PEACE BUILDING INITIATIVES AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA: THE

NORTH-EAST EXPERIENCE 2010-2020

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

Over the years, it has been observed that the world has become generally less peaceful

(especially in recent times). The decrease in peacefulness has reversed a long time trend in

peaceful coexistence since the end of the Cold War (Adelusi & Oluwashakin, 2014). Many

countries of the world are engulfed in one form of conflict or the other such as: violence,

terrorism, civil unrest, insecurity and insurgency resulting to deaths and increase in the number

of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). The number and intensity of the high profile

conflict extremism, violence, terrorism and civil unrest has had a detrimental effect on peace and

development in many developing countries including Nigeria (Obamwonyi and Owenvbiugie,

2015).

It is common knowledge that conflict extremism, terrorism etc are capable of destroying

both human and physical capital, as well as economic and financial institutions. Furthermore, it

can lead to disruption in consumption, investment, business and trade, production, and can divert

investment from productive areas of development including: entrepreneurship development,

education, infrastructure, and health into areas such as violence containment: security, high

prison population etc. The cost of conflict extremism, violence and terrorism on a society and a

nation is significantly very high (Blanchard 2014; Ogege 2013).

Peace is therefore an essential prerequisite so as to achieve the level of cooperation, trust

and inclusiveness necessary to solve challenges and empower institutions and organizations. In
post-conflict societies and nations like the North Eastern region of Nigeria, peace building offers

itself as an important option for rehabilitation, integration and economic recovery (Orhero,

2015). Peace building has been evolving as the dynamics of the global environment dictates.

Peace building has expanded beyond the United Nations popularized definition of “action to

solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict” (Evans et al, 2013) to a holistic understanding of

the needs for security, justice, political stability, socio-economic recovery and sustaining peace.

There is now a growing awareness both at the national and global levels that to establish

a lasting and objective peace and sustainable development, it requires marshalling more activities

that cut across many domains. Peace building as a process has continued to evolve to encompass

state-building activities and those activities that aim at strengthening the socio-economic aspects

of the society. On this note, the United Nations’ definition could be expanded to include actions

and principles that seek to address the root causes of conflict, insecurity, insurgency and violent

extremism in order to build or rebuild social relationships and structures capable of sustaining

peace (Brabani, 2010).

Studies indicates that regions and countries with high profiles of violent extremism and

insecurity experience low economic activities and lack sustainable livelihood opportunities

(Krueger & Malečková 2003; Piazza, 2013; Crisp, 2003; Ogbozor, 2016). As a result, these

countries are poor compared to those that do not experience conflict, insecurity and violence

(World Bank, 2011; Barnett et al 2007) like Japan, the USA, Korea, Britain etc. The 2009 UN

Secretary General’s Report on Peace building sets out five priority areas for interventions in

post-conflict contexts: establishing security, building confidence in a political process, delivering

initial peace dividends, and expanding core national capacity (UN, 2009).

In Nigeria, conflict, violence and insecurity occasioned by the activities of Boko Haram
insurgency in the North Eastern region appear to be the primary challenge in recent time and a

very significant factor militating against development including sustainable entrepreneurial

activities that would have reduced poverty in the region (Abubakar, 2013). The challenge of

development has been further compounded by the following drivers of conflict; extreme violence

and insecurity, youth unemployment, lack of empowerment (dependency syndrome), poverty,

political exclusion and corruption, inadequate room for creativity and innovation, gender

inequality, high rate of illiteracy, ethnic diversity and religious intolerance. These drivers are

certainly responsible for the woes in this region (Adelusi & Oluwashakin, 2014).

At present peace is gradually returning to North Eastern Nigeria and peace building

becomes inevitable to restore enduring peace and kick-start development. This has been

occasioned by the several peace initiatives that have initiated over the years. Some of which are

Major Military operations, The establishment of Nigerian Joint Task force (under Goodluck

Jonathan), United Nations’ Efforts in Curbing Insurgency in Nigeria, United States responses,

African Coalition force, French and British assistance, Chinese assistance, Colombian assistance,

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection

International (STTEP) and The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Peace building as used

in this context is anchored on activities that seek to address the root causes or potential causes of

violence, creating a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and of course, stabilizing

the society socio-economically, religiously and politically (Michael, 2010; Sandole, 2010)

Taking the security challenges posed by Boko haram insurgency as a case study, the study

appraises the several peace building initiatives/programmes in North East Nigeria by local and

foreign actors. The efforts of Nigeria governments and/with its local stakeholders towards allying

with the United Nations and other foreign actors in the fight against domestic terrorism, are of
major concern in the study.

Statement of the Problem

All societies and nations need peace to exist and develop. However, peace is often

violated due to conflicts, violent extremism, terrorism and insecurity arising from youth

unemployment, poverty, gender imbalance, economic and political exclusion, faith-based

intolerance, low level of education, ethnicity, corruption, inadequate room for creativity and

innovation among others (Obamwonyi and Owenvbiugie, 2015). These vices have brought

negative consequences on economic development of many African nations including Nigeria.

Nigeria, as a country, is under internal security threats occasioned by acts of domestic terrorism

which greatly affects the nation’s stability and well-being (Ogundiya 2009).

Prominent among these acts of domestic terrorism are ethno-religious fighting, violent

and un-abated attacks in the oil-rich Niger-Delta, small arms proliferation, bombing and wanton

destruction of property (Ogundiya 2009). Domestic terrorism, especially Boko-Haram

insurgence negates security and where there is no security, anarchy strives and there is no

development. Any threat to the national security will definitely have far-reaching negative

consequences on Nigeria’s foreign image, the country as a whole and the world at large. The

North Eastern region of Nigeria has been faced with conflict situations like: violent extremism

and terrorism occasioned by the insurgent activities of Boko Haram since 2009. How can this

area return to peace? This is where the problem lies and restoring harmony to the area is one of

the merits of United Nations. The founding of the United Nation (UN) after the Second World

War has provided a stimulus for rigorous approaches to the study of peace and conflict resolution

across the world (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2016). There has been dependence on the

UN for peace building initiatives in order to savor the situation in North-East Nigeria.
Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study is to examine the extent to which various peace

building initiatives has impacted the security challenges that Nigeria has faced between 2010-

2020. The specific objectives are to:

1. To determine the impact of insecurity on the security of North-East Nigeria from 2015-

2020

2. To evaluate if insecurity has undermined the peaceful coexistence of the citizens of the

North East Nigeria from 2015-2020

3. To measure how much the prevalent peacebuilding initiatives has impacted on the

problem of insecurity in North-East Nigeria between 2015-2020

Research Questions

In order to achieve the objectives of this study, the following research questions will be

relevant to this work:

1. what is the impact of insecurity on the security of North-East Nigeria from 2015-2020?

2. has insecurity undermined the peaceful coexistence of the citizens of the North East

Nigeria from 2015-2020?

3. how has the prevalent peacebuilding initiatives impacted on the problem of insecurity in

North-East Nigeria between 2015-2020?

Hypothesis

H1 = there is no significant impact of insecurity on the security of North-East Nigeria from 2015-

2020

H2 = There is no significant role of insecurity in undermining the peaceful coexistence of the

citizens of North East Nigeria from 2015-2020

H3 = There is no significant impact of prevalent peacebuilding initiatives on the problems of

insecurity in North-East Nigeria between 2015-2020

Significance of the Study

The significance of the study is that the findings of this research would contribute to

policy input for members of the Security Council at the Federal, State and Local Government

levels. Secondly, the findings would be useful to policy makers. Also, it shall be useful to the

various security agencies such as the Nigerian Police, State Security Services and their

operatives who are directly charged with the onerous task of maintenance of law and order as

well as members of the armed forces.

This research will also be useful to members of the media especially defense and security

correspondents who report issues related to national security. The study will also highlight the

specific contributions and efforts of the United Nations (UN) in their peace building initiatives to

solve the problem of insecurity in North-East Nigeria.

Scope of the Study

This study covers peace building initiatives and insecurity concerns in Nigeria with

particular reference to the North-East experience. The relationship between insecurity and peace

building, the impact of insurgencies on national security, the contributions of external bodies like

the United Nations (UN) in addressing the menace and the resultant challenges will also be

discussed. This study covers the period of 2010-2020. This period is chosen because of the

upsurge and intensity of insecurity concerns within the period in Nigeria and the urgent need for

a long lasting solution. The North East of Nigeria consists of states such as: Adamawa, Bauchi,

Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe

Operational Definition of Terms

Terrorism: for the purpose of this study, terrorism refer to the thoughts Akanji (2009). Terrorism

as conceptualized by Akanji (2009) is: “The act of terror committed within the boundaries of a

sovereign state against civilians, the government and public and private properties in a bid to

coerce or intimidate the government or people of that state”.

National Security: the study adopts the definition by Obasanjo (2009) which states that national

security is the: “Aggregation of the security interests of the individuals, political entities, human

associations and ethnic groups, which make up the nation. The security interest includes safety of

life and property, economic, psychological and mental well-being and the freedom to pursue the

attainment of legitimate objectives without hindrance” (Obasanjo 2009). Obasanjo’s definition is

comprehensive as it touches every aspect of human endeavor and the society and hence will be

adopted as the definition for this study.

Peace Building Initiative: Peace building is an intervention technique or method that is

designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict by creating a sustainable peace.

Peace building activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal

expectation for peaceful conflict resolution, and stabilize society politically and

socioeconomically. The activities included in peace building vary depending on the situation and

the agent of peace building. Successful peace building activities create an environment

supportive of self-sustaining, durable peace; reconcile opponents; prevent conflict from

restarting; integrate civil society; create rule of law mechanisms; and address underlying

structural and societal issues. Researchers and practitioners also increasingly find that peace

building is most effective and durable when it relies upon local conceptions of peace and the

underlying dynamics which foster or enable conflict (Coning, 2013).

REFERENCES
Adamu, A. (2008). The crisis of leadership: An obstacle to sustainable democracy and

Development in Nigeria. Maiduguri: Shatta Press.

Adesola, F. (2007). National Security, Democratization and the Menace of Ethnic Militia in

 Nigeria. Africa Resource Centre Publishers.

Adelusi, O.P and Oluwashakin, A (2014) “Foreign Policy and Nigerians in Diaspora: An

Analysis of President Goodluck Jonathan’s Foreign Policy Review (2011)”, in Chibuzo

N. Nwoke and Ogaba Oche (eds.) Contemporary Challenges in Nigeria, Africa and the

World. Lagos: the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Pp. 131-152.

Akindele, R.A (2013) “Nigeria’s Multilateral Diplomacy, 1960-2012: Structure, Process and

Preoccupation”. Nigerian Journal of International Studies (NJIS), Vol. 38, Nos. 1&2, pp.

1-68

Andersson, Ruben; Weigand, Florian (2015). "Intervention at Risk: The Vicious Cycle of

Distance and Danger in Mali and Afghanistan". Journal of Intervention and State

Building. 9 (4): 519–541.

Autesserre, Severine (2014). Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of

International Intervention. UK: Cambridge University Press. 

Barnett, Michael; Kim, Hunjoon; O'Donnell, Madalene; Sitea, Laura (2007). "Peace building:

What Is in a Name?". Global Governance. 13: 35–58. 

Coning, C (2013). "Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local". Stability: International

Journal of Security and Development. 2 (1): 6.

Duffield, Mark R. (2010). "Risk-Management and the Fortified Aid Compound: Everyday Life

in Post-Interventionary Society". Journal of Intervention and State building. 4 (4): 453–474.

Evans, I., Lane, J., Pealer, J. & Turner, M. (2013). A Conceptual Model of Peace building and

Democracy Building: Integration of Fields. School of International Services, American

University, Spring.

Jennifer M. (2007). "Can Peacekeepers Be Peace builders?". International Peacekeeping. 14 (3):

323–338.

Mac Ginty, Roger (2011). International Peace Building and Local Resistance. United Kingdom:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Orhero, Abraham Ejogba (2015). ”The Economic and Security Implications of Boko Haram

Terrorism”. International Journal of African and Asian Studies. Vol.10, 2015.

Obamwonyi, Samson E. and Owenvbiugie, Robinson O. (2015). “Boko Haram Insurgency in

Nigeria: A Nation-State in Search of Cohesion for National Development”. International

Journal of Arts and Humanity (IJAH) 4(1), S/No 13, January, 2015.

Porter, Elisabeth (2007). Peace Building: Women in International Perspective. Oxon, UK:

Routledge.
 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter, is devoted to the review of related literature. This will be discussed under

the following sub-headings:

 Conceptual Review

o Concepts Peace and Peacebuilding

o Peacebuilding in Nigeria

o Issues Threatening Peace in Nigeria

o Stakeholders for Peacebuilding

 Security Challenges in Nigeria: Boko-Haram Insurgency as a Case study

o Evolution of Boko Haram

o Operational Strategy of Boko Haram

o Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency

o Government Response towards Boko Haram

 Internal and External Peacebuilding attempts in North East Nigeria (2010-2020)

 o Major Military operations against Boko Haram under President Buhari

dispensation

o Amnesty

o The Nigerian Joint Task force under Goodluck Jonathan

o United Nations’ Efforts in Curbing Insurgency in Nigeria

o The partnership and contributions of the United Nations (UN) in addressing the

scourge of insecurity and violence in North-East Nigeria

o United Nations contributions

o United States responses:

o African Coalition force

o French and British assistance

o Chinese assistance

o Colombian assistance

o The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)

o Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection International (STTEP)

o The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

 Theoretical Framework

o Cognitive Dissonance

 Gap in Research

Conceptual Review

Concepts of Peace and Peacebuilding

This section attempts a clarification of the twin concept of ‘Peace’ and ‘Peacebuilding’.
Peace appears to be an independent variable while building in peacebuilding is a dependent

variable. Peace, therefore, is indispensable to peacebuilding, such that without peace, there can

be no peacebuilding. In other words, peace is key or the heart of peacebuilding, it is only when

there is a peace that one can build on it. What then is ‘peace’?

The concept of peace has been variously defined by different scholars, without a

consensus on how ‘peace’ should be accurately defined. The word is derived from the Latin word

‘pax’, which means a treaty, a deal or an agreement to end the war, dispute, and conflict between

or among people, groups of people or nations. The Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary defines peace as “freedom from civil clamour and confusion”. It is also “a state of

public quiet.” In other words, to have peace, there must be an atmosphere that is free from uproar

and chaos, where there are no restrictions or obstructions to people’s daily activities. Peace

according to Howard (n.d.) is not only the absence of war; but also “the maintenance of an

orderly and just society”. He further states that orderly has to do with protection against violence

and threat from invaders, while “just society” in this context means, a society where people are

protected from exploitation and abuse by the power that be within the society (Howard, cited in

Cortright, n.d.).

