NICOLAS VS.

DESIERTO
G.R. No. 154668, DEC. 16, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Nicolas was the Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau. He was
administratively before the Ombudsman for allegedly releasing an apprehended cargo based on spurious
documents. The Graft Investigation Officer found him guilty of gross neglect of duty which was duly
approved by the Ombudsman. The motion for reconsideration was denied, and thus he appealed to the
CA. The CA upheld the decision. Petitioner went further to the SC arguing that the CA erred in affirming
the decision despite of lack of substantial evidence to support his conviction of gross neglect of duty.

ISSUE:

What is the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings?

HELD:
The quantum of proof necessary to prove a charge in an administrative case
is substantial evidence, which is defined as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Such quantum was not met here. Even though petitioner had not
adduced evidence on his behalf, the facts on record show that his act or omission does not constitute gross
neglect of duty.

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. VS. ABAD

G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1992

FACTS:
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and
utilize timber within the concession area in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years. Private
respondents Gilbolingo and Bugtai filed a petition with the DENR for the cancellation of the TLA on the
ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The
same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for
injunction with damages against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City. The
petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the
complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought
was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The petitioner
then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court. The Court of
Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and
pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent
court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial
intervention.

ISSUE:
What is the correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

HELD:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of
a cause of action,  which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the
complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as
a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been
observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon
the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative
authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that
errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance
to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the
special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict
enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which
otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 
As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when
the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal;  2) when the administrative body is in
estoppel;  3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;  4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention;  5) when the claim involved is small;  6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;  7) when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;  8) when strong public interest is involved;  9) when
the subject of the controversy is private land;  and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. VS. NTC

G.R. No. 151908, AUGUST 12, 2003

FACTS:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules
and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.
Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National
Telecommunications Commission an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade
and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive,
confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular
service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable.
Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention. This was granted by the trial court.
On October 27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NTC from
implementing Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and the Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.
In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not exhaustion of administrative remedies apply to this case.
HELD:
NO. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial
or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and
the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must conform to and be
consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by
it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or
a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or
defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the
former must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is
its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions
of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-
judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for
the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies
only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, it was held:
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial
review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no
application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or
legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the
exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.

VICTORIA’S MILLING CO., INC. VS. OFFICE OF THE PRES’L. ASST. & PPA
G.R. No. 73705, AUGUST 27, 1987

FACTS:
The Iloilo Port Manager of respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA for short) wrote petitioner
Victorias Milling Co., requiring it to have its tugboats and barges undergo harbor formalities and pay
entrance/clearance fees as well as berthing fees. PPA, likewise, requiring petitioner to secure a permit for
cargo handling operations at its Da-an Banua wharf and remit 10% of its gross income for said operations
as the government's share.
To these demands, petitioner sent two (2) letters, both dated June 2, 1981, wherein it maintained
that it is exempt from paying PPA any fee or charge because: (1) the wharf and an its facilities were built
and installed in its land; (2) repair and maintenance thereof were and solely paid by it; (3) even the
dredging and maintenance of the Malijao River Channel from Guimaras Strait up to said private wharf are
being done by petitioner's equipment and personnel; and (4) at no time has the government ever spent a
single centavo for such activities. Petitioner further added that the wharf was being used mainly to handle
sugar purchased from district planters pursuant to existing milling agreements.
In reply, on November 3, 1981, PPA Iloilo sent petitioner a memorandum of PPA's Executive
Officer, Maximo Dumlao, which justified the PPA's demands. Further request for reconsideration was
denied on January 14, 1982.
On March 29, 1982, petitioner served notice to PPA that it is appealing the case to the Court of
Tax Appeals; and accordingly, on March 31, 1982, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the said
Court, entitled "Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority," On January 10, 1984, the CTA
dismissed petitioner's action on the ground that it has no jurisdiction. It recommended that the appeal be
addressed to the Office of the President.
On April 2, 1984, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President, but the same was
denied on the sole ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period. A motion for Reconsideration
was filed, but the same was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the period of appeal under Sec. 131 of PPA AO No. 13-77 was tolled by the
pendency of the petitions filed first with CTA, and then with the SC.

