16. Reyes vs. Abeleda G.R. No.

L-25491 February 27, 1968

FACTS:
On June 15, 1939 and continuously up to the present, the petitioner Reyes has been employed in the
government, particularly, in the School Finance Division, Bureau of Public Schools, since July 25, 1940, while
respondent Abeleda has been in the government service since August 16, 1937. On August 2, 1962, Reyes
was last appointed as Acting Budget Officer III at P5,376 per annum, in the School Finance Division,
Bureau of Public Schools, while respondent Abeleda was last appointed as Budget Officer III in the Medical
and Dental Services Division, same Bureau, at P5,376 per annum effective July 1, 1962.
In a Memorandum dated December 10, 1962, the Director of Public Schools submitted to the Secretary of
Education an assignment proposal recommending the promotion of Reyes to the position of Budget Officer IV.
However, the Secretary of Education instructed the respondent Director of Public Schools to prepare an
appointment proposal in favor of respondent
Romeo G. Abeleda, instead of Reyes, to the position of Budget Officer IV. So, Reyes filed a formal protest with
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service contesting the appointment of respondent Romeo G. Abeleda to the
position of Budget Officer IV in the Bureau of Public Schools, School Finance Division.

ISSUE: Who, under the Civil Service Law (RA No. 2260.), has the right to a promotion to fill a vacancy in a
competitive or classified position in the government as the person “next-in-rank” likewise competent and
qualified to hold the position and possessing of an appropriate civil service eligibility?

HELD:
As noted at the outset, a person next in rank, competent and qualified to hold the position and possessing an
appropriate civil service eligibility is entitled to a vacancy occurring in any competitive or classified position in
the government. There is the proviso however that should there be two or more persons under equal
circumstances, seniority must be given preference. As between petitioner Reyes and respondent Abeleda,
who is the person next in rank? Both as admitted in the Brief of petitioner are in the ranking list, being Budget
Officers III, the petitioner in the School Finance Division and respondent Abeleda in the Medical Dental
Services Division of the Bureau of Public Schools. Petitioner, however, was holding such office in an acting
capacity, unlike respondent Abeleda whose tenure had permanency. Under the above circumstances it cannot
be said that petitioner was the person next in rank.

Even on the assumption however that both petitioner Reyes and respondent Abeleda could be considered, in
the language of the law, "as persons of equal circumstances" still respondent's appointment by the Secretary of
Education could not be declared illegal as the very same proviso makes clear that seniority shall be given
preference. There was no denial of the statement in the Brief of respondent Abeleda about his seniority, having
been appointed in the government service on August 8, 1937 while petitioner did not join the government until
June 15, 1939, having been assigned thereafter to the School Finance Division on July 25, 1940.

Now as to the discharge of the functions of Budget Officer III. While petitioner was appointed in an acting
capacity on August 21, 1962, respondent Abeleda assumed such position with a permanent status earlier,
namely, on July 1, 1962. The right to the promotion then had been earned by respondent Abeleda. There was
precisely compliance with, not deviation from, the applicable statutory provision, with the appointment extended
to him by respondent Secretary of Education.
17. Pimentel v. Ermita G.R. No. 164978 October 13, 2005

FACTS:

The Senate and the House of Representatives (Congress) commenced their regular session on July 26, 2004.
The Commission on Appointments composed of Senators and Representatives was instituted on August 25
2004. Meanwhile, President Gloria appointed acting secretaries on August 15 and August 23 2004 to
different departments such as Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Education, National defense, Agrarian
Reform, Tourism and Environment and Natural Resources. Senators, filed the petition for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to declare these appointments unconstitutional and prohibit the secretaries from
performing their duties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries WITHOUT the consent of
the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes. It is constitutional.

On the Nature of the Power to Appoint

• The power to appoint is essentially EXECUTIVE in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere.

• Legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to: the power to prescribe
qualifications to an appointive office.

• Congress may not: 1. Appoint

2. Impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office

• THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

(THESE ARE THE IMPLICATIONS WITH THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS)

- and the exercise of its powers is EXECUTIVE and NOT LEGISLATIVE, even if it is composed of
members of the Congress.

- Does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments

- Is independent of Congress hence it is NOT an agent of the Congress

- And its power does not come from the Congress but emanate directly from the Constitution

- And its function is executive in nature

The Constitutionality of President Arroyo’s Issuance of Appointments to Respondents as acting
secretaries

• PT: They argue that in the event of vacancy, EO 292 directs the undersecretary should replace him
and that there should be no new appointments whether regular or acting without obtaining the
Commission on Appointment’s consent.
• RP: that the President can without their consent because of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
In Particular this states the president’s power to issue temporary designation
o The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any
other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch,
appointment to which is vested in him by law, when:
▪ the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of
illness, absence or any other cause; or
▪ there exists a vacancy.
o In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.

DISPOSITION:

• The essence of appointment in an acting capacity is temporary. A measure to fill in a gap until a
permanent appointment is done. In case of vacancy the President must necessarily appoint an alter
ego of her choice.

• Congress cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as
her temporary alter ego, whether temporary or permanent – because such positions hold great trust
and confidence.

• The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment.

Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that

"[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch."

• Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

Ad Interim Appointments Appointments in an Acting Capacity

Effective upon acceptance
Extended only during a recess of Congress
Appointments are submitted to the
commission on appointments for confirmation
or rejection
Effective upon acceptance
May be extended any time there is a vacancy
Not submitted to the commission on
appointments for confirmation or rejection

18. Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President

FACTS:

This case is a consolidated case assailing the constitutionality of Executive Order 2 Issued by Presiden Aquino
which recalled, withdrew and revoked midnight appointments by President Gloria Arroyo, Atty. Garafil was one
of those midnight appointees

Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution reads:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

Thus for the purpose of the 2010 elections, March 10 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and March 11
was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. An exception to this rule would be if the position and the
lack of a temporary appointee would endanger public safety and prejudice public service. Still, then President
Arroyo appointed persons to different offices despite the ban on midnight appointment.

The appointments by Arroyo were issued before the period for the ban of midnight appointments started, but
was only accepted during the ban.

None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under the exception. When President Aquino was
elected President, he issued EO which recalled, withdrew and revoked these appointments made by
President Arroyo in violation of the Constitutional ban on midnight appointments. Hence the appointees,
without prior notice were dismissed from their respective offices.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners’ appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether EO 2 is unconstitutional

HELD:

1. Yes, the appointment was in violation of the Constitutional provision

2. Yes, the Executive Order is constitutional in all aspects

The dissent's view will lead to glaring absurdities. Allowing the dissent's proposal that an appointment is
complete merely upon the signing of an appointment paper and its transmittal, excluding the appointee's
acceptance from the appointment process, will lead to the absurdity that, in case of non-acceptance, the
position is considered occupied and nobody else may be appointed to it. Moreover, an incumbent public
official, appointed to another public office by the President, will automatically be deemed to occupy the new
public office and to have automatically resigned from his first office upon transmittal of his appointment paper,
even if he refuses to accept the new appointment. This will result in chaos in public service.

Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, must consist of:
1. the President signing an appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office
2. the official transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through the MRO)
3. receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee
 4. and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her
assumption to office.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both
complete and effective) appointment:

1. authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;

2. transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;
3. a vacant position at the time of appointment; and
4. receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications

Appointing Authority.