Matsuo (n.d.) states, that ‘peace and war are, as it were, in “zero-sum” relationship’, such

that, if there is a war, it means there will be no peace, and if there is no war, there is peace.

Ibeanu (2006), sees peace as activities geared towards reducing conflict and increasing

development within specific societies and the wider international community. Thus, to guarantee

social, political, and economic development there must be peace. To Ahamefule (2013), peace is

a condition where there is no war; where people are not annoyed by other people; and where

there is calmness; without worries or anxieties.

 Peacebuilding, on the other hand, has become a daily discussed subject among social

scientists, human scientists, politicians, international organizations as well as concerned global

citizens. Given the mix-up surrounding the meaning of the concept of peacebuilding which made

some people see it as mere crisis intervention, there is a need to properly clarify the concept to

remove the misconceptions around the concept. “Peacebuilding” to Brinkmann (2006) means,

transforming from a condition or situation of violence to more political, socio-economic equality,

justice, fairness as well as security for all within cultural plurality. Brinkmann takes further steps

to identify two aspects of peacebuilding. According to him, the first aspect of peacebuilding is

concerned with reducing or transforming violence, while the second aspect is about improving

on ‘existing peaceful activities or to encourage new ones’.

It should be noted, that the timing is imperative in the planning and application of

peacebuilding activities, as some activities will produce positive results very quickly while

others will be noticeable in the future (Brinkmann, 2006). Boutros-Ghali (1992) sees

peacebuilding as the channel through which war-affected areas or places are rebuilt. It is a

process of identifying and supporting those structures which will enhance, strengthen as well as

solidify peace, to avoid a reversion into conflict. Peacebuilding according to Doyle and

Sambanis (1999) ‘depends on the prior achievement of a minimum standard of peace’. That is,

peacekeeping is the foundation for peacebuilding, therefore, a failed peacekeeping will have

‘opposite effect, calcifying a conflict over time and making peacebuilding impossible’ (Doyle

and Sambanis, 1999).

While peacebuilding is not intended or an attempt at eliminating conflict from society, it

is about building an environment for negotiation, reconciliation, mutual understanding, and

compromise that allows for resolving conflict issues before it degenerates into violence and
conflict. In creating room for negotiation and reconciliation there is a need for peacemakers to

break the truce. Peacekeeper needs to meet peace-builder, as they are inseparable partners. In his

study, Maiese (2003) considers peacebuilding to be a process that facilitates the establishment of

durable harmony by preventing the recurrence of violence. To him, peacebuilding is about peace

sustenance, where every hand is on deck to keep peace and make it endure. To Conflict

Information Consortium; cited in Alliance for Peacebuilding (2013), peacebuilding is a way of

facilitating durable peace as well as preventing the recurrence of violence through addressing

root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as

well as economic transformation.

To Johan (1975), peacebuilding is a systematic way of creating self-supporting structures

that could check causes of wars and at the same time proffering alternatives to war in situations

where wars are looming. According to Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell, and Sitea, (2007),

peacebuilding is seen as external intercessions designed ‘to prevent the eruption or return of

armed conflict’. To them, peacebuilding is about addressing sources of conflict to stem out

anything that can bring back or induce conflict, so that peace could be sustained. In a similar

vein, Lederach (1997) defines peacebuilding as “a multiplicity of interdependent elements and

actions that contribute to the constructive transformation of the conflict.” Transformation in this

context means, conversion of conflict to peace or constructively mediate in the conflict. It also

means changing people’s beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours that will lead to transformation

dynamics between individuals and groups to achieve a more stable, peaceful coexistence.

Alliance for peacebuilding (2013) defines peacebuilding as the process of establishing

civic order and governmental functions in countries that are emerging from a period of war or

other types of upheaval. The Alliance for peacebuilding further stresses that peacebuilding
encompasses all efforts directed towards managing, mitigating, resolving, and transforming

‘central aspects of conflict’. It equally involves applying diplomacy, civil society peace

processes, and informal dialogues, negotiations, and mediations. These are with the view to

addressing the root causes of violence to nurture reconciliation and preventing the reoccurrence

of conflict.

Peacebuilding is the identification and support of measures needed for transformation

toward a more sustainable, peaceful relationship and structures of governance, to avoid a re-lapse

into conflict, (UN, 2005). Peacebuilding is also perceived as attempts to conquer the structural,

relational, and cultural contradictions hastily causing conflict, especially in strong support of

peacemaking and peacekeeping. Inspirations of peacebuilding are drawn from developmental

imperatives facing mankind and conflict resolution initiatives (Ifesinachi, 2009, cited in

Uzuegbunam, 2013). Flowing from above, peacebuilding can be seen as methodical and rational

approaches geared towards determining and removing sources of conflict, reconciling parties in

conflict as well as addressing or tackling perceived issues that can trigger future conflict.

Peacebuilding in Nigeria

Ordinarily, the nation called Nigeria probably might not have had any serious business

with peacebuilding, but for the system or pattern of her emergence into nationhood that has

continued to seriously threaten its corporate existence. Nigeria unlike the USA and Switzerland

who bargained to come together, was instead forced into nationhood. Even after more than five

decades of its independence, Nigeria has not got it right in terms of national cohesion and

integration; socio-economic as well as political development. One can at the juncture ask, what

has been wrong or what was wrong with the patterns of Nigeria’s emergence into a nation? The

answer to this is not far-fetched. Distinguished scholars such as Suberu and Agbaje in their study
have described the nation as ‘devolutionary federations’. They further submitted regarding

Nigeria as a federation thus: The Nigeria federation…was established to ‘hold together’ the

diverse ethnicities and nationalities that had been forcibly and arbitrarily incorporated into a

Unitary Colonial State under British imperialism (Suberu & Agbaje, 2003, p. 336).

The need for peacebuilding in Nigeria could further be understood by the astounding

disclosure made by Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar III, the Sultan of Sokoto, and Northern Nigeria

while delivering a lecture at Harvard University in the United State of America. According to

him,

Many people consider Nigeria as a theatre of absurd

conflicts and interminable crises…with the Jos crises
festering for years, with post-election violence and suicide
– bombings; it is difficult to think otherwise. When we
consider Nigeria’s population of 150 million, half the
population of West Africa, its over 250 ethnic and language
groups, its regional and geo-political configurations, its
landmass and its diversity in religion and culture, we may
be constrained to reach a different conclusion (Abubakar,
2011).
With the above comments coming from eminent Nigeria scholars as well as a respected

and first-class traditional ruler in Nigeria among many other comments, Nigeria has no choice

but to constantly seek for peacebuilding to protect the fragility of the nation, and preventing the

escalation of constant conflicts that pervade the nation. Therefore, Nigeria needs peace and

peacebuilding for many reasons. Some of the reasons can be summarised as follows:

▪ For national integration and cohesion

▪ To be able to continually form a formidable force against external aggressors

▪ To reduce hunger and possibly eradicate all forms of poverty from its environments

▪ To maintain its record as the most populous nation in Africa as well as the most diverse nation

of the world
▪ To improve its citizens’ life expectancy

▪ To be able to keep and improve the existing infrastructural amenities

▪ For political and socio-economic development and general growth of the nation

▪ For the protection and preservation of its environment against pollution from war equipment

Issues Threatening Peace in Nigeria

In other to put the subject of peacebuilding in a proper perspective, there is a need to state

those issues that generate conflicts in Nigeria. These issues could be easily categorized under the

following:

Ethnicity

Nigeria’s type of federalism brought together over 300 ethnic groups, with over 1000

dialects, and with different cultures and histories. This has made ‘national question’ in Nigeria

one of the most complicated in the world. The main ethnic groups in the nation are the Yorubas,

Hausa-Fulani, and the Igbos who constitute the majority in terms of the nation’s population. The

multi-ethnic nature of the nation over the years has been one of the factors that breed conflicts. In

the past few years, thousands of people have been killed in ethnic clashes. The fear of being

schemed out of politics and socio-economy of the nation by the different ethnic groups has

always generated political worry and tension that consequently led to conflicts. Different ethnic

groups had from time to time been trying to outsmart one another, and for this reason, it has

always resulted in conflicts.

The Control of Natural Resources

One of the major causes of conflict in Nigeria is the issue of economic and resource

control. The neglect of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, where the country’s wealth is mainly

derived from through the exploration and exploitation of crude oil has remained one of the
sources of conflict and hostility in Nigeria. Oil bearing Niger Delta communities have remained

economically marginalized and underdeveloped. This has continually forced the people to agitate

for empowerment, development and to even control the resources in their domain. Consequently,

the Niger Delta areas are prone to inter and intra communal conflicts. The fact that the areas are

subjected to massive exploitation of natural resources without any meaningful development in

terms of social services delivery has made the conflicts a recurrent one as the people in the areas

continued to agitate for what they see as their rights. As cited in Opone (2014, p. 1) the major

reason for incessant conflict in the Niger Delta Areas was quests by the indigenous people of the

areas for ‘enhanced revenue allocation, sustainable development, and environmental protection,

fairness, equity, and social justice’. Paradoxically, the inhabitants of the areas were subjected to

abject poverty amid plenty.

This has led to a situation where different militia groups continue to emerge, such as; the

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); the Movement for the Survival of

the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). Besides, this has led to a

situation where people from Igbo extractions are clamouring for secession. That is, to have their

nation and to separate themselves from Nigeria. The two most outstanding groups in the struggle

are, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, (MASSOB) and The

Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).

The Creation of States and Local Government Areas

The creation of states and local government areas had on several occasions resulted in

violence and conflict in Nigeria. The creation of states and local government which is supposed

to be for development had on many instances led to the destruction of lives, properties, and even

developmental projects. For instance, the location of the administrative headquarters of local
governments had on different occasions brought about crises and conflicts in some parts of

Nigeria. In Warri, part of Delta State, the relocation of headquarter of the Warri-South local

government early sited at Ogbe-Ijoh which is an Ijaw town to Ogidigba an Itsekiri town

generated conflict between the Ijaw and Itsekiri ethnic groups. Similarly, the creation of the Ife

East Local Government and the positioning of headquarter at Oke-Ogbo, part of Ile-Ife bred

conflict between the Ife and the Modakeke.

Land Ownership

All over the world, due to the importance attached to land ownership and usage, people

continue to struggle for it. The land conflict has thus become a widespread issue that occurs in

different parts of the globe. The land is one of the most common factors that breed conflict in

Nigeria, be it intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic. The issues attached to land include the struggle for the

ownership of land, land boundaries, and land demarcation issues as well as land inheritance

issues. Conflicts and disputes do occur among neighboring communities, as well as between and

among towns living close to one another. For example, a series of conflicts that occurred

between the Ife and Modakeke and between the Tiv-Jukun as well as that of the Umuleri and

Aguleri communities were associated with land ownership. Similarly, conflicts do occur among

siblings and families over the inheritance of land. The use and ownership of the inherited piece

of land have on many instances bred disaffections among the member of the same family which

within a short time snowballed to conflict.

In addition to the above, some conflicts have to do with land grabbing and land invasions.

The cases of land grabbing are peculiar to major cities of Nigeria where people pay a huge sum

of money to purchase land and the ‘Omo Onile’ the land grabber will just surface and take over

the possession of land from the purchaser. Similarly, there are also cases of a land invasion. In
the middle belt and many parts of northern Nigeria for example, there have been several cases of

land invasion by the Fulani herdsmen. This has resulted in the killings of many Nigerians by the

arms carrying Fulani herdsmen. The case has since been extended to southern parts of the nation

where the Fulani herdsmen have continued to invade on peoples’ land, while they (the people)

appear helpless, as the government has not been able to curtail the situation.

Religious Intolerance

Religious intolerance is another source of conflict in Nigeria. Nigeria’s vast population is

fragmented into two main religious lines (Islam and Christianity). In Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,

the formal introduction and implementation of the criminal aspects of the Muslim sharia legal

code in some states in the northern part of Nigeria, in October 1999 sparked off conflict. The

northern Muslim political and religious leaders established the Supreme Council for Sharia in

Nigeria (SCSN) to further promote sharia to other parts of the nation. The Christian groups in the

southern and Middle Belt of the country reacted against this. The Christians alleged that the step

was a calculated attempt by the Muslim, and the northern agenda to Islamize the nation. Ahmed

Sani Yerima who was then a Governor of Zamfara State was reputed to have first introduced and

applied the sharia code into Zamfara State as means of adjudging and adjudicates the law. His

decision was applauded and supported by the local population most of who were Muslim

adherents. The introduction of sharia generated tension and mutual mistrust with a further

division of the nation along the Muslim-Christian pole.

Similar to the above is the presence of other variations of local Muslim groups or sects in

Nigeria which include Sunni, Shia, Ahmadiyya, Salafi, Sufi, as well as Boko Haram extremists.

These different sects have always had an altercation that led to serious conflict.

Youth Unemployment/ Restiveness

 The youth of a state undeniably is the driving force for development. For them to be a

tool for the state’s development; they must be well planned for by their parents on one hand, and

the government on the other hand. The parents are expected to give their children adequate

training, while the government is expected to provide an enabling environment for youth to earn

their living. This is because; youth could be the most volatile when their energies are misdirected

or misapplied. Of the millions of Nigeria’s population, youth constitute more than 60%. There is

no gainsaying the fact that youth are important factors in the development of a state, hence, they

should always be put into consideration while formulating governmental policies. Failure to

consider them in the policies of the state could mar the developmental activities of the state as it

could lead to their restiveness.

Youth restiveness could be seen as their refusal to be controlled due to an unsatisfied

stance to the unfavourable condition of the state. Owing to improper planning for youth as

manifested in the areas of their unemployment, especially when they have basic qualifications

and strengths to work with, the youth in Nigeria are found to be involved in most of the violent

conflicts that have occurred in different parts of the country. Youth restiveness has been a

recurring issue in our contemporary time, as there have been an upsurge in violence and conflicts

across the nation. In the northern part of the nation are the cases of Boko Haram insurgencies

that have led to the killings of several people and destruction of properties. In the south are the

activities of different insurgents that specialize in hostage-taking, oil bunkering, etc., all these

insurgents are parading not less than 98% of youth as their members.

Stakeholders for Peacebuilding

Stakeholders are those people, or group of people who have ‘stake or interest’, or those

who are affected or concerned by a particular problem. It could also be those who can be affected
by a particular problem. Regarding peacebuilding, different sets of people from different walks

of life are the stakeholders. They include:

Political Actors: these are – leaders of recognized political parties, state actors (e.g. government

at different levels, ministries, departments of government), the legislative bodies, and the

judiciary.

