert v. Demopolis Sch. Bd. of Educ., 73 So. 321, 323 (622) (Ala. 1916)

Herbert v. Board of Education, 197 Ala. 617, 73 So. 321 (1916)

Nov. 16, 1916 · Alabama Supreme Court
197 Ala. 617, 73 So. 321

Furthermore, it may be a matter of doubt whether it was not petitioner’s obligation to make
demand upon the board of education to admit the child to the school as a condition precedent to
the remedy sought in this instance. — See Moseley v. Collins, 133 Ala. 326, 32 South. 131.

Herbert v. Board of Education, 197 Ala. 617, 619, 73 So. 321 (1916)

It is insisted, however, that the allegations of the bill present a case showing gross abuse of
discretion. So far as we are aware this court has not attempted to define precisely "gross abuse of
discretion", perhaps for the reason that it is best to allow the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case to determine its presence or absence. In a general way, however, we say that it means
such an arbitrary and unreasonable act or conclusion as to shock the sense of justice and indicate
lack of fair and careful consideration. State ex rel. King et al. v. County Board of Education of
Russell County, 214 Ala. 620, 108 So. 588; Scott v. Mattingly, 236 Ala. 254,182 So. 24;
Christian v. Jones, Superintendent of Public Schools, 211 Ala. 161, 100 So. 99, 32 A.L.R. 1340.

The broad powers conferred on the county board of education to which we have referred include
the power to consolidate schools and to arrange for transportation of pupils to and from such
consolidated school (§ 76, Title 52, Code of 1940), the power to determine the "kind, grade and
location of schools" (§ 113, Title 52, Code of 1940) and the power to adopt "a building program
adequate to the present and future needs of the schools in the county" (§ 116, Title 52, Code of
1940). Do the allegations of the bill remove the case from within the discretion of the board to an
arbitrary, unreasonable and unjustifiable misuse of power? Do the allegations of the bill
overcome the presumption which is in favor of the reasonableness and propriety of the action of
the board? Christian v. Jones, Supt. of Ed., supra. It does not appear so to us.

The proposed school is to replace a school destroyed by fire in a community now without a
school.
…

The allegations of the bill will not be aided by the general allegation that "the proposed action of
the defendants *Page 48 is a gross abuse of discretion" because this is "merely to apply an
epithet without defining the act". State ex rel. King v. County Board of Education, supra; Hodges
v. Board of Education of Geneva County, supra.