HEIDEGGER THE MAN AND THE THINKER. Edited by Thomas Sheehan Precedent Publishing, Ine ChicagoContents Preface . - Thomas Shechan Introduction: Heidegger, the Project and the Fulfillment... ‘Themes Sheehan Part I. Glimpses of the Philosopher's Life Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography - Thomas Sheehan OMISSION ‘A Recollection (1957) The Pathway ‘Martin Heidegger Martin Heidegger Letter to Rudolf Otto (1999) «es eseeveeeese ISBN: 0-913750-166 Edmund Husser! Lo: 77-082476 Why DoT Stay in the Provinces? (1994)....-.+ ao Martin Heidegger ‘Heidegger's Early Veus: Fagments fr a Philosophical Biograpiy,” by Thoms Sheehan: Heidegger and the Nazis ger and the Nazis” by Karl A. Mechling; Seeking and Finding: The Speech a Heideg: lara by Bernhard Welte,Heideggers Way Through Phenomenology tthe Thinking of Ene by Willan) Rchardon Sorat he Topdog af Doster Oy Meare “Heidegger and Metaphysics” by Walter Biemel, "The Poverty of Thought: A Rellesion oo “Martin Heidegger Heidegger and Ecthart,”by Jabn D. Caputo; “Beyond ‘Hurmsoisn’: Heidegger's Understanding seBurk of Technology" by Mlchsei E. Zimmerman; transations of Why Do [Stay inthe Province Seeking and Finding: The Speech at Heidegger's Burial (930), by Mari Heidegger, with notes, and of "Realty and Resistance. On Bung end Tine, "Bernhard Welle Section 43° by Max Scheer, ith preface and notes, copyright ©1977, Listening Incorporated {Non-Proti Journal]. Reprised by permision. Translations of and orignal prelaees an notes ‘works by Martin Heidegger, Edmund Huss And Jacques Taminiauy, and original work by Thoma Sheehan, Parve Emad, David Schweikart, Reiner Schdrmann, Sandra Lee Barty, Karl A. Mochling Part IT. Being, Dasein, and Subjectivity - Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology tthe Thinking of Being ‘copyright ® 1981 by Thomas Sheehan. William J. Richardson, SJ. ‘Printed inthe United States of America, ‘Toward the Topology of Dasein.....+.c.seseeseseeseseereeesses Theodore Kisiel “Typeseing: North Cons Anis ‘ “Only a God Can Save Us": The Spidge! Interview (1966) ....22660eee8 21 2 ar 3 4s 13 ” 79 95Intothe Clearing .. John Salis Heidegger's Model of Subjectivity: A Polanyian Crit Robert E. Innis man Geis Part III, In Dialogue with Max Scheler - Realty and Resistance: On Being and Tine, Section Max Scheler “ * Seefon Heidegger on Transcendence an it leggeron Transcendence and lntetionality: His Grique of Seber Tn Memory of Max Scheler (1928) . Martin Heidrgger PartIV. Overcoming Metaphysics ............. Heidegger and Metaphysics ....... Walter Biemel Metaphysics and the Topology of Being in Heidegger Ou Piggeer 9 ofBeing in Heeger Finitude and the Absolute: Remarks on Hey ce: Remarks on Hegel and Heidegger Jocques Taminiau ss ‘The Poverty of Thought: A Reflection on Heidegger a ever of Th -gger and Eckhart PartV. Technology, Politics, and Art Beyend Humanism’: Heidegger's Understanding of Technology .. Michael E, Zimmerman eorrececn Heidegger and Marx: A Framework for Dialo David Schavickart = Principles Precarious: On the Origin of les Precio igin ofthe Political inHleidegger ...... Heidegger's Philosophy of Art Sandra Lee Bartky Part VI. Bibliographies. .. “Heidegger: Translation in English 1949-19 H, Miles Grok Engh 7 “keg Secondary true in agli 1929: Hi, Miles Groth “ er 107 n7 131 133 145 159 16 163 173 187 209 27 219 45, 257 25 27 293 Preface Thomas Sheehan "The essays and translations that follow provide a glimpse in- to the life and a clarification of tie thought of Martin Heidegger. His thought, forall its breadth and complexity, was quite simple: the meaning of Being as disclosure, His life was almost as simple —that of a German professor—except for a brief but significant period in which he supported the Nazi Regime. While that misguided sally from philosophy continues to haunt his name and work to this day, the question seems to be whether his thought from 1912 to 1976 cen be measured by the yardstick of his politics from May, 1933, through February, 1934, The anthology addresses both topics: his complex but simple thought and his simple but complex life. art One charts the span of Heidegger's career from his early work and fame, through his political involvement and his attempts to explain it, to his death on May 26, 1976, at the age of 86, Part Two examines the center of his thought the relation between the disclosure that is Being and the nature of man that is the place of such disclosure. Part Three presents new material on fn important polemical discussion between Heidegger and Max Scheler until the latter's death in 1928. Part Four probes Heidegger's claims about the forgottenness of Being, his interpretations of key figures in metaphysics, and his atternpe to overcome the tradition, Part