Title 8 Crimes Against Persons - Digest

Remove Watermark Wondershare
PDFelement
TITLE 8 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS_DIGEST CRIMREV | SBCA | A.Y. 2021-2022
TITLE 8 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS DIGEST

1. People v. Abarca | G.R. No. 74433 | Sept. 14, 1987 | Issa 3
2. People v. Oyanib | G.R. No. 130634 | March 12, 2001 | Jammy 5
3. Wacoy v. People | G.R. No. 213792 | June 22, 2015 | Aubrey 7
4. People v. Adalia | G.R. No. 235990 | January 22, 2020 | Vee 11
5. Cruz v. People | Rape | G.R. No. 166441 | Oct. 8, 2014 | Kate 14
6. People v. Chavez | Rape | G.R. No. 235783 | Sept. 25, 2019 | Louise 17
7. People v. Lucena | Rape | G.R. No. 190632 | Feb. 26, 2014 | Jolo 19
8. People v. AAA | Rape | G.R. No. 248777 | July 7, 2020 | JL 22
9. People v. Caga | Rape | G.R. No. 206878 | Aug. 22, 2016 | Vee 23
10. People v. Baay | Rape | G.R. No. 220143 | June 7, 2017 | Ivy 25
11. People v. Deniega | Rape | G.R. No. 212201 | June 28, 2017 | Enzo 28
12. People v. Niebres | Rape | G.R. No. 230975 | Dec. 4, 2017 | Vee 30
13. People v. Catig | Rape | G.R. No. 225729 | March 11, 2020 | Vee 32
14. People v. Gutierez | Rape | G.R. No. 208007 | April 2, 2014 | Jammy 34
15. People v. Bay-od | Rape | G.R. No. 238176 | Jan. 14, 2019 | Jolo 36
16. People v. Fetalco | Rape | G.R. No. 241249 | July 28, 2020 | Issa 38
17. People v. Laoag | Rape | G.R. No. 178321 | Oct. 5, 2011 | Enzo 39
18. People v. Villaflores | Rape | G.R. No. 184926 | April 11, 2012 | Ivy 42
19. People v. Cial | Rape | G.R. No. 191362 | Oct. 9, 2013 | Enzo 46
20. People v. De Guzman | Rape | G.R. No. 224212 | Nov. 27, 2019 | Vee 47
21. People v. Jumawan | Rape | G.R. No. 187495 | April 21, 2014 | Jammy 50
22. People v. Briones | Rape | G.R. No. 240217 | June 23, 2020 | Louise 55
23. Ricalde v. People | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610

| G.R. No. 211002 | January 21, 2015 | Issa 57
24. Lutap v. People | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610

| G.R. No. 204061 | Feb. 5, 2018 | Jolo 59
25. People v. Tulagan | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610

| G.R. No. 227363 | March 12, 2019 | Aubrey 62
AGUILAR, CABEL, CAROCHE, DIMAYACYAC, GABUCO, MANDOCDOC, NARZABAL, VIADO, VILLAMOR, VILLAVERT, VILORIA | 1 of 101
PDFelement
26. Bangayan v. People | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610 | G.R.

No. 235610 | September 16, 2020 | Kate 70
27. Bongalon v. People | Child Abuse | G.R. No. 169533 | March 20, 2013 | Toby 74
28. Calaoangan v. People | Child Abuse | G.R. No. 222974 | March 20, 2019 | JL 75
29. Rosaldes v. People | Child Abuse | G.R. No. 173988 | Oct. 8, 2014 | Ivy 77
30. Delos Santos v. People | Child Abuse | G.R. No. 227581 | Jan. 15, 2020 | Enzo 80
31. Dabalos v. RTC | VAWC | G.R. No. 193960 | Jan. 7, 2013 | Vee 82
32. Melgar v. People | VAWC | G.R. No. 223477 | Feb. 14, 2018 | Jammy 84
33. Reyes v. People | VAWC | G.R. No. 232678 | July 3, 2019 | Louise 86
34. Ang v. CA | VAWC | G.R. No. 182835 | April 20, 2020 | Issa 88
35. AAA v. BBB | VAWC | G.R. No. 212448 | Jan. 11, 2018 | Jolo 90
36. Araza v. People | VAWC | G.R. No. 247429 | Jan. 7, 2013 | Aubrey 92
37. Dungo v. People | Hazing | G.R. No. 209464 | July 1, 2015 | Kate 95
38. People v. Bayabos | Hazing | G.R. No. 171222 | Feb. 18, 2015 | Toby 99
PDFelement
1. People v. Abarca | G.R. No. 74433 | Sept. 14, 1987 | Issa
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | defendants-appellants: FRANCISCO ABARCA

