Moral Personhood and Accountability

Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr.

In judging whether a given action is morally good or bad, or morally right or

wrong, we determine whether this action conforms to or violates our moral standards or
principles. For instance, we usually judge an act of killing to be morally wrong because it
violates our moral principle which states that we ought not kill or which gives absolute
value to the preservation of life. Our judgment, however, already assumes that the
entities or beings involved in the act are appropriate sources and/or receivers of acts
evaluable in terms of our moral standards. That is, they are the kind of entities which
can perform and/or receive actions which we can meaningfully say to be right or wrong
on the basis of our moral standards. Thus, when we say that an act of killing is morally
wrong, we are presumably referring to an act of killing done by a normal human adult to
another human or fellow humans. This, for instance, may be an act where a terrorist
killed several innocent humans lives by bombing a mall, or where a policeman killed an
unarmed drug suspect. This is because we regard normal human adults as appropriate
sources while humans in general as appropriate receivers of actions that can be
evaluated using our moral standards.
Suppose the act that we are considering was instead done by an animal to its
fellow animal, say a spider killing a mosquito trapped in its web, or a cat killing a mouse.
We will most likely not judge this particular act of killing as either morally wrong or right.
And the simple reason is that we generally do not regard animals as appropriate
sources of morally evaluable actions (actions evaluable in terms of our moral
standards). This is also true even in cases when animals happen to kill humans, as
when a shark or a wild bear attacked a human and killed him/her in the process. We
will surely be angry at this animal and will consider the act wrong. But most likely we will
not regard it as wrong in the moral sense in that we believe that the animal has done
something morally wrong. Now some people (for instance, those who believe that all
kinds of life are sacred) may consider animals as appropriate receivers of morally

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evaluable actions; but still this is only when the actions done to these animals are
performed by appropriate sources of morally evaluable actions like normal human
adults. An example is when humans kill animals for entertainment purposes only.
With regard to humans, we noted that normal human adults are appropriate
sources of morally evaluable actions. This is to distinguish them from humans who we
do not regard as sources of morally evaluable actions, which include young children and
humans whose mental capacities are seriously impaired. Furthermore, we noted that
humans are regarded as appropriate receivers of morally evaluable actions only in the
general sense. This is because there are standing disagreements on whether to include
severely damaged infants (such as the anencephalic infants), comatose patients, brain
dead patients, and patients in persistent vegetative state, and human embryos in the
class of humans in which actions done to them can be judged to be morally wrong or
not. For instance, it is not yet clear whether it is morally good or bad to kill them so that
their organs can be used to help save or prolong the life of other humans who are in
great need of these organs.
All these considerations highlight the fact that in judging the morality of an action,
a prior consideration is whether the entities or beings involved in the action are
appropriate objects of moral concern—such that we should care whether their actions
or the actions done to them are morally good or bad. Such entities are referred to by
philosophers as moral persons. They are the kind of entities believed to have a moral
standing or status, such that we should care whether the actions that they do and/or
receive are morally good or bad. Consequently, actions are morally evaluable, or can be
judged to be good or bad using our moral standards, only if they involve moral persons.
In studying how we make moral judgments, it is important we examine the moral
standards that we use, which we shall do in the succeeding chapters. But before we can
appropriately do this we need to examine first the concept of moral personhood, which,
as we have shown above, is a precondition to the application of our moral standards.
Now, a concept necessarily connected to moral personhood is moral accountability; for,
as we shall make clear later on, an essential consideration in what makes certain
entities appropriate sources of morally evaluable actions is whether they can be held
morally accountable for their actions. Normal human adults, for instance, are regarded

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as appropriate sources of morally evaluable actions because they can be held morally
accountable for their actions; while animals and infants, among others, are not because
they cannot be held morally accountable for their actions. This chapter shall thus be
about these two concepts. We shall begin our examination with the concept of moral
personhood, after which we shall proceed to the concept of moral accountability.

I. Moral Personhood
In investigating the nature of moral personhood, we shall look into four things:
first, how moral personhood is defined in terms of duties and rights; second, how the
two kinds of moral persons, namely moral agents and moral patients, differ from and
relate with one another; third, what functional capacities must an entity posses to qualify
as a moral person; and fourth some controversial issues concerning moral personhood.

Moral Persons, Rights and Duties

We earlier noted that moral persons are entities having moral status or standing;
and as such are objects of moral concern. That is, they are the kind of entities whose
actions and to whom actions done we ought be concerned about as regards whether
they are morally good or bad. Consequently, an action is only morally evaluable (that is,
is only appropriate to evaluate using moral standards) when it involves moral persons,
in that both its doer and receiver have moral status.
But what gives moral status to an entity? Or what accounts for the moral
personhood of an entity? This question can be broken down into two parts: the first
inquires into what makes an entity a person; the second inquires into what makes a
person a moral person. With regard to personhood, one convenient way of defining or
understanding it is to see how it relates to rights and duties. Accordingly, a person is
one who at least have, or is a bearer of, rights. Having rights is the minimum
requirement for being a person; for some persons, in addition to having rights, may
have duties as well. In short, we thus say that all persons have rights but some also
have duties. Now what gives persons rights and duties is a question that will require
identifying the specific features that an entity must have to be regarded as a moral
person or as an entity having moral status. We shall deal with this question in the