Military/Security Actors: the security sector comprised the Military, the Police, the Air Force,

the Navy, and other Para-military segments). Constitutionally, these sets of actors are saddle with

the responsibility of providing adequate security for the people and their properties as well as to

protect the nation against external invasion or aggression.

Economic Entrepreneurs/Business Actors: these are the people managing companies,

multinational companies, business mogul, and traders, who are in the areas of economic and

business activities in the country. These sets of people need their business to be protected and

where there is no peace there cannot be any business transaction.

Civil Society/Non-Governmental Organisation: Civil society denotes a collection of

organizations such as – community groups, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), labour

unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional

associations, and foundations. These groups; for the fact that their member covers an array of

organizations; they are very useful and indispensable in peacebuilding activities.

International/Regional Organisations: these include the United Nations, African Union,

ECOWAS, etc. who from time to time seek peace and strive that peace is maintained regionally

and internationally.

The Media: the media is referred to as the collective communication channels or apparatuses

involved in storing and disseminating information especially to the people. The media include
specialized communication businesses such as print media or the press, photography, advertising,

cinema, broadcasting (radio and television). The media report any breakdown of peace, as well

as sensitize people on the need to maintain peace and on the essentiality of peacebuilding.

Professional Groups: this includes the academia, the businessmen, journalists, bankers,

engineers, medical personnel, etc. these sets of professionals can mobilize their members to

support peace initiation and equally involve in peacebuilding across the nation as they have

member across the nation.

Religious Groups: in Nigeria, the major religious affiliation of the citizens are – Christianity,

Islam, and traditional religion. Although under each of the religions there are different sects. The

religious leaders too are usually involved in peacebuilding in Nigeria. Their involvement could

be physical when they preach peace to their followers; or when they are involved in the

settlement of conflicts. Their involvement could also be spiritual when they ask to pray or

propitiate for peace to reign.

Traditional Institutions: traditional institutions are also stakeholders in peacebuilding. The

leaders of traditional institutions include – Oba, Emir, Sultan, Obi, and other titleholders who are

spread all over the country. The institutions do involve in keeping peace in their domains,

besides, conflict cases that are brought to the palaces are amicably settled by the

Oba/Emir/Sultan/Obi, and other titleholders. The traditional institutions equally go all-out to

maintain an atmosphere of peace. Given the fact that peacebuilding is a complex task, all the

stakeholders involved in peacebuilding must be up to the task of peacebuilding activities.

For effective peacebuilding, people should come together and find a way of forging

ahead in peace and its sustenance. In essence, peacebuilding always involves many sets of actors

to achieve a successful peacebuilding process.

Security Challenges in Nigeria: Boko-Haram Insurgency as a Case study

Evolution of Boko Haram

Publicly, Boko Haram insurgent group came to lime light in 2002 following its confrontation

with the Nigerian security agents as a result of disagreement between the group and people of

Kanama and Gwoza villages in Yobe and Borno states of North Eastern region. However, the

emergence of the group can be traced to the Muslim brotherhood movement in northern Nigeria

during the 1980s. The Muslim brotherhood movement also known as Tashayyu (Shiism) under

the leadership of Sheik Ibrahim Elzakzaky attracted many Muslim youths as a result of its

emotional and radical preaching against the Nigeria government among them was Muhammad

Yusuf. After few years, the group became disunited and broke into factions with some members

remaining loyal to Sheik Elzakzaky while others joined groups such as the Salafiyyah, Jama’at

ut-Tajideed ul-Islami (Murtada, 2013). Following the breakup of the brotherhood group in the

early 1990s, Lawan Abubakar established Ahlil us-Sunnah wal jama’ah hijra or Shabaab group

(Muslim Youth Organization) in Maiduguri capital city of Borno state in 1995. Under the

leadership of Abubakar, the group was not known to be associated with violence. However, when

Muhammad Yusuf took over as the leader of the group following Abubakar departure to Saudi

Arabia for further studies, Yusuf aligned the group with Ahl us-Sunnah group (Jama’at ul Izalatul

Bida’a wa Iqamatus Sunnah) translated as (People who are committed to the removal of

Innovation and Establishment of the deeds of prophet) under the leadership of Sheik Ismail Idris

(Taiwo & Olugbode, 2009; Adisa, 2012; Bello, 2013). Like the brotherhood group, Jama’at ul

Izalatul Bida’a wa Iqamatus Sunnah also broke up into groups as a result of leadership disputes

over three masajids in Yobe and Borno which were used as administrative offices of the group.

This development further led Muhammad Yusuf and his followers to pitch their allegiance to one
of the masajids and subsequently form his own group under the name of Jama’at Ahl us -Sunnah

Lid-Dawah Wal-Jihad (people who are committed to propagation of the teachings of prophet and

jihad) in 2002 with Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri capital city of Borno state

serving as centre of their preaching (Murtada, 2013; Meehan & Speier, 2011). Not contented

with their continuous practicing of their religious doctrine at the Ndimi’s mosque in Maiduguri,

some of the radical members of the group headed by Mohammed Ali decided that it was time for

them to embark on Hijra by moving from Maiduguri to Kanama Village in Yobe state and

establish a separate community based on Islamic injunctions within the Nigerian and Niger

border. Their reason is that the Nigerian societies under the current secular government are not in

accordance with Islamic tenets. Hence, it has become imperative for them to leave the city

following the tradition of the prophet who departed Makah to Medina in response to the

hostilities confronting the Muslims during the early stage of the Islamic religion (Anyadike,

2013). The group through its factional leader Mohammed Ali, called on other Nigerian Muslims

to rise against the secular government and demand for an Islamic system of governance in

accordance with Sharia or true Islamic law (Walker, 2012).

However, in 2003 while in Kanama village, the split group was caught in a dispute over

fishing rights in the village community pond which led to armed conflict with policemen who

came to settle the dispute. In the ensuring confrontation, the group members over ran the police

and disarmed them. As a result of this development, the government responded by dispatching

army to the community leading to a siege in the group’s mosque with brutal force resulting in the

death of many members of the group including its leader Mohammed Ali. The surviving

members of the group later returned to Maiduguri and teamed up with their old members under

the leadership of Muhammad Yusuf at the Ndimi mosque. It was therefore through this particular
incidence that the group and its activities were exposed to the public earning them a nickname of

Nigerian Taliban. Few years later, the united group led by Muhammad Yusuf began the process

of building its permanent mosque named Taimiyyah Masjid on a land donated by Yusuf’s father

in-law Baba Fugu Mohammed. Apart from Yusuf’s father in-law who donated a land for the

group’s mosque, it also enjoyed support and patronage from wealthy Muslim and members of the

political elites. For instance, between the periods of 2000-2003, the group was reported to have

supported the governorship candidature of Senator Ali Modu Sheriff on the basis that the then

state government under the leadership of Mala Kachalla was not in support of full

implementation of Islamic Shariah in the state. With the support of the group, Sheriff won the

governorship election. This period marked the beginning of the group’s growth and spread

among the Muslims especially youths within the north eastern states of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi,

Gombe and other states in the north such as Niger and Kano, and Kaduna (Reinert & Garcon,

2014; Pham, 2012; Walker, 2012). With Sheriff as the governor of the state in which the group’s

leadership located, Boko Haram began to get bolder in its defiance and challenge of the Nigerian

state. The group according to Walker (2012) constituted itself into a “state within a state”, by

establishing administrative and institutional structures such as cabinet, police, and large farm.

With this, it was able to provide some social and economic relief to war driven refugees from

neighboring Chad Republic and many unemployed Nigerian youths thereby attracting more

followers. Mohammed (2014) summarized the evolution of Boko Haram insurgent group in

Nigeria from a non-violent to a violent group into three periods. The first period which marked

the beginning of the group’s transformation is known as the Kanama Hijra (departure from

Maiduguri to Kanama Village) in 2003-2005, in which the radical sect of the group led by

Mohammed Ali declared war on the Nigerian state and was brutally repelled by the Nigerian
army with more casualties on the group. The second period began after the Kanama Village

confrontation and their subsequent retreat back to Maiduguri and ended in 2009 following the

death of its leader Mohammed Yusuf in the hands of the Nigeria police after he was captured and

handed over to them by the army.

It was within this period that the group consolidated its strength through extensive dawah

(preaching), debates with other opposing Ulama (clerics) on the issue of western education,

western civilization, secularism, and corruption within the state. It also engaged in extensive

recruitment of new members, indoctrination, intensive proselytizing and radicalization of its

members. The third period began immediately after the extra judiciary killing of their leader in

2009 by the police. The group retreated from the scene for a while to re-organize before re-

surfacing in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau to avenge for the loss of its leader

and other members. Onuoha (2014) explained that during the period of their retreat, Boko Haram

regrouped, mobilized, recruited and radicalized its members by preaching the message of

martyrdom through the video pictures of the July, 2009 confrontation with the Nigerian security

agents.

Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency

Beginning from 2003 when Boko Haram insurgent group launched its campaign of terror

on Nigeria, there have been corresponding political and socio-economic effects ranging from loss

of human lives, destruction of properties, damaging of the country’s image, to general insecurity.

Recently, Nigeria’s President Good luck Jonathan was quoted to have summarized the effect of

Boko Haram insurgency as being worse than the country’s 1960s civil war. According to

President “Boko Haram insurgency is worse than civil war. During the civil war, the battle line

was drawn and the enemies known; while in a terror war, the enemies are from within and are
faceless” (Daily Trust Newspaper, June 26th 2014). Similarly, Oladesu (2013) observed that:

Since the end of the civil war no calamity of enormous proportion has befallen the fledging

nation state more than the harrow unleashed by the dreadful sec - Boko Haram. Many lives have

been lost property worth billions of naira have been destroyed. Nobody is insulated from the

attack. Government officials and buildings, traditional rulers, police and military formations and

church worshippers are targets. On daily basis, there is panic. The fear of the invincible agitators

has become the beginning of wisdom. (The Nation Newspaper, 2013, p. 4). Although the exact

effects cannot be cumulatively quantified in figures, it is however estimated to be high as the

group continues to unleash more terror attacks in different parts of the country. Nwozor (2013)

and Onuoha (2014) explained that, apart from the loss of human lives and properties through the

use of explosive devices, suicide bombing and assassination tactics by Boko Haram insurgents,

there is general atmosphere of insecurity in the polity. This has resulted in creating some

negative effects in the country and psychological trauma among the citizens. Aro (2013)

categorized the effects of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria along security, political, economic,

social dimensions.

Security Challenges

Generally, the primary aim of all insurgent groups is to create fear and chaos leading to

feelings of insecurity in the minds of citizens. Thus, in terms of security, the effect of Boko

Haram insurgency has continued to be a source of threat to not only lives and property but to the

corporate existence of the country. Many Nigerians especially within the Northern regions are

now living in a state of apprehension from Boko Haram attacks which has become a daily

routine. The situation is so bad that virtually no day goes by without a report of people being

killed here or there. For example, between the periods of July 2009 to January 2012, the group
has undertaken over 160 attacks resulting in over 1000 deaths (Nwozor, 2013). The prevalence of

these attacks has created a serious security problem as many people are no longer free or able to

go about their daily activities due to fear of being attacked by the insurgents. The implication for

this scenario is that people’s fundamental right of free movement is being restricted and violated

by the violent activities of the insurgents and the government’s corresponding security measures

aimed at controlling the problem. Furthermore, some politicians and criminals are capitalizing on

the security challenges posed by the insurgents to settle political scores and engage in other

criminal activities using the name of Boko Haram.

Political Effects

Politically, activities of Boko Haram insurgents have succeeded in creating more

misunderstanding between the political elites of Nigeria’s geo-political zones particularly

between the North and South. Thus, politicians from the two major geographical divides of

South and North are accusing each other of either creating Boko Haram insurgents or being

behind them for political reasons. For instance, on the one side Northern political elites are

accusing the federal government of President Jonathan a Southerner for using the insurgent

group to create insecurity, decrease the population of the region particularly Muslims, and

destroy their economy so as to reduce their bargaining powers against the then 2015 presidential

elections. Similarly, on the other hand, the government of President Jonathan is pointing

accusing fingers on the Northern political elites for orchestrating the insurgent group as a mean

of preventing his government from fulfilling its campaign promises. The government believed as

at then, that the whole idea of Boko Haram insurgency is a calculated plan by some Northern
politicians to stop him from contesting the 2015 presidential election. Therefore, on the whole,

the activities of Boko Haram insurgents are having a serious effect on the ability of the

government to deliver on her objectives. Like the politicians and the government, many

observers are also of the opinion that the Boko Haram insurgency is a deliberate hand work of

some politicians aimed at 2015 presidential elections.

Economic Effects

Economically, activities of the insurgency have almost crippled daily economic activities

in many parts of the Northern states. Both the government and individuals have been affected

especially in places like Kano, Maiduguri, Damaturu where many business outfits have closed

their shops due to incessant attacks from the insurgents. For example, since the security situation

in the country took an ugly dimension, many commercial banks have been attacked and robbed

of various sums of money. This has made the banks to resort to reducing their daily working

hours and sometimes forced to remained closed in order to safe guard the lives of their staff and

public funds in the affected states. In addition, public and private infrastructures such as mobile

telecommunications masks, fueling stations, residential buildings, offices, shopping malls,

markets, motor parks, and other economic goods estimated in trillions of naira or dollars have

been destroyed. The cumulative effects of these unfortunate destructions have greatly impacted

on the country’s national economy. As many economic sectors of the country are having

difficulties attracting foreign investments because potential investors are scared of the prevailing

security situation.

Social Effects

In addition, to the economic and other effects, the activities of Boko Haram insurgents

have worsened the existing animosity in the relations among the already polarized population
along ethnic and religious affiliations. Prior to the current indiscriminate violent attacks, the

insurgents who started their violent campaign by attacking security institutions and their agents

latter directed their attacks against the Christians. For example, the bombings of Madallah

church in Suleja, Niger state near Nigeria’s federal capital city of Abuja and luxurious

commercial buses in predominant Igbo speaking population of Sabon Gari in Kano state has led

to degeneration of relations between the adherents of the country’s two dominant religions (Islam

and Christianity). Furthermore, it has also generated criticisms from various people,

organizations and attracted other negative responses from the country’s non-Muslim populations.

By extension, it has strained the diplomatic relations between Nigeria and other countries.

