Mhj5343 Nature of Science

THE OPEN FACULTY OF ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY
UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS & PHILOSOPHY OF

OF SRI LANKA ENGINEERING
BACHELOR OF TECHNOLOGY HONOURS IN ENGINEERING: LEVEL 5
MHJ 5343: NATURE OF SCIENCE
Unit 1, Unit 2, Unit 3
NATURE OF SCIENCE
Nature of Science
NATURE OF SCIENCE
Unit I, Unit 2, Unit 3
NATURE OF SCIENCE
Published by the Open University of Sri Lanka
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Nature of Science
Course Team Chair
Ms.P.Y.A.G.S.Yapa
Author
Mr.J.A.D.F.M Jayathilake
Course Team
Mr.J.A.D.F.M Jayathilake
Mr.G..Nanadasena
Dr. Nalin de Silva
Content Editor
Dr. Nalin de Silva
Language Editor
Ms.S.L.Ranasingha
Word processing
Ms.P.Liyanage
Open University of Sri Lanka

Nawala Nugegoda, Sri Lanka
First Edition 2000
2019 Open University of Sri Lanka

Revised Edition.
Unit [1, 2, 3]: Nature of Science
Acknowledgement
The present course team would like to acknowledge the previous course team
members specially Prof. Arjuna De Zoysa and Prof. R.D. Gunarathne.
In this new edition the course material has been almost completely revised
and updated. In revising the session 14 on Relativity the course team has
included some examples and problems from the course material “PYU2160 :
Special Theory of Relativity”. Therefore we would like to acknowledge the
course team members of the course PYU2160.
Nature of Science
Introduction
Under this course ‘Nature of Science’ we are concerned with ‘Philosophy of

Science’ which covers the study of the knowledge system called western
science, the methodologies of science proposed by various philosophers of
science and its impact on human beings and nature.
Before embarking on ‘Philosophy of Science’, let us consider ‘Philosophy’ in
general. Philosophy consists of four main areas of study, namely
Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics and Logic. Under Epistemology (Theory
of knowledge), we explain what ‘knowledge really is”, and how knowledge
is acquired. In this course we focus our attention on the knowledge system
called western science which comes under the broader area Epistemology. It
is important to note that there are also non-western sciences such as Chinese,
Indian, Hela (Sinhala) and Middle Eastern etc.
Western Science originated in Western Europe in around the 17th Century AD
in the midst of ‘Renascence’. Before this period around the 15th century AD,
the dominant regions of science, technology and mathematics were China,
India, Middle Eastern countries, African Countries and North / South
American countries. Through the Arabic merchant sailors these various
knowledge systems were brought to Western Europe via Greece. Therefore
Greece became the knowledge hub of Western Europe.
This course will present a brief survey of ‘philosophy of science’ which
originated in the Western Europe and spread to America and other regions of
the world. We start with Francis Bacon in England and Galileo Galilee in
Italy, then the philosophers in the European countries such as Germany,
France, Austria namely members of the Vienna Circle (Logical Positivists)
and Karl Popper, the American philosopher Thomas Kuhn and conclude with
the philosopher Paul Feyeraband.
Also we will present a critique of modern science from epistemological,
ethical and environmental points of view. The major drawbacks and limits
of modern science such as Reductionism as epistemological violence will also
be discussed. To justify the arguments present in this critique some recent
human and environmental disasters are briefly discussed.
Unit [1, 2, 3]: Nature of Science
CONTENT
SESSIONS PAGES
Session 1: Scientific theories: Inductivism Vs Hypothesism 01-09
Session 2: Hume’s problem of justification of Induction 10-13
Session 3: Positivism and Logical Positivism 14-18
Session 4: Fall of logical positivism 19-20
Session 5: Introducing Falsificationism 21-24
Session 6: Falsification, Demarcation & Ad-hoc modifications 25-28
Session 7: Falsification and Progress of Science 29-30
Session 8: Drawbacks of Falsificationism 31-34
Session 9: Abduction as a method of Science –Charles Peirce 35-40
Session 9: Theories as Structures I – Kuhn’s Paradigms 41-45
Session 10: Normal Science, Revolutions and Scientific Community 46-47
Session 11: Incommensurability, Relativism and Progress 48-50
Session 12: Anarchistic theory of science-Feyerabend views 51-59
Session 13: Critique of Modern Science 60-74
Session 14: Special Theory of Relativity .A Revolution in Science 75-95
Session 15: Relativistic Mechanics- Momentum, Mass and Energy 96-106

Nature of Science
Session 1:
Scientific theories: Inductivism Vs Hypothesism
1.1 Introduction
The birth of modern philosophy of science happened in the 17th century. With the emergence of
this modern philosophy of science the question “What is the method of Science?” was raised afresh.
In the whole period of three centuries, i.e. from 17th to 19th century, two views stand out
prominently as answers to the above question. The first view is called Inductivism according to
which the method of science is the method of induction. The second view is called Hypothesism
(or Hypothetico – Deductivism) according to which the method of science is the method of
hypothesis and deducing predictions from that hypothesis. Francis Bacon was the leading figure
in Inductivism, while Galileo was the leading figure in Hypothesism. Inductivism is rooted in the
school of philosophy called Empiricism,according to which sense experience is primary in
gaining knowledge and only those ideas which are traceable to sense experience are legitimate.
Hypothesism is rooted in the school of philosophy called Rationalism, according to which the
mental faculty is primary in gaining knowledge and most of human knowledge cannot be traced
to, and therefore is independent of sense experience. According to the method of induction, we
first collect observational data without recourse to any theory (or hypothesis). We then put forward
a tentative generalization which we verify. Once verified, the tentative generalization becomes a
law, enabling us to go from a limited number of already made observations to an infinite number
of as yet unmade observations. (i.e. a leap from observed territory to unobserved territory). By
accumulating such established inductive generalizations, inductivists claimed that, we will have
at our disposal an enormous amount of observations the totality of which constitutes reality.
According to Inductivism, the hallmarks of scientific knowledge are certainty and breadth and
according to Hypothesism, the hallmarks of science are novelty and depth. That is to say,
(according to Hypothesism) science must aim at knowledge which is new in the sense of being
trans-observational and deep in the sense of referring to entities underlying the phenomena given
to us in observations. In other words, according to Hypothesism, genuine science must not remain
content with generalizations based on observations but must seek to explain observations in terms
of unobservable or deeper entities and processes. A theory can be considered as a stronger or a
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tested and repeatedly verified hypothesis. A ‘theory’ is a statement or set of statements involving
at least one theoretical term (eg. ‘electron’, ‘proton’, ‘force’, etc.). Indutivists are empiricists who
maintain that anything which exists must be observable. Therefore inductivists claimed that
theoretical entities are fictitious entities created by us (humans) for the purpose of either economic
description of observations or predication. Hence, according to inductivists theories are not
descriptions of a real world of unobservables.
As against this, the Hypothesists maintain that the theoretical terms designate real entities not given
to us in observations and theories are descriptions of a real world of unobservable entities.
1.2 Induction by enumeration
A brief survey of Bacon’s life
Francis Bacon was born in January 1561 in Elizabethan England .His father, Sir Nicholas Bacon,
held the highest judicial office of state, the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, at the court of Elizabeth
I. His mother, Anne, was the daughter of Edward VI’sTutor, and Anne’s sister was married to the
Lord Treasurer. Born in to this highly political family, the first love of Francis Bacon, it seems,
was palace politics.
Aided by such means he rose slowly , to the position of Lord Keeper(later designated Lord
Chancellor)that his father had had .He also obtained the title of Baron Verulam ,and later that of
Viscount St Albans.
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Lord Bacon in his judicial office is known to have misused his authority to torture prisoners and
to issue injudicious monopolies to please his superiors at court. He accepted bribes from litigants
while occupying the highest judicial chair in England. For this he was impeached by the House of
Commons and sentenced by the House of Lords in 1626 to a large fine, imprisonment at the
pleasure of the King, and banishment from court for life. The sentence was not fully executed as
Lord Bacon died in 1626.
Bacon’s world view
Despite a hectic political carrier, Lord Bacon found time to write number of literary and
Philosophical works. These works mainly preach a reorientation to learning, providing a new
direction, organization and method for the business of acquiring knowledge about the world. In
this attempt he, like Aristotle, wanted to take all knowledge as his domain, even though he
criticized Aristotle, often sharply. In his major work ‘A Treatise on the Advancement of
Learning’ ,first written in English in1605 ,and later expanded in the Latin version De
Augmentis ,we find him propounding authoritatively his theories on all subjects under the
sun .This book largely defines the new direction and organization of learning and also outlines
the ethics and norms of Bacon’s ideal society .In his other major work, Novum Organum(new
organ), published in1621 ,Bacon proposed to establish a new method for acquiring knowledge,
promising to give humanity a ‘new engine’ that would simplify the art of discovery and lead men
quickly to the final truths about nature(Nandy,1988).
Bacon could see that there was sharp dichotomy in the approaches of the traditional scholar and
the craftsman of his time. The scholar, usually associated with universities, churches and the more
respectable or “genteel” class, followed the time-worn methods based on revelation, authority,
logic etc., for gaining new knowledge. The craftsman, as the situation demanded, was more
practical in his approach. Bacon saw that the scholars were not making progress in gaining new
knowledge, whereas the craftsmen were innovating and producing new and useful artifacts. Bacon
therefore suggested that the scholar should adopt the methods of the craftsman and the resulting
synthesis should be the basis of the new system of knowledge which could open the secrets of
nature to man. He wrote in his Novem Organum.
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LXXIV – “those (systems of philosophy and the sciences) which are founded on nature grow
and increase, whilst those which are founded on opinion change and increase not (so that as
for the last two thousand years) … the sciences still continue in their beaten track, and nearly
stationary, without having received any important increase ……
XCV – “Those who have treated of the science have been either empirical or dogmatic. The
former like ants only heap up and use their store, the latter like spiders spin out their own
webs. The bee, a mean between both, extracts pollen from the flowers of the garden and the
field, but works and fashions it through its own efforts. The true labour of philosophy
resembles hers …… we have good reason, therefore, to derive hope from a closer and purer
alliance of these faculties, the experimental and the rational, than has yet been attempted”.
This was the basis of the new method of induction that Bacon advocated. Bacon conceived
the method of science as the method of inductive generalization. That is, from a large number
of experimental or observational facts, arriving at a general proposition (a law or theory) by
induction. This is like observing that each human being passes away and coming to the
general conclusion. “All humanbeings are mortal,” although, this latter is not strictly a “law
of nature”, in the sense of a law in science. This method is also called induction by
enumeration. The emphasis on induction is seen when Bacon writes,
“We must first, by every kind of experiment, elicit the discovery of causes and true axioms
and seek for experiments which may afford light ….. (Novum Organum LXX).
Having freed knowledge from all constraints of good and evil, he subjects it to a new overriding
constraint – it should generate power. Power and utility are in fact the key-words of Bacon’s
thought. These words appear as the principal values in everything that Bacon has written. For
him the value of power and utility is so great that truth, power and utility become identical concepts
in his perception.
Going further, he sought to cement the union of knowledge and temporal power by asserting that
knowledge in the pursuit of power ought to be organized by the King. All his books are addressed
to the King. But in the second book of the Advancement of Learning we find him making specific
recommendations to King James 1 to organize knowledge for the sake of power.
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Bacon’s advice to the temporal powers to take knowledge under their wings was heeded .The
Royal society was founded in 1662, and its founders named Bacon as their model and
inspiration.Soon knowledge began to be organized all over Europe on the Baconian Model.
In sum ,then, the new ideal that makes Bacon the prophet of the scientific revolution was that
knowledge ought to be organized under the tutelage of the temporal authority for the exclusive
purpose of gaining power without regard to the questions of good and evil.
To complete the picture, however, we must also answer the question: power for whom and over
what? Theoretically Bacon’s answer to this question is that knowledge is power over nature for
the benefit of mankind.
First, the statement that Baconian science is a search for power over nature ,not over man : it is
true that in Baconian philosophy the major attack is aimed at nature .In Bacon’s writings , nature
appears almost as an enemy , to be dissected and tortured to make it yield its secrets. No state
(may) expect any greatness of empire, unless it be immediately ready to seize any just occasion
for war.’ The conclusion is clear: Bacon’s nature includes man; and when he talks of knowledge
as power over nature, power over man and other nations is also implied(Nandy,1988).
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1.3 Hypothetico-Deductivism
As against this inductive method of going from particular to general, a deductive approach to
methodology too appeared at the very beginnings of modern science. This is no surprise, for it
was the highly mathematical, and physical sciences, particularly astronomy and physics, which
made the first strides. The first advocate of the deductive method was no less a person than Galileo
Galili(1564-1642), the father of modern science. Although Galileo’s fame rested on his ousting
the methods of rationalist Plato (and views of Aristotle), he himself started as a mathematician and
remained so in his approach. In consequence the deductive method remained his model.
It is not surprising that in one of Galileo’s dialogues it is Simplicious, the spokesman of the
Aristotelians who defended the experimental method of Aristotle against what could be described
as the mathematical method of Galileo. This is not to say that Galileo was not a great
experimentalist. He was. He did many experiments, made a telescope himself and directed it to
the heavens and made astounding observations. The point here is a different one; one of
methodology, Consider for example, the famous experiment at Pisa ascribed to Galileo where two
bodies of different weights were supposed to have been dropped from the leaning tower of Pisa at
the same time, and both reached the ground at the same time. There is no conclusive evidence that
Galileo conducted that particular experiment. Galileo had, in his youth, made various speculations
on the behavior of falling bodies and to arrive at the conclusion that velocity of a freely falling
body is independent of its weight. He makes use of an argument which his predecessors had
vaguely used. This is to the effect that different weights of the same substance dropped at the same
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height simultaneously would fall simultaneously. They had reasoned that two tiles each weighing
a pound and dropped at the same moment would reach the ground simultaneously. If the tiles wee
fastened together, end to end, or one over the other, they would still descent at the pace at which
they had descended when dropped merely side by side although now the joint body would be
having double the weight. Galileo used this argument, to reach the conclusion that different bodies
dropped together at the same height would fall simultaneously irrespective of their weights and
the contention of the Aristotelians that they had actually dropped different weights and found the
heavier to reach the ground first did not shake him.
The point is that “thought experiments” of Galileo played a big role in his methodology. This is a
point which writings like that of Paul Feyerabend, whose views we shall have occasion to discuss
later in this course, lay some emphasis on. The similarity of the approach of this method to that
of the contemporary theoretical physicists who themselves use Gedanken experiments (thought
experiments) and who get at a hypothesis using physical intuition and reason and make predictions
of further testable situations which could confirm (or overthrow) it is clear. Galileo too arrived at
a proposition (the law or hypothesis) first, and then sought an experiment which would confirm it.
Whenever possible he reduced his problem to mathematics. He loved geometry and followed its
method. He formulates a problem, solves it by reason, and then suggests an experiment by which
it might be tested further.
Galileo’s work on the path of a projectile illustrates his method. That the path of a projectile
should be a parabola, he concluded by mathematical reasoning independent of any empirical
observation of projectiles. He had Galileo’s law which indicated that the downward acceleration
of the projectile is constant and the parallelogram of forces had been devised for the composition
of motions by a senior contemporary of Galileo when he was young. Using these, once the
hypothesis that the path of a projectile is a parabola was obtained by reasoning; it was tested by
the actual observations that had been made on the trajectory of bullets from gun shots. Indeed
Galileo tested Galileo’s law itself by deriving a mathematics consequence of it, viz. “The spaces
described by a falling body from rest with a uniformly accelerated motion are to each other as the
square of the time intervals employed in traversing this distance (i.e: s  t2), which he tested, using
the amount of water which passed into a vessel from a devise to measure the ratio of the time
intervals.
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Galileo thus defended that mathematical method (i.e. hypothetico- deductive method as it is termed
today). He showed by his method, that one need not wait for chance observations to make
discoveries in science. Once a hypothesis is formulated, deductive reasoning could led you to
predictions, or new facts, possibly hitherto unknown, which will test the hypothesis.
Learning outcomes
Upon completion of the session you should be able to
 Define the two schools of Philosophy namely Empiricism and Rationalism
 Identify the Method of Induction
 Identify the method of Hypothetico- Deductivism (Hypothesism)
Learning Activity
1. Compare and contrast the two schools of philosophy, Empiricism and Rationalism
2. Explain the relation between Empiricism and Inductivism
3. Explain the relation between Rationalism and Hypothesism
Co- References
Chalmers ,A.F.(1999). What is this thing called Science? , Third edition: Deriving theories from
the facts induction (chapter 4, pp41-58).Cambridge: Hackett publishing company
Smith,P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Induction and confirmation (chapter3,pp39-56).Chicago:

The University of Chicago press
Supplementary references
Videos
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Nature of Science
Introduction to philosophy -Lectures by Prof. Hoyningen Huene , Leibniz University, Hannover,

Germany
Lecture 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tP8teUgZcBY
Lecture 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8CN071tAf3g
Lecture 3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpCcEzgNVuc
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Session 2:
Hume’s problem of justification of Induction
2.1 Hume’s problem of justification of induction

