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A320 Sims
A320 Sims
ECAM HANDLING ⏎
POST HANDLING OF ECAM APPLY THE BELOW PROCESS AND THEN USE THE FORDEC TOOL
FOR SOUND DECISION MAKING
TOWNC - TECH STATUS, OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS & NOTAMS , COMPANY REQUIREMENTS
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
PREPARATION = GO OVER
: FLOWS - IN REGULAR FLG ONE PICKS UP WRONG HABITS
: AIRBUS GOLDEN RULES - HAS SOLUTION FOR EVERYTHING!!!
: ECAM HANDLING
: FAILURES - THE REGULAR ONES (COVERED LATER)
: START FAULTS, MANUAL START, ALL STARTS
: REJECT CONDITIONS
: STANDARD CALL OUTS
: DIFFERENT TYPES OF APPR, SPECIALLY “STEP DOWN LOC APPR”
: MAA ILS APPR O7 FROM O/H AND DEL LOC APPR FOR RW 28
: RAW DATA ILS
: MEL
: TECH NOTICES
: QRH – BE AWARE OF ALL THE CONTENTS
: MEMORY ITEMS
IN THE SIM = BE
: DELIBERATE
: SLOW – DON‟T GET RUSHED TO DO THINGS FAST
: SURE – MOVE YOUR HAND FOR A VERY SPECIFIC PURPOSE
: A THINKING PILOT
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
*ONCE THINGS UNDER CONTROL, ECAM ACTIONS; COMPLETE THE ENTIRE CYCLE OF
ECAM ACTIONS AS COVERED IN ECAM HANDLING
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
ECAM CONTINUED:
Page 9 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
PRELIMINARY COCKPITPREPARATION PM
PF
ENG MASTERS 1, 2............................................................. OFF
ENG MODE selector............................................ CHECK NORM
*WX RADAR& PW……...........................................................OFF
GAIN KNOB…………………………AUTO/CAL
MODE SELECTOR/TURB Sw..…….AS REQD
L/G lever............................................................................ DOWN
Both WIPER selectors........................................................... OFF
SIGNS -SEAT BELT…………..ON (IF REFUELLING IS OVER)
- PED…………………..ON
BAT1&2...................OFF,CHECK VOLTAGE=/> 25.5V….. AUTO
((###If the aircraft has not been electrically supplied for 6
h or more, perform the following check:
BAT 1 pb and BAT 2 pb....................................... CHECK OFF
BAT 1 and 2 VOLTAGE.....................CHECK ABOVE 25.5 V))
EXT PWR pb-sw...........................................................AS RQRD
APU FIRE............................................................... CHECK/TEST
(IF APU IS ALREADY ON, DO NOT CARRY OUT FIRE TEST)
APU....................................................................................START
(WAIT AT LEAST 3s BETN APU MAS ON AND APU START)
When the APU is AVAIL:
AIR COND panel....................................................................SET
APU BLEED…………………………...ON
ALL WHITE LIGHTS……………….... OFF
PF X-BLEED………………………………AUTO
*NEO: FADEC OFF TO CHECK OIL QUANTITY ZONE TEMP SELECTORS………….AS REQD
* EXT PWR pb-sw......................................................AS RQRD
*CHECK DOCUMENTS OR ASK PM TO DO IT
* COCKPIT LIGHT......................................................AS RQRD
- TAKE OUT METAR, CFP AND FUEL CHIT-H/O FUEL CHIT (INT/FLOOD/INTEG including GLARESHIELD AND FCU)
- SWITCH ON EFB, FIX IN FRAME AND PUT ON CHARGE * ECAM RCL pb........................................................PRESS3s
- ADJUST SEATING: BE COMFORTABLE AND RELAXED * ECAM OXY PRESS/HYD QTY/ENG OIL QTY............CHECK
- *FMGS PRE-INITIALISATION: OXY…DOOR Pg CHK PR, IF BOXED CHK MIN REQ FM FCOM LIM‟TN
ENG AND A/C TYPE………………………………………...CHECK HYD…FLUID LEVEL IN NORMAL (GREEN) RANGE
DATABASE VALID…………………………………………..CHECK ENG OIL…=/> 11 qt + @ 0.3qt/h
FLAPS............................................................ CHECK POSITION
FLT NBR & FROM/TO……………………………………….INSERT
(HANDLE POSN AGREES FLAPS POSN ON UPPER ECAM)
ACARS……………………………….INITIALISE (CREW DATA) * SPD BRK lever........................CHECK RET AND DISARMED
-EFB :CHARGE >50% * PARKING BRAKE handle......................................................ON*
: AIB Mngr VERSION MATCHING FRC, OLB :LYR 3 ACCU/BRAKES PRESS................CHECKIN GREEN BAND
: Jepp FD PRO - DATE NOT IN RED ###ELEC………NO AMBER LIGHTS EXCEPT GEN FAULT LTS
CM1 -EFB :CHARGE >50%
* ECAM RCL pb........................................................PRESS 3s : AIB Mngr VERSION MATCHING FRC,OLB :LYR 3
*LOGBOOK……………………………………………………CHECK : Jepp FD PRO - DATE NOT IN RED
*EFB MEL/CDL……CONSULT AND ACTIVATE INOP SYSTEMS CM2
*AIRCRAFT ACCEPTANCE……………………………PERFORM *LOGBOOK……………………………………………………CHECK
*EFB MEL/CDL……CONSULT AND ACTIVATE INOP SYSTEMS
OEB IN QRH (WHEN BOTH PILOTS ARE SEATED…….CHECK AND READ OUT TO PF; HIGHLIGHTING THE RED OEBs (IN BOLD)
Page 10 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
PF
* ALL IR MODE selectors.........................................................NAV
EXTERIOR LIGHTS.................SET; STROBE-AUTO,BEACON-OFF
* SIGNS................................................................................... SET
SEAT BELT……ON, if refueling over
PED „off „ SIGN….ON, IF REFUELLING IS ON;
Announce on PA – “REFUELING IN PROGRESS” (NOTAC 20)
EMERG EXIT LT SELECTOR…….ARM
PROB/WINDOW HEAT....................................................... AUTO
LDG ELEV KNOB................................................................ AUTO
* PACK FLOW............................................................... AS RQRD
LO - IF PAX <141 (LATEST)
HI – IF ABNORMALLY HOT AND HUMID CONDITIONS
NORMAL – FOR ALL OTHER NORMAL OP CASES
(IF APU IS SUPPLYING, HI SELECTED AUTOMATICALLY)
BAT................................................................................... CHECK
ELEC pb ON ECAM PANEL………….PRESS
BATT 1&2……………………………….OFF AND THEN ON
CHECK….AFTR 10s, CURRENT CHRG OF BATT<60A & DECREASING
ENG FIRE.................................................................CHECK/TEST
ENG FIRE pb………………….IN AND GUARDED
AGENT 1&2 LIGHT…………....OFF
FIRE TEST BUTTON………… PRESS AND MAINTAIN
CHECK………………………….6 LIGHTS+ECAM + CRC
MASTER WARNING LT….PRESS, SEE WARNING STOPS
AUDIO SWITCH................................................................. NORM
VENT panel...................................................CHECKALL LT OFF
PA (3rd occupant)...................................RECEPT, VOL 1‟O‟CLOCK
*RMP: ON; MEMO SHOULD SHOW EITHER:”HF VOICE” OR “DATA”
&&&HF OVER RIDE Pb…ON (ARINC A/C ONCE REFUELING IS OVER)
MAINT panel.....................................................CHECKALL LT OFF
CTR INSTRUMENT PANEL:
* STBY INST (ASI, ALTI, A/H)………..................................CHECK
(CHECK NO FLAG; ERECT IF NECESSARY)
*IF ISIS……ADJUST BRIGHTNESS, CHECK IAS, ALT
READINGS, ALT SETTINGS AND ATTITUDE DISPLAY;
CHEK NO FLAGS, RESET ATTD IF NECESSARY
* CLOCK.....................................................................CHECK/SET
* A/SKID & N/W STRG sw...................................................... ON
PEDESTAL:
RMP…………..RMP ON, NAV & SEL LT OFF, TUNE COM FREQ
(VHF1 FOR ATC, VHF2 FOR ATIS & CO FREQ, VHF3 FOR ACARS)
ACP...................................................................................CHECK
INT KNOB….PRESS OUT, VOLUME SET
VHF&HF….CHECK TX AND RX (NO HF IF REFUELLING ON)
COCKPIT DOOR................................................................CHECK
-ANN LT SELECTOR (O/H PANEL)…..TEST; CHECK OPEN &FAULT
LT(ON PEDESTAL) AND THREE LED LT(O/H PANEL) ON
-ANN LT SELECTOR….BRT; CHECK ALL LT GO OFF
-SET CCPT DOOR TO UNLOCK POSN…CHK DOOR OPENS&OPEN LT
COMES ON
-WITH THE DOOR FULLY OPEN, RELEASE CCPT DOOR SW, CHK
THAT IT RETURNS TO NORM POSN.
-CLOSE THE DOOR, CHECK THAT IT IS LOCKED AND OPEN INDICA-
TION LT GOES OFF
-CCPT DOOR MECHANICAL OVERRIDE…CHECK
SWITCHING PANEL............................................................NORM
* THRUST LEVERS.................................................CHECK IDLE
* ENG MASTERS......................................................CHECK OFF
* ENG MODE selector...........................................CHECK NORM
*PARKING BRK..............................................................AS RQRD
ACCU PRESS indicator......................................................CHECK
The ACCU PRESS ind must be in the green band. If reqd, use the
elec pump on yellow hyd sys to recharge the brk accumulator.
WARNING Get grd crew clearance bfore using the electric pump.
* PARK BRK handle.....................................................CHECK ON
* BRAKES PRESS indicator...............................................CHECK
Check for normal indications.
IF BRK ARE HOT AND CHOCKS IN PLACE…BRK OFF TO
INCREASE COOLING
GRAVITY GEAR EXTN....................................CHECK STOWED
Page 11 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
RMP…………..RMP ON, NAV & SEL LT OFF, TUNE COM FREQ
(ON VHF2, SET ATIS FREQ)
(VHF1 FOR ATC, VHF2 FOR ATIS & CO FREQ, VHF3 FOR ACARS)
ACP...................................................................................CHECK
INT KNOB….PRESS OUT, VOLUME SET
VHF&HF….CHECK TX AND RX(NO HF IF REFUELLING ON)
VHF2 KNOB OUT VOLUME ADJUSTED
LOUDSPEAKER VOLUME TURNED ON
* ATC........................................................................................SET
ALT RPTG - ON, ATC SYS 1/2 (DEPENDING ON AP 1/2 LI-
KELY TO BE USED), ATC ON STBY, TCAS-ABOVE AND ON
STBY
* AIRFIELD DATA...............................(FROM ATIS/R/T)OBTAIN SET QNH ON FCU
* ACARS ......................................................................INITIALIZE
* FMS..............................................................................PREPARE
DIFSRIPP:
DATA: CHK ENG&AC TYPE, FM DATA VALIDITY,
PERF FACTOR (IF REQD CHANGE USING “ARM” CODE)
INIT „A‟: FILL DETAILS; MAKE CORRECTIONS TO
- CHK FLT No IN IGO, ATIS CODE, GATE, ORIG/DEST
SAT, TROPO (HIGHEST) AND ENTER TRIP WINDS
#DEPARTURE CLEARANCE THRU DATA LINK AND TIME WITHIN 30‟OF DEP AND SEND
#(IF DCL NOT AVAILABLE: R/T> “I FLY 306, REG „VT-IGI‟, BAY NUM- - CHK MESSAGE OF RECEIPT OF REQUEST
BER xx, QNH 1008, INFO „R‟, DESTINATION ZZZ, FL360, REQUEST - FINISH ACARS INIT WITH DATE,PILOTs IGA AND SEND
CLEARANCE”. Note down Clearance and Read back. - WHILE AWAITING DEP CLEARANCE:
# SET SQUACK FREQ ON ATC AND INITIAL ALT ON FCU. : SET JEPP FD ROUTE TO DEP AND DEST
FLIGHT PLAN: PLAN MODE, RG 20 AND CHK RTE : SELECT THE EXPECTED SID, TAXI AND RCF Pg
BEFORE INSERTING, INSERT EXPECTED ARRIV- : KEEP AN EYE ON COMPANY MESSAGE FOR CLR
AL RW: NOT THE STAR OR VIA (HELPFUL IN
: ACCEPT CLEARANCE AND TAKE A PRINT
FUEL PREDICTION AND ALSO WHEN REQD TO
USE NAV BACKUP) : TIME PERMITTING ENTER THE ENTIRE ROUTE
SECONDARY FLT PLAN: COPY ACTIVE; : FINISH THE PERF CALCULATION FOR T/O
CHANGE FOR IMMEDIATE RETURN FOR EX-
PECTED R/W; FILL APPROACH AND GA Pg
(COULD PREPARE FOR ALT RW/ INTERSECTION)
RAD NAV:SELECT VOR FOR ONSIDE T/O (IF (SEE THE TRIM SHEET/FUEL CHIT, ATIS AND CLEARANCE; FEED DA-
REQD TO INTERCEPT A RADIAL AFTER T/O, TA INTO EFB FOR CALCULATIONS TO X-CHECK DATA ENTERED INTO
FEED IN HERE AND USE ROSE VOR AFTER T/O) FMGS; SELECT THE REQUIRED CHARTS ON JEPP FD PRO TO X-
INIT „B‟: START FROM TRIP WIND AND THEN TOP CHECK ROUTE)
RIGHT; CORRECT THE FUEL FIGURES
PERFORMANCE: (BEFORE THIS EFB CALCULA-
TION). START FILLING FROM T/O SHIFT AND * FMS PREPARATION..........................................................CHECK
THEN TOP RIGHT ONWARDS. THR RED/ACCN (RANGE/MODE TO 20/PLAN AND CHECK CHART CONSTRAINTS AND
/EO ACCN::400‟/800‟/1500‟ (FM R‟WAY ELEVATION WAYPOINTS WITH CONSTRAINTS/POINTS ON FMGS AND ND)
Op Notice 8A : 29 Dec 16) [IF TURN INVOLVED
IS>1200 OR HIGH ROC REQD, ON NEXT Pg(CLB
PHASE), SELECT „G‟ DOT/APPROPRIATE SPEED]
ONCE THE FINAL L&T SHEET IS AVAILABLE CM1 WILL CHECK FOR
GROSS ERRORS (CORRECT FLT No., A/C REG, DATE, FOB etc.) THE
L&T DATA IS TO BE INSERTED AS FOLLOWS:
FIGURES
CM1 SHALL CALL OUT ZFW, ZFWCG AND FUEL
(CM1 WILL OBSERVE CM2 ENTERING THE CORRECT DATA) CM2 WILL CNFM IT MATCHES WITH CFP AND INSERT DATA IN MCDU
CM2 WILL NOW CALL OUT THE TOW & LW AS CAL BY FMGS
CM1 WILL CROSS CHECK TOW AND LW WITH L&T SHEET
CM1 WILL NOW CALL OUT T/O MACIN % FROM L&T SHEET
CM1 WILL CONFIRM/CALL OUT TRIM SETTING IN TRIM SHEET CM2 WILL CHK& CALL OUT CORR TRIM SETTING FM TRIM WHEEL
PIC SHALL SIGN THE TRIM SHEET, ANNOTATE NAME, ATPL No., CM2 WILL ENTER THE FIGURE CNFD BY CM1 IN PERF T/O Pg
TIME(UTC) AND H/O A/C COPY TO CM2 CM2 WILL INDEPENDENTLY, X-CHK THE FIG OF L&T SHEET WITH
* TAKEOFF BRIEFING.................................................PERFORM THOSE ENTERED AND ANNOTATE THEM IN THE CFP
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
PF PM
WINDOWS/DOORS...................................................CHECK CLOSED ATC………………………………………………………ON AUTO
SLIDES................................................................... CHECK ARMED WINDOWS/DOORS........................................CHECK CLOSED
BEACON………………………………………………………………….ON SLIDES..............................................................CHECK ARMED
THRUST LEVERS..........................................................................IDLE EFB CHARGER…………………………………………..STOWED
EFB CHARGER…………………………………...……………..STOWED “DELIVERY/GRD, I FLY___, WITH DATA LINK CLEARANCE,
QNH___, ____ (POB) THROUGH SECURITY, REQ PUSH&START.”
BEFORE START CL BELOW THE LINE PERFORM BEFORE START CL BELOW THE LINE
DON HEADSET( TILL 10,000‟ AND FM FL 100 TILL SWITCH OFF) DON HEAD SET
PF GROUND PM
“GRD-CCPT, CLEARED FOR PUSH AND
START FACING__”( FEET OFF PEDALS:Op N8A) “CLEARED FOR PUSH AND START FACING
_____. RELEASE BRAKES”
“BRAKES RELEASED, READY FOR PUSH”
WHEN BRAKES ARE RELEASED………
CHK NW STRG DISC
START ET
“CLEAR TO START?”
“CLEAR TO START”
“STARTING No, 1/ 2”
MODE SEL: IGN; CHK ALL XX OFF; PR AVL
*NEO: DUAL COOLING Pb ON START CHRONO & MONITOR START
ENG MASTER: ON
WHEN P/BAK COMPLETE- “SET BRAKES”
“BRAKES SET” IDLE PARAMETERS:
MONITOR START: NOTE:
-N1 ~21.4%
-ST VALVE OP -N1 INCR - MAX START CYCLE : 2 MINUTES
-N2 ~57.8%
-N2 INCR -OIL PR INCR -EPR ~1.01
- GAP BETN START ATTEMPTS : 15s
-IGN A/B -IGN OFF -EGT ~414*C
-FUEL FLOW -ST VALVE CL - AFTER UNSUCCESSFUL AUTO
-FF ~350Kg/Hr
-EGT INCR START, ATTEMPT MANUAL START
AS START GETS OVER: - MAX 3 START ATTEMPT INCL CRANK
ACTN OF ENG MODE NORM:TRIGGER
ENG MODE selector...............................NORM - MANUAL ST: READ NOTES ON GND SPOILERS.........................................ARM
*NEO: DUAL COOLING OFF START RUD TRIM.................................................ZERO
APU BLEED pb-sw....................................OFF
FLAPS..........................................................SET
ENG& WING ANTI ICE pb-sw...........AS RQRD “DISCONNECTING, HAND SIG ON L/R” PTCH TRIM.....(T/O IN % FM FUEL PRED Pg) SET
APU MASTER SW............................ AS RQRD
NOTE:IN AFTER START CL, FLAP CHK: ECAM STATUS.....................................CHECK
Sec 1&2…………...RESET(OFF wait 2" – ON) -PERF T/O Pg : REQD
ECAM STATUS....................................CHECK
-FLAP LEVER POSN : SELECTED
“CLEAR TO DIS HAND SIG ON L/R”(ONLY AFTER START C/L........................COMPLETE
AFTER PM COMPLETES HIS FLOW) -E/WD FLAP INDICATION : POSN ACHIEVED
N/W STR DISC MEMO...CHK NOT DISPLYED
AFTER START C/L......................COMPLETE
PF PM
-FLIGHT CONTROL CHECKS -CALL OUT THE MOVT FM F/CTL Pg; FOLLOW ON RUDDERS
-CARRY OUT SILENT CHECK OF CRTL EXCEPT RUDDERS
-AFTER CHK, SELECT A/BRK TO MAX
-“I HAVE THE PINS AND THUMBS UP, TAXI CLEARANCE”
-“GRD, I FLY___, REQ TAXI.” WRITE DN TAXI INST & READ BK
-VERBALISE TAXI INST. VERIFY TECH IS DISPLAYING TH UP,
CHECK AND CALL OUT “L/R CLEAR” -CHECKS HIS SIDE FOR TH UP, CHK AND CALL OUT”L/R CLR”
-TAXI LT ON, RELEASE BRK, TAXI OUT. CALL OUT “BRK CHK”. -MONITOR BRK CHK; SEL TAXI Pg ON Jepp FD AND GUIDE PF
Page 14 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS IN COCKPIT: - FLOWS
- FIGURES
- BRIEFING
- SEATING
- BEFORE START CL DOWN TO THE LINE (AFTER CHECKING 8 THINGS)
- CLOSE DOORS, PA, ARM SLIDES
- PUSH BACK CLEARANCE (AFTER CHECKING 8 THINGS)
- BEFORE START CL BELOW THE LINE
- “GROUND CLEAR TO START”
- START UP, AFT ST FLOWS, “CLR TO DISCON, HAND SIG L/R”, AFTR START CL
- CONTROL CHECKS; MAX BRAKE
- TAXI CLEARANCE, VERBALISE, SELECT TAXI Pg, TAXI LT ON:CHK L/R, MOVE
- BRAKE CHK
Page 15 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
TAXI
PF PM
ATC CLEARANCE...........................................................CONFIRM
T.O DATA............................................................................CHECK
FMS F-PLAN/SPD...............................................................CHECK
FCU ALT/HDG...........................................................................SET
BOTH FD......................................................................CHECK ON
PFD/ND................................................................................CHECK PFD/ND.............................................................................CHECK
TAKEOFF BRIEFING.......................................................CONFIRM RADAR and PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR SYSTEM …..AS RQRD
(GOOD IDEA TO REVISE: T/O RW, SID & TRANSITION, INITIAL ATC CODE..............................................................CONFIRM/SET
ALTITUDE CLEARED TO, CONFIG AND SPEEDS AND X- TERR ON ND ………......................................................AS RQRD
CHECK AT RELEVANT PLACE ON PFD, ND AND FCU.) AUTO BRK...............................................................................MAX
CABIN REPORT..............................................................RECEIVE
IF READINESS CHIME NOT HEARD :“CONFIRM CABIN CLEARANCE”
T.O CONFIG pb......................................................................TEST
T.O MEMO........................................................CHECK NO BLUE
BEFORE TAKEOFF C/L down to the line.....................COMPLETE BEFORE TAKEOFF C/L down to the line....................COMPLETE
Page 16 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
BEFORE TAKEOFF
PF PM
0 0
BRAKE TEMP..... (<300 C: FAN OFF;,150 :FAN ON)….. CHECK
###CHECK, APPROACH PATH, R/WAY….”APPCH CLEAR” BRAKE FAN……………………………………….......................OFF
###CHECK, APPROACH PATH, R/WAY….”APPCH CLEAR”
“TWR, IFLY_____REQUEST LINE UP”; READ BK CLEARANCE
EXTERIOR LIGHTS...................................................................SET “CLEARED FOR LINE UP BEHIND____R/W_____, I FLY ____.”
