Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19521            October 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
ESTEBAN R. CHAVES, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. 

Maximo Z. Pacudan for defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Misamis, dated December 1, 1961, issued in Criminal
Case No. 1601, declaring a family home extrajudicially constituted not exempt from the execution levy issued at the
instance of the offended party.

The accused, Esteban Chaves, has been found by the Court of First Instance (Crim. Case No. 1601) and by the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 00053-R) guilty of a violation, of Republic Act No. 145, in that he had collected, in
January, 1948, a claim of Marcela Rambuyon for death benefits in the sum of $4,252.20 due her for the demise of
her son, USAFFE veteran Santos Echaure; the corresponding check was cashed by Chaves, who later delivered
only P3,202.20 to the claimant, and retained P5,362.20 for himself. Chaves was sentenced to undergo one year
imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P5,362.20 and to pay the costs. The conviction and
sentence became final on April 16, 1961.

The indemnity not having been paid, the offended party obtained a writ of execution in May, 1961, and the Sheriff
accordingly levied on a residential lot and building of the accused, but desisted from proceeding further when the
accused exhibit proof that the property had been extrajudicially constituted and recorded as a family home, in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. on December 5, 1953, after the filing of the information but before
conviction. Upon petition by the complainant, the Court issued the contested order declaring that the family home
was not exempt from the levy made by the Sheriff because the accused's obligation to pay the amount wrongfully
retained by him was anterior to the constitution of the family home. The motion of accused Chaves for
reconsideration of the order having been denied, he resorted to this Court on appeal.

The issue is whether the family home extrajudicially constituted is entitled to exemption, considering that Article 243
of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect:

ART. 243. The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment, except:

(1) For nonpayment of debts,

(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such re-cord of the declaration;

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and others who have rendered
Service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

Appellant takes the position that the indemnity due to the complainant became a "debt" within the purview of this
Article only from the date of the judgment ordering indemnification, years after family home in question was
established.
We see no merit in the appeal. The word "debt", as used in subdivision (2) of Article 243, "is not qualified and must,
therefore, be taken in its generic sense" (Montoya vs. Ignacio, 54 Off. Gaz. 978-979), i.e., of "obligations" in general.
The duty of Chaves to reimburse the amount of the veteran's benefits improperly retained by him certainly arose
and came into existence from the date of his misappropriation (January, 1948), and the judgment of 1961 merely
established the fact of the misappropriation beyond controversy and reasonable doubt. The judgment sentencing
Chaves to indemnify complainant was not the source of his duty to return, any more than a judgment on a
promissory note would be the origin of the promissor's duty to pay.

That a judgment is not necessary to clothe a preexisting debt with the privileged character of being enforceable
against the family home extrajudicially established at a later date is apparent by comparison with Article 247 of the
Civil Code.

ART. 247. When a creditor whose claim is not mentioned in article 243 obtains a judgment in his favor, and
he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home of the judgment debtor is worth more than the
amount mentioned in Article 231, he may apply to the Court of First Instance for an order directing the sale
of the property under execution.

Note that under this article it is only claims not mentioned in Article 243 that must be reduced to judgment before
being enforced against the family home. Certainly, the "humane considerations," for which the law surrounded the
home with immunities from levy, did not include the intent to enable a debtor to thwart the just claims of his
creditors. If in the case of a judicially established family home the law requires that the petitioning debtor should first
give sufficient security for his unsecured debts before the family home is authorized (Art. 231), there is no reason
why in the case of the extrajudicial constitution, that creditors have no opportunity to oppose or protest, the
constituting debtor should be enabled to escape payment of his just debts, and leave the creditors holding an empty
bag.

The order appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar,
J.J.,concur.
Regala, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-630            November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant, 
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.

MORAN, C.J.:

Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the
registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was
denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this
jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of
a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko
appealed to this Court.

There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may
acquire residential land.

It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal
which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another
case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest
upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the
constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be
made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply
because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the
appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be,
granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated.

According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of
appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only
had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared.
The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the
motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of
deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was
naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had
been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the
withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision
of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before
this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor
General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether
or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional
functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive
conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the
constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be brought
upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the
circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because both
vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the
register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its
conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent
offense to the Constitution.

All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal
result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the
proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that
question.

Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:

Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited
to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inaguration of the Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may
be the measure and the limit of the grant.

The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind
of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and
utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public
domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain
are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds
corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification
existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said
classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional
Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.

As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase
"agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in
several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court.
(See Montano vs.Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159;
Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of
the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither
mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:

Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and
planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must
necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the
purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other
circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special
provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.

In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only
whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the
test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were
classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural
lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands.
It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when
they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
 Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have
been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified
it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p.
683.) AlsoCalder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P.,
1039.)

It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning
which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the
instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be
presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky.,
526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)

Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain
meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute
in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be
construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary
from strict literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)

Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be
construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the
adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a
Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so
revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National
Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof
permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens,
which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the
Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the
same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a
particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are
neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which
classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or
actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for
other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in
favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute
and under the Constitution.

It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874,
aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and
under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely
stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under
section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could
be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such
land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for
the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional
limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for
residence purposes.

Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the
Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not
the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to
include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short,
sharp and crystal-clear opinion:

Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into
agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of
 Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the
Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public
laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil.,
175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many
subsequent case. . . .

Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one
or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be
classified as agricultural.

Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the
character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123
p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary
farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).

Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to
a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his
home.

This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice
of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who
actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of
Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both
administrations.

It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and executive — have
always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that
agricultural lands include residential lots.

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But
this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated
by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent
this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into
aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they
may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1.
Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It
must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons
who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the
subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since
"agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to
"agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute
will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public
and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in
both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the
property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of
Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas
residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for
such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind
that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential
lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially
is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become
superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to
private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant
disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public
domain shall have become private residential lands.

It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later
changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these
changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the
meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The
wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The
words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and
mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same
would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is
supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private,
and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the
first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely
one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of
ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly
agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their
names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in
appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative
spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was
embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources
of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the
exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign
authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate
Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech
delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege
of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the
Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the
same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and
natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino
hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a
person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not
completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall
be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we
going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor
Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives
was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now
members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if
under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly
not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly
passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to
the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to
acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:

SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations
organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by
the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands
the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements
thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in
such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.

SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of
any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form,
nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to
persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to
corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon
express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to
citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the
manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not
thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition
by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and
improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such
purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in
this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or
associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so
capacitated within the precise period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the
Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)

It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of
the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect,
that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature,
to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In
other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:

SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations
organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.

SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance,
royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to
public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement
on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations
who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines
whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to
the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by
competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements
mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,
 corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act,
such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to
others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the
Government.

These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being
that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to
conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the
alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction
carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been
members of the Constitutional Convention.

It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions. We are
not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that
had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the
instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in
the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its
origin might have been.

And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real
property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take
part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction
between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The
prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation
and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private
residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found
necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But
clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that
prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.

It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it
is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into
the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the
Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however,
that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their
residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes,
Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.

For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinion

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by future generations
always with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of the land to do its duty in this case
would have amounted to a national disaster. We would have refused to share the responsibility of causing it by,
wittingly or unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage the most important safeguard
of the age-long patrimony of our people, the land which destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent
abode of our race for unending generations. We who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave long
and ramifying dendriform lines of descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse they may fling at us should
the day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their fatherland, because in the crucial moment of our history ,
when the vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and boldness to affirm and withhold the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have prefered heroic defeat to inglorious desertion.
Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of our convictions for truth, for justice, for racial survival. We are
happy to record that this Supreme Court turned an impending failure to a glorious success, saving our people from a
looming catastrophe.

On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our decision. The
case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of
China, applied for title and registration of a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas,
with a house thereon. The Director of Lands opposed the application, one of the main grounds being that "the
applicant, being a Chinese, is not qualified to acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the
Constitution."

On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of Lands appealed.
In the brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and now
Secretary of Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo, appellant made only two assignments of error,
although both raised but one question, the legal one stated in the first assignment of error as follows:

The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the applicant who,
according to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.

The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos — who, while
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the Japanese — addressed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the same theory as the one advanced by the
Director of Lands. The same legal question raised by appellant is discussed, not only in the brief for the appellee,
but also in the briefs of the several amici curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.

As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of 1941, that is,
six years ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December, 1941. After the Supreme Court
was recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was among those which were destroyed in
February, 1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila. The case had to be reconstituted upon motion of the
office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court on January 14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that, after being
reconstituted, the case be submitted for final adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for decision
on July 3, 1946.

After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially on the legal
question as to whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private urban lands. An overwhelming majority
answered no. But when the decision was promulgated on August 31, 1946, a majority resolved to ignore the
question, notwithstanding our efforts to have the question, which is vital, pressing and far-reaching, decided once
and for all, to dispel definitely the uncertainty gnawing the conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be alone
in expressing in unmistakable terms our opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant.
The constitutional question was by-passed by the majority because they were of opinion that it was not necessary to
be decided, notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal question upon which appellant Director of
Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost exhaustively argued in four printed briefs filed by the
parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in the next case in which the same
constitutional question is raised, the majority shall make known their stand on the question.

The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again, we deliberated
on the constitutional question for several days.

On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the constitutional question was
decided against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There were eight of us, more than two-thirds of the
Supreme Court. Only three Justices dissented.
While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked out. On July 10,
1947, appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident purpose of preventing the
rendering of the majority decision, which would settle once and for all the all-important constitutional question as to
whether aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines.

Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office gave its conformity
to the withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given without expressing any ground at all. Would the
Supreme Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February 24, 1947?

Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is, whether this Court
should abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of the vote taken on February 24, 1947,
as if, after more than six years during which the question has been submitted for the decision of the highest tribunal
of the land, the same has failed to form a definite opinion.

After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice Padilla and and
Mr. Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to deny the motion were Mr. Justice
Feria, Mr. Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr. Justice Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-5.
The deadlock resulting from the tie should have the effect of denying the motion, as provided by section 2 of Rule
56 to the effect that "where the Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the petition or
motion shall be denied." And we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be promulgated.

Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the opportunity of
casting his vote on the question, although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days later, when all the members of
the Court were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice Briones voted for the denial of the motion, and
his vote would have resulted, as must be expected, in 6 votes for the denial against 5 for granting. But the final
result was different. Seven votes were cast for granting the motion and only four were cast for its denial.

But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the registration by the
register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public polemic flared up in one section of the
press, followed by controversial speeches, broadcast by radio, and culminating in the issuance on August 12, 1947,
of Circular No. 128 of the Secretary of Justice which reads as follows:

TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:

Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or
association for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for another five years, may be accepted for
registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.)

"(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban
lands, or any right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not an
enemy national, may be registered. Such classes of land are not deemed included within the purview of the
prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private
agricultural land" by those who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in
conformity with Opinion No. 284, series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the practice
consistently followed for nearly ten years since the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935.

"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines
and the Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the so-called Parity Amendment
to the Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations or associations owned or controlled by
such citizens are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or
associations owned or controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines
and corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the acquisition of all
classes of lands in the Philippines, whether of private ownership or pertaining to the public domain."
 ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice

Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows:

Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest therein, is
transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy national, may be entered in the primary
entry book; but, the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied — unless and/or until
otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the party in interest
shall be advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the
provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code. The denial of registration of shall be
predicated upon the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of
the Philippines, and sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the former as amended by the
Commonwealth Act No. 615.

The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final result of long and
tense deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution adopted on August 29, 1947:

In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for decision, the appellant
filed a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the adverse party. After full discussion of the
matter specially in relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, and Rule 58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr.
Justice Hilado, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to
deny it. A redeliberation was consequently had, with the same result. Thereupon Mr. Justice Paras proposed
that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to sit and break the tie; but in view of the latter's absence due to illness
and petition for retirement, the Court by a vote of seven to three did not approve the proposition. Therefore,
under Rule 56, section 2, the motion to withdraw is considered denied.

Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the previous vote
of seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.

Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy. He has voted
once on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a member of the Court and, on a moment's notice, can
be present at any session of the Court. Last month, when all the members were present, the votes on the
motion stood 7 to 4. Now, in the absence of one member, on reconsideration, another changed his vote
resulting in a tie. Section 2 of Rule 56 requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I
deplore the inability of the majority to agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to
participate in the resolution of the motion for withdrawal. I hold it to be fundamental and necessary that the
votes of all the members be taken in cases like this.

Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that when the petition to
withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two days after this petition was filed, five
justices voted to grant and five others voted to deny, and expressed the opinion that since then, according to
the rules, the petition should have been considered denied. Said first vote took place many days before the
one alluded to by Mr. Justice Padilla.

Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the result that 5
were granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was decided to wait for him. Some
time later, the same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting was had, on which occasion all the 11
justices were present. The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice
Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these
dissents were filed, about one month afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was brought up
again and re-voted upon; the result was 5 to 5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might have been able
to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence, was absent. As the voting thus stood, Mr. Justice
Hontiveros' vote would have changed its result unless he changed his mind, a fact of which no one is aware.
My opinion is that since there was no formal motion for reconsideration nor a previous notice that this matter
would be taken up once more, and since Mr. Justice Hontiveros had every reason to believe that the matter
was over as far as he was concerned, this Justice's vote in the penultimate voting should, if he was not to be
 given an opportunity to recast his vote, be counted in favor of the vote for the allowance of the motion to
withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not have been denied on grounds of pure
technicality never invoked before. I counted that the proceeding was arbitrary and illegal.

The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that last two votings
and why it became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of the Court and to cast his vote
on the question.

Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging that it became
moot in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus giving us a hint that the latter,
wittingly or unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme Court the decision of an important
constitutional question, submitted to us in a pending litigation. We denied the motion for reconsideration. We did not
want to entertain any obstruction to the promulgation of our decision.

If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official actuations of this
Supreme Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since July, 1946, that is, more than a year ago,
the opinion of the members of this Court had already been crystallized to the effect that under the Constitution,
aliens are forbidded from acquiring urban lands in the Philippines, and it must have known that in this case a great
majority had voted in that sense on February 24, 1947.

The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public interest. The
uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. While the doubt among the people as to
what is the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated, there will be uneasiness, undermining public
morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This Supreme Tribunal, by overwhelming majority, already
knows what the correct answer is, and should not withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with
which the ancient families of the Eumolpides and Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of
Delphus must speak so that the people may know for their guidance what destiny has in store for them.

The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one of the most
cherished treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending generations of our race, is not a new
one. The long chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations, and colonial imperialism recorded in the
darkest and bloodiest pages of history from the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old Assyria,
irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of
Hernan Cortes and Pizarro, the achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese,
Dutch, French and German colonial empires, had many of its iron links forged in our soil since Magellan, the
greatest navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his daring enterprises, with his life at the
hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.

Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless struggle to
defend the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. First
came the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who were granted by the Spanish crown
immense areas of land. Immediately came the friars and other religious corporations who, notwithstanding their
sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed whetted by the bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment.
Taking advantage of the uncontrollable religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of obedience,
resignation, humility, and credulity of a people who, after conversion to Catholicism, embraced with tacit faith all its
tenets and practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from the disappointments and
bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization, the foreign religious orders set aside all compunction to
acquire by foul means many large estates. Through the practice of confession and other means of moral
intimidation, mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell, they were able to obtain by donation or by will the lands of
many simple and credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the eternal bliss of heaven, renounced all their
property in favor of religious orders and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently religious
purposes, leaving in destitute their decendants and relatives. Thus big religious landed estates were formed, and
under the system unbearable iniquities were committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of the
situation, which, under the moral leadership of the hero, finally drove our people into a national revolution not only
against the Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to unlimited proportions.

Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to insert in the
fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the wisdom of which cannot be
disputed in a world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same way that scientists and technicians resorted to
radar, sonars, thermistors and other long range detection devices to stave off far-away enemy attacks in war, said
Delegates set the guarantees to ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means
of insuring racial safety and survival.

When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be needed and
our people may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the ultimate guardians of the
Constitution, never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever our action is called upon in a case, like the
one now before us.

One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very words, that it
"shall conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed to all departments and
branches of our government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To make more specific the mandate, Article XIII
has been inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural resources of the country are reserved to Filipino
citizens. Our land is the most important of our natural resources. That land should be kept in the hands of our
people until, by constitutional amendment, they should decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by
hereditary succession — the only exception allowed by the Constitution — no foreigner may by any means acquire
any land, any kind of land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment prevailing in the Constitutional
Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the great majority of the Delegates, that was the dominating
thought that was intended to be expressed in the great document, that was what the Committee on Style — the
drafter of the final text — has written in the Constitution, and that was what was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite by
our people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally Japanized Davao.

The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case cannot be
overemphasized. If we should decide this question after many urban lots have been transferred to and
registered in the name of alien purchasers, a situation may be created in which it will be hard to nullify the
transfers and the nullification may create complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. The
Georgia case is an objective lesson upon which we can mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book
of Charless P. Curtiss, Jr. entitled "Lions Under the Throne," we quote the following:

It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck, in 1810, is the
stock example. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute void. It involved a national
scandal. The 1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most of Alabama and Mississippi, to
speculators. Perhaps it was the greatest real estate steal in our history. The purchase price was only half a
million dollars. The next legislature repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the
land companies had completed the deal and unloaded. By that time, and increasingly soon afterwards, more
and more people had bought, and their title was in issue. Eleven million of the acres had been bought for
eleven cents an acre by leading citizens of Boston. How could they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton
gave an opinion, that the repeal of the grant was void under the Constitution as an impairment of the
obligation of a contract.

But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New Hampshire, had
bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. He sued Peck, and he won. Fletcher appealed.
Plainly it was a friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told Cranch that the Court was reluctant to
decide the case "as it appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting the Court's judgment." John
Quincy Adams so reports in his diary. Yet Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton
said it was. "The fact that Marshall rendered an opinion, under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one
of the finest proofs of his greatness. A weaker man than John Marshall, and one less wise and courageous,
would have dismissed the appeal." That may be, but it was the act of a stateman, not of a judge. The Court
has always been able to overcome its judicial diffidence on state occasions.

We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due to legal
technicalities the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the case of Georgia, the lands had fallen
into American hands and although the scandal was of gigantic proportions, no national disaster ensued. In our case
if our lands should fall into foreign hands, although there may not be any scandal at all, the catastrophe sought to be
avoided by the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing.
We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban
or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions
since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio. As all public officials have sworn,
and are duty bound, to obey and defend the Constitution, all those who, by their functions, are in charge of enforcing
the prohibition as laid down and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts so that any and all
violations which may have taken place should be corrected.

We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a Filipino citizen,
could not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, the sale made in his favor by the
Magdalena Estate, Inc. being null and void ab initio, and that the lower court acted correctly in rendering the
appealed decision, which we affirm.

HILADO, J., concurring:

Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in behalf of
appellee, indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of another department, I ultimately voted to grant
the motion after the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. But the votes of the ten Justices participating
were evenly divided, and under Rule 52, section 4, in relation, with Rule 56, section 2, the motion was denied. The
resolution to deny was adopted in the exercise of the court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which it
has discretion to deny the withdrawal of the appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the
withdrawal, when appellee's brief has been filed. Under the principle that where the necessary number have
concurred in an opinion or resolution, the decision or determination rendered is the decision or determination of the
court (2 C.J.S., 296), the resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the resolution of the court.
Pursuant to Rule 56, section 2, where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion, such a motion "shall be
denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to decide the case upon the merits.

After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a government like ours that I
have always been, I think that under the circumstances it is well for all concerned that the Court should go ahead
and decide the constitutional question presented. The very doctrine that the three coordinate, co-equal and
independent departments should be maintained supreme in their respective legitimate spheres, makes it at once the
right and duty of each to defend and uphold its own peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and confidence
in each department must be striven for and kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of that confidence
will in the same measure take away from the very usefulness of the respective department to the people. For this
reason, I believe that we should avert and avoid any tendency in this direction with respect to this Court.

I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of Justice, was
issued in good faith. But at the same time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14,
which was already amended, to the effect that private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban
lands "are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the
Constitution", made at a time when the self-same question was pending decision of this Court, gives rise to the
serious danger that should this Court refrain from deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the
constitutional mandate, the people may see in such an attitude an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty,
peculiarly its own, to decide a question of such a momentous transcedence, in view of an opinion, given in advance
of its own decision, by an officer of another department. This will naturally detract in no small degree from public
respect and confidence towards the highest Court of land. Of course, none of us — the other governmental
departments included — would desire such a situation to ensue.

I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question here presented,
namely, "whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land." (Opinion, p. 2) Leases of
residential lands, or acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or building thereon, for example, are not covered by
the decision.

With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by the Chief Justice,
I have signed said decision.

BRIONES, M., conforme:
Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e puede añadir ni quitar nada, tal es su acabada y
compacta elaboracion. Escribo, sin embargo, esta opinion separada nada mas que para unas observaciones,
particularmente sobre ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto singular y extraordinario.

I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto, despues de laboriosas deliberaciones este
asunto se puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de este año, confirmandose la sentencia apelada por una
buena mayoria. En algunos comentarios adelantados por cierta parte de la prensa — impaciencia que solo puede
hallar explicacion en un nervioso y excesivo celo en la vigilancia de los intereses publicos, maxime tratandose,
como se trata, de la conservacion del patrimonio nacional — se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha demorado
la promulgacion de la sentencia, habiendose votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del año.

A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien considerados los hechos se vera que no ha habido demora
en el presente caso, mucho menos una demora desusada, alarmante, que autorice y justifique una critica contra los
metodos de trabajo de esta corte. El curso seguido por el asunto ha sido normal, bajo las circunstancias. En
realidad, no yan en esta Corte ahora, sino aun en el pasado, antes de la guerra, hubo mas lentitud en casos no tan
dificiles ni tan complicados como el que nos ocupa, en que las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la
densidad constitucional y juridica de las que se discuten en el presente caso. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde el
24 de Febrero en que se voto finalmente el asunto hasta el 1.0 de Abril en que comenzaron las vacaciones
judiciales, no habian transcurrido mas que 34 dias; y cuando se reanudaron formalmente las sesiones de esta
Corte en Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario — incidente que practicamente vino a impedir, a
paralizar la pronta promulgacion de la sentencia. Me refiero a la mocion que el 10 de Julio persentaron los
abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para retirar su apelacion. Lo sorpredente de esta mocion es que viene
redactada escuetamente, sin explicar el por que de la retirada, ni expresar ningun fundamento. Pero lo mas
sorpredente todavia es la conformidad dada por el Procurador General, tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente.

Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que hayan sido arguidos con
tanta energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte apelante como este que nos ocupa. Los abogados del
apelante no solo presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino que cuando se llamo a vista el asunto
informaron verbalmente ante esta Corte argumentando vigorosa y extensamente sobre el caso. El Procurador
General, por su parte, ha presentado un alegato igualmente denso, de 31 paginas, en que se discuten
acabadamente, hasta el punto maximo de saturacion y agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion
constitutional objeto de este asunto. Tambien informo el Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte,
entablando fuerte lid con los abogados del apelante.

Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la promulgacion de la sentencia,

pues trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para resolver la cuestion, dividiendose casi por igual los
miembros de la Corte sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada. Habia unanimidad en que bajo la regla 52, seccion
4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion para conceder o denegar la mocion, toda vez
que los alegatos estaban sometidos desde hacia tiempo, el asunto estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y
promulgacion de la decision juntamente con las disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos Magistrados opinaban que la
discrecion debia ejercitarse en favor de la retirada en virtud de la practica de evitar la aplicacion de la Constitucion
a la solucion de un litigio siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra manera. (Entre los Magistrados que pensaban
de esta manera se incluian algunos que en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia
apelada, es decir, creian que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion a titulo dominical de todo
genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares residenciales, comerciales e industriales.) Pero otros
Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan avanzado en que se hallaba el asunto los dictados del interes publico y
de la sana discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la cuestion se atacase y decidiese frontalmente; que si una
mayoria de esta Corte estaba convencida, como al parecer lo estaba, de que existia esa interdiccion constitucional
contra la facultad adquisitiva de los extranjeros, nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar pleno y positivo
cumplimiento a la Constitucion al presentarse la primera oportunidad; que el meollo del asunto, la lis mota era eso
— la interdiccion constitucional — ; por tanto, no habia otra manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la Constitucion;
obrar de otra manera seria desercion, abandono de un deber jurado.

Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y sorprendente todavia que
la retirada no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita conformidad del Procurador General; algo asi como si de un
cielo sereno, sin nubes, cayera de pronto un bolido en medio de nosotros, en medio de la Corte: me refiero a la
circular num. 128 del Secretario de Justicia expedida el 12 de Agosto proximo pasado, esto es, 32 dias despues de
presentada la mocion de retirada de la apelacion. Esa circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su texto
se copia integramente en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo excusado de transcibirla in
toto. En breves terminos, la circular reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 del mismo Departamento de Justicia
de fecha 25 de Agosto, 1945, y levanta la prohibicion o interdiccion sobre el registro e inscripcion en el registro de
la propiedad de las "escrituras o documentos en virtud de los cuales terrenos privados residencias, comerciales,
industriales u otras clases de terrenos urbanos, o cualquier derecho, titulo o interes en ellos, se transfieren, ceden o
gravan a un extranjero que no es nacional enemigo." En otras palabras, el Secretario de Justicia, por medio de esta
circular dejaba sin efecto la prohibicion contenida en lacircular num. 14 del mismo Departamento — la prohibicion
que precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que tenemos ante Nos — y authorizaba y ordenaba a
todoslos Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para que inscribiesen las escrituras o documentos de venta, hipoteca
o cualquier otro gravamen a favor de extranjeros, siempre que no se tratase de terrenos publicos o de "terrenos
privados agricolas," es decir, siempre que los terrenos objeto de la escritura fuesen "residenciales, comerciales e
industriales."

La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un simple tropo, no
esuna mera imagen retorica; refleja una verdadera realidad.Esa circular, al derogar la prohibicion decretada en
elparrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 — prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho, es precisamente el objeto del presente
asunto — venia practicamente a escamotear la cuestion discutida, lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la
jurisdiccion de lostribunales. Dicho crudamente, el Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras
manos, delas manos de esta Corte, anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor inmediatos a
su resolucionmediante la correspondiente autorizacion a los Registradoresde Titulos.

A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la apelacion consentida
insolitamentepor el Procurador General. ¿ Para que esperar ladecision de la Corte Suprema que acaso podria ser
adversa? ¿ No estaba ya esa circular bajo la cual podian registrarseahora la ventas de terrenos residenciales,
comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por eso no es extraño quelos abogados del apelante Krivenko, en su
mocion de 1.0 de Septiembre, 1947, pidiendo la reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la
apelacion, dijeran porprimera vez como fundamento que la cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is
now moot") en vista deesa circular y de la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada de la apelacion. He
aqui las propias palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko:

In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1947, which amends Circular No.
14 by expressly authorizing the registration of the sale of urban lands to aliens, and in view of the fact that
the Solicitor General has joined in the motion for withdrawal of the appeal, there is no longer a controversy
between the parties and the question is now moot. For this reason the court no longer has jurisdiction to act
on the case.1

Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el camino de los
tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice, es que ello no tieneprecedentes, que yo sepa, en los anales de la
administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo que llevamosde existencia bajo un gobierno
constitucional y sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los llamados dias del Imperio, cuando la soberania
americana era mas propensa a manejar el baston grueso y afirmar vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y
autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento de Justicia o a alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el ejercicio
ordenado por los tribunales de sujurisdiccion y competencia. Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en las
esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo — tradicioninviolada e inviolable — maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en la
Fiscalia General, el inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto ya sometido a los tribunales, excepto
cuando venian llamados a hacerlo, en representaciondel gobierno, en los tramites de un litigio, civil o
criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. Fuera deestos casos, la inhibicion era tradicionalmente
absoluta,observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad de un rito.Y la razon era muy sencilla: hamas se queria
estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los tribunales de justicia, loscuales, bajo la carta organica y las leyes, tenian
absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo desembarazo, libres de todaingerencia extraña. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley
Cooper; estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se hizo bajo la Ley Tydings-McDuffie, la ley organica del
Commonwealth. Creo que el pueblo filipino tiene derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno de la
Republica, que es suyo, que es de su propia hechura. ¡ No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le
nieguen lo que no le negaron gobernantesde otra raza!

No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y dependenciasque
caen bajo su jurisdiccion, entre ellas las varias oficinasde registro de la propiedad en Manila y en las
provincias.Tampoco se niega la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara expedir circulares, ya de caracter
puramente administrativo,ya de caracter semijudicial, dando instrucciones,vgr., a los registradores acerca de como
deben desempenarsus funciones. De hecho la circular num. 14 de 25 deAgosto, 1945, es de esta ultima
naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de
propiedad inmueble aextranjeros, asi sean terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales. Pero la facultad llega
solo hasta alli; fuerade esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y exclusivamentejudicial. Cuando una determinada
circular del Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio ante los tribunales, ora por
fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por razones meramente legales, ya no esel Departamento el que tiene que
determinar o resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete en absoluto a los tribunalesde justicia. Asi lo dispone
terminantemente el articulo200 del Codigo Administrativo. Segun este articulo, elasunto o disputa debe elevarse en
forma de consulta a la Sala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila.La ley no confiere ninguna facultad
al Departamento deJusticia para enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Y cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme con la
decision de la SalaCuarta, ella puede alzarse de la sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. He aqui el texto integro
del articulo 200 del Codigo Administrativo:

SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at Manila. —
When the register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be
made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented for registration or where any party
in interest does not agree with the register of deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be
referred to the judge of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on
the certificate of the register of deeds stating the question upon which he is in doubt or upon the suggestion
in writing of the party in interest; and thereupon said judge, upon consideration of the matter as shown by
the record certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter
an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made.

Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento su escritura de compraventa al Registrador de

laPropiedad de Manila. Este denego la inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la prohibicion contenida en la circular
num.14. ¿ Que hizo Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal Departamento de Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron
susabogados entonces fue presentar una demanda el 23 de Noviembre, 1945, contra el Registrador de Titulos ante
laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila,numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num. 1289;
ycuando esta Sala decidio el asunto confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la
apelacionque estamos considerando. Tan elemental es esto que enla misma circular num. 14 se dice que la
prohibicion quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo contrario. He aqui la fraseologia pertinente de
dicha circularnum. 14:

. . . the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied, — unless and /or until otherwise
specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the party in interest shall be
advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of
section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code.

La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision (interference) en sus funciones esde
lo mas peculiar. Tenemos en el Reglamento de losTribunales algunas disposiciones que proveen sancion
pordesacato para ciertos actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones judiciales. 2 Pero se preguntara
naturalmente;son aplicables estas disposiciones cuando la intromisionprocede de un ramo del poder ejecutivo, el
cual, como sesabe, en la mecanica de los poderes del Estado, es — usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado
con el poder judicial,maxime si esa intromision se ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede
imaginarse la situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada
con motivo de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose a chocar con otropoder del Estado. En casos recientes
en que estaban envueltos otros poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa suposicion constitucional, prefirio adoptar
una actitud deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si bienhay que hacer constar que con la fuerte
disidencia dealgunos Magistrados, entre ellos el opinante. 3 Tenemos, portanto, un caso de verdadera intromision en
que siendo, porlo menos, dudosa la facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por desacato de acuerdo con
el Reglamento delos Tribunales, le queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar su excepcion sin ambages
ni eufemismos contrala intromision, y reafirmar con todo vigor, con toda firmezasu independencia.

Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la apelacion, por
dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador General estaba conformecon dicha retirada; (b) para evitar la resolucion
delpunto constitucional envuelto, en virtud de la practica,segun se dice, de soslayar toda cuestion
constitucionalsiempre que se pueda. Respecto de la primera razon serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General
es libre de entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un asunto en que interviene,pero es evidente que su accion no
ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio de la discrecion que le confierela regla, 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de
los Tribunales,que reza como sigue:

Rule 52, SEC. 4 — An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appelle's
brief. After that brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion. . . . (Las cursivas
son nuestras.)

Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o disconformidad de una delas
partes. Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es masabsoluta e imperativa alli donde el litigio versa sobre
unamateria queno afecta solo a un interes privado, sino quees de interes publico, como el caso presente en que el
Procurador General ha transigido no sobre un asunto suyopersonal o de un cliente particular, sino de un cliente
demucha mayor monta y significacion — el pueblo filipino — ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo,
parte, vitalisima del patrimonio nacional que nuestro pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion.

Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion para no tener queresolver
la cuestion constitucional disputada, bastara decirque la practica, prinsipio o doctrina que se invoca, llevaconsigo
una salvedad o cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda resolver de otra mañera. ¿ Podemos soslayar elpunto
constitucional discutido en el pleito que nos ocupa? ¿ Podemos decidirlo bajo otra ratio decidendi, esto es, queno
sea la constitucionalidad o inconstitucionalidad de laventa del inmueble al apelante Krivenko, en virtud
desucondicion de extranjero? Indudablemente que no: la lis mota, la unica, es la misma constitucionalidad de la
compraventa de que se trata. Para decidir si al recurrido apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la Ciudad de Manila,le
asiste o no razon para denegar la inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y apelante, Krivenko, la unica
disposicionlegal que se puede aplicar es el articulo XIII, seccion 5, dela Constitucion de Filipinas, invocado por el
Registrador como defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular num.14 como fundamento de la prohibicion o
interdiccion contrael registro de las ventas de terreno a extranjeros. Nohay otra ley para el caso.

El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., No. 3 pag. 866), que se cita en unade las disidencias,
es completamente diferente. Es verdadque alli se planteo tambien la cuestion constitucional de quese trata, por
cierto que el que lo planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el actual Secretario de Justicia que entoncesera
Procurador General, y lo pleantaba en un sentido absolumente concorde con la circular num. 14. Pero esta Corte,
con la disidencia de algunos Magistrados, opto porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el registro
solicitadopor Oh Cho, por fundamento de que bajo la LeyNo. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los
extranjerosestan excluidos de dichos terrenos; es decir, que el terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno publico.
¿ Podemos hacer la misma evasion en el presente caso, acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874 o a cualquier otra ley?
Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte, muchomenos los disidentes, consideran el
terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno publico. Luego todos los caminosestan bloqueados para nosotros,
menos el camino constitucional.Luego el segundo fundamento alegado paracubrir la evasiva tambien debe
descartarse totalmente.

Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto, puesto que
puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no remoto,y en efecto se cita el caso de Rellosa contraGaw
Chee Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que los alegatos de ambas partesya estan sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente
de decision.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la evasiva,en primer lugar, porque cuando se le
somete el deber de iraveriguando en su Escribania si hay casos de igual naturaleza, sino que los casos se someten
por orden de prelaciony prioridad de tiempo a medida que esten preparados paracaso debe decidirse por
sus propios meritos y conforme ala ley pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao practica que se invoca
no dice: "hay qoe soslayar la cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver
de otra manera, reservando dicha cuestion constitucional para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. De
otro modono seria un simple soslayo legal, sino que seria unsub terfugio impropio, indebido, ilegal. En el presente
caso no ha habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se insinua;desde luego no mayor prisa que en otros asuntos.
Elcurso, el ritmo de los tramites ha sido normal; en realidad,si ha habido algo, ha sido un poco de parsimonia,
lentitud.

¿ Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la
formidablecuestion constitucional debatida, por lo menos, tan pronto como fuese posible? ¿ Habia alguna razon de
interespublico para justificar una evasiva? Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario, nuestro deber ineludible,
imperioso,era formular y promulgar inmediatamente ese veredicto. Lo debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo
debiamos, sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y conveniencia de todos — del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros
residentes o quetuvieren voluntad de residir o negociar en estas Islas. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de
lugar, podriaorientarse sin zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre. Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian donde
invertir sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta Corte una provee la interdiccion de que se
trata. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este asuntoen Febrero de este año (8 contra 3); la
tuvimos cuandodespues de laboriosas deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de retirada de la mayoria haya
cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la cuestion; la tenemos ahora naturalmente.Por tanto, nada hace falta ya
para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion de la sentencia.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia, desidia. Es
mas: seriaabandono de un deber jurado, como digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte Suprema
naturalmente npha de permitir que se la pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su puesto privilegiado de
vigia, de centinela avanzado de la Constitucion.

No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de sostener y poner en vigor,o de
suplir una deficiencia en la Constitucion," o que segobierno, como se insinua en una de las disidencias. Nohay tal
cosa. El principio de la supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni mucho menos un ademan de inmodestiao
arrogancia, sino que es una parte vital de nuestrasinstutuciones, una condicion peculiarisima de nuestro sistema de
gobierno en que la judicatura, como uno de lostres poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade
disponer de los asuntos judiciales. Con respecto a losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad exclusivano
solo se infiere del principio de la supremacia judicial, sino que, como ya se ha dicho en otra parte de esta
concurrencia,se halla especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo Administrativo transcrito arriba. Este
articuloconfiere jurisdiccion exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las cuestiones sobre registro, y esto lo
ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de Justicia en su circularnum. 14 al referir tales cuestiones a la
determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos de duda o litigio.

Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria denego la retirada de la apelacion no tanto para
resolver el asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos, como paraenrvar los efectos de la circular num. !28 del
Departamentode Justicia, pues Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces su pleito no en virtud de una
sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta trasera abierta por esacircular. Tampoco hay tal cosa. Ya repetidas
veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia votado muchoantes de que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que
mascorrectamente podria decirse es que antes de la expedicion deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones
de interespublico aconsejaban que se denegase la retirada de la apelacion y se diese fin al asunto mediante una
sentencia enel fondo, despues de la expidicion esas razones quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion es sencilla:
nuestra aquiescenciaa la reirada hubiera podico interpretarse entoncescomo que nuestra jurisdiccion. Es mas:
hubiera podidointerpretarse como una abyecta rendicion en la pugna porsostener los fueros de cada ramo coigual y
coordinado del gobierno.

Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la apelacion equivale "a asumir
queel solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan confabulado con el Departamento de Justicia no solopara
ingerirse en las funciones de esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el patrimonio nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes
inconcebible. La corte presume que todos han obradode buena fe, de acuerdo con los dictados de su
conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la apelacion por razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin
consideracion a losmotivos de nadie.

Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de la votacion
queculmino en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode la retirada de la apelacion, a tenor de la regla 56,
seccion2, Reglamento de los Tribunales. El Magistrado Hontiverosno estaba presente en la sesion por estar
enfermo;pero estaban presentes 10 Magistrados, es decir, mas queel numero necesario para formar quorum y para
despacharlos asuntos. La rueda de la justicia en la Corte Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia de uno
o dosmiembros, siempre que hubiese quorum. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas deliberaciones.
Ningun Magistrado Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. Ningun Magistrado pidio que
se leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion, no obstante la
ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. En efecto, se hace la votaciony resulta un empate, es decir, 5 contra 5. De acuerdo
conla regla 56, quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada. ¿Donde esta, pues, la "ilegalidad", donde
la"arbitrariedad"?

Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion,la misma en que ya se alegaba como
ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era simplemente academica (moot question) por la conformidad del
Procurador Generalcon la retirada y por la circular num. !28 del Departamento de Justicia. Tampoco estaba
presente el Sr. Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la cual fue de nuevo denegada.Pregunto otra vez: ¿donde esta
la "arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr. Hontiveros no pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo?
¿Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia por eso? Conviene, sin embargo, hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la
cuestion el Sr. Hontiverosera uno de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada,
es decir, en favor delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la propiedad de bienes raices en
Filipinas.

II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. Todos los angulos y fases de la misma
estanacabadamente tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare, por tanto, a hacer unas cuantas
observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica legal, y otra sobre historia nacionalcontemporanea, aprovachando en este
ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi experiencia como humilde miembroque fui de la Asamblea Constituyente
que redacto y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas.

Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural) usada enel
articulo XIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion. He aqui eltexto completo de la seccion:

SEC. 5. — Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.

¿Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Tal es
lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que si; los disidentesdicen que no.

Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata debe interpretarse como
untodo homogeneo, simetrico. En otras palabras, los cocablosalli empleados deben interpretarse en el sentido de
quetienen un mismo significado. Es absurdo pensar o suponerque en el texto de una ley, sobre todo dentro del
estrechomarco de un articulo, un vocablo tenga dos o mas significadosdistintos, a menos que la misma ley asi to
diga expresamente. Lapresuncion es que el legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales.

Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes — laprimera, que trata de los terrenos agricolas de dominiopublico,
y la segunda, que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares.

La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos publicos enel Estado
y disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde ciudadanos filipinos, o de corporaciones o asociacionesen que
el 60 por ciento del cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales ciudadanos. En secciones se emplea literalmentela frase
"public agricultural land."

La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the Congress may determine bylaw
the size of private agricultural land which individuals,coporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subjectto
rights existing prior to the enactment of such law"4 ;y la seccion 5 es la que queda transcrita mas arriba y esobjeto
del presente litigio. En ambas secciones se emplealiteralmente la frase "private agricultural land."

