UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
(GR 122156, February 3, 1997; 335 Phil. 101)
Case Digest by: Atty. Chrisha Romano
One Sentence Summary (OSS): Petitioner filed a case of
prohibition and mandamus with request of TRO stopping
respondents from completing sale of Manila Prince Hotel to
Malaysian firm.
Parties: Manila Prince Hotel as petitioner v GSIS, et. al. as
respondents
Statute: Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
and also Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, entitled
“PROVIDING FOR ALTERNATIVE AND/OR INTERMEDIATE MODES
OF PRIVATIZATION PURSUANT TO PROCLAMATION NO. 50 (s.
1986)”.
Procedural History: Petitioner  Supreme Court
Facts: GSIS, pursuant to privatization program, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation which owns the
historic Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding, only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15.3 M shares for P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm, which bid for the same number
of shares for P44.00 per share, higher by P2.42 per share than
that of the petitioner’s bid.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder
and the execution of required contracts, Manila Prince sent a
letter to GSIS matching the bid price of P44.00 of Renong Berhad.
In a subsequent letter, Manila Prince sent a manager’s check for
P33 M as bid security to match the bid of the Malaysian Firm.
Apprehensive that GSIS disregarded the letters, petitioner Manila
Prince filed an action for prohibition and mandamus. The court
then issued a temporary restraining order stopping GSIS from
perfecting and consummating the sale to Renong Berhad.
The instant case was referred to and accepted by the Court En
Banc by the First Division.
Petitioner’s Contention:
1. (Sec. 10 Second Part of Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution) The
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino Nation and is
a historical monument which reflect the Philippine heritage and
Culture. Thus to all intents and purposes, the Manila Hotel has
become a part of the national patrimony.
2. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the MHC carries with
it its ownership and is owned by GSIS, a government-owned
and controlled corporation, then the tourism business of this
hotel is unquestionably part of the national economy.
3. This said, since the Manila hotel is part of the national
patrimony and economy, then the petitioner, a Filipino
Corporation, must be given preference over the Malaysian Firm
after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the
bidding rules mandate that: “if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share.”
Respondent’s stand:
1. They maintain that Sec. 10 Second Part of Art. 12 of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy. It is
not a self-executing provision and thus requires implementing
legislations.
2. Even if the above provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does
not fall under the term “national patrimony” because this term
refers only to lands of the public domain, waters, mineral, coal,
flowers, animals, forests, marine and other natural resources
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CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)
found within its territory as cited in the 1st and 2nd paragraph
of Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
More importantly, the mandate of the constitution is addressed
to the state, not to GSIS, which possesses a personality of its
own separate and distinct from the state.
3. That even if Manila Hotel is part of National Patrimony, Sec. 10
of Art 12 is still inapplicable since what is being sold is 51% of
the outstanding shares of the hotel, not the hotel building or
the land upon which the bldg. stands.
Moreover, if the disposition of the shares is really contrary to
the constitution, Manila Prince, petitioner, should have
questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost
in the bidding.
4. The reliance of petitioner on the bidding rule (if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.”)
is misplaced. The privilege of submitting a matching bid has
not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the
highest bidder cannot be awarded the block of shares. Thus,
the submission of a matching bid is premature since Renong
Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares.
5. The petition filed by Manila Prince was grounded on grave
abuse of discretion however GSIS did not exercise discretion in
a whimsical manner. And if there was abuse of discretion, then
it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty required by law.
Issues:
1. Is Sec. 10 Second Part of Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution not
a self-executing provision as invoked by the respondents?
2. Does Manila Hotel qualify as a part of the National patrimony
and economy?
3. What is meant by the term “qualified Filipinos”?
4. If a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is
also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference? And if the foreigner is more qualified in some
aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?
5. Is the action of GSIS covered by the constitutional provision
when GSIS is an entity distinct from the government or the
state itself?
Held: WHEREFORE, respondents GSIS, MHC, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD,
and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
1. Sec. 10 of Art. 12 of the 1987 constitution is considered to be
self-executing. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws
which is supreme, imperious, absolute, and unalterable except
by the authority from which it emanates. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law
of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract.
“in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would
give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them
entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
“the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not
by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights covering
the national economy and patrimony”
“Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution
is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation”

2. Yes. The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and

developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also
to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark. It has become a venue

of various significant events which have in part shaped
Philippine history. It has even been dubbed as “the Official
guest house of the Phil. Gov’t”

3. The term “qualified Filipinos” used in our Constitution includes

entities or corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos.

4. Yes to both questions except when the Filipino is incompetent

or insufficient. This is the embodiment of the so-called Filipino
First Policy.

5. Yes. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct

from the government are considered "state action" covered by
the Constitution when:
a. the activity it engages in is a "public function;"
b. the government is so significantly involved with the private
sector as to make the government responsible for his action;
and
c. the government has approved or authorized the action.

Thus, without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered

into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command

Ratio:
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall
only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals.

Since the "Filipino First Policy” provision of the Constitution

bestows preference on qualified Filipinos, the mere tending of the
highest bid is NOT an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder.

The refusal of GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with

petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its

business viability, should not take precedence over nonmaterial
values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should
not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity.