- The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary; it is not a ministerial act

Transmittal

- It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the
President intended the appointment paper to be issued.
- Release of the appointment paper through the MRO (Malacanang Records Office?) is an unequivocal
act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance.
- MRO was created by Memorandum Order no. 1 of 1958

- For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the appointment
paper must bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and
must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.

- The MRO does not exercise any discretion in the release of documents for.

Process:

1. After an appointment paper is signed by the President, the Office of the Executive Secretary
(OES) forwards the appointment paper bearing the stamp mark, barcode, and hologram of the Office of
the President, together with a transmittal letter, to the MRO for official release.

2. Within the same day, the MRO sends the original copy of the appointment paper together with
the transmittal letter and a delivery receipt which contains appropriate spaces for the name of the
addressee, the date released, and the date received by the addressee. Only a photocopy of the
appointment is retained for the MRO's official file.

- the effect if a document is released by an office or department within Malacañan without going through
the MRO: the MRO cannot issue a certified true copy of the same because as far as the MRO is
concerned, it does not exist in our official records, hence, not an official document from the Malacañang

• The testimony of Ellenita G. Gatbunton, Division Chief of File Maintenance and Retrieval Division of the
MRO, supports Dimaandal's counsel's manifestation that the transmittal of petitioners' appointment
papers is questionable. The transmittal letter, was merely turned over to the MRO on May 13, 2010

• The possession of the original appointment paper is not indispensable to authorize an appointee to
assume office. However, in case of loss of the original appointment paper, the appointment must be
evidenced by a certified true copy issued by the proper office, in this case the MRO
Vacant Position

- An appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be made to an occupied
office. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated, before one
could be validly installed to succeed him

Acceptance By The Qualified Appointee

- Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount
to acceptance of the appointment
- An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the
office.

• Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot
prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took
effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.
Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it,
unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.
18. Judge Griño v. Civil Service Commission, Arandela, Gelvezon, Dato-On, and Geduspan

G.R. No. 203372               June 16, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner Sixto Demaisip was the first appointed Provincial Attorney of Iloilo. Sometime in 1986, he offered to
resign from his position. In his resignation letter, petitioner Demaisip recommended the elevation of respondent
Teotimo Arandela from Senior Legal Officer to Provincial Attorney. OIC Governor Licurgo Tirador later on
decided to appoint respondent Arandela as the Provincial Attorney. Respondent Cirilo Gelvezon, on the other
hand, was promoted from Legal Officer II to Senior Legal Officer. Respondents Teodolfo Dato-on and Nelson
Geduspan were appointed to the position of Legal Officer
II.

On February 2, 1988, petitioner Simplicio Griño assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo. One
month later, he informed respondent Arandela and all the legal officers at the Provincial Attorney's Office about
his decision to terminate their services. Petitioner Demaisip was reappointed by Governor Griño as the
Provincial Attorney, The latter, on the other hand, arranged the replacements of the other legal officers.

On March 15, 1988, petitioner Governor Griño formally terminated the services of the respondents herein on
the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
The Merit Systems Board issued an Order declaring the respondents' termination illegal and ordering that they
be immediately restored to their positions with back salaries and other emoluments due them. This was
appealed by petitioner Griño to the Civil Service Commission.
The Civil Service Commission affirmed the Order of the Merit Systems Protection Board, and directed that the
respondents be restored to their former legal positions and be paid back salaries and other benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates are primarily
confidential in nature so that the services of those holding the said items can be terminated upon loss of
confidence.

HELD:

The Supreme Court finds as an undeniable fact that the position of a City Legal Officer is one which is
"primarily confidential." This Court held in the case of Claudio vs. Subido, L-30865, that the position of a City
Legal Officer is one requiring that utmost confidence on the part of the mayor be extended to said officer. The
relationship existing between a lawyer and his client, whether a private individual or a public officer, is one that
depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter entertains for the counsel selected. As stated in the case
of Pinero vs. Hechanova, the phrase "primarily confidential" "denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of
the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse,
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of
state. (Emphasis supplied.)

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term
of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endure; and thus their cessation involves no removal
(Corpus vs. Cuaderno, L23721, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 591-596). When such confidence is lost and the
officer holding such position is separated from the service, such cessation entails no removal but an expiration
of his term.

It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue
only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the
ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely
the expiration of the term of office — two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in
the Law of Public Officers.

When an incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing
power, and the pleasure turns into a displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office — his
term merely expires, in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the
fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed
therefrom, upon expiration of said term.

The main difference between the former — the primary confidential officer — and the latter is that the latter's
term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment
or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an
end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not removed or dismissed from
office — his term merely expired.

A city legal officer appointed by a city mayor to work for and in behalf of the city has for its counterpart in the
province a provincial attorney appointed by the provincial governor. In the same vein, a municipality may have
a municipal attorney who is to be named by the appointing power. The positions of city legal officer and
provincial attorney were created under Republic Act No. 5185 which categorized them together as
positions of "trust", to wit:

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5185, both the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal
adviser and legal officer for the civil cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their
services are precisely categorized by law to be "trusted services."

A comparison of the functions, powers and duties of a city legal officer as provided in the Local Government
Code with those of the provincial attorney of Iloilo would reveal the close similarity of the two positions. Said
functions clearly reflect the highly confidential nature of the two offices and the need for a relationship based on
trust between the officer and the head of the local government unit he serves. The "trusted services" to be
rendered by the officer would mean such trusted services of a lawyer to his client which is of the highest
degree of trust.5

The fact that the position of respondent Arandela as provincial attorney has already been classified as one
under the career service and certified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission cannot conceal or alter
its highly confidential nature.

This Court holds that the position of respondent Arandela as the provincial attorney of Iloilo is also a primarily
confidential position. To rule otherwise would be tantamount to classifying two positions with the same
nature and functions in two incompatible categories. This being the case, and following the principle that the
tenure of an official holding a primarily confidential position ends upon loss of confidence, the Court finds that
private respondent Arandela was not dismissed or removed from office when his services were terminated. His
term merely expired.

The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and confidence of the
highest degree, irrespective of whether the client is a private person or a government functionary. The personal
character of the relationship prohibits its delegation in favor of another attorney without the client's consent.

Occupants of such positions would be considered confidential employees if the predominant reason they were
chosen by the appointing authority is the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the
occupant which measures freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible
betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of state.

There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff which assists the confidential
employer above described. Since the positions occupied by these subordinates are remote from that of the
appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. The importance of these
subordinates to the appointing authority now lies in the contribution of their legal skills to facilitate the work of
the confidential employee. The client can be protected without need of imposing upon the lower-ranked
lawyers the fiduciary duties inherent in the attorney-client relationship. Hence, there is now no obstacle to
giving full effect to the security of tenure principle to these members of the civil service.

Thus, with respect to the legal assistants or subordinates of the provincial attorney namely, Cirilo Gelvezon,
Teodolfo Datoon and Nelson Geduspan, the Cadiente and Besa rulings cannot apply. As head of their
respective departments, the city legal officer, the provincial attorney or the PNB chief legal counsel cannot be
likened to their subordinates. The latter have been employed due to their technical qualifications. Their
positions are highly technical in character and not confidential, so they are permanent employees, and they
belong to the category of classified employees under the Civil Service Law. Thus, the items of Senior Legal
Officer and Legal Officer II remain permanent as classified by the Civil Service Commission. Consequently, the
holders of the said items, being permanent employees, enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed under the
Constitution.
19. Grino v. Civil Service Commission

FACTS:

Griño was the Provincial Governor of Iloilo. He terminated the services of respondents who were provincial
legal officers based on an article pertaining to the Iloilo office of the Provincial Attorney which appeared in the
Panay News and which “undermined that trust and confidence” that he reposed on them.

The Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission and the CSC ruled that the respondents
were illegally dismissed and that they should be restored to their former offices.

ISSUE: Who are highly technical, primarily confidential, policy-determining officials?

HELD:

In Cadiente, the Court resolved that the position of a provincial attorney is primarily confidential so that the
holder thereof may be terminated upon loss of confidence. The position of a Legal Officer is one requiring that
utmost confidence on the part of the executive office be extended to said officer. The relationship existing
between a lawyer and his client, whether a private individual or a public officer, is one that depends on the
highest degree of trust that the latter entertains for the counsel selected.

In Besa, it was held that the work of the Chief Legal Counsel of PNB, as of any lawyer for that matter, is
impressed with a highly technical aspect. As had been pointed out, however, it does not mean that thereby a
client is precluded from substituting in his stead another practitioner. Where the position partakes of the
attributes of being both technical and confidential, there can be no insistence of a fixed or a definite term if the
latter aspect predominates.

Policy-determining position refers to a position which vests in the occupant the power to formulate policies for
the government or any of its agencies, subdivisions, or instrumentalities, like that of a member of the Cabinet.

In this case, respondent Arandela, who was the provincial legal attorney, held a primarily confidential position.
And he was not dismissed or removed from service. When Griño lost confidence in him, his term merely
expired, as is the nature of primarily confidential positions.

However, lawyers as counsel in non-confidential positions must be distinguished from those in confidential
positions. The difference between the two is the proximity of the position in question in relation to that of the
appointing authority. They would be confidential employees if the predominant reason they were chosen by the
appointing authority is the appointing authority’s belief that they can share a close intimate relationship with the
employee which measures freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible
betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of state.

Since the positions occupied by employees like legal staff who assist the confidential employee are remote
from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. The
importance of these subordinates to the appointing authority now lies in the contribution of their legal skills to
facilitate the work of the confidential employee. At this level of the bureaucracy, any impairment of the
appointing authority's interest as a client, which may be caused through the breach of residual trust by any of
these lower-ranked lawyers, can be anticipated and prevented by the confidential employee, as a reasonably
competent office head.

Thus, in the case of the other respondents who were legal assistants or subordinates of the provincial attorney,
the Court held that the Cadiente and Besa rulings cannot apply. Their positions are highly technical in
character and not confidential, so they are permanent employees, and they belong to the category of classified
employees under the Civil Service Law. Thus, the items of Senior Legal Officer and Legal Officer II remain
permanent as classified by the Civil Service Commission. Consequently, the holders of the said items, being
permanent employees, enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed under the Constitution.
20. Jimenea vs. Guanzon
G.R. No. L-24795           January 29, 1968

FACTS:
Pedro Jimenea took and passed the Civil Service Patrolman Examination held in Bacolod City with a rating of
72%. In the local elections held in Bacolod City on November 12, 1963, Teofisto Cordova, the then incumbent
Mayor, lost to Romeo G. Guanzon for the office of Mayor.
On November 20, 1963, Jimenea was appointed Second Class Patrolman in the Bacolod Police Department by
then Mayor Cordova, said appointment being characterized as "provisional". Jimenea took his oath of office
and commenced serving as Second Class Patrolman on November 25, 1963.

On February 7, 1964, Mayor Guanzon brought an administrative case against Jimenea, under RA No. 557, for
serious irregularity in the performance of his duties. Subsequently, however, Jimenea was acquitted of the
charge. Mayor Guanzon wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting for the disapproval and revocation
of the appointment of

Jimenea on the grounds that his appointment was not in conformity with the Commissioner's Memorandum
Circular No. 35, being provisional in nature, and that there were many civil service eligible whose ratings were
much higher than that of the appointee.
On the same date, then Acting Commissioner of the Civil Service Abelardo Subido, in a communication
denominated "First Indorsement" addressed to the City Treasurer and the Mayor -of Bacolod City, approved as
temporary the appointment of
Jimenea for the period of actual service but not beyond the date of receipt of said communication. Pursuant to
said indorsement of Commissioner Subido, Mayor Guanzon informed Jimenea by letters that his services were
to cease and terminate effective at the close of office hours of said date. Sometime later Mayor Guanzon
appointed Luis Gador, a civil service eligible, in Jimenea's stead. This caused Jimenea to file a petition for
mandamus and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction, praying for an interlocutory order
commanding Commissioner Subido and Mayor Guanzon to restore him to his position enjoining Luis Gador
from continuing in holding on to his position as Second Class Patrolman therof.
Guanzon and Gador filed a motion to dismiss the petition but was denied. After the submission of the parties'
respective memoranda, the lower court on April 14, 1965 rendered a decision finding petitioner Jimenea
without right to the remedy prayed for and ordering the dismissal of the petition. Jimenea now appeals.

ISSUES:
(1) Was the appointment extended to petitioner appellant temporary or permanent? Did said appointment
confer upon petitioner appellant a vested right to occupy in a permanent character the position to which he
was appointed?

RULING:

His appointment was temporary. Art. VI, Sec. 24(c) of Rep. Act 2260 says that provisional appointment may be
issued to a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination when the following requisites concur:
(a) a vacancy occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the service; and (b) there is no
appropriate register of eligibles at the time of appointment. There is therefore merit in appellant's allegation that
a mistake was indeed committed in the designation of his appointment because these two requisites do not
concur in appellant's case, being a civil service eligible, he has qualified in an appropriate examination.
Petitioner-appellant was appointed by then Mayor Teofisto Cordova on November 20, 1963, just a week or so
after the elections wherein he lost to the incumbent Mayor herein respondent Guanzon. Mayor Cordova knew
that incoming Mayor Guanzon should be given the privilege of filling up vacant positions in the police
department. But there was an urgent need to fill the position left vacant by a policeman who had to be confined
at the National Mental Hospital—there being an insufficient number of policemen in Bacolod City. Thus Mayor
Cordova appointed appellant but he expressly stated that the nature of the appointment be "provisional",
obviously to afford Mayor Guanzon a chance to retain the petitioner or replace him with another of his
confidence.
If the intention of Mayor Cordova was to extend a permanent appointment to petitioner, he would have so
stated instead of characterizing appellant's appointment as "provisional". Appellant's civil service eligibility and
the permanent character of the position filled by him, will not and cannot transform his temporary appointment
into a permanent one.
"Where the nature of the appointments extended to petitioners was merely temporary, the same cannot acquire
the character of permanence simply because the items occupied refer to permanent positions. What
characterized an appointment is not the nature of the item filled but the nature of the appointment extended. If
such were not the case, then there would never be temporary appointments for permanent positions.”

Since his appointment is temporary, it did not confer upon appellant a vested right to occupy in a permanent
character the position to which he was appointed. His civil service eligibility will avail him none. For a civil
service eligible who accepts a position in a temporary capacity is not entitled to the protection accorded by
Republic Act No. 557 nor to the protection of security of tenure in office guaranteed by the Constitution.