David Hume (1711-1776) criticized the inductive method and the possibility of finding causes of
phenomena by that method. Both science and common sense embody knowledge of matters
which go beyond our direct perception. Hume’s critique begins with the simple question, “How
do we acquire knowledge of the unobserved?” Science, of course, uses induction to extend its
knowledge from the observed to the unobserved. But how do we know whether this method
actually yields knowledge? In other words, what justifies knowledge acquired by the inductive
method?
The method of induction advocated by Inductivists like Francis Bacon is based on observations
(or in other words ‘sense experience’). Bacan himself emphasized the primary status of
observations in his writings. Therefore Bacon belong to the Empirical school of philosophy but
the strongest critique of the principle of induction came from the most prominent Empirisist of all,
namely David Hume. Hume showed that the very principle of induction allowed us to draw
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generalizations from observed phenomena to as yet unobserved phenomena. Therefore this

inductive leap from observed territory to unobserved territory stood unjustified and irrational
according to Hume. He did not accept the method of hypothesis (Hypothesism), because of his
commitment to Empiricism. Hume concluded that since we have no alternative to the principle
of induction, our belief in induction is irrational; we have to boldly accept that the whole of our
knowledge including science rests on an irrational belief. The critique of the principle of induction
by Hume shook the very foundations of science, because causality (or the cause and effect
relationship) which is very important to science is based on the principle of induction. Hume
conclusively showed that any attempt to justify the principle of induction (eg: uniformity in
Nature) leads to circularity in argument.
Consider the following experiment. Every time a person presses a button attached to a closed
box, a red ball comes out through an outlet. But does this observed fact justify the conclusion
that the next time the button is pressed; a red ball will come out , Or the conclusion that all the
balls in the box are red?
These inferences conform to an inductive principle that observed instances which conform to the
generalization constitutes evidence for it. But Hume’s question was on what basis, other than
this inductive principle itself, is this particular inductive principle justified or accepted. Hume’s
problem has had no generally agreed solution, and Hume’s own position was one of skepticism.
Consider the simple experiment that we described above. It is quite possible that the next time
the button is pressed, no ball comes out (there are no more balls inside the box) or it is quite
possible that after getting n red balls successively, (n+1)th ball is going to be black.
Hume’s problem also raised doubts about the possibility of discerning causal relations by the
scientist. If every time I see black clouds, there is rain following. So I generalize “Black clouds
bring rain” and behind this generalization lingers the idea that black clouds are a cause of rain,
i.e., black clouds and rain are causally connected. But the observed conjunction of two situations
or events does not necessarily justify the inference that, there is a causal relationship between
these situations or events. Suppose that I walk to the bus stand on a particular road every
morning to catch the 7 O’clock bus, and every day I find the Buddhist priest in the nearby temple
sweeping the temple ground when I pass that place Such “constant conjunction ” is based on no
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causal relation (say between my walk and the priest’s activity). Science accepts something like
the principle of Uniformity of Nature, which could be expressed as “similar causes lead to similar
effects”. But if pressing the button in the earlier experiment was the cause of a red ball being
ejected, we saw that pressing it at the (n + 1)th time need not necessarily produce the effect of
ejecting a red ball. This is, of course, a bad example in considering causal relationships. For when
a button is pressed lots of other things can happen; waiters come to your table ; the door bell
rings and the land lady looks at you inquiringly, and there is no red ball in all this. But nevertheless,
even though in a very crude way, it indicates the problem. The ‘similar’ in similar causes and
similar effect is a vague term. Let us take a telling example from the history of science. The path
of Uranus did not agree well with the predications of Newton’s Theory of gravitation. A cause
for this effect was found; the existence of planet Neptune, until then unknown to the scientist.
Later on, Neptune itself misbehaved. There was irregularity in Neptune’s orbit. Again, the cause
was ascribed to another planet hitherto unknown. Astonishingly, this little planet, Pluto, was
discovered by the scientists. Following on, a similar deviation of Mercury was assigned to a
similar unknown planet, Vulcan, christened before birth. But it was never born. There was no
Vulcan. The cause this time was different. The Theory of Relativity explained away the
discrepancy. Uniformity of nature is not always helpful. Moreover although science accepts
uniformity of nature as justifying induction, such assumptions themselves are based on inductive
generalizations, and hence are no answer to the problem of justification of induction without
circularity in the argument.
Hume’s position with regards to the problem raised by him on the principle of induction and
finding causal relations by that method was something like this. He had no straight forward answer
to this problem but accepted that it is human nature to draw generalizations from observed
phenomena to unobserved phenomena and also to link cause and effect relations from similar
causes and similar effects.
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Learning outcomes
 Describe Hume’s critique of the Method of Induction
 Identifythe consequences of Hume’s critique
Learning Activities
1. Explain Hume’s problem regarding the Method of Induction

2. Relate Hume’s critique of the Method of Induction to the cause and effect
relationship(causality)
3.Express the debate between Hume and the defenders of Inductivism
Co -References
Chalmers ,A.F.(1999). What is this thing called Science? , Third edition: Deriving theories from
the facts induction (chapter 4, pp41-58).Cambridge: Hackett publishing company
Smith, P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Induction and confirmation (chapter3,pp39-56).Chicago:

Videos

Germany
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Lecture 2 (2.4): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8CN071tAf3g
Session 3:
Positivism and Logical Positivism
3.1 Positivism
Positivism is the school of philosophy which believed that the methodology of the empirical
tradition namely the’ method of induction’ adopted in Natural Sciences should be the method to
be followed by the practitioners of other areas of knowledge such as Social Sciences. French social
theorist and philosopher Auguste Comte(1798—1857) was the founder of Positivism. In fact it
was Comte who coined the terms ‘Positivism’ and ‘Sociology’. Comte lived in an era which the
Natural Sciences had already started its dominance in the Western Europe.
3.2 Logical positivism

The philosophy of the Vienna Circle, as this group came to be known later, was called logical
positivism. One of the main bases of their view was acceptance of the principle of Verifiability as
a criterion of meaningfulness. This principle said that the meaning of a proposition is identical
with the method of verifying it – that is, that a proposition means the set of experiences which
are together equivalent to the proposition being true. What is meant here is not the actual
procedure of verification but the possible way of verification. Thus, consider the statement ‘It
takes eight minutes for light to travel from the Sun to Earth’. This statement must have some
ways of empirically testing it. It could be, for example, that we can measure the distance between
the Sun and the earth (say, 93 million miles) and also measure the speed of light (say,
186000miles/second) and determine that it takes eight minutes for light to travel from the Sun
to the Earth. There may be other ways of testing this statement. The meaning of the statement
is the sum total possible methods of verification of it.
They were trying to build a scientific philosophy which got rid of speculative metaphysics, ethics
and religion. A statement like ‘The absolute is beyond time’ or ‘stealing is wrong’ has no process
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by which these could be verified, and hence were considered as nonsense or as in the of the
second sentence above, as an expression of emotions or attributes. Thus, it was maintained that,
when a speaker says, “stealing is wrong”, he is only expressing his emotional response or attitude
to stealing.
Most of these philosophers of science were trained in mathematics (and logic), physics and
philosophy. The Vienna Circle, together with a group called the Berlin Society led by Hans
Reichenbach, and of which Carl Hempel was a member, organized seminars and published
journals and they had followers and sympathizers in the English speaking world – particularly UK
and USA and later on, as it happened, most of the philosophers mentioned above migrated to
USA or UK, probably due to the unsatisfactory conditions that prevailed in Germany in particular
and Continental Europe in general, at the time.
Logical positivism did get into a lot of problems with the verification principle. In time its hard
core attitudes gave way and it became part of an international logical empiricist movement. They
attempted to explicate and reconstruct rationally the methodology of science and their
methodology took the shape of hypothetico- deductive verificationism. This methodology
suggested that the verification of deductions or predictions drawn from hypotheses (taken
together with other factors like the initial conditions) verified the hypotheses. But the idea of
verification of a hypothesis seemed too strong a view.
H: Hypothesis P: Prediction
H→P (Hypothesis implies prediction)
P (Prediction is true by empirical test)
H (Therefore the hypothesis is true)
The inference form mentioned above is logically invalid. Indeed verification thus indirectly
stumbles on the problem that Hume raised, viz. That inductive generalization has no logical
justification.
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The prominent intellectuals of the Vienna Circle were Schlick, Carnap, Feigl, Neurath and
Waismann. The 20th century begins with the emergence of this school of thought called Logical
Positivism. Some of the basic tenets (principles) of Logical Positivists are mentioned below.
(i). Science is district from other areas of human creativity (or knowledge) because it
possesses a method which is unique to it.
(ii). There is only one method common to all sciences irrespective of their subject matter
(Methodological monism).
(iii). The method of science is the method of induction (Inductivism).
(iv). Observations in science are ‘pure’ in the sense that they are theory independent.
(v). The Hallmark of science is that its statements are systematically verifiable
H→P
(vi). A theory is nothing but a condensed version of a set of well ordered observation-
statements. Therefore a theory is reducible to a set of statements describing observations.
(vii). To a given set of observation- statements there corresponds uniquely a (one) theory such
that we can deduce the latter from the former.
(viii). The aim of philosophy of science is to discover and systematize those universal and
changeless norms which science follows, and by following which science has become
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the most rational enterprise. Philosophers of science seek to understand science in terms
of these norms which determine scientific practice.
(ix). In doing so, they provide an account of science which is normative. Since these norms
constitute the very logic of scientific practice, philosophers of science provide what may
be called a logic of science.
Logical Positivists thought that through the above mentioned tenets (principles) they could defend
the principle of inductions in the face of the formidable attack made by David Hume. They took
up the challenge of Hume to show that the principle of induction can be rationally justified.
Logical Positivists argued that if they could show that the inductively arrived at scientific theories
are related in certain specifiable ways to the bedrock constituted by indubitable observations, they
would succeed in establishing the rationality of our belief in the principle of induction.
Learning outcomes
 Explain clearly the main views of Positivism.
 Express the Salient features of Logical positivism.
Learning Activities
1 .Explain briefly the views of Logical Positivists regarding the following

(i) Observation (ii) Scientific Theories (iii)The Methodology of Science
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Co-Reference
Smith, P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Logic plus Empiricism (chapter2,pp19-37).Chicago: The

University of Chicago press
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Session 4:
Fall of logical positivism
4.1 Introduction
But the whole programme of Logical Positivists collapsed like a house of cards. Not only they
failed to identify the specific ways in which the observational base (foundation) and the theoretical
superstructure of science were related; they also dismally failed to show that our observations are
theory–free or theory–independent. Logical Positivism dominated the scene during the first half
of the 20th century, but every tenet of Positivism has been successfully overthrown (demolished)
by the subsequent developments in the philosophy of science. The first tenet of Positivism to fall
was the one that observations are ‘pure’ or theory – independent. The critics of Positivism
exploded the myth of ‘pure’ observation by showing how our observations presuppose theory as
mentioned below.
(a). Firstly, observations presuppose some principle of selection. We cannot go on observing

anything we come across. We need ‘relevant’ observations. Before we can collect data,
our interest in the data of a certain kind must be aroused. There cannot be observations
without a prior problem. The problem always comes first.
(b). Secondly, in science, observations are taken into account only if they are describable in a
language that is currently used in a particular science.
(c). Thirdly, most of the observations in science are made with the help of instruments which
are highly sophisticated. These instruments are constructed or designed in accordance
with the specifications provided by some theories. Reliability of these instruments
implies the acceptance of those theories which have gone into designing these
instruments. Thus, observations presuppose prior theoretical commitment.
(d).Fourthly, observations in science need to be legitimized or ratified by a theory. For

example, the opponents of Galileo rightly demanded from Galileo a theory of optics
which could justify the extension of the use of telescope from terrestrial to celestial
19
sphere. Galileo had no such theory, but he believed that in future such a theory would
be formulated.
Learning Outcomes

 Identify the main drawbacks regarding the views of Logical Positivists
Learning Activities
1.Explain the critique of the views of Logical Positivists regarding the following
(i) Observations (ii) Scientific Theories (iii)The Methodology of Science
Co-References
Smith, P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Logic plus Empiricism (chapter2,pp19-37).Chicago:

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Session 5:
Introducing Falsificationism
5.1 Introduction to Popper’s method of falsification

The Logical Positivists’ ambitious programme regarding the theory of science and its method was
most systematically attacked by Karl Popper. He provided an alternative theory of science and its
method which won a lot of admirers both in science and philosophy. While the Positivists tried to
work out a sophisticated version of Inductivism, Popper sought to resurrect its rival, namely
Hypothesism. Both the Positivists and Popper claimed the uniqueness and supremacy of science
in the overall scheme of our activities aimed at knowledge acquisition. Hence both Positivists and
Popper felt the need to demarcate science from the rest of knowledge–acquisition activities.
Logical Positivists who were inductivists, maintained that the hallmark of scientific theories is
their systematic verifiability. Karl Popper replaces verifiability by falsifiability. According to
Popper, scientific theories are falsifiable in the sense that they transparently state what
circumstances lead to their rejection. Popper also demanded that once a theory is falsified, it has
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to be rejected and replaced by a new theory. We should not try to make ad-hoc modifications to a
theory in order to save it from being falsified. A more falsifiable theory is a better theory.
A theory however plausible and perfectly consistent with what we observe is not scientific unless
we can easily deduce testable consequences from it.
It is in this connection, Popper attacks Marxism as being pseudo- scientific. When Karl Marx
propounded his theory of capitalist society, his theory was a falsifiable theory because it yielded
test implications such as disappearance of middle class, revolution in advanced industrial societies,
etc. However, these test implications were not borne out and hence the theory was falsified. But
the followers of Marx tried to explain away the fact that the Marxist predictions did not come about
by taking recourse to ad-hoc modifications (explanations) and thus insisted that there was nothing
wrong with the theory. In the process, they went on building safety valves for the theory with the
result the theory became unfalsifiable. Hence, according to Popper, Marxist theory is not only
unfalsifiable and therefore unsicientific, but also pseudo-scientific. It is this pretension to be
scientific while being unfalsifiable makes the theory pseudo-scientific. In Popper’s scheme no
amount of positive results of scientific testing can prove our theories, whereas the Logical
Positivists speak of confirmation of our theories in the face of positive results of the tests, Popper
only speaks of corroboration.
In other words, in the Positivist scheme we can speak of scientific theories as established truths,
whereas in the Popperian scheme a scientific theory however well supported by evidence
remainspermanently tentative.
5.2Popper’s falsificationism and realism

While one group of deductivists, the logical empiricists, based their methodology on the idea of
verification or confirmation of hypotheses by testing the logical consequences of these
hypotheses, Karl Popper’s version of deductivism based itself on the falsifiability of hypotheses
by testing the logical consequences of the latter.
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This could be considered, in a way, as the most extreme rejection of inductivism. Popper
considered that induction is no reasoning process, and that a true prediction of a hypothesis does
not verify or confirm it as,
(taking H: hypothesis, p: prediction,  symbol for implication)
H P (Hypothesis implies prediction)
P (Predication is true by empirical test)
 H (Therefore, the hypothesis is true)
is a deductively invalid inference.
He thus opted for the form
~ P (Predication is false by empirical test)
~H (Therefore, the hypothesis is false)
which is a deductively valid inference.
Popper also differed from the logical positivists in that he claimed himself to be a realist. The
positivist took up the position that theoretical entities like atoms and electrons have no
independent meaning or existence but a realist does. Although Popper, himself hailing from
Vienna, had participated in discussions of the Vienna Circle and perhaps because of this early
association he was at times branded as a positivist.He explicitly labeled himself a realist in his
work. He calls his view hypothetical realism as he accepts entities posited by a hypothesis as real,
if the hypothesis is not already falsified.
The idea of falsifiability could appear alien to the method of the scientist, if it is not looked at in
the correct perspective. The student should understand that what is given by methodologists
like Popper is the logical form which could be seen in the scientific method. It is often called a
logical reconstruction of the method of the scientist. The student would better appreciate the
basis of the idea of falsifiability, if one considers the statement “science progresses by
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elimination”. This statement means that it is by rejecting (i.e. falsifying) the current theory only,
the way is made for a new or a competing theory.
Learning outcomes
 Identify how Karl Popper overcomes the drawbacks of Logical Postivists
 Explain Popper’s Method of Falsification
Learning Activities
1.Compare and contrast the views of Logical Positivists and Karl Popper regarding the following
(i) Observation (ii) Scientific Theories (iii)The Methodology of Science
Co -References
Chalmers ,A.F.(1999). What is this thing called Science? , Third edition: Introducing
falcificationism (chapter 5, pp59-73).Cambridge: Hackett publishing company
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Session 6:
Falsification, Demarcation & Ad-hoc
modifications
6.1 Demarcation criteria for scientific theories

Popper explained the demarcation of science from non-science using his concept ‘falsification’.
According to Popper any statement or set of statements is scientific if and only if that statement or
set of statements is falsifiable. If any statement or set of statements is not falsifiable, then that is
not scientific. He also maintained that a more falsifiable theory is a better theory. A theory P is
more falsifiable than theory Q, if the set of observational statements which can contradict (falsify)
P is larger than the set of observational statements which can contradict Q
For example, let P: All acids turn blue litmus red
Q: Sulfuric acid turns blue litmus red
Clearly any observation which falsifies Q also falsifies P but not vice- versa.In other wards P has
more potential falsifiers than Q and therefore it has more informative content or empirical content.
P has a higher degree of testability. Thus according to Popper P is a better theory than Q. Newton’s
theory of gravitation is a highly falsifiable theory; therefore it is a much better theory.
Popper also maintains that once a theory is falsified it has to be rejected or given up and subtituted
by a new theory. He is against the modification of theories in order to save them from falsification.
6.2 Ad-hoc modification of theories