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section “The Criteria for Moral Personhood.” At this point, our concern merely is to
analyze the concept of moral personhood in terms of duties and rights.
Accordingly, we first need to have a good grasp of the concepts of rights and
duties—how they differ from and relate to one another. To begin with, rights are
entitlements. They are things we deserve to have and actions we are allowed to do. For
instance, when we say that humans have the right to live, it means that humans are
entitled, or deserve, to live. When we say, on the other hand, that we do not have the
right to take another person’s life, we mean that we are not entitled, allowed, or
permitted to take another person’s life. Duties, on the other hand, are actions that we
ought to do or perform. They are expressed in the form of commands, laws, or
imperatives, like the duties expressed in the Ten Commandments.
One difference between rights and duties concerns whether one deserves
punishment or blame for failing to satisfy them. On the one hand, failure to exercise a
right does not merit any sanction; that is, one does not deserve to be punished or
blamed for it. For instance, if I do not use the resources in the university library, which I
have the right to (say for) being a student of this university, I do not deserve to be
punished for it. On the other hand, failure to perform a duty merits a sanction or makes
one deserving of punishment or blame. For instance, if I, again as a student, do not
follow the rules of the university, such as I wear inappropriate clothes while on campus
or I cheat during examinations, I deserve to receive the punishment imposed by the
university as specifically specified in its rules and policies.
Duties and rights, however, are tightly correlated in that they imply one other. On
the one hand, a right implies certain duties in that one’s right imposes certain duties on
other people. For instance, if I have the right to use the resources in the library, other
people have the duty not to prevent me from using such resources if I decide to do so.
If I have the right to know certain information, then other people have the duty to provide
me such information. On the other hand, a duty respects a right in that a person’s duty
is directed towards a person with a corresponding right. For instance, it is our duty not
to kill a person because every person has the right to live. Another, we have the duty to
respect the privacy of other persons because every person has the right to privacy.

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 Thus, when we say that persons are bearers of rights, we mean that they are
entitled to do certain actions or they deserve to receive certain things. And when we say
that some of them are also bearers of duties, we mean that some of them ought to
perform certain actions. Furthermore, persons who are also bearers of duties should
thus respect the rights of other persons, otherwise they will deserve blame or
punishment. In this connection, persons with duties can thus be held accountable for
their actions; while persons with rights only cannot be held accountable for their actions.
Being held accountable for one’s action means here that one deserves blame or praise,
or punishment or reward, for one’s actions. And only those that can be held accountable
for their actions can have duties; or vice versa. (We shall deal with the concept of
accountability in the second part of this chapter.)
Let us now deal with the second part of the question of what gives moral status
to a person, namely, what makes a person a moral person. Basically, it is the kind of
rights and duties a person has. In this regard, a moral person is a person whose rights
and/or duties are moral rights and duties. In the same way, a legal person is a person
whose rights and/or duties are legal rights and duties. For our purposes, let us examine
the differences and similarities of legal rights and duties and moral rights and duties.
Legal rights and duties are defined by legal laws, as embedded in the constitution of a
state. By being a citizen of a certain state, we acquire the legal rights and duties defined
by the laws of the constitution of the said state. On the other hand, moral rights and
duties are defined by moral laws or principles. By being moral persons, our moral rights
and duties are defined or determined by the moral principles governing our actions.
Humans, in so far as they are citizens of a certain state, are legal persons for
they possess the legal rights guaranteed by the constitution of their state. But while they
all have legal rights, some of them also have legal duties. Human infants and young
children have legal rights but they certainly do not have legal duties as well. Animals, at
least some of them, are also given legal rights but certainly not legal duties as well. On
the other hand, humans who have reached a certain age acquire certain legal duties
such as the right to vote and marry. Only those who have acquired legal duties are held
legally accountable for their actions; that is, only they can receive the legal penalties for
violating the law.

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 The case is no different for moral persons. All moral persons are bearers of moral
rights, but some of them also have moral duties. Moral persons who do not have moral
duties as well standardly include human infants, young children, and humans with
serious mental disabilities, among others. (Arguably, they also include animals and
trees, among others.) They are moral persons because they have moral rights; but they
do not have moral duties as well. As such, while they are objects of moral concern they
cannot he be held morally accountable for their actions. On the other hand, moral
persons who, in addition to having moral rights, also have moral duties as well
standardly include normal human adults. (Arguably, they also include corporations and
other possibly rational collective entities, such as states, or machines—those with
artificial intelligence.) They are moral persons who can be held morally accountable for
their actions.