The undisturbed unanimity of the cases is that one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of
office; his employment can be terminated any time at the pleasure of theappointing power without need to
show that it is for cause.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment was permanent, it had not yet become final and thus could
not as yet vest in him any right to the protection extended by Rep. Act 557 to regular employees of the Civil
Service. This is so because, "All appointments made by the provincial governors, municipal mayors and city
mayors shall, after being attested to by the respective provincial treasurer or city treasurer, be forwarded within
ten days to the Commissioner of Civil Service for review pursuant to Civil Service law and rules. If, within one
hundred eighty days after receipt of said appointments, the Commissioner of Civil Service shall not have made
any correction or revision, then such appointments shall be deemed to have been properly made;
x x x " Thus, all appointments made by city mayors and attested to by city treasurers must still be submitted to
the Civil Service Commissioner for review. Under the latter's power of review, he may correct or revise such
appointments submitted to him within one hundred eighty days or six months. Within this period, an appointee
cannot yet claim any vested right. The Commissioner, therefore, acted well within the scope of his powers and
prerogatives when within the prescribed 180day period he corrected the appointment made by Mayor Cordova
from "provisional" to "temporary", to reflect its true nature as intended , and terminated appellant's appointment
as explained above, since appellant's appointment was temporary, he was "not entitled to the protection
afforded by Rep. Act 557 to members of the corps of provincial guards, city police and municipal police.
21. Erasmo v. Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation
G.R. NO. 139251August 29, 2002

FACTS:

This case involves petitioner Erly Erasmo who worked with respondent Home Insurance & Guaranty
Corporation (HIGC) in 1982. She worked in various positions until she finally became Vice-President of
TS/GCIG. The nature of her appointment was a “promotion” and her employment status were “temporary”
since the position is a Career Executive Service Office (CESO) and petitioner lacks the required CES eligibility.
In1993, petitioner was administratively charged of several malpractices while appealing the status of her
temporary appointment to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC held that a CES eligibility is required
to a CES position, and even is one possesses such eligibility, still the appointment cannot be considered
permanent unless the President of the Philippines has granted an appointment to the rank. Respondent sent a
letter stating petitioner’s termination from service. Petitioner sought the opinion of the Career Executive Service
Board that stated that the filing of an administrative case does not automatically revoke the appointment, nor
does it affect the validity of the temporary appointment. Encouraged, petitioner wrote back to respondent
seeking reinstatement, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner wrote to the CSC appealing her case, which
was also dismissed, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position of VP of TS/GCIG of HIGC

HELD:

NO, she is NOT entitled. Petitioner does not possess career executive service eligibility, which is necessary for
the position of VP of TS/GCIG. Her new appointment, being temporary in character, was terminable at the
pleasure of the appointing power with or without case and petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure. Simply
put, it was ruled that CES eligibility is required for a CES position, such that an appointment of now who does
not possess such eligibility shall be temporary and may be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority at “at a
moment’s notice”. Although she was formerly holding a permanent appointment, she accepted such temporary
appointment, petitioner had abandoned or given up her former position. When she accepted the temporary
appointment, in effect, she abandoned her right to security of tenure as we have ruled in
Romualdez v. CSC.DENIED
22. Ricardo L. Medalla, Jr., Vs. Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
G.R. No. 94255 May 5, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner, Engr. Ricardo Medalla, was appointed as a Geodetic Engineer of the then Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA for brevity). In 1986, he was promoted to Supervising Engineer A of its Buildings,
Pavements and Grounds
Division, otherwise known as the B P and G Division. On February 16, 1987, Engr. Elpidio Mendoza, the said
Decision's Department Manager, was likewise promoted, thereby leaving his position vacant. In view thereof,
Engr. Armando Singson was designated as the Acting Division Manager on July 1, 1987. The MIAA
Selection/Promotion Board, however, unanimously appointed Medalla as the new Division Manager B of the B
P and G Division. Medalla was issued his formal appointment by the then MIAA General Manager Aurelio
German after which he immediately assumed his post. Apparently aggrieved over Medalla's appointment,
Singson filed a protest to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service Commission which
endorsed the same to the MIAA General Manager for appropriate action in accordance with Section 14 of CSC
Resolution No. 83-343. In response thereto, Mr. German affirmed Medalla's promotional appointment and in
effect dismissed Singson's protest. The latter appealed the decision once more to the MSPB which again
referred the same to the MIAA General Manager for comment. Acting thereon, Mr. Evergisto C. Macatulad as
the Officer-in-Charge, reiterated MIAA's position as contained in the letter of Mr. German, thus reaffirming
Medalla's appointment. The MSPB then required the submission of the list of positions considered next-in-rank,
the approved organization chart and systems of ranking positions and the qualification standards for the
contested position which was duly complied with by the MIAA. In the meantime, the MIAA underwent a
reorganization pursuant to its Resolutions Nos. 87-55 and 87-68 dated as early as September 30 and October
22, 1987 respectively. Its new staffing pattern was approved by the Department of Budget and Management
thus the MIAA Placement Committee deliberated on personnel appointments prescinding from the said pattern.
Medalla and Singson were subsequently reappointed as Division Manager D and Principal Engineer C
respectively of the new Civil Works Division which replaced the former B P and G Division due to added
functions . Both ostensibly accepted their new designations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Commission through the MSPB in replacing an appointee with an
employee of its choice is valid.

HELD:

NO. The Court has already repeatedly ruled that the Commission has no such authority to do so. Its only
function is limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their accordance with the requirements
of the Civil Service Law (Chang v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 86791, November 26, 1990, 191 SCRA 663). Thus,
when the Commission finds the appointee to be qualified and all the other legal requirements have been
satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment (Central Bank of the Philippines, et al., v. CSC, G.R.
Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 774). Thereafter, its participation in the appointment process ceases
(Orbos v. CSC, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, 189 SCRA 464). Indeed, the determination of who
among several candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound

discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority and not in the Commission (Gaspar v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 90799, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 777). This is because the appointing authority
occupies the ideal vantage point from which to identify and designate the individual who can best fill the post
and discharge its functions in the government agency he heads (Abila v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 92573, June 13,
1991, 198 SCRA 102). Consequently, when the appointing authority has already exercised his power of
appointment, the Commission cannot revoke the same on the ground that another employee is better qualified
for that would constitute an encroachment on the decision vested in the appointing authority (Luego v. CSC,
G.R. No. 69137, August 5, 1986; Pintor v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 84022 and 85804, March 9,
1989, En banc). The Commission may not and should not substitute its judgment for that of the appointing
authority (Patagoc v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 90229, May 14, 1990, 189 SCRA 416).

In fine, the Court has categorically ruled: We declare once again, that the Civil Service Commission has no
power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the
appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should be
preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow an
appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and much less can it direct the appointment
of its own choice. Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of
appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee –– taking
into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality –– is
the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing
authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to review under the
Constitution and the applicable laws. (Lapinid v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991). The Commission
appears to have overstepped its jurisdiction when it revoked the appointment of petitioner Medalla who was
shown to have satisfied the requirements prescribed for the contested position, and instead directed the
appointment of protestant Singson.
23. Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag v. Alfredo L. Benipayo, Borra, Tuason, Jr., Cinco, and De Guzman In His
Capacity As Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department Of The Comelec
G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002

FACTS: On March 22, 2001, Presiden Gloria Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,
and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on Feb
2, 2008. However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. Consequently, on June
2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of those 3 people to the same positions and for
the same term of 7 years, expiring on Feb 2,
2008. Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on
June 8, 2001, President Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of the 3 to the same positions.
Petitioner Angelina Matibag filed the instant petition questioning the appointments Matibag claims that the ad
interim appointments of the 3 violate the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its
Chairman and members.