Sometimes scientists introduce ad-hoc modifications to theories in order to save them from
falsification. Popper is strongly against this modification because according to him by modifying
a theory, we make it a less falsifiable thereby that theory becomes weaker.
An ad-hoc modification of a theory is the addition to that theory of some postulates or statements
which have no additional or testable consequences.
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Examples for some Ad-Hoc modifications of scientific theories
1. Let us consider the generalization, “Bread nourishes”. This low-level theory, if spelt out
in more detail, amounts to the claim that if wheat is grown in the normal way, converted
into bread in the normal way and eaten by humans in a normal way, then those humans
will be nourished. This apparently innocuous theory ran into trouble in a French village
on an occasion when wheat was grown in a normal way, converted into bread in a normal
way and yet most people who ate the bread became seriously ill and many died. The
theory, “(All) bread nourishes”, was falsified. The theory can be modified to avoid this
falsification by adjusting it to read, “(All) bread, with the exception of that particular batch
of bread produced in the French village in question, nourishes”. This is an ad- hoc
modification. The modified theory cannot be tested in any way.
The modified hypothesis is less falsifiable than the original version. The falsificationist
rejects such rearguard actions (Chalmers,1999). .
2. The next example is less gruesome and more entertaining .It is an example based on an
interchange that actually took place in the seventeenth century between Galileo and
Aristotelian adversary. Having carefully observed the moon through his newly invented
telescope, Galileo was able to report that the moon was not a smooth sphere but that its
surface abounded in mountains and craters. His Aristotelian adversary had to admit that
things did appear that way when he repeated the observations for himself .But the
observations threatened a notion fundamental for many Aristotelians, namely that’ all
celestial bodies are perfect spheres’ .Galileo’s rival defended his theory in the face of
the apparent falsification in a way that was blatantly ad-hoc. He suggested that there was
an invisible substance on the moon, filling the craters and covering the mountains in such
a way that the moon‘s shape was perfectly spherical. When Galileo inquired how the
presence of invisible substance might be detected, the reply was that, there was no way
in which it could be detected .There is no doubt ,then, that the modified theory led to no
new testable consequences and would be quite unacceptable to a falsificationist
(Chalmers,1999)
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Modifications of a theory in an attempt to overcome a difficulty need not be ad- hoc. Here are
some examples of modifications that are not ad- hoc, and which consequently are acceptable
from a falsificationist point of view.
Let us return to the falsification of the claim, “Bread nourishes”, to see how this could be modified
in an acceptable way. An acceptable move would be to replace the original falsified theory by
the claim, ‘All bread nourishes except bread made from wheat contaminated by a particular kind
of fungus” (followed by a specification of the fungus and some of its characteristics). This
modified theory is not ad- hoc, because it leads to new tests. It is independently testable, to use
Popper’s phrase.
Turning now to the history of science for a less-artificial example, we might consider the train of
events that led to the discovery of the planet Neptune. Nineteenth-century observations of the
motion of theplanet Uranus indicated that its orbit departed considerably from that predicted on
the basis of Newton’s gravitational theory, thus posing a problem for that theory. In an attempt
to overcome the difficulty, it was suggested, by Leverrier in France and by Adams in England, that
there existed a previously undetected planet in the vicinity of Uranus. The attraction between
the conjectured planet and Uranus was to account for the latter’s departure from its initially
predicted orbit. This suggestion was not ad- hoc, as events were to show. It was possible to
estimate the approximate vicinity of the conjectural planet if it were to be of a reasonable size
and to be responsible for the perturbation of Uranus’ orbit. Once this had been done, it was
possible to test the new proposal by inspecting the appropriate region of the sky through a
telescope. It was in this way that Galle came to make the first sighting of the planet now known
as Neptune. Far from being ad- hoc, the move to save Newton’s theory from falsification by
Uranus’s orbit led to a new kind of test of that theory, through which it was able to pass in a
dramatic and progressive way ( Chalmers,1999).
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Learning outcomes
 Identify Popper’s demarcation of science from non- science
 Explain Popper’s objection to ad-hoc modifications to scientific theories
Learning Activities
1. How does Popper demarcate science from non- science?
2. Why did Popper reject ad-hoc modifications to theories?
Co-References
Smith, P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Popper: Conjecture and Refutation (chapter4, pp57-
74).Chicago: The University of Chicago press
Chalmers ,A.F.(1999). What is this thing called Science? , Third edition: Sophisticated
falsificationism, novel predictions and the growth of science (chapter 6, pp74-86).Cambridge:
Hackett publishing company
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Session 7:
Falsification and Progress of Science
How does Popper characterize scientific progress? According to him, one finds in the history of
science invariable transitions from theories to better theories. What does the word ‘better’ stand
for? Popper contends that no scientific theory however corroborated can be said to be ‘true’.
Hence, Popper drops the very concept of ‘Truth’ and replaces it by the concept of ‘Verisimilitude’
(truth-likeness or truth–nearness),in his characterization of the goal of science. In other words,
though science cannot attain truth, that is, though our theories can never be said to be true, science
can set for itself the goal of achieving higher and higher degrees of verisimilitude, that is, they can
progressively approximate to Truth. So, according to Popper, in science we go from theory to
better theory ,and the criterion of betterness (being better) is Verisimilitude. But what is the
criterion of Verisimilitude? The totality of test implications of a hypothesis constitutes, what he
calls, the empirical content of the hypothesis. The totality of the test implications which are bone
out constitute the truth content of the hypothesis, and the totality of the test implications which
are not borne out is called the false content of the hypothesis. The criterion of the
Verisimilitude of a theory is nothing but the truth content minus (-) the false content of that theory.
Thus, according to Popper, out of two successive theories at any time in the history of science, we
find the successor (latter) theory possesses greater Verisimilitude, and is therefore better than its
predecessor.
Learning Outcomes
 Recognize how Popper explains the progress of science
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Learning Activities
1.Explain the concept ” verisimilitude” introduced by Popper
2.Examine the relation between ‘verisimilitude’ and the progress of science
Co-References
falsificationism, novel predictions and the growth of science (chapter 6, pp74-86).Cambridge:
Hackett publishing company
31
Session 8:
Drawbacks of Falsificationism
8.1 Attack on Popper’s Methodology

Popper’s methodology has been increasingly under attack in recent times. We will now look at
themain problems in it.
Asymmetry between confirmation and falsification
Popper saw an asymmetry between confirmation was not so possible. But how far could this
be upheld?
The case against falsificationism has a number of aspects. Let us examine them in turn.
8.2 Some aspects of falsification
Although
~ P (Predication is false)
~H (Therefore Hypothesis is false)
is a valid form of inference, the cases dealt with in science are rarely reducible to this form. For
any comprehensive theory the predictions from the theory have to be obtained not only from
that theory, but also from the theory coupled with a number of other factors. These are broadly
categorized as the ‘auxiliary hypotheses’ and the ‘ initial conditions’.
Let us consider a predication of a lunar eclipse using Newton’s theory of gravitation. Suppose
that the orbits of the earth and the moon have been determined using the theory. To determine
these orbits the masses of the sun, Earth and Moon have to be taken into account. Moreover,
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to predict the eclipse, the particular positions of the Earth and Moon in relation to the Sun in that
night have to be taken into consideration. Moreover, the prediction will need theories about
light ,namely the speed of light, that light gravels in straight lines and so on, to be used. Thus,
auxiliary hypotheses like the theories on light, and initial conditions like the masses, distances
and locations of bodies like the Sun, Moon and he Earth are used along with the theory of
gravitation to make the prediction. And the observations may agree with this prediction.
Thus the form of the argument should be
(Hypothsis + Initial Conditions + Auxiliary hypotheses) imply Prediction.
Prediction is false
Therefore,
(The Hypothesis + Initial conditions + Auxiliary Hypotheses) is false
or in symbolic form
(H + I1 + I2 …. + A1 + A2 + …. )  P
~P
 ~ (H + I1 + I2 ….. + A1 + A2 + ….)
And for this conjunction to be false it is sufficient for any one of the conjuncts is false.
This argument clearly shows that when an observation goes against a prediction, it is not possible
to say that the main theory is false, as, one or more of the initial conditions or the auxiliary
hypotheses could be false.
The history of Newton’s theory of gravitation provides many instances where, the observation
contradicting the theory was not due to the theory being false, but due to initial conditions being
false. At the very conception of the theory itself this situation occurred. Newton is supposed to
have developed the theory of gravitation in 1666 or thereabouts but, he found that the observed
“fall” of the Moon towards the Earth (i.e. the amount by which its path should have “curved”
towards earth) was different from what the theory predicted. This was at least one of the reasons
for him to shelve the theory until the 1680s. The contradiction was not due to the theory being
false, but due to an error in the then available estimated dimensions of the Earth. A French
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expedition later arrived at a more accurate size of the earth and the calculations using these new
dimensions made the prediction and observation agree. Again, the discrepancy between the
predicted and the observed paths of Uranus was not due to the theory of gravitation being false,
but in not taking into account the existence of Neptune.
Thus, falsification of a theory by a single instance of an observational statement going against the
theory is not possible, as we are unable to pick out which of the statements used to get the
prediction to be false.
Popper was aware of this problem, and he had been emphasizing that, it is only on the
assumption that the initial conditions etc., are correct that the theory is proved to be false. But
there is no basis for such an assumption. And history of science has repeatedly shown that such
assumptions could be false.
Learning outcomes
 Identify the drawbacks of Popper’s method of falsification.
Learning Activities
1. Express the major drawback of Popper’s method of falsification in symbolic form.
2. Justify the above mentioned drawback by employing an actual episode in science.
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Co-References
Chalmers ,A.F.(1999). What is this thing called Science? , Third edition: The limitations of
falsificationism (chapter 7, pp87-103).Cambridge: Hackett publishing company
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Session 09
Abduction as a Method of Science – Charles
Peirce
Introduction, p
9.1 A Brief Sketch on the Life of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
9.2 Problem Regarding the Relation between Induction and Empiricism
9.3 Problem Regarding the Relation between Deduction and Rationalism
9.4 Abduction
9.5 Western Science and Abduction
Learning Outcomes, p
References, p
Introduction
The debate on the ‘methodology of science’ dates back to the 17th Century A.D. Francis Bacon,
Galileo Galleli, David Hume, Rudolf Carnap, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Emre Lakatos and
Paul Feyerabend are the prominent philosophers in this long debate from 17th Century A.D. to
date. The methodologies advocated by the philosophers of science are Induction (Bacon),
Hypothetico Deduction (Gallileo), Verification (Carnap) and Falsification (Popper). There was
also another method namely “Abduction” advocated by Charles Pierce in around 1903, but long
being neglected. This method of Abduction has emerged from oblivion recently in the ongoing
debate on the methodologies of science.
9.1 A Brief Sketch on the Life of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
Charles Sanders Peirce was an American born in Cambridge Massachusetts. Although educated
as a chemist and employed as a Scientist for 30 years, he is now mostly seen as a Philosopher.
He is considered by some scholars as the most original and versatile American Philosopher and
America’s greatest Logician. Philosophers Kant and Hegel had major influences on Peirce. He
was a versatile scholar who excelled in many fields such as mathematics, logic, research
methodology, philosophy of science, epistemology and metaphysics. His father, Benjamin
Peirce was a Professor of Astronomy and Mathematics at Harvard University. Charles obtained
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BA and MA from Harvard and B.Sc in Chemistry. At Harvard he developed lifelong friendship
William James, another well-known American Philosopher.
One of Peirce’s Harvard instructors, Charles William Eliot, formed an unfavorable opinion of
him and they clashed on many occasions. Eliot went on to become the President of Harvard
from 1869-1909 a period encompassing nearly all of Peirce’s working life, during which he
repeatedly vetoed having Harvard employ Peirce in any capacity. In 1879, Peirce was appointed
Lecturer in Logic at the new John Hopkins University. This university was strong in number of
areas that interested Peirce, such as philosophy (John Dewey was a student), psychology (Joseph
Jastrow was a student) and Mathematics (J.J. Sylvester was a lecturer who admired Peirce’s
work on Mathematics and Logic). This untenured position was the only academic appointment
that Peirce ever held.
Famous American Universities like Stanford, Chicago, Cornell, Michigan, Wisconsin and Clark
all declined to appoint him for an academic post. This was mainly due to the covert opposition
of a very influential American Scientist of the day, Simon Newcomb (1835-1909). Due to these
setbacks Peirce suffered depression. There are some evidence that Peirce tried to alleviate his
symptoms with ether, morphine and cocaine. He had to undergo grave financial and legal
difficulties. During the final twilight phase of Peirce’s life, he did some scientific and
engineering consulting and wrote articles and reviews to Newspapers. The one who did the most
to help Peirce in those desperate, times was his old friend and philosopher William James.
James arranged two series of lectures at or near Harvard (1898 and 1903) for Peirce.
Peirce’s writings are voluminous and full of wonderful and thought-provoking ideas. In this
Session we only explore Peirce’s views on “The role of ‘Abduction’ as a method of theorizing
creatively”.
9.2 Problem Regarding the Relation between Induction and

Empiricism
Is there a specific method of acquiring knowledge, which is peculiar to Science? Starting with
Bacon up to Kuhn perhaps the Philosophers of Science had thought so, though the methods that
they identified were not the same. They were in agreement that Science differs from other subjects
and systems of knowledge mainly because there was a “scientific method” in acquiring knowledge.
Feyerabend on the other hand was of the opinion that there was no scientific method as such.
According to the school of empiricism, sense experience is primary in gaining knowledge and
therefore they followed the method of induction.
According to the school of rationalism, mental faculty is primary in gaining knowledge and
therefore they followed the method of deduction (or Hypothetico-deduction).
Now consider the method of induction, where we start with a finite number of observations and
then generalize that property to the entre membership of the population.
eg: After observing a finite number (say 1000) of crows as being black in colour, we generalize
that property (colour) to the entire population of crows and say “All crows are black”
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The leap (jump) from a limited number of observations of a property (blackness) of those numbers,
to all the members of the population is called a generalization which involves the metal faculty.
Therefore, generalizations come under rationalism.
The jump(leap) from observed to unobserved is not empiricism but rationalism, which cannot be
solved by empiricism alone. This is one of the problems that David Hume associated with
induction, which has no solution within the sphere of pure empiricism. Most of the problems of
Hume including causality arose because Hume was a hardcore (pure) empiricist,
Hume admitted that it is ‘human nature’ to generalize a similar property of a limited number of
members of a population to the entire population, or humans have a tendency to came to
conclusions by induction.
9.3 Problem Regarding the Relation between Deduction and

Rationalism
On the other hand, deductions in rationalism make use of rules of inference, which are obtained
through induction. The rule if a=c and b=c, then a=b is nothing but a generalization from limited
observations such as if two people are equal in height to a third person, then the two people
concerned are themselves equal in height to one another. The rule if a=b then b=a, or the rule
a=a are rules of inference obtained through induction by observing a limited number of cases.
These rules of inference are static in the sense “change” has been ignored. The rule a=a is valid
only if a does not change. If a changes then what is identified as a does not exist as it is not the
same a that is encountered. To say that a= a, one needs to consider a as an object that does not
change. This is generalized from the observation of “non-changing” properties of objects.
9.4 Abduction
People and animals learn by trial and error if left to themselves. It is revealed by experiments done
with mice when they are left to find their way through a mesh with blocks and openings. They try
one path, if they do not succeed they try another path and so on, until they find their way out. The
children left to themselves follow the same method of trial and error.
In western science scientists adopt the same method in arriving at “axioms” that explain
observations with respect to a property of the members of the population. This method is known
as abduction after the American Philosopher and Logician Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 -1914).
Abduction, though in the earlier formulations of Peirce had similarities with induction, is entirely
different from induction. In abduction, in order to explain a set of observations a hypothesis, an
“axiom” is guessed. If the “axiom” does not lead up to the set of observations, then the particular
“axiom” is dropped and a different “axiom” is introduced. The process is repeated until a
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satisfactory “axiom” is obtained. The “axiom” if satisfactory, is sometimes called a theory. This is
what happens in abduction but it has to be elaborated in comparison with induction and deduction.
Let us consider the box of toys. We guess that the colour of the toys is red. Then we observe a few
samples and find that the toys are not red. We throw away our guess and make another guess and
say that the colour of the toys is red. We consider a few samples and then find that they are red,
and come to the conclusion that the colour of the toys in the box is red. It is not induction as
induction is made after observing a property of sample(s) of the population, whereas, we make an
“axiom” from abduction without making any observation. Somebody comes with a box of toys
and asks what is the colour of the toys in the box without showing any one of the toys. We have
to guess the colour of the toys, of course assuming that they are of the same colour. If they are of
different colours there is neither any meaning of asking the colour of the toys nor of guessing the
colour of them. Observations come after guessing, and if the observations agree with the “axiom”
we claim that the “axiom” is valid as far as the relevant property of the members of the population.
9.5 Western Science and Abduction
Abduction is relevant to western science as it is the method that is used in arriving at “axioms”
that explain generalized observations through induction. We may call it the scientific method if
such description is needed. However, in western science, there are two stages. In the first stage
observations and induction take place in that order, and in the second stage abduction and
observations take place in that order. Having said that it has to be emphasized that in the first stage
the observations are dependent on theory or one’s beliefs, and that the observations could have
been proceeded by thoughts. There are neither observations independent of conceptions, nor
perceptions without conceptions, and the idea of perceptions without conceptions stem again from
the dualities in western Chinthanaya.
In the second stage, we said that abductions and observations take place in that order. The guesses
are made to explain the generalized observations from the first stage and having made guesses or
“axioms” observations are usually carried out in order to arrive at an “axiom” that works.
Now consider the example of “Newton’s theory of Gravitation”. Let us examine how the methods
of induction and abduction were employed by Newton in arriving at the theory of gravitation.
Stage I:
Newton would have observed some apples falling when released from the trees. What he did was
to generalize this experience to all objects (not merely apples) near the earth, and to make the
generalized statement that all bodies near the earth fall to the earth when released. That was
abstract induction, and the population was the bodies near the earth. Then of course he had the
problem of the moon that did not fall. Newton could have said that moon was not near the earth
and excluded the moon from the population of bodies near the earth.
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This is the first stage of western science. The population is identified, samples are considered,
some property of the sample(s) is observed, and the property is generalized to the entire population,
very often of infinite number of members. With respect to populations with infinite number of
members we are dealing with abstractions. Also, the body is an abstract concept unlike an apple,
which cannot be even imagined.
Stage II:
In the second stage scientists attempt to give an explanation of the generalized abstract observation.
This is where abduction comes in. Abduction is guessing and nothing more, however smart the
guesser may be. It belongs to rationalism and by abduction we arrive at “axioms”. In guessing we
assume again that the “axiom” applies to the entire population.
Why do the bodies near the earth fall to the earth? Newton had an answer to the question. Newton
and others might have given different answers to the question, which did not work. Finally it was
Newton’s guess on gravitation that worked.
However, it did not work for the entire population. The moon does not fall. Newton could have
excluded the moon from the population by taking the moon not to be near enough to the earth.
However, he did not do that and gave an explanation as to why the moon does not fall to the earth.
It was with his laws of motion and by considering circular motion. Newton said that bodies moving
in circular orbits have an acceleration towards the centre of the circle, produced by some kind of
force acting on the body towards the centre, and in the case of the moon there is an acceleration of
the moon towards the earth caused by the gravitational attraction.
Any guess is subject to correction, and would not hold for the entire population for all situations.
Guesses, and hence “axioms” which are very often called theories, are valid only for limited cases.
It can be said that the guesses work only for a limited number of cases, and one should expect them
to fail in some cases. This is somewhat similar to Popper’s falsification and guesses or “axioms”
or theories are subject to falsification, after particularization as explained below. The guesses are
never right but only “work” under certain circumstances. However, an “axiom” is not thrown
away, simply because one of its particularization does not work. It is used wherever it works,
leaving aside the case when it did not work. The theory of gravitation due to Newton was not
thrown away just because its particularization with respect to the orbits of the planets around the
sun did not work. It is still used wherever it works.
This is based on pragmatism, and abduction is based on pragmatism as a Philosophy. It does not
come as a surprise to note that abduction was introduced in US that follows a pragmatic philosophy
unlike Europe with other types of philosophies. Quantum Mechanics, though not “understood” by
western scientists within their culture continues to be used for its pragmatic features in western
science mainly because US is the dominant force in science today.
Learning Outcomes
Upon completion of the session you should by able to,

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 Identify that there are neither pure empiricists nor pure rationalists
 Induction involves mental faculty in the process of generalization from observed to

unobserved
 Identify the method of abduction introduced by Charles Peirce
 Analyze the procedure thought to be employed by Newton in formulating his ‘theory of

gravitation’ with the help of observation, induction and abduction
References
On Charles S. Peirce’s Lecture “How to Theorize” (1903)

Article by Richard Swedberg
The Essential Peirce, Volume 1
Selected Philosophical Writings‚ (1867–1893)
Edited by Nathan Houser and Christian J W Kloesel
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Session 10:
Theories as Structures I – Kuhn’s Paradigms
“Examining the record of past research from vantage of contemporary historiography ‘the
historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigm changes ‘the world itself
changes with them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new
places. Even more important, during revolutions scientists see new and different things when
looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before. It is rather as if the
professional community has been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects
are seen in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as well…..
It is as elementary prototypes for these transformations of the scientist’s world familiar

demonstrations of a switch in visual gestalt prove so suggestive. What were ducks in the scientist’s
world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards”
Thomas Kuhn
10.1 Introduction
Thomas Kuhn, the American philosopher of science marked a turning point in the 20th century
philosophy of science by his major work (magnum opus) ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’.
According to Kuhn, the life of every major science passes through two stages which can be
characterized as pre-paradigmatic and paradigmatic. During the pre-paradigmatic period of a
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science, one finds more than one mode of practicing that science. In other words there was a time
when there were different schools of Astronomy, schools of Physics, Chemistry, Biology,
Philosophy, and Art etc. But whereas even today we speak of schools of Art, schools of Literature,
schools of Philosophy, schools of Social Science and systems or schools of Medicine, we do not
speak of schools of Astronomy, schools of Physics, schools of Biology etc. This is because
according to Kuhn, areas like Art, Literature, Philosophy, Social Science and Medicine do not and
perhaps cannot, make a transition from pre-paradigmatic stage to paradigmatic stage. Therefore
what characterizes a science which enters a paradigmatic stage is the disappearance of plurality of
the mode of practicing that science, that is, the disappearance of ‘schools’. Kuhn claims that when
a science reaches the paradigmatic stage, it becomes ‘mature’ or ‘science’ in the present sense of
the term. Astronomy was the first to enter the paradigmatic stage followed by Physics, Chemistry
and Biology. Hence it is the acquisition of paradigm which replaces plurality by uniformity of
practice.
10.2 What are the paradigms?