Moral Agents and Patients

The difference between moral agents and moral patients is a result of the roles
that a moral person can play in a given action, as the doer or the receiver of the action.
A moral person acting as the doer of an act is a moral agent; while a moral person
acting as the receiver of the act is a moral patient (also called moral recipient). Being a
moral agent and being a moral patient are thus two main functional roles of a moral
person (see Floridi 2011, 184; Haksar 1998, 5632). Another way of saying the same is
that moral personhood has two aspects or dimensions, namely, moral agency and moral
patiency.
While all moral persons can assume the role of being a moral patient, not all
moral persons can assume the role of being a moral agent. This is because to be a
moral agent, one has to be accountable for one’s actions. As Haksar (1998, 5632)
explains:
Moral agents should be distinguished from moral recipients. Moral agents are
those who are morally responsible for at least some of their conduct. They are
subject to moral duties and obligations, and, therefore, to moral praise and
blame. Moral recipients are those who are owed moral consideration for their
own sakes.

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 What this means, given our discussion above on the relation of moral
personhood with rights and duties, to be a moral agent is be a moral person who, in
addition to having moral rights, has moral duties or obligations as well. Only moral
persons who have moral duties as well, and as such can be held morally accountable
for their actions, can assume the role of moral agents. But in as much as all moral
persons have moral rights, all moral persons can assume the role of being moral
patients. Accordingly, all moral agents are moral patients as well (that is, all moral
persons who can be moral agents can also be moral patients); but not all moral patients
can be moral agents as well (that is, not all moral persons who can be moral patients
can also be moral agents). Thus, we have the following two kinds of moral patients: (1)
moral patients who can functions as moral agents, which we can conveniently call
agentive moral patients; and the (2) moral patients who cannot function as moral
agents, which we can in turn conveniently call non-agentive moral patients. Overall, we
thus have the following classification of moral persons:

Moral Persons:
I. Moral Agents (doers of morally evaluable actions; bearers of both moral
rights and duties; can be held morally accountable for their actions)
2. Moral Patients (receivers of morally evaluable actions; bearers, at least,
of moral rights; can be held morally accountable for their actions if bearers of
moral duties as well)
2.1 Agentive Moral Patients (bearers of both moral rights and duties;
can be held morally accountable for their actions)
2.2 Non-agentive Moral Patients (bearers of moral rights only; cannot be
held morally accountable for all their actions)

It shall be observed that moral agents and agentive moral patients are the same
moral persons in so far as being bearers of both moral rights and duties and of being
accountable for some of their actions are concerned. Their difference only lies in the
role they play: moral agents do actions while agentive moral patients recieve actions.

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Consequently, the examples given to moral persons who have moral duties as well are
the same examples that can be given to moral agents and agentive moral patients, such
as normal human adults (and arguably corporations and some others as well). On the
other hand, the examples given to moral persons who only have moral right are the
same examples that can be given to non-agentive moral patients, such as human
infants, young children, and seriously mentally impaired humans (and arguably animals,
and some others as well). One conceptual advantage of having the distinction between
moral agents and moral patients is that it avoids confusion in assigning moral
personhood to certain entities. For instance, some say that a certain entity (say a
human fetus or a comatose patient) cannot be a moral person because it does not have
the capacity to play the role of being a moral agent. This obviously confuses, if not
falsely equates, moral personhood with moral agency. As we have noted, moral agency
is only an aspect of moral personhood; it is not the same as moral personhood.

Criteria for Moral Personhood

Let us now tackle the question of what makes a certain entity a bearer of moral
rights and duties. To properly do this, we need first to qualify what kind of properties are
relevant in this question. In this connection, an important point to consider is an
implication of defining personhood in terms of possession of rights and duties, namely
that personhood is a functional concept. A functional concept is a concept sufficiently
definable in terms of possession of functional capacities, referring to capacities to
perform certain functions. By being sufficient, it means that the other qualities, such as
those related to material composition, are secondary in significance. To make the point
clearer, consider how chess pieces are defined. Chess pieces are good examples of
functional concepts because they are sufficiently definable in terms of their functional
capacities or roles—referring to their allowable moves on the chessboard. What they
are made up of, say of glass, wood, or metal, are not essential to what they mean. In
fact, if a chess piece is missing, we usually just get a small object to take its place. This
object, upon assuming the functional roles of missing lost chess piece becomes this
chess piece.