ISSUE:

1. WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1(2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.

2. Whether the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same
positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

HELD:

1. NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the COA does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the COA or until the
next adjournment of Congress. Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or
next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the
President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without
basis.
In the instant case, the president did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to the confirmation by the COA. The 3 were extended permanent appointments during
the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad
interim appointments of the 3 are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during
the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

2. NO. We must distinguish those which were disapproved from those which were by-passed. An ad
interim appointee disapproved by the COA can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is
a final decision of the COA in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President.
On the contrary, a by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because
there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article 7 of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not
resuly in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of 7 years.

The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of the 3 do not violate the prohibition
on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the COA. A
reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and
renewals of appointments will also not breach the 7 year term limit because all the appointments and renewals
of appointments of the 3 are for a fixed term expiring on Feb 2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not
extend the expiry date of their terms of office. The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these 3
respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on Feb 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on
reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article 9-C of the Constitution
24. Emily Marohombsar, in her capacity as President of MSU v. CA and Billante
Maruhom GR 126481 | February 18, 2000

FACTS:

• RP was appointed as a technical officer under the then MSU President Alonto as confirmed bby MSU
Board of Regent. The position title was reclassified and retitled to Executive Assistant II by virtue of RA
6788 or Salary Standardization law. The law further requires that employees undertaking the position
must have CS Eligibility, to which the Maruhom does not acquire at that time.
o She nevertheless took the position however in a temporary appointment. o Upon passing the
Eligibility examination, the permanent position was immediately extended to her on Mar 3, 1991.
• 2 years after holding the position, a termination later was forwarded to Maruhom to vacate the position as
per letter by the new president Emily on the grounds of establishment of new order and maintain trust and
confidence.
o After failing to seek reconsideration, Maruhom filed a complaint for illegal termination before CSC
regional office.
§ It decided that there was an illegal termination and ordered that she be reverted with salaries
and benefits repaid.
• Petitioner remained stern to which the CSC issued a directive of compliance and warning of penal and
administrative sanctions o PT posed that the appointment of RP was not valid for the lack of
confirmation from the Board of Regent before it was submitted to CSC for attestation. And that assuming
that it is valid, the appointment was confidential and therefore co-terminus with the term of office of the
previous president Alonto.
§ CSC Regional director reiterated its order of reinstatement with warning. And rejected PT's
claim of coterminus, as there was no declaration of the position being confidential by the CSC
pursuant to Admin code. Absence of such declaration it is considered under Career service,
thereby protected by Security of Tenure guaranteed by law. Thus, she could not be
terminated without cause and due process.
• CA confirmed the CSC's orders.
• PT files this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Appointment lacks the requisite of confirmation by the Board of Regent;

2. Position is primarily confidential, hence co-terminus with the office of the appointing authority.

DECISION:

1. Court does not agree to any.

• The power to appoint is vested on the Board of Regent while the power to recommend qualified persons
to the BOR is with the President. Pursuant to the MSU Code of Governance and Charter creating MSU.
• SC recognizes the position of the PT that RP's appointment is Ad Interim (In the time between) because
it was issued by the President instead of BOR prior to submission to the CSC for attestation. o
However PT is wrong in claiming that interim appointment is invalid and ineffective, therefore
terminable at any time and for any cause.
• In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
o Ad interim appointment is used to denote the manner in which the appointment is made; and it is
not descriptive of the nature of appointment given to the appointee. Simply, it is an appointment
done by the
President IN THE MEANTIME, while the BOR (originally vested by charter of power of appointment)
is UNABLE TO ACT.
 § In other words, the President merely NOMINATES while the board ISSUES THE
APPOINTMENT.
§ But when the Board is NOT IN SESSION, the president is AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE ad
interim appointments.
• Such appointments are permanent but their terms are ONLY UNTIL THE BOARD
DISAPPROVES them. If confirmed, the appointee's term is converted into the regular
term inherent in the position.
• There is no question that the position being an Ad interim, the issue is whether it may be terminated any
time for any case by PT. o SC disagrees, ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of
appointment, that is, it is nt indicative of whether the appointment is temporary or in acting capacity.
§ It denotes only the manner of appointment.
• In the case, the position was extended to RP without condition nor limitation as to tenure. As reiterated
by Jurisprudence, interim appointments are permanent until the board disapproves them. o There
is no showing the BOR disapproved respondent's appointment. Contrarily, RP has been discharging her
duties for 2 years without objection from BOR until her dismissal.

2. SC disagrees
• It found no proof classifying that RP was holding the position as primary confidential. PT failed to give
particular duty of RP which would determine her position as such. PT holds her claim on CSC
Memorandum classifying Executive assistant as primarily confidential in nature.
o PT failed to recognize that what the memo means is Executive Assistants ASSIGNED IN THE
OFFICE OF UNDERSECRETARIES and not to University Presidents or Chancellors.

Therefore, being that the appointment is under permanent status, it enjoys security of tenure. Maruhom is
entitled to benefits and could not be removed from office without observing due process. She had been illegally
dismissed and entitled to back salaries limited to maximum of 5 years and not full salary from her termination.
25. Canonigo v. Ramiro
GR No. L-26316 January 30, 1970

FACTS:

Appeal on pure questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in its
Special Civil Case No. 2288 (for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction), ordering therein
respondents (herein appellants) Municipal Board and Officials of Ozamiz City to pay back salaries to therein
petitioners Antero Canonigo, Beata Morilao and Francisco Artajo, and to reinstate the last named petitioner to
the office previously held by him before the termination of his services occasioned by the abolition of the said
office by the Municipal Board.

Petitioners were appointed by then Mayor Medina as field clerk (Canonigo & Morilao) and market inspector
(Artajo) in the office of the City Treasurer which were duly approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service. In
1959, Mayor Medina was defeated by Mayor Ramiro and upon assumption of office, Mayor Ramiro requested
the petitioners to tender their courtesy resignation but the petitioners did not resign. On May 3, 1960, the
Municipal Board of the City of Ozamis abolished the positions of the petitioners while holding permanent
appointments.

ISSUE: Whether the appointments of the petitioners are considered permanent.

RULING: Yes. The clause or proviso "subject to the availability of funds" has long ceased to have any
significance. Neither is it effective as a condition subsequent attached to the appointments in this case; every
appointment to a position in the civil service presupposes the existence of a corresponding item or fund in the
budget — be it national, provincial, city or municipal — from which the salary of the appointee is to be drawn;
and considering that at the time the services of herein appellees were terminated, the fiscal year in which their
appointments were extended had not ended, it may not be validly argued that the funds for their positions were
then no longer available. Moreover, it may be stated by way of a general proposition that all appointments in
the civil service may be deemed subject to such condition subsequent, and to follow herein appellants' line of
reasoning would make all appointments in the civil service conditional forever, never to acquire the status of
permanence.
26. Province of Camarines Sur v. CA
G.R. No. 104639 July 14, 1995

FACTS:

Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Governor of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza. He was later
promoted and was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then Governor Alfelor. Because he had no civil
service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, private respondent Tito Dato could not be legally
extended a permanent appointment. Hence, what was extended to him was only a temporary appointment and
this temporary appointment was renewed annually.