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

INTERPRETATION / CONSTRUCTION OF THE as the case may be, is not

CONSTITUTION sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs House of Representatives impeachment is filed or
(GR 160261, 10 November 2003) endorsed, as the case may
Case Digest by: Atty. Tabitha Faye V. Tagimacruz, RN be, by at least one-third
(1/3) of the Members of the
OSS: This is a case about 2 impeachment proceedings being filed House, impeachment
against the Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide within a proceedings are deemed
period of 1 year. The dispute here is whether the filing of the 2nd initiated at the time of the
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional or not, and whether filing of such verified
the resolution thereof is a political question or has resulted in a complaint or resolution of
political crisis. impeachment with the
Secretary General.
Parties: Ernesto Francisco, Jr. as petitioner, et. al. vs House of
Representatives (Speaker Jose De Venecia), et. al. as RULE V Section 17. Bar Against
respondents BAR AGAINST Initiation Of
IMPEACHMENT Impeachment
Statute: Section 14. Scope of Proceedings. – Within a
1. The most important is Paragraph 5, Section 3 of Article XI Bar. – No impeachment period of one (1) year from
(Accountability of Public Officers) of our present 1987 proceedings shall be initiated the date impeachment
Constitution which states that: against the same official proceedings are deemed
more than once within the initiated as provided in
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the period of one (1) year. Section 16 hereof, no
same official more than once within a period of one year. impeachment proceedings,
as such, can be initiated
2. Section 1 of Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the against the same official.
1987 Constitution which states that: (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and supplied)
in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to Procedural History: Petitioner  Supreme Court
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or Facts:
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
instrumentality of the Government. Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
3. Paragraph 8, Section 3 of Article XI which states that:
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Note: Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS was endorsed by the HOR, and was referred to the House
NEW RULES Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with
RULE II RULE V Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House
INITIATING BAR AGAINST Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
IMPEACHMENT INITIATION OF impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to
Section 2. Mode of IMPEACHMENT dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
Initiating Impeachment. – PROCEEDINGS AGAINST substance.
Impeachment shall be THE SAME OFFICIAL
initiated only by a verified Section 16. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
complaint for impeachment – Impeachment impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
filed by any Member of the Proceedings Deemed the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario
House of Representatives or Initiated. – In cases where G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
by any citizen upon a a Member of the House files inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The
resolution of endorsement by a verified complaint of second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
any Member thereof or by a impeachment or a citizen “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3
verified complaint or files a verified complaint that of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
resolution of impeachment is endorsed by a Member of
filed by at least one-third the House through a Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were
(1/3) of all the Members of resolution of endorsement filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
the House. against an impeachable Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
officer, impeachment filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as
proceedings against such it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
official are deemed initiated Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
on the day the Committee on initiated against the same official more than once within a period
Justice finds that the verified of one year.”
complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the Issue:
case may be, is sufficient in 1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second
substance, or on the date the impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses
House votes to overturn or under the Constitution.
affirm the finding of the said 2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Committee that the verified Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
complaint and/or resolution, unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article
XI of the Constitution.

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Held:
1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond
the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
 Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make
a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
 Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota(motivation of legal
action) or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is
unconstitutional.
 Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate
its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence,
these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively
carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides
for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
 It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution
which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had
absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
proposing that “A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment
proceedings,” this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third
of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny
and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it
had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business
of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government.

3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

 Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
 Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives
on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.

Ratio:
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy,
this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances

which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper
the official acts of each of these three branches must be given
effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There
exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that
no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
(GR 83896, 83815, 22 February 1991)
Case Digest by: Atty. James Acuno
OSS: Civil Liberties Union and Anti-Graft League filed a petition
that were resolved jointly by the Supreme Court in declaring EO
284 as unconstitutional.
Parties: Civil Liberties Union as petitioner vs Executive Secretary
as respondent
Statute:
EO 284 issued by President Corazon Aquino on July 25, 1987, as
stated:
Section 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions
of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc
bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which
the President is the Chairman.
Section 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive
Department holds more positions than what is allowed in
Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position
in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in
no case shall any official hold more than two positions other
than his primary position.
Section 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the
government in government-owned or controlled corporations,
at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such
corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.
petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284 contravenes
the provision in Section 13 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
as stated:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted
by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Procedural History: Petitioner  Supreme Court
Facts: Corazon Aquino issued EO 248 allowing Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials
of the Executive Department, in addition to his primary position,
hold not more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor
The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional
EO 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino. In which
petitioners assailing that the executive order is in contrast of what
the SEC. 13 of the ART 7 of the 1987 constitution states wherein
prohibited such act, where the underlined positions above should
not obtain additional office or position aside from their primary
position. Arguing that the EO must be declared unconstitutional.
Anti-Graft League further seeks for the issuance of writs of
prohibition, mandamus and a temporary restraining order,
commanding the public respondents to step down from their
other position aside from their primary office. Compelling the
respondents to refund the exact amount of the money that they
have obtained illegal from their other positions.
The DOJ Justice Sedfrey Orodoñez and the Solicitor General give
their opinion on this case, where they both agreed that the EO
248 is constitutional and its is okay to give more positions to
those Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department.
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2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)
The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the case, in
which their principal submission that it adds exception to Section
13 of Article VII. The petitioners assailed that the phrase, “ unless
it is otherwise provided on this constitution” means that it has
exception and not applicable to all position listed on Sec. 13 Art
7 of the constitution.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in
Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil Service Commission
applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general
and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to
Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants.
Exception (they are exempted because it is explicitly provided in
the law):
(1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par.
(2), Article VII thereof; and
(3) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII (LAW).
They are the positions where provided in the law that can have
other positions aside from their primary position.
There were disagreement between petitioners and public
respondents, on what lies the constitutional basis of the
exception.
Issue:
1. Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made
for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2),
Article I-XB?
2. Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio
capacity?
3. Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites
they have received from the offices they have held pursuant to
EO 284?
Held: EO 248 is unconstitutional. Because it is against what is
stated in Section 13 Article 7. WHEREFORE, subject to the
qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly
set aside.
1. No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in
so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective and
appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission
should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article
VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from
holding any other office or employment during their tenure,
unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all
other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold
other office or employment in the government during their
tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions
of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution”
must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the
Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet
under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in
those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3),
Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8
(1), Article VIII.
2. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution
must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

by the Executive officials specified therein without additional

compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of said officials’ office.
The reason is that these posts do no comprise “any other office”
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but
are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on
said officials. The term ex-officio means “from office; by virtue
of office.” Ex-officio likewise denotes an “act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.”
The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but
must be required by the official’s primary functions. If the
functions required to be performed are merely incidental,
remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien
to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional
functions would fall under the purview of “any other office”
prohibited by the Constitution.

