April 2, 2019
Commission issued Resolution No. 262-s.
G.R. No. 210500
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by
its Secretary General ROGELIO SOLUTA;
REP. FERNANDO HICAP for himself and
as representative of the ANAKPAWIS
PARTY-LIST; CENTER FOR TRADE
UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
represented by its Executive Director
DAISY ARAGO; JOSELITO USTAREZ and
SALVADOR CARRANZA, for themselves
and in representation of the NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KMU;
NENITA GONZAGA, PRESCILA A. MANI
QUIZ, RED EN ALCANTARA,, Petitioners
vs.
Hon. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
Hon. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION, SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, AND EMILIO S. DE
QUIROS, JR., Respondents
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This Court is called to determine the validity
of the Social Security System premium hike,
which took effect in January 2014. The case
also involves the application of doctrines on
judicial review, valid delegation of powers,
and the exercise of police power.
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,  praying that a temporary
1
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to annul the Social
Security System premium hike embodied in
the following issuances: (1) Resolution No.
262-s. 2013 dated April 19, 2013;  (2) 2 file the Petition.  Citing David v. Macapagal-
Resolution No. 711-s. 2013 dated
September 20, 2013;  and (3) Circular No.
3 petitioners' legal personality arises from the
2013-010  dated
4
October 2, 2013
(collectively, the assailed issuances).
Kilusang Mayo Uno, together with
representatives from recognized labor
centers, labor federations, party-list groups,
and Social Security System members
(collectively, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al.),
filed the case against government officials
and agencies involved in issuing the
assailed issuances.
On April 19, 2013, the Social Security
2013,  which provided an increase in: (1) the
5
Social Security System members'
contribution rate from 10.4% to 11%; and (2)
the maximum monthly salary credit from
₱15,000.00 to ₱16,000.00. The increase
was made subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines. 6
In a September 6, 2013 Memorandum, the
President approved the increase. 7
On September 20, 2013, the Social Security
Commission issued Resolution No. 711-s.
2013,  which approved, among others, the
8
increase in contribution rate and maximum
monthly salary credit.
On October 2, 2013, the Social Security
System, through President and Chief
Executive Officer Emilio S. De Quiros, Jr.,
issued Circular No. 2013-010,  which 9
provided the revised schedule of
contributions that would be in effect in
January 2014. Per the circular, the employer
and the employee shall equally shoulder the
0.6% increase in contributions. Thus, the
employer would pay a contribution rate of
7.37% (from 7.07%); the employee, 3.63%
(from 3.33%).
On January 10, 2014, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,  questioning the validity of the
10
assailed issuances.
Maintaining that a majority of them are
Social Security System members directly
affected by the premium hike, petitioners
assert having the requisite locus standi to
11
Arroyo,  they further argue that the other
12
transcendental importance of the Petition's
issues. 13
Petitioners claim that the assailed issuances
were issued per an unlawful delegation of
power to respondent Social Security
Commission based on Republic Act No.
8282, or the Social Security Act. In
particular, Section 18  allegedly offers
14
vague and unclear standards, and are
incomplete in its terms and conditions. This
provision, they claim, has allowed
respondent Social Security Commission to
fix contribution rates from time to time,
subject to the President's approval.
Petitioners claim that the delegation of the
power had no adequate legal guidelines to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority.15
In addition, petitioners claim that the
increase in contribution rate violates Section
4(b)(2) of the Social Security Act,  which16
states that the "increases in benefits shall
not require any increase in the rate of
contribution[.]" They argue that
this proviso prohibits the increase in
contributions if there was no corresponding
increase in benefits. 17
Petitioners then argue that the increase in
contributions is an invalid exercise of police
power for not being reasonably necessary
for the attainment of the purpose sought, as
well as for being unduly oppressive on the
labor sector.  According to them, the Social
18
Security System can extend actuarial life
and decrease its unfunded liability without
increasing the premiums they pay. 19
Petitioners further insist that the revised ratio
of contributions between employers and
employees, per the assailed issuances, is
grossly unjust to the working class and is
beyond respondents' powers. They claim
that for the purposes of justice and
consistency, respondents should have
maintained the 70%-30% ratio in the
premium increase. Changing it, they add, is
grossly unfair and detrimental to
employees. 20
Petitioners further emphasize that the State
is required to protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare under the
Constitution. 21
Lastly, petitioners pray that a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to stop the
implementation of the increase in
contributions. They aver that stopping it is
necessary to protect their substantive rights
and interests. They point out that their
earnings for food and other basic needs
would be reduced and allocated instead to
defraying the amount needed for
contributions. 22
The issues for this Court's resolution are:
First, whether or not this Court can exercise
its power of judicial review;
Second, whether or not there is an actual
case or controversy;
Third, whether or not the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies
applies;
Fourth, whether or not petitioners have legal
standing to file the Petition; and
Finally, whether or not the assailed
issuances were issued in violation of laws
and with grave abuse of discretion.
In connection with the fifth issue, this Court
further resolves:
First, whether or not the assailed issuances
are void for having been issued under vague
and unclear standards contained in the
Social Security Act;
Second, whether or not the increase in
Social Security System contributions is
reasonably necessary for the attainment of
the purpose sought and is unduly
oppressive upon the labor sector; and
Finally, whether or not the revised ratio of
contributions between employers and
employees is grossly unjust to the working
class and beyond respondent Social
Security Commission's power to enact.
This Court denies the Petition for lack of
merit.
I
Procedural infirmities attend the filing of this
Petition. To begin with, former President
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, as President
of the Philippines, is improperly impleaded
here.
The president is the head of the executive
branch,  a co-equal of the judiciary under
23
the Constitution. His or her prerogative is
entitled to respect from other branches of
government.  Inter-branch courtesy  is but a
24 25
consequence of the doctrine of separation of
powers. 26
As such, the president cannot be charged
with any suit, civil or criminal in nature,
during his or her incumbency in office. This
is in line with the doctrine of the president's
immunity from suit. 27
In David,  this Court explained why it is
28
improper to implead the incumbent
President of the Philippines. The doctrine
has both policy and practical considerations:
Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving
as such. Furthermore, it is important that he
be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative
and judicial branch, only one constitutes the
executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of
the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government. However, this does not mean
that the President is not accountable to
anyone. Like any other official, he remains
accountable to the people but he may be
removed from office only in the mode
provided by law and that is by
impeachment.  (Emphasis in the original,
29
citations omitted)
As to the propriety of seeking redress from
this Court, it is best to be guided by the
power of judicial review as provided in
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution:
ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court has discussed in several cases
how the 1987 Constitution has expanded the
scope of judicial power from its traditional
understanding. As such, courts are not only
expected to "settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable[,]"  but are
30
also empowered to determine if any
government branch or instrumentality has
acted beyond the scope of its powers, such
that there is grave abuse of discretion. 31
This development of the courts' judicial
power arose from the use and abuse of the
political question doctrine during the martial
law era under former President Ferdinand
Marcos. In Association of Medical Clinics for
Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved
Medical Centers Association, Inc.,  this 32
Court held:
In Francisco v. The House of
Representatives, we recognized that this
expanded jurisdiction was meant "to ensure
the potency of the power of judicial review to
curb grave abuse of discretion by 'any
branch or instrumentalities of government.'"
Thus, the second paragraph of Article VIII,
Section 1 engraves, for the first time in its
history, into black letter law the
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, whose nature and purpose had been
provided in the sponsorship speech of its
proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion[:]
....
The first section starts with a sentence
copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our
constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is
actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up
the defense of political question and got
away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ
of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of
courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed
because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it." The Committee on
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the
rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during
the martial law regime.
....
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the
limits of power of the agencies and offices of
the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of
this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of
Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political
question.  (Emphasis
33
in the original,
citations omitted)
Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of
Court provides remedies to address grave
abuse of discretion by any government
branch or instrumentality, particularly
through petitions for certiorari and
prohibition:
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When
any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying
the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
SECTION 2. Petition for Prohibition. —
When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action
or matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied
by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of
all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
While these provisions pertain to a
tribunal's, board's, or an officer's exercise of
discretion in judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions, Rule 65 still applies to
invoke the expanded scope of judicial
power. In Araullo v. Aquino III,  this Court
34
differentiated certiorari from prohibition, and
clarified that Rule 65 is the remedy to "set
right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial[J or ministerial functions."
35
This Court further explained:
The present Rules of Court uses two special
civil actions for determining and correcting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. These are the
special civil actions for certiorari and
prohibition, and both are governed by Rule
65. . . .
The ordinary nature and function of the writ
of certiorari in our present system are aptly
explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company:
....
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is
not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave,
which means either that the judicial or quasi-
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent
judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers
acted in a capricious or whimsical manner
as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will
lie for want or excess of
jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished
from prohibition by the fact that it is a
corrective remedy used for the re-
examination of some action of an inferior
tribunal, and is directed to the cause or
proceeding in the lower court and not to the
court itself, while prohibition is a
preventative remedy issuing to restrain
future action, and is directed to the court
itself. The Court expounded on the nature
and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Defensor:
A petition for prohibition is also not the
proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from
further proceedings when said proceedings
are without or in excess of said entity's or
person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Prohibition lies against judicial or
ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the
limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain
the administration of justice in orderly
channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy
to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its
cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or
where there is no adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law by
which such relief can be obtained. Where
the principal relief sought is to invalidate an
IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary
action for its nullification, an action which
properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. In any case,
petitioners' allegation that "respondents are
performing or threatening to perform
functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined
by the trial court through a writ of injunction
or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and
the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions
but also to set right, undo and restrain any
act of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, . . . .
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition
are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.  (Emphasis in the
36
original, citations omitted)
Here, petitioners filed a Petition for
both certiorari and prohibition to determine
whether respondents Social Security
System and Social Security Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion in
releasing the assailed issuances. According
to them, these issuances violated the
provisions of the Constitution on the
protection of workers, promotion of social
justice, and respect for human rights.  They
37
further claim that the assailed issuances are
void for having been issued based on vague
and unclear standards. They also argue that
the increase in contributions is an invalid
exercise of police power as it is not
reasonably necessary and, thus, unduly
oppressive to the labor sector. Lastly, they
insist that the revised ratio in contributions is
grossly unjust to the working class. 38
Petitioners must, thus, comply with the
requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review: (1) there must be an actual
case or justiciable controversy before this
Court; (2) the question before this Court
must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person
challenging the act must be a proper party;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity and must
be the very litis mota of the case. 39
I (A)
Most important in this list of requisites is the
existence of an actual case or
controversy.  In every exercise of judicial
40
power, whether in the traditional or
expanded sense, this is an absolute
necessity.
There is an actual case or controversy if
there is a "conflict of legal right, an opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution."  A petitioner bringing a case
41
before this Court must establish that there is
a legally demandable and enforceable right
under the Constitution. There must be a real
and substantial controversy, with definite
and concrete issues involving the legal
relations of the parties, and admitting of
specific relief that courts can grant. 42
This requirement goes into the nature of the
judiciary as a co-equal branch of
government. It is bound by the doctrine of
separation of powers, and will not rule on
any matter or cause the invalidation of any
act, law, or regulation, if there is no actual or
sufficiently imminent breach of or injury to a
right. The courts interpret laws, but the
ambiguities may only be clarified in the
existence of an actual situation.
In Lozano v. Nograles,  the
43
petitions
assailing House Resolution No. 1109 were
dismissed due to the absence of an actual
case or controversy. This Court held that the
"determination of the nature, scope[,] and
extent of the powers of government is the
exclusive province of the judiciary, such that
any mediation on the part of the latter for the
allocation of constitutional boundaries would
amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere
fulfillment of its 'solemn and sacred
obligation' under the Constitution." The 44
judiciary's awesome power of review is
limited in application.