Operational Strategy of Boko Haram

When Boko insurgents first declared war of on the Nigeria state in 2002 at the Kanama

village by engaging in direct confrontation with the Nigeria army, it suffered some serious

casualties as many of its members including the factional leader Mohammed Ali were killed. A

similar attempt by the group under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 also resulted in

heavy loss of the group’s members including its leader Mohammed Yusuf in the hands of the

Nigerian security agents. However, when the group retreated and resurfaced in 2010, its mission

statement was to avenge for the loss of their leader Mohammed Yusuf and other members in

2009. According to Onuoha (2014) when the group resurfaced in 2010, it had planned and re-

strategized on how to carry out its mission. Firstly, the group accepted to use the hard line

posture of its new leader Abubakar Shekau and secondly, it redefined its tactics of conducting the

war by introducing new flexible violent dimension to its traditional hit-and-run strategy. Thus, at

first, they started by attacking and killing security agents in their duty posts and homes while at
the same time destroying security installations such as police stations, army barracks,

immigration, state security service offices, etc. While, the direct armed confrontation with

security agents remained their major terror campaign tactics, other tactics employed by the group

include drive-by-shooting, targeted assassination, suicide bombing, use of improvised explosive

devices (IEDs), and kidnapping. However, the use of any these tactics is determined by factors

such as the prevailing situation, nature of the potential target, and the desired objective.

The modus operandi of the above mentioned tactics employed by Boko Haram insurgents

to carry out their attacks are as follows:

(1) Direct Armed Confrontation - Although this has been group’s major campaign tactics since

2009, it also combines some aspects of modified version of the group’s traditional hit-and -run

tactics. Initially, this tactics involved the deployment of selected members of the group between

10-60 people to confront security agents in direct armed battles. But under the modified system,

the group sends large numbers of its men to conduct surprise attacks on selected security outfits

such as police stations, army barracks, prisons or civilian populated places such as shopping

malls, mosques, and churches. The reason is that, such places are usually crowded by people who

can easily overpower the group’s operatives in a direct confrontation (Onuoha, 2014; Murtada,

2013).

(2) Drive-by-Shooting - This method involves the use of motorbikes by the group’s operatives to

hit their target (s) and easily escape apprehension by the security agents. Onuoha (2014)

explained that this method is favored by the group because it provide the group’s operatives with

the flexibility of hitting their target at close proximity and find their way without much

difficulties in congested areas especially in urban centers. It is closely related to target

assassination tactics. Through this method, prominent politicians, businessmen, and people
identified as threat to the group’s interest have been killed. Among them are the former Deputy

Inspector General of police Saleh Abubakar Ningi on 6 June 2012, and Sheik Albani including

his wife and two children on 1st February 2014(The Punch Newspapers 7 June 2012, Daily

Times Newspapers 2 February 2014).

(3) Targeted Assassination - This tactic is used by the group to kill people who have been

identified and labeled as its enemy. The method involves trailing of the target by the group’s

operatives to a convenient environment or ambushing them so that the killing will be done with

less difficulty. In most cases, the operatives of the group use motorbikes when they are trailing

their target. The use of motorbikes provide the operatives advantages of killing their victims at

close range and at the same time maneuver their ways with ease to avoid arrest. Victims of this

tactic have mostly been those who are openly opposed to the group’s ideology and activities such

as politicians, clerics, and other community leaders. Some of the victims associated with this

pattern of attack by the group includes late Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi on 12 March 2010,

Borno state ANPP governorship candidate Engineer Modu Fannami Gugbio in company of six

other people including governor Sheriff’s younger brother on 28 January 2011, Kano cleric Alh

Muhammadu on 9 February 2012, Borno state Justice commissioner Zanna Malam Gana in

Bama town on 17 September 2012, family of four in Kano on 16 September 2012 etc. (Idris,

2011; PM News of 9 February 2012, 16th and 18th September 2012).

(4) Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) - The group adopted this method after the 2009

confrontation. The tactic involves use of improvised explosives devices such as drums, gallons,

jerry cans, and used soft drink cans filled with petrol and other inflammable chemicals like

trinitrotoluene and ammonia fertilizers. Any of these devices is subsequently planted in bags,

dust bins, or un-use empty containers within the premises of the selected target such as car parks,
bus stops, lecture halls, places of worships, and other public places. Among the prominent

attacks conducted by the group using this method are the coordinated Kano bombings on 2o

January 2012, This Day Newspapers Abuja building on 26 April 2012, Bayero University Kano

Christian chapel on 29 April 2012, Abuja bus station on 14 April 2014, and Jos market bombing

on 20 May 2014 (Nkechi, 2013; Blanchard, 2014; Vanguard Newspapers 21/5/2014, and BBC

News 21/1/2012).

(5) Suicide Bombing - This method also involves the use of improvised explosive devices by the

group. However, the difference is that, the improvised explosive devices are fitted in the boot of

a car and driven by the operative (s) to strike at the target. In this case the driver (s) is also killed

by the explosion when the car hits the target or the explosive is detonated by the suicide bomber

to avoid detection or apprehension by the security agents. The types of suicide bombings used by

the group includes vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), motorbikes-borne

improvised explosive devices (MBIED), body-borne improvised explosive devices (BBIED),

and tricycle-borne improvised explosive devices (TBIED). Through this tactic, the group has

undertaken several attacks in different parts of Nigeria. For instance, some of the most prominent

suicide attacks carried out by the group between June, 2012 to May, 2014 includes: Abuja Police

headquarters car par suicide bombing, UN building suicide bombing in Abuja on 26 August

2011, Madallah Saint Theresa Catholic Church in Niger state on 25 December, 2011, Kaduna

army headquarters suicide bombing on 8 February 2012, Taraba state police commissioner

convoy suicide bombing on 3 August, 2012, and Maiduguri suicide bombing on 14 January,

2014 (Joe, 2011; Bekoe, 2011; Mark, 2012; Onuoha, 2014).

(6) Kidnapping - This is one of the newly modification in the tactics of the Boko Haram sect. It

involves the kidnapping of foreigners, women, school girls, and young able men by the group.
While, it is clear that foreigners are kidnapped by the sect for ransom purposes, the group

explains that they are kidnapping school girls in order to stop them from pursuing western

education. And even though, the sect has not offered any reason as to why they are also

kidnapping women, media reports seems to suggest that it is being done to satisfy the sexual

needs of the group members. Whatever may be the reason of this tactic, it has generally been

assumed that both the girls and the women are being subjected to sexual slavery by the sect. This

assumption was recently confirmed by the sect’s leader in a televised video message when he

asserted that the over 250 Chibok school girls kidnapped by the group have become subjects of

war bounties or slaves as such they can be treated in any way. On the hand, the kidnapping of the

young men by the group is attributed to their desire to argument the strength of their lost

operatives by forcing those who are kidnapped to join the sect (Muhammad, 2012; Ruth, 2014;

BBC News 21 April 2014). Through the combination of the above enumerated tactics, Boko

Haram insurgent group have undertaken different types of terror attacks in Nigeria since 2009

which have in turn impacted negatively for the overall wellbeing of the citizens and the country

at large.

Government Response towards Boko Haram

The transformation of Boko Haram from a peaceful group of Islamic sec under the name

of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad to a violent insurgent group has been attributed

to the nature of responses made by the Nigerian government. In particular, the high harden all

military approach of the Nigerian government through its security agencies is seen as the major

reason why the issue of Boko Haram degenerated into its present condition. Many observers are

of the opinions that, from the beginning, the government ought to have adopted a multi-faceted

approach comprising political, social and economic dimensions as its major strategy towards the
problem. For instance, although the Boko Haram conflict started over disagreement on the issue

of Mosque management in Monguno in 2008 between the Izala sect and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah

Lidda’awati Wal -Jihad leading the death of 67 members of the latter, its leader Mohammed

Yusuf made a declaration to pursue the matter through legal means (Mohammed, 2014).

However, subsequent events indicate that the situation was mismanaged by the Nigeria’s security

agencies through various policies which were specifically aimed at the group. For example, the

introduction of joint military operations tagged “operation Flush II” was the first government

response to the problem. Unfortunately, the actions of the security agents operating under the

task force were reduced to harassment of Boko Haram members during their trips on dawah or

preaching activities. Attempt at enforcing the compulsory use of motorcycle crash helmets by

riders who were mostly members of the group even though the policy was not strictly enforced in

other parts of the country was another act aimed at the group.

Notwithstanding all these provocative measures, members of Operation Flush II security

task force launched a direct onslaught by shooting at Boko Haram members who were on a

funeral procession at Gwange cemetery at Maiduguri in 2009 killing 17 of the group’s members.

This particular incident is therefore regarded as the cause of violence between Boko Haram

group and the security agents in Maiduguri (Yusuf, 2009). Anyadike (2013) observed that the

Nigerian government response to the problem of Boko Haram insurgency is undesirable. She

therefore asserted that: Tactics employed by government security agencies against Boko Haram

have been consistently brutal and counterproductive. From the attacks so far, the group will

continue to attack softer targets in the northeast rather than international targets inside or outside

Nigeria, which would further threaten the country’s unity, (2013, p. 22). Thus, the worsening

security situation in the country is blamed on the extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram leader
Mohammed Yusuf by the security agents. This incidence according to many observers is

considered as the major factor that precipitated the sudden transformation of Boko Haram into a

ferocious violent group against the Nigerian state to date.

The Federal Government of Nigeria spends a huge chunk of its annual budget on security

without providing security to Nigerians. This is because of the mono-sectoral approach of the

government, which places undue emphasis on military solution without addressing the

underlying causes of the security challenges such as poverty, joblessness, illiteracy, hunger and

disease, amongst others.

Internal and External Peacebuilding Initiatives in North East Nigeria (2010-2020)

Major Military operations against Boko Haram under President Buhari dispensation

The Nigerian military is, in the words of a former British military attaché speaking in

2014, "a shadow of what it's reputed to have once been. It's fallen apart". They are short of basic

equipment, including radios and armoured vehicles. Morale is said to be low. Senior officers are

alleged to be skimming military procurement budget funds that are intended to pay for the

standard issue equipment of soldiers. The country's defense budget accounts for more than a

third of the security budget of $5.8 billion, but only 10 percent is allocated to capital spending. In

a 2014 United States Department of Defense assessment, funds are being "skimmed off the top",

troops are "showing signs of real fear" and are "afraid to even engage".

In the summer of 2013, the Nigerian military shut down mobile phone coverage in the

three north-eastern states to disrupt the group's communication and ability to detonate IEDs.

Accounts from military insiders and data of Boko Haram incidences before, during and after the

mobile phone blackout suggest that the shut down was 'successful' from a military- tactical point
of view (Ufour, 2018). However it angered citizens in the region (owing to negative social and

economic consequences of the mobile shutdown) and engendered negative opinions toward the

state and new emergency policies. While citizens and organizations developed various coping

and circumventing strategies, Boko Haram evolved from an open network model of insurgency

to a closed centralized system, shifting the center of its operations to the Sambisa Forest. This

fundamentally changed the dynamics of the conflict (Ufour, 2018).

In July 2014, Nigeria was estimated to have had the highest number of terrorist killings in

the world over the past year, 3477, killed in 146 attacks. The governor of Borno, Kashim

Shettima, of the opposition ANPP, said in February 2014: Boko Haram are better armed and are

better motivated than our own troops. Given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely

impossible for us to defeat Boko Haram (Ufour, 2018). In March 2015, it was reported that

Nigeria had employed hundreds of mercenaries from South Africa and the former Soviet Union

to assist in making gains against Boko Haram before the 28 March election. In October 2015,

General David M. Rodriguez, head of U.S. Africa Command, reported that Boko Haram has lost

territory, directly contradicting statements made by Boko Haram. U.S. efforts to train and share

intelligence with regional military forces is credited with helping to push back against Boko

Haram, but officials warn that the group remains a grave threat (Ufour, 2018).

In April 2018, the President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, approved a release of $1bn

for the procurement of security equipment to fight insurgency and revolt in the country. This

announcement came days after an attack by Boko Haram that left 18 dead in northern Nigeria.

Operation Safe Corridor and the Misplaced Investment on Terrorism

Since 2011, Boko Haram Islamic insurgency has resulted in about 37,500 deaths making

it the most deadly extremist group according to the Global Terrorism Index (2015). Attacks and

casualties have been rising and in 2019 alone, insurgents caused at least 750 security force

casualties. Literature suggests that the original Boko Haram Islamic insurgent group has split

into different factions and at least two factions (WARONTHE ROCKS 2019) of the terrorist

group have been identified. According to the Council on Foreign Relations (2019), the

insurgency brought about the displacement of about 2.5 million people with nearly 244,000

Nigerians living as refugees. Boko Haram insurgent group causes havoc through a wave of

bombings, assassinations, and abductions (DATAPHYTE 2020)

Amnesty as an option 

Significant investments have been made on the war against the insurgency in northern

Nigeria. While the net investment to Boko Haram insurgency may be somewhat difficult to

quantify, Nigeria’s security spending is traceable to the budget. A DATAPHYTE story in January

2020 indicated that over ₦4.61 trillion was invested in Nigeria’s security sector between 2012

and 2015. In 2019 alone, over ₦1 trillion was earmarked to the security sector. While the efforts

to combat insurgency in Nigeria have yielded some results, analysts say the Boko

Haram insurgency does not appear to be ending soon (The Humanitarian 2019). Though

the Nigerian government make claims that the insurgent group has been technically defeated

(Sahara reporters 2019), the threat posed by Boko Haram insurgents is real and persistent.

In April 2016, the Nigerian military announced an exercise whose aim is to rehabilitate

repentant members of the Boko Haram extremist group. In many ways, policy analyst considers

this exercise to be an amnesty alternative with considerable similarity to the Niger Delta

Amnesty programme launched by the Nigerian government in 2009. The exercise which is

known as Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC) involved the setting up of a special facility where

repentant terrorists who surrender their arms can get rehabilitated. The camp promised to offer
numerous opportunities, and participants were scheduled for vocational training to ease their

reintegration into the society.  

Ultimately, Operation Safe Corridor promised de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and

reintegration of repentant insurgents. Considerable success has been ascribed to OPSC. For

instance, 95 Ex-Boko Haram terrorists have reportedly been rehabilitated and reintegrated into

the society in January 2018. Also, in 2019, OPSC reportedly (VON 2019) secured the release of

1800 insurgents for rehabilitation and also graduated a set of 15 convicted Boko Haram

fighters. Similarly, the operation also secured and handed over 86 child fighters who voluntarily

surrendered to the rehabilitation centre in Borno State in November 2019 (All AFRICA 2019). 