-TAXI LT…….To TAXI DURING TAXI; To T/O FOR T/O
-R/W TURN OFF LT….ON TCAS Mode selector ................................................TA or TA/RA
-NAV AND WING LTS OFF DURING DAY, EXCPT LVO APPROACH PATH..................................CLEARED OF TRAFFIC
-NAV LT ON IN 1/2 POSN ON ODD/EVEN Dt. DURING NIGHT & LVO CABIN CREW....................................................................ADVISE
-STROBE LT ON (NOT RQD WHILE XING/BACK TRKNG INACTIVE R/W) “CABIN CREW PLEASE BE SEATED FOR T/O”
SLIDING TABLE ...............................................................STOWED ENG MODE selector......................................................AS RQRD
TAKEOFF RUNWAY........................................................CONFIRM SLIDING TABLE ……......................................................STOWED
TAKEOFF RUNWAY.......................................................CONFIRM
BEFORE TAKEOFF C/L below the line.........................COMPLETE
PACKS 1+2.....................................................................AS RQRD
BEFORE TAKEOFF C/L below the line........................COMPLETE
Page 17 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
PF TAKEOFF PM
TAKEOFF..................................................................ANNOUNCE
BRAKES........................................................................RELEASE
THRUST LEVERS.................................................. FLX or TOGA CHRONO...........................................................................START
Page 18 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
PF PM
CRUISE
ECAM MEMO/SD PAGES.............................................. REVIEW -MONITOR PROG OF FLT; NOTE ATA AND FUEL FIGURE
FLIGHT PROGRESS........................................................CHECK -KEEP OBTAINING ATIS OF ENROUTE A/F, DEST AND ALT
FUEL.............................................................................MONITOR -KEEP TRK OF EQI-TIME PT/ACARS REP: ADV CAPT IF REQD
NAVIGATION ACCURACY.......................................... MONITOR
-KEEP WORKING OUT NEW EQI-TIME PTs BETWEEN RELE-
RADAR........................................... ADJUST AS APPROPRIATE
VANT AIRPORTS. KEEP A MENTAL PICTURE OF NEAREST
AIRPORTS
DESCENT
DESCENT..........................................................................INITIATE
MCDU.......................................................PROG/PERF DESCENT MCDU.....................................................................................F-PLN
Page 19 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION FOR APPROACH
### 30NM…………………………….SPEED 210KT/GREEN DOT
### 25NM………………………………….”ACTIVATE APPROACH” ACTIVATE APPROACH
#APPR SP TGT SHOULD APPEAR AT THE BOTTOM OF SP SCALE IN
MAGENTA;ON
NOTES FORAPPROACH
VOR APPR “BOX” SHOULD APPEAR NAV ACCURACY...........................................................MONITOR
•At green dot:
-FLAPS 1...............................................................................ORDER
PRECISION APPR: ILS and RNAV-RNP; lateral + vertical guidance FLAPS (ILS, RNAV-RNP). The guidance is by Grd Based Aids/ FMS.
1............................................................................ SELECT
-S SPEED/
NON PRECISION
###180KT.............................................CHECK
APPR: LOC, VOR, NDB, RNAV-GNSS; ORNo
SET
vertical
*‟S‟ SPEED, VFE NEXTselected
guidance ie. Vertical AND FLAP (NAV-FPA,
LIMIT SP LOC,
INDRNAV-GNSS
WILL APPEAR
with LNAV
FLIGHT minima)
PATH..................................................................MONITOR
-*### IF SP
During
BRKthe approach
REQD, SELECT the altitude
FLAP 2on the FCU shall be set in the following order:
FIRST
oATC cleared altitude
###ONCE oMinimum
ON RADaltitude VECT FOR at Final approach Fix.
INTERCEPT LEG, “SEQUENCE SEQUENCE F-PLN WITH RADIAL IN, PULL HEADING
oInitial altitude constraintorLevel segment of the go-around procedure as per charts.
F-PLN”
- DECELLERATED APPR: The aircraft descends along the defined vertical path (G/S or VNAV) in minimum Flaps 1. Flaps 2 may be
###REVISE GO-AROUND DRILL
selected depending upon speed control, latest by 2000ft AAL. Aircraft is to be in landing configuration not later than 1500 ft AAL so as
to meet the stabilized criteria of not later than 1000ft nd AAL for an instrument approach.
ONCE CLEARED FOR APPR, ARM APPR AND 2 AP……… ON
- STABILISED APPR The a/c leaves the Final Descent Point in a stabilized state. This could be due to low altitude intermediate approach
(platform altitude around 2000 ft or less), vertical descent angle more than 3.5 degrees, tail wind greater than 10 Kts, aircraft abnor-
(READ FMA TO CHK “CAT III DUAL, AP 1&2, LOC&G/S BLUE,
mal procedure etc.
ILS IDENT ON PFD”
- CRITERIA FOR STABILISED APPRThe following Stabilisation thresholds need to be met: (OM A)
a) NPA/PAR - FAF
LOC........................................................................CHECK ARMED
b) ILS - 1000 ft AAL
G/S.........................................................................CHECK ARMED
LOCc) Visual - 500 ft AAL
CAPTURE...............................................................MONITOR CHK SP IS 10KT < VFE NEXT, AT „S‟ SPEED….SELECT FLAP 2
G/Sd)CAPTURE................................................................MONITOR
Circling - 400 ft AAL * ‟F‟ SPEED AND NEW VFE NEXT WILL APPEAR
By this threshold, the airplane should be:
###- In
GSlanding configuration.
LIVE: “FLAP 2” (LATEST BY 2000‟AGL) CHECK SP, GEAR DOWN; ARM SPOILERS, LIGHTS ON, AUTO
- On the published approach profile(LATERAL AND VERTICAL) until conditions have been met to descend below MDA/DA.
### SELECT SPEED 160KT BRKapproach,
ON, CHK SP MANAGED
- At TARGET Speed as computed by the FMS. In case of SELECTED Speed not more than Vapp + 20 Knots.
- Rate of descent not in excess of 1000 fpm (up to 1200 fpm authorised on a non-precision approach when conditions require)
### ½ DOT : “GEAR DOWN”, MANAGE SPEED
and not less than 400 fpm.
G/S*: GA ALT
- Engines SET up; Compatible to approach configuration.(USUALLY ABV IDLE, TO MAINTAIN TARGET VApp)
spooled
#(PF
- No excessive PNF
if AP is ON, flight ifparameter
AP is OFF. The PF may request that this
deviation CHK SP AND SELECT FLAPS
action
- The is landing
performedcheck by the PNFTHE
list „TO depending
LINE‟must on thebe situation.)
completed
###- IfFLAP 3
the aircraft is not stabilized, the flight crew must initiate a go-around, (FULL FLAPS
unless theyAT 160KT
think that ORonlyLESS)
small corrections are necessary
to rectify minor deviations from stabilised conditions due, amongst others, to external perturbations.
### FULL FLAPS VAPP......................................................................CHECK OR SET
#LATEST
GeneralBY 1500‟AGL LDG FLAPS SHOULD BE SELECTED
points: A/THR..............................................................CHECK SPD or OFF
SO=Precision
THAT THEApproaches
ENGINES SPOOL and FullyUP BY 1200‟
managed NPAAND BE be
shall flown as a WING
STABI- A. ICEApproach
Decelerated (if not required).....................................................OFF
unless required to be flown as an Early Sta-
LISED BY 1000‟
bilized Approach due conditions mentioned above. SLIDING TABLE ……….........................................................STOW
=Other NPA (selected) shall be Early Stabilized. LDG MEMO....................................................... CHECK NO BLUE
=For all NPAs (Managed or Selected), DDA (MDA+50 feet) is to be entered CABIN REPORT................................................................RECEIVE
in the PERF APP page.
SLIDING TABLE ………........................................................STOW CABIN CREW......................................................................ADVISE
Page 20 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
HOLD ENTRY:
using the POD Method, we use the heading indicator as an “entry aid.” As we approach the fix, the heading to the fix
appears at the top of the heading indicator (assuming, that is, you are proceeding directly to the fix, which will always
be the case with a hold clearance). We then visualize an inverted “T” centred on the instrument as indicated below:
Note that the thumb rotates the lateral line 20° as indicated. Once the imaginary sectors are mapped on the heading
indicator, the rest is easy. Simply visualize which sector the outbound track of the assigned hold lies. If the outbound
track is in the “P” sector, the pilot performs a parallel entry procedure; if the outbound track is in the “O” sector, an off-
set entry procedure is flown; finally, if the outbound track is in the “D” sector, the pilot flies a direct entry procedure.
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
GO AROUND
Apply the following three actions simultaneously:
THRUST LEVERS.......................................................................TOGA
ROTATION..........................................................................PERFORM
GO-AROUND...................................................................ANNOUNCE
FLAPS lever..................................................SELECT AS RQRD
Retract one step of flaps. #MONITOR ENG PARAMETERS.
FMA..................................................................................ANNOUNCE
#MAN TOGA / SRS / GA TRK or NAV / A/THR (in blue).
#MONITOR THE FLIGHT PATH
POSITIVE CLIMB....................................................ANNOUNCE
L/G UP.....................................................................................ORDER
L/G............................................................................SELECT UP
AP .......................................................................................AS RQRD
NAV or HDG mode..............................................................AS RQRD
(Reselect NAV or HDG, as required (minimum height 100 ft)).
#PUSH OR TURN+PULL HDG/TRK SEL KNOB ON FCU, ACCORD-
ING TO ATC CLEARANCE
•AT S SPEED:
FLAPS 0...................................................................................ORDER FLAPS 0.........................................................................SELECT
GND SPLRS...................................................................DISARM
###Consider the next step: EXTERIOR LIGHTS............................................................. SET
‐ Engage NAV mode, to follow the published missed approach
procedure, or
‐ Prepare for a second approach by selecting the ACTIVATE APP
PHASE, and CONFIRM on the PERF page.
LANDING
•In stabilized approach conditions, at approx. 30 ft: ATTITUDE.....................................................................MONITOR
FLARE...............................................................................PERFORM
THRUST LEVERS.......................................................................IDLE
•At touchdown:
DEROTATION......................................................................INITIATE
BOTH THRUST LEVERS.............................REV MAX or REV IDLE GRND SPLRS..............................................CHECK/ANNOUNCE
REVERSERS...............................................CHECK/ANNOUNCE
DIRECTIONAL CONTROL...................................................ENSURE
DIRECTIONAL CONTROL...........................................MONITOR
BRAKES.............................................................................AS RQRD
DECELERATION.........................................CHECK/ANNOUNCE
70 kt...........................................................................ANNOUNCE
•At 70 kt:
BOTH THRUST LEVERS...................................................REV IDLE
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
AFTER LANDING
#EXTERIOR LIGHTS................................................................SET
PARKING
ACCU PRESS......................................................................CHECK ANTI-ICE..................................................................................OFF
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
DURING START
MONITOR START
: IN CASE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY IS INTERRUPTED DURING THE START SEQUENCE
(INDICATED BY THE LOSS OF ECAM DUs), ABORT START BY SETTING ENG MASTER OFF
AND THEN PERFORM A 30 SEC DRY CRANK BEFORE STARTING
: IN CASE N2 SHOOTS TO 40% IMMEDIATELY, IT INDICATES COMPRESSOR /TURBINE
SHAFT HAS BROKEN; PUT THE MASTER OFF AND INFORM GROUND STAFF. ENGINE
CHANGE WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THIS CASE. THERE WOULD BE NO ECAM FOR THIS
AND SO WATCH OUT FOR THIS FAILURE
: IN CASE OF ANY START FAULT (ECAM), PF/PM CALLS OUT THE ECAM, CANCELS CAU-
TION
ECAM HANDLING:
-PF: I HAVE CONTROLS & COMMUNICATION; ANY OEB OR TECH NOTICE
-PM: NO OEB, NO TECH NOTICE
-PF: ECAM ACTIONS
-PM: PERFORMS ECAM ACTIONS; READS: „AUTO CRANK IN PROGRESS‟
-PF: : “STOP ECAM”
:INFORM GRD CREW: READS OUT THE ECAM LINE AND ASKS THEM TO INFORM MCC
(MCC CLEARANCE IS REQD FOR MANUAL VALVE OPERATION)
:INFORM GROUND-“GRD I FLY 001, START FAULT, WILL HOLD GROUND POSITION AND
WILL CALL WHEN READY FOR TAXI” (DON‟T SPECIFY TIME!!!)
-PF: CONTINUE ECAM
-PM: FINISHES ECAM; “STATUS?”
-PF: STANDBY STATUS; ANY NORMAL C/L ,ANY OEB, ANY COMPUTER RESET
-PM: CONFIRMS “YES/NO”
-PF: READ STATUS/CONTINUE ECAM
-PM: READS STATUS;ON COMPLTION OF STATUS, ASKS “REMOVE STATUS”
-PF: REMOVE STATUS
-PM: “ECAM ACTIONS COMPLETE”
-PF: “ANY ABNORMAL PAPER C/L?”
-PM: CHECKS THE ABNORMAL FROM FCOM; COMES TO THE POINT ABOUT THE NEXT
COURSE OF ACTION AND THEN GOES TO THE RELEVANT SUPPLEMENTARY PROCE-
DURE TO START THE ENGINE
: FIRST READS THE ENTIRE PROCEDURE, AND THEN
: READS THE „TO DO ACTIONS‟
-PF: DOES THE START ACTIONS AS READ BY PM
*** REMEMBER: ALL SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, PM READS, PF DOES
*** IN NEO ENGINES IF THERE IS A FUEL LEAK FROM THE ENGINE, ABORT START: MAIN-
TENANCE ACTION IS DUE BEFORE THE FLIGHT
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
GRD PNEUMATIC START: (WHEN APU IS INOPERATIVE) AFTER START, ASK GRD CREW TO
DISCONNECT: EXT PWR, AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM, AND EXTERNAL PNEUMATIC
APU FIRE AT APU SHUTDOWN AFTER ENGINE START:
- APU AUTO SHUTDOWN AND AUTO FIRE BOTTLE DISCHARGE WILL TAKE PLACE
- OBVIOUSLY IT IS A “NO GO”!
- CHECK FIRE PUSH BUTTON LIGHT AND ALSO CONFIRM FROM GROUND CREW
ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF FIRE
- IF FIRE IS STILL ON: EVACUATE USING THE EVACUATION CHECKLIST
*DO NOT INITIATE AN EVACUATION WITHOUT THE CHECKLIST, LEST YOU EVACUATE
WITH ENGINES RUNNING!
- EVACUATION: DO NOT FORGET TO INFORM ATC ABOUT EVACUATION
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
DURING TAXI
BE PREPARED FOR:
- LOSS OF BRAKING (USING MAX REVERSERS IS A LEGAL REUIREMENT!!!)
- NOSE WHEEL STEETING FAULT: WITH OR WITHOUT ECAM
: WITH ECAM- IMPLIES THE ENTIRE SYSTEM HAS FAILED; SO STOP THE AIRCRAFT
IMMEDIATELY
: WITHOUT ECAM- IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ONLY THE PF SIDE HAS FAILED, SO HAND
OVER CONTROLS TO PM TO MANOEUVER AND STOP THE A/C
: INFORM ATC; CARRY OUT ECAM/RESET
- BSCU FAULT
- FAILURES RELATED TO MEL OR THOSE IN THE TECH NOTICES
LOSS OF BRAKING
TASK-SHARING: THE PF CALLS FOR “LOSS OF BRAKING" AND THE PNF THEN EXECUTES THE
ACTION.IN CASE OF URGENCY AND CONDITIONS PERMITTING, THE PF CAN HIMSELF SELECT
THE A/SKID & N/WSTRG SW OFF WITHOUT CALL.
IF NO BRAKING AVAILABLE:
REV..................................................................................................................MAX
BRAKE PEDALS..............................................................................................RELEASE
A/SKID & N/W STRG.......................................................................................OFF
BRAKE PEDALS..............................................................................................PRESS
MAX BRK PR...................................................................................................1000 PSI
IF STILL NO BRAKING:
PARKING BRAKE......................SHORT AND SUCCESSIVE APPLICATIONS
PF PM
- ANNOUNCE………….”LOSS OF BRAKING; ANTI SKID OFF”
-REVERSERS………………………………..MAXIMUM
-BRAKE PEDALS…………………………...RELEASE CHECK: BRAKE PEDALS………………………….. RELEASED
-BRAKE PEDALS………………………...…PRESS; MAX 1000PSI ANTI-SKID AND N/W STEERING…………………..OFF
BRAKE PRESSURE: MONITOR AND CALL OUT; MAX
1000PSI
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
FOR REJECT:
: CALL “STOP”
: THRUST LEVER IDLE, MAX REVERSERS (GET TO IDLE IF DIRECTIONAL CONTOL
ISSUES)
: CHECK DECELLERATION: PREFERABLY „MAX AUTO BRK‟ BUT BE PREPARED FOR
MANUAL BRK
: MAINTAIN CENTER LINE
: A/C STOPS, STOW REVERSERS, PARKING BRK ON
: ON PA “ATTENTION CREW, AT STATIONS”
: ORDER ECAM ACTIONS
: BUILD UP DECISION OF EVACUATION
: IF REQD “PASSENGERS EVACUATE, EVACUATE, EVACUATE”
: IF NOT REQD “CREW AND PAX PLEASE REMAIN SEATED”
*USE ATC/FIRE SERVICES INPUTS FOR DECISION MAKING
AT LOWER SPEED USE TILLER FOR DIRECTIONAL CONTROL, BUT KEEP IN MIND THAT IT
WILL BE MORE SENSITIVE/RESPONSIVE AND SO IT CAN CREATE ITS OWN PROBLEMS IF
NOT HANDLED WELL
REVERSERS AND BRAKES: FULL REVERSE MAY BE USED UNTIL COMING TO A COMPLETE
STOP. BUT, IF THERE IS ENOUGH RUNWAY AVAILABLE AT THE END OF THE DECELERATION,
IT IS PREFERABLE TO REDUCE REVERSE THRUST WHEN PASSING 70 KT. THE USE OF FULL
REVERSE UNTIL COMPLETE STOP MUST BE REPORTED IN THE LOGBOOK FOR MAINTENANCE
ACTION.
NOTE: 1. IF THE BRAKE RESPONSE DOES NOT SEEM APPROPRIATE FOR THE RUNWAY CON-
DITION, FULL MANUAL BRAKING SHOULD BE APPLIED AND MAINTAINED. IF IN DOUBT, TAKE
OVERMANUALLY. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO CLEAR THE RUNWAY, UNTIL IT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR
THAT AN
EVACUATION IS NOT NECESSARY AND THAT IT IS SAFE TO DO SO.
2. IF THE AUTOBRAKE IS UNSERVICEABLE, THE CAPTAIN SIMULTANEOUSLY REDUCES
THRUST AND APPLIES MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON BOTH PEDALS.
THE AIRCRAFT WILL STOP IN THE MINIMUM DISTANCE, ONLY IF THE BRAKE PEDALS ARE
MAINTAINED FULLY PRESSED UNTIL THE A/C COMES TO A STOP.
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
EVACUATION
*ECAM: PM DOES WITHOUT ANY CONFIRMATION FROM PF
EVACUATION C/L:
PM : “ READS AS IT IS”
PF : CONFIRMS THE RESPONSE “AS IT IS”
PM : AIRCRAFT/PARKING BRK………..STOP/ON
PF : STOP ON
PM : ATC (VHF1)………………………….NOTIFY
PF : NOTIFIED (IF NOT DONE, DO IT NOW)
PM : CABIN CREW (PA)………………….ALERT
PF : ALERTED
PM : ∆P ……………………………………..CHECK; “NOT APPLICABLE”
PM : ENG MASTER (ALL)…………………OFF
HE WILL NOW PUT OFF ALL ENGINES
BEFORE ENGINES OFF, HE WILL PUT DOME LT TO BRIGHT
PF : OFF
PM : FIRE Pb (ALL: ENG AND APU)…….PUSH
HE WILL NOW PUSH ALL FIRE Pb
PF : WILL MONITOR/CHK AND THEN CONFIRM: PUSHED
PM : AGENTS (ENG&APU)………………...AS REQUIRED (THE ONES ON FIRE)
PF : ENG1/2//APU AGENTS USED; OTHERS NOT REQUIRED
PM : IF EVACUATION REQUIRED
PF : ANALYSE/DECIDE (INPUTS FROM ATC/FIRE CHIEF TO BUILD DECISION).
EVACUATION REQUIRED
o PM : EVACUATION INITIATE
o PF : “PAX EVACUATE,EVACUATE,EVACUATE”
EVACUATION NOT REQUIRED
o PF : “CABIN CREW AND PAX,KINDLY REMAIN SEATED”
PROCEDURE DURING A REJECTED TAKEOFF:
CAPT FO
"STOP"............................................................................ANNOUNCE REVERSERS................................................CHECK/ANNOUNCE
Simultaneously: DECELERATION..........................................CHECK/ANNOUNCE
THRUST LEVERS..........................................................IDLE ANY AUDIO..................................................CANCEL
REVERSE THRUST.......................................................MAX AVAIL
AIRCRAFT STOPPED
Consider posn the a/c to keep any possible fire away from fuselage- ATC...............................................................NOTIFY
taking into account the wind direction. “TWR, IFLY 210, STOPPING”
REVERSERS..................................................................STOWED
PARKING BRAKE..........................................................ON
CABIN CREW.......................”ATTENTION CREW! AT STATIONS”
EMER EVAC Procedure (QRH)....................LOCATE
ECAM ACTIONS.............................................................ORDER
ECAM ACTIONS...........................................PERFORM
The a/c should remain stationary while the crew evaluates the sit.
