Revised Sessions 1 and 2

Process Safety Management
PSM Training Course 4
Supervisor + Workforce
© SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com
3/25/2021 1
Agenda
Session 1 (2 hrs) Session 3 (2 hrs)

Introductions The Key Elements of PSM System
Drivers for Effective PSM • Commit to Process Safety: Leadership & Culture
• When things have gone wrong • Workforce Engagement
Personal vs. Process Safety Manage Risks during Operations
• LSRs & PSFs • Process Safety Information
Session 2 (2 hrs) • Identifying Hazards and Risks
Introduction to Risk & Bowties • Identifying own PSM Roles & Responsibilities
Major Accidents - Sao Mateus Session 4 (2 hrs)
• Hazards and Risk Manage Risks during Operations – Part 2
• Implementation of lessons Process Safety Assurance & Continuous Improvement
learned from CdSM in SBM • Management overview and KPIs
• Incident investigations & lessons learned
Course Summary & Wrap-up
3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 2

Session 1 (2 hr)
3/25/2021 3
Session 1 (4 hrs)
• Introductions
• Drivers for Effective PSM
• When things have gone wrong
• Personal vs. Process Safety
• LSRs & PSFs
© SBM Offshore 2017. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com
3/25/2021 4
SAFETY MOMENT
What are the Major Hazards associated with your job?

How often do you think about them?
What do You Do to prevent these Hazards causing

incidents?

Course Objectives
• Basic Understanding of Process Safety Management

• Hazard & Risk appreciation & Process Safety Fundamentals (PSFs)
• Barriers, Bowtie Introduction & Barrier Ownership.
• Maintaining Barriers
• Learning from experience: when things have gone wrong and how SBM has learned and improved from
them.
• How you can contribute to PSM Continual Improvement
• The objective of this training is therefore to have a full understanding and be able to answer:
 What can go wrong?
 How can the tasks you perform release the hazard and potentially result in a Major
Accident Scenario?
 What systems are in place to stop bad things happening to you and others.
 What preventative barriers prevent a leak/loss of containment?
 What mitigation barriers are in place to prevent the leak escalating resulting in a Major
Accident Hazardous scenario?
 How do you know the barriers are working? Hearts and
Minds
 Your role to verify the barriers are healthy and working effectively. I own my
barrier – video
Part 1
Session 1 (2hrs)
• Introductions
• When things have gone wrong
• LSRs & PSFs
3/25/2021 7
SBM Process Safety Management
PSM Ambition
SBM Offshore PSM Ambition

To be at the forefront of our industry in Process Safety Management
and to be best in class in Loss of Primary Containment Performance.
Tier 1 and Tier 2 < 3 per year
How ?
• PSM – knowledge, awareness, commitment, implementation & culture
• Driving and Sustaining Process Safety Leading Indicators to positively impact

the Lagging indicators (Tier 1 & 2 LOPC’s).
• Consistent shared ambition & commitment across the company.

Introduction
What Is Process Safety Management?

Process Safety is a disciplined framework for Managing the low
probability but high consequence major events that can result from
major process hazards inherently present within our industry.
It deals with the prevention, control and mitigation for major hazard
events that have the potential to release hazardous materials which
could result in toxic events, fire, explosion, multiple fatalities, major
asset damage and environmental impact.
In Essence, those events that have the potential to destroy our
business reputation and company as a whole.

FPSO MAJOR HAZARDS
This picture does not represent a specific FPSO; the objective is to
provide a general view of any FPSO hazards. Figures change from Flame Out
FPSO to FPSO
Helicopter
Transfers Lifting of Heavy Loads ( from
15 to 25 T)
Risers Gas Injection