Paradigms are universally recognized scientific achievements that for a considerable period of time
provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners (scientific community).
Paradigms specify the exact manner in which the relevant disciplines (physics, chemistry, biology
etc.) ought to proceed. They laid the ground rules regarding what problems these disciplines must
tackle and how to tackle them.
A paradigm specifies what kind of things exist in the universe, how they interact with each other
and our senses, what kind of questions may legitimately be asked about these things, what
techniques are appropriate for answering those questions, what counts as evidence for a theory,
what questions are central to a particular science, what counts as a solution to a problem, what
counts as an explanation of some phenomena and so on. A ‘Disciplinary Matrix’ is a set of
answers to the above mentioned questions that are learned by scientists in the course of the
education that prepares them for research and that provides the framework within which a
particular science operates. In other words, a paradigm is a disciplinary matrix of a professional
group. Once a science comes to possess a paradigm, it develops, what Kuhn calls, a ‘normal
science tradition’. Normal science is the day-to-day research activity purporting to force nature
into conceptual boxes provided by the paradigm.
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Scientific practice is not exhausted in terms of day-to-day research of ‘normal science’. When a
paradigm fails to promote fruitful, interesting and smooth normal science, it is considered to be in
a crisis. The deepening of the crisis leads to the replacement of the existing paradigm by a new
one. This process of replacement is called a ‘scientific revolution’. Therefore, scientific revolutions
are the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition bound activity of normal science. ‘Normal
science’ occupies much larger time span than does ‘revolutionary science’. That is to say, science
is revolutionary once in a while, and mostly it is normal. Normal science is an activity that purports
not to question the existing paradigm, but to
(a) increase the precision of an existing theory and
(b) extend the existing theory to areas that it is expected to cover but in which it has never
before been tried.
Some examples of paradigms are mentioned below.
(i) Classical or Newtonian physics.
Newton’s laws of motions and gravitational theory with its metaphysical picture of the
world as composed of material particles, interacting by colliding with each other, and by
attractive and repulsive forces acting in straight lines between particles, and the guiding
image of the world as giant clockwork (machine).
(ii) Phlogiston theory of combustion
Based around the idea that combustion is the release of a substance called phlogiston
(iii) Doltonian Chemistry
Based on the chemical theory according to which the elements may be distinguished by
their differing atomic weights. Atoms are indivisible and are the ultimate particles in nature.
(iv) Caloric theory of heat
According to which heat is a material fluid.
(v) Particle optics
According to which light is a collection of fast moving and tiny particles
(vi) Wave optics
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According to which light is composed of waves of disturbance in some medium.
(vii) Relativistic Physics
According to which the time elapsed between two events is relative to the state of motion
of an observer (a frame of reference).Mass in the universe is not conserved. Mass could be
transformed into energy. Mass of a body increases with its velocity.
(viii) Quantum Physics
According to which the energy possessed by material objects or electromagnetic waves

comes in discrete units, rather than taking a continuous range of values. The values of
certain properties cannot be measured certainly; only a probability could be assigned
(Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle).
Learning Outcomes
 Explaining the concept ‘paradigm’ introduced by Kuhn
 Identifying the relation between paradigm and the uniqueness of science according to
Kuhn
Learning Activities
1. Describe clearly the concept ‘paradigm.’
2. Relate the concept’ paradigm’ with the uniqueness of science as mentioned by Kuhn
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Co-references
Chalmers ,A.F.(1999). What is this thing called Science? , Third edition: Theories as structures
i:Khun’s paradigms (chapter 8, pp104-129).Cambridge: Hackett publishing company
Videos

Germany
Lecture 5: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kAhD7nKrLbE
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Session 11:
Normal Science, Revolutions and Scientific
Community
According to Kuhn normal science is the puzzle- solving activity which is a highly cumulative
enterprise, eminently successful in its aim, the steady extension of the scope and precision of
scientific knowledge.
During this process of normal science activity, scientists come across ‘anomalies’. That is, an
anomaly arises when a puzzle remains a puzzle defying every attempt to solve it within the
framework of the paradigm. With the accumulation of major anomalies in a particular
paradigm ,the practitioners begin to loose confidence in that paradigm. Then that paradigm is
declared to be crisis – ridden, and the search for an alternative paradigm begins. But there is no
‘clear cut’ and ‘objective’ criterion to decide which anomalies are major and how many anomalies
must be accumulated in order to declare a paradigm to be crisis – ridden. That will be decided by
the community of the practitioners of the discipline (scientific community),2 through the
judgment of its peers (contemporaries or follow practitioners). The crisis – ridden paradigm will
not be given up until and unless a new paradigm is accepted in its place. The issue concerning the
paradigm choice cannot be settled by logic and experiment alone. What ultimately matters is the
consensus (agreement) of the relevant scientific community. In other words the choice of a theory
as the new paradigm has to be understood in terms of the value judgments, which a scientific
community exercises in the context in which they find themselves.
A theory is chosen as the new paradigm which fits the value commitments of a scientific
community. Hence the question of choice becomes the question of value. The ultimate
explanation of a theory choice is not methodological but sociological. Thus, the concept
‘scientific community’ is basic to the concept ‘paradigm’. The concept of scientific
community can be explicated only in sociological terms.
The hallmark of science, according to Popper is critical thinking but according to Kuhn, the
hallmark of science is tradition – bound thinking. In fact, according to Kuhn, what distinguishes
47
science from other areas of knowledge is that whereas in science one finds institutional
mechanisms of enforcing consensus (agreement), the other areas of knowledge suffer from
perpetual disagreements even on fundamentals. If Popper considers the individual to be the locus
of scientific activity, Kuhn bestows that status upon the scientific community. In other words, as
opposed to the individualistic account of scientific enterprise by Popper, Kuhn propounds a
collectivistic view of scientific activity.
Learning outcomes
 Identify the difference between normal science and revolutionary science.
 Identify the role of scientific community in bringing forth a revolution in science.
Learning Activities
1. Compare and contrast normal science and revolutionary science.

2. Explain the role of scientific community in bringing forth a revolution in science.
Co -References
Smith, P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Kuhn and Normal Science(chapter5,pp75-86).Chicago:

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Smith, P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Kuhn and Revolutions(chapter6,pp87-101).Chicago: The

University of Chicago press
Session 12:
Incommensurability, Relativism and Progress
11.1 What is the relation between the old paradigm which is

overthrown and the new paradigm which succeeds it?
Kuhn’s answer to this question is extremely radical. Kuhn maintains that two successive paradigms
cut the world differently. They speak different languages. What can be said in the language of
one paradigm cannot be translated into the language of the other. Therefore Kuhn claims that the
relation between two successive paradigms is incommensurable. With this, the idea of scientific
progress as a continuous process, and the idea of truth as the absolute standard became totally
repudiated. That is to say, what is true is relative to a paradigm and there is no truth lying outside
all paradigms. Thus, Kuhn advances what might appear to be an undiluted ‘Relativism’. But Kuhn
hesitated to be branded as a relativist. Thomas Kuhn’s position regarding the scientific enterprise
could be characterized as conservative.
Compared to Kuhn’s conservative character, his contemporary Pail Feyerabend was a radical
philosopher. Feyerabend in his classic, ‘Against Method’ repudiates the very idea of scientific
method. Both on grounds of logic and history, he questions the time-honoured belief that these is
something called the method of science which distinguishes science from the rest of other
knowledge systems.
Almost all the philosophers of science maintain that there are at least two conditions which ought
to be met by any theory that is proposed for acceptance. These conditions are called ‘consistency
condition’ and ‘correspondence condition’. According to the consistency condition, the new
theory must be consistent with the already well established theories. According to the second
condition, the new theory must correspond to the well established facts.
49
Feyerabend claims that both these conditions are illegitimate in the sense their acceptance hinders
the progress of science. By insisting upon the first condition, the traditional philosopher of science,
both Positivists and Popper, overlooked the fact that the so-called well established theories may
themselves be faulty. Their faculty character might come to surface only if we allow the new
theory provisional acceptance. Hence, Feyerabend insists that the real test of a theory may be
possible only by adopting an alternative theory. We might believe that our existing theories are
well supported by facts. But there may be some facts which might go against these theories.
However, we may never become aware of these new facts unless we transcend these theories and
adopt an alternative, just as we cannot become aware of all the defects of our society unless we
look at it from the point of view of another society.
Similarly, the corresponding condition too cannot be sustained. Given the fact that all observations
are theory-laden, it may be that what we consider to be observationally obvious might be wrong
due to the incorrectness of the theory. Hence, Feyearbend say that a new theory must be allowed
to grow even if it goes against well known facts. It may be noted that of the two conditions,
correspondence condition is primary because the consistency condition can be reduced to it. The
consistency condition says that a new theory must be consistent with existing theories if the later
are supported by facts. In other words, the consistency condition seeks to guarantee that a new
theory correspond with known facts by being consistent with existing theories. By rejecting both
conditions, Feyerabend advocates that a new theory should not be constrained by the rule that it
should first correspond with facts which we already know. In fact, he says that we must make
deliberate attempts to develop theories which go counter to the so-called known facts.
Feyerabend goes one step further. He challenges his traditional opponents by saying “Give me
any norm you like. I will show that it is violated at certain important phases in the history of
science, not by oversight or negligence, but consciously and deliberately”. According to him, in
the most productive periods of any science, scientists found themselves in situations which are too
complex to be tackled by simple rules of thumb which philosophers of science glorify as
methodological norms. Since science in its history has violated every possible norm, we must give
up the very idea of the scientific method.
Kuhn claims that science is unique because it has reached the paradigmatic stage with the scientific
community agreeing to share (consensus) a paradigm. In other words, Kuhn celebrates the fact
that in natural sciences there is a qualitatively greater consensus than in other knowledge systems
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Nature of Science
(eg. Social Sciences). Feyerabend stands against this monolithic view (monism) of Kuhn.
According to Feyerabend, even if Kuhn is right in his description of the actual (present day)
scientific practice where the scientific community is in greater consensus regarding a single
paradigm, he (Kuhn) cannot justify that this monolithic state of affairs is the ideal (best).
Feyerabend strongly criticizes the scientific community for being arrogant (even worse than the
Catholic Church during Galileo’s era) by not allowing alternative theories to blossom (grow).
Feyerabend advocates the need for pluralism (allowing alternative theories to compete) in
scientific practice.
Finally, like Kuhn, Feyerabend maintains that successive paradigms in science are
incommensurable. He provided new arguments in favour of the incommensurably thesis
propounded by Kuhn.
Learning Outcomes
 Describe the concept ‘incommensurability’ according to Kuhn
 Identify the consequences of applying the concept‘incommensurability’
Learning Activities
1. Explain the concept ‘incommensurability’ according to Kuhn.
2. Argue how ‘incommensurability’ leads to relativism of scientific knowledge.
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Co -References
Smith, P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Kuhn and Revolutions(chapter6, 6.3,pp91-96).Chicago:
Session 13:
Anarchistic theory of science-Feyerabend’s
views
13.1 Introduction
In his books’ Against Method ‘and’ Science in a Free Society’, Feyerabend defended the idea that
there are no methodological rules which are always used by scientists. He objected to any single
prescriptive scientific method on the grounds that any such method would limit the activities of
scientists, and hence restrict scientific progress. In his view, science would benefit most from a
"dose" of theoretical anarchism. He also thought that theoretical anarchism was desirable
because it was more humanitarian than other systems of organization, by not imposing rigid rules
on scientists.
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Feyerabend's position was originally seen as radical in the philosophy of science, because it implies
that philosophy can neither succeed in providing a general description of science, nor in devising
a method for differentiating products of science from non-scientific entities like myths.
(Feyerabend's position also implies that philosophical guidelines should be ignored by scientists,
if they are to aim for progress.)
To support his position that methodological rules generally do not contribute to scientific success,
Feyerabend provides counterexamples to the claim that (good) science operates according to a
certain fixed method. He took some examples of episodes in science that are generally regarded as
indisputable instances of progress (e.g. the Copernican revolution), andshowed that all common
prescriptive rules of science are violated in such circumstances. Moreover, he claimed that
applying such rules in these historical situations would actually have prevented scientific
revolutions.
One of the criteria for evaluating scientific theories that Feyerabend attacks is the consistency
criterion. He points out that to insist that new theories be consistent with old theories gives an
unreasonable advantage to the older theory. He makes the logical point that being compatible with
a defunct older theory does not increase the validity or truth of a new theory over an alternative
covering the same content. That is, if one had to choose between two theories of equal explanatory
power, to choose the one that is compatible with an older, falsified theory is to make an aesthetic,
rather than a rational choice. The familiarity of such a theory might also make it more appealing
to scientists, since they will not have to disregard as many cherished prejudices. Hence, that theory
can be said to have "an unfair advantage".
Feyerabend was also critical of falsificationism. He argued that no interesting theory is ever
consistent with all the relevant facts. This would rule out using a naïve falsificationist rule which
says that scientific theories should be rejected if they do not agree with known facts. Feyerabend
uses several examples, but "renormalization" in quantum mechanicsprovides an example of his
intentionally provocative style: "This procedure consists in crossing out the results of certain
calculations and replacing them by a description of what is actually observed. Thus one admits,
implicitly, that the theory is in trouble while formulating it in a manner suggesting that a new
principle has been discovered “Against Method. p. 61. Feyerabend is not advocating that scientists
do not make use of renormalization or other ad- hoc methods. Instead, he is arguing that such
methods are essential to the progress of science for several reasons. One of these reasons is that
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progress in science is uneven. For instance, in the time of Galileo, optical theory could not account
for phenomena that were observed by means of telescopes. So, astronomers who used telescopic
observation had to use ad- hoc rules until they could justify their assumptions by means of optical
theory.
Feyerabend was critical of any guideline that aimed to judge the quality of scientific theories by
comparing them to known facts. He thought that previous theory might influence natural
interpretations of observed phenomena. Scientists necessarily make implicit assumptions when
comparing scientific theories to facts that they observe. Such assumptions need to be changed in
order to make the new theory compatible with observations. The main example of the influence of
natural interpretations that Feyerabend provided was the tower argument. The tower argument was
one of the main objections against the theory of a moving earth. Aristotelians assumed that the fact
that a stone which is dropped from a tower lands directly beneath it shows that the earth is
stationary. They thought that, if the earth moved while the stone was falling, the stone would have
been "left behind". Objects would fall diagonally instead of vertically. Since this does not happen,
Aristotelians thought that it was evident thatthe earth did not move. If one uses ancient theories of
impulse and relative motion, the Copernican theory indeed appears to be falsified by the fact that
objects fall vertically on earth. This observation required a new interpretation to make it
compatible with Copernican theory. Galileo was able to make such a change about the nature of
impulse and relative motion. Before such theories were articulated, Galileo had to make use of ad-
hoc methods and proceed counter-inductively. So, "ad-hoc" hypotheses actually have a positive
function: they temporarily make a new theory compatible with facts until the theory to be defended
can be supported by other theories.
Feyerabend considered the possibility of incommensurability, but he was hesitant in his

application of the concept. He wrote that "it is hardly ever possible to give an explicit definition
of [incommensurability]"Against Method. p. 225., because it involves covert classifications and
major conceptual changes. He also was critical of attempts to capture incommensurability in a
logical framework, since he thought of incommensurability as a phenomenon outside the domain
of logic. In the second appendix of Against Method(p. 114), Feyerabend states, "I never said...
that any two rival theories are incommensurable... What I did say was that certain rival theories,
so-called 'universal' theories, or 'non-instancial' theories, if interpreted in a certain way, could not
be compared easily." Incommensurability did not concern Feyerabend greatly, because he believed
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that even when theories are commensurable (i.e. can be compared), the outcome of the comparison
should not necessarily rule out either theory. To rephrase: when theories are incommensurable,
they cannot rule each other out, and when theories are commensurable, they cannot rule each other
out. Assessments of (in)commensurability, therefore, don't have much effect in Feyerabend's
system, and can be more or less passed over in silence.
In Against Method Feyerabend claimed that Imre Lakatos's philosophy of research programmes is
actually "anarchism in disguise", because it does not issue orders to scientists. Feyerabend
playfully dedicated AgainstMethod to "Imre Lakatos: Friend, and fellow-anarchist". One
interpretation is that Lakatos's philosophy of mathematics and science was based on creative
transformations of Hegelian historiography ideas, many associated with Lakatos's teacher in
Hungary Georg Lukács. Feyerabend's debate with Lakatos on scientific method recapitulates the
debate of Lukács and (Feyerabend's would-be mentor) Brecht, over aesthetics several decades
earlier.
13.2 The decline of the physicist-philosopher