IF EVACUATION REQUIRED
EMER EVAC Procedure (QRH)..............................IMPLEMENT
EMER EVAC Procedure.............................................. APPLY
Notifies the cabin crew to start the evacuation AIRCRAFT/PARKING BRK.....................................STOP/ON
“PASSENGERS EVACUATE,EVACUATE,EVACUATE” ATC (VHF 1)............................................................NOTIFY
Activates the EVAC command (NOTAC 11) “TWR, IFLY 201 EVACUATING ON R/Y, ASSISTANCE RE-
QUIRED”
CABIN CREW (PA).................................................ALERT
ΔP (only if MAN CAB PR has been used)..............CHECK ZERO
If not zero, MODE selector on MAN, V/S CTL FULL UP.
ENG MASTERS (ALL).............................................OFF
FIRE Pushbuttons (ALL : ENG and APU)................PUSH
AGENTS (ENG and APU)........................................AS RQRD
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
Page 38 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
PF PM
0
-VR………………………… ROTATE TO 12.5 ; FOLLOW SRS
MAINTAIN WINGS LEVEL
APPLY RUDDERS TO CENTER β TGT -POSITIVE CLIMB……………………………………..ANNOUNCE
TRIM RUDDERS
-POSITIVE CLIMB…………………………………………...GEAR UP
-GEAR UP
-FLIGHT PATH UNDER CONTROL…………………..ENGAGE AP
-MONITOR FLIGHT PATH
-R/T:“MAYDAY MAYDAY MADAY IFLY 201 ENG FAILURE,
MAINTAINING T/O LEG” OR FOLLOW SID/EO SID
-ECAM ACTIONS…………………………………….ORDER
-ECAM ACTIONS………………………………………..PERFORM
-SECURE ENGINE:
NO DAMAGE - ENG MASTER OFF
DAMAGED ENG - AGENT 1 DISCHARGED
ENG FIRE - AGENT 2 DISCHARGED
- CALL “ENGINE SECURED”
-AT~1400‟…………………….....STOP ECAM
-AT 1500‟………………………..PUSH V/S KNOB TO LEVEL OFF
-„F‟ SPEED………………………FLAP 1
-„S‟ SPEED……………………....FLAP 0
-SPEED ~GREEN DOT………..OPEN CLIMB
-„LVR MCT‟ FLASHES…………THRUST LEVERS TO MCT
- “CONTINUE ECAM”
-COMPLETE ECAM; consider OEB, if applicable
-“STOP ECAM” -“STATUS?”
-FINISH AFTER T/O/CLIMB CL -AFTER T/O, CLIMB CL…………………………..COMPLETE
-ANY COMPUTER RESET…….DO THE RESET
-CHECK QRH FOR ANY COMPUTER RESET AND RESET C/B
-IF NO DAMAGE………………..CONSIDER RELIGHT
-“REVIEW STATUS” -RELIGHT…………………….FROM QRH „READ AND DO‟
-“REMOVE STATUS” -STATUS…………………..REVIEW
-REMOVE STATUS
-FORDEC
-NITES
Page 39 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
*GA ACTIONS IN SINGLE ENGINE IS THE SAME AS EFATO: JUST THAT EVERYTHING HAP-
PENS SLIGHTLY FASTER
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
Page 41 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
: PLAN AN EARLY STAB APPR i.e. ALL CONFIG AND CHECKS OVER 1NM BEFOREFDP
: ASK FOR LONG VECTORS: INTENTION IS TO BE WELL SETTLED ON LOC AND SP UN-
DER CONTROL BEFORE GLIDE INTERCEPT
: ON INTERCEPT LEG:
BIRD ON, FDs OFF, “T” SCAN
BE AT PLATFORM ALTITUDE
CONFIG 1 AND „S‟ SPEED
IF A/THR AVAILABLE, SPEED MANAGED
0.5 NM FROM FINAL COMMENCE TURN WITH 50 BANK AND ASK
FOR FINAL TRACK TO BE SET: CROSS CHK FINAL APPR TRACK
ONCE LOC LIVE, COORDINATE TURN TO ROLL OUT CORRECTLY
: ON FINAL TRACK:
ENTIRE GAME IS ON SCAN: “T” SCAN FASTER
CONFIGURE EARLY
CONTROL SPEED WITH ANTICIPATION: SMALL VARIATIONS
LOCK ARMS: STICK MOVEMENT ONLY BY WRIST MOVEMENT
SMALL CORECTION FOR LOC AND G/S: NOT >50&10 RESPECTIVE-
LY; ANTICIPATE CORRECTIONS
IN SINGLE ENG, CENTER β TGT AND TRIM; DO NOT TRIM IN
TURNS; ANTICIPATE RUDDERS FOR THRUST VARIATIONS
*MONITOR FMA AND ECAM FOR ADDITIONAL FAILURES
o WITH TRACK INDEX:
WHOLE GAME IS TO BE PLAYED AROUND THE BLUE TRACK INDEX
SCAN AND ANTICIPATE CORRECTIONS,NO LARGE CORRECTIONS
o WITHOUT TRACK INDEX:
STABILISE EARLY ON FINAL TRACK
OFFSET REQD FOR X-WIND IS = 1/3 OF X-WIND. SO, IF X-WIND IS
15 Kt, 50 OFFSET REQD TO TRACK CORRECTLY: ROLL OUT WITH
OFFSET
ILS DAGGER CAN BE USED AS THE TRACK INDEX AND GAME
PLAYED AROUND IT WITH THE TRACK DIAMOND. SO, IF LOC DI-
AMOND HAS GONE TO THE LEFT, SET THE TRACK DIAMOND TO
THE LEFT OF THE ILS DAGGER AND WAIT FOR LOC DIAMOND TO
RETURN TOWARDS THE CENTER; ANTICIPATE AND REDUCE THE
CORRECTION TO FINALLY PLACE THE TRACK DIAMOND CEN-
TERED ON THE ILS DAGGER TO KEEP LOC CENTERED
BECAUSE OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED CORRECTION, SCAN FAST-
ER FOR G/S AND SPEED: KEEP THEM UNDER CONTROL TO GET
MORE TIME TO JUDGE AND ANTICIPATE LOC CORRECTN BETTER
- ALL CORRECTIONS TO BE:
SMALL AND GENTLE; ONLY WITH WRIST
FOR SPEED
ANTICIPATE AND “KILL” THE TREND ARROW
SMALL CORRECTIONS OF THRUST: (PERSONAL: MAKE VERY
SMALL THRUST VARIATION ON ONE THRUST LEVER AT A TIME
USING THE OTHER LEVER AS A FULCRUM AND THEN MATCHING
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
MEMORY ITEMS: WET LUG SS
WINDSHEAR: PREDICTIVETHE “W/S AHEAD” MESSAGE IS DISPLAYED ON EACH PFD. THE COLOR OF THE MESSAGE DEPENDS
ON THE SEVERITY AND LOCATION OF THE WINDSHEAR.
NOTE: WHEN A PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR ALERT (″WINDSHEAR AHEAD″ OR "GO AROUND WINDSHEARAHEAD") IS TRIGGERED,
IF THE FLIGHT CREW MAKES A POSITIVE VERIFICATION THAT NO HAZARD EXISTS, THEN THE ALERT MAY BE DISREGARDED,
AS LONG AS:
‐ THERE ARE NO OTHER SIGNS OF POSSIBLE WINDSHEAR CONDITIONS, AND
‐ THE REACTIVE WINDSHEAR SYSTEM IS OPERATIONAL.
*KNOWN CASES OF SPURIOUS PWS ALERTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED AT SOME AIRPORTS, DURING EITHER TAKEOFF OR LDG,
DUE TO THE SPECIFIC OBSTACLE ENVIRONMENT. HOWEVER, ALWAYS RELY ON ANY REACTIVE W/S (″WINDSHEAR″).
W/S AHEAD RED
TAKEOFF:
ASSOCIATED WITH AN AURAL SYNTHETIC VOICE “WINDSHEAR AHEAD, WINDSHEAR AHEAD”.
BEFORE TAKEOFF:
DELAY TAKEOFF, OR SELECT THE MOST FAVORABLE RUNWAY.
DURING THE TAKEOFF RUN:
REJECT TAKEOFF.
NOTE: PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR ALERTS ARE INHIBITED ABOVE 100 KTS UNTIL 50 FT.
WHEN AIRBORNE: CALL “ WINDSHEAR, TOGA”
THR LEVERS................................................................................................................................TOGA
AS USUAL, THE SLAT/FLAP CONFIGURATION CAN BE CHANGED, PROVIDED THE WINDSHEAR IS NOT ENTERED.
AP (IF ENGAGED)..............................................................................................................................KEEP ON
SRS ORDERS...............................................................................................................................FOLLOW
IF NECESSARY, THE FLIGHT CREW MAY PULL THE SIDESTICK FULLY BACK.
NOTE: 1. AUTOPILOT DISENGAGES IF THE ANGLE OF ATTACK VALUE GOES ABOVE Α PROT.
2. IF THE FD ARE NOT DISPLAYED, MOVE TOWARD AN INITIAL PITCH ATTITUDE OF 17.5 °. THEN, IFNECESSARY, TO
PREVENT A LOSS IN ALTITUDE, INCREASE THE PITCH ATTITUDE.
LANDING:n
ASSOCIATED WITH AN AURAL SYNTHETIC VOICE “GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD”.
GO AROUND......................................................................................PERFORM
AP (IF ENGAGED).................................................................................... KEEP ON
IF NECESSARY, THE FLIGHT CREW MAY PULL THE SIDESTICK FULLY BACK.
NOTE: 1. AUTOPILOT DISENGAGES IF THE ANGLE OF ATTACK VALUE GOES ABOVE Α PROT.
2. IF THE FD ARE NOT DISPLAYED, MOVE TOWARD AN INITIAL PITCH ATTITUDE OF 17.5 °. THEN, IF NECESSARY, TO
PREVENT A LOSS IN ALTITUDE, INCREASE THE PITCH ATTITUDE.
W/S AHEAD AMBER
APPLY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES, AS INDICATED BELOW:
BEFORE TAKEOFF:
- DELAY TAKEOFF UNTIL CONDITIONS IMPROVE.
- EVALUATE TAKEOFF CONDITIONS:
- USING OBSERVATIONS AND EXPERIENCE,CHECKING WEATHER CONDITIONS.SELECT THE MOST FAVORABLE RUN-
WAY (CONSIDERING LOCATION OF THE LIKELY WINDSHEAR).
- USE THE WEATHER RADAR OR THE PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR SYSTEM BEFORE COMMENCING TAKEOFF TO ENSURE
THAT THE FLIGHT PATH CLEARS ANY POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS.
- SELECT TOGA THRUST.
MONITOR CLOSELY AIRSPEED AND AIRSPEED TREND DURING THE TAKEOFF RUN FOR EARLYSIGNS OF WINDSHEAR.
DURING APPROACH:
- DELAY LANDING OR DIVERT TO ANOTHER AIRPORT UNTIL CONDITIONS ARE MORE FAVORABLE.
- EVALUATE CONDITION FOR A SAFE LANDING BY:
- USING OBSERVATIONS AND EXPERIENCE,CHECKING WEATHER CONDITIONS.
- USE THE WEATHER RADAR.
- SELECT THE MOST FAVORABLE RUNWAY, CONSIDERING ALSO WHICH HAS THE MOSTAPPROPRIATE APPROACH AID.
- SELECT FLAPS 3.
- USE MANAGED SPEED IN THE APPROACH PHASE.
- CHECK BOTH FDS ENGAGED IN ILS, FPA OR V/S.
- ENGAGE THE AUTOPILOT, FOR A MORE ACCURATE APPR AND EARLIER RECOGNITION OFDEVIATION FROM THE
BEAM, WHEN ILS IS AVAILABLE.
NOTE: ‐ WHEN USING THE GS MINI-FUNCTION, ASSOCIATED WITH MANAGED SPEED,THE SYSTEM WILL CARRY EXTRA SPEED
IN STRONG WIND CONDITIONS.
‐ IN CASE OF STRNG OR GUSTY CROSSWIND GREATER THAN 20 KT, REFER TO QRH PER-C VAPP DETERMINATION WITHOUT
FAILURE
VAPP=VLS + APPR COR
IN CASE OF STRONG OR GUSTY CROSSWIND GREATER THAN 20KT, VAPP SHOULD BE AT LEAST VLS+5KT. THE 5KT INCRE-
MENT ABOVE VLS MAY BEINCREASEDUPTO 15KT AT THE FLIGHT CREW'S DISCRETION.
Page 44 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
WINDSHEAR: REACTIVE
A RED FLAG “WINDSHEAR” IS DISPLAYED ON EACH PFD ASSOCIATED WITH AN AURAL SYNTHETIC VOICE “WINDSHEAR” RE-
PEATED THREE TIMES. IF WINDSHEAR IS DETECTED EITHER BY THE SYSTEM OR BY PILOT OBSERVATION, APPLY THE FOL-
LOWING RECOVERY TECHNIQUE:
AT TAKEOFF:
IF BEFORE V1: CALL “ STOP”
THE TAKEOFF SHOULD BE REJECTED ONLY IF SIGNIFICANT AIRSPEED VARIATIONS OCCUR BELOW INDICATED V1 AND THE
PILOT DECIDES THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT RUNWAY REMAINING TO STOP THE AIRPLANE.
IF AFTER V1: CALL “ WINDSHEAR, TOGA”
THR LEVERS...........................................................................................TOGA
REACHING VR.........................................................................................ROTATE
SRS ORDERS..........................................................................................FOLLOW
IF NECESSARY, THE FLIGHT CREW MAY PULL THE SIDESTICK FULLY BACK.
NOTE: IF THE FD BARS ARE NOT DISPLAYED, MOVE TOWARD AN INITIAL PITCH ATTITUDE OF 17.5 °. THEN, IFNECESSARY, TO
PREVENT A LOSS IN ALTITUDE, INCREASE THE PITCH ATTITUDE.
AIRBORNE, INITIAL CLIMB OR LANDING: CALL “ WINDSHEAR, TOGA”
THR LEVERS AT TOGA..........................................................................SET OR CONFIRM
AP (IF ENGAGED).........................................................................................KEEP ON
SRS ORDERS..........................................................................................FOLLOW
IF NECESSARY, THE FLIGHT CREW MAY PULL THE SIDESTICK FULLY BACK.
DO NOT CHANGE CONFIGURATION (SLATS/FLAPS, GEAR) UNTIL OUT OFWINDSHEAR.
CLOSELY MONITOR FLIGHT PATH AND SPEED.
RECOVER SMOOTHLY TO NORMAL CLIMB OUT OF WINDSHEAR.
NOTE: 1. AUTOPILOT DISENGAGES IF THE ANGLE OF ATTACK VALUE GOES ABOVE Α PROT.
2. IF THE FD BARS ARE NOT DISPLAYED, MOVE TOWARD AN INITIAL PITCH ATTITUDE OF 17.5 °. THEN, IFNECESSARY,
TO PREVENT A LOSS IN ALTITUDE, INCREASE THE PITCH ATTITUDE.
PF PM
-TAKE OVER CTRLS; CALL “WINDSHEAR, TOGA”: GO TOGA◦ -MONITOR AND CALL OUT HT, SPEED,ROC/ROD WIND VE-
-ROTATE TO FOLLOW SRS/17.5⁰ ; IF NECESSARY:STICK FULLY LOCITY
BACK -ONCE OUT OF WINDSHEAR, CLEAN UP THE A/C
-ONCE OUT OF WINDSHEAR, ENGAGE AP AND CLEAN UP THE -R/T: “IFLY…..ENCOUNTERED WINDSHEAR FROM ---FT to---
A/C FT”
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
EMERGENCY DESCENT:THE EMERGENCY DESCENT SHOULD ONLY BE INITIATED UPON POSITIVE CONFIRMATION THAT CA-
BIN ALTITUDE AND RATE OF CLIMB IS EXCESSIVE AND UNCONTROLLABLE. THE CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT WARNING MUST BE
CONSIDERED AS A CONFIRMATION THAT THE CABIN ALTITUDE IS EXCESSIVE, EVEN IF NOT CONFIRMED ON THE CAB PRESS
SD PAGE. THE CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT WARNING CAN BE TRIGGERED BY A CABIN PRESSURE SENSOR DIFFERENT FROM
THE ONE USED TO CONTROL THE PRESSURE AND DISPLAY THE CABIN ALTITUDE ON THE SD.
The flight crew should perform the actions of the EMER DESCENT in two steps:
‐ First step: Apply the memory items.
‐ Second step: Perform the read-&-do procedure (ECAM or QRH).
FIRST LOOP: IMMEDIATE ACTION
CREW OXY MASKS...................................................................................................................................................ON
COCKPIT COMMUNICATION…………………………………………………………………………………………….ESTABLISH
SIGNS.........................................................................................................................................................................ON
EMER DESCENT........................................................................................................................................................INITIATE
THE RECOMMENDATION IS TO DESCEND WITH THE AP ENGAGED: AFM
‐ TURN THE ALT SELECTOR KNOB AND PULL :::CAB PR - EXCESS CAB ALT
‐ TURN THE HDG SELECTOR KNOB AND PULL If above FL 100: Use crew oxygen masks. " If below
FL 160: Initiate descent to the higher one of: FL 100 or
‐ ADJUST THE TARGET SPD/MACH.***SPEED SELECTOR KNOB: PULL
MEA. " If above FL 160: -Turn on cabin signs. -Initiate
THR LEVERS(IF A/THR NOT ENGAGED)......................................................................IDLE emergency descent to the higher one of: FL 100 or
‐ IF AUTOTHRUST IS ENGAGED, CHECK THAT THR IDLE IS DISPLAYED ON THE FMA. MEA. Refer to EMER-90 EMER DESCENT ! If cabin
‐ IF NOT ENGAGED, RETARD THE THRUST LEVERS. altitude above 14 000 ft: Manually confirm passengers
SPD BRK..........................................................................................................................FULL oxygen masks on.
EXTENSION OF THE SPEEDBRAKES WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE VLS.
TO AVOID AP DISCONNECTION AND AUTOMATIC RETRACTION OF THE SPEEDBRAKES, DUE TO POSSIBLE ACTIVATION
OFANGLE-OF-ATTACK PROTECTION, ALLOW THE SPEED TO INCREASE BEFORE STARTING TO USE THE SPEEDBRAKES.
SECOND LOOP: WHEN DESCENT ESTABLISHED:
- ORDER ECAM/QRH
- REFINE THE DESCENT
EMER DESCENT FL100, OR MINIMUM ALLOWABLE ALTITUDE.
SPEED.........................................................................................................................................................................MAX/APPROPRIATE
CAUTION DESCEND AT THE MAXIMUM APPROPRIATE SPEED. The flight crew should suspect structural damage in case of a loud
bang, or high cabin vertical speed. IF STRUCTRAL DAMAGE SUSPECTED: SPD/MACH PB….SPEED (TO PREVENT AN INCREASE
IN THE IAS, OR TO REDUCE SPEED); CAREFUL USE OF SPEED BRAKES, TO AVOID ADDITIONAL STRESS ON AIRCRAFT
STRUCTURE.
LANDING GEAR MAY BE EXTENDED. IN SUCH A CASE, SPEED MUST BE REDUCED TO VLO/VLE.
NOTE: THE RECOMMENDATION IS TO DESCEND WITH THE AUTOPILOT ENGAGED.
ENG MODE SEL........................................................................................................................................................IGN
ATC............................................................................................................................................................................NOTIFY
NOTIFY ATC OF THE NATURE OF THE EMERGENCY, AND STATE INTENTION. THE FLIGHT CREW CAN COMMUNICATE WITH
THE ATC USING VOICE, OR CPDLC WHEN VOICE CONTACT CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED OR HAS A POOR QUALITY. *** IF NOT IN
CONTACT WITH ATC, TRANSMITA DISTRESS MASSAGE ON ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FREQUENCIES: (VHF) 121.5 MHZ, OR (HF)
2 182 KHZ, OR8 364 KHZ.
EMER DESCENT.......................................................................................................................................................ANNOUNCE(PA)
THE FLIGHT CREW MUST INFORM THE CABIN OF EMERGENCY DESCENT ON THE PA SYSTEM
ATC XPDR 7700........................................................................................................................................................CONSIDER
SQUAWK 7700 UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED BY ATC.
TO SAVE OXYGEN, SET THE OXYGEN DILUTER SELECTOR TO THE N POSITION. IF THE OXYGEN DILUTER SELECTOR RE-
MAINSAT 100 %, THE QUANTITY OF OXYGEN MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR THE ENTIRE EMERGENCY DESCENT PROFILE.
MAX FL.....................................................................................................................................................................100/MEA
IF CAB ALT > 14 000 FT:
PAX OXY MASKS......................................................................................................................................................MAN ON
THIS ACTION CONFIRMS THAT THE PASSENGER OXYGEN MASKS ARE RELEASED.
NOTE: NOTIFY THE CABIN CREW WHEN THE AIRCRAFT REACHES A SAFE FLIGHT LEVEL, AND WHEN CABIN OXYGEN IS NO
MORE NECESSARY.
EMERGENCY DESCENT: ADDITIONAL POINTS
- PF ANNOUNCES: “PRESSURISATION FAILURE, EMERG DESCENT, O2 MASK ON”
- ONCE ON O2, PF : “CAPTAIN ON O2”
PM : “FIRST OFFICER ON O2”
- R/T CALL BY PF: “MAYDAY X 3, I FLY 001, EMERG DESCENT, REQUEST MEA”
- PM: CHECK CABIN ALT, IF >14000‟, DEPLOY CABIN MASK. THIS IS TO BE CHECKED
DURING THE FMA CHECK OF THE FIRST LOOP ITSELF AND THEN CONTINUE TO
MONITOR CABIN ALT AND DEPLOY MASKS ANYTIME CABIN ALT > 14000‟.