45
Jurisprudence lays down guidelines in
determining an actual case or controversy.
In Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines v. Commission on
Elections,  this Court required that "the
46
pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand,
and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it
must concern a real and not a merely
theoretical question or issue."  Further,
47
there must be "an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts."
48
Courts, thus, cannot decide on theoretical
circumstances. They are neither advisory
bodies, nor are they tasked with taking
measures to prevent imagined
possibilities of abuse.
Hence, in Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council,  this Court ruled:
49
Without any justiciable controversy, the
petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency,"
where both the activity the petitioners intend
to undertake and the anticipated reaction to
it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the
implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to
take the present petitions out of the realm of
the surreal and merely imagined, . . .
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on
real events before courts may step in to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable.  (Emphasis supplied, citations
50
omitted)
In Republic v. Roque,  this Court further
51
qualified the meaning of a justiciable
controversy. In dismissing the Petition for
declaratory relief before the Regional Trial
Court, which assailed several provisions of
the Human Security Act, we explained that
justiciable controversy or ripening seeds
refer to:
. . . an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening
seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient
accrued facts may be dispensed with, but
that a dispute may be tried at its inception
before it has accumulated the asperity,
distemper, animosity, passion, and violence
of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The
concept describes a state of facts indicating
imminent and inevitable litigation provided
that the issue is not settled and stabilized by
tranquilizing declaration.  (Emphasis
52
supplied, citations omitted)
The existence of an actual case or
controversy depends on the allegations
pleaded. 53
Here, petitioners allege that the premium
hike, through the assailed issuances,
violates their rights as workers whose
welfare is mandated to be protected under
the Constitution.  They further allege that
54
the issuances are grossly unjust to the
working class and were issued beyond the
scope of constitutional powers. 55
Thus, petitioners' allegations present
violations of rights provided for under the
Constitution on the protection of workers,
and promotion of social justice.  They 56
likewise assert that respondents Social
Security Commission and Social Security
System acted beyond the scope of their
powers.
This Court, however, notes that petitioners
failed to prove how the assailed issuances
violated workers' constitutional rights such
that it would warrant a judicial review.
Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on
the Constitution without specifying how
these rights translate to being legally entitled
to a fixed amount and proportion of Social
Security System contributions.
Moreover, an actual case or controversy
requires that the right must be enforceable
and legally demandable. A complaining
party's right is, thus, affected by the rest of
the requirements for the exercise of judicial
power: (1) the issue's ripeness and
prematurity; (2) the moot and academic
principle; and (3) the party's standing. 57
I (B)
A case is ripe for adjudication when the
challenged governmental act is a completed
action such that there is a direct, concrete,
and adverse effect on the petitioner.  It is,
58
thus, required that something had been
performed by the government branch or
instrumentality before the court may step in,
and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action. 59
In connection with acts of administrative
agencies, ripeness is ensured under the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Courts may only take cognizance
of a case or controversy if the petitioner has
exhausted all remedies available to it under
the law. The doctrine ensures that the
administrative agency exercised its power to
its full extent, including its authority to
correct or reconsider its actions. It would,
thus, be premature for courts to take
cognizance of the case prior to the
exhaustion of remedies, not to mention it
would violate the principle of separation of
powers. Thus, in Rule 65 petitions, it is
required that no other plain, speedy, or
adequate remedy is available to the party.
In Association of Medical Clinics for
Overseas Workers, Inc.:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies applies to a petition for certiorari,
regardless of the act of the administrative
agency concerned, i.e., whether the act
concerns a quasi-judicial, or quasi-legislative
function, or is purely regulatory.
Consider in this regard that once an
administrative agency has been empowered
by Congress to undertake a sovereign
function, the agency should be allowed to
perform its function to the full extent that the
law grants. This full extent covers the
authority of superior officers in the
administrative agencies to correct the
actions of subordinates, or for collegial
bodies to reconsider their own decisions on
a motion for reconsideration. Premature
judicial intervention would interfere with this
administrative mandate, leaving
administrative action incomplete; if allowed,
such premature judicial action through a writ
of certiorari, would be a usurpation that
violates the separation of powers principle
that underlies our Constitution.
In every case, remedies within the agency's
administrative process must be exhausted
before external remedies can be applied.
Thus, even if a governmental entity may
have committed a grave abuse of discretion,
litigants should, as a rule, first ask
reconsideration from the body itself, or a
review thereof before the agency concerned.
This step ensures that by the time the grave
abuse of discretion issue reaches the court,
the administrative agency concerned would
have fully exercised its jurisdiction and the
court can focus its attention on the questions
of law presented before it.
Additionally, the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies affects the
ripeness to adjudicate the
constitutionality of a governmental act,
which in turn affects the existence of the
need for an actual case or controversy
for the courts to exercise their power of
judicial review. The need for ripeness — an
aspect of the timing of a case or controversy
— does not change regardless of whether
the issue of constitutionality reaches the
Court through the traditional means, or
through the Court's expanded jurisdiction. In
fact, separately from ripeness, one other
concept pertaining to judicial review is
intrinsically connected to it: the concept of a
case being moot and academic.
Both these concepts relate to the timing of
the presentation of a controversy before the
Court — ripeness relates to its prematurity,
while mootness relates to a belated or
unnecessary judgment on the issues. The
Court cannot preempt the actions of the
parties, and neither should it (as a rule)
render judgment after the issue has already
been resolved by or through external
developments.
The importance of timing in the exercise of
judicial review highlights and reinforces the
need for an actual case or controversy — an
act that may violate a party's right. Without
any completed action or a concrete threat of
injury to the petitioning party, the act is not
yet ripe for adjudication. It is merely a
hypothetical problem. The challenged act
must have been accomplished or performed
by either branch or instrumentality of
government before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege
the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action.
In these lights, a constitutional challenge,
whether presented through the traditional
route or through the Court's expanded
jurisdiction, requires compliance with the
ripeness requirement. In the case of
administrative acts, ripeness manifests itself
through compliance with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative
remedies.  (Emphasis in the original,
60
citations omitted)
Here, it is clear that petitioners failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies.
Petitioners allege that they "have no appeal
nor any plain, speedy[,] and adequate
remedy under the ordinary course of law
except through the instant Petition."
61
However, Sections 4 and 5 of the Social
Security Act are clear that the Social
Security Commission has jurisdiction over
any dispute arising from the law regarding
coverage, benefits, contributions, and
penalties. The law further provides that the
aggrieved party must first exhaust all
administrative remedies available before
seeking review from the courts:
SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the
Commission and SSS. — (a) The
Commission. — For the attainment of its
main objectives as set forth in Section 2
hereof, the Commission shall have the
following powers and duties:
(1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to
the approval of the President of the
Philippines, such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Act;
....
SECTION 5. Settlement of Disputes. —
(a) Any dispute arising under this Act with
respect to coverage, benefits, contributions
and penalties thereon or any other matter
related thereto, shall be cognizable by the
Commission, and any case filed with respect
thereto shall be heard by the Commission,
or any of its members, or by hearing officers
duly authorized by the Commission and
decided within the mandatory period of
twenty (20) days after the submission of the
evidence. The filing, determination and
settlement of disputes shall be governed by
the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission.
(b) Appeal to Courts. — Any decision of the
Commission, in the absence of an appeal
therefrom as herein provided, shall become
final and executory fifteen (15) days after the
date of notification, and judicial review
thereof shall be permitted only after any
party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has
exhausted his remedies before the
Commission. The Commission shall be
deemed to be a party to any judicial action
involving any such decision and may be
represented by an attorney employed by the
Commission, or when requested by the
Commission, by the Solicitor General or any
public prosecutor. (Emphasis supplied)
In Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. Social
Security Commission,  this Court upheld the
62
jurisdiction and competence of the Social
Security Commission with regard to the
grant of authority under the unambiguous
provisions of the Republic Act No.
8282.  This Court stated:
63
Section 5 of the Social Security Act . . . on
its face, would show that any dispute arising
therein "with respect to coverage entitlement
to benefits, collection and settlement of
premium contributions and penalties
thereon, or any other matter related thereto,
shall be cognizable by the
Commission . . . ." On its face, support for
the competence of respondent Commission
to decide . . . would thus seem to be
evident.  (Emphasis
64
supplied, citations
omitted)
In Enorme v. Social Security System,  this
65
Court categorically sustained the Social
Security Commission's exclusive power and
jurisdiction to take cognizance of all disputes
covered under the Social Security
Act.  Consequently, plaintiffs must first
66
exhaust all administrative remedies before
judicial recourse is allowed.
67
In Social Security Commission v. Court of
Appeals,  this Court upheld the rules of
68
procedure of the Social Security
Commission with regard to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies
before a resort to the courts may be
permitted:
It now becomes apparent that the
permissive nature of a motion for
reconsideration with the SSC must be read
in conjunction with the requirements for
judicial review, or the conditions sine qua
non before a party can institute certain civil
actions. A combined reading of Section 5 of
Rule VI, quoted earlier, and Section 1 of
Rule VII of the SSC's 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure reveals that the petitioners are
correct in asserting that a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory in the sense
that it is a precondition to the institution of
an appeal or a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals. Stated differently, while
Rago certainly had the option to file a motion
for reconsideration before the SSC, it was
nevertheless mandatory that he do so if he
wanted to subsequently avail of judicial
remedies.
....
The policy of judicial bodies to give quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the SSC, an
opportunity to correct its mistakes by way of
motions for reconsideration or other
statutory remedies before accepting appeals
therefrom finds extensive doctrinal support
in the well-entrenched principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The reason for the principle rests upon the
presumption that the administrative body, if
given the chance to correct its mistake or
error, may amend its decision on a given
matter and decide it properly. The principle
insures orderly procedure and withholds
judicial interference until the administrative
process would have been allowed to duly
run its course. This is but practical since
availing of administrative remedies entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. Even comity
dictates that unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted
to and appropriate authorities given an
opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum,
judicial recourse must be held to be
inappropriate, impermissible, premature,
and even unnecessary.  (Emphasis
69
supplied, citations omitted)
Furthermore, jurisdiction is determined by
laws enacted by Congress. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies
ensures that this legislative power is
respected by courts. Courts cannot ignore
Congress' determination that the Social
Security Commission is the entity with
jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the
Social Security Act with respect to coverage,
benefits, contributions, and penalties.
Here, nothing in the records shows that
petitioners filed a case before the Social
Security Commission or asked for a
reconsideration of the assailed issuances.
Moreover, petitioners did not even try to
show that their Petition falls under one (1) of
the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies:
However, we are not unmindful of the
doctrine that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not an ironclad
rule. It may be disregarded (1) when there is
a violation of due process, (2) when the
issue involved is purely a legal question, (3)
when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel
on the part of the administrative agency
concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when
it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land
in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention, (12) when no
administrative review is provided by law,
(13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies, and (14) when the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot.  (Emphasis in the
70
original, citations omitted)
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is settled in jurisprudence.  As
early as 1967, this Court has recognized the
requirement that parties must exhaust all
administrative remedies available before the
Social Security Commission.  The Social
72
Security Commission, then, must be given a
chance to render a decision on the issue, or
to correct any alleged mistake or error,
before the courts can exercise their power of
judicial review. This Court ruled:
In the case at bar, plaintiff has not
exhausted its remedies before the
Commission. The Commission has not even
been given a chance to render a decision on
the issue raised by plaintiff herein, because
the latter has not appealed to the
Commission from the action taken by the
System in insisting upon the enforcement of
Circular No. 34.  (Emphasis in the original)
73
Thus, petitioners have prematurely invoked
this Court's power of judicial review in
violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Notably, petitioners failed to abide by the
principle of primary administrative
jurisdiction. This principle states that:
. . . courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction
of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. 74
In Republic v. Gallo: 75
[U]nder the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, if
administrative tribunal has jurisdiction over a
controversy, courts should not resolve the
issue even if it may be within its proper
jurisdiction. This is especially true when the
question involves its sound discretion
requiring special knowledge, experience,
and services to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
In Republic v. Lacap:
71
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or
will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. . . .