No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte comprende
terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales; lo admitenlos mismos abogados del apelante y los Sres.
Magistradosdisidentes. Y ¿por que lo admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion se define la palabra "agricultural"
aplicadaa terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir solaresresidenciales, comerciales e industriales?
Indudablementeque no, porque en ninguna parte de la Constitucion se datal definicion. Lo admiten porque en esta
jurisdicciontenemos una serie consistente de sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia
firmamente establecidala doctrina de que la palabra "agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados
Unidos de 1902 (LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos publicos comprendey abarca solares residenciales,
comerciales, industriales yqualquier otra clase de terrenos, excepto forestales yminerales. 5 Es decir, que se aplica a
la actual Constitucion deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica, tradicional, embebidaen nuestra jurisprudencia de
cerca de medio siglo.

Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo XIII tiene talsignificado —
y lo tiene porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente — ¿por que esa misma palabra empleada en lasegunda parte,
unas cuantas lineas mas adelante, no hade tener el mismo significado? ¿Da acaso la Constitucionuna definicion de
la palabra "agricultural" cuandose refiere a terreno privado? ¿Donde esta esa definicion? ¿O es que se pretende
que la diferenciacion opera no envirtud de la palabra "agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o "private",
segun que se trate de terrenopublico o privado?

Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno privadoun
significado distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico, lo hubiese hecho constar asi expresamente en elmismo
texto de la Constitucion Si, como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no definir la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a
terreno poblico porque contaba para ello con ladefinicion clasica establecida en la jurisprudencia, cuandola misma
Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con relaciona terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion,
esto es, aplicar la definicion de la jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno — el publico y el privado. Pensarde otra
manera podria ser ofensivo, insultante; podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea estaba compuestade
miembros ignorantes, desconocederos de las reglas elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa.

Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu. Tambien me cupo elhonor
de partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete — elcomite encargado finalmente de redactar la ponencia dela
Constitucion. No digo que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios, pero indudablemente no era inferiora
ninguna otra de su tipo en cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli habia un plantel de buenos abogados,algunos
versados y especialistas en derecho constitucional.Alli estaba el Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr. Rafael
Palma; alli estaba el propio Presidentede la Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos prestigios de su
reconocida cultura juridica y humanista; alli estaba tambien el Dr. Jose P. Laurel, considerado comouna de las
primeras autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en nuestro pais. En el Comite de Siete o dePonencia
figuraban el actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el ex-Senador de Cebu Hon. Filemon Sotto;el Hon.
Vicente Singson Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea Filipina, ex-miembro de la Comisionde
FIlipinas, ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de Gabinete;el ex-Magistrado de la Corte Suprema Hon. NorbertoRomualdez;
el actual Secretario de Hacienda Hon. MiguelCuaderno; y el ex-Decano del Colegio de Artes Liberalesde la
Universidad de Filipinas, Hon. Conrado Benitez.

No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera redactarse el texto de un
articuloenque un vocablo — el vocablo "agricultural" — tuviera dosacepciones diferentes: una, aplicada a terrenos
publicos;y otra, aplicada a terrenos privados. Menos se concibeque, si fuese esta la intencion, se incurriese en una
comisionimperdonable: la omision de una definicion especifica, diferenciadora, que evitase caos y confusion en la
mente delos abogados y del publico. Teniendo en cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la Asemblea
Constituyentey de sus liders, lo mas logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no diferenciarsu
aplicacion entre terrenos publicos y privados, lo hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla manifiesta intencion dedejar
enteramente la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una sola comun definicin — la establecida en la
jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares (supra); es decir, que la palabra
"agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien solaresresidenciales, comerciales, e industriales.

A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different
intention appears. . . . Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially
construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning
prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in
such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used,
although that sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction,
p. 758.)

Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra "agricultural" referente aterreno
particular, dando a entendar con su silencio queendosaba la definicion al diccionario o a la usanza popular.La
suposicion es igualmente insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se entrega la definicion a la jurisprudencia,y por que en
otro al diccionario, o al habla popular?Aparte de que los miembros y dirigentes de la AsembleaConstituyente sabian
muy bien que esto causaria unatremenda confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel lenguaje popular,
ofrecen apoyo seguro para una fiely autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con definiciones
especificas y casuisticas, todavia ofrecedudas a veces ¿como no el lexico vulgar, con su infinitavariedad de matices
e idiotismos?

Ahora mismo ¿no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una perplejidad? ¿Hay acaso uniformidad en la
definicionde lo que es un terreno privado agricola? No; cadacual lo define a su manera. Uno de los disidentesel
Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del Diccionario Internacional de Webster que
dice . . . "of or pertaining to agricultural connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as the agricultural class; agricultural
implements, wages etc." Tambien hacereferncia el mismo Magistrado al concepto popular. Otrodisidente el
Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice que "the termprivate agricultural land means lands privately owneddevoted to cultivation,
to the raising of agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado Sr Paras no da ninguna definicion;da por definida la palabra
"agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular.

Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta. Segun ellos, "land spoken of
as `agricultural' naturally refers to land not only susceptible of agricultural or cultivation but more valuable for such
than for another purpose, say residential,commercial or educational. . . . The criterion is notmere susceptibility of
conversion into a farm but its greater value when devoted to one or the other purpose." Demode que, segun esta
definicion, lo que determina la calidaddel terreno es su valor relativo, segun que se dedique alcultivo, o a
residencia, o al comercio, o a la industria.Los autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el hecho
de que en las afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos immensos que desde tiempo inmemorial se handedicado a
la agricultura, pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones multiplicandose su valor en mil por cientosi no mas. De
hecho esos terrenos son agricolas; comoque todavia se ven alli los pilapiles y ciertas partes estancultivadas; pero
en virtud de su mayor valor para residencia,comercio e industria se les aquiere colocar fuera dela prohibicion
constitucional. En verdad, el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico y convencional, y denota cuanincierta y cuan
confusa es la situacion a que da lugar latesis del apelante y de los que le sostienen.

Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del concepto popular y de
losdiccionarios, asi sean los mejores y mas cientificamente elaborados ¿que normas claras, concretas y
definitivasde diferenciacion podrian establecerse? ¿Podrian trazarsefronteras inconfundibles entre lo que es
agricola y lo quees residencial, comercial e industrial? ¿Podria hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria?
Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de diferenciacion es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno; se
considera comoresidencial, comercial e industrial todo lo que esta dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero
¿resolveria esto la dificultad? Proporcionaria un patron exacto, cientifico,no arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro de
una ciudado poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo muy bien el Magistrado Sr. Willard en el
asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los inconvenientes de la adopcion de este criterio es que
es tanvago e indeterminado, que seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. ¿Que terrenos son agricolas por
naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato presentado en este asunto, dice: 'La montaña mas pedregosa y
el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la mano del hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur. Fil.,183).
Y Luego el Sr. Willard añade las siguietes observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare
solucion del asunto que nos ocupa, a saber:

. . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los limites de cualquier ciudad.
Hay dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la parte densamente poblada de lamisma, una granja experimental.
Esta es por su naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta, en la misma ciudad, hay una gran extension de
terreno denominado Camp Wallace, destinada a sports. El terreno que circuda los muros de la ciudad de
Manila, situado entre estos y el paseo del Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene muchas hectareas de
extension y es de naturaleza agricola. La Luneta misma podria en cualquier tiempo destinarse al cultivo.

La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno industrial. En este respectoes
preciso tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee que ser necesariamente urbano; en realidad,la tendencia
moderna es a situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas zonas rurales. Verbigracia; anpredor de la famosa
cascada de Maria Cristina en Lanao existen grandes extensiones de terreno agricola, algunasde propiedad
particular. Cuando, se industrialice aquellaformidable fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster ¿que normas
segfuras se podrian establecer para poner envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada enajenandosetierras
agricolas de propiedad privada a favorde extranjeros, ya sean individuos, ya sean corporacioneso asociaciones, so
pretexto de ser industriales?

Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido la idea deque
el articulo XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago e indeterminado que llama el Sr. Willard. Es mas
logico pensar que el criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio establicido en la jurisprudencia sentada en el
asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos concomitantes citados — criterio mas frime, mas seguro,
menos expuesto a confusion y arbitrariedad, y sobre todo, "que ofrece menos inconvenientes", parafraseando otra
vez al Magistrado Sr. Willard, (supra, p. 185).
Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la Constitucion, dispone que "el Congreso puedo
determinarpor ley l;a eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola que los individous, corporaciones o
asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la aprobacion de dicha ley." Si
seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural land" noincluye terrenos residenciales, comerciales e
industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian excluidas de la facultad reguladora concedida por
la Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha seccion 3. Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueños
de todoslos terrenos de una ciudad; no habria limite a las adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos
residenciales,comerciales e industriles. Esto parece absurdo, peroseria obligada consecuencia de la tesis
sustentada por elapelante.

Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las deliberacionesde
la Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio no figuraba el adjetivo
"agricola"en la seccion 5, diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas trade se añadio la palabra calificativa
agricola—"private agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir quela adicion de la palabra "agricultural" debio de ser
poralgun motivo y este no podia ser mas que el de que sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e
industriales, limitandose el precepto a los propia o estrictamenteagricolas.

La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra "agricultural" en estecaso
equivale a excuir los terrenos residenciales, comercialese industriales, por la sencilla razon de que la Constitucion
no solo no define lo que es residencial comercial e industrial, comercial e industrial. En cambio ya hemosvisto que
la palabra "agricultral" tiene una significaciontradicionalmente bien establecida en nuestra jurisprudenciay en
nuestro vocabulario juridico: incluye no solo terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien
residencialescomerciales e industriales. Se admite por todo elmundo que la palabra tiene tal significacion en el
articuloXIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea terreno publico. Ahora bien; ¿que diferencia hay,
despuesde todo, entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la calidad de agricola, absolutamente ninguna.Uno
no es mas menois agricola que el otro. La unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad, al titulo dominical — en que el
uno es del Estado y el otro es de un particular.

En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica,subjetiva — en que vulgarmente hablando pareceque
los conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se repelen.No se debe menospreciar la influencia del vulgo en
algunascosas; en la misma literatura el vulgo juega su papel; digasi no la formacion popular del romancero. Pero es
indudable que cietas cosas estan por encima del conceptovulgar — una de estae la interpretacion de la leyes,
lahermeneutica legal. Esto no es exagerar la importancia de la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las
cosasensu verdadero lugar. La interpretacion de la ley es unafuncion de minoria — los abogados. Si no fuera asi
paraque los abogados? ¿Y para que las escuelas de dercho,y para que los exmenes, cada vez mas rigidos, para
de purar el alma de la toga, que dijo un gran abogado español?6 Asi que cuando decimos que el precepto
constitucional en cuestion debe interpretatarse tecnicamente, a la luz de la jurisprudencia, por ser ello el metodo
mas seguro para hallar la verdad judicial, no importa que ello repugne al concepto vulgar a simple vista, no
ponemos,en realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino que propugnamos una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida.

Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que en la tamizacion delprecepto
se añadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private land" en vez de dejarlas solas sin cualificacion.Algunos
diran que fue por razon de simentria para hacer"pendant diran que fue por razon de simetria para hacer"pendant"
con la frase "public agricultural land" puestamas arriba. Pero esto np tiene ninguna importancia. Loimportante es
saber que la añadidura, tal como esta jurisdiccion, de la palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. Eso es todo;
lo demas creo que es puro bizantinis mo.

III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente para ver de inquirir la
motivacion y finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos ocupapuede ayudar grandemente y arrojar no poca luz
en lainterpretacion de la letra y espiritu de dicho precepto.Este genero de inquisicion es perfectamente propio y
permisible en hermeneutica constitucional, y se ha hechosiempre, segun las majores autoridades sobre la materia.
Cooley, en su authorizado tratado sobre Limitaciones Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este
efectolo sigiuente:

When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to

be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings of the convention
which framed the instrument. Where the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid
will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to
 derive from this source much reliable assistance in interpretation. (1 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations
[8th ed.], p. 142.)

¿Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general sobre el problema capitalismo
de los terrenos naturales? ¿Cual era la tendenciapredominante entre los Delegados? Y ¿como era tambienel giro
de la opinion, del sentimiento publico es decir comoera el pulso del pueblo mismo del cual la Asamblea despuesde
todo no era mas que organo e interprete?

Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. El tono predomionante entodos
ellos era un fuerte, profundo nacionalismo. Tanto dentro como fuera de la Asamblea Constituyente era evidente,
acusado, el afan unanime y decidido de conservar el patrimonio nacional no solo para las presentes generaciones
filipinas, sino tambien para la posteridad. Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de todos un significadocategorio
e indubitable; significion de si es dedominio publico o privado. Muestras tipicas y representativas de este tono
pecular y dominantes de la ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m,anifestaciones que constanen el diario de serines
has en el curso de los debateso en el proceso de la redaccion del proyecto constitucionalpor Delegados de palabra
autorizadam bien por su significacion personal bein por el papel particula que desempeñaban en las treas
constituyentes. Por ejemplo el Delegado Montilla por Negros Occidental, conspicuo representante del agro, usando
del privilegio de madia horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte:

. . . Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse que nuetro
patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por 100 en manos filipinas. Tierras y recursos naturales son
inm,uebles y como tales pueden compararse con los organos vitales del cuerpo de una persona: la falta de
posesion de los mismo puede caussar la muete instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de
Sesiones Asamblea Constituyente, inedita, "Framing of the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592 Libro del Profesor
Aruego).

Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar entre propiedad publica y
privada.

El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del comte de agricultura de la
Asamblea que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas palabras:

La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos agricolas y de poder se dueños
de propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una parte necesaria de las leyes de terrenos publicos de Filipinas
para mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los filipos' (Diario de Sesiones, id.; Libro de
Aruego, supra, pag. 593.)

Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos Naturales de la
Asamblea Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa generricamente sin cualificacion de publica o privada. Dice el
Comite:

Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la herencia exclusiva de la
nacion filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser conservados para aquellos que se halian bajo la autoridad soberana de
esa nacion y para su posteridad. (Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 595.)

La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea Constituyente. Sus
mienbros que todavia viven recordaran l;a infinita paciencia, el esmero de orfe breria con que se trabajo el
preambulo de la Constitucion. Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a un rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas
resultans es la labor benedictina una de las gemas redel patrimonio nacional. He aqui el preambulo:

The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene Providence,in order to establish a government that shall
enbody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themslves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and
democracy, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con respecto a la tierre y
recursosnaturales es de facil explicacion. Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el Commonwealth,
sino tambien para la republica que advendria despues de10 años. Querianos, puesd asegurar firmemente las
basesde nuestra nacionalidad. ¿Que cosa major para ello quebildar por los cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela
mnacion delcual — parodiando al Delegado Montilla — la tierra y losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales
cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte instantanea o el abreviamiento dela vida?

Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en cuenta las cirucmstancias.Nos
debamos perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion geografica,asi como tambien de nuestras limitaciones
demograficas.Se trataba, por ciento de una conciencia agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante. Estabamos
roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas — centenares de milliones — economica y biologicamente agresivas,
avidad de desbordarsepor tadas partes, poir las areas del Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales.
China, Japon-Japon, sobretodo que estaba entonces en el apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y
militarista. Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada rutilante de Samurrai,el pavoroso problema de
Davao, donde, por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la tierra, instituyendos alli una especie de
Japon en miniatura, con todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello implicaba para la integridadde nuestra existancia
nacional. Como que Davaoya se llamaba popular y sarcasticamente Davaoko, entragica rima con Manchuko.

Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. Texas, Mejico, Cuba y
otraspaises del Mar Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban, como una terrible maldicion el error de
susgobernantes al permitir la enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros.

Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas, los Delegados a la Constituyente se

haciancargo tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de, por lo menos,vincular el apatrimonio nacional, entre otras cosas
la tierra, en manos de los filipinos.

Que de extraño habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se aprobase un articulo
rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion y finalidad, como ya se ha dicho, era triple:
(a)consetvar el patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones filipinas; (b) vincular, por lo menos,la
propiedad de la tierra y de los recursos naturales en manos filipinas como la mejor manera de mantener elequilibrio
de un sistema economico dominado principalmente por extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know-how) superior y
de su abudancia de capitales: (c) prefictos y complicaciones internacionales.

No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos residenciales
comercialese industrial, pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban de conseguir y los peligros quie se
trataban de evitar con la politica de nacionalizacion y conservacionrezaban tanto para una clase de terrenos como
para otra. ¿Por que se iba a temer, verbigracia, el dominio extranjero sobre un terreno estrictamente, agricola,
sujeto a cultivo, y no sobre el terreno en que estuviera instalada unaformidable industria o fabrica?

Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente que,
noobstante el natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los americanos., a estos no se les
concedioningun privilegio en relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales, sino que se les coloco en el mismo
plano que alos otros extranjeros. Como que ha habido necesidad deuna reforma constitucional — la llmada reforma
sobre laparidad — para equipararlos a los filipinos.

The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of
the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other
construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the latter
will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be
ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law
should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words. (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721,
722.)

IV. — Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la propiedadsobre
terrenos residenciales e industriales,porque ello imposibilitaria toda accion legislativa en sentidocontrario para el
caso de que el Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que semejante interdiccio debialevantarse. Se dice que es
majes y mas conveniente dejaresta cuestion en manos del Congreso para que haya maselasticidad en las
soluciones de los diferentes problemassobre la tierra.
Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por excelencia. Solamenteel
pueblo puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso, ni mucho menos los tribunales, pueden disponerde
ese patrimonio. Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es proponer una reforma constitucional mediante los votosde
tres cuartas (3/4) de sus miembros; y el pueblo tienela ultima palabra que se expresara en una eleccion oplebiscito
convocado al efecto.

El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria una economia mal entendida. Si no se escatiman
gastos para celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente ¿como ha del pueblo en un asunto tan vital como es la
disposicion del patrimonio nacional, base de su mismaexistencia? para reformar la Constitucion, apoyado portres
cuartas (3/4) del Congreso, por lo menos.

En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es, e interpretarse en la forma como lo
interpretamos en nuestra decision.

Se confirma la sentencia.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." The important question that arises is whether private
residential land is included in the terms "private agricultural land."

There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, quoted in the majority opinion, lands of the
public domain are classified into agricultural, timber,or mineral. There can be no doubt, also, that public lands
suitable or actually used for residential purposes, must of necessity come under any of the three classes.

But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of the approval of the
Constitution, have the same classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the conclusion — which is at once
absurd and anomalous — that private timber and mineral lands may be transferred or assigned to aliens by a mode
other than hereditary succession. It is, however, contended that timber and mineral lands can never be private, and
reliance is placed on section 1, Article XIII, of the Constitution providing that "all agricultural, timber and mineral
lands of the public domain . . . belong to the State," and limiting the alienation of natural resources only to public
agricultural land. The contention is obviously untenable. This constitutional provision, far from stating that all timber
and mineral lands existing at the time of its approval belong to the State, merely proclaims ownership by the
Government of all such lands as are then of the public domain; and although, after the approval of the Constitution,
no public timber or mineral land may be alienated, it does not follow that timber or mineral lands theretofore already
of private ownership also became part of the public domain. We have held, quite recently, that lands in the
possession of occupants and their predecessors in interest since time immemorial do not belong to the Government,
for such possession justifies the presumption that said lands had been private properties even before the Spanish
conquest. (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect to the pronouncement in Cariño vs.
Insular Government (212 U.S., 446; 53 Law. ed., 594), that it could not be supposed that "every native who had not
a paper title is a trespasser." It is easy to imagine that some of such lands may be timber or mineral. However, if
there are absolutely no private timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral lands,
why did the framers of the Constitution bother about speaking of "private agricultural land" in sections 3 and 5 of
Article XIII, and merely of "lands" in section 4?

SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals,
corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subject to rights existing prior to the enactmentof such
law.

SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
 SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines.

Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals,
corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subbject to rights existing prior to the enactment of such law,
and under section 4 it may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. The latter section clearly negatives the idea that
private lands can only be agricultural. If the exclusive classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held
applicable to private lands, and , as we have shown, there may be private timber and mineral lands, there would be
neither sense nor justification in authorizing the Congress to determine the size of private agricultural land only, and
in not extending the prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands.

In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of public lands, and the term
"agricultural" appearing in section 5 was used as it is commonly understood, namely, as denoting lands devoted to
agricultural. In other words, residential or urban lots are not embraced within the inhibition established in said
provision. It is noteworthy that the original draft referred merely to "private land." This certainty would have been
comprehensive enough to included any kind of land. The insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore
significant. If the Constitution prohibits the alienation to foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can
ever be enacted with a view to permitting limited areas of land for residential, commercial, or industrial use, and said
prohibition may readily affect any effort towards the attainment of rapid progress in Philippine economy. On the
other hand, should any danger arise from the absence of such constitutional prohibition, a law may be passed to
remedy the situation, thereby enabling the Government to adopt such elastic policy as may from time to time be
necessary, unhampered by any inconveniences or difficulties in amending the Constitution. The power of
expropriation is, furthermore, a handy safeguard against undersirable effects of unrestricted alienation to, or
ownership by, aliens of urban properties. The majority argue that the original draft in which the more general terms
"private land" was used, was amended in the same that the adjective "agricultural" was inserted in order merely "to
clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties" and because, as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be
private, "the prohibition to transfer the same, would be superfluous." In answer, it may be stated that section 4 of
Article XIII, referring to the right of expropriation, uses "lands" without any qualification, and it is logical to believe
that the use was made knowingly in contradistinctions with the limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3
and 5. Following the line of reasoning of the majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be
expropriated is not only private agricultural land but also private timber and mineral lands, as well, of course, as
private residential lands. This of course tears apart the majority's contention that there cannot be any private timber
or mineral land.

Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in mind that no less than Honorable Filemon Sotto,
Chairman of the Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional Convention, in supporting section 3 of the Article XIII,
explained that the same refers to agricultural land, and not to urban properties, and such explanation is somewhat
confirmed by the statement of another member of the Convention (delegate Sevilla) to the effect that said section "is
discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists."

Sr. SOTTO (F) Señor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el fondo de esta cuestion al
parecer inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo haya metido tanto en la sesion de ayer como en la de
hoy? Que hay de misterios en el fondo de este problem, para que politicos del volumen del caballero por
Iloilo y del caballero por Batangas, tomen con gran interes una macion para reconsiderar lo acordado ayer?
Voy a ser frio, señores. Parece que es meyor tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. He
prestado atencion, como siempre suelo hacer a todos los argumentos aqui en contra del precepto contenido
en el draft y a favor ahora de la reconsideracion y siento decir lo siguiente; todos son argumentos muy
buenos a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble Nacional se haya reunido, sera la ocasion de ver si procede o no
expropiar terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao existentes despues. En el presente, yo me limito a invitar
la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que el procepto no tome las medidas necesarias en tiempo
oportuno, cuando el problema del latifundismo se haya presentado con caracterres tales que el beinestar,
interes y orden publico lo requieran. Permitame la Convencion que lo discuta en globo las dos pates del
articulo 9. Hay tal engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho precepto, hay tral eslabon en una u otra
parte que es imposible, que es dificil que quitaramos deslindes si nos limitasemos a considerar una sola
parte. La primera parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar el limite maximo de propiedad agricola que los
ciudadanos particulares puede tener. Parece que es un punto que ha pasado desapercibido. No se trata
aqui ahora de propiedades urbanas, sino de propiedades agricolas, y es por la razon de que con mucha
especialidad en las regiones agricolas, en las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo se extiende con
facilidad, y desde alli los pequeños propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para intilizarles. Esta pues,
a salvo completamente la cuestion de las propiedades urbans. Cietos grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes
que con pretexto de tener cietos eficios, que en realidad no necesitan de tales extensos solares para su
existencia ni para su mantenimineto, puedan dormir transquilos. No Vamos contra esas propiedades. Por
una causa o por otra el pasado nos legardo ese lastre doloroso. Pero la region agricola, la region menos
explotada por nuetro pueblo, la region que necesitamos si queremos vivir cuenta propia la region que es el
mayor incentivo no para solo para los grandes capitalistas de fuera merece todos los ciudados del
gobierno.

Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad con la primera. Una vez
demostrado ante la Lehgislatura, una vez convencida la Asamblea Nacional de que existe un latifundismo y
que este laitifundismo puede producir males e esta produciendo daños a la comunidad, es cuando entonces
la Legislatura puede acordar la expropiacion de los latifundios. Donde esta el mal que los opositores a este
es un postulado que todos conocen. Bien, voy a admitir para los propositos del argumento que hoy no
existen laifundios, y si los opostores al precepto quieren mas vamos a convenir en que no existrian en el
futuro. Pues, entonces, donde este el temor de que el hijo de tal no pueda recibir la herencia de cual? Por lo
demas el ejemplo repetidas veces presentado ayer yhoy en cuanto al herdero y al causahabiente no es
completamente exacto. Vamos a suponer que efectivamente un padre de familia posee un numero tal de
hectareas de terreno, superior o exedente a lo que fija la ley. Creen los Caballeros, creen los opositorees al
precepto que la Legislatura, la Asamblea Nacional va a ser tan imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente
disponga por ley que aquella porcion excedente del terreno que ha de recibir un hijo de su padre no podra
poseerlo, no podra tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero.

Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede dictar leyes o
medidas imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el plazo, fijara la proporcion de acuedo con las circunstancias del
tiempo entonces en que vivamos. Es posible que ahora un numero determinado de hectereas sea excesivo;
es posible que por desenvolvimientos economics del paius ese numero de hectareas puede ser elevado o
reducido. Es por esto porque el Comite precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de
hectareas presamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas, prefireindo dejar a la
sabiduria, a la prudencia, al patriotismo y a la justicia de la Asambela Nacional el fijar ese numero.

Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero; se hablqa de que no podra
revender las propieedades. Pero, Caballeros de la Convencion, caballeros opositores del precepto; si la
Legislatura, si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de que el gobierno no puede hecer una
exporpiacion, va a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional dictara una ley autorizando la expropiacion de tal a cual
latifundio cuando este convencida, primero, de que la existencia de ese latifundio es amenazante para el
publico; y segundo, cuando la asamblea Nacional este convencida de que el gobierno esta disposicion para
disponer la expropiacion.

Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo autorizar,fijar los limites, ni macho menos es malo
autorizar a la Legislatura para dictar leyes de expropiacion.

Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito esta mañana — y digo con
exito porque he oidoalgunos aplausos — se ha mentado la posibilidad de que los comunistas hagan
un issuede esta disposicion que existe en el draft; podran los comunistas pedir los votos del electorado para
ser elloslos que dicten las leyes fijando el limite del terreno y ordenen la expropriacion? ¡Que argumento
mas bonito si tuviera base! Lo mas natural, creo yo, es que el pueblo, el electorado, al ver queno es una
Asamblea Constituyente comunista la que ha puestoesta disposicion, otorgue sus votors a esta misma
Asamblea Nacional, o a esos condidatos no comunistas. ¿Quien esta en disposicion de terminar mejor una
obra aquel que trazado y puesto los primeros pilares, o aquel que viene de gorra al final de la obra para
decir: "Aqui estoy poner el tejado?"

Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como este, pretendamos ligarla a los
votos de los comulites de terreno; no ha de venir porque nosotros fijemos loslimites de terreno; no ha de
venir porque prohibamos los latifundiosmediante expropiacion forzosa, no; ha de venir precisamentepor
causa de los grandes propietarios de terreno, y ha de venir,queramoslo o no, porque el mundo esta
 evolucionando y se va aconvencer de que la vida no es solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos ,
porque Dios no la dio, con la libertad, el aire, la luz,la tierra para vivir (Grandes Aplausosz), y por algo se ha
dichoque en los comienzos de la vida himana debio haber sido fusilado,matado, a aquel primero que puso
un cerco a un pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a propiedad.

Por estas razones, señor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para terminar, voy a dar fin a mi
discurso agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech of Delegate Sotto.)

I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by limiting private individuals to holding and acquiring
lands, private agricultural lands . . . is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists. Why not, Mr.
President, extend this provision also to those who are engaged in commerce and industries? Both elements
amass wealth. If the purpose of the Committee, Mr. President, is to distribute the wealth in such a manner
that it will no breed discontent, I see no reason for the discrimination against the agricultural. In view of these
reasons, Mr. President, I do not want to speak further and I submit this amendment because many reasons
have been given already yesterday and this morning. (Speech of Delegate Sevilla.)

Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on the observation that section 3 of Article XIII does
not embrace private urban lands. There is of course every reason to believe that the sense in which the terms
"private agricultural lands" were employed in section 3 must be the same as that in section 5, if consistency is to be
attributed to the framers of the Constitution.

We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by Delegate Ledesma to the effect
that "the exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a
necessary part of the Public Land Laws," and of the statement of Delegate Montilla regarding "the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources," because (1) the remarks of Delegate Ledesma expressly
mentions "public agricultural lands" and the terms "real estate" must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the
preceding words "public agricultural lands", under the principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must
have in mind purely "agricultural" lands, sicne he was the Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development
and his speech was made in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands; (3) the general nature of the
explanations of both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate Montilla, cannot control the more specific clarification of
Delegate Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include urban propeties. Neither are we bound to give
reater force to the view (apparently based on mere mental recollections) of the Justices who were members of the
Constitutional Convention than tot he specific recorded manifestation of Delegate Sotto.

The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is surely not
controlling, because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and, secondly, in that case it was expressly held
that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
not timber or mineral lands," — the definition held to be found in section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and
after a carefully consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act
is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "make rules and
regulations for the lease, sale or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To
our minds that is the only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the
phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands accquired from Spain which are
not timber or mineral lands. (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 182.)

The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the approval of the
Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of this Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous
Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard
to public lands, terrenos baldios realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively
of the public domain." (Section 123.) They hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly
implemented by said Act." The majority have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition contained in said
sections refer to lands originally acquired under said sections referto land originally acqured under said Act or
otherlegal provisions lands, which of course do not include lands not originally of the public domain. The lands that
may be acquired under Act No. 141 necessarily have to be public agricultural lands, since they are the only kinds
that are subject to alienation or disposition under the Constitution. Hence, even if they become private, said lands
retained their original agricultural character and may not therefore be alienated to foreigners. It is only in this sense,
I think, that act No. 141 seeks to carry out and implement the constitutional objective. In the case before us,
however, there is no pretense that the land bought by the appellant was originally acquired under said Act or other
legal provisions contemplated therein.

The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of the Public Land Act No.
2874 aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential purposes, but after the
Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is
completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuanceof the Constitutional limitation," and that "prior to the Constitution,
under section 57 of the Public Land Act No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial
purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the
land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution speaks of "public agricultural
lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted after the approval of the Constitution, has to limit
the alienation of its subject matter (public agricultural land, which includes public residential or industrial land) to
Filipino citizens. But it is not correct to consider said Act as a legislation on, or a limitation against, the right of aliens
to acquire residential land that was already of private ownership prior to the approval of the Constitution.

The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government — Judicial, Legislative
and Executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and
timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots," is rather misleading and not inconsistent, with our
position. While the construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers exclusively to lands of the public domain,
our view is that private residential lands are not embraced within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of
Article XIII. Let us particularize in somewhat chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading case
of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, only held that agricultural public lands are those public lands acquired from
Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 15, 1939,
quoted in the majority opinion, limited itself in affirming that "residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of
the public domain . . . must be classified as agricultural." Indeed, the limited scope of said opinion is clearly pointed
out in the following subsequent opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 25, 1941, expressly hoding that
"in cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment
of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable."

This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding the request of the Register of
Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion No. 130, dated July 15, 1939, of this
Department quoted in its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941, holding among others, that the phrase "public
agricultural land" in section 1, Article XIII (formerly article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, includes
residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition, amends or supersedeas a decision
or order of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered pursuant to section
200 of the Administrative Code which holds that a residential lot is not an agricultural land, and therefore, the
prohibition in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines does not apply.

There is no conflict between the two opinions.

Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines, speaks of public agricultural
lands while section 5 of the same article treats of private agricultural lands. A holding, therefore, that a
residential lot is not private agricultural land within the meaning of that phrase as found in section 5 of Article
XIII (formerly Article XII) does not conflict with an opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots
forming part of the public domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1,
Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the prohibition in
section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to
foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable. In cases involving the
prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding disposition in favor of, and exploitation,
development or utilization by foreigners of public agricultural lands, the opinion that residential, commercial
or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land"
found in said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly Article XII) governs.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction against transfers in
favor of alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions
formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands. On November 29, 1943, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in
section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G. R. No. 29.) During theJapanese occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of
the Philippines contained an almost verbatim reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII; and the then National
Assembly passed an Act providing that "no natural or juridical person who is not a Filipino citizen shall acquire
directly or indirectly any title to private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including buildings and other
improvements thereon or leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal succession of proper cases, unless
authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines." (Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497, February,1944.) It is true
that the Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have rendered an opinion on the matter, but it cannot have any
persuasive force because it merely suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department pending judicial
determination of the question. Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting in effect the opinion
of his Department rendered in1941. Last but not least, since the approval of the Constitution, numerous transactions
involving transfers of private residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered without any opposition on
the part of the Government. It will thus be seen that, contrary to what the majority believe, our Government has
constantly adopted the view that private residential lands do not fall under the limitation contained in section 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution.

I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not permit myself to be
blinded by any sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a degree as to attribute to any of its
provisions a construction not justified by or beyond what the plain written words purport to convey. We need not
express any unnecessary concern over the possibility that entire towns and cities may come to the hands of aliens,
as long as we have faith in our independence and in our power to supply any deficiency in the Constitution either by
its amendment or by Congressional action.

There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the appellant, with the conformity of the
appellee, had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should have been granted outright. In Co
Chiong vs. Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago, we reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court
should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such
question is raised by the the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words, a
court will always avoid a constitutional question, if possible. In the present case, that course of action was not only
possible but absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had been opposed by the appellee, there
might be some reasons for its denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that after the filing of appellee's
brief, "the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion." At any rate, this discretion should always be
exercised in favor of a withdrawal where a constitutional question will thereby be avoided.

In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice Tuason) that led to
teh denial of the motion for withdrawal. During the deliberation in which all the eleven members were present, seven
voted to allow and four to deny. Subsequently, without any previous notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was
absent, the matter was again submitted to a vote, and one Justice (who previously was in favor of the withdrawal)
reversed his stand, with the result that the votes were five to five. This result was officially released and the motion
denied under the technicality provided in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to observe that Mr.
Justice Hontiveros, who was still a member of the Court and could have attended the later deliberation, if notified
and requested, previously voted for the granting of the motion. The real explanation for excluding Mr. Justice
Hontiveros, against my objection, and for the reversal of the vote of one Justice who originally was in favor of the
withdrawal is found in the confession made in the majority opinion to the effect that the circular of the Department of
Justice instructing all registers of deeds to accept for registration transfers of residential lots to aliens, was an
"interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions," and that "if we
grant the withdrawal, the result is that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of
this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice issued while this case was pending before this
Court." The zealousness thus shown in denying the motion for wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of course
is another way of assuming that the petitioner-appellant and the Solicitor General had connived with the Department
of Justice in a scheme not only to interfere with the functions of this Court but to dispose of the national patrimony in
favor of aliens.
In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the Department of Justice to issue
any circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject, and the corollary right of the appellant to take advantage
thereof. What is most regrettable is the implication that the Department of Justice, as a part of the Executive
Department, cannot be as patriotic and able as this Court in defending the Constitution. If the circular in question is
objectionable, the same can be said of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the
registration of transfers of private residential lots in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the
case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands (43 Off. Gaz., 866), wherin according to the appellant, the only question raised
was whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name," and notwithstanding the fact
that in said case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien applicant and that, as hereinbefore stated, the Court
of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd in 1943 a decision holding that private residential lots are
not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution. And yet this Court, failing to consider
said opinion as an "interference," chose to evade the only issue raised by the appellant and squarely met by the
appellee in the Oh Cho case which already required a decision on the constitutional question resolved in the case at
bar against, so to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other words, the majority did not allow the withdrawal of the
present appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits, but to annul the circular of the Department of Justice
which is, needless to say, not involved in this case. I cannot accept the shallow excuse of the majority that the denial
of the motion for withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our indifference of today might signify a permanent
offense to the Constitution," because it carries the rather immodest implication that this Court has a monopoly of the
virtue of upholding and enforcing, or supplying any deficiency in, the Constitution. Indeed, the fallacy of the
impliation is made glaring when Senator Franscisco lost no time in introducing a bill that would clarify the
constitutional provision in question in the sense desired by the majority. Upon the other hand, the majority should
not worry about the remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this Court to pass upon this constitutional
question, because we can take advance notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345), in
which the parties have already presented. But even disregarding said case, I am sure that, in view of the recent
newspaper discussion which naturally reached the length and breadth of the country, there will be those who will
dispute their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the constitutional prohibition.

BENGZON, J., dissenting:

It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition. Both parties
having agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no obligation to hold forth on the issue. It is not our mission to
give advice to other person who might be interested to give advice to other persons who might be interested to
know the validity or invalidity of their sales or purchases. That is the work of lawyers and juriscounsults.

There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the constitutional problem. It
must be remembered that the other departments of the Government are not prevented from passing on
constitutional question arising in the exercise of their official powers. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p.
101.) This Tribunal was not established, nor is it expected to play the role of an overseer to supervise the other
Government departments, with the obligation to seize any opportunity to correct what we may believe to be
erroneous application of the constitutional mandate. I cannot agree to the suggestion that the way the incumbent
Secretary of Justice has interpreted the fundamental law, no case will ever arise before the court, because the
registers of deeds under his command, will transfer on thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy to perceive several
probabilities: (1) a new secretary may entertain opposite views; (2) parties legally affected — like heirs or or
creditors of the seller — may wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens, invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in a
truly contested case, with opposing litigants actively arguing their sides we shall be in a position to do full justice. It
is not enough that briefs — as in this case — have been filed; it is desirable, perhaps essential, to make sure that in
a motion for reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention shall be invited to points inadequately
touched or improperly considered.

It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter. Those sales will be subject
to the final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. To spell necessity out of the existence of such
conveyances, might amount to begging the issue with the assumption that such transfers are obviously barred by
the Organic Law. And yet sales to foreigners of residential lots have taken place since our Constitution was
approved in 1935, and no one questioned their validity in Court until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese
authorities had shown distaste for such transfers.
The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and reflect upon the conflicting
politico-economic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation against international cooperation, and vice-
versa. We could also delve into several aspects necessarily involved, to wit:

(a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose of landowners at the time
of its adoption; or whether it merely affected the rights of those who should become landowners after the approval of
the Constitution;7

(b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in the United
Nations Organization, and upon our treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the worlds; and

(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the treaties between the United
States and Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places under the jurisdiction of the
United States? If so, did our Constitution have the effect of modifying such treaty during the existence of the
Commonwealth Government?

The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the parties, and for
withholding of any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. However, I am now ready to cast my vote. I am convinced
that the organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are popularly understood — not including
residential, commercial, industrial or urban lots. This belief is founded on the reasons ably expounded by Mr. Justice
Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuason. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted
interpretation of the prohibition, if erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation
amplifying it; whereas a liberal and wide application, if erroneous, would need the cumbersome and highly
expensive process of a constitutional amendment.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or intended for
residence may be alienated or sold to an alien.

Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.

The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for residence is included in
the term "private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the Constitution. In support of the opinion that
lands of private ownership suitable for residence are included in the term "private agricultural land" and cannot be
alienated or sold to aliens, the majority invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil.,
175), which holds that urban lands of the public domain are included in the term "public agricultural land." But the
opinion of the majority overlooks the fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in the
term "public agricultural land" was due to the classification made by the Congress of the United States in the Act of
1 July 1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In said Act, lands of the public domain were classified into
agricultural, timber and mineral. The only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain were those belonging
to the first class. Hence a parcel of land of the public domain suitable for residence, which was neither timber nor
mineral, could not be disposed of or alienated unless classified as public agricultural land. The susceptibility of a
residential lot of the public domain of being cultivated is not the real reason for the inclusion of such lot in the
classification of public agricultural land, for there are lands, such as foreshore lands, which would hardly be
susceptible of cultivation (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167-168), and yet the same
come under the classification of public agricultural land. The fact, therefore, that parcels of land of the public domain
suitable for residence are included in the classification of public agricultural land, is not a safe guide or index of what
the framers of the Constitution intended to mean by the term "private agricultural land." It is contrary to the rules of
statutory construction to attach technical meaning to terms or phrases that have a common or ordinary meaning as
understood by he average citizen.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in force was Act No. 2874.
Under this Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and corporations or associations
described in section 23 thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands
the same right to acquire the public land as to their own citizens, could acquire by purchase agricultural land of the
public domain (section 23, Act No. 2874). This was the general rule. There was an exception. Section 24of the Act
provides:

No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last preceding section
may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or classification, not used for
industrial or residence purposes, that is at the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public
domain, or any permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement: Provided,
however, That persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships which at the date upon which this Act
shall take effect, hold agricultural public lands or land of any other denomination not used for industrial or
residence purposes, that belonged originally, really or presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent
improvements on such lands, or a real right upon such lands and improvements, having acquired the same
under the laws and regulations in force at the date of such acquisition, shall be authorized to continue
holding the same as if such persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships were qualified under the
last preceding section; but they shall not encumber, convey, or alienate the same to persons, corporations,
associations or partnerships not included in section twenty-three of this Act, except by reason of hereditary
succession, duly legalized and acknowledged by competent Courts. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural, provides:

Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person,
corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural
purposes. . . . Provided further, That any person, corporation, association, or partnership disqualified from
purchasing public land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act, may purchase or lease land
included under this title suitable for industrial or residence purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only
be valid while such land issued for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 121 of the Act provides:

No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other
Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine
Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that
were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; . . . Provided,
however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of
hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent Courts, nor to lands and
improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes: . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)

Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public domain, that were neither
timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, could be acquired by aliens disqualified from acquiring
by purchase or lease public agricultural lands (sections 24, 57, 121, Act No. 2874). The delegates to the Constituent
Assembly were familiar with the provisions of the Public Land Act referred to. The prohibition to alienate public
agricultural lands to disqualified persons, corporations or associations did not apply to "lands and improvements
acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the provisions of
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, lots for townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of citizenship,
pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. In spite of the nationalistic spirit that pervades all the provisions of Act No.
2874, the Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to exclude aliens from acquiring and owning lands of the
public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It adopted the policy of excluding aliens from acquiring
agricultural lands of the public domain not "suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other productive
purposes," which, together with timber, mineral and private agricultural lands, constitute the mainstay of the nation.
Act No. 2874 was in force for nearly sixteen years — from 1919 to 1935. There is nothing recorded in the journals of
proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which would have justified a departure from the
policy theretofore adopted.