- AT STATUS: PF: “STANDBY STATUS”
IF IN R/T CONTACT ASK FOR DIRECT TO DESTINATION
IF NOT IN R/T CONTACT, ASK PM TO SET OFFSET 15 NM L/R; PM SETS IT;
PF: “MANAGE NAV, CONTINUE ECAM”
Page 46 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
WHEN DESCENT EST, ORDER ECAM/QRH, AND REFINE: PERFORM ECAM FOLLOWED BY QRH
BY MEMORY: (IN YELLOW)
ALTITUDE ………………………………..SET (ATC/100/MEA-MORA) ENG MODE SEL...............................................................IGN
HDG……………………………………….SET EMER DESCENT.............................................................PA
SPEED....................................................MAX/APPROPRIATE “EMERGENCY DESCENT, DO NOT STAY IN LAVATORIES”
IF STRUCTRAL DAMAGE SUSPECTED: ATC XPDR 7700.........................................................CONSIDER
- SPD/MACH pb…….SPEED FMA………………………………………………………CHECK
- CAREFUL USE OF SPEED BRAKES PAX OXY MASKS.IF CAB ALT > 14 000 „................MAN ON
L/G GEAR EXTEN-
SION…………………CONSIDERATC.................................................
..................................NOTIFY
“MAYDAY MAYDAYMAYDAY IFLY….. EMERGENCY DESCENT
REQUEST MEA” IN ECAM: “STATUS?”
“STANDBY STATUS”
- IF IN R/T CONTACT ASK FOR DIRECT TO DESTINATION
- IF NOT IN R/T CONTACT, ASK PM TO SET OFFSET 15
NM L/R; PM SETS IT; PF: “MANAGE NAV, CONTIN- FINISH ECAM
UE ECAM” QRH : READ
: CREW OXYGEN MASKS DILUTION CONSIDER
Page 47 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
TCAS RA
SELECTION AND COVERAGE: ABV : IN CLIMB (+9 900 FT/-2 700 FT, ALL : IN CRUISE (+2 700 FT/-2 700 FT) {INDIGO: BELOW IN
CRUISE}, BELOW : IF THE CRUISE ALTITUDE IS WITHIN 2 000 FT OF FL 410, OR IN DESCENT (+2 700 FT/-9 900 FT)
PF PM
Page 48 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATIONS
THE ADRS DETECT MOST OF THE FAILURES AFFECTING THE AIRSPEED OR ALTITUDE INDICATIONS. THESE FAILURESLEAD
TO:
‐ LOSE THE ASSOCIATED SPEED OR ALTITUDE INDICATIONS IN THE COCKPIT
‐ TRIGGER THE ASSOCIATED ECAM ALERTS.
HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE SOME CASES WHERE AN AIRSPEED AND/OR ALTITUDE OUTPUT IS ERRONEOUS, WHILETHE ADRS
DO NOT DETECT IT AS ERRONEOUS. IN SUCH A CASE, NO ECAM ALERT IS TRIGGERED AND THE COCKPITINDICATIONS MAY
APPEAR TO BE NORMAL WHEREAS THEY ARE ACTUALLY FALSE. FLIGHT CREW MUST HAVE INMIND THE TYPICAL SYMPTOMS
ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH CASES IN ORDER TO DETECT THIS SITUATION EARLY ANDAPPLY THE "UNRELIABLE SPEED IN-
DIC/ADR CHECK PROC" QRH PROCEDURE.
THE "UNRELIABLE SPEED INDIC/ADR CHECK PROC" PROCEDURE HAS TWO OBJECTIVES:
‐ TO IDENTIFY AND ISOLATE THE AFFECTED ADR(S)
‐ IF NOT SUCCESSFUL, TO PROVIDE GUIDELINES TO FLY THE AIRCRAFT UNTIL LANDING.
IT INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING STEPS:
1. MEMORY ITEMS (IF NECESSARY),
2. TROUBLESHOOTING AND ISOLATION,
3. FLIGHT USING PITCH/THRUST REFERENCES OR THE BACK-UP SPEED SCALE (BUSS, BELOW FL 250), IF THETROUBLE-
SHOOTING HAS NOT ENABLED TO ISOLATE THE FAULTY ADR(S).
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
Page 50 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
GPWS ALERTS
THE GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM (GPWS) IS EMBEDDED IN THE T2CAS SYSTEM (TERRAIN ANDTRAFFIC COLLI-
SION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM) AND GENERATES AURAL AND VISUAL WARNINGS, WHEN ONE OF THEFOLLOWING CONDITIONS
OCCURS BETWEEN RADIO HEIGHTS 10/30 FT AND 2 450 FT.
‐ MODE 1: EXCESSIVE RATE OF DESCENT
‐ MODE 2: EXCESSIVE TERRAIN CLOSURE RATE
‐ MODE 3: ALTITUDE LOSS AFTER TAKEOFF, OR GO-AROUND
‐ MODE 4: UNSAFE TERRAIN CLEARANCE, WHEN NOT IN LANDING CONFIGURATION
‐ MODE 5: TOO FAR BELOW GLIDESLOPE.
IN ADDITION TO THE BASIC GPWS FUNCTIONS, THE GPWS PROVIDES PREDICTIVE FUNCTIONS. THE PREDICTIVEFUNCTIONS
ARE BASED ON A WORLDWIDE TERRAIN DATABASE, AND ON THE MODELING OF THE CLIMB PERFORMANCECAPABILITY OF
THE AIRCRAFT.
THE ALTITUDE USED BY THE GPWS IS COMPUTED BASED ON THE BAROMETRIC ALTITUDE, THE RADIO ALTITUDE ANDTHE
GPS ALTITUDE IS ORDER TO REDUCE BARO SETTING ERRORS.
DEPENDING ON THE AIRCRAFT POSITION AND PERFORMANCE, IN RELATION TO THE TERRAIN, THE GPWS TRIGGERS:
‐ TERRAIN AHEAD, PULL UP WARNING
‐ AVOID TERRAIN WARNING
‐ TERRAIN AHEAD CAUTION
‐ TOO LOW TERRAIN CAUTION
DURING NIGHT OR IMC CONDITIONS, APPLY THE PROCEDURE IMMEDIATELY. DO NOT DELAY REACTION FOR DIAGNOSIS.
DURING DAYLIGHT VMC CONDITIONS, WITH TERRAIN AND OBSTACLES CLEARLY IN SIGHT, THE ALERT MAY BE CONSIDERED
CAUTIONARY. TAKE POSITIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION UNTIL THE ALERT STOPS OR A SAFE TRAJECTORY IS ENSURED.
"AVOID TERRAIN" OR ″PULL UP″ OR ″TERRAIN AHEAD PULL UP
CALL “PULL UP, TOGA”SIMULTANEOUSLY:
AP.....................................................................................................................OFF
PITCH...............................................................................................................PULL UP
PULL TO FULL BACKSTICK AND MAINTAIN IN THAT POSITION. DO NOT FOLLOW THE FDs.
SIMULTANEOUSLY, THRUST LEVERS.............................................................TOGA
SPEED BRAKES LEVER.....................................................................................CHECK RETRACTED
BANK................................................................................................................WINGS LEVEL OR ADJUST
WHEN FLIGHT PATH IS SAFE AND THE WARNING STOPS:
DECREASE PITCH ATTITUDE AND ACCELERATE.
WHEN SPEED IS ABOVE VLS, AND VERTICAL SPEED IS POSITIVE:
CLEAN UP AIRCRAFT, AS REQUIRED.
“TERRAIN TERRAIN” OR“TOO LOW TERRAIN”:
ADJUST THE FLIGHT PATH OR INITIATE A GO-AROUND.
″TERRAIN AHEAD″:
ADJUST THE FLIGHT PATH. STOP DESCENT. CLIMB AND/OR TURN, AS NECESSARY, BASED ONANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE
INSTRUMENTS AND INFORMATION.
“SINK RATE” OR“DON‟T SINK”:ADJUST PITCH ATTITUDE AND THRUST TO SILENCE THE ALERT.
“TOO LOW GEAR” OR“TOO LOW FLAPS”: PERFORM A GO-AROUND.
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
STALL AT LIFTOFF
STALL: IN FLIGHT
AS SOON AS ANY STALL INDICATION (COULD BE AURAL WARNING, BUFFET...) IS RECOGNIZED, APPLY THE IMMEDIATEAC-
TIONS:
CALL “STALL, I HAVE CONTROLS”
NOSE DOWN PITCH CONTROL....................................................................................................APPLY
THIS WILL REDUCE ANGLE OF ATTACK
NOTE: IN CASE OF LACK OF PITCH DOWN AUTHORITY, REDUCING THRUST MAY BE NECESSARY.
***IF BELOW 20,000‟ AND IN CLEAN CONFIG, SELECT FLAP 1 IMMEDIATELY
BANK...............................................................................................................................................WINGS LEVEL
WHEN OUT OF STALL (NO LONGER STALL INDICATIONS) :
THRUST..................................................................................................................................INCREASE SMOOTHLY AS NEEDED
NOTE: IN CASE OF ONE ENGINOP, PROGRESSIVELY COMPENSATE THE THRUST ASYMMETRY WITHRUDDER.
SPEEDBRAKES..............................................................................................................................CHECK RETRACTED
FLIGHT PATH..................................................................................................................................RECOVER SMOOTHLY
***CHECK SP ABOVE VLS AND POSITIVE TREND; RECOVER ENSURING SP DOES NOT DROP BELOW VLS
IF IN CLEAN CONFIGURATION AND BELOW 20 000 FT:
FLAP 1.............................................................................................................................................SELECT
NOTE: IF A RISK OF GRD CONTACT EXISTS, ONCE CLEARLYOUT OF STALL (NO LONGER STALL INDICATIONS), EST SMOOTH-
LY A POSITIVE CLIMB GRADIENT.
*** IN STALL RECOVERY, LOWERING THE ATTITUDE/ AIRCRAFT BOX TO THE BIRD IS A GOOD IDEA AS IT WILL IMMEDIATELY
UNSTALL THE AIRCRAFT AND THEN SLOWLY RAISE THE AIRCRAFT BOX/ATTITUDE WITH THE „RIDING‟ BIRD (THE BIRD AUTO-
MATICALLY RISES WITH THE INCREASING SPEED); THIS WAY THE CHANCES OF ANOTHER STALL WARNING COMING UP IS
AVOIDED. IN THE LATER PART OF PULL OUT, START OPENING THRUST TO ASSIST BUILD UP OF SPEED.
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
ENGINE RELIGHT::: JUST FOR AWARENESS
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
ENGINE-OUT LANDING AUTOLAND IS AVAILABLE WITH ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE, AND MAXIMUM USE OF THE AP SHOULD
BE MADE TOMINIMISE CREW WORKLOAD. IF REQUIRED, A MANUAL APPROACH AND LANDING WITH ONE ENGINE INOPERA-
TIVE ISCONVENTIONAL. THE PILOT SHOULD TRIM TO KEEP THE SLIP INDICATION CENTERED. IT REMAINS YELLOW AS LONG
ASTHE THRUST ON THE REMAINING ENGINE(S) IS BELOW A CERTAIN VALUE.WITH FLAP SELECTED AND ABOVE THIS THRE-
SHOLD VALUE, THE INDICATOR BECOMES THE BLUE BETA TARGET. THIS ISA VISUAL CUE THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS AP-
PROACHING ITS MAXIMUM THRUST CAPABILITY.DO NOT SELECT THE GEAR DOWN TOO EARLY, AS LARGE AMOUNTS OF
POWER WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN LEVEL
FLIGHT AT HIGH WEIGHTS AND/OR HIGH ALTITUDE AIRPORTS.TO MAKE THE LANDING RUN EASIER, THE RUDDER TRIM CAN
BE RESET TO ZERO IN THE LATER STAGES OF THEAPPROACH. ON PRESSING THE RUDDER TRIM RESET BUTTON, THE TRIM
IS REMOVED AND THE PILOT SHOULDANTICIPATE THE INCREASED RUDDER FORCE REQUIRED. WITH RUDDER TRIM AT ZE-
RO, THE NEUTRAL RUDDER PEDALPOSITION CORRESPONDS TO ZERO RUDDER AND ZERO NOSE WHEEL DEFLECTION.
ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE GO-AROUND A ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE GO-AROUND IS SIMILAR TO A GO-AROUND FLOWN
WITH ALL ENGINES. ON THE APPLICATION OF TOGA, THE FLIGHT CREW MUST APPLY RUDDER PROMPTLY TO COMPENSATE
FOR THE INCREASE IN THRUST AND CONSEQUENTLY TO KEEP THE BETA TARGET CENTERED. PROVIDED THE FLAP LEVER
IS SELECTED TO FLAP 1 OR GREATER, SRS WILL ENGAGE AND WILL BE FOLLOWED. IF SRS IS NOT AVAILABLE, THE INITIAL
TARGET PITCH ATTITUDE WILL BE 12.5 °.THE LATERAL FD MODE WILL BE GA TRK (OR NAV IF OPTION INSTALLED) AND THIS
MUST BE CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO TERRAIN CLEARANCE. AT THE ENGINE-OUT ACCELERATION ALTITUDE, APPLY
THE SAME TECHNIQUE AS DESCRIBED EARLIER. REFER TOAO-020 ENGINE FAILURE AFTER V1.
Page 55 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
ENGINE FIRE
ON GROUND
THR LEVERS...............................................................................................................................IDLE
WHEN A/C IS STOPPED:
PARKING BRK.............................................................................................................................ON
ATC (VHF 1).................................................................................................................................NOTIFY
CABIN CREW (PA).......................................................................................................................ALERT
ENG MASTER (AFFECTED)........................................................................................................OFF
ENG FIRE P/B (AFFECTED)........................................................................................................PUSH
ENG FIRE PUSHBUTTON REMAINS ON, AS LONG AS FIRE IS DETECTED.
FADEC IS NO LONGER SUPPLIED.
AGENT 1+2...................................................................................................................................DISCH
EMER EVAC PROC......................................................................................................................APPLY
- IF FIRE STILL ON (ENG FIRE Pb LT REMAINS ON) : AGENT 2 DISCHARGE AFTER 30”
- DO NOT ATTEMPT TO RESTART THE ENGINE
*SECONDARY FAILURES:
: HYDRAULIC
: ELEC
: AIR BLEED
* IF AVAILABLE, APU MAY BE STARTED AND APU GEN MAY BE USED
* IF ENG 1 FIRE Pb IS PUSHED, APU BLEED MUST NOT BE USED
IF ENG 2 FIRE Pb IS PUSHED, APU BLEED MAY BE USED IF X-BLEED IS SHUT
Page 58 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
ENG TAILPIPE FIRE
EXTERNAL FIRE AGENTS CAN CAUSE SEVERE CORROSIVE DAMAGE ANDSHOULD, THEREFORE, ONLY BE CONSIDERED AF-
TER HAVING APPLIED FOLLOWING PROC:
MAN START.................................................................................................................................OFF
AIR BLEED PRESS......................................................................................................................ESTABLISH
BEACON.......................................................................................................................................ON
ENG MODE SEL...........................................................................................................................CRANK
MAN START..................................................................................................................................ON
WHEN BURNING HAS STOPPED :
MAN START..................................................................................................................................OFF
ENG MODE SEL...........................................................................................................................NORM
Page 59 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
SMOKE PROCEDURE
- MAYDAY, LAND ASAP RED
- GET ONTO MASKS ESTABLISH COCKPIT COMMUNICATION: MASK ON, HEADSETS ON
- ASK FOR THE QRH PROCEDURE AND GIVE MAYDAY CALL
- IF IN A CLIMB: ASSESS POSITION AND IF IN A SAFE AREA, LEVEL OUT
- TURN FOR DIVERSION/RETURN
- IF SAFE, COMMENCE DESCENT TO 10,000‟WHILE PROCEEDING TOWARDS DIVER-
SION
- CONTINUE ACTIONS FOR SMOKE BUT DON‟T FORGET RECOVERY/DIVERSION
- AFTER STARTING THE QRH PROCEDURE, REMEMBER THAT SMOKE REMOVAL IS A
VERY IMPORTANT ASPECT AND SO BEFORE STARTING THE ISOLATION OF THE
FAULTY SYSTEM, YOU COULD CONSIDER STARTING THE REMOVAL PROCEDURE, IF
SMOKE IS INCREASING, AND THEN COME BACK TO THE ISOLATION PROCEDURE
- SMOKE FROM:
LOUVERS = AIRCONDITIONING SMOKE
FLOOR = AVIONICS
- AFTER EACH PACK OFF, GIVE IT SOMETIME, 2-5 MINUTES (NO ONE HAS AN EXACT
FIGURE!!!), TO LET THE SMOKE FLOW OUT OF THE PIPELINES SO THAT YOU ARE
ABLE TO CORRECTLY ISOLATE IT. (I THINK 2 MINUTES IS A GOOD ENOUGH TIME!!!)
- LANDING ELEVATION 10,000‟, IS REQUIRED TO GET THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
TO <1PSI FOR OPENING OF THE RAM AIR
- IN EMER ELEC CONFIG, DO NOT FORGET TO RESET GEN1 LINE AND GEN2, 3 MI-
NUTES/2000‟ AAL, BEFORE LANDING; WITH THIS YOU LAND WITH ALL SYSTEMS BACK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
GREEN+BLUE FAILURE:
- SPEEDS SELECTED: GREEN DOT/210 Kt – FLAP 1
- SELECT SPEED 200Kt; STABILISE AT 200Kt IN STRAIGHT AND LEVEL
- SPEED AND THRUST STABILISED AT 200Kt, A/THR OFF
- SPEED 200 Kt, GEAR DOWN
- SELECT SPEED VFE NEXT -5Kt; IN THIS CASE 195 Kt
- SELECT FLAP 2: DISREGARD STALL WARNING AT THIS STAGE
- WHILE FLAP IS IN TRANSIT TO FLAP 2, SELECT SPEED VFE NEXT -5Kt i.e. 180 Kt IN THIS
CASE
- SELECT FLAP 3
- SELECT V APPR (IN THIS CASE V APPR= V REF + 25 Kt)
*VREF IS EQUAL TO VLS CONFIG FULL IN THE APPR PERF PAGE. TO THIS VLS ADD 25 Kt
WITH CONFIG FULL AND INSERT AS VAPPR AND NOW ON PERF PAGE, SELECT CONFIG
3 FOR LDG
- CONTINUE WITH APPR; TRIM THS FOR BETTER HANDLING: REMEMBER THE LAG
- BE AWARE OF TAIL STRIKE RISK
Page 64 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
INDICATIONS:
- APs, FDs AND A/THR ARE LOST
- FCU DISPLAY WINDOWS ARE BLANK
- FCU CONTROLS ARE LOST
- BOTH EFIS CONTROL PANELS ARE LOST
- PFD:
ALL TGTS: SPEED, HDG, ALT ARE LOST
RED FLAGS ARE DISPLAYED
ALTITUDE ALERT IS LOST
MACH INDICATION IS LOST
FMA IS LOST (EXCEPT IN LAND AND GA MODE)
BARO REVERTS TO STD
ILD DEVIATION SCALES ARE DISPLAYED
FPV (BIRD) IS DISPLAYED
- ND:
ROSE NAV WITH MAP AT 80 NM RANGE IS DISPLAYED
VOR1, DME1 AND ADF2 POINTERS ARE AUTO DISPLAYED
WEATHER RADAR DISPLAY IS LOST (IF DISPLAYED, IS FALSE)
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE:
- PERFORM RAW DATA FLIGHT
- ECAM CYCLE INCLUDING THE COMPUTER RESET
- REFER TO FCOM PROCEDURE (MANDATORY)
- USE STANDBY ALTIMETER TO SET ACTUAL BARO SETTING
- CAN USE THE PFD ALTIMETER WITH THE QNH-STD DIFFERENCE ALTITUDE
- DO NOT INSERT MDA/MDH ON MCDU PERF PAGE AS IT IS REFRENCED TO STD SETTING
Page 67 of 70
AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
CREW INCAPACITATION:
FIRST PHASE:
- ASSUME CONTROL AND RETURN TO A SAFE FLIGHT PATH
- ANNOUNCE “I HAVE CONTROLS”; USE PRIORITY Pb: KEEP PRESSED FOR 40‟
- ENGAGE AP TO REDUCE WORKLOAD
- ENSURE INCAPACITATED PILOT DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH CONTROLS
- DECLARE EMERGENCY: MAYDAY CALL
- INVOLVE CABIN CREW;PA CALL “ATTENTION, LEAD TO COCKPIT PLEASE”
- LAND ASAP
- REQUEST FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
SECOND PHASE:
- PREPARE THE APPR AND READ THE C/L EARLIER THAN USUAL
- REQUEST RADAR VECTORS AND PREFER A LONG APPR TO REDUCE WORKLOAD
- PERFORM THE LANDING FROM THE FIT PILOT USUAL SEAT
ADDITIONAL POINTS:
- THE CABIN ATTENDANT MUST:
o TIGHTEN AND MANUALLY LOCK THE SHLDR HARNESS OF INCAP PILOT
o PUSH THE SEAT COMPLETELY AFT
o RECLINE THE SEAT BACK
- IT TAKES TWO PEOPLE TO REMOVE THE DEAD WEIGHT OF AN UNCONCIOUS BODY-
FROM THE SEAT WITHOUT ENDANGERING ANY CONTROLS AND SWITCHES
- IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO REMOVE THE BODY, ONE CABIN ATTENDANT MUST REMAIN
IN THE COCKPIT TO TAKE CARE OF AND OBSERVE THE INCAP CREW
- IN COORDINATION WITH THE LEAD:
o REQUEST ASSISTANCE OF A MEDICALLY QUALIFIED PERSON
o CHECK IF A TYPE QUALIFIED COMPANY PILOT IS ON BOARD TO REPLACE THE INCAP
CREW MEMBER
INCAPACITATION ON T/O ROLL:
- CALL TWO SPEEDS, NO RESPONSE TAKE OVER CTRLS: PRESS PRIORITY Pb FOR 40‟
- AT VR ROTATE TO GET AIRBORNE
- SAFE HEIGHT, AP ON
- POSITIVE CLIMB, GEAR UP
- MAYDAY CALL; REQUEST RADAR VECTORS FOR ILS APPROACH
- CLEAN UP THE A/C
- COMPLETE THE AFTER T/O CLIMB C/L TO THE LINE
- LEAD TO COCKPIT; BRIEF HER
- ACTIVATE SECONDARY; CHECK FOR CORRECTNESS
- DO A SELF BRIEF, ACTIVATE APPROACH
- DO THE 10,000‟ AND APPROACH C/L
- FOLLOW ILS PROCEDURE AND CARRY OUT AN AUTOLAND OR LAND MANUALLY
- ASK FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND AFTER LANDING CLEAR OFF AND SWITCH OFF AT
DESIGNATED BAY
- WITHOUT PANIC GET THE DOORS OPENED
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
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AIRBUS A320 - SIM CHK
MISCELLANEOUS POINTS:
- BEFORE SIM SESSION, CHECK THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN QNH AND STD, FOR ALTITUDE
DIFFERENCE TO BE FLOWN IN CASE OF DUAL FCU FAILURE
- ON THE VOR IN RAD NAV PAGE, SET THE RADIAL OUT FOR THE AIRWAY TO DESTINATION:
WILL COME HANDY IN CASE RADAR IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THE INITIAL CLIMB OUT BEFORE
A DECISION IS MADE TO EITHER CONTINUE OR RETURN. FOR THIS, SELECT THE ROUTE
ON THE EFB AND AT THE DEPARTURE STATION “BLOW UP” THE ROUTE TO SEE THE RADI-
AL OT ON THE ROUTE „LINE‟
- BEFORE THE SIM SESSION, ON THE OLB, BOOK MARK THE FOLLOWING:
o COMPANY MINIMAS
o FCOM : SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES (FOR START FAULTS)
: SOME FAILURES LIKE DUAL FCU, DUAL FMGC
o IGO CHARTS
o MEL
o TECH NOTICES
o ANYTIME IF BOTH BLEEDS ARE LOST, START APU: PRESSURISATION WOULD
BECOME AN ISSUE
-IN CAT ll/lll LANDING, AT <60 kts, PUT THE AUTO BRAKE OFF SO THAT YOU CAN CONTROL THE
TAXI SPEED AND CONTINUE TO ROLL BECAUSE THE CLEAR OFF POINT MAY STILL BE SOME
DISTANCE AWAY. CONTINUE TO TAXI WITH AUTO BRAKE OFF BUT AUTOPILOT ON, SO AS TO
BE ABLE TO USE THE ROLLOUT CAPABILITY OF THE AP TO MAINTAIN CENTERLINE. MAINTAIN
AP ON TILL THE TAXI TURN OFF LIGHTS.