He later passed the civil service exam and applied for a change in his status from temporary to permanent. But
this was rejected by the CSC who had not yet validated Dato’s exam results. He was suspended from work
when criminal charges were filed against him. Two years after the request to change his status, however, the
CSC approved Dato’s change from temporary to permanent. The change was to be made retroactive to the
time Dato’s exam results were released, even before he was indicted.

In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant
Provincial Warden and deleted Dato’s name from the petitioner's plantilla. Dato was subsequently acquitted of
the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Governor for reinstatement and backwages arising
from the time he passed the exam. This request was not heeded.

Petitioner contended that when Governor Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the employment status
of private respondent from temporary to permanent, which the CSC approved as only temporary pending
validation of the results of Dato’s examination for supervising security guard, Dato’s appointment in effect
remained temporary. Hence, his subsequent qualification for civil service eligibility did not ipso facto convert his
temporary status to that of permanent.

The Court held that the fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as
his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary
appointment into a permanent one.

In cases such as the one at bench, what is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is
not a continuation of the temporary appointment — these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority.
That the change was to be made retroactive to the time Dato’s exam results were released is a usurpation of
power properly belonging to the appointing authority.

ISSUE: How is a Temporary Tenure become permanent?

HELD:

The CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it but it does not have the power
to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an
employee.
The CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person
qualified it must so attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC is to attest
appointments and after that function is discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases.

Hence, Dato, being merely a temporary employee, was not entitled to the relief he seeks, including his claim
for back wages for the entire period of his suspension.
27. Agustina G. Gayatao v. Civil Service Commission And Bayani I. FernandeZ
G.R. No. 93064 June 22, 1992

FACTS:

Bayani I. Fernandez was holding the position of Customs Operations Chief I (COC) in the Bureau of Customs
since March 5, 1984 in a permanent capacity.

He was assigned to the aircraft Operations Division and later reassigned as Acting Chief of the Export Division
at the NAIA, as issued by Commissioner Salvador M. Mison.

Commission Mison, purportedly acting pursuant to EO No. 127 implementing the reorganization of the
Department of Finance, Bureau of Customs, appointed petitioner Agustina G Gayatao, then a Supervising
Customs Trade Examiner, to the position of Customs Operations Chief at the NAIA CustomhousShe was later
designated as COC of the Export Division at NAIA, while Fernandez was designated as Customs Operations
Assistant Chief (COAC) of the Aircraft Operations Division, both designations being effective March 1, 1988.

Fernandez filed a letter of protest before the Merit System Protection Board of respondent Civil Service
Commission (CSC) questioning the appointment of petitioner as COC and his demotion to the position of
COAC.

Private respondent alleged that he was unjustifiably demoted since he had been holding the contested position
prior to the reorganization; that he is more qualified than herein petitioner

Civil Service Commission: Revoked the appointment of Gayatao as Customs Operations Chief of the Export
Division at the NAIA and directed the Commissioner of Customs to appoint Bayani I. Fernandez.

MR denied

ISSUE:

Whether CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of Gayatao and ordering the
appointment of Fernandez in her place.

HELD:

NO. Petition dismissed. The resolutions of the CSC are affirmed. The CSC, after finding that the demotion was
patently illegal, is merely restoring private respondent to his former position, just as it must restore other
employees similarly affected to their positions before the reorganization.

It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of government employees who have
been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to implement and
safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. In the present case, the
issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasons clearly explained therein, is indubitably in
the performance of its constitutional task of protecting and strengthening the civil service

A demotion in office,i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment
with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary,21 is
tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it.

28. Summers v. Ozaeta

GR NO. L-1534 October 24, 1948

FACTS:
Petitioner was a cadastral judge. He received an ad interim appointment for the position of judge-at-large of
first instance by the Secretary of Justice. His appointment was disapproved by the Commission on
Appointment. The Secretary of Justice then informed him that he was separated from service. He seemed to
have acquiesced to the separation as can be inferred “from the FACTS”. His only effort was trying to be
reappointed to one of the vacancies in the Court of First Instance. Petitioner argues that under Article VIII,
Section 9 of the Constitution, 12 he is entitled to continue working as a cadastral judge during good behavior
until he is 70 years old or becomes incapacitated to discharge his duties. He further argued that the positions
of cadastral judge and judge-at-large are not incompatible and that the fact that he accepted the latter position
did not mean that he ceased to be a cadastral judge, especially since his appointment was disapproved by the
CA.

ISSUE: Whether Summers ceased being a cadastral judge by accepting the ad interim position of judge-at-
large?

RULING:

There can be no doubt about the constitutional right of member of the Supreme Court and judge of inferior
court to hold offices during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. However, citing the concurring opinion of Justices Pablo, Perfecto and
Hilado in Tavora v. Gavina and Arciaga, the right is waivable and should be construed without prejudice to the
legal effects of abandonment in proper cases. Petitioner argued that the president, on his own initiative and
without the knowledge or consent of the petitioner, appointed petitioner to the ad interim position of judge-at-
large. Petitioner’s voluntary acceptance of the position consequent upon taking of his oath of office amounted
to a waiver of his right to hold the position of cadastral judge during the term fixed and guaranteed by the
Constitution. Further, ad interim appointments are made pursuant to Article VII, section 10 (4) of the
Constitution: “President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress." A hasty acceptance on the part of an ad interim appointee, in the anxiety to
enjoy either the higher honour or better material advantages of a second office, may lead to seemingly unfair
consequences for which the appointing power should not be blamed. While in the ordinary course of things, an
appointee certainly has the right to rely on his record and expect the approval of his appointment, it is
nevertheless the better part of wisdom for one always to adopt the surer method which will, furthermore,
protect him against any design, intentional or otherwise, to oust him from an office the tenure of which is fixed
by the Constitution.
29. Republic Of The Philippines, v. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a quo warranto petition to
declare as void Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and exclude her.

The Republic sought to declare Sereno ineligible to hold the Chief Justice position for failing to regularly
disclose her SALN as a member of the career service prior to being appointed Associate Justice and later as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. This, the petitioner claimed, violates the Constitution, the Anti-Graft Law,
and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The petitioner also
asserted that her failure to file the required documents and to submit them to the JBC show that she is unfit to
be a member of the Judiciary.

Sereno argued that an action for quo warranto cannot lie against an impeachable officer such as a member of
the Judiciary and that an impeachable officer may not be removed from office through any procedure other
than impeachment. Sereno also asserted that failure to file the required documents and to submit them to the
JBC has no bearing on one’s integrity and therefore not a ground for disqualification. Sereno further claimed
that the JBC failed to exclude her from the shortlist of applicants and that the JBC, using its discretionary
powers, could have disqualified. Thus, she should be deemed to have substantially complied with the legal
requirements at the time of her application. She contended that her appointment cannot be questioned due to
the absence of challenge to her nomination and appointment on the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the JBC and President.

The Court found that Sereno is ineligible as a candidate and nominee for the position of Chief Justice. The
Constitution requires that a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity,
and independence.

Compliance with the constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN intimately relates to a person’s
integrity. Failing to file such documents violates the Constitution and the laws and one who violates the
Constitution and the laws cannot rightfully claim to be a person of integrity.

Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs to qualify for the nomination pursuant to the JBC rules. The JBC
required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices,
absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination.

