A festering wound in Pakistan
Anita Joshua
I
f Pakistan manages to weather the cri-
sis it is facingg with the demand for an
independent Balochistan gathering
steam, the nation may have to thank an
American for it. An American who is pres-
ently a dartboard for the political class and
opinion makers of a country that has mostly
turned a Nelson’s eye to this festering
province.
What Republican Congressman Dana
Rohrabacher has succeeded in doing with his
two interventions on Balochistan in the U.S.
Congress is to break the conspiracyp y of si-
lence in Pakistan on itss resource-rich but
most backward,, sparsely
p y populated
p p and
largest
g p province which makes up for 44 per
cent of the country’sy land mass.
Despite
p thee p perennial violence,, disappear-
pp
ances and the ‘kill-and-dump’ p p
phenomenon
of mutilated bodies of the missing turning up
along roadsides frequently, Balochistan has
seldom been more than a footnote in main-
stream discourse — in politics, the media and
elsewhere. The Internet, which gave the Ba-
loch a chance to tell the world what’s going
on in their land, has a limited reach in Pakis-
tan because many of these websites and
blogs have been blocked here.
Similar to 1971
In fact, the collective silence on Balochis-
tan and the bid to paper over the sense of
alienation felt by the Baloch have been li-
kened to the narrative that prevailed in West
Pakistan about its eastern flank ahead of the
1971 War. Through the war, people were told
via mainstream media that Pakistan’s victo-
ry over India was certain. Not just the media,
even diplomats serving overseas were fed
these lies by the Yahya Khan dispensation,
according to retired diplomat Tariq Fatemi.
“A lot of media outlets are compelled to
opt for a blackout of news from the conflict-
stricken province because of pressure from
the ‘higher authorities’ who cite the ‘sensi-
tivity’ of the conflict vis-à-vis the national
security paradigm as a serious concern,”
maintains Malik Siraj Akbar, editor of The
Baloch Hal, Balochistan’s first online En-
glish newspaper. Mr. Akbar was recently
granted asylum in the U.S. after threats to his
life. Needless to say, The Baloch Hal is
blocked in Pakistan.
Earlier this month, a section of the media
was shamed into breaking this orchestrated
silence after a shutdown of all Urdu channels
by cable operators across the province. Sind-
hi, Pashto, Baloch and Brahui channels were
spared by the boycott call given by a faction
of the Baloch Students Organisation.
The floodgates opened a week later, first
with the exclusive hearing held by the Roh-
rabacher-chaired U.S. House Foreign Affairs
Sub-Committee on Oversight g and Investiga-
g issue of demands. Manyy Pakistanis still do Barhamdagh Bugti
tions onn human rights violations in Balochis-
tan; and then, the resolution he introduced
in Congress seeking the right of self-deter-
mination for the Baloch.
An incensed nation immediately saw Mr.
The conspiracy of silence over Balochistan our military in his case.”
While mainstream political parties of the
is finally breaking but the alienation of province are not for independence, Asad
Rahman — who participated in the Baloch
the province runs too deep for any resistance movement in the 1970s — main-
tains that they have been silenced by repeat-
ed betrayals, atrocities and continued denial
easy solutions. of rights
g to their resources.
A classic case is that of ggas which was
Pakistan provides them this time, it is not discovered at Sui in Dera Bugti g in 1952. It
going to help.’’ With these words, Mr. Akbar was piped
p p to all of Pakistan — foremost Pun-
sums up what is being articulated by Baloch jab
j — from 1954 but Balochistan’s capital p
leaders from various locations. Such is their Quetta
Q got connected to the pipeline only in
anger now that they don’t mind being la- 1985, points out Mr. Rahman.
belled Indian/American agents. In one tele- Accordingg to him,, the genesis
g of the pre-
p
vision programme, Baloch Republican Party sent resistance goes
g back to 2002 when Per-
chief Barhamdagh Bugti’s retort to a ques- vez Musharraf handed over the Saindak
tion on whether he would take India’s help project
p j in the Chagai g desert — with a project-
p j
was: “Why only India? If satan offers help, ed annual yield
y of 1,44,000
, , tonnes copper,
pp ,
we will take it.” 1.47 tonnes gold
g and 27.6 tonnes of silver for
His is one of the many voices for sep- 80 years
y — to a Chinese company.
p y While the
aration being raised in the province. Al- company
p y was allowed to keep p 75 per
p cent of
though there is no data on how widespread the profit,
p , the federal government
g got
g the
the demand is, the separatists with their remainingg 25 perp cent,, of which just two per
guns dominate the narrative as the ordinary cent went to the province.
p
Baloch is caught in the crossfire between The development
p of the Gawadar port
p
them and the security forces. Given the fre- near the Straits of Hormuz byy the Chinese
quency with which people are picked up, cemented the fear amongg the Baloch that
tortured and killed — the Human Rights through g this,, the Punjab-centric
j establish-
Commission of Pakistan report of June 2011 ment would tryy to change g the demographics
g p
said tortured bodies of 140 missing persons of the province
p and turn them into a minor-
Rohrabacher’s twin moves as interference in turned up between July 2010 and May 2011 ity in their own land.
its internal affairs and wondered why the — more families were getting affected by this Now the charge against the Baloch is that
U.S. was silent on the Kashmiris’ demand for kill-and-dump practice. they are targeting settlers from other parts
self-determination and human rights vio- of Pakistan but the natives counter that
lations in the ‘Indian Held Kashmir.’ Embittered Bugtis proxies of the security establishment are in-
Suddenly Balochistan was trending — to Though the Bugtis were once pro-Pakis- volved in these killings to justify their pres-
use a social networking term — all over Pa- tan, the murder of Akbar Bugti in 2006 and ence in the province. As proof, they cite
kistan’s media. Now not a day goes by with- the public celebration of the killing by the instances when killers of settlers have been
out at least a couple of talk shows on Musharraf regime embittered them. As op- caught and handed over to the police only to
Balochistan. Newspapers seem incomplete posed to greater autonomy within the feder- be whisked away by intelligence agencies
without a few articles on the province. This ation, the demand for independence began who have viewed the Baloch with suspicion
may stop in the electronic media as the Pa- gaining traction and several Baloch parties from the very beginning for their reluctance
kistan Electronic Media Regulatory Author- withdrew from the p parliamentaryy process.
p to join Pakistan, resulting in four earlier
ity has threatened action against the Conscious that the strategic g location of the rounds of insurgency.
channels airing programmes featuring Ba- p province will remain the bane of their exist- But none of them lasted this long. And
loch separatists. ence even if they get independence, so bitter those resistance movements were not for
How many withstand this diktat remains are they now that an uncertain future is independence but rights. Demand for seces-
to be seen but anger over the American in- preferred to remaining within the sion is a bitter pill to swallow for any coun-
tervention has subsequently
q y given
g wayy to federation. try, more so for a nation that has been
some introspection
p ass Baloch separatists
p liv- Most of them have refused to participate
p p seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan at
ingg in exile made it clear that the time for in the All Parties Conference ((APC)) that the phenomenal costs to itself to counter the
p was longg ggone and theyy would settle for Prime Minister is p
sops planning,
g, and rejected
j the Indian behemoth.
nothing less than independence. Interior Minister’s offer to withdraw cases if
“What you read in the Pakistani newspa- theyy return from exile or their mountain ‘Foreign hands’
pers and see on the television channels is hideouts as “hogwash.” When the govern- As always, “foreign hands” are being ac-
barely the reflection of anti-Pakistan public ment cannot get Frontier Corps — a mil- cused of destabilising Balochistan with the
sentiments prevailing in Balochistan. Pakis- itary-headed paramilitary force — to remove aim to Balkanise Pakistan. Challenging this,
tan has failed as a state to resolve issues one checkpost from the province, asked Fed- Alia Amirali, a researcher on the Baloch Na-
which matter a lot more to the elite, such as eral Minister Israrullah Zehri, how can they tional Movement,, wrote in The News: “Rhet-
the power crisis. No one is truly interested in withdraw cases? oric of ‘foreign
g hands’ has allowed for further
Balochistan among the rulers. The politic- Stating that the government’s offer [to militarization of Balochistan and given
g the
ians can’t fix it and the soldiers can only drop cases against Baloch leaders] was good, militaryy a licence to seal the province
p and
worsen it. Mehmal Sarfraz wrote in The Daily Times: make it a no-go zone where it can abduct,
“The real thing that merits attention is the “But who is going to ensure the safety of torture, kill and display bodies with impun-
g and Hyrbyair
y y Marri once ity, extract Balochistan’s resources under
not want to hear the real Baloch demands theyy are back? The problem p is the govern-
g the barrel of a gun, use Balochistan territory
but the Baloch movement is not meant for ment cannot save the Baloch leaders from to conduct nuclear tests … There is one thing,
provincial autonomy.
p y There is a full fledged
g the military. Let’s
L not forget what happened however, that the military in Balochistan
movement for Balochistan’s independence to the Baloch leader Nawab Nauroz Khan. does not control: the spirit of the Baloch
taking place in the province. NNo matter what An oath taken on the Quran was violated by people.”
In Bangladesh, a year of living dangerously | The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/in-bangladesh-a-year-of-living-d...

Opinion » Op-Ed

Published: June 19, 2013 00:53 IST | Updated: June 19, 2013 01:18 IST
In Bangladesh, a year of living dangerously
Zia Hassan

A NATION DIVIDED: For the main political parties, sustaining an ideological division among the people is critical for diverting attention AP

from other issues such as corruption. The picture is of Hefajat-e-Islam activists at a rally in Dhaka.
Beneath the chaotic events that have convulsed the country in recent months is the unmistakeable undertow of election year politics

Bangladesh’s War Crimes Tribunal (WCT), set up to try Bengalis who committed war crimes along with the Pakistan
Army during the 1971 war, has reopened unhealed wounds. Though everyone more or less agrees that the
perpetrators must be brought to book, the desire of the two major political parties to use the tribunal to further their
own political ends has created unexpected consequences.
The Bangladeshi people are struggling to choose between two “quarrelling Begums” who head parties that have
between them ruled the country for the past two decades, each successive government worse than the one it
replaced. For both these parties, sustaining an ideological division among people is critical for diverting attention
from other issues such as corruption.
For the Awami League, keeping up the division between pro- and anti-liberation forces is critical for sustaining its
political grip. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), meanwhile, claims to be the one that will “save Islam” and
rides the tide of nationalist sentiment. Barring this superficial debate, the two parties are practically two sides of the
same coin.
The Awami League government under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, which started off well, had begun to look
vulnerable from its fourth year in office. The World Bank-Padma Bridge fiasco, the share market collapse, and bank
loan scandals have all rocked the government. In the midst of this came the rumour that the government was
making a secret pact with the Jamaat to wean them away from their electoral alliance with the BNP. When Jamaat
member Kader Molla, convicted in one of the most notorious cases before the WCT, was given a life sentence instead
of the death penalty, the suspicions of a back door deal grew.
Outrage over the verdict led urban youth to gather in Shahbag square in Dhaka, demanding nothing less than the
hanging of convicted war criminals. The movement had all the elements of an anti-establishment revolution. In the
first few days water bottles were hurled at government ministers who tried to get on the central podium. But the
Awami League displayed great political acumen in eventually appropriating the Shahbag movement. Influential
members of the intellectual elite worked to channel Shahbag’s message in ways that the government’s own narrative
was not disrupted. Thus was a potential revolution hijacked by the ruling party.
In traditional Bangla style, when the Awami League appropriated Shahbag, the BNP took on the role of

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In Bangladesh, a year of living dangerously | The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/in-bangladesh-a-year-of-living-d...

delegitimising it. Mahmudur Rahman, editor of the daily Amar Desh, took over the role of portraying the Shahbag
Movement as an “anti Islamic” movement. The opportunity came with the discovery that a murdered member of the
Shahbag movement was an “atheist blogger” writing as “Thaba Baba.”
Rahman was successful in getting religious scholars all worked up by reprinting Thaba Baba’s blogs, which had
sentences and words directly insulting the Prophet and his family. These articles were photocopied and distributed
in villages. People across the country were agitated that the Prophet had been insulted, and a counter-Shahbag
movement brewed.
More unrest
Bangladesh was poised for a showdown and the occasion was provided by the next verdict at the tribunal, against
Delowar Hossain Sayedee. Though Sayedee is a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami, he has a huge personal following as
a cleric who regularly criss-crosses the country to address mass congregations. After the death sentence was given to
Sayedee, countrywide protests erupted, which led to the burning of government offices, the killing of policemen, and
firing by the police that took many lives. But it was difficult to discern what had set it off — his popularity, the anger
over the defamation of the Prophet, or the Jamaat taking advantage of the situation to create anarchy.
The subsequent turn of events included the arrest of Mahmudur Rahman, and the closure of his paper, the arrest of
a few bloggers to appease the Islamists, and the rise of a new Islamist movement under the banner of Hefazat-
e-Islam.
It is a generally held belief that due to their association with the 1971 war crimes and its perpetrators, Islamists
would never gain grassroot popularity. The Jamaat-e-Islami especially would always have to depend on either the
BNP or the Awami League for survival. But the Hefajat-e-Islam, which consists of the students of the Kawmi
Madrasa, do not have the “anti liberation force” stigma attached to them. They are also known to have ideological
differences with the Jamaat-e-Islami. For its protest against the Shahbag movement — during which it also
presented an Islamist wishlist — the group was able to gather huge numbers of supporters. However, there are
analysts who claim that the Hefajat is just a front for the Jamaat. There was a midnight crackdown by the police and
paramilitary forces on the Hefazat’s protest. Two television channels were shut down by removing their
transmission machinery. Interestingly, on the same night, the government also demolished the podium of the
Shahbag protesters.
Insecurity
The volatile environment has given rise to all kinds of rumours about a “third force” — that could be the military, or
a select civil society group preferred by India, or Pakistan, or even Dr. Muhammad Yunus of the Grameen Bank,
backed by America. But in reality, it is the strong undertow of election year politics that lies beneath these chaotic
events — especially the wrangling between the Awami League and BNP over the appointment of a neutral caretaker
government to oversee the elections that should be held at the end of 2013.
Despite runaway capitalism and a feudal democracy, the people of Bangladesh have worked hard to maintain a GDP
growth rate of over six per cent even during a global recession. But, in these uncertain times, imports have seen a
drop of 25 per cent, and orders in the key export sector of garments are dwindling after the collapse of the Savar
building that killed more than 1,000 workers.
No one in Bangladesh is sure how things will unfold from now on. All that the people have is a deep sense of
insecurity and the fear of the unknown.
(Zia Hassan is a blogger and publishes in AlalODulal.org)
Keywords: BNP, Awami League, Sheikh Hasina, Shahbag, 1971 Bangladesh war crimes, Delowar Hossain
Sayedee, Jamaat-e-Islami
Printable version | Jun 19, 2013 10:28:51 AM | http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/in-bangladesh-a-year-of-living-dangerously/article4827464.ece
© The Hindu

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 http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/1155035/

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C. Raja Mohan Posted online: Wed Aug 14 2013, 00:11 hrs

As it celebrates the launch this week of the Vikrant, the much delayed first indigenous aircraft carrier, India is not the
only one in Asia focused on the virtues of airpower at sea. While the Western powers are struggling to maintain their
existing aircraft carriers, leading Asian nations are investing, big time, in naval aviation. The residual European
capabilities for carrier design and construction are actively feeding into Asian warship-building.

India also plans to build a larger second indigenous aircraft carrier in the coming years. Meanwhile, it has begun the sea
trials of the long awaited Vikramaditya, the carrier acquired from Russia (the Gorshkov). By the end of the next decade,
the Indian navy should be close to realising the dream of operating three carriers. But India, the first Asian country to
acquire an aircraft carrier after World War II, will no longer have monopoly over naval airpower in the region.

China, Japan, Russia, Korea and Australia are all beefing up airpower capabilities at sea. Aircraft carriers were, until
recently, the symbol of American naval primacy in Asia. But airpower at sea is now integral to the regional military
balance in Asia. As the naval ambitions of the regional powers intersect in the Indo-Pacific, there will be much jockeying
for positions of advantage in the waters of Asia.

Beijing’s anxieties about the expanding naval capabilities of Japan and India are mirrored by New Delhi’s concerns about
the rising Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Future maritime balance in Asia will be shaped not just by the
individual capabilities of Asian powers, but the kind of alignments they might generate among themselves and with the
United States.

Asian Flat--Tops

China, which is building a powerful blue water navy, commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, last year. Like
the Vikramaditya, the Liaoning is a refurbished version of a carrier built in the Soviet Union many years ago. Like India,
China has plans to have more than one carrier and is building an indigenous carrier of its own. Reports also suggest that
a nuclear powered aircraft carrier may be on Beijing’s drawing board.

Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea are boosting naval aviation. Both operate helicopter carriers. Japan had
commissioned two powerful Hyuga-class destroyers carrying helicopters in 2009 and 2011. Korea has one helicopter
carrier called Dokdo in operation since 2005 and is building a second one. Russia too is constructing a helicopter carrier,
named Vladivostok, in collaboration with France. If it does join the Russian Pacific fleet, it will underline Moscow’s new
determination to strengthen its naval power in the waters of Asia. Australia is building two helicopter carriers, Canberra
and Adelaide, which are expected to be commissioned in the next few years.

The helicopter carriers may not have the profile of their muscular cousins, but will have a profound impact on the Asian
maritime security environment.

Japan's Izumo

Japan’s commissioning of a third helicopter carrier, the Izumo, last week has created a flutter in East Asia. The Izumo is
much larger than the two Hyuga-class destroyers and, at 24,000 tonnes, is the biggest ship now in the Japanese navy.
Japan says the Izumo’s tasks include disaster relief and the rescue of its overseas nationals trapped in crises. China,

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 http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/1155035/

however, is not impressed by the humanitarian justification for the Izumo. Chinese analysts have called the Izumo an
“aircraft carrier in disguise” and believe is meant for power projection. In a formal statement, China’s defence ministry
called on Tokyo to reflect on its imperial history and limit itself to self-defence.

Given the enduring memories of Japan’s colonial occupation, some in Asia are deeply concerned about the resurgence
of Japanese nationalism and its attempt to break out of the political constraints of the post-war pacifist constitution. For
the current leadership of Japan, though, the logic is different. Facing a rising China and concerned about the growing
reluctance of its only ally, the US, to be drawn into Tokyo’s conflicts with Beijing, Japan may have no choice but to tone
of up its military muscle.

Not everyone in Asia, however, is worried about Japan. Some are looking for Japanese military support to counter
Chinese assertiveness. Vietnam and the Philippines, two countries that came under Japanese colonialism, are now
eagerly seeking greater naval cooperation with Tokyo.

The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a contributing editor for ‘The Indian
Express’

2 of 2 8/15/2013 11:15 PM
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 http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/1028910/

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james bevan Posted online: Fri Nov 09 2012, 02:28 hrs

An article appeared in The Indian Express on October 25 from The Economist, entitled: ‘The Tories’ barmiest policy:
Britain’s immigration policy is crippling business and the economy. Wake up, Mr Cameron’. I want to reassure readers
that the British government is wide awake to the benefits of migration to the UK economy. There is no “keep out” sign on
the White Cliffs of Dover. If there were a sign, it would read “open for business”.

The British government has been clear in its aim to reduce net migration to the UK. Yet it is equally committed to
ensuring that highly skilled workers, business people, students and visitors view the UK as one of the best places to
invest and do business, study and visit. And India continues to be a key focus of our attention. So let’s deal with some of
the myths around the UK’s approach to migration as it affects India.

There are many good reasons why there are 900 Indian companies already in the UK, why the UK is the largest market
in Europe for Indian IT companies and why last year Indians invested more in the UK than in the rest of the EU
altogether. These rest on the following facts:

One, Britain is, and intends to remain, one of the world’s largest economies. We are the seventh largest economy (India
is the eleventh) with an annual GDP of over $2.4 trillion.

Two, we are one of the most business-friendly environments. The current government has cut red tape. It has cut
corporation tax to 24 per cent this year and we will bring this down further to 22 per cent by 2014.

Three, we make it easy for entrepreneurs. The UK is ranked first in Europe by the World Bank as the easiest place to
set up and run a business.

Four, Britain is the place to be if you want to do business in Europe. We offer direct access to the largest single market
in the world — the EU.

Five, Britain is the place to be if you want to be a global player. Britain is where the world raises its capital and trades its
shares, through the City of London and the Stock Exchange.

Six, our UK Trade and Investment Offices offer a bespoke service to encourage India’s entrepreneurs to set up their
global HQ in the UK.

Seven, we are in the right time zone — allowing you to talk to Asia in the morning and the US in the evening.

Eight, we have the best connections in the world: Heathrow Airport handles more international flights than any other
airport, and Britain speaks the world’s language — English.

Nine, we are a world leader in the things which drive prosperity and growth — science, technology and innovation.

Ten, we are a world leader in education — of the top six universities in the world, four are British.

Eleven, we can do difficult things well, for example, the London 2012 Olympics — delivered on time, in budget, with
friendliness, good humour and style.

1 of 2 02-Dec-12 8:45 AM
 http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/1028910/

Turning specifically to UK visas and the myth that Britain is closed — that we no longer want foreign students, business
people and visitors, let me deconstruct this: The UK’s largest country visa operation is in India and we process in the
region of 400,000 visas each year. Most Indians who apply for a UK visa get one — almost 90 per cent.

We aim to make our visa service as accessible as possible, with 12 visa application centres across India — more than
any other country. We process most short-term visa applications within 15 working days, and successful applicants
usually receive their visas more quickly than this. We aim to make our visa service as convenient as possible, with
special services for business and frequent travellers.

Last year, of those Indians who applied for a business visitor visa, 95 per cent were successful — a total of 57,000
visas. Of those Indians who applied for visitor visas, 90 per cent were successful — a total of about 250,000 visas for
tourism, family visits and business. Last year we issued over 30,000 student visas to Indians, and 75 per cent of those
who applied were successful.

In reforming our migration policies the British government conducted extensive global consultations. It listened to
business, including Indian business, in the reform of work visas. It kept intra-company transfer visas outside the
migration limit — an important point as they constitute about 90 per cent of all skilled migrant applications from Indians.
Last year we issued about 14,000 ICT visas — about 95 per cent of ICT visas applied for were issued.

We are not closing the door to skilled workers from India. We continue to welcome those who can fill gaps in the labour
market. The government announced a limit on general skilled migrant visas and it then fixed this limit at 20,700 each year
until 2014, to allow businesses to plan. No one has been refused a skilled migrant visa because of this limit. And no
company has been impeded from investing in or trading with the UK because of this limit.

The UK is doing more than ever to make entrepreneurs welcome. We have made changes to our visas for investors and
entrepreneurs — providing greater flexibility. Far from making settlement more difficult for entrepreneurs and investors,
the new rules provide a fast track to settlement in the UK. And there is no limit on their numbers.

We have also set no limit on the number of business visitor visas. The high volumes that we issue are important to oil the
wheels of business between our two countries — to attend meetings, arrange deals/ negotiate agreements or contacts,
undertake fact finding missions, conduct on-site visits and so on.

We want genuine Indian students to come to the UK in large numbers. So we have set no limit on their numbers. You will
have read about the abuse of UK student visas over the past couple of years. It would have been irresponsible to allow
this to continue and for students to be exploited. The new student visa rules protect and support good students enjoying
the UK’s finest universities. Anyone who meets the new criteria is welcome.

Graduate employment opportunities still exist for international students. We want talented Indian and other graduates to
work in the UK. Yes, we closed the visa route to allow graduates to work in low-skilled work not commensurate with
their qualifications, or not work at all. But contrary to much reporting, graduates can continue to work after their studies.
They can work in graduate-level employment for a licensed employer and earning a graduate-level salary — for three
years, with the possibility of extending for a further three years. We have also introduced a visa for graduate
entrepreneurs, which allows students who have world-class innovative ideas to stay in the UK and develop their ideas.

In conclusion, the myth is that there is a “keep out” sign on the White Cliffs of Dover. The reality is that Britain is open for
business.

The writer is the British High Commissioner to India, New Delhi

2 of 2 02-Dec-12 8:45 AM
 
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China not yet buying the world
‘The most remarkable fact is that Nokia has not been killed by a Chinese or Indian firm’
Anuj Srivas
Professor Peter Nolan has re-
searched, written and taught on a wide
range of issues in economic develop-
ment, globalisation and the transition of
former planned economies. After receiv-
ing his BA degree from the University of
Cambridge and his MSc and PhD from
the University of London, he went onto
become the Director of University of
Cambridge’s Centre of Development
Studies.
He is also in charge of the Chinese
Executive Leadership Programme
(CELP), which each year brings CEOs
from China’s largest firms to the Uni-
versity of Cambridge for a three-week
training programme, taught by a combi-
nation of academics and the leaders of
international firms.
As the Financial Times put it: ‘No-
lan knows more about Chinese compa-
nies and their international competition
than anyone else on earth, including in
China’. Excerpts from his recent inter-
view to The Hindu:
What is the way forward for China now,
with its new leadership, with regard to
its economy?
Well, the challenges facing China at
the moment are very clear, very obvious.
It has had a very successful export strat-
egy and needs to start thinking about
moving from that and creating consumer
demand. Great potential is coming from
the service sector, of course, and another
major problem is, of course, corruption
which India is suffering from as well.
One of the major factors why China
has grown so fast when compared with
India is the ease of allowing foreign in-
vestment. Of course, yes, it is phased, but
look at them, they’re thinking about
opening up the services sector to more
foreign competition. In India, yes, you
have your reforms which are slowly hap-
pening, but it is such a colossal issue that
sometimes it dampens the positive ef-
fects of foreign investment.
One of the major contentions that India
has with China at the moment is the
widening trade gap.
gap What is your take on
this? Is it a question of India not
producing quality manufactured goods
or China clamping down on Indian
imports?
I think for a problem like this, the root
cause, what is exactly the nature of this
situation becomes very important in
solving a problem. Let’s be clear, itt is a
long-term issue. Whether it is the pene-
tration of Indian pharma products or IT
services into the Chinese market, what
you have to understand is the similar-
ities of both China and India.
India
These are two countries which have
companies that compete in a lot of the
same areas. It is very similar to the strug-
gle over who gets to be the leading pro-
ducer of air-conditioners or any other
fast moving consumer good. Not every-
body can be a leader in everything and
that’s where the problem starts. Sure
some of the fault might be that India
cannot produce high-quality goods for
export, which is why most of India’s ex-
ports to China are raw materials, but the
problem also extends beyond that. More
needed.
rational discussion is needed
Have Chinese and Indian firms reached
the point where they can truly project
themselves onto the global stage?
In a short answer, no, at least mostly
no. The most remarkable thing, of the
last ten years, is the fact that Nokia
okia has
ha
The whole threat of security concerns
is laughable. It is also hypocritical of
America. Take, for example, the Chinese
banking system — the reason why it is so
modernised and secure is that most of
them are using IBM mainframes. Isn’t
that an American product in a Chinese
sector that needs the greatest security? I
honestly believe that this Huawei inci-
dent is a bone that is being thrown to the
anti-Chinese sentiment in the U.S. The
whole affair has caused deep debate in
China and I am sure that there are les-
sons in it for India too.
With
ith the shale gas revolution starting to
gather pace, and China having abundant
reserves of it, will this reduce China’s
dependence on oil and other sources of
energy?
energ
Why yes, it does appear that China has
large reserves of shale gas, which is very
good news as this means China could
become self-sufficient in terms of ener-
gy. There are, however, a couple of prob-
lems that have to be surpassed before
this is realised.
One is that China needs the technol-
ogy, and while there are some advances
on that front it isn’t for sure.
Number two is that getting the shale
gas requires a lot of water.
water There is a lot
of water requirement for the whole proc-
ess. Now U.S. has that in the form of even
rainfall distribution, but China has over-
all very little water.
water
Over the last year, there have been a
number of disputes between China and
Japan, how has this affected business
Japan
and overall relations?
Well, when people talk about these
disputes the important thing to under-
can do is go out and buy a trophy compa- stand is that Japan’s FDI stock in China
ny, like Jaguar Land Rover.
Rove last year was in the range of $83 billion.
billio
Where is their global dominance? The Sure there are regional and international
operating-system market is dominated disputes and if it does continue, the ef-
by just two companies — Apple and Goo- fects, of course, will be harmful. Howev-
gle. Over 90 per cent of market share. er, there has been far too much media
The problem with Indian and Chinese speculation over this.
companies is that they have deep roots in The studies and surveys that I have
the political economy.
econom The Ambanis, Ta- personally seen show that most people
tas and Birlas. The whole banking sys- in China want these disputes to be re-
not been killed by a Chinese or Indian tem as well. Sure, it protects them from solved by diplomatic means.
means I also be-
company. It’s been brought down by two financial shock and such, but it begs the lieve that Abe will distance himself from
American firms — Apple and Google. Goog question as to what they have really pro- some of the comments he made during
Now just think about that for a second. duced on a global level? This is some- his election campaign.
Once you become a world leader like thing that needs to be reflected on. Also, to the contrary, these sentiments
Nokia, it isn’t that easy to be brought are not being whipped up by the Chinese
down. When Chinese and Indian companies go Government.
Ten years ago, everybody was talking out, however, there is mistrust. Take
about how even though low-income Huawei for example, are the recent There has been a lot of talk about
countries like India might not be able to security concerns expressed by both Chinese investment into global natural
catch up in terms of manufacturing, they U.S. and Indian officials a real threat? Or resources. Is the ‘string of pearls
would win the race in terms of high-tech is it smoke without fire? approach’ something that India should
and other forms of consumer electronics The allegations of security problems be worried about?
and technology. That hasn’t happened and intellectual property theft are just I think my feelings on this can be
now and I don’t think it is likely to hap- absolutely ridiculous. Just because the summed up by a message from my book
pen. There is something about the ecol- head was a former member of the Army? Arm ‘Is China Buying the World’. The con-
ogy of high-income countries such as the Come on. Today, for example, there was cluding sentence is this: ‘China
China is not yet
U.S. that allow them to dominate in this a delegation of American businessmen buying the world and shows little sign of
space. who went to Iran to further their in- doing so in the near future’.
future’
terests. They were made up of military But let us look at the numbers and not
But you have companies like Tata in India men — tell me now why that isn’t a prob- the hype. In 2011, China’s total outward
who have gone out, there might not be lem? FDI in extractive industries was $67 bil-
something too wrong with the Indian and The thing about Huawei is that it is the lion, and in the manufacturing sector it
Chinese ecology? only Chinese company which is truly was just $27 billion.
billio China’s outward
Well, I mean sure yes, you have a large competing on a global level in a very stock of FDI in the extractive industries
group of very powerful companies in high-tech industry. They were initially is less than a quarter of the international
both China and India who are literally disadvantaged in the Chinese market; assets of a single giant global company,
into everything. Those firms manufac- they weren’t given lucrative government Royal Dutch Shell, and less than one-
everyything from salt to roads to contracts and were forced to look out-
ture everything Mobil.
third of that of Exxon Mobil
ks. But that’s the thing; if you want to side Chinese borders to grow.
trucks.
truck gr China’s outward stock of FDI in man-
be a global company you can’t diversify The upper management of Huawei is ufacturing amounts to only one-twen-
into everything and do that. You have to actually grateful for that, as it helped tieth of the foreign assets of General
focus on one or two things. Sure you have them focus — if they had taken govern- Electric, and 13 per cent of that of Toyo-
Chinese and Indian companies which ment contracts to build roads and air- ta. Who is buying who, you tell me.me
suck in huge amount of resources and ports they would have become bloated
produce cheap goods — but the best they and diversified. anuj.s@thehindu.co.in
A handshake across the Himalayas | The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/a-handshake-across-the...

Today's Paper » OPINION

A handshake across the Himalayas

Li Keqiang

ILLUSTRATION:K.G. Rangarajan
We live in an age of change, but there are always certain things that are enduring, forever refreshing and attractive.
India is such a nation, at once old and young. I will be leading a Chinese government delegation to India, the first
country I will visit as the Premier of China. I am very much looking forward to it and hope to make some concrete
contribution to deepening the friendship and promoting cooperation in various areas between China and India.
Pillars of civilisation
Both China and India have a long and great history that goes back thousands of years. The Chinese and Indian
civilisations are among the oldest of human civilisation. They represent the two pillars of the civilisation of the East.
The towering Himalayas have not prevented them from mutual attraction and illumination. Fahien and Huen
Tsang, two eminent Chinese monks of the Jin and Tang dynasties respectively, and Bodhidharma of ancient India
all made outstanding contribution to religious and cultural exchanges between China and India. In my student days,
I already had a strong interest in India. I was impressed by the memorable poetic lines and the deep philosophical
insights of Rabindranath Tagore, the famed “sage poet”, and moved by his profound friendship with the leading
Chinese authors of his day. There was a Chinese Indologist at my alma mater, Peking University, with whom I was
well acquainted. He spent his whole life studying and teaching ancient Indian culture and in recognition of his
contribution, he was awarded the Padma Bhushan. Indeed, from generation to generation, our two cultures have
learned and benefited from each other through exchanges and, as a result, they have both flourished with the
passage of time.
When I first visited India 27 years ago, I was struck by her warm sunshine, brilliant colours, beautiful arts,
hard-working and talented people and amazing splendour and diversity. As far as I know, the India of the 21st
century is taking a fast track of innovation-driven development. Bangalore, the “Silicon Valley of South Asia”, is
home to about 1/3 of IT talents in India; it is not only the ICT centre of India, but also a hub of software services in
Asia. India’s manufacturing sector has also moved forward. Tata Motors ranks among the world’s top five
manufacturers of commercial vehicles, and Tata Global Beverages is the world’s second-largest producer of tea. I
have read that Steve Jobs, the late CEO of Apple, had travelled to India with no other purpose than to learn yoga and
meditation. It is believed that this gave him many inspirations and resolve for innovation. Now, a growing number
of Chinese youth are backpacking across your country, intent on discovering and appreciating India’s magnificent
culture and retracing the footsteps of history.
China and India, two big Asian countries living next door to each other, are destined to be together.
Since modern times, our destinies have been more closely tied than ever. Our peoples sympathised with, supported
and helped each other in their quest for national independence and liberation, leaving behind a trail of touching
stories. Afterwards, our two countries jointly initiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which have
become the important basic norms underpinning the new type of international relations that we both seek. Our two
countries have worked shoulder to shoulder to uphold the rights and interests of developing countries, giving lasting
traction to South-South cooperation.

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Today, the handshake across the Himalayas is even stronger. Facing the same task of boosting the economy,
improving people’s living standards and reviving the nation, both countries need a peaceful and tranquil
neighbourhood and external environment and wish to achieve win-win results through dialogue and cooperation.
India, a strong Asian nation and a major country with global influence, is playing an increasingly important role in
international affairs. India, a BRICS member with robust economic growth, is playing a significant role for peace
and prosperity in South Asia and in the Asia Pacific in general. China is happy to see the growth momentum of India
and ready to expand and upgrade Sino-Indian cooperation to the benefit of all-round economic and social
development in both countries.
There is no denying that China and India still have between them some difficult issues left over from history. But the
rich historical experience and the broad vision, which are common qualities of big countries, serve as the basis for
China and India to take a long-term view and live in amity with each other. With joint efforts in the past few years,
the two sides have gradually found a way to maintain peace and tranquillity in the disputed border areas, and have
learned to deal with the situation in a reasonable and mature manner. Both agree that the common interests
between China and India far outweigh their differences and that the two countries should enhance mutual trust
rather than increasing mutual suspicion. I believe that as long as we draw on wisdom and strength on our way
forward, there will be no obstacle that we cannot overcome. As long as we face the problems squarely and talk to
each other with sincerity, we will eventually find proper solutions.
Seven necessities
China is a big country that is growing and peace-loving. What we Chinese value most are “Do not do unto others
what you do not want others to do unto you” and the philosophy that stresses the importance of good faith and
making friends with neighbours. China is more developed than before, but it remains a developing country. Even if
China becomes strong one day, it will never embark on the doomed path of seeking hegemony. We suffered
immensely from foreign bullying, wars and chaos and know so well that the same tragedy should not be allowed to
happen to anyone ever again.
China has a long way to go to achieve modernisation. To successfully manage a populous big country like China, the
top priority is to ensure the supply of seven daily necessities, namely firewood, rice, cooking oil, salt, soy sauce,
vinegar and tea. In other words, we have to address the most immediate concern of our people in everyday life. The
Chinese people want better education, more stable employment, more reliable social security, more comfortable
housing, more colourful cultural life and national stability and prosperity. It is not easy to deliver all those to our
people and modernise the country. We must focus on self-development and that calls for a peaceful international
environment. We need to live with our neighbours in harmony and make friends in the world. To pursue a path of
peaceful development is the unwavering commitment and firm action of the Chinese people.
Continuous reform
China owes its rapid growth to continuous reform as well as external cooperation. Interdependence is a defining
feature in state-to-state relations in this era of globalisation. China is a beneficiary and a defender of the existing
international order and system and stands ready to work with India and other countries to advance reform of the
system. China will undertake international obligations commensurate with its national strength. We stand ready to
embrace the world with a more open mind and hope that the world will view China with a calm frame of mind.
Both China and India are big countries in size and in population. Together, the populations of our two countries
exceed 2.5 billion and account for nearly 40 per cent of the world’s total. We are viewed as the two most important
emerging markets. However, our bilateral trade volume was less than $70 billion last year. This is incompatible with
the strength and status of our two countries, but it also points to the huge potential for expanding and upgrading
our bilateral trade and business cooperation. This is an issue that the two sides must work to resolve together.
The world looks to Asia to be the engine driving the global economy. This would be impossible without the two
powerhouses of China and India. Our two countries need to work hand in hand if Asia is to become the anchor of
world peace. An Asian century that people expect would not come if China and India, the two most populous
countries in the world, failed to live in harmony and achieve common development. Asia’s future hinges on China
and India. If China and India live in harmony and prosper together, and if our two markets converge, it will be a true
blessing for Asia and the world at large. China’s development promises opportunities for India, and India’s
development promises opportunities for China. Our common development will benefit people of the two countries
and offer the world more and better opportunities.
(Li Keqiang is Premier of the People’s
Republic of China)
China and India are destined to be together. They should work hand in hand if Asia is to become the

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anchor of world peace

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 Chinese
TAKEAWAY
C. RAJA MOHAN

SNUBBING MOSCOW
ONE would think Beijing has enough problems right
now in the South China Sea, fending off the US pivot to
Asia and its quarrelsome maritime neighbours, espe-
cially the Philippines and Vietnam. But when it comes to
asserting its territorial sovereignty over the South China
Sea, Beijing was not going to cut slack to any one, not
even its current best friend, Russia.
When Russia and Vietnam announced a deal for hy-
drocarbon exploration
p in the South China Sea this
month, Beijing
j g was quick
q to tell Moscow not to poke its
nose into the contested waters.
After nearlyy 25 years
y of hostile relations, from the
late 1950s to the earlyy 1980s, China and Russia have
steadily warmed up to each other in recent yyears. T Their
strategic
g p partnership p is built on thee shared objective
j of
limitingg American dominance in world affairs and the
creation of a multipolar
p world.
Beijing’ss recent snub tto Moscow on the South China
Sea, however, p points to the deeper faultlines in the Sino
Russian partnership.
Russia’s latest foray into the South China Sea, com-
ing at a time when Washington and Beijing are circling
each other in one of the world’s important
p waterways,y
reflects the renewed geopolitical rumbling of Asia’s tec-
tonic plates. China claims almost all the waters of the
South China Sea and has warned other countries includ
ing the United States, Japan and India to stay out of its
maritime territorial disputes with a number of southeas
Asian countries. Beijing has cautioned international oil
companies against embarking on exploration and pro-
duction of offshore oil and ggas in the South China Sea. I
is against
g this background
g d that the Russian Company,
p y
Gazprom
p signed
g a deal with PetroVietnam
V for the ex-
ploration hydrocarbons in the South China S Sea.
While the foreign office in Beijing was firm but polite
in ticking off the Russians, the Chinese media was razor
sharp in its criticism. “Gazprom’s agreement with the
Vietnam company could simply be profit-oriented. How
ever, as both companies are controlled by their respec-
tive governments, this action could be seen as a reflec-
tion of the attitude of top-level leaderships,”
p the Global
Times newspaper
p p said in a commentary. y It p
pointed to the
trend that Vietnam and the Philippines pp are “involvingg
outsiders” in a bid to “stack up their chips on the negoti
ation table against China,” the t newspaper argued.
“China attaches great importance to the Sino-Russian
strategic relationship, but it is not something to be
begged from Russia,” the editorial concluded.

DEFIANT VIETNAM
IN RESPONSE to Chinese statements, Hanoi declared
that all of Vietnam’s oil and gas projects with foreign
partners, including with Gazprom, are “within Viet-
nam’s sovereign territory” and in accordance with inter-
national laws.
“Vietnam welcomes foreign partners to cooperate
with Vietnamese companies in the oil and gas sector
within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and conti-
nental shelf, and on the basis of Vietnam’s laws,” a
spokesman for Vietnam’s ministry of foreign affairs said
last week. “Vietnam pledges (to protect) and is respon-
sible for protecting the rights and legitimate interests of
foreign partners in Vietnam,” he added.

RUSSIAN ALLIANCE
AS RUSSIA steps p into the roughg waters of the South
China Sea, some Chinese analysts y recalled the Russia-
Vietnam alliance against Beijing during the Cold War.
They see a new pattern in ggreat p power intervention
in the South China Sea. Theyy accuse the United States
of encouraging
g g its Cold War ally,
y the Philippines,
pp to step
upp the current confrontation with China. Moscow, the
Chinese observers say, y is doingg much the same — back-
ingg its Cold War partner
p Hanoi against
g Beijing.
j g
Soviet Russia maintained a bigg naval presence
p at
Cam Ranh Bay, y on Vietnam’s longg coastline framingg the
western
w estern edges
g of the South China Sea, in the 1980s. The
facilityy was developed
p into a major base by the Ameri-
cans duringg the Vietnam war.
There is some speculation
p on the Russian Navyy re-
turningg to Cam Ranh Bay. y Moscow, it mightg be recalled
has recentlyy established bases in Syria
y and Djibouti.
j
Duringg the Cold War, Russia was shunned byy most of
South East Asia. The ASEAN now has welcomed
Moscow, alongg with Washington,
g into the region’s pre-
mier political forum, the East Asia Summit.
Meanwhile, Russia is the biggest
gg source of advanced
arms to Vietnam, as Hanoi seeks a rapid p militaryy mod-
ernisation to copep with the perceived
p threats from
China. TheT e focus, unsurprisingly, is on naval weapons.
weapon
As China builds a powerful navy and seeks to dominate
the South China Sea, Vietnam is focused on acquiring
sufficient capability to deny Beijing total control over
the disputed waters.

The writer is a distinguished fellow a

the Observer Research Foundation, Delh
A civil war set to escalate
Chinmaya R. Gharekhan
N
ow that there is a ceasefire be-
tween Israel and Hamas, the in-
ternational community will focus
again on Syria; it cannot pay at-
tention to two crises at the same time, just as
a state, however mighty, cannot wage suc-
cessful wars on two fronts simultaneously.
The externally induced National Coalition
for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces is almost guaranteed to lead to two
outcomes: the conflict will suck in Syria’s
neighbours, making the region even more
volatile. For once, it is the regional powers
that are calling the shots. The extra-regional
powers have allowed themselves to become
allies of the regional players, unlike the more
familiar scenario of regional states being
used as allies of the West. Secondly, the civil
war in Syria will intensify and extend well
into the future with the Syrian people con-
demned to suffer and die in large numbers in
the months ahead.
Role of international community
Is this what the ‘international community’
really desires? There is no dearth of expres-
sion of concern, even of sadness, at the loss
of lives in Syria. But if this concern for hu-
man lives was genuine, should there not have
been a serious effort towards a political solu-
tion? No one can honestly say that the Assad
regime never gave the slightest hint that it
was ready to explore the possibility of reac-
hing a peaceful denouement. On the other
hand, the rebels and those backing them
made it clear ab initio, that there was no
question of even ‘talks about talks’ unless
Bashar al-Assad was first eliminated, politi-
cally at least.
The obsession with regime change has
come in the way of a search for political
dialogue. Negotiations have to include those
whom one regards as one’s enemies. Not
inviting Iran to the Geneva conclave was
clearly wrong, given the fact that Iran was a
most interested as well as influential player
in the great game. If the demand is only for
Mr. Assad to leave, and not regime change, a
senior figure in the Assad regime, Deputy
Prime Minister Qadri Jamil, had said publi-
cly in Moscow on August 12, 2012, that ev-
erything could be discussed in negotiations
around a table, including the resignation of
The regime change obsession of the
West and the coalition of rebels it is
propping up has obstructed the search
for a peaceful solution in Syria
President Assad, but Mr. Assad’s departure
could not be a precondition for talks. This
was a reasonable offer. Why was it not fol-
lowed up? Why was no effort made to ascer-
tain its seriousness?
If wholesale regime change is what is
sought, there is no incentive for any side —
there are certainly more than two sides in
this tragic conflict — to stop the fight. Mr.
Assad is not going to surrender, exposing
himself, his family, his community and the
various minorities to a certain bloody back-
lash. The regime has committed atrocities,
no doubt, but the rebels are not angels as has
now been conclusively established. The re-
bels, for their part, have a significant number
of extremist elements in their ranks, includ-
ing Salafists, Muslim Brotherhood, as well as
al- Qaeda, all of whom have a radical agenda
and will not settle for anything less than a
complete overthrow of the Ba’ath regime.
The rebels have a vested interest in contin-
uing the civil war; if peace talks succeed, they
will lose all relevance particularly because
ple. It would be interesting to follow how
that drama will unfold.
Regional dimensions
The regional dimensions of the Syrian war
are becoming apparent by the day. Lebanon
has already suffered shocks, which could
threaten to drive it into a civil war situation
of its own. Jordan is fragile, with demonstra-
the Syrian people, including the Sunnis, are tors calling openly for a change of regime
unlikely to vote for the Brotherhood and its there. Turkey which has played a very proac-
allies. Those supporting the rebels do not tive role in the Syrian situation is not im-
seem to have given sufficient attention to mune from problems of its own, particularly
what might follow the regime’s fall; the to- with its Kurdish minority, which, with Sy-
ken assurances they have received from ria’s support will do its best to cause in-
some of the rebel groups on this score cannotstability in the country which, in turn, would
be taken at face value. lead to more direct confrontation between
In any case, Mr. Assad is not going to give
the two countries. If Patriot missiles are
up without a stiff fight. He has the means todeployed along the Syrian border and NATO
carry on, given the fact that the bulk of hisgets involved, Russian and Chinese attitudes
large army is still with him. The number of will harden significantly.
deserters and defectors is not alarming from And there is always the decades old Arab-
his perspective, despite huge monetary in- Israeli dispute. Already Syria and Israel have
centives offered by some states. His air force
exchanged fire. It is not clear who on the
has enough firepower to inflict significant Syrian side was responsible; it is possible
damage. Importantly, he has the support of that rebels and the regime could in fact im-
regional powers that will go to almost any plicitly agree on dragging Israel into their
length to ensure his and his regime’s survival
conflict for different reasons. On the Pal-
and of influential external powers that will estinian front, Hamas has succeeded in
ensure that the United Nations Security bringing the Palestinian issue to the fore.
Council will not lend legitimacy to a no-fly Hamas is in a win-win situation. It has com-
zone or any form of international military pelled the Arab states in North Africa, which
action. is where the Arab Spring has occurred, to
The Syrian national council, based in Tur-come out strongly in its support, unlike in
key, would have been reluctant to merge previous times. The Arab League will have to
with the National Coalition, but it had very express solidarity with Hamas even if Hamas
little choice in the matter once Secretary will remain more beholden to Iran than to
Clinton criticised it as not being representa-
the Arabs. President Abbas’s position has
tive enough of the Syrian opposition. Now weakened after the recent events in Gaza
that the National Coalition, supposedly and he will come under increased pressure
more representative of the Syrian people, from his own Fatah faction to adopt a tough-
has been formed, it will expect, and will sure-
er, almost belligerent, posture to retain Fa-
ly receive, increased financial, intelligencetah’s support base in the West Bank.
and military assistance from its patrons Hezbollah, which has thousands of upgraded
making the civil war even bloodier. It will missiles capable of reaching Tel Aviv and
also expect to obtain diplomatic recognition Jerusalem, is waiting in the wings and might
in the near future as the government in exile,
be tempted to join the fray at some point in
which also will be forthcoming from some time.
western countries and most of the regional The Middle East has rarely been so vola-
powers, with the certain exception of Iran tile, complex, conflicted and
and, most likely, Iraq. The sectarian divide conflict-connected.
will be complete. No one should be surprised
as and when the National Coalition demands (Chinmaya R. Gharekhan served as India’s
Syria’s seat in the United Nations as the special envoy to the Middle East and is a
‘legitimate’ representative of the Syrian peo- former U.N. Under Secretary General.)
 OP-ED
NOIDA/DELHI

THE HINDU SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2012 11

THE WORLD BOOTS UP FOR OBAMA 2.0

From different capitals, The Hindu’s correspondents analyse expectations of the U.S. President
in his second term and his foreign policy challenges

At State Department, expect new face but no big shift

Narayan Lakshman
WASHINGTON: In a world boiling over with
political and social crises, Team Obama
will have little time to sit back and sa-
vour its triumph in the U.S. elections.
While there is little doubt that the Presi-
dent used his first term to successfully
steer the country into a new, post-Bush
paradigm, every burning policy issue
from continuing instability in West Asia
to China’s relentless push for economic
and political dominance, will call for a
rapid but careful recalibration in the
White House’s foreign policy calculus
and a fresh approach where failure has
been imminent.
An important, even critical, factor in this
will be the choice of the next Secretary of
State after Hillary Clinton who is planning
her exit after clocking nearly a million air
miles travelling to over 102 countries and
laying the groundwork for President Obama’s
first-term thrust towards multilateralism, re-
gional cooperation, United Nations-focused
sanctions and interventions, and, above all,
the move away from war.
Will her successor, yet to be determined,
prove as focused and nimble-footed to avoid
getting mired in any single regional entangle-
ment across the world?
Once he has put in place his new foreign
policy team, the big shift in Mr. Obama’s glob-
al game will come from the fact that re-elec-
tion is no longer an issue.
This is not to say he can ignore the fact that
American voters continued to place their
faith in a Republican-controlled House of
Representatives, or that the popular vote was
as much a win for Mr. Romney as it was for
him. Paradigm-shifting foreign policy chang-
es are unlikely. For example, a slight increase
can be expected in backdoor diplomatic pres-
sure on Israel, but the U.S. would be unlikely
to back suggestions that the U.N. be the new
platform for negotiations between the con-
flicted parties.
Similarly on Iran, Obama 2 may continue to
remain unreceptive to arguments that a nego-
tiated outcome on uranium enrichment —
such as the one that involved Turkey and
Brazil — may deliver success.
The one driving force behind American for-
eign policy over the next four years that will
not change, however, is economics. There is
wide support for the view that the loss of its
position as the world’s economic superpower
will constitute the greatest threat to the U.S’s
national security. Mr. Obama can thus be ex-
pected to relentlessly keep his “boot to the
throat” of nations that are perceived as lucra-
tive markets for American investment and a
source of job creation here.
India will lead that list of nations. Few
eyebrows should be raised, then, when both
soft diplomatic pressure and strident calls for
greater market access in India accelerate over
time.