3. During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents

may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that
“in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer,
who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to
the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action
recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to
the office. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments
received by the respondents by virtue of actual services
rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained
by them.

Ratio: The constitution seeks to prohibits the president, vice

president, members of the cabinet, their deputies or assistants
from holding tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to the posts held without
additional compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of their office.

Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually

allows a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018
JUDICIAL REVIEW CHARACTERIZED
Section 1 and Section 4 (2) Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
SECTION 4. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard
en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary
(GR 157584, 2 April 2009)
Case Digest by: Atty. Sandra Borgueta
OSS: Congressman Enrique Garcia filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court to declare Section 19 of Oil
Deregulation Law 1998 as unconstitutional.
Parties: Enrique Garcia as petitioner vs Executive Secretary, et.
al. as respondents
Statute:
Res judicata – since Petitioner Garcia has earlier filed a similar
petition that was struck down by the SC
Section 19 of RA No 8479, which states:
Full deregulation of the [Oil] Industry shall start five (5) months
following the effectivity of this Act
and also Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution:
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or
unfair competition shall be allowed.
Procedural History: Petitioner  Supreme Court
Facts: On March 1996 Gov’t enacted RA 8180, the
Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996. The law
was struck down as invalid because the three key provisions
intended to promote free competition were shown to achieve the
OPPOSITE result. It encouraged monopolistic power and
interfered with the free interaction of market forces.
Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real
competitors but did not have a free run of the market because
government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of
the oil industry. After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX
remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer
subject to control by government with respect to their pricing and
non-pricing decisions.
Congress enacted on February 10, 1998 a BETTER oil
deregulation law, RA 8479 sans problematic provisions of former
law. Petitioner Garcia has previously filed a petition before the SC
arguing the same issues. SC dismissed the said case stating that
the petition did not have sufficient merits for judicial review.
Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full deregulation
and removing price control at a time when the market is still
dominated and controlled by an oligopoly would be contrary to
public interest, as it would only provide an opportunity for the Big
3 to engage in price-fixing and overpricing
Issue: Whether or not without government control, “BIG 3” oil
companies [Caltex, Shell and Petron] will take over the industry
, therefore creating a monopoly of the industry.
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CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)
Held: No. WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition. No
pronouncements as to costs.
Petitioner Garcia’s thesis readily reveals the political, hence, non-
justiciable, nature of his petition; the choice of undertaking full
or partial deregulation is not for this Court to make. When
political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination as to whether there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the official whose action is being questioned.
Ratio: Supreme Court declared that the issues petitioner Garcia
presented to this Court are non-justiciable matters that preclude
the Court from exercising its power of judicial review. The
immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local
downstream oil industry is a policy determination by Congress
which this Court cannot overturn without offending the
Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. That the
law failed in its objectives because its adoption spawned the evils
petitioner Garcia alludes to does not warrant its nullification.
SC: Res juridicata does not apply because there is no final
judgment. We find, however, that there is no justiciable
controversy that would justify the grant of the petition.
Read correctly, constitutional provision on Article XII Section 19
does not declare an outright prohibition of monopolies. It simply
allows the State to act "when public interest so requires"; even
then, no outright prohibition is mandated,
1. There in fact exists a monopoly or an oligopoly, and
2. Public interest requires its regulation or prohibition.
Petitioner failed to prove existence of monopoly; question of fact.
The petition fails to satisfy a requirement for judicial review: the
existence of an actual case or controversy. An actual case or
controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution
Another requirement for judicial review is lis mota (cause of
action). Petitioner was not able to show that the case cannot be
legally resolved in another way
Even assuming that the Big 3 indeed schemed in fixing oil prices,
the remedy against the perceived failure of the Oil Deregulation
Law to combat cartelization is not to declare it invalid, but to set
in motion its anti-trust safeguards under Sections 11, 12, and 13.
What is res judicata?
It is the Latin term for "a matter already judged", also known as
claim preclusion, which refers to either of two concepts: in both
civil law and common law legal systems, a case in which there
has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal; and
the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued litigation
of a case on same issues between the same parties.
In the case of res judicata, the matter cannot be raised again,
either in the same court or in a different court. A court will use
res judicata to deny reconsideration of a matter.
The doctrine of res judicata is a method of preventing injustice to
the parties of a case supposedly finished, but perhaps also or
mostly a way of avoiding unnecessary waste of resources in the
court system. Res judicata does not merely prevent future
judgments from contradicting earlier ones, but also prevents
litigants from multiplying judgments, and confusion.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

Louis Barok Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(GR 192935, 193036, 7 April 2010)
Case Digest by:

OSS:

Parties:

Statute:

Procedural History:

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Ratio:

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Jovito Salonga vs Ernani Cruz Pano
(GR 59524, 18 February 1985)
Case Digest by: Atty. Renier Z. Hidalgo
Atty. Riczen Gingoyon
OSS: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right
to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging
that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing
of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the
Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron
arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member
of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
Parties: Jovito Salonga as petitioner vs Ernani Cruz Pano
(Presiding Judge of CFI), et. al. as respondents
Statute: RA 1700 approved on June 20, 1957; entitled “AN ACT
TO OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SIMILAR ASSOCIATIONS, PENALIZING MEMBERSHIP THEREIN,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”; as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code, as stated:
WHEREAS, the Communist Party of the Philippines, although
purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy
to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion
and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and
control; WHEREAS, the continued existence and activities of
the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear,
present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines;
and WHEREAS, in the face of the organized, systematic and
persistent subversion, national in scope but international in
direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and
its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope
with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country:
Article 142 of Revised Penal Code, as stated:
Article 142. Inciting to sedition. - The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding
Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the
crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment
of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons,
banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or
upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or
speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against
the Government, or any of the duly constituted authorities
thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer
in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to
instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful
purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the
lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the
safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly
conceal such evil practices. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187,
amended by Republic Act No. 10951, [August 29, 2017]).
Procedural History: Petitioner  Supreme Court
Facts: The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which
occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of
the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one
of those responsible.
On September 6, 1980, at YMCA building in Manila, a small bomb
exploded inside the room of Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-
born American citizen from Los Angeles, California. Found in
Lovely's possession were several pictures taken sometime in
May, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul
Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb.
Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose
likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other
guests, including Lovely.
On September 21, 1980, newspapers came out with almost
identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had been linked
to the various bombings in Metro Manila.
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2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-
accused), stating that “the preliminary investigation of the
above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on
December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days
from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence
within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states
that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981,
and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any
copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called
supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended
complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981,
charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation
of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736.
On March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a
copy of an amended complaint, dated March 12, 1981, charging
the petitioner, along with 39 others accused with the violation of
R.A. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 and
P.D. 1736. Hearings for preliminary investigation were
conducted.
On October 15, 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to
dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution
to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981,
Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion.
On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion.
On January 4, 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the filing of
an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act,
as amended, against forty (40) people, including herein
petitioner.
On January 4, 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the
filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-
Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including
Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December
1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition
for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie
case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing
of an information against him. He states that to sanction his
further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him
would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines
today.
The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981
and January 4, 1982 are now the subject of the petition. The
term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if
unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the
proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-
balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.
The question raised before us now is: Were the evidences against
the petitioner uncontradicted and if they were unexplained or
uncontradicted, would they, standing alone, sufficiently
overcome the presumption of innocence and warrant his
conviction? After a painstaking review of the preliminary
investigation, the Supreme Court finds the evidence offered by
the prosecution utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case
against the petitioner. We grant the petition.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life
and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that
no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of
an information for subversion against him. He states that to
sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence
against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the
Philippines today.
Respondent’s Arguments:
Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed
by an accused in a criminal case shall be denied, the remedy of
the accused-movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or
mandamus or prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to trial,
without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in
his motion to quash if an adverse judgment is rendered against
him, in the appeal that he may take therefrom in the manner
authorized by law. (Mill v. People, et al., 101 Phil. 599; Echarol
v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309.)
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

Issue: determination of probable cause since the same must be decided

1. Whether or not the denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss,
being interlocutory in character, can be questioned by
certiorari?
2. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
3. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still
deserves a decision from the Supreme Court
Held: No, on issues 1 and 2 but Yes on issue 3.
In the light of the failure to show prima facie evidence that the
petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime,
the initial disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together
with the massive and damaging publicity made against him,
justifies the favorable consideration of this petition by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot
and academic.
No, the above case doesn’t fall under an actual case. The Court
had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s
judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was
circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when
on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the
motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the
subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions
of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence
and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as
one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned
resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the
respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating
for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the
Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing
of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
Yes, the above case still deserves a decision from the supreme
court. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s
moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered
elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
Ratio:
There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked
by the respondents. However, it is also recognized that, under
certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a
motion to quash is considered proper in the interest of "more
enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap
v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969."
in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion
of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should
not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the
clear dictates of reasons (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v.
Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should
not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible
evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a
flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to
uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission
by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has
been before. It should continue to be so. (Mercado v. Court of
First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93).
Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a
not too well known aspect of the Supreme Court's functions:
 The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of
intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of
Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres
where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter
at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
 The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar
on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
Requisites for the exercise of judicial review: “actual case”
and ripeness”. The first requisite, therefore, for the court to be
able to exercise the power of judicial review is that there must be
before it an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power.
This is a manifestation of the commitment to the adversarial
system. Hence, the court has no authority to pass upon issues of
constitutionality through advisory opinions and it has no authority
to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or
friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real
adverse interests. Nor will the court normally entertain a petition
touching on an issue that has already become moot because then
there would no longer be a “flesh and blood” case for the court
to resolve.
In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that
the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie
case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a
destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer
or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the
initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. We
reiterate the rule, however, that this Court will not validate the
filing of an information for subversion based on the kind of
evidence against the petitioner found in the records.

Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general

rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be
free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the

innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution,
and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also
to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v.
Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216).
The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and
to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process.
(See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to
satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the
preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making
sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A
preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the
State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom
and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country.
It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the
case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going
through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause
exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Randolf David vs Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GR 171396, 3 May 2006)
Case Digest by: Atty. Riczen Gingoyon
OSS:, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state
of national emergency, On the same day, the President issued
G.O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
Parties: Randolf David, et. al. as petitioners vs President Gloria
Arroyo, et. al. as respondents
Statute:
On February 24, 2006 Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
was issued, as stated:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political
opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme
Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists � the historical enemies
of the democratic Philippine State � who are now in a tactical
alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy,
over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted
Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring
down the President;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly
magnified by certain segments of the national media;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State
by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of
the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in
government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the
extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their
avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes
the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and
the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences,
ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and
present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine
State and of the Filipino people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of
the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
and also President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017,
as stated:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political
opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme
Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of
the democratic Philippine State � and who are now in a tactical
alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy,
over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted
Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring
down our republican government;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly
magnified by certain segments of the national media;
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2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State
by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of
the economy and sabotaging the people�s confidence in the
government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the
extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their
avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the
defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the
State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences,
ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and
present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine
State and of the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has
been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue
of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President
of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of
the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism
and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of
the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP,
to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence.
On March 23, PP 1017 was lifted and Proclamation 1021 was
issued, as stated:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated
February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national
emergency;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated
February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of
Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and
suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of
rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented,
suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President
of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist.
Procedural History: Petitioners  Supreme Court
Facts: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo
members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017)
and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The
said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance
of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I
and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and
other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the
editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated
anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-
GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same
day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was
however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985
for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in
jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of
national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition
Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has
no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president
for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is
actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those
of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners
claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon
protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the
issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of
PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power,
take care power and take over power.
Issue: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
Held:
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and
partly unconstitutional.
Ratio:
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason
of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative
because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation
of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at
bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the
same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC
ruled in the following way;
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power
to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the
President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has
been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution
(He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the
president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017
however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated
legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in
Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that granted former President
Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled
that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Phil