If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could acquire by purchase or lease
lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, how can it
be presumed that the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude such aliens from acquiring by purchase private
lands suitable for industrial or residence purposes? If pursuant to the law in force at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, lands of the public domain and improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence
purposes were not included in the prohibition found in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason for
believing that the framers of the Constitution, who were familiar with the law then in force, did not have the intention
of applying the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution to lands of private ownership
suitable or intended or used for residence, there being nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the
Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which, as above stated, would have justified a departure from the policy
then existing. If the term "private agricultural land" comprehends lands of private ownership suitable or intended or
used for residence, as held by the majority, there was no need of implementing a self-executory prohibition found in
the Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a
clear indication and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution does not apply to lands of private ownership
suitable or intended or used for residence. The term "private agricultural land" means privately owned lands devoted
to cultivation, to the raising of agricultural products, and does not include urban lands of private ownership suitable
for industrial or residence purposes. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has the effect of excluding all other
private lands that are not agricultural. Timber and mineral ands are not, however, included among the excluded,
because these lands could not and can never become private lands. From the land grants known
as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under the Royal Decrees of 25 June 1880 and
13 February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law, Act No. 2874, the Constitution, and
Commonwealth Act No. 141, timber and mineral lands have always been excluded from alienation. The repeal by
sections 23, 60, 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the exception provided for in sections 24, 57, 121 of Act No.
2874, did not change the meaning of the term "private agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the
Constitution and understood by the people that adopted it.

The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the Register of
Deeds of Manila to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to the appellant who is an alien.

There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by the appellant —
whether it is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; or a private land that had never
been a part of the public domain (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43
Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the latter, the prohibition of section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not apply. If it is
the former, section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which providesthat —

No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order,
royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public
lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively
of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land,
shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may
acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose
charters authorize them to do so: . . .

is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned section unconstitutional, for it
violates section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law (Central
Capiz vs.Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, following the rule laid down in the
aforecited case, must also be declared unconstitutional, for it violates section 21 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution,
which is exactly the same as the one infringed upon by section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law
may not be passed by Congress to prohibit alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so
doing, it must avoid offending against the constitutional provision referred to above.

Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits of the case,
despite the withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants, consented to by the appellee. If discretion was to be
exercised, this Court did not exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally avoid passing upon constitutional
questions if the case where such questions are raised may be decided on other grounds. Courts of last resort do not
express their opinion on a consitutional question except when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public
Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116, 120; Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of the
provisions of the Constitution is no exclusive of the courts. The other coordinate branches of the government may
interpret such provisions acting on matters coming within their jurisdiction. And although such interpretation is only
persuasive and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be deprived of such power. Of course, the
final say on what is the correct interpretation of a constitutional provision must come from and be made by this Court
in an appropriate action submitted to it for decision. The correct interpretation of a constitutional provision is that
which gives effect to the intent of its framers and primarily to the understanding of such provision by the poeple that
adopted it. This Court is only an interpreter of the instrument which embodies what its framers had in mind and
especially what the people understood it to be when they adopted it. The eagerness of this Court to express its
opinion on the constitutional provision involved in this case, notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal, is
unusualf or a Court of last resort. It seems as if it were afraid to be deprived by the other coordinate branches of the
government of its prerogative to pass upon the constitutional question herein involved. If all the members of the
Court were unanimous in the interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny, that eagerness might be
justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree to the interpretation placed upon such provision, that
eagerness becomes recklessness. The interpretation thus placed by the majority of the Court upon the
constitutional provision referred to will be binding upon the other coordinate branches of the government. If, in the
course of time, such opinion should turn out to be erroneous and against the welfare of the country,an amendment
to the Constitution — a costly process — would have to be proposed and adopted. But, if the Court had granted the
motion for the withdrawal of the appeal, it would not have to express its opinion upon the constitutional provision in
question. It would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act according to their wisdom, foresight and
patriotism. They, too, possess those qualities and virtues. These are not of the exclusive possession of the
members of this Court. The end sought to be accomplished by the decision of this Court may be carried out by the
enactment of a law. And if the law should turn out to be against the well-being of the people, its amendment or
repeal would not be as costly a process as a constitutional amendment.

In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by the appellant and consented
to by the appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion, that, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment
under review should be reversed.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it says, "the Constitution as
we see it and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we cannot compromise it
even in the name of equity." We wish deep in our heart that we were given the light to see as the majority do and
could share their opinion. As it is, we perceive things the other way around. As we see it, the decision by-passed
what according to our humble understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in
search of the ideal result. The denial by this Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor
General gave his conformity collides with the professed sorrow that the decision cannot be helped.

Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:

5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines.

The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used in this section?
Before answering the question, it is convenient to refresh our memory of the pertinent rule in the interpretation of
constitutions as expounded in decisions of courts of last resort and by law authors.

It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a construed so to give
effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself,
and the apparent meaning of the words employed is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where the
assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p.
20.)
 Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless
the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for
metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of
meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a
practical nature founded on the common business of human life adapted to common wants, designed for
common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them, the people adopt them, the
people must be supposed to read them with the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in
them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary gloss. (1 Story, Const. sec. 451.)

Marshall , Ch. J., says:

The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1,
188; 6 Law. ed., 23).

Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions afford no basis for
construction where the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. Nor
can construction read into the provisions of a constitution some unexpressed general policy or spirit,
supposed to underline and pervade the instrument and to render it consonant to the genius of the institutions
of the state. The courts are not at liberty to declare an act void because they deem it opposed to the spirit of
the Constitution. (12 C.J., 702-703.)

There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal interpretation of
the words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion, the phrase has no technical meaning, and the
same could not have been used in any sense other than that in which it is understood by the men in the street.

That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all lands proceed from the
sovereign. And, that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial, is
another truth which no one can successfully dispute. In prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural land to
aliens, the Constitution, by necessary implication, authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private property. The
express mention of one thing excludes all others of the same kind.

Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can see what lands
do not fall within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New international Dictionary defines this word
as "of or pertaining to agriculture connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as, the agricultural class; agricultural
implements, wages, etc." According to this definition and according to the popular conception of the word, lands in
cities and towns intended or used for buildings or other kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural
lands. They are either residential, commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings, communities are divided into
residential, commercial and industrial sections. It would be extremely out of the ordinary, not to say ridiculous, to
imagine that the Constitutional Convention considered a lot on the Escolta with its improvement as agricultural land.

If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under consideration will
dispel all doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the Constitution as properties that may be
assigned to foreigners.

Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the statement that the committee
on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report recommended the
incorporation into the Constitution of the following provision:

SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or
assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands; and the Government shall regulate the transfer or
assignment of land now owned by persons, or corporations,or associations not qualified under the
provisions of this Constitution to acquire or hold lands in the Philippine Islands.
In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-committee of seven
embodied the following provision which had been recommended in the reports of the committee on agricultural
development, national defense, industry, and nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources:

SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or
assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of the articleo n
General Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had been prepared by the committee in consultation with
President Quezon. The revised draft as it touches private lands provides as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership shall be transferred or
assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands, of the public domain in the Philippine Islands. (2 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Aruego,
595-599.)

The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with sligh alteration in
the phraseology.

It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first draft of the
Constitution all proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any land of private ownership without
regard to its nature or use, but that the last mentioned sub-committee later amended that proposal by putting the
word "agricultural" before the word "land." What are we to conclude from this modification? Its self-evident purpose
was to confine the prohibition to agricultural lands, allowing the ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not
partake of agricultural character. The insertion of the word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby
eliminating any possibility that its implication was not comprehended.

In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the conclusions in this Court's
decision are erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because the conclusions do not follow the
premises.

According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the scope of the
provision. It says that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and
avoid uncertainties."

If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a better way of messing up and
obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. If the purpose was "to clarify concepts and avoid
uncertainties," the insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word "land" produced the exact opposite of the
result which the change was expected to accomplish — as witness the present sharp and bitter controversy which
would not have arisen had they let well enough alone.

But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the final draft as
"merely one of words" is utterly unsupported by evidence, by the text of the Constitution, or by sound principles of
construction. There is absolutely no warrant or the statement that the Constitutional Convention, which was guided
by wise men, men of ability and experience in different fields of endeavor, used the termafter mature deliberation
and reflection and after consultation with the President, without intending to give it its natural signification and
connotation. "We are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did
not understand the force of language." (People vs. Rathbone, 32 N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution will be scanned in
vain for any reasonable indication that its authors made the change with intention that it should not operate
according to the rules of grammar and the ordinary process of drawing logical inferences. The theory is against the
presumption, based on human experience, that the framers of a constitution "have expressed themselves in careful
and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as
possible to implication." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 128, 129.) "As men, whose intention require
no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey,
the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have
employed words in their natural sense and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.)
When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as originally proposed, the
prohibition was changed to private agricultural lands, the average man's faculty of reasoning tells him that other
lands may be acquired. The elementary rules of speech with which men of average intelligence, and, above all, the
members of the Constitutional Assembly were familiar, inform us that the object of a descriptive adjective is to
specify a thing as distinct from another. It is from this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius stems; a familiar rule of interpretation often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason.

If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are they? Timber land or mineral
land, or both? As the decision itself says these lands are not susceptible of private ownership, the answer can only
be residential, commercial, industrial or other lands that are not agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable and
profitable to the owners as residential, commercial or industrial than if he devotes it to the cultivation of crops is a
matter that has to be decided according to the value of the property, its size, and other attending circumstances.

The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are suitable for home building
are considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that private residential, commercial or industrial lands
should be considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that "what the members of the Constitutional
Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification (timber, mineral and
agricultural) and its technical meaning then prevailing."

As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. The classification of
public lands was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification of private lands. At the outset, it should
be distinctively made clear that it was this Court's previous decisions and not an Act of Congress which declared
that public lands which were not forest or mineral were agricultural lands. Little reflection on the background of this
Court's decisions and the nature of the question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments
which came up for construction, will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of public
lands.

In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very simple and
manifest reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands — agricultural — can find their
way into the hands of private persons. Forest lands and mineral lands are preserved by the State for itself and for
posterity. Granting what is possible, that there are here and there forest lands and mineral lands to which private
persons have obtained patents or titles, it would be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones which
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution wants to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The
majority themselves will not admit that the Constitution which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands
allows the conveyance of private forests and mines.

In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in view.
Classification of public lands was and is made for purposes of administration; for the purpose principally of
segregating lands that may be sold from lands that should be conserved. The Act of July 1, 1902, of the United
States Congress designated what lands of the public domain might be alienated and what should be kept by the
State. Public lands are divided into three classes to the end that natural resources may be used without waste.
Subject to some exceptions and limitation, agricultural lands may be disposed of by the Government. Preservation
of forest and mineral lands was and is a dominant preoccupation. These are important parts of the country's natural
resources. Private non-agricultural land does not come within the category of natural resources. Natural resources
are defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or produced by nature. The United States
Congress evinced very little if any concern with private lands.

It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above mentioned was an
organic law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. It was enacted by a Congress whose members
were not closely familiar with local conditions affecting lands. Under the circumstances, it was natural that the
Congress employed "words in a comprehensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of
thought or of narrow distinctions. "The United States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline
governing the administration, exploitation, and disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out
by the local authorities and courts entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation of the law.

It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of scattered small parcels
of public lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with which the Congress had not bothered
itself to mention separately or specifically. This Court, forced by nature of its duty to decide legal controversies, ruled
that public lands that were fit for residential purposes, public swamps and other public lands that were neither forest
nor mineral, were to be regarded as agricultural lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, often inevitable
in a law or constitution, and this Court merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say that
agricultural lands and residential lands are the same or alike in their character and use. It merely said that for the
purpose of judging their alienability, residential, commercial or industrial lands should be brought under the class of
agricultural lands.

On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different aim. This Court
is not now confronted with any problem for which there is no specific provision, such as faced it when the question
of determining the character of public residential land came up for decision. This Court is not called to rule whether a
private residential land is forest, mineral or agricultural. This Court is not, in regard to private lands, in the position
where it found itself with reference to public lands, compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call
public residential lands, agricultural lands. When it comes to determining the character of private non-agricultural
lands, the Court's task is not to compare it with forests, mines and agricultural lands, to see which of these bears the
closest resembrance to the land in question. Since there are no private timber nor mineral lands, and if there were,
they could not be transferred to foreigners, and since the object of section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution is
radically at variance withthat of the laws covering public lands, we have to have different standards of comparison
and have to look of the intent of this constitutional provision from a different angle and perspective. When a private
non-agricultural land demands to know where it stands, we do not acquire, is it mineral, forest or agricultural? We
only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is within the inhibition of section 5 of Article XIII.

The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. Stripped of the special
considerations which dictated the classification of public lands into three general groups, there is no alternative but
to take the term "agricultural land" in its natural and popular signification; and thus regarded, it imports a distinct
connotation which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the organic law. Its meaning
is that agricultural land is specified in section 5 of Article XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more
suitable for purposes other than agriculture.

It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on constitutional law, Justice
Story and Professor Cooley:

"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a
constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice
Story has well observed; `It does not follow, either logically or grammatically, that because a word is found in one
connection in the Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same is to be adopted in every other connection in
which it occurs. This would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or
critics, and not whole clauses and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more
common than to subject the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and subtle
minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the Constitution a word used in some
sense which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to measure its
use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping
off its meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it, when it seemed too short. They have
thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where they have sought only to adjust its proportions
according to their own opinions? And he gives many instances where, in the National Constitution, it is very manifest
the same word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption
merely, its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in the instrument." (1
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 135.)

As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and that the
Constitution has employed them in that sense, it can only be accepted in reference to public lands. If a technical
import has been affixed to the term, it can not be extended to private lands if we are not to be led to an absurdity
and if we are avoid the charge that we are resorting to subtle and ingenious refinement to force from the
Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While in the construction of a constitution words must be given
the technical meaning which they have acquired, the rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which the
people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting them." To give an example. "When the constitution
speaks of an ex post facto law, it means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning of the phrase
having become definite in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not necessary
to employ language of a more popular character to designate it." In reality, this is not a departure from the general
rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to the popular mind, "for the technical sense in
these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal and
constitutional history where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights." (1 Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., 132-133.) Viewed from this angle, "agricultural land" does not possess the quality of a technical
term. Even as applied to public lands, and even among lawyers and judges, how many are familiar with the
decisions of this Court which hold that public swamps and public lands more appropriate for buildings and other
structures than for agriculture are agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully said of members of the
Constitutional Assembly.

The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. The sentiments
expressed in those speeches, like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may have reflected the sentiments of the
Convention in the first stages of the deliberation or down to its close. If they were, those sentiments were relaxed
and not given full sway for reasons on which we need not speculate. Speeches in support of a project can be a
valuable criterion for judging the intention of a law or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. If
anything, the change in section 5 of Article XIII wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute
nationalization of all lands, without exception, offers itself as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the
change was not "merely one of words" but represented something real and substantial. Firm and resolute
convictions are expressed in a document in strong, unequivocal and unqualified language. This is specially true
when the instrument is a constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of human writings, always carefully drawn,
and calculated for permanent endurance."

The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says that one of the
principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands, minerals, forests and other natural
resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation." In underlying the word lands the Court wants to
insinuate that all lands without exceptions are included. This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. It is hyperbole, "a
figure of speech in which the statement expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of
expression." It is an expression that "lies but does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all
men, and every one knows we don't.

The decision says:

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or disposable public lands" which
are the same as "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential,
commercial, industrial and for other purposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands"
has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution,
it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or
disposition, into lands that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes;
lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are
made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino Citizen, is a conclusive
indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution."

If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage, my humble opinion is
that there is no logical connection between the premise and the conclusion. What to me seems clearly to emerge
from it is that Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that Court's theory, actually pulls down its case
which it has built upon the foundation of parallel classification of public and private lands into forest, mineral and
agricultural lands, and the inexistence of such things as residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted
that Act No. 141, section 9, classifies disposable lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc. And
these are lands of the public domain.

The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article XIII, which is
entitled "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no ground for treating public lands and private lands
on the same footing. The inference should rather be the exact reverse. Agricultural lands, whether public or private,
are natural resources. But residential, commercial, and industrial lands, as we have seen, are not natural resources
either in the sense these words convey to the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. This fact may have been
one factor which prompted the elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the prohibition, along
with reasons, of foreign policy, economics and politics.
From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not derive any comfort unless we
cling to the serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. In that opinion the question propounded
was whether a piece of public land which was more profitable as a homesite might not be sold and considered as
agricultural. The illustrious Secretary answered yes, which was correct. But the classification of private lands was
not directly or indirectly involved. It is the opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the
construction placed by the law-officer of the government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as
the majority say but which I doubt, as representing the true intent of the instrument, this Court, if it is to be
consistent, should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor General's attitude as interested counsel for the
government in a judicial action is — as the decision also suggests but which, I think, is still more incorrect both in
theory and in practice — then this Court should have given heed to the motion for withdrawal of the present appeal,
which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in line presumably with the opinion of the head of his
department.

The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens
may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of
aliens." It reasons that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if,
after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino
citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No. 141 should banish this fear. These sections, quoted and relied upon in the
majority opinion, prevent private lands that have been acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into
alien possession in fee simple. Without this law, the fear would be well-founded if we adopt the majority's theory,
which we precisely reject, that agricultural and residential lands are synonymous, be they public or private. The fear
would not materialize under our theory, that only lands which are not agricultural may be owned by persons other
than FIlipino citizens.

Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5 of Article XIII.
Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner under its provisions or under
the provisions of any previous law, ordinace, royal order, royal decree, or any other law formerly enforced in the
Philippines with regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute eloquent testimony that in the minds of the legislature,
whose interpretation the majority correctly say should be looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not carry
such prohibition. For if the Constitution already barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the
provisions of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 would have been superfluous.

The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small
jeepney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece of land." There is no
similitude between owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store and operating a jeepney for hire. It is not the
ownership of a jeepney that is forbidden; it is the use of it for public service that is not allowed. A foreigner is not
barred from owning the costliest motor cars, steamships or airplanes in any number, for his private use or that of his
friends and relatives. He can not use a jeepney for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to
Filipino nationals, and the operation of a jeepney happens to be within this policy. The use of a jeepney for hire
maybe insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that performs a vital function in the country's
economic life, closely associated with its advancing civilization, supplying needs so fundamental for communal living
and for the development of the country's economy, that the government finds need of subjecting them to some
measure of control and the Constitution deems it necessary to limit their operation by Filipino citizens. The
importance of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or minimized just as a vote for public office by a single
foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug of the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the
political complexion or scene of the nation.

This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private agricultural
lands' is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar nature, the result will be that aliens may
freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions and whole
towns and cities, and that they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes,
factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf — courses,
playgrounds, airfields and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural."
Arguments like this have no place where there is no ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not at liberty
to disregard a provision that is clear and certain simply because its enforcement would work inconvenience or
hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results. Courts have nothing to do with inconvenience or
consequences. This role is founded on sound principles of constitutional government and is so well known as to
make citations of authorities presumptuous.
Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General dread, we
should not overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop such excesses or abuses if
and when the menace should show its head. The fact that the Constitution has not prohibited, as we contend, the
transfer of private non-agricultural lands to aliens does not prevent the Congress from passing legislation to regulate
or prohibit such transfer, to define the size of private lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to specify the
uses for which lands may be dedicated, in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries, vacation
resorts, markets, golf-courses, cemeteries. The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as to exclude foreigners from
entering the country or settling here. If I may be permitted to guess, the alteration in the original draft of section 5 of
Article XIII may have been prompted precisely by the thought that it is the better policy to leave to the political
departments of the Government the regulation or absolute prohibition of all land ownership by foreigners, as the
changed, changing and ever-changing conditions demand. The Commonwealth Legislature did that with respect to
lands that were originally public lands, through Commonwealth Act No. 141, and the Legislative Assembly during
the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all private lands, as Mr. Justice Paras has pointed out. In the
present Congress, at least two bills have been introduced proposing Congressional legislation in the same direction.
All of which is an infallible sign that the Constitution does not carry such prohibition, in the opinion of three
legislatures, an opinion which, we entirely agree with the majority, should be given serious consideration by the
courts (if needed there were any doubt), both as a matter of policy, and also because it may be presumed to
represent the true intent of the instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In truth, the decision lays special emphasis on the fact that
"many members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. 141) had been members of the
Constitutional Convention." May I add that Senator Francisco, who is the author of one of the bills I have referred to,
in the Senate, was a leading, active and influential member of the Constitutional Convention?
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83736 January 15, 1992

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.

TMX SALES, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

F.R. Quiogue for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In a case involving corporate quarterly income tax, does the two-year prescriptive period to claim a refund of
erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code
commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid, as contended by the petitioner, or from the date
of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment), as claimed by the private respondent?

Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code provides:

Sec. 292. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. — No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty,
or sum has been paid under protest or duress.

In any case no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date
of payment of that tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: . . . (Emphasis supplied)

The facts of this case are uncontroverted.

Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc., a domestic corporation, filed its quarterly income tax return for the first quarter
of 1981, declaring an income of P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on
May 15, 1981. During the subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed on
April 15, 1982 its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income of
P904,122.00 and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of P6,156,525.00 (CTA Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo,
pp. 45-46).

Thereafter, on July 9, 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. thru its external auditor, SGV & Co. filed with the Appellate Division of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax.
(Rollo, p. 30)

This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On March 14, 1984, TMX Sales, Inc. filed
a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, praying that the
petitioner, as private respondent therein, be ordered to refund to TMX Sales, Inc. the amount of P247,010.00,
representing overpaid income tax for the taxable year ended December 31, 1981.

In his answer, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue averred that "granting, without admitting, the amount in
question is refundable, the petitioner (TMX Sales, Inc.) is already barred from claiming the same considering that
more than two (2) years had already elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in
Court (March 14, 1984). (Sections 292 and 295 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended)."

On April 29, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition of TMX Sales, Inc. and
ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund the amount claimed.

The Tax Court, in granting the petition, viewed the quarterly income tax paid as a portion or installment of the total
annual income tax due. Said the Tax Court in its assailed decision:

xxx xxx xxx

When a tax is paid in installments, the prescriptive period of two years provided in Section 306 (now
Section 292) of the Revenue Code should be counted from the date of the final payment or last
installment. . . . This rule proceeds from the theory that in contemplation of tax laws, there is no
payment until the whole or entire tax liability is completely paid. Thus, a payment of a part or portion
thereof, cannot operate to start the commencement of the statute of limitations. In this regard the
word "tax" or words "the tax" in statutory provisions comparable to section 306 of our Revenue Code
have been uniformly held to refer to the entire tax and not a portion thereof (Clark v. U.S., 69 F. 2d
748; A.S. Kriedner Co. v. U.S., 30 F Supp. 274; Hills v. U.S., 50 F 2d 302, 55 F 2d 1001), and the
vocable "payment of tax" within statutes requiring refund claim, refer to the date when all the tax was
paid, not when a portion was paid (Braun v. U.S., 8 F supp. 860, 863; Collector of Internal Revenue
v. Prieto, 2 SCRA 1007; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Palanca, 18 SCRA 496).

Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is now before this Court seeking a reversal of the above decision. Thru
the Solicitor General, he contends that the basis in computing the two-year period of prescription provided for in
Section 292 (now Section 230) of the Tax Code, should be May 15, 1981, the date when the quarterly income tax
was paid and not April 15, 1982, when the Final Adjustment Return for the year ended December 31, 1981 was
filed.

He cites the case of Pacific Procon Limited v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 68013, November 12,
1984) involving a similar set of facts, wherein this Court in a minute resolution affirmed the Court of Appeals'
decision denying the claim for refund of the petitioner therein for being barred by prescription.

A re-examination of the aforesaid minute resolution of the Court in the Pacific Procon case is warranted under the
circumstances to lay down a categorical pronouncement on the question as to when the two-year prescriptive period
in cases of quarterly corporate income tax commences to run. A full-blown decision in this regard is rendered more
imperative in the light of the reversal by the Court of Tax Appeals in the instant case of its previous ruling in
the Pacific Procon case.

Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code should be interpreted in relation to the other
provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which
may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. In the case of People vs. Rivera (59 Phil 236 [1933]), this Court stated
that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT
EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Furthermore, courts must give effect to the general legislative intent
that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent,
the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered. (Manila Lodge No. 761, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 73 SCRA 162 [1976]) Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded
by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.
(Chartered Bank v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 [1921]; Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino, 47 Phil. 249, cited in Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation v. City of Cebu, 13 SCRA 449 [1965]).

Thus, in resolving the instant case, it is necessary that we consider not only Section 292 (now Section 230) of the
National Internal Revenue Code but also the other provisions of the Tax Code, particularly Sections 84, 85 (now
both incorporated as Section 68), Section 86 (now Section 70) and Section 87 (now Section 69) on Quarterly
Corporate Income Tax Payment and Section 321 (now Section 232) on keeping of books of accounts. All these
provisions of the Tax Code should be harmonized with each other.

Section 292 (now Section 230) provides a two-year prescriptive period to file a suit for a refund of a tax erroneously
or illegally paid, counted from the tile the tax was paid. But a literal application of this provision in the case at bar
which involves quarterly income tax payments may lead to absurdity and inconvenience.

Section 85 (now Section 68) provides for the method of computing corporate quarterly income tax which is on a
cumulative basis, to wit:

Sec. 85. Method of computing corporate quarterly income tax. — Every corporation shall file in
duplicate a quarterly summary declaration of its gross income and deductions on a cumulative
basis for the preceding quarter or quarters upon which the income tax, as provided in Title II of this
Code shall be levied, collected and paid. The tax so computed shall be decreased by the amount of
tax previously paid or assessed during the preceding quarters and shall be paid not later than sixty
(60) days from the close of each of the first three (3) quarters of the taxable year, whether calendar
or fiscal year. (Emphasis supplied)

while Section 87 (now Section 69) requires the filing of an adjustment returns and final payment of income tax, thus:

Sec. 87. Filing of adjustment returns final payment of income tax. — On or before the fifteenth day of
April or on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth month following the close of the fiscal year, every
taxpayer covered by this Chapter shall file an Adjustment Return covering the total net taxable
income of the preceding calendar or fiscal year and if the sum of the quarterly tax payments made
during that year is not equal to the tax due on the entire net taxable income of that year the
corporation shall either (a) pay the excess tax still due or (b) be refunded the excess amount paid as
the case may be. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its
Adjustment Return required in Section 87 (now Section 69), is equivalent to the tax paid during the first quarter. A
literal application of Section 292 (now Section 230) would thus pose no problem as the two-year prescriptive period
reckoned from the time the quarterly income tax was paid can be easily determined. However, if the quarter in which
the overpayment is made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal application of Section 292 (Section 230) would lead
to absurdity and inconvenience.

The following application of Section 85 (now Section 68) clearly illustrates this point:

FIRST QUARTER:
Gross Income 100,000.00
Less: Deductions 50,000.00
—————
Net Taxable Income 50,000.00
=========
Tax Due & Paid [Sec. 24 NIRC (25%)] 12,500.00
=========
SECOND QUARTER:
Gross Income 1st Quarter 100,000.00
2nd Quarter 50,000.00 150,000.00
—————
Less: Deductions 1st Quarter 50,000.00
2nd Quarter 75,000.00 125,000.00
—————
Net Taxable Income 25,000.00
=========
Tax Due Thereon 6,250.00
Less: Tax Paid 1st Quarter 12,500.00
—————
Creditable Income Tax (6,250.00)
—————
THIRD QUARTER:
Gross Income 1st Quarter 100,000.00
2nd Quarter 50,000.00
3rd Quarter 100,000.00 250,000.00
—————
Less: Deductions 1st Quarter 50,000.00
2nd Quarter 75,000.00
3rd Quarter 25,000.00 150,000.00
————— —————
100,000.00
=========
Tax Due Thereon 25,000.00
Less: Tax Paid 1st Quarter 12,500.00
2nd Quarter — 12,500.00
————— =========
FOURTH QUARTER: (Adjustment Return required in Sec. 87)
Gross Income 1st Quarter 100,000.00
2nd Quarter 50,000.00
 3rd Quarter 100,000.00
4th Quarter 75,000.00 325,000.00
————— —————
Less: Deductions 1st Quarter 50,000.00
2nd Quarter 75,000.00
3rd Quarter 25,000.00
4th Quarter 100,000.00 250,000.00
————— —————
Net Taxable Income 75,000.00
=========
Tax Due Thereon 18,750.00
Less: Tax Paid 1st Quarter 12,500.00
2nd Quarter —
3rd Quarter 12,500.00 25,000.00
————— —————
Creditable Income Tax (to be REFUNDED) (6,250.00)
=========

Based on the above hypothetical data appearing in the Final Adjustment Return, the taxpayer is entitled under
Section 87 (now Section 69) of the Tax Code to a refund of P6,250.00. If Section 292 (now Section 230) is literally
applied, what then is the reckoning date in computing the two-year prescriptive period? Will it be the 1st quarter
when the taxpayer paid P12,500.00 or the 3rd quarter when the taxpayer also paid P12,500.00? Obviously, the
most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the time
of filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, when it can be finally ascertained if the
taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax.

Furthermore, Section 321 (now Section 232) of the National Internal Revenue Code requires that the books of
accounts of companies or persons with gross quarterly sales or earnings exceeding Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) be audited and examined yearly by an independent Certified Public Accountant and their income tax
returns be accompanied by certified balance sheets, profit and loss statements, schedules listing income producing
properties and the corresponding incomes therefrom and other related statements.

It is generally recognized that before an accountant can make a certification on the financial statements or render an
auditor's opinion, an audit of the books of accounts has to be conducted in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards.

Since the audit, as required by Section 321 (now Section 232) of the Tax Code is to be conducted yearly, then it is
the Final Adjustment Return, where the figures of the gross receipts and deductions have been audited and
adjusted, that is truly reflective of the results of the operations of a business enterprise. Thus, it is only when the
Adjustment Return covering the whole year is filed that the taxpayer would know whether a tax is still due or a
refund can be claimed based on the adjusted and audited figures.

Therefore, the filing of quarterly income tax returns required in Section 85 (now Section 68) and implemented per
BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax should only be considered mere installments of the annual
tax due. These quarterly tax payments which are computed based on the cumulative figures of gross receipts and
deductions in order to arrive at a net taxable income, should be treated as advances or portions of the annual
income tax due, to be adjusted at the end of the calendar or fiscal year. This is reinforced by Section 87 (now
Section 69) which provides for the filing of adjustment returns and final payment of income tax. Consequently, the
two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the Tax Code should be computed from
the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax.

In the case of Collector of Internal Revenue v. Antonio Prieto (2 SCRA 1007 [1961]), this Court held that when a tax
is paid in installments, the prescriptive period of two years provided in Section 306 (Section 292) of the National
internal Revenue Code should be counted from the date of the final payment. This ruling is reiterated
in Commission of Internal Revenue v. Carlos Palanca (18 SCRA 496 [1966]), wherein this Court stated that where
the tax account was paid on installment, the computation of the two-year prescriptive period under Section 306
(Section 292) of the Tax Code, should be from the date of the last installment.

In the instant case, TMX Sales, Inc. filed a suit for a refund on March 14, 1984. Since the two-year prescriptive
period should be counted from the filing of the Adjustment Return on April 15, 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. is not yet
barred by prescription.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and
Romero, JJ., concur.

Feliciano and Nocon, JJ., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24806             February 13, 1926

JULIO AGCAOILI, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
ALBERTO SUGUITAN, defendant-appellee.

The appellant in his own behalf.

The appellee in his own behalf.

JOHNSON, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte. Its purpose was to obtain
the extraordinary legal writ of quo warranto. The petition was denied by the trial court and the plaintiff appealed. The
question presented by the appeal are:

(a) Is the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far as it provides that "justices of the peace shall be appointed to
serve until they have reached the age of 65 years," valid and constitutional, when applied to justices of the
peace appointed under Act No. 2041, section 1, to serve "during good behavior?" And,

(b) Is the present action barred by the statutes of limitations?

The facts involved in the decision of those questions are as follows:

(a) That the said Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, of the
Province of Ilocos Norte, by His Excellency, Francis Burton Harrison, on the 25th day of March, 1916, with
authority "to have and to hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of
right appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law.

The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at the time of his appointment, are
found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 (vol. 8 Public Laws, 153). Said section is amendment to section 67 of Act
No. 136, and provides among other things for the "appointment and term of the justices of the peace." It
provides that one justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice shall be appointed by the Governor-General,
etc., for each municipality organized according to the Municipal Code. Said section further provides that "All
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior . . . ." Said Act No. 2041
was adopted, the Philippine Legislature was composed of the United States Commission and the House of
Representatives.

(b) That on the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature, composed of the Senate and House of
Representatives, adopted Act No. 3107, which was "an Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the
Administrative Code relative to the judiciary in order to reorganize the latter; increasing the number of judges
 for certain judicial districts; increasing the salaries of judges of Courts of First Instance; vesting the Secretary
of Justice with authority to detail a district judge temporarily to a district or province other than his
own; regulating the salaries of justices of the peace; abolishing the municipal court and justice of the peace
court of the City of Manila and creating in lieu thereof a municipal court with three branches; regulating the
salaries of clerks of court and other subordinate employees of Courts of First Instance, and for other
purposes.

Notwithstanding the fact that the title of said Act No. (3107), so far as the same relates to justice of the peace,
provides only for "regulating the salaries of justices of the peace," said Act in section 203 provides for "the
appointment and distribution of justices of the peace" with the proviso in said section ". . . That justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." Attention is
here called to the fact again that there is nothing in the title of the Act, which, in the slightest degree, indicates that
said Act contains provisions for "appointment of justices of the of the peace" nor as to the period during which they
may serve after appointment. Attention is also invited to the fact that the same section (203) contains provisions for
the jurisdiction of justices of the peace while section 207 contains provisions defining the "qualifications for justices
of the peace." Section 210 of said Act provides for the "filling of vacancies in the office of justices of the peace."
There is nothing in the title of the Act which in any way indicates that the Act contains said provisions. Attention is
here called to the provision of the Act of Congress of the 29th day of August, 1916, and to section 3 thereof, which
provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that the subject
shall be expressed in the title of the bill." The effect of a violation of said provision of said Act of Congress will be
discussed later.

(c) That on the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent the following letter to the said Julio
Agcaoili, through the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Third Judicial District, of the Province of
Ilocos Sur. Said letter is in the words and figures following:

MANILA, April 9, 1923

SIR: In view of the provision of section 203 of the Administrative Code as amended by
section 1 of Act No. 3107, which, in part, provides that justices and auxiliary justices of the
peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, and in
view of the fact that the record shows that you are over sixty-five years of age already, I have
the honor to hereby advise you that, upon receipt hereof, you cease to be a justice of the
peace by operation of said amendment of the Administrative Code.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS P. TORRES 

Undersecretary of Justice

Said letter was received by Julio Agcaoili, the justice of the peace, on the 26th day of April, 1923. It was handed to
him by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte.

(d) It will be noted that in the letter of April 9, 1923, the Secretary of Justice directed or ordered Julio Agcaoili, then
justice of the peace, "upon receipt of said letter, to cease to be a justice of the peace." Against the order contained
in said letter of April 9th, Julio Agcaoili entered a protest dated April 28, 1923, in the following language:

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF COURT OF LAOAG, ILOCOS NORTE 

P. I.

April 28, 1923

The Hon. LUIS TORRES 

Undersecretary of Justice of 
the Philippine Islands
 SIR: The undersigned, Julio Agcaoili, justice of the peace of Laoag, capital of the Province of Ilocos
Norte, has the honor to state that on April 26, 1923, he received, through the clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte, your communication of April 9, 1923, informing the undersigned that,
having attained the age of 65 years, he ceased to be justice of the peace of Laoag under the
provisions of section 1 of Act No. 3107, amending section 203 of the Administrative Code, which is
Act No. 2711 enacted in the year 1919, and which section 1 of said Act No. 3107 provides in part
that the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they
attain the age of 65 years.

With all due respect, the undersigned has the honor to state that he believes that the aforecited part
of the provision of section 1 of Act No. 3107 does not include those justices of the peace who had
already been appointed justices of the peace, like the undersigned, before the passage and
enactment of said Act No. 3107 and the amended Administrative Code, nor can this be the intention
of the legislator, for if it were so, it should have so stated in order that the justices of the peace
already appointed, who were discharging the functions of the office and who had attained the age of
65 years when said Act was passed and enacted, should cease from their office.

The undersigned was appointed of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, and therefore under Act
No. 2041, enacted February 3, 1911. Section 1 of this Act, which amended section 67 of Act No.
136, was not amended by any subsequent Act and provides: All justices if the peace and auxiliary
justices shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office who have not the
qualifications required by this Act shall continue in office until their successors are appointed.

Has section 203 of the Administrative Code amended or repealed section 1 of Act No. 2041? The
undersigned believes that it has not, judging from the context of both laws, nor was it repealed
because if this were the case the Governor- General would have renewed the appointments of all
the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace under said section 203 of the
Administrative Code.

The undersigned was appointed justice of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, under the said Act
No. 2041 and continues in the discharge of the duties of the office up to the present time, without the
Governor-General having renewed his appointment under said section 203 of the Administrative
Code.

Then Act No. 3107 came, section 1 of which amends section 203 of the Administrative Code.

Has this amendment retroactive effect? In the first place the legislature could not give or have given
this Act such a character, and if it had intended to do so, it would have so stated; and in the second
place, because not only is such express declaration lacking in the law but Act No. 3107 very clearly
provides that the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace to be appointed shall hold
office until they attain the age of 65 years.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI

Justice of the Peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte

A further protest against the said order of the Secretary of Justice was made by Julio Agcaoili on the 7th day of July,
1923, and is couched in the following language:

I, Julio Agcaoili, Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, do hereby state that
on this day, July 7, 1923, Mr. Buenaventura Ocampo, Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, appeared at
my office and thereupon showed me the telegram of Undersecretary of Justice Torres, addressed to
said provincial fiscal. After reading said telegram I asked the provincial fiscal to furnish me a copy
thereof and he furnished me a copy of the telegram.
 Said telegram of the Undersecretary of Justice in substance orders the provincial fiscal; to cause me
to deliver the office and all the documents and records thereof to the auxiliary justice of the peace,
because according to said Undersecretary of Justice I must cease from the office under Act No.
3107, and that I be prosecuted for violation of article 370 of the Penal Code should I fail to comply
with the telegram sent to me on the 2d instant by the same Undersecretary of Justice.

I do also state that I have never had any malicious intention to disobey the orders of the
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, one given telegram and the other by letter. I only desired to
study the spirit of the law and this is the reason why I did not leave the office until the present
time, because I was from the office of the justice of the peace under the provision of Act No. 2041
under which I was appointed justice of the peace of the capital, and which Act was not repealed by
any subsequent one, nor by Act No. 3107, which Act No. 2041 provides that the justices of the
peace to be appointed under it, should hold office during good behavior. This Act does not say
anything as to limitation of age, and therefore I believe myself entitled to continue in, and retain the
office.

I do also state that lest the Undersecretary of Justice should think that I do not duly respect the
constituted authorities, I now deliver under protest the office of the justice of the peace of Laoag and
all its documents and records, as well as the furniture therein contained, to Mr. Alberto Suguitan,
auxiliary justice of the peace, in the presence of the provincial fiscal, in compliance with the telegram
of the Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, received by me through the provincial fiscal of Ilocos
Norte. I make under protest the delivery of the office and its documents and records because I think,
as I have stated, that I must not cease from the office of justice of the peace, and in order that my
right may be defined, I shall institute an action in the proper court of justice to decide the case.

(Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI

I received the things of the office.

(Sgd.) ALBERTO SUGUITAN

In the presence of:

(Sgd.) BUENA V. OCAMPO Provincial Fiscal

Julio Agcaoili patiently waited in vain for a resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the protest which he presented
on the 28th day of April and on the 7th day of July, 1923; and not having received any reply to his protest, filed a
petition for a writ of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte on the 23d day of
April, 1925, which petition was amended by the filing of another petition in the same court on the 8th day of
September, 1925.