Five analyzes Heidegger's statements on technology, politics, and art, and examines the possibility of a Marxist-Heideggerian dialogue. Part Six provides extensive bibliographies of works by and about Heidegger in English up to 1977. The unity of the collec- tion is it concentration on a single thought forged over a lifetime: themeaning of Being—"that ever-puzzling question,” as Aristotl " veto,” a Arsote sys ha {Shed ofl, itl beng asked day and wil vay Be sed Ihe tre (aap, Z, 1, 102062) T wah fo express my grata tthe contribuors to this collet J contributors this election, to Pro Tp Vicor a cng le ete ene mpson of Layela University st Chicago for his suppor and ead throughout its compilation. * aia oe Introduction: Heidegger, the Project and the Fulfillment Thomas Sheehan Bergson has written that every great philosopher thinks only one inexhaustible thought and spends his whole life trying to express it: {Br ces pouruai i paré tote se wie. Over the half-century of his professional life, Martin Heidegger liked to insist that his thought was focused on one topic only and that this topic was utterly simple. But defining and articulating that imple opic, die eck set, has proven to be no easy matter for either Heideg fer of his commentators. Tis truism to say that che subject matter of Heidegger's thought isthe (de Sensfog), bt like most raises hiss both correct and potentially misleading. Indeed, it could be argued that we might enhance the Explanation of Heidegger's subject matter by retiring the terms “Being” and the “question of Being’ from the discussion. Yor one thing, the phrase “the question of Being” is a condensation (its earliest form reads: the question of the meaning of Being), and for another, the full for of the phrase underwent changes throughout Heidegger's career (the question ofthe meaning of Being ~r the question ofthe ruth of Being —* the {question of the place of Being). Furthermore, the word “Being” (Sei) has two Gistinee bat easily confused meanings in Heidegger, with the result that Heidegger himself, in order to specify hs meaning ofthe term, resorted in his later writings to such strategems as spelling it archaically (Som) crossing it out (Sea), and finally dropping it from his lexicon, There isthe added problem that the word (especially when capitalized in English) seems to suggest @ setaphyseal super-entity, which is anathema to Heidegger’s intentions. Andwhea we read about Being “hiding itll" or “sending itse™ to man, we find ie hard not to think that Heidegger has lapsed into theology or metaphysical an- thropomorphism. Moreover, talk of Being “isell" can easily lose sight of the analogical character of Being. Heidegger was not after a univocal something that subsists on its own. Over and above the Being of man, the Being of im- plements, nature, artworks and ideal objects, there is no second levelof “Being: itself" Rather, the “tselP” refers to the analogically unified meaning of Being {in Aristotelian cerms, its pros hen unity) which is instantiated in all eases of the Being of this or that Moreover, there is the problem of Heidegger's audacious claim that the question of Being has been entirely forgotten by the Western philosophical tradition. Apropos ofthis, Helmut Franz tells an anecdote about a philosophy conference in 1958 at which Heidegger had discussed this fate of metaphysics. A Protestant participant asked Heidegger whether it were not the case that at Jeast Martin Luther was an exception to this charge. Heidegger quipped: Would you care to guess how many Catholics ask me the same thing about ‘Thomas Aquinas? Let us pose this asa testcase. After the painstaking work of Etienne Gilson and others, is it not the legitimate claim of the neo-Thomist that Aquinas raised metaphysical questioning to @ new and creative level by his thematiza- tion ofthe primacy of ese, the existential act of Being, over essence? Whereas Avistate’ philosophy was sil one of form as highest actuality, Aquinas com- pared form to esas potency to a higher actuality. “Being [ess] is the actuality of every form or nature” (8.T.., I, 3, 4, e); “Being itself [sum ese] isthe most perfect of all; indeed, itis compared as act to everything. For nothing has ac- tuality except Insofar as it is. Thus Being itself is the actuality of all things” (8-11, 4, 1, ad 3). And since in God there is nothing potential, it follows that At the apex of reality essence is existence: “The divine essence is Being itell™ (S.T., 1, 12, 2, ad 3) “God is Being itself subsisting per se” (5.T., I, #, 2, c) Surely there is no forgetfulness of Being here! And indeed, the various at- tempts to rescue Aquinas from Heidegger's indictment generally consist in ‘demoastrating—irrefutably, as far as I can see—that