Recently, a bill for an Act tagged “National Agency for Education, Rehabilitation, De-

radicalization and Integration of Repentant Insurgents in Nigeria 2020, SB. 340” was sponsored

at the National Assembly (Pulse 2020). The bill hopes to provide an avenue for rehabilitating, de-

radicalizing, educating, and reintegrating the defectors, repentant, and detained members of the

Boko Haram insurgent group to make them useful members of the society (Guardian 2020). It

also aims at providing an avenue for reconciliation and promoting national security. Sponsors

of the bill hope that this amnesty will frustrate insurgent activities and contribute to providing

intelligence on the activities of the insurgent group. It is hinted that the bill will also offer

repentant terrorists the privilege of enjoying foreign education (PUNCH 2020).  

Perspective on Amnesty Plan for Repentant Boko Haram Insurgents 

Largely, the bill to establish the rehabilitation agency for repentant Boko Haram

insurgents has been welcome with considerable public disapproval. For example, the Socio-

Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) outrightly condemned the bill and urged
the National Assembly to focus its efforts towards ensuring justice and reparation for the victims

of the Boko Haram insurgency (Vanguard 2020). Similarly, Senator Istifanus Gyang also

condemned the bill stating that it is an insult to Nigerians (PUNCH 2020). Also, the Centre for

the Vulnerable and Underprivileged described the bill as “Anti-Nigerian” (Daily Post 2020). To

the Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF), the bill is simply unfortunate (Vanguard

2020). Contrariwise, some Senior Advocates of Nigeria have expressed their support for the bill

and have urged the government to only exercise caution in the implementation (The Nation

2020). 

A variety of reservations have been expressed on the proposed bill. One of the

concerns bothers on the antecedents of the extremist group. Historically, Boko Haram insurgents

are pursuing a course that is against western education with the hope to Islamize Nigeria. From a

pragmatic viewpoint, offering foreign education to individuals who are opposed to education

appears to be a mismatch of priority.  Another dimension to the reservation against the bill is the

issue of negotiating with terrorists (Brookings 2020). The question of justice to victims of the

Boko Haram insurgency is prominent in public conversations around the proposed amnesty

(Guardian 2020). Some have described the bill to be a bold attempt by the Nigerian government

to incentivize terrorism particularly as the insurgent group has not declared a ceasefire (Guardian

2020). 

The relative failure of the Niger-Delta amnesty programme is another dimension to

the reservation. This is because previous leniency approaches have amounted to narrow and

unpopular political and financial payoffs. This leniency reportedly promoted impunity and moral

hazard which created more problem for societies in Nigeria. Drawing from the position of

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Operation Safe Corridor, the other concerns are
summarized to revolve around clarifying eligibility and defining repentant insurgents, de-

radicalization, operationalizing sustainable reintegration, ensuring a gender-sensitive approach,

and demobilizing and reintegrating civilian militias. 

The Nigerian Joint Task force under Goodluck Jonathan

Given the ongoing carnage perpetrated by Boko Haram, the Nigerian authorities clearly

want to put an end to the group's activities, hence the need to cooperate with United Nations in

her missions of peace building and conflict resolution. In the process, the administration of

President Goodluck Jonathan adopted a series of counter-terrorism measures in assisting United

Nations to deal with this threat (Global Peace Index, 2018).

In response to fresh terrorist atrocities on the part of Boko Haram, in June 2011 the

Federal Government of President Jonathan set up a special military task force in Maiduguri

consisting of the army, navy, air force, Department of State Security and the Nigerian Police

Force.

The creation of such a joint task force was, at least theoretically, to allow resources to be

pooled, to prevent duplication and to allow the free flow of information between the different

parts of the security services. In practice, the federal nature of the Nigerian state and its security

forces, as will be discussed below, undermined the objectives behind the creation of such a joint

task force (Global Peace Index, 2018). The government of Muhamadu Buhari has also

established check points around the capital Abuja following two terrorist attacks on the capital,

whilst a state of emergency was declared in areas of Borno, Niger, Plateau and Yobe states. In

addition, in states like Adamawa, a curfew was imposed (Ufour, 2018).

Altogether, 30,000 army, police and state security personnel were deployed to enforce the

state of emergency and curfew. The government also closed the borders between northern
Nigeria and neighbouring states (Global Peace Index, 2018). The underlying reason for this

closure was an attempt to prevent the perpetrators of terrorist atrocities from escaping into

neighbouring countries as well as trying to prevent Boko Haram from receiving reinforcements

of foreign jihadi elements in the region. However, given the length of these borders, the terrain

and the capacity of the Nigerian state, the frontiers remained porous. In addition, on 22 February

2011 the Jonathan administration adopted an anti-terrorism bill to deal with contingencies such

as those created by Boko Haram. The effectiveness of such legislation, given the ongoing

terrorist atrocities, is, however, a moot point (Global Peace Index, 2018).

This counter-terrorism bent has been reinforced by various outside actors, notably the

United States, since in Boko Haram they see yet another front in the war against terrorism. In

this regard, General Carter F Ham, commander of US Africa Command, recently noted: ‘what is

most worrying at present is, at least in my view, a clearly stated intent by Boko Haram and by Al

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to coordinate and synchronize their efforts (Global Peace Index,

2018).

United Nations’ Efforts in Curbing Insurgency in Nigeria

Chambas told the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) in Lagos that the UN stood in

solidarity with the Nigerian government in its ongoing effort at fighting the activities of Boko

Haram. “Today, as we can all see, terrorism is no longer a Nigerian problem alone. It has become

an international problem that calls for a strong international response. The UN stands in

solidarity with Nigeria as it takes the fight to Boko Haram terrorism which must be defeated at

all cost. We will continue to be supportive in ensuring the effective coordination of situations in

Nigeria and other countries currently being affected by Boko Haram terrorism,’’ he said.

The UN official said that he and other UN agencies’ chiefs were in Nigeria for
discussions with notable Nigerian leaders on the way forward to ending the menace of Boko

Haram. Chambas also announced plan to increase the number of troops for the Multi-National

Joint Task Force to be able to match stride with Boko Haram activities in Nigeria and other

countries. The UN special representative also disclosed plans by the UN to work closely with the

National Emergency Management (NEMA) and Non-Governmental Organisations in providing

humanitarian support for internally displaced persons. Chambas said that the UN had recently

visited the North-East part of Nigeria for an assessment of the humanitarian situation of the

displaced persons. “So, many Nigerians have been displaced and so many others dead due to

activities of these terrorists. The UN is already supporting many Nigerians who are refugees in

neighbouring countries particularly in Niger and Chad. We expect to see a significant and

effective response to thoroughly fighting Boko Haram in the coming months,’’ he said. (NAN)

Boko Haram is engaged in “almost unimaginable” violence and brutality that has forced

massive numbers of people to flee their homes and led to unprecedented numbers of people in

need, the U.N. humanitarian chief said Wednesday. Stephen O'Brien said the U.N. estimates that

over nine million people across the Lake Chad Basin spanning parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and

Cameroon need humanitarian assistance, including about 2.8 million who fled violent attacks in

their towns and villages. Boko Haram’s “most heinous, barbaric and unconscionable” violence

and brutality has also resulted in serious human rights violations and economic disruption in a

fragile region already impacted by the world’s highest population growth and worst poverty,

climate change and the massive drying up of Lake Chad which straddles the four countries, he

said.

O'Brien told the Security Council that Nigeria is bearing “the brunt of the crisis” despite

significant government efforts, with Nigerians accounting for seven million of the nine million
people needing humanitarian help. The 1.7 million children who have been displaced across the

Lake Chad Basin are especially vulnerable and risk abduction and recruitment by Boko Haram

including for suicide bombings, he said. “From January to June 2016, more than 50 children

have been coerced to carry out suicide bombings across the four countries,” O’Brien said.

U.N. political chief Jeffrey Feltman said that despite regional efforts to weaken Boko

Haram, the group continues to threaten regional stability. He said the joint military offensive by

troops from the four countries “has led to the recapture of 80 percent of areas under Boko Haram

control, the freeing of thousands of captives and the prevention of terrorist attacks.” While the

military campaign is essential, Feltman said the only way to end the Boko Haram threat is for the

affected countries to tackle the root causes for its emergence including addressing the social,

economic and political grievances of marginalized communities. O’Brien said humanitarian

efforts to help the needy are severely underfunded, and Feltman said the military operation

against Boko Haram is also facing “a severe lack of funding.” (AP)

Based on the foregoing, it could be deduced that the United Nations have had little efforts

and influence toward the curbing of insurgency in Nigeria through peace building initiative

processes. This implies that Nigerian government should put in more hard work to collaborate

with the United Nations in order to curb insurgency affecting the country.

The partnership and contributions of the United Nations (UN) in addressing the scourge of

insecurity and violence in North-East Nigeria

The United Nations General Assembly has condemned terrorist acts since 1994. She

adopted a political description that has come to be finally accepted by some UN member

countries to define terrorism. For the UN, terrorism refers to criminal acts intended or calculated

to provoke terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes that are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations; political,

philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to

justify them (UN, 1994). However, several strategies has been taking by United Nations (UN) in

addressing the scourge of insecurity and violence in North-East Nigeria especially by mobilizing

the members states led by USA in tackling the menace in North east Nigeria.

United Nations contributions

In January 2019, when thousands of refugees from north-east Nigeria were forced to

return from Cameroon, despite the continuous threat to civilian lives by Boko Haram jihadists,

the United Nations was "extremely alarmed". "This action was totally unexpected and puts lives

of thousands of refugees at risk," the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo

Grandi said (Wikipedia, 2019). The UNHCR appealed to Cameroon "to continue its open door

and hospitable policy" and stop any more returns.

United States responses:

In 2012, the U.S. Department of State had an internal debate on whether to place Boko

Haram on its list of FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organizations). The Bureau of Counterterrorism

leaned towards designation while the Bureau of African Affairs urged caution. Officials from the

Justice Department, the FBI, the CIA, and a number of members of Congress urged the State

Department to designate Boko Haram as an FTO. The Nigerian government voiced its opposition

to an FTO designation, citing concerns that it would raise Boko Haram's stature and have

implications for humanitarian aid in the region where Boko Haram operated (Kilishi et al, 2018).

Twenty academic experts on Nigeria signed a letter to the State Department urging it not to

designate Boko Haram as an FTO, saying that it would hinder NGO efforts in the region and
might legitimize the Nigerian Army's human rights abuses in its efforts to fight Boko Haram.

The U.S. State Department designated Boko Haram and its offshoot Ansaru as terrorist

organizations in November 2013, citing Boko Haram's links with AQIM and its responsibility for

"thousands of deaths in northeast and central Nigeria over the last several years including

targeted killings of civilians". The State Department also cited Ansaru's 2013 kidnapping and

execution of seven international construction workers. In the statement it was noted, however,

"These designations are an important and appropriate step, but only one tool in what must be a

comprehensive approach by the Nigerian government to counter these groups through a

combination of law enforcement, political, and development efforts (Kilishi et al, 2018)." The

State Department had resisted earlier calls to designate Boko Haram as a terrorist group after the

2011 Abuja United Nations bombing. The U.S. government does not believe Boko Haram is

currently (2014) affiliated with al Qaeda Central, despite regular periodic pledges of support and

solidarity from its leadership for al-Qaeda, but is particularly concerned about ties between Boko

Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (including "likely sharing funds, training,

and explosive materials") (Kilishi et al, 2018).

Efforts to cooperate in freeing the Chibok schoolgirls had faltered, largely due to mutual

distrust; the infiltration of the military by Boko Haram meant that U.S. officials were wary of

sharing raw intelligence data, and the Nigerian military had failed to supply information that

might have aided U.S. drone flights in locating the kidnapped girls (Kilishi et al, 2018). The

Nigerian government claims that Boko Haram is "the West Africa branch of the world-wide Al-

Qaida movement" with connections to al-Shabaab in Somalia and AQIM in Mali. The Nigerian

government denies having committed human rights abuses in the conflict, and therefore oppose

U.S. restrictions on arms sales, which they see as being based on the U.S. misapplication of the
Leahy Law due to concerns over human rights in Nigeria. The U.S. had supplied the Nigerian

army with trucks and equipment but had blocked the sale of Cobra helicopters. In November

2014 the U.S. State department again refused to supply Cobras, citing concerns over the Nigerian

military's ability to maintain and use them without endangering civilians (Kilishi et al, 2018).

On 1 December 2014, the U.S. embassy in Abuja announced that the U.S. had

discontinued training a Nigerian battalion at the request of the Nigerian government. A

spokesman for the U.S. state department said: "We regret premature termination of this training,

as it was to be the first in a larger planned project that would have trained additional units with

the goal of helping the Nigerian Army build capacity to counter Boko Haram (Kilishi et al,

2018). The U.S. government will continue other aspects of the extensive bilateral security

relationship, as well as all other assistance programs, with Nigeria. The U.S. government is

committed to the long tradition of partnership with Nigeria and will continue to engage future

requests for cooperation and training".

On 24 September 2015, the White House announced a military aid package for African

allies fighting Boko Haram. The package included up to $45 million for training and other

support for Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. On 14 October, the White House

released a statement, in accordance with the War Powers Resolution, announcing the deployment

of 300 troops to Cameroon to conduct airborne ISR: "These forces are equipped with weapons

for the purpose of providing their own force protection and security, and they will remain in

Cameroon until their support is no longer needed (Kilishi et al, 2018).

African Coalition force

After a series of meetings over many months, Cameroon's foreign minister announced on

30 November 2014 that a coalition force to fight terrorism, including Boko Haram, would soon
be operational. The force would include 3,500 soldiers from Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and

Nigeria. Discussions between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

about a broader based military force have been scheduled.

French and British assistance

France and the United Kingdom, in coordination with the United States, have sent trainers and

material assistance to Nigeria to assist in the fight against Boko Haram. France planned to use

3,000 troops in the region for counter-terrorism operations. Israel and Canada also pledged

support.

In 2017, the United Kingdom enforced an emergency assistance package worth $259 million.

The United Kingdom has also aided Nigeria through military support and counter-terrorism

training. The British government has provided training to 28,000 Nigerian military troops to aid

against Boko Haram. More than 40 British troops have also been sent long term to Nigeria.

Chinese assistance

In May 2014, China offered Nigeria assistance that included satellite data, and possibly military

equipment.

Colombian assistance

In October 2015, Colombia sent a delegation of security experts to assist the Nigerian authorities

and share expertise on security and counter terrorism. In January 2016, a delegation led by

Lieutenant General Tukur Yusuf Buratai also visited Colombia to exchange information in

regards to the war against Boko Haram.