Her failure to submit to the JBC for several years means that her integrity was not established at the time of her
application. This is in violation of the Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the
Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be a person of proven integrity. The Court
disagrees

ISSUES: Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief
Justice.
Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.

HELD:

The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement. Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states
that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required
by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required
by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of
unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of
the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes
of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal
from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-
compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in
disqualification to hold public office. Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and
statutorily mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno
herself in her dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a
burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby
subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all
the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance of those duties. More importantly,
while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Noncompliance with the SALN
requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The
contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering that RA
6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that
act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision
has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial
Conduct. In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could
have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or non-filing of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before
the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The
Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a leer of the
head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and
received by the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be
in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository
agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof
constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is
categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009
except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her
SALN. For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP
HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence.
Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the
burden rests upon the respondent. In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not
exempt her from filing her SALN because it is not tantamount to separation from government service.

Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the Constitutional and statutory
requirements . Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the
same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious
circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997
SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received the
bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from
PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her
first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with
the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The
Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were
found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent
appointment as Chief Justice. Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at
the time of appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing
requirement.

Is Sereno a De Facto or De Jure officer?

- Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto. The effect of a finding that a person
appointed to an office is ineligible therefore is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of
the title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno
is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding the title.
- As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the
office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of
the State is proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice.

De Facto v. De Jure:

A de facto officer is one who exercises the duties of an office under color of an appointment or election thereto.
They differ, on the one hand, from a mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color of right,
and on the other hand, from an officer de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose
term of office has not expired.

The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial functions, cannot be questioned by any
merely private suitor, nor by any other, excepting in the form especially provided by law. A judge de facto
assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is open to
the attack of the sovereign power alone.

Accordingly, it is a well established principle that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.

The rule is the same in civil and criminal cases. The principle is one founded in policy and convenience, for the
right of no one claiming a title or interest under or through the proceedings of an officer having an apparent
authority to act would be safe, if it were necessary in every case to examine the legality of the title of such
officer up to its original source, and the title or interest of such person were held to be invalidated by some
accidental defect or flaw in the appointment, election or qualification of such officer, or in the rights of those
from whom his appointment or election emanated; nor could the supremacy of the laws be maintained, or their
execution enforced, if the acts of the judge having a colorable, but not a legal title, were to be deemed invalid.
As in the case of judges of courts of record, the acts of a justice de facto cannot be called in question in any
suit to which he is not a party. The official acts of a de facto justice cannot be attacked collaterally. An
exception to the general rule that the title of a person assuming to act as judge cannot be questioned in a suit
before him in generally recognized in the case of a special judge, and it is held that a party to an action before
a special judge may question his title to the office of judge on the proceedings before him, and that the
judgment will be reversed on appeal, where proper exceptions are taken, if the person assuming to act as
special judge is not a judge de jure. The title of a de facto officer cannot be indirectly questioned in a
proceeding to obtain a writ of prohibition to prevent him from doing an official act nor in a suit to enjoin the
collection of a judgment rendered by him. Having at least colorable right to the office, his title can be
determined only in a quo warranto proceeding or information in the nature of quo warranto at suit of the
sovereign.
30. Jesus P. Morfe V Amelito R. Mutuc
GR No. L-20387, January 31, 1968

FACTS:

Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public officials and employees
from committing acts of dishonestly and improve the tone of morality in public service. One of the specific
provisions of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, either within 30 days
after its approval or after his assumption of office and within the month of January of every other year
thereafter, as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head office to which he
belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts
and sources of his income, the amount of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes
paid for the next preceding calendar.”

Plaintiff Morfe filed an action for declaratory relief with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan alleging
that the periodical filing of sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities after an officer
or employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office was violative of due process as
an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right of privacy,
implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against
self-incrimination. Also, there was an allegation that the requirement amounts to an insult to the personal
integrity and official dignity of public officials.

Defendants Executive Secretary and Secretary of Justice, in its Answer, contended that when a government
official, like Morfe, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give
information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he
continues to discharge public trust.

In addition, they likewise denied that there was a violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination
as well as unreasonable search and seizure and maintained that the provision of the law in question cannot be
attacked on the ground that it impairs Morfe’s normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because
the said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest or general welfare in
honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power.

ISSUES: Whether or not Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it required periodical submission of
sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an officer or employee of the government after
he has once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming office is unconstitutional.

RULING:

NO. Said provision is constitutional. It is not violative of due process, right of privacy, guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure, non-incrimination clause, and it is not an insult to the personal integrity and
official dignity of public officials. The Supreme Court (SC) held that the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of
1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration.
While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must
be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows.

Due Process
If the police power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life, then anyone with an
alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process or liberty as long as such requirement is observed.
To the extent then that the questioned section of the statute compels public officials to do a certain act, there is
an infringement on their liberty. However, under the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due
process is observed.

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public
service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and
oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of
assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not
susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.

Right to Privacy

The challenged statutory provision does not call for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a
person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the
objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to
say that a public officer, by virtue of the position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to
emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including
the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into
what would otherwise be a private sphere.

Unreasonable Search and Seizure

No violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has been shown to exist by such
requirement of further periodical submission of one's financial condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act of 1960.

Right against Self-incrimination

The protection which the guarantee against self-incrimination affords will have to await, in the language of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, for the existence of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or administrative." Prior to such a
stage, there is no pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an
infringement of the non-incrimination clause.

Insult to the personal integrity and dignity of public official

The questioned section of the statute cannot be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes an insult to the
personal integrity and official dignity of public officials. Such action would in effect question the wisdom of the
statute which is not allowable under the principle of separation of powers. There would be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own.
31.Lo Cham v. Ocampo
G.R. No. L-831            November 21, 1946

FACTS:

This is a proceeding for Certiorari. Gregorio T. Lantin, a Doctor of Medicine & lawyer, Acting Chief, Medico-
Legal
Section, Div of Investigation, DOJ, was given an assignment by Acting Secr of Justice Quisumbing in a letter:
SIR: "Pursuant to the request of the City Fiscal of Manila and in accordance with the provision of section 1686
of the Revised Administrative Code, you are hereby temporarily detailed to this office effective today, to assist
him in the discharge of his duties with the same powers and functions of an assistant city fiscal.

Following his detail, Doctor Lantin signed and filed informations in the aforesaid cases after, presumably,
conducting preliminary investigations. Thereafter, the attorneys for the defendants filed motions to quash on
the ground already stated. When two of these motions were denied and one was sustained, the losing parties
instituted the instant proceedings for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gregorio T. Lantin had the authority to sign information as assistant city fiscal of Manila.

HELD:
YES. The SC ruled that there is no anomaly and no injustice is committed in lodging on the person designated
by the Sec of Justice those powers of the prosecuting attorney which we have named. In view of all the
foregoing, it is clear that Dr. Lantin, who was appointed in the present case by the Secretary of Justice to assist
the city fiscal of Manila, had authority to sign the information in the criminal cases herein involved.

According to the majority opinion "it is a fact, of which we may take Judicial notice, that the Attorney General
signed such information. And he did it, not by virtue of any express legal provision but on the strength, as we
may suppose, of his authority to assist provincial fiscals. This was a practice that continued for a considerable
length of time. But "it is not to the point to inquire whether the Solicitor General has now the power to sign
information." "The reason is that the power to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions
is inherent in the power 'to assist' a prosecuting attorney, as these words are used in the Administrative Code.
It does not emanate from the powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General conferred upon the officer
designated by the Secretary of Justice."