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 Regardless of what functional capacities are relevant for moral personhood, the
implication is that being human is not necessary for moral personhood, or for
personhood for that matter. If humans are persons by virtue of possessing the relevant
functional capacities for personhood, then any entity that possesses the same functional
capacities should, by force of consistency, be regarded as persons as well. In the legal
context, in addition to human legal persons, there are nonhuman legal persons as well,
such as corporations and certain animals. who are nonhumans possessing legal rights.
These nonhuman legal persons include animals and corporations (see Floridi 2011,
186). The same works in the moral context. There are human and nonhuman moral
persons. Animals, corporations, and even trees, can be moral persons if they are
regarded as possessing the relevant functional capacities for moral personhood.
So what then are these relevant functional capacities for moral personhood?
First, let us take a look at two proposed lists of functional capacities deemed necessary
for personhood in general. The first is by Michael Tooley (2009, 131), who defines a
person as one that: (1) possesses consciousness, (2) has preferences, (3) has
conscious desires, (4) has feelings, (5) can experience pleasure and pain, (6) has
thoughts, (7) is self-conscious, (8) is capable of rational thought, (9) has a sense of
time, (10) can remember its own past actions and mental states, (11) can envisage a
future for itself, (12) has non-momentary interests, involving a unification of desires over
time,(13) is capable of rational deliberation, (14) can take moral considerations into
account in choosing between possible actions, (15) has traits of character that undergo
change in a reasonably non-chaotic fashion, (16) can interact socially with others, and
(17) can communicate with others.
The second is by Mary Anne Warren (1999, 205), who defines a person as one
that possesses: (1) consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the
being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain; (2) reasoning (the developed capacity
to solve new and relatively complex problems); (3) self-motivated activity (activity which
is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control); (4) the capacity to
communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is,
not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible

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topics; and (5) the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or
racial, or both.
Some of these functional capacities can be lumped together or be subsumed
under more general capacities. For instance, having feelings, can experience pleasure
and pain, has conscious desires, presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, and
others can be subsumed under consciousness; and capable of rational deliberation, can
take moral considerations into account in choosing between possible actions,
reasoning, and capacity to communicate, can be subsumed under rational thought.
More importantly, as we are considering moral personhood, not just personhood in
general, we should only consider those features of personhood that are morally
relevant; that is, relevant to the moral evaluability of the actions of persons. For
instance, to be conscious is a general capacity of a person. But for a moral person, it is
not just being conscious of anything, but to be conscious of certain kinds of
experiences, such as pleasures and pains.
The morally relevant features of personhood are actually embedded in our moral
principles. When moral principles state that persons should do such and such things, it
is assumed that these persons have the capacity to these things. According to the
principle “ought implies can,” when a moral principle states that we ought to perform an
action, it is assumed that we can or have the capacity to do so. It is meaningful, for
instance, to say that we ought to keep our promises because we have the capacity to
do so. It is absurd to say the same to a frog, for instance, which (presumably) does not
have such capacity. Another, if our moral principle states that we ought not to inflict
unnecessary pain to persons, it is assumed that this is addressed to persons capable of
inflicting and experiencing pain. The moral principles contain their own criteria for moral
personhood. For it is only to these persons, or entities, satisfying these criteria that such
principles are intended to apply.
Now as there are different ethical theories advancing certain moral principles, the
criteria for moral personhood vary. For our purposes, we shall examine the criteria
assumed in certain dominant ethical theories (the ones that we shall focus on in the
following chapters of this book). This means that our list does not claim to be
exhaustive. Furthermore, we shall be neutral in our presentation in that we shall

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disregard the question of which among them should be regarded as supreme or
overriding in case of conflict. Accordingly, let us consider the following criteria for moral
personhood:
1. Sentience: the capacity to feel pleasure and pain
2. Rationality: the capacity for reason and free will
3. Relationality: the capacity to establish relationships (interpersonal and/or
ecological)
Sentience is the morally relevant feature of moral personhood assumed in ethical
theories which generally state that actions are morally good in so far as their
consequences give pleasure to persons or do not inflict pain on them. As we shall see
later on, there will be many variations of this moral principle. One variation subsumes
sentience under the capacity to have interests, thereby making the experience of
pleasure as only one of the possible interests of persons that an action, to be morally
good, must satisfy. Rationality is the morally relevant criterion for moral personhood
assumed in ethical theories which judge the morality of actions in terms of whether they
follow rational or reasonable moral rules. It is likewise assumed in ethical theories which
see morally good actions as actions of persons with good character traits. Relationality,
on the other hand, is the morally relevant criterion for moral personhood assumed in
ethical theories which see relationships as the sources of moral duties or obligations.
These relationships may be interpersonal such as the relationship of a mother to her
child, or ecological such as the relationships among the different organisms existing in
an ecosystem.
Other criteria include, among others, having life or being alive, such that any
living organism, in just being alive, is a moral person. In its extreme version, it also
considers insects and micro-organisms as objects of moral concern such that if possible
we should not kill them. Another is one that treats all entities inhabited by spirits, which
include trees, mountains, rocks, animals, and others, as objects of moral concern.
A main source of disagreement concerning these criteria is the question of which
among them is/are sufficient. For instance, is sentience alone, rationality alone, or
relationship alone sufficient? Or is it a combination of any two of them or all of them?
There are, consequently, two general approaches to this question: the uni-criterial and