Page 70 of 70
PROCEDURES
ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
A318/A319/A320/A321
FLIGHT CREW [MEM] MEMORY ITEMS
OPERATING MANUAL
BRAKES
[MEM] LOSS OF BRAKING (Refer to procedure)
Ident.: PRO-ABN-ABN-MEM-ABN-MEM-00020948.0001001 / 17 MAR 17
MISC
[MEM] EMER DESCENT (Refer to procedure)
[MEM] STALL RECOVERY (Refer to procedure)
[MEM] STALL WARNING AT LIFT OFF (Refer to procedure)
Ident.: PRO-ABN-ABN-MEM-ABN-MEM-00020949.0001001 / 01 JUN 17
NAV
[MEM] UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION (Refer to procedure)
Ident.: PRO-ABN-ABN-MEM-ABN-MEM-00020950.0001001 / 03 DEC 19
SURV
[MEM] GPWS/EGPWS CAUTIONS (Refer to procedure)
[MEM] GPWS/EGPWS WARNINGS (Refer to procedure)
[MEM] TCAS WARNINGS (Refer to procedure)
[MEM] WINDSHEAR WARNING - REACTIVE WINDSHEAR (Refer to procedure)
Notify the cabin crew, when the aircraft reaches a safe flight level, and when cabin oxygen is no more
necessary.
IGO A318/A319/A320/A321 FLEET PRO-ABN-MISC P 1/32
FCOM A→ 19 MAY 21
PROCEDURES
ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
A318/A319/A320/A321
FLIGHT CREW MISC
TECHNIQUES MANUAL
Finally, subsequent to an emergency descent, once the oxygen masks are removed, the flight crew
should perform all of the following:
‐ Close the oxygen stowage mask compartment.
‐ Press the PRESS TO RESET oxygen control slide, to deactivate the mask microphone, and to cut
off the oxygen.
Below FL 100, the flight crew should limit the rate of descent to approximately 1 000 ft/min, except
during the approach phase.
However the PA, Lavatory signs and Cabin Crew actions in brief will be as
under:
Cockpit Crew Action Cabin Crew Action
RAPID Decompression
Advise cabin crew of The fasten seat belt sign will come on in the
the situation and advise cabin.
them if they have time
All Cabin crews should secure the aircraft
to check the occupancy
cabin in their respective zones, check the
of lavatories and ask
occupancy of the lavatories and ask their
their occupants to
occupants to return to their seat
return to their seat
immediately, and occupy their jump seats.
immediately.
Remain seated till the time the aircraft has
reached a safe altitude.
On reaching Safe Announce on the P.A – - Get up from their seats to do a walk
Altitude (10,000 ft) around in the cabin.
A320: Refer QRH 25.02A, EMER DESCENT, Abnormal and Emergency procedures and
FCTM PR-AEP-MISC, EMER DESCENT, Abnormal and Emergency procedures
2.2.7.2 Pilot In Command - Use of emergency authority
The PIC of an airplane has the necessary responsibility and authority to take
any action in an emergency or under unusual circumstances to preserve the
safety of the airplane, its crew, passengers, mail and freight.
4
"STALL, TOGA 15°"
If stall warnings trigger at liftoff, apply the following immediate actions:
THRUST.................................................................................................................................... TOGA
At the same time:
PITCH ATTITUDE........................................................................................................................ 15 °
BANK.......................................................................................................................... WINGS LEVEL
0 VMO/MMO CRUISE
1 230 KT HOLDING
1
1+F 215 KT TAKE OFF
2 2 200 KT TAKEOFF/APPROACH
3 3 185 KT TAKEOFF/APPROACH/
LAND
Pressurization System:
- Max positive differential pressure ……….9.0 PSI
- Max positive cabin pressure Δ 8.6 PSI
(safety relief valve setting)
- Max negative cabin pressure Δ -1.0psi.
- Max cabin altitude – 8000 ft.
- Cabin altitude warning – 9550 ft. (+/-350ft.)
- Max cabin alt. selection – 14,000ft. / -2000ft.
- Max pressure Δ and safety valve setting tolerance – 0.1psi
- Ram air inlet – will open if pressure Δ below 1.0psi
APU :
- Oil quantity:
Can be start even if the LOW OIL LVL ECAM advisory is
displayed. Maintenance action is
required in the next 10 hrs.
- Envelope:
Ground starting and operation limit – 15,000ft.
APU battery starting limit (ELEC EMRG CONFIG) –
25,000ft.
APU restart & operation limit (normal A/C power) – 41,000ft.
APU Bleed & Generator – up to 22,500ft.
APU Generator only – up to 41,000ft.
-Bleed Air:
Supplies 2 packs – up to 15,000 ft.
Supplies 1 pack – from 15,000ft. up to 22,500ft.
ENGINE
STARTER
LIMITATION
‐ A standard automatic start that includes only one
attempt, is considered one cycle
start
ground starts (automatic or manual), a 15 s
‐ For
is required between successive cycles
pause
‐ A 30 min cooling period is required, subsequent to
three failed cycles or 5 min of continuous crank
‐ For manual start, observe a two-minute maximum cycle
time
‐ For crank, observe a 5 min maximum cycle time
‐ The starter must not be run when N2 is above 10 %
on-ground
and 18 % in-flight.
Maximum NWS angle..............................±85 °
TAXI WITH DEFLATED OR DAMAGED TIRES
To vacate the runway or taxi at low speed with tire(s) deflated
(not damaged), all of the following limitations apply: ‐ If maximum
one tire per gear is deflated (consider three gears)
Maximum taxi speed ................7 kts
‐ If two tires are deflated on the same main gear (maximum one main
gear)
Maximum taxi speed.................3 kt
OXYGEN:
The most demanding case among the following:
• Protection after loss of cabin pressure, with mask regulator
on NORMAL (diluted oxygen):
▪ During emergency descent for all flight crewmembers and
observers for 13 min
▪ During cruise at FL 100 for two flight crewmembers for 107
min.
• Protection against smoke with 100 % oxygen for all flight
crewmembers and observers during 15 min at 8 000 ft cabin
altitude.
Revision….3
Low Visibility Operations
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Preface
As part of the modernization of airport facilities in the country, ILS capability is being
upgraded to CAT II and CAT III A/B levels at some of the airports to permit
operations during poor weather conditions.
CAT II and CAT III A/B operations are part of LVO {Low Visibility Operations}.
The main objective of CAT II/III operations is to provide a level of safety when
landing in low visibility conditions equivalent to that of ‘normal operating conditions.
The main difference between CAT II and CAT III operations is that CAT II provides
sufficient visual reference to permit a manual landing at DH, where CAT III does not
provide sufficient visual references and requires an automatic landing system, pilots
see the runway lights only for a few seconds (say about 5 seconds) before touch
down; therefore there is no margin for error.
The minima only permit the pilot to decide if the aircraft will land in the touch down
zone (basically CAT III A) and ensure safety during roll out (CAT III B)
The basis for Low Visibility operations, such as aircraft certification or airline
operational demonstration, ensures a high level of safety necessitating, authorization
for Low Visibility operations which in turn depends on the following four elements:
The aircraft
The Flight Crew
The airport and
The Operator
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These elements must comply with the regulations established by DGCA. Aircraft on
Indigo strength must be approved for Low Visibility operations with an automatic
landing system
(which provides automatic control of the aircraft during approach and landing).
Similarly, the airfield must be approved for Low Visibility operations.
The Flight Crew therefore should be trained for such operations and have
authorization for the same from DGCA. Crew training for Low Visibility is divided
into two parts. Firstly ground instructions and secondly Simulator / airborne training.
This hand book outlines the purpose and the concept behind Low Visibility
operations. Following pages also cover in brief all aspects of CAT II, CAT III and
LVTO operations with a special mention of aircraft automatic control systems,
stringent requirements for airfield equipment and crew qualification.
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Table of Contents:
References: ............................................................................................................................................................. 7
General ................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Definitions and Explanation (relevant to LVO) ..................................................................................................... 11
A-320 Automatic-Flight System for Automatic Approach and Landing: ............................................................... 13
Something about FMA: ......................................................................................................................................... 14
Fail-Operational automatic landing system .......................................................................................................... 15
Fail-passive automatic landing system ................................................................................................................. 15
Alert Height........................................................................................................................................................... 17
DA / DH ................................................................................................................................................................. 18
RVR: ...................................................................................................................................................................... 22
SVR ........................................................................................................................................................................ 25
Approach ban point .............................................................................................................................................. 26
Cockpit Cut-off Angle ............................................................................................................................................ 27
Obstacle Clearance Altitude (OCA) Height (OCH) ................................................................................................. 28
Obstacle Free Zone: .............................................................................................................................................. 28
Minimum Approach Break-off height (MABH): .................................................................................................... 28
Concept of Operating Minima .............................................................................................................................. 29
ILS critical area: ..................................................................................................................................................... 30
ILS sensitive area: ................................................................................................................................................. 30
Safe guarding Procedures (SP):............................................................................................................................. 31
LOW VISIBILITY PROCEDURES (LVP) ..................................................................................................................... 32
Taxing in low visibility conditions: ........................................................................................................................ 37
LVTO ..................................................................................................................................................................... 39
ILS CAT I APPROACH ............................................................................................................................................. 40
For ILS CAT II Operations: ..................................................................................................................................... 40
CAT IIIA {with system as FAIL-PASSIVE} ................................................................................................................ 41
CAT III B {system has to be FAIL-OPERATIONAL} .................................................................................................. 42
Airline, Aircraft, Aircrew qualification: ................................................................................................................. 43
Aircraft and operating limitations (Automatic Approach, Landing and Roll Out) ................................................ 45
Flight Preparation and Approach procedures including flare and associate actions: .......................................... 49
Task Sharing during CAT II / CAT III Approach and Landing: ................................................................................. 49
Practice Approaches ............................................................................................................................................. 50
AIRFIELD REQUIREMENT FOR CAT II / III A/B ........................................................................................................ 51
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References:
CAR, Section 2 – ‘Airworthiness and Maintenance Requirements for CAT II & CAT III
Operations, Series ‘O’, Part XIV Rev. 1, 28th July 2014.
CAR, Section 8 – ‘Operator Authorisation for ILS CAT II/IIIA/B Operations’, Series
‘B’ Part I dated 30th March, 2001 Rev 2. Dated 1st December, 2009
CAR, Section 8 – ‘All Weather Operations (AWO), Series ‘C’ Part I, Issue 1 dated
13th June, 2011 Effective (Rev 08): 11th January 2016
QRH May-2015
COM Part A, Issue II, TR-41 Chapter 17, A-17-119, 17.4 dated June, 2014
COM Part D, Issue II, TR 05 Chapter 02, D-2-117, 2.8.11 dated June, 2014
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General
The main part of AWO (All Weather Operations ) includes taxiing in low
visibility, Category I, Category II, Category III and LVTO operations.
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The ILS installed at various airports in India meet the CAT I level requirement that permits
landing up to RVR of 550 m and above.
When RVR is below 550 m, the operations fall into CATII or CAT III depending upon minima
and aircraft is not allowed to land or take off unless aircraft, Flight Crew, Airport and
operator is appropriately approved-- In order to maintain required level of safety.
CAT II / III approaches are flown to very low DH (or without DH) with very low RVR. The
guidance of the aircraft on the ILS beam and the guidance of the aircraft operation must be
consistently of high performance and accurate so that the acquisition of visual cues is
achieved and the aircraft is properly stabilized and an automatic landing and roll out can be
performed.
In view of this…………….
An aircraft type must be approved for Cat II/Cat III operations with an automatic
landing system, which provides automatic control of the aircraft during approach
and landing.
The flight crew should be trained for such operations and have authorisation for
the same from DGCA.
The airport must be equipped and approved for Cat II / Cat III operations. Refer
AIP.
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CAT I
CAT I operation is a precision instrument approach and landing using ILS. The associated
company operating minima for CAT I are given below:
DH not lower than 200 feet.
Either a visibility not less than 800 m or RVR not less than 550 m.
CAT II
CAT II operation is a precision instrument approach and landing using ILS with:
Decision Height below 200 ft but not lower than 100 feet and
RVR of not less than 300 m.
CAT II weather minima has been established to provide sufficient visual references at DH to
permit a manual landing (or a missed approach) to be executed (it does not mean that the
landing must be made manually)
CAT III
CAT III A operation: A precision instrument approach and landing using ILS with…….
CAT III B operation: A precision instrument approach and landing using ILS with……..
CAT III C operation: A precision instrument approach and landing with no DH and no RVR
limitations.
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For easy reference minima for CAT II /III approaches are appended below in a tabular form:
Note: CAT III C operations are not currently authorized. Refer Indigo AOP.
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A-320 aircraft is approved for 'Automatic Approach & Automatic Landing' operations under
all weather conditions if CAT 3 DUAL / CAT 3 SINGLE or CAT2 is displayed on FMA.
A320 is not approved for Auto-Land if CAT1 is displayed on the FMA.
Automatic landing system is only equipment providing automatic control of the aircraft during
the approach and landing and not related to particular weather conditions.
The automatic landing is required in CAT III operations including roll out in CAT III B.
The automatic landing is the preferred landing technique in CAT II conditions.
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The ' FMA Second & ThirdColumn 'displays the AP guidance modes during the
automatic approach / landing. When established on the ILS, this FMA display is GS / LOC
initially, and subsequently changes to LAND, FLARE, and ROLLOUT towards the final
stages.
The ' FMA Fourth Column 'displays the aircraft's " Capability " in regard to its
automatic approach & automatic landing at a particular moment during the progress of the
approach.
The changes in approach & landing capability is decided by the FMGC which takes into
account the availability of various aircraft technical systems integrated to the aircraft’s Auto -
Flight at a particular stage.
If an associated system fails the capability downgrades and if the system is restored, the
capability automatically upgrades back.
Whenever a downgrade in capability occurs, a triple click is generated as CLICK
CLICKCLICK.
The ' FMA FIFTH COLUMN 'indicates the engagement of the number of autopilots,
FDs, & A/THR. Whenever there is a change in the fifth column, a triple click is also
generated but NOT for any change in regard to FDs since FD is not mandatory for Automatic
Approach / Landing.
FREEZING OF FMA :Below 100 ft. ( RA ), the available display on the FMA's ' Fourth
Column is frozen. This means that a failure of one AP or a loss of an associated integrated
technical / function system would not affect a change in the capability of the aircraft unless
LAND mode is disengaged or both auto-pilots are off.
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An automatic landing system is fail operational if, in the event of a failure below AH, the
approach, flare and landing can be completed by the remaining part of the automatic
system.
CAT 3 Dual is annunciated on FMA as long as the airborne systems are fail-operational.
In the event of a failure below the AH, the AP will continue to guide the aircraft on the flight
path and automatic landing. The approach, flare and landing can be completed by the
remaining part of the automatic system.
In that case no capability degradation is indicated and CAT 3 Dual remains annunciated
even after failure.
An automatic landing system is fail passive if, in the event of a failure, there is no significant
deviation of aeroplane trim, flight path or altitude but the landing{Landing Roll} will not be
completed automatically.
CAT 3 Single is annunciated when the airborne systems become fail passive above AH,
which means that a single failure will lead to the AP disconnection without any significant out
of trim condition or deviation of the flight path or altitude. Manual flight is then required.
Minimum DH is 50 ft.
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Note:
A fail operational hybrid landing system may consist of a fail passive automatic landing system with a
monitored head-up display which provides guidance to enable the pilot to complete the landing
manually after failure of the automatic landing system.
Head-up display is the display system that presents flight information into the Pilots’ forward external
field of view.
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Alert Height
An alert height is a height above the runway threshold which is based on the
characteristics of the aeroplane and its fail operational landing system, above which
a Category III auto-land operation would be discontinued and a missed approach initiated if
a failure occurred in one of the redundant parts of the landing system, or in the relevant
ground equipment.
FMA indication would remain frozen and FMA continues to indicate CAT 3 DUAL.
The approach can be continued as the aircraft design capability is such that in spite of the
failure/ malfunction, the Auto-Pilot would successfully perform an automatic landing using
the remaining automatic system.
The flare, touchdown and roll out may be accomplished using the remaining Automatic
system.
In other words, if a failure occurred below the Alert Height, it would be ignored by the system
and the approach continued. The Alert Height permits the continuing of the approach below
RA 100 ft for CAT III B ifCAT 3 DUAL is displayed on the FMA at RA 100 ft.
AH is only linked to the probability of failure (s) of the automatic landing system.
The term pertains only to a CAT III ‘Fail Operational’ Automatic Landing.
AH is evaluated during aircraft certification; it is established as 100 ft. for A320.
AH concept is relevant only when CAT 3 DUAL is displayed on FMA.
Operators are free to select an AH lower than the 100 ft but not higher than 100 ft.
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DA / DH
A specified altitude or height (A/H) in the precision approach at which a missed approach
must be initiated, if the required visual reference to continue the approach has not been
established.
If the visual references have been established, the approach can be continued. However a
pilot may always decide to execute a Go around if sudden degradations in the visual
references or a sudden flight path deviation occur.
For CAT II and CAT III A, a pilot may not continue the approach below DH, unless a visual reference
containing not less than 3 light segments of the centre line of the approach lights or runway center
line or touch down zone lights or runway edge lights is obtained.
For CAT III B no visual reference reqd.
When necessary, the published DH takes into account the terrain profile before runway
threshold.
In fact Decision height is the wheel height above the runway elevation.
Note: Jeppesen approach charts use the abbreviation DA (H). The ‘DA’ is reference to MSL and
parenthetical DH is reference to the TDZ
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An operator must ensure that the decision height for Category II operations is not lower than:
The minimum decision height specified in the AFM, if stated; or
The minimum height to which the precision approach aid can be used without the
required visual reference; or
The OCH for the category of aeroplane; or
The decision height to which the flight crew is authorised to operate;or
100 ft.
whichever is higher.
Note: In the case of a CAT III runway it may be assumed that operations with no
decision height can be supported unless specifically restricted as published in the AIP or
NOTAM.
In contrast to other operations, CAT III weather minima do not provide sufficient visual
references to allow a manual landing to be made. The minima only permit the pilot to decide
if the aircraft will land in the touchdown zone (basically CAT III A) and to ensure safety
during rollout (basically CAT III B).
Therefore an automatic landing system is mandatory to perform Category III
operations. Its reliability must be sufficient to control the aircraft to touchdown in
CAT III A operations and through rollout to a safe taxi speed in CAT III B.
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Visual references at DH
DGCA in its CAR SECTION 8 – SERIES ‘C’ PART I on All Weather Operations (AWO), has
defined criteria for CAT II and CAT III for visual reference at DH which are :
(b) For Category III B operations conducted with fail-operational flight control systems
using a decision height a pilot may not continue an approach below the decision height,
unless a visual reference containing at least one centreline light is attained and can be
maintained.
(c) For Category III B operations conducted with fail-operational flight control systems
without a decision height, there are no requirements for a visual verification prior to
landing.