A careful reading of the two protests (April 28, 1923, and July 7, 1923) shows that they contain arguments in
support thereof which, in all equity and justice, demanded a reply, but no reply was forthcoming. The arguments in
support of his protests find a counterpart and are fully supported in the decision of this court in the case of Segovia
vs. Noel, of March 4, 1925 (47 Phil., 543), wherein the Supreme Court held that the Act No. 3107 could not be
applied to and enforced against justices of the peace who had been appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923.
Had the Secretary of Justice answered said protests, the great injustice which has been done to Julio Agcaoili
perhaps might have been avoided.

(e) That Julio Agcaoili being threatened with a criminal prosecution unless he turned his office over to the auxiliary
justice of the peace, and to avoid scandal, disgrace and humiliation which might come to him by virtue of said
prosecution, on the 7th day of July, 1923, still protesting, delivered the possession of his office, as justice of the
peace, to the auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. It is a matter of common knowledge that
Julio Agcaoili had been entrusted with the highest office in his province which the people could confer upon him.

The petitions presented by Julio Agcaoili in the Court of First Instance, the first on the 23d day of July, 1925, and the
second on the 8th day of September, 1925, contain, in resume, the foregoing facts. To the petition the respondent
Alberto Suguitan answered and set up the defense of prescription. Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable
Fermin Mariano, judge, sustained the defense of prescription and denied the petition for the extraordinary legal
remedy of quo warranto. From that judgment Julio Agcaoili appealed, and now contends in a vigorous and logical
argument that his remedy has not prescribed.

Considering the first question suggested above, attention is again called to one of the provisions of section 3 of the
Jones Law (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, vol. 12, Public Laws of the Philippine Islands). The "Jones Law" is
the constitution of the Philippine Islands providing a government therefor. Subparagraph 16 of section 3 of the
Jones law provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Under said provision, may the legislature adopt a law which
contains in the title of the Act? The effect of violating said provision of the Jones Law has been brought before the
courts many times. The effect of violating said provision has already been passed upon by this court. (Central Capiz
vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883, 889.)

In the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, supra, it was decided that said provision of the Jones Law was mandatory
and not directory and its violation was fatal to any provision of the law to which no reference was made in the title. In
the decision of this court in the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, the decisions of the courts of many of the states
of the Union were followed. Many of the constitutions of the States of the Union contain similar provision to that
quoted above from the Jones Law. Among such states may be mentioned Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.

Mr. Justice Sutherland, now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in his valuable work on
"Statutory Construction," vol. 1, 2nd ed.) at section 111, states the reason and the purpose of such a constitutional
provision. He says:

In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have kept steadily in view the
correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. The object is to prevent the practice, which was
common in all legislative bodies where no such restriction existed, of embracing in the same bill incongruous
matters having no relation to each other, or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures were
often adopted without attracting attention. Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were
combined in order to unite the members of the legislature who favor either in support of all. These
combinations were corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the state. Such omnibus bills sometimes
included more than a hundred sections on as many different subjects, with a title appropriate to the first
section, and for other purposes.

The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the legislation often
resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved. And not
only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that legislative provisions were stealthily pushed
through in the closing hours of a session, which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made
odious by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The
constitutional clause under discussion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting
aggregations of incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject; to prevent surprise and
inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressed in the title.

The Supreme court of the State of Alabama, in discussing the effect of the violation of a similar provision of the
constitution of that state in the cases of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) and Lindsay vs. United States Savings and
Loan Association (120 Ala., 156), had the following to say, quoting with approval, what Mr. Justice Cooley in his
Constitutional Limitations, at page 143, had said upon that question:

The object sought to be accomplished, and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision, are well
known. . . . Legislative assemblies for the dispatch of business often pass bills by their titles only, without
requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes covered a legislation which, if its real character had
been disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one
of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision, the title of a
statute was often no indication of its subject or contents. . . .
 An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same statute
of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all the
advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of several measures, no one of which could have
succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up his review of the authorities, defining the objects of
this provision: It may, therefore, be assumed as settled, that the purpose of these provisions was: First, to
prevent hodge-podge, or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by
means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked
and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication
of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in
order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.
(49 Ala., 330, 331.)

The purposes of constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind, when it becomes necessary to
determine whether there has been legislative observance of it. The exposition of these purposes by Judge
Cooley is accepted, we believe, in all the states in which a like limitation prevails. . . . (120 Ala., 172.)

In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) the Supreme Court of the State of California had occasion to discuss
the question now before us and said:

At the least, then two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of which is not expressed in the
title, and they cannot be segregated. The title does not express the objects of legislation embodied in the
provisions of the act. It is, therefore, narrower than the body of the act, and fails to impart that notice of the
measures enacted, which the Constitution requires. To prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of
the constitutional requirement. The practice, says the Supreme Court of Missouri, of comprising in one bill
subjects of a diverse and antagonistic nature, in order to combine in its support members who were in favor
of particular measures, but neither of which could command the requisite majority on its own merits, was
found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislature itself, but destructive of the best interests of the
State. But this was not more detrimental than that other pernicious practice, by which, through dexterous
and unscrupulous management, designing men inserted clauses in the bodies of bills, of the true meaning of
which the titles gave no indication, and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to their passage. These things
led to fraud and injury, and it was found necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of a constitutional
provision. (City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 590.) The provision has been framed in the constitutions of
many of the States of the Union; and the courts, whenever it has come before them, have liberally construed
it as the will of the people in the interests of honest legislation.

Decisions to the same effect are found in the following cases: City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel (42 Mo., 578); Cannon vs.
Mathes (8 Heisk [Tenn.], 504); Ryerson vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269); Board of Public Education for the City of Americus
vs. Barlow (49 Ga., 232); Spier vs. Baker (120 Cal., 370).

Mr. Justice Sutherland, in a further discussion of the question, at section 112 of his work on Statutory Construction,
said:

The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has been pointed out
depends on judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regarded as mandatory, and
compliance with it essential to the validity of legislation. The mischief existed notwithstanding the sworn
official obligation of legislators; it might be expected to continue notwithstanding that the obligation is
formulated and emphasized in this constitutional injunction, if it be construed as addressed exclusively to
them, and only directory. It would, in a general sense, be a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the
provisions of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature,
unless it is clear beyond all question that such was intention of the framers of that instrument. It would seem
to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that it descends to prescribing rules of
order in unessential matters which may be followed or disregarded at pleasure. The fact is this: That
whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by the
legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded.

In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Nicholson, in discussing the effect of the violation of a
constitutional provision like the one before us, said:
 * * * This is a direct, positive, and imperative limitation upon the power of the Legislature. It matters not that
a bill has passed through three readings in each house, on three different days, and has received the
approval of the Governor; still it is not a law of the State if it embraces more than one subject. . . .

The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of Walker vs. State, supra, said:

It is settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us unanswerable, that this provision of
the Constitution is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to the general assembly, but that it is
mandatory, and it is the duty of courts to declare void any statute not conforming to it. . . .

Mr. Justice Cooley in his valuable work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179. 180) states that our courts have held,
without exception, that such constitutional provision is mandatory.

Considering that the great weight of authority is to the effect that the provision like the one above quoted from the
Jones Law is mandatory; and considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in the
slightest degree that said Act contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years," we are forced to the conclusions that, that
provision is illegal, void and contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law, and that said law (3107) cannot
be applied to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923;
and that when Julio Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice
of the peace, he was forced to do so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as
justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay.

With reference to the second question above suggested, in re prescription or limitation of the action, it may be said
that originally there was no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be,
for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action
by the Government. The ancient writ of quo warranto was a high prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by
the King against any one who usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to inquire by what
authority the usurper supported his claim, in order to determine the right. Even at the present time in many of the
civilized countries of the world the action is still regarded as a prerogative writ and no limitation or prescription is
permitted to bar the action. As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal,
have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. (McPhail vs. People ex rel.
Lambert, 160 Ill., 77; 52 Am. St. Rep., 306; People ex rel. Moloney vs. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 175 Ill., 125; 64 L.
R. A., 366.)

In all public matters a writ of quo warranto is a writ of right at the suit of the state, and issues as a matter of course
upon demand of the proper officer (State ex rel. Washington County vs. Stone, 25 Mo., 555; Commonwealth vs.
Allen, 128 Mass., 308), and the court has no authority to withhold leave to file a petition therefor.

If the statute of limitation or prescription cannot run against the state, it is difficult to understand how in the same
action they may be used as a defense against a public officer who has been forcibly, with threats and intimidation,
ousted from a public office by the Government itself as was done in the present case. The principle that acts of
limitation do not bind the King (the State) or the people, applies to proceeding by quo warranto, the rule being that
the representative of the state may file an information on behalf of the people at any time; and the lapse of time
constitutes no bar to the proceeding, in conformity with the maxim Nullum tempus occurrit regi. (Catlett vs. People
ex rel. States's Attorney, 151 Ill., 16.) For the state to claim that the statutes of limitation do not apply to it and yet
insist that it may plead such statutes to bar the action of quo warranto brought by one of its public officials whom it
itself has ousted from office, appears to us to be unjust, unfair, unreasonable, and not within the contemplation of
sound jurisprudence.

So much of the general rule concerning limitation of action in quo warranto proceedings. Is there a statute in the
Philippine Islands of limitation, limiting the action of a public official of the Government who has been duly appointed
and qualified, and who has, by force and intimidation, been ousted from such office, to defeat his action of quo
warranto?

On the 7th day of August, 1901, the United States Philippine Commission adopted Act No. 190 which had been
considered privately and publicly for several months theretofore. Its provisions were published throughout the
Philippine Islands long prior to its adoption. While said Act was adopted on the 7th day of August, 1901, it did not
take effect, even though it had been published, until the 1st day of October, 1901. (Act No. 212.) An examination of
said Act (190) shows that it provides remedies for the usurpation of office or franchise, etc. (secs. 197-216). Said
Act No. 190 was published in both English and Spanish. Section 216, in English, provided that "Nothing herein
contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced
within five years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer
to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office,
arose." The same section (216), as published in Spanish, reads as follows: "Ninguna de estas disposiciones
facultara la iniciacion de un juicio contra una corporacion por la perdida de sus derechos de concesion, a menos
que el juicio se lleve a efecto dento de los cinco años siguente a la comision u omision del hecho objeto de la
accion. Tampocose podra iniciar un juicio la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporaciuon para desposeerla, a
menos que se lleve a efecto dentro del año siguente a la fecha de la comision del hecho que dio motivo a su
privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo."

Said section (216), as published in Spanish and translated into English, reads as follows: "Nothing herein contained
shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of its corporate rights, unless the same be commenced
within five years after the commission or omission complained of took place. Neither may an action be brought
against an officer to oust him from office, unless the same is commenced within one year after the commission of
the act which caused the deprivation thereof, or after the right to hold the office arose."

Said section 216, as above quoted in Spanish, was published in vol. 1 of the Public Laws of the Philippine Islands
and distributed to the public officers throughout the Philippine Islands. It is a fact of general information that even
now, in 1926, the Spanish copy of the Public Laws are consulted by the people in remote parts of the Philippine
Islands for the purpose of knowing what the law is. It is not strange, therefore, that the appellant did not believe that
said section 216 applied to public officers; that it only applied to officers of corporations as it appeared in the
Spanish translation. Is it just and fair and reasonable for the Government of the Philippine Islands to oust one of its
officers from an office to which he had been legally appointed, by force and intimidation and without just cause, and
then to defeat his action in quo warranto by invoking the provisions of a public statute, different from the one which
the Government itself had furnished its public officers? The appellant is familiar with the Spanish but not with the
English language. He naturally relied upon the Spanish version of the law for his information as to what the law
really was. Not only had the appellant the right to rely upon the provisions of section 216 as they appeared in
Spanish in the Public Laws of the Philippine Islands, but the reading of the three or four sections immediately
preceding section 216 will show that they refer specifically to corporations only. The appellant, therefore, was
justified in believing that said section 216 as it appeared in Spanish was correct. At least the Government should
give him credit with having in good faith.

But, even granting that the appellant is bound by the provisions of section 216 as it appears in English, is the same
applicable to the appellant? By reference to said section above quoted in English, it will be seen that after the word
"committed" there is a semicolon. Does that which follows the semicolon have reference to the same subject matter
which precedes it? A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a
separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that
semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of
introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree
greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The
comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences,
the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma. The
punctuation used in a law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful
statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which precede the semicolon
refer to corporations only, that which follows the semicolon has reference to the same subject matter, or to officers
of a corporation.

But even granting, for the sake of the argument, that the word "officer" as used in the latter part of said section
applies to public officers who have been ousted from their position, and not only to officers of corporations, then we
have the question presented: Had the one year mentioned in said section expired on the 23d day of April, 1925,
when the first complaint, was filed in the present action? When did the year begin to run if said section is applicable
to the appellant?

It will be remembered that on the 7th day of July, 1923, the appellant was ousted from his office as justice of the
peace of the municipality of Laoag. Not only did he surrender his office on that date under protest, but also on the
28th day of April, 1923, when he was notified by the Secretary of Justice that he cease to be a justice of the peace
of his municipality, he then protested and gave a long and lucid argument in support of his protest. In all justice to
him, did he not have a right, without any legal action to protect his right, to await the solution of his protest of the
28th day of April, 1923? He had a right to believe that the grounds upon which his protest was based would be
convincing to the Secretary of Justice and that he would not be removed. Until this very hour the record contains no
reply from the Secretary of Justice and no answer whatever to the legal grounds presented by the appellant upon
his right to continue as justice of the peace and not to be ousted.

In our opinion even granting that section 216 is applicable to the appellant, the period of prescription had not begun
and run at the time of the commencement of the present action. He was justified in delaying the commencement of
his action until an answer to his protest had been made. He had right to await the answer to his protest, in the
confident belief that it would be resolved in his favor and that action would unnecessary.

It is contended, however, that the question before us was answered and resolved against the contention of the
appellant in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo (38 Phil., 624). In that case no question was raised nor was it even
suggested that said section 216 did not apply to a public officer. That question was not discussed nor referred to by
any of the parties interested in that case. It has been frequently decided that the fact that a statute has been
accepted as valid, and invoked and applied for many years in cases where its validity was not raised or passed on,
does not prevent a court from later passing on its validity, where the question is squarely and properly raised and
presented, Where a question passes the court sub silentio, the case in which the question was so passed is not
binding on the Court (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563), nor should it be considered as a precedent. (U.
S. vs. Noriega and Tobias, 31 Phil., 310; Chicote vs. Acasio, 31 Phil., 401; U. S. vs. More, 3 Cranch [U. S.], 159,
172; U. S. vs. Sanges, 144 U. S., 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146 U. S., 82.) For the reasons given in the case of
McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, supra, the decision in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo, supra, can have no binding
force in the interpretation of the question presented here.

The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance with the law to
the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he had faithfully and honestly served the Government for a
number of years the legislature adopted a new law which arbitrarily, without giving any reason therefore, provided
that said officer cease to be such when he should reach the age of 65 years. Said law contained no express
provision or method for its enforcement. The Executive Department, through its Undersecretary of Justice, without
any authority given in said law, notified the said officer that he was no longer an officer in the judicial department of
the Government and must vacate his office and turn the same over to another, who was designated by said
Undersecretary. When the officer protested against such arbitrary action, giving reasons therefor, and without
answering said protest, he was threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did not immediately vacate his office.
The history of this case reads more like a story of the Arabian Nights than like a procedure under a well-organized
Government. It seems impossible to believe, and we could not believe it, were the facts not actually supported by
the record.

Why the Undersecretary of Justice did not follow the orderly procedure marked out by Act No. 190 is not explained.
The appellant was given no hearing. Even his protest, couched in most humble and respectful language, fell upon
deaf ears. Absolute indifference was shown to the respectful protest and the able argument given in support thereof.
The only answer to his protest was a threat of a criminal prosecution if he did not vacate his office. His humility was
met with austereness. His humble petition was met with a threat. His patient waiting for a reply to his protest was
ended by a demand that he be prosecuted for refusing to comply with an order by one who was not willing to follow
the well-defined and well-beaten road of "due process of law" by preferring charges and giving the appellant an
opportunity to be heard and to defend his right. Nothing of that character took place. The whole procedure, from
beginning to end, in ousting the appellant from an office to which he had been legally appointed and against whom
no complaint has been made, is anomalous in the jurisprudence under the American flag.

Believing as I do, that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to the fundamentals of the
law, I have never yielded, and I hope that I may never yield, to considerations of expediency in expounding it. There
is also some plausible reason for the latitudinarian constructions which are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring
power — some evil to be avoided, or some good to be attained by pushing the powers of the Government beyond
their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to such influences that the courts and legislatures are gradually
undermining and finally overthrowing constitutions. It is by yielding to such influences that constitutions are gradually
undermined and finally overthrown. It has been, and is my purpose, so far as it is possible for me, to follow the
fundamental law does not work well the people or the legislature may amend it. If, however, the legislature or the
courts undertake to cure defects in the law by forced and unnatural constructions, they inflict a would upon the
constitution of the state which nothing can cure. One step taken by the legislature or the judiciary in enlarging the
powers of the Government, opens the door for another which will be sure to follow; and so the process goes on until
all respect for the fundamental law is lost and the powers of the Government are just what those in authority are
pleased to call them. (Oakley vs. Aspinwall, 3 Comstock [N. Y.], 547, 568.) I cannot give my consent to a rule or
doctrine which will permit a Government to throw an honest and efficient official out of office without reason and
without authority of law, refuse to consider a protest, and then permit the application of a law to prevent a recovery
of that which he has lost illegally and without reason.

The judgment appealed from should be revoked, and a judgment should be entered ordering the restoration of the
appellant to the office from which he was illegally rejected. We should follow the effect of the doctrine announced
solemnly by this court in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543). So ordered.

Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johns, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., concurring and dissenting:

(1) I concur in so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson as relates to the legal issue presented in the lower
court and here, pertaining to the question of whether or not the present action was barred by the Statute of
Limitations, and in entire accord with the reversal of the judgment and the reinstatement of Julio Agcaoili, the
appellant, in his office as justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. My reasons are these:

(A) Act No. 3107, providing that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until
they have reached the age of 65 years, should not be given retroactive effect. That was expressly decided in
the analogous case of Segovia vs. Noel ([1925], 47 Phil., 543).

(B) Plaintiff's action is not barred by the provisions of section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That
section particularly confines itself to an action "against a corporation." Thereafter following a semicolon,
comes the clause "nor shall an action be brought against an officer," which plainly relates back to
"corporation." Otherwise, the new idea would neither have been expressed in a separate section or in a
separate sentence. That this is true is further borne out by the Spanish transaction, making use of the
phrase "la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporacion," which we are privileged to consult to explain
an ambiguity in the English text.

(C) Even under the supposition the section 216 of the code of Civil Procedure applies, still it is not clear that
one year has elapse "after the cause of such ouster, . . . arose." In reality, no cause for ouster has arisen
since it was an erroneous interpretation of the law which met with the disposal of the Supreme Court, which
resulted in the attempt to force Mr. Agcaoili out of the office and to place the auxiliary justice of the peace on
office. The most that could be said of the attempted ouster is that the auxiliary justice of the peace became a
justice of the peace de facto.

(2) I dissent from so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, as discusses the question of whether or not the
provisions of act No. 3107 are costitutional, as unnecessary to a decision, as not submitted for decision, and so as
entirely uncancelled for.

The complaint for quo warranto presented in the court of first Instance contained the usual allegations without,
however, making any reference at all to the constitutionality of Act No. No. 3107. the answer set up presentation.
The trial judge announcing the theories of the parties said: "The defense of the defendant is that the action brought
by the plaintiff has prescribed because since July 7, 1923, when he left his office, no complaint was filed until April
23, 1925, and, therefore, more than one year had elapsed. The plaintiff in turn alleges that there is no such
prescription," and then proceeded to deny the petition. On appeal this court, the errors assigned by Mr. Agcaoili as
appellant are these:
 (1) The lower court erred in holding that the action of the petitioner had prescribed on account of the same
not having been brought within one year from July 7, 1923, when by an illegal order of the Honorable, the
Secretary of Justice, the petitioner forcibly ceased to discharge the duties of the office of justice of the peace
of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, and respondent assumed said office and began to act as such justice of the peace.

(2) The lower court erred in applying tot he instant case the provisions of section 216 of act No. 190 (Code
of Civil Procedure).

(3) The lower court erred in finding that the period of prescription must be counted from July 7, 1923, instead
of March 4, 1925.

(4) The lower court finally erred in not granting the relief invoked by the petitioner; in not ousting the
respondent from the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, in not reinstating the petitioner in
said office and in not sentencing the respondent to pay the costs and damages caused to the petitioner in
the sum of P5,000."

There is not one word either in appellant's brief or in appellee's brief on the subject of the constitutionality of Act No.
3107.

Had not the constitutional question been discussed and decided without it being suggested anywhere in the bill of
executions, in the assignments of error, on in the briefs, it would hardly be necessary to cite well known principles as
these:

It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge,
cconscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can
consciously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. . . .

. . . The task . . . is a delicate one, and only to be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation. . . .

Neither will a court, as a general rule pass a constitutional question, and decided a statute to be invalid,
unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the determination of the cause. "While courts
cannot shun the discussion of constitutional questions when fairly presented, they will not go out of their way
to find such topics. They will not seek to draw in such weighty matters collaterally, nor on trivial occasions. It
is both more proper and more respectful to a coordinate department to discuss constitutional questions only
when that is the very lis mota . . ." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 227, 228, 231.)

STREET, J., dissenting:

This is an action of quo warranto instituted in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte by Julio Agcaoili for the
purpose of restoring his restoration to the office of justice of peace of Laoag and to secure the removal of the
defendant, Alfredo Saguitan, from the present employment of the same office. Upon hearing the cause of the trial
judge, while recognizing the theoritical right of the plaintiff's right of section had been barred by the limitation
prescribed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He therefore denied the writ, with half costs, and the
plaintiff appealed.

It appears that on March 25, 1916, the plaintiff was appointed by the Governor-general to the office of Justice of the
peace of Laoag, in the Province of Ilocos Norte, effective from April 10, 1916, subject to the conditions prescribed by
law. This appointment was approved by the Philippine Senate, and the plaintiff entered upon the discharged of his
duties in due course. At that time there was no age limit upon the tenure of office of justices of the peace, but on
March 17, 1923, act No. 3107 of the Philippine Legislature went into effect. By this Act, appointment of justices of
the peace, was amended by the addition of a proviso to the first auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to
serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years."

In the year 1923 the plaintiff herein had attained the age of 65; and the Secretary of Justice, supposing that was
applicable to the case, brought Administrative Code was applicable tot he case, brought administrative pressure to
bear upon the plaintiff, with the result that the plaintiff ceased to exercise the functions of justice of the peace for
Laoag and the Governor-General to the same office. This appointment having been approved by the Senate, the
said Suguitan entered upon the discharge of the duties thereof.

On March 4, 1925, this court promulgated the decision in the case of segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543), wherein we
decided that the amendment contained in Act No. 3107 to section 203 of the Administrative Code should be given
prospective application only, with the result that said provisions is not applicable to a justice of the peace appointed
prior to enactment of the amendatory law. When this decision was promulgated it came to the attention of the
plaintiff, and the present action was stipulated by him shortly thereafter for the purpose of obtaining his restoration to
the office. Practically the only defense insisted upon in the court below was to the effect that the action had
prescribed under the one-year limitation; and the only question made in this appeal arises upon the application of
said section.

It appears from he record that the plaintiff was ousted from office on July 7, 1923, and that the defendant, as
auxiliary justice of the peace, then entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office, by direction of Governor-
General Wood, in the character of a temporary appointee to the vacancy. Later, as already stated, Suguitan entered
upon the discharged of the duties of the office under commission from the Governor-General, approved by the
Philippine Senate, effective from December 13, 1923. It is therefore apparent that more than a full year had elapse
between the removal of the plaintiff from office and the date of the institution of the present action; and more than a
year had also elapsed later the defendant began the discharge of the duties of the office as a regularly
commissioned justice of the peace.

The section of the Code of civil Procedure, the application of which is here in question, reads, in English, as follows:

SEC. 216. Limitations. — Nothing herein continued shall authorized an action against a corporation for
forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was done
or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one
year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office arose.

The same section as it stands in a current version of the Spanish translation differ somewhat, in the second member
from the English version, a s will be seen by comparing the Spanish version, which reads as follows:

ART. 216. De las limitaciones. — Ninguna de estates disposiciones facultara la perdida de sus derechos de
concesion, a menos que el jioco se lleve a efecto dentro de los cinco anos sigientes a la comision u omision
del hecho objecto de la accion. Tampoco se podra inciar un juicio contra la persona que ejerza un cargo en
una corporacion para desposeerla, a menos que se lleve a fecto dentro del año siguinte la fecha de la
comision del hecho que dio motivo a su privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo.

Upon comparison of these version it will be seen that the word office (cargo) in the second sentenced of the
Spanish version is qualified by the expression "en una corporacion." The plaintiff, relying upon the Spanish version,
insist that the provision is not applicable to a public office, like that of justice of the peace; and it is further insisted
that the whole section deals exclusively with the subject of the writ of quo warranto as used against a corporation or
against a person in possession of a corporate office.

I am unable to accede to this view of the law. Upon examination of section 197 to 216, inclusive, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it will be found that two subjects are there threated, namely, usurpation of franchise by corporation and
usurpation of office; and the evident purpose of this part of the Code is to define the conditions under which the writ
of quo warranto may be final section (sec. 216) dealing with the subject, a limitation is prescribe for both. The first
member of the section, down as far as the semicolon in the English version, prescribes a limitation of five years
upon any action instituted against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter. In the matter following the semicolon is
found the limitation appropriate to the case where instituted to oust the incumbent and to secure the office for the
person unlawfully kept from the occupancy thereof. The prescription established for this case is one year.

A careful perusal of the section, in connection with related provisions of the Code, leaves no room for doubt that
have actions over public of the section was instituted to apply to actions over public officer as well as corporate
offices; and in this sense said provision has been applied by this court. (Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil., 624.) The
author, or authors, of the Code of Civil Procedure could hardly have intended for this provision to be applied only to
corporate officers, since there is a public interest in public offices which requires there should be a prescriptive
provision applicable to actions over these offices no less than to actions over the offices of corporations. The
insertion "en una corporacion" after the word "cargo" was evidently a mere mistake, resulting from a superficial
attention to the context; and it will be found that in the Spanish edition to the Code of civil Procedure edited by C. M.
Recto this phrase has been dropped. It goes without saying that the English version of the Code of civil Procedure is
controlling, and in case of conflict the courts must be governed by this version. The suggestion contained in the
opinion of the court of the Spanish language is novel and if followed by us in the future will be the source of much
uncertainty in the interpretation and application of our statutes.

The opinion of the court contains a lengthy dissertion intended to demonstrate that the amendment of section 203 of
the Administrative Code contained in act No. 3107 is unconstitutional, for defect in the title of the Act. With this
provision I am also unable to agree. The title to act No. 3107 begins with theses words: "An Act to amend and
repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code in my opinion broad enough to include the amendment of
section 203 relating the analysis of Title IV of the Administrative Code it will be found that justices of the peace are;
and although the provisions of act No. 3107 are variously, they have this in common, that they deal with different
parts of the judiciary establishment and are intended that a pronouncement as to the constitutionality of the
amendment in question was by no means called for in this case, not only because the point was not raised in the
discussion of the case but for the further reason that we the plaintiff.

RESOLUTION UPON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

February 26, 1926

The clerk having before it for consideration, (a) the motion of Alberto Suguitan for a reconsideration of the decision
of the court promulgated on February 13, 1926, and (b) the motion of the Secretary of Justice, praying for leave to
appear in the said decision in relation with said motions, it is hereby ordered and decreed that said decision
heretofore announcement, be modified, to the end that the decision of all the questions involved ins aid decision be
limited tot he following alone:

(a) That said act No. 3107 can have no application to the petitioner herein, following the doctrine heretofore
announced in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543); and,

(b) That the defense of the limitation or prescription contended for by the respondent does not apply to the
petitioner under the particular facts of this cause. Modifying the decision heretofore announced, as herein
indicated, and basing the decision upon the two grounds above-mentioned only the eliminating all remarks
made about the action and conduct of the Acting Secretary of Justice, said motions are hereby denied.
Avanceña, C. J., Street and Ostrand, JJ., adhering tot he dissenting opinion heretofore promulgated, concur
nevertheless in this resolution.

Avanceña, C.J. and Ostrand, J., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12767             November 16, 1918

In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,

Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.

Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, personally and as guardian, 
and for Simeona Ibañez, appellees.

STREET, J.:

On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the
city of Manila, leaving a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of which, as
estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own
handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally
applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under section
618.

On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the
probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United
States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could
properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:

Will made here by alien. — A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state
or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or
subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved,
allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to
the laws of these Islands.

The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks publication of notice was ordered in the
"Manila Daily Bulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court. On March 6, 1916, witnesses
were examined relative to the execution of the will; and upon March 16th thereafter the document was declared to
be legal and was admitted to probate. At the same time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and John T.
Pickett as administrators of the estate, with the sill annexed. Shortly thereafter Pickett signified his desire not to
serve, and Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator.

By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred shares of the corporate stock in the
Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba
Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to
Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five
children — Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.

The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an understanding of the case are these: Emil H.
Johnson was born in Sweden, May 25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the United States and lived in
Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he was married to Rosalie Ackeson, and
immediately thereafter embarked for the Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the United States. As a result
of relations between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after
their marriage. This child was christened in Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish Lutheran Church upon October 16,
1898.

After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he continued to live in the
Philippine Islands, and on November 20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a decree of divorce from him
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion. A little later Johnson appeared in the United
States on a visit and on January 10, 1903, procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago. From Chicago he
appears to have gone to Sweden, where a photograph, exhibited in evidence in this case, was taken in which he
appeared in a group with his father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, who was then living with her
grandparents in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila, where he prospered in
business and continued to live until his death.

In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had three children,
to wit, Mercedes, baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and Victor, baptized December 9,
1907. The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to the deceased by Simeona Ibañez.

On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson
entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will to probate. On October
31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various other orders in the
case. On February 20, 1917, this motion was denied, and from this action of the trial court the present appeal has
been perfected.

As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is to annul the decree of probate and
put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner
as the sole legitimate heir of her father.

The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four in number and may be stated, in the
same sequence in which they are set forth in the petition, as follows:

(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at the time the will
in question was executed;

(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois;

(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner; and

(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks essential jurisdiction over the probate of wills.
The fourth proposition above stated must, accordingly, be interpreted in relation with the third and must be
considered as a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover, both the third and fourth grounds stated take
precedence, by reason of their more fundamental implications, over the first two; and a logical exposition of the
contentions of the petitioner is expressed in the two following propositions:
 (I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void because made
without notice to the petitioner;

(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside because the testator was not a
resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that State.

In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems arising in this cae in the order last above
indicated. Upon the question, then, of the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an inspection of the record of
the proceedings in the court below that all the steps prescribed by law as prerequisites to the probate of a will were
complied with in every respect and that the probate was effected in external conformity with all legal requirements.
This much is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed out in the argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at
the time the court made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the petitioner lived in the United
States and that as daughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore,
insisted that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to permit
the petitioner to be present either in person or by representation; and it is said that the failure of the court thus to
postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of the Philippine Bill which declared that
property shall not be taken without due process of law.

On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the
publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be
probated.

As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially
one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the
constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be
an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due
process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the
constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."

In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands at the time of the testator's death; and it was
impossible, in view of the distance and means of communication then existing, for the petitioner to appear and
oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing in California. It was nevertheless held that publication in the
manner prescribed by statute constituted due process of law. (See Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs. Muir,
151 Cal., 363.)

In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the fact that, under the laws of California, the petitioner
had a full year within which she might have instituted a proceeding to contest the will; and this was stated as one of
the reasons for holding that publication in the manner provided by statute was sufficient. The same circumstance
was commented upon in O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien (199 U. S., 89), decided in the Supreme Court of the United
States. This case arose under the laws of the State of Washington, and it was alleged that a will had been there
probated without the notice of application for probate having been given as required by law. It was insisted that this
was an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. This contention was,
however, rejected and it was held that the statutory right to contest the will within a year was a complete refutation of
the argument founded on the idea of a violation of the due process provision.

The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in perhaps all of the States of the American Union,
contain no special provision, other than that allowing an appeal in the probate proceedings, under which relief of any
sort can be obtained from an order of a court of first instance improperly allowing or disallowing a will. We do,
however, have a provision of a general nature authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set aside any
judgment, order, or other proceeding whatever. This provision is found in section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which reads as follows:

Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment,
order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six
months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" in this section indicates an intention on the part of the
Legislature to give a wide latitude to the remedy here provided, and in our opinion its operation is not to be restricted
to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation where a plaintiff impleads a defendant and brings
him into court by personal service of process. In other words the utility of the provision is not limited to actions
proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings.

In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that the provisions of this Code shall be liberally
construed to promote its object and to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. We think that the intention thus
exhibited should be applied in the interpretation of section 113; and we hold that the word "party," used in this
section, means any person having an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be
concluded by the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.

The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the section cited, at any time within six months for
March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by
conditions over which she had no control and that the order admitting the will to probate had been erroneously
entered upon insufficient proof or upon a supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been
authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was, under the
circumstances, a very short period of time within which to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest
the probate with the proof which she might have desired to collect from remote countries. Nevertheless, although
the time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the possibility
of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her
attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.

It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis case, above cited, the proceedings in the court
below were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law. The law supplied a remedy by which the
petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have obtained relief from the order by which she is supposed to have
been injured; and though the period within which the application should have been made was short, the remedy was
both possible and practicable.

From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate
cannot be declared null and void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from appearing at the
original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in question. Whether the result would have been the same
if our system of procedure had contained no such provision as that expressed in section 113 is a matter which we
need not here consider.

Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the court, is another matter which may be properly
discussed at this juncture. This relates to the interpretation to be placed upon section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The position is taken by the appellant that this section is applicable only to wills of liens; and in this
connection attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an
alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body of the section is not capitalized. From this it is argued
that section 636 is not applicable to the will of a citizen of the United States residing in these Islands.lawphil.net

We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the opinion that, by the most reasonable interpretation of
the language used in the statute, the words "another state or country" include the United States and the States of
the American Union, and that the operation of the statute is not limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of hermeneutics
that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never
control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. Furthermore, the epigraph, or heading,, of a section,
being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the
operative words contained in the body of the text. It results that if Emil H. Johnson was at the time of his death a
citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, his will was provable under this section in the courts of the
Philippine Islands, provided the instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate under the laws of the
State of Illinois.

We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition stated at the outset of this discussion, which raises
the question whether the order f probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in the
petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in
conformity with the laws of that State.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate recites, among other things:

That upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil H. Johnson was a citizen of the United
States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, County of Cook, and that the will in question was executed in
conformity with the dispositions of the law f the State of Illinois.

We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the execution of the will the testator was a citizen of
the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State. Upon the last point the
finding is express; and in our opinion the statement that the testator was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in
the State of Illinois, should be taken to imply that he was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well as of the United
States.

The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition precedent to the granting of the certificate of
naturalization, that the applicant should have resided at least five years in the United States and for one year within
the State or territory where the court granting the naturalization papers is held; and in the absence of clear proof to
the contrary it should be presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a citizen
of that State as well as of the United States.

In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
declares, in its opening words, that all persons naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the probate of this will does not assert that the testator
was not a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was executed. The most that is said on this point is he was
"never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became and was a resident of the city of Manila,"
etc. But residence in the Philippine Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered that
the allegations of the petition on this point are, considered in their bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in
Illinois, wholly insufficient.

As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was
executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate. And
how is it possible to evade the effect of these findings?

In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the allowance by the court of a will of real or
personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution."

The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age and mental capacity
of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of
the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to
attest the act. The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them the probate
is conclusive. (Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-
Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep.,
676.)

Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has been probated according to law, and
without fraud, can be annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account of any supposed irregularity or defect
in the execution of the will or on account of any error in the action of the court upon the proof adduced before it. This
court has never been called upon to decide whether, in case the probate of a will should be procured by fraud, relief
could be granted in some other proceeding; and no such question is now presented. But it is readily seen that if
fraud were alleged, this would introduce an entirely different factor in the cae. In Austrua vs. Ventenilla (21 Phil.
Rep., 180, 184), it was suggested but not decided that relief might be granted in case the probate of a will were
procured by fraud.

The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will was executed in conformity with the law of
Illinois and also, in effect, that the testator was a citizen of that State places the judgment upon an unassailable
basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon the fact of the judgment is concerned. It is, however, probable
that even if the judgment had not contained these recitals, there would have been a presumption from the admission
of the will to probate as the will of a citizen of Illinois that the facts were as recited in the order of probate.

As was said by this court in the case of Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921), "There is no
principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been acquired, every act of a court of general
jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment or decree rendered
in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank,
10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have established before
the court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge."

The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general jurisdiction; and there is no difference in its faculties in
this respect whether exercised in matters of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious litigation. The trial court
therefore necessarily had the power to determine the facts upon which the propriety of admitting the will to probate
depended; and the recital of those facts in the judgment was probably not essential to its validity. No express ruling
is, however, necessary on this point.

What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered in its aspect as an attack upon the order of
probate for error apparent on the face of the record. But the petitioner seeks to have the judgment reviewed, it being
asserted that the findings of the trial court — especially on the question of the citizenship of the testator — are not
supported by the evidence. It needs but a moment's reflection, however, to show that in such a proceeding as this it
is not possible to reverse the original order on the ground that the findings of the trial court are unsupported by the
proof adduced before that court. The only proceeding in which a review of the evidence can be secured is by
appeal, and the case is not before us upon appeal from the original order admitting the will to probate. The present
proceedings by petition to set aside the order of probate, and the appeal herein is from the order denying this relief.
It is obvious that on appeal from an order refusing to vacate a judgment it is not possible to review the evidence
upon which the original judgment was based. To permit this would operate unduly to protract the right of appeal.

However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case from the point of view of the petitioner, we
propose to examine the evidence submitted upon the original hearing, in connection with the allegations of the
petition, in order to see, first, whether the evidence submitted to the trial court was sufficient to justify its findings,
and, secondly, whether the petition contains any matter which would justify the court in setting the judgment, aside.
In this connection we shall for a moment ignore the circumstance that the petition was filed after the expiration of the
six months allowed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The evidence adduced upon this point in the trial
court consists of the certificate of naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, in connection with certain biographical facts contained in the oral evidence. The certificate of naturalization
supplies incontrovertible proof that upon the date stated the testator became a citizen of the United States, and
inferentially also a citizen of said State. In the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that, when Johnson
first came to the United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State of Illinois and there remained until he
came as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands. Although he remained in these Islands for
sometime after receiving his discharge, no evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United
States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his permanent domicile, and on the
contrary the certificate of naturalization itself recites that at that time he claimed to be a resident of Illinois.

Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, how
has he lost the character of citizen with respect to either of these jurisdictions? There is no law in force by virtue of
which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore,
impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change his
political status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This being true, it is to be presumed
that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the United States. It would
be novel doctrine to Americans living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose their citizenship
in the State of their naturalization or nativity.

We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his abode in another State
with no intention of returning, he immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is in
accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which says
that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. The effect of this provision
necessarily is that a person transferring his domicile from one State to another loses his citizenship in the State of
his original above upon acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. The acquisition of the new State
citizenship extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, has no analogy to that which arises when a citizen of
an American State comes to reside in the Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new citizenship; nor by the
mere change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with him.

The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as showing that, at the time the will was executed,
the testator was, as stated in the order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in connection with the
circumstance that the petition does not even so much as deny such citizenship but only asserts that the testator was
a resident of the Philippine Islands, demonstrates the impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of the
necessary citizenship on the part of the testator. As already observed, the allegation of the petition on this point is
wholly insufficient to justify any relief whatever.

Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of the State of Illinois —
we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transaction of the testimony adduced in the trial court that any
witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no
doubt was satisfied that the will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois,
as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed
that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was
in our opinion mistaken. that section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the
acts of the legislative department of the United States. These words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress
of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice of
the multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor do we think that any such authority can be derived from
the broader language, used in the same action, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of
public knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of
the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in
the Philippine courts.

Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the
point in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state any fact
from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly, because the
assignment of error and argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based on such supposed error.
Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its
judgment could not be set aside, even upon application made within six months under section 113 of the Code of
Civil procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is
true, states in general terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in
the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied
contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the appellant's brief which might tent to raise
a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be
urged as of serious moment.

But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not properly admissible to probate because
it contains provisions which cannot be given effect consistently with the laws of the Philippine Islands; and it is
suggested that as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of the testator she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which
she is entitled under the law governing testamentary successions in these Islands. Upon this point it is sufficient to
say that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being
conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 625, 614; Sahagun vs. De
Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119, 121; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil.
Rep., 393, 395.)

If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any legacy given by the will or other disposition
made therein is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the
law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must
be determined by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general provisions here
applicable in such matters; for in the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and
testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be situate."
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition submitted to the court below on October 31, 1916,
was entirely insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the other probating the will in question, whether said petition
be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as an
application for a rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the petition.
And in this latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not presented within the time
allowed by law.