Towards maturity Continuity welcomed,

New Delhi’s ties with Washington are not problem-free
but have evolved enough to weather transitions well
Sandeep Dikshit
I n the run-up to the U.S
presidential polls, when
bilateral diplomatic activity
was expected to taper off,
South Block logged as many as
a dozen delegations from Wash-
ington between September 25
and end-October. Four of these
were headed by cabinet minister-
level officials.
Even just a couple of days before
the Americans went to the polls,
U.S. diplomats landed in Delhi for
a trilateral meeting with Japan
and the U.S. Simultaneously, se-
nior officials from the Pentagon
arrived with a U.S. Navy comple-
ment that was to conduct joint ex-
ercises with the Indian Navy.
“The relationship now is truly
institutional in character. Regard-
less of the transition, the momen-
tum would have continued. With
Barack Obama’s re-election, many
of the faces will remain the same,”
said a senior diplomat.
That does not mean it is a prob-
lem-free relationship. But offi-
cials on both sides are beginning
to accept that there are some
issues on which the
two will never agree,
and others that have
evolved to the point
they need to be
ramped up to the next
engagement.
level of engagemen
Defence is one area
where India is keen to
push up. Starting
from scratch around
2004-2005, U.S. com-
panies have sold $10
billion worth of mil-
INDIA
itary hardware to the Indian
armed forces in under a decade.
India is now eager to move to
R&D and co-production but is yet
to find the same readiness on the
other side. For its part, Washing-
ton feels the economic dividend of
the India-U.S. strategic partner-
ship has been below expectations
although the decision to open the
retail sector to foreign direct in-
vestment has given it some cause
for cheer.
India too has its own concerns
including the clamping down of
work visas for techies and the foot-
dragging over access to U.S. fossil
fuel.
One big ticket item that has
failed to make much progress is
civilian nuclear cooperation. Hav-
ing done the heavy lifting, the U.S
was expecting quick rewards. But
the Nuclear Liability Act has put
paid to American hopes of quickly
setting up multi-billion dollar
plants
plant ts in Gujarat and Andhra Pra-
desh. With anti-nuclear protests,
protest
and the U.S. demanding that the
Act should be modified to conform
.................................
THERE IS A GREATER
CONVERGENCE ON
SECURITY COOPERATION,
PARTICULARLY
COUNTER-TERRORISM.
..................................
to international legislation, the
complication has increased.
For India too, the rate of return
from the nuclear deal has been
negative. Issues remain relating to
the transfer of top-end technology
to India. Many of these are cate-
gorised as sensitive or dual use,
and the U.S has been unable to
help India enter four export con-
trol regimes including the Nuclear
Suppliers’ Group.
In the field off cyber security,, the
wariness about letting an outside
agency get too close to the Indian
cyber security set-up has not di-
minished the eagerness to learn
from the U.S, as well as partner it.
“After all most of the servers are in
the U.S. We need to do a lot more
in the area of cyber crime by get-
ting to the stage where they re-
spond to most of our information
needs,” said an official.
Officials say there is greater
convergence on security cooper-
ation, particularly
counter-terrorism.
While India and the U.S. have a
meeting of minds on most global
trends, whether it is partnership
in Africa or beefing up collabora-
tion in maritime security, y, politi-
cally, the biggest divergence is on
West Asia.
“We don’t want to compete with
or undermine the U.S. position in
the region but they should learn
from us. And what’s most impor-
tant is that the areas where both
differ should not become dis-
agreements or disputes. That is
something India has to achieve
with the second Obama adminis-
tration,” said a senior official.
sandeep.d@thehindu.co.in
but pivot worries
Beijing views Obama’s re-election as ensuring
stability in ties but anxiety persists over
his plans for Asia
Ananth Krishnan ber 8 Party Congress, officials said
the Chinese government’s emphasis
A s much as the relationship be-
tween Washington and Beijing
has been tested in the past four
was on ensuring stability in what
they frequently like to describe as
“the world’s most important bilater-
years byy disputes over trade,, Taiwan relationship.”
al relationship.
and the U.S. “pivot” to strengthen As Mr. Obama was also relatively
familiar with Chinese leaders, hav-
alliances in Asia, the re-election of
Barack Obama has been largely wel- ing engaged with them over four
comed by officials and analysts in years, China would have had a clear
China, sseen as ensuring a degree ofpreference for a second Obama
term, Mr. Shi said.
stability amid recently strained ties.
Trade relations figured as a key Even the usually nationalistic
issue on the campaign trail, with Global Times, a popular tabloid pub-
Mitt Romney, the Republican con- lished by the Party-run People’s
tender, promising he would label Daily that has been very critical of
China a currency manipulator on U.S. policies in Asia, said in an edi-
his first day in office. Even thoughtorial that Obama was “more open
the shrill rhetoric of the to diversity than his prede-
campaign was downplayed cessors” and “not likely to
by many officials here as
par for the course in an CHINA take a tough attitude to-
ward China.”
election year, the positions staked However, Chinese anxieties over
out by Mr. Romney were a cause of the Obama administration’s “pivot”
some concern in Beijing. to Asia, which has seen a reaffirming
“China might be somewhat of alliances amid strained relations
pleased to see President Obama re- between China and many of its
neighbours, are likely to persist,
elected as the ‘lesser of the two evils’
comparing with Mr. Romney,” Shi analysts say.
Yinhong, Director of the Centre for
American Studies in Beijing’s Ren-
The official Xinhua news agency
greeted Mr. Obama's electoral tri-
min University and a leading strate-umph with a commentary accusing
gist on China-U.S. ties, told The him of “blatantly meddling in Chi-
Hindu in an interview. na’s territorial rows with its neigh-
He said Mr. Obama had been “ve- bours.” It did also express optimism,
ry smart” in “diplomatic competi-
tion” in the Asia-Pacific, where he
citing the record of the past four
years, that tensions between the
succeeded in “winning friends and world’s two biggest powers would be
often doing it at China’s cost and effectively managed.
using China's own faults in some “Putting these disagreements…
cases.” aside, thee Obama administration
But at the same time, he added, has worked with China over the past
Mr. Obama had taken “a generally four years to set up a series of com-

From cold peace to engagement moderate approach towards U.S.-

Obama must make a bold push for a game-changing nuclear deal with Tehran
Atul Aneja
F rom his tumultuous four years in of-
fice, during which he battled a chron-
ic recession and tried to clean up the
wreckage left behind by the hubristic for-
eign policy of his predecessor George W.
Bush, it is evident that Barack Hussein
Obama is not a war-president. Though he
failed to close Guantánamo Bay — a pris-
on but more a symbol of hate, and per-
haps vendetta, that continues to alienate
Muslims across the globe — the charis-
matic President did manage to fulfil two
important campaign promises of his first
term: winding down the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Mr. Obama’s instinctive lack of the
bloodlust — drone strikes in AfPak and
the barren mountains of Yemen notwith-
standing — must be terrible news for the
super-hawks in Israel. They barely man-
aged to conceal their dismay as polling
closed in the U.S and vote counters
showed up numbers that meant the Pres-
ident would serve another four years in
the White House. Unfettered by the bur-
den of seeking re-election, and with a rare
chance of creating history before his four-
year term ends, it is unlikely that Obama
would fulfil the dreams of the cabal that
surrounds Israel’s Prime Minister Benja-
min Netanyahu of flattening Iran’s nucle-
ar infrastructure through endless waves
of air strikes.
While Mr. Obama may not send his
B-2s, F-18s and Tomahawks into battle,
and will likely restrain Mr. Netanyahu —
the likely Prime Minister for a second
term after Israel’s January elections —
from attacking Iran, he would still need to
mend a broken relationship with Tehran.
The President does have a real chance of
bridging the gap between a cold peace and
WEST ASIA
a substantial engagement with Iran. The
key, of course, is the nuclear dialogue,
where the real gamechanger would be a
deal — if achieved — that allows Iran to
enrich uranium up to 20 per cent purity,
but no more.
Calming West Asia
By striking a deal with Iran that would
seal Tehran’s non-nuclear weapon status,
Mr. Obama would make a substantial
contribution, worthy of his Nobel, in
calming West Asia. It is conceivable that
the resulting peace-dividend may help
defuse the noxious Cold War between
Iran and Saudi Arabia — a major source of
rising sectarian tensions between the re-
gion’s Sunni monarchies, led by Riyadh,
and countries that supposedly form the
region’s Shia crescent, led by Iran. Is-
rael’s so called “existential threat” —
though hardly believable because of the
presence of its own stockpile of atomic
weapons — arising from the deployment
of medium range, nuclear tipped Iranian
missiles would also be largely eliminated.
With the Iranian crisis out of the way, the
region’s concerns would once again shift
naturally towards the festering but al-
most forgotten Israel-Palestine conflict,
whose resolution holds the promise of
imparting real stability to West Asia and
beyond. It is now up to President Obama
to either pursue timid incremental poli-
tics and risk being rated by history as an
underachiever, or boldly navigate
through the region’s uncharted waters
and elevate his status from a well-mean-
ing politician to a real statesman of our
times.
China economic rivalry and fric-
tion” in spite of domestic pressures
— an approach that many Chinese
munication platforms, drive up two-
way trade to historic numbers, and
agree on forging a partnership based
on mutual trust and mutual bene-
analysts believe would have been
discarded by a
fit,” the commentary said, adding
that “while the new Obama adminis-
Romney
administration. tration is set to carry on its ‘pivot to
Emphasis on stability
Asia’ policy, it is expected that Chi-
na’s legitimate and core interests
With China embarking on its own and rightful requests to sustain
leadership transition at the Novem- growth should be truly respected.”
Militaristic engagement
U.S. policy in the continent is too much
about terrorism, too little about trade
Aman Sethi Germany, but the U.S. military
frequently conducts joint training
E very day, a fleet of remotely
piloted
d drones takes off from
American bases around the horn
exercises with African allies.
Since the Arab spring, the Obama
administration has focused on
of Africa and heads out towards the growing influence of groups
Somalia, Yemen and parts of the like Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Middle East. As reported in The Maghreb (AQIM). U.S. Secretary
Washington Post, the U.S. of State Hillary Clinton visited

Shadow-boxing with drones and terrorism

military has acknowledged the the region last month to urge
existence of some of Algeria to support
these bases, like Camp
Lemonnier in Djibouti, AFRICA African-led military
operations in Mali,
Islamabad will continue to have a blow-hot, blow-cold relationship with Washington and the remote airstrip
in Arba Minch in southern
where AQIM allied
militias control an area the size of
Ethiopia, even as host countries France.
Anita Joshua would prevail whatever the result. eignty even further by sending in Navy are reluctant to comment on the
Though the two governments are PAKISTAN Seals to kill al-Qaeda leader Osama bin matter. Contrasts China's moves

A bad marriage, which both partners

have no choice but to plod through
With little difference in the positions of
President Obama and Mitt Romney to-
wards AfPak in general and Pakistan in
particular, there was never an expecta-
tion that the election, irrespective of the
winner, would improve the course of the
relations between the two countries.
That much was clear from the last presi-
dential debate on foreign policy when Mr.
Romney essentially articulated the cur-
rent U.S. policy towards Pakistan, only
using different words.
Yet, Pakistan emerged as the only
country to prefer the Republican candi-
date over Mr. Obama among the 21 coun-
tries surveyed for a poll conducted for
BBC World Service. While 14 per cent of
the respondents in Pakistan wanted to
see a Romney White House over the 11
per cent who wanted Mr. Obama, 75 per
cent expressed no opinion, indicative of
the widely held view that status quo
CM
YK
working hard to put their blow hot and
cold bilateral relationship back on track
after it went into deep freeze for seven
months following the 2010 NATO bom-
bardment of a Pakistan Army outpost in
Bajaur tribal agency killing 24 soldiers,
they have failed to cap the anti-Amer-
icanism whipped up over the years. It
maintained an upward trajectory right
through the Obama years, and is still
rising.
On Kashmir
For Pakistan, Mr. Obama’s first stint
was a series of disappointments starting
from his reneging on the 2008 election
promise of “devoting serious diplomatic
resources to get a special envoy in [Kash-
mir] to figure out a plausible approach.”
The subsequent years saw him shift to
non-interference in Kashmir, billing it a
bilateral matter.
If this was not disappointing enough
for Pakistan, there was the hyphenation
with Afghanistan in place of his original
proposal to have a special envoy for Af-
ghanistan, Pakistan and India. It needled
Islamabad even more because India had
managed to work its way out of that for-
mulation and decouple from the India-
Pakistan prism through which the U.S.
had previously crafted policies towards
New Delhi.
Though the India’s dehyphenation
from Pakistan had begun before Mr. Oba-
ma took charge, the appointment of a
Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan gave currency to the AfPak
coinage.
Worst of all, in Pakistan’s view, was the
U.S. push for India to assume the role of a
regional power.
While all this is of interest to foreign
policy wonks, on the streets Mr. Obama
has become synonymous with drones and
is the man who violated Pakistan’s sover-
Laden in the heart of the country. The
Obama years have seen drone attacks
multiply, making it a major irritant in
bilateral relations.
And, he is unlikely to budge unless Pa-
kistan goes after terrorist havens in the
tribal areas, especially North Waziristan
now regarded by Washington as “terror
central.”
akistan has for years warded off pres-
Pakistan
sure to “do more” in North Waziristan,
particularly against the Haqqani network
which the U.S. holds responsible for
many of the attacks inside Afghanistan.
Now, with NATO’s withdrawal from Af-
ghanistan imminent, Islamabad is un-
likely to shift policy and risk losing its
influence in Kabul in the post-2014 sce-
nario by antagonising the Afghan Tali-
ban. As things stand, “four more years”
for Mr. Obama could see more of the
usual bickering that goes on in a bad mar-
riage that neither can afford to walk out
from at this juncture.
America’s drone programme
expanded exponentially in
President Obama’s first term; and
as he takes office once more,
American engagement with the
African continent continues to be
predominantly militaristic.
“There are two trends that we
see regarding the U.S. in Africa:
both revolve around the
securitization of U.S. relations,”
said Dr. Christopher Alden of the
South African Institute of
International Affairs.
“One is institutional and
involves the decision to promote
the U.S. Africa Command
(Africom). The second is that the
relationship is based too much on
pursuing terrorism and not
enough about trade and
development.
development.”
Africom is based in Stuttgart,
The U.S. administration’s
n sharp
approach to Africa is in
contrast to the Chinese principle
of investment and military non-
interference. At a forum last
interferenc
month, Liu Guijan, former
Chinese Special Representative
on Darfur, spoke of Sudan as an
example of China’s preference for
trade, investment and
engagement over the embargoes
and sanctions adopted by western
powers.
“Neglecting Africa in the
twenty first century is a policy
that no global power can afford,”
afford
Dr. Alden said, “but Washington
seems intent on putting other
regions ahead of the continent,
seeing established and deep links
in Asia as more consequential
than new opportunities in
Africa.”
ND-ND
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Evaluating India’s Strategic Partnerships using Analytic Hierarchy Process

Arvind GuptaSarita Azad

September 17, 2011

Introduction

A strategic partnership is a long-term interaction between two countries based on political,

economic, social and historical factors. Such a partnership manifests itself in a variety of
relationships. India has signed “strategic partnerships” with more than 30 countries. Are these
countries equally important for India? Or do they have their own hierarchy? For instance, India
has strategic partnerships with the United States, Russia, China, Japan, UK, France and others.
It is obvious that not all strategic partnerships are equally important. Some have a dominant
political element, while others have a prominent economic dimension. In some cases, the
security dimension may be the most important. Is there a way to rank the partnerships on the
basis of multiple criteria? Which strategic partnership is more important than others?

This work has been inspired by the need to devise a more effective method based on expert
judgments using statistical techniques to rank the preferences. We look at India’s relationship
with the United States, Russia, Japan, UK and China, on the basis of five parameters, namely
economics, politics, defence, technology and people-to-people and rank them in order of
importance.

Analytic Hierarchy Process

Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)1 is one of the multi-criteria decision making methods based
on relative priorities assigned to each criterion in achieving the stated objective. This technique
(which to the best of our knowledge has not been previously used for analyzing strategic
partnerships) exploits the powerful idea of evaluation and selection of options based on a
consistency test, which goes with the subjective judgment of experts. Furthermore, the actual
process of carrying out the analysis helps the decision maker to prioritize the parameters in a
manner that otherwise might not be possible.

1 Thomas L. Saaty (1990), “How to make a decision: The Analytic Hierarchy Process”, European
Journal of Operational Research, 48, 9-26 9 North-Holland, http://www.elsevier.com
/authored_subject_sections/S03/Anniversary/EJOR_f... [1].
The AHP ranking model relies on subjective assessments of various experts. To begin with, an
objective for a decision is stated (in this case, the importance of India’s strategic partnership with
a particular country); a set of relevant criteria is chosen and a set of alternatives (i.e. US, UK,
Japan, etc.) are expressed. The overall goal of the decision is presented at the top level of
hierarchy as depicted in Figure 1. The second level represents the main criteria that define
India’s strategic partnerships. Finally, at the lowest level of the hierarchy are the partner
countries, which are the decision options as shown in Figure1.
Figure 1: A hierarchy model for the selection of India’s strategic partnership

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Methodology

Firstly, a pair-wise comparison of selected criteria is performed. We assess India’s strategic

partnerships in terms of five criteria namely: economics, politics, defence, technology and
people-to-people factors. Pair-wise comparison begins with comparing the relative importance of
two selected criteria. Assuming n attributes, the pair-wise comparison of attribute i with attribute j
yields a square matrix where aij denotes the comparative importance of attribute i with respect to
attribute j. In the matrix, aij = 1 when i = j and aij=1/aji. An attribute compared with itself is
assigned the value 1, so the main diagonal entries of the pair-wise comparison matrix are all 1.
Therefore, there are
n x (n-1) judgments required to fill in a n x n matrix. The judgments are entered using the
fundamental scale of the AHP (Table 1). The numbers 3, 5, 7 and 9 correspond to the
judgments “moderate importance”, “strong importance”, “very strong importance”, and “absolute
importance” (with 2, 4, 6, and 8 for compromise between these values). Hence, the relative
importance of India’s relationship with other countries based on different criteria under study is
evaluated using the opinion of 15 experts. Similarly, the relative importance of India’s relation
with country A vis-à-vis country B with reference to different criteria under study is evaluated.

Table 1: The Fundamental scale

Intensity of
Definition Explanation
importance
1 Equal importance Two factors contribute equally to the objective
Moderate importance Experience and judgment slightly favour one over
3
of one over another the other
Essential or strong Experience and judgment strongly favour one
5
importance over the other
Experience and judgment very strongly favour
7 Very strong importance one over the other. Its importance is
demonstrated in practice
The evidence favouring one over the other is of
9 Extreme importance
the highest possible validity

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2,4,6,8 Intermediate values When compromise is needed

Since the comparisons of factors are done through the subjective judgment of experts, some
degree of inconsistency is expected to occur. To avoid that, each matrix of pair-wise
comparisons of the criteria is subjected to mathematical verification called ‘consistency ratio
(CR)’. CR is the ratio of consistency index (CI) to random index (RI) defined as

CR=CI|RI (1)

where the consistency index is defined as

Where n is the matrix size and is the maximum eigen value. The random index (RI) is often
chosen from a pre-calculated Table 2. Hence, using Equation 1, the consistency ratio of each
judgment is calculated. If CR<0.10, the degree of consistency is satisfactory, but if CR>0.10
serious inconsistencies may exist and the AHP may not yield meaningful results.

Table 2: The Random consistency index

n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RI 0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49

Lastly, the priority vector of each criterion in relation to different countries is calculated. For
example, the vectors of priorities are defined as

The vectors of
priorities are the principal eigenvectors of the matrix aij. It gives the relative priority of the criteria
measured on a ratio scale.

Results and Discussion

After the priority vectors for each criterion in relation to different countries are calculated, the last
step is to establish the overall priorities of the criteria. We lay out the priorities of each criterion in
relation to India’s partnerships with other countries and multiply each column of vectors by the
priority of the corresponding criteria and add across each row which results in the desired vector
of India’s strategic partnership. Table 3 shows our final results.

Table 3: India’s strategic partners

Ranking India’s strategic Partner’s Priority Vectors
1 US 0.4084
2 Russia 0.2412
3 China 0.1627
4 Japan 0.1561
5 UK 0.1451

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Thus, in the opinion of fifteen experts polled, the Indo-US partnership is the most important with
a score of 0.4084, followed by the partnerships with Russia, China, Japan, and UK. In Table 4,
the comparisons of India’s partner countries with respect to the criteria and their priorities are
listed. For instance, Table 4 (first column) shows that the priority, economic dimension, is
strongest in the case of the Indo-Japan partnership. In the case of the Indo-US partnership, the
political parameter is predominant. Defence cooperation takes precedence over all other aspects
in the Indo-Russia partnership. The Indo-UK partnership is dominated by people-to-people
considerations. And in Sino-India relations, the political parameter is the key.

Table 4: The Priority Vectors

Economics Politics Defence Technology People-to-People
India & US 0.1433 0.5046 0.0756 0.0435 0.2330
India & Russia 0.796 0.2121 0.4903 0.1814 0.0367
India & Japan 0.5097 0.2602 0.0364 0.1055 0.0881
India & UK 0.1617 0.4450 0.0522 0.0522 0.2890
India & China 0.3446 0.4518 0.0784 0.0320 0.0933

The AHP technique as demonstrated above helps prioritize India’s strategic partnership. In
principle, the exercise can be further expanded by including more countries, more parameters
and more experts.

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Foreign policy lessons

Volume 30 - Issue 01 :: Jan.

• Contents
12-25, 2013
INDIA'S NATIONAL MAGAZINE
from the publishers of THE HINDU

Pomeranian BOOKS
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This book is refreshingly different from what most other retired diplomats have
written. There is no sharing of personal experience or boasting of being present on
momentous occasions. There is no attempt at esoteric theorising. The author shares
with the reader his lucid thoughts on the evolution of India’s foreign policy. He
also makes cogent recommendations for action. The title says it all. Is not foreign
policy all about how the country copes with the changing world around it and takes
care of its interests?

The author is much more than a retired diplomat. After retiring in 1991, he was
Professor at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University for
eight years. He is an economist and is quick to spot the economic considerations
behind foreign policy decisions.

There are 12 chapters in all. The author himself says that the first one, “India’s

file:///R|/News/Magz/Frontline/12th%20Jan/20130125300108100.htm[2/5/2013 10:53:56 AM]

Foreign policy lessons

Foreign Policy: Underlying Principles, Strategies, and Challenges Ahead”, is the

most important one.
THE HINDU ARCHIVES

Jawaharlal Nehru flanked by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and

Yugoslav President Josef Tito, founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. NAM
has not lost its validity in the post-Cold War world, Dubey insists.

The fundamental purpose of India’s foreign policy, and for that matter of any state,
is to promote its national interest. But, there are complications. There is no single
national interest. There are many. There is a hierarchy of such interests. By
pursuing a particular interest, a state might reduce its ability to pursue another.
Security is the pre-eminent national interest. But the author, with his background
in social sciences and his abiding commitment to the poor, takes care to define
security in a holistic manner.

Security has military and non-military dimensions. Economic security, energy

security, and environmental security, to name only a few, are important. The
author brings in social inequalities, poverty, and denial of human rights in the
consideration of national security. He is one of the very few of our thinkers to take
such a holistic view of security.

The foreign policy of India should contribute to world peace and prosperity. The
author does not agree with the view that working for world peace might hurt the
national interest. He points out that in the medium and long term, India will gain
by having a peaceful and more just world. The “sheet anchor” of India’s foreign
policy was non-alignment. The “most significant strivings” of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) have been in the areas of “development, peace, disarmament,
decolonisation, the establishment of a just and equitable world order and the
strengthening of multilateralism under the United Nations”. The reader will note
the word “strivings” showing the analytical sharpness of the author.
SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY

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Foreign policy lessons

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh greeting U.S. President Barack Obama

during his visit to New Delhi on November 8, 2010.

For years since independence, India’s foreign policy “admirably” served its
interests. It gave India a higher profile than warranted by its economic or military
strength. India chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission following the
armistice in Korea. It made a signal contribution to bringing about the 1954
Geneva Agreements on Indochina. But starting from the latter years of the Nehru
era, it became evident that the policy had lost its “elan and effectiveness”.

The military defeat in 1962 was a major setback; “semi-permanent” hostility with
Pakistan had a “disabling effect” on the conduct of policy. By the mid-1960s,
other countries had overtaken India in terms of economic development. India’s
stature, particularly among the developing countries, declined. The trend was
reversed starting from the early 1990s. India’s crushing defeat by Japan in the
1995 election to the Security Council dramatically demonstrated the country’s low
standing in the comity of nations.

The situation improved following the success of the economic reforms and the
heightened growth rate of the economy. The 1998 nuclear tests also helped.
Foreign heads of states came in one after another. The author shows his ability to
look at the big picture when he draws the attention of the reader to the “domestic
constraints” on foreign policy: poor infrastructure, poor performance on the social
front, particularly health and education and similar factors.

Analysing the major changes between 1980 and 1995, the author starts with the
end of the Cold War. The good developments include the fall of the apartheid
regime in South Africa, the restoration of the U.N. to its legitimate role and the
progress in arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union.
However, there was a marked decline of multilateralism under the U.N. The end of
the Cold War did not lead to the emergence of a peaceful world order based on
trust and cooperation among the great powers.

NAM relevant

The author does not agree that NAM has lost its validity in the post-Cold War
world. Nor does he accept the argument that India should get out of G-77. For
long, the developed countries have been trying to undermine and divide G-77. The
“struggle for hegemony” did not disappear with the Cold War. The world order
needs change. The essence of NAM is to judge issues on merit and not in the

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Foreign policy lessons

interest of a power or a power bloc. The major powers continue to try to impose
their views on developing countries on issues such as trade liberalisation and
climate change. Therefore, NAM and G-77 remain relevant.

India is at the “receiving end” of the world order and should work for changing it.
India focussed too much on its search for a permanent seat on the Security Council
and neglected other reforms of the U.N. meant “to dilute the domination of the
major powers”. The author even proposes the creation of a U.N. Rapid
Deployment Force for peace-keeping. The reader might agree on the desirability of
such a force even while doubting the chances of its actual formation. Big power
domination is built into the charter and the big powers are in no mood to surrender
their advantages in any substantial measure.
AFP

At the IBSA summit in Pretoria on October 18, 2011, Brazilian President

Dilma Rousseff, South African President Jacob Zuma and Manmohan Singh.

He notes that IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) is the “most cohesive and natural
grouping for economic cooperation”. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa) can play an important role in G-20. But the underlying differences
among the members of the group need to be noted. China does not support the bid
of India or Brazil for a permanent seat on the Security Council. The latter two are
concerned with the undervalued yuan and the nature of China’s economic
engagement with Africa.

G-20 is important, but it is wrong to say that it has replaced G-7. Only issues for
which cooperation from countries such as India, Brazil and China is required will
be brought to G-20, which is used as a forum to get decisions taken elsewhere
ratified. Countries such as India, Brazil, China and South Africa can be “scarcely
expected” to demand a change in the world order. The 173 states outside the G-20
have an equal right to be at the decision-making table. The committed democrat in
the author comes out strongly and clearly through his insightful observations. He
urges developing countries, including India, to work for the strengthening of the
U.N., a new international financial architecture and a nuclear weapon-free world,
to combat protectionism and neo-protectionism, and to form a united front at the
climate-change negotiations.

Asia started forming new regional groupings starting from the 1980s, but India
“found itself marginalised”. It took the initiative to get associated with Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Association of Southeast Asian

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Foreign policy lessons

Nations (ASEAN). India should not expect to be a full member of ASEAN. The
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) should become a
full-fledged regional grouping by moving towards a free-trade area. South Asia
Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which came into force in 2006, is “deeply flawed”. The
time target is too distant. The negative lists of exempted items are too long.

India tried a sub-regional option by forming the South Asia Growth Quadrangle
(SAGQ), consisting of the north-eastern region of India, Bangladesh, Nepal and
Bhutan. It made good sense, but there was too much opposition and it has not
delivered so far. It was difficult to raise the money needed to improve the
infrastructure. There is also the Kuming Initiative, linking the Yunan Province of
China, the north-eastern region of India, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Laos and
Thailand. It has not taken off because India is “over-cautious” and has an
“inferiority complex” vis-à-vis China.

As regards the desirability of seeking foreign investment and the general question
of globalisation, the author cautions India against rushing “headlong towards
integrating with the world economy”. If India rushes in that direction, it will not be
able to retain an independent and flexible foreign policy. Even China, much more
integrated with the world economy than India, has “fully retained control over the
strategic sectors of its economy”. Capital account convertibility should be avoided.
Similarly, import-intensive production structures and import-based consumption
patterns are not to be encouraged.

Turning to military security, he says India “faces a direct and immediate threat”
from Pakistan. India should note that Pakistan maintains its claim on Kashmir and
has never given up the option of war to gain territory in Kashmir. Pakistan has
harboured and trained terrorists carrying out terrorist acts against India. It has been
raising the water issue even though the Indus Waters Treaty, according to many
observers in India, is “tilted decisively” in favour of Pakistan.

China poses another threat. At least a part of the medium-range missiles in Tibet
are targeted at India. India should not be lulled into a position of “military
unpreparedness vis-à-vis China”, he says.

Source of threat

The military bases and the deployment of nuclear forces of the extra-regional
powers in its close vicinity can be a source of threat to India’s security. India
cannot forget that the U.S. warship Enterprise came to threaten it in 1971, during
the Bangladesh war.

Given the threats mentioned above, India has to bolster its security, conventional
and nuclear. India went overtly nuclear on account of the imminent threat of
Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Both Pakistan and China have been
augmenting and improving their nuclear arsenal. India should speed up its
programme for minimum nuclear deterrence and second strike capability. But,
India need not enter into any arms race with China or any other country. The
author is broadly supportive of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and
the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). He supports and hopes for a nuclear
weapon-free world in the future. He is a realist who does not abandon his dreams.

The author is of the opinion that India tends to rely too much on the U.S. to solve
its problems with Pakistan. Russia is important and relations with that country
should be strengthened.

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Foreign policy lessons

On China, the author argues that India cannot afford to have hostile relations with
it. Having normal relations with China can free vast resources that are currently
devoted to defence. But does China want normal relations with India? He does not
explore the option of India working together with the U.S., Japan and Vietnam in
the context of the tension in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. But he
has promised to write more books to deal with such matters in detail.

Coming to neighbours, almost all neighbours “suffer from an identity crisis vis-à-
vis India”, he says. At times India is overbearing and its policies are short-sighted.
India should never interrupt dialogue and people-to-people contacts should be
encouraged.

The prose is pellucid and it is a delight to read the book. It should be read by the
general public interested in foreign policy, especially the young people. Scholars
and practitioners of diplomacy will benefit from the book. For the young diplomats
in India and in other SAARC countries, it is essential reading.

Finally, this is not Professor Dubey’s first book. We expect many more as he has
promised, and that too, soon, dealing with matters not fully dealt with in the
present one. This is one of the few books that describe the past and the present and
at the same time prescribes for the present and the future.

K.P. Fabian, former Ambassador, is the author of Diplomacy: Indian Style.

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In the neighbourhood,
it’s ‘India fading’
Moral consistency in New Delhi’s actions,
and not money or muscle power, can counter
Chinese and U.S. inroads into the region
Suhasini Haidar move was justified by the
government’s growing concern

W ithin 48 hours of taking back

control of Male airport from
the Indian consortium GMR,
over the treatment of Tamils and
President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s
refusal to keep his promises of
Maldivian Defence Minister devolution. Even so, it was a break
Mohammed Nazim had touched from India’s past conduct. India
down in Beijing. The timing of the voted on a “country-specific”
trip was probably coincidental, but resolution at the U.N. body. Next,
the signal to India was by endorsing a U.S. resolution
unambiguous. As Col. Nazim and against its own neighbour, it
the Chinese Defence Minister, Gen advertised how little influence its
Liang Guanglie, signed a military bilateral pressure has. China, in
agreement, with China offering $3 contrast, showed itself to be a
million and more in free defence more dependable partner in the
aid, the message that Maldives is region by backing Sri Lanka.
looking far beyond India for its
defence needs rang out. The year Bangladesh
2012 also saw the Maldives reach If the impression that the vote
out to the United States, which has was done under pressure from
been keen to set up a base (to Tamil Nadu’s leaders made the
occupy the one vacated by the government in New Delhi seem
United Kingdom in 1976) on the weak, in the case of ties with
southern atoll of Gan
Gan. Dhaka too, the United Progressive
The rights and wrongs of the Alliance (UPA) chose to bow to the
GMR deal will be argued in courts wishes of a State government.
and at the negotiating table for More than a year after Dr. Singh’s
some time to come. Yet, the he fact visit to Bangladesh announcing
that the Indian government tried several agreements, India has been
to intercede, even threaten the able to seal neither the Teesta
Maldivian government, and failed, agreement for water, nor the swap
is an indicator of the loss in India’s of land enclaves. It seems even less
influence in this island nation. The likely that the government will
image of India, a $3 trillion prevail on West Bengal Chief
economy, attempting Minister Mamata Banerjee to push
unsuccessfully to flex its muscles the Bangladesh accords now, given
with an island nation which has a that she is no longer a UPA ally. In
GDP of just $2 billion should cause Dhaka, the Hasina government
even more discomfo
discomfort. will have less leeway to negotiate
In fact, India’s waning influence with elections due next year.
was visible in February 2012, when India’s broken promises to
former President Nasheed was Bangladesh are made more tragic
ousted by President Waheed. India by the earlier commitment it had
was informed only after the fact, made: “deliver on terror, and India
and Prime Minister Manmohan would go the extra mile.” In the
Singh was disastrously advised to past four years, the Hasina
immediately endorse the new government has delivered more
government. When India finally than 20 wanted terrorists,
raised concerns over the coup and including the top leadership of
the crackdown on protesters, and ULFA and Bodo groups, and
sent a special envoy to Male, the conducted crackdowns on camps
envoy landed more than 24 hours inside Bangladesh. But India has
after U.S. Assistant Secretary of been unable to keep its end of the
State Robert Blake, who had flown bargain.
half way around the world to show
Washington’s interest in events. Nepal and Bhutan
Nepa
Those days of indecision have cost In other parts of the
the Indian government dearly. neighbourhood too, there are
Since then, the U.S. has kept up its examples of India’s loss of
voice for democracy and free influence. In Nepal, despite several
elections as a way of staying botched efforts, New Delhi has
engaged, while managing to been unable to help with
discuss the possibility of taking government formation or the
over the base in Gan Island. China, writing of the constitution. Indian
which stayed out of the political investment has fallen, with the loss
situation, has engaged with the of bids for Kathmandu airport, and
new government strategically and passport printing, while China has
economically to the tune of bagged the country’s biggest
millions of dollars in deals
deals. investment project, the West Seti
hydropower plant, originally
In Myanmar meant to supply electricity to
The pattern of waning influence India. Even ven Bhutan, a country with
continued in other parts of India’s which India’s relations have been
neighbourhood in 2012 — in untroubled, took baby steps out of
countries Robert Kaplan refers to India’s shadow by standing for a
hadow zones”; those that fall U.N. Security Council seat on its
as “shadow
within India’s shad
shadow. In los
own in 2012, a bid it lost.
Myanm for example, the year
Myanmar, This year must then be the one
saw historic changes, as pro- when India regains its lost
democracy leader Aung San Suu influence among geographically
Kyi entered Parliament. For the smaller neighbours.
past decade China has dominated
the Myanmar economy; now it is India’s moves
the U.S. that is welcome as it has It would, of course, be unfair to
lifted sanctions. India, its fourth conclude that India hasn’t taken
largest trading partner, has large steps in investing in these
remained at about 13 in the list of countries. In 2012 alone, India
countries investing in Myanmar. extended lines of credit and
On the other side of the political infrastructural spending worth
spectrum, India won no praise hundreds of millions of dollars to
from Ms Suu Kyi, who made a Myanmar, Sri Lanka and
point of visiting Europe and the Afghanistan, while boosting
U.S. before coming to New Del Delhi, bilateral trade with Pakistan and
and spoke of her “disappointment Bangladesh.
with India” for engaging with the Housing projects in Jaffna, the
military junta in the intervening parliament in Kabul and the Sittwe
years. India, as is often the case, port renovation project in
has fallen between two stools, and Myanmar are all symbols of Indian
appears neither pragmatic, nor efforts to reach out in the region.
principled in the process. But if it is to counter China and the
U.S. seeking twin “strings of
Sri Lanka pearls” here, then that cannot be
In Sri Lanka, a country where achieved from muscle or money
India is the largest investor and power, but from moral consistency
trading partner, the year saw a in its action
actions.
deep schism in relations after (Suhasini Haidar is senior
India voted against Lanka at the Editor, CNN-IBN, and presents
U.N. Human Rights Council.
Council The the show “WorldView.”)
India needs a federal foreign policy
Manoj Joshi
T
he competitive populism in Tamil
Nadu over the situation of Tamils
in Sri Lanka has generated a great
deal of alarm in New Delhi over the
manner in which political issues relating to a
State have begun impinging on India’s for-
eign and security policies. Though some-
what over the top, the Dravidian parties have
a point, but a general one rather than the
specific case they are advocating.
The
he general point is that in any country,
the people have a right to advocate and push
for a particular foreign and security policy
policy.
Given our linguistic, ethnic, religious and
ideological divisions, these views often come
across as those belonging to this or that sec-
tion. That, too, is legitimate. But at the end of
the day, this diverse country must have a
single policy and its execution must be the
government.
responsibility of its federal government
Sectional interests
The government structure as such does
not cater to these sectional interests; in oth-
er words, there are no constitutional or in-
stitutional mechanisms to relay those
interests. So, with Union governments tak-
ing the form of coalitions, they have become
vulnerable to party or sectional pressure
which often takes the form of pure
blackmail.
The withdrawal of the Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam from the United Progressive Alli-
ance government could be seen as being part
of the rough and tumble of coalition politics.
Actually, it is more likely that the party has
used the Sri Lankan crisis to push for a sep-
aration from the UPA, because it is politi-
cally expedient for it to do so. After all, what
is happening in 2013 — or even what hap-
pened in 2012 — is not the worst that has
befallen the Tamils of Sri Lanka.
But with general elections looming, com-
petitive populism seems to be ruling the
roost. The DMK wanted the UPA govern-
ment to pilot a resolution in the United Na-
tions demanding an international probe into
alleged war crimes tantamount to “geno-
cide” in Sri Lanka. Then with Tamil Nadu
Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa joining the
fray, the demands escalated — a boycott of
the Commonwealth Heads of Government
summit to be held later this year in Colombo,
a ban on Sri Lankan players in the Indian
Premier League matches in Tamil Nadu and
an Assembly resolution asking the Union
Since most States share an
international boundary, they need
to be involved and consulted on
external affairs that affect them
government to get the U.N. to create a sep-
arate Eelam in Sri Lanka.
The DMK and the All-India Anna Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam are only a more ex-
treme manifestation of a trend we have been
witnessing recently in India where coalition
constituents and States are bringing foreign
and security issues to the bargaining table.
Actually, the leader of this pack has been the
Indian Left for which the United States is a
permanent anathema. This is what led to the
crisis in UPA-I in 2008 when the Left pulled
out of the coalition because it opposed the
India-U.S. civil nuclear deal. This move of
the Left was also pitched as much on its
belief that nothing good could come out of an
agreement with “imperialist” America, as its
attempt to cloak the decision in the garb of
attacking America for its anti-Muslim
policies.
The next instance of this “State-first” ap-
proach occurred when West Bengal Chief
Minister and then UPA coalition partner,
Mamata Banerjee, opposed the river waters
agreement with Bangladesh. In September
2011, on the eve of Prime Minister Manmo-
han Singh’s visit to Dhaka, the Union gov-
and Pakistan on Sir Creek remains disputed
and, as a result, the maritime boundary be-
tween the two countries has yet to be final-
ised. In this sense, India and Pakistan are
both losers, not only because no one will
invest in exploiting the natural resources
from a disputed area, but also because they
will lose out on the extended exclusive eco-
nomic zone they can get under the U.N. con-
ernment was forced to call off the signing of a vention on the laws of the seas.
pact that would have ratified a formula for
sharing the waters of the Teesta with Intersection of issues
Bangladesh. Yet, there
here is a case for institutionalising
The surprise entrant into this club was the process of consultation and involvement
Narendra Modi who suddenly jumped into of States which are affected by a particular
the Sir Creek issue on the eve of the Gujarat foreign or security policy measure. Barring
elections. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and
Mr. Modi said that not only should India not Chhattisgarh, all Indian States share borders
hand over the Creek to Pakistan, it should with other countries, or with the interna-
stop any dialogue with Islamabad on the tional waters of the sea. In that sense, they
issue. Any concession by New Delhi would have interests or issues that may intersect
affect Gujarat negatively. with the foreign and security policies of the
In all four instances, it is possible to argue country.
country
for a “Union of India” stand rather than that In recent times, we have seen how the
of the State or party in question. In Sri Lan- politics of Kerala has impinged on a foreign
ka, the Government of India has had to bal- affairs issue relating to two Italian marines.
ance its policies to ensure that Colombo does There is Jammu and Kashmir which still
not drift towards Beijing and Islamabad. complains about the short shrift it got on the
There also is the question of pushing resolu- matter of river waters when the Union gov-
tions on the territorial issues of other coun- ernment signed the Indus Waters treaty
tries, having burnt our hands on the Kashmir with Pakistan. As for waters, the Chief Min-
issue once. Equally, resolutions on human isters of Bihar and Assam too have important
rights in international bodies are a double- issues which impinge on our relations with
edged sword, especially given our own shod- Nepal and China. China
dy record in dealing with internal Among the various governmental sys-
insurgency. tems, the U.S. is one in which the interests of
As for the Teesta issue, there were expec- its federal constituents are taken into ac-
tations that in exchange for the river waters count in the formulation and exercise of
treaty, Bangladesh would sign an agreement foreign and security policies. This was part
giving India transit rights to its land-locked of the large and small States compromise
north-east. Clearly, while West Bengal may that resulted in its constitution. This enables
have notionally given up something, there its ts upper chamber, the Senate, to be the lead
was the advantage of the greater good that house on foreign policy issues — ratifying
would accrue, not only for the north-eastern international agreements, approving ap-
states but West Bengal as well, through the pointments of envoys and so on. The Senate,
increased commerce that would have result- as is well known, has a membership which is
ed from a transit agreement. not based on population — each State, large
In the case of the nuclear deal, too, the net and small, populous and otherwise, has the
gainer was India. It was the U.S. which had to same number of Senators.
Senators
abandon its sanctions regime against us and It would be difficult to graft something
agree to allow civil nuclear commerce to like the U.S. system on to the Indian system.
resume with India. Given the balance of Yet, clearly the time has come when Miz-
power in the international system, it was a oram and Nagaland also have a say in India’s
deal only the U.S. could pilot — not France, Myanmar policy, instead of merely having to
China or Russia — though all of them had to bear its consequences.
finally put their stamp on it through the (The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at
Nuclear Suppliers Group. the Observer Research Foundation, New
In Gujarat, the boundary between India Delhi)
Crude and not sweet at all - The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/crude-and-not-sweet-at...

Today's Paper » OPINION

Published: August 6, 2013 00:00 IST | Updated: August 6, 2013 05:37 IST
Crude and not sweet at all
Sudha Mahalingam
Far from being automatic, the energy security from India’s overseas oil assets is only as good as thecontracts and joint ventures that
govern them

For some years now, energy insecurity has come to dominate the collective national psyche. Every pundit and
observer has her own set of nostrums and homilies to deal with the country’s energy vulnerability. A range of
solutions is being touted and tried. None, however, has captured the public imagination as the acquisition of
overseas oil equity in pursuit of energy security. That China has embarked on an aggressive acquisition spree of
hydrocarbon assets in every corner of our planet seems to have convinced us that this is indeed the way to go and
that we must ‘catch up’ with China if we are to be energy secure.
Misplaced perception
In the public perception, it is almost axiomatic that overseas oil assets constitute energy security. It assumes that
ownership confers rights of unqualified access. There is a belief that if you own hydrocarbon assets in any corner of
the world, it automatically and ineluctably entitles you to physically access those resources as and when you need
them; in fact, especially when you need them in the event of a sudden disruption in global oil supply arising from
natural disasters, terror strikes or political disturbances.
That may not be true, except under specific conditions and circumstances. It is instructive to note that neither
ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) nor its Chinese counterpart actually brings any significant quantities of oil from any of
its overseas assets. Most of OVL’s overseas oil production is sold in the local or international markets and the
company is compensated in cash payments. As for gas, OVL does not bring to India even a molecule of gas produced
in its own fields in Sakhalin, Vietnam or Myanmar although China fares better in this regard, primarily because it
has had the foresight to build transnational gas pipelines.
While India does not have a single transnational gas pipeline yet and therefore cannot access its own equity gas,
what about oil which is fungible and can be brought in tankers from anywhere? Why are we not bringing our own oil
from our overseas acreages? Does mere ownership confer any degree of energy security on the country?
Many necessary and sufficient conditions must be satisfied before equity oil of our national oil companies translates
into energy security. Firstly, not all assets in which OVL has invested are producing assets. Exploratory acreages can
contribute to India’s energy security only if and when there is an exploitable, viable discovery of hydrocarbons.
Secondly, even in the case of producing fields, equity participation is subject to certain contractual terms with the

1 of 3 8/6/2013 9:07 AM
Crude and not sweet at all - The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/crude-and-not-sweet-at...

host government. Additionally, if you share your equity with other partners as in a consortium or joint venture, you
would also be subject to the terms of the consortium or joint venture agreement or the operating agreement between
parties. Both these must contain provisions that allow you to take your share of production in kind.
Types of participation
Let me explain this point further. There are many types of participation in overseas oil fields: production sharing
agreements, service contracts, production leases, concessions and so on. Not every type of contract envisages equity
oil to be taken in kind. Service contracts, for instance, envisage only a pre-determined fee, not a share in production.
Only production sharing contracts usually have an express provision with the host government wherein the foreign
investor can take his share of production in kind. Even so, ownership of the mineral — in this case oil or gas —vests
with the host government, except in the U.S. What this implies is that the host government can, and often does, in
its national interest, impose Domestic Market Obligations where the operator is required to sell part or all the
production to the local market. Sometimes, the domestic market has prior claim and only surpluses can be
exported.
We in India know little about the type of overseas engagement of our oil companies. Even the company websites are
vague in disclosing the exact type of engagement. Except for one or two assets, our companies are partners in a
consortia of international oil companies or in a Joint Venture with the host country national oil company. Yet, we
know absolutely nothing about their terms of engagement with other consortium or JV partners anywhere in the
world.
Even assuming that our oil companies have Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) that allow profit share in kind,
equity oil can be lifted only after the operator of the field has recovered its costs of exploration and development
from the sale of the mineral. When exploration and production costs go up, profit take gets thinner and that has
been happening in consortia-operated fields almost everywhere.
The partners in a JV or a consortium can elect to cede their profit oil to the operator who in turn sells the oil and
shares the revenues thereof with the former. It is customary for major oilfield operators to enter into long-term
contracts with buyers, prior to actual production and as such, the option to take equity oil in kind has to be
exercised ex ante . Since most disruptions occur suddenly and unexpectedly, the freedom to divert one’s own share
of equity production to one’s domestic market to take care of the disruption is severely constrained by prior
contracts. Violation of oil/gas sale contract terms invites serious penalties and ends in litigation. Where, then, is the
scope for physically ensuring energy security in the event of supply disruption?
Certainly OVL can exercise its option to take its profit share ex ante and bring the oil or gas to India wherever it is
able to do so. For any oil importing country, and even more so for a country like India that imports almost four out
of every five barrels it needs, the economics of transporting equity crude from distant sources like Venezuela or
Sakhalin (in Russia) will have to be weighed against buying from our own neighbourhood, namely the Middle East/
Persian Gulf region. Until recently, our refineries were geared only to certain kind of crudes available in our
neighbourhood. Now, that constraint has vanished with the advent of new refinery capacities in both private and
public sector. Even so, since heavy sour crudes entail high refining costs, most refineries prefer familiar crudes
unless the former is available at a substantial discount.
There are many other ifs and buts before overseas oil equity becomes an energy security measure, such as political
risks, risks of expropriation or outright nationalisation. The host country can strengthen its control over production
of oil and gas by foreign oil companies without even violating the terms of PSA. For instance, in Russia, foreign
investors have been slapped with tax claims and penalties for environmental violations that seriously impact the
viability of the investments. During Vladimir Putin’s presidency, Gazprom was nominated the sole export agency for
gas exports from Sakhalin. This puts a question mark over the ability of foreign investors to claim their own share of
gas production for export to their home markets without going through the agency of Gazprom. If, as reports claim,
Gazprom will buy gas at discounted domestic prices and resell at international prices, that would rob international
investors of any advantage of ownership over the mineral. How does this scenario enhance our energy security?
If the circumstances allow it, OVL can swap its equity oil with other buyers. For example, it can swap Sakhalin oil
with Japan and divert oil bound for Japan from the Persian Gulf region to our ports. We have no information in the
public realm about whether such swaps have been effected and if so, the extent and scope of such swaps to be able to
judge the energy security impact. However, swaps are possible, inter alia , only when the swapping country’s
refinery configuration matches the quality of our equity crude.
Illusion
All things considered, reserve accretion through overseas oil equity seems to give only a notional sense of energy
security. This illusion is emphasised by the lack of transparency in overseas petroleum contracts. We need greater

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Crude and not sweet at all - The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/crude-and-not-sweet-at...

transparency in contract types and terms to be able to judge the energy security quotient of an overseas oil asset.
This is not to minimise the investment benefit of a good quality asset. When international prices of crude/gas reign
high, a risk-free asset whose production/development costs are reasonable can make an excellent investment
option, provided we have not paid a higher-than-competitive price for acquiring the asset . That does not seem to be
the case in some of our overseas oil assets.
A diplomatic thrust with emphasis on assets that can be connected to our borders through pipelines could ensure
better energy security for India since pipeline supply is dedicated to the destination. It is not impossible to tweak
our engagement overseas to subserve our energy security, but that would require a visionary approach and a great
power mindset backed by matching strategies.
( The author is an independent energy analyst and former Member, Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory
Board )
Printable version | Aug 6, 2013 9:07:05 AM | http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/crude-and-not-sweet-at-all/article4993932.ece
© The Hindu

3 of 3 8/6/2013 9:07 AM
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Economically meaningless

Amitendu Palit

A Free Trade Agreement between India and China will only be a strategic confidence building measure for now

Should India and China sign a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA)? Since the last decade, both countries have been
scouting for and connecting to new trade partners. The Asia-Pacific has been the main domain of their search. They have
either concluded, or are negotiating, trade agreements with common partners including Australia, New Zealand,
Singapore, ASEAN, Japan and South Korea. They are also actively forging formal trade links with the Gulf and Latin
America.