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF): This is a loose group of militants that was formed in

Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria to help oust Boko Haram Islamist fighters from their city. The

group possesses basic weapons and has female members (Wikipedia 2021) The vigilante group
numbers over 26,000 in the northeastern Borno and Yobe States, of which only 1,800 receive a

salary ($50 per month) (Wikipedia 2021). The CJTF has suffered about 600 casualties in the

conflict, counting both lost and missing members (Wikipedia 2021). The CJTF has been accused

of abuses, including slaughtering men beside a mass grave, diverting food destined for starving

families and beating men and subjecting women and girls to systematic sexual violence in camps

(Wikipedia 2021).

Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection International (STTEP): This is

a private military company founded in 2006. STTEP was hired by the Nigerian government in

2015 to provide military training for the offensive against Boko Haram. Its chairman, Eeben

Barlow, was the founder of the South African PMC Executive Outcomes, which ceased

operations in 1998. Though the company remains secretive about its contracts, it claims to have

operated throughout Africa, the Far East, the Middle East and Central America.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF): This is a combined multinational formation,

comprising units, mostly military, from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. It is

headquartered in N’Djamena and is mandated to bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency.

The task force was first organised as a solely Nigerian force in 1994, during the

administration of Sani Abacha, to "checkmate banditry activities and to facilitate free movement"

along its northern border (Wikipedia 2021). In 1998 it was expanded to include units from

neighbouring Chad and Niger with the purpose of dealing with common cross-border security

issues in the Lake Chad region, with its headquarters in the town of Baga, Borno State

(Wikipedia 2021). Islamist groups grew and expanded their operations during the 2000s and

early 2010s. Boko Haram's insurgency began in 2009, and security forces across the region were

increasingly directly challenged by jihadist militant groups. Boko Haram and Ansaru were the

most active and well known. In April 2012, the MNJTF's mandate was expanded to

encompass counter-terrorism operations (Wikipedia 2021).

Brig. Gen. Enitan Ransome-Kuti, son of Beko Ransome-Kuti and nephew of the

musician Fela Kuti was a previous commander of the force (Wikipedia 2021). In January 2015

the MNJTF headquarters in Baga, Nigeria, was overrun by militants of Boko Haram, who then

proceeded to massacre local residents and destroy the town, displacing many citizens (Wikipedia

2021). At the time, only Nigerian soldiers were present in the HQ. There were reports that they

fled the attackers (Wikipedia 2021). It was an ignominious moment for the MNJTF, and indeed

the contributing nations. The political process of expanding the MNJTF was given new strength

and energy which led to swifter progress, including the expansion of troop numbers and

mandate, and relocation of the HQ to N'Djamena, Chad (Wikipedia 2021).

The most significant structural changes for the MNJTF that emerged from the meetings

in 2015 were a rise in numbers, the creation of a new Concept of Operations under the

supervision of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the move of the HQ to N'Djamena. It was

agreed that a Nigerian officer would be the Force Commander for the duration of the mission

against Boko Haram, with a Cameroonian as Deputy Commander and Chadian Chief of Staff.

Major-General Tukur Yusuf Buratai (Nigerian) was appointed first Commander of the

rejuvenated MNJTF in May 2015 (Wikipedia 2021). However, his command was short lived as

in July 2015 he was appointed Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff and handed command to Major-

General Iliya Abbah (Nigerian) on 31 July 2015 (Wikipedia 2021). Nigerian Major-General

Lamidi Adeosun, was appointed MNJTF Commander in January 2016 (Wikipedia

2021). Adeosun was in turn replaced as commander by Major-General Lucky Irabor in May

2017 (Wikipedia 2021). In August 2018, Irabor is replaced by Major-General C.O. Ude
(Wikipedia 2021). Maj Gen I.M.Yusuf took over from Ude, while Current commander Maj Gen

J.J Ogunlade took over from yusuf on 19 Mar (Wikipedia 2021).

The Force is structured in four national sectors: Sector 1 (Cameroon) headquartered at

Mora; Sector 2 (Chad) headquartered at Baga-Sola; Sector 3 (Nigeria) based in Baga; and Sector

4 (Niger), based in the town of Diffa (Wikipedia 2021). There is still considerable skepticism in

the international community that the new force can deliver results, and its success or otherwise as

a multinational endeavour will be closely monitored (Wikipedia 2021). Discontent has been

voiced within coalition by Chadian president Idris Deby for shouldering disproportionate burden

of fighting armed groups and announced confining its military operations to its boundaries

(Wikipedia 2021).

Theoretical Framework

Acts of terrorism are manifestations of unresolved conflicts and the inability of the

government to overcome the challenges are reflections that the root cause(s) of the conflicts are

not identified and therefore the correct mechanism could not be adopted to manage or resolve it.

Scholars have propounded so many theoretical models to explain the prevalence of terrorism but

for the purpose of this study, a combination of cognitive dissonance, frustration aggression and

asset to liability theories are adopted. Adekanye (2007) enumerates three set of factors that

largely explain the processes that metamorphose in to conflict situation that can as well lead to

terrorism and these are the structural background conditions, precipitating and triggers factors.

Cognitive Dissonance

Festinger (1951) developed a theory about communication’s social influences, referred to

as cognitive dissonance which is one of the most important psychological concepts that shed

light on terrorist behavior. Cunningham, Jr. (2003) observes that: Men prefer a situation of
stability in respect of values, behavior and their environmental conditions. When people

experience a difference between what they perceive and what they desire (cognitive dissonance),

they seek to reduce this dissonance by reducing this gap through actions, filtering information or

altering perceptions.

Cognitive dissonance is therefore experienced whenever there is a discrepancy between

preferred value and actual value states. Such a situation has the tendency to produce hatred,

anxiety, fear and the desire to hurt or eliminate the source. The discrepancies could manifest

within economic, social, cultural political and religious spheres as these issues form the micro

level of analysis that could be regarded as the structural background conditions operating at

individual level. The predisposition factors to insurgency could therefore be located largely in the

real or perceived discrepancy between the preferred way of life (to maintain the sanctity of

orthodox Islam) and the actual state of their existence (secular state) that influence the

dissonance. The voice of the few elements that initially reacted to the perceived dissonance is

what the issue at stake requires to garner popular support. In effect, the personal dissonance

grows to become group level grievances and discontentment. By this means, it transforms from a

micro into macro-level phenomenon that agrees with what Gurr, (1970) refers to as relative

deprivation and largely provides explanation to what this study refers to as precipitating or

accelerating factors.

The shared view by the sect and other recruited members of the larger society provides a

cheap platform for mobilization of groups for political action that can lead to popular uprisings,

riots and revolutions. In this specific instance, it develops to terrorism as the movement enjoys

widespread overt or covert support among the disgruntled elements within the society (Volkan,

1990:31).The goal of such individuals is to remove the hindrances through whichever methods
that Cunningham (2003) refers to as maladaptive means. Maladaptive means could include

forming a terrorist organization and carrying out terrorist acts. It needs to however be

acknowledged that it is not in all instances of cognitive dissonance (or everybody that

experiences it as well as deprived individuals or groups) may choose to commit terrorist acts.

Some people may suffer in silence or adopt constitutional means to address their grievances.

Galtung, (1969) in addition notes that the theories hypothesize the presence of significant socio-

economic indicators that can serve as breeding grounds for terrorists, but they do not answer the

question of why some people or groups in the same structurally disadvantaged situations choose

terrorism and others do not.

As a catalytic factor, Cunningham (2003) discusses asset to liability shift theory which

serves as a root of terrorist strategy. The theory assumes governments view states and local

government areas within its jurisdiction as assets that must be defended against internal or

external aggression. It goes further to state that acts of terrorism will cost the government

valuable lives and money in defending these assets against a sustained terrorist campaign as

experienced with Boko-Haram menace. The theory assumes that after the government suffers

significant losses, the asset will become instead, a liability and the government will decide to

forfeit the asset and cut their losses.

Hence, the goal of the terrorist in this instance is to destabilize the country and make it

‘ungovernable’ as this could lead to a situation of break-up of the country or imposition of

Islamic ways of life. This is anchored on the assumption that during anti-terrorist campaigns

government will overreact and become oppressive in order to combat the terrorists as this will

expose the weakness of the government to the populace like the extra-judicial killing of

Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko-Haram insurgents. This in turn will make the members
of the public withdraw their support for the government and develop sympathy for the sect.

Though the theory had been criticized but it reflects significantly the philosophy behind

insurgents and to a large extent while the governments have been unable to overcome the

challenges posed by the sect.

Gaps in the Literature

Few studies have explored how the UN and other foreign bodies could partner with

Nigerian government to curb the menace of domestic terrorism and conflicts in the North-East.

These bodies have made their presence known in the efforts against book haram. However, not

much studies have been conducted to evaluate the efforts and participation of these foreign

bodies in the strive against security challenges (especially Boko Haram). Thus the essence of this

study. This study (relating government efforts in partnership with the UN to build peace

initiatives) attempts to fill gaps in the literature. The study argues that conflicts and insurgencies

have weakened the security and economy of the country and therefore needs to be attended to.

Thus, the peace building initiative by the United Nations (UN) and others needs to be evaluated,

so as to help decide whether to clamour for more or throw down the ideas.

References

Adisa, T. (2012). Security agencies uncover sources of Boko Haram’s explosives. In A. R.

Adenrele (Ed.), Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria as a Symptom of Poverty and

Political Alienation. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS),

3(5). African Confidential. (2011, June 24). Retrieved from http://www.africa-

confidential.com

Allafrica (2019) retrieved from https://allafrica.com/stories/201911080035.html. 23rd June 2021

 FRN (2020) ministry-to-collaborate-with-operation-safe-corridor-to-end-insecurity-in-

the-north-east retrieved from https://fmic.gov.ng/ministry-to-collaborate-with-

operation-safe-corridor-to-end-insecurity-in-the-north-east/. 23rd June 2021

Alli, Y. (2011). FBI, INTERPOL Join Manhunt for Bomb Suspect Nur. The Nation.

Anyadike, N. O. (2013). Boko Haram and National Security Challenges in Nigeria: Causes and

Solutions. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 4(5).

Aro, O. I. (2013). Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its Implication and Way Forwards

towards Avoidance of Future Insurgency. Retrieved June 30, 2014, from

https//www.academia.edu/3559251

Bekoe, D. (2011). Nigeria’s 2011 Elections: Best run, but Most Violent (Peace Brief, August

2011). Washington: UNO Publication.

Bello, A. (2013). Boko Haram: The Greatest Security Threat to the Sovereignty of Nigeria.

International Journal of Management and Social Sciences Research (IJMSSR), 2(2),

67.

Blanchard, L. P. (2014). Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions (Congressional

Research Service 7-5700). Retrieved July 17, 2014, from http://www.crs.gov

Brookings (2019) In Nigeria we don’t want them back retrieved from https://

www.brookings.edu/research/in-nigeria-we-dont-want-them-back/. 23rd June 2021

Carnegie (2018) achieving-peace-in-northeast-nigeria-reintegration-challenge retrieved from

https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/09/05/achieving-peace-in-northeast-nigeria-

reintegration-challenge-pub-77177. 23rd June 2021

CFR (2019) Boko haram Nigeria retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-

tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria 24th June 2021

Crenshaw, M. (1995). Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts. University Park:

The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Crisp, J. (2003). No solution in sight: the problem of protracted refugee situations in Africa.

Crouch, I. C. (2010). Managing Terrorism and Insurgency: Regeneration, recruitment, and

attrition. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

DailyPost (2020) rights-activist-ikimi-condemns-bill-seeking-amnesty-for-repentant-boko-haram

retrieved from https://dailypost.ng/2020/03/02/rights-activist-ikimi-condemns-bill-

seeking-amnesty-for-repentant-boko-haram/. 23rd June 2021

DATAPHYTE (2020) operation-safe-corridor-and-the-misplaced-investment-on-terrorism

retrieved from https://www.dataphyte.com/latest-reports/security/operation-safe-

corridor-and-the-misplaced-investment-on-terrorism/?amp_markup=1 24th June2021

FRN (2020) presidential-amnesty-programme-brace-up-no-more-business-as-usual-ex-agitators-

to-contractors retrieved from https://www.osapnd.gov.ng/presidential-amnesty-

programme-brace-up-no-more-business-as-usual-ex-agitators-to-contractors/. 23rd

June 2021

Gompert, D. C., & Gordon, J. (2008). War by Other Means: Building complete and balanced

Capabilities for Counterinsurgency. Rand Corporation, California.

Guardian (2020) crisis-as-stakeholders-reject-amnesty-for-repentant-boko-haram-terrorists

retrieved from https://guardian.ng/news/crisis-as-stakeholders-reject-amnesty-for-

repentant-boko-haram-terrorists/. 23rd June 2021

Gupta, D. K. (2008). Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life cycle of birth,

growth, transformation and demise. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203930274
Hammes, T. (2004). The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. London: Zenith Press.

Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Idris, H. (2011). Boko Haram financier, 91 others in Police net. Daily Trust.

Jenkins, B. M. (1980). The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems. Santa Monica: RAND.

Joe, B. (2011). Nigerian Islamist Sect Claims Bombing Attack.

Kilcullen, D. (2006). Counter-Insurgency Redux. Survival: The IISS Quarterly, 48(4).

Krueger, A. B., & Malečková, J. (2003). Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal

connection? Journal of Economic perspectives, 17(4), 119-144.

Mackinlay, J. (2002). Globalization and Insurgency. Adelphi Papers, No. 352 (London:

International Institute for Strategic Studies).

Manuel, R., & Lou, G. (2014). Boko Haram: A Chronology. In M. A. P. D. Montclos (Ed.), Boko

Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and State in Nigeria. Enschede Netherlands,

Ipskamp Drukkers.

Mark, M. (2012). Boko HaramVows to fight until Nigeria establishes Sharia law. Retrieved from

http://www.theguardian.com.retrieved on 23/07/2014

Meehan, P., & Speier, J. (2011). Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the US Homeland. US

Government Publication. Retrieved July 25, 2014, from

http://www.homeland.house.gov/Boko

Metz, S. (2007). Rethinking Insurgency. US Government Publication. Retrieved from

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/.Accessed on 23/07/2014

Mohammed, K. (2014). The message and methods of Boko Haram. In M. A. P. D. Montclos

(Ed.), Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and State in Nigeria. Enschede

Netherlands, Ipskamp Drukkers.

Muhammad, B. (2012). Still on Boko Haram. Daily Trust.

Murtada, A. (2013). Boko Haram in Nigeria: Its Beginnings, Principles and Activities in Nigeria.