at about 500 bar
Adverse Weather
Conditions Potential
Risers Gas Export

at 200-250 bars
Hazardous Chemicals
Storage (process
Interface with
chemicals, methanol,
Shuttle Tankers
solvents, etc) cca
30,000 bbls
High Pressure
Steam
HCs Storage in
cargo tanks approx
Interface with About 150,000 bbls/ day of Processing of HCs approx from
2,500,000 bbls
Shuttle Tankers stabilised crude from topsides to 0 – to 250 bar
Interface with
cargo tanks Note: 0.1 bar overpressure due to explosion causes
Field Vessels
damage to buildings
FPSO MAJOR ACCIDENT EVENTS
LoC due to
Liquid Carry
Over from
Flare
Pressurized flammable
fluids in FPSO topside
Risers / Gas piping and equipment
Export Line (including H2S) LoC
Loss of LoC
Control of
Helicopter LoC of Dead
crude in cargo
export system
Dropped
Loss of LoC due to LoC of
Objects
Control of hazaroud Hazardous
interacing material in cargo materials in hull
vessels tank ullage storage tanks -
space crude, MGO and
Loss of slops
Accumulation of fuel Stability /
for Boiler operations Sinking
BW Offshore Sao Mateus Pump Room Explosion
11/2/15
12:37:58 secs 12:38:01 secs 12:38:04 secs
 Vapour from condensate ignited

 9 x Fatalities, 26 injured

Paraty drain drum – 18th January 2014
Draining operation under pressure to remove liquids

from compressor prior to start, into a common ‘casing
drain tank’.
The tank designed for 10barg.
Tank overpressured and ruptured.
Flying parts missed everyone and gas did not ignite
© SBM Offshore 2017. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 13

3/25/2021
Kikeh Pump Room 1/10/17 (1 of 2)
Task In Progress – 28” Spectacle blind swing in Pump Room – elevation @ 15.0 metres
Aft PW/Slop Tank Isolation Valve

F24-BF-004
(passing)
Fwd PW/Slop Tank Isolation Valve

F24-BF-002
Fwd PW/Slop Tank

28 inch Spectacle Blind
Kikeh Pump Room 1/10/17
Open 28” spectacle blind: 250 T of Produced Water followed by 6 tons

hydrocarbon enriched inert gas released to pump room. Gas detection & ESD.
LEL at 100% for nearly 2 hours
100% LEL
2 hours

Lessons Learned from aged SBM Units
FPSO Saxi Batuque: SXB20210101-001
• Total Mass of HC Gas Released = 12500 kg
(PSE Tier 1 Limit: > 500 kg worst 1-hour)
• Spurious release of gas from Port PV Breaker.
• No Gas Detectors activated luckly due the wind
direction. The LOPC was realized by the OIM during
boots on deck.
• In the days after the incident, a pinhole leak was found
in one of the Port PVB sight glasses, which had not
previously been noted. It is concluded that the lower, or
both, of the sight assembly shutoff valves were
probably left open, allowing the very slow loss of water
to occur.
• Water in PVB is also consistently below the required
level as per calculations made during the investigation,
which further contributed to the loss of water seal.
• No formal instruction in place on how and why to
perform PVB water filling.
• A similar leakage was found in the Stbd PVB few days
before the incident and no WO was raised to repair it.

2018-2019 Process Safety Incidents/Near Misses
2018 incidents
• CdI: 3 x cargo venting on CdI during low wind conditions . . . none of them ignited
• Mast riser bullets replaced for HVVV type as per CdM/CdS Nov 2018.
• SXB: PSV flange failure from wrong material in bolts (SS304) . . . 14 tons hydrocarbon gas
released . . . did not ignite
2019 Incidents
• NGO: 3 x ESD2 events (20% LEL in HVAC intakes of LER (1) & Accom. (2).
8 tons flammable gas released . . . cloud did not ignite
60mm hole in 20 inch common o/board discharge line passing through vessel drain tank (fuel gas blanketed which
was entrained in discharge line and dispersed over FPSO – Tier 1
• SER: ESD2 & full field S/D due to 20% LEL in ER HVAC when starting up ER boiler in benign
conditions when unapproved override not used on specific occasion
• OQ initiated to extend/relocate FG vent line to safer location
• SXB: ESD2 (20% LEL in pump room). COP #3 overpressure to 24 barg & flange gasket failure.
100% LEL for 20 min . . . no ignition

Process Safety Event Prevention
What threats can lead to a major

hazard event ?
Companies must ask themselves 3 questions:
• Do we understand what could go wrong? What barriers do you have in

place to stop the major event
• Do we know what our systems are to prevent this happening? occurring?
• Do we have information to assure us that they are working

effectively?
Do you have information and/or
KPIs aligned to the barriers to
tell you that they are still
working?