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual
basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.
Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool

developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech
cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom
of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is
not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct.
It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not
intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate
state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and
‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial
overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by
their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that
‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact
remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared

PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power
as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed
that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether
it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017
for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp vs COMELEC
(GR 133486, 28 January 2000)
Case Digest by: Atty. Rachel Ruth Montilla
Atty. Justeen David
OSS: COMELEC prohibited the conduct of exit polls by ABS-CBN
on the ground that it poses a clear and present danger to the
integrity of elections. However, the Supreme Court said that
COMELECE erred in such measure because it violates freedom of
speech and freedom of press by making an overbroad resolution.
What is an exit poll?
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
individuals or group of individuals for the purpose of determining
the probable result of an election by confidentially asking
randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately
after they have officially cast their ballots.
Parties: ABS-CBN as Petitioner vs COMELEC as respondent
Statute: Petitioner availed of Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, which states:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and
a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)
Petitioner herein challenged the COMELEC en banc Resolution
98-1419, which states:
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to
stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting such exit survey and to
authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same.
Procedural History: Petition for certiorari by Petitioner  TRO
by Supreme Court  COMELEC Resolution nullified
Facts: COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a
restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its agents
or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution
was issued by the COMELEC allegedly upon "information from a
reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the
elections and to make an exit survey of the votes cast for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be
broadcasted immediately. The electoral body believed that such
project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as
the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL). It also noted that it had not authorized or
deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order against the
resolution of the COMELEC and the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or
problem.
ABS-CBN contends that the holding of exit polls and the
nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. It submits that, in
restraining the holding and the reporting of exit polls, the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated the
petitioner's constitutional rights.
Issue:
1. Whether or not COMELEC, in the exercise of its powers, can
ban exit polls. Did the COMELEC act with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess or jurisdiction when it
ordered the restraining order?
2. Whether or not the petition is moot and premature, given the
petitioner’s failure to seek reconsideration of the assailed
resolution?
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Held:
1. Yes. No law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit
polls. COMELEC’s resolution grossly violated the petitioner’s
constitutional rights.
2. No. Its implications to the fundamental freedom of expression
transcend the past election. Resolution was issued 20 days
before election itself – there was hardly enough opportunity to
move for a reconsideration.
The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set
aside. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 9, 1998 is made
PERMANENT.
Ratio: Holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their
results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the
press. There can be no honest elections if, in the efforts to
maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are
unduly curtailed.
Oliver Wendell Holmes – we stress that the freedom
encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the thought we
agree with.
The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our
democratic government. Our Constitution clearly mandates that
no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press. In the landmark case Gonzales vs COMELEC, this Court
enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press
consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter
of public interest without prior restraint.
However, there are limitations to this freedom in which, the
State, in the exercise of its police power, can curtail whenever
these tests are satisfied:
1. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE – the evil
consequence of comment or utterance must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence must be extremely high
before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be
guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be
prevented.
2. DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE – If the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is sufficient if
the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be
to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent. Note that the words need not be definite
so as to incite the listeners to acts of force, violence or
unlawfulness.
The court adheres to the clear and present danger rule which is
a question on the proximity and degree of the utterance will result
to the danger or evil sought to be avoided. This is a heavy burden
because the court is always on the side of freedom of expression.
In this case, the freedoms of speech and of the press should all
the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the
dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally
vital right of suffrage. The interest being protected is the
fundamental right to vote and securing its sanctity through the
ballots.
1. Exit polls generate important research data which may be
used to study influencing factors and trends in voting
behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be
unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively prevents the
use of exit poll data not only for election-day projections, but
also for long-term research
2. Overbroad. The COMELEC's concern with the possible non-
communicative effect of exit polls — disorder and confusion
in the voting centers — does not justify a total ban on ABS-
CBN. Undoubtedly, the assailed COMELEC Resolution is too
broad, since its application is without qualification as to
whether the polling is disruptive or not. Concededly, the
Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around
the voting centers. There is no showing, however, that exit
polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting
centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving
that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election
precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.
3. Violation of Ban Secrecy. The contention of public respondent
that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the
secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue.
Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here. The

reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote
buying through voter identification. In exit polls, the contents
of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore,
the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not
compulsory, but voluntary.

What is the Clear and Present Danger Doctrine?

- Clear and present danger was a doctrine adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States to determine under what
circumstances limits can be placed on First Amendment
freedoms of speech, press, or assembly.
- The abridgement of the freedom of expression and of the right
of assembly and petition can be justified only where there exist
substantial danger that the speech, publication, assembly and
petition will likely lead to an evil, which the government has
the right to prevent.
- The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to
be the clear and present danger rule - which words are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
(Soriano v Laguardia, GR 164785 and 165636)

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

WHO MAY EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Restituto Ynot vs IAC
(GR 74457, 20 March 1987)
Case Digest by: Atty. Licinio Angel Lopez Talip, MD
OSS: A case of prohibition of inter-province carabao and carabeef
transfer which was challenged as unconstitutional thus striken
down by the Supreme Court.
Parties: Restituto Ynot as petitioner vs Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC), et. al. as respondents
Statute: EO 626-A of October 25, 1980, which states:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive
Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the
violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef
instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of
Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the
violation.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
Section 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such
that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported
in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject
to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but
in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are
ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights,
as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly
meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free
society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who
are not afraid to assert them.
Ratio: Athough police power was invoked by the government in
this case for the reason that the present condition demand that
the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not
however, comply with the second requisite for a valid exercise of
the said power which is, "that there be a lawful method." The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its
authority in behalf of the public, it must be:
1. The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference;
2. That the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
What is writ of replevin?
A writ of replevin is a prejudgment process ordering the seizure
or attachment of alleged illegally taken or wrongfully withheld
property to be held in the custody of a designated official, under
order and supervision of the court, until the court determines
otherwise.
What is supersedeas bond?
A supersedeas bond, also known as a defendant's appeal bond,
is a type of surety bond that a court requires from an appellant
who wants to delay payment of a judgment until the appeal is
over. An appellant's bond to stay execution on a judgment during
the pendency of the appeal.