Feyerabend was critical of the lack of knowledge of philosophy shown by the generation of
physicists that emerged after World War II:
The withdrawal of philosophy into a "professional" shell of its own has had disastrous
consequences. The younger generation of physicists, the Feynmans, the Schwingers, etc., may be
very bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors
like Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Boltzmann, Mach and so on. But they are uncivilized savages,
they lack in philosophical depth – and this is the fault of the very same idea of professionalism
which you are now defending. (http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Feyerabend)
While astronomy profited from pythagoreanism and from the platonic love for circles , medicine
profited from herbalism, from the psychology, the metaphysics the physiology of witches,
midwives ,cunning men ,wandering druggists, it is well known that 16th and 17th –century medicine
while theoretically hypertrophic was quite helpless in the face of disease (and stayed that way for
a long time after the scientific revolution ‘).Innovators such as Paracelsus fell back on the earlier
ideas and improved medicine .Everywhere science is enriched by unscientific results ,while
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procedures which have often been regarded as essential parts of science are quietly suspended or
circumvented.
When the Communists in the fifties forced hospitals and medical schools to teach the ideas and
the methods contained in the Yellow Emperor’s Text book of Internal Medicine and to use them in
the treatment of patients, many Western experts (among them Eccles, one of the ‘ Popperian
Knights’) were aghast and predicted the downfall of Chinese medicine. What happened was the
exact opposite. Acupuncture, moxibustion, pulse diagnosis have let to new insights, new methods
of treatment, new problems both for the Western and for the Chinese physicians.
Combining this observation with the insight that science has no special method, we arrive at the
result that the separation of science and non-science is not only artificial but also detrimental to
the advancement of knowledge.If we want to understand nature, if we want to master our physical
surroundings, then we must use all ideas, all methods and not just a small selection of them. The
assertion, however that there is no knowledge outside science – extra scientiamnulla salus – is
nothing but another and most convenient fairy-tale. Primitive tribes have more detailed
classifications of animals and plants than contemporary scientific zoology and botany, they know
remedies whose effectiveness astounds physician (while the pharmaceutical industry already
smells here a new source of income), they have means of influencing their fellow men which
science for a long time regarded as non-existent (Voodoo), they solve difficult problems in ways
which are still not quite understood (building of the pyramids; Polynesian travels), there existed a
highly developed and internationally known astronomy in the old Stone Age, this astronomy was
factually adequate as well as emotionally satisfying, it solved both physical and social problems
(one cannot saythe same about modern astronomy) and it was tested in very simple and ingenious
ways (Stone observatories in England and in the South Pacific; astronomical schools in
Polynesia(http://pnarae.com/phil/main_phil/fey/against.htm)
13.3 A summary of the views expressed by Feyerabend in his famous

book ‘Against Method’.
 Science is an anarchistic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more
likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives.
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 This is shown both by an examination of historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the
relation between idea and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything
goes.
 For example, we may use hypotheses that contradict well-confirmed theories and/or well-
established experimental results. We may advance science by proceeding counter-inductively.
 The consistency condition which demands that new hypotheses agree with accepted theories
is unreasonable because it preserves the older theory, and not the better theory. Hypothesis
contradicting well-confirmed theories give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other
way. Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while uniformity impairs its critical
power. Uniformity also endangers the free development of the individual.
 There is no idea, however ancient and absurd, that is not capable of improving our knowledge.
The whole story of thought is absorbed into science and is used to improve every single theory.
Nor is political interference rejected. It may be needed to overcome the chauvinism of science
that resists alternatives to the status quo.
 No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to
blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may
be proof of progress. It is also a first step in our attempts to find the principles implicit in
familiar observational notions.
 As an example of such an attempt, I examine the tower argument which the Aristotelians used
to refute the motion of the earth. The argument involves natural interpretations – ideas so
closely connected with observations that it needs a special effort to realize their existence and
to determine their content. Galileo identifies the natural interpretations which are inconsistent
with Copernicus and replaces them by others.
 The new natural interpretations constitute a new and highly abstract observation language.
They are introduced and concealed so that one fails to notice the change that has taken place
(method of anamnesis). They contain the idea of the relatively of all motion and the law of
circular inertia.
 Initial difficulties caused by the change are defused by ad- hoc hypotheses, which thus turn out
occasionally to have a positive function; they give new theories a breathing space, and they
indicate the direction of future research.
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 In addition to natural interpretations, Galileo also changes sensations that seem to endanger
Copernicus. He admits that there are such sensations. He praises Copernicus for having
disregarded them; he claims to have removed them with the help of the telescope. However,
he offers no theoretical reasons why the telescope should be expected to give a true picture of
the sky.
 Nor does the initial experience with the telescope provide such reasons. The first telescopic
observations of the sky are indistinct, indeterminate, contradictory and in conflict with what
everyone can see with his unaided eyes. And, the only theory that could have helped to separate
telescopic illusions from veridical phenomena was refuted by simple tests.
 On the other hand, there are some telescopic phenomena which are plainly Copernican. Galileo
introduces these phenomena as independent evidence for Copernicus while the situation is
rather that one refuted view – Copernicanism – has a certain similarity with phenomena
emerging from another refuted view – the idea that telescopic phenomena are faithful images
of the sky. Galileo prevails because of his style and his clever techniques of persuasion,
because he writes in Italian rather than in Latin, and because he appeals to people who are
temperamentally opposed to the old ideas and the standards of learning connected with them.
 Such ‘irrational’ methods of support are needed because of the ‘uneven development’ (Marx,
Lenin) of different parts of science. Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern
science survived only because reason was frequently overruled in their past.
 Galileo’s method works in other field as well. For example, it can be used to eliminate the
existing arguments against materialism, and to put an end to the philosophical mind/body
problem (the corresponding scientific problems remain untouched, however).
 The results obtained so far suggest abolishing the distinction between a context of discovery
and a context of justification and disregarding the related distinction between observational
terms and theoretical terms. Neither distinction plays a role in scientific practice. Attempts to
enforce them would have disastrous consequences.
 Finally, the discussion in Chapters 6-13 shows that Popper’s version of Mill’s pluralism is not
in agreement with scientific practice and would destroy science as we know it. Given science,
reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be excluded. This feature of science calls for
as anarchistic epistemology. The realization that science is not sacrosanct, and that the debate
between science and myth has ceased without having been won by either side, further
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strengthens the case for anarchism in

science.(http://pnarae.com/phil/main_phil/fey/against.htm)
Learning Outcomes
 Explain the radical view of Feyerabend regarding the methodology of science namely
‘Anything goes ‘.
 Identify the critique of Feyerabend regarding the methodologies of Popper and Lakatos
 Compare the views of Feyerabend and Kuhn regarding paradigm, incommensurability
and uniqueness of science
Learning Activities
1. Express the arguments of Feyerabend in defense of his anarchistic views regarding the
methodology of science.
2. Compare and contrast the views of Feyerabend and Popper.
3. Compare and contrast the views of Feyerabend and Lakatos.
4. Compare and contrast the views of Feyerabend and Kuhn.
Co-References
59
Chalmers ,A.F.(1999). What is this thing called Science? , Third edition: Feyerabend’s
anarchistic theory of science (chapter 10, pp149-159).Cambridge: Hackett publishing company
Bibliography
falsificationism, novel predictions and the growth of science .Cambridge: Hackett publishing
company
Chalmers, A.F.(1999). What is this thing called Science? , Third edition: Theories as structures
II: Research programs).Cambridge: Hackett publishing company
Lakotos ,I. & Musgrave, A .(1970). Criticism and growth of knowledge: Discussion by
Feyrabend ,Consolations for the specialist. London: Cambridge University press
Nandy, A..(1988). Science ,Hegamony and violence : a requiem for modernity : Francis
Bacon ,the First Philosopher of Modern Science .New Dehli: Oxford University Press
Paul Feyrabend from,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Feyerabend)
Paul Feyrabend’s Against the Method, from http://pnarae.com/phil/main_phil/fey/against.htm
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Session 14:
Critique of Modern Science
14.1Reductionism in modern science

Modern science has given rise to such a large volume of detailed but fragmental information,
that it is impossible for anyone or even a set of individuals to have even a less than detailed
knowledge of all of it. It has therefore bred a number of ‘subject specialists’, who know in detail
and claim to be experts in a small narrow field of activity. For example a Virologist, would be a
specialist on viruses (the smallest disease causing organism), and viral diseases. Although he is
likely to have a general background in Biological or medical sciences, after a few years of
specialized knowledge, he would have lost touch with part of this background knowledge.
Further he or she as a serious scientist would have been fully immersed in the narrow specialty
and his career, economic well being etc. and will be tied to it. Therefore it is natural that he
would have an exaggerated view of the importance of his specialty, if not he would at least be a
propagandist of this. He or she is now in danger of being a reductionist, ignoring the totality or
the whole and concentrating on his partitioned field of knowledge
14.2 Philosophical position of Reductionism

Reductionism provides the assumptions and criteria which guide modern science. The basic
assumptions are ontological and epistemological.
The ontological assumptions of reductionism are:
(a). that a system is reducible to its parts; and
(b). that all systems are made up of the same basic constituents which are discrete and atomistic;
and
(c). that all systems have the same basic processes which are mechanical.
The epistemological assumptions of reductionism are
(a). that knowledge of the parts of a system gives knowledge of the whole system;
(b). that ‘experts’ and ‘specialists’ are the only legitimate knowledge-seekers and knowledge-
justifiers.
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14.3 The Politics of Reductionism
Well known environmentalist Vandana Shiva expresses clearly her views on the Politics of
Reductionism in an article titled “Reductionist Science as Epistemological Violence” as given
below.
The ontological and epistemological components of the reductionist worldview provide the
framework for a particular way of doing science, which is projected as the ‘scientific method’,
that is, as the only reliable and objective way of discovering the facts of nature and correctly
understanding nature. Deriving its inspiration and authority from Descartes, modern science
gives the Cartesian method a twist to christen (name) it the sole ‘scientific method’.
This reductionist method has its uses in the fields of abstraction such as logic and mathematics,
and in the fields of man made artefacts such as mechanics. But it fails singularly to lead to a
perception of reality (truth) in the case of living organisms such as nature, including man, in
which the whole is not merely the sum of the parts, if only because the parts are so cohesively
interrelated that isolating any part distorts perception of the whole.
In any event, there is no warrant for the claim that the reductionist method is a ‘scientific
method’, much less the sole scientific method. Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Michael
Polanyi and others have convincingly argued that modern science does not proceed according to
a well-defined and stable scientific method. All that can be granted to reductionist science is that
it is an approach, a way of looking, a mode of thought. Considering its predatory treatment of
nature, attested to by the ecological crisis, it is indeed a very unreliable way.
Controlled experiment in the laboratory is a central element of the methodology of reductionist
science. The object of study is arbitrarily isolated from its natural surroundings, from its
relationship with other objects and observer(s). The context (the value framework) so provided
determines what properties are perceived in nature, and leads to a particular set of beliefs about
nature.
These is threefold exclusion in this methodology:

(i). Ontological, in that other properties are not taken note of
(ii). Epistemological, in that other ways of perceiving and knowing are not recognized.
(ii). Sociological, in that the non-expert is deprived of the right both of access to knowledge and
of judging the claims of knowledge.
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All this is the stuff of politics, not science. Picking one group of people (the specialists), who
adopt one way of knowing the physical world (the reductionist), to find one set of properties in
nature (the reductionist/mechanistic), is a political, not a scientific, act. It is this act that is
claimed to be the ‘scientific method’. The knowledge obtained is presented as ‘the laws of
nature’ wholly ‘objective’ and altogether universal.
It is argued in defence of modern science that it is not science but the political misuse of science
and the unethical technological application of science that lead to violence. The speciousness of
the argument was always clear, but is totally untenable in today’s world, when science and
technology have become cognitively inseparable and the amalgam has been incorporated into the
economic system.. Fragmentation of science into a variety of specializations and sub-
specializations is used as a smokescreen to blur the perception of this linkage between science
and a particular model of social organization that is, a particular ideology. Science claims that
since scientific truths, are verifiable, they are justified beliefs and therefore universal, regardless
of the social context.
The verificationist model of science was forcefully presented by Positivism. It claimed that
verification was direct observation of the ‘facts’ of nature, free from the proclivities of the
observer. This was, however, challenged by post-positivist philosophers. Kuhn, for example,
showed that facts and data in science are determined by the theoretical commitment of scientists.
In other words, scientific facts are determined by the social world of scientists, not by the natural
world.
While the Kuhnian model challenged the neutrality of scientific facts, it failed to provide an
adequate epistemological framework for handling the violence of reductionist science. By
insisting that ‘nature fits into the realistic boxes of paradigms’, Kuhn rendered his model of
science materially and politically vacuous. Moreover, he failed to take into account the value
system of the larger society that determines the choice of scientific research. Value-
determination in the Kuhnian model is done by scientific paradigms, not by social, political,
economic interests. By restricting itself to the social world of scientists, the Kuhnian model is
unable to deal with the more significant value determination of scientific facts by the demands
made on the system of science by economic interests. Moreover, by restricting himself to the
material world of the lab, Kuhn was unable to deal with those ecological situations in which
reductionist claims are falsified by nature, as symbolized by ecological crises.
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A more appropriate account of modern science (including technology) should extend the
Kuhnian model both materially and socially. Materially, the testing of scientific beliefs has to be
taken out of cloistered labs into the wider physical world. Socially, the world of scientific
experiments and beliefs has to be extended beyond the social organization of science to the
social organization of society. The verification and validation of a system of science would then
be validation in practice, where practice is real life activity in society and nature.
14.4 Profits, Reductionism and Violence

The artificial cognitive dichotomy between science and technology dissolves when science is
viewed as a set of beliefs guiding practice, and technology as practice guided by scientific belief.
The duality between belief and action, thought and practice, is responsible for encouraging many
to mistake the cognitive weaknesses of reductionism for cognitive success.
Reductionism, however, is not an epistemological accident. It is related to the needs of a
particular form of economic organization. The reductionist worldview, the industrial revolution
and the capitalist economy were the philosophical, technological and economic components of
the same process. Individual firms and fragmented sectors of the economy, whether privately or
publicly owned, have their own efficiency needs in mind; and every firm and sector measures its
efficiency by the extent to which it maximizes its gains, regardless of the fact that in the process
it also maximizes the social and ecological costs of the production process. The logic of this
internal efficiency is provided by reductionism: only those properties of a resource system are
taken into account which generate profits through exploitation and extraction; properties which
stabilize ecological processes but are commercially non exploitative are ignored and eventually
destroyed.
The rationality and efficacy of the reductionist and non-reductionist knowledge systems are
never evaluated cognitively. The rationality of reductionist science is declared a-priori superior,
even though it can be argued that if reductionist science has displaced non-reductionist modes of
knowledge, it has done so not through cognitive competition, but through political support from
the state and the state’s development policies and development programmes which provide both
financial subsidies and ideological support for the appropriation of nature for profits. Since the
twin myths of progress (material prosperity and superior rationality) have lost their sheen in the
working out of development patterns and paradigms, and have been visibly exploded by the
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widespread ecological crisis, the state has stepped in to transform myths into an ideology. When
an individual firm or sector directly confronts the larger society in its commercial appropriation
of nature, people can assess the costs and benefits for themselves; they can differentiate between
progress and regression, rationality and irrationality. But with the mediation of the state, the
citizen-as-subject becomes the object of change rather than its determinant and consequently
loses the right to assess progress. If they have to bear the costs instead of reaping any benefit of
‘development’ it is justified as a minor sacrifice for the ‘national interest’.
The link between the state and the creation of surplus value provides the power with which
reductionism establishes its supremacy. Institutions of learning in agriculture, medicine and
forestry, for instance, selectively train people in reductionist paradigms, which are given the
names respectively of ‘scientific agriculture’, ‘scientific medicine’ and ‘scientific forestry’, to
prove the superiority of reductionist science. Stripped of the power the state invests it with, such
a science can be seen to be cognitively weak and ineffective in responding to problems posed by
nature. As a system of knowledge about nature, reductionist science is weak and inadequate; as
a system of knowledge for the market, it is powerful and profitable.
Let us consider some ecological crises created by the reductionst science and technology
(i). Eucalyptus Planting (under scientific forestry)
Desertification and its consequence, famine, has already caused the death of over 900,000 people
in Ethiopia. In the Sahel, 40 to 90 percent of the livestock has died.
Since ancient times societies have known that forests are the best insurance against
desertification and famine. The reductionist version of this response to desertification is itself a
prescription for desertification. Under the World Food Programme, FAO planted eucalyptus in
Ethiopia, Under the social forestry schemes for ecological repair, the World Bank, SIDA,
USAID have coaxed India into putting farmlands under eucalyptus. People who for centuries
have been planters and protectors of trees have suddenly been marginalized. Knowledge of tree
planting has become the sole preserve of international and national bureaucracies. Throughout
the world, irrespective of local ecological conditions and economic needs, the prescription is
only one-eucalyptus. The biological wealth and diversity of the tropics have been destroyed to
make room for the reductionist solution, even through eucalyptus causes rather than cures
deserts, upsets the cycle of life, the hydrological cycle and the nutrient cycle.
The ecological audit of eucalyptus plantations reveals that it involves heavy economic costs
through the destruction of the hydrological stability and soil productivity in the following ways
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First, in regions which have water scarcity, the high waterintake of eucalyptus destroys the
natural processes that replenish soil moisture and recharge the sources of underground water,
turning the region into a completely arid zone. Moreover,eucalyptus damages the innate
allelomorphic capacity of all other plants, seriously depleting the gene pool. The process
initiated by large-scale cultivation of eucalyptus in water-scarce regions therefore leads
inexorably to desertification.
Second, on fertile agricultural lands, eucalyptus, when planted and harvested in short rotation,
heavily diminishes soil nutrients, destroying the soil’s capacity for biological productivity.
Moreover, eucalyptus destroys the environment for soil fauna that are at once ‘factories’ for
reproducing soil fertility, and efficient ‘machines’ for maintaining the soil structure.
In the countries of the South, desertification has become an increasingly severe threat to human
survival. The recently published UNEP report on deserts estimates that about 3-5 million
hectares of productive and fertile rain-fed land is being lost annually. The food crisis in Africa
testifies to the cost of desertification in human and economic terms. It is also a reminder that
many of the economic problems of the poorest of mankind are rooted in the ecological
destruction caused by excessive demands on the natural resources by the elites of the world.
Eucalyptus emerged as a magical candidate for all kinds of a-forestation programmes during the
1960s because it is a fast-growing species. This belief was, however, challenged and it was
shown that many indigenous species have higher growth rates than eucalyptus.
In spite of eucalyptus being fast-growing and productive only in the narrow context of wood-
fibre production, it was prescribed as a universal means for achieving increased productivity of
biomass for the satisfaction of diverse needs. And so, a reductionist view of forestry wedded to
pulp industry was universalized at the cost of conservation of soil and water.
The rapid decline, and even total destruction, of water resources as a consequence of large-scale
planting of eucalyptus has been reported from all parts of India. The environmentalist Sunderlal
Bahuguna recorded the following statement of an elderly forest ranger in the Nainital tarai of
Uttar Pradesh: ‘We felled mixed natural forest of this area and planted eucalyptus. Our hand
pumps have gone dry as the water-table has gone down. We have committed a sin’.
Sri Lankan experience regarding eucalyptus
Eucalyptus Planting (Sri Lankan Experience)
As mentioned in this article by Vandana Shiva, eucalyptus planting programmes were introduced
and implemented in Ethiopia and India by the international organizations such as the Food and
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Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Bank and USAID. In Sri Lanka too an eucalyptus
planting programme was implemented under the patronage of the World Bank in the early 1990s.
The Sri Lankan scholars who were trained in UK advised the government to carry out an
eucalyptus planting programme in Sri Lanka. This was implemented in various parts of the
country and the World Bank consultants even introduced a Forestry Master Plan for Sri Lanka
which included the world renowned tropical rain forest in Sri Lanka namely “Sinharaja Forest”.
Due to the strong protests by the peasants and environmentalists this forestry master plan was
withdrawn. After experiencing the harmful effects of the existing eucalyptus plantations and the
continuous protests by the environmentalists and rural people in those areas, the Sri Lankan
government finally decided to gradually clear the eucalyptus plantations and substitutethem with
suitable indigenous species which restore ecological balance.
Reductionist forestry science is intimately linked to forest based industry, notwithstanding its
claim to be ‘objective’. When its violence to nature through desertification, and its violence to
man through famine, is exposed, official foresters turn on the victims of desertification and
accuse them of colossal ignorance of the science of forestry. But this science does not balk at
manufacturing data to legitimize misinformation; it violates the tradition of science itself to deny
people the right to know and to hide, under the protective umbrella of the state, the nexus
between modern science and capital accumulation.
(ii). Pesticides (Under Scientific agriculture)
Traditional, or what the reductionist world-view calls unscientific, systems of food production
have managed pest control by a series of measures which included building up plant resistance,
practising rotational and mixed cropping, and providing habitats for pest-predators in farm trees
and hedgerows. These practices created stable local conditions; a balance was achieved between
plants and their pests through natural competition, selection and predator-prey relationships.
Myths are generally found to be important sources of traditional knowledge about quiet but
essential ecological processes. For example, the Kayape Indians of the Amazon basin have a
ritual in which the women paint their faces with ant parts in the maize festival. The principal
theme of the myth is the celebration of the little red ant as the guardian of the fields and a friend
of women.
‘Scientific’ farming upset this balance and created favourable conditions for the multiplication of
disease. Organic fertilizer, which builds up plant resistance to disease, was replaced by chemical
fertilizers, which decrease plant resistance to by chemical fertilizers, which decrease plant
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resistance to pests. Since many pests are specific to particular plants, replacing crop rotations by
the planting of the same crop year after year often encourages pest build-ups. Substitution of
mixed cropping pattern by monoculture also makes crops more prone to pest attacks. The
mechanization of farming leads to the destruction of hedgerows and trees, and thus destroys the
habitat for some pest-predators.
The problem of pest control was therefore mostly a problem created by the disturbance of the
ecological balance of agro-ecosystems by the introduction of ‘scientific agriculture’.
Reductionist science was concerned merely with the existence of pests, not with the ecology of
pests. The solution that suited both science and the pesticide industry was production and sale of
poisons to kill pests. As a pesticide company announced in a TV advertisement, ‘The only good
bug in a dead bug’.
Interference with natural balance also fails to anticipate and predict what will happen when that
balance is upset. Besides reflecting the cognitive weakness of the approach of over-kill, the
violenceof the pesticide-based approach decreases plant resistance, increases pest attacks and the
need for even more pesticides. Gradually, pesticides are absorbed by plants and animals in ever
increasing quantities. Rachel Carson’s book titled “The Silent Spring” remains the best
commentary on how pesticides are becoming a major source of water pollution and health
hazards.
The claims made by reductionist science and the pesticides industries about the damage to crops
prevented by pesticides have a persuasive ring because the effect of pesticides is visible. A heap
of bugs killed in a lightning operation can be dramatized and turned into an impressive sight and
good selling point. Natural enemies of pests, on the other hand, although more effective because
they do not produce any destructive fall-out for flora, fauna and humans, work quietly and
invisibly and cannot therefore be shown on the
TV screen dancing round a heap of bugs. Chemical pesticides are successful but indiscriminate
killers; they kill not only pests, but the natural enemies of pests also.
That ignorance, irrationality and greed are characteristics of the pesticide industry have been
tragically revealed in the Bhopal disaster. Union Carbide was simultaneously a creator of
scientific knowledge, profits and violence.
But in spite of its complete failure to solve the problem of pest control, and in spite of its
violence against nature and humans, the sale of pesticides continues to increase, because its use
is insured through state agricultural policy, through pesticide subsidies and through pesticide
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propaganda, and also because pesticides destroy the ecological basis of the alternative systems of
pest management that show better and longer-lasting results.
Note: Bhopal disaster