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction refers to the competence of a
court to take cognizance of a case at first
instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, it cannot be
waived.  (Emphasis in the original, citations
76
omitted)
Here, respondent Social Security
Commission qualifies as an administrative
tribunal, given sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact. This is evident
from the qualifications of its members and its
powers and duties under Sections 3 and 4 of
the Social Security Act:
SECTION 3. Social Security System. — (a) .
. . The SSS shall be directed and controlled
by a Social Security Commission,
hereinafter referred to as 'Commission',
composed of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or his duly designated
undersecretary, the SSS president and
seven (7) appointive members, three (3) of
whom shall represent the workers' group, at
least one (1) of whom shall be a woman;
three (3), the employers' group, at least one
(1) of whom shall be a woman; and one (1),
the general public whose representative
an
shall have adequate knowledge and
experience regarding social security, to be
appointed by the President of the
Philippines. The six (6) members
representing workers and employers shall
be chosen from among the nominees of
workers' and employers' organizations,
respectively. . . .
(b) The general conduct of the operations
and management functions of the SSS shall
be vested in the SSS President who shall
serve as the chief executive officer
immediately responsible for carrying out the
program of the SSS and the policies of the
Commission. The SSS President shall be a
person who has had previous experience in
technical and administrative fields related to
the purposes of this Act. . . .
(c) The Commission, upon the
recommendation of the SSS President, shall
appoint an actuary and such other
personnel as may be deemed necessary; fix
their reasonable compensation, allowances
and other benefits; prescribe their duties and
establish such methods and procedures as
may be necessary to insure the efficient,
honest and economical administration of the
provisions and purposes of this
Act: . . . Provided, further, That the
personnel of the SSS shall be selected only
from civil service eligibles and be subject to
civil service rules and regulations:. . .
SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the
Commission and SSS. — (a) The
Commission. — For the attainment of its
main objectives as set forth in Section 2
hereof, the Commission shall have the
following powers and duties:
(1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to
the approval of the President of the
Philippines, such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Act;
(2) To establish a provident fund for the
members which will consist of voluntary
contributions of employers and/or
employees, self-employed and voluntary
members and their earnings, for the
payment of benefits to such members or
their beneficiaries, subject to such rules and
regulations as it may promulgate and
approved by the President of the
Philippines;
(3) To maintain a Provident Fund which
consists of contributions made by both the
SSS and its officials and employees and
their earnings, for the payment of benefits to
such officials and employees or their heirs
under such terms and conditions as it may
prescribe;
(4) To approve restructuring proposals for
the payment of due but unremitted
contributions and unpaid loan amortizations
under such terms and conditions as it may
prescribe;
(5) To authorize cooperatives registered with
the cooperative development authority or
associations registered with the appropriate
government agency to act as collecting
agents of the SSS with respect to their
members: Provided, That the SSS shall
accredit the cooperative or
association: Provided, further, That the
persons authorized to collect are bonded;
(6) To compromise or release, in whole or in
part any interest, penalty or any civil liability
to SSS in connection with the investments
authorized under Section 26 hereof, under
such terms and conditions as it may
prescribe and approved by the President of
the Philippines; and
(7) To approve, confirm, pass upon or
review any and all actions of the SSS in the
proper and necessary exercise of its powers
and duties hereinafter enumerated.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, petitioners should
have first filed their case before respondent
Social Security Commission.
I (C)
As for mootness, as earlier mentioned, moot
cases prevent the actual case or
controversy from becoming justiciable.
Courts cannot render judgment after the
issue has already been resolved by or
through external developments. This entails
that they can no longer grant or deny the
relief prayed for by the complaining party. 77
This is consistent with this Court's deference
to the powers of the other branches of
government. This Court must be wary that it
is ruling on existing facts before it invalidates
any act or rule.78
Nonetheless, this Court has enumerated
circumstances when it may still rule on moot
issues. In David:
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.  (Emphasis in
79
the original, citations omitted)
The third exception is corollary to this
Court's power under Article VIII, Section 5(5)
of the 1987 Constitution.  This Court has the
80
power to promulgate rules and procedures
for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts. It applies where
there is a clear need to clarify principles and
processes for the protection of rights.
As for the rest of the exceptions, however,
all three (3) circumstances must be present
before this Court may rule on a moot issue.
There must be an issue raising a grave
violation of the Constitution, involving an
exceptional situation of paramount public
interest that is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
Here, since respondent Social Security
Commission is set to issue new resolutions
for the Social Security System members'
contributions, the issue on the assailed
issuances' validity may be rendered moot.
Nonetheless, all the discussed exceptions
are present: (1) petitioners raise violations of
constitutional rights; (2) the situation is of
paramount public interest; (3) there is a
need to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public on the power of respondent Social
Security Commission to increase the
contributions; and (4) the matter is capable
of repetition yet evading review, as it
involves a question of law that can recur.
Thus, this Court may rule on this case.
I (D)
Petitioners argue that they have the legal
standing to file the Petition since: (1) a
majority of them are Social Security System
members and are directly affected by the
increase in contributions;  and (2) other
81
petitioners argue that the standing
requirement must be relaxed since the
issues they raise are of transcendental
importance. 82
On the contrary, not all petitioners have
shown the requisite legal standing to bring
the case before this Court.
Legal standing is the personal and
substantial interest of a party in a case
"such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged,
alleging more than a generalized
grievance." 83
Petitioners Joselito Ustarez, Salvador T.
Carranza, Nenita Gonzaga, Prescila A.
Maniquiz, Reden R. Alcantara, and
Anakpawis Party-List Representative
Fernando Hicap, for himself, are Social
Security System members who stand to
suffer direct and material injury from the
assailed issuances' enforcement. They are,
thus, clothed with legal personality to assail
the imposed increase in contribution rates
and maximum monthly salary credit.
On the other hand, petitioners Kilusang
Mayo Uno, Anakpawis Party-List, Center for
Trade Union and Human Rights, and
National Federation of Labor Unions-
Kilusang Mayo Uno all failed to show how
they will suffer direct and material injury from
the enforcement of the assailed issuances.
However, jurisprudence is replete with
instances when a liberal approach to
determining legal standing was adopted.
This has allowed "ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving
the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations[,] and rulings."
84
This Court has provided instructive guides to
determine whether a matter is of
transcendental importance: "(1) the
character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest
in the questions being raised." 85
Here, the assailed issuances set the new
contribution rate and its date of effectivity.
The increase in contributions has been in
effect since January 2014. As such, the
issue of the validity of increase in
contributions is of transcendental
importance. The required legal standing for
petitioners must be relaxed.
It is worth noting that this issue affects
millions of Filipinos working here and
abroad. A substantial portion of members'
salaries goes to the Social Security System
fund. To delay the resolution of such an
important issue would be a great disservice
to this Court's duty enshrined in the
Constitution.
For all these reasons, and despite the
technical infirmities in this Petition, this Court
reviews the assailed issuances.
II
Petitioners' attack on the increase in
contribution rate and maximum monthly
salary credit is two (2)-tiered: (1) they assail
the validity of the exercise of respondents
Social Security System and Social Security
Commission's power under the law; and (2)
they assail the validity of the delegation of
power to respondent Social Security
Commission.
Petitioners argue that the assailed
issuances are void for being issued under
vague and unclear standards under the
Social Security Act. They admit that Section
18 allows the Social Security Commission to
fix the contribution rate subject to several
conditions. However, petitioners claim that
the term "actuarial calculations" is too vague
and general, and the relationship between
the rate of benefits and actuarial calculations
is not clearly defined. Thus, they conclude
that the delegation of power to fix the
contribution rate is incomplete in all its terms
and conditions.
Petitioners' argument lacks merit.
Petitioners are putting in issue not only the
validity of the exercise of the delegated
power, but also the validity of the delegation
itself. They are, thus, collaterally attacking
the validity of the Social Security Act's
provisions.
Collateral attacks on a presumably valid law
are not allowed. Unless a law, rule, or act is
annulled in a direct proceeding, it is
presumed valid. 86
Furthermore, the "delegation of legislative
power to various specialized administrative
agencies is allowed in the face of increasing
complexity of modern life."  In Equi-Asia
87
Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign
Affairs:
88
Given the volume and variety of interactions
involving the members of today's society, it
is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate
laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of
everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate
to administrative bodies, as the principal
agencies tasked to execute laws with
respect to their specialized fields, the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations
to implement a given statute and effectuate
its policies.
89
For a valid exercise of delegation, this Court
enumerated the following requisites:
All that is required for the valid exercise of
this power of subordinate legislation is that
the regulation must be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; and that
the regulation be not in contradiction to, but
in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by the law. Under the first test or the so-
called completeness test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing
he will have to do is to enforce it. The
second test or the sufficient standard test,
mandates that there should be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.90
Simply put, what are needed for a valid
delegation are: (1) the completeness of the
statute making the delegation; and (2) the IV 2,25.00-2,749.99 2500 126.70
presence of a sufficient standard.91

V 2,750.00- 3000 152.00

To determine completeness, all of the terms 3,249.99
and provisions of the law must leave nothing VI 3,250.00- 3500 177.30
to the delegate except to implement it. 3,749.99
"What only can be delegated is not the
discretion to determine what the law shall be VII 3,750.00- 4000 202.70
but the discretion to determine how the law 4,249.99
shall be enforced." 92

VIII 4,250.00- 4500 228.00

4,749.99
More relevant here, however, is the
presence of a sufficient standard under the IX 4,750.00- 5000 253.30
law. Enforcement of a delegated power may 5,249.99
only be effected in conformity with a
sufficient standard, which is used "to map X 5,250.00- 5500 278.70
out the boundaries of the delegate's 5,749.99
authority and thus 'prevent the delegation XI 5,750.00- 6000 304.00
from running riot.'"  The law must contain
93
6,249.99
the limitations or guidelines to determine the
scope of authority of the delegate. XII 6,250.00- 6500 329.30
6,749.99
Not only is the Social Security Act complete XIII 6,750.00- 7000 354.70
in its terms; it also contains a sufficient 7,249.99
standard for the Social Security Commission
to fix the monthly contribution rate and the XIV 7,250.00- 7500 380.00
minimum and maximum monthly salary 7,749.99
credits.
XV 7,750.00- 8000 405.30
8,249.99
Section 18 states:
XVI 8,250.00- 8500 430.70
SECTION 18. Employee's Contribution. — 8,749.99
(a) Beginning as of the last day of the
calendar month when an employee's XVII 8,750.00-OVER 9000 456.00
compulsory coverage takes effect and every
month thereafter during his employment, the The foregoing schedule of contribution shall
employer shall deduct and withhold from also apply to self-employed and voluntary
such employee's monthly salary, wage, members.
compensation or earnings, the employee's
contribution in an amount corresponding to The maximum monthly salary credit shall be
his salary, wage, compensation or earnings Nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) effective
during the month in accordance with the January Nineteen hundred and ninety six
following schedule: (1996): Provided, That it shall be increased
by One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) every
SALARY RANGE OF MONTHLY year thereafter
MONTHLY until it shall have reached
CONTRIBUTION
BRACKET COMPENSATION SALARY Twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00) by
CREDIT EMPLOYER
Nineteen hundred and ninety nine
(1999): Provided, further, That the minimum
I 1,000.00- 1000 50.70
and maximum monthly salary credits as well
1,249.99 as the rate of contributions may be fixed
from time to time by the Commission
II 1,250.00- 1500 76.00
through rules and regulations taking into
1,749.99
consideration actuarial calculations and rate
III 1,750.00- 2000 of benefits, subject to the approval of the
101.30
2,249.99 President of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)
In relation to Section 18, Section 4(a)
prescribes the powers and duties of the
Social Security Commission. It provides:
SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the
Commission and SSS. — (a) The
Commission. — For the attainment of its
main objectives as set forth in Section 2
hereof, the Commission shall have the
following powers and duties:
(1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to
the approval of the President of the
Philippines, such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Act;
....