Retrieved July 23, 2014, from http://www.salafimanhaj.com

Nwozor, A. (2013). National Security, Religious Anarchism and the Politics of Amnesty in

Nigeria. Covenant Journal of Political and International Affairs (CUJPIA), 1(1).

O' Neill, B. E. (1990). Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Washington

DC: Potomac Books Inc.

Ogala, E. (2012, May 13). Boko Haram Gets #40 Million Donation from Algeria. Sahara

Reporters.

Ogbozor, E. (2016). Causes and Consequence of Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria (No.

227). Households in Conflict Network.

Oladesu, E. (2013). Boko Haram Insurgency, The Nation Newspapers. In O. I. Aro (Ed.), Boko

Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its Implication and Way Forwards towards Avoidance of

Future Insurgency. Retrieved June 30, 2014, from http://www.academia.edu/3559251

Onuoha, F. (2014). Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria. In M. A. P. D.

Montclos (Ed.), Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and State in Nigeria.

Enschede Netherlands, Ipskamp Drukkers.

Paul, C., Clarke, C. P., & Grill, B. (2011). Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Evidence of

Effective Approaches to Counterinsurgency, 1978-2008. Small Wars Journal. Retrieved

from http://www.smalwarsjournal.com

Pham, J. P. (2013). Boko Haram training camps found in Mali - Over 200 Nigerians trained for

10 months in Timbuktu. Daily Trust.

Piazza, J. A. (2013). The cost of living and terror: does consumer price volatility fuel
 terrorism? Southern Economic Journal, 79(4), 812-831.

Pulse (2020) senator-proposes-agency-for-repentant-boko-haram-terrorists retrieved from

https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/senator-proposes-agency-for-repentant-boko-haram-

terrorists/347x4ss. 23rd June 2021

Robertson, A. E., & Ellis, J. O. III. (2007). Global Issues: Terrorism and Global Security. New

York: Infobase Publishing.

Ruby, C. L. (2002). The Definition of Terrorism. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy,

2(1). http://dx.doi. org/10.1111/j.1530-2415.2002.00021.x

Ruth, M. (2014). Nigerian School says 329 girl pupils missing.

Sahara Reporters (2019) nigeria-now-fighting-global-terrorists-boko-haram-technically-

defeated-lai-mohammed retrieved from http://saharareporters.com/2019/10/22/nigeria-

now-fighting-global-terrorists-boko-haram-technically-defeated-lai-mohammed. 23rd

June 2021

Schmid, A. P., & Jongman, A. J. (1988). Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors,

Concepts, Databases, Theories, and Literature. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction

Books.

Stozier, C. B. (2007). Historical and Psychological Reflections on the Emergence of the New

Terrorism. In O. Nikbay, & S. Hancerli (Eds.), Understanding and Responding to the

Terrorism Phenomenon. Amsterdam: IOS Pres

Taiwo, J., & Olughade, M. (2009). Boko Haram Leader Killed. In E. E. Onyebuchi, & C. F.

Chigozie (Eds.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Problem of Insecurity in Nigeria: The

Boko Haram Phenomenon. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-

JHSS), 15(3), 43-53.

The Nation (2020) crisis-as-stakeholders-reject-amnesty-for-repentant-boko-haram-terrorists

retrieved from https://thenationonlineng.net/sans-back-senate-on-agency-for-repentant-

boko-haram-insurgents/. 23rd June 2021

This Day Newspaper. Retrieved August 31, 2012, from http://www.thisdaylive.com

Vanguard (2020) amnesty-for-boko-haram-repentant-insurgents-is-unfortunate-pandef-monarch

retrieved from https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/02/amnesty-for-boko-haram-

repentant-insurgents-is-unfortunate-pandef-monarch/. 23rd June 2021

Vanguard (2020) drop-bill-to-give-repentant-terrorists-foreign-education-serap-tells-senate-

president retrieved from https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/03/drop-bill-to-give-

repentant-terrorists-foreign-education-serap-tells-senate-president/. 23rd June 2021

VON (2019) operation-safe-corridor-de-radicalises-convicted-boko-haram-members retrieved

from https://von.gov.ng/operation-safe-corridor-de-radicalises-convicted-boko-haram-

members/. 23rd June 2021

Walker, A. (2012). What is Boko Haram? Retrieved July 15, 2014, from

https//www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resouces

War on the Rocks (2019) how-boko-haram-has-regained-the-initiative-and-what-nigeria-should-

do-to-stop-it retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/how-boko-haram-has-

regained-the-initiative-and-what-nigeria-should-do-to-stop-it/ 23rd June 2021

Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Hirsh-Hoefler, S. (2004). The Challenges of Conceptualizing

Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(4), 778.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-2415.2002.00021.x

Yusuf, M. (2009). Hazihi Aqeedatun wa Minhaju Da’awatuna. This is Our Belief and Method of

Call, Maiduguri.
 CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHOD

3.1 Quantitative Research Methodology

Quantitative research is regarded as the organized inquiry about phenomenon through

collection of numerical data and execution of statistical, mathematical or computational

techniques. The source of quantitative research is positivism paradigm that advocates for

approaches embedded in statistical breakdown that involves other strategies like inferential

statistics, testing of hypothesis, mathematical exposition, experimental and quasi-experimental

design randomization, blinding, structured protocols, and questionnaires with restricted variety

of prearranged answers (Lee, as cited in Slevitch, 2011).

The focus of this research as stated earlier is to attempt an explication of the implications

of peacebuilding initiatives on security challenges in North East Nigeria, taking Boko Haram

insurgency as a case study. Upon closer review of this research topic, it follows that the research

attempts to measure or determine the influence of a variable (peacebuilding initiative) over

another variable (security challenges/national security) and thus a correlational study. From the

analysis of quantitative methodology by Apuke (2017) and Adedoyin (2020), correlational

studies, or studies attempting to establish causal relationship are known as quantitative research

designs.

3.2 Research Design and Strategy

Being that the study attempts to carry out its study using a particular environment, society or

group, the research design employed in the study is the Case Study research design.

3.2.1 Primary Data: This refers to the kind of data that was collected first hand by the

researcher. Primary data has been said to be more reliable, authentic, objective and one that
enjoys more validity than secondary data. This is used in answering Research Question two and

three.

3.2.2 Primary Data importance: In statistical related studies, it is necessary to obtain data first

hand and from first hand sources, else one may feed-off on the biases of others (secondary source

of Data). For instance, in this study which deals on the implications of peacebuilding initiatives

on security challenges in Nigeria, one cannot afford to get its entire data from newspapers and

magazines. In this study which requires data involving numbers and determination of consumer

behavior, there will be a need to get first hand data from either the security personels or those

connected to the law enforcement Agencies (of which this study has chosen). For the purpose

this study, questionnaire shall be the main primary data source.

3.2.3 Questionnaire: this is a commonly used data source for studies such as surveys but not

limited to surveys. It is a data source and an instrument used in eliciting responses from a large

poll of persons. It is most times a list of questions which are either close-ended or open-ended,

of which the respondents or population involved are required to furnish with answers.

3.4 Instrument for Data Collection: Due to the need for wide response from people, the

questionnaire-instrument will be most appropriate. The instrument that will be generated will be

respondents-based structured questionnaire titled the implications of peacebuilding initiatives on

security challenges in North-East Nigeria (IPISCN). The instrument will have two section,

comprising of 18questions. The questions are structured in such a way that it tests for the two

research questions of this study. The response patterns adopted was four-point likert rating scale

type, and includes the following: Strongly Agreed (SA) = 4 points, Agree (A) = 3 points,

Disagree (D) = 2 points and Strongly Disagree (SD) = 1 point.

3.4.1 Library Research Method: Due to the wide range of answer needed for Resaerch question
one, the researcher attempted an introduction of thematic analysis, where a body of literature

from different sources is analyzed for a particular question

3.6 Population of the Study: The Population of this study will be made up of law enforcement

agents especially in Nigeria. The target population is the Gwagwalada Police station at Abuja.

3.7 Sample and Sampling Technique: Random-selection sampling technique will be used for

the study, where the researcher shall randomly select police officers (from the Gwagwalada

Police station at Abuja), and apply the research instrument. Sample size of the study will be 50

respondents. This size is chosen so as to avoid taking so much time at the security outpost.

3.8 Validity of the Instrument: Copies of the structured questionnaire titled the implications of

peacebuilding initiatives on security challenges in Nigeria (IPISCN), was submitted for

certification for face, and content validity to the supervisor (who is also a research expert) and

two (2) other research experts. Thus, their corrections were helpful in the production of the final

draft of the questionnaire.

3.8.1 Reliability of the Instrument: To determine the reliability of the questionnaire, ten (10)

copies were administered to ten (10) respondents in the non-sampled police outfit in Abuja which

share similar characteristics with the police outfit at Gwagwalada. Statistical Package for Social

Sciences (SPSS) was used to compute Cronbach Alpha for reliability test. The reliability

coefficient was above 0.5 thus it was considered excellent and appropriate for the study.

3.9 Method of Data Collection: The researcher administered the questionnaire copies through

the help of a research assistant. Before the administration of the questionnaire, the objectives of

the research work were clearly explained to the respondents. However, respondents were given

two days to complete the questionnaire after which they were collected

3.9.1 Method of Data Analysis: Based on the research questions of this study which entails the
determination of the implications of peacebuilding initiatives on security challenges in Nigeria,

Arithmetic mean (X) was considered appropriate and was used for the analysis of the research

questions.

But, arithmetic mean (X) = ∑fx

∑f

Decision Rule:

Strongly Agreed (SA) = 4

Agree (A) = 3

Disagreed (D) = 2

Strongly Disagreed (SD) = 1

Thus, 4 + 3 + 2 + 1
4
= 10/4 = 2.5

Hence, theoretical mean (X) or critical value = 2.5

Decision: The study shall accept a research item, if its calculated Mean (X) is greater than or

equal to the theoretical mean (2.5), otherwise reject.

 CHAPTER FOUR
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
The researcher has administered 50 questions by email to Gwagwalada Police station

zone 5, and a total of 50 participants sent back their questionnaire. After the brief checking, 2

were not completed, 3 were left blank, and so 45 questionnaires will be used for the results and

further analysis. The responding rate therefore is up to 90% (50-5)/50 x 100%), so the result will

be accepted and representative.

From the questionnaire Section A (see Attachment 1, Section A), the first 4 questions are about

respondents’ demographic information. The table below show some details summarized:

Gender/Other Marital Status Years have been Religion Educational

s working Background
Male 20% married 20% above 3years 55% Muslims 40% above

30% 45% Single 30% above 2years 45% Christians Bachelors

20% Single 40% above 1year 60% Degree

Parents 10% less than a year

15% Dating
Female 50% above 3years 5% above

70% 30% above 2years Bachelors

15% above 1year 95% Degree

5% less than a year

SECTION A

Table 1 – Demographics Information of research respondents

 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
Research Question 1: what is the impact of insecurity on the security of North-East Nigeria

from 2015-2020?

Table 1

Impact of insecurity on the security of North-East Nigeria from 2015-2020

30

25

20
Strongly Agree
Agree
15
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
10

0
Question Question Question Question Question Question Question Question Question Question
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Table 1.1 Anchor Questionnaire Items

S/N Effects of on Boko Haram crisis Percentage Frequency Mean
Strongl Agree Disagre Strongl X Decision
y Agree e y
Disagre
 e
1. Boko Haram is a threat to life and 26 14 2 3 3.40 Accepted
Property (57.8%) (31.1%) (4.4%) (6.7%)

2. Boko Haram is now a threat to the 26 16 2 1 3.49 Accepted

corporate existence of Nigeria (4.4%) (2.2%)
(57.8%) (35.6%)
3. Boko Haram does not violate the 4 4 22 15 1.93 Rejected
fundamental human rights of citizens in (8.9%) (8.9%) (48.9%)
North East (33.3%)
4. Other sinister groups have been formed 25 11 5 4 3.27 Accepted
due to the successes of Boko Haram (55.6%) (24.4%) (11.1%) (8.9%)
5. Boko Haram has brought a distrust 25 12 4 4 3.29 Accepted
between the Elites and the Masses (55.6%) (26.7%) (8.9%) (8.9%)
(Electorates)
6. Boko Haram activities has brought ill 25 15 2 3 3.38 Accepted
feelings between Christians and (55.6%) (33.3%) (4.4%) (6.7%)
Muslims
7. Boko Haram insurgents are having a 25 10 5 5 3.22 Accepted
serious effect on the ability of the (55.6%) (22.2%) (11.1%)
government to deliver on her objectives (11.1%)
8. Many business outfit have closed down 27 16 1 1 3.53 Accepted
their shops due to incessant attacks (60.0%) (35.6%) (2.2%) (2.2%)
from the Boko Haram insurgents
9. Commercial banks have not reduced 1 2 22 20 1.64 Rejected
their working hours due to the (2.2%) (4.4%) (48.9%) (44.4%)
incessant raiding and looting of public
funds
10. Fueling stations, telecommunications 26 15 1 3 3.42 Accepted
masts, residential buildings, offices, (57.8%) (33.3%) (2.2%) (6.7%)
shopping malls, markets, motor parks,
and other economic goods worth
millions of dollars have been destroyed
by Boko Haram activities
11. Boko Haram crises has not kept away 4 4 22 15 1.93 Rejected
foreign investors (8.9%) (8.9%) (48.9%)
(33.3%)
12. Boko Haram has not strained the social 1 2 22 20 1.64 Rejected
relationship between Christians and (2.2%) (4.4%) (48.9%) (44.4%)
Muslims on the one hand, and
Southerners and Northerners on the
other hand
In Table 1, the the effect of Boko Haram crises in North-East Nigeria was determined. It was

revealed and agreed: that Boko Haram is a threat to life and Property with a mean score of

(3.40); That Boko Haram is now a threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria in the North East

of Nigeria

with a mean score 3.49; That Other sinister groups have been formed due to the successes of

Boko Haram in North east of Nigeria with a mean score of 3.27; Boko Haram has brought a

distrust between the Elites and the Masses (Electorates) in North East of Nigeria with a score of

3.29; that Boko Haram activities has brought ill feelings between Christians and Muslims 3.38;

that Boko Haram insurgents are having a serious effect on the ability of the government to

deliver on her objectives in the North east of Nigeria with a mean score of 3.22; that Many

business outfit have closed down their shops due to incessant attacks from the Boko Haram

insurgents in Nigeria with a mean of 3.53; Fueling stations, telecommunications masts,

residential buildings, offices, shopping malls, markets, motor parks, and other economic goods

worth trillion of dollars have been destroyed by Boko Haram activities with a mean score of