HELD:
The instant petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner, in holding that the recourse first to the Court of
Tax Appeals and then to this Court tolled the period to appeal, submits that it was guided, in good faith,
by considerations which lead to the assumption that procedural rules of appeal then enforced still hold
true. It contends that when Republic Act No. 1125 (creating the Court of Tax Appeals) was passed in
1955, PPA was not yet in existence; and under the said law, the Court of Tax Appeals had exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs regarding, among
others, customs duties, fees and other money charges imposed by the Bureau under the Tariff and
Customs Code. On the other hand, neither in Presidential Decree No. 505, creating the PPA on July 11,
1974 nor in Presidential Decree No. 857, revising its charter (said decrees, among others, merely
transferred to the PPA the powers of the Bureau of Customs to impose and collect customs duties, fees
and other money charges concerning the use of ports and facilities thereat) is there any provision
governing appeals from decisions of the PPA on such matters, so that it is but reasonable to seek recourse
with the Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioner, likewise, contends that an analysis of Presidential Decree No.
857, shows that the PPA is vested merely with corporate powers and duties (Sec. 6), which do not and can
not include the power to legislate on procedural matters, much less to effectively take away from the
Court of Tax Appeals the latter's appellate jurisdiction.
These contentions are untenable for while it is true that neither Presidential Decree No. 505 nor
Presidential Decree No. 857 provides for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President,
nevertheless, Presidential Decree No. 857 empowers the PPA to promulgate such rules as would aid it in
accomplishing its purpose.

UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. CA

G.R. No. 134625, AUGUST 31, 1999

FACTS:
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a
Philippine visitor’s visa.  Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology
of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman,
Quezon City. After she was conferred the Doctorate Degree, the UP Board of Regents stripped her of that
Degree on the ground of plagiarism. She argued that her right to due process was violated because she
was not accorded opportunity to cross examine the witnesses against her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to meet or confront the witnesses is demandable as a matter of right in
the administrative proceedings.

HELD:

Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain one’s side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been
denied due process.
In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her [29] and afforded
opportunities to refute them.  She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded on
September 25, 1993. Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the
Zafaralla committee to discuss her case.  In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position.
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the
Board of Regents.  Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance
of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.
Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla
committee as part of her right to due process.  In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, we held:
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see
and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners’ February 14, 1991 order, they
were denied procedural due process.  Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not
be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not
necessarily include the right to cross examination.  An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate
students’ participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.

VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. VS. ACHACOSO

G.R. No. 81805, MAY 31, 1988

FACTS:
 The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office, POEA
against the private respondents for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with the
petitioners which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the
International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.
On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda the public respondent rendered a decision.
Petitioner argued that they were denied due process of law because the respondent Administrator resolved
the case without any formal hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a formal type of hearing is required in the administrative proceedings.
HELD:
NO. “Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they were denied due process
because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard (Bermejo vs. Banjos, 31 SCRA 764), or, as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438; Gas Corporation of the Phil.
vs. Hon. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653; Cebu Institute of Technology vs. Minister of Labor, 113 SCRA 257), or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (Dormitorio vs. Fernandez,
72 SCRA 388).
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4,1987, it was agreed by the parties that they
would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision (Annex 7
of Bunyog's Comment). This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes.
However, only the private respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. On June 10, 1987,
the respondents filed a motion to resolve (Annex 7, Bunyog's Comment). The petitioners' counsel did not
oppose either the "Motion to Resolve" or the respondents "Motion for Execution of Decision" dated
October 19, 1987 (Annex 10), both of which were furnished them through counsel. If it were true, as they
now contend, that they had been denied due process in the form of a formal hearing, they should have
opposed both motions.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS VS. DELA ROSA

G.R. No. 95122-23, MAY 31, 1991

FACTS:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother,
Marciana Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has
five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco
Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from
Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them
Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a
cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought
admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago
Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961,
admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens. As a consequence thereof, William
Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16,
1961.
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu
proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of
Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Bureau of Immigration are appealable to the CA.

HELD:
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with —
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order,
or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board
or commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-
 paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends
to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the
Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are
specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals. Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically
provided that the decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security Commission
(SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.