(7) To approve, confirm, pass upon or
review any and all actions of the SSS in the
proper and necessary exercise of its powers
and duties hereinafter enumerated.
It is evident from these provisions that the
legislature has vested the necessary powers
in the Social Security Commission to fix the
minimum and maximum amounts of monthly
salary credits and the contribution rate. The
agency does not have to do anything except
implement the provisions based on the
standards and limitations provided by law.
In fixing the contribution rate and the
minimum and maximum amounts of monthly
salary credits, the legislature specified the
factors that should be considered: "actuarial
calculations and rate of benefits"  as an
94
additional limit to the Social Security
Commission's rate fixing power under
Section 18, the legislature required the
approval of the President of the Philippines.
The Social Security Act clearly specifies the
limitations and identifies when and how the
Social Security Commission will fix the
contribution rate and the monthly salary
credits.
Actuarial science is derived from the
concepts of utilitarianism and risk aversion.
Thus:
Just as economic systems are the realm of
the economist, social systems are the realm
of the sociologist, and electrical systems are
the realm of the electrical engineer, financial
security systems have become the realm of
the actuary. The uniqueness of the actuarial
profession lies in the
actuary's understanding of financial security
systems in general, and the inner workings
of the many different types in particular. The
role of the actuary is that of the designer, the
adaptor, the problem solver, the risk
estimator, the innovator, and the technician
of the continually changing field of financial
security systems.
....
Utilitarianism as a philosophy, and risk
aversion as a feature of human psychology,
lead to the evolution of financial security
systems as a means of reducing the
financial consequences of unfavorable
events. Actuaries are those professionals
with a deep understanding of, and training
in, financial security systems; their reason
for being, their complexity, their
mathematics, and the way they
work.  (Emphasis supplied)
95
Actuarial science is "primarily concerned
with the study of consequences of events
that involve risk and uncertainty. Actuarial
practice identifies, analyzes and assists in
the management of the outcomes—
including costs and benefits—associated
with events that involve risk and
uncertainty."96
Actuarial science is relevant to the operation
of a social security system, in that "the
actuary plays a crucial role in analysing [the
system's] financial status and
recommending appropriate action to ensure
its viability. More specifically, the work of the
actuary includes assessing the financial
implications of establishing a new scheme,
regularly following up its financial status and
estimating the effect of various modifications
that might have a bearing on the scheme
during its existence."97
The application of actuarial calculations in
the operation of a social system scheme
requires the determination of benefits.  To 98
question the use of "actual calculations" as
factor for fixing rates is to question the policy
or wisdom of the legislature, which is a co-
equal branch of government.
As a component of the doctrine of
separation of powers, courts must never go
into the question of the wisdom of the policy
of the law.  In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
99
Corporation, Inc.,  where
100
this Court
resolved the issue of the morality of
gambling, this Court held:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it
is generally considered inimical to the
interests of the people, there is nothing in
the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the
exercise of its own discretion, the legislature
may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for
whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng
and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting
and horse-racing. In making such choices,
Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review,
much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do no[t] sit to resolve the merits
of conflicting theories. That is the
prerogative of the political departments. It is
settled that questions regarding the wisdom,
morality, or practicibility of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary but may be
resolved only by the legislative and
executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive.
Whichever way these branches decide, they
are answerable only to their own conscience
and the constituents who will ultimately
judge their acts, and not to the courts of
justice.  (Emphasis
101
supplied, citation
omitted)
Recently, in Garcia v. Drilon,  this Court has
102
upheld the long-settled principle that courts
do not go into the wisdom of the law:
It is settled that courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare not
venture into the real motivations and wisdom
of the members of Congress . . . Congress
has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The
choice may be perceived as erroneous but
even then, the remedy against it is to seek
its amendment or repeal by the legislative.
By the principle of separation of powers, it is
the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law. We only step in when there is a
violation of the Constitution.  (Emphasis
103
supplied, citations omitted)
Hence, the Social Security Act has validly
delegated the power to fix the contribution
rate and the minimum and maximum
amounts for the monthly salary credits. It is
within the scope of the Social Security
Commission's power to fix them, as clearly
laid out in the law.
III
On the question of the validity of the
exercise of respondents Social Security
Commission and Social Security System's
powers, this Court disagrees with
petitioners' argument that the increase in
contribution rate is prohibited by Section
4(b)(2) of the Social Security Act. The
provision states:
SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the
Commission and SSS. . . .
(b) The Social Security System. — Subject
to the provision of Section four (4),
paragraph seven (7) hereof, the SSS shall
have the following powers and duties:
....
(2) To require the actuary to submit a
valuation report on the SSS benefit program
every four (4) years, or more frequently as
may be necessary, to undertake the
necessary actuarial studies and calculations
concerning increases in benefits taking into
account inflation and the financial stability of
the SSS, and to provide for feasible
increases in benefits every four (4) years,
including the addition of new ones, under
such rules and regulations as the
Commission may adopt, subject to the
approval of the President of the
Philippines: Provided, That the actuarial
soundness of the reserve fund shall be
guaranteed: Provided, further, That such
increases in benefits shall not require any
increase in the rate of contribution[.]
(Emphasis supplied)
However, an examination of the provision
and the assailed issuances reveals that the
questioned increase in contribution rate was
not solely for the increase in members'
benefits, but also to extend actuarial life.
Social Security Commission Resolution No.
262-s.2013 provides:
RESOLVED, That the Commission approve
and confirm, as it hereby approves and
confirms, the SSS 2013 Reform Agenda, the
effectivity of which shall be as approved by
the President of the Philippines, which aims
to address SSS' unfunded liability, extend
SSS' fund life to a more secure level and
provide improved benefits for current and
future generations of SSS members,
consisting of the following:
1. Increase in the contribution rate from
10.4% to 11%; and
2. Increase in the maximum monthly salary
credit (MSC) from ₱15,000 to ₱16,000.
The above is based on the recommendation
of the President and CEO in his
memorandum dated 19 November 2012. 104
The provisos in Section 4(b)(2) must not be
read in isolation, but within the context of the
provision, as well as the policy of the law.
The two (2) provisos refer to the last part of
Section 4(b)(2), or on the System's duty to
"provide for feasible increases in benefits
every four (4) years, including the addition of
new ones[.]" Section 4(b)(2) states that the
"actuarial soundness of the reserve fund
shall be guaranteed" in providing any
increase in benefits. As established earlier,
Congress has expressly provided the Social
Security System, through the Social Security
Commission, power to fix the minimum and
maximum monthly salary credits and the
contribution rate.
To disregard actuarial soundness of the
reserves would be to go against the policy of
the law on maintaining a sustainable social
security system:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is
the policy of the State to establish, develop,
promote and perfect a sound and viable tax-
exempt social security system suitable to the
needs of the people throughout the
Philippines which shall promote social
justice and provide meaningful protection to
members and their beneficiaries against the
hazards of disability, sickness, maternity,
old age, death, and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial
burden. Towards this end, the State shall
endeavor to extend social security protection
to workers and their beneficiaries.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners' argument is, thus, bereft of
merit.
In arguing that the increase in contributions
is unduly oppressive upon the labor sector,
petitioners are again asking this Court to
inquire into the wisdom of the policy behind
the issuances made by the executive
branch. This, as earlier said, we cannot and
will not do. 105
Furthermore, this Court is not persuaded by
petitioners' argument that the increase in
contributions constitutes an unlawful
exercise of police power.
Police power has been defined as:
. . . state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general
welfare. Persons and property could thus
"be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state."
[It is] "the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people."106
To be a valid exercise of police power, there
must be a lawful subject and the power is
exercised through lawful means.  The 107
second requisite requires a reasonable
relation between the purpose and the
means. 108
Using the parameters above, we hold that
the increases reflected in the issuances of
respondents are reasonably necessary to
observe the constitutional mandate of
promoting social justice under the Social
Security Act. The public interest involved
here refers to the State's goal of
establishing, developing, promoting, and
perfecting a sound and viable tax-exempt
social security system. To achieve this, the
Social Security System and the Social
Security Commission are empowered to
adjust from time to time the contribution rate
and the monthly salary credits. Given the
past increases since the inception of the
law, the contribution rate increase of 0.6%
applied to the corresponding monthly salary
credit does not scream of unreasonableness
or injustice.
Moreover, this Court will not delve into
petitioners' argument that the revised ratio of
contributions was supposedly inconsistent
with previous schemes.  Nothing in the law
109
requires that the ratio of contributions must
be set at a 70%-30% sharing in favor of the
employee. Supplanting the executive
branch's determination of the proper ratio of
contribution would result in judicial
legislation, which is beyond this Court's
power.
A parameter of judicial review is determining
who can read the Constitution. Interpreting
its text has never been within the exclusive
province of the courts. Other branches of
government are equally able to provide their
own interpretation of the provisions of our
organic law, especially on the powers
conferred by the Constitution and those
delegated by Congress to administrative
agencies.
However, other departments' reading or
interpretation is limited only to a preliminary
determination. Only this Court can read the
text of the Constitution with finality.
In People v. Vera,  Associate Justice Jose
110
Laurel elucidated on how laws must be
accorded presumption of constitutionality
due to the premise that the Constitution
binds all three (3) branches of government.
He explained:
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is
the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce
the Constitution. This court, by clear
implication from the provisions of section 2,
subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII
of the Constitution, may declare an act of
the national legislature invalid because in
conflict with the fundamental law. It will not
shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not
hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by
setting aside a statute in conflict therewith.
This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the
fundamental criteria in cases of this nature
that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute. An act of the legislature approved by
the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations. The responsibility
of upholding the Constitution rests not on
the courts alone but on the legislature as
well. "The question of the validity of every
statute is first determined by the legislative
department of the government itself." . . .
And a statute finally comes before the
courts sustained by the sanction of the
executive. The members of the Legislature
and the Chief Executive have taken an oath
to support the Constitution and it must be
presumed that they have been true to this
oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a
particular law they did not intend to violate
the Constitution. The courts cannot but
cautiously exercise its power to overturn the
solemn declarations of two of the three
grand departments of the government. . . .
Then, there is that peculiar political
philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect
the wisdom of the people as expressed
through an elective Legislature and an
elective Chief Executive. It follows,
therefore, that the courts will not set aside a
law as violative of the Constitution except in
a clear case. This is a proposition too plain
to require a citation of
authorities.  (Emphasis supplied, citations
111
omitted)
As such, courts, in exercising judicial review,
should also account for the concept of
"pragmatic adjudication."  As112
another
parameter of judicial review, adjudicative
pragmatism entails deciding a case with
regard to the "present and the future,
unchecked by any felt duty to secure
consistency in principle with what other
officials have done in the past[.]"  The113
pragmatist judge is:
. . . not uninterested in past decisions, in
statutes, and so forth.  Far from it. For one
1âшphi1
thing, these are repositories of knowledge,
even, sometimes, of wisdom, and so it
would be folly to ignore them even if they
had no authoritative significance. For
another, a decision that destabilized the law
by departing too abruptly from precedent
might have, on balance, bad results. There
is often a trade-off between rendering
substantive justice in the case under
consideration and maintaining the law's
certainty and predictability. This trade-off,
which is perhaps clearest in cases in which
a defense of statute of limitations is raised,
will sometimes justify sacrificing substantive
justice in the individual case to consistency
with previous cases or with statutes or, in
short, with well-founded expectations
necessary to the orderly management of
society's business. Another reason not to
ignore the past is that often it is difficult to
determine the purpose and scope of a rule
without tracing the rule to its origins.