Procedural History: Petitioner sued for recovery in RTC 

issued a writ of replevin  filed a supersedeas bond of
P12,000  denied by RTC  appealed in IAC but upheld the
decision  Supreme Court reserved the decision

Facts: Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump

boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo for the violation of EO 626-A which prohibits the slaughter
of carabaos except under certain conditions. Petitioner sued for
recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of replevin
upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos
(P 12, 000.00). After considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of
the EO, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also
for its presumed validity.

Issue: Whether or not EO 626-A is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes, Supreme Court found the EO as unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled
and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert
and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have
reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged
measure would have become a fait accompli despite its
invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present
challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in
Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its
obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without
protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Jesus Garcia vs Ray Alan Drilon
(GR 179267, 25 June 2013)
Case Digest by: Atty. Achille Lauro Lanutan
OSS: Jesus Garcia, a husband assails the constitutionality of RA
9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.
Parties: JESUS GARCIA as petitioner vs ALAN RAY DRILON
(presiding judge of RTC branch 41, Bacolod City) with ROSALIE
JAYPE-GARCIA and in behalf of her (minor) children: JO-ANN,
JOSEPH, EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE (ALL SURNAMED GARCIA) as
respondents
Statute: Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262
effective March 27, 2004; entitled “An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other
Purposes."
It defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and
their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate partners,
i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a
common child.
Procedural History: Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent)
filed civil case in RTC  30-Day TPO against Jesus Garcia x 5
Times  Petitioner filed prohibition in CA  60-Day TRO against
TPO  CA dismissed petition  MR denied  petition for review
on certiorari in Supreme Court
Facts: Petitioner is the breadwinner of the family as he owns
deep-well construction businesses.
On 23 Mar 2006, Rosalie filed for herself, and in her children’s,
behalf a verified petition before Bacolod’s RTC for the issuance of
a Temporary Protection Order against her husband (petitioner).
HER CLAIM: She was a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence due to her partner’s marital
infidelity. He threatened Rosalie that he will take custody of her
children and deprive her of financial support.
Rosalie claimed she was a responsible wife, on the other hand,
her husband Jesus was controlling and dominant and forced her
to do away with her social life. (like going out with her friends,
etc.)
EXAMPLES OF HER HUSBANDS “WRONGDOING” (for lack of a
better word)
a. When she studied Law and also working part time, her husband
forced her to stay at home.
b. Her husband had an affair. He was even the one to admit to
her that he did it to get in the 3rd party’s bank account.
The consequence of her husband’s doings lead to Rosalie’s
despair, that she even attempted suicide but was found by her
son bleeding on the floor (probably he stopped her from doing
so, it was not mentioned in the full text.) When petitioner found
out, he just fled the house without attending to her medical
needs. Then, she was hospitalized for 7 days and the petitioner
did not even bother to visit. Since then, Rosalie turned to therapy
sessions and started taking anti-depressant medication.
When Rosalie (private respondent) informed the petitioner’s
concubine that she was about to file charges, Jesus Garcia then
was furious because she was jeopardizing the 3rd party’s job.
(She’s a manager of Robinson’s Bank, particular branch was not
mentioned.) The petitioner then packed his things and told
Rosalie he was leaving her for good. He even told Rosalie’s
mother, who was residing in their home, to leave their extra-
marital affair alone. She had plans of leaving Jesus Garcia but
was afraid he might take custody of the children, and even
warned her that if she files charges, she would lose and not get
a single centavo from it.
Due to this, he questioned the RA No. 9262 stating that the law
is gender-discriminatory and only finds provisions in favor of
women and children. It seemed to him that it is injustice in his
part, that only the women and children are the ones being
protected by the law. The quoted phrase below best explains the
issue.
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Issue:
I. The court of appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the
theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at
the earliest opportunity and that, the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
II. The court of appeals committed serious error in failing to
conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative
of the equal protection clause.
III. The court of appeals committed grave mistake in not finding
that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the
constitution.
IV. The court of appeals erred in not finding that the law does
violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a
basic social institution.
V. The court of appeals seriously erred in not RA 9262 as invalid
and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation
of judicial power to the barangay officials
Held: NO on all issues. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. RA 9262
does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an
unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind
of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no
concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by
petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of RA
9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said
in Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts
and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.
Ratio:
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. R.A. 9262 is based on a
valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such,
did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State
extends its protection.
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles
out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC
may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the
use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual
or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships.
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as such, did not violate
the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection. The unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims
of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states,
“the accommodation of differences … is the essence of true
equality.”
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