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multi-criterial approaches (see Warren 1997, 17-23). The uni-criterial approach identifies
only one functional capacity as sufficient for moral personhood; whereas the multi-
cultural approach identifies several (more than one, or all) functional capacities as
sufficient.
Under the uni-criterial approach, we thus have the following views: (1) sentience-
only view, (2) rationality-only view, and (3) relationality-only view. For the sentience-only
view, only entities having the functional capacity for sentience have moral status or are
moral persons. For the rationality-only view, only entities having the functional
capacities for reason and free will have moral status. For the relationship-only view, only
entities having the capacity for social and/or ecological relationships have moral status.
On the other hand, under the multi-criterial approaches, we have the following
contending views: (1) sentience-rationality view, (2) sentience-relationship view, (3)
rationality-relationality view, and (4) sentience-rationality-relationality view.
In giving a single criterion for both moral agents and moral patients, the uni-
criterial approach is bound to face some difficulties. One, the sentience-only and the
relationality-only views, will not be able to account for the moral accountability of moral
agents (which requires rationality). On the other hand, the rationality-only view will not
be able to account for the moral personhood of non-agentive moral patients (those
moral persons who do not have the capacity for rationality). In contrast, in giving more
than one criteria for moral personhood, these diffculites may be overcome by the multi-
criterial approach. The question, however, is which among its particular views is most
preferable. Let us examine the alternatives.
To account for the moral accountability of moral agents, we need to include
rationality in the combination of views. To accommodate the non-agentive moral
patients to the class of moral persons, we also need to include both sentience and
relationality in the combination. The three capacities are thus all important. But should a
single entity need to possess all three functional capacities to be a person? It does not
have to be. A person possessing at least one of them is already a person. This is
consistent with the distinction between the agentive and non-agentive moral patients.
Given these considerations, the sentience-rationality-relationality view proves to be
most preferable, provided, however, that we understand its combination of capacities

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not conjointly but separately. In logical terms, we understand it not conjunctively but
disjunctively, in which the combination is true if at least one of its components is true.

The Case of the Full-fledged and Potential Persons

As moral personhood is critical in most discussions of moral issues, it is also
controversial on some points. In this section, we shall briefly deal with two of these
issues: the cases of the so-called full-fledged and potential persons. We do not intend to
resolve these issues here or to cover all of their relevant aspects; our aim is just to
introduce the issues, explain why they are controversial, and point to some
considerations in handling them.
The case of the full-fledged person concerns the question of whether moral
personhood comes in degrees, which naturally arises from taking the multi-criterial
approach (disjunctively understood) to moral personhood. Accordingly, the question is,
Is the moral personhood of an entity possessing all the morally relevant functional
capacities greater than an entity possessing just one or some of such capacities? The
full-fledged person is deemed to have all these capacities, in contrast to the half-fledged
one who is deemed to have only some (at least one but not all) of these capacities (see
Warren 1997). Consequently, the full-fledged person is believed to have moral priority
over the half-fledged one in cases where their rights conflict (say when the right to life of
an infant conflicts with the right to life its mother). It shall be observed that this view
conflicts with the view that moral rights are the same for all persons. If the purpose is to
be able to effectively handle cases of conflicting rights of persons, there are ways other
than distinguishing degrees of moral personhood. One is to acknowledge that rights
form a hierarchy (following W.D. Ross 2004) in that certain rights override certain
others, say that the right to life overrides the right to know the truth. Another is to
acknowledge that there are other morally relevant considerations, in addition to rights, in
making decisions, such as one that aims to reduce sufferings as much as possible.
A potential person is a nonperson who has the potential to become a person. The
question is whether a potential person should enjoy the same rights enjoyed by an
actual person. Potential persons, for instance, are entities that are not sentient or
rational but have the potential of developing any of such capacities. This is an issue

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specially for those not willing to acknowledge the moral personhood of an entity (say the
human embryo) for it has not yet developed the necessary functional capacity (say
sentience or rationality) but who nonetheless would like to give this entity the same
moral consideration given to actual persons (see Tooley 2009; Warren 2009). This
assumed view here conflicts with the definition of moral persons as the proper objects of
moral concern. If the purpose is to justify why we should give moral care to such
entities, why not just treat them as persons already, in virtue of a morally relevant
functional capacity that it may already have. For instance, it may be still be potentially
rational but it may already be actually sentient. Or it may still be potentially both rational
and sentient but it may already be an actual object of special personal relations (like the
case of a severely impaired infant with which the mother has special personal relations).
This, however, would mean being liberal as to what constitutes the relevant functional
capacities of a moral person.

II. Moral Accountability

As we have seen, an important concept related to moral personhood is moral
accountability, for it is a defining feature of moral agency. In this part of the chapter, we
shall thus focus on this concept. There are three things about moral accountability that
we shall examine: first, how its meaning relates to the various uses of the word
“responsibility”; second, how it differs from other types of accountability specially the
legal one; and third, how its assignment or attribution is done.