While disappointment with the WTO is pushing both into FTAs and Regional Trade Agreements (RTA), the “domino effect”
too cannot be overlooked. Anxieties of being deprived of trade space and markets in economically vibrant and
resource-rich regions are hastening the rush. So are strategic compulsions.

The rush for FTAs is yet to be reflected in negotiations on a bilateral deal. Both countries are part of a regional agreement
— the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) — since 2002. Bangladesh, South Korea, Laos and Sri Lanka are also
members of the APTA making it a cross-regional agreement between South, Southeast and Northeast Asia. The APTA,
however, has remained a rather muted and inconspicuous deal in an Asia-Pacific with hundreds of FTAs and RTAs.

A bilateral Indo-China trade deal was first discussed seriously in 2003, when a joint study group (JSG) was set up for
examining its feasibility. The JSG report submitted in 2005 did recommend such a deal covering trade in goods, services,
investment and trade facilitation. The joint statement issued during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in 2005
took note of the recommendations. That though was as far as matters went. There has hardly been any move on the FTA
since. Subsequent joint statements issued thereafter during visits of heads of states have mentioned phased trade targets
and removal of market access barriers on both sides. But they have conspicuously avoided mentioning a trade deal.

While official proclamations have been silent, discussions on the FTA have continued in academic and business circles.
The Chinese enthusiasm on the issue has been more noticeable. India’s hesitation has been largely due to strong
opposition from its domestic industry. Domestic manufacturers’ fears of being swamped by cheap Chinese exports have
prevented proactive moves. The psychological discomfort of pushing a trade deal with a neighbour often considered a
major strategic adversary has also confined the FTA to the backburner.

Is it worthwhile to have an Indo-China FTA? Bilateral trade has surged without an FTA. At $75.6 billion, China was India’s
largest trade partner in 2011-12. The actual size of bilateral trade, including services, would be larger and not far from the
trade target of $100 billion set for achieving by 2015. Interestingly, India does not have a bilateral FTA with any of its top
10 trade partners, except Singapore. It has bilateral economic partnerships with Japan and South Korea, its 11th and 15th
largest trade partners in 2011-12. Clearly, FTAs are not decisive factors in India’s trade with most of its major partners.

India runs trade deficits with six of its top 10 partners. It runs trade deficits with Japan and Korea as well. While for some
of the Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, high oil imports might influence the deficits, they are certainly not
responsible for deficits with Japan, Korea and Switzerland. India’s main imports from these countries are non-oil
manufactured products, particularly machinery, iron and steel, pharmaceuticals and precious stones. High manufactured
imports from China, therefore, are not solely responsible for India’s enlarging trade deficit. It is the expected outcome for
a country that is a net importer of goods with respect to the rest of the world and has to import due to shortage of inputs
and final products at home.

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Whether there be an FTA or not, Chinese imports would continue to be high in India. These imports have continued in spite
of extensive anti-dumping actions (96 actions for almost 200 tariff lines during 2002-2010). Domestic industry in India is
incapable of producing at scales required for meeting large domestic demand in not only intermediate goods like telecom
and power equipment, but also consumption goods like printers, SIM cards and Diwali diyas. The FTA would only reduce
the scope of protective measures like anti-dumping actions and tariffs making domestic industry unhappy.

Both China and India continue to have multiple market access barriers impeding trade. China’s regulations restricting
distribution of foreign language films, prohibitive testing requirements for pharmaceuticals and non-recognition of foreign
intellectual property content, make access difficult for several exporters, not only Indians. A bilateral FTA excluding these
issues and focusing only on tariffs will hardly make a difference to the current volume and quality of trade.

The JSG had rightly recommended working towards an agreement covering trade in goods, services and investment. But
given the restrictive domestic policies of both countries affecting foreign service providers in several areas, a
comprehensive bilateral economic agreement does not appear feasible till both countries reform the regulations. Till then,
an FTA would just be a strategic confidence-building measure, not an economically meaningful step.

Palit, author of ‘China-India Economics: Challenges, Competition and Collaboration’, is visiting senior research fellow,
Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Views are personal

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2 of 2 04-Jan-13 11:48 AM
India’s date with the Arctic - The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/indias-date-with-the-ar...

Today's Paper » OPINION

India’s date with the Arctic

Shyam Saran

BIG MELT, BIG RUSH:Taking into account the ‘global commons’ character of the Arctic, such an international regime must be able to put in
place an effective compliance mechanism. —PHOTO: AFP
On May 15, 2013, India became an Observer at the Arctic Council, which coordinates policy on the Arctic. (The Arctic
Council has eight states as members, the five coastal states, Canada, Russia, the U.S., Norway and Denmark
(through Greenland), and Sweden, Iceland and Finland.) Other countries that joined India as Observers were China,
Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Italy. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, Spain and the
Netherlands are already Observers.
Criteria
In becoming an Observer, India had to agree to the following criteria set by the Council:
(i) recognise the sovereign rights of Arctic states;
(ii) recognise that the Law of the Sea and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, constitute the legal basis and
the legal framework within which the Arctic will be managed;
(iii) respect indigenous peoples, local cultures and traditions; and
(iv) be able to contribute to the work of the Arctic Council.
Template transfer?
In accepting to abide by these criteria, India has recognised the territorial jurisdiction and sovereign rights of the
Arctic littoral states and hence their pre-eminent and even pre-emptive role over the Arctic zone. The acceptance of
the Law of the Sea as the governing instrument for the Arctic also implies that the extension of jurisdiction over the
continental shelf as well as over maritime passage and the resources of the ocean space will lie with the littoral
states. The Arctic has virtually become the inland water space of the five coastal states — Russia, Norway, Denmark,
Canada and the United States. India has, therefore, no more room to argue that the region be treated in the same
manner as the Antarctica. In the Antarctica Treaty of 1959, territorial claims have been kept in abeyance in favour of
a global commons approach, respecting the pristine nature of the ice covered continent. The trends we see in the
Arctic region may well come to pass in the Antarctic as well. The claimant states could reasonably argue that just as
the Arctic space is being managed by the sovereign members of the Arctic Council, with well-defined norms and
through cooperation among both the littoral and user states, why could this not serve as a template for Antarctica?
Like the Arctic, the Antarctic, too, is a treasure house of resources. These are also being unlocked by the steady
melting of the continent’s ice cover. It may only be a question of time before the northern Gold Rush is followed by
its rampant Southern version.
India has succumbed to the temptation of sharing in the emerging opportunities for resource extraction as the
Arctic continues to melt because of global warming, Yes, as the government argues, becoming an Observer would
enable India to take part in scientific research into the changing Arctic environment, including its serious climate
change effects. These effects will be global, whether in sea level rise, the acidification of the worlds’ oceans and
change in ocean currents and weather patterns. India’s association with the Arctic Council puts it in a better
position to understand these changes and be a part of efforts to minimise the adverse consequences of the Arctic
being opened up to intensified human activity. However, both the members of the Arctic Council and the Observers,
including India, have avoided confronting the obvious: the opportunities that they seek to exploit and profit from

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are the very activities which will exacerbate the climate change impact of a warming Arctic. The “on the one hand”
and “on the other hand” approach that all these stakeholders are guilty of merely disguises the fact that the lure of
profit has already triumphed over the fear of ecological disaster. China has lost no time in positioning itself through
a number of asset acquisitions in several Arctic states, in particular, Russia and Canada.
Practical
What could be done to restrain this headlong rush into a potential ecological catastrophe of global dimensions?
Oceanographer and Arctic expert Rick Steiner has made a practical and reasonable suggestion. This is for the U.N.
to set up its own Arctic body. It may be on the lines of the Indian Ocean Commission, which may provide the
international community the capacity to monitor what is happening in the region, draw up strict norms for
activities, taking into account the “global commons” character of the Arctic, and put in place a credible and effective
compliance mechanism. India could certainly push for such a global regime without violating its role of Observer at
the Arctic Council.
It may also be worthwhile for India and other developing states to put the Arctic on the agenda of the ongoing
multilateral negotiations on Climate Change under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. A separate
resolution or decision of the Conference of Parties to the Convention could draw attention to the Arctic as a global
commons, its impact on global climate and the need to ensure that the activities undertaken there do not harm the
well-being of the vast majority of people around the world.
I have said earlier and reiterate: it is hypocritical of the developed, industrialised countries, in particular, the rich
Arctic states, to preach low carbon development strategies to poor, developing countries, while they themselves,
rush headlong into ensuring the perpetuation of their own carbon and fossil fuel intensive patterns of production
and consumption. This hypocrisy lies at the heart of the relentless spoilage and ravaging of one of the last pristine
frontiers of our endangered planet. If we keep silent and look away because of the prospect of sharing in this
unseemly Gold Rush, India’s credentials as a responsible member of the international community and as a
champion of the principle of equitable burden-sharing and inter-generational equity, would become deeply suspect.
(Shyam Saran, a former Foreign Secretary, is currently Chairman, National Security Advisory Board.)
Instead of joining the race to commercially exploit this pristine region, New Delhi must use its
position in the regional council to push for a global mechanism to prevent an unseemly gold rush

2 of 2 7/15/2013 11:30 PM
The shale revolution’s
shifting geopolitics
It strengthens the United States, reduces China’s
energy dependence, and generates a major global
stimulus, while potentially destabilising both the
Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia
Alan Riley

he shale energy revolution is

T likely to shift the tectonic
plates of global power in ways that
are largely beneficial to the West
and reinforce U.S. power and
influence during the first half of
this century. Yet most public
discussion off shale’s potential
either focuses on the alleged
environmental dangers of fracking OIL AND GAS: Most public
or on how shale will affect the discussion of shale’s potential
market price of natural gas. Both either focuses on the alleged
discussions blind policymakers to
the true scale of the shale environmental dangers of
revolution. fracking or on how it will
The real impact stems from its affect the market price of
effect on the oil market. Shale gas natural gas. — PHOTO: AFP
offers the means to vastly increase
the supply of fossil fuels for shale revolution will grant the
transportation, which will cut into United States a greater range of
the rising demand for oil — fuelled options in dealing with foreign
in part by China’s economic states
states.
growth — that has dominated For the Europeans, the shale
energy policymaking over the last revolution is also largely positive.
decade
decade. A greater variety of gas supplies
from liquefied natural gas
Same technology originally destined for the United
There are two major factors in States has been dumped in
play here. First, the same shale European markets; by 2020, shale
extraction technology of gas in the form of liquefied natural
horizontal drilling and hydraulic gas is likely to begin arriving in
fracturing can be employed Europe in significant quantities,
whether the rocks are oil-bearing and there is also the prospect of
or gas-bearing. We have already some domestic shale gas becoming
seen over half a million barrels of available. Europe will also benefit
oil a day flowing from the Bakken from the second stage of the shale
field in North Dakota. The recent revolution as oil prices come under
Harvard-based Belfer Center pressure.
report — “Oil: The Next However, American self-
gg
Revolution” — suggests that shale sufficiencyy in oil is off greatest
g
oil could be providing
p g America concern to the European Unio Union.
with as much as six million barrels The danger is that the United
a day by 2020. The United States States will no longer have any
imported only 11 million barrels of direct interest in ensuring supply
crude oil a day in 2011. Given the flows out of the Gulf. At the very
potential for offshore and least this will mean that
conventional domestic oil Washington is likely to demand
production, this would suggest greater European investment in its
that by 2020, America could be own energy security. One option
near energy independence in oil. oil for the European Union is to
However, many supporters of develop natural gas transportation
energyy independence
p miss a key as an energy security hedge. This
p
point: The major j ggeopolitical
p would also increase pricing
impact
p of shale extraction pressure on oil producers.
technology gy lies less in the fact that
America will be more energy gy self- About China
sufficient than in the consequentq China
hina has even greater
g
displacement
p of world oil markets incentives to develop its shale gas
byy a sharp reduction in U.S. resource
resources. According to the U.S.
imports
imports. This is likely to be Energy Department’s Energy
reinforced by the development of Information Administration, the
shale oil resources in China, y recoverable resources
country’s
Argentina, Ukraine and other are larger than those of the United
places, which will put additional State
States at 36 trillion cubic meters.
pressure on global oil prices. The main geostrategic reason for
The second factor is the Beijing to develop shale gas for
potential to use natural gas for transportation is that the U.S.
transportation
transportation. Some analysts y Navy controls the Pacific and most
gg that this will onlyy be a
suggest Chinese oil arrives by tanker.
realistic pprospect
p for fleet and Large-scale use of natural gas for
long-haul road transportation
transportation. But transportation would protect
they are overlooking the immense China from much of the effect of a
advantage that natural gas g has as a U.S. blockade.
p
transportation fuel in America and By contrast, the outlook for
Europe,p , which have both Russia and Saudi Arabia seems
developedp a natural gas g bleak. As the decade progresses,
infrastructure in urban areas that shale will be developed worldwide
takes p piped
p natural ggas into and natural gas infrastructures
homes, offices and supermarket
supermarkets. will be constructed. It is difficult to
Once gas is cheap and widely see how the markets will avoid
available, it is possible to consider droppingpp g oil prices
p
prices.
dealing with the “last mile” Geopolitically,
p y, the shale
problem of providing home revolution strengthens
g the United
refuelling kits so consumers can States,, reduces China’s energy gyy
fill up natural-gas powered cars in dependence,
p , generates
g a major
j
their own garages.
garages gglobal stimulus,, which takes the
The incentives to develop shale Western economies off the fiscal
g are veryy great.
oil and natural gas g rocks,, while potentially
p y
But so far,, the
he United States has destabilisingg both the Russian
onlyy experienced
p the first stage
g of Federation and Saudi Arabia. The
low natural-gasg prices
p and the incentives for the West and China
reimportation
p of energygy intensive to develop shale-based fossil fuel
industries such as chemicals and resources are so great that they
steel because of low ggas prices.
p
price The will continue to press ahead with
next stageg of the shale revolution’s them. (Alan Riley is a professor of
impact g g to be felt as major energy law at The City Law School
p is going
stimulus gets
g under way from at City University London.) — New
lower oil prices
prices. More broadly, the York Times News Service
Getting
etting to know India’s other neighbours
Today’s Asean-India Summit is an opportunity to engage with a grouping that
needs more attention from New Delhi
Sanjaya Baru

T
he recently redesigned website
of India’s External Affairs Min-
istry (mea.gov.in) has a link
right on top of its home page,
just below the photograph of the new
Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid, to
“India and Neighbours”. Sadly, the
‘neighbours’ listed are only her so-called
‘South Asian’ neighbours, the inhabit-
ants of the Indian subcontinent.
One cannot blame just those who have
constructed this website for this myopic
view of what constitutes India’s neigh-
bourhood. The occupants of New Delhi’s
Raisina Hill have for long seen only the
Himalayas, the deserts and the Gangetic
plains around them. When one thinks of
the ocean as a barrier rather than a
bridge one cannot come around to think-
ing of countries on the other side of the
waters as ‘neighbours’.
But Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
has never been a victim of this common
Delhi affliction. Why, only earlier this
year he told the chief guest at India’s
Republic Day celebrations, Thailand’s
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra,
that India and Thailand are “maritime
neighbours”. That is a message that Dr.
Singh has proudly carried in recent years
to Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Iran,
Saudi Arabia and Oman.
However, in repeating that message to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Tan Dung applaud as their
his hosts at the Asean-India Summit on Commerce and Industry Ministers Anand Sharma and Vu Huy Hoang exchange documents during the 15th
Monday Dr. Singh must remember that
India’s eastern maritime neighbours ex- Asean Summit in Hua Hin, Thailand in 2009. — PHOTO: PTI
pect a little more attention than they are
getting. Over the past couple of years I Vajpayee, had left the relationship. In- the provisions of the Asean-India FTA India FTA in services. He is seeking a
have heard South-East Asian members deed, on the India-U.S. civil nuclear that they alleged would hurt Kerala’s wider, comprehensive economic cooper-
of the Asean-India Eminent Persons agreement he even told Mr. Vajpayee, “I farmers. An unflustered Dr. Singh re- ation agreement. Despite all this effort,
Group (AIEPG) lament the slow pace have completed what you began”. plied in his characteristic soft voice, there is still a perception in South-East
and the low profile of India’s engage- “But, comrade, I am told the benefici- Asia that India is not as actively engaged
ment of the region. Sensitivity on this PM’s personal interest aries would be poor farmers from the with the region as it ought to be.
score has reached a new height as many If there is one relationship that Dr. fraternal socialist republic of Vietnam!” On the other hand, some in India be-
Asean (Association of South-East Asian Singh has pursued with great personal Everyone broke into laughter, enjoying lieve that Asean has been unable to func-
Nations) members have become wary of interest, it has been the relationship the Prime Minister’s understated rebuff.tion in a cohesive manner, has become
China’s assertiveness in the region. with Asean nations. The first time a dif- After the resistance from farm inter-internally far too divided and, therefore,
ference of opinion between Congress ests came the resistance from industry. is unable to deliver on its commitments.
Lend a helping hand Party president Sonia Gandhi and Dr. The then Union Minister for Commerce This week’s summit will be followed
Meeting in Phnom Penh over the Singh came out into the open was when a and Industries, Kamal Nath, succeeded up by next month’s Asean-India Com-
weekend, Asean leaders are unlikely to party functionary, now a Cabinet Minis- in delaying negotiations on the FTA in memorative Summit, marking two dec-
forget what happened at their Foreign ter, leaked a letter that Ms Gandhi had goods, pandering to domestic business ades of dialogue partnership between
Ministers’ meeting this July when dis- written to Dr. Singh expressing concern lobbies. When Dr. Singh returned to of- Asean and India. A vision statement for
agreement on how to refer to the South about the provisions of the free trade fice in May 2009 he handed the Ministry future cooperation and economic inte-
China Sea dispute involving China and agreement (FTA) India was then nego- over to Anand Sharma with the explicit gration contained in the report of the
Asean members resulted in the meeting tiating with Asean. Her concern was that AIEPG will be made public and a road
instruction that the signing of the Asean-
ending, for the first time ever, without a the FTA may hurt some Indian interests. India FTA in goods should be his first map for the creation of an Asian Eco-
joint communiqué. C Caught between n Chi- Assuaging her concerns and making nomic Community is expected to be
task. Mr. Sharma’s first foreign visit was
na-U.S. and China-Japan rivalry in the his reply also public, Dr. Singh said: “Our to Singapore in June 2009 and the FTA unveiled.
region, Asean is gasping for life. This
T approach to regional trade agreements, was signed in August. Whatever the hurdles and the gaps in
gives India an opportunity to be the good in general, and FTAs, in particular, has communication, India has to pay greater
The third decisive intervention of Dr.
neighbour, stepping in to boost Asean’s been evolved after careful consideration Singh that has shaped the Asean-India attention to its relations with her mar-
confidence and relevance to Asia. of our geopolitical as well as economic relationship was his categorical state- itime neighbours. A first step would be to
No one can do this with greater con- interests.” By drawing attention to geo- ment at the Asean-India Summit in Oc- recognise the fact that they are, indeed,
viction than Prime Minister Singh. Tak- political considerations in defending the tober 2009: “India’s engagement with our neighbours — not just geographically
ing forward former Prime Minister P.V. Asean-India FTA, Dr. Singh was provid- the Asean is at the heart of our ‘Look but also civilisationally! Neighbours are
Policy”,
Narasimha Rao’s “Look East Policy y”, Dr.
y” ing a wider context to a purely trade East’ Policy.” This was a reassurance defined purely by geography, but a
Singh has done more to cement India’s agreement. It is this approach that both that Asean members were seeking at a neighbourhood is defined by economic,
relations with South-East Asia, for a long Asean and India have since adopted in time when they felt India may pay grea- social, cultural and political factors. A
time referred to as “Indo-China”, than defining the scope of the relationship. ter attention to its bilateral relationscommunity is born of an interactive
any other Prime Minister since Jawa- A few weeks after Ms Gandhi’s letter with Asia’s major powers, China, Japan, neighbourhood. Any which way, Asean
harlal Nehru. to the Prime Minister, the then Chief and India are neighbours, as indeed are
Korea and Indonesia, at the cost of Asean
Analysts of Dr. Singh’s foreign policy Minister of Kerala, V.S. Achutanandan, as a group. India and the Gulf. Time for MEA to
initiatives tend to focus mainly on his led a delegation comprising his bright update its website!
initiatives with the United States and and articulate Finance Minister Thomas Perceptions and visions (Sanjaya Baru is a member of the
Pakistan. In both cases, it can be said, he Isaac and the sagacious Vice-Chairman In travelling to Phnom Penh, Dr. Asean-India Eminent Persons Group
was picking up the threads from where of the Kerala State Planning Board Prab- Singh has once again put his weight be- and Hon. Senior Fellow, Centre for Pol-
his immediate predecessor, Atal Bihari hat Patnaik to lodge a complaint against hind an early conclusion of the Asean- icy Research, New Delhi.)
 http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/1082532/

Print Close Window

Rani D Mullen Posted online: Mon Mar 04 2013, 02:19 hrs

While India’s development assistance has increased markedly since 2000, it remains moderate in relation to the
country’s size and growing stature

The newly released budget has not only protected but has actually increased India’s foreign assistance, or development
partnerships as the government prefers to call it. It has done so despite fiscal pressures to decrease spending, as well
as pre-election year pressures to increase funding only for programmes that will gain votes.

Given India’s growing global stature and its international strategic interests, India needs to ensure that its development
assistance is harnessed to its full potential. Protecting the ministry of external affairs’ budget, and that of development
assistance in particular, will help to further cement several changes India has undertaken over the past decade to
strengthen its relationships with other developing countries.

India is not an “emerging donor”, having started development assistance to neighbouring Bhutan only a couple of years
after Independence, at a time when India was itself struggling to deal with its massive poverty and other social issues,
as well as the horrors of Partition. With the addition of the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC)
programme in the 1960s, India’s development assistance focused on training and capacity building in partner countries
and was able to leverage an entire generation of Indian-trained civil servants from numerous countries into friendly
bilateral relations, as well as support for India’s views in multilateral fora. For example, nearly 700 Ethiopians, largely
civil servants (but including the current prime minister), have received training to date under the ITEC programme. The
Ethiopian government has repeatedly stated that India is among its preferred partners and it supports India’s bid for a
seat on the UN Security Council.

While India’s development assistance has increased markedly since 2000, it remains moderate in relation to the
country’s size and growing stature. Between 2003-04 and the new 2013-14 budget, India’s development assistance
increased fourfold, from Rs 1,749 crore to Rs 7,019 crore annually. Much of this increase in development funding went
to Afghanistan where India, with a total commitment of around Rs 11,000 crore, is the fifth-largest bilateral donor. India
has also provided increased assistance to other neighbouring countries, such as Bhutan and Myanmar, and has given
some grants to several African countries. Over the past two years, development assistance as a percentage of total
government expenditures has grown from 0.27 per cent to 0.42 per cent. Yet, this soft power tool of foreign policy is still
below half a per cent of the budget, and is dwarfed when compared to spending on hard power, as defence accounts for
over 12 per cent of the estimated government spending in this year.

Faced with such budget limits, in 2004 India came up with an innovative development assistance tool: government-
subsidised and Exim Bank-managed Lines of Credit. These credit lines have grown tremendously. While India’s 2013-14
budget allocation for development assistance is about Rs 7,000 crore, the current open Lines of Credit total around Rs
50,000 crore. Building on the Indian idea of a two-way partnership for development, Lines of Credit are structured in a
mutually beneficial way. They enable partner countries to avail of the large funds the bank is able to raise in the
international debt market. Because the Indian government subsidises the interest rates, partner countries get access to
credit at below market rates. India benefits by having a new development assistance tool and larger foreign policy
leverage that is not limited by its government budget. Also, since these credits are largely tied to goods and service
provision by Indian firms, they help open markets for Indian business. For example, the 2010 US$1 billion credit line to

1 of 2 3/17/2013 7:31 AM
 http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/1082532/

Bangladesh has been offered way below market interest rates, while 75 per cent of the credit is tied to Indian imports.

In January 2012, India also took a large step towards coordinating and streamlining its development assistance with the
formation of the development partnership administration (DPA) within the MEA. The DPA is tasked with coordinating and
administering all development assistance, particularly grants and technical assistance, though development policy
decisions remain with the MEA’s respective country divisions.

India today undoubtedly has more resources and tools to strengthen its development partnerships. Yet, given India’s
rising regional and global role as a development partner, these resources are still moderate. The MEA remains
notoriously understaffed, with the size of its diplomatic corps comparable to that of Singapore — a country with a
population size one-third that of Delhi. And the diplomatic staff hiring and training processes remain woefully inadequate.
Fully harnessing this potential will require, to paraphrase the External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, more
investments in human capital, capacity-building and financial resources.

The writer, director of Indian Development Cooperation Research and visiting fellow, Centre for Policy Research, is
associate professor of government at the College of William & Mary, US

2 of 2 3/17/2013 7:31 AM

6 THE HINDU
Message
from
Hon'ble
Prime
Minister
Sheikh Hasina
convey my heartiest greetings
I to my countrymen as well as to
all expatriate Bangalis on the oc-
casion of the great Independence
and National Day of Bangladesh.
The 26th of March is a glorious
day in our national life. On this
great day, I pay my deep homage
to the 3 million martyrs and
200,000 women who lost their in-
nocence in the War of Liberation
in 1971. I recall with deep grat-
itude the greatest Bangali of all
time, Father of the Nation Banga-
bandhu Sheikh Mujihur Rahman,
under whose dynamic leadership
we earned our great independ-
ence. I also pay my humble tribute
to four national leaders and the
valiant freedom fighters, who
fought against the Pakistani occu-
pation forces to free our beloved
motherland. I extend my sympa-
thies to those who lost their near
and dear ones, and were subjected
to brutal torture and subjugation
during the war. I recall with grat-
itude our foreign friends who ex-
tended their whole-hearted
support and cooperation for the
cause of our liberation. The Fa-
ther of the Nation, Bangabandhu
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, pro-
claimed the independence of Ban-
gladesh at the first hour of March
26, 1971 after the occupation
forces launched a sudden attack
on innocent and unarmed Banga-
lis on the black night of March 25,
1971. Bangabandhu's proclama-
tion was spread all over the coun-
try through telegrams,
tele-printers and EPR wireless. At
each and every district and sub-
division, Awami League leaders
and workers publicized the decla-
ration widely through mikes. The
international media also had cir-
culated Bangabandhu's proclama-
tion of independence. Under the
brave and dauntless leadership of
Bangabandhu, we earned the ulti-
mate victory on the 16th of Decem-
ber, 1971 after a nine-month
bloody war. The independence
earned through huge bloodbath
and sacrifice is our people's great-
est achievement. To ensure that
this achievement remains mea-
ningful, the spirit of our great lib-
eration war should reach every
nook and corner of the country.
Cherishing the true history of the
liberation war close to our hearts,
we would have to go ahead in
achieving the objectives of the
Charter of Change by building a
Bangladesh, free from corruption,
mal-governance, terrorism, hun-
ger and poverty. The present Awa-
mi League government has been
implementing huge development
programmes in all sectors, includ-
ing agriculture, education, health,
law and order, information tech-
nology, energy and power and
communications. The defeated
anti-liberation, communal and
identified reactionary forces are
trying to undo the democratic and
development process of our be-
loved country at a time when our
government has executed the ver-
dict of Bangahandhu's assassina-
tion case, and is holding the trial of
the war criminals. On this auspi-
cious day of our independence, I
urge our countrymen to remain
united to foil the ill designed plots
of the anti-democratic and anti-
liberation forces against the gov-
ernment and the people.
We have been striving hard to
establish Bangladesh as a poverty,
hunger and illiteracy free modern
Digital Bangladesh by the Golden
Jubilee year of our independence
through the implementation of
'Vision-2021'. I hope that all citi-
zens of our country would engage
themselves with their utmost sin-
cerity, honesty and dedication to
build Bangladesh as a prosperous
and prestigious country in the
comity of nations.
I am confident that Insha-Allah,
with our united efforts, we would
surely achieve our golden Bangla-
desh as envisioned by the Father
of the Nation.
Joi Bangla, Joi Bangabandhu
May Bangladesh Live Forever.
Sheikh Hasina
CM
YK
Reconfiguring Bangladesh-India Relations
A t the time when the offer of this as-
signment as High Commissioner of
Bangladesh to India was made to me in
mid-2009, I was working in Track II on
how to improve relations with India and
how to promote sub-regional coopera-
tion in the region. When I accepted this
onerous responsibility, I knew fully well
that while the position offered a unique
opportunity of translating my vision for
the region, or at least some aspects of it
into reality, the challenges would also be
formidable. I came to New Delhi in Au-
gust 2009 and one thing followed the
next. Come March 2013, where do we find
Bangladesh-India relations?
Security issues
India’s main concern had always been
its perception that Bangladesh had, wit-
tingly or otherwise, been providing safe
haven for or even abetting, elements of
various militant groups from the North-
east Indian states who were actively pur-
suing anti-India activities using Bangla-
desh as a launching pad. However, the
‘Mohajote’ (Grand Coalition) govern-
ment led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasi-
na considered these same elements as
also being inimical to Bangladesh’s own
security concerns and detrimental to its
overall societal development.
The new Government in Bangladesh
assured India, in clear, categorical and
unambiguous terms that Bangladesh
would not allow its territory to be used by
any one for carrying out activities inim-
ical to India’s security concerns, and
enunciated policy of zero-tolerance to-
wards any terrorist activity conducted in
or launched from Bangladesh.
The sincerity of that commitment,
made in the very early days of the govern-
ment, has since been more than palpably
demonstrated. It has been deeply appre-
ciated by one and all in India. Security
concerns do not cast any cloud over our
growing relations. Notably, within the
overall security rubric, the Home Minis-
ters of the two countries signed an Extra-
dition Treaty in Dhaka in January 2013.
Earlier, during the landmark game-
changing visit of the Bangladesh Prime
Minister to India in January 2010, the
two countries had signed an Agreement
on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal
Matters, another Agreement on Transfer
of Sentenced Persons, and an Agreement
on Combating International Terrorism,
Organized Crime and Illicit Drug
Trafficking.
Boundaries
India’s largest boundary is not with
Pakistan or with China; it’s with Bangla-
desh – 4096 kilometers, somewhat tortu-
ously (and insensitively) defined by Sir
Cyril Radcliffe on the paper map he was
given to draw the partition lines across
India in 1947.
Along with this line that cut through
the heart of communities (and at some
places, incongruously, across what had
once been homes), the border drawn by
Radcliffe also left some strange land-
holdings called enclaves (territory no-
tionally belonging to one side but totally
surrounded by the territory of the other),
with India having 111 such enclaves in
Bangladesh, and Bangladesh having 55 in
India; and Adversely Possessed Lands
(APLs) – land that had been habitually
used for cultivation or other agrarian ac-
tivities by people of a community who
suddenly found a fence drawn across it
and they being technically in wrongful
possession of it by virtue of the Radcliffe
“award”.
In 2009, there were still 6.5 kilometers
of demarcated border. The problem of the
enclaves had become more complicated,
by virtue of increasing populations since
1947 – some 50,000 people on both sides
were virtually “stateless”.
Effectively, the question of territory
became increasingly irrelevant in the face
of the denial of basic human rights and
governance benefits to these people –
coupled with forced cessation of tradi-
tional seasonal economic activities that
used to define them prior to the Partition
of 1947.
In 1974, the Indira-Mujib accord on
land boundaries had sought to resolve the
legacy left behind by the Radcliffe Award,
but this remained largely unaddressed af-
ter the assassination in 1975 of Bangla-
desh’s Father of the Nation, Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman. Operationalizing the
provisions of the Land boundary Agree-
ment of 1974 became a priority agenda
item for me.
In the new atmosphere of trust ema-
nating from having satisfactorily ad-
dressed hitherto vexing security-related
issues, both sides were also able, together,
to resolve all boundary related issues am-
icably and to their mutual satisfaction,
and to this effect signed the Protocol to
the LBA of 1974 on September 6, 2011 in
Dhaka in the presence of the two Prime
Ministers.
However, “straightening” of the border
line, that involves each country absorbing
de jure the enclaves with their respective
populations that they had hitherto held
hostage de facto, and accepting the Rad-
cliffe line largely (with minor modifica-
tions in the APLs), as well as finally
signing off on all strip maps relating to
the finally demarcated border, also re-
quires constitutional ratification in Par-
liament by both sides.
In Bangladesh, it is a relatively simple
procedure, and has been done. But it still
remains to be ratified by the Indian Par-
liament. In terms of managing the border,
the job of the two forces guarding it from
NOIDA/DELHI
TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2013
either side is primarily to maintain the
inviolability and integrity of the zero-line
mal trade now, but more importantly
serve the most useful function of expand-
linked with increasing people-to-people
connectivity. Towards that end, the two
on the border. Both sides now need their
district administrations to manage activ-
ities along the border within the param-
ing the spaces of mutual trust and com-
fort with each other.
Any expansion of trade would auto-
countries have, in January 2013, signed
the Revised Travel Agreement that vastly
eases travel restrictions that had hitherto
eters of their respective legal systems.
This requires that different units of the
matically involve operationalization of
carriageways to facilitate movement of
existed and had virtually held our peoples
“boundary-locked”. Five years multiple
district administration (dealing with cus- goods and services across, as well as mea- entry business and investors visa, visa on
toms, immigration, narcotics, anti-ter- ningfully linking, our respective territo- arrival to diplomatic and official passport
rorism, trafficking of all types of ries. For the first time in recent history, holders, two-years multiple entry educa-
contraband, etc) should have periodic Bangladesh has offered itself as a bridge tional visas to students (renewable on
meetings at regular intervals with their as well as tele-communication hub, link- annual basis thereafter), long term mul-
counterparts on the other side of the bor- ing the Northeast with mainland India, tiple entry visa for medical treatment
der. The Home Ministers of both coun- linking South Asia with Southeast Asia with accompanying attendants, and three
tries, therefore, has so decided to and beyond, and opening up the vast po- months multiple entry tourist visas are
reactivate a practice that had for long tentials of trade and economic interlocu- some of the prominent features of this
been discontinued. With this more holi- tion that still remain untapped. We have new RTA. Tariq A. Karim
stic approach to border management, our offered the use of Chittagong and Mongla During the visit of the Prime Minister High Commissioner
borders henceforth will become a shining ports for use by India and landlocked of India to Bangladesh in September of Bangladesh to India
and outstandingly commendable border Nepal and Bhutan to facilitate trade; the 2011, a comprehensive ‘Framework
of peace, tranquility and friendship rath- construction of Akhaura-Agartala rail Agreement on Cooperation for Develop-
er than otherwise. Another related but linkage is well underway, while the re- ment’ that outlines the shared vision for exchanges – bringing to table sources
left-over problem from earlier times was suscitation of several other dormant but durable and long-term cooperation to such as Sikkim, Meghalaya and Tripura.
the Tin Bigha corridor issue, which in- long atrophied rail links are under dis- achieve mutual peace, prosperity and sta- In principle, Bangladesh has also agreed
volved allowing unfettered access of Ban-
gladeshis in the Dahagram-Angarpota
cussion. The Maitree passenger train ser-
vice between Dhaka and Kolkata has
bility was signed by the two sides. In to linking our respective grids in our east
terms of this remarkable document, the (with Tripura) and more importantly in
territories of Bangladesh to the Bangla- already been under operation for the last two sides agreed to set up a Joint working our north (with Meghalaya-Assam). The
desh mainland around the clock from the several years, and reviving some other Group on Trade and Connectivity to look northern grid holds the most exciting
previous very restrictive arrangement. historically popular routes (like Khulna- into all aspects of trade and related con- possibilities for both sides.
Simple traffic management principles Kolkata) and opening new ones (between nectivity issues with a view to addressing It will finally enable India to concretiz-
were applied to a “problem” that need Agartala in Tripura and Ramgarh in Chit- them jointly. During the visit of Indian ing plans to tap into the vast potentials of
never have become a problem and 24- tagong) is under contemplation. External Affairs Minister to Dhaka in hydro-power in Arunachal Pradesh (esti-
hour access by citizens of both sides to Bus services have been in operation February 2013, the formation of this mated at between 50,000 MW_90,000
their respective territories is now avail- between Calcutta and Agartala via Dhaka JWG was announced. The first meeting of MW) and also evacuate it economically
able since it was initiated in 2011. from the time of Sheikh Hasina’s first this group is likely to be held in a few across Bangladesh. In return, Bangladesh
Waters term in office (1996-2001). A similar ser- weeks time. has requested to obtain a meaningful por-
In 1995, the sharing of the Ganges wa- vice between Guwahati-Shillong-Sylhet- A most remarkable development was tion of the power so produced (whether
ter had become the one issue which vir- Dhaka is currently under discussion. the resounding reaffirmation of the deep jointly or otherwise). Almost all or most
tually held hostage forward movement on New ports-of-calls have been added in cultural connectivity that had historically of all that was narrated above was virtual-
all other areas. With the election of the our Inland Water Transport and Transit existed between the peoples of our two ly unthinkable just a few years ago.Sub-
Awami League-led coalition to power and agreement, and additional ports are un- countries through jointly celebrating the Regionalism:
forming the government in June, 1996, der consideration. A coastal shipping Sesquicentennial birth anniversary of Expanding from bilateral cooperation
the two sides were able to very speedily agreement is under discussion, linking Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore, the nine- to sub-regional cooperation on water
arrive at a 30-year Treaty on Ganges Wa- ports across our long but contiguously tieth anniversary of Bangladesh’s nation- management and hydro-energy harvest-
ter sharing within six months, on Decem- shared coastline on the Bay of Bengal. al poet Kazi Nazrul Islam’s iconic work ing has been one of the most remarkable
ber 12, 1996. Resolving amicably the Work is well underway to putting in place “Bidrohi” (the Rebel) and the 120th birth outcomes of this new relationship be-
festering Ganga issue opened the space the infrastructure and supporting hard- anniversary of Swami Vivekananda. tween Bangladesh and India, enunciated
for also successfully resolving the cross- ware needed to concretize that shared Energy and Power in the Framework Agreement of Septem-
border insurgency problem with the sign- vision and transform it into reality. Most For the first time, Bangladesh will be ber 2011.
ing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts accord in of the US$ 1 billion Line of Credit ($200 purchasing 500 MW of power from India. This new paradigm envisages Bangla-
December 1997. million of which was converted into out- Purchasing power also requires that both desh convening two sets of tri-nation
This time, Sheikh Hasina’s govern- right grant) is being used towards fulfill- countries need to connect their respec- meetings (the Ganges basin with Bangla-
ment took on the task of arriving at an ment of this grand design. tive power grids. desh-India-Nepal; and the Brahmaputra
interim accord on the Teesta River (that When completed, one could well envi- This too is underway, and everything basin with Bangladesh-India-Bhutan),
flows from Sikkim, across West Bengal sage a continuation of these connectiv- should be in place to allow power to flow first at technical/senior officials’ level, to
into Bangladesh). ities to eventually heralding the revival of by middle of this year. We have also set up be followed at higher political level.
The two sides did arrive at an agreed the ancient Silk Route that had once con- a Joint Working group on power cooper-
draft in early 2011 for an interim sharing nected Asia with Europe. Trade connec- ation to explore avenues for joint produc-
agreement for fifteen years that was ini- tivity is inextricably intertwined and tion as well as more such power Continued on Page 7...
tialed by the senior officials (Secretaries
of the respective Water Resources minis-
tries) of the two sides, but it is still await-
ing final signature pending the Union
government arriving at a satisfactory un-
derstanding on the issue with the govern-
ment of West Bengal. Bangladesh and
India share 54 rivers between them, and
so far we have been able to resolve only
the sharing of waters of one river (Gang-
es) and arrive at an agreed draft interim
agreement on a second (Teesta). But our
approach to addressing our waters issues
has graduated from piecemeal and indi-
vidually addressing questions of sharing
of river waters to managing them basin
wise. This stems from the realization that
while, rhetorically, “sharing” connotes a
division of these fluid assets, “managing”
connotes common ownership involving
optimal management and use of a com-
mon resource.
This change of the rhetoric, immedi-
ately, impacts the way we look at the
issue, psychologically shifting the focus
away from contentious division of re-
sources to cooperatively optimizing man-
agement and use of available waters,
which then bind us together rather than
dividing us against each other. With real-
time sharing of flood data, fruits have
started to be borne already.
The proposed Tipaimukh hydro-elec-
tric dam in Manipur on the Barak river
that we share was another festering irri-
tant, governed by deep-seated mistrust,
India’s assurance of no-harm and offer to
Bangladesh to become a share-holder in
the project notwithstanding.
A sub-committee under the Joint Riv-
ers Commission has been formed to study
and look into all aspects of this proposed
project. Should the experts come to a
consensus conclusion on it, next steps
would be contemplated.
Trade and connectivity
The hugely yawning trade gap has been
always a rankling matter for Bangladesh-
is. When I came here, Indian formal ex-
ports to Bangladesh amounted to about
US$4 billion (with an additional US$4
billion of “informal” exports to Bangla-
desh), while Bangladesh’s total exports to
India was around US$350 million. During
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit
to Bangladesh in September 2011, he an-
nounced removal of 46 textile items from
India’s negative list which was hugely ap-
preciated by Bangladesh. Soon after, at
the SAARC summit in Male, India went
the extra mile and announced virtually all
but 25 items being removed from the
SAFTA Sensitive list in respect of the
LDC countries. Already Bangladeshi ex-
ports to India have crossed the US$ 500
million mark, and may even reach the
magical one billion figure in the foresee-
able future. The positive effect of this
far-sighted decision on the Bangladeshi
psyche is incalculable.
To revive traditional community trad-
ing that used to exist prior to the 1947
Partition, Bangladesh and India has also
started ‘Border Haats’, initially on a pilot
basis – in the Meghalaya and Tripura sec-
tors. These haats are not only helping to
convert former “informal” trade into for-
ND-ND
Back to militarism? | Frontline http://www.frontline.in/world-affairs/back-to-militarism/article4991989....

WORLD AFFAIRS
Published: August 7, 2013 12:30 IST | Updated: August 6, 2013 14:23 IST
JAPAN

Back to militarism?

Show Caption Show Caption

A resurgent right-wing Prime Minister in Japan sees China as the main enemy and promises to rewrite his
country’s Constitution to allow the deployment of its defence forces overseas. By JOHN CHERIAN
JAPANESE voters once again gave their vote of confidence to the right-wing government led by Shinzo Abe in the pivotal elections to
the Upper House held on July 23. The results have given the ruling coalition consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the
New Komeito a working majority in both Lower and Upper Houses. The government has plans to pass some ambitious bills and
radically overhaul its foreign and economic policies. The Prime Minister’s much-touted “Abenomics” has effectively devalued the
Japanese currency, making Japanese exports to the international market competitive once again. The government wants to revive the
stagnant economy by pumping in 46 trillion yen (more than $400 billion).
On the foreign policy front, Abe has made competition with China his number one priority. Last year, China officially overtook Japan
as the world’s second biggest economy. Encouraged by the United States, Japan has expended its energy raking up territorial disputes
with China. Abe even described China as a country that had a “deeply ingrained” ambition to rake up territorial disputes with
neighbours.
Japan’s territorial dispute with China revolves round the tiny Senkaku/Diaayovu islands. Beijing was, of course, angry with the
Japanese Prime Minister’s statement and demanded a clarification. The Japanese Foreign Ministry then stated that Abe’s quotes about
China were “misleading”. Japan also has territorial disputes with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands.
Abe has threatened to rewrite the pacifist Japanese Constitution that the U.S. imposed on the country after the Second World War.
Abe has repeatedly stated that he wants the Japanese army, officially known as the “Self-Defence Forces”, to be unfettered from the
restraints imposed by a constitution drafted by an occupying force. Under the current Constitution, Japan, one of the U.S’ trusted
allies in the region, cannot deploy its troops in foreign countries. For a long time, the Japanese political elite has cherished the dream
of Japan’s army participating in the military adventures of the U.S. in foreign climes under the guise of “collective self-defence”. In
one of his final campaign speeches before the elections to the Upper House, Abe pledged to go ahead with far-reaching constitutional
changes to make Japan once again a “proud nation”.
The Prime Minister has so far not talked openly about amending Article 9 of the Constitution, which “renounces war” and “the threat
of use of force as a means of settling international disputes”. Article 9 specifically prohibits “the maintenance of land, sea and air
force”. This has not, however, prevented the Japanese state from making, with the active help of the U.S., its “Self-Defence Forces”
one of the most powerful in the region and deploying them in so-called “reconstruction activities” to help U.S. forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan. U.S. President Barack Obama has also encouraged the Japanese government to play a more robust security role in his
“pivot to Asia” policy.
The U.S., from available indications, tacitly supports Abe’s efforts to engage in “collective self-defence”, which would allow the
Japanese army to conduct joint military operations with its counterparts in the U.S. and elsewhere. After Abe took over as Prime
Minister in December 2012, the Japanese government increased military spending for the first time in more than a decade.
Defence White Paper

The latest Japanese Defence White Paper, released in July, identifies China as the main threat and lays emphasis on expanding
Japan’s military capabilities and strengthening ties with the U.S. After winning the election in December last year the LDP had
pledged to make Japan stronger militarily to take on a resurgent China. The LDP’s main campaign plank then was to build a “strong

1 of 2 9/11/2013 11:38 AM
Back to militarism? | Frontline http://www.frontline.in/world-affairs/back-to-militarism/article4991989....

nation” and a “strong military”.

The Japanese Prime Minster has also spoken about the need to have the capability for pre-emptive strikes against enemy bases
abroad. He said that “pre-emptive strikes” were essential to counter the threat of missile strikes from hostile nations. Japanese leaders
have said that their military has the right to take pre-emptive action against enemy bases overseas if there is a credible and imminent
threat to the country. The previous Defence White Papers had identified North Korea as the main military threat to Japan. The latest
one, however, categorically paints China as the major potential security threat to the country.
Even the U.S. seems to have been taken aback by some of the positions the right-wing government in Tokyo intends to adopt. A recent
report in The Wall Street Journal said the Obama administration was alarmed by Abe’s ambitious nuclear policy. Japan is preparing
to start a massive nuclear fuel processing plant capable of producing 9 tonnes of weapons-usable plutonium annually, enough to build
2,000 bombs.
The Obama administration objected to the plan by saying that it could encourage a nuclear arms race in the region and beyond. U.S.
officials fear that Taiwan and South Korea may follow suit. South Korea has an advanced nuclear programme and only because of U.S.
pressure it has abandoned its programme to produce a nuclear weapon.
In 2011, Japan lifted its ban on arms exports so as to facilitate the participation of big Japanese companies in multinational weapons
projects. During the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Japan in May, it was reported that the Japanese were on the verge of
clinching a deal with India to sell 15 U.S.-2 amphibious military planes. If the Indian government goes ahead with the deal, it will be
the first time since the Second World War that Japan has got involved in the sale of military hardware.
“Quadrilateral axis”

Japan has wooed India for many years in its efforts to build an anti-China military alliance. Abe was instrumental in promoting the
“quadrilateral axis” comprising the U.S., Japan, Australia and India during his first stint in office in 2006-07. Last December, Abe
branded the “quadrilateral” as the “Democratic Asian Security Diamond” and emphasised the need of the four countries to “maintain
freedom of navigation” in the Indian Ocean. During the Indian Prime Minster’s recent visit, Abe said it was up to “India from the West
and Japan from the East” to maintain peace in the region. He pointedly excluded China from his calculus.
Shrine, an “obstacle”

Abe, like many in the Japanese political firmament, continues to be in denial mode about the atrocities committed by the Imperial
Army during the Second World War. He has been a visitor to the controversial Yasukuni shrine where the ashes of many Japanese
“war criminals” are kept, though he has not done so since his re-election as Prime Minister. After taking over, he did send ritual
offerings bearing the insignia of the Prime Minister. However, his deputy, the even more hawkish Taro Aso, and other senior
Ministers have visited the shrine honouring the Japanese war dead.
The repeated annual visits by senior Japanese politicians to the shrine have irked governments in China and the two Koreas, countries
which were under brutal Japanese military occupation. South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se cancelled an official visit in
April in protest against the frequent homage the ruling establishment has paid to Japan’s war heroes. The South Korean Foreign
Ministry, in a statement, expressed “deep concern and regret” over the visits to a shrine “that glorifies Japan’s wars of aggression”.
Beijing has let it be known that the frequent visits to Yasukuni will be “an obstacle” in the improvement of bilateral relations.
Many Japanese voters have been swayed by the heated nationalistic rhetoric Abe has used. This is despite the fact that around 50 per
cent of the electorate did not bother to vote in these elections. The turnout was one of the lowest in post-War Japanese history. “I am
back” and “so is Japan”, Abe theatrically proclaimed to reporters in Washington earlier in the year during his first visit to the U.S. after
taking over the top job for the second time.
The Japanese electorate was disappointed by the performance of the previous government led by the Democratic Party (DP). The
failure of the DP to revive the economy or fulfil its campaign promises led to its eclipse. The DP’s first Prime Minster, Yukio
Hatoyama, had to leave office after he unsuccessfully tried to evict the U.S. from its military base in Yokohama. Hatoyama had also
advocated closer ties with China. Relocating the U.S. base was one of the election pledges of the DP. Japan is still described as an
“unsinkable aircraft carrier” for the U.S. off the coast of China. There are 50,000 U.S. troops permanently based in Japan.
It was on the DP’s watch that the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the worst since Chernobyl, happened. In the elections to the Upper
House held in July, the DP suffered an ignominious defeat. Many Japanese chose to support the Japanese Communist Party (JCP),
viewing it as the only party that opposes the LDP on ideology and national objectives. The JCP won a seat from the Tokyo district for
the first time in 12 years. It won seats in the Osaka and Kyoto prefectures also.
The LDP has ruled Japan since the 1950s. For that matter, the DP, which substituted the LDP as the ruling party in 2009, consisted
mainly of leaders from the LDP. In the latest election to the Upper House, the DP won only 15 seats, its worst performance since its
creation in 1998. The LDP, which critics say is neither Liberal nor Democratic, seems to be destined for another long stint in Japanese
politics. Japanese Prime Ministers, on the other hand, have in recent times had short stints in office, some of them for only a few
months. If “Abenomics” of the faction-ridden LDP fails to deliver, the cycle could be repeated.