The pragmatist judge thus regards
precedent, statutes, and constitutions both
as sources of potentially valuable
information about the likely best result in the
present case and as signposts that must not
be obliterated or obscured gratuitously,
because people may be relying upon them. 114
Going into the validity of respondents'
actions, petitioners must show that the
assailed issuances were made without any
reference to any law, or that respondents
knowingly issued resolutions in excess of
the authority granted to them under the
Social Security Act to constitute grave abuse
of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion denotes a
"capricious, arbitrary[,] and whimsical
exercise of power. The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
not to act at all in contemplation of law, or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility."
115
Any act of a government branch, agency, or
instrumentality that violates a statute or a
treaty is grave abuse of
discretion.  However, grave abuse of
116
discretion pertains to acts of discretion
exercised in areas outside an agency's
granted authority and, thus, abusing the
power granted to it.  Moreover, it is the
117
agency's exercise of its power that is
examined and adjudged, not whether its
application of the law is correct.118
Here, respondents were only complying with
their duties under the Social Security Act
when they issued the assailed issuances.
There is no showing that respondents went
beyond the powers under the law that
amounts to lack of or in excess of their
jurisdiction. Petitioners' claims are
unsubstantiated and, as such, merit no
finding of grave abuse of discretion.
IV
Petitioners have failed to show that there
was an invasion of a material and
substantial right, or that they were entitled to
such a right. Moreover, they failed to show
that "there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious and
irreparable damage."  Accordingly,
119
petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction is denied.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. Resolution Nos. 262-s. 2013
and 711-s. 2013 issued by the Social
Security Commission, as well as Circular
No. 2013-010 issued by the Social Security
System, are valid. The prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction is
also DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin (C.J.), Carpio, Peralta, Del
Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, A.
Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo,
Carandang and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Jardeleza, J., no part and on official
business.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on official leave.
Hernando, J., on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 216634, October 14, 2020 ]
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HON. ROZANNO RUFINO B. BIAZON,
AND ATTY. JUAN LORENZO T. TAÑADA,
IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS
COMMISSIONER AND DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, PETITIONERS, VS. ATTY.
CHRISTOPHER S. DY BUCO,
RESPONDENT.
[G.R. No. 216636]
SANYO SEIKI STAINLESS STEEL
CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY.
CHRISTOPHER S. DY BUCO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
INTING, J.:
These are consolidated Petitions for Review
on Certiorari1 filed pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2 dated August 15, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated January 29, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
126239. The assailed Decision dismissed
the complaint and reversed and set aside
the Decision of the Office of the President
(OP) that found Atty. Christopher S. Dy
Buco (Atty. Dy Buco) among others, guilty of
Grave Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority
and Oppression, Gross Incompetence and
Inefficiency, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service with the penalty
of dismissal from service and the
concomitant accessory penalties meted out
upon them.
The Antecedents
Atty. Dy Buco, together with Deputy
Commissioner Gregorio B. Chavez (Deputy
Commissioner Chavez), Edgar Quiñones
(Quiñones), Francisco Fernandez, Jr.
(Fernandez), Alfredo Adao (Adao), Jose
Elm.er Velarde (Velarde), Thomas Patrie
Relucio (Relucio), and Jim Erick Acosta
(Acosta), are members of the Run-After-
The-Smugglers (RATS) Group of the Bureau
of Customs (BOC).
On June 30, 2011, then BOC Commissioner
Angelito A. Alvarez (Commissioner Alvarez)
issued four Letters of Authority (LOAs) dated
June 30, 2011 addressed to the following
entities: (a) Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel
Corp. (Sanyo Seiki) Warehouse, New York
St., Industrial Subd., Meycauayan, Bulacan
(Bulacan address);4 (b) McCon nell
Stainless Incorporated (McConnell), located
a. the same Bulacan address;5 (c) Sanyo
Seiki Stainless Steel Corp. Warehouse,
RSBS Building, Dagat-dagatan Avenue,
near corner 93 Road, Malabon (Malabon
address);6 and (d) Cowlyn Precision
(Cowlyn) Warehouse located at the same
1alabon address.7 The LOAs were similarly
worded as follows:
Sir,
This is to inform you that the following
Customs Officers:
ATTY. CHRISTOPHER DY BUCO
SA II EDGAR QUIÑONES
SA II FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ
SA II ALFREDO ADAO
SA I JOSE ELMER VELARDE
SA I THOMAS PATRIC RELUCIO
SA I JIM ERICK ACOSTA
duly authorized by this Office, are directed to
enforce Section 2536 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), as
amended. Accordingly, they may demand
evidence of payment of duties and taxes
and/or other import documents on foreign
articles in your premises, either openly
offered for sale or kept in storage and/or that
pending reconciliation of the documents you
may submit a detailed inventory of said
foreign articles/motor vehicle if necessary.
x x x8
Commissioner Alvarez also issued Mission
Order Nos. 046-119 and 041-1110 of even
date and directed at the Bulacan address of
Sanyo Seiki and McConnell respectively.
Meanwhile, he issued Mission Order No.
042-1111 which pertained to Cowlyn's
Malabon address and Mission Order No.
043-1112 which, in turn, referred to Sanyo
Seiki's Malabon address.
On July 1, 2011, the RATS Group (Atty. Dy
Buco, Quiñones, Fernandez, Adao, Velarde,
Relucio, and Acosta) requested for police
assistance for the service and
implementation of the LOAs and Mission
Orders at the Bulacan address.13 When
they arrived at the Bulacan address, the
warehouse security guards demanded for a
copy of the Mission Order and instructed the
RATS Group to wait for the warehouse legal
representative outside the
premises.14 However, no one arrived so the
RATS Group, except for Acosta, left the
premises. Eventually, one Atty. Neil Jerome
Rapatan (Atty. Rapatan) arrived and
confirmed to Acosta that the warehouse
belonged to Sanyo Seiki. Thereafter, the
RATS Group and the elements of the
Meycauayan police stationed themselves in
a vacant lot 20 meters away from the
warehouse.15
Meanwhile, Quiñones, Fernandez, and
Relucio tried to serve the LOAs and Mission
Orders for the Malabon address on July 4,
2011 with the assistance of Punong
Barangay Alexander Mangasar of Brgy. 14,
Zone 2, District 2 of Caloocan City.
However, they were also denied access to
the warehouse so they just left.16
On July 9, 2011, Acosta followed and
intercepted an Isuzu delivery truck with Plate
Number ZJN-869 that left the Bulacan
warehouse. He demanded from the driver
the evidence of payment of duties and taxes
of the finished stainless steel products
aboard the truck. However, what the driver
presented were receipts issued by Sanyo
Seiki to its local clients.17 Acosta then
brought the delivery truck to the nearest
police station.
Atty. Rapatan, acting as Legal Counsel for
Sanyo Seiki, explained that the confiscated
steel products were locally purchased, but
he could not present evidence to prove
it.18 Hence, the RATS Group issued a
Warrant of Seizure and Detention19 against
the delivery truck and its cargo.20
On July 12, 2011, Atty. Rapatan and Adrian
Retardo went to the RATS Office to present
Sales Invoice No. 083221 to prove that the
steel products were locally purchased from
Speedwealth Commercial Company
(SCC).22 However, the confiscated delivery
truck and its cargo were not released
because, upon checking with the records on
the BOC Mobile Customs System, Acosta
discovered that SCC was neither an
accredited importer nor engaged in the
manufacture of steel products.23 He further
revealed that SCC is a partnership of the
Chan family in the same way that Sanyo
Seiki is likewise owned and controlled by the
Chans.24
Thereafter, Sanyo Seiki filed a Letter-
Complaint with the OP demanding for an
investigation relative to the implementation
of the subject LOAs and Mission Orders
against Atty. Dy Buco and the members of
the RATS Group.25
On September 29, 2011, the OP, through
then Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr. (Hon. Ochoa), formally charged Atty. Dy
Buco, Deputy Commissioner Chavez,
Quiñones, Fernandez, Adao, Velarde,
Relucio, and Acosta with Grave Misconduct,
Grave Abuse of Authority, Oppression, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service.26
Ruling of the OP
In the Decision27 dated January 26, 2012,
the OP found Atty. Dy Buco, together with
the other members of the RATS Group,
guilty of Grave Misconduct, Grave Abuse of
Authority and Oppression, Gross
Incompetence and Inefficiency, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this
Office finds respondents Deputy
Commissioner Gregorio B. Chavez. Atty.
Christopher Dy Buco, Edgar Quiñones,
Francisco Fernandez, Alfredo Adao, Jose
Elmer Velarde, Thomas Patrie Relucio and
Jim Erick Acosta, GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT, GRAVE ABUSE OF
AUTHORITY AND OPPRESSION, GROSS
INCOMPETENCE AND INEFFICIENCY,
CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, and hereby
imposes the penalty of DISMISSAL from
service, with the accessory penalties of
CANCELLATION OF ELIGIBILITY,
FORFEITURE OF RETIREMENT
BENEFITS, and PERPETUAL
DISQUALIFICATION FROM
REEMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT
SERVICE. Furthermore, for respondent
Chavez his temporary appointment as
Acting Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of
Customs, is deemed terminated, effective
immediately.
SO ORDERED.28
The OP ruled that it had jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint since Executive
Order No. (EO) 13 abolished the then
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
and transferred all its powers and functions
to the OP which included the power to
investigate and hear administrative
complaints, provided that: (1) the official to
be investigated must be a presidential
appointee in the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities; and (2) the
said official must be occupying the position
of Assistant Regional Director, or an
equivalent rank or higher. It further ruled that
considering Deputy Commissioner Chavez
is a presidential appointee as the BOC's
Deputy Commissioner for Assessment and
Operations Coordinating Group and, in a
concurrent capacity, the Executive Director
of the RATS Group, he is under the direct
disciplining authority of the President; and
that the other officers in the administrative
complaint who were all members of the
RATS Group, together with herein Atty. Dy
Buco, were charged to have acted in
conspiracy with Deputy Commissioner
Chavez; thus, the OP also had jurisdiction
over them.29
As to the merits, the OP found Atty. Dy
Buco, together with the other members of
the RATS Group, guilty of Grave
Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority and
Oppression for enforcing patently defective
Mission Orders against Sanyo Seiki. It
declared that the Mission Orders enforced
against Sanyo Seiki were addressed to
McConnell and Cowlyn.
The OP further ruled that even if Atty. Dy
Buco and his team aborted the search upon
Sanyo Seiki's refusal for their entry to the
warehouse, their act of stationing
themselves outside and within the vicinity of
Sanyo Seiki's warehouse for several days
constituted a violation of Section 3(e)30 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
under Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 and
Willful Oppression under the color of law
under Section 3604 of the Tariff and
Customs Code.31
The OP furthermore ruled that there was
also Gross Incompetence and Inefficiency
committed by Atty. Dy Buco and his group in
their failure to obtain Mission Orders which
are sufficient in form and substance before
proceeding in its implementation and
execution; that Atty. Dy Buco and his group
are liable for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service as their acts
constituted harassment, corrupt and
retaliatory tactics against Sanyo Seiki for the
latter's filing of criminal and administrative
charges against Deputy Commissioner
Chavez with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman); that the seizure of Sanyo
Seiki's truck without a warrant was flawed
considering the absence of probable cause;
and that Atty. Dy Buco and his group had no
authority to demand payment of duties and
taxes on account of the sales invoice
presented by Sanyo Seiki showing that the
seized stainless steel items were not
imported, but locally purchased from a
common bonded warehouse.