Victim(s): KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH (died), ARNOLD & LINA AMPARADO (lived)
Location: TACLOBAN | Date of Incident: JULY 15, 1984
Information: MURDER WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER

RTC: guilty of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder
SC: ACQUITTED OF MURDER AND DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER, GUILTY OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES THROUGH SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE OR NEGLIGENCE (ART. 365)
Mode: DIRECT APPEAL | Modifying Circumstance/s: Art. 247 absolutory cause; treachery (not appreciated)
DOCTRINE: Article 247 applies even if an hour passed between the time that accused discovered his wife having
sex with another and the time the latter was actually shot. The law only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of
infidelity.
FACTS: Khingsley Paul Koh and Jenny, Francisco Abarca’s wife had an illicit affair while Francisco Abarca was in Manila
reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. Jenny was left behind in their residence in V & G Subdivision, Tacloban. In the
morning of July 15, 1984, Francisco Abarca went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar to fetch his daughter.
He was not able to catch the 1st trip so he went back at 2:00 pm but the bus had engine trouble. He went to his father’s
house after then went home at around 6:00 pm. When he got home, he found his wife Jenny and Khingsley Paul Koh in
the act of sexual intercourse. When Jenny and Koh noticed Abarca, Jenny pushed Koh who got his revolver. Abarca, who
was then peeping above the built-in cabinet, jumped and ran away. Abarca went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He
went to the house of a PC Soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo at around 6:30 pm. He got Talbo’s M-16 rifle and went back to his
house. Jenny and Koh were no longer there so he proceeded to the “mahjong session” as it was the hangout of Koh.
Abarca found Koh playing mahjong and he screamed warning words, “an waray labot kagawas” (no translation included).
Abarca fired at Koh 3x with the M-16 rifle and got hit in the head, trunk and abdomen. Arnold and Lina Amparado, who
were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots. Khingsley Koh
died instantaneously. Arnold and Lina were taken to a hospital, where Arnold’s kidney was operated on to remove a bullet
while Lina was treated as she was hit by bullet fragments. The Amparados survived.
Prosecution: The City Fiscal of Tacloban alleged that there was deliberate intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery
RTC: GUILTY OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER with treachery
(imposed death penalty).
The RTC held that Francisco Abarca had been deceived, betrayed and disgraced by his wife’s infidelity which deprived
him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts and in consideration, recommended that Abarca deserves executive clemency,
not of full pardon, but of a substantial reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Contention to SC: The Solicitor General recommends that Art. 247 of the RPC, defining death inflicted under exceptional
circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder be applied.
The 1987 Constitution was approved, abolishing death penalty. The SC required Francisco Abarca to inform the Court
W/N he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. Abarca filed a statement informing the Court that he wished to
continue the case by way of an appeal.
ISSUE: 1) W/N Francisco Abarca is guilty of murder and double frustrated murder. (NO)
2) W/N the killing was attended by treachery. (NO)
HELD: 1) No.
Art. 247, RPC- Death or Physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances
PDFelement
Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind,
he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under 18 years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
ART. 247 ELEMENTS:
1. that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person
2. that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter
These elements are present in this case. There is no question that Francisco Abarca surprised his wife and her paramour
in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill Koh in a fit of passionate outburst. Though about an
hour had passed between the time that Abarca discovered his wife having sex with Koh and the time the latter was
actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by Abarca. The RPC, in
requiring that the accused “shall kill any or both of them immediately” does not say that he should commit the killing
instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually
motivated by the same blind impulse, and not influenced by external factors. Further, it must be stressed that Art.
247 does not define an offense. The Court has previously held that Art. 247 grants a privilege or benefit- amounting
practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment. In effect, Art. 247 amounts to an exempting circumstance, for
even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at
all. The penalty is mere banishment and is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment.
2) No. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either
aggravating, mitigating or other qualifying circumstances. Treachery cannot accordingly be appreciated in this case.
As to the liability of Francisco Abarca for the physical injuries suffered by the Amparado couple, Abarca did not have the
intent to kill them. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule
presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. But this case requires distinctions. Here, Abarca was not committing
murder when he discharged his rifle upon Koh. However, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. Although he
uttered warning words before firing at Koh, that is not enough precaution to absolve him from the injuries sustained by the
Amparados. Abarca is therefore liable for less serious injuries through simple imprudence or negligence,
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to 4 months and 21
days to 6months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the
service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of
P16,000 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500 as and for Arnold Amparado’s loss of earning
capacity.
PDFelement
2. People v. Oyanib | G.R. No. 130634 | March 12, 2001 | Jammy
plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines | accused-appellant: Manolito Oyanib