Printable version | Sep 11, 2013 11:37:30 AM | http://www.frontline.in/world-affairs/back-to-militarism/article4991989.ece

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For Russia, deepening friendship with
India is a top foreign policy priority
A new level of partnership can be achieved by developing business, scientific
and technological, and humanitarian ties
Vladimir Putin
I
am glad to have an opportunity to
address the readers of one of the
most influential Indian newspa-
pers — The Hindu. As my visit to
New Delhi is beginning, I would like to
outline approaches to further develop-
ment of the strategic partnership be-
tween India and Russia.
This year marked the 65th anniversary
of diplomatic relations between our
countries. During the past decades we
have acquired vast experience of work-
ing together and achieved progress in a
range of fields. Political epochs changed
but the principles of bilateral ties, such
as mutual confidence and equality, re-
mained the same. I would like to stress
that deepening of friendship and cooper-
ation with India is among the top pri-
orities of our foreign policy. And now we
have every reason to say that they have
really unique special and privileged
character.
The Declaration on Strategic Partner-
ship between India and Russia signed in
October 2000 became a truly historic
step.
step The developments in the first dec-
ade of the 21st century confirmed that it
was a particularly significant and timely
step. In fact, today we, the whole civi-
lization, face serious challenges. These
are unbalanced global development, eco-
nomic and social instability, lack of con-
fidence and security.
In that situation India and Russia
show an example of responsible lead-
ership and collective actions in the in-
ternational arena.
Multipolar world
We have a common goal — to make the
world we live in more just, democratic
and secure and to facilitate resolving
problems, including
global and regional problems
the situation in the Middle East and
North Africa, and in Afghanistan.
I would like to note that our joint work
in the BRICS has become increasingly
intensive. The authority of that associ-
intensive
ation is growing every year, and that is
quite natural. Our proposed initiatives
are aimed at establishing new architec-
ture for a multipolar world order. The
same constructive
nstructive approach
appro is also re-
flected in our interaction in the Shanghai
hanghai
Cooperation Organization and other
formats. We expect a mea-
multilateral formats
ningful dialogue with the Indian side
within the framework of Russia’s presi-
dency in the G20 that has begun.
Joint steps in the international arena,
participation in the development of
rules of global trade and enhancing busi-
ness, scientific and technological and hu-
manitarian ties form the basis for
MULTIVECTOR COOPERATION: Joint high-technology projects can yield products that India and Russia can
offer to markets of third countries. — PHOTOS SANDEEP SAXENA & SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT
achieving a new quality of partnership.
We attach particular significance to
bilateral trade and investment relations.
The growing economic potential of India
and Russia is mutually complementary
in many respects. Our trade turnover has
overcome the consequences of the global
crisis, and in 2012 we expect to reach
record numbers, over $10 billion. Our
2015.
next goal is to reach $20 billion by 2
To this end, we should engage all re-
serves and maintain direct contacts be-
tween business communities and
promote establishing efficient invest-
ment, technological and industry alli-
ances in the most dynamic and
promising fields, for instance, in the en-
ergy industry, primarily the nuclear one.
The construction of the Kudankulam
Nuclear Power PlaPlant with the use of the
most reliable and up-to-date technolo-
gies and standards became a major
breakthrough project in that field. The
beginning of operation of the first power
unit of that plant will allow to signif-
icantly reduce the energy deficiency in
southern States of India, and eventually
eliminate it completely, after the launch
of the second and other power units. We
expect that the implementation of our
arrangements on the construction of
new NPPs in India will begin in the near-
est future.
We hope for significant returns from
long-term
ong-term projects in steel industry, hy-
drocarbon production, car and aircraft
manufacturing, chemical and pharma-
ceuticals industries, in the field of in-
formation and biotechnologies.
biotechnologies
Important benchmarks are set in the In-
tegrated Long-Term Program of Cooper-
ation in the sphere of science,
technology and innovation until 2020.
Its main task is to ensure that our scien-
tists conduct fundamental and applied
research in order to create new tech-
nologies, equipment and materials.
The joint operation of Russian global
navigation satellite system GLONASS
opens up broad prospects. The package
of respective bilateral agreements has
already been signed. We intend to pro-
mote practical interaction in that impor-
tant area.
The
he strategic nature of the partner-
ship between India and Russia is wit-
nessed by the unprecedented level of our
military and technical cooperation. The
licensed
icensed production and joint develop-
ment of advanced armaments rather
than just purchasing military products
becomes a key area of activities.
Serious attention is being paid to de-
veloping a fifth generation multifunc-
tional fighter plane
plan and a multipurpose
aircraft. The product of our
transport aircraf
designers, the ‘BrahMos’
BrahMos’ cruise missile,
has successfully passed all tests. Today
experts are thinking of its aircraft ver-
sion.
I am confident that such
uch a multivector
cooperation will allow our countries not
only to reach leading positions as a range
of hi-technology projects are concerned,
but will help to successfully advance
joint products to markets of third coun-
tries.
tries
Humanitarian cooperation
cooperatio has a par-
ticular significance for India and Russia,
which are states with great cultural heri-
tage and potential. The centuries-old
history and culture of India, majestic
architectural monuments and museums
of Delhi, Agra and Mumbai have a unique
attractive force. In its turn, Indian citi-
zens with interest discover the wealth of
Russian music, literature and art. The
Festival of Russian Culture in India and
All-Russian Festival of Modern Cinema
and Culture of India which were success-
fully held this year have convincingly
proved it once again.
I am confident that awareness-raising
and educational projects should be more
actively promoted and tourism and
youth exchanges developed. In fact, they
enrich our citizens and add new contents
to human dimension of bilateral rela-
tions which becomes all the more signif-
icant and relevant today.
The India-Russia summit in New Del-
hi was preceded by painstaking and com-
prehensive preparations. We have a
clear vision of major vectors of future-
oriented joint work. I am confident that
the summit talks will be constructive, as
they always were, and their outcome will
give a powerful impetus to a strategic
partnership for the benefit of our two
countries and peoples, in the interests of
peace and stability in Eurasia and on our
common planet.
I will take the liberty to outline joint
prospects for strategic partnership be-
tween India and Russia in the 21st centu-
ry. These are deepening of cooperation
in knowledge-intensive fields based on
strong historic traditions, advancement
of joint products to international mar-
kets, further increasing of the share of
high value added products in the trade
turnover, enhancing the role and effec-
tiveness of Indian-Russian interaction
in international affairs, and the widest
possible realization of the potential of
contacts.
cultural and humanitarian contacts
I sincerely wish to the people of
friendly India peace, well-being and new
impressive achievements.
(Vladimir Putin is President of Russia.
He arrives in New Delhi on Monday)
Time to revisit the Vienna Convention
Unilateral changes by the West are increasingly affecting diplomats from
the developing world
Vivek Katju
he Italian Ambassador’s matter
T before the Supreme Court is over
but problems with the Vienna Conven-
tion will not go away. This is because
the past three decades have witnessed
an increasing effort on the part of
western countries to unilaterally in-
troduce changes in the application of
the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic
Relations to the detriment of diplo-
mats of developing countries. They say
that this aggressive approach is in
keeping with new standards of human-
itarian and labour laws. However, its
selective, self-serving and at times un-
scrupulous application belies these tall
claims. These countries are also taking
care to ensure that the functioning or
personal situations of diplomats work-
ing in their embassies are not impaired
while considerable difficulties are ex-
perienced by those of developing
countries.
Some years ago the domestic help
who had accompanied a senior Indian
diplomat to his post in a Western
country sued him for maltreatment in
a local court. Along with the diplomat,
the Indian government was also sued.
The country concerned took the posi-
tion that its courts had jurisdiction as
it was a civil law matter.
As the case was going on, authentic
documentary evidence emerged that
established the involvement of the of-
ficials of the host country in a virtual
conspiracy to instigate the domestic
help to leave his employer. They had
also created circumstances that had
enabled him to take legal action. Under
sustained pressure from South Block,
the country cleared up the matter
within its own system, including its
courts, but requested the Indian au-
thorities that the issue be kept confi-
dential. That request was accepted for
diplomats prefer to deal with all mat-
ters relating to privileges, immunities
and protocol discreetly, outside the
public gaze. They especially try to
avoid entanglements with the courts.
Convention prescribes that members
of a diplomat’s household also enjoy
immunity. It does not define house-
hold but it is accepted that household
means family. The official definition of
family differs from country to country.
country
In the past, a relaxed attitude was tak-
en and dependent children irrespec-
tive of their age or dependent parents
were accepted as family and given the
protection of the Convention. Now,
western countries and some others are
applying their official definition of
family. Consequently many diplomats
from developing countries with elderly
single parents or dependent university
going children face problems. On the
other hand western countries are urg-
ing that live-in partners of their diplo-
mats be accepted as family members
under the Convention.
Inherent to the Vienna Convention
That is one reason why the Italian Am- solved quietly between the embassies is the practice of reciprocity. Reciproc-
bassador’s affidavit to the Supreme and foreign ministries. They were not ity can be applied if a diplomatic privi-
Court was, per se, so extraordinary. allowed to reach the courts. It was gen- lege is restricted or denied by one
erally felt that local staff were outside country, even if it is applied uniformly
Safety net the jurisdiction of the application of to all diplomats stationed there.
there Thehe
The Convention codifies traditional local labour laws even if their work problem lies in uneven situations
immunities and privileges given to dip- contracts were more generous than where on account of their power and
lomats to enable predictable diplomat- the contracts between embassies and economic clout some countries can get
ic interaction between states. local staff. Western countries took the a better deal for their diplomats.
Immunities
mmunities are essential for diplomat- lead in asserting that their labour laws There is no absolute freedom of
ic interaction. They also provide a safe- would cover employees recruited lo- movement for diplomats. Many coun-
ty net for intelligence officers posted cally by embassies and disputes be- tries require that diplomats seek the
under cover in Embassies. The identity tween them would, if necessary, have clearance of the Foreign Ministries be-
of such officers is known or discovered to go to the courts whose decisions fore leaving the capital city. In any
by host countries. Whenever their ac- would be executed. Bank accounts of event, sensitive areas are out of bounds
tivities cross the acceptable line, they some embassies have been frozen on for them. The European Union mildly
are declared persona non grata and are orders of Italian courts or payments and indirectly protested against the
publicly expelled.
expelled Reciprocal action is made from them in commercial or la- Supreme Court’s decision that the Ital-
taken in such cases by the other coun- bour disputes. ian Ambassador should not leave the
try. Diplomats caught in unbecoming country till it heard the matter on April
acts including criminal acts such as Defining family 2. In view of the sui generis circum-
smuggling or bribing are withdrawn There was certainly no attempt at stances of the case, this writer feels
quietly at the demand of the host coun- intervening with home based person- that it was not unwarranted.
try or suo moto. Reciprocal action is nel including domestic help. Now this he Vienna Convention is now 50
The
seldom taken in such cases. is being done regularly as in the Indian years old. In these decades, the world,
Till about four decades ago, a lais- domestic help’s case. Court action is including that of diplomacy, has
sez-faire approach was taken in the being allowed even though they are changed in fundamental ways. A re-
working of Missions. Issues relating to Indian nationals, are recruited in India view of the Convention will be timely.
commercial disputes of embassies or and always travel on official passports.
passports (Vivek Katju is a former Indian
differences between embassies and lo- Another emerging problematic area Ambassador to Afghanistan and
cal employees were almost always re- is the definition of family itself. The Myanmar.)
Sino-Indian border dispute 1

Sino-Indian border dispute

Sovereignty over two large and various smaller separated pieces of territory are contested between China and India.
The westernmost, Aksai Chin, is claimed by India as part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and region of Ladakh
but is controlled and administered as part of the Chinese province of Xinjiang. It is a virtually uninhabited high
altitude wasteland crossed by the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway. The other large disputed territory, the easternmost, lies
south of the McMahon Line. It was formerly referred to as the North East Frontier Agency, and is now called
Arunachal Pradesh. The McMahon Line was part of the 1914 Simla Convention between British India and Tibet, an
agreement rejected by China.[]
The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought in both of these areas. An agreement to resolve the dispute was concluded in
1996, including "confidence-building measures" and a mutually agreed Line of Actual Control. In 2006, the Chinese
[1] [2]
ambassador to India claimed that all of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory amidst a military build up. At the
[3]
time, both countries claimed incursions as much as a kilometer at the northern tip of Sikkim. In 2009, India
[4]
announced it would deploy additional military forces along the border.

Aksai Chin
From the area's lowest point (on the Karakash River at about 14,000
feet (4,300 m) to the glaciated peaks up to 22,500 feet (6,900 m) above
sea level, this is a desolate, largely uninhabited area. It covers an area
of about 37,244 square kilometres (14,380 sq mi). The desolation of
Aksai Chin meant that it had no significant human importance other
than ancient trade routes crossing it, providing brief passage during
summer for caravans of yaks from Xinjiang and Tibet.[5]

One of the earliest treaties regarding the boundaries in the western

sector was issued in 1842. The Sikh Confederacy of the Punjab region
in India had annexed Ladakh into the state of Jammu in 1834. In 1841,
they invaded Tibet with an army. Chinese forces defeated the Sikh
army and in turn entered Ladakh and besieged Leh. After being
checked by the Sikh forces, the Chinese and the Sikhs signed a treaty
The western portion of the disputed boundary.
in September 1842, which stipulated no transgressions or interference
in the other country's frontiers.[6] The British defeat of the Sikhs in
1846 resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh to the British, and British commissioners attempted to meet
with Chinese officials to discuss the border they now shared. However, both sides were apparently sufficiently
satisfied that a traditional border was recognized and defined by natural elements, and the border was not
demarcated.[6] The boundaries at the two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were reasonably
well-defined, but the Aksai Chin area in between lay largely undefined.[5][]
Sino-Indian border dispute 2

The Johnson Line

W. H. Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of
India proposed the "Johnson Line" in 1865, which put
[7]
Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir. This was the
time of the Dungan revolt, when China did not
control Xinjiang, so this line was never presented to
the Chinese.[7] Johnson presented this line to the
Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, who then claimed
the 18,000 square kilometres contained within his
territory [7] and by some accounts he claimed territory
further north as far as the Sanju Pass in the Kun Lun
Mountains. Johnson's work was severely criticized for
gross inaccuracies, with description of his boundary
as "patently absurd",[] and he was reprimanded by the
British Government and resigned from the
[7][][]
Survey. The Maharajah of Jammu amd Kashmir
apparently sent a few soldiers to man the abandoned
fort at Shahidulla (modern-day Xaidulla) at one point,
by the time most sources placed Shahidulla and the
upper Karakash River firmly within the territory of
Xinjiang (see accompanying map). According to
Francis Younghusband, who explored the region in
the late 1880s, there was only an abandoned fort and
not one inhabited house at Shahidulla when he was
Map of Central Asia (1878) showing Khotan (near top right corner).
there - it was just a convenient staging post and a The previous border claimed by the British Indian Empire is shown in
convenient headquarters for the nomadic Kirghiz.[8] the two-toned purple and pink band with Shahidulla and the Kilik,
The abandoned fort had apparently been built a few Kilian and Sanju Passes clearly north of the border.
[9]
years earlier by the Dogras. In 1878 the Chinese
had reconquered Xinjiang, and by 1890 they already had Shahidulla before the issue was decided.[7] By 1892, China
[]
had erected boundary markers at Karakoram Pass.

In 1897 a British military officer, Sir John Ardagh, proposed a boundary line along the crest of the Kun Lun
[10]
Mountains north of the Yarkand River. At the time Britain was concerned at the danger of Russian expansion as
China weakened, and Ardagh argued that his line was more defensible. The Ardagh line was effectively a
modification of the Johnson line, and became known as the "Johnson-Ardagh Line".

The Macartney-Macdonald Line

In the 1890s Britain and China were allies and Britain was principally concerned that Aksai Chin not fall into
Russian hands.[7] In 1899, when China showed an interest in Aksai Chin, Britain proposed a revised boundary,
initially suggested by George Macartney,[] which put most of Aksai Chin in Chinese territory.[7] This border, along
the Karakoram Mountains, was proposed and supported by British officials for a number of reasons. The Karakoram
Mountains formed a natural boundary, which would set the British borders up to the Indus River watershed while
leaving the Tarim River watershed in Chinese control, and Chinese control of this tract would present a further
obstacle to Russian advance in Central Asia.[] The British presented this line to the Chinese in a Note by Sir Claude
[7]
MacDonald. The Chinese did not respond to the Note, and the British took that as Chinese acquiescence. This line,
known as the Macartney-MacDonald line, is approximately the same as the current Line of Actual Control.[7]
Sino-Indian border dispute 3

1899 to 1947
Both the Johnson-Ardagh and the Macartney-MacDonald lines were used on British maps of India.[7] Until at least
1908, the British took the Macdonald line to be the boundary,[11] but in 1911, the Xinhai Revolution resulted in the
collapse of central power in China, and by the end of World War I, the British officially used the Johnson Line.
However they took no steps to establish outposts or assert actual control on the ground.[] In 1927, the line was
adjusted again as the government of British India abandoned the Johnson line in favor of a line along the Karakoram
range further south.[] However, the maps were not updated and still showed the Johnson Line.[]
When British officials learned of Soviet officials surveying the Aksai Chin for Sheng Shicai, warlord of Xinjiang in
1940-1941, they again advocated the Johnson Line.[7] At this point the British had still made no attempts to establish
outposts or control over the Aksai Chin, nor was the issue ever discussed with the governments of China or Tibet,
and the boundary remained undemarcated at India's independence.[7][]

Since 1947
Upon independence in 1947, the government of India used the Johnson Line as the basis for its official boundary in
[]
the west, encompassing Aksai Chin. From the Karakoram Pass (which is not under dispute), the Indian claim line
extends northeast of the Karakoram Mountains north of the salt flats of the Aksai Chin, to set a boundary at the
Kunlun Mountains, and incorporating part of the Karakash River and Yarkand River watersheds. From there, it runs
east along the Kunlun Mountains, before turning southwest through the Aksai Chin salt flats, through the Karakoram
[5]
Mountains, and then to Panggong Lake.
On July 1, 1954 Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo directing that the maps of India be revised to show definite
boundaries on all frontiers. Up to this point, the boundary in the Aksai Chin sector, based on the Johnson Line, had
[]
been described as "undemarcated."
During the 1950s, the People's Republic of China built a 1,200 kilometres (750 mi) road connecting Xinjiang and
western Tibet, of which 179 kilometres (111 mi) ran south of the Johnson Line through the Aksai Chin region
[5][7][]
claimed by India. Aksai Chin was easily accessible from China, but was more difficult for the Indians on the
other side of the Karakorams to reach.[5] The Indians did not learn of the existence of the road until 1957, which was
[12]
confirmed when the road was shown in Chinese maps published in 1958.
The Indian position, as stated by prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was that the Aksai Chin was "part of the Ladakh
region of India for centuries" and that this northern border was a "firm and definite one which was not open to
discussion with anybody".[5]
The Chinese minister, Zhou Enlai argued that the western border had never been delimited, that the
Macartney-MacDonald Line, which left the Aksai Chin within Chinese borders was the only line ever proposed to a
Chinese government, and that the Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction, and that negotiations should
take into account the status quo.[5]
In April 2013 India claimed, referencing their own perception [] of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) location, that
Chinese troops had established a camp in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector, 10km on their side of the Line of Actual
Control. This figure was later revised to a 19km claim. According to Indian media, the incursion included Chinese
military helicopters entering Indian airspace to drop supplies to the troops. However, Chinese officials denied any
[13][14]
trespassing having taken place. Soldiers from both countries briefly set up camps on the ill-defined frontier
facing each other, but the tension was defused when both sides pulled back soldiers in early May.[15]
Sino-Indian border dispute 4

Trans Karakoram Tract

The Johnson Line is not used west of the Karakoram Pass, where China adjoins Pakistan-administered
Gilgit–Baltistan. On October 13, 1962, China and Pakistan began negotiations over the boundary west of the
Karakoram Pass. In 1963, the two countries settled their boundaries largely on the basis of the
Macartney-MacDonald Line, which left the Trans Karakoram Tract in China, although the agreement provided for
renegotiation in the event of a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. India does not recognise that Pakistan and China
have a common border, and claims the tract as part of the domains of the pre-1947 state of Kashmir and Jammu.
However, India's claim line in that area does not extend as far north of the Karakoram Mountains as the Johnson
Line[5]

The McMahon Line

British India and China gained a common border in 1826, with British
annexation of Assam in the Treaty of Yandabo at the conclusion of the
First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826). Subsequent annexations in
further Anglo-Burmese Wars expanded China's borders with British
India eastwards, to include the border with what is now Myanmar.
In 1913-14, representatives of Britain, China, and Tibet attended a
conference in Simla, India and drew up an agreement concerning
Tibet's status and borders. The McMahon Line, a proposed boundary
between Tibet and India for the eastern sector, was drawn by British
negotiator Henry McMahon on a map attached to the agreement. All
three representatives initiated the agreement, but Beijing soon objected
to the proposed Sino-Tibet boundary and repudiated the agreement,
refusing to sign the final, more detailed map. After approving a note
which stated that China could not enjoy rights under the agreement
The McMahon Line is the northern border of the
unless she ratified it, the British and Tibetan negotiators signed the
red tinted disputed area.
Simla Convention and more detailed map as a bilateral accord. Neville
Maxwell states that McMahon had been instructed not to sign
bilaterally with Tibetans if China refused, but he did so without the Chinese representative present and then kept the
declaration secret.[5]

V.K. Singh argues that the basis of these boundaries, accepted by British India and Tibet, were that the historical
boundaries of India were the Himalayas and the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian and
associated with India.[16] The high watershed of the Himalayas was proposed as the border between India and its
[16]
northern neighbours. India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the
Indian subcontinent and thus should be the modern boundaries of British India and later the Republic of India.[16]
Chinese boundary markers, including one set up by the newly created Chinese Republic, stood near Walong until
January 1914, when T. O'Callaghan, an assistant administrator of North East Frontier Agency (NEFA)'s eastern
[]
sector, relocated them north to locations closer to the McMahon Line (albeit still South of the Line). He then went
[]
to Rima, met with Tibetan officials, and saw no Chinese influence in the area.
By signing the Simla Agreement with Tibet, the British had violated the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in
which both parties were not to negotiate with Tibet, "except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government",
as well as the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, which bound the British government "not to annex Tibetan
territory."[17] Because of doubts concerning the legal status of the accord, the British did not put the McMahon Line
on their maps until 1937, nor did they publish the Simla Convention in the treaty record until 1938. Rejecting Tibet's
1913 declaration of independence, China argued that the Simla Convention and McMahon Line were illegal and that
Sino-Indian border dispute 5

Tibetan government was merely a local government without treaty-making powers. In 1947, Tibet requested that
India recognize Tibetan authority in the trading town of Tawang, south of the McMahon Line. Tibet did not object to
any other portion of the McMahon line. In reply, the Indians asked Tibet to continue the relationship on the basis of
the previous British Government.[5]
Tibetan officials continued to administer Tawang and refused to concede territory during negotiations in 1938.[] The
governor of Assam asserted that Tawang was "undoubtedly British" but noted that it was "controlled by Tibet, and
none of its inhabitants have any idea that they are not Tibetan."[] During World War II, with India's east threatened
by Japanese troops and with the threat of Chinese expansionism, British troops secured Tawang for extra defense.[]
China's claim on areas south of the McMahon Line, encompassed in the NEFA, were based on the traditional
boundaries.[16] India believes that the boundaries China proposed in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh have no written
basis and no documentation of acceptance by anyone apart from China.[16] Indians argue that China claims the
[16]
territory on the basis that it was under Chinese imperial control in the past, while Chinese argue that India claims
[18]
the territory on the basis that it was under British imperial control in the past. The last Qing emperor's 1912 edict
of abdication authorized its succeeding republican government to form a union of "five peoples, namely, Manchus,
[19]
Han Chinese, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans together with their territory in its integrity" However, V.K. Singh
cites the presence of the Mauryan Empire and Chola Dynasty in regions India does not place a claim to but which
[16]
were heavily influenced by Indian culture.
India's claim line in the eastern sector follows the McMahon Line. The line drawn by McMahon on the detailed
24–25 March 1914 Simla Treaty maps clearly starts at 27°45’40"N, a trijunction between Bhutan, China, and India,
and from there, extends eastwards.[5] Most of the fighting in the eastern sector before the start of the war would take
[][20]
place immediately north of this line. However, India claimed that the intent of the treaty was to follow the main
watershed ridge divide of the Himalayas based on memos from McMahon and the fact that over 90% of the
McMahon Line does in fact follow the main watershed ridge divide of the Himalayas. They claimed that territory
south of the high ridges here near Bhutan (as elsewhere along most of the McMahon Line) should be Indian territory
and north of the high ridges should be Chinese territory. In the Indian claim, the two armies would be separated from
each other by the highest mountains in the world.
During and after the 1950s, when India began patrolling this area and mapping in greater detail, they confirmed what
the 1914 Simla agreement map depicted: six river crossings that interupted the main Himalayan watershed ridge. At
the westernmost location near Bhutan north of Tawang, they modified their maps to extend their claim line
[5]
northwards to include features such as Thag La ridge, Longju, and Khinzemane as Indian territory. Thus, the
[5]
Indian version of the McMahon Line moves the Bhutan-China-India trijunction north to 27°51’30"N. India would
claim that the treaty map ran along features such as Thag La ridge, though the actual treaty map itself is
topographically vague (as the treaty was not accompanied with demarcation) in places, shows a straight line (not a
watershed ridge) near Bhutan and near Thag La, and the treaty includes no verbal description of geographic features
nor description of the highest ridges.[5][21]
Sino-Indian border dispute 6

Sikkim
India's annexation of Sikkim in 1975 was rejected by China at the time. The Sino-Indian Memorandum of 2003 was
hailed as a de facto Chinese acceptance of the annexation.[22] China published a map showing Sikkim as a part of
India and the Foreign Ministry deleted it from the list of China's "countries and regions".[22] However, the
Sikkim-China border's northermost point, "The Finger", continues to be the subject of dispute and military activity.[3]

References
[1] " Arunachal Pradesh is our territory: Chinese envoy (http:/ / www. rediff. com/ news/ 2006/ nov/ 14china. htm)", Rediff India Abroad,
November 14, 2006.
[2] Subir Bhaumik, " India to deploy 36,000 extra troops on Chinese border (http:/ / www. bbc. co. uk/ news/ world-south-asia-11818840)", BBC,
23 November 2010.
[3] Sudha Ramachandran, " China toys with India's border (http:/ / www. atimes. com/ atimes/ South_Asia/ JF27Df01. html)", Asia Times
Online, Jun 27, 2008.
[4] "[The China-India Border Brawl http:/ / online. wsj. com/ article/ SB124578881101543463. html]", Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2009.
[5] Maxwell, Neville, India's China War (http:/ / www. scribd. com/ doc/ 12249475/ Indias-China-War-Neville-Maxwell), New York, Pantheon,
1970.
[6] The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1960), pp.
96-125.
[7] Mohan Guruswamy, Mohan, "The Great India-China Game" (http:/ / www. rediff. com/ news/ 2003/ jun/ 20spec. htm), Rediff, June 23, 2003.
[8] Younghusband, Francis E. (1896). The Heart of a Continent. John Murray, London. Facsimile reprint: (2005) Elbiron Classics, pp. 223-224.
[9] Grenard, Fernand (1904). Tibet: The Country and its Inhabitants. Fernand Grenard. Translated by A. Teixeira de Mattos. Originally published
by Hutchison and Co., London. 1904. Reprint: Cosmo Publications. Delhi. 1974, pp. 28-30.
[11] Woodman (1969), p.79
[12] China's Decision for War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver (http:/ / www. people. fas. harvard. edu/ ~johnston/ garver. pdf)
[13] India sends out doves, China sends in chopper - Hindustan Times (http:/ / www. hindustantimes. com/ India-news/ JAndK/
After-incursion-China-s-helicopters-violate-Indian-airspace/ Article1-1049762. aspx)
[14] India, China caught in a bitter face-off - Hindustan Times (http:/ / www. hindustantimes. com/ India-news/ NewDelhi/
India-moves-in-more-troops-stand-off-with-china-escalates/ Article1-1048784. aspx)
[15] BBC News - India and China 'pull back troops' in disputed border area (http:/ / www. bbc. co. uk/ news/ world-asia-india-22423999)
[16] VK Singh (http:/ / www. india-seminar. com/ 2006/ 562/ 562-vk-singh. htm) resolving the boundary dispute
[17] Karunakar Gupta. " The McMahon Line 1911-45: The British Legacy (http:/ / links. jstor. org/ sici?sici=0305-7410(197107/
09)0:47<521:TML1TB>2. 0. CO;2-I)". The China Quarterly, No. 47. (Jul. - Sep., 1971), pp. 521-545.
[18] "The Place of International Law in Chinese Strategy and Tactics: The Case of the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute", by Arthur A. Stahnke.
The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 30, No. 1, Nov 1970. pg. 95-119
[19] Qing Dynasty Edict of Abdication, translated by Bertram Lenox Putnam Weale, The Fight For The Republic in China, London: Hurst &
Blackett, Ltd. Paternoster House, E.C. 1918. - Emphasis added, "Muslims" rendered as "Mohammedans" in original translation
[20] A.G. Noorani, " Perseverance in peace process (http:/ / www. hinduonnet. com/ fline/ fl2017/ stories/ 20030829001604900. htm)". India's
National Magazine, August 29, 2003.
[21] Tawang and "The Un-Negotiated Dispute" (http:/ / links. jstor. org/ sici?sici=0305-7410(197104/ 06)0:46<357:TA"UD>2. 0. CO;2-X), T. S.
Murty, Neville Maxwell. The China Quarterly, No. 46. (Apr. - Jun., 1971), pp. 357-362.
[22] D. S. Rajan, " China: An internal Account of Startling Inside Story of Sino-Indian Border Talks (http:/ / www. southasiaanalysis. org/
\papers28\paper2732. html)", South Asia Analysis Group, 10-June-2008.
Article Sources and Contributors 7

Article Sources and Contributors

Sino-Indian border dispute  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=566198708  Contributors: 211oo1, Arch dude, Armbrust, AshLin, Blethering Scot, Charles Matthews,
Chinki61398, Cst17, DLinth, Eraserhead1, Farolif, Ferox Seneca, Hybernator, InstantNull, JamesBWatson, John of Reading, Kauffner, Kwamikagami, Lamro, LilHelpa, Maias, Melchoir,
Mhockey, Mr Mobile Man, Rayshade, Rich257, Rjwilmsi, Sameerkulkarni, Sir Nicholas de Mimsy-Porpington, The Banner Turbo, TheOriginalSoni, Traing, Utcursch, Vedabit, Woohookitty,
Xingdong, Yash Lele, Zanhe, 46 anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

File:Kashmir map big.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Kashmir_map_big.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Flamarande, Juiced lemon, LX, Phatom87,
Roland zh, Sven-steffen arndt, TheDJ, Timeshifter, Zaccarias, Zykasaa, 19 anonymous edits
File:Hindutagh-pass-aksai-chin-center2-1873.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Hindutagh-pass-aksai-chin-center2-1873.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors:
Roland zh, Rosemania, Vmenkov, Zolo
File:China India eastern border 88.jpg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:China_India_eastern_border_88.jpg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Central Intelligence
Agency

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Development without strings attached - The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/development-without-strings-atta...

Opinion » Op-Ed

Published: April 18, 2013 01:04 IST | Updated: April 18, 2013 01:04 IST
Development without strings attached
Ranjan Mathai
Unlike North-South development cooperation, India’s approach to its peers in the South is unconditional and mutually beneficial

(Excerpts from keynote address at the Conference of Southern Providers South- South Cooperation: Issues and
Emerging Challenges, at New Delhi on April 15, 2013)
1. In the last decade or so, the range and quantum of South-South cooperation has expanded significantly. It has
also inspired spirited multilateral discussions on harmonising the traditional frameworks of North-South
cooperation with the emerging patterns of South-South developmental partnerships. There is, however, a pervasive
sentiment among countries of the South that they do not factor in sufficiently the underlying premises of
South-South cooperation, the circumstances in which it developed and its unique character.
2. I outline India’s experience to illustrate this point. From the time of our emergence as a free nation, we
recognised the importance of human resource capacity building as a requirement for economic growth and
independent policy making. This recognition informed the course of our cooperation with other developing
countries with whom we shared the aspiration of eradicating poverty and under development. The Indian Technical
and Economic Assistance programme, ITEC, was launched in 1964 with the objective of sharing our knowledge and
skills with fellow developing countries. Over nearly five decades, ITEC and its sister initiatives, the Special
Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP) and the Technical Cooperation Scheme of Colombo Plan,
have contributed substantially to capacity building in many parts of the world. Last year, nearly 9,000 civilians from
161 countries attended courses in diverse disciplines, conducted by 47 Indian institutions. We offer 2,300
scholarships annually for degree courses in Indian universities. We also run special courses at the request of
countries or regions on specialised subjects such as election management, WTO studies, parliamentary practices
and public-private partnerships. At the India-Africa Forum Summits in 2008 and 2011, we committed to
establishing about 100 institutions in different African countries to strengthen capacities. We depute experts abroad
to share expertise in areas like information technology, auditing, pharmacology, public administration and textiles
research.
3. The core idea is to share the lessons we have learnt and continue to learn, with other countries traversing the
same path towards development. This is the spirit in which illiterate grandmothers from various countries are
trained in a remote village in Rajasthan, so that they can carry back solar electrification technologies to their remote
villages in Africa, Central America, Asia or the Pacific Islands. The NGO SEWA — Self Employed Women’s
Association — similarly contributes to women’s empowerment in rural Afghanistan through livelihood generating
programmes. An earlier example is from our Green Revolution, when we shared with Vietnam research on
high-yielding rice varieties through exchanges of scientists and the establishment of a Rice Research Institute in
southern Vietnam. Today, Vietnam is a major rice exporter and competes with India in world markets. In their
structure and diversity, such programmes do not have many parallels in North-South cooperation.
4. Over the years, we have expanded our development cooperation portfolio through grant assistance to
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka for projects in infrastructure,
hydroelectricity, power transmission, and other sectors identified by the host government as priority areas for their
development. Another strand has been concessional Lines of Credit. Over the last decade or so, over 150 Lines of
Credit totalling over U.S. $9.5 billion have been allocated, financing a wide range of projects from drinking water
schemes to power plants to technology parks and railway infrastructure in developing countries.
5. In all these strands of development assistance, our underlying philosophy remains that which underpins
South-South cooperation. Our engagement is demand-driven and responds to the developmental priorities of our
partner countries. We do not attach conditionalities, we do not prescribe policies and we do not challenge national
sovereignty. We promote a mutually beneficial exchange of development experiences and resources.
6. There is an acknowledged historical context to Official Development Assistance (ODA), which distinguishes
North-South Cooperation from South-South Cooperation. The focus on South-South cooperation in the prevailing
international discourse on aid architecture increasingly glosses over this fact. It conveniently overlooks the reality

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that developing countries, even the so-called emerging economies, continue to confront major economic challenges
of their own, exacerbated by the current global economic situation, which place an inherent limitation on their
capacity to contribute to international development cooperation. The assistance which developing countries offer to
other developing countries should therefore continue to remain voluntary and free from externally imposed norms
drawn from North-South Cooperation. Simply put, whereas North-South cooperation is a historic responsibility,
South-South cooperation is a voluntary partnership.
(Ranjan Mathai is Foreign Secretary.)
Keywords: Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme, Official Development Assistance
Printable version | Apr 19, 2013 8:16:52 AM | http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/development-without-strings-attached/article4627666.ece
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WORLD AFFAIRS
Published: March 21, 2013 00:00 IST | Updated: April 5, 2013 11:22 IST

Strategic embrace

Show Caption

Strategic ties between Russia and China, driven by economic and geopolitical compulsions, are growing
apace, prompting some analysts to warn of greater risks for Russia. By VLADIMIR RADYUHIN in Moscow
RUSSIA’S new push for closer strategic ties with China is gaining momentum. Major deals in two critical areas, energy and defence,
are already in the pipeline.
When China’s new leader Xi Jinping visits Moscow this month, the two sides are expected to sign an agreement to increase Russian oil
deliveries to China by more than 60 per cent from the current level of 15 million tonnes. Russian officials said crude shipments to
China could eventually grow to 50 million tonnes.
Going by official statements in Moscow and Beijing, the two countries are close to breaking the deadlock over price in the
long-winding talks on the supply of Russian natural gas to China. The two sides hope to sign a contract by the end of the year for the
transport of 38 billion cubic metres of gas through a pipeline along the Pacific coast. Russian supplies will account for 30 per cent of
China’s gas needs.
In another major development, Russia is resuming the supply of advanced weapons platforms to China. In December 2012, Russia
concluded a framework agreement with China for the sale of four Amur-1650 diesel submarines. Earlier this year, the two countries
signed an intergovernmental agreement for the supply of Russia’s latest Sukhoi Su-35 long-range fighter planes. If the deals go
through, for the first time in a decade Russia will deliver offensive weapons to China.
Relations between Russia and China have followed an upward trajectory ever since they were normalised in the late 1980s under
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev after a long period of hostility triggered by an ideological split in the mid-1950s. In 2008, Russia
and China removed the last major irritant in their relations, settling the long-running territorial dispute along their 4,300-
kilometre-long border.
A new stage in strategic ties between the two countries began with Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin for a third presidential term
almost a year ago. Beijing was the first capital outside the former Soviet Union that Putin visited soon after assuming office. The
choice of China was loaded with symbolism since it came shortly after Putin skipped a G8 summit in the United States, demonstrating
his reluctance to make the U.S. his first overseas destination. For Xi, Moscow will be the first foreign capital he visits as President.
Russia and China are driven closer by economic and geopolitical compulsions. Russia hopes to benefit from China’s insatiable thirst
for energy and other resources and diversify its oil and gas export routes away from stagnating Europe. China considers Russia to be
part of “strategic rear” along with Central Asia, and its value for Beijing is especially high today when the U.S. is mounting its “pivot”
towards Asia.
Russia and China are drawing closer at a time when their relations with the U.S. have run into rough waters. Moscow is deeply
disappointed with U.S. President Barack Obama’s policy of “reset”, seeing it as an instrument for winning unilateral concessions from
Russia on Iran, Afghanistan and Libya, while refusing to heed Russia’s concerns over the U.S. global missile defence, tone down
criticism of Russia’s human rights record, and ease access to high technologies of the U.S.
Beijing sees Obama’s strategic redeployment in the Asia-Pacific region as aimed at containing China. The U.S. support for Japan in its
territorial dispute with China has only strengthened Chinese suspicions. Moscow and Beijing have achieved unprecedented
coordination on all major issues of global politics, including Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and North Korea. It is in the sphere of defence
that strong Russian-Chinese relations come out most graphically.

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Arms exportIn the 1990s and early 2000s, cash-strapped Russia sold aircraft, ships and other weapons worth $26 billion to China.
The sales were dictated by economic necessity rather than strategic considerations. Without the Chinese and Indian contracts, the
Russian defence industry would have died as the Russian army had no money to buy weapons. In later years, Russian arms sales to
China declined because the Chinese industry mastered the production of clones and the modification of Russian systems. For its part,
Moscow became far more cautious about supplying cutting-edge defence technologies to China and turned down Beijing’s requests for
more advanced weapons.
However, today Russian experts tend to think that China’s ability to copy critical technologies, such as aircraft engines, has been
overrated in Moscow. “Chinese aircraft engines, which are essentially modified versions of Russian engines, are way too inferior to the
originals, and China continues to depend on the supply of Russian engines,” Vasily Kashin, an expert on China, said.
The sale of Amur-1650 and Su-35 marks a turnaround in Russia’s China arms export policy.
“When and if China succeeds in copying Russia’s new weapons platforms, the Russian industry will hopefully move ahead with new
technologies,” Kashin said.
Resumption of large-scale weapons sales to China is essentially a political decision, as the Russian defence industry today has its
books full with orders from the Russian armed forces under a $700-billion rearmament programme launched two years ago. It is part
of a foreign policy strategy Putin formulated for his new six-year term in the Kremlin in an election campaign manifesto a year ago,
about which he said:
“I am convinced that China’s economic growth is by no means a threat, but a challenge that carries colossal potential for business
cooperation—a chance to catch the Chinese wind in the sails of our economy.” The Russian leader explained why Russia stood to gain
from deeper ties with China. First, China’s potential would help Russia “develop the economy of Siberia and the Russian far east”.
Second, China “shares our vision of the emerging equitable world order”, and the two countries “work together to solve acute regional
and global problems”. Lastly, Russia and China had resolved “all the major political issues” between them, including the border
disputes.
China has already overtaken Germany as Russia’s top commercial partner, with bilateral trade expected to touch $90 billion this year
and soar to $200 billion by 2020. There is a geopolitical aspect to the Russia-China axis, which Putin chose to omit. “The balance of
power between America and China will to a large extent depend on whether and on which side Russia will play,” the foreign policy
analyst Fyodor Lukyanov said.
The renewal of Russian sales of advanced weapons to China may be an indication on whose side Moscow has decided to stay.
American analysts are already ringing the alarm bells. “The sales of advanced new equipment, otherwise unavailable from local
Chinese industry, could have serious implications for U.S. security commitments in the region,” Wendell Minnick, Asia Bureau Chief
of Defence News, wrote in the Washington-based defence weekly newspaper. Quoting Dean Cheng, a research fellow with the
Heritage Foundation, Minnick warns of an “enormous and fundamental strategic shift” the Russian arms sales could trigger in the
region. “…The introduction of new, quieter subs and the more advanced fighter aircraft calls into question the ability for the U.S. to
control the ‘commons’ —that is, airspace and sea space. Future conflicts may not see American dominance of air and sea, and certainly
should not be assumed as a given,” Minnick quoted Dean Cheng.
Ironically, the new Russian arms sales to China could ricochet against India, Russia’s most trusted defence partner. For the first time,
Russia is going to sell China more powerful weapons platforms than those it has supplied to India. The Amur submarine is far more
silent and powerful than the Kilo-class submarines the Indian Navy has in its inventory. India’s Su-30MKI will be no match for China’s
Su-35, which is powered by a higher thrust engine and possesses more sophisticated radar, avionics and weapons, according to
Konstantin Makienko, a leading Russian military expert with the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.
For the same reason, China’s acquisition of Su-35s will knock down the value of India’s planned purchase of the French Rafale,
Makienko said. At the same time, he believes that India is in a position to retain its edge in military aviation vis-a-vis China if it speeds
up the development of a fifth-generation fighter plane with Russia and goes for in-depth upgrade of its fleet of Su-30MKI fighters.
Risks for RussiaSome analysts think that the Russia-China camaraderie poses far greater risks for Russia itself. They argue that
demographic pressures and the growing need for resources may push China to turn the Russian-built weapons against Russia. “We
should stop selling them the rope to hang us with,” said Alexander Khramchikhin of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis.
Other experts believe that China will not need to resort to arms to conquer Russia through demographic and economic expansion. The
Russian far east, which constitutes 40 per cent of the country’s territory, has a shrinking population of 6.5 million, whereas three
contiguous regions of China have more than 100 million people.
Demographic threatsIn a rare recognition of demographic threats, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned in August 2012 that
the sparsely populated far-eastern region should be protected “from the excessive expansion of people from neighbouring countries”.
The structure of trade between Russia and China prompts fears of Chinese colonisation. Russia ships oil, timber, metals and other
commodities to China, and imports machinery and consumer goods.
“If the current economic trends persist, it is very likely that Russia east of the Urals and later the whole country will turn into an
appendage of China—first as a warehouse of resources and then economically and politically. This will happen without any
‘aggressive’ or hostile efforts by China, it will happen by default,” wrote the respected political scientist Sergey Karaganov.
There has been little evidence so far of any serious effort to change the prevailing pattern of economic ties. In 2009, Russia and China
signed a nine-year economic cooperation agreement, which provides for stepped-up supplies of Russian raw materials to China,
where they would be processed into manufactured goods for export back to Russia.
Alexei Yablokov, a prominent Russian environmentalist, denounced the pact as “humiliating” for Russia and said it would reduce
eastern Siberia and the far east, which constitute roughly half of Russia’s territory, to a “raw material appendage of China”.
Russian strategists have criticised the Kremlin for pursuing a China-centrist policy after the break-up of the Soviet Union and urged
Moscow to balance its tight embrace of China with active engagement of other Asia-Pacific nations.
Last September, Russia announced its own pivot to Asia by hosting a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in

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Vladivostok. Moscow is trying to reach out to Japan, strengthen relations with South Korea and revamp strategic bonds with Vietnam.
In early March, Russia’s Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Myanmar and Vietnam, vowing to boost defence ties with both
countries.
Russia must rediscover itself “as a Euro-Pacific nation and look not only across the river to China, but also across the sea to Japan and
Korea as well as across the ocean to North America and Australia,” Dmitry Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Centre said.

Printable version | Jul 30, 2013 4:06:35 PM | http://www.frontline.in/world-affairs/strategic-embrace/article4521893.ece

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The promise of Africa - The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/the-promise-of-africa/a...