This is not an arbitrary rule but one founded on logic. Was it the purpose of the legislature to confine the work
to be performed by the lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal to certain duties in the fiscal's office and deny him
others? If it was, the law does not say so, and one would be at a loss to know what duties were conferred and
what were not. It is fair to presume that if the legislature had wanted to forbid the lawyer appointed to assist the
fiscal, to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions, it would have said so or indicated its
intention by clear implication. We need to be reminded that of all the functions of the fiscal, those referred to
are the most important and outstanding and the ones in which the fiscal usually needs aid.

The last measure passed on this subject was section 17 of Act No. 867 which reads: "SEC. 17. Fiscals may be
aided by lawyers appointed by Attorney General; duties of such appointees; compensation. — It shall be lawful
for the Attorney General to appoint any lawyer, either a subordinate from his office, or with the approval of the
Secretary of Finance and Justice, a General or Solicitor General in the conduct of causes 'in which the
Government is interested and to which he may be assigned.

If the authority to assist a fiscal confers the power to sign informations, it would not have been necessary for
section 1, of Act No. 300, section 17 of Act. No. 867, section 1305 of the first Administrative Code of 1916 (Act
No. 2657), sec 1661 of the Revised Administrative Code, and sec 4 of Act No. 144 of the Commonwealth, to
add or provide that the person appointed to assist the fiscal shall have all the powers or the same authority of
the Attorney General or the Solicitor General.

Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they were enacted. The duties of a
public office include all those which truly lie within its scope, those which are essential to the accomplishment
of the main purpose for which the office was created, and those which, although incidental and collateral, are
germane to, and serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal purposes. The authority to sign
informations make investigations and conduct prosecutions is within the inferences to be gathered from the
circumstances which prompted the passage of section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 144 and it predecessors

The historical background of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended and the
construction placed on its precursors confirm our opinion.

As contemporaneous construction this practice should carry great weight in the operation of the enactment in
question. The fact that it was the chief law officer and legal adviser of the government who put it into effect and
that he did it in the discharge of his duties lends added force to the interpretation. As has been well said,
"interpretations by the Attorney General and the legal department of a state have important bearing upon
statutory meaning, since the Attorney General and his office are required by law to issue opinions for the
assistance of the various departments of the government administrative the law competent person not in the
public service, temporarily to assist the Ascal of a province or district in the discharge of his duties and to
represent the Attorney General in such matters. The person so appointed shall have all the powers of the
Attorney.
32. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Santiago
G.R. No. L-29236 August 21, 1974

FACTS:
On July 12, 1966, a telegram was filed with respondent-company and the amount of P1.50 was paid for the
transmission of said telegram to Zamboanga City. The telegram, however, was never transmitted until now.
The respondent not only did not give any valid explanation, but did not present any evidence to explain why the
said telegram was not forwarded to the addressee until now. This is, therefore, a clear case where the
respondent, taking advantage of the rates fixed by this Commission collected the sum of P1.50 and promised
to render a service to the complainant, i.e. the transmission of his telegram, but, after receiving the sum of
P1.50, respondent failed to render the promised service. In another complaint, complainant filed a telegram at
the branch office of respondent in Dumaguete City, addressed to Commissioner Enrique Medina, PSC, Manila.
The telegram was received by an employee of the respondent, and the sum of P2.64 was collected in payment
of said telegram. The telegram, in effect, advised Commissioner Medina that the Land Registration Case where
he was cited by subpoena to testify before the CFI of Oriental Negros on August 14 and 15, 1967, was
transferred and, therefore, there was no necessity for the said Commissioner to proceed to Negros Oriental on
those dates. It appears that the said telegram received at Dumaguete City was transmitted to Manila, but was
never delivered to the addressee, and on August 14 and 15, when Commissioner Medina appeared before the
Dumaguete Court, he was advised that the case was postponed and that a telegram was sent to the said
Commissioner. Inquiries were made, why the telegram was not received by the Commissioner in Manila; the
Dumaguete Office communicated with the Manila Office, on the same date, August 14, 1967 and it was only on
August 15, 1967 that the telegram was relayed to the Public Service Commission and was received by one of
the employees of the Commission, in the absence of Commissioner Medina who was then in Negros Oriental.
It was the manifest failure in both cases to render the service expected of a responsible operator that led to the
imposition of the penalty. The motions for reconsideration in both cases having proved futile, the matter was
elevated to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Public Service Commission had the jurisdiction to act on complaints by dissatisfied
customers of Radio Communications of the Philippines Inc., and thereafter to penalize it with a fine

HELD:
No. There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission imposing the fines in these two
petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio companies, as noted was the
fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance. It was bereft of such
competence. It was not vested with such authority. What it did then in these two petitions lacked the impress of
validity. Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a
public official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. It need not be
express. It may be implied from the wording of the law. Absent such a requisite, however, no warrant exists for
the assumption of authority. The act performed, if properly challenged, cannot meet the test of validity. It must
be set aside. So it must be in these two petitions. RATIO: Grant of particular power must be found in the law
itself. Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a
public official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it.
33. Patricio M. Miguel V. Jose C. Zulueta And Ricardo Tancinco,
G.R. No. L-19869. April 30, 1966

FACTS:

The provincial board of Iloilo passed a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor, to name the seat of the
provincial government of Iloilo and its session hall. Pursuant therewith, he issued EO. No. 3-z series of 1961
naming the renovated session hall as President Garcia Hall. The name is to be placed at the back portion of
the aforesaid Session Hall facing Iznart Street, Iloilo City. He also issued EO. No 4-z series of 1961 naming the
Provincial Building of Iloilo as "Provincial Capitol of Iloilo". The name should be placed in the front post of the
said building at the entrance facing Iznart St., Iloilo City. It appears that the name “President Garcia Hall” was
placed in the very same place where the previous name Iloilo Provincial Building was inscribed. The District
Engineer, implementing the executive order obliterated the original name placed on the facade which is Iloilo
Provincial Building and placed in its stead President Garcia Hall. Patricio Miguel instituted mandamus
proceedings in the lower court, to cause the erasure or removal from the frontage of the provincial building of
the name "President Garcia Hall" and to place thereon the name "Provincial Capitol of Iloilo” for the reason that
it violates RA 1059 which prohibits the naming of "sitios, barrios, municipalities, cities, provinces, streets,
highways, avenues, bridges, and other thoroughfares, parks, plazas, public schools, public buildings, piers,
government aircrafts and vessels, and other public institutions after living persons. The lower court granted the
petition. The respondent provincial governor filed an appeal before the SC contending that that the lower court
erred in not dismissing the case for lack of cause of action and in not declaring that the name "President Garcia
Hall", is for the session hall of the provincial building of Iloilo and does not refer to the building itself.

ISSUE: Whether the provincial governor may be compelled by mandamus to remove the sign in question.

HELD:

Yes. The putting of the sign “President Garcia Hall” on the façade of the building is contrary to RA 1059. The
Provincial Governor, are in duty bound not only to observe, but even to enforce the law, they may properly be
compelled by mandamus to remove or rectify an unlawful act if to do so is within their official competence, at
the instance of a taxpayer. As established by the preponderance of authority, where the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty which, in this case,
is the observance of the law, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of
the proceeding. It is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in
question enforced, even though he may have no exclusive right or interest to be protected.