It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed from is accordingly
affirmed with costs. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10201            September 23, 1957

NICOLAS Y. FELICIANO, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
BENIGNO S. AQUINO JR., defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

On November 11, 1955, the respondent-appellant Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., was proclaimed elected to the position of
Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac, as a result of the elections held on November 8 of that year. Four days after the
proclamation, defeated candidate Nicolas Y. Feliciano instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac (Case No. 2021) challenging the eligibility of respondent Aquino on the ground that the latter did
not have twerty three (23) years of age at the time of his election.  It is uncontested that respondent Aquino became
23 years of age only on November 27, 1955, nineteen (19) days after the elections were held, and sixteen (16) days
after the canvassers proclaim him Mayor-elect.

The court below, relying on section 2174 of the Administrative Code, declared Aquino's election unlawful and illegal,
and enjoined him from assuming office. Contending that the 23-year age requirement applied only to the
assumption of office (in this case on January 1, 1956) and not to his eligibility, respondent Aquino appealed to this
Court.

The controversy revolves around sec. 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (Act 2711), reading as
follows:

"Sec. 2174. Qualifications of Elective Municipal Officer. - An elective municipal officer must, at the time of the
election, be a qualified voter in his municipality and must have been resident therein for at  least one year; he must
be loyal to the United States 1and not less than twenty-three years of age. He must also be able to read and write
intelligently either Spanish, English or the local dialect."

Appellant avers that the phraseology of the section and the existence of a semi-colon (;) after the first two
requirements (improperly converted into a comma (,) in the 1951 edition of the Revised Administrative Code) proves
that while the candidate must be a qualified voter and a resident at the time of the election, he need not possess the
remaining qualifications until he assumes the office; that appellant was chosen by an overwhelming majority of his
constituents and that the evident will of the electorate was thwarted by the judgment appealed from.
In our opinion, the spirit of the law, as well as the natural and obvious sense of section 2174,is that the candidate for
a municipal elective office must be not less than 23 years of age at the time the election is held. The section only
makes mention of this time:  it refers to no other. And this interpretation of the section aforementioned is in harmony
with the legal requirements for other elective offices, from President of the Republic to provincial officers.

"(a) As to President and Vice-President.

No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately pre- ceding the election. Constitution of the Philippines. Art. VII. Sec. 3.

(b) As to Senator.
No person shall be a Senator unless he be a natural-born citizen' of the Philippines and, at the time of his election,
is at least thirty-five years of age, a qualified elector, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately prior to his election.Constitution of the Philippines. Art. VI. Sec. 4.

(c) As to Member of the House of Representatives.

No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and, at the time of his election, is at least twenty-five years of age, a qualified elector, and a resident of the province
in which he is chosen for not less than one year immediately prior to his election. Constitution of the Philippines. Art.
VI, Sec. 7.

(d) As to provincial officer.

An elective provincial officer must be a citizen of the Philippines and, at the time of his election, a qualified elector in
the province, a bona fide resident therein for at least one year prior to the election, is loyal to the Republic, and not
less than twenty-five years of age. Secs. 2070. 2071. Revised Adm. Code."

No reason is shown why, after plainly and inequivocably requiring that candidates for all other elective offices should
possess the age qualification "at the time of the election", the law should suddenly change the requirement in the
case of municipal officers. And in view of the express reference to the time of the election in the first part of sec.
2174 (in requiring the candidate to possess the voting and residence qua- lifications), the least that can be said is
that if the Legislature intended to refer the rest of the requirements to the time of assuming office, then it would have
said so expressly, instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and doubt. For it can not be gainsaid that the
elaborate specification of the various conditions that a candidate must possess is motivated by a desire to avoid
conflicting interpretations; and with such intent in view, it is inconceivable that the lawmakers should have
considered that a semi-colon would be sufficient to refer the loyalty and age requirements to the time of assuming
office, without words to that effect, when the voting and residence conditions are expressly required as of the time of
the election.

And such haphazard formulation of the rule becomes the more unlikely when we consider that the drafters of
section 2174 of the Administrative Code had before them, as immediate precedent, section 12: of Act 1582 (of the
Philippine Legislature) that clearly differentiated eligibility and holding office:

"An elective municipal officer must have been, at the time of the election, a qualified voter and resident in the
municipality for at least one year, owing allegiance to the United States; he must be not less, than twenty-three
years of age, and be able to read and write intelligently either Spanish, English, or the local dialect: Provided. That a
person ineligible for office by reason of nonpayment of taxes who is elected to any office may remove such
ineligibility by the payment of the taxes before the date fixed by-law for assuming office, but not afterwards.

Unless fully pardoned, no person who has been convicted of a crime which is punishable by imprisonment for two
years, or more shall hold any public office and no person disqualified from holding public office by the sentence of a
cburt or under the provisions of  Act Numbered Eleven hundred and twenty-six shall be eligible to hold.public office
during the term of his disqualification.

The official acts of a person who is elected and assumes  office when ineligible thereto shall not be invalid, but such
office shall be vacated in the manner following dmmediately upon discovery of such ineligibility." (Emphasis
supplied)
The text just quoted is clear in requiring the candidate to owe allegiance to the United States at the time of the
election, since this requisite came before the semi-colon. In substituting for it the phrase "he must be loyal to the
United States" in sec. 2174 of Act 2711, and placing this condition after the semi-colon, it is scarcely arguable that
the law intended to permit the election of disloyal persons, provided they took an oath of loyalty before assuming
office.  And if this be clearly improbable, why should the semi-colon assume such overwhelming importance in
connection with the age requirement, as to nullify the common antecedent, "at the time of the election"?

The appellant's case is built exclusively upon this semi-colon that separates the voting and residence requirements
on the one hand and the loyalty and age requirements on the other. He argues that the semi-colon, in lieu of a
comma, indicates that the last two conditions need not be present at the time of the election. We deem this reliance
upon punctuation altogether too shallow a foundation upon which to rest a conclusion that would upset the obvious
pattern of the Constitution and the laws, of requiring candidates to possess the requisite age at the time of the
election, without any cogent reason to justify departure from such requirement in the case of municipal offices. And
as already pointed out, had the legislators intended to radically alter the time when the loyalty and statutory age
must be possessed, they would have done so more clearly than by the simple recourse to a semi-colon.

The Supreme Court of the United States is on record as holding that "punctuation is most fallible standard by which
to interpret a writing" (Ewing vs.  Burent, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L. Ed. 624), and that -

"Punctuation marks are no part of a statute; and to determine its intent the court in construing it will- disregard
punctuation or will repunctuate if that be necessary, in order to arrive at the natural meaning of the words employed.
(U.S. vst Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 77 L. Ed. 175; Hammock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust
Co., 105 U.S. 77, 26 L.Ed. 1111)."

Professor Sutherland,in his classic work on Statutory Construction, (Vol. 2, pp. 479-4&0, 3rd Ed.) says:

"Courts have indicated that punctuation will not be given too great consideration in interpretation because it results
from the whim of printer or proofreader. The author's experience confirms his conclusion. Printters are prone to use
their own style manuals and to  make all copy conform to it. When a bill is repunctuated and printed to conform to a
manual it is usually too late and too risky to resubmit the bill to the legislature for the correction of the changes
unless they are particularly flagrant.  Thus often the punctuation becomes that of the printer rather than of the
legislature.2 (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, pp. 479-430"

Other courts have expressed the same opinion: Thus, in Holmes vs. Phoenix Ins. Co., 47 L.R.A., 308, 9S Fed. 240,
the court said:

"Punctuation is no part of the English language. The Supreme Court says that it is a most fallible guide by which to
interpret a writing" Ewing v. Burent (1837) 11 Pet. (U.S.) 41, 54, 9 L.Ed. 624, 630. The Century Dictionary tells us,
what,is common knowledge, that tthere is still much uncertainty and arbitrariness in punctuation.' It is always
subordinate to the text, and is never allowed to control its meaning."

And in Olivet vs. Whiteworth, 82 Md. 258, 33 Atl. 723, the court stated:

"That punctuation alone is not necessarily conclusive must be conceded, as it is well known that draftsmen of legal
instruments frequently ignore all the rules on that subject, to which grammarians and rhetoricians attach great
importance. The most learned and accomplished lawyers oftentimes pay .but little attention to it in their preparation
of legal documents.  This may be because the copyist or the writer to whom the paper is dictated has not followed
the directions or intonations of the author, or it may be because it is known that the cases are few that are
determined by punctuation, or for other reasons. But when, where is an ambiguity which may be wholly or  partially
solved by it, provided the punctuation itself has not created the ambiguity, it can be considered (Weatherly v. Mister
(1874) 39 Md. 629; Black v. Herring (1894) 79 Md. 149, 22 Atl. 1063), but it can never be, permitted to over turn,
what seems the plain meaning of the whole instrument."

In the case at bar there are additional reasons for dis~ regarding the semi-colon which the appellant views with a
respect bordering on fetishism.  A comparison of the texts of sec. 2174 of Act 2711, and sec. 12 of Act 1582 (both
heretofore reproduced),shows beyond doubt that the former is a practical reproduction of the qualifications
demanded by the latter of municipal elective officials; wherefore, we may conclude that the intent of both provisions
is one and the same. Now, it is incontestable that, under Act 1582, the candidate to an elective municipal position
must be twenty-three years of age at the time of the election, if only for the reason that he could not be a qualified
voter under said Act unless he was 23 years old. This being the case, it necessarily follows that when sec. 2174 of
Act 2711 reproduced the requirements of Act 1582, it must have intended also that the requiredage of 23 should be
attained at the time of the election, as demanded by the model legislation.

It is true that the voting age has been reduced from 23 to 21 years. But this reduction is of no importance, since
neither sec. 12 of;Act 1582 nor sec. 2174 of Act 2711 made the candidate's age requirement dependent on the
voting age. Then, again, the Congressional Record of the discussions on the Election Code, with respect to what
was intended to be covered by the candidate's certificate of candidacy, and the requirement that he should certify to
his eligibility to the office sought, clearly shows that the term "eligibility" included the attainment of the age required
by law; so that this requisite was considered a condition precedent to the valid election of the particular candidate
and not a prerequisite to his assuming office after being elected.

"Mr. Rañola. Is not the gentleman aware of the provision  of the Constitution with respect to persons running for a
national office, particularly with respect to candidates for the House of Representatives? I refer to Section 7, Article
VI, of the Constitution' which provides that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he
be a natural born citizen at least 25 years of age, and a resident of the province wherein he launches his candidacy
for not less than one year.  My question is, is it necessary that the other qualifications should also be stated here in
the certificate of candidacy, in view of the fact that the amendment of the Committee makes the allegation of
residence so necessary? In other words, shall we not also allege in the certificate of candidacy for national office
that the candidate is a natural born citizen, 25 years of age, and a resident of the province wherein he launches his
candidacy for at least one year?

Mr. Laurels The provision of the Constitution with respect to,the qualifications of candidates for Senators and
Representatives appearing in Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI are naturally to be considered. The gentleman will
notice, however, that in the proposed,law, in Section 30 of this bill, there is a provision to the effect that
the candidate must state that he is eligible for the office.  So  that  a person cannot be a candidate unless he
possesses the qualifications prescribed not only by law but-also and more important still by the Constitution. As a
matter of fact, my personal opinion is that it would.be enough to simply state in the certificate of candidacy that a
person is eligible for the office.  I believe that it will not be necessary to insert the qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution with respect to certain constitutional officers; it is understood that they are required, and they have been
complied with, and the word "eligible" covers everything.

Mr. Rañola. But when we speak of the word "eligible" does not the gentleman feel that the inclusion of "residence" is
also a surplusage, in view of the fact that the Constitution also provides for that?

Mr. Laurel. The idea is to generalize. lour Committee might possibly include all the qualifications for particular
offices, but that would make the section too long, not to say unnecessarily long.

Mr. Rañola." Mr. Speaker, I am perfectly in accord and satisfied with the explanation of the gentleman from
Batangas. yield?

Mr. Primicias. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield.

The Speaker. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. Laurel. I yield.

Mr. Primicias. The gentleman has just stated that this proviso sought  to be inserted by the proposed amendment is
also in the  text of the old law. Is the gentleman sure of that?

Mr. Laurel. I am sure of it because I checked it up. It appears in Section 27 of the Election Code which is
Commonwealth Act 357; in fact, I have a copy of the Election Code here.
Mr. Primicias. But what is the use of that proposed amendment if  at any rate, residence is included in the word
"eligible"? Would not that be a redundancy?

Mr. Laurel. The idea is simply to keep intact the provisions of the,old law unless they are not good. However,
personally, I would not mind the elimination of  that proviso.

Mr, Primicias. My point is, if we put residence there, why do we not  put also the other qualifications, such as being a
natural born citizen and the age required by law or by the Constitution?

Mr. Laurel. The trouble is that, with respect to the qualification that a candidate must be a natural born citizen, this
requirement affects only a few officers, like the President, the Vice-President, Senators and Representatives,

Mr. Primicias. How about the age requirement?

Mr. Laurel. We simply want to put provisions which have a general application. With respect to the agreement
quirement  the ages required for different offices also vary, and that qualification is also covered by the
word "eligible"." (Congressional Record, House of Representatives, May 13, 1947, No. 52, pp. 1145-1146)
(Emphasis supplied)

That the term "eligibility" as used in the Election law has reference to the election time, and not to the
commencement of  the term of office is further confirmed by seetion 31 of said law, about certificates of candidacy. It
says:

"SEC. 31. Certificate of Candidagy for oniv one office. - No person shall be eligible unless, within the time fixed by
law, he files a duly signed and sworn certificate of candidacy, nor shall any person be eligible for more than one
office to be filled in the same election, and, if he files certificates of candidacy for more than one office, eh 'shall not
be eligible for any of them."

No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as "eligible" or "ineligible" in this section,
taking part in the election is meant, and not capacity to assume office. No reason is shown why the word "eligibility"
should have different meanings in the law. Whatever the weight of American authority should be, the stark fact is
that "eligibility" in our law has its own meaning, and refers to possession of qualifications at the time of the election.

And this view is entirely in accord also with the requirement of the Election Code, sec. 173, that "when a person who
is not eligible is elected to a provincial or municipal office, his right to the office must be contested by quo
warranto proceedings within one week after the proclamation of his election. Nothing in this section indicates that
the age requirement is not included. If the contest must be filed within one week after proclamation, it must be
because by that time it can be determined whether or not the candidate has complied with the age and other
requirements of the law. Were we to follow appellant's contention that he needs to be twenty three only upon
assuming office, obviously his compliance with the age requirement can not be determined beforehand; nor could a
successful candidate be ever contested for disloyalty or non-age, because he can always defer his assumption of
the office until he attains the requisite age or is ready to take a loyalty oath.

On this point, the Supreme Court has remarked in Topaclo vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 23$, 252:
"It is possible to finally pass upon the eligibility of a candidate for such elective offices at any time prior to the date
upon which he is to assume office? It is plain that if the candidate can not qualify on election day as to length of
residence, age, or other requirement which can only be met by time, he would be ineligible to hold office and the
court or any other deciding power cduid! very well decide immediately after the election that he was ineligible."

It is true that the Court was discussing Act 1582 in the particular case; but as already pointed out, the qualifications
required being identical to those demanded by the present law, the passage quoted is perfectly applicable to the
case now before us.

Appellant cites the case of Morrero vs. Bocar as authority in his favor. We think it is not, for the reason that the
decision was there rendered under the provisions of Art. VII, sec. 2 of the Constitution as it stood before the 1941
amendments,, At the time Bocar was elected, the constitutional provision required that-
"No person shall be a member of the National Assembly unless he has been five years a citizen, is at least 30 years
of age, and at the time of his election, a qualified elector and a resident of the province",

so that it could be plausibly argued and held that the phrase "at the time of his election" qualified only the
requirements of residence and electoral capacity, since only these two conditions followed the qualifying words;
while the age requirement (which preceded the words "and at the time of his election") could not be restricted by
that expression, but should be construed as a qualification only for assuming membership in the Assembly. But the
Constitution was amended subsequently to the Bocar case, and now reads:

"unless he be a natural born citizen of the Philippines and, at the time of his election, is at least twenty-five years of
age," etc.-

The interversion of the phrases "at the time of his election" and "at least twenty-five years of age" by placing the first
requirement ahead of the latter, makes it clear that now the age requirement must be possessed by the candidate at
election time, precisely in line with the requirement for other offices. Wherefore, the Bocar decision could not be
maintained under the present Constitution. And precisely section 2174 of the Administrative Code, covering
appellant's case, is constructed in a manner identical to the present constitutional and legal requirements for
national and provincial offices since the words "at the time of the election" precede, and therefore, modify, all
qualifications set forth in the law after such words, including the age requirement.

Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441, held that a disqualification from being a voter, due to a criminal conviction at the
time of the election, was retroactively wiped out by a plenary pardon granted after the election. Such retroactive
operation is in line with the general doctrine as to the effect of pardons; and moreover is supported by section 99 of
the Election Law:

"Sec. 99. Disqualifications. - The following persons shall,not be qualified to vote:

(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judg- ment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon."

It will be noticed that the law does not limit the time i when the pardon should be issued, whether before or after
elecion. The majority of the Court chose to interpret the law liberally, by giving the pardon full rehabilitating power,
regardless of the time it was issued, because "an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabisalities resulting from the conviction". But since that ratio decidendi of the Pelobello case does not
apply to a candidate's age, and there is no authority for granting retroactive operation to the attainment of a certain
age (which would be absurd), plainly the Pelobello decision does not support appellant Aquino's case.

Appellant argues, as a last resort, that the construction to be given to see, 2174 of the Administrative Code (Act
2711) should be in harmony with the popular will, reflected in his overwhelming victory at the polls.  We do not
believe that it was ever the legislative intent to make the application of the law dependent upon the vagaries of the
election results.  Appellant's argument simply amounts to this that because he won, the 23 years of age requirement
should be held as required by law only at the time of the candidate's assumption of office. Logically, the sequel of
this argument would be that if appellant had lost, the age requirement would be demanded by law as of thu time of
the election. And yet the meaning of the statute must have been fixed sinee the time it was enacted in 1917 long
before appellant was born.

In conclusion, we are of the opinion that, as in the case of candidates for elective provincial and national offices, a
candidate for an elective municipal office must have, in order to be eligible, at least twenty three years of age at the
time the election is held. In so holding, the court below committed no error.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
1
 now,the Republic of the Philippines.
2
 See Ewing v. Burent, 11 Pet. (36 U.S.) 41, 9 L. Ed. 624

CONCURING

FELIX, J.:

I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes.

The reasons are obvious. The construction that the 'Justices subscribing it give to the provisions of Section 2174 of
the Eevised Administrative Code of 1917 is, in my opinion, the most natural and logical interpretation of the terms
thereof and in consonance with the intent of Congress and the policy of the Government, Under such
circumstances, I do not think it fair or proper to resort to subtleties just to give effect to the will of the electorate of
the municipality of Concepci6n, Tarlac, who, it is not disputed, chose the respondent Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., as their
mayor at the last general elections held on November 8, 1955. I have no quarrel with the dissenting Justices as to
the principle that, whenever possible or warranted, the popular mandate should be respected; but We are called
upon to decide a case before Us and in doing so We shall also avoid giving so liberal interpretation of the law thajr
might result in its infringement.  And We shall be more cautious in this case for there is another and better remedy to
respect said popular will.  Once the position of Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac, is declared vacant, it would be up to
the President of the Philippines to fill the vacancy and I do not entertain the least doubt that His Excellency, in
performing the high prerogatives of his office in connection with this case, will find his way clear to abide by the will
of the electorate of Concepcion, Tarlac.

Paras, C. J. Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, 
and Felix, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING

CONCEPCION, J.:

Despite the well written dissent of Mr. Justice Bengzon, I am constrained to concur in the majority opinion, for the
following reasons, among others?

1. Thg  view adopted in the majority opinion is in line with  the policy of the Constitution.

As stated in said opinion, the requisite qualifications for President, Vice-President and members of Congress must,
pursuant to the Charter of our Republic, be possessed at the time of election (Art. VI, Sections 1 and 4, and Art. VII,
Section 3, Constitution of the Philippines). The same pattern is followed in Section 2071 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as regards elective provincial officers. It is obvious that in the absence of a clear and explicit
provision to the contrary  we should favor such interpretation of the statute relative to the qualifications of elective
municipal officers, as would dovetail with said policy of the Constitution and the aforementioned Code with respect
to elective national and provincial officers respectively.  Said policy, particularly that of the Constitution is, certainly,
sufficient reason to offset the semicolon upon which the minority opinion is hinged.

2. The  so-called "majority rule" in the United States 1

Concurring  should not be followed in this jurisdiction.

The states of the Union that have adopted said "majority rule" 2   had no constitutional mandate,  like that found in
our organic law, providing that the requisite qualifications for national elective officials must be possessed at the
time of the election. The cases adhering to said "majority rule" did not involve the question whether a statutory
provision - like Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code  should be synchronized with the aforementioned
policy of the fundamental law.

Besides, Act No. 1582, from which said Section 2174f was taken, had been patterned by the Philippine Commission
after the laws of Massachusetts, New York, District of Columbia and California, 3  and the courts of California and
New York have adhered to the so-called "minority rule" 4

Again, the determination of the question whether or not the qualifications for a particular office are necessary at the
time of election, is dependent primarily upon the intent of the lawmaker, which is to be inferrld from the language of
the legal provision under construction, in relation to the context of the statute of which it forms part, 5 and other
pertinent facts. The majority opinion, in the case at bar, is borne out, not only by the provisions of the Constitution
and the Revised Administrative Code adverted to above, and by Sections 31 and 173 of Republic let No, 180, as
well as by the decision in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil., 233, 258), as stated in the majority opinion, written by Mr.
Justice Reyes (J.B.L.), but, alsos:

(a) By section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, reading:

"Persons ineligible, to municipa offligce. - In no case shall there be elected or  appointed to a municipal office
ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or National
funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality."

It is clear that, if the person appointed or elected to a municipal office belongs to any of the classes specified in this
section, his appointment or election shall be null and void, and he shall have no right to assume or hold office, even
if, prior thereto, he may have divested himself of the status, or removed the condition, that disqualified him therefor. 
In short, the word "ineligible", as found in Sfjctlon 2175, refers to the attributes of the person concerned at the time
of his election or appointment, thus indicating that our lawmakers understood the terms "eligible", "ineligible" and
"eligibility" as indicative of a circumstance, qualification or requisite existing at the time of election.

(b) By Section 2070 of the same Code, entitled: "General qualificatipns for provincial office", and declaring that: "No
person shall be appointed to any provincial office or be eligible, thereto, unless he is a citizen of the Philippines."
Thus, Philippine citizenship is a qualification for appointment or election to a provincial office, and lack of this   
qualification renders the party concerned ineligiblefor said office. What is more, said qualification must be
possessed, not merely at the time of assumption of office, but, also, at the time of appointment or,
therefore, election thereto.

(c) By Section 2071 of the same Code, entitled: ''Qualifications of provincial officer". It provides:

"No person shall be eligible to a provincial office unless at the time of the election he is a qualified voter of the
province, has been a bona fide resident therein for at least one year prior to the election, and is not less than thirty
years . of age," (Underscoring supplied.)

The "qualifications" referred to in this provision are indispensable to eligibible or synonymous therewith. What is
more, such qualifications and eligibility are essential "at the time of the election "

Incidentally, the foregoing shows that the term "qualifications" appearing in Section 2174, instead of "eligibility", and
the title thereof, reading: "Qualifications of elective municipal officer", Instead of "Eligibility of municipal of- ficer", or
"Eligibility to municipal  office" or "Qualifications of candidate for municipal office", do not warrant the conclusion
drawn therefrom in the dissent. As pointed out above, the title of Section 2071 6  reads: "Qualifications"7 of
provincial officer "8 and yet said Section 2071 refers to eligibility, to a provincial office at the time of the election
thereto.

Moreover, the statement in the dissent to the effect that:

"x x x even those courts (in the minority) holding that 'eligibility' refers to the time of election, are inclined to hold that
removal of disqualification before the time fixed for the commencement of the term of office qualified the incumbent,'
(Annotation, 88 &.L.R. p. 814 citing cases of Conn., Kansas, Alabama, Pennsylvania and Virginia.)"

refers to cases in which "the qualifications provision of the Constitution or statute does not refer to  'eligibility, ' but to
'holding' of office," and such is not the case at bat.

Needless to say, the majority does not pass upon it does ffj not even inquire into respondent's particular capacity to
perorm the duties of a municipal mayor. It says, however, that he did not possess the qualifications required therefor
by law, at the time therein contemplated. It may be added, also, that in fixing a minimum age as one of the
qualifications for public office, the law is concerned exclusively with the number of years the candidates have lived.
"How they have lived" is not a  requisite for eligibility; but, it is a factor that the electorate is supposed to consider in
determining who, among the candidates, deserve the popular mandate. When the previous behaviour of a person is
meant to be a condition essential to the acquisition of the right to an office, as in the case of appointive officers, the
law generally requires good moral characters.

3. The rule to the effect that the provisions of the  Election Law are mandatory before the election, but the directory
after the election, is not in point..

The Election Law merely prescribes the metfaod by which the will of the electorate shall be determined.
Consequent, irregularities in the proceedings to determine said will, onca expressed, should not defeat the same,
unless its free expression has been materially impaired thereby. Thus, the failure to comply with the requirements
felative to the filing of certificates of candidacy  which are procedural in character -if not invoked prior to the election,
will not, after the election, affect the right of the winning candidate (Cecilio v. Belmomte; 51 Phil., 540, 546).

The qualifications far an office are, however, matters of substance, not of procedure. In fact, the qualifications for
elective municipal officers are found in Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code, which forms part, not of
the Election Law, but of the Municipal Law. The absence of said qualifications cannot be offset, therefore, by the
plurality of votes cast in favor of the candidate concerned. It is evident, for instance, that, under the present law, a
foreigner cannot be entitled to a municipal office, even if the electorate had unanimously voted for him.

Thus, in 1951, Jose V. Yap was proclaimed elected municipal mayor of Victoria, Tarlac. He having been born on
January 16, 1929, upon proper proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac rendered a decision "declaring x x
x Yap x x x ineligible x x x as municipal mayor x x x of Victoria,  Tarlac, on November 13, 1951'' the  day  of the 
election. On appeal, we unanimously affirmed said decision9 despite the fact that Yap was then already over 23
years of age, and that the electorate had already expressed its will in his favor. The argument to the effect that the
will of the majority should, after the election, be respected, despite the lack of qualifications of the candidate for an
elective municipal office, would seem to overlook the fact that said qualifications are proscribed by law, which is,
also, an expression of the will of thfi electorate. There is, however, this fundamental differences whereas the votes
cast in favor of said candidate reflect the will of the voters in the municipality concerned,T said legal provision
represents the will of the electorate in the entire Philippines, expressed thru their representatives in Congress.

Furthermorej in the present case, the will of the majority in Concepcion, Tarlac, was expressed with knowledge of
the fact that said Jose V. Yap had recently been declared ineligible as mayor of Victoria, Tarlac, he being below 23
years of age on the date of his election. The electorate in Concepcion took, therefore, a calculated risk, when it
voted for respondent herein as municipal mayor thereof. In other words, it was willing to run the danger of seeing
the chosen mayor ousted from office by reason of ineligibility.

4. public interest would, be promoted by the view adopted in the majority opinion.

Pursuant thereto, there would be only one inifor policy 10  Which represents the period "during which the incumbent
actually holds the office" (Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil., 12, Honourring as regards the time at which the qualifications
to any and all it elective offices in the Philippines shall be necessary  said i qualifications must exist on election day.
In other words, : the majority opinion tends to simplify the rule in connection  therewith, to make it easier f or all  to
know and remember the "; principle obtaining thereon, and, hence, to minimize litigations relative thereto.

Upon the other hand, the practical effect of the view advocated by the majority in the present case, would be to
establish several, distinct policies with respect to the aforementioned subject  one for elective national and provincial
officers and another for elective municipal officers.  What is worse, if the terms "eligibility" and "qualification" ware
construed to refer to the right, not to be elected, but to holdoffice, we would be opening the door to a number of
other debatable questions. For instance, does the word "hold" have reference to "term"or to "tenure"? 10  May a
candidate proclaimed elected remove his disqualifications at any time before the expiration of his term? If
"qualifications" or "eligibility" were expressions affecting merely the right to hold office, thens logically, there would
seem to be no justification for demanding the possession of said "qualifications" of "eligibility" prior to the
assumption of office, whether this takes place at tha beginning of the term, or, at any time prior to its expiration.

In short, with due respect to the opinion of the minority, the same would, to my mind, encourage, not only litigations
which, insofar as elective offices are concerned often lead, in the Philippines, to grave consequences, affecting
peace and order in the community   but, also, the nomination of candidates who do not have the requisite
qualifications on the date set for the elections, in the hope that, should they tie elected, means and ways could be
devised in order that thoy may possess such qualifications sometime before the conclusion of the term of the office
for which they run.  I cannot find my way clear to cooperating in bringing about such consequences. Should the
policy-making body of the State be in favor thereof, it may do so by direct, clear and positive enactment. Section
2174 of the Revised Administrative Code, however, is not sufficiently explicit thereone.

1
  88 A.L.R. 812-813, refers thereto as the majority rule, not because most of the States have adhered thereto, but
because there are twelve (12) States in favor thereof, as against nine (9) in favor of the other rule.
2
  Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Vermont and
Wisconsin.
3
  Report of the Philippine Commission, 1906, Vol. I, p. 154; the Election Law, Laurel, 1931 Ed., p. 134.
4
  Followed in Alabama, California, Georgia, Minnesota, Mississippi, Hebraska, Nevada, New York and Washington.
5
  Hence, the warning in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil., 233, 255)! "The utmost care must be exercised In the
citation of authorities in support of any particular contention in the interpretation of election laws. They
are universally statutory and seldom similar in the matter of election controversies. Asingle statutory or constitutional
provision, may render worthless as an authority the best considered case coming from some other jurisdiction on
the point under discussion."

Thus, in Searcy vs. Grow (15 Cal. 117), the Court adhered to the so-called minority rule after pointing out that the
cases holding the contrary involved the construction of language different from that used in the California
Constitution.
6
    Like that of Section 2174.
7
   Not eligibility.
8
   Wot of "candidates for provincial office": Concurring
9
 Castañeda vs. Yap (48 Off. Gaz., 3364).
10
 Which reperesents the period "during which the incumbent actually holds the office " (Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil.,
12, 22).

DISSENTING OPINION

BENGZON, J.:

A.  In case of doubt uphold voters' choice. When this appeal was first discussed and voted, we divided five to five. 1 
Because there was doubt as to the law's moaning this Court should have sustained the respondent mayor, in
consonance witu its policy of respecting the electorate's will, and in line with unanimous judicial attitude here and
elsewhere.
"There is a presumption in favor of eligibility of one who has been elected or appointed to public office and any
doubt as to the eligibility of any person to hold an office must be resolved against the doubt." (67 G.J.S. p. 126)

"Provisions in statutes imposing qualifications should receive a liberal construction in favor of the right of the people
to exercise freedom of choice in the election of officers and in favor of those seeking to hold office; and ambiguities
should be resolved in favor of eligibility to office." (67 C.J.S. p. 126) (2)

   .

After relating the equal division of opinion, the Court  could (and should) have confirmed the popular choice
following the above trend, declaring substantial compliance with the age requirement when the respondent reached
23 before the commencement of his term, the provisions of the election law being mandatory before the elections,
but directory thereafter.

Even so, the majority chose a narrow, impractical view. The respondent was not old enough, they said, and should
be ejected, even if he had reached the stated age before his schedulcd oath-taking.  As if one's capacity to perform
official duties depended upon the number of years he has lived, instead of how he has lived; as if youth were such a
serious handicap that it could never be overcome.

Yet in 1941 this Court allowed Mayor-elect Palatine to stay in office although he was on election day disqualified to
be a candidate, for having been convicted of a crime 3. As life was fully pardoned after election and before the 
commencement of his term of office, this Court, one member dissenting, held that the disqualification had been
cured.  Mayor-elect Aquino committed ho. crime, has reached the required age, but the majority treat him worse
than Palatines had been. Which is not equality before the law.

Worth remembering is the circumstance that neither the Constitutional Assembly nor the Legislature regarded age
as essential, for every Government office. The first prescribed no age for some constitutional officers, such as the
members of the Commission on Elections and the Auditor-General. Even for Cabinet members there is no fixed age.
And for officials of similar rank, -the Mayors of Cebu and Iloilo for instance- the statutes require no specific age.
Such is the case because experience has proved youth to be no disqualification for executive or political leadership.

B. 23 -years not required on Election. Denying that the stated age was needed on Election Day  appellant argues
that anyway, when his term commenced (and  even before the case was submitted for decision) he was already 23
years of age. Appellee on the other hand contends Aquino is disqualified, because on the day of the election
(proclamation) he was not yet 23 years old.

As the majority opinion states, the issue hinges on the construction of sec. 2174 of the Revised Administrative
Code. 'The section's meaning' would be more easily perceived if it were written this way:

Sec. 2174. Qualifications of elective municipal officer.  An elective municipal officer must, at the time of the election,
be a qualified voter in his municipality and must have been resident therein for at least one year;
he must be loyal to the United States, and must not be less than, twenty-three years  of age.
He must also be able to read and write intelligently either Spanish, English or the local dialect.

In the face of the above exposition, -which omits' no worl or punctuation- I fail to see how in the world the phrase "at
the time of the election" could be made to qualify "twenty-thre years of age."  The phrases are  far apart, and the
clauses ara separated by a semicolon.  "A semicolon is used to separate two independent statements," 4

"Punctuation by semicolon is indicative of complete though in one clause, separate from the other clauses of the
statute." 5

Examine the two statements separated by the semicolon in sec, 2174: they are complotey by themselves.  A period
could have been used, instead of tha semicolon, and the meaning would be the same.

The majority would xcrite the pertinent part of the section in this manner:   

An elective municipal officer must, at the time of the election, be a qualified voter etc.; he must be loyal etc. must not
be less than 23.

But, thus outlined the section is unbalanced. One paragraph begins with "be", and the others with "he must" or
"must".

And if the Legislature's intention had been as the majority now reads the statute, the section would have been
worded:

At the time of the election, an elective municipal officer must be a qualified voter of his municipality, residing therein
for at least one year, loyal to the Government and not less than twenty-three years of age.

Which is not the case. The presumption is that the congressional drafters meant what they wrote. In fact, they wrote
what they meant: when they wanted election-day qualifications they said so, (V. secs. 123, 2071 and 2137 Rev.
Adm. Code.)

C. Punctuation can not be disregarded. Impliedly recognising the force of our arguments resting on punctuation, the
majority quotes authorities holding punctuation may at times be disregarded.  We agree. However the primary rule
is: "A law should be read as punctuated unless there is some reason to the contrary, (Sutherland, Statutory
Construction (3rd Ed.) Vol. 2 p. 478.)

The majority finds no reason to believe the Legislature intended to require Governors to have 25 on the day of
election, and at the same time require Mayors to be 23 upon assumption of office. We answer: the reason lies in the
difference of rank, the very reason for requiring 25 years for the former and 23 for the latter. Anyway, courts apply
the law as it is; not as it  should be.

Again, the punctuation is overlooked where there are reasons to do so. Yet in this instance the majority disregards
punctuation for the reason that there is no reason to believe etc."

On this matter, the principle impliedly endorsed by this Court is that punctuation may be disregarded where it is "in
oonflict with the plain and evident intent of the Legislature. 5  But precisely, we now advert to the punctuation to
discover the legislative intent, there being no other evident intention to the  contrary.

D.  Sec.  2174 lists qualifications for holding office. Closely examine   section 2174 deals with qualifications
for holding municipal office;  and except where apt words are used,  such qualifications are required at the 
cooiiencement  of the  term  - not pn the dayof election.    Observe that the section is not  entitled:  "Eligibility of
municipal officer",  or "Eligibility to municipal  office"  or  "'Qualifications  of   candidate for minicipal office."    Instead
its  caption is,   "Qualifications of elective municipal officer referring to the capacity of one elected to municipal
office6.    Such capacity'must  exist, when? Obviously not on election day,  because at that time he is not yet a
municipal officer.  Therefore, the qualification must be met upon the commencement of the term when he becomes
such ofixer. (Except, of course, the voting and residence requirements which  by express direction, must existnat the
time of the election".)

It is not likely, think the majority, for one section to refer to two different times: election day and commencement of of
term.

In answer to this let me cite the cases of

E. The three congressmen elected when below age wherein competent tribunals regarded one paragraph, (not
separated by semicolon), as referring to two different periods: election day and commencement of tenure.
Juan L. Bocar was chosen congressman even though he was less than thirty. The Constitution provided,

"SEC. 2. No person shall be a member of the National Assembly unless he has been" five years a citizen of the
Philippines, is at least thirty years of age, and, at the time of his election, a qualified elector, and a resident of the
province in which he is chosen for not less than'one year immediately prior to his election."

The Commission on Elections, in a contest, allowed him to qualify upon reaching thirty, on the theory that the age
was needed at the beginning of the tenure. The same section was therefore' found to refer in one part to tenure and
in the other (residence) to election time 7.

Jose Zurbito was elected assemblyman when below age, yet he was permitted to take his seat because he reached
the required age before the inauguration of the Assembly 7-a.

The case of John Young Brown, congressman of Kentucky: "A member-elect not being of the required age, the
taking of the oath was deferred until he was qualified." (Hinds' Precedents 'of the House of Representatives, Vol. 1
p. 389.)

The U. S. Constitution said "No person shall be a Representative who, shall not have attained the age of twenty-five
years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that
State in ("which he shall be chosen."

F.  Aquino had eligibility. Portions of the Congressional Record are quoted in the majority decision to demonstrate
that the age qualification affects eligibility, not mere office-holding; and, then the inference is drawn that such
qualification must exist during election time.  For the sake of argument I'll admit the relation between age and
eligibility.  But I deny above inference, because it runs counter to the weight of "judicial'opinion. Eligibility has
reference to commencement the" term and induction into office.

"The view that eligibility to public office must be determined with reference to conditions existing at the time of
commencement of the term of office or induction of the successful candidate into office and assumption by him of
his official duties, and not with reference to conditions existing, at the time of the election, constitutes the majority
rule, and is supported by the cases discussed under this subdivision, the decisions in most of which are based on
the construction of the word 'eligible' as used in constitutions, statutes, or otherwise, and in some on independent
grounds." (Annotation, 88 American Law Reports p. 820, citing cases of Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana etc.)
(Underscoring ours.) Same conclusion in note, with cases, 23. L. R. A. (N. S.) p. 1228.

Our Law on Public Officers and our Election Law derived from American sources, and it is practical to look for
guidance at American jurisprudence, in default of local judicial pronouncements.

The paragraph quoted by the majority from Topacio v. Paredes,. 23 Phil. 233 concerning eligibility on election day,
is obiter dictum. It was not the issued the debate in that litigation revolved around the jurisdiction of courts of first
instance, in an election-protest, to decide questions of eligibility of the protestee. This Court held they had not. (The
statute was later amended, to permit quo warranto proceedings like this  to test eligibility.)

G. Petitioner must lose, because respondent has capacity to hold office. This proceeding was initiated under section
173 of the Election Law, which permits it "when a person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial or municipal
office"'.

Therefore, in order to win, the petitioner must allege, and prove, that respondent was not "eligible". Eligibility   at 
what time, said section does not specify. The word "eligibly", according to the majority of the courts8 "has reference
to the capacity not of being elected to office, but of holding office, and that therefore, if qualified at the time of
commencement of the term and induction into office, disqualification of the: candidate at the time of election is
immaterial". (Annotation, 88 A.L.R. p. 813, quoting decisions from Colorado, Idaho', Illinois and ten other states.)
'And even those courts (in the minority)  holding that "eligibility"  refers to the time of election,  are "inclined to hold
that removal of disqualification before the time fixed for the  commencement of the terra of office  qualified the 
incumbent".  ' (Annotation,  88 A.L.R.  p.  814 citing cases of Conn.,  Kansas,  Alabama,   Pennsylvania and
Virginia.)

H. Pelobello v.  Palatino,  78 Phil. 441,  is a case  on all fours with the present.  On election day Palatino was 
disquali- fied to become an elective municipal official because he had been previously convicted of a crime."  Yet he
was elected Mayor by the people of Torrijos, Marinduque,    Thereafter and before the commencement of the term
he was fully pardoned.  On a  quo warranto proceeding by his  opponent,   this Court regarded the disqualification
removed and allowed him to  continue in office.  Inevitable  consequence:  Mayor Aquino should likewise ba allowed
to retain his'office,  his disqualification9  having been duly removed.

I. Elected official sustained despite non-eligibility.    This is another case on-all-fours.'    In Cecilio v.  Belmonte,   51
Phil. 540, 546 the  eligibility of the Governor-elect was  questioned because he  had  filed no certificate of
candidacy.   The  law provided that No person shall be  eligible x x x for any provincial office unless within the time
fixed by law,  he  shall file  a duly sworn certificate  of candidacy".  (Sec.  404 Administrative Code.)  This Court
said, even  if he had  not  filed such certificate the protestant could not win, since "the will of the people cannot be
frustrated" by such "technicality", Mark well, there was no curing of the deficiency.  No "substantial compliance" as
alleged here. The unqualified, sweeping statement, aligned with the doctrine that provisions of the Election Law are
mandatory before, the election but directory afterwards. (See De Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211.)