in Aquinas exsenta or ‘ipsum ese has primacy over esentia, indeed that essntia is reducible to ese Far from being ignorant of Aquinas’ metaphysical revolution and of its rediscovery in this century, Heidegger freely grants this achievement while still maintaining chat in Thomas, as much as in Plato or Nietzsche, “Being” is forgowen. Clearly Heidegger's “Being” means something different from Aquinas’ ipsum ers or actus exendi. As a preliminary and merely formal ind tion othe difference, we may say that Heidegger is asking for the possibilizing condition of what Aquinas calls ese, and that from this viewpoint all the ultimate ontological principles of the tradition—whether Plato's eidos or Aquinas’ esse—are on the same plane. vill/suenan ‘One way to get at the simple tepic that commands Heidegger's thought is to distinguish the two meanings of “Being,” the one that is the sole and exclusive topic throughout the history of metaphysis, and the other which isthe prerogative only ofa pre- or pstmetaphysical thinking. In the at sense Be ing” refers to the highest ontological or theological principle discoverable by traditional metaphysics. This we shall call generically “beingness” (Seiendhai. In the second sense “Being” refers to a pre-ontological principle undiscovered and undacoverable by metaphysics the prior event whereby bingnss can "be" at all, And by this Heidegger does not mean eration but, in the most terms, the happening of the world of sensc in which man lives an seovcr and Let use et givea name to this, the thant say i Being™ in Heidegger's sense of the term. “Beno! as Beinoness aon ot = yroblematic of metaphysics is that constellation of questions tha es ote eee eee i? That is: What is a being insofar as it is at all? This is the question of be- ings ar bring (Greek: on Aci on). Arse articulates this leary: “The ever puzaling question chat has alvays been asked and is ail being asked today namely, What i bing? comes io Sateen ena ing-ness?"” (Metaphysics, Z, 1, 1028, b 2). Explanation: The uniqueness of a eee ‘hits question is that it looks away from and beyond the ob- ious dimensions of things in order to ask about the *-ness" dimension of gh, beyond virtues o vena as in Pat's Man, beyond plus at 10 piey, atin the Eutypire, beyond particular men to maniod at inthe De ‘Anima, The philosophical question i, in the broadest sense, the question of essence” or #X-ness" af X. And the highest form of philosophy is not to ask about the “essence” of particular regions of things (the X-ness of all Xs, the Y-ness of all Ys), but to ask about the “is-ness” of all that is. In Aristotle's framework, this the question which defines “first” philosophy as contrasted sth regional dsiptnes within philosophy: the question ofeach and every be ing insofar is itis at all, beings with regard to their “is-ness.” Now, to designate this"ieness or state-of-being which characterizes beings as beings, Arsole took over from popular usage of his day the noun oui ig derived from the present participle of the verb simi, einai, “to be,” and Special from the feminine singular, ows, jus asthe newer of hat ari ple supple the word for “beings en, onl). The nous oui in its popular meaning referred o that whichis propery ones own, ones presen possession or holdings, one's property or substance. When taken up by Aristotle as 2 philosophical term, it came to mean that which is the “essential property” of beings: their “is-ness’ or state-o-being. It was eventually translated into Latin as essntia and into English as “substance” or “essence.” But lest we be tempted “SHEEHAN Lx.to understand ousia as referring exclusively to “essence” as contrasted with “ex- istence” (as Heidegger shows, the Greck word includes both), let us translate it simply as“beingness," that which characterizes a being insofar as itis at all and is what itis. Thus Aristotle can say that the question which defines First Philosophy — What are beings as beings? ~comes down to the question: What is beingness? For Heidegger, the whole history of metaphysics, from Plato through Nie~ «sche, is structured by this same question, the search for the analogical unity of beingness as the substantial ground and cause of actual beings, regardless of the particular interpretations of beingness that emerge in the tradition, In Pro- fessor Werner Mary's phrase, the history of metaphysics as a whole and in ‘each of its parts is an “ousiology” or doctrine of ousia/beingness, where be- ingness has the double sense of what-things-are and that-they-are. Regardless ‘of whether whatness or thatness is given priority, metaphysics still and always moves within the parameters of the doctrine of eusia. One may wish to claim that certain forms of beingness are improvements over