3.42. It was disagreed that Boko Haram does not violate the fundamental human rights of

citizens in North East Nigeria with a mean score less than 2.5 (1.93); Commercial banks have not

reduced their working hours due to the incessant raiding and looting of public funds was rejected

with a mean score less than 2.5 (1.64); It was disagreed that Boko Haram crises has not kept

away foreign investors from North East Nigeria with a mean score less than 2.5 (1.93); Boko

Haram has not strained the social relationship between Christians and Muslims on the one hand,

and Southerners and Northerners on the other hand, was rejected with a mean score less than 2.5

(1.64).
 Research Question 2: what are the prevalent peacebuilding initiatives against insecurity and

violence in North-East Nigeria;

Table 2

Prevalence of peacebuilding initiatives against insecurity and violence in North-East

Nigeria
30

25
Strongly Agree
20 Agree
Disagree
15 Strongly Disagree

10

0
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7

Presentation and Discussion of Anchor Questionnaire items

Table 2.1
Presence of Peace Building
S/N Percentage Frequency Mean
Initiatives
Strongly Strongly
Agree Disagree X Decision
Agree Disagree
1. The Civilian Joint Task 26 13 4 2 3.40 Accepted
Force (CJTF) is an actor in (57.8) (28.9) (8.9) (4.4)
the restoration of peace in
North east Nigeria
(Especially in relation to
Boko Haram)
2. The Multinational Joint Task 28 13 2 2 3.49 Accepted
Force (MNJTF) is an actor in (62.2) (28.9) (4.4) (4.4)
the restoration of peace in
North east Nigeria
(Especially in relation to
Boko Haram)
3. Specialized Tasks, Training, 26 15 2 2 3.44 Accepted
Equipment and Protection (57.8) (33.3) (4.4) (4.4)
International (STTEP)
 is an actor in the restoration
of peace in North east
Nigeria (Especially in
relation to Boko Haram)
4. The provision of Amnesty to 26 9 5 5 3.24 Accepted
Insurgents is a major (57.8) (20.0) (11.1) (11.1)
government initiative for the
restoration of peace in North
east Nigeria (Especially in
relation to Boko Haram)
5. The United Nations is a 26 17 2 3.53 Accepted
major actor in the restoration (57.8) (37.8) (4.4)
of peace in North east
Nigeria (Especially in
relation to Boko Haram)
6. France is a major actor in the - 1 22 22 1.53 Rejected
restoration of peace in North (2.2%) (48.9%) (48.9)
east Nigeria (Especially in
relation to Boko Haram)
7. The United States of - 1 22 22 1.53 Rejected
America is a major actor in (2.2%) (48.9%) (48.9%)
the restoration of peace in
North east Nigeria
(Especially in relation to
Boko Haram)

In Table 1, With a mean score of 3.40, It was revealed that The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)

was one the major initiatives instituted to bring about normalcy in North East Nigeria. Also, it

was discovered that The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was a major actor in the

restoration of peace in North east Nigeria (Especially in relation to Boko Haram) with a mean of

3.49. It was discovered that Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection

International (STTEP) is also an actor in the restoration of peace in North east Nigeria

(Especially in relation to Boko Haram) with a mean score of 3.44. Also, with a mean score of

3.24, it was agreed that the provision of Amnesty to Insurgents is a major government initiative

for the restoration of peace in North east Nigeria (Especially in relation to Boko Haram). The

United Nations was agreed to be a major actor in the restoration of peace in North east Nigeria
 (Especially in relation to Boko Haram) with a mean of 3.53. However, with a mean score less

than 2.50 (1.53) it was however rejected that France was a major actor in the restoration of peace

in North east Nigeria (Especially in relation to Boko Haram). Lastly, it was disagreed that The

United States of America is a major actor in the restoration of peace in North east Nigeria

(Especially in relation to Boko Haram).

Research Question 3: what are the implications of the prevalent peacebuilding initiatives on the

problem of insecurity and violence in North-East Nigeria?

Table 3

implications of the prevalent peacebuilding initiatives on the problem of insecurity

and violence in North-East Nigeria
30

25

20 Strongly Agree
Agree
15 Disagree
Strongly Disagree
10

0
Question Question Question Question Question Question Question Question Question Question
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Table 3.1 Anchor Questionnaire Items

Effects of Peacebuilding Initiatives
S/N Percentage Frequency Mean
on Boko Haram crisis
Strongl
Strongl Disagre y
Agree X Decision
y Agree e Disagre
e
 1. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) 26 14 2 3 3.40 Accepted
have not been able to bring lasting (57.8%) (31.1%) (4.4%) (6.7%)
peace to the North East of Nigeria

2. The assistance of Specialised Tasks, 26 16 2 1 3.49 Accepted

Training, Equipment and Protection (4.4%) (2.2%)
International (STTEP) is yet to bring (57.8%) (35.6%)
about lasting peace in the North East of
Nigeria

3. The Multinational Joint Task Force 4 4 22 15 1.93 Rejected

(MNJTF) have been able to bring (8.9%) (8.9%) (48.9%)
lasting peace to the North East of (33.3%)
Nigeria

4. United Nations Contributions have not 25 11 5 4 3.27 Accepted

been able to bring lasting peace to the (55.6%) (24.4%) (11.1%) (8.9%)
North East of Nigeria

5. France Peacebuilding attempts not been 25 12 4 4 3.29 Accepted

able to bring lasting peace to the North (55.6%) (26.7%) (8.9%) (8.9%)
East of Nigeria

6. Actions such as declaring state of 25 15 2 3 3.38 Accepted

emergency in some areas of North East (55.6%) (33.3%) (4.4%) (6.7%)
Nigeria has been counterproductive
7. The Amnesty program may be 25 10 5 5 3.22 Accepted
counterproductive on the long run (55.6%) (22.2%) (11.1%)
(11.1%)
8. The several peacebuilding peace 27 16 1 1 3.53 Accepted
initiatives have solved the problems of (60.0%) (35.6%) (2.2%) (2.2%)
insecurity in Nigeria
9. United States of America responses to 1 2 22 20 1.64 Rejected
insurgency in Nigeria not been able to (2.2%) (4.4%) (48.9%) (44.4%)
bring lasting peace to the North East of
Nigeria
10. The peacebuilding initiatives are not 26 15 1 3 3.42 Accepted
formidable enough to surmount Boko (57.8%) (33.3%) (2.2%) (6.7%)
Haram

In Table 2, the implications of the prevalent peacebuilding initiatives on the problem of

insecurity and violence in North-East Nigeria was determined. It was revealed and agreed: that
the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) have not been able to bring lasting peace to the North East

of Nigeria with a means score of (3.40); That the assistance of Specialised Tasks, Training,

Equipment and Protection International (STTEP) is yet to bring about lasting peace in the North

East of Nigeria

with a mean score 3.49; That United Nations Contributions have not been able to bring lasting

peace to the North East of Nigeria with a mean score of 3.27; France Peacebuilding attempts not

been able to bring lasting peace to the North East of Nigeria with a score of 3.29; that Actions

such as declaring state of emergency in some areas of North East Nigeria has been

counterproductive with a mean score of 3.38; that the Amnesty program may be

counterproductive on the long run with a mean score of 3.22; that the several peacebuilding

initiatives have not been able to solve the problems of insecurity in Nigeria with a mean of 3.53;

The peacebuilding initiatives are not formidable enough to surmount Boko Haram with a mean

score of 3.42. It was disagreed that The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) have been able

to bring lasting peace to the North East of Nigeria with a mean score less than 2.5 (1.93); The

peacebuilding initiatives are not formidable enough to surmount Boko Haram with a mean score

less than 2.5 (1.64).

 CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

5.0 Introduction

This concluding chapter will contain the summary of findings, recommendation and conclusion

5.1 Summary of findings

The aim of this study was to analyze the peace building initiatives and insecurity concerns in

North east Nigeria. It adopted a qualitative and quantitative approach in the analysis. Results

from this study revealed the effects of insecurity and violence on the national security of Nigeria

to be poverty, poor socioeconomic development, unemployment, forced displacement and

wanton destruction of lives and properties. Also the issues encountered by the various security

agencies in combating the incidence of insecurity and violence in Nigeria were identified to be

poor funding, lack of basic equipment, poor welfare package and lack of training of the security

personnel. The strategies to tackle this issues rest majorly on the government to provide all these

necessary things in order to counter insecurity and violence in Nigeria. However, the Nigerian

scape has entertained several actors in a bid to finding a lasting solution to Boko Haram

Insurgency.
 Analysis on the partnership and contributions of the United Nations (UN) in addressing

the scourge of insecurity and violence in North-East Nigeria revealed that UN has mobilized the

member states to support Nigeria in peace building, yet much needed to be done. Although USA

has not been committed to her promise, but other bodies such as the multi-national joint task

force (of Africa) have not defaulted. This study also proves it not to be enough. Findings further

show that the efforts of successive Nigeria governments and diplomats in engaging

peacebuilding initiatives in solving the problem of insecurity and violence in North-East Nigeria

have proven abortive.

Conclusion

This research has revealed the effects of insecurity and violence on the national security of

Nigeria to be insecurity, poverty, poor socioeconomic development, unemployment, forced

displacement and wanton destruction of lives and properties. Also the issues encountered by the

various security agencies in combating the incidence of insecurity and violence in Nigeria were

identified to be poor funding, lack of basic equipment, poor welfare package and lack of training

of the security personnel. The strategies to tackle this issues rest majorly on the government to

provide all these necessary things in order to counter insecurity and violence in Nigeria. From all

indications security is a big challenge in Nigeria’s effort to develop, but violent crimes such as

the Boko Haram insurgence has compounded the existing threatening security situation in

Nigeria. While it could be true that security is a major issue globally, Nigeria’s security situation

has in recent times deteriorated owing to poor governance, political desperation and government

inability to deliver the needed dividend with emphases to employment rate in the country.

5.3 Recommendations

Following the findings and the conclusion, the researcher hereby recommends as follows:
1. The government should tackle the root cause of insecurity which are poverty, unemployment,

illiteracy, corruption and lack of commitment to national development.

2. Necessary equipment and training should be provided for the security forces in an attempt to

discharge their duties effectives.

3. There is need to curb corruption among the top senior officers of the military in order to boost

the welfare packages of the security forces to ensure they are adequately motivated.

4. Nigeria government should cooperate with United Nations and other members states in their

peace building initiatives.

PEACE BUILDING INITIATIVES AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA: THE

NORTH-EAST EXPERIENCE 2010-2020

With the prevalence of Boko Haram Insurgency in North-east Nigeria, issues regarding peace

building have become a burning issue to the government and the masses alike. Foreign supports

have as well been garnered in the direction of building and forestalling peace in the area.

However, there is a need to investigate the implications of the several peacebuilding

attempts/initiatives in North East Nigeria. This study therefore attempts to measure how much

the prevalent peacebuilding initiatives have impacted on the problem of insecurity in North-East

Nigeria between 2010-2020.

Statement of Ethical Concerns

Anonymity: We shall ensure that the responses on this Questionnaire shall not be in anyway

linked or related to you.

Instructions:

Please you are to tick (✓) the spaces that correspond to your choices

1. what is the impact of insecurity on the security of North-East Nigeria from 2015-2020?

2. has insecurity undermined the peaceful coexistence of the citizens of the North East

Nigeria from 2015-2020?

3. how has the prevalent peacebuilding initiatives impacted on the problem of insecurity in

North-East Nigeria between 2015-2020?

 Section A

Bio-Data

Gender: Male _____ Female _____

Marital Status: Single _____ Married _______ Divorced _________

Religion: Christianity _______ Islam________

Years of Experience: _________years

Educational Background: Degree ______ Undergraduate ______ SSCE _____

Section B

S/ Questions Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly

N Agree Disagree
1. Boko Haram is a threat to life and
Property
2. Boko Haram is now a threat to the
corporate existence of Nigeria
3. Boko Haram violates the fundamental
human rights of citizens in North East
4. Other sinister groups have been formed
due to the successes of Boko Haram
5. Boko Haram has brought a distrust
between the Elites and the Masses
(Electorates)
6. Boko Haram activities has brought ill
feelings between Christians and Muslims
7. Boko Haram insurgents are having a
serious effect on the ability of the
government to deliver on her objectives
8. Many business outfit have closed down
their shops die to incessant attacks from
the Boko Haram insurgents
9. Commercial banks have reduced their
 working hours due to in times due to the
incessant raiding and looting of public
funds
10. Fueling stations, telecommunications
masts, residential buildings, offices,
shopping malls, markets, motor parks, and
other economic goods worth trillion of
dollars have been destroyed by Boko
Haram activities
11. Boko Haram crises have gone a long way
to keep away foreign investors
12. Boko Haram has strained the social
relationship between Christians and
Muslims on the one hand, and Southerners
and Northerners on the other hand
13. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) is an
actor in the restoration of peace in North
east Nigeria (Especially in relation to
Boko Haram)
14. The Multinational Joint Task Force
(MNJTF) is an actor in the restoration of
peace in North east Nigeria (Especially in
relation to Boko Haram)
15. Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment
and Protection International (STTEP)
is an actor in the restoration of peace in
North east Nigeria (Especially in relation
to Boko Haram)
16. The provision of Amnesty to Insurgents is
a major government initiative for the
restoration of peace in North east Nigeria
(Especially in relation to Boko Haram)
17. The United Nations is a major actor in the
restoration of peace in North east Nigeria
(Especially in relation to Boko Haram)
18. France is a major actor in the restoration
of peace in North east Nigeria (Especially
in relation to Boko Haram)
19. The United States of America is a major
actor in the restoration of peace in North
east Nigeria (Especially in relation to
Boko Haram)
20. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) have
not been able to bring lasting peace to the
North East of Nigeria
21. The assistance of Specialised Tasks,
 Training, Equipment and Protection
International (STTEP) is yet to bring about
lasting peace in the North East of Nigeria
22. The Multinational Joint Task Force
(MNJTF) have been able to bring lasting
peace to the North East of Nigeria
23. United Nations Contributions have not
been able to bring lasting peace to the
North East of Nigeria
24. France Peacebuilding attempts not been
able to bring lasting peace to the North
East of Nigeria
25. Actions such as declaring state of
emergency in some areas of North East
Nigeria has been counterproductive
26. The Amnesty program may be
counterproductive on the long run
27. The several peacebuilding peace initiatives
have solved the problems of insecurity in
Nigeria
28. United States of America responses to
insurgency in Nigeria not been able to
bring lasting peace to the North East of
Nigeria
29. The peacebuilding initiatives are not
formidable enough to surmount Boko
Haram