In other words,
For CAT II and CAT III A, a pilot may not continue the approach below DH unless a visual
reference containing not less than a 3 light segment of the centerline of the approach lights
or runway centerline or touchdown zone lights or runway edge lights is obtained.
For CAT III B with DH, the visual reference must contain at least one centerline light.
For CAT III B with NO DH, visual references are not required.
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(i) Establish visual contact about 3 seconds above DH and this reduces to about 1
second when fail-operational automatic landing system is being used.
(ii) Establish lateral position and cross-track velocity – to see not less than a three-light
segment of the centre line of the approach lights or runway centre line or runway
edge lights.
(iii) To maintain a lateral level – to see a lateral element of the ground pattern, i.e. an
approach lighting cross-bar, the landing threshold, or barrette of the touch down zone
lighting.
(iv) To make an accurate adjustment to the flight path in the vertical plane, such as a
flare, using purely visual cues – to see a point on the ground which has a low or zero
rate of apparent movement relative to the aircraft.
(v) Approaching the DH, the PF starts to look for visual reference progressively
increasing external scanning. DH is the lower limit of the decision zone. The Captain
should come to this zone prepared for a go-around but with no pre-established
judgement.
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RVR:
The range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centre line of a runway can see the runway
surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying its centre-line.
Cat II and III operations require rapidly updated and reliable reports of the visibility conditions which a
pilot may expect to encounter in the touch down zone and along the runway.
RVR measurements replace the use of Reported Visibility Values (RVV) which is not appropriate for
conditions encountered during the final approach and landing in low visibility, because the visibility
observations are often several miles away from the touch down zone of the runway.
RVR Measurements: For Cat II and Cat III operations, the RVR measurements are provided by a
system of calibrated transmissometers and account for effects of ambient background light and the
intensity of runway lights.
Trans-misso-meters systems are strategically located to provide RVR measurements associated with
three basic portions of a runway.
RVR is reported depending upon the RVR value/trend in the increments of 100m, 50m or 25m.
RVR is reported up to 3 points along runway whenever normal visibility is detected as being less than
1500 m
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When all three values are given, the names of each individual point are omitted.
The touch-down zone RVR is always controlling. If reported and relevant, the mid-point and stop-end
are also controlling.
The minimum RVRvalue for the mid-point is 125 m in CAT I, CAT II and CAT III A.
The minimum RVR value for the mid-point is 75 m in CAT III B.
The minimum RVRvalue for the stop-end is 125 m in CAT I, CAT II and CAT III A.
The minimum RVR value for the stop-end is 75 m in CAT III B..
Note:
‘Relevant’ is the context, means that part of the runway used during the high speed phase of the
landing down to a speed of approximately 60 knots.
Note:
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If it is necessary to increase DH due to, for example, facility limitations or an increased OCH,
then a corresponding increase in minimum RVR will be required as shown in Table 7 of
CAR..
Note1 - The reference to “Coupled to below DH” in this table means continued use of the
automatic flight control system down to a height which is not greater than 80 per cent of the
applicable DH. Thus airworthiness requirements may, through minimum engagement height
for the automatic flight control system, affect the DH to be applied.
Note 2- For a CAT D aero plane conducting an auto land, 300 m may be used.
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SVR
SVR is the range over which a pilot of an aircraft in the final stages of approach or landing
can see the marking or the lights as described in definition.
In shallow fog or when fog is confine to ground layers, SVR is more than RVR.
In matured fog the density of fog increases with height and so SVR is less than RVR.
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The point on a final approach where the reported weather conditions at the runway must
meet the applicable minima so as to be able to meet regulatory requirements for continuing
an instrument approach to a landing.
For Information…………..
The PIC shall not commencean instrument approach if the reported RVR/Visibility is below
the applicable minimum.
If, after commencing an instrument approach, the reported RVR/Visibility falls below the
applicable minimum, the approach shall not be continued:
a) Below 1000 ft. above the aerodrome; or
b) Into the final approach segment
If after entering the final approach segment or descending below 1000 ft. above the
aerodrome elevation, the reported RVR/visibility falls below the applicable minimum, the
approach may be continued to DA or MDA/H.
The approach may be continued below DA/H or MDA/H and the landing may be completed
provided that the required visual reference is established at the DA/H or MDA/H and is
maintained.
Final approach:
That part of an instrument approach procedure which commences at the specified
final approach fix or point, or where such a fix or point is not specified,
a) at the end of the last procedure turn, base turn or inbound turn of a racetrack
procedure, if specified; or
b) At the point of interception of the last track specified in the approach procedure;
and ends at a point in the vicinity of an aerodrome from which:
1) A landing can be made; or
2) A missed approach procedure is initiated.
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The angle made by the direction of aircraft nose with fore and aft axis, with pilot’s eye
correctly positioned, is called the Cockpit Cut-off Angle.
- This is 20 degrees for A320 Aircraft with a 4 deg. Pitch Angle on final approach; the
earliest point visible will be 16 degrees below horizon.
- The approximate distance from aircraft’s position blocked by nose and the SVR is
given in the diagram below:
- Correct eye position during low visibility approach and landing is significant.
- A too low seat position may greatly reduce the visual segment.
- When the eye reference position is lower than intended, the visual segment is further
reduced by the cut off angle of the glare shield or nose.
- As a rule of thumb, an incorrect seating position which reduces the cut off angle by
10reduces the visual segment by approx. 10 m (30 feet
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The lowest altitude (OCA), or alternatively the lowest height above the elevation of the
relevant runway threshold or above the aerodrome elevation as applicable (OCH), used in
establishing compliance with appropriate obstacle clearance criteria.
Sometimes, the term OCL (obstacle clearance limit) can be found in the documentation, but
this term is being phased out.
When an operator establishes his operating aerodrome minima, he must take into account
the OCH only for CAT II. The minimum DH for CAT II is always equal or higher than any
OCH mentioned in the aerodrome chart. This OCH is a function of the category of aircraft (A
to E).
The airspace above the inner approach surface, inner transitional surfaces, and balked
landing surfaces and that portion of the strip bounded by these surfaces, which is not
penetrated by any fixed obstacle other than a low-mass and frangible mounted and
required for air transportation purposes.
MABH is the lowest height above the ground, measured by radio altimeter, such that if a
missed approach is initiated without external references in normal operations the aircraft
does not touch the ground during the procedure. With an engine failure during missed
approach, it can be demonstrated that taking this failure probability, an accident is extremely
improbable.
The MABH or the altitude loss during automatic GA can be used to determine the minimum
DH in Cat III operation.
Note:
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Regulations often use the term minima. In fact, this term could refer to different concepts:
a) Airfield operating minima: established in accordance with the airport authority and published on
approach charts.
b) Operator's minima: lowest minima that an operator is allowed to use at a specified airfield, following
an approval from its operational authority.
c) Crew minima: lowest minima that the crew is authorized to operate, depending on the crew
qualification.
d) Aircraft minima: lowest minima which have been demonstrated during aircraft certification. These
minima are indicated in the AFM.
For all CAT II / CAT III operations, these minima consist of a DH and an RVR.
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An area of defined dimensions around the localizer and glide path antennas where vehicles including
aircraft are excluded during all ILS operations. The critical area is protected because the presence of
vehicles and/or aircraft inside its boundaries will cause nacceptable disturbance to the ILS signal-in-
space.
An area extending beyond the critical area where the parking and/or movement of vehicles, including
aircraft, is controlled to prevent the possibility of unacceptable interference to the ILS signal during
ILS operations. The sensitive area is protection against interference caused by large moving objects
outside the critical area but still normally within the airfield boundary.
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Safeguarding Procedure are the necessary actions to prepare airport for CAT II/IIIA
operations (Low Visibility Procedures). They include
Safeguarding Procedures shall be initiated when the RVR is less than 1200m and visibility
is forecast to deteriorate to 800m or less.
The cloud ceiling is 400ftand forecast to fall to 200ft or less.
On the receipt of outlook for Low Visibility the Watch Supervisory Officer (WSO) will inform
theAirport Manager, Apron Controller, Communication/Technical Supervisor and the
AerodromeTower Controller.
On receipt of the above information the above mentioned agencies will take action for
properplanning for activation of LVP.
When all the concerned agencies have completed their necessary actions they shall report
to WSO(ATC) that their SP are completed and the airport is safeguarded for CAT II/IIIA /IIIB
operations.
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LVP are specific procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring safe
operations during CAT II and III approach and/or low visibility take off.
The airport authorities are responsible for establishing and maintaining the equipment
required for CAT II and III approach and landing. The airport authorities will activate the
LVP as the need arises based on RVR. Prior to planning of CAT II / III approach, crew must
ensure that LVP are in force.
LVP shall be implemented when SP has been completed and the airport is configured for
LVO.
WSO shall implement Low Visibility Procedure when either Touch down RVR or MID RVR is
less than 800m and/or the cloud ceiling is less than 200ft. He shall also ensure that LOW
VISIBILILTYPROCEDURE IN FORCE is included in ATIS broATCast.
Aerodrome Control on being notified that LVP are to commence will inform
- Fire station
- Apron Control and obtain confirmation that grounds SP have been implemented and
runway has been safeguarded.
- Communication/Technical Supervisor and Include, “Low Visibility Procedures in-
force” in ATIS broATCast.
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LVP OPERATIONS
- Status of ILS
- The serviceability of visual aids
- RVR information
- In addition to the information normally transmitted by approach control, the following
information must be passed to the arriving aircraft on first contact or as soon as
possible, thereafter
TDZ RVR is below 550m then MID RVR shall also be passed. However in case MID
RVR is U/S the end RVR shall be passed.
TDZ and/or MID RVRis below 300m, then end RVR readings shall also be passed.
The un-serviceability of any component parts of CAT II/IIIA /IIIB facilities not
previously broATCast on ATIS.
Approach Control should vector the arriving aircraft to intercept the localizer at a
distance not less than 10NM from touchdown.
Suitable spacing between the arriving aircrafts may be provided to ensure that the
arriving aircraft can be given a landing clearance by 2 NM from touchdown.
The spacing of 15NM between two successive landing aircraft may be necessary.
If there is a departure between the two arrivals the spacing between the arriving
aircraft may be suitably increased depending upon whether the departing aircraft is
entering the runway via Taxiway ‘C’ or ‘P’.
Note:
To ensure that the departing aircraft passes overhead the Localizer before the in bound
aircraft reaches 2NM from touch down, a departing aircraft must commence its take off run
beforean arriving aircraft passes 5 DME/NM from touch down Approach control shall be not
subject an aircraft carrying out CAT II/IIIA approaches to any speed control.
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Arriving aircrafts shall be issued landing clearance not later than 2NM from touch
down, if landing clearance cannot be issued when the aircraft is 2NM from
touchdown it shall be instructed to carryout a missed approach.
Arriving aircraft should be given un-interrupted taxi route to allow it to clear the
Localizer Sensitive Area (LSA).
The LSA in front of an arriving aircraft shall not be infringed from the time it is
2NMfrom the touchdown until it has completed its landing roll.
The Low Visibility Taxi routes are intended to assist the pilots in determining their
location on the airport during the periods of low visibility. The centreline lights on the
taxiway not in use may be switched off.
During Take-off in Cat II, Cat IIIA, Cat IIIB condition the LSA in front of a departing
aircraft shall not be infringed from the time that take-off clearance is issued until the
aircraft has departed and passed over the localizer aerial.
ATC shall initiate emergency, action, if an aircraft not seen or is not in radio contact
as expected.
Pilots need additional guidance and information when taxing during periods of
reduced visibility. The view from the cockpit of the aircraft is very limited. Therefore
taxi instructions and essential traffic information should be passed in a clear and
concise manner.
Taxing aircraft should be routed in accordance with the prescribed Low Visibility
Routes to ensure a simple one-way traffic flow is maintained, however it may be
necessary for operational reasons to sometimes route aircraft via alternative
taxiways.
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During LVP, full use should be made of intermediate Taxi holding point and selective
switching of taxiway centreline lights to control traffic and provide additional visual
guidance to pilots.
Surface Movement Control shall monitor the status of taxiway lights and immediately
advise the aircraft under its control of any un-serviceability affecting the LVP
taxiways.
During the period of LVP the lights on taxiways that are not being used should be
switched off wherever possible.
Surface Movement Control should monitor the progress of arriving aircraft as they vacate the
runway after landing and ensure that they do not stop within the LSA thereby degrading ILS integrity
for subsequent landing aircraft.
Pilots shall report RWY vacated on RTF ensuring that the entire aircraft is clear of the ILS sensitive
area.
Vehicles movement when RVR is less than 550m should be restricted. Only operationally essential
vehicle duly authorized by Apron Control should be permitted to operate. These vehicles shall remain
outside the Localizer Sensitive Area (LSA). Any movement of vehicle on the manoeuvring area shall
be coordinated with ATC.
When LVP are in force aircraft shall be routed in accordance with the Low Visibility Procedures taxi
routes.
During Cat IIIA conditions i.e. when RVR reduced to less than 300m a ‘Follow me’ service will be
provided to arriving/departing aircraft on request.
NOTE
Person providing follow me service will be trained and fully familiar with the taxi routes intersections
and other manoeuvring area/apron/bays.
Cancellation of Safeguarding Procedures and Low Visibility Procedures WSO may terminate
LVP………..
When meteorological conditions improve and both the TDZ and MID RVR are 800m or more and the
cloud ceiling is 200ft or higher, and trend is for improvement.
Facilities, equipment and services necessary for CAT II/IIIA/IIIB operations are degraded and/or the
prevailing conditions are considered unsafe for such operations.
WSO should consult MET office for forecast before cancelling SP and LVP.
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When LVP are cancelled Aerodrome Control shall include it in the subsequent two ATIS broATCasts
that ‘Low Visibility Procedures are cancelled’.
ATC will inform all the concerned agencies. If SP are implemented and LVP are not subsequently
initiated and Met conditions improve and the visibility/RVR is more than 1200m and the cloud ceiling
is 400ft. or higher and both are forecast to remain above the required SP criteria, WSO may cancel
SP.
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The attention of pilot is drawn to the increased ground collision risk that might occur when
aircraft are taxied in low visibility conditions. Experience show that traffic flow rates on
taxiways can be conducted safely in aerodrome visibility down to approx. 500m.
However, when the visibility is below 500 m, the safe ground manoeuvring of the aircraft
demands special care and alertness by the crew, with an awareness of the difficulties, which
may be encountered.
Close co-operation between the crew and ATC is essential from first entering taxiways until
parked or taken-off.
Do not hesitate to request the assistance of a ‘Follow me’ jeep. Some useful guidelines are
given below……….
The greater risk when taxing is likely to occur after landing and crews are known to relax
their concentration and alertness, and especially so following a low visibility landing.
Crews should note that the reported RVR values may not be representative of the general
level of visibility at the airfield and taxi speed should allow for sudden or very rapid reduction
in visibility.
It should also be noted that taxi-way marking, signs, signals and lighting systems throughout
the world are not standardized.
Likewise, terminology and nomenclature varies from one regulating authority to another and
may even be different within the jurisdiction of a particular authority.
It is therefore essential that crews make a careful note of the taxi instructions given and that
the read back is acknowledged.
Before taxing the crew should ensure that the intended routing clearance passed is
acknowledged, make full use of the aircraft compass, airfield chart and low visibility route
chart when available.
When approaching the runway in use, the crew must ensure that the CAT II/III holding point
is not passed, bearing in mind that the green taxi way central line lights may be illuminated
beyond the holding point if it does not coincide with a stop bar, or the stop bar may be out
because a preceding aircraft is lining up.
After landing, when the aircraft has vacated the runway, the taxi way should not be entered
until contact has been made with the appropriate ground movement control, and instructions
given are acknowledged.
If in doubt, in all cases stop and request further guidance or instructions from ATC before
proceeding.
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During taxying in poor visibility, ensure that flight deck checks and drills do not conflict with
the need to maintain a good look out.
If necessary, carry out the majority of taxi checklist items at, or just before, approaching the
holding point. Keep track of the aircraft positions at all times and monitor R/T transmissions
in order to determine the position of other aircraft and vehicles on the airfield.
Where a choice of taxi route is presented, the pilot taxying should be given the other crew
members notice of his intentions, so that the routing can be confirmed and closely
monitored.
Pilot should be aware of the effects fog and mist will have in reducing the level of contact
between objects and background, making it difficult to identify potential hazards, which in
turn will reduce the time available to react to any sign of a risk to the aircraft.
Fog and mist will also degrade the pilot’s peripheral vision and affect his judgment of taxi
speed which, if too high, will again reduce the time of reaction to any hazards.
In poor visibility, bright lights may be seen by day at approx. 100m away and at a greater
distance by night.
On the other hand navigation lights may not be visible before sighting the actual aircraft, and
especially so with certain angle of approach. Therefore great care should be taken when
following another aircraft to the stand or runway for take-off.
When taxing, make use of all the aircraft lighting. Be prepared to switch off any light, which
restricts visibility due to glare.
The use of landing lights at night in low visibility can be detrimental to the acquisition of
visual reference. Reflected lights from water droplets or snow may actually reduce visibility.
The landing lights would therefore not normally be used in CAT II / III weather conditions.
DO NOT USE HIGH INTENSITY LIGHTS UNLESS OCCUPYING THE ACTIVE RUNWAY
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LVTO
A term used in relation to flight operations referring to take-off on a runway where the
RVR is less than 400 m.
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1. Min MDA 200 ft. & RVR = / > 550 mts. Not less than 550 / 125 / 125.
2. TDZ is controlling.
3. Automatic Approach + Manual Landing is authorised.
Manual APP + Manual Landing is authorized.
4. No AP or One or Both APs may be engaged but if any auto- pilot is engaged, it
must be disconnected latest by 160 ft. AGL
5. FMA 4th Column display must be CAT1 or CAT2 or CAT3 SINGLE or CAT3
DUAL*
6. The FMA 5th Column display may be no AP or AP1 or AP 1+2
7. A/THR may or may not be used, i.e. its serviceability is not mandatory
8. LOW VISIBILITY PROCEDURE ( LVP ) for the respective airport is not
mandatory but in case of Auto-Land practice, ATC must be informed.
*(Even for Auto-Land practice, CAT 1 must not be displayed on the FMA)
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1. TDZ RVR not less than 175 M/ MID RVR not less than 125 M / RO RVR not less
than 125
2. Automatic Approach + Automatic Landing only.
For CAT IIIA*, in case of a system failure, the AP can be disconnected at
touchdown
.if the visual reference required is established.
3. At least ONE AP (for DH >50 ft.) MUST be engaged and an Auto-Land must be
performed.
4. FMA 4th Col. display may be either CAT 3 SINGLE or CAT 3 DUAL
5. FMA 5th Col. display must be either AP 1{2} or AP 1+2 & A/THR
6. A/THR MUST be serviceable and available
7. LOW VISIBILITY PROCEDURE (LVP) at the respective airport must be in-force /
activated. ATC confirmation and approval is required.
8. Establishment of VISUAL REFERENCE at DH, remains same as for CAT II.
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1. DH= less than 50 FT or No DH; TDZ RVR not less than 75 / MID RVR not less
than 75M / RO RVR not less than 75 mts.
3. AUTOMATIC APPROACH + AUTOMATIC LANDING ONLY
4. Both APs must be available and engaged.
5. FMA 4th Col. must display CAT 3 DUAL
6 FMA 5th Col. must display AP 1+2 & A/THR
7. LOW VISIBILITY PROCEDURE (LVP) for the respective airfield must be in force /
activated and ATC confirmation and approval is required.
When system becomes Fail Passive, {AP 1+2 and CAT 3 SINGLE / or Any one AP and CAT
3 SINGLE}, you will do the CAT III A operation.
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The airline, aircraft and the crew are required to be qualified for LVO as per the
requirement of DGCA:
The operations by Indigo are approved by DGCA in accordance with CAR Section 2
Series ‘O’ Part XIV – ‘Airworthiness and maintenance requirements for CAT II / CAT
III Operations’, CAR Section 8 Series ‘B’ Part I – ‘operator Authorisation for ILS CAT
II/III/A/B Operations’ and CAR Section 8 Series ‘C ‘Part I Rev. 4 – ‘All Weather
Operations’.
Each aircraft on the strength of Indigo are certified for operations with decision
heights below 200 ft. or no decision height and equipped in accordance with CAR
Section 2 Series ‘O’ Part XIV – Airworthiness and Maintenance Requirements for
CAT II / III Operations.
Vide Operation Specification of the Air Operator Permit; Low Visibility Operations are
approved for Approach and landing CAT II/III A/III B with RVR 300/175/75 m and DH
100/50/0 ft.
Prior to being authorized for CAT II or CAT III operations, pilot shall meet the
following qualifications and experience requirements (Refer CAR Section 8
Series ‘C’ Part I Rev. 5, 3rd June 2014):
- PIC experience on type 500 hrs. (For pilots with no previous CAT II/III
authorisation), 100 hrs. (For pilots with previous CAT II/III
authorisation).
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- Instrument Flying 100 hrs. (Including not more than 50 hrs. on Full
Flight Simulator of the type)
- Instrument flying 100 hrs. (Including not more than 50 hrs. on Full
Flight Simulator of the type).
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Aircraft and operating limitations (Automatic Approach, Landing and Roll Out)
FMGS with the associated equipment has been found to meet the requirements and
performance criteria. Compliance of these standards does not constitute an approval
to conduct CAT II /III operations. Such authorisation must be obtained from DGCA –
Refer AOP.
AUTO- LAND:
CAT II and CAT III autoland are approved in CONF 3 and CONF FULL.
Automatic landing is demonstrated:
‐ With CAT II and CAT III ILS beam.
‐ With slope angle within (-2.5 °, -3.15 °) range.
‐ At or below the maximum landing weight.
‐ For airport elevation at or below 6 500 ft.
‐ At approach speed (VAPP) = VLS + wind correction.
Minimum wind correction 5 kt, maximum wind correction 15 kt.
Automatic rollout performance has been approved on dry and wet runways, but performance on
snow-covered or icy runways has not been demonstrated.