The Bhopal Gas tragedy is the worst air pollution episode ever witnessed in India. It happened
in Bhopal on December 3, 1984.
The Union Carbide factory was located in Bhopal, a town in Madhya Pradesh. The fateful
incident happened due to the leakage of lethal gas called methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas from three
storage tanks of Union carbide factory, a Multinational Corporation. MIC is an intermediate
used in the manufacture of pesticides. Methyl isocyanate (MIC) is produced by combination of
phosgene, a deadly poisonous gas used in the First World War with methyl amine. In the
accident nearly 36 tones of poisonous MIC gas released into the air of Bhopal. MIC gas causes
burning sensation in the eyes, removes oxygen from the lungs resulting in breathing trouble and
chest tightness, and also cyanide generation in the body, which ultimately turn fatal and leads to
death.
Bhopal gas tragedy caused the single biggest air pollution tragedy which, according to official
sources, claimed 2500 lives, whereas non-governmental sources put the figure much higher.
According to the figure released by the government around 17,000 people have been rendered
permanent disabled and another 30,000 partially handicapped. Those who have suffered mini
disability number about 150,000.
The Bhopal gas tragedy polluted drinking water, soils, tank and pond water and adversely
affected foetus, newly born babies, pregnant woman, young and old people alike. It killed
thousands of animals and innumerable micro-organisms.
The tragedy is a burning example of one of the deadliest disasters caused by arrogance and
negligence of the authorities of a USA based Multinational Corporation and relevant authorities
of the Indian government who allowed the setting up of the Union Carbide factory in a densely
populated area of Bhopal.
Sri Lankan experience regarding a serious health hazard due to the usage of pesticide.
Chronic Kidney Disease (CKD) among paddy farmers in the North-Central Province of Sri
Lanka was first reported in 1994. Since then it has spread to other agricultural communities in
the Dry Zone. This had not been attributed to any of the known causes of CKD like diabetes,
hypertension etc. Thus, it was named as Chromic Kidney Disease of unknown origin (CKDu).
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Various groups involving university academics, medical and agricultural experts have done
research on this Chronic Kidney Disease using large amount of financial and other resources of
the
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Ministry of Health (MOH). These researchers have
given various conclusions as the cause of the CKD, such as high Floride ion content in the
ground water in those areas, excessive usage of low quality Aluminium utensils for cooking
food, the heavy metal ‘Cadmium’ available in the imported phosphate fertilizer etc. All these
causes have been soundly disproved by subsequent investigations. A group of medical experts
and university academics have done a comprehensive study on the CKD in the area Padhavi Sri
Pura where this disease is prevalent. They came up with the conclusion that ‘Arsenic’ available
in Pesticides (Specially the most widely used Pesticide namely Glyphosate) and imported
chemical (phosphate)fertilizer is the main contributor to the CKD. They also identified two
other factors namely heavy water and reddish-brown soil in those areas. They concluded that the
above three factors combined to cause the CKD. This research team carried out their research
according to the accepted procedures of the western science and medicine. They even verified
their results at some world renowned laboratories in Malaysia and USA. This research team
advised the government to ban the import of the above mentioned agrochemicals and chemical
fertilizers and encourage the use of traditional methods of pest control and organic fertilizers.
But many university academics and agriculture experts, most of whom are linked with
multinational companies exporting agrochemicals and chemical fertilizers to Sri Lanka, attacked
the findings of the above mentioned research team. They tried hard to divert the main cause
(Arsenic in agrochemicals) to natural causes such as ground water, soil quality and excessive
heat in those areas. Their arguments were soundly nullified by the experts in the above
mentioned research team. But the opposing experts who defended the use of agrochemicals and
chemical fertilizers were more powerful because most of them had links with the multinational
companies whose owners and directors had strong connections with the high ranking officials of
the Ministry of Agriculture and powerfulpoliticians and the media owners. Therefore they
managed to prevent the recommended agrochemical ban and let the continued the use of those
harmful agrochemicals and chemical fertilizers. This shows the tremendous power of the
multinational companies and the hegemony of the western science.
But in spite of its complete failure to solve the problem of pest control, and in spite of its
violence against nature and humans, the sale of pesticides continues to increase, because its use
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is insured through state agricultural policy, through pesticide subsidies and through pesticide
propaganda, and also because pesticides destroy the ecological basis of the alternative systems of
pest management that show better and longer-lasting results.
(iii). Medical Drugs

Medicine is generally presented as an area in which modern science has the most achievements
and successes to its credit. But there is increasing evidence that modern medicine and
therapeutics have themselves become a source of disease and death. According to Ivan Illich,
diseases brought on by doctors are a greater cause of increased mortality than traffic accidents
and war-related activities. Iatrogenic illnesses cause between 60,000 to 140,000 deaths in
America alone each year, and leave 2 to 5 million others more or less seriously ill. The situation
is worst in establishments which generate medical knowledge, viz. University hospitals where
one in five patients contracts an iatrogenic disease which usually requires special treatment, and
leads to death in one case out of thirty.
‘Scientific medicine’ extends its monopoly even to those cases of common diseases in which
people would get well without therapeutic intervention. It only converts simple problems into
serious or fatal ones. Thus, diarrhoea has always been common illness managed traditionally by
diet control and re-hydration. Rice water, kanji, isabgol, curd, coconut water are just a few
among the numerous traditionally established means for controlling diarrhoea in tropical
countries like India.
When ‘scientific medicine’ steps in, it reduces the problem of diarrhoea to the existence of a
discrete entity in the guts that can be cured only by drugs. This shifts the focus from the patient
to the disease and applies solutions which result in violence on the patient, both through drugs
and the side effects of drugs. “It is not necessary to cure the patient, but the disease itself must
be the focus of medical attention with the patient as a kind of inert carrier of his condition. The
doctor is not interested in equilibrium. He is at war.
Clioquinol was introduced as an anti-diarrhoeal drug in 1934 by Ciba-Geigy under the brand
names of Mexaform and Enterovioform. Although its effectiveness was established only for
amoebiasis in lab and clinical trials, its therapeutic action was extrapolated to all kinds of
diarrhoea. Clioquinol was indicated for summer, traveller’s or unspecified diarrhoea, gastro-
enteritis, colitis, and digestive disorders associated with diarrhoea. It was even suggested for
prophylactic use. It therefore became a commonly dispensed drug for common aliments.
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Ciba and the scientists working in its support universalized the efficacy of the drug on the basis
of scanty information in order to capture larger markets. But this medical ‘science’ showed an
amazing reluctance to use information already available about the toxic effects of the drug. As
early as 1935 two cases with severe neurological symptoms and signs were reported in
Argentina, and one of the authors of the report informed the drug company about the suspected
adverse effects. Between 1935 and 1970 the potential risk of irreversible neurological damage
was documented in the medical literature as well as in the internal files of CIBA. According to
late Dr. Olle Hanson, ‘Attempts to hide facts, deny facts and attempts to convince doctors not to
publish their negative experimental findings have been made throughout by Ciba Geigy, the
producers of Mexaform and Enterovioform.
The cost of hiding these facts in order to continue sales was the crippling of an estimated 10,000-
30,000 people in Japan also, where the prescription of Clioquinol led to a SMON epidemic, a
severe neurological disorder caused by the drug. SMON stands for ‘Subacute Mylo Optic
Neuropathy’, in plain English it means loss of sight, loss of function of legs, loss of bladder
control, and constant pain in the legs.
In 1970, Professor Tadao Tusbaku discovered that SMON was caused by Clioquinol. In 1971,
5000 SMON victims filed law suits in Japan against Ciba-Geigy. In spite of all the evidence, the
drug company stated that there might be another factor to cause SMON, but could not prove any
factor besides Clioquinol through eight years of examination. The company that has generalized
the efficacy of the drug for all kinds of diarrhoea considered all the evidence inadequate to prove
the side effects of the drug. The Tokyo district court, however, decided that Clioquinol was the
cause of SMON.
The next ‘scientific’ move by Ciba smacked of racism. It said that the Japanese were genetically
prone to SMON. That canard was exploded when Dr. Hanson found forty cases of SMON in
Sweden. It became evident that the high incidence of the disease in Japan was due to over
prescription-because the doctor’s income in the Japanese health system depends on the quantity
of drugs he prescribes. The second reason is related to reductionism and the myth of the
universal validity of modern science, which ignores the fact that since the Japanese are of a
smaller build than Europeans and Americans, the dose advised per kilogram is relatively large
for the Japanese people.
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Even the discovery of cases outside Japan was not accepted as an adequate reason to suspend
sales of the drug. At the Geneva press conference on SMON in 1980, Dr. Sabatkiewiez of Ciba-
Geigy stated:
“We have no medical reason to be afraid of this drug. I have seen Clioquinol used in tropical
countries. I know there is need for it, and we have no – I repet no – medical reason to withdraw
the drug from the market at this moment”.
As Ciba-Geigy continued to market the drug, SMON victims from Japan raised funds to inform
people in other countries of the hazards of the drug. Pressure mounted on Ciba Geigy when
Scandinavian doctors boycotted its product and demanded withdrawal of Mexaform and
Enterovioform from the third world. When, in 1978, Ciba eventually announced the withdrawal
of the drugs, there was hue and cry from some doctors in India who could not comprehend why
such a ‘wonderful’ drug was being withdrawn; they did not know that the drugs had been proved
to be harmful. And no wonder; for it is in the nature of their science to close the lid on correct
and full information, and to disseminate misinformation. That is why the Clioquinol controversy
did not deter drug companies from continuing to manufacture hazardous drugs on the non-
experts’ certificates about safety. For, without an adequate and appropriate challenge of the kind
that was offered to Ciba, the modern medical system is left free to grow in direct proportion to
the damage it does.
Scientific medicine uses different criteria for measuring a drug’s strength and weakness. It uses
one set of criteria for efficacy and quite another for drug toxicity. And this is supposed to be a
system of knowledge which is ‘objective’, which has no bias. In the case of Ciba it was because
of the involvement of doctors and the public in a campaign that the bias came out in the open. In
most cases, the bias lies undiscovered and passes for neutral, objective, universal science.
Simple ailments have been cured over centuries by appropriate use of dococtions made from
plants and minerals found in nature. ‘Scientific medicine’ removes the diversity by isolating
‘active’ ingredients or by synthesizing chemical combinations. Such processing first involves
violence against the complex balance inherent in natural resources. And then, when the chemical
is introduced into the human body, it is often a violation of human physiology.
But it is highly unlikely that medical science and pharmaceutical establishments will pay heed.
For the reductionist medical science cannot but manufacture reductionist products and
undermine the balance inherent in natural products. The multinationals that produce synthetic
drugs in pursuit of fabulous profits ignore their toxic side-effects. When they are forbidden to
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sell some harmful drugs in the home countries, they find a lucrative market in the third world
where the elites, including the medical establishment, are usually bewitched by anything that is
offered as scientific, especially if it comes wrapped in pretty pay offs. They give a free hand to
multinationals to buy medicinal plants at dirt-cheap rates and sell the processed pills in the third-
world countries at exorbitant prices and at enormous cost to the health of the people. The elites
cannot accept that it would be more equitable socially, cheaper economically, conductive to self
reliance politically, and more beneficial medically for the third world countries to use the plants
locally according to time tested indigenous pharmacology.
While multinational drug companies and the third world political elites are out for profits, the
third world intellectual elites, eager to prove their scientific temper, join in a chorus to denounce
indigenous therapeutics and related knowledge systems as hocus-pocus and their practice as
quackery. It is through this mixture of misinformation, falsehood and bribes that a reductionist
medical science has established its monopoly on medical knowledge in many societies.
And, as we have seen the links between modern medical science, violence and profits are not
only through politics and economics but also, as in the case of agriculture and scientific forestry,
through the internally determined structure and content of the system of scientific knowledge.
Learning Outcomes
 Explain what ‘Reductionism in modern science’ means.