Spouses Alejandro and Lilia Mirasol vs CA
(GR 128448, 1 February 2001)
Case Digest by: Atty. Licinio Angel Lopez Talip, MD
OSS: This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of CA,
petitioners availed of crop loan financing scheme with PNB but
failed to settle their accounts thus the latter extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage properties.
Parties: Alejandro Mirasol and Lilia Mirasol as petitioners vs CA,
PNB, PHILEX as respondents
Statute:
PD 579 of November 12, 1974; entitled “RATIONALIZING AND
STABILIZING THE EXPORT OF SUGAR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.”
RA 7202 of February 29, 1992; entitled “REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7202 - AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE RESTITUTION OF LOSSES
SUFFERED BY SUGAR PRODUCERS FROM CROP YEAR 1974-1975
TO CROP YEAR 1984-1985 DUE TO THE ACTIONS OF
GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED AGENCIES”
Procedural History: petitioners filed specific performance in
RTC  RTC found PD 579 unconstitutional, PNB et. al. to pay
damages, pay for whole amount of unpaid export sugar; and
moral damage  petitioners appealed to Court of Appeals for
nullifying dacion en pago and mortgage contracts  denied
motion for reconsideration  Supreme Court upheld CA decision
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar
production venture from 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing
scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel
Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor
of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and
sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment
of their obligations to it.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to
enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his
intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty
is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be
tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress
that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice
requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief
and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is
required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory
relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule,
there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the
validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or
proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
Petitioners contend that PD 579 and its implementing issuances
are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition
against the taking of private property without just compensation.
Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the
exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an
actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third,
the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing
to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have
been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
What is lis mota?
Literal translation is “litigation moved”. Thus it is the cause or
motivation of a legal action or lawsuit.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November 1974 authorizing

Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar
allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's
purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX
might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing
that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their
obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the
proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other
loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their
accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due
and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to
PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an
unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds,

insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset
their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its
stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account
since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar
pertained to the National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting,

specific performance, and damages against PNB in the RTC.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a
statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General
where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the
resolution of the Trial Court.
2. Whether or not PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are
unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not PD 570 can not be subject to judicial review.

Held: No, in all issues. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is

DENIED and the assailed decision of the respondent court in CA-
G.R. CV 38607 AFFIRMED

Ratio:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
all Regional Trial Courts.

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

REQUISITES OF THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Dennis Funa vs Executive Secretary
(GR 184740, 11 February 2010)
Case Digest by: Atty. Justeen David
Atty. Maria Benilda de Veyra
OSS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare
as unconstitutional the designation of respondent Undersecretary
Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
Parties: Dennis Funa as petitioner vs Executive Secretary
(Eduardro Ermita), et. al. as respondents
Statute: Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in
any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
and also Section 7, paragraph (2) Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-own or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Procedural History: Petitioner  Supreme Court
Facts: On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
appointed Bautista as Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Bautista was
designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente
T. Suazo on September 1, 2008, Bautista was designated as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Secretary.
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants (e.g., the
Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet)
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed
at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department
Since Funa filed this as a concerned citizen, he is within his right
to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials. Also, given
the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the
Authority, we are hardly persuaded by respondents’ submission
that respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA was
merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary
position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
De Facto v De Jure Officers v Usurper
De facto Officer
- a state of affairs that is true in fact, but that is not
officially sanctioned
- has color in title but in actual position and possession of
the office
- acts done are valid only in so far as third parties and
general party public right acts are concerned
- should not benefit from own acts
- requisites: (1) existence of de jure office; (2) color of
title; (3) actual and physical possession of office
De jure Officer
- a state of affairs that is in accordance with law (i.e. that
is officially sanctioned)
- lawfully entitled to the office
- in possession of the office
An officer de facto is different from an officer de jure, and is one
who has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he
assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or
title to the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a
mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the former holds by
some color of right or title while the latter intrudes upon the office
and assumes to excercise its functions without either the legal
title or color of right to such office. (McQuillin , Municipal
Corporations, Vol. 3, 3rd ed., pp. 376-377.)
Usurper
- no color in the title
- in possession of the office
- acts are void definitely

On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa filed the instant petition

challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment
because there is a prohibition on the president, vice-president,
members of the cabinet and their deputies and assistants to hold
any other office or employment (Section 13, Art. VII of the 1987
Consti.) While it was clarified in Civil Liberties Union that the
prohibition does not apply to those positions held in ex-officio
capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio
to the post of DOTC Undersecretary. The fact that Bautista was
extended an appointment naming her as OIC of MARINA shows
that she does not occupy it in an ex-officio capacity since an ex-
officio position does not require any "further warrant or appoint."

During the pendency if his petition, Bautista was appointed

Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as

OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or
multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.

Held: Yes! Petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent

Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent
capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being
violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore, NULL and VOID.