One autopilot at least must be engaged in APPR mode and CAT 2 or CAT 3 SINGLE or CAT 3 DUAL
capability must be displayed on FMA.
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- At take-off: 100 ft. AGL or at least 5 seconds after lift off whichever is earlier.
- In ILS approach if CAT 1 is displayed {CAT 2 or CAT 3 capabilities are not displayed} on
FMA: 160 ft.AGL
- In ILS approach when CAT 2 or CAT 3 capabilities are displayed on FMA:
See in succeeding paragraphs…………
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Minimum Approach Break-Off height: 25 ft. AGL based on a demonstrated height loss from
when TOGA is selected in a go-around and wind speeds of 5 kt. tail, 15 kt. head or below.
Two autopilot must be engaged in APPR mode and CAT3 DUAL capability must be
displayed on FMA.
Headwind: 30 kt.
Tailwind: 10 kt.
Crosswind: 20 kt.
Note: Wind limitation is based on the surface wind reported by the tower. If the wind
displayed on the ND exceeds the above-noted Auto Land limitations, but the tower
reports surface wind within the limitations, then the autopilot can remain engaged.
If the tower reports a surface wind beyond the limitations, only a CAT I automatic
approach without Auto Land can be performed.
LIM 22 section of FCOM provides all limitations regarding CAT I, CAT II and III approaches
and landings. This also includes precautions to be taken when performing auto-land on Cat
1 ILS beam with good visibility.
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- Landing Categories
- Warnings for ILS Approach
- Failures and associated actions above 1000 feet for a CAT II or CAT III
- Failures and associated actions above 1000 feet during a CAT II approach
- Failures and associated actions below 1000 feet during a CATIII with DH
- Failures and associated actions below 1000 feet during a CAT III no DH.
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Practice Approaches
All Practice approaches on aircraft are to be carried out under weather conditions at
or above CAT I minimums
Practice Auto Approaches, at or above CAT I minimum, can be carried out on any
ILS equipped runway. However, practice Auto Approach Auto Land can only be
carried out on the below mentioned runways.
During practice approaches, crew should be aware that fluctuations of the LOC
and/or GS might occur due to the fact that protection of ILS sensitive areas, which
applies during LVP, will not necessarily be in force.
It is essential that the PF is prepared to take over manually at any time during a
practice approach and roll out, should the performance of AP becomes
unsatisfactory.
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a. Video
b. PPT
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Table of equipment required for A-320 Cat 2 and Cat 3 approaches and landings
FMGS MONITORED:
DH INDICATOR 1 1 1
ILS RECEIVER 2 2 2
BEAM EXCESSIVE 1 2 2
DEVIATION WARNING
ATTITUDE INDICATION N° 1 + N° 2
(PFD1 / PFD2)
ADR / IR 2/2 2/2 2/2
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Table of equipment required for A-320 Cat 2 and Cat 3 approaches and landings
CREW MONITORED:
“AUTOLAND “ LIGHT 1 1 1
RUDDER TRAVEL LIMIT 1**** 1**** 1****
SYSTEM
ND DUs 1 2 2
ANTISKID 0 1 1
NOSE WHEEL 0 0 1
STEERING
ATTITUDE INDICATION 1 1 1
(Stand- by)
NOTE Auto call-out function. Anti-skid and nose wheel steering are partially monitored by the FMGS
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INTERGLOBE AVIATION LIMITED Issue-II, Revision 00
PRE-REQUISITES:
Verify Crew qualification and currency
Aircraft Status (Check on ECAM STATUS page/QRH that the required landing capability is available)
Weather (Destination & Alternate), check minima’s and wind limitation for auto land
NOTAMs – Check that the airport meets CAT II/ III requirements as applicable
ATC clearance for a CAT II/ III approach obtained
BRIEFING
Approach Briefing as per S.O.P
Approach Ban
Minimum Visual References applicable to type of approach
Vacation point/ Taxi route
Brief review of task sharing & crew call outs
Review crew response to failures
AUTO BRAKE MED and MAX REV
Cabin Crew Briefing
COCKPIT PREP
Press to Test “ Auto-land” light
Check Seat Position optimum
Auto Brakes set to ‘MED’
Flight deck lighting dimmed & Use of exterior lights
Below 1000 FT AGL and above DH (CAT 2 or CAT 3 SINGLE) or above 100 feet RA / Alert Height (CAT 3 DUAL), a Go-
Around should be performed in case of:
Amber Caution (single chime), or
Landing capability degradation
Page | 14
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LIMITED Issue-II, Revision 00
(1) (2)
Monitor auto call out if available CAT III B NO DH
TABLE - REPORTED AND RELEVANT RVR (Minimum Values for a type of operation)
RVR
Type of operation
Touch-downzone Mid zone Roll-out zone
Cat I 550m 125m 125m
Cat II 300m 125m 125m
Cat IIIA 175m 125m 125m
CAT IIIB 75m 75m 75m
Note:
1 Minimum RVR of 75m corresponds to AFM roll-out guidance system limitations.
2 The values underlined in bold font are required for the type of operation.
3 Specific Rwy RVR Applicability - Refer on board minima file
Page | 15
U.P.R.T
RECOMMENDED RECOVERY
TECHNIQUES TRAINEE
Nose Low:
- wings level
- simultaneously pull nose up, gently 6 deg.
- thrust lever IDLE and speed breaks FULL.
- once speed starts decreasing ( check the speed trend)
- speed BRK RETRACT, THRUST TO C/L
UPSET RECOVERY PREVENTION TRAINING
Introduction
The Objective of Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) is to provide flight crew with
the required competencies in order to prevent or recover from a developing or developed
aeroplane situation including a stall. UPRT is one concept with two parts·
1)Upset prevention training 2) Upset recovery training. This presentation addresses upset
recovery training. For the purpose of the exercises, upset prevention is assumed to have failed.
All exercises are manoeuvre-based, enabling the flight crew to apply their handing Skills and
recovery strategy whilst applying CRM principles to return the aeroplane from an upset
condition to a stabilised flight path.
OEM ( Original Equipment Manufacture) -AIRBUS Recommendations
Type-specific stall recovery procedures and upset recovery techniques recommended and
published by the OEM takes precedence over any other guidance, recommendations or
methodology. Refer to the FCOM/FCTM as applicable.
Note: Airbus Upset Recovery Techniques currently published as an OPERATIONS TRAINING
TRANSMISSION (OTI - Ref 999.0077/16 Rev 00 dated 20-Jun-2016). Refer to the Upset
Prevention and Recovery section in the FCTM .
UPRT:
This presentation of this course is a company requirement .The course will be taught through E
Learning and discussed and evaluated on an online platform (For Eg. MS Teams) with the
instructor.
> Causes and contributing factors to upsets
> Upset presentation and recognition
> Recovery strategies
> Emphasis on aerodynamics, flight dynamics and aircraft design principles.
ENERGY
A pilot has three sources of energy available to manage or manipulate the flight path of
an airplane.Pilots who understand the airplane energy state will be in a position to know
instantly what options they may have to manoeuvre their airplane and therefore manage
the trajectory.
The three sources of energy are:
a Kinetic energy, which increases with increasing airspeed.
b Potential energy, which is proportional to altitude.
c Chemical energy, from the fuel in the tanks which can be converted to thrust.
AIRPLANE UPSET RECOVERY TECHNIQUES
Upset recovery techniques can be refined into either:
• Nose high
• Nose low.
This provides the basis for relating the aerodynamic information and techniques to specific
situations.
Consolidation of recovery techniques into these two situations is done for simplification and
ease of retention.Autopilots (A/P) and auto thrust (A/THR) are generally intended to be used
when the airplane is within its normal flight envelope. If the A/P and/or A/THR are responding
correctly to a flight path and/or energy divergence, it may not be appropriate to decrease the
level of automation. Adhere to OEM guidance.If the A/P and A/THR are not responding
correctly they must be disconnected.
The first actions for recovering from an airplane upset must be correct and timely.
It is very important for the crew to realise the differences in airplane handling at
low altitude, versus high altitude (less thrust/power available and more sensitive
flight controls).
Managing startle is imperative all the time, but particularly in high altitude
conditions where the pilot has the least amount of hands on experience to
manipulate the airplane.
The key point is to use gentle control inputs and not arbitrary control inputs.
Exaggerated control inputs through reflex responses must be avoided.
An excessive or inappropriate control input that overshoots the desired response
can startle the pilot and cause one upset to lead to another.
VERTICAL SPEED
PITCH ATTITUDE
SPEED
RECOGNITION:
FIRST PILOT TO NOTICE ANNOUNCE ANY
PFD DIVERGENCE:
ANNOUNCE:
1) NOSE HIGH/ NOSE
2) WINGS LEVEL / BANK
PITCH ( NOSE HIGH-NOSE LOW)
3) SPEED INCREASING / SPEED
DECREASING
ROLL/ BANK (WINGS LEVEL-BANK)
R: ROLL
PITCH: APPLY NOSE DOWN -
UNLOAD APPLY AS MUCH NOSE DOWN
CONTROL INPUT AS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A T: THRUST
NOSE DOWN PITCH RATE.IT IS IMPORTANT TO
REDUCE WING LOADING EVEN IN A NOSE
LOW HIGH BANK SITUATION UPSET
S: SPEED
SITUATION AS THIS INCREASES ROLL
EFFECTIVENESS WHILE DECREASING LOADS
ON THE AIRCRAFT.
S: STABILISE.
ROLL/BANK
ADJUST AS NECESSARY
This sequence of actions is for guidance only
and represents options for the PF to consider
THRUST -DRAG and use depending on the situation.
THRUST & DRAG: ADJUST IF REQUIRED Calling out each action triggers this thought
USE THRUST SPEED BRAKES TO CONTROL process.Not all actions may be necessary once
AIRSPEED.
the recovery is underway.It must be clearly
understood and emphasised that these steps
SPEED:
INCREASING: MONITOR VMO/MMO.
(PITCH/THRUST ;CORRECTED ACCORDINGLY)
DECREASING; AVOID STALL
(PITCH/THRUST CORRECTED ACCORDINGLY)
A/THR :OFF
(*iF A/THR IS RESPONDING CORRECTLY TO
ARREST DIVERGENCE-MAINTAIN ON”
ACTIONS
PITCH: APPLY NOSE DOWN -UNLOAD APPLY CALL OUT
AS MUCH NOSE DOWN CONTROL INPUT AS ATTITUDE
REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A NOSE DOWN PITCH SPEED
RATE.IT IS IMPORTANT TO REDUCE WING ALTITUDE
LOADING EVEN IN A NOSE LOW HIGH BANK
SITUATION UPSET SITUATION AS THIS THROUGHOUT THE RECOVERY
INCREASES ROLL EFFECTIVENESS WHILE
DECREASING LOADS ON THE AIRCRAFT. VERIFY ALL ACTIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED
AND CALL OUT ANY OMISSIONS
THRUST TABLES
AIRBUS STALL RECOVERY PROCEDURE
STALL
SKY POINTER/SIDE
SLIP INDICATOR
PITCH ATTITUDE
1200
ACTIONS
PITCH: NOSE DOWN PITCH CONTROL …
APPLY, THEN ADJUST ACCORDINGLY.
ROLL: WINGS LEVEL
SPEED BRAKE: RETRACT
WHEN OUT OF STALL CONDITIONS
THRUST SMOOTHLY AS REQUIRED
NOTE: THRUST HAS AN ADVERSE EFFECT
ON ANGLE OF ATTACK WITH UNDER WING
MOUNTED ENGINES
STALL RECOVERY (LEFT SEAT)
“STALL I HAVE
STALL STALL CONTROL ”
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1) STALL
2) LOW ALTITUDE
3) ALTITUDE LOSS IS
CRITICAL
RIGHT HAND
STALL STALL
“STALL I HAVE
CONTROL”
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1) STALL
2) LOW ALTITUDE
3) ALTITUDE LOSS IS
CRITICAL
LEFT HAND
STALL
SKY POINTER/SIDE
SLIP INDICATOR
PITCH ATTITUDE
10000
ACTIONS
PITCH: NOSE DOWN PITCH CONTROL …
APPLY-(Off load to neutral then push)
ROLL: WINGS LEVEL
SPEED BRAKE: RETRACT
WHEN OUT OF STALL CONDITIONS
CONFIG: CLEAN UP AS PER GO AROUND.
THRUST SMOOTHLY AS REQUIRED
NOTE: THRUST HAS AN ADVERSE EFFECT
ON ANGLE OF ATTACK WITH UNDER WING
MOUNTED ENGINES
STALL RECOVERY (LEFT SEAT)
“STALL I HAVE
STALL STALL CONTROL”
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1) STALL
2) ALTITUDE LOSS IS
NOT CRITICAL
STALL STALL
“STALL I HAVE
CONTROL”
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1) STALL
2) ALTITUDE LOSS IS
NOT CRITICAL
LEFT HAND
PITCH ATTITUDE
28000
ACTIONS
PITCH: NOSE DOWN PITCH CONTROL …
APPLY-(Off load to neutral then push)
ROLL: WINGS LEVEL
SPEED BRAKE: RETRACT
WHEN OUT OF STALL CONDITIONS
THRUST SMOOTHLY AS REQUIRED
NOTE: THRUST HAS AN ADVERSE EFFECT
ON ANGLE OF ATTACK WITH UNDER WING
MOUNTED ENGINES
STALL RECOVERY (LEFT SEAT)
“STALL I HAVE
STALL STALL CONTROL ”
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1) STALL
2) ALTITUDE LOSS IS
NOT CRITICAL
RIGHT HAND
STALL STALL
“STALL I HAVE
CONTROL”
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1) STALL
2) ALTITUDE LOSS IS
NOT CRITICAL
LEFT HAND
a. Objective
1. The instructor should remind the crew that this is a handling exercise to maintain their
proficiency.
2. The instructor should also remind the crew that a loss of automation may be startling but
that minimal inputs are required to maintain the safe flight-path in such a case.
3. Knowledge of the normal pitch and thrust values is of great importance.
4. Both pilots should practice the exercises with an emphasis on discovering the handling
characteristics associated with the corresponding flight control law.
5. They should also gain a better understanding of High Altitude Handling in particular the
Detection and Recognition of the degraded situation if any.
6. Repeat the exercise for each pilot until they are ready to continue.
1. Select an aircraft weight that results in a recommended maximum altitude (REC MAX) at
2000ft below the aircraft certified ceiling. Position the simulator close to this REC MAX.
2. Position the aircraft as described above, with normal operations and a Mach number
according to Cost Index.
3. Set AP/FD and A/THR to OFF. Flight Path Vector OFF.
PITCH ATTITUDE
35000
ACTIONS
PITCH: NOSE DOWN PITCH CONTROL …
APPLY-(Off load to neutral then push)
ROLL: WINGS LEVEL
SPEED BRAKE: RETRACT
WHEN OUT OF STALL CONDITIONS
THRUST SMOOTHLY AS REQUIRED
NOTE: THRUST HAS AN ADVERSE EFFECT
ON ANGLE OF ATTACK WITH UNDER WING
MOUNTED ENGINES
STALL RECOVERY (LEFT SEAT)
“STALL I HAVE
STALL STALL CONTROL ”
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1) STALL
2) ALTITUDE LOSS IS
NOT CRITICAL
RIGHT HAND
STALL STALL
“STALL I HAVE
CONTROL”
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1) STALL
2) ALTITUDE LOSS IS
NOT CRITICAL
LEFT HAND
WINGS LEVEL
SKY POINTER/SIDE
SLIP INDICATOR
NOSE HIGH
5000
PITCH ATTITUDE
SPEED
FIRST PILOT TO NOTICE ANNOUNCE ANY PFD >NOSE HIGH/ NOSE LOW>WINGS LEVEL/ BANK
DIVERGENCE >”PITCH” >BANK >SPEED >SPEED INCREASING/SPEED DECREASING
“I HAVE CONTROL”
A/THR :OFF
(IF A/THR IS RESPONDING CORRECTLY TO ARREST
DIVERGENCE-MAINTAIN ON”
ACTIONS
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1) NOSE HIGH
1 2) WINGS LEVEL
3) SPEED: DECREASING
2
BOTH PILOTS MUST
ANNOUNCE WHAT
THEY OBSERVE
“ I HAVE CONTROL”
WINGS LEVEL
NOSE HIGH
SPEED 28750
STD
FIRST PILOT TO NOTICE ANNOUNCE ANY PFD >NOSE HIGH/ NOSE LOW>WINGS LEVEL/ BANK
DIVERGENCE >”PITCH” >BANK >SPEED >SPEED INCREASING/SPEED DECREASING
“I HAVE CONTROL”
A/THR :OFF
(IF A/THR IS RESPONDING CORRECTLY TO ARREST
DIVERGENCE-MAINTAIN ON”
ACTIONS
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1) NOSE HIGH
2) WINGS LEVEL
1 3) SPEED: DECREASING
“NOSE HIGH”
“WINGS LEVEL”
“SPEED DECREASING” “ ALL CONFIRMED”
2
BOTH PILOTS MUST
ANNOUNCE WHAT
THEY OBSERVE
“ I HAVE CONTROL”
PITCH ATTITUDE
STD
FIRST PILOT TO NOTICE ANNOUNCE ANY PFD >NOSE HIGH/ NOSE LOW>WINGS LEVEL/ BANK
DIVERGENCE >”PITCH” >BANK >SPEED >SPEED INCREASING/SPEED DECREASING
“I HAVE CONTROL”
A/THR :OFF
(IF A/THR IS RESPONDING CORRECTLY TO ARREST
DIVERGENCE-MAINTAIN ON”
ACTIONS
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1)NOSE LOW
2) BANK:
1
3) SPEED: DECREASING
NOSE LOW”
“ ALL CONFIRMED”
“ BANK”
“SPEED INCREASING”
2
BOTH PILOTS MUST
ANNOUNCE WHAT
THEY OBSERVE
“ I HAVE CONTROL”
5) THRUST : ADJUST
PITCH
NOSE HIGH
ATTITUDE
35000
SPEED
FIRST PILOT TO NOTICE ANNOUNCE ANY PFD >NOSE HIGH/ NOSE LOW>WINGS LEVEL/ BANK
DIVERGENCE >”PITCH” >BANK >SPEED >SPEED INCREASING/SPEED DECREASING
“I HAVE CONTROL”
A/THR :OFF
(IF A/THR IS RESPONDING CORRECTLY TO ARREST
DIVERGENCE-MAINTAIN ON”
ACTIONS
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
1)NOSE HIGH
2) BANK:
1
3) SPEED: DECREASING
“NOSE HIGH”
“BANK”
“SPEED DECREASING” “ ALL CONFIRMED”
2
BOTH PILOTS MUST
ANNOUNCE WHAT
THEY OBSERVE
“ I HAVE CONTROL”
Description:
This document includes guidance material on:
1. Definitions
2. Pilot Certification & Authorization
3. Aircraft Approval
4. RNP APCH – Equipment Required
5. RNP Approach Minima
6. Approach Guidance
7. Standard Operating procedures
8. Management of degraded Navigation
9. Standard Callouts
10. Use of AP/FDs
11. FAQs on RNP Approaches
1. DEFINITIONS
iii. Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS): Any global position, speed, and time determination system
including:
• One or more main satellite constellations, such as Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Global
Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS).
• Aircraft receivers and
• Several integrity monitoring systems including
- Aircraft Based Augmentation System (ABAS),
- Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) e.g. GAGAN (India), EGNOS (Europe), WAAS (US) etc.
- Ground-based augmentation systems (GBAS), such as the Local Area Augmentation System -LAAS
Note: IndiGo Airbus A320/A321 aircraft are currently not SBAS or GBAS capable.
iv. Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM): A technique used in a GNSS receiver / processor to
determine the integrity of its navigation signals, using only GPS signals or GPS signals enhanced with
barometric upper-air data. This determination is achieved by a consistency check between pseudo-range
measurements. At least one additional available satellite is required with respect to the number of
satellites that are needed to obtain the navigation solution.
RAIM levels required for RNP APCH down to LNAV or LNAV/VNAV minima can be verified either through
NOTAMs (where available) or through prediction services.
When the operation is predicated on the availability of ABAS, the pilot should perform a new RAIM
availability check if ETA is more than 15 minutes different from the ETA used during the preflight
planning. This check is also processed automatically 2 NM before the FDP for an E/TSO-C129a Class A1
receiver.
In the event of a predicted, continuous loss of appropriate level of fault detection of more than five
minutes for any part of the RNP APCH operation, the flight planning should be revised (e.g. planning a
different procedure or delaying the departure when RNP procedure/s are the only option).
v. RNP Value: The RNP value designates the lateral performance requirement associated with a procedure.
Examples of RNP values are: RNP 0.3 and RNP 1. The RNP Value and the Estimated Position Uncertainity
(EPU) are displayed on the MCDU PROG page.
• If the EPU does not exceed the RNP, the accuracy is HIGH
• If the EPU exceeds the RNP, accuracy is LOW.
vi. Waypoint (WPT). A specified geographical location used to define an area navigation route or the flight
path of an aircraft employing area navigation. Waypoints area identified as either:
Fly-by waypoint - A waypoint which requires turn anticipation to allow tangential interception of the
next segment of a route or procedure.
Fly over waypoint - A waypoint at which a turn is initiated in order to join the next segment of a route or
procedure.
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3. AIRCRAFT APPROVAL
Currently, all IndiGo aircraft are approved for RNP APCH (LNAV & LNAV/VNAV). MSN specific approvals are part of
onboard EFBs under OLB – Approvals.
‐ The FMS vertical profile does not take into account the effect of low OAT. Therefore, FINAL APP (Fully
Managed) guidance:
• Must not be used when the actual OAT is below the minimum temperature indicated on the
approach chart or defined by the Operator, or
• May not be used when temperature corrections are required (FINAL APP mode may not engage).
Note: If airport OAT is above Approach Chart Maximum Temperature, use of FINAL APP is not authorised.
Only NAV-FPA may be used down to LNAV Minima. Aircraft true altitude will be higher than indicated.