 Identify clearly the ontological assumptions of reductionism
 Identify clearly the epistemological assumptions of reductionism
 Identify clearly the epistemological assumptions of reductionism
 Identify some ecological crises created by the reductionist science and technology
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Nature of Science
Learning Activities
1.Briefly describe what Reductionism in modern science means
2.Outline the ontological assumptions of reductionism
3.Outline the epistemological assumptions of reductionism
4.Outline the ontological assumptions of reductionism
5.Explain briefly one ecological crisis created by the reductionist science and technology in
India.
6.Explain briefly one ecological crisis created by the reductionist science and technology in Sri
Lanka.
References
Nandy, A..(1988). Science ,Hegamony and Violence : a requiem for modernity :Reductionist
Science as Epistemological Violence, by Vandana Shiva.New Dehli: Oxford University Press
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Session 15:
Special Theory of Relativity
A Revolution in Science
15.1 Introduction
For over 200 years the equation of motion enunciated by Isaac Newton were believed to describe nature
correctly. But in 1905 an error in these Newton's laws of motion was detected and the way to correct it
was also suggested by Albert Einstein.
Before dealing with the error and correction mentioned above we should deal with some important
concepts related to Special Theory of relativity (STR)
15.2 Frames of Reference
A frame of reference is a conventional standard of rest, relative to which measurements can be made
and experiments described. For example, if we choose a frame of reference rigidly attached to the earth,
the trajectories of the stars in the right sky are concentric circles. The question "what type of reference
frame is most convenient for the development of physical theories?" is of fundamental significance for the
STR.
15.3 Inertial (or Galilean) frames of reference:

Newton assumed that an absolute space and an absolute time existed. For
example he wrote:"Absolute space in its own nature and without regard to anything externalalways
remains similar and unmovable".
"Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and by its own nature, flows
uniformly, without regard to anything external".
If in a frame of reference a body not under the influence of any forces moves in a straight line with
constant speed, then Newton's first law is valid in this reference frame. Such a reference frame is called
an inertial reference frame and Newton's law of motion hold true in it.
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The concept of an inertial frame is meaningful as an approximation and is a very convenient idealization
in mechanics. In such a coordinate system, the interaction forces are measured by the accelerations of the
bodies. It has been verified by experiments that Newton's frame of reference taking stars to be fixed is
an inertial frame.Onthe other hand , a reference frame fixed in earth is not an inertiai frame, as the
earth rotates about its axis as well as around the sun. But for almost all practical purposes, experiments
performed on earth (although it is not an inertial frame) do not give errors of great significance.
15.4 Galilean Transformations
Let S be an inertial reference frame fixed in the Newton's absolute space. Consider another reference
frame, S', which is moving with uniform velocity v relative to frame S along the common x axis. Let
the origins of the two frames S and S' coincide at a time t = t'=0 and let the direction of y' and z' axes
coincide with the y and z axes of S at t = 0. With the standard notation, an event P with space and time
coordinates in S are (x,y,z,t) and the corresponding space and time coordinates of P in S' are
(x',y',z',t') then, according to Galilean Transformations,
x' = x – vt
y’ = y
z’ = z
t’ = t
15.5 The question of 'Ether'
James Clerk Maxwell who created the equations of electromagnetism (electrodynamics) , conceived
elastic and magnetic fields as arising when an all pervasive elastic medium, he called the ' ether'
was put into a state of stress.
Thus, he regarded a light wave as a wave of stress being propagated through the ether in the same
way that a sound wave is a wave of compression propagated through the atmosphere (air). Now if
there is an ether , does it surround the earth and travel with it, or does it remain stationary while
the earth travels through it? Various known facts (eg: aberration of light) indicate that the ether does
not travel with the earth. If , then, the earth is moving through the ether , there must be an 'ether
wind', just as a person riding on a bicycle through still air, feels an air wind blowing past him. So an
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experiment was performed by Michelson and Morley in 1887, to detect this ether wind. But much
to the surprise of every one, no ether wind was detected.
15.6 Explanation of the null result of Michelson and Morley(M-M)

experiment
In 1892 Lerentz and Fitzgerald independently proposed a hypothesis to explain the null
result of the M-M experiment and thereby defend the existence of ether. "All material
bodies moving with velocity v are contracted in the direction of motion by a factor
1
 v2  2
1   , where c is the velocity of light”.
 c 2 
15.7 Albert Einstein's response to 'ether'

Einstein ruled out the existence of ether. He said that no experiment could detect
the velocity of earth through ether simply because there is no ether. In 1905 he stated
"Nature is such that it is impossible to determine absolute motion by any
experiment whatsoever". It was the first clear statement of the law of relativity. His
conclusion was that the motion relative to material bodies has physical
significance while the motion through ether (relative to ether) is meaningless. In
other words, there is no such thing as an absolute motion and all motions are relative.
15.8 The choice between Newton's laws of motion and

Maxwell electromagnetism.
The principle of relativity has been used in mechanics by Galileo. Einstein expanded
this for all laws of physics. Thus, Einstein's principle of relativity "Laws of physics
have the same form in all inertial reference frames".
There was a serious problem with the Maxwell's laws of electromagnetism. They did
not seem to obey the principle of relativity. Maxwell's laws of electromagnetism
does not take the same form under Galilean transformation. But Newton's laws of
motion take the same form under Galilean transformation. At that time Newton's laws
of motion were about 200 years old and Maxwell's laws of electromagnetism were
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about20 years old. Therefore scientists thought that there was something wrong in the
Maxwell's laws (equations) of electromagnetism. Attempts to change, Maxwell's
laws of electromagnetism led to predictions of thephenomena that did not exist at all
when tested experimentally, so had to be abandoned. Then it gradually became clear that
Maxwell’s laws of electromagnetism (electrodynamics) were correct, and the trouble
to besought elsewhere.
That is when Einstein took the bold step to modify the Newton's laws of motion.
Einstein corrected Newton's second law
 
 ie F  mv  , where m (mass) is a constant  by proposing that m (mass)
d
 dt 
is not a constant but m (mass) increases with velocity such that
m0
m where mo represents the 'rest mass' (ie mass of the body that
v2
1 2
c
is at rest) and c is the speed of light.
In the meantime Lorentz noticed a remarkable and curious result when hemade the
following transformation on the Maxwell's Laws of electromagnetism:
x  vt
x' 
v2
1
c2
y’ = y
z’ = z
vx
t
t'  c2
v2
1 2
c
Or
x' =  (x – vt)
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y’ = y
z’ = z
 vx  1
t’ =   t  2  where  
 c  v2
1
c2
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Maxwell's laws of electromagnetism remain in the same form when the above
transformation is applied to them. These equations are called
Lorentztransformation.
Einstein then proposed that all the laws of physics should be of such a kindthat
they remain unchanged (takes the same form) under a Lorentztransformation.
Inother words, we should change not the Maxwell's laws ofelectrodynamics, but
Newton's laws of mechanics. How shall we changeNewton's laws so that they
will remain unchanged (take the same form under the Lorentz
transformation)? Ifthis goal is set, we then have to rewrite Newton's equations
in such a way that the conditions we haveimposed are satisfied. As it turned out ,
the only requirement is that the mass
m0
(m) in Newton's equations must be replaced by m =
v2
1
c2
When this change is made, Newton's laws of motion and Maxwell's laws
ofelectromagnetism (electrodynamics) will harmonize.
Self Assessments Questions (SAQ) 14.8
This exercise is to develop your ability to solve problems using the Lorentz
transformation equations.
Observer in an inertial frame S assigns the space-time coordinates for an event

as (100 km, 10 km, 1 km, 200 s).
What are the coordinates of this event in the frame S’ which moves in the
direction of increasing x with speed 0.90 c? Assume that the origins of two
coordinate systems representing frames S and S’ coincide when t = t’ = 0.
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15.9 The postulates of STR
The two basic postulates of STR are:
(i) Laws of physics have the same form in all inertial of reference frames
(Theprinciple of relativity)
(ii) The velocity of light in free space in the same for all observers independent
ofthe relative velocity of the source of light and the observer.(The principle ofthe
constancy of c)
The basic concept of relativity is as old as the mechanics of Galileo

andNewton. Einstein extended it to all the laws of physics including the laws
ofoptics and laws of electromagnetism. According to the principle of relativity,if
an isolated system is observed from two different inertial frames, onemoving
with uniform velocity relative to other, though the observations on thesystem carried
out in the two inertial frames yield different numerical valuesfor the same
quantities, the laws derived on the basis of these observationsshould have the
same mathematical form in both inertial frames.
15.10 Nature of time and simultaneity
Einstein ruled out the classical concept of absolute space and time and
forwarded his special theory of relativity based on the relative nature of space
and time.
If two events take place at the same time, then they are known as simultaneous
events. Two independent events which are simultaneous for an observe in an
inertial frame may not necessarily be simultaneous for anogher observer in a
different internal frame which is moving relative to the former. Simultaneity
is not an absolute concept but a relative concept and it depends on the state of
motion of the observer. The relativity of simultaneity is directly linked with
the relativity of time.
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Self Assessments Questions (SAQ) 14.10
This exercise is for you to realize that the simultaneity is a relative concept
and it depends on the state of motion of the observer.
The space-time coordinates fo two events as measured by an observer. O are

x1 = 6  104 m, y1 = z1 = Om, t1 = 2  10-4 s and x2 = 12 104 m, y2 = z2 = o
m, t2 = 1  10-4 s.
What must be the velocity of observer O’ with respect to the observer O if O’

measures the two events to occur simultaneously? Also find the spatial
separation of the two events as measured by O?
15.11 Some consequences of the Lorentz

Transformation (LT):
(i) Length contraction
The Lorentz transformation equations predict that, "when a body moves with
the velocity v relative to an observer, its measured length is contracted in the
v2
direction of its motion by a factor 1  2 , whereas its
c
dimensionperpendicular to the direction of its motion is unaffected".
Let the inertial frame S' moves with velocity v along the x-axis relative to
aninertial frame S.
Let l’ and l be the length a of a rigid rod as measured in frames S' and S
respectively.
1
 v2  2
Then we can show by using LT thatl’ =l 1  2  and l’ <l
 c 
(ii) Time dilation and apparent retardation of clocks

Consider the two inertial frames of reference S and S' such that S' is
moving with uniform velocity v along the x-axis w.r.t frame S.
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Let the time interval between two events as measured in frame S be

t = t2 – t1
Let the corresponding time interval between the same two events as
measured in frame S' be
t’ = t’2 – t’1
Then we can show using LT that
1
 v2  2
t '  t 1 - 2  and t’ >t
 c 
Therefore we can conclude that,
"A moving clock always appears to go slow". This is called the apparent
retardation of clocks.
Note: Time dilation means lengthening of a time interval.
In other words , when the clock in the spaceship (or rocket) records 1 second
is
1
elapsed, as seen by the observer in the spaceship, it shows seconds
v2
1 2
c
to the observer outside the spaceship. The interval t’, as it appears to the
observer in motion is lengthened, i.e. the time is dilated and hence called the
“time dilation”. This time dilation is due to the nature of time and is nothing to
do with any mechanical changes that may happen in a clock. The time dilation
given by the equation is a very real observable effect.
Example for time dilation (14.11)
This interesting example on time dilation allows you to calculate the

lengthened time interval due to the time dilation in relativity.
Once a 40 years old scientist falls in love with 16 years old girl who is his
laboratory assistant. They decided to marry, but feel that their marriage
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cannot be welcomed by the society due to the age difference. The scientist
decided to make use of the principle of time dilation of relativity to
minimize the age gap between him and the girl. So he synchronizes his
clock with that of his assistant and goes for a long journey in a rocket with
velocity 0.999c. He returns back when his clock reads one year. How many
years have passed in the assistant’s clock as observed by the scientist?
What will be the age difference between the scientist and his assistant once
he returned to the earth?
Solution
∆𝑡0
Let us recall the time dilation equation ∆𝑡 = 2
√1−𝑣 ⁄ 2
𝑐
event 1: Scientist leaving the earth
event 2 : Scientist returning to the earth
The scientist observe both events by his clock and the time interval will be a
proper time for him. t0 = 1 year
Substituting v = 0.999 c and t0 = 1 year I the above equation, we get
1
∆𝑡 = = 22.7 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
0.999𝑐 2
1−( 𝑐 )
The scientist finds that in her clock, 22.7 years have passed.
Now the scientist is 40 + 1 = 41 year old
And his assistant is 16 + 22.7 = 38.7 years old
The age difference = 2.3 years
Their age difference barrier has now been overcome. Therefore they can
marry happily.
Experimental verification of time dilation
The time dilation effect was successfully tested in 1971 by two American
physicists. They flew very precise cesium atomic clock around the world on
jet airplanes. Since the speed of jet airplanes is much smaller than the speed
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of light, the resulting time dilation effect is very small. However, the atomic
clocks used were capable of monitoring even a difference of a nanosecond.
The relativistically predicted time laps between the clocks on jet airplanes
from those on the earth were in good agreement with the experimental
observation. These results confirm the fact that ‘moving clocks run slower’.
Let us discuss another experiment confirming the time dilation and verifying
the concept of relativity. Muons are subatomic particles with a short lifetime
of about 2.2 s when at rest. These muons are charged particles with mass
aobut 200 times that of an electron.
A muon produced at higher altitude in the atmosphere may not expect to reach
the surface of the earth before it disintegrates into other particles because of
its short lifetime. However experiments reveal that there is a large number of
muons reach the earth surface. This is possible due to the dilated muon life
time that occurs as a consequence of the time dilation in relativity.
Example : The lifetime of Muon
This example intends to show you how muons with a short lifetime could
reach the earth’s surface as a result of time dilation.
A muon produced in the upper atmosphere at ten thousand meters above the
sea level, travels toward the earth surface at a speed of 0.999c, assume that
the average lifetime of a muon at rest is 2.20 s. Find (a) the average lifetime
of a muon as measured by an earth observer, (b) the distance a muon travels
before it disintegrates into other particles.
Solution
(a). The two events take place in the process are :
Event 1 : production of muon
Event 2 : disintegration of muon to other particles
When a muon is at rest, both events happen at the same place and the time
interval between the two events is a proper time interval and t0 = lifetime
of the muon.
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Nature of Science
t0 = 2.20 s
When the muon is travelling at a speed of 0.999c with respect to the earth,
the earth observer measures the lifetime of the muon as t and the time
dilation gives,
∆𝑡0
∆𝑡 =
2
√1 − 𝑣 ⁄ 2
𝑐
Substituting t0 = 2.20  10-6 s and v = 0.999c in the above expression, we

get
2.2 × 106 𝑠
∆𝑡 = = 4.9 × 10−𝑠 𝜇𝑠
√1 − (0.999)2
(b). The distance traveled by the muon before it disintegrates into other
particles is the distance it travels at a speed 0.999c over a dilated muon
lifetime of 4.9  10-5 s and is given by
(0.999) (3.0  108 m/s) (4.9  10-5 s) = 14685 m
Example : Relativistic Effect at low speeds
This example intends to show you the smallness of relativistic effects at

ordinary speeds.
An airplane is moving with respect to the earth at speed of 600 ms-1, as

determined by earth clocks, how long will it take for the airplane’s clock to
fall behind by two microseconds?
Solution
Let us use the dilation equation
∆𝑡
∆𝑡 =
2
√1 − 𝑣 ⁄ 2
( 𝑐 )
With t = tearth and t0 = tplane
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∆𝑡𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑒
Now ∆𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡ℎ =
2 2
√1−(6×108 )
3×10
∆𝑡𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑒
≃
1 − 2 × 10−12
tearth (1 – 2  10-12) = tplane
tearth (2  10-12) = tearth -tplane
For the difference in clocks to be 2  10-6 s;
tearth -tplane = 2  10-6s
tearth (2  10-12) = 2  10-6s
tearth = 10-6 s = 11.6 days
It will take 11.6 days for the airplane’s clock to fall behind by two
microseconds.
(iii) The twin paradox
The misunderstandings of relative motion in special theory of relativity

sometimes lead to paradoxes. The twin paradox is the most famous among
paradoxes in the special theory of relativity. The story of twin paradox is based
on time dilation and relative motion between twins, born at the same time.
Suppose the twin Y on earth sees that twin X files away at a high speed in a
rocket. According to Y. twin X’s clocks appear to go slow, his heart beat go
slower and all physical processes go slow in the moving rocket. However, X
does not feel anything unusual way. If X completes his long space journey and
returns to the earth. Then he will be younger than the twin Y stationed on the
earth. This is actually correct in accordance with the special theory of relativity.
This situation is quite similar to lengthening of lifetime of a travelling muon
and in a similar manner time dilation lengthen the time periods of all activities
including biological processes of the travelling twin X, however, according to
the principle of relativity if we regard all motions are to be relative then it is
also possible to consider twin Y to be in motion relative to twin X and calims
twin Y to be younger than twin X as observed by the twin X on the rocket. The
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observation of X and Y are exactly opposite. This is the twin paradox in

relativity. Comparison of ages is possible only if they meet each other. The
twin X should come back to the earth for such a comparison and for that he had
to turn around. When he turns around, he will undergo an acceleration and he
cannot make any conclusions based on time dilation in special relativity.
However, twin Y on earth always remain in one frame of reference and felt no
accelerations.
Thus, the conclusions of twin Y must be correct. In other words, a twin who
felt the acceleration is the one who would be the younger.
Example:
The space and time coordinates of two events as measured in

reference frame S are as follows.
x0
Event A: x t =x 0 ,y,=0,z,=0, t 1 
c
x0
Event B: x2 = 2x0, y2 = 0, z2 = 0, t2 =
2c
Find the velocity of the frame S' (relative to S) in which the above A and
B occur simultaneously.
Simultaneity
Let us now, use the Lorentz transformation to study the simultaneity of two events
as observed by two difference inertial observers.
Let two events occur simultaneously in the frame S at two different points P1(x1,
y1, z1, t1) and P2(x2, y2, z2, t2) so that x1 x2, t1 = t2
The events are simultaneous in the frame S implies t1 = t2 let t’1 and t’2 be the times
in s’ corresponding to the times t1 and t2 in S.
By the Lorentz transformation,𝑡1′ = 𝛾(𝑡1 − 𝑣𝑥1 /𝑐 2 ) , 𝑡2′ = 𝛾(𝑡2 − 𝑣𝑥2 /𝑐 2 )
Hence 𝑡2′ − 𝑡1′ = 𝛾 (𝑡2 − 𝑡1 ) + 𝛾/𝑐 2 (𝑥1 − 𝑥2 )
Since t1 = t2 we have,
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𝑡2′ − 𝑡1′ = 𝛾 𝑣/𝑐 2 (𝑥1 − 𝑥2 )
Since (x1 x2), we have 𝑡2′ ≠ 𝑡1′
This means that the same two events which are simultaneous in the frame S
are not simultaneous in the frame S’.
Two events which occur at different places P1 and P2simultaneously for an

observer at rest in the frame S, are no longer simultaneous to an observer in
the frame S’ which is moving with velocity v relative to S along the X-axis.
It shows that the simultaneity is not absolute, but is relative.
Solution to the above example
Let the frame S' be moving in the (+)ve direction of x w.r.t frame
velocity v.
Then, using the Lorentz transformation equations
x  vt 1
x'   ( x  vt ) where  
v2 v2
1 1
c2 c2
y’ = y
z’ = z
vx
t
t'  c   t  vx 
 2 
v2  c 
1 2
c
 vx  x vx 
t 1   t 1  21    0  20  --------- (1)
 c   c c 
 vx  x 2 vx 
t 2   t 2  22    0  2 0  ----------- (2)
 c   2c c 
If the two events A and B appear to be simultaneous in frame S’,
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Then t 1  t 2
x vx  x 2 vx 
 0  20    0  2 0  by (1) and (2)
 c c   2c c 
x 0 vx 0 x 0 2vx 0
 2   2
c c 2c c
x0 vx
  20
2c c
c
v=-
2
15.12 Velocity transformation
With the standard notion, let the frame S’ moves with uniform velocity
v along the (+)ve x-direction relative to frame S.
Lorentz Transformation equation
x’ = (x – vt)
y’ = y
z’ = z
 vx  1
t    t  2  where  
 c  v2
1
c2
Now in the standard notation, the velocity components can be

expressed as,
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dx dy dz
ux  , uy  , u2  and
dt dt dt
dx  dy dz 
u x  , u y  , u 2 
dt dt dt
By LT we get
dx' = (dx – vdt)
dy’ = dy
 vdx 
dz’ =  dt  2 
 c 
then
dx
v
dx  dx  vdt  dx  vdt
u x     dt
dt   vdx  vdx v dx
 dt  2  dt  2 1 2
 c  c c dt
ux  v
u x  ---------- (1)
vu x
1 2
c
Similarly we get
dy ' uy
u y   ------------ (2)
dt '  vu 
1  2x 
 c 
dz ' uz
u z   --------------- (3)
dt '  vu 
1  2x 
 c 
(1), (2), (3) equations are called the velocity transformation equations.
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SAQ: In the above velocity transformation equations change the

subject to ux, uy, uz respectively and show that
′ +𝑣 ′
𝑢𝑦
𝑢𝑥
𝑢𝑥 = 𝑣𝑢′
𝑢𝑦 = 𝑣𝑢′
𝑢𝑧 =
1+ 2𝑥 𝛽 (1+ 2𝑥 )
𝑐 𝑐
𝑢𝑧′
,
𝑣𝑢
𝛽(1+ 2𝑥 )
𝑐
′ +𝑣
𝑢𝑥
The above equation of the SAQ 𝑢𝑥 = 𝑣𝑢′
is alsoknown as the
1+ 2𝑥
𝑐
relativistic velocity addition law.
SAQ:
A frame S’ moves with a speed of 0.6c. with respect to a frame S in the

direction of the increasing x. A particle moves along the X’ axis of the frame
S’ with a speed of 0.4c. Use the relativistic velocity addition formula and
also the classical velocity transformation formula separately to find the
velocity of the particle in the frame S and compare the results of the two
different methods.
Solution for SAQ:
Let us recall relativistic velocity addition formula as
𝑈′ + 𝑣
𝑈=
𝑈′𝑣
1+ 2
𝑐
Here U is the speed of the particle w.r.t. S, U’ is the speed of the particle
w.r.t. S’, v is the relative velocity between the S and S’ frame.
93
Then, with U’ = 0.4c and v = 0.6c we have
0.4𝑐 + 0.6𝑐 𝑐
𝑈= = = 0.8𝑐
0.4 × 0.6𝑐 2 1.24
1+
𝑐2
The relativistic velocity addition formula gives us the speed of the

particle w.r.t. the frame S as 0.8c.
However, the classical velocity transformation gives us the classical

velocity addition formula as U = U’ + v
Then with U’ = 0.4c and v = 0.6c, we have
U = 0.4c + 0.6c = c
The particle has to move at the speed of light, which is not possible.
Learning Outcomes
 Describe a ‘Frame of reference’