As to the existence of conspiracy, the OP
concluded that it was Deputy Commissioner
Chavez who was on top of the operations
because he was the one who requested for
the issuance of the Mission Orders and even
requested for continuing police assistance in
the implementation of the LOAs and Mission
Orders; and that it was also him who
instructed Atty. Dy Buco to handle Sanyo
Seiki's truck after its seizure without a
warrant.
The OP denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Atty. Dy Buco in a
Resolution32 dated July 27, 2012. Thus, he
appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On August 15, 2014, the CA found the
appeal meritorious.33 It reversed and set
aside the OP Decision and dismissed the
complaint against Atty. Dy Buco.34 It ruled
that Atty. Dy Buco had in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance
of his official duties as he acted with due
care in the implementation of the Mission
Orders. According to the CA, the OP
misunderstood and misinterpreted the LOAs
and Mission Orders issued by the BOC
which were addressed to McConnell,
Cowlyn, and Sanyo Seiki, although it
appears therein that the respective
warehouses of Sanyo Seiki had the same
addresses with those of Cowlyn in Malabon
and McConnell in Bulacan. The CA did not
give weight to the conclusion of the OP that
the LOAs and the Mission Orders were
improperly implemented considering that
Atty. Dy Buco and the members of the
RATS Group were never allowed entry to
the warehouse, nor did they persist in
entering it.
The CA further held that there was neither
Grave Misconduct nor Grave Abuse of
Authority in the alleged implementation of
the Mission Orders as the Meycauayan
Police certified that no untoward incident
took place and that Atty. Dy Buco left the
premises without having entered the
warehouse. The CA furthermore held that
there is also no proof that Atty. Dy Buco
committed Gross Incompetence and
Inefficiency considering that the Mission
Orders were not enforced at that time and
he was not present during the apprehension
of the delivery truck.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 26, 2012, and the Resolution dated
July 27, 2012, issued by the Office of the
President in OP DC Case No. 11-G-017,
insofar as it found herein petitioner Atty.
Christopher S. Dy Buco guilty of the
offenses charged against him,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
consequently, the complaint against him
is DISMISSED. Atty. Christopher S. Dy Buco
is ordered REINSTATED immediately to his
former or equivalent position in the Bureau
of Customs without loss of seniority or
diminution in his salaries and benefits. In
addition, he shall be paid his salary and
such other emoluments corresponding to the
period he was out of the service by reason
of the judgment of dismissal decreed by the
Office of the President.
SO ORDERED.35
Aggrieved by the CA Decision, Hon. Ochoa,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the
OP; Bon. Rozanno Rufino B. Biazon (Hon.
Biazon), in his capacity as Commissioner of
the SOC; and Atty. Juan Lorenzo T. Tañada
(Atty. Tañada), in his capacity as Deputy
Commissioner of the BOC (collectively,
petitioners), elevated the case to the
Court via a petition for review
on certiorari citing as lone error the
following:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT
IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT,
GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY OR
OPPRESSION, GROSS INCOMPETENCE
AND INEFFICIENCY AND CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE SERVICE.36
Similarly, Sanyo Seiki filed its petition which
raised the following arguments, to wit:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
AND RESOLUTION WERE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISION/S OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN FINDING THAT
DY BUCO'S GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
B.
THE COURT OF APPFALS' DECISION
AND RESOLUTION WERE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISION/S OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN FAILING TO
RULE THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY
BETWEEN DY BUCO AND HIS CO-
RESPONDENTS IN OP-DC CASE NO. 11-
G-017 AS DULY ESTABLISHED BY
EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND FULLY
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED AND
OBTAINING IN OP-DC CASE NO. 11-G-
017.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
AND RESOLUTION WERE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DEClSION/S OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN FAILING TO
RULE THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
OFFICIAL DUTIES IN FAVOR OF DY
BUCO WAS SUFFICIENTLY OVERCOME
IN THIS CASE.37
Our Ruling
The petitions lack merit.
Before delving into the substantial matters,
the Court shall first address the issue raised
by Atty. Dy Buco in his Consolidated
Comment38 questioning the legal
personality of Sanyo Seiki to appeal the CA
Decision.
Atty. Dy Buco alleges the following: Sanyo
Seiki, as a private complainant, is a mere
government witness that cannot appeal from
the decision and resolution rendered in an
administrative case. With respect to the
petition filed by the OP, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), it lacks the
signatures of Hon. Biazon and Atty. Tañada
as the respective Commissioner and Deputy
Commissioner of the BOC in the verification
and certificate against forum shopping. Hon.
Biazon and Atty. Tañada are not real
parties-in-interest and with no legal
personality to file the petition as they are no
longer connected with the BOC. Hon.
Ochoa, acting on behalf of the OP, is also
not the real party-in-interest, but an
adjudicator who must remain partial and
detached.
"Aggrieved party" who may appeal in an
administrative case.
In administrative cases, appeals are
extended to the party adversely affected by
the decision.39 The phrase "party adversely
affected by the decision" refers to the
government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action, or the disciplining
authority whose decision is in
question.40 This definition does not include
the private complainant in the administrative
case. It is elementary that in an
administrative case, a complainant is a mere
witness.41 No private interest is involved in
an administrative case as the offense
committed is against the government.42
By inference or implication, considering that
only an aggrieved party who is adversely
affected by a decision in an administrative
case is authorized to file an appeal in cases
falling under the Civil Service Commission
and the Ombudsman, the Court sees no
reason to deviate from this doctrine with
respect to appeals on administrative cases
falling under the jurisdiction of the OP. To
reiterate there are no private interests
involved in an administrative case and the
only aggrieved party is the one who shall be
adversely affected by a decision imposing a
penalty of suspension or removal from
service.
In the instant case, Sanyo Seiki, as
petitioner herein, cannot be considered as
an aggrieved party because it is not the
respondent in the administrative case below.
As correctly opined by Atty. Dy Buco, Sanyo
Seiki, as the complainant, is not the party
adversely affected by the decision inasmuch
as it has no legal personality to interpose an
appeal before the Court. Consequently, the
petition of Sanyo Seiki, being the private
complainant below, should be denied as it
has no legal interest or standing to appeal
and seek the nullification of the CA Decision
exonerating Atty. Dy Buco from the
administrative charges of Grave Misconduct,
Grave Abuse of Authority and Oppression,
Gross Incompetence and Inefficiency and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service for it merely acted as a
government witness in an administrative
case bereft of any private interest.
With respect to the lack of signatures of
Hon. Biazon and Atty. Tañada in the
petition, in Torres v. Specialized Packaging
Development Corp.,43 the Court gave due
course to a petition even if the verification
and certification against forum shopping
were not signed by all of the parties. It found
substantial compliance in the signatures of
just two of the petitioners in the verification
considering that they were unquestionably
real parties-in-interest who undoubtedly
have sufficient knowledge and belief to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the
petition. The same rule was applied by the
Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile,44 wherein
the Court decreed that the signing by only
one of the 22 petitioners in the certificate of
non-forum shopping as substantial
compliance as the petitioners had a
common interest in the property involved,
they being relatives and co-owners of that
property. Applying these principles to the
case at bench, the signature of Hon. Ochoa,
acting on behalf of the OP, in the verification
and certificate against non-forum shopping
is sufficient as substantial compliance taking
into account their common interest in the
exercise of their disciplining authority over
erring government officials in the BOC.
In the same vein, the OP, as the disciplining
authority has a legal interest to appeal the
CA Decision being a "party adversely
affected by the decision". Emanating from
the constitutional mandate of control over all
the executive departments, bureaus and
offices as well as faithful execution of the
law, the direct disciplining authority of the
President which proceeds from the well-
settled principle that unless otherwise
provided by the Constitution, the power to
appoint carries with it the power to discipline
and remove public officials and employees,
the OP has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Office of the Ombudsman to hear,
investigate, receive, gather, and evaluate
intelligence reports and information on
administrative case against all presidential
appointees in the executive department and
any of its instrumentalities or agencies on
the basis of a complaint or motu
proprio.45 The OP exercises quasi-judicial
functions to resolve administrative
disciplinary cases over erring government
officials and employees who commit acts
inimical to government and public interest. In
the case of Office of the Ombudsman v.
Gutierrez,46 the Court ratiocinated that the
Ombudsman is vested with legal interest to
appeal a decision reversing its ruling being
the disciplining authority whose decision is
being assailed, pursuant to its mandate
under the Constitution bestowing wide
disciplinary authority, which includes
prosecutorial powers. Similar to the
Ombudsman, the Court also views that the
OP enjoys the same authority as it cannot
be detached, disinterested and neutral
specially when defending its decisions in
administrative cases against government
personnel since the offense is committed
against the government and public interest.
As a disciplining authority, the OP and the
Ombudsman have a direct constitutional and
legal interest in the accountability of public
officers. Indeed, in keeping with its duty to
preserve the integrity of public service, the
OP should likewise be given the opportunity
to act fully within the parameters of its
authority.
The Court shall now discuss the substantial
arguments raised by the OP.
As a general rule, only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari because the Court is not a trier
of facts.47 However, the findings of fact of
the OP are different from those of the CA.
Thus, it is necessary for the Court to take a
second look at the factual matters
surrounding the present case.
Pursuant to EO 13, series of 2010, the
PAGC was abolished and their vital
functions, particularly the investigative,
adjudicatory and recommendatory functions
and other functions inherent or incidental
thereto, were transferred to the office of the
Deputy Secretary for Legal Affairs of the OP,
and the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division was created. In its repealing clause
under Section 6, it effectively modified EO
12 dated April 16, 2001 which created the
PAGC. Section 4 of EO 12, series of 2001
provides for the scope of authority of the
PAGC which covers other public officials
and private persons who act in conspiracy,
collusion, or connivance with any covered
Presidential Appointee.
In the present case, Atty. Dy Buco and the
other members of the RATS Group were
charged by the OP with (1) Grave
Misconduct; (2) Grave Abuse of Authority;
(3) Oppression; and (4) Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service for having
acted in conspiracy with Deputy
Commissioner Chavez, a presidential
appointee for alleged impropriety of the
implementation of the LOAs and Mission
Orders.48 With the four charges, there are
three acts which are being complained of:
(a) implementation of the Mission Orders
and LOAs; (b) conduct of a stakeout outside
the premises of Sanyo Seiki; and (c)
confiscation of the delivery truck and its
cargo of stainless steel.
The main defense of Atty. Dy Buco against
the administrative charges against him is the
existence of the Mission Orders and LOAs.
Armed with these Mission Orders and LOAs,
Atty. Dy Buco asserts that he merely
attempted to enforce them in good faith,
within the scope of his authority, and in
obedience to an order issued by a superior
for some lawful purpose.
The Mission Orders and LOA were issued
pursuant to Section 2536 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines.
The issuance of the LOAs and Mission
Orders, the stakeout, and the seizure of the
delivery truck and its cargo were all
authorized exercise of the visitorial and
inspection powers of the BOC and
sanctioned by Section 253649 of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines.
As correctly found by the CA, the OP
appeared to have misunderstood the import
of the LOAs and Mission Orders.
There was no Grave Misconduct committed
in the implementation of the LOAs and
Mission Orders addressed to McConnell,
Sanyo Seiki, and Cowlyn. Misconduct
generally means a wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct motivated by a disregard of regulations governing the
premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.50 To constitute as an
administrative offense, the misconduct
which is an intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public
officer.51 To be characterized as Grave
Misconduct, the transgression must be
accompanied by the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of an established rule which must
be proved by substantial evidence.52
To support their argument that Atty. Dy Buco
committed Grave Misconduct, the OSG
harped on the attempt of the RATS Group to
implement the LOAs and Mission Orders
against Sanyo Seiki that was not the
addressee; and that there was a clear intent
to violate the law and established rules. In
the Decision of the OP, it ruled that Atty. Dy
Buco's acts were a flagrant violation of the
authority contained in the Mission Orders.