PSM Performance – Continual Improvement
2014 - 2020 PSM Journey
PSM Performance – The Big Picture 2020

Session 1 (2hrs)
• Introductions
– when things have gone wrong
• LSRs & PSFs
3/25/2021 20
Occupational Safety
Occupational Safety
• Typically quite frequent but only slight consequence
• However, when a major consequence usually single fatality (e.g. falling from height)
• Single or few individuals affected
• Consequences contained locally
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) often used as a control
Occupational Safety in SBM Offshore

• What was the most recent LTI for your site/vessel?
• What is the current TRIFr for your asset/vessel and for SBM as a whole?

Occupational Health & Safety vs. Process Safety
Personal Safety
e.g. slips, trips and falls
Too Many Companies

Focus here

What is Process Safety?
• Process Safety is a blend of engineering and management skills

focused on preventing catastrophic accidents and near misses
We design &
• The core areas are: construct so as
to minimise risk
(ALARP)
• PEOPLE
• PROCESSES Design
Integrity
• PLANT
• In order to ensure: Integrity

Leadership
Operating Technical
Integrity Integrity
We work We maintain
within all hardware barriers
operational without
limits compromise
Process Safety - Simplified
Zero loss of containment = Zero Process Safety incidents

Keep It In The Pipe – How?
Simple – get the Basics right & established in day-to-day ways of working.
Knowledge, awareness & compliance to the

10 x Process Safety Fundamentals (PSFs)
Knowledge, awareness & compliance to the

9 x Life Saving Rules (LSRs)

Group Exercise/discussion:
What barrier is each PSF protecting?
And how could that barrier degrade?
Always use two barriers for Always remain in attendance Verify for complete Walk the Line –
hydrocarbon and chemical when performing a critical tightness after Verify & Validate any
drains & vents transfer or draining operation maintenance work line up change
Barrier: process
Barrier: process containment
containment
Degradation Factor:
Degradation Factor: human activities:
human activities: draining changing the line-up
and sampling, leaving a
single valve that can fail
Control: Walk the line to
ensure correct line-out &
Control: 2 barriers no open ends

For all defined high risk activities,

Take interim mitigating measures Respond to follow the procedures and sign off
in case of failure of critical alarms after each step
Safety Critical Equipment
Barrier: All barriers involving humans

Degradation Factor: human
factors: distraction, forgetting, etc.
Control: use managed procedures
[and management actions to maintain
and update procedures]

Always use MoC when making a Perform MOC and install Always check that equipment is
change backflow protection when pressure free, drained, and
connecting utilities to process provides safe isolation before
starting maintenance work
Barrier: Barrier:
Degradation Factor: Degradation Factor: uncertain
unexpected corrosion due to conditions leading to loss of
backflow in to utilities control, passing valves.
Control: backflow protection Control: pressure free and
drained. Isolation Integrity check
prior breaking containment
There were 89 LOPCs between Jan 2018 and Aug 2019 that could have
been avoided if there had been 100% compliance with the PSFs.
Please rank them together from 0 to 10. Which led to the most LOPCs?
Always remain in attendance Take interim mitigating For all defined high risk Walk the Line –
Always use two barriers for
when performing a critical measures in case of failure of activities, follow the Verify & Validate any line up
hydrocarbon and chemical
transfer or draining operation Safety Critical Equipment procedures and sign off after change
drains & vents
each step
Always use MoC when making Verify for complete tightness Always check that Perform MOC and install Respond to critical alarms
a change after maintenance work equipment is pressure free, backflow protection when
drained, and provides safe connecting utilities to process
isolation before starting
maintenance work
© SBM Offshore 2017. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 29

3/25/2021
PSF Tracking
PSF Associated LOPC’s Jan 2018 – Aug 2019
1st
2nd
• Do you find PSF’s useful?