others (for example, Aquinas “existential” beingness over Aristotle's form-centered beingness), but specific differences within the genus “beingness” remain instances of that genus. Moreover, metaphysics works out the beingness of beings in a twofold pat- tern that makes up a unified science. The question “What isa being as being?” asks about the entity's ontological constitution in general and about the be- ingness ofthe highest entity, the divine. In Heidegger’s telling, all metaphysics is onto-theo-logical: ontological in that it transcends beings o their beingness, and theological in that it secks ultimate cause or ground (thian). Heidegger ‘goes 50 far as to say: “Even Nietzsche's metaphysics as enfolgy is... at the same time theology."> So far, our discussion of “Being” as beingness has led to these conclusions: prerogative of traditional metaphysics is the question of the beingness of beings, the whatness or thatness of whatever is under discussion. (2) The tradition’s name for the “beingness of beings” is the “Being of beings* under a variety of nomenclatures: the idea of beings, the enrgia of beings, the ssse of beings, and so forth. But thus far Heidegger's discussion of beingness has gotten no further than discovering the unity of the metaphysical tradition in the most general terms. There is a second step in his reeding, whereby he ‘uncovers a first level of the hidden meaning of that unity. Beingness in all ts historical forms conceals, in the broadest sense, a certain relation to man. The beingness of beings isnot something “out there” in beings bbut rather is the meaningful relatedness, the intelligible presentness, of things to and for man, Beingness always includes this implicit referredness, even if it is suppressed or forgotten. Beingness means “revealedness,” in Greek: aleteia. When we speak of inelighility, we mean it x/sHEEHAN inthe broad sense of “meaningful accessibility,” not just theoretical knowabili- fy. And the peculiarity of the Greeks asthe spiritual forefathers ofthe West Consists in the fact that in a unique way their culture—their poetry, drama, Sculpture. thought—understood impliily and celebrated at large this open tress ot revealedness, this up-front-ness, of things. The word eidas— the visible thape or meaningful appearance of things—summarizes and typifies this Greck vision. It says that the world of things is open, accessible, present to nan. Tobe isto appear. To be sure, the “to-ness” or relatedness to man is not thematized (and ifit were, it would not denote any kind of objectivity before a Subject), The implcitness of it all constitutes the beauty and enchanting nabveté of the Greeks. Man is “all eyes" and therefore caught up in secing the vNorld as just “there.” No subjectivity, no anthropocentrism, only captivation the openness of things. the word ni which we inially and very Blandly tant as be- ingness, in fact has overtones of “thereness” or “presentness” (perouria) and openness” (alteia), indeed of “emergence into appearance” (physit). All of shee rely mean the same hig. By pushing the problema Ete) fe jngness) back to the problematic of parusia (presentness, openness), Hei a ae te oper ius of Gree plxopy in the dove bond logos, lqen) between man and beingness: the appearance or openness of things in conjunction with the essence of man as allowing that appearance to ape sang din ha ger of slopes ‘and man was explicit and thematic in Greek philosophy (in fact, the first task ‘Of his deconstruction and retrieval of the Grecks is to uncover this dimension). But nice ean he clam tha thi conjunction wat unknown the ration its beginnings in Parmenides, philosophy has sought to clarify bein Dy vlog upon the thinking (nari) of beingness (ef. Fr. 3). In Plato the disiosure ofthe leas aks it bearings from he sous monologue ee) wih itself (cf. Sophist, 245). In Aristotle the categories of beingness are connec dee a ennledge of lg In Aquinas finde probimat of the agent inlet as revelatory exces towards beingnest In Deseares First Philosophy is expicidly founded on ther eegitans. In Kant, “The conditions of the posibliy of experience in general area the sare time conditions ofthe pouty of the object of experience.” In short, the proper subject matter o Philosophy bar always imply been the bond between Beingnst and man fen the openness and presence of things and the essence of man. eye may now ad two more conclusions those already made concerning the explanation of "Being" as beingness: (3) The problematic of beingness is yplenomenslogical beingness isthe appearing (openness, presenines) of things. (8) The problematic of beingnes simplicity phenomenolagica: i implies that man i esentil tothe event ofthe appearing of things. And if we pull all four