The records of the case reveal otherwise.
The elements of Grave Misconduct,
particularly violation of the law or flagrant
disregard of an established rule, are not
attendant here.
There is flagrant disregard of an established
rule or, analogously, willful intent to violate
the law constitutive of Grave Misconduct
when the public official or employee
concerned, through culpable acts or
omission, clearly manifests a pernicious
tendency to ignore the law or
rules.53 In Imperial, Jr. v. Government
Service Insurance System,54 the Court
elucidated the instances where flagrant
disregard of rules is present, to wit:
Flagrant disregard of rules is a ground that
jurisprudence has already touched upon. It
has been demonstrated, among others, in
the instances when there had been open
defiance of a customary rule; in the repeated
voluntary disregard of established rules in
the procurement of supplies; in the practice
of illegally collecting fees more than what is
prescribed for delayed registration of
marriages; when several violations or
collection of government funds were
committed; and when the employee
arrogated unto herself responsibilities that
were clearly beyond her given duties. The
common denominator in these cases was
the employee's propensity to ignore the
rules as clearly manifested by his or her
actions.55
There are two Mission Orders dated June
30, 2011 directed at the Bulacan address:
Mission Order No. 046-1156 directed
against Sanyo Seiki, and Mission Order No.
041-1157 in the name of McConnell. There
are also Mission Order No. 043-1158 which
pertained to Sanyo Seiki's Malabon address
and Mission Order No. 042-1159 issued to
Cowlyn in the same Malabon address. In
addition, there are four LOAs dated June 30,
2011 addressed to the following: (a) Sanyo
Seiki in the Bulacan address;60 (b)
McConnell located at the same Bulacan
address;61 (c) Sanyo Seiki in the Malabon
address62; and (d) Cowlyn located at the
same Malabon address.63 Atty. Dy Buco
admitted that only Mission Order No. 041-11
was presented at the Bulacan address. He
justified that upon arrival at the target place,
they saw the signage "Connel Specialty
Steel Inc., New York Street, Meycauayan
Industrial Subd., Brgy. Pantoc, Meycauayan,
Bulacan" which led them to inquire first from
the security guards if the warehouse
belonged to McConnell or Connell Specialty
Steel Inc. while presenting Mission Order
No. 041-11.64 Instead of an answer, the
security guards took Mission Order No. 041-
11 and informed the RATS Group to wait for
a legal representative from the warehouse.
The legal representative only arrived after
two hours when the group had already left
the place and without having entered the
premises to implement the Mission Orders
and LOAs.65 Based on the surrounding
circumstances, the RATS Group had no
opportunity to present Mission Order No.
046-11 as they were already refused entry
early on. Also, their desistance to enter the
warehouse was justified because insisting
on the implementation of the LOAs and
Mission Orders despite uncertainty as to the
actual occupants in the subject address
would make them criminally and
administratively liable. The attendant facts
are contrary to the OP's speculative
conclusion that their desistance to enter the
warehouse proves the lack of a valid
Mission Order.
Neither was there Grave Abuse of Authority
and Oppression. Jurisprudence defines it as
a misdemeanor committed by a public
officer, who under color of his office,
wrongfully inflicts upon any person any
bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury
constituting an act of cruelty, severity, or
excessive use of authority.66 No substantial
evidence was presented against Atty. Dy
Buco to prove that there was a showcase of
cruelty, severity, or excessive use of
authority against Sanyo Seiki considering
that the RATS Group did not successfully
implement the LOAs and Mission Orders.
There was also no showing that the RATS
Group insisted on implementing the Mission
Orders and LOAs despite the presence of
police assistance to aid them because they
needed to confirm first that they were in the
right address.
The Court likewise upholds the findings of
the CA that Atty. Dy Buco neither
participated in the stakeout outside the
premises of Sanyo Seiki nor was he present
during the apprehension of the latter's
delivery truck and cargo. If at all, Atty. Dy
Buco's participation in the seizure of the
delivery truck and its cargo was when he
correctly refused to release the confiscated
cargo in the absence of the required
documents to prove that there was no
violation of the tariff and importation laws.
More importantly, allegations against the
propriety of the seizure proceedings should
be ventilated in the proper forum, which is
the Collector of Customs, anchored upon
the policy of placing no unnecessary
hindrance on the government's drive not
only to prevent smuggling and other frauds
upon Customs, but more importantly, to
render effective and efficient the collection of
import and export duties due the State to
enable the government to carry out the
functions it has been instituted to perform.67
Indeed, the Court rules that there was no
law nor any established rule violated by Atty.
Dy Buco in the implementation of the LOAs
and Mission Orders; and that no grave
abuse of authority nor oppression was
committed by him in the confiscation of
Sanyo Seiki's cargo.
As regards the charge of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, nothing in the questioned acts
could have possibly tarnished the image and
integrity of public office68 in light of the fact
that the acts complained of were not in
violation of any law, or established rule and
were justified as faithful performance of a
duty.
Due process in administrative cases should
be observed.
With respect to Atty. Dy Buco's liability for
Gross Inefficiency and Incompetence, the
Court similarly finds that this charge was not
included in the Formal Charge, thus, Atty.
Dy Buco cannot be held liable therefor. The
Rules on Investigation and Adjudication of
Administrative Cases, particularly, Section 1,
Article IV on Administrative
Adjudication69 provides:
SECTION 1. Formal Charge. - The Formal
Charge shall narrate the ultimate facts
constituting an offense, specifying the law,
issuance, rule or regulation violated and
accompanied by certified true copies of
testamentary and/or documentary evidence
substantiating the same. Upon filing of the
Formal Charge, the complaint shall be
docketed as an Administrative Case for
purposes of adjudication.
Similarly, the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service70 provides:
SECTION 16. Formal Charge. - After a
finding of a prima facie case, the disciplining
authority shall formally charge the person
complained of. The formal charge shall
contain a specification of charge(s), a brief
statement of material or relevant facts,
accompanied by certified true copies of the
documentary evidence, if any, sworn
statements covering the testimony of
witnesses, a directive to answer the
charge(s) in writing under oath in not less
than seventy-two (72) hours from receipt
thereof, an advice for the respondent to
indicate in his answer whether or not he
elects a forn1al investigation of the
charge(s), and a notice that he is entitled to
be assisted by a counsel of his choice.
If the respondent has submitted his
comment and counter-affidavits during the
preliminary investigation, he shall be given
the opportunity to submit additional
evidence. Ꮮαwρhi ৷
The disciplining authority shall not entertain
requests for clarification, bills of particulars
or motions to dismiss which are obviously
designed to delay the administrative
proceedings. If any of these pleadings are
interposed by the respondent, the same
shall be considered as an answer and shall
be evaluated as such.
Although administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense and technical rules of
procedure are not strictly applied, the
observance of fairness in the conduct of any
investigation is at the very heart of
procedural due process.71 Administrative
due process mandates that the party being
charged is given an opportunity to be
heard.72 Due process is complied with if the
party who is properly notified of the
allegations and the nature of the charges
against him or her is given an opportunity to
defend himself or herself against those
allegations, and such defense was
considered by the tribunal in arriving at its
own independent conclusions.73 The
essence of due process is that a party is
afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence he/she may
have in support of his/her defense.74
In Geronga v. Hon. Varela,75 the Court
pronounced the requisites of due process in
administrative proceedings as follows:
Two fundamental requirements of due
process in administrative cases are that a
person must be duly informed of the charges
against him; and that he cannot be
convicted of an offense or crime with which
he was not charged. A deviation from these
requirements renders the proceeding invalid
and the judgment issued therein a lawless
thing that can be struck down any time.76
In the instant case, the Formal Charge
against Atty. Dy Buco did not include the
charge of Gross Inefficiency and
Incompetence. Neither was there an
allegation in the Formal Charge of
conspiracy among the RATS Group and
Deputy Commissioner Chavez which made
the act of one as the act of all. Thus, there
was a violation of due process with respect
to Atty. Dy Buco's right to be duly informed
of the allegations and the nature of the
charges against him which included his
concomitant right to an opportunity to defend
himself adequately. It is only through a
formal charge for Gross Inefficiency and
Incompetence and commission of the acts in
conspiracy that Atty. Dy Buco could have
truly and sufficiently defended himself and
presented evidence to prove his defenses.
The charge of Gross Inefficiency and
Incompetence is different from the other
offenses of Grave Misconduct, Grave Abuse
of Authority, Oppression, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
which Atty. Dy Buco was accused of in the
Formal Charge.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.
The Decision dated August 15, 2014 and the
Resolution dated January 29, 2015
respectively of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 126239 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Senior Associate Justice,
(Chairperson), Hernando, and Delos Santos,
JJ., concur.
Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188066               October 22, 2014
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review  under Rule 45 of
1 G. GENCAYA, Asst. Schools Division
the Rules of Court of the Decision  dated
2 Superintendent, CLARISSA G. ZAMORA,
November 21, 2008 and Resolution  dated3
May 14, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 03498, which reversed
and set aside the Consolidated
Decision  dated June 30, 2005 of the Office
4 Teacher III, Ramon Avanceña National High
of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman)
and absolved respondent Cynthia E.
Caberoy (Caberoy) of any administrative
liability.
Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña
National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo,
Iloilo City. She was charged with Oppression
and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f)
ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the "Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"by Angeles
O. Tuares (Tuares) for allegedly withholding
her salary for the month of June 2002. The
case was docketed as OMB-V-A-03-0239-E.
Saidcase was consolidated with OMB-V-A-
03-0572-I, which was a complaint filed by
Tuares against Ida B. Endonila, Erlinda G.
Gencaya, Clarissa G. Zamora and Victoria
T. Calunsod.
Caberoy denied the charge against her,
alleging, among others, that the payrolls of
June 1 to15, 2002 and June16 to 30, 2002
show that Tuares received her salary as
shown by her signatures on lines no. 11 of
the payrolls.5
In the Consolidated Decision dated June 30,
2005 rendered by the Ombudsman,
Caberoy was found guilty of Oppression and
was meted out the penalty of dismissal from
service. The dispositive portion of the
consolidated decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondent CYNTHIA E. CABEROY,
Principal II, Ramon Avanceña National High
School, (RANHS), Arevalo, Iloilo City, is
hereby found GUILTY of OPPRESSION and
is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM THE SERVICE WITH
CANCELLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE
ELIGIBILITY, FORFEITURE OFEARNED
LEAVECREDITS AND RETIREMENT
BENEFITS, AND DISQUALIFICATION
FROM REEMPLOYMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE. On the other
hand, respondents IDA B. ENDONILA,
Schools Division Superintendent, ERLINDA
Administrative Officer III, all three of the
Division of Iloilo City, DepEd Region VI,
Iloilo City, and VICTORIA T. CALUNSOD,
Officer-In-Charge/Secondary School Head
School, (RANHS) Arevalo, Iloilo City, are
found NOT GUILTYof the same offense
and/or violating Sec. 3 (f) of R.A. 3019and
thus these cases are considered
DISMISSED as far as they are concerned.