Accountability and “Responsibility”

Deservingness of blame or praise for the actions that we perform is a necessary
consequence of our rationality, which consists of our intelligence and freedom. Our
intelligence enables us to distinguish between right and wrong actions, or between
actions that we ought and ought not to do. And our freedom enables us to choose the
kind of action that we would like to perform. Consequently, in choosing to perform an
action that we know to be either right or wrong we deserve either blame or praise. We,
in particular, deserve blame for choosing to perform an action we know to be wrong (or

14
for choosing not to perform an action we know to be right); while we deserve praise for
choosing to perform an action we know to be right (or for choosing not to perform an
action we know to wrong).
The deservingness of blame or praise for the actions that we do is what we refer
to as accountability. It is important to emphasize at the onset that accountability,
specially in its moral sense, involves both blame and praise (see Uniake 2010, 602); for
it is usual to associate accountability with blame only. Now, it is usual to use the word
“accountability” interchangeably with the word “responsibility,” such that moral and legal
accountability are respectively also referred to as moral and legal responsibility. The
word “responsibility,” however, has other uses or meanings in addition to its being a
synonym for accountability. Though these uses are interrelated, it is important not to
confuse them. One of its other uses has something to do with causation (see Uniake
2010, 596). Here, being responsible for something means being the cause of that
something. The entity responsible for something in this sense may be inanimate, like
storms and stones, or animate like animals and humans. Thus we sometimes say, for
instance, that the storm was responsible for devastation of the city; and that the lion was
responsible for the death of the deer. We simply mean here that the storm was the
cause of the said devastation and the lion was the cause of the death of the deer. We
surely do not mean that the storms and the lion were accountable for these events in
the sense of deserving blame or punishment. When the cause of something is a person,
say a human being, we call the cause a personal agent. (A non-personal cause, such as
an inanimate object, is usually just referred to as a cause.) Now some personal agents
may be held accountable for their actions; but this is due to some additional conditions
that have obtained (which we shall examine under the section on the conditions of
moral accountability) and not just the mere fact of being the causes of actions.
The word “responsibility” is also being used to refer to one’s duty or obligation
(see Zimmerman 2010, 607-08). Here, being responsible for someone means having
certain duties or obligations towards this someone. Parents, for instance, are said to be
responsible for their children in virtue of the fact that they hold certain duties or
obligations towards their children. This particular meaning of responsibility, however, is
closely related to accountability in that the act of performing and not performing one’s

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duties gives rise to accountability. Parents thus are accountable for not peforming their
duties towards their children. In this connection, Zimmerman (2010, 608) distinguishes
between prospective responsibility, which is concerned with what will or may happen,
and retrospective responsibility, which is concerned with what had happened already.
Prospective responsibility corresponds to responsibility understood as having duties
while retrospective responsibility corresponds to responsibility understood as
accountability. Using his own example, the prospective responsibility of a lifeguard to
the swimmers under his care is his duty to ensure their safety; but his retrospective
responsibility for the death of a swimmer under his care is his accountability for this
event.
In light of these two other meanings of responsibility, along with its meaning as a
synonym for accountability, when we ask, Who is responsible for this action? (assuming
here that we have in mind a particular human individual), we thus may be asking either
of the following: Who causes this action? Whose duty is this action? (or Who is tasked
to do this action?) Who should be blamed or praised for this action? Now the person
who does the action may not be the person tasked to perform it and thus should not be
blamed (or praised) for it. Now, what we have just said, using the word “responsibility” in
its three different senses, may be put as follows: “Now the person responsible for the
action may not be responsible for it and thus should not be responsible for it.” This
shows us the confusion that may arise from these three uses of “responsibility.”

Moral Accountability: Some Distinguishing Features

Accountability can be of various types, and moral accountability is just one of

them. What then makes moral accountability different from the other types of
accountability. For our purposes, let us focus on the differences between moral
accountability and legal accountability. Among others, there are two such differences.
One is the kind of standards or principles used in ascertaining the quality (rightness or
wrongness) of an act, for which one may deserve blame or praise. In this regard, legal
accountability uses legal standards (the legal laws) whereas moral accountability uses
moral standards (the moral rules or principles). As legal laws do not always embody

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moral rules, legal accountability does not always reflect moral accountability.
Specifically, the person who deserves moral blame is sometimes not the one being
legally punished; or the person who does not deserve moral blame is the one legally
punished. In any case, the second difference concerns their kind of sanctions or
penalties for wrongful actions done. Legal sanctions are said to be external in that they
come in the form of physical punishments. Moral sanctions (moral blame or fault), on
the other hand, are said to be internal in that they come in the form of mental sufferings
such as guilt or remorse, shame, self-hatred, and the like. In other words, as legal
accountability is the deservingness of legal punishment or reward (though usually it is
just legal punishments); moral accountability is the deservingness of moral blame or
praise.
We earlier noted that it is important to highlight the fact that accountability
involves both blame and praise, not just blame as it is usually understood. This is
specially true in the case of moral accountability. Speaking of moral accountability as
moral responsibility, and of moral blame and praise as moral fault and moral credit,
respectively, Uniake (2010, 602) emphasizes this point:
In ascribing moral responsibility we are concerned with an appropriate moral
appraisal of moral agents for what they do or bring about (Feinberg 1970). This
appraisal includes attribution of moral credit for good consequences as well as
attribution of moral fault for the bad consequences of our actions, so ascription
of moral responsibility underpins attribution of moral credit for good
consequences. For example, were I to act in a way that deflects a threat of
serious harm from another person, it is relevant to ask whether I am morally
responsilble for this good outcome.