Today's Paper » OPINION

Published: July 11, 2013 00:00 IST | Updated: July 11, 2013 05:42 IST
The promise of Africa
Ian Shapiro

MAPPING THE FUTURE:Though there are daunting challenges, a sustained boom in world commodity prices and insulation from the worst
of the global financial crisis by comparatively low levels of debt have helped many African economies progress.—PHOTO: REUTERS
Is Africa rising? Judging by the buzz and optimism of the young business leaders and political trailblazers from
across the continent who gathered in Cape Town for the World Economic Forum on Africa recently, the answer is a
qualified “yes.” The African Leadership Network — co-founded by Stanford graduates Fred Swaniker, now the CEO
of the African Leadership Academy, and Achankeng Leke, director of McKinsey’s Nigerian operations — is
emblematic of a new generation of leaders who brim with sophisticated confidence about Africa’s emergence. They
are part of the coming elite whose ideas shaped the discussion in Cape Town.
There is a new discourse on African development. Echoing last June’s U.N.-sponsored Rio Plus 20 summit on
sustainable development, many young leaders want to replace the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDG),
defined in the global North, with Sustainable Development Goals defined in the global South. Their call is to follow
an era of loans and aid with one of investment and trade by “Unlocking Africa’s Talent” — the WEF theme for the
Cape Town meeting.
Thriving economies
Optimism about Africa’s prospects is not new. Fifteen years ago, then South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki
heralded a coming African renaissance. He turned out to be prescient. Helped along by a sustained boom in world
commodity prices and insulated from the worst of the global financial crisis by low levels of debt, at least when
compared with the U.S. and much of Europe, many African economies are thriving. Recently, Africa Monitor singled
out South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana and Ethiopia as high-growth economies to watch for. Of the world’s fastest
growing economies, five of the top 12 and 11 of the top 20 are now in Africa.
Rwanda, best known for the genocidal murder of a million people less than two decades ago, is now peaceful and
flourishing, with a 7.8 per cent projected GDP growth rate for 2013 and an announced goal of eliminating
dependence on foreign aid.
According to the World Bank’s 2013 Doing Business report, Rwanda is the world’s second most improved nation
since 2005 and the most improved in sub-Saharan Africa. Recent discoveries of vast quantities of natural gas in
Mozambique promise to grow that country’s GDP by a factor of 10 in the coming decade. Hedge funds have been
investing even in Zimbabwe — to the point where investment director David Stevenson was wondering in
Moneyweek in 2010 whether it might be “the next emerging market dynamo.”
In an era of financial upheavals and bursting bubbles, we are bound to ask how much of this Africa enthusiasm is
hype. Global GDP, trade or investment figures do not show the continent having that much impact yet, and 18 of the
world’s 20 poorest countries are still in Africa — the other two being war-torn Afghanistan and earthquake-
devastated Haiti.
Poverty and inequality
The African situation might be even worse than the statistics suggest. As noted by WEF co-chair and philanthropist
Mo Ibrahim, born in South Sudan and who went on to study in Britain before and founding the telecommunications
firm Celtel, there are no reliable data on poverty for many of Africa’s poor countries. This is to say nothing of the
effects of civil strife roiling North and West Africa. At least 50,000 have now died in Libya’s post-Qadhafi continuing
catastrophe. Egypt, with its decimated tourist industry, exploding population and collapsing infrastructure may be

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heading for the ranks of failed states. Somalia and Mali stagger along.
There was much talk at the WEF of reducing poverty-and-inequality, often uttered almost as a single word. It is far
from obvious that the two go so easily together.
China has pulled millions out of poverty over the past few decades, but inequality there has increased dramatically.
South Africa has also made inroads into its high poverty rates since the 1994 transition, but its Gini coefficient, a
standard measure of inequality, remains unchanged and one of the highest among countries for which data are
available. There are contrarian examples, Lula’s Brazil being a country in which poverty and inequality were reduced
together. But people in Cape Town were not talking about Lula.
Demography
There are also demographic worries. The median age on the continent is 20. Countries like Nigeria are even
younger: 30 per cent of its 180 million citizens are under the age of 10. These people must be educated and
employed. In South Africa, unemployment has come down to a (still staggeringly high) 25 per cent, but its youth
unemployment rate, at over 48 per cent, is the third highest in the world. Because of the AIDS tragedy, the country’s
ratio of working age to dependent population is the highest it has ever been, or will be in the coming decades, but
that does not help much if the working-age population does not work.
Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown noted at one WEF session that currently 61 million school-aged
children in Africa are not being educated. The demands on educational infrastructures suggested by these numbers
are almost beyond comprehension — not least because of the dearth of qualified, or in many cases even literate,
teachers.
Then there are concerns about the shape of economic growth. Unless economic resurgence steers Africa’s economies
in more diversified directions, the dangers of cronyism and misgovernment long associated with the oil curse will
remain. Winner-take-all economics begets loser-lose-all politics. Mozambique’s natural gas bounty could do for it
what North Sea oil did for Britain and Norway, but there are also the Libyan, Venezuelan and Russian possibilities.
Ditto for Nigerian oil.
Employment
Economic diversification is easier said than done. Mo Ibrahim noted that there are now 650 million cellphones in
Africa, a remarkable fact for which he and the telecommunications firm he founded deserve a good part of the credit.
This reality makes instant communication, retail banking, and other forms of commerce possible overnight — all of
which would have required decades of infrastructure building a generation ago. But Ibrahim also pointed out that
not one of those cellphones is manufactured anywhere in Africa.
By itself this is not such a devastating fact. Economists tell us that everything need not be built everywhere; people
must play to their comparative advantages. The failure to grasp that led to plenty of wasted effort on import-
substitution industrialisation in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. But Africa’s emerging-market economies are
in desperate need of diversification and employment in an era of deskilling. The Chinese do not have any particular
skill or resource endowment for manufacturing cellphones. Africans should be competing with the Chinese rather
than just selling them raw materials, the extraction of which often does not even create local employment when
Chinese companies bring in their own nationals to do the work.
Africa faces daunting challenges, but no one should write-off the entrepreneurial dynamism that pulsed through
Cape Town’s International Convention Center — a venue that consistently calls to mind the amazement at what has
been achieved every year since South Africa’s transition began in the early 1990s. But one could also have looked
forward in any of those years at challenges so forbidding that it would have been hard to imagine the country
meeting them. In South Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, this gap between what has been done and what now
awaits will partly be filled by the new generation of African leaders who shaped the conversation at the WEF. They
represent hope for a better African future.
(Ian Shapiro is Sterling Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he serves also as Henry R. Luce
Director of the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies.)
A new generation of leaders in the continent is waiting to give voice to the aspirations of its people
Printable version | Jul 11, 2013 8:34:45 AM | http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/the-promise-of-africa/article4903285.ece
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 US-Russia relations are likely to cool off in the wake of Medvedev’s departure
CHARLES GRANT
INN FEBRUARY
FEBRUARU RY 2009,, US Vice Presi-
dent Joe Biden called for the reset but-
ton to be p pressed in the US-Russia
R re-
lationship,p andd for the next three years
y Another thorny issue is missile de-
Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitri
Medvedev fostered a rapprochement
between Washington and Moscow.
However, the message g I picked up
from recent conversations in Moscow
was thatt the reset is unlikely to survive
Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian
presidencyy in May. y
The reset brought
g benefits to both
sides. M Moscow
oscow obtained an accord on
sharingg civil nuclear power
p technology,gy
help p with its WTO membership p appli-
pp
cation, and an implicit
p understandingg
that the US would not directlyy chal-
lengeg Russia’s keyy interests in its back-
yyard
ard (for
( example,p in Ukraine). ) say that Iran is the rationale. Russian
The US benefitted from Moscow
allowingg men and suppliespp for the
NATO
A mission in Afghanistan
g to pass
p concept of “mutually-assured destruc-
throughg Russia. Moscow refused to
deliver S-300 surface-to-air missiles to
Iran. Both p parties were happy
ppy to sign
g eratingg the US if it wished to do so.
the New STAR
START
T RT agreement
g that will
reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals.
Putin, who has remained the pre-
eminent political figure in the Kremlin
during the Medvedev presidency, al-
lowed the reset to happen, though he
never used the word. He is less of a
natural diplomat than Medvedev, and
has a less benign view of the US.
During the recent presidential elec-
tion campaign in Russia, Putin resorted
to tough anti-American rhetoric, accus-
ing opposition demonstrators of beingg
paid
p byy the US. Putin’s recent newspa- p geopolitics will drive the US to use
per
p articles also suggest
gg that he sees US
hegemony
g y as a bigger
gg p problem than the
rise of Chinese power. Those who have
heard him talk in private say that
Putin’s suspicion and mistrust of the
US is genuine, rather than mere elec-
toral rhetoric.
Any arguments over human rights
are likely to cause further strains in the
relationship. Within Russia, NGOs
funded by Western foundations are
facingg new forms of harassment.
fence. Much
M of the Russian security es-
tablishment appears to believe that
THOSE WHO have heard him
talk in private say that
Putin’s suspicion and mistrust
of the United States is genuine,
rather than mere electoral
rhetoric
America’s plans
p for missile defense are
aimed at Russia, though g the Americans
strategists
g worryy that the American
plans
p s could require
q them to rethink
r the
tion,” although those plans, if fully im-
plemented, could not stop Russia oblit-
Medvedev has threatened to respond p
to the US scheme byy deploying
p y g cruise
missiles to Kaliningrad
g and building
Russian missile defense systems.
Syria and Iran are causingg great
g modernisation of the Russian economy.
strains. Russian strategists
g view the
turmoil in the Middle East almost ex-
clusivelyy in terms of a conflict be-
tween Iran on the one hand, and
Saudi Arabia and the US on the other.
other
Syria
y is not onlyy Iran’s allyy but also
Russia’s best friend in the region.
Manyy Russians believe that
force against not only Iran but also
Bashar al-Assad’s regime g in Syria.
y
Theyy believe that onlyy ill will come off
the Arab Spring p g and p predict that
manyy countries will end up p with ex-
treme Islamist regimes backed byy
Saudi Arabia.
Putin is ardently opposed to any kind
of humanitarian intervention in Syria.
This position is based partly on princi-
ple, notably a strong attachment to ab-
solute state sovereignty. His belief that
the West abused the terms of Resolution
1973 to justify striking Libya has rein-
forced his hostility to Western interven-
tion elsewhere. The position
p is based
partly
p y on realpolitik:
p Syria
y buys y a lot off
Russian arms, p provides Russia with a
naval base and helps p to prevent
p US-
Saudi dominance in the Middle East.
Afghanistan,
g byy contrast, has fos-
tered cooperation
p between Washing- g
ton and Moscow. Russia views the US
presence
p in the countryy as a bulwark k
against
g the spread
p of Islamist funda-
mentalism, and theyy work together g on
counter-narcotics operations. But
many Russians believe that when US
troops depart in 2014, the Americans
will have fewer reasons to collaborate
with Moscow.
Still, both the next US president and
Putin are likely to see good reasons to
stop the US-Russia relationship p turningg
hostile. The US needs Russia’s help p in
the UN Securityy Council in tacklingg
Iran and other problems
p in the Middle
East. And Putin knows that stormyy rela-
tions with the West could hold back the
But it won’t be the reset, or the
cordiality, that Obama had with
Medvedev.
The writer is director of the Centre for
European Reform
The New York Times
 http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/1172842/

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C. Raja Mohan Posted online: Mon Sep 23 2013, 02:18 hrs

PM has the opportunity to inject fresh momentum in the engagement with US and Pakistan. Will he take it?

If you compare Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s trip to America this week with that of his predecessor Atal Bihari
Vajpayee 15 years ago, a paradox stares at you. India’s economic weight and political standing in the world have risen
remarkably over the last decade and a half. Yet, Singh’s diplomacy looks listless while that of Vajpayee radiated energy.
Representing India at one of its most difficult moments, Vajpayee thought big and acted boldly to pull India out of a tricky
diplomatic corner and alter the terms of its global engagement. Singh, who speaks for a much stronger India, appears
irresolute.

In September 1998, Vajpayee arrived at the United Nations in New York to a hostile international audience, thanks to the
five nuclear tests he had conducted four months earlier in May. In response, the UN Security Council passed a resolution
condemning the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan (which had followed a few weeks later), and demanding that the two
countries roll back their nuclear and missile programmes.

Tensions with Pakistan were boiling over and there was a growing international perception that Jammu and Kashmir was
the “world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoint”. Any number world leaders, from America’s Bill Clinton to South Africa’s
Nelson Mandela, thought a forced mediation between India and Pakistan on Kashmir might be a good idea. Unlike Singh,
Vajpayee was not invited to visit Washington. The US had imposed a range of nuclear sanctions against India in May
1998 and pressed Europe and Japan to intensify the economic pressure on India. Walking into this minefield, Vajpayee
did two important things.

One was to leverage the shock of the nuclear tests to turn the ties with the US on their head. In New York, Vajpayee
declared India and the US are “natural allies”. After the nuclear defiance of the US, Vajpayee was inviting Washington to
a strategic re-imagination of bilateral relations. Vajpayee’s thesis offended not just the Left and sections of the Congress
party, but also a large number of nativists in the BJP long reared on a diet of anti-Americanism. Foreign policy pundits
were apoplectic at Vajpayee’s heresy against the canon of non-alignment. It was Vajpayee’s departure from received
wisdom that opened the door to US support for ending India’s nuclear isolation, American neutrality on Kashmir,
expanded bilateral defence cooperation and Washington’s endorsement of a stronger Indian role on the global stage.

As he reordered ties with America, Vajpayee also confronted head-on the more complex relationship with Pakistan at a
moment when cross-border terrorism was at its peak. In New York, Vajpayee sat down with his Pakistani counterpart,
Nawaz Sharif, and announced the launch of what was then called “composite and integrated dialogue” with Islamabad.
Vajpayee broke the long-standing taboo on talking to Pakistan about Kashmir and took the first steps towards expanding
people-to-people contact between the two nations, including a decision on starting a bus service between Delhi and
Lahore. India’s bilateral talks with Pakistan took much of the international heat off on the Kashmir question.

Since 1998, there have been many twists and turns in India-Pakistan relations, including the Kargil War, the attack on
Parliament in December 2001, and the outrageous terror assaults on Mumbai, including the one in November 2008. Yet,
Vajpayee sought to sustain the peace process against all odds, for he recognised that limiting tensions with Pakistan is in
India’s own interest.

History will record that Singh eagerly embraced Vajpayee’s legacy on the US and Pakistan. He understood that the

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 http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/1172842/

restructuring of relations with the US and a careful management of those with Pakistan were a critical part of India’s
advancement on the regional and global stage. Singh took Vajpayee’s atomic engagement with America to its logical
conclusion — the integration of India into the global nuclear order. Singh pursued the dialogue with Pakistan under
turbulent conditions, negotiated a framework for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, came close to signing accords on
the Siachen and Sir Creek disputes, expanded people-to-people contact, and worked out a roadmap for normalising
trade relations.

Despite Singh’s conviction and commitment to these two relationships, there is no escaping the strange defensiveness
that has crept into Delhi’s current approach to Washington and Islamabad. The Congress was never too enthusiastic
about ties with the US. The risk-averse party is also opposed to any bold initiatives towards Pakistan. As a result, the
pace of engagement with the US has slowed, and even the simple question of the PM meeting Sharif has become
contentious.

This week in Washington and New York, Singh has an opportunity to inject fresh momentum in the engagements with
America and Pakistan. The PM’s conversations with US President Barack Obama and Pakistan PM Sharif should not be
about negotiating the nitty-gritty. They should be about reaffirming the political will in Delhi to deepen the strategic
partnership with the US and to pursue normalisation of relations with Pakistan.

While there are many issues to be sorted out with both, India is in a much better position with the US and Pakistan than
the one Vajpayee found himself in. What is missing is the self-confidence that marked Vajpayee’s bold outreach to the
US and Pakistan in 1998. Singh’s trip to America will show if there is any political energy left in the UPA government for
purposeful international engagement. If the answer is in the negative, the rest of the world will simply wait for stronger
leadership to re-emerge in Delhi. India might pay a price for the wasted moments, but the ruling party may not much
care, having grown rather comfortable with a do-nothing foreign policy.

The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a contributing editor for ‘The
Indian Express’ express@expressindia.com

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Durand Line
The 2,600 km line is named after Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, undivided India’s foreign secretary who
“negotiated” it with the Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, in 1893. At the end of the 19th
century, when the power of the Raj was at its apogee, the rulers of Kabul had no choice but to acquiesce.
After the Partition of the subcontinent, the Afghans were less obliged to accept the claims of Pakistan that
inherited the Durand Line.
India has largely stayed away from the controversy over the legitimacy of the Durand Line. Its
silence though is widely interpreted as supporting Pakistan’s position. In 1978, after the
communist revolution in Afghanistan, India’s then foreign minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
reportedly called on the new government to respect the Durand Line and urged Kabul and
Islamabad to settle their differences through negotiations.
A border becomes one only when both sides accept its legitimacy. While claiming it to be an
international border, Pakistan does everything to undermine the Durand Line. The Pakistan army
and the ISI behave as if the line does not exist, intervene in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, and
support insurgent groups trying to destabilise Kabul. From another perspective, the war in
Afghanistan has already spilled over into Pakistan; the US rains drones from across the Durand
Line. Rawalpindi’s own search for strategic depth in Afghanistan has undone what little
legitimacy the Line had.
The problem of the Durand Line can only be settled as part of a larger political reconciliation
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such reconciliation would involve skirting the question of
sovereignty, promoting transborder economic connectivity and cooperation, meeting the
aspirations of the Pashtuns on both sides of the Line, and ending support to cross-border
terrorism.

Pakistan
• Pakistan on 14th Nov agreed to the Afghan government and High Peace Council’s (HPC)
pending request for release of a number of Taliban detenus to facilitate the peace and
reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Both countries have been in talks over the release
of some Afghan prisoners in Pakistani jails and Islamabad has time and again refused to
confirm whether Baradar’s release also featured in these negotiations. Baradar (most
influential Taliban leader after Mullah Omar) was arrested from Karachi in 2010. Given
that Baradar is married to Taliban chief Mullah Omar’s sister and is one of the four men
who founded the movement in 1994, there is a perception in Afghanistan that his release
would give traction to the efforts to put together a viable arrangement for governance in
Kabul ahead of the drawdown of the coalition forces.
• Update: The release of a seven Afghan prisoners by Pakistan in September, 2013 has
raised hopes, once again, for a formal dialogue between Kabul and the Taliban leaders
under the protection of Pakistan. While Baradar was not among the Afghan leaders let
out by Pakistan, there is speculation that the ISI might soon release him. Afghan critics of
Pakistan say it is by no means certain if those released recently are credible interlocutors.
They suspect those let out by Pakistan might represent the interests of the ISI rather than
of the Taliban. The critics also insist that only those Taliban leaders who are free and are
not under any pressure from Pakistan can be trusted to seriously negotiate the terms of
peace with Kabul.
• Update: Baradar was released in Sept, 2013 (above speculations also true about Baradar)
• “Afghanistan is a new country today, but the only one who doesn’t seem to have
recognised it is Pakistan,” he said. “When the Taliban took over in the mid-1990s, the
Pakistanis were only one in three countries in the world who supported them. They
believe that when the Americans leave in 2014, the Pakistani army and ISI (“deep
state”—a network of current and retired intelligence and military officers who are
actively undermining the official policy of Pakistan’s government) will return to being the
most influential in Afghanistan through their control of the Taliban and the Haqqani
 recognised it is Pakistan,” he said. “When the Taliban took over in the mid-1990s, the
Pakistanis were only one in three countries in the world who supported them. They
believe that when the Americans leave in 2014, the Pakistani army and ISI (“deep
state”—a network of current and retired intelligence and military officers who are
actively undermining the official policy of Pakistan’s government) will return to being the
most influential in Afghanistan through their control of the Taliban and the Haqqani
network. What really infuriates the Afghans is that Pakistan continues to treat their
country as a weak-willed state with a ragtag security and police force that is totally
corrupted from within.
• Bilateral trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan has witnessed an impressive growth in
recent years and reached $2.44 billion in 2012. Pakistan’s exports stood at $2.24 billion,
making Afghanistan the third largest destination for Pakistani products. Recognising the
vast untapped potential, the two countries have agreed to expand bilateral trade to $5
billion by 2015. The two countries signed the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade
Agreement (APTTA) in 2010, which serves as a key instrument for the facilitation of
Afghanistan’s access to foreign markets through Pakistani sea-ports and land routes. Both
sides are engaged in efforts for optimal utilization of the APTTA and its extension to
Central Asia.
• To support Afghanistan’s reconstruction and socio-economic development, Pakistan has
been providing bilateral assistance worth $330 million in diverse fields, including
infrastructure, health, and education. Pakistan has also offered $20 million for the Afghan
National Security Forces.

US
• Karzai and the US President Barack Obama have not been able to build much mutual
trust since the latter took charge of the White House in January 2009. Obama and his
foreign policy advisers believed Karzai was part of the problem in Afghanistan. Karzai,
in turn, was concerned at Obama's 'surge and exit' policy in Afghanistan and
Washington's reluctance to confront the sources of regional instability across the Durand
Line in Pakistan.
• Recent engagement with Taliban without taking Karzai on board and allowing Afghans to
lead the process has further soured the relationship.

Exit
The twin pillars of the exit policy — reintegration and reconciliation — have not worked. A
very small proportion of the insurgents have integrated which is more than offset by the large
number of desertions and “green-on-blue” attacks. As for reconciliation, the Taliban have always
known that the distant power will not stay engaged forever and that time was on their side. They
are the ones who set conditions for even talking about reconciliation. The term “reconciliation”
is misleading in the Afghan context. Reconciliation presupposes the existence of two or more
parties which must reconcile among themselves. In Afghanistan, clearly defined or structured
parties do not exist. Even the Taliban, obviously one “side,” is a fractured movement with
several groups, but at least they agree on one leader in the person of Mullah Omar whose
decision everyone will accept. But on the other side, there is not even this kind of a party.
President Hamid Karzai was elected in his individual capacity, not as head of a political party.
Even the High Peace Council is a nominated body. In any case, the reconciliation talks were to
take place between the Taliban and the Americans who do not represent any segment of the
Afghan population.
The U.S. ought to ponder over what kind of Afghanistan it will leave behind after its withdrawal.
As The NYT editorial points out, even most of its downsized objectives would not have been
fulfilled. The Taliban will form part of the government at some stage. Al Qaeda, with whom the
Taliban are in cahoots, is supposed to have been decimated but is alive and will probably start
kicking post-2014. It is very much active, lethally so, in many other parts of the mainly Islamic
world.
• The American forces would stop fighting and shift to supportive missions, such as
training, before the summer of 2013. But few are willing to bet that the Afghan National
Army and its police forces are fully prepared to cope with the inevitably stronger military
offensives from the Taliban and other militant groups that enjoy sanctuaries in Pakistan.
Most military experts, however, still believe that an international force of around 30,000
is needed to support the ANSF after 2014. Yet it now appears that the troop levels under
consideration by the president range between 6,000 and none. Even if the higher force
figure gets the go-ahead, allies will be reluctant to contribute to it, concluding that
 Army and its police forces are fully prepared to cope with the inevitably stronger military
offensives from the Taliban and other militant groups that enjoy sanctuaries in Pakistan.
Most military experts, however, still believe that an international force of around 30,000
is needed to support the ANSF after 2014. Yet it now appears that the troop levels under
consideration by the president range between 6,000 and none. Even if the higher force
figure gets the go-ahead, allies will be reluctant to contribute to it, concluding that
America is more than halfway out of the door and that such a minimal force can achieve
little beyond a small training mission in Kabul and securing the air base at nearby
Bagram for limited counter-terrorism operations.
• The two sides, however, differ on the size of a potential American residual force in
Afghanistan, the pace of the withdrawal, the legal terms under which the American and
international forces will operate, and the kind of arms and equipment the US should
supply to Kabul.
• America would want to keep bases in the country as a way of maintaining its influence in
a region full of security threats, whether from Iran or from a failing Pakistani state armed
to the teeth with nuclear weapons. But, Acute budgetary pressures; the draining of public
support for involvement in a war most believe long ago to have been lost; and a belief in
some quarters that drones and the intelligence networks that have been built up over the
past decade are all that is needed for American security: all have chipped away at the
notion of leaving behind a substantial force. Hence, leaving no troops behind after 2014
was one of the options under active consideration.
• Mr Karzai and other Afghan political leaders are sensitive about their country’s
sovereignty. But they have no intention of emulating the Iraqis, who brought an abrupt
end to the presence of American troops by refusing to sign a new status of forces
agreement providing immunity from prosecution for foreign soldiers(America is asking
Afghanistan too to sign such an agreement).
• Hastily recruited and trained, the ANSF is still a work in progress. It was deliberately
denied heavy weapons or much of an air force on the assumption that America would
provide key “enablers” for years to come. Only one out of 23 brigades is capable of
operating without any outside help.

Kajaki dam
The Kajaki dam on the Helmand River symbolises for both the Afghans and their American
backers what they had hoped the infusion of U.S. troops and cash would produce across the
nation: an Afghan government that can provide for its people and in turn count on its support
against the Taliban insurgency.The completion, originally was envisaged for 2005, now is
projected for some time in 2015 — the year after most combat troops will have left the country.
It is also a symbol of the American presence in Afghanistan dating back to the1950s and the
Cold War. That was when the U.S. built the original dam, with a power-house added in the
1970s. The Soviets invaded and construction stopped. The dam was still squeezing out a bit of
power in 2001when the U.S. attacked and,ironically enough, bombed the dam’s power
transmission line. At present, fighting as well as limited oversight of spending has led to huge
delays and cost overruns, and now Helmand province, home of the Kajaki dam, is seeing the first
and largest wave of U.S. troop reductions.

Pakistan’s +ve moves

• PAKISTAN’S decision to free some members of the Taliban (Nov 2012 & Jan, 2013) has
been welcomed in Kabul and Washington as an important step towards a political
reconciliation in Afghanistan and a major shift in Pakistan’s policy.
• Pakistan has promised togive safe passage to these leaders to engage in a dialogue with
Kabul and Washington.
• Until now, the Pakistan army has been reluctant to facilitate talks with the Taliban leaders
based on its soil. Infact, Rawalpindi detained anyone from the Taliban it suspectedof
establishing contact with Kabul or Washington. Rawalpindi had seen itself as the
principal channel of communication between the Taliban and the international
community. Having invested in the Taliban for decades as the instrument to promote its
interests in Afghanistan, the Pakistan army was naturally reluctant to allow the group to
develop an independent engagement with either Kabul or Washington. Relentless
pressure from the US in the last two years appears to have compelled the Pakistan army
to signal a measure of flexibility.
 interests in Afghanistan, the Pakistan army was naturally reluctant to allow the group to
develop an independent engagement with either Kabul or Washington. Relentless
pressure from the US in the last two years appears to have compelled the Pakistan army
to signal a measure of flexibility.

Bone of contentions with Pak

• Afghanistan continues to accuse its Pakistan of harbouring the Taliban leadership in
Quetta and nurturing terrorist outfits — including the Haqqani network.
• Kabul is particularly resentful of Pakistan's alleged sabotaging of the reconciliation
process. The first chief of the High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was killed in
2011 by the Taliban. The assassin, according to Kabul, came from Pakistan. Moreover,
moderate Taliban voices open to holding independent dialogue with the Karzai
government are allegedly being systematically eliminated. The struggle, apparently, is
over the ownership of the peace process. Karzai wants moderate Taliban voices to be free
of Pakistani influence so as to have a truly Afghan-led peace process. Pakistan wants to
retain its strategic significance in the Afghan political landscape by controlling the peace
process.
• Islamabad, for its part, accuses Afghanistan of offering a safe haven to Islamist
groups targeting the Pakistani state, including Maulana Fazlullah, a leader of the
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic
Law) and Mangal Bagh Afridi of the Lashkar-e-Islam. The TNSM, now allied with the
Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP), had come to the rescue of the Afghan Taliban in 2001 and
may well attack Pakistan from that side of the border now that the withdrawal of Nato
forces is giving militants room for manoeuvre. Lashkar-e-Islam, a smaller militant outfit,
continues operating in the Khyber Tribal Agency, while its leadership frequently travels
to the Nangarhar province in Afghanistan.
• Karzai may also be asked, once again, to recognise the Durand Line as an international
border in order to ward off the risk of Pashtunistan.
• But there is another, more immediate cause for concern for Islamabad: the Indo-Afghan
rapprochement that materialised in 2011 after the first "strategic partnership" ever
signed by Kabul. This agreement is problematic from the Pakistani point of view. First,
New Delhi has committed itself to training Afghan soldiers in counter-insurgency
operations. Second, India would provide arms to its partner. Afghanistan President Hamid
Karzai’s request for heavy weaponry from India during his last visit to the country has
further alarmed the security establishment in Islamabad. The Indian government,
however, insists that it has said a polite no to the request for weaponry from Afghanistan.

Peace Process Roadmap

• consisting of five steps
• Sought to outline a vision in which, by 2015, the Taliban, the Hizb-e-Islami and other
armed groups will have given up armed opposition. Assumes that all the armed
insurgencies will have transformed themselves into political groups and will actively
participate in the political and constitutional process, including national elections.
• The bulk of the roadmap proposes agreements between the Afghan government and the
Taliban that are geared towards an end to violence and reintegration of ex-combatants.
• The first step focuses on securing Pakistan’s collaboration which would include Pakistan
releasing specific Taliban detainees, an end to cross-border shelling of villages, release of
designated Taliban from Pakistani prisons, a Taliban announcement of severing ties with
the al-Qaeda, and renewal of negotiations for safe passage. Pakistan has already
repatriated several mid-level Taliban prisoners and might release Mullah Baradar.
• The second step envisages direct talks with the Taliban, which Pakistan should facilitate,
in Saudi Arabia in the first half of 2013.
• Step three calls for ceasefire and transformation of the Taliban into a political party.
• The final steps include securing peaceful end to the conflict during the first half of 2014
and moves to sustain the long-term stability of Afghanistan and the region.
• Cause for worry in India: To start with the last first, in stage three of the plan, the
Afghan government and the Taliban are to agree on giving the Taliban positions in “the
power structure of the state” such as ministerial berths and governorships, which other
parties have to win through elections or at the President’s pleasure.
This could mean handing over the southern and eastern provinces to the Taliban in a kind
of de facto but not de jure partition(Broadly, the Pakistani security establishment sees a
 • Cause for worry in India: To start with the last first, in stage three of the plan, the
Afghan government and the Taliban are to agree on giving the Taliban positions in “the
power structure of the state” such as ministerial berths and governorships, which other
parties have to win through elections or at the President’s pleasure.
This could mean handing over the southern and eastern provinces to the Taliban in a kind
of de facto but not de jure partition(Broadly, the Pakistani security establishment sees a
post-2014 scenario Afghanistan in which the Taliban will control southern Afghanistan
while the Haqqanis dominate the southeast — both assets and vehicles of influence for
Islamabad. Jihadists targeting Kashmir could once again find safe havens in those parts
just as Pakistan will enjoy a measure of deniability).They will also agree to “a vision on
strengthening the ANSF and other key government institutions to remain non-political
and enjoy full public support.” This proposal, if it does actually become a focus of
negotiations, will immediately polarise the polity on ethnic grounds. Moreover, the task
of creating a vision for security forces, along with rules and regulations, belongs to
Parliament not to the Afghan government and Taliban, on the fundamental principle that
elected legislators are the best expression of the will of the people.

The roadmap also gives Pakistan a controlling role in the proposed peace process, thereby
keeping the door open to strategic depth. Pakistan will mediate between the Taliban and
the Afghan government, and will decide, with the Afghan government and the United
States, the conditions for Taliban participation, such as delisting and safe passage;
Afghanistan and Pakistan will cooperate on fighting the al-Qaeda and any groups that
threaten each other’s security.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are fully entitled to enter into bilateral security arrangements,
and if their cooperation can bring the Taliban to the table it must be welcome. But any
moves towards the institutionalisation of Pakistani influence in Afghan security
structures, however indirectly, are bound to trigger fears of Afghanistan being used again
for proxy wars. Indeed, they run counter to the Afghanistan-India Strategic Partnership
Agreement.
• Several of the points made above could be accommodated through the inclusion of
guarantees that would satisfy opposition and neighbour concerns; for example that any
provisional agreements regarding governance and security would be put to Parliament or
a specially convened Loya Jirga, as was earlier done, or that the Taliban would
simultaneously pledge not to support or give sanctuary to groups threatening a third
country.
• There is one larger problem that needs addressing by all the negotiators. The roadmap
proposes regular monitoring and consultations with countries that have influence over the
Taliban directly or through Pakistan, which is useful coordination. But it entirely omits
consultations with neighbours who will be directly impacted by the outcome of its
proposals.India should seek to be in the consultation mechanism, as indeed should other
neighbours that would need to on board if a peace process is to succeed.

Chantilly (Paris) negotiation

• This was the first time senior Taliban representatives sat down with the government and
other opposition groups. The Taliban was represented by senior leaders Shahabuddin
Dilawar, former Taliban ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and Naeem Wardak — both based
in Doha. The government side was represented by the Higher Peace Council chairman
Salahuddin Rabbani.
• The Taliban, for its part, clarified in no uncertain terms that no negotiations with anyone
were involved and that the Taliban “wants the world community to listen to our goals;” in
other words, the Taliban approached the Paris talks as a platform to air its ideology and
demands. The Taliban issued a statement after the talks in which it rejected the present
constitution on the ground that it was made “under the shadows of B52 bombers of the
invaders.”
• This amounts to a concession by the Taliban which had, thus far, refused to talk to the
Kabul government which it did not regard as legitimate.
• There was no joint statement after the Chantilly meeting.
• The objective was to encourage the Afghans to “project themselves towards the horizon
of 2020.”
• Objective from the American and the West’s perspective: to provide a respectable screen
behind which to implement the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As for Hamid Karzai, he
 • This amounts to a concession by the Taliban which had, thus far, refused to talk to the
Kabul government which it did not regard as legitimate.
• There was no joint statement after the Chantilly meeting.
• The objective was to encourage the Afghans to “project themselves towards the horizon
of 2020.”
• Objective from the American and the West’s perspective: to provide a respectable screen
behind which to implement the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As for Hamid Karzai, he
too would wish to leave behind some legacy whereby there will be at least an agreement
on paper which, hopefully, will avoid the country’s descent into chaos which many
analysts anticipate post-2014.
• Firstly, it means that the U.S. and NATO have given up, once and for all, the objective of
defeating the Taliban. Secondly, there is more than a tacit admission that the Afghan
National Security Force will be incapable of ensuring security in the country post-
2014,considering that only one out of 23 Afghan brigades is considered capable of
operating on its own. The ‘green on blue’ attacks have also played their part in this.
Thirdly, it proves that the British are still far ahead of the Americans in understanding the
region. The U.K. called for co-opting the Taliban in the government years before even
Mr. Karzai did, as the only way out for the country.
• Fourthly, and importantly, it must be borne in mind that the West, especially the
Americans, never had any problem with the Taliban. It was the treatment of women that
made the then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright anti-Taliban. The forceful
action after 9/11 was aimed at al-Qaeda, not the Taliban. Had the Taliban agreed to cut
ties with al-Qaeda then, it would still be ruling in Kabul.
• There is no reason for us (India) to rejoice at the possibility of the Taliban becoming a
part of the government. We did support the reconciliation process some time ago, but it
was probably more theoretical at that time when the three ‘red lines’ were still in place,
namely, respecting the constitution, renunciation of violence and severing ties with al-
Qaeda. These red lines have since been given up and are now projected as objectives to
be considered at the end of the process rather than as preconditions for talks.
• Pakistan has emerged the clear winner. Mr. Karzai’s roadmap “Peace Process roadmap”
confers key role on Islamabad in the whole process. Pakistan has succeeded in
convincing its western interlocutors that there is a paradigm shift in the political mindset
in the country. Once the Taliban manages to get a share of power in Kabul, it will
eventually endeavour to grab total power. Since it will remain the most cohesive force,
ideologically, politically and militarily, it would be imprudent to exclude this possibility.
In other words, the Taliban might well achieve around a conference table what it failed to
achieve in the battlefield.

Major achievements in Afghanistan:

• Earlier life was almost nil in Kabul—no traffic, none of the signs of a normal life. Today,
you will have traffic similar to that in Delhi. That means progress, more economic
development, more people living in Kabul.
• On the political front, Afghanistan has a very progressive constitution. They have held
elections over the last 11 years—presidential and parliamentary.
• Government institutions full of young talent coming back from India and around the
world. So, we are gradually moving to our own human resources
• Healthcare services are now available throughout the country.
• Connectivity has improved, with more than 14 million cellphone users.
• Budgetary systems are improving to ensure better accountability and delivery of public
services
• Over nine million children go to school, 34 per cent of them are girls. On economic
development, billions of dollars of investment is coming in from all parts of the world.
• Economic potential: Afghanistan is full of minerals, 400 kinds of minerals, unexploited,
untapped.
• 27 per cent representation of women in Parliament

Challenges post withdrawal

• The effort to improve local government must be accelerated. In the decade between the
two Bonn conferences, much was done to build national institutions in Kabul. When it
came to building local government, however, donor impatience led to shortcuts. Each
donor selected a province to set up its own provincial reconstruction team (PRT) and
deliver assistance. The hard slog to build effective local government seemed time-
Challenges post withdrawal
• The effort to improve local government must be accelerated. In the decade between the
two Bonn conferences, much was done to build national institutions in Kabul. When it
came to building local government, however, donor impatience led to shortcuts. Each
donor selected a province to set up its own provincial reconstruction team (PRT) and
deliver assistance. The hard slog to build effective local government seemed time-
consuming and difficult. Setting up a PRT with visible results was much easier. Now, as
foreign troops withdraw, we're dealing with the same issue — the rebuilding of local
government infrastructure without which delivery of services isn't possible
• The likelihood of a sharp drop in aid post-2014 occupies attention. But even current
levels of promised assistance are not flowing through
• need to create employment for a young and rapidly growing population
• A majority of Afghanistan's population depends on agriculture, and revitalising
agricultural growth remains the largest source of job-creation and improving
livelihoods. Not enough focus has been given to understanding the supply chain,
encouraging agro-processing, and finding markets for agricultural products. Much
attention has turned to Afghanistan's mining potential, exploitation of which is time
taking and contingent upon peaceful conditions.
• There has been a heavy emphasis on building and strengthening the Afghan security
forces. But not enough focus on justice and the rule of law.
• A visible and vital symbol of a credible transition will be the conduct of the 2014
presidential elections, and subsequent parliamentary and local elections.
• A landlocked country, Afghanistan has always prospered when it has been a bridge
across regions — with China and Central Asia to the north and east, with India and
Pakistan to the south, and with the Near East to its west. Therefore, regional cooperation
must form a core of any strategy of economic development for Afghanistan.
• With the prospects of improved India-Pakistan relations, any trade agreement between
them would be a huge boon for Afghanistan as it would pave the way to the large and
growing Indian market. It would also open the possibility of the much-discussed TAPI
energy corridor. Likewise, entry into Central Asia and China, along the Silk Route, offers
Afghanistan a huge trade potential.
• If these challenges are overcome, we can see more progress on economic and social
development, and a better framework for security too

Talks with Taliban

There is no clarity yet on the process, but it will most likely involve direct engagement between
the Taliban and the United States before the group talks to the High Peace Council, the
negotiating body set up by the Karzai government.
Major roadblock:
• Release of Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo, a sticking point on which the process
collapsed in 2011.
• Pakistan’s role (the Pakistani army and its ISI intelligence service are their patrons) —
especially with Nawaz Sharif, an old friend of the Taliban, now in power — will also be
crucial to how the process unfolds. Pak demands from Afghanistan include severing
Kabul's ties with India, sending Afghan army officers for military training in Pakistan and
the immediate signing of a strategic partnership agreement. Pakistani officials deny
making any demands on Kabul and insist that Karzai is increasingly an obstacle to the
Afghan peace process. They also accuse Kabul of sheltering a section of the militants
belonging to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that fights the Pakistani state.
• Karzai is angry that Qatar was trying to promote reconciliation between the Taliban and
the West behind Kabul's back. Karzai insists that the negotiations with the Taliban must
be led by Kabul. Independent international negotiations with the Taliban will undermine
the legitimacy of the elected government in Kabul.
• The Taliban dismisses Karzai as a puppet of America, refuses to engage with him and
insists on direct negotiations with the US.
• The Afghanistan government has designated a “High Peace Council” comprising former
Taliban officials and politicians belonging to different groups to negotiate with the
Taliban. The peace council is part of the country’s internationally recognised “Peace and
Reconciliation Programme”. The Taliban has so far refused to recognise the Karzai-led
government and prefers direct talks with Washington.
• The Doha office is audaciously named the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and flies
 • The Afghanistan government has designated a “High Peace Council” comprising former
Taliban officials and politicians belonging to different groups to negotiate with the
Taliban. The peace council is part of the country’s internationally recognised “Peace and
Reconciliation Programme”. The Taliban has so far refused to recognise the Karzai-led
government and prefers direct talks with Washington.
• The Doha office is audaciously named the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and flies
Taliban flag, recalling their rule over the country between 1996 and 2001. They were not
reticent in declaring that their Qatari base would help them “improve […] relations with
countries around the world through understanding and talks”. The name has already cast
a shadow on the process
• But many in India and the world are not ready to bet that the Taliban, which enjoys strong
support from the Pakistan army, is amenable to a reasonable political bargain in
Afghanistan. After all, America's efforts to negotiate with the Taliban — in 1998, after
the al-Qaeda bombings of the American embassies in East Africa, and in the immediate
wake of the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington — came to naught.
• Taliban's refusal to renounce violence during the talks. Further, instead of acknowledging
the legitimacy of the Afghan constitution, the Taliban has underlined its commitment to
establish an Islamic political system in the country
• The Taliban has consistently stated that it remains opposed to the presence of foreign
troops in the country. The Taliban has even expressed a readiness to share power after the
American withdrawal.
• Afghan’s conditions: Taliban must accept the Afghan Constitution and respect the
democratic gains of the Afghan people, including the constitutionally-protected rights of
women. They must also cut ties with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, while verifiably
renouncing violence. And it has been emphasised time and again that any external
interference intended to influence the peace talks would jeopardise and stall the process.
• The Taliban have so far announced that they will not let Afghan soil be used for an attack
against a third party and guaranteed women's rights under certain conditions. However,
they do not recognise the constitution.
The time has also come for India to step up its engagement with all Afghan formations and
intensify its support to Kabul. India must continue to caution the US against too many
compromises with the Taliban and its chief patron, the Pakistan army, in its eagerness to
withdraw from Afghanistan.

Misc
• Fifth Afghan War began with American occupation at the end of 2001 and is coming to
an end. The British Raj fought the first three Afghan Wars in the 19th and early 20th
centuries. The fourth was when the West promoted jihadi extremism in response to Soviet
Russia's occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989.
Leadership transition
• The Party has faced renewed calls for political and economic reforms to tackle corruption
and rising inequality. The urban-rural income gap today is 68 per cent higher than it was
in 1985. A continuing slow-down in China’s export-led and infrastructure
investment based economy has pushed critics to ask for economic reforms as well. China
will look to expand its export basket, with more value-added products like machinery,
and at the same time focus on opening up its services sector and boosting domestic
consumption. The outgoing president has called for a new growth model, marked by
greater domestic demand and encouraging private enterprise by offering it a level playing
field. Other demands are to prioritise addressing the demands of the public for better
education, greater social security, improved health care and a cleaner environment.
• Increase the number of non-party representatives in the people’s congress would “mark
significant progress on introducing democratic processes” to policymaking if introduced
next year at the Parliament session in March. “If we see a significant drop in the number
of party cadres in the legislative arm, and then a total exit, the ‘rubber stamp’ nature of
the legislative body will finally become history.
• The Work Report presented to the 18th National congress by Hu Jintao shed some light
on how the leadership under Xi will move forward. Xi told a meeting of the Politburo on
November 17 that the Work Report, which is a policy document approved by the
congress, had “outlined a blueprint for China, under new circumstances, to complete the
building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects, advance the socialist
modernisation and win new victory for socialism with Chinese characteristics”.
• Among the problems highlighted by Hu in the work report were: unbalanced,
uncoordinated and unsustainable development; weak capacity for scientific and
technological innovation; serious resource and environmental constraints; a marked
increase in social problems; widening gaps between urban and rural areas and disparities
in incomes; and problems affecting people’s interests in social security, health care,
housing and the environment. Hu also stressed the dangers of rampant corruption,
warning it could “even cause the collapse of the party and the fall of the state”. The report
warned that the country’s export-driven, state investment-supported model had reached a
turning point. There is need for greater protection for farmers’ rights and expansion of
social security to reduce disparities and to encourage domestic consumption as a new
driver of more balanced growth.
• It is not just the “once in a decade” leadership change at the very top; seven of the nine
members of the PSC will step down. Around 60 per cent of the ruling central committee
will change. There will be changes in the body that oversees the military and in the body
in charge of campaigns against corruption.
• The Party has reduced the size of its elite inner circle (Politburo Standing Committee-
PBSC) from nine to seven, underscoring long-discussed moves, analysts said, to make
the top body more efficient and nimble, and less riven by competing factional interests
seen as stalling reform moves. The composition of the new PBSC disappointed some
Chinese liberals who are pushing for faster political reforms. The CPC appears to have
weighed the age of prospective candidates as a major criterion for selection, choosing
leaders who were just under the retirement age of 68. This also means that five of the
seven PBSC leaders, besides Xi and Li, will only serve one term, and will retire at the
next congress in 2017. Two scholars with party ties said the conservative outlook of the
body suggested that for the next five years the PBSC was likely to continue the policies
of the Hu Jintao administration and that major political or economic reforms were
unlikely.
• An amendment to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was approved
• An amendment to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was approved
on the last day of the leadership change Congress making the Scientific Outlook on
Development as part of the party’s guide for action. Hu Jintao on stepped down from
power, leaving a stamp of his own with the ruling Communist Party incorporating his
theory of “Scientific Outlook” in its constitution, figuring along theories of top leaders
like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. The resolution said it represents the Party’s latest
achievement in adapting Marxism to China’s conditions.
• The composition of the PBSC was along expected lines, filled by four officials close to
former leader Jiang Zemin and two others who rose under outgoing General Secretary Hu
Jintao. This reflects the continuing influence the two leaders will wield from behind the
scenes even as Mr. Xi, known as a moderate, pragmatic and consensus-building leader,
looks to make his mark. potential source of trouble at the top is the lingering influence of
retired leaders.
China now has a unique situation where two “retired” top leaders are still alive and
politically active. Both have proxies in the standing committee and the Politburo. Both
can influence policy from behind the scenes. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that
Hu has lost influence, he has retained considerable political capital despite his full
nominal retirement. Of the 15 new members of the 25-member Politburo, at least seven to
10 people are close to him. Two of the new Politburo members, one of them a protege of
Hu, are 49. This means that these two are well-positioned to be anointed as leaders of the
sixth generation when the party convenes its 19th congress in 2017.
• Mr. Hu, a strong follower of Deng’s reform policies, discarding Mao’s hard-line Marxist
policies opened up China’s economy in the last ten years and presided over a decade of
rapid economic growth, which made China the world’s second-largest economy and
raised per capita incomes fivefold. IN the decade since Hu Jintao took over as
Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary in the autumn of 2002, the fourth
generation of the Chinese leadership has presided over many firsts for the People’s
Republic of China. Under the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration, China grew into the
world’s second-largest economy. The country’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased
by an extraordinary five times. When Hu came to power, China had only just acceded
into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Under his charge, China became the world’s
biggest exporter, overtaking Germany, with its share of world exports rising from around
4 per cent in 2002 to more than 10 per cent. China, today, is the richest nation in respect
of foreign reserves, which have grown to more than $3 trillion. More meaningful
economic indicators, such as per capita GDP, are no less impressive: in the past decade,
per capita annual income increased from $800 to $4,000. The Hu decade will, perhaps, be
remembered most for heralding China’s rise as a global economic, political and military
power, with Chinese influence in all three spheres rising considerably in the period.
• Despite the obvious link between corruption and the absence of political accountability,
the party under Mr. Hu did little to push forward meaningful reforms. He put a strong lid
on the political reforms, and consolidated his hold on the party. The purge of former
Politburo member Bo Xilai, who will soon stand trial on corruption charges, embarrassed
the party, revealing how one of its most powerful leaders amassed a fortune and held
scant regard for the law. His regime is also marked by heavy deterioration of China’s
environment as the country sped on feverish growth emerging as the world’s largest
carbon emitter surpassing the US. Also China for the first time witnessed ballooning
wealth gap between rich and poor, prompting the party to make it as a priority issue to be
resolved by the new leadership.
• On the ideological front, the CPC has avoided the risk of formally discarding Mao
Zedong’s tragic leftist legacy. It has amended the party constitution to include the
outgoing leader Hu Jintao’s formulations on “scientific development”, which are said to
provide all the answers to the multiple challenges faced by China.
• Having formed their worldview in the reforms-and-open-door-policy era, the fifth
generation of Chinese leadership is expected to be more global in their outlook and
possess a more sophisticated understanding of the economy and the world.
• Given the size of the Indian market, the country’s penchant for low-cost equipment and
relatively fewer non-tariff barriers, Beijing will definitely have its eye on India. Beijing
is also worried about Washington’s Asia pivot. Beijing already believes the US pivot has
 is also worried about Washington’s Asia pivot. Beijing already believes the US pivot has
emboldened Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Against this backdrop, Beijing would
not like to worsen its ties with India, carry the baggage of 1962 and push Delhi closer to
Washington.
• Challenges: need to establish its own political authority over the Chinese party/state and
to get the economy back on course after what seems to be some serious slowing down,
how, and to what extent, will the party be prepared to engage in meaningful reforms
mentioned in the first point, meeting the expectation on international front through
meaningful foreign policy as last ten years have seen changing Chinese stand on the
global front to a new higher level.

Xi Jinping
The “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” ( fuxing) and “the Chinese Dream” ( zhongguo meng)
are two themes that have found prominence in Xi’s speeches since he has taken over as the head
of the CPC. In the 10-minute opening address on November 15, Xi used the phrase “fuxing” no
less than three times. China’s revival after “a century of humiliation” is hardly a new idea in CPC
politics, and has been routinely invoked by nationalists who are pushing for China to take a more
prominent, assertive role on the world stage. But in the past decade under Hu Jintao, the phrase,
to some degree, went out of favour as Hu emphasised “a harmonious society” at home and a
“peaceful rise” overseas.
Xi outlined his vision of “the Chinese Dream”, an idea that would guide the CPC’s political
outlook and decision-making in the next decade. He said: “Everybody has their own ideal,
pursuit and dream. Today, everybody is talking about the Chinese dream. I firmly believe that by
the time the CPC celebrates its 100th anniversary [in 2021] we will no doubt have achieved the
goal of completely building a well-off society, and by the time the People’s Republic celebrates
its 100th anniversary [in 2049], we will become a prosperous, strong, democratic, civilised and
harmonious socialist modernised country on its way to the ultimate great rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation. This is the greatest dream of the Chinese nation in modern history.”
The CPC’s official newspaper, People’s Daily, in a commentary that was disseminated widely
across media outlets shortly after Xi’s speech, listed what it described as the “three main driving
forces behind the Chinese dream”. The first, the commentary said, was “the pursuit of economic
lift-off, livelihood improvement, and social and environmental progress”. The second driving
force involved “the pursuit of national wealth and military strength, national dignity, sovereign
integrity, national unity, and world peace”, while the third was “the pursuit of fairness and
justice, democracy and the rule of law”. How the CPC plans to balance and prioritise the three
goals has emerged as the focus of the debate.
Xi said he did not agree “with the idea that China’s reform has been falling behind in some
regard”. “The key is what to reform and what not to reform. There are things we have not
changed, things we cannot change, and things we will not change no matter how long a time
passes…. Some people define reform as changes towards the universal values of the West, the
Western political system, or it will not constitute ‘real’ reform. This is a stealthy tampering of the
concept and a misunderstanding of our reform. Of course, we must uphold the banner of reform,
but our reform is reform that keeps us moving forward on the path of socialism with Chinese
characteristics. We will walk neither the closed and rigid old path, nor the evil path of changing
the flag.” He cautioned that if the party “loses sight of our vision as communists, we will lose our
direction and succumb to utilitarianism and pragmatism”. “The great renewal of the Chinese
nation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese nation over the last couple of hundred years,”
he concluded. “The ‘China Dream’ is an ideal. But of course, as communists, we should have a
higher ideal, and that is, Communism.”

Reforms undertaken
• CHINA’S new leader, Xi Jinping, has marked the start of his term in office by unveiling
an ambitious restructuring of the government—the biggest such plan in 15 years—that
aims to trim the bureaucracy.
• The restructuring dissolves two Cabinet-level Ministries—the vast and powerful Ministry
 of Railways and the Health Ministry, which has been merged with the family planning
authority.
• The four other major reforms included raising the status of the state Food and Drug
Administration to a Ministry-level body to give it more power to address rising concerns
over food safety issues; merging the regulators of the press and radio, film and television
to create a unified authority that will regulate the media and enforce censorship;
restructuring and streamlining the National Energy Administration to include the now-
dissolved State Electricity Regulatory Commission; and setting up a National Oceanic
Administration to centralise maritime law enforcement agencies, currently operated by
different Ministries, with the aim of enabling a more coordinated response to the
increasing number of maritime disputes.
• Xi Jinping has launched a campaign against corruption, government extravagance and
bureaucratic “formalism” in the months since taking over.
• The most significant of the six reforms was the dissolution of the Ministry of Railways,
which has been seen as the most powerful of the Cabinet-level Ministries along with the
Defence Ministry, which operates under the purview of the People’s Liberation Army,
and the National Development and Reform Commission. Reflecting the unique degree of
autonomy it has enjoyed in the recent past, the Railways even operated its own courts
system and police force. Now, the Ministry will operate under the Ministry of Transport,
which will supervise Administration and Planning. The high degree of independence had
allowed it to spearhead an unprecedented expansion of China’s railway network. The
independence did, however, lead to a system that enabled little oversight, symbolised in
the widespread abuses of power by the notoriously corrupt former Minister Liu Zhijun,
who accumulated billions of dollars of ill-gotten gains.

Political Setup
• National Congress: A carefully selected 2,268 delegates (“people’s representatives”)-
once in a 5 year
• A Central Committee (205 members in the new 18th Committee) that proposes resolution
to National Congress (more often than not, resolutions are passed without a single
dissenting vote)
• PBSC (of CPC)
• Politburo- 25 members (7 belongs to PBSC) . For the first time, two women were
nominated.
• Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) — the Party’s powerful internal
disciplinary body —
• Hu Jinato held 3 posts-General Secretary of CPC (rather of Central Committee I guess),
President of China and head of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Central Military
Commission. Xi Jinping has been elected as G.Sec and Head of Central Military
Commission.