Victim(s): Jesus Esquierdo and Tita Oyanib | Location: ILIGAN CITY Date of Incident: 09-04-1995
Information: PARRICIDE AND HOMICIDE

RTC: GUILTY
CA: GUILTY
SC: ACQUITTED BASED ON 247
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: Art. 247 absolutory cause
FACTS: As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial court conducted a joint trial.
PROSECUTION: Accused Manolito Oyanib and Tita T. Oyanib were married on February 3, 1979 10 and had 2 children,
Desilor and Julius. They lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City. In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita
separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their 2 children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of
Edgardo Lladas, not far from the place where her family lived. At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while
Edgardo and his family were watching TV at the sala located at the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan,
Iligan City, they heard a commotion coming from the second floor rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for
quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs to check. Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster,
bloodied and sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus Esquierdo while sitting on the latters stomach. Jesus
was wearing a pair of long black pants. When Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told Edgardo not to
interfere. Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital.
She died on the way to the hospital.
DEFENSE: As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live separately.
Manolito retained custody of their 2 children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyns house for
2 months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented
the second floor. The rented space consisted mainly of a sala with one adjoining room. It was arranged in a manner that if
one enters the main entrance door, one is immediately led to the sala and from the sala, directly to the door of the
adjoining room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the
children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her relationship
with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a
very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this.
He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City
National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in 2 subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at
the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to Titas
house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf. Upon reaching Titas rented place, he heard sounds of
romance (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and
Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5’9 in
height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito
took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to
come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting kill him Jake, kill
him Jake.
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again.
Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita
in the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her
PDFelement
paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and
inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his
friends neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning
of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan,
he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police
authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife’s place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-
defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they
could live together.
RTC: GUILTY OF HOMICIDE AND PARRICIDE
CA: AFFIRMED
Contention to SC: Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional
circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors allegedly committed by the trial
court, which boiled down to the basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code. He questioned the trial courts appreciation of the facts and the evidence, contending that it
ignored and overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence material to the defense of the accused, like the photograph of
the lifeless body of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus pants were wide open,
unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any underwear, lending credence to his defense that he
caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that
accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he killed the victims
under the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court did not
err in denying him the exempting privilege under the Article.
ISSUE: Whether or not 247 should be appreciated in this case?
HELD: YES. At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code as an absolutory and an exempting cause. An absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime
but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the
court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following
essential elements for such a defense:
1. that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person;
2. that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and
3. that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable. The
death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in
the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery. There is no
question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must convincingly prove to the
court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have
acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant
surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw
his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who
PDFelement
fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in
support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to
the police when a call for him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of
Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v. Wagas:
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this,
authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe
as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with
great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately
thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the RTC in the 2 criminal cases. The Court
sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to 2 years and 4 months of destierro. He shall not be permitted to
enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of 100 kilometers from Iligan City.
3. Wacoy v. People | G.R. No. 213792 | June 22, 2015 | Aubrey
petitioners: Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and James Quibac y Rafael | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PH
Victim(s):Elner Aro y Laruan Location: Ambongdolan, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet
Date of Incident: April 11, 2004
Information: Homicide; attended by aggravating circumstance of superior strength

RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Death caused in Tumultuous Affray
CA: Modified the conviction to Homicide
SC: Affirmed CA’s decision
Mode: Petition for review on certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s: AC- Superior strength (information); MC – Lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong (CA ruling which was affirmed by SC)
FACTS: An information was filed charging petitioners Wacoy and Quibac with the crime of homicide attended by the
aggravating circumstance of superior strength for inflicting upon Elner Aro blunt traumatic injuries which directly caused
his death. cousin of the victim
Prosecution: presented as witness Edward Benito. He testified that around 3pm on April 11, 2004, he heard a
commotion at a nearby establishment and saw his cousin Aro, who was already sprawled on the ground. While in that
position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained
from doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter,
Aro was taken to the hospital.
At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum" and was set
for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large
intestines meet, that caused intestinal bleeding, and that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid
contents from the bile. However, Aro suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation.
Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and eventually, died the next
day. While Aro's death certificate indicated that the cause of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a
perforated ileum and generalized peritonitis secondary to mauling," an autopsy performed on his remains revealed that
the cause of his death was "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt traumatic injuries."
PDFelement
Defense: Wacoy and Quibac denied the charges against them and argued that while playing pool, they saw Aro drunk
and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly and kicked the leg of the pool table, causing Wacoy to shout and pick up a
stone to throw at Aro but Quibac pacified him. They also claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a 2x3 piece of wood if not
for Quibac's intervention. Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and then tripped and fell to the ground. Quiniquin Carias (Kinikin),
Aro's companion, followed Wacoy to the waiting shed nearby, cornered and kicked the latter, and the two engaged in a
fist fight. Quibac came over to pacify the two and told Wacoy to go home.
RTC:
RTC found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray. The
Court sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum. RTC ruled
that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that Wacoy and Quibac conspired in the killing of
Aro, and that the medical reports were neither categorical in stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the mauling
directly contributed to his death.
The Court opined that as conspiracy was not proven and the prosecution has failed to show the extent and effect of injury
that Wacoy and Quibac personally inflicted on Aro that led to his death, the defendants should be liable for the crime of
death caused in a tumultuous affray and not homicide.
CA:
CA modified Wacoy and Quibac’s conviction to homicide with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong. The Court also adjusted their prison term to prision mayor minim to reclusion temporal maximum.
CA gave credence to Benito's simple, direct, and straightforward testimony. In this relation, it observed that the mere fact
that Benito is Aro's cousin should not militate against his credibility since there was no proof that his testimony was driven
by any ill motive. CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be convicted of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous
Affray since there were only (2) persons who inflicted harm on the victim, and that there was no tumultuous affray
involving several persons. Instead, they were convicted of the crime of Homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only to
maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.
Contention to SC:
Appellees argued that CA erred in their decision for charging the former guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
homicide and that in view of their intent only to inflict slight physical injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the
corresponding penalty therefor in its maximum period.
ISSUE: WON Wacoy and Quibac are liable for the crime of homicide and not death caused by tumultuous affray?
HELD: Yes, Wacoy and Quibac are liable for the crime of homicide.
Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray; NOT LIABLE
The Court ruled that under Art. 251 of the RPC, Death caused in a tumultuous affray is defined as when, while several
persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally,
quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed,
and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical
injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon the person of the
victim.
PDFelement
The elements are as follows:
a. that there be several persons;
b. that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each
other reciprocally;
c. that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner;
d. that someone was killed in the course of the affray;
e. that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and
f. that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.
Moreover, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a
confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot
be ascertained.
Homicide; LIABLE
Homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC is defined as any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed
guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
The elements are as follows:
a. a person was killed;
b. the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance;
c. the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
d. the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or
Infanticide.
In the case at bar, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro died. On the
contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one
defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim.
There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful incident.
Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the latter's death cannot be said to have
been caused in a tumultuous affray. Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac's act of mauling Aro was the
proximate cause of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable therefor, specifically for the crime of
Homicide.
As to the argument that in view of their intent only to inflict slight physical injuries on Aro, they should only be
meted the corresponding penalty therefor in its maximum period
The Court ruled that the argument of Wacoy was without merit.
Art. 49, RPC provides the penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime is committed from that intended.
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the
accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the
accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty
person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for
PDFelement
either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be
imposed in the maximum period.
Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different from that intended
and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and not to cases where more serious
consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem), it is well-settled that if the
victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if
there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences
thereof.
Mitigating circumstance;present; praeter intentionem
The Court ruled that the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due to the presence of
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. In determining the presence of this
circumstance, it must be considered that since intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the accused's
intention must be judged by his conduct and external overt acts. In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is
available to Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on the
stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and
not to end the life of Aro.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision and Resolution rendered
by the CA are AFFIRMED in toto.
PDFelement
4. People v. Adalia | G.R. No. 235990 | January 22, 2020 | Vee
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | defendants-appellants: GIRALYN P. ADALIA