‐ If a TOO STEEP PATH is displayed after the Final Descent Point (FDP), do not use FINAL APP guidance
for approach. Use NAV FPA for approach.
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6. APPROACH GUIDANCE:
APPROACH MINIMUM
APPROACH APPROACH OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FLYING
SPEED REQUIRED
TYPE CATEGORY MINIMUM MODES REFERENCE
TECHNIQUE SYSTEM
Decelerated
/ Early
FINAL HDG-V/S
RNP APCH Stabilized
APP*
WITH LNAV NPA MDA(H) + 50’
MINIMA ABAS
Early
NAV – FPA
TRK – FPA Stabilized
RNP APCH
Decelerated ABAS +
WITH
APV (NPA) DA(H) FINAL APP HDG – V/S / Early Baro
LNAV/VNAV
Stabilized VNAV
MINIMA
* FINAL APP is the preferred mode
DIRECT TO FDP NOT ALLOWED. RADAR VECTORS TO INTERCEPT BEFORE FDP MAY BE ACCEPTED
“DIRECT TO” CLEARANCE TO INTERMEDIATE FIX (IF) MAY BE ACCEPTED PROVIDED THAT
RESULTING TRACK CHANGE AT THE “IF” DOES NOT EXCEEDS 450
THE AIRCRAFT MUST BE ESTABLISHED ON THE FINAL APPROACH COURSE NO LATER THAN THE
FDP BEFORE STARTING THE DESCENT (TO ENSURE TERRAIN AND OBSTACLE CLEARANCE)
APPROACH NAV SPECIFICATION BY FLIGHT PHASE
INITIAL APPROACH – RNP 1
INTERMEDIATE APPROACH – RNP 1
FINAL APPROACH - RNP 0.3
MISSED APPROACH – RNP 1 (NOT APPLICABLE IF MISSED APPROACH IS BASED ON
CONVENTIONAL NAVAIDS)
INTERMEDIATE ENSURE RNP VALUE OF 0.3 BEFORE CROSSING FDP
APPROACH ENSURE APPROPRIATE MODE IS ARMED ( FINAL APP / NAV FPA )
FINAL
ENSURE APPROPRIATE MODE IS ENGAGED
APPROACH
FOLLOW PUBLISHED MISSED APPROACH PROCEDURE. IF MISSED APPROACH CARRIED OUT DUE
MISSED
TO DEGRADATION OF NAVIGATION, FOLLOW PLANNED ALTERNATIVE MISSED APPROACH BASED
APPROACH
ON CONVENTIONAL RADIO NAVAIDS OR AS COORDINATED WITH ATC
Note: The RNP Apch Briefing Guide will be amended in due course
FAILURES
FAILURE ACTION
GPS PRIMARY LOST ON ONE
Use the AP/FD on the other side and Continue
SIDE
NAV ACCURACY DOWNGRADE
Use the AP/FD on the other side and Continue
on one FMGC
GPS PRIMARY LOST ON BOTH Discontinue approach if Visual references are not sufficient to Continue
SIDES visually
NAV ACCURACY DOWNGRADE Discontinue approach if Visual references are not sufficient to Continue
ON BOTH FMGC visually
ECAM: NAV FM/GPS POS Discontinue approach if Visual references are not sufficient to Continue
DISAGREE visually
XTK > 0.3 NM Discontinue approach if Visual references are not sufficient to Continue
visually
LNAV/VNAV App: V.DEV > - 75 ft Discontinue approach if Visual references are not sufficient to Continue
(3/4 dot BELOW) visually
LNAV App: If vertical guidance is
not satisfactory in FINAL APP Switch to NAV-FPA, correct vertical profile and continue
Mode
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Note: In case of Go-Around, FD Bars will be displayed automatically with NAV or GA TRK engaged. Select
the appropriate lateral mode to fly the planned Missed Approach Procedure.
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When the temperature is higher than standard (temperature under international standard atmospheric
(ISA) conditions)), the aircraft will be flying above the indicated altitude. When the temperature is below
the standard, the aircraft will be flying below the altitude indicated in the altimeter.
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Q13 For use of FINAL APP guidance during approach what is the tolerance between MCDU and charted
procedure?
A13 To use FINAL APP guidance for approach
• 0.1 degree of difference between the MCDU and the charted final vertical path is acceptable
• 1 degree of difference between the MCDU and the charted final lateral track is acceptable
Q14 Can the flight crew modify SPD & ALT constraints for a RNP APCH that are programmed on the
MCDU F/PLN page?
A14 The constraints coded as part of NAV Database must match those on the Jeppesen Approach Charts. In
case of any discrepancy the chartered constraints take precedence and can be manually inserted by
the flight crew.
IAF and IF constraints could be modified / disregarded only in coordination with ATC. However, do not
modify the final approach (FDP to Runway or MAP), including altitude constraints.
Q19 When can we not follow the published RNP Missed Approach?
A19 If RNP capability is lost (Degradation of Lateral Navigation), the published RNP Missed Approach
Procedure must not be flown. Crew must plan, during Approach Preparation, and be prepared to follow
a Missed Approach based on conventional navaids, if available, in case of degradation. Coordinate with
the ATC. Radar Vectors may be requested in a radar environment.
Q20 Is it mandatory to discontinue approach in case of deviation of 75 ft above the vertical path?
A20 One must discontinue approach in case of deviation of 75 ft below the vertical path (V/DEV >3/4 dot)
unless adequate visual references established and approach may be continued safely.
If above the vertical path, one can take appropriate action to re-establish the aircraft on profile within
the limits of the stabilization-criteria as per Company Policy, failing which a Go-Around is mandatory.
Q21 What would be the appropriate action in case of degradation of Navigation Capability but Adequate
Visual References have been established?
A21 In the above scenario, if external visual references are sufficient to continue the approach safely, one
can continue and land.
Q22 Can we plan and execute RNP APCHs into all airfields for which Approach Plates are available in
Jeppesen and the corresponding approach is correctly coded in the FMS NAV Database?
A22 Few of the RNP APCHs included in the FMS NAV Database are for trial purposes. List of the same are
available in C-NOTAM 04 series (NAV DATABASE BULLETIN). Pilots are informed not to select the
mentioned approaches.
Q23 As per Company Operations Manual C for VEPT R/W 25 NPA APCHs require prior approval from SVP-
Flight Operations. Are we legal to fly the VEPT RNP Y RWY 25?
A23 Both LNAV / VNAV as well as LNAV APCHs are permitted for VEPT RNP Y RWY 25. Company Operations
Manual will be amended to clarify the same.
Q24 What are the conditions for FINAL APP mode engagement?
A24 FINAL APP mode engages when:
• NAV or APP NAV is engaged,
• FINAL is armed (by pressing APPR on the FCU),
• Predictions are available in FMS,
• APPROACH phase is active,
Note: APPROACH phase may have to be manually activated on MCDU PERF page if the approach starts
at high altitude above aerodrome level (i.e. RNAV(RNP) approaches).
• The aircraft is within the capture area of the FMS profile:
Laterally: ±1.5 NM from the Final Descent Point.
Vertically: +150 ft above the Final Descent Point.
• The aircraft intercepts a descending leg of the vertical flight path.
Q25 Can we use the LPV minima shown on an RNP APCH chart?
A25 LPV Approaches require SBAS capability which IndiGo aircraft do not currently possess. Therefore, LPV
minima are not to be used. LPV minima are not included in the Company Aerodrome Minima Folder.
Q26 The RNP Briefing Guide also states that one must check predicted RAIM at destination on PREDICTIVE
GPS page. Are we legal to commence the approach if we do not get the Y Y Y Y Y Y confirmation at
ETA +/- 15 minutes?
A26 If this check fails when done as part of the pre-flight checks, one can proceed to the destination as long
as the destination has an alternate approach which uses conventional RADIO NAVAIDs.
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If unsuccessful when done as part of the Approach Preparation one can still plan for the RNP APCH as
long as GPS PRIMARY is available.
In case of E/TSO-C129a Class A1 receivers installed on all IndiGo A320 aircrafts, an auto check is
performed 2 NM before FAF which is adequate to confirm Navigation Accuracy for the approach.
In the Final Approach Segment, NAV ACCUR DOWNGRAD message (for both FMS) on the MCDU or ND
would be the only condition that warrants discontinuing the approach.
Q27 Is the L-DEV scale mandatory for RNP APCHs?
A27 The L-DEV scale is not a mandatory indication for RNP APCH with FINAL APP guidance.
X-TRACK Error indication on 2 NDs is required for RNP APCH with FINAL APP or FPA guidance.
L-DEV indication is mandatory only for RNP-AR APCHs.
L-DEV indication is available in the simulators and will be available on RNP-AR capable aircraft.
Q28 When would I need to do an LNAV Only Approach?
A28 An LNAV Only approach would be flown in the following scenarios
• If OAT is below the Minimum Temperature specified on the chart.
• QNH available is that of a remote station.
• If the vertical descent profile on the F/PLN page of FMGC differs from the charted procedure by
more than 0.1 degrees.
• If F/PLN page of FMGC shows “TOO STEEP PATH” beyond the final descent point (FDP).
• If the chart only has a LNAV procedure.
Q29 Minimum Equipment Required to Start an RNP APCH states a requirement for 01 FMS & 01 GPS.
However, the IndiGo RNP APCH Briefing Guide lists the need for 02 FMS & 02 GPS receivers as part of
the “Pre-Flight Checks”. Why the discrepancy?
A29 Disregard the requirement of 02 FMS & 02 GPS receivers mentioned in the briefing guide. It will be
corrected in the next edition.
Q30 Can the AP/FDs be kept on below the minima on a RNP approach?
A30 For RNP approaches using the “FINAL APP” guidance the crew may elect to keep the FDs on below the
minima. From Minima down to the MAP the FDs provide an additional guidance. At the MAP the FMA
will change from “ FINAL APP” to HDG-V/S along with a triple click and FDs then become irrelevant and
should be disregarded.
RNP APCH briefing in the briefing guide advices the crew to switch off FDs at Minima. This maybe
disregarded and the crew may elect to keep FDs on uptil the MAP. Briefing guide will be corrcted in the
next revision.
The AP must be must be disconnected by AP Minimum Use Height or MAP, whichever is higher.
For Minimum Use Height of the AP, Refer to LIM-AFS-10 Autopilot Function
Q31 Can the FDs be kept on below minima for all approaches that use “ FINAL APP” guidance?
A31 In addition to the RNP Approach, approved VOR and NDB approaches can also be done using the “ FINAL
APP” guidance. However, since in most cases of VOR or NDB approaches the Final approach track is not
completely aligned with the runway the crew should not use FDs below the minima for fully managed
VOR and NDB approaches.
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No: 03
NOTAC (AIRBUS)
1.1. Introduction
This Policy has been developed based on the guidelines provided by the Bureau of Aviation Security
(BCAS) for the purpose of assisting all agencies involved in civil aviation to respond effectively and
expeditiously to a hijack situation. The Policy has been drafted keeping in view guidelines issued by the
ICAO and the Contingency Plan approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). It addresses best
practices to be implemented in the event of a hijack. This is sought to be achieved by clearly laying down
the response expected in a hijack situation by various agencies involved, keeping in view the guidelines
laid down by BCAS. The basic objectives at all times remains release of the hostages without harm or loss
of property or capitulation to demands inimical to national security.
1.2. Types Of Unlawful Seizure
The following would be the types of unlawful seizure of an aircraft on the ground or in flight in which the
Contingency Plan would be activated.
a. Indian Registered aircraft after hijacking lands at an Indian Airport.
b. Indian Registered aircraft after hijacking is being taken outside the country.
c. Indian Registered aircraft after hijacking lands at a foreign airport.
d. A foreign registered aircraft after hijacking lands at an Indian airport.
e. An aircraft is hijacked for being used as missile to attack strategic targets.
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NOTAC (AIRBUS)
The executive responsibility for crisis management would rest with the Central Committee chaired by the
DGCA, and the Aerodrome Committee, functioning under its guidance/supervision at the airport level,
where the hijacked aircraft lands. Necessary authority and resources would be available to the Aerodrome
Committee for taking on the spot decisions and actions based on the assessment of the ground situation
2.1. Objective
Near instantaneous intimation of occurrence of a hijack to those concerned with crisis management
and immediate response by the latter by way of decisions/actions is of the essence.
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NOTAC (AIRBUS)
In the event of a hijack, the Lead Cabin Attendant is to advise the Captain, as soon as possible,
on the interphone system about the hijacker(s) presence in the cabin. She should be aware
that there may be other as yet unidentified (sleeper) hijackers on board.
In case a hijacker wants to force entry into the cockpit, the Cabin Attendants are required to
contact the cockpit and use the following code:
“Captain, please UNLOCK the door.”
The word UNLOCK is critical.
In such a situation, cockpit entry will be denied. On receipt of the hijack code from the cabin attendant, the
crew will:
a. Immediately notify the appropriate ATS Unit of being subjected to unlawful interference and any
significant circumstance associated therewith and any deviation from the flight plan necessitated in
order to enable the ATS Unit to give priority to the aircraft and to minimize conflict with operations of
other aircraft.
b. When circumstances prevent clear and concise radio transmissions, for example, if the hijacker(s) has
gained access to cockpit, the following discrete communications message/procedure, if possible, may
be used:
VHF communication is set up as follows:
The Captain:
Ensure the captain’s speaker is off.
Use his headset.
Monitor emergency frequency 121.5 MHz on No. 2 transceiver.
The First Officer will:
Monitor ATC on No.1 transceiver.
Place the first officer’s speaker ON to give the hijacker the impression that he is receiving all
transmissions.
c. Operate the Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) transponder, if the aircraft is equipped with the same,
in order to indicate that it is threatened by grave and imminent danger and require immediate
assistance:
i. On Mode A, Code 7500, to indicate specifically that it' is being hijacked or subjected to
unlawful interference.
ii. On Mode B, Code 7700, to indicate that the situation is grave and immediate assistance is
required.
d. Adhere to the following procedures if the pilot is unable to notify the ATS Unit of the unlawful
interference:
i. Unless considerations aboard the aircraft dictate otherwise, attempt to continue flying on the
assigned track and at the assigned cruising level at least until he/she is able to notify an ATS
Unit or comes within radar coverage.
ii. If the pilot departs from his assigned track or assigned cruising level without being able to
make radiotelephony contact with the ATS, he should:-
a. Attempt to broadcast a warning on the VHF channel in use or VHF emergency frequency and
other appropriate frequencies unless considerations aboard the aircraft dictate otherwise.
b. Use the ACARS 7500 RPT to communicate emergency information in the form of an encrypted
message.
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NOTAC (AIRBUS)
c. Other equipment such as on-board transponders, data links, etc., should also be used when it
is advantageous to do so and circumstances permit; and
d. Proceed in accordance with applicable special procedures for in-flight contingencies, as
mentioned in Operations Manual, Part A, Para 36.1.9.3
e. Crew may use any secret facility installed in the aircraft i.e., cellular phones/satellite based
phones to communicate with the ground.
f. The Commander/crew will endeavor to extract as much information about the hijackers as
possible, and make every possible effort to communicate the description, number of offenders
and arms carried by them and their intentions to the ATC and all other relevant
developments/information. Predetermined codes may also be used for this purpose. The crew
may send an ACARS 7500 RPT to communicate details of the situation in an encrypted
message.
g. The commander of the aircraft, as directed by the ATC and without jeopardizing the safety of
aircraft, shall make all efforts to land at an Indian airport, preferably an airport designated for
this purpose, namely Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Thiruvananthapuram, Nagpur, Hyderabad,
Ahmedabad, Bengaluru, Guwahati, Chandigarh, Jaipur and Lucknow.
h. Pilots / crew should be aware of the various actions which would be taken by the ground team
for the immobilization of the aircraft, cordoning it etc. in such a crisis. Refer para 3.1.1 a (i) &
(ii) below.
i. The Commander of the hijacked aircraft should contact his airline at the earliest on VHF/ HF or
DATA link and pass on details of the situation and his intention.
The Commander should anticipate that security forces (BCAS etc.), who have the necessary powers, will begin
to exercise their powers and their authority to control the future course of events as soon as the incident is
reported. From this point, responsibility of the Commander diminishes and he adheres to the lawful
instructions of the police or security forces to the extent that he considers it to be consistent with the safety of
the aircraft, passengers and crew.
Following action will be taken forthwith on receipt of information by the concerned functionaries without
waiting for any instructions or decisions of the Central Committee/COSAH/CCS.
i. Immediate action to immobilize a hijacked Indian registered aircraft which lands at an Indian
airport. Prior to immobilization, efforts will be made, to first direct the Aircraft to an Isolated
Parking Bay, for this purpose.
ii. Employ possible strategies/ methods for immobilizing the aircraft including:-
– Positioning of obstacles on the runway like vehicles / fire tenders;
– Deflating of tyres by personnel coming from rear end;
– Putting off the lights of the runway/ taxi track (at night);
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NOTAC (AIRBUS)
– Any other means, without endangering the safety of the aircraft and the security of
passengers.
iii. Establish a controlled area covering the main incident area. Within the controlled area, an
inner cordon should be established surrounding the actual incident with a Forward Control
Point to control all access to the inner cordon. The inner cordon is normally armed. The
purpose of the inner cordon is to isolate the incident and prevent access to the incident by
the public or press and contain any breakout by the perpetrators. Access to the inner cordon
will be permitted only with the concurrence of the Forward Control Point commander. It is
important that the Forward Control Point be mobile;
iv. The Forward Control Point (FCP) shall be manned by an AAI Communication Officer, Dy. CASO
and Airline Officer deputed by IndiGo Airport Manager.
v. Arrange catering for passengers;
vi. Arrange the immediate induction of the Bomb Disposal Squad at the airport.
vii. Position Fire tenders as per the prescribed drill.
i. Contact with the pilot of the hijacked aircraft shall be established only by the ATC, Chairman
Aerodrome Committee, the Negotiating Team and the Chairman Central Committee. No other official /
person shall establish contact with the pilot of the hijacked aircraft.
As the Commander is responsible for the safety of the passengers, crew and aircraft, his requirements will be
ascertained and met whenever possible by In-charge Aerodrome and ATCO as the case may be.
a. Adequate number of mobile emergency lights for use in any contingency or in case it is decided to
surround the aircraft by strong spotlights and floodlights at night to prevent the perpetrators from
observing the activities in the adjacent area;
b. Food, water, fuel and other requirements of the crew and passengers of the affected aircraft.
c. Positioning of fire/ crash tenders and other emergency services at strategic points;
The InterGlobe Aviation Ltd (IndiGo) Airport Manager/OCC will be responsible for:
a. Ensure that the flight crew is supplied with a condensed kit of valid emergency navigation material for
locations, which are not normally on route. This technical navigational emergency kit will assist the
crew to land the aircraft safely at an airport with which they are not familiar. Onboard Jeppesen
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NOTAC (AIRBUS)
documents comprising Jeppesen enroute and approach charts, airport directory, ATC and Emergency
Sections fulfill this need.
b. Fill in the prescribed Performa of unlawful interference and forward the same, along with the written
report of the pilot-in-command, to the Appropriate Authority, i.e. BCAS by the quickest possible
means.
c. Ensure that the crew are trained to observe the following norms in handling the hijackers:
DO's
In a hijack situation, the Government of the country of landing will undoubtedly be the prime negotiator. Other
Governments may be involved and play critical roles. Delays may be considerable and deadlines may have to
be passed. While the situation may be difficult and frustrating, crew should endeavor to be patient. Each
deadline that can be successfully passed is a positive step towards a satisfactory conclusion of the incident.
Annex 6 (Part - I) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and Chapter 3 of the Tokyo Convention
specify the powers of the Pilot-in Command and authorize specific action to be taken by him in the event of an
unlawful act. (Refer Operations Manual Part A, Para 36.1.9.2.1) The Pilot-in-Command should hold command
of all crew members including any Airlines security personnel. If the Pilot-in Command is unable to do so,
another qualified member of the crew should assume command in accordance with the sequence provided in
the Operation Manual. All crew members shall obey the directions of the Commander and shall assist him in
every way.
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No: 03
NOTAC (AIRBUS)
DON'T's
Do not antagonize or irritate the hijackers or enter into an argument with him/ them, especially on
politics.
Do not allow passengers to get excited or resort to action in an attempt to overpower the hijackers,
which may jeopardize safety. One practical measure to restrain passengers would be to instruct them
to fasten their seat belts.
Do not talk down to the hijackers or appear over-clever, or hurt their self-respect.
Do not let them feel concerned and ensure that only one crew member approaches a hijacker at a
time.
Do not mention insanity or mental disorders.
Do not annoy the hijackers by refusing to carry out their orders.
Do not make sudden movements and have whispered conversations.
Do not try to disarm the hijackers.
Do not allow passengers to interfere
After the event, do not speak to the press/media personnel at any time without proper permission
from the CEO or designate.
5.1 Aircraft
Communication equipment (as specified by DGCA) shall be installed in Indian registered aircraft, by the Aircraft
Operator, to facilitate communication with ground stations in case of a hijack. This could include secret
facilities i.e. Cellular phones/satellite based phones etc.
All aircraft are equipped with VHF / HF/ SSR Transponder and ACARS for communication with ground. The
aircraft CVR should be kept 'ON' while on ground with engine running.
a. The affected air carrier along with a written report of the pilot-in command.
b. The Aerodrome Officer in-charge
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INTERGLOBE AVIATION LIMITED FLT/OPS/N
No: 03
NOTAC (AIRBUS)
(a) A criminal case of unlawful interference to civil aviation under relevant sections of law shall be got
registered, normally by the Airline concerned, at the appropriate police station for facilitating the investigation
and prosecution of offenders.
All documents and materials relevant to the investigation of the act of unlawful interference shall be kept in
safe custody by the agencies concerned and handed over to the authorized agencies as per requirement.
The content of NOTAC 67, dated 07 April 2010 has been re-issued in this notice.
REFERENCES:
NIL
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