Furthermore, on the administrative aspect of
the counter-allegation of Perjury against
herein complainant ANGELES O. TUARES,
Ramon Avanceña National High School,
Arevalo, Iloilo City, the same is likewise
DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
SO DECIDED. 6
Caberoy filed a joint motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the
Ombudsman in its Order dated September
19, 2006.7
The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not
paid any amount in June 2002 because of
her failure to submit her clearance and
Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers
(PAST), while the other teachers received
their salaries for the same month.  The 8
Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was
"singled out by respondent Caberoy as the
only one who did not receive any amount
from the school on June 2002 because, as
established earlier, the former failed to
submit her clearance and PAST."  The 9
Ombudsman also took into consideration
several infractions previously committed by
Caberoy, which allegedly displayed her
"notorious undesirability as a government
officer for withholding teachers’ salaries
without authority."  According
10
to the
Ombudsman, Caberoy could not honestly
claim that she had not been forewarned by
the Ombudsman of the grave consequences
of her repeated illegal act.  Caberoy filed a
11
petition for certiorari with the CA, seeking
the reversal of her dismissal from service,
and in the assailed Decision dated
November 21, 2008, the CA granted
Caberoy’s petition. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The consolidated decision dated June 30,
2005, of the respondent Ombudsman is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another judgment is hereby rendered
ABSOLVING the petitioner of any liability,
with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 12
The Ombudsman filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA in the assailed Resolution dated May 14,
2009.
In clearing Caberoy from the charge against
her, the CA found that no undue injury was
caused to Tuares since she received her
June 2002 salary. According to the CA,
since Caberoy was charged with Violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the
element of undue injury is absent in this
case, Caberoy cannot be held liable for the
offense.  The CA also ruled that Caberoy’s
13
"refusal" to release Tuares’ salary was
justified and the element of "failure to so act
x x x for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly, from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage in favor of an interested party, or
[discrimination] against another" under
Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019, is likewise
absent.  Finally, the CA found that the acts
14
of Caberoy are not constitutive of
oppression. 15
Lastly, the CA ruled that the Ombudsman’s
findings and conclusions are not supported
by substantial evidencesince Caberoy’s act
of withholding Tuares’ salaries was clearly
justified.  Hence, the present petition, based
16
on the ground that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’
REVERSAL OF THE PETITIONER OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S DECISION
FINDING [CABEROY] ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE FOR OPPRESSION IS AN ERROR
OF LAW CONSIDERING THAT ITS
FINDINGS IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTAN[T]IAL EVIDENCE. 17
The Ombudsman argues that it was error for
the CA to exonerate Caberoy on the
reasons that the withholding of Tuares’
salary was justified and that there was no
undue injury onher part as she later received
her salary. The Ombudsman contends that
Caberoy was found guilty of Oppression,
which is an administrative offense under the
Civil Service law, and is distinct from the
crime of Violation of R.A. No. 3019, from
which she was absolved. According to the
Ombudsman, the quantum of proof in these
two offenses (Oppression and Violation
ofR.A. No. 3019) is distinct and the records
of the case disclose that there is substantial
evidence to support its decision. The
Ombudsman also contests the factual
findings of the CA that Tuares actually
received her salary, stating that in the
summary of payrolls and the checks,
Tuares’ name does not appear. Moreover,
no evidence was presented by Caberoy to
prove that Tuares actually received her
salary, other than her bare allegation.
Finally, the Ombudsman states that Caberoy
has already been penalized several times
for previous misconduct, which displays her
propensity to commit the misdemeanor. 18
Ruling of the Court
Initially, it must be stated that in a petition for
review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the Court is limited only to a review of
errors of law committed by the CA, and the
Court is not required to review all over again
the evidence presented before the
Ombudsman.  The 19
rule, nevertheless,
admits of exceptions, such as when the
findings of the CA and the Ombudsman are
conflicting,  which is what occurred in the
20
present case. Hence, the Court must now
look into the matter of whether the CA
committed a reversible error when it
reversed the findings and conclusions of the
Ombudsman.
Tuares charged Caberoy in OMB-V-A-03-
0239-E with both Oppression and Violation
of Section 3(e)(f) of R.A. No. 3019. The
Ombudsman, however, found Caberoy guilty
only of Oppression.
Oppression is an administrative
offense  penalized under the Uniform Rules
21
on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,  which provides:
22
Section 52. Classification of Offenses.—
Administrative offenses with corresponding
penalties are classified into grave, less
grave or light, depending on their gravity or
depravity and effects on the government
service.
A. The following are grave offenses with
their corresponding penalties:
xxxx
14. Oppression.
1st Offense – Suspension for six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year;
2nd Offense – Dismissal.
xxxx
Oppression is also known as grave abuse of
authority, which is a misdemeanor
committed by a public officer, who under
color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any
person any bodily harm, imprisonment or
other injury. It is an act ofcruelty, severity, or
excessive use of authority.  To be held
23
administratively liable for Oppression or
Grave Abuse of Authority, there must be
substantial evidence presented proving the
complainant’s allegations.  Substantial
24
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept
asadequate to support a conclusion.  In this
25
case, the CA correctly overturned the
Ombudsman’s findings and conclusions,
and explained the reasonsfor exculpating
Caberoy, as follows:
Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions,
respondent Ombudsman contradicted itself
when it found and held thatpetitioner was
guilty of "oppression" for not paying the
private respondent her June 2002 salary,
because as a matter of fact she has been
paidalbeit delayed. Such payment is clearly
and indubitably established from the table
where it was shown that private respondent
received on July 17 and 25, 2002, her June
2002 salary in the amounts of ₱4,613.80
and ₱4,612.00, respectively.
xxxx
The above narration of facts do not show
that petitioner committed acts constitutive of
"oppression." Assuming petitioner’s action is
erroneous or overly zealous, this certainly
does not merit the most severe penalty of
dismissal from government service.
Apparently, the petitioner is only protecting
herself from any future, adverse
consequences if she allows the
disbursement of public funds without the
appropriate supporting documents. "It is a
well-known fact that in the government
service an employee must submit his daily
time record duly accomplished and
approved before one cancollect his salary."
xxxx
Finally, on the contention that the findings
and conclusions of the respondent
Ombudsman is considered conclusive and
deserve respect and finality is true only
when the same is based on substantial
evidence. As discussed above, the action
taken by petitioner in withholding the
salaries of private respondent was clearly
justified. It was a measure taken by a
superior against a subordinate who ignored
the basic tenets of law by not submitting the
required documents to support payment of
 her salary and proportional vacation pay for
the aforesaid period. x x x.
June (Proportional pay
x x x [I]n this case before us, the records is
bereft of substantial evidence to support
respondent Ombudsman’s findings and
conclusion that petitioner committed
oppressive acts against private respondent
and violated Sections 3(e) and (f) of RA
3019. On the contrary and as earlier
discussed, respondent Ombudsman found
and concluded that private respondent was
paid her June salaryalbeit late. Hence, it
cannot be gainsaid that the act of
respondent Ombudsman in concluding that
petitioner is guilty as charged despite
absence of substantial evidence to support
the same is totally unfounded and is
therefore, tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of
discretion. x x x.  (Citations omitted)
26
The complaint filed by Tuares against
Caberoy charged the latter with "manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence for having ordered
the payroll clerk of [RANHS] to cause the
exclusion of [her] name in the payroll of
June 2002 x x x and [in spite of] the fact that
[she has already] rendered full service
during said days x x x without any justifiable
reason and without due process and without
any authority under the law."  A perusal of
27
Tuares’ allegations shows that her claim
pertains to the alleged withholding of her
salary for the month of June 2002. Records
show, however, that Tuares was actually
paid her salary for the month of June 2002.
Thus, the vouchers for the payroll period of
June 1 to 15, 2002  and June 16 to 30,
28
2002  showed Tuares’ name on line 11 and
29
her signature acknowledging receipt of her
salary for such period. This was, in fact,
confirmed in the 2002 salary payrolls
submitted by the RANHS Office of the
Auditor and summarized by the
Ombudsman,  to wit:
30
Tuares’
Voucher No. Date of Check
Payroll
onal pay & 101-02-6- June 25, 2002 Name not Found dated July 17 and 25, 2002 were technically
161
al pay) 101-02-6- June 28, 2002 Name not Found corresponding to complainant’s salaryfor the
164
PS-02-7-182 July 4, 2002 Name not Found
& PS-02-7-195 July 17, 2002 11
PS-02-7-196 July 19, 2002 Name not Found
PS-02-7-200 July 25, 2002 11
101-02-8- August 19, 16
231 2002
1âwphi1
The amounts received and signed for by
Tuares correspond essentially to the other
amounts she received as salaryfor the other
periods in 2002. On this score, entries in the
payroll, being entries in the course of
business, enjoy the presumption of
regularity under Section 43, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court,  and absent any evidence
31
presented by Tuares showing the contrary,
good faith must be presumed in the
preparation and signing of such payrolls. 32
Even assuming, as the Ombudsman
asserted, that Tuares received her June
2002 salary only on July 2002, the same
does not constitute Oppression or Grave
Abuse of Authority. The delay in the release
of Tuares’ salary hardly qualifies as an "act
of crueltyor severity or excessive use of
authority," especially when she contributed
to the cause of the delay, that is, she
submitted her Form 48 (Daily Time Record)
for June 2002 only on July 11, 2002. 33
Neither can the Court subscribe to the
Ombudsman’s conclusion that Tuares was
singled out by Caberoy.According to the
Ombudsman:
In other words, as far as these fortunate
teachers are concerned, checks dated June
25 and 28, 2002 and July 04 and 19, 2002
actually and in paper covered their June
2002 salary; checks dated July 17 and 19,
2002 actually and in paper covered their
July 2002 salary; x x x.
No. inWhereas
the on the part of complainant Tuares,
this is what really happened: The checks
for services rendered in June 2002
ascorrected by COA but the amounts
whole month of June 2002 was actually
received by her only in July 2002 and that in
effect means that she did not really receive WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
any amount from the school in June 2002; x DENIED for lack of merit.
x x.
SO ORDERED.
Viewed from the discussion above, it is
therefore crystal clear that complainant was BIENVENIDO L. REYES
singled out by respondent Caberoy as the Associate Justice
only one who did not receive any amount
from the school on June 2002 because, as WE CONCUR:
established earlier, the former failed to
submit her clearance and PAST. 34

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
It must be stressed that like other grave Acting Chairperson
offenses classified under the Civil Service
laws, bad faith must attend the act
ESTELA M.
complained of. Bad faith connotes a MARTIN S.
PERLAS-
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity VILLARAMA, JR.
BERNABE**
and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of Associate Justice
Associate Justice
sworn duty through some motive or intent or
ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud.  There
35
must be evidence, FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
independent of the fact of such delay, which Associate Justice
will lead to the inevitable conclusion that it
was for the purpose of singling out Tuares. ATTESTATION
The Court has consistently upheld the
principle that in administrative cases, to be I attest that the conclusions in the above
disciplined for grave misconduct or any Decision had been reached in consultation
grave offense, the evidence against the before the case was assigned to the writer
respondent should be competent and must of the opinion of the Court's Division.
be derived from direct
knowledge.  "Reliance on mere allegations,
36
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
conjectures and suppositions will leave an Associate Justice
administrative complaint with no leg to stand Acting Chairperson, Third Division
on."  Except
37
for the Ombudsman’s
deduction based on the dates of issuance of CERTIFICATION
the vouchers and the checks as shown in
the payroll, the records of thiscase are bereft
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
of evidence that will support its view that the
Constitution and the Division Acting
delay in the release of Tuares’ salary
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
indicated that she was singled out.
conclusions in the above Decision had been
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the
reached in consultation before the case was
CA, "[t]he certifications issued by Acting
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Book keeper Hayde S. Momblan will show
Court's Division.
that it was not only [Tuares] who was not
included in the June 2002 payrolls; there
were other teachers who were not included MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
because they failed to submit the required Chief Justice
year-end clearance. x x x Evidently, [Tuares]
was not singled out or discriminated against
as insisted by her and respondent
Ombudsman." 38

All told, the Court finds that the CA did not

commit a reversible error in exonerating
Caberoy from the charge against her.