conclusions into unity, we have a clear if general, definition of seen an ximetaphysics: it is the ontological-theological af aphys ical-theological search for the beingness of Sow min alow py ot of ing that appearance sary conjunction with man's essence as allow- haste aaa ome eee Kon vo concede that much ih wadonl ns of “Being” as beingness, what is left over as the inking? vas opie i cw ci Wha cud posaly have boca ogoes inueapbaicg nn Nn Anson tn quetian wil ree iene hep: Bat ono, imal indeton ofthe decton in which Heidegger move, Beingness is the in- Sagi aaa crue ae nce eer ea ae Se rms al hsseen seems Chr eee Ti hning a horus sg sha iia at ito tugs i on ca mee aro ras ets eicecane ea n inte me eg caste pet poe! Or ie aang estos ne eee (ates ct nore tad he) ight heen oe? “se work way of puting Heiseqge nia gues inte oi tin nas es Ou mp sey ae CF hcingnt bucoly noha alos binge oe serlagaly pos cn Henge wb or fcngonsna tm et Sea ene ape Fame eee fap Bathe gunn lems Wha tring aut beep a0 an Seema at seers : ent beng bat othe hoppsing of beingnes? Clearly Heidegger is going to focus on the nature of the dcloive en mgs sees ma as Sul ates apa Corser ronnie Gn ara a ae in the thematic science called metaphysics. To look ahead we at ar ‘nto pape ns en pp ty bea ena sea he mn opp ao ig alady apprised ure tabond, Macatee that heap Eee unto this bond is the possibilizing condition for beingness to hap- Pera nn bg on Tan heroin mn nob ti ig Heng waa Pepin a he nol oie ce hun ei pe Treignis,” the event of. ‘appropriation whereby disclosure happens. TED that fm nen of Beer eae mor net Seer ea nea See ea eos pe asked about the presentness of present beings, or equally, about beings jr beingness, Heidegger's new question, which claims to be the _xii/snmerian phenomenological question par excell, i: What about presentness or be- Fngness ar such? What allows ito be present? What is the “Being” of be: ingness? Now, if phenomenology is about the immediate appearance of ngs, and if the above questions arc to be answered phenomenological), then beingness itself must become a phenomenon, something seen as im- mediately showing itselfto man. Coneretely this means focusing on the unique Correlatien between man and beingness and, more concretely yet, frecing be ingness from its traditional imprisonment in the copuls of rentential log “These services were performed for Heidegger by Edmund Hussert's ground: breaking work, Logical Investigations. Hosen: Pasomenovoarcal Access To BEINONESS ‘From out of such questions as the above, Heidegger came to the text of Husserl which was to remain the most important for him: Logical Investigations Vi, chanter 6, “Sensuous and Categorial Intuitions."” Ahough he began reading this work as eatly as 1909 when he entered Freiburg University, it was ‘Gane years before its import fr his own question about the “meaning of Dex imgnes” became apparent. The tie of this chapter at one and the same time point towards and away from Kant. Whereas the general theme of the Second pant of the Sixth Investigation, “Sense and Understanding,” certainly recalls Keane, the specific title of chapter six in that section already heralds a revolu- tionary break with Kant: “Sensuous and Casgerial Intitions.” For Kant Categoria! intuitions are imposible, since the categories ofthe understanding fonction merely to bring the yltie data into categorial form, such thatthe ob> ject Kroven is posited in a synthesis of imuition and concept. But Hustets xfapter seeks to broaden the range of intuitive givenness beyond Kants {imation of intuition tothe realm of the senses and sense data. Husser’ aim in this Investigation is phenomenological clarification of ruth or rue lnovwledge by means ofa phenomenological analysis of the identity-synthesisy Specially by analyzing how categorial as well as. sensuous meaning: Petuitions are fulfilled. But for such a Phenomenslgical clarification, the ategoral content itself must become a phenomenon, an immediate and in- This concernful, historically enacted self-having is the “how” (Wie) ‘of man’s Being, and: “The phenomenological explication of the ‘how’ of this ‘enactment of experience according to its fundamental hisorzal sense is the decisive task in this whole complex of problems involving the phenomenon of existence." Within that phenomenology, facticity —the lived experience of ‘one’s own “here and now"—is crucial. Facticity is a phenomenon enacted only historically, where “the historical” means not “the chronological” but the very content and “how” of the self-concern wherein I experience my specific past, present, and future. In this regard Heidegger speaks of “conscience” as the “renewal of concern” (Bekiimmerungserneuerung) by the enactment of self appropriation (Seldstancignung), and he emphasizes that the meaning ofthe fac~ tical “I am" includes in an original way historical living within the problematic of the *how” of concernful appropriation of oneself. Clearly, the kernel of SZ, is already present in this essay. (On February 1, 1920, when Heidegger was in the middle of a course that investigated the hermeneutics of facticity” and the structure of the Umwelt, Huser! was at last impressed enough with the thirty-year-old lecturer to write to Natorp recommending that Heidegger fill the position that Wundt was ‘vacating to go to Jena.