J. Reversal of previous decisions. The majority now may disagree with the Pelobello and Cecilio decisions, and has
power to overrule them, on valid grounds of course10; but by all tenets  of fairness it should not apply the new ruling
to the polls of 1955 when voters and candidates had a right to rely on both said precedents as a part of the Election
Law 11.

K. Castañeda v. Yap, 48 Of. Gaz. The voters of Ccncepcion, it is pointed out, were aware of this decision, ousting
an elected mayor who was not yet 23 on election day. Therefore, it is argued, they are to blame for choosing herein
respondent despite his age handicap.

In the first place such decision was based on an erroneous text (of sec. 2174) which omitted some words and
altered the punctuation. In the second place, the argument assumes the voters' knowledge, before the election, of
said handicap. Which assumption I must share, since petitioner would have been a poor campaigner had he not
raised in his speeches and interviews this shortcoming of his antagonist. But then the electors also knew  because
the appellant and his leaders must have explained that, unlike Yap, he would not be ousted, because his
disqualification would certainly be cured before the commencement of his term, that the Castañeda-Yap ruling
would not control, and  that the Supreme Court would respect the electorate's choice by applying the Pelobello and
the Cecilio decisions. The voters could presume the same doctrine would be extended to all kinds of
disqualification of elective mayors, following a uniform and simple rule concerning removal of electoral disabilities.

L. Petitioner's inaction.  On the other hand, in view of this knowledge of his opponent's disqualification, one might
inquire why did not petitioner before the election (12) seek his exclusion from the poll lists? Did he purposely keep
this ace up his sleeve, intending to show it only when defeated, thereby to fvastrate the electorate's will?

Such neglect or stratagem-entailing waste of public funds does not deserve judicial assistance, in the form of
distinctions more or less tenable- to justify departure from settled jurisprudence concerning matters of eligibility.

M. Estoppel. Court's discretion. The equitable consideration immediately preceeding becomes all the more relevant
in the light of decisions here and abroad upholding laches and estoppel 13 as defenses in quo warranto actions, and
of authorities recognizing the court's discretion14 to eject the office-holder or not, as justice and equity require.

"Estoppel or laches may bar a private relator from attacking the validity of an election" 15.  And the court may dismiss
the proceeding where "ouster would not be in the public interest or serve any good,end or purpose" 16.

N. Resume. To sum up my position:

a.  The law, as it is, doas not require the majror-elect to be 23-year of age at the time of election;

b.  In general, section 2174 fixes qualifications for holding the mayor's office to be met on commencement of the
term;
c.  Supposing section 2174 fixes conditions of eligibility as to age, by the weight of judicial opinion it is enough to
meet such conditions at the commencement of the term or tenure;

d.  Because in the Pelobello case this Court believed that a disqualification existing on election day may be removed
after election and before oath-taking, Mayor Aquino's disqualification (supposing it is) must be held cured;

e.  Because in the Cecilio case respecting the popular vote this Court declined to unseat Belmonte even if he was
not eligible, Aquino should not also be unseated (supposing he was non-eligible);

f.  Where there is doubt -five-five vote- the right of the incumbent mayor should be sustained;

g.  Court's discretion -what with petitioner's inaction- should be used to uphold the popular choice.

O. Vote. For the above reasons I vote to reverse the decision and to dismiss the proceedings with costs against
petitioner.

CONCUR

REYES, A., J.:

I concur with Mr. Justice Bengzon in his dissent.

It appears that the respondent-appellant was already 23 years of age when he assumed the office of mayor of
Concepcion to which he was elected on November 11, 1955, and the only question is whether he should now be
unseated just because "at the time of the election" he had not yet attained that age.

The majority of this Court answer the question in the'affirmative, citing section 2174 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, which reads:

" Sec. 2174. Qualifications of Elective Municipal Officer. - An elective municipal-officer must, at the time of the
election, be a qualified voter in his municipality and must have been resident therein for at least one year; he must
be loyal to the United States (now the Republic of the Philippines), and not less than twenty-three years of age.  He
must also be able to read and write intelligently either Spanish, English or the local dialect."

Construing this section as they think it should be construed , the majority hold that the adverbial phrase "at the time
of the election" qualifies not only the officer's voting and residence qualifications but also his loyalty and age
qualifications. It seems to me that, as written and punctuated, the section does not lend itself to that interpretation. It
is to be noted that those two sets of qualifications are stated separately, each set in one sentence, and each
sentence complete in itself and separated from  the other by a semicolon, a punctuation mark which   to quote from
Mr. Justice Bengzon's opinion is used "to separate two dissenting independent statements" and in legal
hermeneutics held to be "indicative of complete thought in one clause, separate from the other clauses of the
statute." Considering then the statemeats contained in the two sentences as independent of each other because of
the semicolon that separates them, it is not logical to hold that the adverbial phrase which qualifies one does also
qualify the other. Punctuation may not be everything in the interpretation of laws, but I am afraid that a willful
disregard thereof would only open the door to capricious interpretations of the sovereign will as expressed in
legislative enactments. It so happens that in the present case it would also defeat the will of the electorate as
expressed in a free election.

It is, therefore, my view that a person twenty-three years of age is qualified to be an elective municipal officer
although at the time of his election he had not yet reached that age, so long as he possessed the other
qualifications prescribed in the section of the statute under consideration. This view becomes more tenable when it
is noted that the title of the section speaks of the qualifications of an elective municipal officer, .i..e., one who is
already holding an elective municipal office.

The majority would read the law as if the semicolon were not there in order, so they say, to harmonize it "with the
legal requirements for other elective offices from President of the Republic (down) to provincial officers." This is
 taking liberties with the lav; to an extent amounting to judicial legislation. To is no business of the courts to remake
the law in this case by. re-punctuating it. Their function is to apply the law as it  is and not as they think it should be.

As may be seen from lir.  Justice Bengzonfs dissenting opinion, the validity of respondent-appellant's election to the
office is amply supported by precedents,  including decisions of this very Court.  I don't think we would be doing
justice to the electorate of the municipality of Concepcion, who voted respondent-appellant  into  office in reliance
upon the wording of the law and its interpretation by the courts, if we were now to re-punctuate that law and give it a
different meaning.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13160             January 30, 1960

BIENVENIDO NERA, petitioner-appellee, 
vs.
PAULINO GARCIA, Secretary of Health, and TRANQUILINO ELICANO, Director of Hospitals, respondents-
appellants.

Jose Tumanong Guerrero for appellee.

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for appellants.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Respondents are appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated October 30, 1957, ordering
them to reinstate petitioner Bienvenido Nera to his former position as clerk in the Maternity and Children's Hospital,
and to pay him his back salary from the date of his suspension until reinstatement.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. Petitioner Nera a civil service eligible, was at the time of his suspension,
serving as clerk in the Maternity and Children's Hospital, a government institution under the supervision of the
Bureau of Hospitals and the Department of Health. In the course of his employment, he served as manager and
cashier of the Maternity Employer's Cooperative Association, Inc. As such manager and cashier, he was supposed
to have under his control funds of the association. On May 11, 1956, he was charged before the Court of First
Instance of Manila with malversation, Criminal Case No. 35447, for allegedly misappropriating the sum of
P12,636.21 belonging to the association.

Some months after the filing of the criminal case, one Simplicio Balcos, husband of the suspended administrative
officer and cashier of the Maternity and Children's Hospital, named Gregoria Balcos, filed an administrative
complaint case then pending against him. Acting upon this administrative complaint and on the basis of the
information filed in the criminal case, as well as manager and cashier of the association, he was liable in the amount
of P12,636.21, the executive officer, Antonio Rodriguez, acting for and in the absence of the Director of Hospitals,
required petitioner of the communication, Exhibit D, why he should not be summarily dismissed from the service for
acts involving dishonesty. This period of seventy-two hours was extended to December 20, 1956. Before the
expiration of the period as extended, that is, on December 19, 1956, Nera received a communication from
respondent Director of Hospital suspending him from office as clerk of the Maternity and Children's Hospital,
effective upon receipt thereof. This suspension carried the approval of respondent thereof. This suspension carried
the approval of respondent Garcia, Secretary of Health.

The petitioner asked the PCAC to intervene on his behalf, which office recommended to respondents the lifting of
the suspension of petitioner. Upon failure of respondents to follow said recommendation, petitioner asked
respondents for a reconsideration of his suspension, which request was denied. Petitioner then filed the present
special action of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus to restrain respondents from proceeding with the
administrative case against him until after the termination of the criminal case; to annul the order of suspension
dated December 19., 1956, and to compel respondents to lift the suspension. After hearing of this special civil
action, the appealed decision was illegally suspended, first because the suspension came before he was able to file
his answer to the administrative complaint, thereby depriving him "of his right to a fair hearing and an opportunity to
present his defense, thus violating the due process clause"; also, that assuming for a moment that petitioner were
guilty of malversation or misappropriation of the funds of the association, nevertheless, said irregularity had no
connection with his duly as clerk of the Maternity and Children's Hospital.

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint,
suffice it say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in
office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after
such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending
an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and he given an opportunity to
prove his innocence.

As to the holding of the trial court about dishonesty or misconduct in office having connection with one's duties and
functions in order to warrant punishment, this involves an interpretation of Section 694 of the Revised Administrative
Code, which for purpose of reference we reproduced below:

SEC. 694. Removal or suspension. — No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law.

The President of the Philippines may suspend any chief or assistant chief of a bureau or office and in the
absence of special provision, any other officer appointed by him, pending an investigation of his bureau or
office. With the approval of the proper head of department, the chief of a bureau in his bureau or under his
authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such subordinate or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty. (Emphasis supplied).

It will be observed from the last four lines of the second paragraph that there is a comma after the words dishonesty
and oppression, thereby warranting the conclusion that only the phrase "grave misconduct or neglect "is qualified by
the words "in the performance of duty". In other words, dishonesty and oppression to warrant punishment or
dismissal, need not be committed in the course of them performance of duty by the person charged.

Section 34 of Republic Act No. 2260, known as the Civil Service Act on 1959, which refers to the same subject
matter of [preventive suspension, throws some light on this seeming ambiguity. We reproduced said section 34;
SEC. 34. Preventive Suspension. — The President of the Philippines may suspend any chief or assistant chief of a
bureau or office and in the absence of special provision, any other officer appointed by him, pending an
investigation of the charges against such officer or pending an investigation of his bureau or office. With the
approval of the proper Head of Department, the chief of a bureau or office may likewise preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against
such officer, or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or to believe that the performance
of duty, or if there are strong reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his
removal from the service. (Emphasis supplied).

It will be noticed that it introduces a small change into Section 694 of the Revised Penal Code by placing a comma
after the words "grave misconduct," so that the phrase "in the performance or neglect", as it did under Section 694
of the Revised Administrative Code, now qualifies only the last word "neglect", thereby making clear the person
charged is guilty merely to neglect, the same must be in the performance of his duty; but that when he is charged
with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct these need have no relation to the performance of duty. Thus is
readily understandable. If a Government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his force, they affect his right to continue in
office. The Government cannot well tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly
and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the Government other than the office where
he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders
the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to
counteract his evil acts and actuations. As the Solicitor General well pointed out in his brief, "the private life of an
employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or
employee to continue in office and the discipline and morals of the service."

It may not be amiss to state here that the alleged misappropriation involved in the criminal case is not entirely
disconnected with the office of the petitioner. True, the Maternity Employee's Cooperative Association that own, the
funds said to have been misappropriated is a private entity. However, as its name implies a, it is an association
composd of the employees of the Maternity Children's Hospital where petitioner was serving as an employee.
Moreover, if petitioner was designated to and occupied the position of manager and cashier of said association, it
was because he was an employee of the Maternity and Children's Hospital. The contention though indirect, and, in
the opinion of some, rather remote, exists and is there.

The trial court cites a cases of Mondano vs. Silvosa 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., [6], 284 Lacson vs. Roque (92 Phil.,
456; 49 Off. Gaz., 93), and others to support its holding that an official may not be suspended for]irregularities not
committed in connection with his office.

These cases, however, involve elective officials who stand on ground different from that of an appointive officer or
employee, and whose suspension pending investigation is governed by other laws. Furthermore, an elective officer,
elected by popular vote, is directly responsible only to the community that elected him. Ordinarily, he is not
amendable to rules of official conduct governing appointive officials, and so, may not be fortwith and summarily
suspended, unless his conduct and acts of irregularity have some connection with his office. Furthermore, an
elective official has a definite term of office, relatively of short duration; naturally, since suspension from his office
said suspension should not be ordered and done unless necessary to prevent further damage or injury to the office
and to the people dealing with said officer.

In view of the conclusion that we have arrived at, we deem it unnecessary to discuss and determine the other
questions raised in the appeal. In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, with costs.

Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, Barrera and
Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8782             April 28, 1956

MARCELINO B. FLORENTINO and LOURDES T. ZANDUETA, petitioners-appellants, 

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondent-appellee.

Marcelino B. Florentino for appellants.

Ramon de los Reyes for appellee.

JUGO, J.:

The petitioners and appellants filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union a petition for mandamus against
respondent and appellee, Philippine National Bank, to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner
Marcelino B. Florentino issued to him by the Republic of the Philippines, to pay an indebtedness to the Philippine
National Bank in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage on certain properties.

The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, which reads as follows:

Parties herein represented by counsel, have agreed on the following facts:

 1. That the petitioners are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of P6,800 plus interest, the same
having been incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954;.

2. That the said loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties;.

3. That the petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated
October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953;
and.

4. That on December 27, 1953, petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their
backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused to accept petitioner's offer to
pay the said indebtedness with the latter's backpay certificate;

The legal provision involved is section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, which provides:

SEC. 2. Section two of the said Act (Republic Act 304) as amended by Republic Act Numbered Eight
hundred, is further amended to read:

SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons specified in section one
hereof and within one year from the approval of this Act, and under such rules and regulations as may be
promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests for the recognition of the right of
the salaries or wages as provided in section one hereof, and notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued
to the applicant which shall state the total amount of such salaries or wages due the applicant, and certify
that it shall be redeemed by the Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their
issuance without interest: Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and regulations as may
be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the
Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total salaries or wages the right to which has been duly
acknowledged and recognized, provided that the face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not
exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of
the approval of this amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to
any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by the Government, or to any
citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines,
who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.

The question raised is whether the clause "who may be willing to accept the same for settlement" refers to all
antecedents "the Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by the
Government, etc.," or only the last antecedent "any citizen of the Philippines, or any association or corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines.

The contention of the respondent-appellee, Philippine National Bank is that said qualifying clause refers to all the
antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent.

Incidentally, it may be stated that one of the purposes of Republic Act No. 879 was to include veterans of the
Philippine Army and their wives or orphans among the beneficiaries of the Backpay Law, Republic Act No. 304, in
recognition of their great sacrifices in the resistance movement. as shown by the following quotation from the
Congressional Record:

. . . This particular bill, House Bill No. 1228, has been filed by this public servant for three objectives: First, to
serve as a source of financial aid to needy veterans, like crippled or disabled veterans, and to their wives or
orphans. Secondly, to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the last war, and particularly to
those who have given their all for the cause of the last war. And thirdly, to eliminate the discrimination that
has been committed either through oversight, or on purpose, against the members of the Philippine Army,
the Philippine Scouts, and guerrillas or the so-called civilian volunteers, who joined the resistance
movement. (Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session, May 6, 1953, page 74;
quoted in Appellant's brief, pages 13-14.).
Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any
association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma
before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding ones.

But even disregarding the grammatical construction, as done by the appellee, still there are cogent and powerful
reasons why the qualifying clause should be limited to the last antecedent. In the first place, to make the acceptance
of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or corporation, which are not government
entities or owned or controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional,
for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of
promissory note payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal
one.

The other reason is found in the Congressional Record, which says:

Mr. TIBLE: On page 4, lines 17, between the words "this" and "act", insert the word "amendatory".

Mr. ZOSA: What is the purpose of the amendment?.

Mr. TIBLE: The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the provision of section 2. I believe, gentleman from
Cebu, that section 2, as amended in this amendatory bill permits the use of backpay certificates as payment
for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the government. (Congressional Record No. 64, 2nd Congress,
4th Regular Session May 11, 1953 page 41; quoted in Appellants brief, p. 15.).

As there would have been no need to permit by law the use of backpay certificates in payment of debts to private
persons, if they are willing to accept them, the permission necessarily refers to the Government of the Philippines,
its agencies or other instrumentalities, etc.

Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that many officials and employees of the Philippine
Government, who had served during the Japanese Occupation, have already received their backpay certificates and
used them for the payment of the obligations to the Government and its entities for debts incurred before the
approval of Republic Act No. 304.

The case of Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil., 608 (July 11, 1952), is different from the
present one. In the Diokno case, his debt to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was incurred on January 27,
1950. He brought the action on November 10, 1950, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304 (section 2), which
was approved on June 18, 1948; that is, one year and almost eight months before Diokno could not avail himself of
the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 304, because said section provides that the application for recognition of
backpay must have been filed within one year after the approval of said Act No. 304, and the debt must be
subsisting at the time of said approval, Diokno having incurred the debt on January 27, 1950, and brought action on
November 10, 1950. It was, therefore, discretionary in the Diokno case for the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to
accept or not his backpay certificate in payment.

The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 226, series of 1948, held that the phrase "who may be willing to accept
the same for such settlement" qualifies only its immediate antecedent and does not apply to the Government or its
agencies.

The appellee asserts in his brief that the Secretary of Justice, in his letter of June 19, 1953, remarked that the
clause "who may be willing to accept such settlement" refers to all antecedents, including the Government and its
agencies. We are not impressed with this observation of the Secretary, for we believe that his Opinion No. 226,
series of 1948, correct for the reasons we have stated above.

In the present case, Marcelino B. Florentino incurred his debt to the Philippine National Bank on January 2, 1953;
hence, the obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present
case falls squarely under the provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellee is ordered to accept the backpay
certificate above mentioned of the appellant, Marcelino B. Florentino, in payment of his above cited debt to the
appellee, without interest from December 27, 1953, the date when he offered said backpay certificate in payment.
Without pronouncement as to costs. It is ordered.

Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-21734 September 5, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
ABELARDO SUBlDO, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Ceferino Padua for plaintiff-appellee. Estanislao A.
Fernandez for defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, J.:

Appeal on questions of law from the Orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 23041,
entitled People of the Philippines versus Abelardo Subido, denying defendant-appellant's motion for the cancellation
of his appeal bond and declaring him to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine and
indemnity.

From an adverse decision in said case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused guilty of libel and he is hereby sentenced to three (3)
months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos,
to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson in the sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

defendant-appellant Abelardo Subido has taken an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which modified the said
judgment in the following tenor:

However, in the application of the penalty provided for the violation of the libel law, the courts are given discretion
of whether or not both fine and imprisonment are to be imposed upon the offender. In the instant case, we believe,
considering the attendant circumstances of the case that the imposition of the corresponding penalty should be
tempered with judicial discretion. For this reason, we impose upon accused-appellant a fine of P500.00.

Similarly, the amount of the indemnity to be paid by appellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00.

WHEREFORE, with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at appellant's
costs.

In due time the case was remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment.

On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion with the trial court praying that (1) the court enter of
record that the judgment of the Court of Appeals has been promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be cancelled.
Accused-appellant argued that although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity prescribed in the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, he could not be required to serve the amount of fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary
imprisonment because said judgment did not expressly and specifically provide that he should serve the fine and
indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

On December 20, 1958, upon motion of the offended party the lower court issued a writ of execution of its judgment.
However, the writ was returned unsatisfied.

On February 25, 1959, the Sheriff of the City of Manila, armed with an alias writ of execution, attached "whatever
rights, interests, or participation, if any, defendant Abelardo Subido may have" in a two-storey building situated at
No. 2313 Suter, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54170 of the Register of Deeds of
Manila. However, it turned out that the property levied upon be the sheriff was registered in the name of Agapito
Subido who, upon learning of the levy, immediately filed a Third party claim with the sheriff's office and instituted an
action in the lower court (Civil Case No. 41731) to enjoin the Sheriff of Manila from proceeding with the sale of his
property. In the meantime the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the sale of property levied
upon by the sheriff.

On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its opposition to accused-appellant's motion for cancellation
of appeal bond and asked the lower court to require accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the indemnity
of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

On December 19, 1959, the lower court issued an order denying the accused-appellant's motion and declared that
in accordance with the terms of the judgment of the Court of Appeals the accused-appellant has to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case he could not pay the fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision. Accused-appellant moved
for reconsideration, but the same was denied on December 26, 1959.

Hence this appeal from the lower court's orders of December 19 and 26.

In his appeal, accused-appellant presses that the lower court erred

 I. IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS LIABLE TO SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY.
II. IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN SATISFIED WITH
THE ATTACHMENT SECURED BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.1

The threshold issue in this appeal is whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and
indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel committed by means of writing, printing, litography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall
be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6000 pesos or
both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party". It is evident from the foregoing
provision that the court is given the discretion to impose the penalty of imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of
libel. It will be noted that the lower court chose to impose upon the accused: three months of arresto mayor; a fine of
P500.00; indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P10,000.00; subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and the payment of the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its discretion
decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity of P10,000.00 to
P5,000.00.

Thus the Court of Appeals resolved:

However, in the application of the penalty provided for in the violation of the libel law, the courts are given
discretion of whether or not both fine and imprisonment are to be imposed upon the offender. In the instant
case, we believe, considering the attendant circumstances of the same, that the imposition of the corresponding
penalty should be tempered with judicial discretion. For this reason we impose the accused a fine of P500.00.

Similarly, the amount of the indemnity to be paid by appellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00.

WHEREUPON, with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at appellant's
cost.

To Us it is clear that when the Court of Appeals provided in the concluding portion of its decision:

WHEREUPON, with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at appellant's
costs

the alluded modifications could mean no less than the elimination of the three months of arresto mayor and the
reduction of the indemnity to the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00. All the rest
of the punishment remains including the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Had the Court wanted to do
away with the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency of accused-appellant to pay the fine and the indemnity
it would have so expressly provided.

A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency" is separated by a comma (,) from the preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months of arresto
mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the
offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a
comma (,) in the part of the sentence is to make "the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not only to
non-payment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.

If the lower court intended to make the phrase "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer to non-
payment of indemnity only and not to the non-payment of the fine, it would have omitted the comma (,), after the
phrase "to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson in the amount of P10,000.00 pesos," so that the
decision of the lower court would read:

From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused guilty of libel and he is hereby sentenced to three (3)
months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
As thus worded and punctuated there would be no doubt that the lower court would want to make accused-appellant
serve the subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of the indemnity only.

Besides, We see no plausible reason why the lower court would want accused-appellant to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the indemnity only and not to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment of the fine. Accordingly if according to the lower court's decision, the accused-appellant should suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine and the indemnity and the only modifications made by
the Court of Appeals are to eliminate the three (3) months of arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity to the
offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00, then by force of logic and reason, the fine of
P5000.00, the reduced indemnity of P5,000.00 and the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency should stand.

Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay his civil liability.2

It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the government
and liberally in favor of the accused.3 In the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful
scrutiny, and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendant. 4 Considering that Article
39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should be made
applicable to him. It is so provided in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that:

Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving sentence.

Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be
required to serve his civil liability to the offended party in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
because this is no longer required by the aforesaid article.

Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment because his civil liability has
been satisfied with the attachment secured by the offended party on the property of Agapito Subido, wherein he is
supposed to have an interest. He therefore argues that until the final determinations of Civil Case No. 71731 which
Agapito Subido filed to enjoin the Sheriff of Manila from proceeding with the sale of his property, accused-
appellant's liability for subsidiary imprisonment cannot attach as the determination of whether the accused is solvent
or not is a prejudicial question which must first be determined before subsidiary imprisonment may be imposed.

We cannot agree. Attachment does not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment on civil liability and the accused
must suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment thereof. Subsidiary imprisonment applies when the
offender is insolvent as shown in the present case. There is nothing in the law that before subsidiary imprisonment
may attach, there must be prior determination of the question of solvency of the accused. The moment he cannot
pay the fine, that means he is insolvent and he must serve the same in form of subsidiary imprisonment. So
accused-appellant has to choose to pay the fine or serve in jail.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING except with the modification that accused-appellant may no longer be required to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the indemnity provided for in the judgment below, the
Orders of the lower court dated December 19 and 26, 1959 denying defendant-appellant's motion for cancellation of
appeal bond and sentencing him to suffer the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine imposed
by said judgment, are hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Castro, (Chairman), Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 As the errors assigned involved purely questions of law, the honorable court of Appeals certified the case to Us,
pursuant to Section 17, par. 16, in relation to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
2 Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty.-If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of
the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight
pesos, subject to the following rules:

1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement
until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed
one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or
part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.

2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months,
if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for
a light felony.

3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no subsidiary imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the culprit.

4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is
of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer
the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.

5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not
relieve him from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve.

3 U.S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243; People vs. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 728.

4 People vs. Ahearn, 196 N.Y. 221, 89 NE 930, 26 LRA (NS) 1153.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

GR No. L-8759, May 25, 1956

SEVERINO UNABIA, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
CITY MAYOR, defendant-appellant.

99 Phil. 253

LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu ordering respondents to reinstate petitioner as
foreman (capataz), Garbage Disposal, Office of the City Engineer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day from the date of his
removal.
The case was submitted to the court for decision on a stipulation of facts the most pertinent of which are as follows:
Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day On June 16,
1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by
Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division, including personnel, was transferred from
the City Health Department to the Office of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, petitioner sought to be reinstated but
his petition was not headed by the respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that petitioner is a person in the Philippine
Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code as amended), and his
removal from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 4 of Art XII of
the Constitution. The court further held that the notation at the bottom of petitioner's appointment to the effect that
his appointment is "temporary pending report from the Government Service Insurance System as to the appointee's
physical and medical examination" did not make his appointment merely temporary.
First error assigned on this appeal is the failure to include in the complaint, the names of the persons holding the
Offices of City Mayor, City Treasurer, City Auditor and City Engineer, all of Cebu City, they being designated only by
their official positions. This is no reason for a reversal of the proceedings and of the judgment. As said persons were
sued in their official capacity, it is sufficient that they be designated by their official positions.
It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words "Civil Service" in section 1 and 4 of Article XII of the
Constitution and the use of small letters for the same words, "civil service," in section 670, Revised Administrative
Code, indicates that only those pertaining to the classified service are protected in the above-mentioned sections of
the Constitution. We see no validity in this argument. Capital "C" and "S" in the words "Civil Service" were used in
the Constitution to indicate the group. No capitals are used in the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the
system. We see no difference between the use of capitals in the former and of small letters in the latter. There is no
reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging to the
classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service; hence, the same rights and priviliges
should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service are so designated because the nature of their work
and qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified service. This
can not be a valid reason for denying previleges to the former that are granted the latter.
As the removal of petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and void and
petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which he was removed. (Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740,
47 Off. Gaz. [4], 1778)
There is, however, an, additional objection to the reinstatement raised in the memorandum submitted by the
attorneys for the respondents in lieu of oral argument. This is the fact that as petitioner was removed on June 16,
1953 and only filed his petition on July 1, 1954, or after a delay of one year and 15 days, petitioner should no longer
be allowed to claim the remedy, he being considered as having abandoned his office.
We can not or should not overlook this objection. If an employee is illegally dismissed, he may conform to such
illegal dismissal or acquiesce therein, or by his inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in law be considered
as having abandoned the office to which he is entitled to he reinstated. These defenses are valid defenses to an
action for reinstatement. To that effect is our decision in the case of Mesias vs. Jover, et al., 97 Phil., 899, decided
November 22, 1955. In that case we cited with approval Nicolas vs. United States, 66 L. Ed. 133, and the following
ruling therein contained:
"A person illegally dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from the obligation to take steps for his own
protection, and may not for an unreasonable length of time, acquiesce to the order of removal * * * and then sue to
recover the salary attached to the position. In case of unreasonable delay he may be held to have abandoned title to
the office and any right to recover its emoluments." (Mesias vs. Jover, supra.)
Difficulty in applying the principle lies in the fact that the law has not fixed any period which may be deemed to be
considered as an abandonment of office. In the abovecited case decided by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States, 11 months was considered an unreasonable delay amounting to abandonment of office and of the
right to recover its emoluments. H6wever, we note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the
action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the period
having been originally fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Proceedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be
an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally
dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of
one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons of
public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions
in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may be unduly retarded; delays in
the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The following considerations as to public
officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to employees in the civil service:
"Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer for one year could be
validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice may prevent, he being at liberty to
resign his position anytime he pleases. "And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that
the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainly, and the peoples' interest requires that such
right should be determined as speedily as practicable." (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off.Gaz., 18], 3693, 3695.)
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or
a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so 1&at title Government may not be faced with
the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and
another, for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. We hold that in view of the policy of the
State contained in the law fixing the period of one year within which actions for quo warranto may be instituted, any
person claiming right to a position in the civil service should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement
within the period of one year, otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.
One other point, merely procedural, needs to be considered. This is the fact that the objection as to the delay in
filing the action is raised, for the first time in this Court, not having been raised in the court below. The above
circumstance (belated objection) would bar the consideration if it were a defense merely. However, we consider it to
be essential to the petitioner's right of action that the same is filed within a year from the illegal removal. The delay is
not merely a defense which may be interposed against it subject to waiver. It is essential: to petitioner's cause of
action and may be considered even at this stage of the action.
"We would go farther by holding: that the period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to the existence of the
cause, of action, with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper although the matter
is not set up in the answer or motion to dismiss." (Abeto vs. Hodas, 46 Off. Gaz., [3], 930, 932.)
A defense of failure to state a cause of action is not waived by failure to raise same as a defense (section 10, Rule
9),
For all the foregoing considerations, we hold that as petitioner was dismissed on June 16, 1953 and did not file his
petition for mandamus for his reinstatement until July 1, 1956, or after a period of one year, he is deemed: to have
abandoned his right to his former position and is not entitled to reinstatement therein by mandamus. Without costs.
So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B., and Endencia,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35902             October 28, 1931

EXEQUIEL KARE, petitioner, 
vs.
SERVILIANO PLATON, Judge of First Instance of Albay, FRANCISCO PERFECTO, SULPICIO V. CEA,
GERONIMO P. VIBAL, AGRIPINO SEGOVIA, and FELIPE GARCIA, respondents.

Luis Baquizal, Honesto Bausa and Victor Bocaya for petitioner.

The respondent Judge in his own behalf.
Francisco Perfecto in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

VILLAMOR, J.:
In this original action arising from an election contest with reference to the office of third member of the provincial
board of Albay, it is prayed that a writ of prohibition be issued against the respondent judge requiring him to desist
and refrain from having his order of July 11, 1931, executed or enforced.

It appears from the complaint and the answer: (1) That the petitioner filed a motion of protest in the Court of First
Instance of Albay contesting the election of the respondent Francisco Perfecto, upon the grounds alleged therein;
(2) that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay entered an order on July 11, 1931, requiring the
petitioner to give two kinds of bond in order that proper proceedings might be taken on his motion of protest: A
personal bond for P3,000 and a cash bond of P2,000 to be deposited with the provincial treasurer of Albay within
the time specified in the order. These sums were later changed so that the cash bond was for P1,500 and the
personal bond for P3,500.

The petitioner invoked section 482 of the Election Law in support of his contention. The respondent judge bases his
action upon the same section and also upon section 479 as lately amended by Act No. 3699. Section 482 provides:

Bond or cash deposit required of contestants. — Before the court shall entertain any such contest or
counter-contest or admit an appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest, or appeal shall give bond in
an amount fixed by the court with two sureties satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will pay all expenses and
costs incident to such motion or appeal, or shall deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond. . . .

This section, it should be observed, is preceded by the heading, "Bond or cash deposit required of contestants,"
which apparently indicates that the court taking cognizance of the election contest may require the contestant either
to give a bond or to make a cash deposit. But the petitioner contends that the right to choose between giving a
personal bond and depositing a sum of money in lieu thereof is granted only to the contestant or appellant. If there
be any conflict between the heading of the section under question and the body, it must be settled according to the
canons of statutory construction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 181, says: "Headings prefixed to the titled,
chapters, and sections of a statute or code may be consulted in aid of the interpretation, in case of doubt or
ambiguity; but inferences drawn from such headings are entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the
plain terms of the enacting clauses." In a case in Kansas (Griffith vs. Carter, 8 Kan., 565), it is said that when a
statute is divided into separate subjects or articles, having appropriate headings, it must be presumed and held that
the provisions of each article are controlling upon the subject thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such
questions as are embraced therein. But the rule accepted by most of the authorities is that if the chapter or section
heading has been inserted merely for convenience of reference, and not as an integral part of the statute, it should
not be allowed to control the interpretation. (Union Steamship Co. vs. Melbourne Harbour Trust Comm'rs., L.R. 9
App. Cas., 365.)1awphil.net

Applying this rule to the case at bar, it will be seen that the present section provides that before the court entertain
any contest or counter-contest or admits an appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest or appeal shall give
bond with two sureties to the satisfaction of the court, or deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond. The contending
parties differ in this that while the respondent judge holds that the court may require either a bond or a cash deposit,
the petitioner maintains that it is to him alone the choice is given to file a personal bond or to make a cash deposit in
lieu thereof, inviting our attention to the opinion of the Attorney-General dated August 21, 1928, on the interpretation
of the aforesaid section 482 of the Election Law. The Attorney-General was of the opinion that in election contests
the contestant had to give a personal bond in the amount fixed by the court with two sureties satisfactory to it, and
that since he was under this alternative obligation, according to article 1132 of the Civil Code, he was entitled to
choose one or the other of the alternatives. We hold that the court may only require a personal bond, and that the
contestant may make a cash deposit in lieu thereof.

We shall now see how the court has demanded two kinds of bond of the petitioner by means of the order dated July
11, 1931. It reads as follows:

The bond to be given by the petitioner within five days hereafter with solvent sureties satisfactory to this
court is hereby fixed at five thousand pesos (P5,000) whereof P3,000 shall be in the form of a personal
bond, and P2,000 in cash to be deposited by the petitioner with the provincial treasurer within the time given.
Both bonds shall answer for the costs and expenses arising from this contest. The P2,000 cash shall be
applied to the payment of the first costs of transportation and the daily allowances of such municipal
treasurers, and municipal, provincial, and insular employees as may be cited to appear before the court in
connection with this contest, and the commissioners' fees of those whom the court may appoint.
Although this order provides that of the P5,000 bond, P3,000 shall be in the form of a personal bond, and P2,000 in
cash (or as subsequently altered, P3,500 shall be in the form of a personal bond, and P1,500 in cash);
nevertheless, the amount of P1,500 in cash does not coincide with the legal definition of a bond, inasmuch as it is
intended to defray the initial expenses arising from the contest. In reality, this sum of money is an advance given by
the contestant to defray the required expenses for the expedition of the contest. Formerly the provincial treasury
paid these expenses in the first instance, but section 479 of the Election Law which so provided, was amended by
Act No. 3699, relieving the provincial treasury of this obligation, thereby implying that in election cases the
contestant is to supply whatever may be necessary for the prompt despatch of his protest.

There is no question as to the court's discretionary power to demand of a contestant a certain sum of money in
advance to meet the initial expenses arising from the contest, such as the production of ballot boxes in court, etc. It
is true that the bond obliges the contestant or his sureties to pay all the costs arising from the contest, should he be
defeated, but the bond is not to be executed until the final determination of the protest. And it is well known that
certain services are required in the course of election contests which must be paid for immediately, because it would
be unjust to delay their payment until the termination of the contest.

Considering the order of July 11, 1931, in this sense, we believe that although it does not adhere strictly to legal
technical phraseology, there is in it no excess of jurisdiction or abuse of judicial discretion to be rectified by means of
the writ applied for.

Wherefore, the petition must be and is hereby denied, without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 39085           September 27, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appelle, 

vs.
ANTONIO YABUT, defendant-appellant.

Felipe S. Abeleda for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

BUTTE, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, convicting the appellant of the crime of
murder and assessing the death penalty.

The appellant, Yabut, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of murder upon the
following information:
 That on or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the accused Antonio
Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, in said city, did then and there, with intent to
kill, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously, assault, beat and use personal violence upon one
Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by then and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo
suddenly and unexpectedly from behind with a wooden club, without any just cause, thereby fracturing the
skull of said Sabas Aseo and inflicting upon him various other physical injuries on different parts of the body
which caused the death of the latter about twenty-four (24) hours thereafter.

That at the time of the commission of this offense, the said Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he having
previously been convicted twice of the crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of
final sentences rendered by competent tribunals.

Upon arraignment, the accused plead not guilty. The court below made the following findings of fact which, from an
independent examination of the entire testimony, we are convinced, are supported by the evidence beyond
reasonable doubt:

La brigada de presos, conocida como Brigada 8-A Carcel, el 1.º de agosto de 1932, estaba compuesta de
unos 150 o mas penados, de largas condenas, al mando del preso Jose Villafuerte, como Chief Squad
Leader, y del preso Vicente santos, como su auxiliar. forman parte de esta brigada el occiso Sabas Aseo, o
Asayo, el acusado Antonio Yabut y los presos llamados Apolonio Saulo, Isaias Carreon, Melecio Castro,
Mateo Bailon y los moros Taladie y Hasan.

Entre siete y media y ocho de la noche de la fecha de autos, estando ya cerrado el pabellon de la brigada,
pues se aproximaba la hora del descanso y silencio dentro de la prision, mientras el jefe bastonero
Villafuerte se hallaba sentado sobre su mesa dentro de la brigada, vio al preso Carreon cerca de el, y en
aquel instante el acusado Yabut, dirigiendose a Carreon, le dijo que, si no cobrada a uno que la debia, el
(Yabut) le abofetearia. El jefe bastonero Villafuerte trato de imponer silencio y dijo a los que hablaban que
se apaciguaran; pero, entre tanto, el preso Carreon se encaro con el otro preso Saulo cobrandole dos
cajetillas de cigarillos de diez centimos cada una que le debia. Saulo contesto que ya le pagaria, pero
Carreon, por toda contestacion, pego en la cara a saulo y este quedo desvanecido. En vista de esto, el jefe
bastonero se dirigio a su cama para sacar la porra que estaba autorizado a llevar. Simultaneamente
Villafuerte vio que el preso Yabut pegaba con un palo (Exhibit C) al otro preso Sabas Aseo, o Asayo,
primeramente en la nuca y despues en la cabeza, mientras estaba de espaldas el agregido Sabas, quien, al
recibir el golpe en la nuca, se inclino hacia delante, como si se agachara, y en ese momento el acusado
Yabut dio un paso hacia delante y con el palo de madera que portaba dio otro golpe en la cabeza a Sabas
Aseo, quien cayo al suelo.

El jefe bastonero Villafuerte se acerco al agresor Yabut para desarmarle, pero este le dijo: "No te acerques;
de otro modo, moriras." No obstante la actitud amenazadora de Yabut, Villafuerte se acerco y Yabut quiso
darle un golpe que iba dirigido a la cabeza, pero Villafuerte lo pudo desviar pcon la porra que Ilevaba. Los
dos lucharon y Ilegaron a abrazarse hasta que se le deslizo a Villafuerte la porra que llevaba. Continuaron
luchando ambos y el acusado Yabut llego a soltar el palo Exhibit C con que acometia a Villafuerte y habia
malherido al preso Sabas Aseo. Despues de aquello, Yabut consiguio zafarse de Villafuerte y se dirigio al
otro extremo de la brigada, escondiendose dentro del baño y alli fue cogido inmediatamente despues del
suceso por el preso Proceso Carangdang, que desempenaba el cargo de sargento de los policias de la
prision.

We reject, as unworthy of belief, the testimony of Yabut that it was Villafuerte, not he, who gave the fatal blow to the
deceased Aseo. The testimonies of Santiago Estrada, resident physician of the Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo
Anzures of the Medico Legal Department of the University of the Philippines, clearly establish that the death of Aseo
was caused by subdural and cerebral hemorrhages following the fracture of the skull resulting from the blow on the
head of Aseo. They further confirm the testimony of the four eyewitnesses that the deceased was struck from
behind.

On appeal to this court, the appellant advances the following assignments of error:

1. The lower court erred in applying article 160 of the Revised Penal Code.
 2. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence of the defense are contradictory and not corroborated.

3. The lower court erred in holding that the crime of murder was established by appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia.

4. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

In connection with the first assignment of error, we quote article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, in the Spanish text,
which is decisive:

Comision de un nuevo delito durante el tiempo de la condena por otro anterior — Pena. — Los que
comentieren algun delito despues de haber sino condenados por sentencia firme no empezada a cumpir, o
durante el tiempo de su condena, seran castigados con la pena señalada por la ley para el nuevo delito, en
su grado maximo, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la regla 5.a del articulo 62.

El penado conprendidoen este articulo se no fuere un delincuente habitual sera indultado a los setenta
años, si hubiere ya cumplido la condena primitiva, o cuando llegare a cumplirla despues de la edad
sobredicha, a no ser que por su conducta a por otras circunstancias no fuere digno de la gracia.

The English translation of article 160 is as follows:

Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense — Penalty. —
Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age
of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after
reaching said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such
clemency.