Ratio: Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general

rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and

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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs Anti-
Terrorism Council
(GR 178552, 5 October 2010)
Case Digest by: Atty. Hillary Olga M. Reserva
OSS: This is a petitioner for certiorari and prohibition on RA 9372
Parties: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network as
petitioners vs Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), et. al. as
respondents
Statute: RA 9372 of March 6, 2007, entitled “AN ACT TO SECURE
THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM”; also
known as Human Security Act of 2007.
Procedural History: Petitioner  Supreme Court
Facts: After the effectivity of 9372 on July 15 2007, different
groups have filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition of the
law. The groups have filed on the basis of their interest as non-
governmental organizations, concerned citizens, as tax payers,
as legislators, and as lawyers. Petitioners have asserted locus
standi on the basis of being suspected as communist front and
individual petitioners have also invoke the doctrine of
transcendental importance as their status as citizens and tax
payers.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJA, and PCR
allege that they have been subject to close security surveillance
by state forces and their members have also been folloed by
suspicious persons and vehicles with dark windshields. Their
offices have also been monitored by men with a military built.
They claimed that they have been branded as enemies of the
state. BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham
would like the court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged
action of tagging them as CPP and NPA front. They claim that
such tagging is tantamount t the effects of proscription without
following the procedure under the law.
While IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their
sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. Thus, these claims are
allegedly be of valid reasons for petitioners to be in locus standi.
Petitoners also claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad. With such
term like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the popular” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
deman” are nebulous, leaving the law enforcement agencies with
no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the petition of certiorari is improper?
2. Whether or not petitioners lack locus standi?
3. Whether the petitioners have an actual controversy?
4. Whether void-of-vagueness doctrine and overbreath doctrines
are equally applicable grounds to assail penal statute?
5. Whether the element of “unlawful demand” in RA 9372 in the
definition of terrorism, must necessarily be transmitted
through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause?
Held: No, in all issues as petitioners failed in their contentions.
Petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited
vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus
legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial
power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes
future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1. According to the Rules of Court, Certiorari does not lie against
respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. And basically the respondents are the Anti-Terrorism
Council which is composed of, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson,
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and
Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales,
Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and
Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the
petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar
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2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)
Calderon. These respondents do not assume any judicial or
quasi judicial function.
2. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. A person who assails the
constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal
interest. For the party to be allowed to raise a constitutional
question, it must show that 1 it has personally suffered some
actual and threated injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; 2. The injury is fairly traceable to
the challenge action; 3. The injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action. In this case, petitioners have not
presentated any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
The allegation that KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos,
SELDA and PCR have been subjected to close security
surveillance by state security member have yet to show the
connection between the surveillance and the implementation of
RA 9372.
On BAYAN- ST et.al allegation of being tagged as CPP and NPA
front, Court cannot take judicial notice of such allegation.
Matters of judicial notice must be 1. A matter of common and
general knowledge; 2 must be well and authoritavely settled;
3 it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court;. No ground was properly established by petitioners
for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners’ apprehension is
insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge
or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them,
three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence
of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.
And this is also applied with petitioners KMU, ANFLU, and
CTUHR. Courts said that in the Philippines there is no judicially
declared as terrorist organization. Abusayaf, CPP, NPA as
considered as foreign terrorist organizations. Thus, even after
the effectivity of RA9372 for 3 years, the petitioners have
conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of
much less and actual prosecution under RA 9372.
IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn
duty to uphold the constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section
21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistane to those arrested
and detained under the law. The mere invocation of the duty
to preserve the rule of law does not sued to clother the IBP
with standing. The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how
its mandate under the assailed statutes revolts against its
constitutional rights and duties.
Former Senator Madrigal claims that she has been a subject of
political surveillance. Yet also lacks locus standi, the Court finds
that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being
charged under RA 9372.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty Santos
raised transcendental importance without mention of any
specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been
charged or may be charged. The mere invocation of being a
human rights advocate cannot be sufficient to clothe litigants
with locus standi.
On the basis of petitioners as taxpayers and citizens, a
taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power of congress, whereas citizen standing
must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
What is locus standi?
means the right to bring an action, to be heard in court, or to
address the Court on a matter before it. Locus standi is the ability
of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to
and harm from the law or action challenged to support that
party's participation in the case.
3. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government Thus, Petitioners’ obscure
allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and supposedly being
tagged as “communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible
threat of prosecution.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS 2018 CONSTITUTON I (CASE DIGESTS)

4. Overbreadth Doctrine are decrees that mounts a facial presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
challenge of invalidation in free speech cases, RA 9372 highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition
regulates the conduct and not the speech. cannot re-categorize the unprotected conduct into a protected
speech. Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it heed the call for a facial analysis.
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. Meanwhile, the overbreadth doctrine, is a
decree whose governmental purpose is to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. A facial
invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation
to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its
very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or activities. Thus, the
overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech.
Petitioners’ claim of RA 9372 being intrinsically vague and has
an impermissibly broad definition of the crime terrorism is a
facial invalidation by which it is only allowed in free speech
cases. And with such, RA 9372 regulates the conduct and not
the speech.

What is Overbreadth Doctrine?

The “overbreadth” doctrine is related to the vagueness doctrine.
Under this doctrine, a law is unconstitutional or void for being too
broad if it covers activities that are protected by the federal Bill
of Rights or the rights listed in state constitutions. Unlike
vagueness doctrine, arguments that a particular law is overbroad
typically do not appear in criminal cases. Instead, most
overbreadth arguments come up in First Amendment cases,
where a statute tries to prohibit or to make criminal a behavior
protected by the First Amendment.

The First Amendment protects five basic rights: the rights to

freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion
(both to have a religious preference and to be free from
government mandates that one practice or avoid practicing a
certain religion), the freedom to assemble peaceably, and the
freedom “to petition the government for redress of grievances.”
When a law is unconstitutionally overbroad, it often is because
that law prohibits some behavior that is otherwise protected by
the First Amendment.

Overbreadth is related to vagueness because an overbroad law is

often too vague for a reasonable person to understand what
behavior is covered and what behavior is not. In order to avoid
breaking an overbroad law, then, many people will voluntarily
choose not to engage in behavior protected by the First
Amendment or another basic right, just to be sure they are not
accidentally breaking the overbroad law. Since these laws either
infringe on basic rights or encourage people to avoid exercising
basic rights, most courts recognize that anyone who is affected
by an overbroad law has standing to challenge the law’s
overbreadth on behalf of all persons affected by that law – an
exception to the usual rules of standing and those that cover class
actions.

What is Void for Vagueness Doctrine?

A constitutional rule that requires criminal laws to state explicitly
and definitely, what conduct is punishable. Criminal laws that
violate this requirement are said to be void for vagueness.
Vagueness doctrine rests on the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (Wex Legal
Dictionary)

In American constitutional law, a statute is void for vagueness

and unenforceable if it is too vague for the average citizen to
understand. There are several reasons a statute may be
considered vague; in general, a statute might be called void for
vagueness when an average citizen cannot generally determine
what persons are regulated, what conduct is prohibited, or what
punishment may be imposed. Criminal laws, which do not state
explicitly and definitely what conduct is punishable, for example,
are void for vagueness. A statute is also void for vagueness if a
legislature's delegation of authority to judges and/or
administrators is so extensive that it would lead to arbitrary
prosecutions.

5. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372,

there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to
trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an “unlawful demand.” Given the

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