Another point to highlight here is the word “deservingness.” A person may

deserve to receive something and yet does not actually receive it. But the fact that he/
she does not receive it does not negate the fact that he/she deserves to receive it.
Immanuel Kant thinks, in this connection, that the goal of morality is not really
happiness but the deservingness of happiness; and so the morally good person is one
who deserves happiness regardless of whether he/she is in fact happy or not. It may

17
happen, for whatever reason, that the person who deserves to be happy is not actually
happy; and the person who does not deserve to be happy is happy. This, however, does
not change the situation that the morally good person deserves to be happy. The same
is actually true in the case moral accountability. The person who deserves moral blame,
for instance, may not really be experiencing the mental sufferings (such as guilt or
shame) that go with moral blame. He/she may in fact be happy with the wrongdoing that
he/she has intentionally done, and perhaps even feel proud about it. But this possibility
does not change the fact that he/she deserves moral blame for his/her wrongdoing.

Conditions for Moral Accountability

The conditions for moral accountability can be classified into two general sets.
We shall call the first the attribution conditions (or assignment conditions), for they
determine whether moral accountability can be attributed or assigned to a person for an
action that he/she has done. Under this set are the incriminating conditions, the
occurrence of which make one morally accountable for the action under consideration;
and the excusing conditions, the occurrence of which excuse one from moral
accountability for the action under consideration. We shall call the second set the
degree conditions, for they determine the degree of one’s moral accountability. Under
this set are the mitigating and aggravating conditions, which either lessen or increase
the degree of one’s moral accountability. They are called mitigating when they lessen
the degree of one’s moral accountability; while they are called aggravating when they
increase it. Analysis of the degree conditions assumes that a person is morally
accountable for the action under consideration; what is being determined is simply the
the degree of his/her moral accountability.

The Attribution Conditions

There are two necessary incriminating conditions for moral accountability. The
first is the knowledge condition, the occurrence of which means that the person whose
action is being considered knows or has the capacity to know the moral quality of the
said action (that is, whether this action is morally good or bad). The second is the
intentionality condition, the occurrence of which means that the person whose action is

18
being considered have intended, or have freely chosen, to perform the said action.
Haksar (1998, 5633) refers to these two conditions in the following way:
It seems that moral accountability requires that the agents should have an
objective basis for choosing their moral values. They could then be held morally
accountable to the extent that they have the capacity to find out what the
relevant moral requirements are and, to the extent that they have the capacity, to
conform to such requirements in the relevant ways. People who cannot reason
properly (such as the severely mentally ill) or those who lack certain volitional
abilities lack the capacity to conform to the relevant moral requirements.

Haksar refers to the knowledge condition as the ability of “agents to have an

objective basis for choosing their moral values” or as “the capacity to find out what the
moral requirements are.” On the other hand, he refers to the intentionality condition as
“the capacity to conform to the relevant moral requirements.”
It is necessary for these two incriminating conditions to obtain to make a person
morally accountable for his/her action. If at least one of them does not obtain, say the
intentionality condition obtains but the knowledge condition does not, or the knowledge
condition obtains but the intentionality condition does not, or both of these conditions do
not obtain, the person is excused from moral accountability for his/her act under
consideration. This means that moral accountability cannot be assigned to this person.
The conditions in which at least one of the two attribution conditions does not
obtain constitute the excusing conditions for moral accountability. In this regard, we may
refer to the absence of the knowledge condition as the ignorance condition; while the
absence of the intentionality condition as the involuntary condition. If the knowledge and
intentionality conditions constitute the incriminating conditions, the ignorance and
involuntary conditions thus constitute the excusing conditions. But while it is necessary
that both incriminating conditions obtain to make a person morally accountable, it is only
necessary that at least one of the excusing conditions obtains to excuse a person from
moral accountability. Thus, if the ignorance condition obtains but the involuntary
condition does not, or if the involuntary condition obtains but the ignorance condition
does not, or if both conditions do not obtain, the person is thereby excused from moral