 Describe an ‘Inertial frame of reference’
 Explain ‘Ether’ with reference to electromagnetic waves.
 State the Lorentz-Fitzgerald length contraction hypothesis
 State the two postulates of Special Theory of Relativity (STR)
 Identify problem regarding Newton’s 2nd laws of motion and
Maxerll’s laws of Electromagnetism with reference to laws of
Physics.
 State the Lorentz Transformation Equations.
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Nature of Science
 Explain how Einstein settled the above mentioned problem, using

Lorentz Transformation
 Describe some consequences of the Lorentz Transformation
 Solve simple problems related to Special Theory of Relativity such
as Simultaneity, Time Dilation, Twin Paradox etc.
 Solve simple problems related to VTE.
Learning Activities
1. Define an Inertial frame of reference.

2. Outline the purpose of Michelson – Morley Experiment.
3. Explain how the ‘Ether’ hypothesis was defended in the face of the
null-result of the m-m experiment.
4. Solve the problem given in the example 15.11 without looking at the
solution.
5. Derive the Velocity Transformation Equations (VTE)
6. Change the subjects u1x , u1y, u1z in the above VTE to ux, ug, uz and
show that
′ +𝑣 ′
𝑢𝑦
𝑢𝑥
7. 𝑢𝑥 = 𝑣𝑢′
𝑢𝑦 = 𝑣𝑢′
𝑢𝑧 =
1+ 2𝑥 𝛽 (1+ 2𝑥 )
𝑐 𝑐
𝑢𝑧′
,
𝑣𝑢
𝛽(1+ 2𝑥 )
𝑐
8. Solve the problem given in Exmaple 15.12 without looking at the

solution
95
References
Amarasekara, C.D.(2010). Science , Special Theory of

Relativity,Unit1,Modern Physics,PYU2160.Department of Physics, Faculty
of Natural Science, Open University of Sri Lanka
Lieber, L.R.(2007).The Einstein Theory of Relativity, Paul Dry Books,USA
96
Nature of Science
Session 16
Relativistic Mechanics- Momentum,

Mass and Energy
Introduction
To introduce the new definitions and relationships between the above

quantities as implied by the postulates of the STR.
The development of relativistic mechanics starts with the generalization of

the classical expressions for linear momentum and kinetic energy. The form
of the relativistic linear momentum was developed by Einstein and modern
experiments show that Einstein’s expression is in agreement with the
laboratory results. We define the relativistic liner momentum as
𝑚0 𝑣
𝑝= 1⁄ = 𝛽𝑚𝑣
𝑢2 2
(1 − 2 )
𝑐
1
When 𝛽 = 1⁄ = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑣 << 𝑐 and m0 is the rest mass.
𝑣2 2
(1− 2 )
𝑐
𝑣
For 𝑐 << 1, the relativistic linear momentum reduces to the classical
Newtonian form𝑝 = m 𝑣 . Also note that the relativistic momentum
goes to infinity as v ---> c.
𝑑𝑝
Now we can define the relativistic force 𝐹 = 𝑑𝑡
97
Consider a particle of mass m which is accelerated from rest by a force

of constant magnitude and direction. According to Newtonian
mechanics its velocity increases without limit. In special theory of
relativity we can show that the particle speed approaches c in the limit
as t ---->
This is readily seen by integrating with respect to t: we obtain
𝑝=𝐹𝑡
𝑚0 𝑣
⟹ = 𝐹 𝑡, 𝑖𝑠 𝐹 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡
2
√1 − 𝑣2
𝑐
𝑣2
⇒ 𝑚02 𝑣 2 = 𝐹 2 𝑡 2 (1 − )
𝑐2
𝑣 2 𝑣 2
⇒ (𝑚0 𝑐)2 ( ) = 𝐹 2 𝑡 2 − 𝐹 2 𝑡 2 ( )
𝑐 𝑐
𝑣 2 𝐹2𝑡2
⇒ ( ) =
𝑐 [(𝑚0 𝑐)2 + 𝐹 2 𝑡 2 ]
𝑣 𝐹𝑡⁄
𝑚𝑜 𝑐
⇒ =
𝑐 2
√1 + ( 𝐹𝑡 )
𝑚0 𝑐
𝑣 1
⇒ = → 1 𝑎𝑠 𝑡 → ∝
𝑐 2
√1 + (𝑚0 𝑐 )
𝐹𝑡
Ie. v  c as t  (or for large t )
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Nature of Science
In classical mechanics the law of conservation of momentum states
(a). the mass of a moving body is the same as that of the stationary
body
(b). the total linear momentum of a body remains unchanged unless an

external force is applied.
The first hypothesis is not true under the Lorentz transformation. The
Lorentz invariance of law of conservation of momentum states that the
mass of a moving body does not remain constant but it changes with
velocity and it is given by
𝑚0
𝑚=
2
√1 − 𝑣 ⁄ 2
𝑐
Where m0 is the mass of the particle when at rest and m is its mass
when moving with velocity v.
This result shows that, the mass of a body increases with the increase
of velocity.
We result shows that when v = 0, then m = m0. Therefore m0 is known

as rest moss.
Example
Find the velocity that an electron must be given such that its
momentum is ten times its rest mass times the speed of light.
99
We have 𝑝 = 10 𝑚0 𝑐
𝑝 = 10 𝑚0 𝑐
𝑚0 𝑣 𝑣2 𝑖2
𝑝 = 𝑚𝑣 = ⟹ 1− 2 =
2 𝑐 100𝑐 2
√1 − 𝑣 ⁄ 2
𝑐
𝑚𝑜 𝑣 1 𝑣2
∴ 10 𝑚0 𝑐 = ⇒ (1 + ) =1
2 100 𝑐 2
√1 − 𝑣 ⁄ 2
𝑐
𝑣2 𝑣2 𝑣 2 100
1− 2 = ⟹ 2=
𝑐 100𝑐 2 𝑐 101
⇒ 𝑣 = 0.995 𝑐
= 2.99 × 1010 𝑐𝑚⁄𝑠𝑒𝑐 is the required velocity
Relativistic Energy
In classical mechanics the work done on a particle by a net force F is

calculated as ∫ 𝐹 𝑑𝑥. The result is the change in the Kinetic energy K,
1
where 𝐾 = 2 𝑚𝑣 2
𝑑𝑝
In special theory of relativity, 𝐹 = (rate of change of momentum)
𝑑𝑡
𝑚0𝑣
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝 = (1)
⁄√1 − 𝑣⁄
𝑐2
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Nature of Science
𝐾 = ∫ 𝐹 𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑥
= ∫ 𝐹 𝑑𝑡 .
𝑑𝑡
= ∫ 𝐹 𝑣 𝑑𝑡
𝑙 𝑡
𝑑𝑝
𝐾 = ∫ 𝐹𝑣𝑑𝑡 = ∫ 𝑣 ( ) 𝑑𝑡
0 𝑐 𝑑𝑡
𝑝 𝑝
⁄𝑚0
⇒ 𝑘 = ∫ 𝑣𝑑𝑝 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣 =
0 2
√1 + ( 𝑝 )
𝑚0 𝑐
2𝑝
2 𝑑𝑝
𝑝
(𝑚0 𝑐) 1
⇒𝑘= ∫ . ( 𝑚𝑜 𝑐 2 )
0 2 2
√1 + ( 𝑝 )
( 𝑚0 𝑐 )
1⁄ 1⁄
𝑝2 2 𝑝2 2
⇒ 𝑘 = 𝑚0 𝑐 2 [(1 + 2 2 ) − 1] = 𝑚0 𝑐 2 (1 + 2 2 ) − 𝑚0 𝑐 2
𝑚0 𝑐 𝑚0 𝑐1
𝑚0 𝑐 2
= 1⁄ − 𝑚0 𝑐 2 , By (1)
𝑣2 2
(1− 2 )
𝑐
= 𝑚𝑐 2 − 𝑚0 𝑐 2
101
⇒ 𝑘 = 𝑚0 𝑐 2 − 𝑚0 𝑐 2 = 𝑚𝑐 2 = 𝑚0 𝑐 2
K is the Kinetic energy acquired by the particle whose rest mass is m0
K = mc2 – m0c2
K + m0 c2 = mc2 = E
Where E is the total energy and m0c2 is called internal (or rest) energy
of the particle.
i.e. E = mc2
This is the famous formula, showing that the two fundamental

conceptions of mass and energy are identical.
𝑚0 𝑐 2
The expression for relativistic Kinetic energy 𝐾 = 2
− 𝑚0 𝑐 2
√1−𝑢 ⁄ 2
𝑐
holds for all speeds, where 0  v < c . This expression reduces to the
Newtonian form for small speeds v << c as shown below.
By binomial theorem, we get
−1⁄2 2
𝑣2 1 𝑣2 3 𝑣2
(1 − 2 ) = 1+ + ( ) + ⋯.
𝑐 2 𝑐2 8 𝑐2
2
2
1 𝑣2 3 𝑣2
⇒ 𝑘 = 𝑚0 𝑐 [1 + + ( ) + ⋯ − 1]
2 𝑐2 8 𝑐2
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Nature of Science
1 𝑣
⇒ 𝐾 = 2 𝑚0 𝑣 2 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 << 1 (i.e. v is very small compare to c)
𝑐
This is in agreement with Newtonian mechanics where m = m0. Where

v is small compared to c.
Energy momentum relation
We can prove the energy momentum relation E2 = c2 p2 + 𝑚02 𝑐 4
Where E is the energy and p is the momentum of a particle of rest mass

m.
Proof
We have p = mv and E = mc2
Then E2 – c2p2 = m2c4 – c2m2v2
𝑣2
∴ 𝐸 2 − 𝑐 2 𝑝2 = 𝑚2 𝑐 4 (1 − )
𝑐2
1⁄ 2
𝑣2 2
= 𝑐 4 {𝑚 (1 − 2 ) }
𝑐
𝑚0
= 𝑚02 𝑐 4 → ∵ 𝑚= 1⁄
𝑣2 2
[ (1 − 2 ) ]
𝑐
∴ ⇒ 𝐸 2 − 𝑐 2 𝑝2 = 𝑚02 𝑐 4
103
This is sometimes called Einstein’s relation
Conservation laws
In Newtonian mechanics the conservation laws are
(i). Conservation of mass
∑ 𝑚 = ∑ 𝑚′ , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑚 ⇒ 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠
(ii). Conservation of momentum
∑ 𝑝 = ∑ 𝑝′ 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝 = 𝑚𝑢
(iii). Conservation of energy
∑ 𝐸 = ∑ 𝐸′
But in the new world view (STR) the conservation laws are
(i). Conservation of momentum
𝑚𝑢
∑ 𝑝 = ∑ 𝑝′ 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝 =
2
√1 − 𝑢 ⁄ 2
𝑐
(ii). Conservation of energy
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Nature of Science
𝑚𝑐 2
∑ 𝐸 = ∑ 𝐸 ′ 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐸 =
2
√1 − 𝑢 ⁄ 2
𝑐
It can be shown, that these laws have the same form in all inertial
frames, thus satisfying the postulate of relativity.
Example:
This example shows you that the addition of any speed leaves the speed
of light unaffected.
An electron is moving with a speed of 0.85c (relative to the earth) in a

direction opposite to that of a moving photon. Calculate the relative
velocity of the electron and the photon.
Solution
Suppose electron moving with velocity -0.85c is at rest in the frame S.
Hence the frame S’ (the earth) may be assumed to have a velocity

+0.85c relative to S (where the electron is at rest) and the photon (the
object) may be assumed to have a velocity of +c relative to S’.
Thus v = 0.85c, U’ = c
Let U be the velocity of the photon relative to the electron (S’ frame),
then form the velocity addition law,
105
0.85𝑐 + 𝑐
𝑈′ + 𝑣 (0.85 + 1)𝑐
𝑈= = 0.85𝑐2 × 𝑐 = =𝑐
𝑈′𝑣 𝑐 (1 + 0.85)
1+ 2
𝑐
Hence the relative velocity of the electron and the photon is c.
Learning Outcomes
 Define the Relativistic Linear Momentum (RLM)

 Derive Einstein’s famous equation E = mc2 from the above defined
RLM
 Derive the Energy – Momentum relation E2 = c2p2 +m20
c4(Einstein’s relation)
 State the Conservation laws in Newtonian
 State the conservation Laws in Einstein’s STR
Learning Activities
1.
Prove Einstein’s famous equation E = mc2
2. Prove the energy –Momentum Relation(Einstein Relation)
E2=c2p2+m2c4
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References
Amarasekara, C.D.(2010). Science , Special Theory of

Relativity,Unit1,Modern Physics,PYU2160.Department of Physics, Faculty
of Natural Science, Open University of Sri Lanka
Lieber, L.R.(2007).The Einstein Theory of Relativity, Paul Dry Books,USA
107

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THE OPEN FACULTY OF ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY

UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS & PHILOSOPHY OF

Unit 1, Unit 2, Unit 3

Unit I, Unit 2, Unit 3

Published by the Open University of Sri Lanka

Course Team Chair

Dr. Nalin de Silva

Dr. Nalin de Silva

Open University of Sri Lanka

First Edition 2000

2019 Open University of Sri Lanka

Under this course ‘Nature of Science’ we are concerned with ‘Philosophy of

Session 1: Scientific theories: Inductivism Vs Hypothesism 01-09

Session 2: Hume’s problem of justification of Induction 10-13

Session 3: Positivism and Logical Positivism 14-18

Session 4: Fall of logical positivism 19-20

Session 5: Introducing Falsificationism 21-24

Session 6: Falsification, Demarcation & Ad-hoc modifications 25-28

Session 7: Falsification and Progress of Science 29-30

Session 8: Drawbacks of Falsificationism 31-34

Session 9: Abduction as a method of Science –Charles Peirce 35-40

Session 9: Theories as Structures I – Kuhn’s Paradigms 41-45

Session 10: Normal Science, Revolutions and Scientific Community 46-47

Session 11: Incommensurability, Relativism and Progress 48-50

Session 12: Anarchistic theory of science-Feyerabend views 51-59

Session 13: Critique of Modern Science 60-74

Session 14: Special Theory of Relativity .A Revolution in Science 75-95

Session 15: Relativistic Mechanics- Momentum, Mass and Energy 96-106

1.2 Induction by enumeration

A brief survey of Bacon’s life

Bacon’s world view

Smith,P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Induction and confirmation (chapter3,pp39-56).Chicago:

Introduction to philosophy -Lectures by Prof. Hoyningen Huene , Leibniz University, Hannover,

2.1 Hume’s problem of justification of induction

generalizations from observed phenomena to as yet unobserved phenomena. Therefore this

1. Explain Hume’s problem regarding the Method of Induction

Smith, P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Induction and confirmation (chapter3,pp39-56).Chicago:

Introduction to philosophy -Lectures by Prof. Hoyningen Huene , Leibniz University, Hannover,

3.2 Logical positivism

H→P (Hypothesis implies prediction)

P (Prediction is true by empirical test)

H (Therefore the hypothesis is true)

(iii). The method of science is the method of induction (Inductivism).

1 .Explain briefly the views of Logical Positivists regarding the following

Smith, P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Logic plus Empiricism (chapter2,pp19-37).Chicago: The

(a). Firstly, observations presuppose some principle of selection. We cannot go on observing

(d).Fourthly, observations in science need to be legitimized or ratified by a theory. For

Upon completion of the session you should be able to

Smith, P.G.(2003).Theory and Reality: Logic plus Empiricism (chapter2,pp19-37).Chicago:

5.1 Introduction to Popper’s method of falsification

5.2Popper’s falsificationism and realism

(taking H: hypothesis, p: prediction,  symbol for implication)

H P (Hypothesis implies prediction)

P (Predication is true by empirical test)

 H (Therefore, the hypothesis is true)

is a deductively invalid inference.

He thus opted for the form

H P (Hypothesis implies prediction)

~ P (Predication is false by empirical test)

~H (Therefore, the hypothesis is false)

which is a deductively valid inference.

6.1 Demarcation criteria for scientific theories

For example, let P: All acids turn blue litmus red