CPEC
• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor envisages improving road links from Xinjiang to
Pakistan, including expanding and bolstering the Karokaram Highway, as well as
building railway lines and pipelines from Kashgar in Xinjiang to the Gwadar Port on the
Arabian Sea, which could open up a much-needed alternative route for energy imports.
• Concerns over security could hinder the ambitious plans. China’s growing concerns over
security in Pakistan, in the wake of recent kidnapping threats to workers, have also
slowed down other infrastructure projects executed by Chinese companies in the country.
Analysts say China’s investments in the country have, as a result, not kept pace with the
often lofty rhetoric hailing “all-weather” relations.
• The security implications of the plan have concerned India as the corridor runs through
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which borders Xinjiang.S

Defense Modernization
Defense Modernization
• the current wave of Chinese military modernisation, which began when the US military’s
performance in the 1991 Gulf War shook the PLA out of its Stalinist mindset,
• EYEING the international market, China in Nov 2012, for the first time displayed its new
radar-evading stealth fighter, J-31, jet at the country’s annual air show, where it also
unveiled an unmanned drone, Wing Loong, for public view. This is the first time China
has unveiled its stealth aircraft for public. Earlier only photos and videos were circulated.
China now has two stealth fighter designs in development (the larger J-20 was unveiled
in 2010.
• China’s modern submarine fleet, its emerging surface ship force, its huge ballistic missile
arsenal and hundreds of modern combat aircraft now make it very difficult to imagine
that the US would intervene in a military crisis over Taiwan. The costs of victory for the
US would now be far higher than in the days before China’s modernisation. China could
inflict a great deal of pain in such a conflict, probably more than the US would be willing
to sustain to defend Taiwan.
• China has a handful of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles with global reach, and it is
developing cyber warfare capabilities that know no geographical limits.
• In September the PLA Navy accepted into service a Russian vessel purchased half-
finished in 1998 and then methodically refitted in Chinese shipyards for naval service.
The Pentagon’s latest report on China’s military says parts for a home-built follow-on
carrier may already have been ordered. Nuclear weapons aside, there is no more powerful
weapons system for deployment far from a nation’s shores than a carrier.
• China still has very little ability to project military force more than a few hundred
kilometres beyond its shores. Were it to deploy more than one carrier with high-
performance stealth fighters like the J-31, China would become the pre-eminent regional
maritime power, with the ability to coerce neighbours in disputes in which the US prefers
not to get involved. That scenario is still several years away, perhaps a decade or more.
China is still learning how to land a fixed-wing aircraft on its first carrier. Much of
China’s indigenous military technology remains of poorer quality and performance than
that of Russia or the West, and China’s appropriation of foreign intellectual property has
been nothing short of brazen. But we cannot say that China’s military-technological
development has lacked purpose or determination. weaknesses are being identified and
addressed.
• Ultimately, military power is exercised by China’s leaders, and rests on economic
foundations. Answers to the big questions about China’s future must come from the new
generation of decision-makers in Beijing. Can they build an economy to sustain China’s
ambitions abroad, and will they pursue those ambitions peacefully?

Africa
China's economic and political profile in Africa has risen rapidly over the last decade. But
Beijing has also invited a mild backlash to the economic model it has promoted in the continent.
Beijing's intensive diplomacy with Africa over the last decade has seen a dramatic rise in China's
trade with the continent — from barely $10 billion in 2000 to nearly $200 bn in 2012. China's
massive investments in Africa's mineral sector have been accompanied by an expansive
emphasis on building transport infrastructure that links the continent to itself and the world
markets. Beijing has also emerged as a major donor of economic assistance to Africa. Unlike the
West, China does not put any conditions for the aid or give lectures on good governance to
Africa. China's emphasis on non-intervention in internal affairs and the size of its economic
assistance — last year Beijing offered loans worth $20 bn — has given Africa greater room vis-
a-vis the Western powers that have long dominated its political and economic landscape. At the
same time, China's Africa policy has drawn charges of "neo-colonialism". Western governments
and activist groups are accusing Beijing of an exploitative relationship with Africa. The
chairman of Nigeria's central bank, Lamido Sanusi, urged Africa to reconsider its romance with
China. He pointed out: "China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was
also the essence of colonialism."
Misc
• China has started receiving natural gas from Myanmar through an 800 km-long pipeline
project-a landmark step towards diversifying China’s energy supply routes. At present, as
many as 80 per cent of China’s oil imports depend on the supply line going through the
Malacca and Singapore straits, while the maritime route is patrolled by fleets headed by
the U.S. navy
Congo’s troubled east has been plagued by decades of violence, and the latest rebellion is a
reincarnation of a previous conflict. The rebel group that took Goma dubs itself the M23, a
reference to the March 23, 2009 peace deal that paved the way for fighters from a now-defunct
rebel group to join the army. Charging that the peace ac-cord was not implemented, soldiers
defected from the Congo army in April to form the M23. Both the M23 and the previous rebel
group, known as the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), are widely
believed to be backed by neighbouring Rwanda, which has fought two wars against its much
larger neighbor. Numerous reports by the United Nations Group of Experts have shown the
extent of Rwandan infiltration in the rebel groups based in Congo, as well as in Congo’s armed
forces, but it wasn’t until the release of the most recent findings that Congo took decisive action.
The rebellion has raised the risk of all-out war in a borderlands region dogged by nearly two
decades of conflict that has killed about five million people and is fuelled by competition over
mineral resources. While Rwanda officials stand accused of coordinating rebel attacks and
providing M23 with weapons and logistical support, Uganda has been accused of proving safe
haven to M23’s political operations. .

Further Progress
Congo-lese military was handed a humiliating defeat earlier this week, when the M23 rebel
group seized the major eastern city of Goma, and then pushed onwards to the town of Sake
which they took after a four-hour firefight. On Fri-day, platoons of rebels were making their way
across the hills from Sake.

Truce
Rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have started withdrawing from towns
captured since last week from government troops, following a deal brokered by Uganda. Such a
pull-out would mean the M23 rebel group was giving up gains from a lightning offensive carried
out. The Congolese army was sceptical about any M23 withdrawal.
Tiff with SCAF
In the first face-off, in August, Morsi dared to cancel the SCAF’s constitutional declaration (gave
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) legislative and executive powers) and transfer
the powers to himself. He then reshuffled Egypt’s top brass by retiring more than 70 generals.

Overpowering Judiciary
Bolstered by rising inter-national stature after his vital contribution in brokering a ceasefire
between Israel and Hamas, Mr. Morsy had on Thursday armed himself with impregnable powers,
immune to the intervention by Egypt’s courts. In essence, the President’s constitutional decree
makes it impossible for the judiciary, which is mulling over a slew of litigations, to dissolve
Egypt’s controversial constitutional-drafting assembly that critics say is dominated by pro-
Islamists. The founding document of Egypt’s new democracy is full of waffle about the role of
Islam and draws freely on the dictatorial constitution of 1971. Just as bad, Mr Morsi has
engineered the backing of Egypt’s armed forces for the rushed job by enshrining the principle
that a serving officer will be minister of defence. In effect, that spares the over mighty army from
civilian oversight. Soon after his inauguration to the presidency, Mr. Morsy consolidated his
powers by successfully challenging the country’s military top brass, which steered Egypt’s initial
transition to democracy. Mr. Morsy’s dismissal of the senior military has reduced the army’s
influence.
Mr. Morsy told his supporters outside the presidential palace that his sole aim through the decree
was to impart “political, social and economic stability” in the country. The President says he
means the new powers to apply only to “sovereignty-related issues”, but that is at best vague; the
judiciary, for its part, is widely distrusted for its role during the 30-year-long Mubarak regime,
and the President’s announcement of a special judicial group to reopen the trials of former
members of the dictatorship may not go far enough. Egypt’s judges have serially and petulantly
interfered with the creation of better democratic institutions, disbanding an elected parliament on
a technicality and threatening to scrap the constitution-drafting body. His powers will lapse when
the constitution is adopted. Analysts say that the President’s authority on “sovereign issues”
implies that courts would not be able to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and Shura Council,
while other presidential decisions could be challenged before the courts. The decree has united
the democratic opposition, including liberals, leftists, and other groups, in a new National
Salvation Front.
The decree, which critics say is akin to former dictator Hosni Mubarak’s laws and may even go
beyond any of them, gives Mr. Morsy the power to enact any law he wants, and in effect removes
the current prosecutor general, so that no authority can now revoke any presidential decision; the
President also gets the power to appoint a new prosecutor general for a four-year term. The edict,
claimed by Mr. Morsy to be a way of ‘cleansing public institutions,’ will remain in force until a
new parliament is elected — but that cannot be done until a new constitution is drafted — and
Mr. Morsy has also extended the timeline for that process. The President issued the decree of his
own accord, without consultation, in a move that has been likened to the Free Officers’ coup in
1954 and amounts to a sidelining of the judiciary. It is a contemporary version of a Henry VIII
clause.
Update: President Mohamed Morsy met one of the opposition’s demands, annulling his
November 22 decree that gave him near unrestricted powers. But he insisted on going ahead with
the referendum on a constitution hurriedly adopted by his Islamist allies.

Fast Forwarding passing of constitution

The rush to pass the constitutional draft began when the Supreme Constitutional Court, the
The rush to pass the constitutional draft began when the Supreme Constitutional Court, the
country’s highest judicial body announced that it would rule on the lawsuits. Forty three lawsuits
have been filed that challenge the existing process steering the transition. Supreme Constitutional
Court may dissolve the constitutional assembly. The court will also rule on the legitimacy of
Parliament’s Upper Chamber, also dominated by Islamists. Mr. Morsy’s critics say that the
current assembly is unrepresentative of the country's social mosaic, as it is packed with Islamists.
• The Lower Chamber, the lawmaking People’s Assembly, was dissolved by the same court
in June. The announcement triggered a marathon session of the Assembly that began on
Thursday night, and continued till all the 234 Articles were passed. According to the draft
constitution, the President would be able to serve a maximum of two four-year terms. The
draft includes an Article that defines “principles of Sharia” as the primary source of
legislation. Dissolving the panel and replacing it with a more inclusive body is a key
demand by the liberal-led opposition.
Update: President Mohamed Morsy ordered Egypt’s army to take on police powers — including
the right to arrest civilians — in the run-up to a vote on a constitution that has triggered
bloodshed. Military has sought to remain neutral in the political crisis but has also warned that it
“will not allow” the situation to deteriorate, and urged both sides to dialogue.

Referendum
The draft Egyptian constitution has been passed with a 64 per cent vote in favour in a two-round
referendum, which was held on 15 and 22 December. The draft was written mainly by President
Mohamed Morsy’s Islamist allies in the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and its parent body, the
Muslim Brotherhood, on a 100-member pan-el convened after the Supreme Constitutional Court
had dissolved the elected constituent assembly in April on the grounds that it contained too many
Islamists; both liberals and Copts had left the panel, saying the draft document was excessively
Islamist. The referendum does not confirm the public support the raw figures imply, as turnout
among the 52 million registered voters was only 32.9 per cent, and voters even in Cairo
complained of irregularities, such as inadequate judicial supervision and attempts by poll staff to
influence voters.
The President now loses his power to appoint judges and has to accept nominations from the
judiciary. In addition, the newly-approved constitution transfers legislative power from the
President to the upper house, the 270-member Shura Council, until a new lower chamber or
People’s Assembly is elected, but opposition suspicions are deepened by the President’s power to
appoint up to 90 Shura members.
Eurozone and IMF secure deal on cutting Greek debt
Greece's international lenders agreed on a package of measures to reduce Greek debt by 40
billion euro, cutting it to 124 per cent of gross domestic product by 2020. Ministers committed to
taking further steps to lower Greece’s debt to “significantly below 110 per cent’’ in 2022 — the
most explicit recognition so far that some write-off of loans may be necessary from 2016, the
point when Greece is forecast to reach a primary budget surplus. To reduce the debt pile, they
agreed to cut the interest rate on official loans, extend their maturity by 15 years to 30 years, and
grant Athens a 10-year interest repayment deferral. Greece will receive up to 43.7 billion euro in
stages as it fulfils the conditions. The IMF's share, less than a third of the total, will only be paid
out once a buy-back of Greek debt has occurred in the coming weeks. They promised to hand
back 11 billion euro in profits accruing to their national central banks from European Central
Bank purchases of discounted Greek government bonds in the secondary market. They also
agreed to finance Greece to buy back its own bonds from private investors at what officials said
was a target cost of around 35 cents in the euro.

2nd recession
The debt crisis dragged the euro zone into its second recession since 2009 in the third quarter
despite modest growth in Germany and France. The two leading economies both managed 0.2
per cent growth in the July-to-September, 2012 period. But the resilience could not save the
austerity-hit 17-nation bloc from overall contraction as the likes of The Netherlands, Spain, Italy
and Austria shrank. Economic output in the euro zone fell 0.1 per cent in the quarter, following a
0.2-per cent drop in the second quarter. Those two quarters of contraction put the euro zone’s 9.4
trillion euro ($12 trillion) economy in recession, although Italy and Spain have been contracting
for a year already and Greece is suffering an outright depression. They are now getting into a
double dip recession which is entirely self-made. It is a result of excessive austerity in southern
countries and unwillingness in the north to do anything else.

ECB as chief bank watchdog

Finance ministers from the European Union's 27 countries agreed to hand the ECB the authority
to directly police at least 150 of the euro zone's biggest banks and intervene in smaller banks at
the first sign of trouble. This is a big first step for banking union. The new system of supervision
should be up and running by March 1, 2014, following talks with the European Parliament,
although ministers agreed that could be delayed if the ECB needed longer to prepare itself.
Agreement on bank surveillance is a crucial first step towards a broader banking union, or
common euro zone approach to dealing with failing banks that in recent years dragged down
countries such as Ireland and Spain. The next pillar of a banking union would be the creation of a
central system to close troubled banks. Other difficult issues remain.

At a summit in June, EU leaders pledged that once a common bank supervisor was in place, the
bloc's rescue mechanism would have the power to directly recapitalize struggling banks.

Countries like France, Italy and Spain are keen for those powers to be in place as soon as
possible. But Germany, worried it could be forced to foot the bill for struggling banks across the
bloc, is not in a rush. In the longer term, there is also disagreement over how the burden of
winding down failed banks should be shared.
Velayat-91
• Velayat 90 in Dec, 2011
• Six day naval exercise to establish Iran’s doctrine of deterrence
• to demonstrate that it has acquired credible answers to American and Israeli
advancements in cyber and drone warfare
• By achieving military deterrence, Iran’s leadership hopes to expand and rein-force the
diplomatic space on the nuclear issue
• Iran has been paying special attention to developing drones and has used them as a tool
of psychological warfare against Israel.

Egypt visit
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became in Feb, 2013 the first Iranian head of state since the
1979 revolution to pay an official visit to Egypt — a step which could become a game changer in
defining the region’s power hierarchy - as part of an effort by Iran and Egypt to heal the rift
between the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam, exacerbated by the crises in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.
The fundamental reason for the Sunni-Shia rift—the perception among Shias that after his death,
the Prophet Muhammad’s companions denied their leader, Imam Ali Ibn Abi Taleb, succession
to the Caliphate

What US wants
The outlines of a nuclear deal have been clear for months: an Iranian agreement to limit the
number of centrifuges that produce uranium, a cap on the amount of fuel in Iranian hands, and an
agreement to ship its most potent stockpiles the stuff that can be quickly converted to bomb fuel
out of the country. It would also have to agree to expose its history of nuclear work, including
any on weapons technology, which it has refused to show international inspectors. In return, Iran
would get an acknowledgment that it has a right to peaceful nuclear enrichment, and a gradual
lifting of the sanctions. The Iranians have insisted that the sanctions be lifted first

Iraq
• After the war, instead of a solidly pro-U.S. regime, the Iraqis have a government that is
arguably closer to Tehran than to Washington and that struggles to exert full control over
the country itself.
•
Attack on Sudan
The midnight attack on October 24 by Israeli military aircraft on a Sudanese armaments factory
located in Khartoum has baffled the international community. Sudan, already weakened by
partition and internal wars, poses no credible threat to Israel. Yet, in the past couple of years
Israel has been systematically targeting the country. Israel has been making several allegations
against the government in Khartoum. One of them is that Sudan is supplying the Hamas
administration in the Gaza Strip weapons allegedly provided by Iran. Another is that Sudan has
forged a military alliance with Iran and is helping Tehran sidestep the punitive sanctions the West
has imposed on it. The strike could have been aimed at destroying “a new category of weapons”
that were meant to be delivered to Gaza. Most observers, however, are of the view that the latest
attack on Sudan is part of the pysops (psychological operations) that Israel has been conducting
against Iran. Besides, they point out that carrying out a similar operation against Iran would be a
difficult proposition as Israeli planes would have to fly over countries such as Jordan and Iraq. A
war with Iran would be a “generations-long war”. Countries such as Egypt, which have
normalised relations with Iran after the Arab Spring, will not take kindly to any unilateral action
by Israel on Iran. The Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf are crucial for the commercial and
military activities of the West. This was the fourth documented attack by Israel in the past couple
of years. Israel has supported southern Sudan for the past two decades in its fight to secede.
Today, the newly independent South Sudan is a strong military and commercial ally of Israel.

Attack on Palestine
• Start of the war: The website points out that an earlier cycle of violence had begun when
Israeli planes killed a man in Gaza, who was accused by Israel of firing mortars at its
soldiers. In response, on October 29 the Palestinians slammed 26 rockets into Israel (they
injured or killed no one). Since then there was hardly any rocket firing from Gaza,
according to the Israel-based Twitter account Qassam Count, which keeps a tab on the
projectiles that the Palestinians fire. Yet, on November 4, the Israelis killed an unarmed
and mentally unfit man, who was walking near a “buffer” area that had been carved out
by Israel inside the Gaza Strip.
Four days later, during an Israeli incursion into Gaza, a child, by the name of Ahmad Abu
Daqqa, was fatally injured, near al-Qarara village north-east of Khan Younis. It was only
then that the Palestinians fired two rockets into Israel, according to Qassam Count. On
November 10, the Palestinians attacked an Israeli military jeep near the Gaza border,
injuring four soldiers. With that, a new cycle of violence commenced. The Israelis
attacked with ferocity over the next 72 hours, killing seven Palestinians, of whom five
were civilians, three of their children, according to a count by the Palestinian Centre for
Human Rights (PCHR). Fifty-two others, including six women and 12 children, were
wounded.
After the November 10 attacks, the Palestinians let go a barrage of rockets but halted the
attacks the next day because Egypt got involved in working out a ceasefire. Israel’s Ynet
news reported that Egyptian intelligence officials had successfully brokered an end to the
current round of escalation in the south. Two rockets were fired on November 12, but
these attacks came amid air strikes by Israel. Nevertheless, on November 13, Reuters
reported that “after five days of mounting violence, Israel and the Palestinians stepped
back from the brink of a new war in the Gaza Strip…sending signals to each other via
Egypt that they would hold their fire unless attacked.” Yet, the fragile truce was broken
the very next day with the assassination of Jaabari.
• An ever-escalating number of missiles that were landing not just in Israeli territory but in
areas that are populated. Southern Israel has been hit by more than 750 rockets from Gaza
 areas that are populated. Southern Israel has been hit by more than 750 rockets from Gaza
this year that have caused injuries. Israel launched its assault, Operation Pillar of
defense, on Gaza on 14th Nov,2012, the most ferocious in four years, in response to
persistent Palestinian rocket fire. On the first day Ahmed Jabari was killed in the Israeli
attack. Ahmed Jabari was the most senior Hamas official to be killed since an Israeli
invasion of Gaza four years ago. Israel blamed him for in a string of attacks, including the
kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Schalit in 2006.The assassination marked the
beginning of the war and resulted in escalation of firing of missiles and rockets from both
sides for over a period of one week. Egypt-mediated ceasefire has been established, to be
only breached next day by Israel. Thins since then have been calm. It was a test for
Israel’s Iron Dome- the missile shield that it has created for itself. In OpIsrael, a group
of Hackers, Anonymous, either damaged or completely erased the sites of more than 650
private and public Israeli institutions that included the Bank of Jerusalem — one of the
country’s main finance houses.
• Hundreds of airstrikes on Gaza followed, but, the real victory was possibly the combat
debut of Iron Dome, the U.S.-funded defense shield that kept dozens of Hamas rockets
from hitting Israeli civilians. An Iron Dome battery consists of a battle management
control unit, detection and- tracking radar and three launchers, each containing 20
interceptors. One battery is said to be able to cover a city sized area. Iron Dome tracks
incoming missiles, determines whether they are on course to hit a populated area and, if
they are, launches interceptors to destroy them in flight. The Israelis claim to have
knocked out more than 85% of the missiles headed for their towns and villages.
• Ceaseless air strikes by Israel during the week-long conflict had killed 140 Palestinians
and destroyed dozens of buildings, including the office complex of Hamas Prime
Minister Ismail Haniyeh. The war would also remain etched in public memory for the
targeted attack on media centres, underscoring that a parallel media war was as much in
play during the Gaza conflict as the fighting itself.
• Ceasefire: FRAGILE is perhaps the best way to depict the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, which
came into effect to end the war. The durability of the current ceasefire rests on the
willingness of both sides to adhere to their part of the deal and use the window of
opportunity prudently. The principle players, especially Morsi, Hamas and Netanyahu
only gained brownie points without emerging with decisive gains. The ceasefire
agreement after Israel’s 2009 “Operation Cast Lead” insisted that aid go through the
Palestinian Authority, which is run by Fatah, Hamas’s rival amongst the Palestinians.
This time there was no such stricture.
Ahead of the ceasefire, Iran acknowledged it had transferred technology but not war
material into Gaza.
• As the smoke clears in Gaza it is clear that the destruction has been immense. After the
last bombardment in 2009, the U.N. empanelled a commission to look into the conflict.
The Goldstone Report was very critical of Israel. But none of its recommendations could
be pursued even though they intimate that Israel had committed crimes against humanity
(perhaps even war crimes). Nor was Is-rael enjoined to pay reparations for the destruction
of civilian infrastructure. Such impunity against the occupied ter-ritories suggests that
once more Israel will neither face scrutiny for the conduct of its war nor will it have to
consider the economic toll. Israel will go scot-free

UN Vote
ISRAEL said it was withholding this month’s transfer of tax revenues to the Palestinian
Authority, after the United Nations’ de facto recognition of a Palestinian state (giving it an
observer status). Under interim peace deals, which Israel says the Palestinians violated by
unilaterally seeking an upgrade of their status at the United Nations, it collects about $100
million a month in duties on behalf of the authority. The cash-strapped authority, which exercises
limited self-rule in the occupied West Bank, largely depends on the tax money to pay civil
servants’ salaries.
In response, Israeli government officials unveiled a plan to build 3,000 new settlement units in
the so-called E-1 area, which connects Jerusalem and Israeli settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim in
occupied West Bank. In case Israel goes ahead with the construction, it would disrupt the
occupied West Bank. In case Israel goes ahead with the construction, it would disrupt the
contiguity of West Bank with East Jerusalem, thus destroying the viability of a two-state
solution, premised on the emergence of an independent Palestine in the occupied territories,
cohabiting peacefully with Israel. Israel’s decision to build new homes near occupied East
Jerusalem is evoking an unexpectedly strong response in Europe — with Britain and France
considering withdrawal of their ambassadors from Tel Aviv in protest.

Nuclear non-proliferation
Israel refuses to confirm or deny it has nuclear bombs though it is widely believed to have a
nuclear arsenal. It has refused to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, along with
three nuclear weapon states India, Pakistan and North Korea. The Arab proposal to create a
weapons-of-mass-destruc-tion-free zone in the West Asian region, and to pressure Israel to give
up its undeclared arsenal of perhaps 80 nuclear warheads, was endorsed at an NPT conference in
1995 but never acted on.
The U.N. General Assembly overwhelmingly approved a resolution calling on Israel to quickly
open its nuclear programme for inspection and backing a high-level conference to ban nuclear
weapons from West Asia which was just cancelled. The resolution, approved by a vote of 174-6
with six abstentions, calls on Israel to join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty “without further
delay” and open its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Misc
• The Palestinians’ first attempt to join the I.C.C. was thwarted in April, 2012 when the
court’s chief prosecutor at the time, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, declined the request on the
grounds that Palestine was not a state. That ambiguity has since diminished with the
United Nations’ conferral of non-member state status on Palestine in November, 2012.
Israel’s frantic opposition to the elevation of Palestine’s status at the United Nations was
motivated precisely by the fear that it would soon lead to I.C.C. jurisdiction over
Palestinian claims of war crimes.
The reason for Japan taking offence is that the name ‘Sea of Japan’ is a bone of contention between it
and the Koreas. While Seoul prefers the name ‘East Sea’ to be used instead of or in addition to ‘Sea of
Japan’, North Korea wants it called ‘East Sea of Korea’. Japan has also given documents to the MEA
saying the UN recognised ‘Sea of Japan’ as the standard geographical term in March 2004. “The
simultaneous use of both — ‘Sea of Japan’ and ‘East Sea’ — infringes on the neutrality of the UN,” Japan
has argued. Japan and the Koreas also differ over when the name was adopted. While Japan says ‘Sea of
Japan’ has been the international standard since the early 19th century, the Koreas claim the term came to
be used while Korea was under Japanese rule, and that ‘Sea of Korea’ or ‘East Sea’ was used originally.

Mr. Abe selection (as PM)

• A hawk on security matters, Mr. Abe has promised aggressive monetary easing by the
Bank of Japan and big fiscal spending by the debt-laden government to slay deflation and
weaken the yen to make Japanese exports more competitive.
• will implement bold monetary policy, flexible fiscal policy and a growth strategy that
encourages private investment,
• has proposed weakening the yen to stimulate exports.
• Abe campaigned on a right-wing nationalistic agenda, highlighting the territorial disputes
the country has with China. The China Daily described Abe as “a war-monger with
dangerous designs”. His campaign slogan was “Take Back Japan”. Abe has said that he is
leading a fight to “to free the Japanese nation from the post-War history and return it to
the Japanese people”.
• The people of East Asia and South-East Asia have not yet forgotten the havoc wrought
by Japanese imperialism before and during the Second World War. Just before the
Japanese went to the polls, Abe had made a highly publicised visit to Yasukuni shrine
honouring Japan’s war dead. China, South Korea and other countries in the region have
angrily protested against Japanese leaders’ practice of visiting the shrine.
• “Abe Doctrine”: will spell out new initiatives to deepen Japan’s economic, political and
security ties with Southeast Asia. Abe’s emphasis is likely to be on developing strategic
economic relations with the region amidst China’s emergence as the largest trading
partner for most nations in Southeast Asia. Abe would want to translate the shared
concerns on China’s assertiveness into concrete political cooperation between Tokyo and
the ASEAN (esp. Philippines and Vietnam) as a collective, and bilaterally with key
individual members.
• Until recently, Japan, a major donor of development assistance, was very careful in
avoiding military ties with its Asian neighbours. SECURITY cooperation (with countries
other than the US) is no longer a taboo in Japan’s foreign policy. Tokyo announced plans
last year to offer 10 coast guard vessels to Manila, which has been desperately seeking
foreign support to cope with the Chinese navy’s manoeuvres. Shedding some of that
inhibition in recent years, Tokyo has signed declarations on security cooperation with
India and Australia. Japan has provided limited military aid recently to East Timor and
Cambodia. It is also reported to be in talks with Vietnam to train its submarine crews.
Abe might further build upon it.
• For India, Mr. Abe’s election is likely to create a more favourable environment for
civilian nuclear cooperation. Even as it prepares for a tighter embrace with a valued
partner, New Delhi needs to guard against any renewed attempt by the Japanese side to
overlay the bilateral relationship with strategic initiatives that might polarise Asia.
• After a prolonged absence from Myanmar, Japan is intensifying the strategic engagement
with Myanmar under the activist reign of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
• Abe emphasised the importance of strengthening the longstanding alliance with the
United States and deepening the new partnerships with India, Indonesia and Australia.
Japan already has formal declarations on security cooperation with both India and
Australia and is hoping to build one with Indonesia. Revival of Mr. Abe’s earlier
 Australia and is hoping to build one with Indonesia. Revival of Mr. Abe’s earlier
proposals for a ‘Quadrilateral’ linking Japan, the U.S., Australia and India will certainly
irk China
• THE absence of good neighbourly relations with Russia has long been a major weakness
of Japan’s foreign policy since World War II. Moscow and Tokyo never signed a formal
peace treaty thanks to the dispute over four islands — Russia calls them the Kuriles and
Japan, the Northern Territories — occupied by the Red Army at the end of the war.
Japan’s military alliance with the US made the two countries irreconcilable adversaries in
the Cold War. Abe has now spoken about the responsibility of the current generation of
Japanese leaders to end the territorial dispute with Russia. Putin, who has a strong interest
in elevating Russia’s standing in East Asia, should be equally interested in playing the
Japan card.
• Now pacifist Japan wants to develop a marine force. Facing China's growing military
power and Beijing's increasingly assertive regional policy, Japan may have no option but
to make marines a critical element of its new defence strategy.Tokyo once had a
formidable marine force. Unlike in the past when marines were integral to Japan's
imperial expansion, Tokyo today sees the marines as vital for securing its territorial
claims against Beijing over the disputed islands called Senkaku in Tokyo and Diaoyu in
Beijing.

Misc
Still a lot to be done
In Myanmar, reformers in the military and the government have managed to convince the
conservatives that the country's — and the military's — interests would be best served by
backing the reforms. Both camps agree that the process should be gradual and controlled, and it
should unfold within certain red markers. Governance can be liberalised as long as there is no
witch-hunt for the previous military leaders, nor an immediate campaign to reduce the military's
role as envisaged by the Constitution. Besides, the military's stake in order, stability, and unity of
the country will have to be respected. The government wants Ms Suu Kyi to help it to
progressively reduce the country's international isolation. It won its first major reward when Ms
Suu Kyi advised Mr. Obama to upgrade engagement with Myanmar. Ms Clinton's visit and the
decision by ASEAN (to allow Myanmar chair ASEAN in 2014) resulted from this collaboration.
• Today the military machine is all there is, with only the shadow of other institutions
remaining.
• Political institutions are in their infancy. The existence of Hluttaw (parliament) is not
enough to usher in democracy in Myanmar.
• Parliament and Assembly members are inexperienced and ignorant about procedures.
Most do not even know how to introduce a bill and table a resolution.
• The National League of Democracy is not in good shape as the party infrastructure ASSK
had built before the 1990 elections was all but destroyed by the military junta. Its
overwhelming victory in the by-elections early this year was due to her own charisma and
that cannot see her through all the time, particularly in the next elections in 2015. The
NLD is now controlled by old people, some in their eighties, while younger party
members are impatient to be inducted.
• Myanmar has a long history of failure in state and institution building. In the absence of
institutions and the vision of a new Burma that includes concerns of the ethnic groups in
the country, any political change, even with a new civilian government, will be
meaningless, for the army would still be there, lurking in the wings and waiting to
overturn everything through a coup as it did in 1962. The problem lies in creating state
institutions from scratch that can replace the military state that exists, not just in
governance and administration, but also in the economy of the country
• Civil society was completely debilitated, but now seems to be growing again, though on a
smaller scale and under difficult circumstances.
• An independent judiciary is another precondition for the restoration of democracy in the
country.
• Thein Sein has even declared that he was prepared to accept SuuKyi as the next president
if the people of the country wanted it so. That will, however, require amendment to the
present constitution that bars her from occupying the highest position in the country
because of the foreign origin of her children.
•
Aware of these difficulties, Suu Kyi knows that she cannot afford to be impatient and push things
through. She believes that President Thein Sein is “sincere” in his intent to bring about change in
the country even while he faces formidable challenges from the hardliners in the armed forces
and therefore needs her help in steering those changes. It is the same caution and pragmatism
that has prompted her not to criticise the government and take sides on the sensitive Rohingya
issue even though she has emphasised the necessity of restoring the rule of law and dealing with
the root causes of the tensions. She may have disappointed some by not taking sides in a very
critical and sensitive issue, but one cannot be both a politician and an activist.

Obama Visit
United States has scrapped a nearly decade-old ban on most imports from the long-isolated
United States has scrapped a nearly decade-old ban on most imports from the long-isolated
nation, ahead of Obama visit. The U.S. move could bring major growth to Myanmar’s garment
industry, as the United States was once the main buyer of clothes made in the low-cost nation.
The Obama administration earlier gave the green light for U.S. companies to invest in oil and gas
in Myanmar. Washington also wants the regime to cut military ties with North Korea. Much like
New Delhi, Washington has been concerned about increasing Chinese influence in Myanmar.
Washington would allow Myanmar’s participation in a U.S.-backed grouping of Mekong River
countries (Lower Mekong initiative); no longer block enhanced cooperation between the country
and the IMF and support intensified U.N. health, microfinance and counter-narcotics
programmes.
Investments from the West could now start trickling in. Vietnam, once a sworn enemy of the
U.S., is now a major destination forAmerican and European investment.
In 1988, the U.S. downgraded diplomatic relations with Myanmar after a military crackdown on
pro-democracy activists; it still does not have an Ambassador there.

Census
Myanmar is getting ready for a population census in 2014, its first in three decades. The
headcount is also expected to prepare the ground for the country’s next general election in 2015,
which, it is hoped, will usher in a genuine people’s government. The previous military regime
did not feel the need for a census. The last census was in 1983, and Myanmarese born after that
have never been enumerated. An accurate count of the population would both be a critical part of
the government’s political reforms, as well as one of its main drivers.
The census will enable an accurate estimate of key economic indicators such as GDP, per capita
income and other socio-economic data of the country for national development, economic
planning and balanced assessment. It would be crucial to several key policies relating to
education, health care, housing, employment, sanitation, transport and communication, to name
just a few. The process also becomes necessary for delimitation of constituencies and ensuring a
fair representation of all the ethnic nationalities in the national and regional legislative bodies.
The UNFPA has agreed to support proposed population and housing census.
In order to ensure that the census is universal and inclusive of all national races, Myanmar may
even need to review the 1982 citizenship law to bring it in conformity with international
conventions, international custom and principle generally recognised with regard to nationality.
In addition, it should be brought in line with the principles embodied in the 1954 Convention
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
of 1961. The 1982 act denies citizenship to people of Chinese and Indian descent. Rohingyas are
also excluded.

Kachin
Almost all ethnic armed groups have successfully signed ceasefire agreements with the Burmese
government. Ethnic groups like SNDP (Shans), CNP (Chin), and RNDP have decided to take the
parliamentary route. Others like the Karen National Union (Karens), engaged in the world’s
longest running war with the Myanmar regime, have decided to finally enter ceasefire
agreements and initiate talks.

The Kachin Independence Organization, with its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army
(KIO/KIA), is the only major armed group still battling the Burmese army. Along with the
Chins, the Shans and the Burmans, the Kachins signed the historic Panglong agreement to form
the Union of Burma in 1947, a year before the country’s independence from the British.
However, in post-independence Burma, the Kachins felt betrayed and discriminated by the
Burmese central government. The Kachins were denied autonomy that was agreed in principle
during the Panglong conference. Moreover, the Kachins, who are mostly Christians, opposed the
introduction of Buddhism as the state religion by the government of Prime Minister U Nu during
the first parliamentary democracy. Formed in 1961, the KIO/KIA initially demanded
independence from the Union of Burma but later opted for autonomy based on the Panglong
agreement. The group first signed a ceasefire agreement with the State Law and Order
Restoration Council, the then-military government, in 1994.
Restoration Council, the then-military government, in 1994.
Kachins accuse the govt. of cultural discrimination’ where only ‘Burman symbols’ are ‘national
symbols’; and the ‘lack of any representation’ in Cabinet, military, bureaucracy, judiciary and
media.
Their main demands are equality, real federalism, autonomy, and right to self determination,
The 17-year-old ceasefire ended in June 2011 primarily because of two important reasons. First,
in late April 2009, the KIO/KIA refused to accept the terms and conditions of transforming itself
into a Border Guard Force which would come under the direct command of the Burmese Army.
Second, the Burmese military's interest to control lucrative hydropower projects and other
natural resources in Kachin state led to the attack on KIA on June 9, 2011.
Ethnic armed groups that have signed ceasefire agreements with the government should
understand that genuine peace and national reconciliation cannot be achieved on an individual
basis. As much as they have struggled together for the past several decades for the restoration of
democracy and for the establishment of a federal union, it is now equally important to show
solidarity with the Kachins.
The United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations should put pressure on the
Burmese government that continued violence in Kachin state is unacceptable. Since the
KIO/KIA does not demand secession or independence from the Union of Burma, a negotiated
political settlement is not an impossible task.

Misc
• Myanmar’s President asked opposition leader ASSK on Saturday to head an investigation
into the planned expansion of a copper mine that has led to evictions and protests that
were forcibly put down by riot police in Nov 2012.The committee will include three local
villagers and an official from the military-owned Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings
Ltd, a partner in the copper mine project alongside a unit of China North Industries Corp,
a Chinese weapons manufacturer.
• Myanmar will allow private newspapers to publish daily from April 1, ending a decades-
old ban, in a further easing of the draconian censorship regime. Weeklies are allowed.
State-owned newspapersare the only dailies allowed, prompting many private companies
to provide news via the Internet for a population hungry for information after years of
restrictions. The issuing of the new daily licences will come two years after the launch of
a new reformist government.
• The Rohingya Muslims have for centuries lived in Rakhine, where their number is
estimated at 750,000. But Myanmar has denied them citizenship, and treats them as
illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Dhaka does not recognise them as its own either
• Potential: 5th most populous region in ASEAN (55mn people), can be destination of low
cost manufacturing (especially in textile), rice exporter (in 1930s it was the world’s
largest rice exporter)—Consequences: Countries like Cambodia (textile manufacturing
hub) and Thailand (rice and textile) will have to adjust to Myanmar’s entrance. Thailand
will lose ~2mn low cost illegal immigrant worker from Myanmar when they return to
native country
• Reforms: Labour unions have been granted the right to strike. Some political prisoners
have been released. An unpopular dam project on the Irrawaddy was suspended. Changes
have included an easing of censorship, reform of electoral laws, privatisations and calls
for exiles to return.
Nov 22 Deadline for election
Since the term of Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) ended in May, 2012 without the
constitution being written, the new republic has been stuck in a political and constitutional
deadlock. The government announced fresh elections for a new CA, but the opposition has made
Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai’s resignation a pre-condition for any agreement. The interim
constitution does not envisage a second CA poll, and the only way to amend the statute is
through the use of special presidential powers which President Ram Baran Yadav, a former
Nepali Congress leader, has refused to exercise unless there is consensus. In late November, he
has asked parties to come to a consensus about new PM but Maoists dismissed it as
unconstitutional as the CA session has expired and hence President cannot issue a decree. If
issued, it would be illegal.
Dr. Bhattarai plunged the country into a crisis by declaring elections, “without making
appropriate arrangements”. Highly placed sources have told The Hindu that Dr. Yadav has
contemplated “drastic” action, including dismissing Dr. Bhattarai and appointing a new PM for
Nepal after November 22, the date on which the government had originally proposed to hold
fresh Constituent Assembly (CA) polls. Any presidential adventurism will be unconstitutional
and undemocratic, and would only deepen the political polarisation. It will radicalise the
Maoists, who have met their peace process commitments by disbanding the People’s Liberation
Army, and are staying within the confines of multi-party democracy. Dr. Bhattarai’s aides allege
Dr. Yadav is over-stepping his constitutional brief. They cite his refusal to promulgate ordinances
forwarded by the government and endorse a full budget; his regular meetings with political
leaders; and public interventions on political issues, as proof. “The one-third budget runs out in
mid-November. The President showed flexibility and has promulgated the ordinance concerning
budget. The Nepal Army (NA) has advised caution. Still recovering from the civil war, the NA
does not seem to be in any mood to interfere in the political process. India has largely adopted a
hands-off approach in Nepal at the moment, despite some intensive lobbying from all sides to
intervene on their behalf.
Nepal’s political parties have acted irresponsibly by being immersed in short-term power games.
They must strike a deal on four inter-related issues — how to preserve the work done by the
old CA; new election dates; the election system; and the nature of the government. Even as they
discuss the exact government composition, Nepal’s politicians should not squander away the
gains of the 2006 movement only for leadership of an interim government with a brief tenure and
limited mandate. A deal by November-end is essential to hold polls next spring, otherwise the
impasse may continue till 2014. It is time to end the deadlock and go back to the people.

Removal of PM deadlock
The consensus sought by President for appointing a PM seems a farfetched wish. Maoists claim
that they have the prerogative to appoint new PM as they were the single largest Party in the last
CA. The Maoist Govt. has announced polls in April-May 2013. Maoists have proposed a mid
way out, asking NC to join them and could choose the portfolios of their choice. NC has declined
the offer and instead have laid claim to form the government.

Shifting fault lines

• The fundamental fault-lines in Nepali politics over the past 10 years have constantly
shifted.
• Between 2001 and 2005, there was a triangular power-conflict between the King,
parliamentary parties and the Maoists.
• This eventually crystallised into a battle between monarchists and republicans. With the
 This eventually crystallised into a battle between monarchists and republicans. With the
People’s Movement of 2006 and the April 2008 elections to the Constituent Assembly
(CA), Nepalis sent out a clear message in favour of a democratic republic.
• The subsequent polarisation was between the Maoists and non-Maoists. The former saw
their success in elections as a political victory which gave them a licence to implement
their “revolutionary agenda.” But this caused the non-Maoist forces to distrust Maoist
commitment to democracy, and they came together to isolate the former rebels. This
fault-line became somewhat less intense when the Maoists returned to power in August
2011, and gave up their military structure.
• Since 2012, as the CA entered its final lap, the key fault-line has been between forces
which favour identity-based federalism and those against it. The Maoists, Madhesis of the
plains, and ethnic groups in the hills, argued for a federal model, which would enable
transfer of power to excluded social groups. This would be somewhat similar to the
process of State reorganisation that took place in India in the 1950s, and which continued
at regular intervals. But the Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal
(Unified-Marxist Leninist), catering to their social base of hill Hindu upper-castes,
resisted. They manufactured baseless fears that the country would “disintegrate.” At best,
they favoured “administrative federalism,” which would allow hill Hindu castes to retain
hegemony. The outcome was the end of the CA without drafting a constitution.
• A common thread is the struggle between those forces who sought to retain elements of
the past feudal political structures, and those who wished to democratise Nepali politics.
The “pro-change” forces had the upper hand after the 2006 Janandolan.
• But the CA’s end in May 2012 galvanised all those who had lost out. So, monarchists
began claiming that the CA’s republican declaration no longer held. Sections of the NC
and UML, and Nepal’s conservative intelligentsia questioned the need to embark on a
democratic exercise to write the constitution. An ultra-left faction had splintered from the
Maoists to continue its quest for a “People’s Republic.” So if the royalists and
conservatives felt changes had gone too far, the far-left thought it had not gone far
enough. They alleged that Prachanda and the Baburam Bhattarai-led Maoists, by
accepting the line of peaceful and constitutional political change, had betrayed the
revolution. An unlikely alliance between all these forces is now in force. Their central
objective is to disrupt elections for a second CA, slated for November 19. If polls are not
held, the Chief Justice-led election government will collapse. Royalists will project this
as an end of the interim constitution, and demand the revival of the monarchical 1990
statute. The anti-Maoist politicians feel that they have already achieved the aim of
“mainstreaming” the Maoists; there is now no need to follow their agenda of CA
elections. The anti-federalists think this is the best way to stall the identity-based
demands of the marginalised. The ultra-left calculates that this is the best way to create a
crisis, and prepare the ground for people’s revolt.

Truth commission
• President Ram Baran Yadav enacted an ordinance on transitional justice. The
“Investigation of Disappeared Person, Truth and Reconciliation Ordinance – 2013”
will form a truth commission to investigate thousands of human rights abuses committed
during the decade-long Maoist “People’s War” that ended in 2006.The truth commission
was a part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the war as well as the
interim constitution. But the bill has been criticised by some rights activists for its
weaknesses in dealing with grave violations of human rights, which includes murder,
abduction, disappearances, rape and torture, among others. They are unhappy that it could
lead to amnesty on even the gravest crimes, though the truth commission can, if it
chooses, recommend prosecution on those crimes.
• Nine thousand cases of the abuses of human rights and humanitarian law, committed
mostly by the then Royal Nepal Army and the Maoist rebels, have been documented in
the Nepal Conflict Report published by the U.N.’s Office for High Commissioner for
Human Rights in October last year. Though statistics vary, according to the U.N.
estimates, 13,000 people died and 1,300 disappeared during the war. In cases of gravest
crimes, the bill allows the truth commission to recommend the attorney general to
 crimes, the bill allows the truth commission to recommend the attorney general to
prosecute the offenders. That provision, too, has led to fears that this commission will
share the fate of previous commissions — notably the Mallik Commission formed after
the 1990 movement, and the Rayamajhi Commission formed after the 2006 movement.
The governments that followed ignored the commissions’ recommendations, often
promoting those responsible for suppressing the movements.

Misc
• In what looks like a major achievement of the peace accord, altogether 1,531 Maoist
combatants became part of the Nepal Army trainees on Sunday awaiting their
absorption on their completing the prescribed training. These include 71 trainees selected
to join the army at officer’s level.
• Nepal’s major political parties have agreed to form an election government led by the
Chief Justice to hold new Constituent Assembly elections. the legitimacy of the new
government will not be based on the constitution, since it has no provision to change
government in the absence of Parliament. Rather, it will have to be based on political
consensus and the President’s powers to “remove obstacles”. First of its kind in Nepal’s
history, the Chief Justice-led government is likely to be called “a central advisory
council” or an “election council”. It has been criticized as a Maoist ploy to influence the
judiciary by violating the principle of separation of powers.
• Seeking more freedom to operate in Nepal, China has asked the government to give it the
same privilege as availed by India in identifying the "projects in need" and in
"channelling funds through district bodies" without going through the government.
Chinese authorities hold routine meetings with political parties and local leaders of
border districts. Allowing cattle from Nepal to graze in Chinese land and promoting
bilateral trade using the surface route is something China seems to be keen on.
•
3rd nuclear test
Unlike the two earlier tests in 2005 and 2009, Pyongyang gave a little more detail this time
around. Retaliation through sanctions, though, seems to have run its course without any effect on
North Korea’s will or ability to pursue its nuclear weapons programme. The longer the US takes
to come to terms with this inescapable reality, the greater will be the impact of North Korea’s
nuclear threat on the East Asian balance of power and the global non-proliferation regime. The
test has also put China in a quandary. Always protective of the North Korean regime, it has faced
increasing world pressure to wean Pyongyang from the nuclear path, but has been unable to do
so.
Impact:
• miniaturised and lighter nuclear device” just tested can easily be fitted on to a missile
• Six Party Talks (U.S., Russia, China, SK, NK, Japan) process needs re-evaluation.
• To the surprise of many, China has, this time, openly displayed its displeasure and its
foreign minister said Beijing “firmly opposed” the test. China under Xi Jinping now faces
a foreign policy dilemma: how to really contain an increasingly assertive North Korea
without destabilising it? This indicates the failure of Chinese foreign policy in its critical
neighbourhood. Russia has also joined the chorus of condemnation.
• The nuclear test tries to test the credentials of Chinese policy based on “no war, no
instability and no nukes” in the Korean peninsula, and the US resolve to keep a military
presence in the South.
• North Korea’s nuclear ambitions may possibly lead to accelerated demands from US
allies, such as South Korea and Japan, to install ballistic missile defences in the region
that can drastically undercut the strike capability of Chinese nukes — something Beijing
vehemently opposes. Call it a more active ‘pivot to Asia.
• The little nuclear genies in North Korea and Pakistan that China helped conjure up over
the years will both end up as major strategic liabilities for Beijing. There is little the
Chinese can do now to prevent an even more robust American military presence in the
East Asian region
• The test adds to the growing destabilization of one of the world’s most dynamic
economic areas.
• the US reaction to the North’s nuclear blackmail may require hasty changes to the “San
Francisco System” (the strategic triangle of the US, Japan and South Korea, REFER
WIKI)
Risk:
North Korea continues to pose a proliferation risk globally. Pyongyang will be able to finance
its construction activities and other economic needs either through the sale of nuclear technology,
components or even devices, or by getting more out of America through its enhanced bargaining
power.
Way out for SK
Instead of treating North Korea as a deviant state and imposing additional sanctions that will
further provoke Pyongyang, or hoping that China will somehow persuade the regime to give up
nuclear weapons, the US must acknowledge that North Korea is now a nuclear-weapon state.
Best strategy would be to work towards reunification. South Korea will get to inherit not only the
North’s missile and nuclear programmes but also its rich mineral resources to take care of the
economic impact of reunification on the South Korean economy. North Korea is said to have 300
varieties of minerals worth around $6 trillion. The world will be happy, secure in the thought that
Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are in safe hands.
Will North Korea agree? It might if it’s made to feel that it’s entering reunification on an equal
footing because of its developed WMD programme.
But, other neighbouring powers like Japan and Russia do not wish to see a “United Korea”
But, other neighbouring powers like Japan and Russia do not wish to see a “United Korea”
engulfed by nationalism and armed with nuclear weapons. The North understands the US
ambivalence towards a “United Korea”, which may opt to become an aggressive nationalist
power by its own reckoning.
India: Unfolding events in East Asia point to the fact that India’s incorporation in the evolving
regional balance of power may be a necessity. India, which has officially asked Pyongyang to
“refrain from such actions which adversely impact on peace and stability of the region”, sees
instability in East Asia as having the potential to derail its evolving strategic and economic
partnership with South Korea and Japan. However, of more immediate concern to India is that, if
the test was conducted with enriched uranium, it is a confirmation of the clandestine proliferation
network that helped Pyongyang build its bomb in return for missile technology. This may help
India counter Pakistan’s blocking of the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty), citing
asymmetry with India in the stockpile of fissile material.

History
The dangerous geopolitical game initiated by the North’s new regime, led by the young and
inexperienced Kim Jong-un, suggests the country is trying to take refuge in the strong nationalist
constituency that harbours a deep-seated suspicion of China, antagonism against Japan and
lingering doubts about the US role during the Korean War. North Korea’s historiography argues
that, in the past, the “Southern part of the land” (currently South Korea) allied with China’s Tang
dynasty against the northern Goguryeo dynasty (currently North Korea). Nationalists in North
Korea rebuff Chinese civilisational influence on the Korean peninsula. Kim Il-Sung, the founder
of North Korea and the grandfather of the current leader, chalked out this nationalist path, which
found expression in North Korea’s Juche ideology and the policies aimed at “self-reliance”. The
grandson tries to emulate him to bolster public support and the military’s backing.
North Korea’s time-tested “military first” policy originates from the idea that the nation inherited
the legacy of the brave Goguryeo fighters who successfully defied Chinese power. Chinese
efforts to overshadow North Korean nationalist fervour was seen in the Goguryeo controversy
around 2002 when the Chinese foreign ministry website claimed Goguryeo was a Chinese
dynasty. This generated anti-China emotions in both Koreas, providing a fillip to pan-Korean
nationalism. Chinese encroachment on Korean identity, mounting pressure of international
sanctions, and a conservative presidential candidate’s victory in South Korea, have made the
North whip up this nationalist ideology to help consolidate power at the grassroots and strike a
chord with growing pan-Korean nationalism that can constrain South Korea’s antagonistic
policies towards the North.
Since the 1960s, North Korea has been looking for a nuclear deterrent to protect itself from its
enemies, most notably the U.S. Recent events in Libya and elsewhere have made the North
Korean government more nervous about American intentions. “Regime change” in Pyongyang
has been high on the American agenda, especially after former President George W. Bush put the
country in the so-called “axis of evil”. At the same time, North Korea has, on several occasions,
strongly signalled that improving ties with the U.S. is one of its top priorities. The two countries
were actually on the verge of normalising relations during the last days of the Bill Clinton
presidency.
In 2005, North Korea had agreed to roll back its nuclear programme in exchange for energy aid
and diplomatic recognition from the West. After the collapse of the six-party talks in 2008 and
the imposition of more sanctions by the West, North Korea hardened its stance. Relations with
South Korea had also soured with the coming to power of a right-wing government in Seoul.
There were serious military incidents between the two sides in the last couple of years. North
Korea has been demanding the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea since the end of the
Korean War in 1953. The U.S. and Korea are still technically at war.