19
accountability. Consequently, the person does not deserve moral blame for doing a
morally bad action, or moral praise for doing a morally good action.
Consider the case of a young child who mistook a real gun for a toy and, wanting
to play with his older brother, shot and eventually killed the latter. The young child did
not really intend to kill his older brother; he just wanted to play with him. But even
assuming that child did want to kill his older brother, say as an immediate reaction to
their quarrel, he did not yet know or understand the immorality of killing a person. In this
case it is appropriate to excuse the child from moral accountability. But consider the
following situation. Suppose a factory manager did not, or failed, to do preventive
measures to protect the health of his workers from the hazardous fumes emitted in his
factory, and as a result a number of his workers got seriously sick. Later on when an
investigation was done, this manager explained that he did not know then that such
fumes were hazardous. Should the manager then be excused from accountability? Is
this a case where the ignorance condition obtains? We surely would not excuse him
from accountability. For not only is he capable of knowing the effects of the factory
fumes on the health of his workers, but as a factory manager it is his duty to know such
things.
The ignorance condition thus needs some qualification in light of a distinction that
can be made between two kinds of ignorance, which we shall refer to as the blameful
and blameless types of ignorance. In blameless ignorance, the ignorant person cannot
be said to have known better, either because it is not really the duty of the person to
know what he/she is ignorant of, or because the person does not have the capacity to
know what he/she is supposed to know. Blameless ignorance is the excusing type of
ignorance. On the other hand, in blameful ignorance, the ignorant person can be said to
have known better, because the ignorant person has the capacity to know what he/she
should have known and it is his duty to know it. This is an irresponsible kind of
ignorance for it results from the ignorant person’s negligence to do his/her duty to know.
Blameful ignorance is thus not an excusing kind of ignorance. In our examples above,
the ignorance of the child was blameless while that of the factory manager was
blameful. Another good illustration comes from Haksar (1998, 5633):

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 In order to be morally accountable, an agent does not always have to know or
even have the correct opinion about what the moral requirements are. The
capacity for finding out such things can be enough. For instance, some Nazis
who persecuted Jews may have thought sincerely that they were doing the right
thing; but if they could and should have known better then they can be censured
for moral negligence. Had they thought things through, which they could and
should have done, they would have realized how wrong such acts were.

But what determines whether a person should know better in a given situation?
The following considerations are helpful: Does the person have the capacity to know
what he/she ought to know in a given situation? And given person’s role in a given
situation, is it his/her duty to know what ought to be known in such a situation? What
determines one’s capacity to know can vary depending on the nature of the given
situation. It can include maturity, mental health, and access to relevant information. On
the other hand, what determines one’s duty to know is one’s role in a given situation.
For instance, being a factory manager, it is one’s duty to know whether the fumes
emitted in one’s factory are toxic. But it is outside of the duty of a factory manager to
know whether his workers are eating the right kind of food.

The Degree Conditions

Moral accountability comes in degrees. Life is not perfect, as we usually say. For
things do not sometimes turn out to be the way we want them to be. Consequently,
there are moments, because of some factors, where we feel forced to do certain actions
we know to be morally wrong. Because we know such actions to be morally wrong and
choose to perform them, we are morally accountable for these actions. The
circumstances surrounding our performance of these actions, however, have an effect
on the degree of our moral accountability. We refer to these circumstances or factors as
the degree conditions of moral accountability. When these conditions tend to lessen the
degre of moral accountability, they are regarded as mitigating; but when they tend to
increase such degree, they are regarded as aggravating. In what follows, let us examine
the different degree conditions.

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 The first is the degree of knowledge of the moral wrongfulness of the action and
the action’s relevant facts. Here, the more knowledgeable a person is, the greater is his/
her moral accountability. The less knowledgeable a person is, the lesser is his/her moral
accountability. Suppose, for instance, that a defective design of a certain kind of cars
resulted in accidents which killed and seriously injured some people. During the
investigation, it was found out that an employee overseeing the manufacture of the cars
and the chief engineer, who headed the committee that designed the car, knew about
the defective design of the car but connived to hide the information from the
management. Given that both are accountable for the incidents that resulted, who
deserved a higher degree of accountability? From the viewpoint of who understands
more the seriousness of the defect and the risks it entailed, the chief engineer had a
higher degree of accountability than the employee.
The second is the degree of pressure or difficulty in life that forces one to perform
a wrongdoing. The greater is the pressure, the lesser is the moral responsibility.
However, the lesser the pressure, the greater is the moral accountability. Thus suppose
two people were guilty of stealing the same amount of money. One did it to pay for the
operation of his daughter suffering from a serious ailment. The other did it to be able to
buy an expensive gadget for his own enjoyment and pleasure. Given that both were
accountable for their actions, who had the higher or lesser degree of accountability?
The one who did it to be able to pay for the operation did it under a greater pressure or
difficulty in life, and thus had a lesser degree of accountability.
The third is the degree of the intensity of the injury caused by the wrongdoing.
The greater is the intensity of the injury, the greater is the moral accountability. The
lesser is the intensity of the injury, the lesser is the moral accountability. Again, suppose
two people stole the same amount of money. One stole it from someone who intended
to use the money to pay for the operation of his ailing daughter. The other one stole it
from someone who intended to use the money to buy an expensive gadget for his own
enjoyment and pleasure. Who had the higher degree of accountability? The intensity of
the injury caused by the one who stole money from the person who intended to use the
money to pay for the operation of his ailing daughter was greater compared to the other

22
one who also stole the same amount of money. Thus, the former person deserved a
greater degree of accountability.
The fourth is the degree of involvement (or participation) in a group or collective
act of moral wrongdoing. The greater is the involvement, the greater is the moral
accountability. The lesser is the involvement, the lesser is the moral accountability. This
condition explains why the accountability of an accomplice, one who helps someone
accomplish his criminal intention, is lesser than that of the principal criminal, the one
who actually does the criminal act.

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