The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English translation of the headnote of
article 160 and would have us accept his deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the
new crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is
serving sentence. Inasmuch as the appellant was serving sentence for the crime of homicide, the appellant
contends the court below erred in applying article 160 in the present case which was a prosecution for murder
(involving homicide). While we do not concede that the appellant is warranted in drawing the deduction mentioned
from the English translation of the caption of article 160, it is clear that no such deduction could be drawn from the
caption. Apart from this, however, there is no warrant whatever for such a deduction (and we do not understand the
appellant to assert it) from the text itself of article 160. The language is plain and unambiguous. There is not the
slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article applies only in cases where the new offense is different
in character from the former offense for which the defendant is serving the penalty.

It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity
nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text,
especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the
general nature of the text that follows. (Cf. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.) A mere glance at the titles to
the articles of the Revised Penal code will reveal that they were not intended by the Legislature to be used as
anything more than catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each article. Being
nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the
effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not
to create doubt.

The remaining assignments of error relate to the evidence. We have come to the conclusion, after a thorough
examination of the record, that the findings of the court below are amply sustained by the evidence, except upon the
fact of the existence of treachery (alevosia). As some members of the court entertain a reasonable doubt that the
existence of treachery (alevosia) was established, it results that the penalty assessed by the court below must be
modified. We find the defendant guilty of homicide and, applying article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in
connection with article 160 of the same, we sentence the defendant- appellant to the maximum degree of reclusion
temporal, that is to say, to twenty years of confinement and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Sabas Aseo
(alias Sabas Asayo), in the sum of P1,000. Costs de oficio.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25291 March 10, 1977

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP
WORKER & EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES AND COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N 

CASTRO, C.J:

The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd., FGU Insurance Group, and Jose M. Olbes, through a motion for
reconsideration filed on April 21, 1971, ask this Court to re-examine its decision dated January 30, 1971.
In the main, the respondents question the review made by this Court of the determination of facts reached by the
Court of Industrial Relations and the consequent revision of the said findings of fact. The respondents allege that
this Court "swept into unmerited oblivion the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence" they proffered
which evidence consisted of

Exhibits "1" to "38", and the testimony of Messrs. Felipe Enage, Enrique Clemente, Vicente Abella,
Rodolfo R. Encarnacion, Nestor Cipriano, Mauro Blardoni, Sr., Ramon Garcia, Ramon M. Zosa,
Vicente R. Ayllon, Antonio L. Castillo, Carlos Valencia, Juan S. Raymundo, Jose Olbes, Calixto S.
Fernandez, Detective Lieutenant Felino Singh of the Manila Police Department Sergeant Crisanto
Lorenzo of the Manila Police Department, and Feliciano Morada. 1

Concededly, the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations, if supported by substantial evidence, bind this
Court. 2 This, for the reason that the rule of substantial evidence, rather than the rule of preponderance of evidence
applicable in ordinary civil cases, governs the Court of Industrial Relations in its findings of fact. 3 And substantial
evidence refers to "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." 4 There too, the substantiality, of the evidence depends on its quantitative as well as
its qualitative aspects. For, to be considered as substantial, Evidence should primarily be credible. 5

However, findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations unsupported by substantial and credible evidence do
not bind this Court. 6 And, certainly, the failure of substantial and credible proof to sustain the findings of fact of the
Court of industrial Relations justifies the review by this Court of the said factual determination. Conmitantly, the need
to revise, reverse or modify the factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations arises to enable this court to draw
the appropriate and correct conclusions for the proper resolution of the questions on the rights and obligations of the
parties involved.

Thus, before coming to the numerous errors which respondents claim have been committed by this Court in
reviewing and reversing the factual determination reached by the Court of Industrial Relations, we reiterate what we
stated in the decision of January 10, 1971: we deemed it necessary to review the entire factual milieu of the case in
controversy and to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the Court of Industrial Relations because we found the
sa same unsupported by Substantial evidence and much more, by credible proof.

The errors allegedly committed by this Court in its factual findings and its conclusions derived therefrom, properly
summed up and grouped, fall into three categories (1) those pertaining to findings and conclusions without basis on
record or contrary to the evidence on records (2) those referring to findings and conclusions contrary to the factual
determination made by and conclusions arrived at by the Court of Industrial Relations, and (3) those relating to
issues not raises or errors not assigned by the parties.

To the respondents' first cauldron of steaming objections belong the following factual findings and conclusions of
this Court purportedly unsupported by the records or contrary to what appears in the same: (1) that the respondents
instructed Ramon Garcia and Vicente Abella to create the disturbance which occurred on May 21, 1958; (2) that
Garcia issued a circular to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the
NATU; (3) that the respondents did not make counter-proposals to the Unions' demands and that the said
respondents insisted on the Unions' dropping their demands for union security, "promising money benefits if this
was done;" (4) that the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the restraining order "on the basis of the pendency of
the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions;" (5) that "more than 120 criminal charges" were
filed against the members of the Unions; (6) that the respondents hired Felipe Enage and Garcia, "former legal
counsels of the petitioner, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary respectively, with attractive
compensations," and (7) that Jose M. Olbes "brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed
men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru
only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the
premises of the Insular Life Building."

1. Anent the first point raised by the respondents, this Court, in the decision of January 30, 1971, stated:

There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create
such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's
office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance. 7
Earlier in the decision (Page 4) and in the preceding statements, this Court briefly recounted the circumstances
attending the occurrence. To claim that this Court, in the above-quoted portion of the decision, found and
categorically stated that Garcia and Abella participated in some sort of a pre- planned scheme to "create the
disturbance" constitutes but a mistaken impression of the statement of this Court. The statement simply express that
in the circumstances already mentioned — which circumstances the records unraveled — lurked the distinct
likelihood that Garcia and Abella purposely provided the provocation for the incident.

2. We find the second objection of the respondents well-taken, for the records offer little to provide sufficient clarity
on whether or not Garcia, as acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees
Association, "in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from
disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)." The transcript of the
proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations reveals only Garcia's apparent adeptness at evasion and
inability to recall, among other things, whether or not he issued the circular aforementioned. Nonetheless, the
foregoing questioned statement of this Court in the narration of facts in the decision bears no materiality to the
conclusions finally arrived at.

3. The respondents claim the statement of this Court that "the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but,
instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was
done" as "truly false" and "an unwarranted deviation from the truth." Far from being so, we find that the records
precisely support the finding. The thrust of the testimony of Enage (Pages 13 to 65, tsn, March 30, 1960; pages 7 to
13, tsn, April 29, 1960) — the chairman of the negotiating committee for the respondents — verily points out that the
said respondents omitted, without sufficient reasons, to present counter-proposals to the Unions' demands. This, in
addition to the testimonial evidence offered by Ignacio Lacsina (Pages 56 to 62, tsn, September 8, 1958) —
chairman of the negotiating panel for the Unions, — supports the finding that, indeed, the respondents offered no
counter-proposals to the demands of the said Unions. At most, the records reveal, the respondents, to placate the
Unions, indulged in the superficial discussion of the demands, requiring the said Unions to explain and clarify the
import of their demands. Then, too, the totality of the testimonial evidence of Lacsina (pages 35 to 38, tsn, October
14, 1958) and the Unions' panel members Villaruel (Pages 60 to 61, tsn, November 21, 1958) and Du Timbol
(Pages 25 to 26 and 30, tsn, November 18, 1959) clearly indicates that the respondents more than persuaded the
Unions to drop their union security demands with the promise of monetary benefits.

4. We consider the objection of the respondents to the statement of this Court that the Court of First Instance of
Manila issued the restraining order "on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking
members of the Unions" as well-founded. The records show that the respondents predicated their petition for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction (Exhibit "32-B") upon certain acts which the said respondents claimed
the picketing members of the striking Unions committed through "force, threats, intimidation, coercion and violence."
The restraining order (Exhibit "33-C") issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila on May 31, 1958 makes no
express mention of the pendency of the various criminal charges already filed against the picketing members of the
striking Unions. Nevertheless, the fact remains that on the day the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the
restraining order, several criminal charges (Exhibits "19," "20", "23" to "29," inclusive and "31") had been filed
already with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila against many of the picketing members of the Unions.

5. The respondents also question the statement of this Court giving the impression of the filing of "more than 120
criminal charges" against the members of the striking Unions. The evidence at hand (Exhibits "19", "20," "23", to
"31," inclusive) show, as of June 2, 1958, four complaints for coercion and seven for grave coercion already filed
with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. Each of the preliminary investigation memoranda, however, except three
(Exhibits "26," "29" and "30") names several members of the striking Unions collectively as accused. Counting the
charges individually — prescinding from the fact that a number of the members of the striking Unions then faced two
or more charges, having been named as accused in more than one memorandum the charges add up to eighty-
four. On this point, we sustain the objection of the respondents.

6. The respondents also allege as objectionable the following statement of this Court:

It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal
of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage
and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant
corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. 8
The respondents claim the "falsity of the finding" that Enage and Garcia worked as "legal counsels of the
petitioners" and alleged this Court as "unduly unkind" in giving the impression that they enticed Enage and Garcia
"from their positions as 'legal counsels of the petitioners' with high salaries." The records, however, evince that
Garcia served as Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation of Free Workers (Pages 59 to 61, tsn, August 4, 1961) and
that Garcia handled cases for the Federation of Free Workers (Page 58, tsn, August 4, 1961) with which the Unions
then formed an affiliation (Pages 59 to 62, tsn, August 4, 1961; page 62, tsn, January 16, 1962). With respect to
Enage, the records show that he worked with the Federation of Free Workers (Page 25, tsn, April 29, 1960). Even
the respondents, in their brief (Page 46), stated that Garcia and Enage worked as counsels for the Federation of
Free Workers. Nevertheless, assuming the truth of the respondents' assertion that neither Garcia nor Enage served
as counsel, directly or indirectly through the Federation of Free Workers, for the Unions, this passing mention of the
disputed former connection of Garcia and Enage to the said Unions bears no relevance to the principal merits of the
case at bar. As to the other observations of the respondents, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the same for only
a misreading of the aforequoted portion of the decision gives, in the words of the respondents themselves, "the
unkind impression that respondents enticed them (Enage and Garcia) from their position as 'legal counsels of the
petitioners' with high salaries."

7. The respondents' allegation that no evidence supports the statement of this Court that they, through their
president and manager Jose Olbes,

brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the
presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one
gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the
premises of the Insular Life Building.9

rounds up the objections of the said respondents properly falling under the first group, The respondents claim the
absence of Evidence showing that: (1) Olbes held the position of manager; (2) Olbes brought three truckloads of
"non-strikers and others;" (3) armed men escorted the non-strikers and others;" (4) eight entrances provided access
to the three buildings; and (5) that the gate through which the non-strikers and others entered measured "less than
two meters wide."

Object number one deals with an inconsequential detail — whether or not Olbes held, in any capacity, the position
of manager — which bears no materiality to the main issues raised by the case at hand.

As to number two, the evidence of the respondents' own witnesses — Ramon Zosa (Page 38, tsn, December 5,
1960), Nestor Cipriano (Pages 18, 19 and 26, tsn, February 1, 1961) and Olbes (Pages 7 to 13, 33, 34 and 45 to 50,
tsn, October 2, 1962) — more than sufficiently indicate the truth that Olbes led three busloads of non-strikers and
others to the picketed buildings. To this effect too, testified some witnesses of the Unions, particularly Ponciano
Abesamis (Pages 57 to 66, tsn, January 20, 1959) and Jose Victorio (Pages 19 to 25, tsn, June 11, 1959).

Regarding number three, the records miss to evince clearly whether or not armed men escorted the three JD buses
filled with non-strikers and others to the respondents' picketed premises.

On number four, a collation of all the evidence bearing on this objection ion reveal the following means of access of
the office premises of the respondents comprised of almost one block bounded by Plaza Cervantes, Plaza Moraga,
Muelle de la Industria and Juan Luna: (1) the Plaza Cervantes entrance to the Insular Life Building (Page 8, tsn,
February 8, 1961); (2) the two Plaza Moraga entrances to the Insular Life Building (Page 8, tsn, September 13,
1960); (3) the basement entrance to the Insular Life Building (Page 29, tsn, October 2, 1962); (4) the Juan Luna
entrance to the Ayala Building (Page 11, tsn, August 4, 1961); (5) the Muelle de la Industria entrance to the Ayala
Building (Page 27, tsn, August 4, 1961); (6) the Plaza Moraga entrance to the Filipinas Building (Page 21, tsn,
August 18, 1959); and (7) the entrance to the National City Bank of New York the premises of which have a
connecting door to the lobby of the Ayala Building (Page 30, tsn, October 2, 1962).

As to objection number five, not one of the parties offers any specific evidence showing the exact measurement of
the gate through which the non-strikers and others entered. The evidence on record relevant to this point disclose
that the gate measures about two to three meters wide.

The respondents further unleash their vigorous exception to the following findings arrived at by this Court; (1) that
the respondents discriminated against the strikers in the re-admission; (2) that the respondents dismissed thirty-four
strikers without lawful cause; (3) that the respondents omitted to give the dismissed strikers the opportunity to
defend themselves against the supposed charges against them; and (4) that the respondents' letter of May 21, 1959
(Exhibit "A") contained "promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work" and that the
said respondents' letter of May 31, 1958 (Exhibit "B") contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking
employees' in the event of their failure to report for work on June 2, 1958. The respondents strongly protest against
the alteration and reversal made by this Court of the factual determination reached by the Court of Industrial
Relations on these salient points.

Setting aside the incisive dissection performed by the respondents on the statements of this Court relevant and
related to the aforementioned findings, the arguments of the said respondents all but lead to their primary objection
that this Court erred in finding that they committed unfair labor practice. For, admittedly, the foregoing findings
provided this Court with the unshakeable bases in arriving at the inescapable conclusion that the respondents
committed unfair labor practice.

In the decision of January 30, 1971, this Court, fully cognizant that the findings now questioned by the respondents
constituted the considerations of importance to the issues involved in the case at bar, sufficiently and clearly, albeit
lengthily, discussed all of them. And a consultation with and a combing of the voluminous records disclose the
evidence, substantial and credible, in support of the said findings.

The respondents labor under the impression that, in the controversy at hand, the findings of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations deserve much weight and consideration. The said findings of fact, the respondents argue,
should remain conclusive. However, the want of substantial evidence, nay, credible proof, to uphold the findings of
the Court of Industrial Relations on the matters now disputed by the respondents, brought about by the mistaken
appreciation of the facts, prompted this Court to review the facts on record and to alter and reverse the
determination reached by the said Court of Industrial Relations. These, consequently, resulted in a view rather
different from that of the Court of Industrial Relations.

Not infrequently, the Court of Industrial Relations misapprehends the facts and, eventually, arrives at erroneous
conclusions. For in the Court of Industrial Relations, only one judge hears the case and usually, not even a judge
hears the same. Instead, a hearing examiner — an employee of the Court of Industrial Relations — takes charge of
the proceedings and receives the evidence. After hearing, the hearing examiner submits his report on the case to
the judge. The judge then studies the case and, relying on the ability and integrity of the hearing examiner who saw
and heard the witnesses and submitted the report, renders the decision. More often than not, the proceedings
before the Court of Industrial Relations drag through years before the case finally becomes subject to study and
decision by the judge.

And even in the reconsideration of the decision asked for by the aggrieved party, no rehearing takes place before
the Court of Industrial Relations en banc. The individual judges, if they have the disposition and the time to do so,
review the evidence on record or merely read and rely upon the memoranda submitted by the respective parties and
the decision subject of reconsideration, giving due consideration to the capability, competency and probity of the
judge who penned the said decision. And almost invariably, the Court of Industrial Relations en banc upholds the
decision for reconsideration. 10

The case at bar, this Court notes, passed from the hands of one hearing examiner — Arsenio Adriano — to another
— Guillermo Medina. This case also took more than seven years before its determination by the Court of Industrial
Relations. These factors, we opine, contributed to the misapprehension of facts committed by the Court of Industrial
Relations warranting a review of the factual determination in its totality.

Thus, this Court finds it neither important nor imperative to pursue any further discussion and resolution of the
matters claimed by the respondents as contrary to the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations. And for the
satisfaction of the respondents, an examination of the entire evidence on record makes it more apparent that
evidence of quantity and quality sustain, the findings of this Court on the aforementioned matters now disputed by
them.

To the third group of the respondents' objections appertain those findings of this Court on issues not raised or errors
not assigned by the parties. The respondents question the action taken by this Court in discussing and resolving the
following: (1) the question as to the nature of the strike staged by the Unions; (2) the issue as to whether or not the
respondents refused to bargain collectively in good faith; and (3) the question as to the reclassification of eighty-
seven employees as supervisors.

Concededly, the Rules of Court, in proceedings before the appellate courts, namely, the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, require the party seeking the review of a judgment to set out in his brief the errors upon which he
relies for reversal. Otherwise, the appellate courts would not consider those errors not properly assigned or
specified. 11 However, the Supreme Court has ample authority to review and resolve matters not assigned and
specified as errors by either of the parties in the appeal if it finds the consideration and determination of the same
essential and indispensable in order to arrive at a just decision in the case. 12 This Court, thus, has the authority to
waive the lack of proper assignment of errors if the unassigned errors closely relate to errors properly pinpointed out
or if the unassigned errors refer to matters upon which the determination of the questions raised by the errors
properly assigned depend. 13

The same also applies to issues not specifically raised by the parties. The Supreme Court, likewise, has broad
discretionary powers, in the resolution of a controversy, to take into consideration matters on record which the
parties fail to submit to the Court as specific questions for determination. 14 Where the issues already raised also
rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to the
former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the authority to include them in its discussion
of the controversy as well as to pass upon them. In brief, in those cases wherein questions not particularly raised by
the parties surface as necessary for the complete adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and such
questions fall within the issues already framed by the parties, the interests of justice dictate that the Court consider
and resolve them.

In the case at hand, the questions as to the nature of the strike staged by the Unions, the refusal of the respondents
to bargain collectively in good faith, and the reclassification of eighty-seven employees as supervisors relate closely
to the determination of whether or not the respondents committed unfair labor practice. Thus, this Court found it
necessary to resolve these issues, without confining itself to those tendered by the parties.

In the same vein, we are also constrained to reassess the ruling in our decision of January 30, 1971 to the effect
that the strikes must receive backwages from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their
discharge or their offer to return to work up to the date of their actual reinstatement, deducting therefrom whatever
they have earned pending readmission.

Significant changes have since supervened as to the method of awarding backwages. In a line of cases, the court
has established a policy of fixing the amount of backwages to a just and reasonable level without qualification or
deduction.

Blazing the trail is Mercury Drug Co. vs. CIR, 15 L-23357, April 30, 1974, which enunciated the policy. The doctrine is
not without justification, for, in the same case, it was stated that the evident aim is "to avoid protracted delay in the
execution of the award of backwages due to extended hearings and unavoidable delays and difficulties encountered
in determining the earnings of the laid-off employees ordered to be reinstated with backwages during the pendency
of the case for purposes of deducting the same from the gross backwages awarded."

Feati University Club vs. Feati University, L-35103, August 25, 1974, adopted a consensus policy of pegging the
amount of backwages to their total equivalent for three years (depending on the circumstances) without deduction or
qualification. The rationale for the policy was stated in the following words:

As has been noted, this formula of awarding reasonable net backwages without deduction or
qualification relieves the employees from proving or disproving their earnings during their lay-off and
the employers from submitting counterproofs, and obviates the twin evils of Idleness on the part of
the employee who would "with folded arms, remain inactive in the expectation that a windfall would
come to him" (Itogon Suyoc Mines, Inc. vs. Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, 24 SCRA 873 (1968),
cited in Diwa ng Pagkakaisa vs. Filtex International Corp., 43 SCRA 217 (1972)) and attrition and
protracted delay in satisfying such award on the part of unscrupulous employers who have seized
upon the further proceedings to determine the actual earnings of the wrongfully dismissed or laid-off
employees to hold unduly extended hearings for each and every employee awarded backwages and
thereby render practically nugatory such award and compel the employees to agree to
unconscionable settlements of their backwages award in order to satisfy their dire need. (See La
 Campana Food Products, Inc. vs. CIR, 28 SCRA 314 (1969) and Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa vs.
La Campana Food Products, Inc., 36 SCRA 142 (1970)).

The above judicial policy became entrenched in our jurisprudence when the Court, in Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation and B.H. Tenefrancia vs. CIR, et al., L-34300, November 22, 1974, reiterated the same way of
computation, decreeing the grant of backwages not exceeding three years without requiring the parties to submit
proof of compensation received from other sources from the time of the illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement. 16

We must now respond to the pronouncements in the above and related cases if we are to give our law on the matter
order, direction and light.

Here, a total of eighteen (18) years has elapsed from June 2, 1958, date of the commencement of the backwages.
Considering all the commencement of the backwages. Considering all the circumstances at bar, viz., the lengthy
procedural and technical manipulations of the parties, the delay in the resolution of the case by the court below, the
complexity of the issues raised by the parties which were resolved only on January 30, 1971, etc., the Court
considers the fixing and limitation of the backwages award to their total equivalent of three years without
qualification and deduction as applicable to and fully justified in the case at bar.

The Court finds no sufficient or compelling reason to further depart from its judgment as embodied in the decision of
January 30, 1971.

ACCORDINGLY, subject to the above modification as to backwages, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
denied, and the judgment of the Court as embodied in its decision of January 30, 1971 is affirmed in all other
respects. This denial is immediately executor.

Barredo., Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO,
EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA,
JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A.
BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO
LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE
LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
UBALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO
REFUNCION, respondents.

Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of
Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.

Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.

Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.

Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.

Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.

Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General,
are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII,
presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao
M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below —
an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts
which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element
of the crime.

Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue
which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.

A — The Information filed by the People —

1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN,

accused.
 Crim. Case No. 19639

VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3,

Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden handle
of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-¾ inches, which the said accused carried outside of his
residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his livelihood
nor being used in connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)

The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.

CRIM. CASE NO.

29677

VIOL. OF PAR. 3,

PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI

No. 266 of the Chief

Executive dated April

1, 1975

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3,

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive
dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:

That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and
pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the same not being
used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)

The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.

 CRIM. CASE NO. 933

For:

ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF

DEADLY WEAPON

(VIOLATION OF PD
NO. 9)

INFORMATION

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of
the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued
by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept.
21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of
Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the
abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his
residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such as
could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act committed by the
accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)

B. — The Orders of dismissal —

In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one
essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the
accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:

... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside
residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege
that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of
the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are
contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this specific
allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not allege
sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases
under consideration suffer from this defect.

xxx xxx xxx

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No.
9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in their
hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which
only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer
had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of
one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available
 even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more
incriminating than the infamous paltik.

For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can
never be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who
are inclined to backsliding.

The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the
conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by
the desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)

2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the
maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to
conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside
of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one
that abetssubversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public
disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by
the fact that all previously existing laws that also made the carrying of similar weapons punishable
have not been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree
No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's
person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful
and punishable by law.

With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant
Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made
unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of the
person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the
prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law
enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in order
that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will
be liable for punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the
decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood
because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.

This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied
in the manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in
promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It
may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.

xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President
intended to make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3
thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)

3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before
him, thus:
 ... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same should
be or there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No.
1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was issued because of wanton
destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the
tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the
quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a
permit unless the same would fall under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more
compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict
enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty
upon the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of status
symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as
their farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in
going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)

In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal
case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash
the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate
release unless held on other charges.

C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.

As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.

We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9

DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22,
1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES THEREFORE.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has
been placed under a state of martial law;

WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22,
1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;

WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public
disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of
firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of

the Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon
conviction suffer:

(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military,

Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is
attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the performance of
 their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if such
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity causing
the death of the victim used in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions
promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081:

(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;

(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or
private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the
firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of
said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.

2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other
explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or
other incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents
containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling
that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the
compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous objects or
of causing injury or death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by
imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan
knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are
being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the
commission of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon
the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular offenses
committed or intended to be committed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-two.

(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President
Republic of the Philippines

D. — The arguments of the People —

In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and
the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument
advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized
for reasons of public policy.1

The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits
the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and
condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the
like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law
days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information.2

E. — Our Ruling on the matter —

1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. 3

Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or
information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford
him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.  4

To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is
imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling
reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of
respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a
Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:

Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie
knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section
shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five
hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4,
1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or both,
at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its
deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is
necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute
and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of
the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.

We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by
P.D. 9 (3).  5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not
favored.  6This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be
construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.  7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code
provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer
or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case, the
right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of
the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of
negligent or misguided official action — a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of
their judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.

2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the
Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the
presidential decree in question?

We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying
the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of
the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons
described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city
ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.

Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D.
9(3).

3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his
residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose,
converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is
manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a
judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that
penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.

4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these cases — the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor,
for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit
of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity,
injustice and contradictions.  8

There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).

First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled
out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to
Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed
and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.

The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is
not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120,
rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the
decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason
which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)

We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D.
9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree
and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which
are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."
(West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble";
emphasis supplied)

While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself
ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty
which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and
Phrases, "Preamble")

In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular
provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might
easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited
application if read together with other provisions.  9

Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.

In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:

NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of

the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

xxx xxx xxx

From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of
Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms
and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect
to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:

WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted government
and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection
and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders,
spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against
innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have seriously
endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and the security of the nation, ...

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos
and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces
of our duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations
because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations,
acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders
and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have
pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless
they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state
power in this country by overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital
Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines, pp. 13-39)

It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to
the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.

Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be

remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine
Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)

When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute
should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by
E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de
Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)

5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict
adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequences.9-a

It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work
a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a
weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10

At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No.
9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in their
hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which
only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer
had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of
one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available
even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more
incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)

And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times.
To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his
house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while
crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him
under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to
produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?

6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion
of the court limited."  11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality
but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.12

Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:

Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms who is
not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by
the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684,
692)

F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.

The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may
constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged
therein.13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the
accusation is in order.

Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the complaint or
information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was
rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal.  14

In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the
Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute a
public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145.  15

G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other available
remedies below.

Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:

Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is sustained
the court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in
custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having
been made another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such
further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be
discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge.

Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance
or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during
the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

xxx xxx xxx

Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:

First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include the
second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the
facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the
prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information. 16

Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780,
quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if
not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.

Section 8. Rule 117 states that:

An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this
rule.

Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal action or liability
had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of double jeopardy.
(ibid., [h])

As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases
should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.

H. — We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true to
the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular
circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3)
and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face
of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on
October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:

In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of
carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted
authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9. 17

Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial
task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental
rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have
to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing
circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their
faith in their government.

WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges
dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the preceding
pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended
Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city
ordinance as the facts may warrant.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.

Aquino, J, took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. Nos. L-45280-81 June 11, 1981,

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FELIX GARCIA and PASTOR MINDAROZA, accused

appellants.

GUERRERO, J.:

Before Us for automatic review is the Joint Decision Rendered by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo City, 8th Judicial District, Branch III, in Criminal Cases Nos. 708-SP and 709-SP, imposing the death penalty
on Felix Garcia y Mindaroza and Pastor Mindaroza y Tiquizchanrobles virtual law library
The complaint in Criminal Case No. 708-SP charged herein appellants with the crime of rape committed as
follows:chanrobles virtual law library

That on or about June 1, 1975, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with lewd
design, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with the use of a deadly weapon, raped complainant
LYDIA CATIBOG in the following manner, to wit: both accused dragged the complaint towards a secluded area and
once there the accused Felix Garcia violently tore and removed the dress of complainant, while his co-accused
Pastor Mindaroza removed her panty, forcing her to lie down, placing himself on top of her while Pastor Mindaroza
held her feet, and did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of her against her will.

The complaint in Criminal Case No. 709-SP charges:chanrobles virtual law library

That on or about June 1, 1975, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with lewd
design, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with the use of a deadly weapon, raped complainant
LYDIA CATIBOG in the following manner, to wit: both accused dragged the complainant towards a secluded place
and after accused Felix Garcia has raped her, he held the feet of the complainant while the accused Pastor
Mindaroza placed himself on top of her, and did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge of her against her will..

Both complaints were signed by the complainant and her mother, Julia Montalbo, who assisted her. The charges in
the two criminal cases having been founded upon the same facts, the lower Court tried both cases
jointly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The prosecution's version of the incident is as follows: On June 1, 1975, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the
fourteen-year old complainant Lydia Catibog was in her stepfather's coconut plantation untying one of their cows
Tethered to a coconut tree about 100 meters from their house. It was then that the two accused Felix Garcia and
Pastor Mindaroza, complainant's barriomates and both well-known to her, took hold of her, covered her mouth,
threatened her with a knife, and dragged her to a banana plantation about seven meters away. There, both accused
forced complainant to he down and took turns in raping her. It was Felix who did it first while Pastor held
complainant's feet. Felix tore her dress, slashed her panty with a knife and pulled it down, took off his trousers,
placed himself on top of complainant, kissed her, touched her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Complainant felt pain in her female organ. When it was Pastor's turn, Felix held complainant's legs. Pastor kissed
complainant, touched her breasts, and inserted her penis into complainant's vagina. All this time, complainant tried
to free herself and was crying. After the accused had satisfied their carnal desires, Felix made a remark to the effect
that he had already avenged his brother ("naipaghiganti na raw ang kanyang kapatid") and warned complainant not
to ten anyone of what happened, otherwise she would be killed. Both accused
left.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Complainant then raised her panty and pulled down her dress, both torn and blood-stained and walked towards her
home. On the way, she met Danilo Diamante. Complainant did not reveal immediately the matter to her mother or
stepfather. Her mother came to know of the incident only thirteen (13) days later, or on June 14, 1975.
Complainant's mother immediately caged a family conference and it was decided that charges would be filed. On
the very same day, the rape was reported to the authorities, to the Barrio Captain and Police, and complainant was
internally examined at the San Pablo City Hospital. The Medico-Legal Certificate, which is on record, contains the
following findings:chanrobles virtual law library

Healed laceration at 3:00 o'clock position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Hymen - ruptured.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Vaginal opening admits one finger freely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Smear for spermatozoa - Negative. 1chanrobles virtual law library

As for the accused Felix Garcia's remark abovementioned, he was referring to an incident that took place on
February 3, 1975 when his brother Raymundo Garcia embraced complainant, which resulted in the filing of charges
against said Raymundo at the City Hall. The case was amicably settled later when Raymundo asked complainant's
mother for forgiveness and executed a statement (Exhibit "A") wherein he acknowledged his misdeed and promised
that he would not repeat the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defense had quite a different story to tell, that accused Felix Garcia and complainant had been sweethearts
more or less one year prior to the incident in question. They had love trysts in the banana plantation where they had
met for about fifteen (1 5) times and complainant allowed Felix to kiss her and have sexual intercourse with her.
However, because complainant always insisted that the act should be done in a standing position to avoid
pregnancy, there was never any penetration. One such rendezvous took place four days before June 1, 1975 when
Felix met complainant again in the banana plantation to make love. Complainant took off her panty and pulled her
dress up while Felix unzipped his pants. They were embracing each other and trying to have sexual intercourse in a
standing position when they heard someone laugh. It turned out that accused Pastor Mindaroza, first cousin of Felix
Garcia, was watching them. Pastor ran away, but complainant was angry at Felix, pushed him and said,
"Walanghiya ka bakit mo ibinibilad ako! " She also said that she would bring a complaint against Felix. It was only
four days later, or on June 1, 1975, when Pastor and Felix saw each other again, this time at the house of their
grandfather, but they did not converse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The trial Court accorded full credence to the testimony of the offended party and rendered the joint decision now
under review, the dispositive portion of which is hereinbelow quoted:chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the court finds both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged in the aforesaid
two informations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In Crim. Case No. 708-SP: the accused Felix Garcia and Pastor Mindaroza are charged with rape with the qualifying
circumstance of 'with the use of a deadly weapon,' defined and penalized under Art. 335, par. 3, Rev. Penal Code
as amended by R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, with reclusion perpetua to death. This is borne out by the facts on the
record. The evidence also shows that after Felix Garcia had raped the victim with the help of his co-accused Pastor
Mindaroza, the latter in turn with the help of Felix Garcia, abused the girl. In accordance with settled jurisprudence,
this circumstance, although not alleged in the information, may be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance which would call for the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period, which in
accordance with Art. 63, par. 2, No. 2, Rev. Penal Code, should be the greater penalty of death. Since also it is
settled that once conspiracy is shown, each is guilty as principal not only of the rape committed by an accused but
also of that committed by his co- defendant (People vs. Villa, 81 Phil. 193; People vs. Alfaro, 91 Phil. 404; People
vs. Soriano, L-29057, Oct. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 450; People vs. Canete No. L-3049 1, Jan. 21, 1972, 43 SCRA 14)
each of the two accused Felix Garcia as principal by direct participation and Pastor Mindaroza as principal by
indispensable cooperation should each be sentenced in criminal case No. 708-SP to suffer the penalty of death,
jointly and severally to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P12,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In Crim. Case No. 709-SP, the two accused, are charged with rape with the use of a deadly weapon and the
allegation that after accused Felix Garcia has raped the victim, the other accused Pastor Mindaroza with the help of
Felix Garcia abused the girl, another circumstance which according to Art. 335, Par. 3, Rev. Penal Code qualifies
the crime. This latter circumstance will be appreciated against the accused only as a generic aggravating
circumstance which as observed in the preceding paragraph raised the imposible penalty to greater penalty which is
death. Also as observed above, defendant it Felix Garcia is liable for the rape committed by Pastor Mindaroza.
Hence, the accused Pastor Mindaroza as principal by direct participation and Felix Garcia. as principal by
indispensable cooperation, should each be sentenced in crime case No. 709-SP to suffer the penalty of death,
jointly and severally to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P12,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

However, in view of the provision of PD 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code) Art. 192 thereof, the proceedings
herein are suspended and the accused Felix Garcia, born May 2, 1956, and Pastor Mindaroza, born August 6,
1955, are hereby committed to the National Training School for Boys (Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation Center)
Tanay, Rizal, until they shall have reached twenty-one (21) years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may
deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the said government agency. In view of the
seriousness of the crime committed and the severity of the imposable penalty, the Director of the aforenamed
institution is hereby directed to exercise utmost caution in the safekeeping of the herein accused to forestall possible
escape. They should be brought before this Court at the latest upon their reaching the age of 21 to be dealt with in
accordance with Art. 197 of said PD 603.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

City of San Pablo, February 11, 1976. 2chanrobles virtual law library

Pursuant to the foregoing judgment, Felix and Pastor were committed to the National Training School for Boys
(Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation Center) in Sampaloc, Tanay, Metro Manila. On June 21, 1976, the Court a quo was
informed by the Officer-In-Charge of the said rehabilitation center, Mrs. Constancia G. Bolinao, in a letter dated June
4, 1976, that Felix "left the institution without permission on May 29, 1976 at about 2:00 p.m." 3chanrobles virtual law
library

On the other hand, Pastor Mindaroza reached the age of twenty-one (21) years on August 6, 1976, and on
September 8, 1976, the Department of Social Welfare, through the abovenamed Officer-In-Charge of the Vicente
Madrigal Rehabilitation Center, submitted to the lower Court a Final Report dated September 4, 1976 as
follows:chanrobles virtual law library

PASTOR MINDAROZA, who was 21 years of age, last August 6, 1976, accused in the above- entitled was admitted
to the National Training School for Boys (Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation Center), Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal on March
5, 1976 as per order of this Honorable Court dated February 24, 1976 pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 603.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As per institutional procedure minor upon admission was placed at the Reception Cottage where he was oriented
with the rules and regulations of the center as well as the programs and services provided for him towards his total
rehabilitation. The importance of the privileges given as provided for by the Presidential Decree 603 were clearly
stressed to enable him to have aspiration to make good to merit was early release from the center. During sessions
with minor he verbalized his willingness to undergo such process and promised to
cooperate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are glad to inform this Honorable Court that minor has maintained his exemplary behavior since his admission.
He has acted remarkably in accordance with the rules and regulations we have in the center. Members of the
Rehabilitation Team concurred that he is cooperative, trustworthy, obedient, hardworking and industrious in the
performance of his task thereby making him likeable to almost everyone. Aside from his task in the cottage and in
the field minor was involved in different activities last summer such as recreational activities like basketball, monthly
social and also outings at the different historical spots.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Having availed of the services of the National Training School for Boys Rehabilitation Team geared towards his total
rehabilitation he gradually reacted positively to all of the therapeutic programs given hintchanrobles virtual law
library

Regarding his spiritual development, Pastor was observed to be a devoted Catholic. He attended masses every
Sunday and Holidays of Obligation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

He is presently engaged in tailoring as his chosen vocational course wherein he acquired skills and shows marked
interest in it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Record shows that he was visited occasionally by his parents and siblings for which he was so happy and thankful.
Such visits had encouraged him to behave properly. Inquiries regarding the plans of his parents revealed that they
expressed their intense desire to have minor with them and will be working in a construction which job is now
waiting for him. The parents promised to give the love, care and attention due
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Frequent session with minor revealed his eagerness and desire to rejoin his family and is amenable to his parents'
plans. He has the determination to leave behind the dubious pasts and do what is right and honest in order to have
peacefully with dignity and respect in the community where he properly
belongs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603, it is respectfully
recommended that the case handed down by this Honorable Court against herein accused, PASTOR MINDAROZA,
be dismissed and definitely terminated and that he be discharged from the National Training School for Boys
(Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation Center), Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal to the care and custody of his parents, Mr. & Mrs.
Apolinario Mindaroza of Bo. San Pedro, San Pablo City.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is also requested that for its information and guidance this office be advised of whatever action this Honorable
Court may deem proper regarding this matter. 4chanrobles virtual law library

The foregoing favorable recommendation notwithstanding, the Court a quo on November 4, 1976 pronounced the
judgment of conviction insofar as Pastor Mindaroza was concerned. Pertinent portions of the "Promulgation of
Judgment (on Pastor Mindaroza)" are quoted hereinbelow:chanrobles virtual law library

Under Section 197 of PD 603 the court is given the authority either to dismiss the case or to pronounce the
judgment of conviction. It is the painful task of the court to decide on the latter course and to pronounce the
judgment of conviction. It is impelled by the following considerations (a) the seriousness of the offenses committed
(b) the degree of perversity demonstrated by the herein accused in the commission of the crimes as narrated in the
decision (c) the herein accused was 19 years, 9 months and 25 days when he abused the victim, age. 14. The court
therefore is pronouncing judgment on the herein accused Pastor Mindaroza by the reading of the decision in the
presence of the accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In view of the death penalty imposed in each of these cases, let the records of these case be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for review. 5chanrobles virtual law library

Thereafter, Pastor Mindaroza was committed to the National Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, Rizal. 6 chanrobles virtual
law library

At the outset, the first question arises as to whether the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, was correctly applied by the trial court to the accused-appellants. Said Code,
which was approved on December 10, 1974, took effect six months after its approval, 7 or on June 8, 1975. 8 Before
the cut-off date, the law in force was Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code under which a minor "under sixteen years
of age at the date of the commission of a grave or less grave felony" was entitled to the benefit of suspended
sentence. On the other hand, P.D. 603 granted the benefit of suspended sentence to a youthful offender defined in
the first paragraph of its Article 189 as one "who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense. " chanrobles virtual law library

The records show that at the time the alleged crime was committed on rune 1, 1975, appellants were both nineteen
(19) years old, the accused Garcia having been born on May 2, 1956 and Mindaroza on August 6, 1955. A week
after the commission of tile crime on June 1, 1975, P.D. 603 took effect on June 8, 1975. On the question whether
P.D. 603 may be given retroactive , We rule that since P.D. 603 is more favorable to the accused in that the
sentence against them may be suspended, said Decree may be given retroactive effect, not only with the end in
view of giving force and effect to the laudable policies for which the P.D. otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code was promulgated, one of which is that of exerting every effort to promote the child's welfare and
enhance his opportunities for a happy and useful life, 9 but also in the light of the provisions of Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code as follows:chanrobles virtual law library

Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of
a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time
of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

The trial court was therefore correct in applying P.D. 603, suspending the sentence on the two accused and
committing them to the National Training School for boys (Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation Center) Tanay, Rizal, until
they shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after
considering the reports and recommendations of the said government agency. The Director of the aforenamed
institution was also directed to exercise utmost caution in the safekeeping of the herein accused to forestall possible
escape in view of the seriousness of the crimes committed and the severity of the imposable
penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As indicated earlier the accused Felix Garcia left the institution without permission on May 29, 1976 but he was
apprehended three years later by the police of San Pablo City on December 13, 1979 and brought before the Court
on January 8, 1980 and the judgment of conviction was read and promulgated to said accused Felix Garcia,
imposing upon him the penalty of death and to indemnify the offended party jointly and severally with the accused
Pastor Mindar0oza the sum of P12,000 as moral damages and to pay the costs.  10He was likewise committed to the
National Penitentiary on January 8, 1980.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The promulgation of judgment on the accused Pastor Mindaroza 11 is assailed by the defense counsel as illegal and
a complete nullity, contending that pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603, said accused is
entitled to the dismissal of the case insofar as he is concerned and to be finally discharged, on the basis of the Final
Report of the Department of Social Welfare dated September 4, 1976.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtuary

The contention is meritorious.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

P.D. No. 603 took effect six months after December 10, 1974. Since then, most of the provisions in its Chapter III on
Youthful Offenders have been amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1179 and 1210, which became effective on
August 15, 1977 and October 11, 1977, respectively. The pertinent provisions of P.D. 603, prior to the subsequent
amendments, are the following:

Art. 196. Dismissal of the case. - If it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the youthful offender whose
sentence has been suspended, has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the
community, even before reaching the age of majority, upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare, it
shall dismiss the case and order his final discharge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 197. Return of the Youthful Offender to Court. - Whenever the youthful offender has been found incorrigible or
has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation programs, or should his continued stay in the
training institution be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the committing court for the pronouncement of
judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one while in commitment, the court shall
determine whether to dismiss the case in accordance with the next preceding article or to pronounce the judgment
of conviction.