Misc
• The North quit the Six Party Talks (aimed at moving the Korean Peninsula towards
denuclearisation) which also involves South Korea, Japan, China, the U.S. and Russia,
after carrying out missile tests in 2009
 after carrying out missile tests in 2009
• Illegal trade with China, across the border, amounts to $10 bn.
Evaluation of Last government (Did Military relinquish power?)
• This is the first time since Pakistan came into being in 1947 that any civilian government
survived this long and left on a day of its choosing. So, yes, Pakistan’s democracy has
turned a corner, but even diehard optimists will admit that this is just an early milestone
on a slippery and trip-wired road that is this country’s democratic project. Cynics, of
course, maintain that the only reason that the PPP-led dispensation survived is not some
new-found love in the military for the “bloody civilians” but its own compulsions.
• The military (Deep State) did flex its muscles whenever the civilians moved into the
security establishment’s turf. So, after early efforts to stare down the military, including
his no-first-use nuclear policy statement and abortive bid to send the Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI) Director-General to India in the wake of the Mumbai terror attacks, the
President and his government opted for the easy way out to survival by staying off
subjects dear to the security establishment. Consequently, national security and issues
central to Pakistan’s existence, such as its relations with the United States, India and
Afghanistan, remained the exclusive domain of the military though both sides continued
with the facade of the civilians, including Parliament, having a say in policymaking.
• In the in-camera briefing given to Parliament after the Abbottabad raid, the then ISI
Director-General Shuja Pasha expected the provincial government, the local police and
other related agencies to share the responsibility for intelligence failure. He had
maintained that criticism of the security establishment at that particular juncture was not
in the national interest as it would strengthen the enemy.
• Another case in point is the Central Intelligence Agency-operated drones. Those in the
know of things claim that the CIA actually gives the Pakistan military a 30-minute heads-
up before sending in the missiles so that security forces present in the area under target
can be moved out. Yet, the civilian government has taken the flak for the drone attacks.
• Similarly, the civilian structure was held responsible for the deteriorating security
situation when it is no secret that terrorist attacks began inside Pakistan as a blowback to
General Musharraf’s decision to align with the U.S.’ war on terror, and most of the
terrorists who have turned anti-Pakistan are essentially the security establishment’s
“assets”-turned-rogue.
• Police plead helplessness in going after some of the religious right-wing organisations
involved in sectarian violence because of the blessing they enjoy in some quarters of the
Deep State.
• Over the past couple of years, circumstances conspired to offer Pakistan several
opportunities to go for an all-out war against home-grown terrorists. But in the crunch
situation, a statement would come out of the security establishment calling for “political
consensus” and that would be enough to have all politicians scurrying for cover for fear
of risking their lives and political future.
• Of all the controversies that bogged down the civilian government, Memogate
(Ambassador Hussain Haqqani had sought U.S. intervention to stop a military takeover
after the Abbottabad raid) was the most threatening as it had the opposition and the
security establishment on one side to run down the ruling dispensation, bringing back
memories of the 1990s when the Deep State successfully kept the PPP and the Pakistan
Muslim League (Nawaz) at loggerheads by playing one against the other.
• All this notwithstanding, even its most ardent supporters admit that the PPP leadership
provided little or no governance and was just interested in survival and making hay while
it could. Bread-and-butter issues were left unaddressed, resulting in a crippling power and
gas shortage that has forced most factories to close down and some to relocate to
Bangladesh.
• Sectarian violence and attacks on the minorities are growing. Though the civilian
• Sectarian violence and attacks on the minorities are growing. Though the civilian
dispensation cannot be held responsible for both since these attacks are a result of the
“jehadi mentality” cultivated by the Deep State, many in civil society are disappointed by
the PPP’s ostrich-like approach to dig its head in the sand. Despite its legacy of being a
“secular”, left-oriented political party, the PPP has chosen not to stand up and be counted
in the face of an onslaught of the religious right wing.
• All this and more on the downside. On the upside are the legislative changes that sought
to block any kind of adventurism in future by the military and the presidency. Zardari
carved for himself a place in Pakistan’s history by becoming the first President to give up
some of his sweeping powers. As part of the 18th Amendment to the much-mauled
Constitution, Zardari ceded powers of the President to Parliament, making his office
subservient to the elected representatives. That a slew of amendments—which included
declaring the subversion of the Constitution “high treason” and removing the vestiges of
military rule—were effected is no mean achievement, more so because it was done
through consensus.
• Another major achievement was the passing of the Seventh National Finance
Commission Award in 2010. This, coupled with the transfer of several administrative
matters to the provinces, has paved the way for the decentralisation of power.
Observer status
A year after failing to win UN recognition as an independent state, the Palestinian Authority
(PA), in a desperate, ill-calculated move, appealed to the UN to change its status from “non-
member observer entity” to “non-member observer state”.The UN bid was the PA’s desperate last
effort to revive the dead two-state solution and obtain UN endorsement of the 1967 borders,
which the PA thinks should serve as the basis for negotiations to resolve the conflict.It will give
the Palestinians a boost, elevating their status from U.N. observer to non-member observer state
like that of the Vatican. The Palestinians can now participate in General Assembly debates, and
in future, haul Israel before the International Criminal Court on possible charges of war crimes.
The U.N. resolution, however, could well be the first of many momentous changes for West Asia.
The Palestinian Authority can now seek membership of several U.N. agencies and, above all, can
apply to sign the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The vote will be truly
meaningful if it marks the start of a new international resolve to ensure the people of Palestine
are able to exercise their right to statehood and self-determination, just as the people of Israel
have been doing for years.

Evaluation
• The vote recognises a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza and east Jerusalem, the
lands Israel capturedin the 1967 Mideast war. This represents far less territory than the
Palestinianswere offered on November29, 1947, when the U.N. General Assembly passed
Resolution 181.By claiming a diminished Palestinian state, the PA has effectively given
up over 80 per cent of Palestinian land, infringing upon the right of return of millions of
Palestinian refugees, and depriving 1.5 million Palestinians — who are citizens of Israel
— of their historical and cultural claim to Palestinian land or identity. If the PA was
already willing to make concessions for free, then it would have been better off asking
the UN to reinstate the 1947 Partition Plan, which would grant Palestinians at least 43 per
cent of the historic Palestine.
• The full consequences of this resolution on complex issues, like the status of Jerusalem or
the legality of Palestinian resistance thus far guaranteed under international law, are still
unknown.
• Nothing much has changed in the official international position. The US continues to
support Israel and threatens to use the veto against any resolution undermining or
criticising Israel. Those supportive of the Israeli position still adopt the official Israeli
narrative and describe the Palestinian move as a unilateral act that aims to undermine the
peace process. The Europeans have realised the need to support Abbas and reinforce the
role of the PA over the Hamas. That is why they tried to distance themselves from the
opposing US and Israeli stand and largely endorsed the bid.
• In reality, no one can force the Israelis to go back to the negotiation table unless they
want to, not even the US.
• The new status would enable the Palestinians to join the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and level war crimes charges against Israel. However, Abbas was quick to reassure
the Israelis that he had no immediate plans to take Israel to the ICC, and that he would
rather resort to that option in the future in case of Israeli aggression. In this context, it is
important to mention that this is the same PA that, upon the US’s request, stalled and
buried the Goldstone report on Israel’s attack on Gaza in 2008 at the UN Human Rights
Council. Besides, a quick review of all the past failed attempts to prosecute Israeli
officials, and the fact that political leadership in some countries, like the UK, were
willing to go as far as to change their own laws to guarantee the safety and immunity of
Israeli officials, makes this ICC option unforeseen.
• If Abbas and the PA were genuine about obtaining recognition for Palestine, then they
 • If Abbas and the PA were genuine about obtaining recognition for Palestine, then they
should have approached the Security Council, which has the authority to recognise
statehood. The UN General Assembly has passed one resolution after other affirming
Palestinian rights over the past 65 years. However, none of these resolutions had teeth. In
fact, Israel repeatedly ignores Security Council resolutions, not to mention those of the
General Assembly

Rising stature of Hamas

• The leaders of Hamas, the Islamist movement, has ruled Gaza since 2007
• As Islamists across the Arab world have gained clout (post Arab spring), so Hamas has
made powerful and rich friends. Turkey, a resurgent regional power that was once Israel’s
closest Muslim ally, has taken up Hamas’s cause; so has Qatar, one of the richest and
most dynamic of the Gulf states.
• Hosni Mubarak, the secular despot who ran Egypt for 30 years until his downfall in 2011,
had little time for Hamas. By contrast, the Brotherhood is a cousin of Hamas. Hamas is
an offshoot of the Brotherhood and has strong institutional links with the leadership
based in Cairo
• Challenges
o Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system has proved its worth and many of Hamas’s
missiles have been destroyed
o Although rockets from Gaza have killed around 30 Israelis since 2004,Israel has
been fairly free of suicidebombers,thanks in part to the barrierthat bites into the
West Bank, themain chunk of a would-be Palestinianstate
o Israel’s defence budget is bigger than that of its four Arab neighbours combined.
Starting a war with the local superpower will hardly help the new Arab
governments mend their economies.
o The task of reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah will not be easy as the two
parties have markedly different views on the issue of dealing with Israel. Hamas,
unlike the Fatah, refuses to recognize Israel. The Fatah swears by the Oslo
accords and wants a negotiated solution to the issue of Palestinian statehood.

Land Swap
• Arab countries have collectively agreed to accept an arrangement that would allow
Israelis and Palestinians to go ahead with land swaps to resolve differences, rather than
strictly sticking to the pre-1967-war position.
• The Arab League’s proposal in its original form was pegged around a full Arab
recognition of an Israeli state, in case it gave up land captured in the 1967 war, and
accepted a “just solution” for Palestinian refugees. The Israelis had earlier rejected the
plan, which was proposed in 2002 at the Arab League’s summit in Beirut.
• Israel objects to the return to 1967 borders, the return of Palestinian refugees displaced in
earlier wars, and the inclusion of East Jerusalem in a future Palestinian state

Misc
• KHALED Meshaal, whom the IsraelistriedtoassassinateinJordanin1997, arrived for his
first visit to the Gaza Strip in early December. Meshal waspermitted to cross the
Egyptianborder now that allies of the MuslimBrotherhood — a cousin ofHamas—have
come to power. Butit also reflected at least a symboliceffort to heal divisions
withinHamas between Meshal and theleadership in Gaza, and for Hamasto promote its
contention that itwas victorious in its recent battlewith Israel.He arrived in Gaza to
celebratethe 25th anniversary on Saturdayof the founding of Hamas, thePalestinian
branch of the MuslimBrotherhood, which has also risento power in neighboring Egypt
andhas been a key to the Arab awakeningthat has shaken old alliancesthroughout the
Middle East.
• Way out: THE ANSWER remains the one trumpeted by sensible people on both sides,
• Way out: THE ANSWER remains the one trumpeted by sensible people on both sides,
most of the outside world and this newspaper: two states, with Israel ceding territory for
security. The hope-a small one in the short-term-is that the ceasefire will give a little more
leverage to outsiders pushing that cause. Egypt, which must now set about stopping the
flow of arms into Gaza, along with Turkey and Qatar, is better placed than ever to
persuade Hamas to accept the idea of a Jewish state based on the1967 boundaries with
land swaps and a shared Jerusalem. Arab outsiders should also press Hamas and Fatah to
come together. That would do more to create a Palestinian state than the imminent bid for
virtual statehood at the UN.
• Fatah Rally in Gaza:Hamas and Fatah had beenat loggerheads since the
Islamistmovement seized controlof Gaza in June 2007,following its victory in
Palestinianparliamentary electionsthe previous year.But under Egyptian mediation,the
two groups reached aunity agreement in April2011, though it has so far notbeen
implemented.Hundreds of thousandsof supporters of PalestinianPresident
MahmoudAbbas’s Fatah party on Fridayheld their first mass rally inGaza since Hamas
seized controlof the territory in 2007,according to a Fatahspokesman.Hamas, in a sign of
reconciliationwith Fatah, permittedthe rally to go ahead as theclimax of a week of Gaza
festivitiescelebrating the 48thanniversary of Fatah takingup arms against Israel.
• Hamas, Fatah agree to push for reconciliation:Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
and exiled Hamas chief KhaledMeshaal have agreed to expedite a stalled reconciliation
deal between the rival factions in Jan, 2012. Both focused on implementing the Egypt-
brokered April 2011 unity agreement aimed at ending years of infighting that was signed
in May that year, but whose main provisions have yet to be put into practice.
• Approximately 500,000 Israelis and 2.5 million Palestinians live in the W. Bank andEast
Jerusalem.
• Peace talks have beenstalled for two years amidPalestinian anger at continued Israeli
settlement. TheIsraelis insist they wouldkeep W. Bank settlementblocs under any final
accordas well as all of Jerusalem astheir capital.The rate of settlement growth in
EastJerusalem and the West Bank is staggering. There are now more than 500,000Israeli
settlers living beyond the GreenLine, in violation of international law.Their numbers have
doubled since theOslo peace accords of 1993. Thousandsmore settlement homes are
planned orunder construction.The peace process established by Oslohas not just stalled; it
is going backwardsfast.
• ISRAEL eased its blockade of Gaza in Dec 2012, allowing a shipment of gravel for
private construction into the Palestinian territory for the first time since Hamas seized
control in 2007. This is the first time gravel has been allowed into Gaza for the
Palestinian private sector since the blockade
APEC
With two-thirds of its territory in Asia and with the longest coastline for any Pacific Rim country,
Russia plans to shift the bulk of its trade from the European Union to APEC, which today
accounts for less than a quarter of the country’s total trade turnover. The Kremlin has pledged to
develop energy-rich but economically weak Eastern Siberia, diversify eastwards its exports of
natural resources, and make Russia a transportation bridge between Asia and Europe. Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, comprises 21 countries with 40 per cent of the
global population and accounts for 54 per cent of the world’s GDP.

Magnitsky Act
• Shortly before the New Year, U.S. President Barack Obama signed in-to law a bill that
blacklists Russian officials allegedly implicated in the death of Russian lawyer Sergei
Magnitsky and in the “gross violations of human rights.” The 37-year-old lawyer, in
2009, died in a Russian prison where he was sent to by some Interior Ministry officials
after blowing the whistle on their multi-million tax scam.
• Russia hit back by adopting an “anti-Magnitsky” law that not only mirrored American
sanctions but also banned U.S. adoptions of Russian orphans.
• Apart from out-lawing U.S. adoptions, the Bill allows Russian authorities to ban
“politically-active” non-govern-mental organisations (NGO) that receive American funds
or engage in activities that “represent a threat to the interests of the Russian Federation.”
It also bars Russians who also have dual Russian-American citizenship from participating
in political NGOs. Mr. Putin thereby sought to kill two birds with one stone: strike a blow
against his foes and boost popularity among his conservative constituency by stoking
anti-Americanism.
• Despite Russia’s anger, its response to the Magnitsky Act was largely a symbolic gesture
that did not really hurt U.S. interests. Hardly any American officials will be harmed by
not being able to travel to Russia or keep their money in a Russian bank. Analysts were
quick to note that if Mr. Putin really wanted to hit the U.S. where it hurts he could have
imposed restrictions on American companies in Russia or shut off U.S. logistics lifelines
to Afghanistan that run through Russia.
• It is for the first time in the history of their relations that Russia/the Soviet Union and the
U.S. have resorted to blacklisting each other’s citizens on the basis of their human rights
record. The U.S. sanctions and the Russian retaliation badly poisoned the air between the
two countries.
• Critics said that for tens of thousands of Russian disabled orphans, foreign adoption was
the only chance to find a family. Russians almost never adopt such children as they need
expensive treatment and rehabilita-tion that are not available in Russia for free. It has
hardened Mr. Putin’s image in the West as a cruel and vindictive autocrat.

START
• current goal of reducing arsenal to 1,550 deployed warheads by 2018 — outlined in the
New START the two countries signed in 2010
• Moscow to will not agree to further nuclear arms reductions with the U.S. until the two
countries have “fully implemented” the New START and unless Washing-ton shifts its
stance on missile defence, nuclear tests, weaponisation of outer space, and conventional
arms in Europe
Chinese Influence
Hambantota, a small coastal town that also happens to be Mr Rajapaksa’s political base, already
boasts a controversial (and so far little used) new port, built with $1.4bn of Chinese loans. A
gleaming 35,000 seat cricket stadium also opened nearby last year. These will soon be joined by
an airport, a convention centre, an oil refinery, tourist hotels and business parks, all designed to
attract foreign investment and transform this war-scarred nation of 21m into what Mr Rajapaksa
likes to call “the emerging wonder of Asia”. Even street signs are in Chinese to guide immigrant
Chinese worker.
Sri Lanka has emerged as not just a global test-case of how to spur growth after a conflict but
also a closely watched swing state where the US and India are vying with China for influence.

Rising Sri Lanka’s stature

• In late October, the US-based Hyatt group joined hoteliers including Sheraton and
Shangri-La in announcing plans to enter the market. One million tourists are expected
this year, a figure the government says can grow to 2.5m by 2015
• Lonely Planet has put Sri Lanka at the top of its list of desirable holiday spots for 2013.
• Moves to welcome more foreign investors are also progressing well. The most recent
World Bank Ease of Doing Business index saw the island improve again, to 81st place,
the highest-ranked country in south Asia.
• P.B. Jayasundera, the country’s most senior economic technocrat, says he thinks foreign
direct investment can also rise to $4bn by 2016, a fourfold increase over last year
($1.05 bn).

The other side

• there are signs that Sri Lanka’s exuberant postwar boom is cooling after sharp increases
in interest rates earlier this year, designed to protect a weakened currency and stem
inflation
• The stock market has fallen sharply, following hikes in tariffs to tackle a worrying trade
gap, as imports sucked in by the growing economy depleted limited foreign reserves. The
result is an economy set to grow by just over 6 per cent this year, alongside rising public
discontent over increased living costs, which has sparked riots and strikes.
• Complaints of corruption and dictatorial regime (greater centralization of power within
the family-army & economic development portfolios)
• Disorganized opposition
• Plight of Tamils, 13th Amendment and rehabilitation, addressing war crimes
• Western governments and New Delhi fear creeping Chinese influence in the strategically-
located island backsliding on democracy and critical civil rights

Internal report of the United Nations

The internal report of the United Nations on its role in Sri Lanka raises troubling questions about
its strategies and actions during critical stages of the conflict in the island nation. In the report,
Sri Lanka emerges none the purer, as it contains cogent evidence of how Colombo worked to
stave off international scrutiny and brazenly hounded U.N. and aid agencies out of the conflict
zone so that there were no witnesses to its undoubted excesses. The U.N.’s internal narrative
reveals a weak system that did not have the stomach to stand up for the rights of the people it
was mandated to protect. The government deliberately underestimated the population trapped in
the Vanni region and issued patently false denials about targeting no-fire zones and hospitals. It
carried on a campaign of intimidation and calumny against U.N. officials, detained its national
staff, and shelled convoys carrying essentials for the trapped population. At least two permanent
Security Council members — China and Russia — and India added heft to the Sri Lankan camp,
and the diplomatic odds were stacked against the U.N. The world body cannot afford to give the
impression that justice and accountability for past impunity have been forgotten. After perceived
failures in Bosnia and Rwanda, and possibly Syria, the U.N. needs to find ways of insulating
itself from the diplomatic clout of key players.

Inability of UN
The UN has proven increasingly irrelevant in human rights crises from Rwanda to Serbia and
more recently, Syria. But the internal review on Sri Lanka reveals a truth more disturbing than
the ineffectiveness of the UN at the level of the SC, which is perpetually gridlocked over
resolutions because of the infamous veto power of its permanent members. The field staff in Sri
Lanka failed to accurately report on and monitor civilian casualties. As a result, member states
and senior staff at headquarters and in Colombo remained blissfully uninformed of the situation’s
gravity.
The UN’s inability to train its staff on their responsibility to protect civilians, at the very least by
providing accurate information about a war that was off-limits to journalists, reveals a crisis of
leadership that extends from the secretary general to the local institutions he oversees. The
leadership in Colombo lacked the political experience in dealing with armed conflict to address
the challenges of the war. Headquarters failed to recognise this. Somewhere along the chain of
command, damning evidence was ignored and covered up. The SC’s inability to intervene in the
civil war in Syria, which has received far more international attention than the one in Sri Lanka,
implies that even if it had been better informed, it would not have taken decisive action in Sri
Lanka.
The concealment of critical information, which could have elicited a more urgent response from
the SC, indicates a loss of conviction within the UN of its responsibility to protect civilians when
states fail to do so. While providing humanitarian assistance and protecting human rights in the
midst of a civil war is an exceedingly challenging task for even the most competent field staff,
conveying the severity of the crisis to senior officials was the most basic responsibility that they
failed to fulfil.
The report recommends that the secretary general renew the UN’s vision of its responsibilities in
large-scale human rights crises, embed a human rights perspective into UN strategies, improve
the management of the UN’s crisis response, promote accountability, improve the UN’s
engagement with its member states and follow up on the report.

Developmental work in North

Northern Province has five districts—Jaffna, Mullaithivu, Mannar, Vavuniya and Kilinochchi—
spread over 8,884 sq km. The war caused extensive damage to public infrastructure, including
roads, and to private property. The loss of livelihood meant there was nothing to spur economic
activity. SOON after the Eelam War IV ended, the Sri Lankan government began moving into
Northern Province with its infrastructure development programme. Of course, there was
generous help from the international community—initially for relief and demining and later for
rehabilitation and infrastructure development. The government immediately utilised its resources
and rebuilt sectors, including housing, water supply and sanitation facilities, hospitals, schools.
The government has spent over Sri Lankan Rs.2.6 billion to repair hospitals, build new ones and
provide equipment and drugs; 900 of the 1,020 schools in the region are functioning.

Impeachment
Just 19 months after Shirani Bandaranayake was appointed with much fanfare as the first female
to head Sri Lanka’s judiciary, the fate of the 43rd Chief Justice appeared to have been sealed
following a ruling she gave to a Bill introduced in Parliament by the Economic Development
Minister, Basil Rajapaksa, one of the many presidential siblings controlling the levers of power.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Bill, which wanted to empower the Central government to
control a $614-million development budget, violated the constitution. The court added that it had
to be first approved by nine provincial councils.
to be first approved by nine provincial councils.
Update: The Sri Lankan Parliament impeached Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake in
Jan,2012, throwing the judiciary into disarray and signalling a breakdown of the Constitution.
Despite the impeachment, Ms. Bandaranayake is still some distance away from being thrown
out. The President has to make a formal proclamation to this effect; and he has said he would
first consult a panel of eminent persons ahead of taking such a decision. Also, since the
Parliamentary Standing Committee (PSC) report itself is void, the judiciary cannot accept the
impeachment. In effect, Ms. Bandaranayake can continue as CJ till the executive implements the
orders of the legislature. The PSC report, on which the impeachment motion was debated, had
probed allegations of misconduct by the top judge and was earlier quashed by The Court of
Appeal. The U.S., the first country to react, said it was deeply concerned by the proceedings
which were conducted in defiance of a Supreme Court order.
“With this the rule of law system in Sri Lanka comes to an end,” said Asian Human Rights
Commission, a Hong Kong based NGO. “This is the culmination of the scheme of the 1978
Constitution which is a constitution, not of a democracy, but of a dictatorship,” it added.

Election to the Northern Provincial Council

• Political forces are arrayed in four positions on the battlefield.
• On the Tamil side there are those who hold that the existing 13th amendment to the
Constitution under which the Northern Provincial Council was established, was
inadequate from the start and that therefore, contesting the election and holding office
would be of no positive consequence, and may even have the negative consequence of
legitimising the institution.
• The other position occupied within the Tamil political spectrum is of those who regard
the 13th amendment to be flawed and deeply unsatisfactory, but grasp the value of
contesting and winning the election, and occupying the political real estate that remains.
• On the Sinhala side are those who wish to abolish the system of provincial autonomy,
those who do not and support the system of limited provincial autonomy, and those who
seek to retain the bare bones of the system for fear of the external repercussions of
abolition, while gutting the provinces of any real measure of autonomy.
• At the moment, the predominance on the Tamil side is of the more pragmatic mainstream
politicians who would like to occupy whatever political space that opens up, and on the
Sinhala side, of those unhappy with provincial autonomy but seek to dilute rather than
dismantle it in its entirety.
• The major error on the Tamil side was and remains the failure to grasp that the 13th
amendment was the best that could be achieved even when the political, or more
accurately politico-military, balance was far less in Colombo’s favour. However, the TNA
not only declined to take the 13th amendment as the explicit basis of negotiations, it
initially rejected that structural reform as the starting line. They have been insistent on
enjoying absolute rather than shared or devolved authority in a unitary state. By the time
the TNA collected its collective wits, the Government had commenced the siege and
attrition of the 13th amendment, while the hardliners within and outside were
campaigning for outright abolition.
• The Rajapaksa government has been doggedly hostile to the idea of a political settlement
and has systematically undermined or sabotaged every initiative in this direction since it
came to power in November 2005. In the domestic sphere, the Rajapaksas control pretty
much everything and have the ability to get things done and undone at will. They have
sweeping powers of the executive presidency, a legislative supermajority large enough to
enact controversial constitutional amendments, and a cowed and pliant judiciary. They
control a vast security apparatus, have quashed or co-opted all meaningful political
opposition, have little to fear from the media, and enjoy widespread support from the
majority community.

Elections held
Sri Lanka has crossed an important milestone toward national reconciliation with the holding of
elections to its Northern provincial council. Held for the first time since the 1988 election for the
short-lived North-Eastern Provincial Council, the September 21 vote gives the war-ravaged
North its first-ever democratic political set up that will share governance with the centre. For
the Tamil-majority province that was first under the thumb of the LTTE, then the military, and
later run by a governor appointed by Colombo, this is the single biggest step towards a political
settlement of the conflict.
The real test, though, begins now. The government must respect the TNA’s mandate. It should
not resist the power-sharing with the Council that is provided under the 13th Amendment, and
must begin to seriously consider progressive devolution on police and land. It would also do well
to rethink its project on scrapping or diluting the constitutional provision for devolution. For its
part, the TNA must avoid the urge to over-interpret its mandate. Steering clear of the extreme
nationalist pronouncements by Tamil diaspora organisations, it has made a good start by stating
that its victory represents the wish of the people for adequate self-rule within a united and
undivided Sri Lanka.

Misc
• Last year, Sri Lanka began recruiting Tamils to the police force. About 1,000 persons
were trained and deployed. But the majority of the force still remains Sinhalese in the
Tamil majority areas. While this in itself is not an issue, the fact that the officials are
unable to converse in Tamil is a serious problem in the Northern Province. In a first,
Army has decided to recruit Tamil women soldiers.
• The 18th Amendment — the only constitutional amendment after the war — has given
greater powers to the President and undermined the independence of commissions
relating to the police, judiciary and human rights. The foreign service and the public
administration are increasingly packed with political appointees and former military
officials. As with the late 1970s, post-war Sri Lankan society is now confronted with the
twin problems of authoritarianism and neo-liberalism
The government led by Omar al-Bashir, which has so far weathered the impact of the “Arab
Spring”, is trying to mobilise support among the people as it faces challenges from within and
without. There were demonstrations against the government all over Sudan in the middle of the
year. Heavy-handed tactics adopted by the security forces helped quell the demonstrations within
a short time. Public dissatisfaction over the rising cost of living (petrol prices were hiked
recently) has not helped matters. The country is facing an economic crisis ever since the south
seceded. More than two-thirds of the oil that was produced in united Sudan came from the south.
The refineries that are located in the north have remained mostly idle after the south unilaterally
stopped pumping oil earlier in the year. Salafi elements are making attempts to sideline the
moderate Islamists who have been in power since the military coup of 1988 led by Bashir. These
elements reportedly played a big role in the violent protests that erupted in September following
the release of the anti-Islam video in the U.S.
Unity deal
Syrian opposition groups meeting in Qatar have inked a hard-won unity deal (a 12-point
agreement) in Nov 2012 and agreed to form a national coalition to fight against President Bashar
al-Assad. The deal came after the Syrian National Council heeded Arab and Western pressure to
embrace other groups. Together, they formed the 60-member “National Coalition of Forces of
the Syrian Revolution and Opposition”. The coalition agreed not to take part in any
negotiation with the regime and to form a provincial government after gaining international
recognition. Leading dissident Riad Seif drew up the U.S.-backed reform proposals on which the
agreement was based. Along with Suhair Atassi, a human rights activist, he has been named as
vice-president. The new body effectively diminishes the influence of the Paris-based Syrian
National Council (SNC), which now has 22 members in the coalition. Still, few opposition
parties of Damascus have stayed away from the coalition and have declined to give any
recognition to it. Washington openly wanted to reduce the influence of the SNC reduce the
influence of Muslim Brotherhood.
The Americans hope that the set-up, which supposedly better represents the opposition inside
Syria, would help remove some of the pillars of social support for Mr. Assad. Moaz Khatib, a
former imam of the Umayyad mosque in Damascus is the coalition’s new leader, in charge of
uniting the opposition factions.
The apparent intention is that western powers in particular could channel aid to a single body
rather than to favored factions. Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State, perhaps shocked by
the new evidence of atrocities committed by the rebel forces, said in the last week of October
that Washington wanted a new leadership to take command of the disparate forces fighting the
Syrian government. Hillary Clinton had previously described the SNC as “the leading and
legitimate representative of Syrians seeking a peaceful democratic transition”. The Obama
administration seems to have finally realized that the rebels have alienated not only the minority
communities, which constitute around 40 per cent of the Syrian population, but also secular and
liberal-minded Syrians, who are not committed to the Ba’athist party, which has been ruling the
country since the 1960s. Hillary Clinton has emphasized that there should be an opposition that
“speaks to every segment and every geographic part of Syria”. It is expected that Alawite,
Kurdish and Christian figureheads will now figure prominently in the U.S.-sponsored list of
opposition leaders.

Casualties/Effects
• The numbers of those killed, according to U.N. agencies, has crossed 48,000 by end of
Nov 2012.
• Meanwhile, the ripple effect of the conflict in Syria is already felt by its neighbors. In
Lebanon, the sectarian schisms have been further exacerbated. A massive explosion in the
third week of October in the capital, Beirut, killed eight people.
• The U.S. has a big troop presence in Turkey. In October, the Obama administration
announced that American troops were being deployed in neighboring Jordan. Democratic
Congressman Dennis Kucinich told the media that this deployment, done without
congressional approval, had brought Washington “immeasurably closer” to being overtly
involved in the war raging in Syria.
• Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been exhorting his people to be
prepared for an open military confrontation with Syria. In Turkey, a recent poll showed
that the majority of the population there was against a war with its neighbor. The Alevis
in Turkey and the Alawites in Syria share a close cultural and religious bond. The sizable
Alevi population in the areas bordering Syria is anyway sympathetic to the Syrian
government. The Alevis are unhappy with their government for playing host to jehadi
 government. The Alevis are unhappy with their government for playing host to jehadi
elements and the more than 100,000 refugees on their lands. In the past few months, the
Kurds in Turkey, led by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), have increased their attacks
on the Turkish military. Ankara is blaming Damascus for aiding the PKK.
• Turkey’s much-vaunted “zero problems with neighbours” policy is now in absolute
tatters. All its immediate neighbours, such as Iran, Armenia and Syria, have been
alienated. Russia is especially angry after the Turkish Air Force F-16s forced a
commercial Syrian Air flight from Moscow to Damascus to land in Ankara in the second
week of October. The Turkish authorities had alleged that the commercial flight was
carrying banned cargo for the Syrian military. They have not been able to provide any
evidence to prove their allegations but have chosen not to deliver a formal apology for
what has been described in the Russian media as “an act of mid-air piracy”. Turkey’s
growing stature in the Arab world has diminished considerably as a consequence of its
interventionist policies. At the same time, Europe, too, is moving away from Ankara,
with the prospects of full-fledged European Union membership for Turkey diminishing
by the day.
• Iraq is another neighbour that has been affected seriously by the snowballing crisis in
Syria. The Americans are angry with the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad for
tacitly supporting the government in Damascus and having close ties with Iran. There are
reports that battle-hardened Shia fighters have been pouring into Syria across the porous
border to help the beleaguered government there. The government in Baghdad realises
that a regime change in Damascus would create significant problems for it as that would
bolster Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq. As it is, ever since the trouble flared up in Syria,
suicide attacks and bombings have registered a sharp increase in Baghdad and other cities
of Iraq.

Geneva Accord
• The result of deliberations between Lakhdar Brahimi, the U. N. and Arab League envoy
predecessor Kofi Annan and the global powers — to resolve the crisis
• focuses on the formation of a transition-al government without demanding the exit of
PresidentBashar al-Assad
• evoked a tepid response from the U.S., which repeatedly demanded that Mr. Assad
should step down

Syrian President’s peace plan

• The political solution en-tails regional and international powers halting their support for
armed groups, which will be followed by a halt in our security forces’ crackdown against
them
• He added that the next step would be to convene a national conference, where all parties
would participate.
• These deliberations would result in a new constitutional draft, which will be put to vote in
a national referendum.
• Finally, the crisis would end with a process of national reconciliation that would include
the granting of amnesty to prisoners.
• The President said he would not negotiate with two main components of the op-position:
The pro-western rebels, whom he described as “western puppets”; and “terrorists” known
for their links with al-Qaeda
Obama’s election
There is apprehension in Israel that the next four years with the second Obama administration
may not offer a smooth ride. Israeli Prime Minister and Mitt Romney, are old friends. Mr.
Netanyahu had a difficult relationship with Mr. Obama during his first term. Mr. Obama refused
to be pushed by Israel on taking action against Iran, and the White House was miffed by Israeli
policy on settlements in the occupied West Bank.
Iran gave a lukewarm reaction to U.S. President Ba-rack Obama’s re-election, warning that the
result would not lead to a normalisation of ties but not ruling out hope altogether. “Four years
ago, Obama was elected on a platform for change and said he was extending his hand for
cooperation with Iran, but he acted otherwise and unprecedented sanctions were imposed. Newer
Obama prefers diplomacy over sanctions but it will only come to fruition if Iran cooperates.
With the Obama White House using drones as a major weapon against terrorist hideouts in
Pakistan, anti-Americanism is at an all-time high, as the drone policy like the raid that killed
Osama bin Laden, raised issues of national sovereignty.
For the Chinese, another four years of Obama may not be good news (Asia pivot, IOR-ARC,
ASEAN). However, compared to Obama, a Romney administration seems a nightmare.
Based on past experience, a new administration in Washington inevitably means a period of
bilateral tensions. The only exception was the Obama administration. There are two
explanations. First, a new administration appoints officials who lack the necessary experience in
handling a bilateral relationship as complex as the one between the US and China. In particular,
few new presidents are versed in the intricacies of America’s China policy. The learning curve is
steep. Second, if China is featured prominently as a campaign issue, the incoming president who
attacks his opponent for being soft on China usually has to carry out some of his threats to
maintain minimum credibility. For example, in 1993, Bill Clinton threatened to end China’s
trading privileges if it did not improve human rights (although he quickly abandoned the policy).
George W. Bush authorised the largest sale of American hi-tech weapons to Taiwan in 2001 to
show that he was serious about treating China as a “strategic competitor”. If seen in this light,
Romney’s get-tough-on-China talk may be just campaign rhetoric. But there is a good chance
that some of it could actually become policy. To be sure, labelling China a currency manipulator
may trigger a drawn-out process of trade retaliations that, in the end, amounts to little. However,
the prospects of a costly trade war between the US and China could spook the markets. Romney
could make life miserable for China on other trade issues. It is conceivable that he will invoke
more anti-dumping measures to impose heavy import duties on Chinese goods.
Domestic policies:
He has hinted at a strong liberal agenda for his second term. He promised to enact reforms to
increase revenue by taxing wealthy Americans; raise the minimum wage to $9 per hour; push for
immigration reform and stricter gun control; and pull out 34,000 troops from Afghanistan in the
year. Comprehensive immigration reform, a subject of signifi-cant bipartisan consensus is on top
of the agenda, and Mr. Obama suggested that his policy packages would focus on border
security, a “respon-sible pathway to earned citizenship”, and fixing the legal immigration system
to cut waiting periods and the highly-skilled persons to help create jobs and spur growth.
He also proposed plans to tweak the country’s tax code with a view to penalising companies that
created any jobs beyond U.S. borders. He wanted to create “a tax code that lowers incentives to
move jobs overseas, and lowers tax rates for businesses and manufacturers that are creating jobs
right here in the U.S.

Obama’s Ditherence
As far as Obama’s foreign policy in general and in Asia in particular is concerned, the
president’s scorecard during his first term in office has hardly been satisfactory. The
president’s scorecard during his first term in office has hardly been satisfactory. The
“change”that he was expected to bring in seems elusive. There was more continuity than change
on Afghanistan and Iran. Many conflicts in Asia, from the ongoing brinkmanship between China
and its Southeast Asian neighbours in the South China Sea to the China-Japan spat over
territorial claims and fishing rights, have been aggravated because Obama repeatedly changed his
stance on crucial issues.For instance, at the beginning of his first term, Obama initiated fresh
dialogue with Iran, which failed to yield the desired results. The subsequent U-turn now sees Iran
and the West at loggerheads. Similarly, Obama’s idea of G-2, envisioning China and the US as
partners, proved to be a major policy flop. To reassure America’s Asian allies and readjust to
new realities, Obama announced theUS’s “rebalancing”, or the “pivot”towards Asia, at the tail
end of hisfirst term.
The real challenge for Obama in Asia, therefore, lies in keeping the promises he has made so
far.It will be interesting to see how consistently Obama pursues hisforeign policy and how
assertivethe US will be in preserving itshegemony in global politics. TheUS might get into a
situation,sooner rather than later, in which itwould be expected to take steps tosafeguard its allies
and friends, includingJapan and the Philippines.To avoid such a situation, it has toensure that the
South China Sea issueremains quiet, even if the disputeis not resolved soon, which isnot easy.

Asia pivot
Why the new slogan about America’s interest in Asia now? What does the U.S. seek to achieve?
• An integrate-but hedge policy constituting a reallocation of military assets (from Atlantic
and Middle east to the Pacific waters facing China), a stronger commercial presence
(TPP, TPIP), and closer relations with states across the Asia-Pacific.
• Military’s Pacific pivot: US has decided to reconfigure its forces from a 50-50 split
between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific to 60 per cent of the Navy's assets assigned to
the Pacific Ocean. These would be fortified by an increase in the number and size of
military exercises in the Pacific, and a greater number of port visits. On his Australia visit
in 2011, Obama announced to deploy 2,500 Marines in Australia to shore up alliances in
Asia. The agreement with Australia amounts to the first long-term expansion of the
American military’s presence in the Pacific since the end of the Vietnam War. In Aug,
2013 US Air Force announced plans to increase the number of airmen and aircraft it will
rotate through Australia.
• The US has also tightened its military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia and
the Philippines. Its newly vigorous Asian diplomacy included the rapid normalisation of
relations with Myanmar, expanded security cooperation with Vietnam, and stronger
engagement with Indonesia. The US has also been urging India to beef up its Look East
policy.
• The Asia pivot is all about transitioning from a world where a single great power reigned,
to one where others ascend to great power status. By locking in new and old allies and
strengthening its strategic position in the region, America hopes to cushion the blow of a
relative global diminution in power
• A lot of the “Asia pivot” narrative is about internal American discussions. Such a new
strategy does away with the most indelible image of America in the new multipolar
world, where it is often seen as “Uncertain Sam” or “The Reluctant Eagle.” The pivot to
Asia serves as a rallying cry of decisiveness. It is also a blueprint for budget priorities,
redeployments and a new and more efficient force architecture that the new
administration will need to define given its campaign commitments.
• The pivot narrative is a comment on the changed dynamics of the Indian Ocean. Soon
there will be the possibility of two or three new powerful navies (India, China and
Indonesia) operating in the region. Ranged against this, are declining American oil and
natural gas interests in play as the coming fracking revolution in America itself allows for
a dramatic new domestic growth in energy production. The Asia pivot at once answers
why America should continue to care about what goes on in the rest of the world (Asia
included); America may not get its oil from Asia, but all the countries it finds itself
interdependent with do. Thus, the Asia pivot sells continuing American engagement to a
weary and economically overburdened American public. So, in the end, this is a bumper
sticker that actually says something.
 sticker that actually says something.
• The region will see more than 50% of world economic growth outside USA in next few
years
How the region itself will respond?
• Asean has in many ways already learnt the fine art of using the U.S. as a strategic
balancer; for example during recent Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea,
Asean drew the U.S. in as a very useful offshore balancer. Asean’s finely-calibrated
balancing act is likely to continue.
• In the short to medium term, India is a key to the “Pivot Paradigm.” For India, China
is a natural neighbour. Difficult as the relationship may be, trade between the newly
emerging economic giants will only increase, whatever the strategic pitfalls ahead. As
the relative economic and political weight of China grows, it is the Indian response
that could well befuddle most American planners. Proud of its “strategic autonomy,”
the Indian reaction to the pivot will be an outcome of the Chinese approach to and
engagement with India. Recent developments show that while China is keen to avoid
pushing India to a place where a U.S. partnership seems reassuring, the new-found
chauvinism and assertiveness emanating from Beijing is disturbing New Delhi.
• When Beijing complained that the U.S. was reverting to the Cold War era policy of
“containing” China, the projection from Washington changed. The preferred vehicle
now was a “re-balancing” of U.S. strategic responsibilities in the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, although little substantial difference was detected between the two postures.
• The U.S. and China are unlikely to advance towards “cold war” or “hot war.” Their
future relationship may be stamped by a blend of “cooperation, competition,
rivalry and periodic tensions.”
Therefore, China itself will ironically determine the contours of the American pivot; the
biggest game changer may well be the upcoming changing of guard in Beijing — the mood and
demeanour of the new leadership led by Xi Jinping. Paradoxically, and the ultimate sign that we
do live in a very different era from the preceding one of American dominance, the form and
content of the U.S. pivot to Asia may be determined more by Asians than Americans. And this
will test the skills and will of Obama 2.0.
Southeast Asia see China rising. They see India rising on the other side. And if you’re a small
country in that situation, your natural instinct is you want more big countries involved rather than
less.” The move to strengthen U.S. presence in the region was directed not just at China
but also at India.

US and ASEAN
• For years, Washington dismissed the ASEAN meetings as talk shops that did not aim for
specific outcomes.
• After the Clinton intervention in 2010, the ASEAN forums have not been the same. The
US secretary of state and the president have made annual diplomatic pilgrimages to the
ASEAN and the East Asia Summit, and have actively shaped the results.
• In 2011, China found itself isolated by US activism on the South China Sea issue.
• In 2012, China hit back. Working with Cambodia, China's strong ally that chaired the
meetings during 2012-13, Beijing successfully divided the ASEAN members. For the
first time in its history, the ASEAN ended without an agreed statement, revealing the
deepening differences within the forum on how to deal with China's rising power and
assertiveness in the South China Sea.
• In the Chinese media, Kerry has been projected as a vast improvement over Clinton, who
was seen as confrontational and is accused of mobilising the ASEAN against China.
Many others in the region are worried for the same reason. They suspect that the new
secretary of state might be soft on China and less interested in the pivot to Asia than his
predecessor.

Fiscal Cliff
The term “fiscal cliff” has been coined to describe several big fiscal events set to occur in the
U.S. at the end of this year and in early 2013. Among them:
U.S. at the end of this year and in early 2013. Among them:
• The expiration of the Bush-era tax cuts at the end of 2012, including current lower tax
rates on capital gains, dividends, income, and estates, as well as number of other
measures.
• The expiration of fiscal stimulus measures, such as the payroll tax cut and extended
unemployment benefits.
• Spending cuts scheduled to be triggered automatically in January 2013 as a result of the
failure of the deficit reduction super committee last year.
Impact:
• if allowed to fullytake hold, their combined impact would rekindle a recession
• The nation would lose up to 3.4million job
• budget cuts ofeight per cent or nine percent would hit most of thefederal government.
• And ifthe limit isn’t raised on howmuch the government canborrow, the government’s
reaching the $16.4- trillion ceiling in February or Marchcould lead to a first-ever default
that would shake world-wide confidence in theUnited States

Final deal (American TaxpayerRelief Act of 2012):

• Taxrates would jump to 39.6 percent from 35 per cent for individual incomes more
than$400,000 and couples morethan $450,000
• Tax deductions and credits wouldstart to be phased out on incomes as low as $250,000.
Reinstateprovisions to tax law, endedby the Bush tax cuts of 2001 that phase out personal
ex-emptions and deductions forthe affluent. Those phaseouts, underthe agreement, would
beginat $250,000 for single peopleand $300,000 for couples.
• Tax rates ondividends and capital gainswould also rise, to 20 from 15per cent.
• The value of estates morethan $5 million would betaxed at 40 percent, up fromthe current
35 percent.
• A full year’s extensionof unemployment insurancewithout strings attached andwithout
offsetting spendingcuts, a $30 billion cost.
• agreed toput off $110 billion in across-the-board cuts to militaryand domestic programs
fortwo months while broaderdeficit reduction talks continue.

Reinvigorating ties with Pak

• The U.S. State Department has determined that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) and two of its former director generals have immunity from prosecution in case filed
 (ISI) and two of its former director generals have immunity from prosecution in case filed
in New York by the families of American victims of the2008 Mumbai attacks (Dec,
2012)
• The legal argument forwarded says the ISI is a “fundamental part” of the Pakistani
government and therefore comes under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. For good
measure, the statement ruled out any “exceptions” or “judicial review” of the decision.
• The U.S. Administration has lately gone into high gear to repair relations with Pakistan,
the same country its senior officials were implicating in major terrorist attacks over the
last three years.
• What has changed are American objectives — from defeating the Taliban to making
peace with them, from forcing Pakistan to behave as a responsible stakeholder to
appeasing its generals in the larger pursuit of bringing U.S. troops safely back home by
2014.
• The Obama Administration has been quietly shifting policy priorities over the year,
starting with its decision in September to issue a waiver for Pakistan without so much as
a credible explanation to allow $2billion in military aid to flow. They are into
negotiations for arms sell.
• Washington has also watched approvingly Pakistan’s engagement with Afghanistan,
which cuts India out
H1B spouses to work
In a rare move that flies in the face of anti-immigrant rhetoric in some corners of the U.S. the
Department of Homeland Security announced in recent weeks that it was proposing to provide
employment authorisation to H-4 visa holders, who are spouse-dependents of principal H-1B
“non-immigrant” visa holders.It planned to extend employment authorisation only to those
within the H4 population who “have begun the process of seeking lawful permanent resident
status through employment and have extended their authorised period of admission. “The Hindu”
spotlighted the debilitating personal circumstances faced by many “H4s.” These included
depression, loss of enthusiasm and self-esteem associated with joblessness and social isolation,
in numerous cases leading to mental health issues or familial breakdown.The proposed rules
granting employment rights to some H4 visa holders were also “intended to mitigate some of the
negative economic effects of limiting H-1B households to one income during lengthy waiting
periods in the adjustment of status process. While opposition to reform (liberalizing visa regime)
has primarily been rooted in concerns over further loss in American jobs to new immigrants,
proponents have made the case that fewer work restrictions for H-4 dependent spouses, for
example, might encourage “professionals with high demand skills to remain in the country and
help spur the innovation and growth of U.S. companies,

Magnitsky Act
• Shortly before the New Year, U.S. President Barack Obama signed in-to law a bill that
blacklists Russian officials allegedly implicated in the death of Russian lawyer Sergei
Magnitsky and in the “gross violations of human rights.” The 37-year-old lawyer, in
2009, died in a Russian prison where he was sent to by some Interior Ministry officials
after blowing the whistle on their multi-million tax scam.
• Russia hit back by adopting an “anti-Magnitsky” law that not only mirrored American
sanctions but also banned U.S. adoptions of Russian orphans.
• Apart from out-lawing U.S. adoptions, the Bill allows Russian authorities to ban
“politically-active” non-govern-mental organisations (NGO) that receive American funds
or engage in activities that “represent a threat to the interests of the Russian Federation.”
It also bars Russians who also have dual Russian-American citizenship from participating
in political NGOs. Mr. Putin thereby sought to kill two birds with one stone: strike a blow
against his foes and boost popularity among his conservative constituency by stoking
anti-Americanism.
• Despite Russia’s anger, its response to the Magnitsky Act was largely a symbolic gesture
that did not really hurt U.S. interests. Hardly any American officials will be harmed by
 that did not really hurt U.S. interests. Hardly any American officials will be harmed by
not being able to travel to Russia or keep their money in a Russian bank. Analysts were
quick to note that if Mr. Putin really wanted to hit the U.S. where it hurts he could have
imposed restrictions on American companies in Russia or shut off U.S. logistics lifelines
to Afghanistan that run through Russia.
• It is for the first time in the history of their relations that Russia/the Soviet Union and the
U.S. have resorted to blacklisting each other’s citizens on the basis of their human rights
record. The U.S. sanctions and the Russian retaliation badly poisoned the air between the
two countries.
• Critics said that for tens of thousands of Russian disabled orphans, foreign adoption was
the only chance to find a family. Russians almost never adopt such children as they need
expensive treatment and rehabilita-tion that are not available in Russia for free. It has
hardened Mr. Putin’s image in the West as a cruel and vindictive autocrat.

Reset with Russia

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has announced an end to ‘reset’ in Russian-American
relations, while also acknowledging its positive impact. The ‘reset’ has improved the
“atmosphere” between the two countries, he said, noting such achievements as a new nuclear
arms control treaty; a 1-2-3 agreement on civil nuclear cooperation; and simplified visa rules.
The two countries are still at odds over the U.S. missile defence plans, which remain the main
stumbling block in their relations. While paying lip service to dialogue, the Americans keep
building up a global missile shield “without paying any consideration” for Russian objections, he
said. Russia is also at odds with the U.S. over the conflict in Syria and Iran’s nuclear programme.
The West is “encouraging” the Syrian opposition to continue the fighting and “providing them
with everything that is needed for the fight”. In addition, new “irritants” have emerged, such as
the “odious” U.S. Magnitsky Act adopted in December, which blacklists Russian officials
accused of human rights violations. Russia hit back imposing similar sanctions on American
rights abusers and banning adoptions of Russian orphans by Americans.

Pakistan
The US-Pakistan relationship is at best cyclical — a crisis-generating strategic convergence of
views and tactical divergence that normally gets reconfigured, in a matter of six to seven years,
in to strategic divergence and tactical convergence.
Both were at loggerheads in 2011-12 on issues of CIA operator Raymond Davis’ killing of two
ISI shadowers, incarceration of doctor who helped US in raid on Oama’s hideout, transit fees for
using the Ground Lines of Communication (NATO supply lines) that run from Karachi to
Afghanistan and killing of 24 Pakistan Soldiers in an US stack in Salala region etc. It was only
after Hillary Clinton “apologized” for the attack that ties were restored and GLOC opened for
NATO.