ROSALES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47821, September 15, 1988

FACTS:
This case sprouted from the complaint filed by Rosales against Don Bosco Technical Institute
before the Bureau of Private School for alleged anomalous ranking of honor pupils for the grade school.
The Bureau of Private School rendered a decision in favour of Rosales, and so the latter filed a complaint
for damages. However, the school insisted that it has filed a motion for reconsideration and the case was
reconsidered. Respondent school insisted that the complaint for damages should be dismiss for failure of
the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. According to the school, the reconsidered decision
should have been appealed by petitioner to the Secretary of Education prior to filing of said complaint for
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Rosales exhausted administrative remedies before filing in court the
complaint for damages.
HELD:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action, as a
general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.
Thus, in Abe-Abe et al. v. Manta, we emphatically declared:
When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the
government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the
judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only
on convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants and respect for
a co-equal office in the government. If a remedy is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) court.
Petitioners however, claim that they were denied due process, obviously to show that their case
falls within one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Such
contention is however untenable, because in the first place, they were made to avail in the same
administrative agency, the opportunity or right to oppose, which in fact they did, when they filed a motion
for reconsideration and later when the motion was denied, they appealed to the Secretary of Education
and Culture. Precisely, a motion for reconsideration or appeal is curative in character on the issue of
alleged denial of due process.
 

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 79684, February 19, 1991

FACTS:
The petitioners Director of Lands and the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
entered into a contract with the private respondent B.A. Gonzalez Surveying Company for which the
latter was bound to execute a public land subdivision mapping (Plsm) of the alienable and disposable
lands in the Municipality of Valderama, Antique. The private respondent was likewise contracted by the
petitioners to do the photo-cadastral mapping of Project PCADM-493-D in Numancia, Aklan. However,
despite written demands from the Bureau of Lands to the private respondent to commence the Numancia,
Aklan Pcadm project, the latter failed to do so; consequently, in an order dated February 7, 1977, the
former cancelled the contract with regard to the said project and declared the performance bond as
forfeited. On a motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent, the Director of Lands reinstated
the said contract without however granting the company's request for a price adjustment, which denial the
private respondent seasonably appealed to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. This
appeal is pending.
 The Director of Lands likewise scrapped the Valderama Plsm contract because of the non-
completion of the project despite the grant of repeated extensions totalling 1,200 days. Similarly, the
private respondent appealed the cancellation of the said contract to the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, where the appeal also still remains pending. Meanwhile, without both appeals being
resolved, the Director of Lands conducted a public bidding for the cadastral survey of several
municipalities including the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and the Municipality of Valderama,
Antique. In the said bidding, Armando Villamayor and Cristina Matuod were declared as the successful
bidders for the Numancia and Valderama projects, respectively. Thereupon, the private respondent filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order with the Court of
Appeals, alleging that the Director of Lands acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in awarding the said
cadastral survey projects to other persons while the appeals of the private respondent remain pending.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the opinion of the Director of Lands on a matter
within its exclusive competence and technical expertise.

HELD:
We likewise take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on this doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court has consistently held
that "acts of an administrative agency must not casually be over-turned by a court, and a court should as a
rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the parameters of its
own competence," unless "there be a clear showing of arbitrary action or palpable and serious error."  In
similar vein, we reiterated recently the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, in the present case cadastral
surveys and mappings and land registration, are accorded not only respect but more often than not even
finality. 

FORTICH VS. CORONA

G.R. No. 131457, APRIL 24, 1998

FACTS:
This case involves a land dispute between the Quisumbings and tenants. Said parcel of land was
supposed to be covered by the Agrarian Law, however, it was exempted from coverage because the area
upon said land lie was subsequently declared by the provincial government and its coverage from the
DAR was exempted which exemption was upheld the Office of the President, said decision by the OP has
become final and executory. Aggrieve by said decision, the farmers and other tenants march their way
from Bukidnon until Manila to protest the land exemption from the coverage of the DAR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President may change its ruling after it has attain finality.

HELD:
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are
embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof
is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained,
save in exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours).
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of
March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto,
the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from
the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be
filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18,
still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration
was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the
act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic
legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110571, MARCH 10. 1994

FACTS:

Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction is the novel question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the Board of
Investments (BOI) should be filed. A thorough scrutiny of the conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive Order No. 226,
also known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus,
called for.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an executive order can change an LOI

HELD:
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third
sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from
final orders or decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that " They
shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an
appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such
statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words " among these agencies are . . . ," strongly
implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not
been expressly listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions
listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final decisions and interlocutory orders are
expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations Commission; (2)
the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other
quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. Since
in DBP v. CA  we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals
despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P.
129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91,
which is but implementary of said law.

EPZA VS. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 101476, APRIL 14, 1992

FACTS:
The CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and
Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism,
and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal before the Commission. Two
weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again bulldozed the area. They
allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents,
and fired a shot in the air. On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another
injunction Order reiterating her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public
Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CHR can issue and injunction order.
HELD:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if
that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek
from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice,
the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued
"by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court
of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58,
Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no
other purpose