3rd
• How do you report an issue when you are

4th
unable to fully and correctly follow a PSF?
+

Group Exercise:
Life Saving Rules: are these personal or process safety?

End Of Session 1
3/25/2021 32
Session 2 (2 hrs)
• Introduction to Risk & Bowties

• Major Accidents - Sao Mateus
– Hazards and Risk
– Implementation of lessons learned
from CdSM in SBM
3/25/2021 33
PSM – Introduction to Risk & Bowtie
Evaluating & Managing Risk
How do we Manage Process Safety Risk in SBM Offshore?

Via Barriers & Bow Tie Methodology
Swiss Cheese Model
Causes/
Consequences
Threats

Bowtie Introduction
A bowtie is a visual risk assessment and simple communication

tool to illustrate how hazards and potential threats are managed.
1. What could go wrong?

Prevention Mitigation
2. What barriers prevent
this happening?
3. How do we know they

are working effectively?

Bowtie Introduction
Example
Riding a bike
on holiday
Excess speed Bike damage

Cycle at safe Evasive action
speed
Loss of Loss of control of Injury to

concentration bike others
No mobile Alert others to
Drink caffeine Evasive action
phone use run
Defective bike / Personal

equipment injury
Preventive
maintenance Wearing helmet
Maintenance
Forgot to pack
missed
Hire company
Holiday checklist
maint. sys.

Bowtie Introduction
Bowtie Definitions
HAZARD: An operation, activity or material with the potential to cause harm to people, property, the environment, or business.
TOP EVENT: An event is when control of the hazard is lost.
CONSEQUENCE: The direct undesirable outcome of an accident sequence that results in harm to people, the environment, asset or reputation,
CAUSE/THREAT: A possible specific initiating event that can potentially release a hazard and produce a Top Event.
BARRIER: Barriers are risk reduction measures (devices, systems, or actions). Complete systems which are effective, independent and auditable.
They must be able to Detect / Decide / Act
PREVENTION BARRIER: Barriers to the left of the event (before it has happened). They must, on their own, be able to completely stop the top
event from occurring.
MITIGATION BARRIER: Barriers to the right of the event (after it has happened). They prevent or reduce losses and regain control.
DEGRADATION FACTORS: a situation, condition, defect or error that compromises the functionality of a barrier
DEGRADATION CONTROL: A risk management measure in place to prevent the failure of an identified barrier; not a barrier in its own right.

Barriers Characteristics
Barriers must be:

• Effective – Refer below;
• Independent – Although their may be some examples of common EIA!
mode failure, strictly speaking, barriers must be independent of each
other;
• Auditable – Be based on performance standards with key
performance indicators.
Definition of Effective
• Prevention Barriers – Are effective if they are capable, on their own,
of completely stopping the cause leading to a Top Event (e.g. Alarm
and Operator Response), i.e. big enough, strong enough, fast enough.
• Mitigation Barriers – Are effective if they prevent the top event
leading to a major consequence (e.g. ignition prevention) or reduce the
magnitude of the consequence (e.g. detect and ESD).

Barriers Characteristics
An active barrier or an active + human barrier must be also able to:

• Detect what is going wrong
• Decide what to do about it
• Act something to stop it progressing
Detect
Decide
Act

The Independent Layers of Protection
BPCS

BowTie - The HAZARD
Anything that has the

HAZARD POTENTIAL to cause harm
Response
Alarm
& Op.
Threat Consequence
Emergency Response
Protection
Systems
Relief
valve
Top
Threat Consequence
Event
Response
Alarm
& Op.
Systems
F&G and
deluge
Threat Trip Consequence
• Crude oil and condensate

• High Pressure Gas
• Crude Oil Storage
• Oxygen Ingress to Cargo Tanks
• Lifted Cargoes