China
Washington's China policy has been swinging back and forth between two strategic perspectives.
• One focuses on direct bilateral engagement with China. Advocates of this perspective
believe that Washington can better manage China's rise and build a more productive
relationship by deepening bilateral relations. This perspective held the sway over
Washington's China policy in the second half of George W. Bush's administration and the
first year of Obama's presidency. The policy manifestations of this perspective were an
accommodative stance on a wide range of bilateral issues (from human rights to trade)
and the creation of high-level channels of exchange (such as the US-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue) denied even to America's closest allies. Yet, accommodation has
yielded disappointing results for Washington. Beijing has not reciprocated enough.
• At its core, the second perspective reflects a more realist view of China. Its advocates
strengthening America's relations with its allies and with China's neighbours fearful
of Beijing's power. The thinking behind this perspective is that this indirect approach is
less costly (since the US can leverage the power and influence of China's neighbours),
 less costly (since the US can leverage the power and influence of China's neighbours),
less confrontational (as the US can form a united front and avoid being seen as picking on
China unilaterally), and more effective (because fears of isolation would give Chinese
leaders incentives to be more cooperative). The ultimate goal of those advocating the
second perspective, it is worth repeating, is not to contain or confront China, but to make
it behave cooperatively or pay a much higher cost.
Washington's recent moves in East Asia suggest that this perspective is now guiding America's
China policy. Washington needs to be careful not to abandon the first perspective altogether. The
most effective approach is a policy that strikes the right balance between both perspectives since
they are not mutually exclusive. The smartest thing for China to do, it seems, is to exercise
strategic restraint and adopt a new Asia policy that will both address its neighbours' fears of
Chinese power and make its ties with the US more cooperative and less competitive.
Scramble to save C. African Republic
BANGUI (CENTRAL AFRICAN RE-
PUBLIC): More regional troops
on Thursday headed to help
secure the capital of the Cen-
tral African Republic in the
face of a rebel advance, as
France said it would not in-
tervene in its former colony’s
conflict.
“Bangui is fully secured by
the troops” of The Multina-
tional Force of Central Africa
(Fomac) central African mil-
itary force, said its command-
er, General Jean-Felix Akaga
on national radio.
“Others will arrive to help
reinforce this mission of se-
curing Bangui,” he added.
The U.N. said it was pulling
out non-essential staff from
the country where a rebel
coalition called Seleka has
seized four major regional
capitals in less than a month,
of protesters at the French
embassy in Bangui demanded
Paris do more to stem the re-
bels’ momentum.
Dialogue plea
Since the end of colonisa-
tion in the 1960s, French
troops in western Africa have
often come to the help of for-
mer colonies whose regimes
were on the verge of being
toppled. The government in
Bangui on Wednesday urged
France to help facilitate a dia-
logue with the rebels.
The rebels began their
push in early December,
and the U.S. urged its nation- charging that President Fran-
als to leave.
leave cois Bozize — who seized
French President Francois power in a coup in 2003 —
Hollande said it would not and his government haven’t
use the troops it has in the abided by terms of peace
country to interfere in the deals signed between 2007
conflict, a day after hundreds and 2011. — AFP
Bid to bring CAR rebels to talks
talk
Aman Sethi
ADDIS ABABA: The African
Union (A.U.) is prepared to
deploy troops in the Central
African Republic (CAR) if all
efforts to stabilise the former
French colony fail, said A.U.
Peace and Security Commis-
sioner Ramtane Lamamra at
a press conference on Friday.
Earlier this month, rebels or-
ganised under the banner of
the Sekele Coalition ad-
vanced on Bangui, the capital
of CAR, to overthrow Presi-
dent Francois Bozize, a mil-
itary officer who seized
power in 2003 and has since
been elected President in
2005 and 2011.
On Thursday, Mr. Bozize
called on the U.S. and France
to provide military assistance
to shore up his besieged gov-
ernment. France had already
turned down the appeal.
“If we have a presence, it’s
not to protect a regime,” said
French President Francois
Hollande, in a statement to
Euronews, on Thursday.
“It is to protect our nation-
als and our interests and in no
way to intervene in the in-
ternal business of a country,
in this case the Central Afri-
can Republic, those days are
over.”
On Friday, in Addis Ababa,
Mr. Lamamra said a meeting
of regional Foreign Ministers
was under way in Libreville,
capital of Gabon, and efforts
were being made to bring the
rebels to the negotiating ta-
ble. “Our preferred option,
obviously, is for the political
dialogue to succeed,” he said,
pointing out that peacekeep-
ers from the Economic Com-
munity of Central African
States [Eccas] were already
deployed in the country.
One of Africa’s poorest and
least developed countries,
CAR has been in turmoil
since its independence from
France in 1960.
Rebel coalition
Most recently, in 2003, a
rebel coalition, called the
Union of Democratic Force of
Unity (UFDR), opposed Pres-
ident Francois Bozize’s sei-
zure of power, prompting an
internal war. In 2007, the re-
bels and government signed a
peace deal granting amnesty
for the UFDR and the integra-
tion of former rebels into the
national armed forces.
The current conflict has its
roots in the 2007 deal, with
rebels contending that Mr.
Bozize has failed to imple-
ment key provisions of the
peace agreement, particularly
the integration of fighters in-
to the national army.
“This is not a new crisis,”
said Mr. Lamamra, “There
are a number of agreements
that were undertaken to im-
plement the agreements.
Now there are shortcomings,
there are problems of re-
sources when it comes to in-
tegrating armed elements
into armed forces but that
doesn’t justify the resort to
violence.”
A joint delegation of Eccas
and the A.U. is expected to
meet the rebel leaders on Fri-
day to convince them to cre-
ate an empowered delegation
to negotiate a resolution to
the conflict.
Seleka rebels seize CAR capital
President flees ahead of presidential palace being taken over
BANGUI: Central African Re-
public’s President Francois
Bozize fled the capital early
on Sunday, hours after hun-
dreds of armed rebels threat-
ening to overthrow him
invaded the city, an adviser
said.
The rebel alliance, known
as Seleka, issued a statement
referring to Mr. Bozize as the
country’s ‘former President’.
“Central African Republic
has just opened a new page in
history,” said the commu-
its history,
niqué, signed by Justin Kom-
bo Moustapha,
secretary-general of Seleka.
The rebels had reached the
outskirts of Bangui late on
Saturday. Heavy gunfire
echoed through the city on
Sunday as the fighters made
their way into the heart of
downtown and seized the
presidential palace, though
the country’s leader of a dec-
ade was not there at the time.
“Bozize left the city this
morning,” said a member of
Mr. Bozize’s presidential ma-
jority. The adviser declined to
say where the President had Seleka rebel coalition members take up positions in a village near Damara in the Central African Republic
gone. in this January 10 photo.— PHOTO: AFP
Rebels from several armed
groups that have long op- vance for peace negotiations expires in 2016, but the rebels country’s military and inte- towns and threatening to ad-
posed Mr. Bozize joined in Libreville, the capital of soon began accusing the Pres- grate some 2,000 rebel fight- vance on the capital.
forces in December and be- Gabon. ident of failing to fulfil prom- ers into the armed forces. An unspecified number of
gan seizing towns across the A peace deal was signed on ises. They demanded that Mr. The deal unravelled more French citizens have taken
country’s sparsely populated January 11 that allowed Mr. Bozize send home South Afri- than a week ago, with the re- refuge in the French Embas-
north but halted their ad- Bozize to finish his term that can forces bolstering the bels taking control of two sy.— AFP
Colombo Plan 1

Colombo Plan

Colombo Plan
(for Cooperative Economic and Social
 Development in Asia and the Pacific)

Current (blue) and former (yellow) members of the Colombo Plan.

Headquarters Colombo, Sri Lanka

Official languages English

Type Economic forum

Member countries

Leaders

 -  Secretary-General Adam Maniku

Establishment

 -  Establishment
a 28 November 1950 

 -  Commencement 1 July 1951 

Website
http:/ / www. colombo-plan. org/

a. As the "Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia".

The Colombo Plan is a regional organization that embodies the concept of collective inter-governmental effort to
strengthen economic and social development of member countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The primary focus of
all Colombo Plan activities is on human resources development.

History
In the Spring 1949, the Indian Ambassador to China, Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, proposed a multilateral fund to
the British and Australian ambassadors, in order to help the states of southeast Asia to battle communist movements
in their countries. The United States was to be by far the largest contributor of aid to the organization.
Formally, the organization was born out of a Commonwealth Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Colombo, Sri
Lanka, in January 1950. At this meeting, a plan was established to provide a framework within which international
cooperation efforts could be promoted to raise the standards of people in the region. Originally conceived as lasting
for a period of six years, the Colombo Plan was extended several times until 1980, when it was extended
indefinitely. Initially it was called the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast
Asia. It has grown from a group of seven Commonwealth nations - Australia, Britain, Canada, Ceylon, India, New
Zealand and Pakistan - into an international organization of 27, including non-Commonwealth countries. When it
Colombo Plan 2

adopted a new constitution in 1977, its name was changed to "The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and
Social Development in Asia and the Pacific" to reflect the expanded composition of its enhanced membership and
the scope of its activities.
In the early years, Colombo Plan assistance from developed to developing countries comprised both transfer of
physical capital and technology as well as a strong component of skills development. Hence, while infrastructure by
way of airports, roads, railways, dams, hospitals, fertilizer plants, cement factories, universities, and steel mills were
constructed in member countries through Colombo Plan assistance, a large number of people were simultaneously
trained to manage such infrastructure and the growing economies.

Purpose
The Colombo Plan is not intended as an integrated master plan to which national plans were expected to conform. It
is, instead, a framework for bi-lateral arrangements involving foreign aid and technical assistance for the economic
and social development of the region.

Objectives
• To promote interest in and support for the economic and social development of Asia and the Pacific;
• To promote technical cooperation and assist in the sharing and transfer of technology among member countries;
• To keep under review relevant information on technical cooperation between the member governments,
multilateral and other agencies with a view to accelerating development through cooperative effort;
• To facilitate the transfer and sharing of the developmental experiences among member countries within the region
with emphasis on the concept of South-South cooperation.

Organizational structure
The principal organs of the Colombo Plan are - the Consultative Committee, the Council and the Secretariat.
Administrative costs of the Council and Secretariat are borne equally by the 25 member countries.
• The Consultative Committee (CCM), comprises all member governments and is the highest review and policy
making body of the Colombo Plan. Its biennial meetings provide a forum for the exchange of views on current
development problems facing member countries and review the work of the Colombo Plan in economic and social
development within the region.
• The Colombo Plan Council, comprises heads of diplomatic missions of member governments who are resident in
Colombo, Sri Lanka. The President of the Council is nominated from among member countries annually on an
alphabetical rotational basis. The Council meets every quarterly to identify important development issues facing
its members and ensure the smooth implementation of the Consultative Committee's decisions.
• The Colombo Plan Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General is located in Colombo, Sri Lanka, since 1951 and
functions as the secretariat for the Consultative Committee and the Council. The Secretariat is responsible for the
effective administration and implementation of the programmes of the Colombo Plan, in partnership with member
countries and collaborating agencies.

Funding
A special characteristic of the Colombo Plan is that the administrative costs of the Council and the Secretariat are
borne equally by all member countries. However, the training programmes of the Colombo Plan are voluntarily
funded by traditional as well as newly emerging donors among its member countries. Developing member countries
are also encouraged to meet local currency costs whenever training programmes are held in their respective
countries. The Colombo Plan training programmes are also funded by contributions from non-member governments
and regional/international organizations.
Colombo Plan 3

In a speech made in Colombo on 5 July 2010, the 20th Secretary-General Dato' Patricia Yoon-Moi Chia said: "The
gearing up of the level of our activities is made possible through the voluntary contributions of member countries
and international agencies such as OPEC fund. Last year our programming was over US$10 million and we expect a
more than US$12 million programming this year with almost another US$2 million in terms of cost-sharing from our
member countries. With funding from the United States Government and 13 other member countries, the Colombo
Plan is now the biggest stakeholder in drug demand reduction in the Asia-Pacific, with a special initiative in
Afghanistan."[1]

Programmes
The Colombo Plan has 4 permanent programmes:
• Programme for Public Administration & Environment (PPA & ENV)
• Programme for Private Sector Development (PPSD)
• Drug Advisory Programme (DAP)
• Long-Term Scholarships Programme (LTSP)

The Plan now

Over the years, while adhering to the concept of human resource development and South-South cooperation in
addressing issues of economic and social development, the programme content of the Colombo Plan has been
changing to take account of the needs of member countries in a fast changing world economic environment. In the
early years, the training programmes were more of a long-term nature, while recent programmes have been focusing
on providing advance skills and experience sharing aimed at arriving at the best practices in different fields of
economic and social activities as a means of good policy making and governance. The current programmes of the
Colombo Plan are in the areas of public policy formulation in an environment of globalisation and market economy,
private sector development as a prime mover for growth and in drug abuse prevention and treatment in member
countries. The Colombo Plan also provides skill development opportunities for technicians in middle level through
another of its programmes the Colombo Plan Staff College for Technician Education located in Manila.
In her 2010 speech, Dato' Patricia Yoon-Moi Chia states: "The current Colombo Plan looks very different since our
restructuring and revitalization in 1995. As we continue to build upon our past successes, the new Colombo Plan
uses cooperation among developing member countries or South-south cooperation between the developed member
countries and developing member countries, to underpin all our activities. Since our restructuring in 1995, we have
now provided 16,082 scholarships to 23 member countries for both long-term and short-term training programmes."

Past Secretary Generals

The Colombo Plan underwent an organizational transformation and renewal in 1995, and the Colombo Plan Bureau
became the Colombo Plan Secretariat to be headed by the Secretary-General, instead of a Director. The first
Secretary-General was Dr. Kim Hak-su from Korea (January 1995 – March 1999) who was succeeded by Dr. Sarat
Chandran, India (April 1999 – June 2003), Mr. Kittipan Kanjanapitkul from Thailand (June 2003 – August 2007)
and Dato’ Patricia Yoon-Moi Chia from Malaysia (August 2007 - August 2011), the first Asian woman to hold this
position. The incumbent Secretary-General, Mr. Adam Maniku from Maldives assumed duties on 15 August 2011 as
the 21st head of the Organization.
Colombo Plan 4

Colombo Plan scholars

• Dr. Baburam Bhattarai (Nepal),Former Prime Minister of Nepal.
• Khaw Boon Wan (Singapore), current Minister for National Development in Singapore.
• Raymond Lim (Singapore), former Cabinet Minister in Singapore.
• Yeo Cheow Tong (Singapore), former Cabinet Minister in Singapore.
• Dato' Hajji Abdul Ghani Bin Othman (Malaysia), former Chief Minister of Johor state in Malaysia.
• Tan Sri Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan (Malaysia), Deputy Chief Minister and Minister of Rural
Development of Sabah.
• Dr. K.V. Thiruvengadam (India), Indian physician and medical teacher.
• Mapatunage James "M. J." Perera (Sri Lanka), he made broadcasting history by being the first Ceylonese Director
General of Radio Ceylon, the oldest radio station in South Asia, taking over the helm from John Lampson of the
BBC.
• Livy Wijemanne (Sri Lanka), pioneer of Radio Ceylon.

Early criticism
The Plan has been criticized on various grounds. Some Asians see in it only the hand of British imperialism,
especially as it is not aimed at developing national self-sufficiency. It offers an almost exclusively economic solution
for problems which are also political and social. Dangerous issues such as landlordism and the organization of
labour, which invite Communist exploitation, are barely touched on, doubtless because it seemed politically
inexpedient to raise such questions.[2]

Present members
The Colombo Plan currently has 27 members, including countries in the Asia-Pacific region, non-Commonwealth
countries and countries belonging to regional groupings such as ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations)
and SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation).

Member economy Date of accession

 Afghanistan 1963

 Australia 1950

 Bangladesh 1972

 Bhutan 1962

 Brunei 2008

 Fiji 1972

 India 1950

 Indonesia 1953

 Iran 1966

 Japan 1954

 South Korea 1962

 Laos 1951

 Malaysia 1957

 Maldives 1963

 Mongolia 2004

 Myanmar 1952
Colombo Plan 5

   Nepal 1952

 New Zealand 1950

 Pakistan 1950

 Papua New Guinea 1973

 Philippines 1954

 Saudi Arabia [3]

2012

 Singapore 1966

 Sri Lanka 1950

 Thailand 1954

 United States 1951

 Vietnam 2004

Past members
There have been four Past members of the Colombo Plan including two founding members in 1950, Canada and the
United Kingdom. South Vietnam joined in 1951 and on 2 Jul 1976 was succeeded by Socialist Republic of Vietnam
which withdrew 1978. Vietnam was a provisional member from 5 Nov 2001 to 18 Nov 2003 until it was accepted in
2004.

Member economy Date of accession Date of deposition

 Canada 1950 1992

 United Kingdom 1950 1991

 Cambodia 1951 2004

 South Vietnam 1951 1975

References
[1] Welcome speech by Dato' Patricia Yoon-Moi (http:/ / www. colombo-plan. org/ colombo-plan_sitearchives/ resources/ speeches/
59Anniversary_05072010. pdf), Colombo, 5 July 2010.
[2] Blackton, Charles S., The Colombo Plan (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ pss/ 3024398), Far Eastern Survey, 7 February 1951.
[3] http:/ / www. colombo-plan. org/ index. php/ kingdom-of-saudi-arabia-joined-the-colombo-plan/

External links
• Colombo Plan - Official Site (http://www.colombo-plan.org)
• International Organizations - The Colombo Plan (http://www.worldstatesmen.org/International_Organizations.
html#Colombo)
Article Sources and Contributors 6

Article Sources and Contributors

Colombo Plan  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=566827841  Contributors: Alansohn, AnakngAraw, AvicAWB, Blackknight12, CJ, Chanakal, Colomboplansecretariat,
Colonies Chris, DBSSURFER, Dfrg.msc, Dichen Di Dicden, DieNormativität, Diglibs2, Dinakarr, Doakman, DoctorKubla, Docu, Gadren, Glane23, GoingBatty, Groucho NL, Hermógenes
Teixeira Pinto Filho, InverseHypercube, Iridescent, Jackiespeel, Javert, Johnpacklambert, Juvenile96, Kanags, Kirti 1102, Krkknows, Le Anh-Huy, Me...™ , Mkill, Mr.Clown, NerdyNSK,
Pegship, Plinth molecular gathered, Pumpernickle Pickle, Riana, Shrigley, Speedboy Salesman, Tejaskr, The Illusive Man, Thelegend2101, Tim!, Tristanb, Wandering Ghost, Whitepaw, 77
anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

File:ColomboPlanMemberspluspast.png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:ColomboPlanMemberspluspast.png  License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0  Contributors:
User:NerdyNSK
File:Flag of Sri Lanka.svg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_Sri_Lanka.svg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Zscout370
File:Flag of Maldives.svg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_Maldives.svg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: user:Nightstallion
File:Flag of Afghanistan.svg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_Afghanistan.svg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: User:Zscout370
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 1615 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20062
Tel: 202-463-5679 Fax: 202-463-3173
usibc@uschamber.com Web: www.usibc.com

U.S.-India Investment Treaty

An investment treaty between India and the U.S. would provide protection to U.S. investors
from arbitrary, discriminatory or confiscatory Indian government measures, enforceable by recourse to
independent international arbitration. Such a treaty could help facilitate additional investment in
infrastructure and other areas in India where investment is badly needed and would provide protections
to Indian companies as they expand investments in the U.S.

Key Elements of an Investment Treaty

In a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), governments commit to protect investments in their

territory by the other country’s nationals.

Substantive Protection. A typical BIT assures foreign investors:

• No Discrimination. BITs usually assure both National Treatment and Most-Favored Nation
(MFN) treatment (i.e., a foreign investor will be treated no less favorably than investors from the
host country, or from third countries)
• Fair and Equitable Treatment. A foreign investor will be protected against arbitrary, unfair, or
inequitable treatment, under international law standards, and often be assured of full protection
and security for its investments.
• No Expropriation Without Due Process and Full Compensation. Expropriation of investments will be
prohibited, except under due process of law, and accompanied by full compensation. This
usually includes indirect expropriation, by measures “tantamount to expropriation.”
• Additional Protections. Investment treaties also may include prohibitions on performance
requirements (i.e., investments conditioned on domestic content or export performance);
protection of financial transfers; freedom to staff the investment; transparency undertakings; and
other protections.

Arbitration of Investor Claims. In a BIT, the host state usually agrees to submit a foreign investor’s
claim of a treaty violation to arbitration before an independent, ad-hoc tribunal. The arbitral award will
be binding, subject to very limited review, and enforceable under treaty.

Benefits of an Investment Treaty

The primary benefit to U.S. industry would be the availability of independent investor-state
arbitration as a recourse against expropriatory, discriminatory, or other arbitrary government measures
that impair U.S. investment. European companies currently enjoy this protection as a result of existing
BITs between India and their host states. U.S. companies lack this safeguard and have limited legal
remedies when facing high-profile disputes in infrastructure projects and other large investments
(although U.S. investments structured through Mauritius have the benefit of the India-Mauritius
investment treaty). An investment protection agreement also would provide U.S. investors with a more
secure, stable, and predictable environment for investment by incorporating well-established substantive
legal protections typically found in the more than 2,000 existing bilateral investment agreements.

A bilateral investment agreement would have benefits for India as well, in part because it would
promote in-bound investment by giving U.S. investors more confidence in the stability and predictability
of the investment environment in India. We understand that Finance Minster Chidambaram is

Information Brief Page 1 of 2

 1615 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20062
Tel: 202-463-5679 Fax: 202-463-3173
usibc@uschamber.com Web: www.usibc.com

interested in a U.S.-India BIT, as it would provide protection for Indian companies as they expand their
investments in the U.S.

Pursuit of an investment protection instrument could also serve as a building block for a more
comprehensive free trade relationship. The process could build confidence among U.S. interests,
including the Congress, of a more liberalized environment in India and a greater readiness by India to
proceed with trade liberalization, within a framework of legally binding international commitments.

U.S. Procedures for a BIT

A BIT will follow standard treaty-making procedure. Once there is high-level mandate to pursue
an agreement, the U.S. Government, led by the Department of State and USTR, would negotiate a text
(based on important input from the private sector, such as from USIBC). The investment treaty does
not enter into force, however, until it is ratified by the Senate by a two-thirds vote. The ratification
process for a BIT is far easier than for a Free Trade Agreement, which requires approval by both the
Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, where there is greater skepticism about investment and
trade agreements.

The U.S. has negotiated 47 BITs, 40 of which are currently in force. In addition to these stand-
alone agreements, the U.S. also has 9 Free Trade Agreements in force with a total of 14 partner
countries. Most of these FTAs contain investment protection provisions similar to those provided for in
a BIT.

Difference in U.S. and Indian Approaches to BITs

India has signed BITs with 61 countries, including all major European countries and recently
concluded BIT negotiations with Canada (which has adopted a model BIT similar to that of the United
States). While the U.S. and Indian investment treaties share the same fundamental features, there are
some differences in the approaches adopted by India and the U.S.

The most important difference and most sensitive to resolve relates to pre-investment
protection. The U.S. has extended BIT protection to pre-establishment investments – e.g., protection
against discrimination based on nationality with respect to investment activities before the investment
has been made in the other country. This has the effect of committing the governments to provide
market access (i.e., to open the market to foreign investment) unless specific sectors are excepted. India,
on the other hand, has in past agreements maintained the freedom to place pre-establishment conditions
on the right to invest in its territory and has not extended market access. India also has not included
prohibitions on performance requirements. In general, the post-2004 U.S. negotiating model for a BIT
(based on the NAFTA) is more detailed and contains a number of provisions not included in the more
traditional BIT model India uses, such as transparency requirements and protection of labor and
environment regulation (which are more hortatory and not enforceable by investors). The provisions
relating to intellectual property and financial services are somewhat different as well.

However, it would not appear too difficult to resolve these differences, with the exception of the
pre-investment issue and perhaps the limited labor and environment provisions. Further, these
differences should not obscure the large underlying commonality between the practice of the U.S. and
India on the basic, core aspects of a BIT – such as assuring foreign investments national and MFN
treatment; fair and equitable treatment; and protection against expropriation, as well as providing for
binding international arbitration of disputes between a foreign investor and host state.

Information Brief Page 2 of 2

Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War 1

Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War

Indian Intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War
Part of the Sri Lankan civil war

Date 1987 - 24 March 1990

Location Sri Lanka

Result Withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka, Civil war continues. Tactical victory for Government of Sri Lanka.

Belligerents
Indian Peace Keeping Force Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
 Sri Lanka

Commanders and leaders

R. Venkataraman Velupillai Prabhakaran
Rajiv Gandhi
V P Singh
Maj.Gen. Harkirat Singh
Maj.Gen. Ashok K. Mehta

Casualties and losses

IPKF: 1,000+ killed LTTE: 8000+ killed
Sri Lanka: 26 Killed ; 578 Wounded

The Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War was the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in
Sri Lanka intended to perform a peacekeeping role. The deployment followed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord between
India and Sri Lanka of 1987 which was intended to end the Sri Lankan Civil War between militant Sri Lankan Tamil
nationalists, principally the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Sri Lankan military.
The original intention was the Indian Peace Keeping Force would not be involved in large scale military operations.
However, after a few months, the Indian Peace Keeping Force engaged the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in a
series of battles. During the two years in which it was deployed, the IPKF fought numerous battles against the LTTE.
The IPKF began withdrawing in 1989, and completed the withdrawal in 1990.

Background
The LTTE and other Tamil militant groups developed strong relationships with political parties in South India, such
as Dravidar Kazhagam (led by K. Veeramani), Kamaraj Congress (led by Nedumaran) and Pure Tamil Movement
(led by Perunchithiranar) during late 1970s.[] These Tamil parties firmly backed the militants' cause of creating a
separate Tamil Eelam within Sri Lanka. Thereafter, LTTE developed relations with M. G. Ramachandran and M.
Karunanidhi, who served as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, succeeding one another.
Although Sri Lanka was a key member of Non-Aligned Movement in its initial stages, the Government of Sri
Lanka's policies became pro-western as J. R. Jayewardene was elected prime minister with his landslide victory in
1977 parliamentary election. Subsequently he introduced a new constitution and Open economy to Sri Lanka. Sri
Lanka is the first South-Asian country to adopt Liberal open economy.[1]
Moreover, President J. R. Jayawardene did not enjoy the same warm relationship with Indian Premier Indira Gandhi
[]
that he had enjoyed with her father, Premier Jawaharlal Nehru. Thus, with the outbreak of Black July ethnic riots,
the Indian government decided to support the insurgent groups operating in Northern Sri Lanka.[citation needed]
Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War 2

Operation Poomalai
India became more actively involved in the late 1980s, and on June 5, 1987, the Indian Air Force airdropped food
parcels to Jaffna while it was under siege by Sri Lankan forces. At a time when the Sri Lankan government stated
they were close to defeating the LTTE, India dropped 25 tons of food and medicine by parachute into areas held by
the LTTE in a direct move of support toward the rebels.[2] Negotiations were held, and the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace
Accord was signed on July 29, 1987, by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene.
Under this accord, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, including a
devolution of power to the provinces, a merger—subject to later referendum—of the Northern and the Eastern
provinces into the single province, and official status for the Tamil language (this was enacted as the 13th
Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka). India agreed to establish order in the North and East through a force
dubbed the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), and to cease assisting Tamil insurgents. Militant groups including
the LTTE, although initially reluctant, agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF, which initially oversaw a
cease-fire and a modest disarmament of the militant groups.
The signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord, so soon after JR Jayawardene's declaration that he would fight the Indians to
the last bullet, led to unrest in south. The arrival of the IPKF to take over control of most areas in the North of the
country enabled the Sri Lanka government to shift its forces to the south (in Indian aircraft) to quell the protests. This
led to an uprising by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in the south, which was put down bloodily over the next two
years.

Conflict with the LTTE

While most Tamil militant groups laid down their weapons and agreed to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict, the
LTTE refused to disarm its fighters.[] Keen to ensure the success of the accord, the IPKF then tried to demobilize the
LTTE by force and ended up in full-scale conflict with them. The three-year-long conflict was also marked by the
IPKF being accused of committing various abuses of human rights by many human rights groups as well as some
[3][4]
within the Indian media. The IPKF also soon met stiff opposition from the Tamils.

Operation Pawan
Operation Pawan was the codename assigned to the operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force to take control of
Jaffna from the LTTE in late 1987 to enforce the disarmament of the LTTE as a part of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord.
In brutal fighting that took about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE rule,
something that the Sri Lankan army had then tried and failed to achieve for several years. Supported by Indian Army
tanks, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery, the IPKF routed the LTTE. But this victory came at a price, as the
IPKF lost around 214 soldiers.[5]

The Jaffna University Helidrop

The Jaffna University Helidrop was the first of the operations launched by the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF)
aimed at disarming the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) by force and securing the town of Jaffna, Sri Lanka, in the opening
stages of Operation Pawan during the active Indian mediation in the Sri Lankan Civil War. Mounted on the midnight
of 12 October 1987, the operation was planned as a fast heliborne assault involving Mi-8s of the No.109 HU, the
10th Para Commandos and a contingent of the 13th Sikh LI. The aim of the operation was to capture the LTTE
leadership at Jaffna University building which served as the Tactical Headquarters of the LTTE, which was expected
to shorten Operation Pawan, the battle for Jaffna. However, the operation ended disastrously, failing to capture its
objectives -owing to intelligence and planning failures. The helidropped force suffered significant casualties, with
nearly the entire Sikh LI detachment of twenty nine troops falling to a man, along with six Paracommandos falling in
battle.
Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War 3

References
[3] Balasingham, Adele. (2003) The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance. Fairmax Publishing Ltd, 2nd ed. ISBN
1-903679-03-6.
[4] NorthEast Secretariat report on Human rights 1974 - 2004 (see Further Reading section).
[5] Operation Pawan. The Battle for Jaffna (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ LAND-FORCES/ Army/ History/ 1987/ Chapter03. html)

Further reading
• Gunaratna, Rohan. (1997). International & Regional Security Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency,
AABC for International Studies. ISBN 955-95060-0-5
• Gunaratna, Rohan. (1998). Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security, Colombo: South Asian Network on
Conflict Research. ISBN 955-8093-00-9
• Gunaratna, Rohan. (October 1, 1987). War and Peace in Sri Lanka: With a Post-Accord Report From Jaffna, Sri
Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies. ISBN 955-8093-00-9
Article Sources and Contributors 4

Article Sources and Contributors

Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=570778733  Contributors: Astronomyinertia, Axeman89, Blackknight12, Bluerocks777,
Charles Essie, Frietjes, Gfosankar, Hammersoft, Khazar2, KplFlUSA, Mark Arsten, Noren, Obi2canibe, PhilKnight, Placelimit, Shyamsunder, Tamil23, TheOriginalSoni, Tpbradbury, Δ, 23
anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

File:Flag of India.svg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_India.svg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Anomie, Mifter
File:Flag of Sri Lanka.svg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_Sri_Lanka.svg  License: Public Domain  Contributors: Zscout370
File:Flag of Tamil Eelam.svg  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_Tamil_Eelam.svg  License: Creative Commons Zero  Contributors: Mugilan

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Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 1

Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was an accord signed in Colombo on 29 July, 1987, between Indian Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene. The accord was expected to resolve the ongoing
Sri Lankan civil war. Under the terms of the agreement,[1][2] Colombo agreed to a devolution of power to the
provinces, the Sri Lankan troops were to be withdrawn to their barracks in the north and the Tamil rebels were to
surrender their arms.[3][4]
Importantly however, the Tamil groups, notably the The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (which at the
time was one of the strongest Tamil forces) had not been made party to the talks and initially agreed to surrender
their arms to the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) only reluctantly. Within a few months however, this flared into
an active confrontation. The LTTE declared their intent to continue the armed struggle for an independent Tamil
Eelam and refused to disarm. The IPKF found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the LTTE. Further
complicating the return to peace was a burgeoning Sinhalese insurgency in the south.

Background
Sri Lanka, from the early part of the 1980s, was facing an increasingly
violent ethnic strife. The origins of this conflict can be traced to the
independence of the island from Britain in 1948 . At the time, a Sinhala
majority government was instituted which passed legislation that were
deemed discriminatory against the substantial Tamil minority
population. In the 1970s, two major Tamil parties united to form the
Location of Sri Lanka
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) that started agitation for a
separate state of Tamil Eeelam within the system in a federal structure
[5]
in the north and eastern Sri Lanka that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy. However, enactment of the sixth
amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution in August 1983 classified all separatist movements as unconstitutional,[6]
effectively rendering the TULF ineffective.[6] Outside the TULF, however, factions advocating more radical and
[5]
militant courses of action soon emerged, and the ethnic divisions started flaring into a violent civil war.

Indian Involvement
[7][8]
India had, initially under Indira Gandhi and later under Rajiv Gandhi, provided support to Tamil interests from
the very conception of the secessionist movement. This included providing sanctuary to the separatists, as well as
support the operations training camps for Tamil guerrillas in Tamil Nadu[9] of which the LTTE emerged as the
strongest force. This was both as a result of a large Tamil community in South India, as well as India's regional
security and interests which attempted to reduce the scope of foreign intervention, especially those linked to the
United States, Pakistan, and China.[9] To this end, the Indira Gandhi Government sought to make it clear to the Sri
Lankan President, Jayewardene that armed intervention in support of the Tamil movement was an option India
[9]
would consider if any diplomatic solutions should fail. Following the anti-Tamil riots, the Tamil rebel movement
grew progressively strong and increasingly violent. However,after Indira Gandhi's assassination, the Indian support
for the militant movement decreased. However, the succeeding Rajiv Gandhi government attempted to re-establish
friendly relations with its neighbours. It still however maintained diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the conflict
as well as maintaining covert aid to the Tamil rebels.[9][10]
From 1985 however, the Sri-Lankan Government started rearming itself extensively for its anti-insurgent role with
support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore and South Africa.[9][11] In 1986, the campaign against the insurgency was
stepped up and in 1987, retaliating an increasingly bloody insurgent movement, Operation Liberation was launched
against LTTE strongholds in Jaffna Peninsula, involving nearly four thousand troops, supported by helicopter
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 2

gunships as well as Ground attack aircraft.[9] In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army laid siege on the town of Jaffna.[12]
As civilian casualties grew,[13][14] calls grew within India to intervene in what was increasingly seen in the Indian
(and Tamil) media as a developing humanitarian crisis, especially with reports use of aerial support against rebel
positions in civilian areas.[14][15] India, which had a substantial Tamil population in South India faced the prospect of
a Tamil backlash at home, called on the Sri Lankan government to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a
political settlement.
However, the Indian efforts were futile. Added to this, in the growing involvement of Pakistani and Israeli advisors,
it was necessary for Indian interest to mount a show of force.[9] Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri
Lanka, India announced on 2 June 1987 that it would send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to
provide humanitarian assistance[16] but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and turned back.[17]
Following the failure of the naval mission, the decision was made by the Indian government to mount an airdrop of
relief supplies in support of rebel forces over the besieged city of Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, in a blatant show of force,
the Indian Air Force mounted Operation Poomalai in broad daylight. Five An-32s of the Indian Air Force under
cover of heavily armed Indian fighter jets flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25 tons of supplies, all the time keeping well
within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi was
summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the Minister External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, of the ongoing
operation. It was also indicated to the Ambassador that if the operation was in any way hindered by Sri Lanka, India
[18]
would launch a full-force military retaliation against Sri Lanka. The ultimate aim of the operation was both to
demonstrate the credibility of the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan Government, as a symbolic
[19]
act of support for the Tamil Rebels, as well to preserve Rajiv Gandhi's credibility.
Faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention and facing an increasingly war-weary population at
home,[20] the Sri Lankan President, J. R. Jayewardene, offered to hold talks with the Rajiv Gandhi government on
future moves.[12] The siege of Jaffna was soon lifted, followed by a round of negotiations that led to the signing of
[21]
the Indo-Sri-Lankan accord on July 29, 1987 that brought a temporary truce. The terms of the truce specified that
the Sri Lankan troops withdraw from the north and the Tamil rebels disarm,[3] and saw the induction of the IPKF as a
peace keeping force in Sri Lanka.

Peace Accord
[4]
Among the salient points of the agreement, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil
demands, which included[1][2] Colombo devolution of power to the provinces, merger (subject to later referendum)
of the northern and eastern provinces, and official status for the Tamil language.[4] More immediately, Operation
Liberation — the successful, ongoing anti-insurgent operation by Sri Lankan forces in the Northern peninsula —
was ended. Sri Lankan troops were to withdraw to their barracks in the north, the Tamil rebels were to disarm.[3]
India agreed to end support for the Tamil separatist movement and recognise the unity of Sri Lanka.[4] The Indo-Sri
Lanka Accord also underlined the commitment of Indian military assistance on which the Indian Peace Keeping
Force came to be inducted into Sri Lanka.
In 1990, India withdrew the last of its forces from Sri Lanka, and fighting between the LTTE and the government
resumed. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and government forces committed serious human rights violations
against one another.
In January 1995, the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam agreed to a cease fire as a
preliminary step in a government-initiated plan for peace negotiations. After 3 months, however, the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam unilaterally resumed hostilities.
The government of Sri Lanka then adopted a policy of military engagement with the Tigers, with government forces
liberating Jaffna from LTTE control by mid-1996 and moving against LTTE positions in the northern part of the
country called the Vanni. An LTTE counteroffensive, begun in October 1999, reversed most government gains; and
by May 2000, threatened government forces in Jaffna. Heavy fighting continued into 2001.
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 3

Reaction
On the eve of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Rajiv Gandhi was assaulted by Leading Rate Vijitha Rohana
at the Guard of Honour held for Gandhi in what seemed an attempted assassination. Four years later, in 1991, Rajiv
Gandhi was assassinated by a LTTE suicide bomber. This radically reduced support for the LTTE within India. In
2009, 19 years after his assassination, the Sri Lankan army mounted a major military offensive in the north and
eradicated the LTTE. The operation was not opposed by India and received Indian diplomatic and military support,
despite condemnations from state of Tamil Nadu and Western nations for alleged human rights violations. Rajiv
Gandhi's widow, Sonia Gandhi was the chairperson of India's ruling coalition at the time.

References
[1] M. L. Marasinghe (1988). Ethnic Politics and Constitutional Reform: The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, 37, pp 551-587 (http:/ / journals. cambridge. org/ abstract_S0020589300047734)
[2] Sri Lanka: The Untold Story Chapter 35: Accord turns to discord (http:/ / www. atimes. com/ ind-pak/ DD13Df02. html)
[3] New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle. The Indo Sri Lanka Agreement. Satyendra N. Tamil Nation (http:/ / www. tamilnation. org/ intframe/ india/
88saty. htm)
[4] Text of the Peace accord. Tamil Nation (http:/ / www. tamilnation. org/ conflictresolution/ tamileelam/ 87peaceaccord. htm#a1)
[5] Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), World Tamil Association (WTA), World Tamil Movement (WTM), Federation of Associations of
Canadian Tamils (FACT), Ellalan Force. GlobalSecurity.org (http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ military/ world/ para/ ltte. htm)
[6] The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka.Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Apr., 1989), pp. 401-415.
[7] India's search for power:Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy.1966-1982. Mansingh S. New Delhi:Sage 1984. p282
[8] A commission, before it proceeded to draw up criminal proceedings against others, must recommend Indira Gandhi's posthumous prosecution
Mitra A. Rediff on Net (http:/ / www. rediff. com/ news/ dec/ 01mitra. htm)
[9] India's Regional Security Doctrine. Hagerty D.T. Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Apr., 1991), pp. 351-363
[10] Research and Analysis Wing. Fas.org (http:/ / www. fas. org/ irp/ world/ india/ raw/ )
[11] The Colombo Chill. Bobb D.India Today.March 31.1986. p95.
[12] India Airlifts Aid to Tamil Rebels" (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ gst/ fullpage. html?sec=health&
res=9B0DE0D8173FF936A35755C0A961948260& n=Top/ News/ World/ Countries and Territories/ India), The New York Times. 5 June
1987
[13] Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP. Pfaffenberger B. Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in
1987: Part II. (Feb., 1988), pp. 139
[14] India Enters; The Airdrop and the L.T.T.E.'s Dilemma. (http:/ / www. uthr. org/ BP/ volume1/ Chapter8. htm)
[15] Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu.Chapter I - Phase II (1987–1988). Jain Commission Interim Report (http:/ / www.
tamilnation. org/ intframe/ india/ jaincommission/ growth_of_tamil_militancy/ ch1sec5. html)
[16] "Indians To Send convoy to Sri Lanka", The New York Times. 2 June 1987
[17] "Indian Flotilla is turned back by Sri Lankan Naval Vessels", The New York Times. 4 June 1987
[18] "Indian Air Force in Sri Lanka.Operation Poomalai - The Jaffna Food drop." Bharat-rakshak.com (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ IAF/
History/ 1987IPKF/ Chapter1. html)
[19] "Operation Poomalai - India Intervenes" Bharat-rakshak.com (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ LAND-FORCES/ Army/ History/ 1987/
Chapter02. html)
[20] Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord Ralph R. Premdas; S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 6.
(Jun., 1988), pp. 676-690.
[21] Background Note: Sri Lanka. U.S Dept. of State (http:/ / www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ ei/ bgn/ 5249. htm)

External links
• Full Text of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (http://peacemaker.un.org/node/1173)
• Text of all peace accords for Sri Lanka (http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&
field_padate_value[value][date]=&field_pacountry_tid=Sri+Lanka)
• Tigers go back to Indo-Lanka accord for federal state (http://www.indiaexpress.com/news/world/20031101-0.
html)
• Muslims have a Case in Sri Lanka (http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://www.geocities.com/
mforumsl/lw3.htm&date=2009-10-26+02:32:55)
• Indo-Sri Lanka trade: Hype and reality (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FC12Df05.html)
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 4

• SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD STORY Chapter 35: Accord turns to discord (http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/
DD13Df02.html)
• PEACE PROCESS IN SRI LANKA --- WITH AND WITHOUT MEDIATION (http://www.irs.org.pk/Focus
2003.htm)
• ETHNIC PEACE ACCORDS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A SURVEY (http://www.american.
edu/jrich/Richardson.peace.html)
• Dr. PC Alexander, former Principal Secretary of Rajiv Gandhi - bares it all on the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987
(http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=11310)
• "Peace for all with equal rights"Minister (http://www.dailymirror.lk/2002/10/19/News/3.html)
• Wickremesinghe Apprises I K Gujral of Stalled Peace Process in Sri Lanka (http://www.asiantribune.com/
show_news.php?id=11650)
• Tiger Rebels are either black or white but not both (http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items04/170204-1.html)
• SLFP to discuss peace process with Indian leaders (http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/12/02/
stories/2002120203591200.htm)
• PEACE PROCESS IN SRI-LANKA (http://www.asian-affairs.com/Sri-Lanka/sugeeswara.html)
• TIGERS, 'MODERATES' AND PANDORA'S PACKAGE (http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/
sinhala/pandora.htm)
• The road ahead (http://www.flonnet.com/fl1909/19090120.htm)
• When guns cease to fire (http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/mag/2002/04/07/stories/
2002040700140300.htm)
• LTTE to take Indo-Lankan accord in peace bid (http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=25634)
Article Sources and Contributors 5

Article Sources and Contributors

Indo-Sri Lanka Accord  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=566276714  Contributors: AllGloryToTheHypnotoad, Ardfern, Barticus88, Blackknight12, CALR, Cossde,
Crystallina, Davecrosby uk, Dewritech, Dr. Blofeld, Duk, Frietjes, Gaius Cornelius, Gettingthere, Gfosankar, Good Olfactory, Gr8opinionater, Ilolelele19, Jimmyvanthach, Kanags, Kanatonian,
Lairor, Magickmonkey54, Maproom, Molecular b, Netmonger, Neutrality, Noble4, Rich Farmbrough, Rjwilmsi, Rockfang, Rueben lys, Sardanaphalus, Share Bear, Shyamsunder, Snowolfd4,
Steven J. Anderson, Tobias Conradi, Tyronen, UESPArules, Ulflarsen, VishalB, Vishnava, 21 anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

Image:LocationSriLanka.png  Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:LocationSriLanka.png  License: Public Domain  Contributors: --Snowolfd4, --Vardion

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India among key
‘Red October’
victims
Vladimir Radyuhin

MOSCOW: India and many oth-

er countries across the world
have fallen victim to an un-
precedented cyber espionage
attack uncovered, but not yet
neutralised by Russia’s lead-
ing internet security
company.
Unidentified criminals
have been siphoning off se-
cret data from hundreds of
computer systems used by
government agencies, nucle-
ar, aerospace and military in-
stitutions and private
companies, in dozens of
countries for the past five
years, said the Kaspersky Lab
in a report released in
Moscow.
While Russia tops the list of
countries with 38 detected in-
fections, India ranks fifth
with 14 infections, after Ka-
zakhstan (21); Azerbaijan
(15); and Belgium (15). The
United States is also on the
list with six attacks.
Termed ‘Red October’ or
Rocra for short, the cyber
spying campaign was
launched in 2007 and is still
active, the report warned.
“It is quite possible there
are other targeted sectors
which haven’t been discov-
ered yet,” Kaspersky cau-
tioned. Kaspersky Lab
detected the attack in No-
vember 2012 thanks to its se-
curity network. The expert
believes the attack could have
Russia roots, while the bulk of
servers the spy network uses
are in Germany and Russia.
The majority of servers were
used as proxies, in order to
hide the command server at
the core of the operation.
U.S. lawmaker accuses Tibet’s government-in-exile of silencing dissidents
Chander Suta Dogra
CHANDIGARH: A row has broken
out between the Dharamsala-
based Tibetan government-
in-exile (TGIE). Congress-
man Dana Rohrabacher over
the removal off Jigme Ngabo,
the head of the Tibetan lan-
guage service of Radio Free
Asiaa (RFA)
(RFA),) earlier this
month.
Mr. Rohrabacher has al-
leged that the government-
in-exile was manipulating
news coverage of itself and
had engineered the dismissal
of Mr. Ngabo, who was re-
portedly not toeing its line on
the resolution of the Tibetan
issue.
The U.S. lawmaker, whose
allegations have been sup-
ported by some prominent
Tibetan intellectuals, has al-
so suggested that U.S. aid giv-
CM
en to the
government-in-exile for the
welfare of Tibetan refugees
might have been misused.
After Mr. Ngabo, a long-
time employee of the RFA
was fired, Mr. Rohrabacher
and some dissident Tibetans
critical of the Dalai Lama’s
middle-way approach to re-
solving the Tibetan issue ac-
cused the
government-in-exile of sti-
fling free speech within the
Tibetan community. De-
manding an investigation in-
to claims of censorship
within the RFA, Mr. Rohra-
bacher has said, “Jigme Nga-
bo’s services were
terminated for political rea-
sons. RFA needs to continue
to be the source for accurate
information.”
Mr. Rohrabacher, one of
the leading supporters of the
Tibetan cause, who had in
2007 called for a boycott of
the Beijing Olympics over
China’s treatment of ethnic
Tibetans, in a letter to the
elected Prime Minister of the
government-in-exile, Lob-
sang Sangay, wrote: “Actions
taken by you and other Tibe-
tan leaders are eroding the
support within the U.S. Con-
gress for the Tibetan cause. I
will not tolerate machina-
tions by you or your associ-
ates to deprive the Tibetans
of the joys of open debate and
free exchange of information
that RFA has provided.”
He went on to say: “I am
also aware off serious accusa-
tions that the U.S. funding
meant for Tibetans may have
been misspent, and perhaps
goes into the pockets of Chi-
nese and Tibetan power bro-
kers.” In 2012, the U.S.
exile over the self-immola- nent Tibetan intellectual which it firmly believes is
Row after a Tibetan journalist is sacked tions by Tibetans inside Tibet whose contract with the fuelling the immolations and
(almost 80 till the beginning RFA was also cancelled, protests within Tibet. Dha-
Dana Rohrabacher suggests that U.S. aid to the of this week) that has trig- wrote in his blog this week: ramsala in turn probably
government-in-exile might have been misused gered a debate in the exile “It is an article of faith in the shares Beijing’s concerns as
community about the useful- Central Tibetan Administra- the self-immolation crisis in
ness of continuing with the tion that if somehow all in- Tibet and the resignations of
government gave $7.5 mil- fere in its functioning.” Dalai Lama’s middle way ap- dependence activism and the Tibetan envoys have
lion to the exiled govern- Parliament’s Speaker Pen- proach. Most of those who discussion were halted or placed extreme pressure on
ment. . pa Tsering, in a letter to Mr. immolated themselves had contained, then Beijing the TGIE leadership’s signa-
The Tibetan Parliament- Rohrabacher made public on been demanding complete in- would agree to the “genuine ture Middle Way policy.”
in-exile has responded to Wednesday, welcomed scru- dependence and the Dalai La- autonomy” solution pro- The government-in-exile’s
these accusations saying: tiny by a U.S. agency over the ma’s return to Tibet. Those posed in the Dalai Lama’s position, however, is that the
“Keeping in view the objec- utilisation of funds. “We opposed to the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way policy; or steps taken by it in resolving
tive of the radio service, we wish to state in unequivocal policy said Mr. Ngabo irked would, at least, resume the the Tibetan issue are unani-
have expressed our opinion terms that any assistance by the government-in-exile by negotiations it terminated mously approved by the Ti-
and concerns in and outside U.S. received through the encouraging open discus- two year ago.” He went on to betan Parliament-in-exile
the Tibetan Parliament-in- Central Tibetan Administra- sions on various options for say that given the extremely and the “U.S. government
exile regarding contents of tion are accounted and audi- Tibet’s future, including out- sensitive situation prevail- has stood firmly behind us.”
some programs of Radio Free ted through proper right independence. ing in Tibet as a result of the The RFA was created in
Asia in the past and we shall democratic mechanisms His removal was preceded immolations “it would not 1996 as a private, not-for-
do so in future as well, which with full transparency and by several interactions be- be unreasonable to assume profit corporation funded by
we consider is well within accountability.” tween government-in-exile that Beijing wants Dharam- the U.S. government to “pro-
our democratic rights. We The crux of the dispute lies officials and RFA head Libby sala to stop the “splittist” vide information to people
have neither in the past nor in the increasing discomfort Liu
Liu. messaging from exile, partic- living under repressive re-
will we ever in future inter- within the government-in- Jamyang Norbu, a promi- ularly from RFA broadcasts, gimes in Asia.”
ND ND