In any case covered by this article the youthful offender shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the full
time spent in actual commitment and detention effected under the provisions of this Chapter. 12chanrobles virtual law
library

There is no doubt as to the applicability of the foregoing provisions to appellant Pastor Mindaroza. Amending Article
80 of the Revised Penal Code, the first paragraph of Article 189 of P.D. 603, prior to its amendment by P.D. 1179,
defined a youthful offender as one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense. 13 Having been born on August 6, 1955, 14appellant Mindaroza was nineteen years and
ten months old at the time he was supposed to have committed the crime for which he was found guilty by the trial
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We find that the Court a quo erred in failing to comprehend the implications of the second paragraph of Article 197
of P.D. 603. It is clear from said provision that the trial court has two alternative courses of action with respect to a
youthful offender whose sentence it had suspended and who is returned to the court upon his reaching the age of
majority, and these are: (1) to dismiss the case and order the final discharge of said offender, or (2) to pronounce
the judgment of conviction. In plain and simple language, it is either dismissal or sentence. As to the first course of
action, the second paragraph of Article 197 makes an explicit referral to Article 196. Thus, when the offender has
reached twenty-one, the Court should dismiss the case and discharge the offender if:chanrobles virtual law library

(1) he has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community; and
(2) the dismissal and discharge is recommended by the Department of Social Welfare.

For pronouncement of judgment, however, Article 197 makes no reference to any particular provision, hence at first
blush it would appear that the authority of the court to pronounce the sentence is absolute. It was probably for this
reason that the Court a quo proceeded, despite Article 196, to promulgate its sentence on appellant Mindaroza,
apparently under the notion that the same could be done provided the Court could give its own grounds or
justifications. Herein lies the error of the trial Court. The very application of Article 196 to cases of dismissal and
discharge necessarily implies that if Article 196 does not apply, i.e., if the requisites for its application are not
fulfilled, the court should proceed to pronounce the sentence. In the last analysis, therefore, the final disposition of
the case as far as the trial court is concerned, which as stated earlier involves the matter of deciding between
dismissal and sentence, rests on how the provisions of Article 196 apply to the case at
hand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Article 196 speaks of facts, circumstances or events obtaining after the court has issued the order of commitment of
the Youthful offender or, in other words, after the criminal case has been tried and the minor found guilty. In effect,
from the time the trial court issues such order of commitment, it is as if the past is temporarily set aside and the
youthful offender is given a new lease in life, so that with proper help and guidance, he may yet prove himself to be
a useful member of society. What solely becomes of material consequence to the court is what transpired during the
period of the youthful offender's commitment. Antecedent matters such as those mentioned by the Court a quo in
the instant case, namely, the seriousness of the offenses committed, the degree of perversity demonstrated by the
accused in the commission of the crimes, and the age of the accused at the time the offenses were perpetrated, do
not have any bearing at all in the determination of whether the case is to be dismissed or sentence is to be
pronounced on the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bar, that the requisites of Article 196 have been satisfied as to appellant Mindaroza needs no lengthy
discussion. A mere perusal of the detailed and complete Final Report of the Department of Social Welfare (now the
Ministry of Social Services and Development) through the Officer-In-Charge of the Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation
Center where Mindaroza was committed, suffices to convince Us that under the law, said appellant should now be
finally discharged and the case against him dismissed. The Report contains nothing which may, in the slightest, be
deemed as adverse or prejudicial to Mindaroza. On the contrary, the language used therein could not have been
more favorable and commendatory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Notwithstanding what has been said above, however, Our task is not concluded by the finding that herein appellant
Pastor Mindaroza should be discharged pursuant to Article 197 in relation to Article 196 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, for the same Code explicitly provides:chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 198. The final release of a child pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall not obliterate his civil liability for
damages. Such release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the recovery of civil
damages.

The civil liability for damages referred to is apparently that obligation created by or arising from the crime, otherwise
known as ex delicto, 15the imposition of which is mandated by Articles 100, 104 (3), 107 and 345 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code. 16 and is based upon a finding of the guilt of the accused. For the purpose, therefore, of deciding the
imposability of the civil liability on said appellant under Article 198 above-quoted, We must review the trial Court
decision, particularly that aspect thereof finding Mindaroza guilty of the crime
charged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appeal centers on the alleged existence of reasonable doubt warranting The acquittal of the appellants in that:
(1) there was undue delay in reporting the alleged rape, and (2) the evidence for the prosecution is improbable,
incredible and inconsistent, especially on the force and violence allegedly
employed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After carefully going over the records, however, We find that We are in accord with and, wherefore, affirm the trial
Court's evaluation of the evidence, to wit:chanrobles virtual law library

The court has carefully examined the testimony of complaining witness and has not found a single detail in her story
that runs counter to human nature and experience. On the contrary, her entire version of the incident - locale,
occasion, opportunity and the manner the act was committed - is inherently credible. The court also had opportunity
to observe that the complaining witness was a young innocent-looking girl who testified shyly and in a soft voice in a
very straightforward manner. The court therefore accords full credence to the
testimony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The motive that the accused would attribute to the complaining witness for filing the complaint against them -
revenge against Felix Garcia for allegedly exposing her to embarrassment before Pastor Mindaroza - is hardly
persuasive for it is contrary to human nature that a young girl would expose her sorry plight with all the
embarrassment that it entails for a relatively minor thing as self-satisfaction of revenge. The defense though
ingenious is puerile in that while suggesting that complaining witness resorted to this charge to same face, it
overlooked the fact that a resort to this device was costlier in terms of besmirched reputation and
humiliation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Now let us analyze defendant Garcia's version. According to Felix Garcia, he did not have to rape Lydia Catibog
because she was his sweetheart. In fact, according to him, he had love trysts with Lydia on no less than 15
occasions and during those times he tried to have sexual intercourse with her but was unable to insert his penis into
the girl's vagina because they were doing it in a standing position. Granting that Lydia was a young virgin, the
chances still are that Felix Garcia, being a young man, would have made a penetration out of so many attempts.
Besides, it stands to reason that after so many failures in the standing position, Felix Garcia would not be lacking in
imagination to suggest and resort to the more conventional position of lying
down.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Felix Garcia also testified that it was not on June 1, 1975 but four (4) days before that date that Lydia and he had a
love tryst at the banana plantation, and that it was on this occasion that his coaccused Pastor Mindaroza chanced
upon them (Sess. Oct. 30 & Nov. 11, 1975). Now, in his statement Exh. C, taken June 14, 1975, he stated that they
were sweethearts for almost a year (Q. No. 10); that one week after they became sweethearts, he and Lydia petted
(Q. No. 1 1) the second week, she gave her body to him (Q. No. 1 1) by having sexual intercourse in standing
position (Q. No. 12), and it was on the second outing that Pastor Mindaroza surprised them (Q. 15, marked Exh. C-
1). Now, if these were true, they were surprised by Pastor Mindaroza about the end of June, 1974, not 4 days
before June 1, 1975 as testified to by Felix Garcia on the witness stand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

On the other hand, the accused Pastor Mindaroza claimed that he surprised them (Felix Garcia and Lydia Catibog)
in a compromising situation about the end of May, 1975 (Sess. Nov. 11, 1975). This coincides with Felix Garcia's
testimony, 4 days before June 1, 1975. Yet, Pastor Mindaroza in his statement, Exh. D, declared that he saw Felix
and Lydia embracing each other in the month of March (Q. No. 13, marked Exh. D-
1).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Defendants' version of the incident is not only inherently unbelievable but categorically belied by Lydia Catibog
when she declared that nobody has ever courted her nor had she ever a sweetheart (Sess. Sept. 9, 1975) that
before June 1, 1975 she never had any love tryst with the accused Felix Garcia (Sess. Oct. 7, 1975). Defendants'
testimonies are also pockmarked with contradictions by their written statements given to the police as shown
above. 17chanrobles virtual law library

It is, nevertheless, contended in the Joint Brief for Appellants that the unusual silence of the offended party for
thirteen (13) days following the alleged incident negates the probability of the commission of rape against her, and
that if there was any threat at all to complainant's life, it had ceased to be imminent as she was able to go home to
avail of the protection and sympathy of her mother, stepfather, brothers and sisters. It is argued that if it were true
that complainant had been raped by appellants, she should have lost no time in seeking justice and retribution.
Instead, she admitted that these rape cases were filed only after she learned that appellants were allegedly
spreading the news that she was no longer a virgin.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We agree with counsel for appellants that "the conduct of the woman immediately following the alleged assault is of
utmost importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge of rape." This Tribunal has so held in U.S.
vs. Flores." 18 Thus, it was stressed in the case of People vs. Ordonio  19 that "(t)he course of conduct followed by the
party aggrieved from the time of the alleged perpetration of the deed must be carefully scrutinized." In People vs.
Savellano, 20 it was held that "(t)he conduct of (complainant) in reporting immediately to the barrio captain that she
had been ravised negates appellant's claim that she had voluntary sexual intercourse with him." And in People vs.
Ilagan et al," 21also a rape case, the accused were acquitted by this Court with the following observations:chanrobles
virtual law library

... if the complainant had really been raped in the early morning of March 28, 1967, she would have shown that
same morning manifestations of the outrage perpetrated against her. It is strange that she showed no signs of
agitation or disturbance. She remainded calm and silent. She did not complain to the two municipal policemen who
were present thereat. She did not even confide to her close lady friends and companions her trouble or
predicament. This is not the normal behavior of a woman who had just been violated it indeed she had.

Nevertheless, the silence of the offended party in a case for rape, or her failure to disclose her defilement without
loss of time to persons close to her and to report the matter to the authorities, does not perforce warrant the
conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue
and fabricated. Other relevant facts and circumstances must likewise be considered to determine the veracity of the
accusations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General in his well-written Brief for the People, it is not unusual for a rape
victim to prefer to suffer in silence and keep to herself the shocking and embarrassing experience of her defloration,
rather than report the crime and subiect herself to public ridicule and contempt and additional shame and humiliation
in having to recall and testify on the manner in which her honor was desecrated. Indeed, this is especially true and
to be expected of a young provinciana like the fourteen-year old complainant. Due regard must also be given to the
testimony of complainant that the accused made threats on her life. We have no reason to disbelieve complainant,
who testified thus:

Q Again, what did he say? chanrobles virtual law library

A That I must not tell anyone. sir. Huag daw akong magsumbong' because I would be killed. 22chanrobles virtual law
library

Q Did you tell your mother or your stepfather what happened to you?chanrobles virtual law library

A I did not, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q Why? chanrobles virtual law library

A I was afraid of Felix and Pastor, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q Why were you afraid of Pastor and Felix? chanrobles virtual law library

A Because I was threatened by Felix and Pastor. 23 chanrobles virtual law library

Q After this incident happened, what did you feel or how did you react on this incident (sic)? chanrobles virtual law
library

A I could not eat and I have sleepless nights, I could not work and I felt ashamed in facing people and I became a
frightened person.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ATTY. LINATOchanrobles virtual law library

Q You stated that you became ashamed to the people, why? chanrobles virtual law library

A Because of what happened to me, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q You likewise mentioned that you are always frightened, why do you have to be frightened always? chanrobles
virtual law library

A Because I was threatened by Felix and Pastor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q In the previous hearing of this case, you testified that you are taking care of three (3) cows and you used to herd
the same cows to the coconut plantation everyday, now, are you still doing the same chore everyday from the time
this crime was committed by the accused?chanrobles virtual law library

A Not anymore, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ATTY. LINATOchanrobles virtual law library

Q Why? chanrobles virtual law library

A Because I am afraid to go out to the coconut plantation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q Whom are you afraid of? chanrobles virtual law library

A Felix and Pastor, sir. 24

The fear engendered by the threats and the desire to avoid further shame were more than sufficient to restrain the
young girl from exposing her gruesome experience, and her family would not have come to know of the outrage
committed against her had she not learned later that the accused, adding insult to injury, told complainant's cousin,
one Guillermo Bunsol that she was no longer a virgin (laspag na). 25 This prompted her to confide in her
mother, 26 telling her that she did not do so earlier 27for fear of the threats on her life. Complainant's mother
immediately summoned her other children for a family conference and they all decided to file charges. 28 chanrobles
virtual law library

Considering the foregoing, the interval of thirteen days from the time of the incident to the time it was reported to the
barrio captain on June 14, 1975 does not, to Our mind, constitute undue delay which could render the rape charges
against herein accused doubtful. The explanation of complainant is not only completely credible, but is likewise
corroborated by other evidence on record.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Julia Montalbo testified during the direct examination that her daughter, the complainant Lydia Catibog, had become
"always lonely" and "could not eat very well at home." On June 14, 1975, Lydia finally unburdened herself and told
her (Julia) of how she was raped by the two accused thirteen (13) days before. Julia asked Lydia why she did not
confide earlier and the latter answered that she was afraid of the accused because of their threats to kill her.
Immediately, Julia caned all her other children - Willy, Jose, Erlinda and Pepito, all surnamed Catibog - to talk about
the matter and decide upon what action to take. They all agreed that a complaint should be filed against the
offenders. They all went to the barrio captain, then to the police headquarters where Lydia was asked to give a
statement. On the same day, too, Lydia was examined by a doctor. 29 chanrobles virtual law library

On the alleged improbability, incredibility and inconsistency in the evidence for the prosecution, the defense points
to a discrepancy in the Affidavit of complainant and her testimony in Court as to who held the knife when she was
dragged by the accused to the banana plantation. In the Affidavit, complainant stated that "si Felix ay may hawak na
lansita." 30 while in Court she testified that Pastor was pointing a knife at her. 31 It appears from the record, however,
that complainant has adequately explained away this seeming inconsistency. As examination of the transcript of
stenographic notes shows that during her cross-examination, complainant was asked:

Q In this Exhibit 'l' you stated Felix was the one provided with a knife, now at the hearing on August 26, 1975, page
16, transcript of record you made an answer like this 'No, sir. Pastor was holding a knife (lanseta).'Which is true, the
one you stated in this Exhibit 1 that Felix to be the one (sic) holding the knife or Felix (should be Pastor) as you
alleged during the hearing dated August 26? 32chanrobles virtual law library

to which she answered:chanrobles virtual law library

A They were alternately holding it, sir. (Halili po sila ng hawak). 33

Complainant's explanation is entirely probable. Moreover, We do not deem the discrepancy to be of such serious
nature that could impair the testimony of complainant. What is material is that force was applied on her and she was
intimidated by the accused with the use of a knife, a deadly weapon. Furthermore, and We quote from the recently
decided case of People vs. Gonzales, et al.: 34 chanrobles virtual law library

... the affidavits were not prepared by the witnesses and could contain certain inaccuracies in the interpretation of
their declarations. "An affidavit prepared for a man to swear to will not always disclose the whole facts, and will
oftentimes and without design incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences
narrated." (2 Moore on Facts, p. 1098). "Being taken ex parte, it is almost always incomplete and inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want partial suggestions and inquiries, without the aid
of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of
the first suggestions of his memory, and for hi s accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject". (Id., pp.
109495).

The defense likewise seeks to destroy the credibility of prosecution witness Danilo Diamante. This witness testified
that in the afternoon of June 1, 1975, on his way home from gathering firewood in the land of Cresenciano Exconde
complainant's stepfather, he met the two accused who were "walking briskly"; that he greeted them and asked
where they had been, and Felix answered, "diyan lang"; that he asked the accused why they were hurrying, but
neither gave a reply; that proceeding on his way home, he saw complainant from a distance of about 10 meters, and
observed that her hair was disheveled and she was crying; that he asked complainant why she was crying but the
latter did not answer, so he went on his way. 35 Witness Diamante is the brother- in-law of complainant's brother,
Pepito Catibog.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Diamante's relation to complainant, aside from being a remote one, does not necessarily render his testimony
unreliable as one emanating from a biased source. We have 36 held in the case of People vs. Padiernos  36that:
"While witnesses may be said to be interested by reason of their relationship with one of the parties, their
declarations should not be disregarded or rejected capriciously on the ground of bias alone where - as in the
present case - they are reasonable, consistent and supported by the facts and circumstances." Such is Diamante's
testimony in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is true, as the defense points out, that there is an inconsistency in the testimony of witness Diamante. Records
show that during cross-examination, the trial Judge asked Diamante if he noticed anything unusual in complainant's
dress when he saw her on June 1, 1975 and he replied: "None, your Honor." 37 He was asked again by the defense
counsel:

Q Her dress (was) not torn?chanrobles virtual law library

A It had a tear, sir (witness pointing at the level of the upper breast).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Q A while ago when you were asked by the Court about the condition of her clothing ..., you said ... that there was
nothing unusual at all ... in her dress, will you please explain to the Court why now you said that the upper portion of
the dress was torn? ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

A What is correct is that it had a tear on the breast area, sir, upper breast area. 38

We rule that the contradictory statements are not of such a magnitude as to destroy the credibility of Diamante or
the veracity of his declarations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The defense finds it improbable that, coming upon complainant in tears, witness Diamante did not do anything to
help her. We do not agree. In the first place, Diamante testified that he asked complainant why she was crying, but
got no reply. 39 Complainant herself, in her testimony, stated that Diamante .1 greeted me but I did not understand
what he said. 40 It cannot, therefore, be said that Diamante did not show any concern at all towards complainant. In
the second place, it is very probable that Diamante did not do anything to help her because she did not tell him what
happened to her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The defense further complainants that the alleged knife, and the dress and panty of complainant, were not
presented in evidence. The non-presentation of the knife, however, does not negate the existence of intimidation.
As 'Are stated in another prosecution for rape where a bolo was used by therein accused to intimidate his victim,
"(c)onsidering that the bolo was in the hands of appellant and presumably belonged to him, it should not be a cause
for wonder why complainant could not present it in evidence. It was not likely that appellant would just leave it at the
scene of the crime." Likewise, the non-presentation of the torn and blood-stained dress and underwear of
complainant does not destroy the case for the prosecution, there being sufficient and convincing evidence to prove
the rape charges beyond reasonable doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The fact that no spermatozoa was found on complainant when she was medically examined hardly comes as a
surprise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Thirteen (13) days had already elapsed from the time of the rape to the time Dr. Aleli Eubinag conducted the
examination of the genital area of complainant on June 14, 1975. This Tribunal has ruled that the absence of
spermatozoa does not render doubtful the commission of rape where several hours had elapsed before the
offended party was examined. 41chanrobles virtual law library

The evidence on record does not support the contention of the defense that the description of the manner by which
complainant was raped makes the commission of rape impossible especially considering that complainant was a
virgin. Complainant, who was just a young girl of fourteen at the time of the incident, could easily have been
overpowered by two adult males. With one of the assailants holding complainant's legs, the other would not have a
difficult time consummating the act of sexual intercourse. If one man can succeed in having carnal knowledge of a
woman against her wishes, with more reason can two men do the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

In fine, the accused Pastor Mindaroza should and must be released immediately from the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa, Rizal to ensure and enable his fullest development physically, mentally, emotionally, morally and
socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity as a rehabilitated and useful
citizen of society.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the other accused Felix Garcia who escaped from the Rehabilitation Center barely three months from the time
he and his co-accused Pastor Mindaroza were received at the said Center, and was finally arrested by the Police
after three years, it is clear that he has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation program, and
the provisions of Article 197, par. I of P.D. 603 cited earlier must govern his
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In promulgating the judgment of conviction against the accused Felix Garcia, imposing upon him death penalty in
each of the two cases, Criminal Case No. 708-SP and Criminal Case No. 1309 -SP the Court was impelled to do so
on the following considerations; (a) the seriousness of the offense committed (b) the degree of perversity
demonstrated by the herein accused in the commission of the crimes as narrated in the decision (c) the herein
accused 19 years, when he abused the victim, age 14. We reiterate Our holding indicated and explained earlier that
such antecedent matters do not have any bearing at all in the determination of whether the case is to be dismiss or
sentence is to be pronounced on the defendant. We rule that the trial court erred in considering the above
considerations. The only considerations according to Article 197 cited above for the return of the youthful offender to
the committing court for the pronouncement of judgment are that the said offender has been found incorrigible or
has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation programs or should his continued stay in the
training institution be inadvisable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The next point to consider is whether the penalty of death imposed upon the accused Felix Garcia in each of the two
criminal cases for rape is correct. The judgment under review sentenced said accused in Criminal Case No. 708-SP
to the penalty of death, applying Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 2632 and
R. A. 4111, considering the circumstance of "with the use of a deadly weapon" as qualifying and the fact that the
rape was committed by two persons as a generic aggravating circumstance, which in accordance with Article 63,
paragraph 2, No. (1) of the Revised Penal Code raises the penalty to the maximum period which is death. And in
Criminal Case No. 709-SP wherein the accused were also charged with rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the
lower court considered the fact that after accused Garcia raped the victim, the other accused Mindaroza ab the girl
with the help of accused Garcia also as a generic aggravating circumstance which raises the imposable penalty to
the greater penalty of death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As amended by Republic Act 2632 approved June 18, 1960 and Republic Act No. 4111 on June 20, 1964, Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 335. When and how rape committed.-Penalties. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:chanrobles virtual law library

1. By using force or intimidation; chanrobles virtual law library

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; andchanrobles virtual law library

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two
next preceding paragraphs shall be present,chanrobles virtual law library

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be likewise death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

In the prosecution of the cases at bar, two circumstances are present, namely: 1. use of deadly weapon and 2. that
two persons committed the rapes. The first was alleged in the information while the second was proved at the trial.
In both cases, the Court appreciated the first as a qualifying circumstance and the second as a generic aggravating
circumstance, in accordance with settled jurisprudence according to the trial
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We do not agree. Under the law above quoted, either circumstance is qualifying. Where the two circumstances are
present, there is no legal basis to consider the remaining circumstance as a generic aggravating circumstance for
either is not considered as such under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code enumerating what are aggravating
circumstances. Hence, the correct penalty is the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, No. 2, Revised Penal
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the sentence of death imposed upon the accused Pastor Mindaroza is
hereby SET ASIDE and he is hereby discharged and released immediately from confinement. The judgment of
conviction against the accused Felix Garcia is hereby AFFIRMED but modified in that the penalty of death in each of
the two rape cases is reduced to reclusion perpetua in both cases. The remaining portions of the decision under
review shall-stand and are hereby affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Fernandez, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J.:, dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library

The lower court found that Felix Garcia and Pastor Mindaroza to have committed two rapes against Lydia Catibog,
14, on June 1, 1975, when the two accused, first cousins, born respectively, on May 2, 1956 and August 6, 1955,
were nineteen years and one month and nineteen years and ten months old.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The circumstances that the rapes were committed with the use of a deadly weapon and by two persons were
alleged in the information and were proven.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, imposes reclusion perpetua for simple rape, and reclusion
perpetua to death for rape "committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The lower court held that the imposable penalties on the two accused are two death penalties because the rapes
were qualified by the use of a deadly weapon and the other qualifying circumstance, which is the commission of the
rape by two persons, should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance.

The trial court suspended the sentence on the two accused and ordered their confinement in the National Training
School for Boys (Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation Center) located at barrio Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal until they
reached the age of twenty-one years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The lower court applied the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603), which took effect on June
8, 1975 and modified article 80 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 189 of that Code regards as a youthful offender
entitled to a suspended sentence one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years at the time of the
commission of the offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Presidential Decree No. 1179, which took effect on August 15, 1977, amended section 189 by regarding as a
youthful offender one who is over nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense (Virtuoso, Jr. vs, Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, L- 47841, March 21, 1978, 82 SCRA 191; People
vs. Casiguran L-45387, November 7,1979, 94 SCRA 244).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Article 192 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (before it was amended) provides that "if after hearing the evidence
in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against
him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However,
instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit
such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the
government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-
one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he
has been committed".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Parenthetically, it should be noted that article 192 was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179 by requiring the
youthful offender to file an application for suspension of his sentence and by providing that those who had
previously enjoyed suspension of sentence or those convicted of an offense punished by death or life
imprisonment are not entitled to the benefits of a suspended sentence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The trial court erred in applying to these cases the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Since the rapes were committed
on June 1, 1975 or before the effectivity of the said Code, these cases are governed by article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code under which a youthful offender is one who was below sixteen years at the time the offense was
committed, chanrobles virtual law library

So, the confinement of Garcia and Mindaroza in the correctional institution was a mistake. They are not entitled to
suspended sentences under article 80 which is the law applicable to their case.

Garcia's case. - The officer-in-charge of the training school in a letter dated June 4, 1976 informed the lower court
that Garcia left the institution without permission on May 29, 1976. He did not return. The lower court issued on June
21, 1976 a warrant for Garcia's arrest. He was arrested on December 13,1979.
The lower court in its order of January 8, 1980 convicted Garcia of two rapes and imposed upon him two death
penalties. The said judgment was promulgated by reading to Garcia the decision of February 11,
1976.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The lower court reasoned out that it had to pronounce the judgment of conviction upon Garcia because of the
gravity of the offenses committed by him and the degree of perversity exhibited by him in the commission of the
rape.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A copy of that order of January 8, 1980, promulgating judgment of conviction against Garcia, together with the
certificate of promulgation, was forwarded to this Court and received by mail on February 5,
1980.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The lower court did not err in convicting Garcia of two rapes but it erred in sentencing him to two death
penalties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The death penalties were improperly imposed because under article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
the circumstance that the rape was committed by two or more persons is always a qualifying circumstance. It cannot
be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. It is not among the aggravating circumstances enumerated in
article.14 of the Revised Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As already noted, the trial court held that the rapes were qualified by the use of a deadly weapon. It regarded the
other qualifying circumstance (commission of the rapes by two persons) as a generic aggravating circumstance. I
am of the opinion that that is erroneous.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

No generic aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the two rapes. Hence, the imposable penalty is
only reclusion perpetual or the lesser penalty (Art. 6321 Revised Penal Code).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Garcia should be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas and to a total indemnity of P 24,000.

Mindarozas case. - The officer-in-charge of the training school in her final report dated September 4, 1976, or after
Mindaroza had reached the age of twenty-one, said that during his stay in the institution his behavior was
exemplary. He chose tailoring for his vocation (p. 53, Record).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The officer-in-charge recommended that the case against Mindaroza be dismissed and terminated and that he be
discharged from the rehabilitation center and entrusted to his parents (p. 53,
Record).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The lower court in its order of September 10, 1976 directed the officer-in-charge of the rehabilitation center to
surrender Mindaroza to the chief of police of San Pablo City so that the said officer could have custody of Mindaroza
"for further proceeding in accordance with PD No. 603 " (p. 58, Record).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

In another order dated November 4, 1976, the lower court, instead of dismissing the case against Mindaroza and
ordering his release, "pronounced judgment" on him "by the reading of the decision" in his presence, meaning the
decision wherein it was stated that the two rapes were punishable by death (p. 68,
Rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The lower court assumed that in Mindaroza's case it had the option "either to dismiss the case or to pronounce
judgment of conviction" under article 197 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The lower court justified its pronouncement of the judgment of conviction upon Mindaroza (instead of releasing him)
by citing the gravity of the offenses committed by him and the degree of perversity which he exhibited in the
commission thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As already stated, the trial court erred in suspending Mindaroza's sentence. As in the case of Garcia, Mindaroza
should be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J.:, dissenting:

The lower court found that Felix Garcia and Pastor Mindaroza to have committed two rapes against Lydia Catibog,
14, on June 1, 1975, when the two accused, first cousins, born respectively, on May 2, 1956 and August 6, 1955,
were nineteen years and one month and nineteen years and ten months old.chanrobles virtual law library

The circumstances that the rapes were committed with the use of a deadly weapon and by two persons were
alleged in the information and were proven.chanrobles virtual law library

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, imposes reclusion perpetua for simple rape, and reclusion
perpetua to death for rape "committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons".chanrobles
virtual law library

The lower court held that the imposable penalties on the two accused are two death penalties because the rapes
were qualified by the use of a deadly weapon and the other qualifying circumstance, which is the commission of the
rape by two persons, should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance.

The trial court suspended the sentence on the two accused and ordered their confinement in the National Training
School for Boys (Vicente Madrigal Rehabilitation Center) located at barrio Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal until they
reached the age of twenty-one years.chanrobles virtual law library

The lower court applied the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603), which took effect on June
8, 1975 and modified article 80 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 189 of that Code regards as a youthful offender
entitled to a suspended sentence one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years at the time of the
commission of the offense.chanrobles virtual law library

Presidential Decree No. 1179, which took effect on August 15, 1977, amended section 189 by regarding as a
youthful offender one who is over nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense (Virtuoso, Jr. vs, Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, L- 47841, March 21, 1978, 82 SCRA 191; People
vs. Casiguran L-45387, November 7,1979, 94 SCRA 244).chanrobles virtual law library

Article 192 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (before it was amended) provides that "if after hearing the evidence
in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against
him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However,
instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit
such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the
government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-
one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he
has been committed".chanrobles virtual law library

Parenthetically, it should be noted that article 192 was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179 by requiring the
youthful offender to file an application for suspension of his sentence and by providing that those who had
previously enjoyed suspension of sentence or those convicted of an offense punished by death or life
imprisonment are not entitled to the benefits of a suspended sentence.chanrobles virtual law library

The trial court erred in applying to these cases the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Since the rapes were committed
on June 1, 1975 or before the effectivity of the said Code, these cases are governed by article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code under which a youthful offender is one who was below sixteen years at the time the offense was
committed,
So, the confinement of Garcia and Mindaroza in the correctional institution was a mistake. They are not entitled to
suspended sentences under article 80 which is the law applicable to their case.

Garcia's case. - The officer-in-charge of the training school in a letter dated June 4, 1976 informed the lower court
that Garcia left the institution without permission on May 29, 1976. He did not return. The lower court issued on June
21, 1976 a warrant for Garcia's arrest. He was arrested on December 13,1979.

The lower court in its order of January 8, 1980 convicted Garcia of two rapes and imposed upon him two death
penalties. The said judgment was promulgated by reading to Garcia the decision of February 11, 1976.chanrobles
virtual law library

The lower court reasoned out that it had to pronounce the judgment of conviction upon Garcia because of the
gravity of the offenses committed by him and the degree of perversity exhibited by him in the commission of the
rape.chanrobles virtual law library

A copy of that order of January 8, 1980, promulgating judgment of conviction against Garcia, together with the
certificate of promulgation, was forwarded to this Court and received by mail on February 5, 1980.chanrobles virtual
law library

The lower court did not err in convicting Garcia of two rapes but it erred in sentencing him to two death
penalties.chanrobles virtual law library

The death penalties were improperly imposed because under article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
the circumstance that the rape was committed by two or more persons is always a qualifying circumstance. It cannot
be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. It is not among the aggravating circumstances enumerated in
article.14 of the Revised Penal Code.chanrobles virtual law library

As already noted, the trial court held that the rapes were qualified by the use of a deadly weapon. It regarded the
other qualifying circumstance (commission of the rapes by two persons) as a generic aggravating circumstance. I
am of the opinion that that is erroneous.chanrobles virtual law library

No generic aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the two rapes. Hence, the imposable penalty is
only reclusion perpetual or the lesser penalty (Art. 6321 Revised Penal Code).chanrobles virtual law library

Garcia should be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas and to a total indemnity of P 24,000.

Mindarozas case. - The officer-in-charge of the training school in her final report dated September 4, 1976, or after
Mindaroza had reached the age of twenty-one, said that during his stay in the institution his behavior was
exemplary. He chose tailoring for his vocation (p. 53, Record).chanrobles virtual law library

The officer-in-charge recommended that the case against Mindaroza be dismissed and terminated and that he be
discharged from the rehabilitation center and entrusted to his parents (p. 53, Record).chanrobles virtual law library

The lower court in its order of September 10, 1976 directed the officer-in-charge of the rehabilitation center to
surrender Mindaroza to the chief of police of San Pablo City so that the said officer could have custody of Mindaroza
"for further proceeding in accordance with PD No. 603 " (p. 58, Record).chanrobles virtual law library

In another order dated November 4, 1976, the lower court, instead of dismissing the case against Mindaroza and
ordering his release, "pronounced judgment" on him "by the reading of the decision" in his presence, meaning the
decision wherein it was stated that the two rapes were punishable by death (p. 68, Rollo).chanrobles virtual law
library

The lower court assumed that in Mindaroza's case it had the option "either to dismiss the case or to pronounce
judgment of conviction" under article 197 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code.chanrobles virtual law library
The lower court justified its pronouncement of the judgment of conviction upon Mindaroza (instead of releasing him)
by citing the gravity of the offenses committed by him and the degree of perversity which he exhibited in the
commission thereof.chanrobles virtual law library

As already stated, the trial court erred in suspending Mindaroza's sentence. As in the case of Garcia, Mindaroza
should be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104528             January 18, 1996

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, ALFONSO MAGLAYA,
ANGELINA MAGLAYA P. REYES, JORGE C. BERNARDINO, CORAZON DE LEON, VICTORIANO ACAYA,
FLORENCIA CULTURA, MARIA CAMPOS, ERNESTO SARMIENTO SANTIAGO TAMONAN, APOLONIA
TADIAQUE, SIMEON DE LEON, NATIVIDAD J. CRUZ, NATIVIDAD B. LORESCO, FELICIDAD GARCIA, ANA
ANITA TAN, LUCAS SERVILLION, JOSE NARAWAL, represented by their duly authorized Attorney-in-Fact,
CORAZON DE LEON AND SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND CARMEN SEBASTIAN, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers on installment of individual lots therein,
or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision
developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree", is not
applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957?
This is the question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the
Office of the President of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by the Executive Secretary, Franklin M.
Drilon, "by authority of the President."

Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. (represented by
spouses Antonio and Susana Astudillo). Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots,
the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this
mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on
the lots in question.

Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.

Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later consolidated), the HLURB Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a decision rendered on October 28, 1988 ruled that PNB - without
prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina Village, Inc. - may collect from private respondents only the "remaining
amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into with" Marikina
Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought from
said subdivision developer. On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board affirmed this decision.
On March 10, 1992, the Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with the HLURB. Hence, the
present recourse to this Court.

Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from judgments or final orders of the . . . Office of the
President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . ." However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case,
which was deemed submitted for decision three years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said
Circular in the interest of speedy justice.

Petitioner bank raised the following issues:

1. The Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 because said law was enacted only on July 12,
1976, while the subject mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975; and

2. Petitioner Bank is not privy to the contracts between private respondents and mortgagor-subdivision
developer, hence, the Office of the President erred in ordering petitioner Bank to accept private respondents'
remaining amortizations and issue the corresponding titles after payment thereof.

Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate
mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent (as succinctly captured in the
preamble quoted below) must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be
achieve:

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement
and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators,
and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and, obligations to provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic
requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver
titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent
sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value; (Emphasis supplied).
1 

While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the
unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As between
these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law
- as an instrument of social justice - must favors the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast
resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is presumed to have conducted the
usual "due diligence" checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the
actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It could not have been
unaware that the property had been built on by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously
were powerless to discover the attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was
precisely in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment
being to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957
termed "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers."

The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and condition it sought to
remedy, must be enforced. Sutherland, in his well-known treatise on Statutory Construction (quoted with approval by
this Court in an old case of consequence, Ongsiako vs. Gamboa ), says:
2 

The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of
the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and
must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the
legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives
life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true
intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the
fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. 3

Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective application of the law. Little
people who have toiled for years through blood and tears would be deprived of their homes through no fault of their
own. As the Solicitor General, in his comment, argues:

Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited mortgage contract, the vigorous
regulation which P.D. 957 seeks to impose on unconscientious subdivision sellers will be translated into a
feeble exercise of police power just because the iron hand of the State cannot particularly touch mortgage
contracts badged with the fortunate accident of having been constituted prior to the enactment of P.D. 957.
Indeed, it would be illogical in the extreme if P.D. 957 is to be given full force and effect and yet, the
fraudulent practices and manipulations it seeks to curb in the first instance can nevertheless be liberally
perpetrated precisely because P.D. 957 cannot be applied to existing antecedent mortgage contracts. The
legislative intent could not have conceivably permitted a loophole which all along works to the prejudice of
subdivision lot buyers (private respondents). 4
Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957, which themselves constitute strong arguments in favor of
the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole. These are Sections 20, 2l and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have
retroactive effect and will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957's
enactment:

Sec. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer or shall construct and provide the facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities,
which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominiun plans, brochures, prospectus,
printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the
license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the
Authority.

Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. - In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior
to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or
condominium project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section
within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an
adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.

Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions
shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree.

Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. - No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or

condominium project for, the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor, of the owner or
developer when the buyer, after, due notice to the owner or developer, desist from further payment due to
the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at this option, be
reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with
interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied)

As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, we find the following statements of Justice
Isagani Cruz enlightening and pertinent to the case at bench:

Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even
completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail
over the contract.

Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as
long as the agreement deals with a matter, affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held,
suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate of the
legal order.5

This Court ruled along similar lines in Juarez vs. Court of Appeals :6 

The petitioner complains that the retroactive application of the law would violate the impairment clause. The
argument does not impress. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate; in fact, there are many who
now believe it, is an anachronism in the present-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the
integrity of private agreements from government meddling, but that was when such agreements did not
affect the community in general. They were indeed purely private agreements then. Any interference with
them at that time was really an unwarranted intrusion that could properly struck down.

But things are different now. More and more, the interests of the public have become involved in what are
supposed to be still private agreements, which have, as a result been removed from the protection of the
impairment clause. These agreements have come within the embrace of the police power, that obtrusive
protector of the public interest. It is a ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as the contract affects the public
welfare one way or another so as to require the interference of the State, then must the police power be
asserted, and prevail, over the clause.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor vs. Lao, et al. penned by then Court of Appeals Associate
7 

Justice Jose A. R. Melo, now a respected member of this Court, is persuasive, the factual circumstances therein
being of great similarity to the antecedent facts of the case at bench:

Protection must be afforded small homeowners who toil and save if only to purchase on installment a tiny
home lot they can call their own. The consuming dream of every Filipino is to be able to buy a lot, no matter
how small, so that he may somehow build a house. It has, however, been seen of late that these honest,
hard-living individuals are taken advantage of, with the delivery of titles delayed, the subdivision facilities,
including the most essential such as water installations not completed, or worse yet, as in the instant case,
after almost completing the payments for the property and after constructing a house, the buyer is suddenly
confronted by the stark reality, contrived or otherwise, in which another person would now appear to be
owner.

xxx       xxx       xxx

We cannot over emphasize the fact that the BANK cannot barefacedly argue that simply because the title or
titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrance or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any
other step to verify the over-reaching implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. The
BANK could not have closed its eyes that it was dealing over a subdivision where there were already houses
constructed. Did it not enter the mind of the responsible officers of the BANK that there may even be
subdivision residents who have almost completed their installment payments? (id., pp. 7 & 9).

By the foregoing citation, this Court, thus adopts by reference the foregoing as part of this Decision.

The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although constituted in 1975 and outside the beneficial aegis of
P.D. 957, was struck down by the Court of Appeals which found in favor of subdivision lot buyers when the rights of
the latter clashed with the mortgagee bank's right to foreclose the property. The Court of Appeals in that case
upheld the decision of the trial court declaring the real estate mortgage as null and void.

As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view of the provisions of Article 1311 of the Civil Code,
PNB, being a "total stranger to the land purchase agreement," cannot be made to take the developer's place.

We disagree, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the
remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private respondents.

Sec. 18. Mortgages. - No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior
written approval of the Authority, Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of
the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective
measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the
mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the
loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall
apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being
paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment
thereof.(emphasis supplied)

Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer the option to
pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such
payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit
being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is without prejudice to petitioner Bank's seeking relief against the
subdivision developer.

Finally, before closing this Resolution, we enjoin petitioner Bank to focus not only on the strictly legal issues involved
in this case but also to take another look at the larger issues including social justice and the protection of human
rights as enshrined in the Constitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum but
within the context of existing social, economic and political conditions, law being merely a brick in the up- building of
the social edifice; and secondly, petitioner, being THE state bank, is for all intents and purposes an instrument for
the implementation of state policies so cherished in our fundamental law. These consideration are obviously far
more weighty than the winning of any particular suit or the acquisition of any specific property. Thus, as the country
strives to move ahead towards economic self-sufficiency and to achieve dreams of "NIC-hood" and social well-being
for the majority of our countrymen, we hold that petitioner Bank, the premier bank in the country, which has in recent
years made record earnings and acquired an enviable international stature, with branches and subsidiaries in key
financial centers around the world, should be equally as happy with the disposition of this case as the private
respondents, who were almost deprived and dispossessed of their very homes purchased through their hard work
and with their meager savings.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby DENIED, petitioner having failed to
show any REVERSIBLE ERROR or GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in the assailed decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.