™* Natorp responded on March 21 that Hedegger was again third on the list, this time after Nicolai Hartmann and Leser, but now “proposed with more emphasis." No matter, Hartmann got the job, ‘The third and finally successful chance came in 1922, Paul Natorp, 68 years ‘old and about to retire, would be succeeded in the fll of 1923 by Hartmann with the result that the Extraordinari position would again be open. On February 1, 1922, when Heidegger was between lectures on Aristotle which in fact were a lour de force on “falling” and Reluzenz (material that would enter SZ at page 21), Husser] wrote Natorp about the “original personality” (originlle Posinlchket) of this Privatdozent, about his command of a range of material from Aristotle through the nco-Platonists to Augustine, and about how “he il- Justrates fundamental problems through concte exegesis [and] develops, for example, thoughts about the hermeneutical categories, about the sense and the genuine method for history” and so on, He also notes that Heidegger has studied Luther (in fact he had opened his Aristotle course on November 2, 10/sHeenan 1921, by citing Luther's condemnation of the Metaphysics, De Anima, and Ethier of the “pagan master Aristotle!) and that his knowledge of Catholicity would bbe important at Marburg for linking up philosophy with Protestant theology, which Heidegger also knows well* In several leters Natorp made postive moves to invite Heidegger to Mar- burg. On September 22, 1922 he wrote Husserl: Whereas Richard Kroner, also of Frebburg, would certainly qualify because of his book From Kant to “Hege,it woald be more desirable to widen the range ofthe philosophical offer- ings at Masburg by bringing in some new blood. Thus we come again to Heidegger, not only because of Hussers high recommendations of his assis- tant, but aso because of what the Marburg faculty has heard of his new developments in applying phenomenological method to the history of Philosophy, especially to Aristole and the Middle Ages. In fact, Marburg ‘eds both a professor to teach phenomenology and a professor familiar with the history of medieval philosophy—and Martin Heidegger would be twa in fone, But these is one hitch (it will occur again in 1925-26): Heidegger has published so litle—in fact nothing since his book on Duns Scotus. Therefore the Marburg faculty is thrown back on Husserl’s judgment of the man, But doesn't Heidegger have something in the works, a manuscript far enough along to be printed or that could be read? Could he send it to Natorp? And in any case Natorp would be thankful to Husserl for any reports available about Heidegger’ lecture courses and seminars.” "That lever is the beginning of the famous and much discussed “Natorp essay.™® Sometime between September 22 and October 30, 1922, Heidegger had his brother Fritz type up two copies of a forty page manuscript which pulled together the major themes and directions of his teaching over the past three years, The manuscript was represented as part of a major work on ‘Aristotle that would be published in Husser!'s Jahrbuch fir Philosophie und ‘phinorenolegische Forachung. (On December 14 of that same year Huster! told Tngarden: “In the seventh {volume of the Jahrbuch} there will appear a fun damental and long work on Aristotle by Heidegger.”*?) The full manuseript ‘was to dea! with texts Heidegger had been discussing in his Aristotle courses: Nicemashess Eis V1, Metophyries Vand VU-IX, De Ania TIL, and Physics Us and the “Natorp essay” was an introduction to this work. The scope of the tssay was enormous: besides Aristotle he spoke of Augustine, the young Luther, Gabriel Biel, St. Paul, Peter Lombard, and the Old Testament. “At that time," Hans-Georg Gadamer writes, “Heidegger would surely have called it a working out of the hermencutial situation: it tried to make the reader aware of the questions and the intellectual resistance (Gegeneolln] with which \we might confront Aristode, the master of the tradition." Heidegger kept one copy for himself (the only one to survive) and covered the margins ofthe other ‘with handwritten additions, clarifications, and amendments before sending it suemnan/1]