BowTie – The Top Event
HAZARD
Response
Alarm
& Op.
Threat Consequence
Emergency Response
Protection
Systems
Relief
valve
Top
Threat Consequence
Event
Response
Alarm
& Op.
Systems
F&G and
deluge
Threat Trip Consequence
When things start to go wrong. Control of the Hazard

has been lost; e.g.
Degradation
Factor
• Loss of Containment (oil and gas)
• Loss of Control (e.g. Cargo Venting, crane operations)
BowTie - Threats
Threat Examples:
 Corrosion
 High/Low pressure HAZARD
 High/Low temperature
 Mechanical Failures/physical damage
 Breaking Containment
 Reinstatement of Equipment
Response
Alarm
& Op.
Threat
Relief
valve
Top
Threat
Event
Response
Alarm
& Op.
Systems
Trip
Threat
Degradation
Factor

BowTie - Consequences
HAZARD
People: Fatalities
Response
Alarm
& Op.
Threat Consequence & permanent
Emergency Response
Protection
disability
Systems
Relief
valve
Top
Threat Consequence Asset: Major
Event
Response damage or loss
Alarm
& Op.
Systems
F&G and
deluge
Threat Trip Consequence Environment:
think Deep Water
Horizion
Consequence Reputation: long
term harm to
company incl.
Degradation major dip in share
Factor price

Bowtie Barriers for Topsides Hazards

Bowtie Barriers for Mitigation of Major Accident
Event

EXERCISE: Find Where they Seat: Prevention or Mitigation?
Bowtie Introduction
Video I own my
barrier
Part 2
What Barriers are applicable to my job?
What Barriers do I support to ensure they are working effectively?
What Barriers do I own?
Video I own my
barrier
Part 3

Session 2 (2 hrs)
• Introduction to Risk & Bowties

• Major Accidents - Sao Mateus
• Hazards and Risk
• Implementation of lessons learned
from CdSM in SBM
3/25/2021 49
Lessons Learned from CdSM

Lessons Learned from Major Accidents – São Mateus
PSF’s applicable in order to prevent this disaster?
FPSO Cidade São Mateus, Brasil, 2015
9 killed

Inherently Safer Design
Inherently Safer Design by Elimination - F4W Projects No Pumproom

End Of Session 2
3/25/2021 53

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Process Safety Management

PSM Training Course 4

© SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com

Session 1 (2 hrs) Session 3 (2 hrs)

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 2

© SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com

© SBM Offshore 2017. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com

What are the Major Hazards associated with your job?

What do You Do to prevent these Hazards causing

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 5

• Basic Understanding of Process Safety Management

© SBM Offshore 2017. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com

SBM Offshore PSM Ambition

• Driving and Sustaining Process Safety Leading Indicators to positively impact

• Consistent shared ambition & commitment across the company.

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 8

What Is Process Safety Management?

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 9

Risers Gas Injection

Risers Gas Export

12:37:58 secs 12:38:01 secs 12:38:04 secs

 Vapour from condensate ignited

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 12

Draining operation under pressure to remove liquids

© SBM Offshore 2017. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 13

Aft PW/Slop Tank Isolation Valve

Fwd PW/Slop Tank Isolation Valve

Fwd PW/Slop Tank

Open 28” spectacle blind: 250 T of Produced Water followed by 6 tons

LEL at 100% for nearly 2 hours

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 15

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 16

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 17

What threats can lead to a major

• Do we understand what could go wrong? What barriers do you have in

• Do we have information to assure us that they are working

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 18

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 19

© SBM Offshore 2017. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com

Occupational Safety in SBM Offshore

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 21

Too Many Companies

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 22

• Process Safety is a blend of engineering and management skills

• In order to ensure: Integrity

Zero loss of containment = Zero Process Safety incidents

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 24

Knowledge, awareness & compliance to the

Knowledge, awareness & compliance to the

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 25

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 26

For all defined high risk activities,

Barrier: All barriers involving humans

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 27

© SBM Offshore 2017. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 29

• Do you find PSF’s useful?

• How do you report an issue when you are

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 30

3/25/2021 © SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com 31

© SBM Offshore. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com

• Introduction to Risk & Bowties

© SBM Offshore 2017. All rights reserved. www.sbmoffshore.com

How do we Manage Process Safety Risk in SBM Offshore?