Victim(s): infant baby of defendant Location: Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental Date of Incident: 07-17-2010
Information: Infanticide under Article 255 of the RPC

RTC: guilty as charged
CA: affirmed the conviction but added award of damages
SC: affirmed CA. Adalia guilty of infanticide
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: none
FACTS: (Prosecution) Appellant first consulted Dr. Futalan, the Municipal Health Officer and Medico-Legal of
Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, for pain in the abdomen and urination. Appellant’s urinalysis showed that she had a mild
form of urinary tract infection. Dr. Futalan prescribed antibiotics for her.
5 months later, Rogelia, appellant’s mother sought a manghihilot, to have the latter check appellant’s stomach which was
growing bigger and bigger. Appellant complained that she had not had her menstruation for 5 months already. The
manghihilot touched appellant's belly and felt something move so she told appellant that she was pregnant. Rogelia
forcefully told the manghihilot that appellant could not be pregnant because she had no husband or boyfriend. Apellant
also insisted that she had not had sexual intercourse with any man.
Appellant returned to Dr. Futalan’s clinic complaining of irregular menstruation and recurrent scanty vaginal bleeding.
Upon examination, Dr. Futalan noted that appellant had an abdominal mass compatible with 5 to 7 months of pregnancy
gestation. When asked, appellant insisted that her last menstruation was just a few days ago. Dr. Futalan directed
appellant to seek medical help from the Provincial hospital for further evaluation and management since the rural health
center was limited to conducting physical examination. Before she discharged appellant, however, Dr. Futalan told her
she might be pregnant.
Meantime, appellant’s neighbors started to notice that Adalia was gaining weight and her stomach was getting bigger.
Later, appellant told Lorna Maruya, who worked in the farm with her, that her menstruation was delayed and that a doctor
allegedly diagnosed her with kidney failure. Appellant also said that a faith healer told her and her mother that her bulging
belly was caused by an “uray” or bad spirit. The faith healer described it as an “octopus getting inside the stomach of a
person.” That appellant would strangle whatever creature she would give birth to. Maruya and Rogelia
On July 17, 2010, Maruya was working in the farm with appellant and Rogelia. Appellant suddenly asked Rogelia’s
permission to go home which the latter granted. Rogelia explained to Maruya that appellant had a headache. Rogelia also
mentioned it was the 9th month from appellant’s last menstruation. At lunch time, Rogelia told Maruya that she would also
be going home as appellant may have given birth already. Rogelia did not come back to work on that day.
Sometime in the morning on that day, Ranie Japon heard a baby crying in the abandoned shanty owned by the
appellant’s family. Curious, he moved towards the shanty. Suddenly, the crying stopped. Peeping through the shanty, he
saw Rogelia and appellant in blood-stained clothes. Blood-stained rags also littered the floor. As if sensing his presence,
Rogelia and appellant hurriedly collected the rads. Japon, on the other hand, left to tell the neighbors what he saw.
Another witness testified to hearing the baby cry and that the crying stopped after just a few minutes.
A few days later, appellant and Rogelia went to Dr. Futalan’s clinic to complain of vaginal bleeding. When she physically
examined appellant, Dr. Futalan noted that appellant’s breasts were engorged and excreted milk, her abdomen was very
lax and the appearance of her cervix was compatible to 3 months gestation and admitted one finger, her vaginal wall was
very lax, and there was a discharge of foul-smelling blood. Dr. Futalan’s conclusion was that appellant had delivered a
baby 2 to 3 days ago. PO3 Diaz - baby in the creek
Meanwhile, PO3 Paquito Diaz received a text message that a baby was found floating in the Arabe creek. Together with
other police officers, PO3 Diaz went to the creek. Indeed, an infant girl was on the creek. The baby’s umbilical cord was
still attached, but her whole body was already bloated. They took pictures of the baby at the situs criminis and interviewed
some of the people who had milled around the area. A certain Cecilia Roco told them that appellant was the only pregnant
PDFelement
woman in town and that there was a shanty nearby with bloodstains on it. When their team went to the shanty, they saw
blood-stained old clothes scattered around the floor and 2 dug holes.
Dr. Futalan was informed that a dead infant was found in the creek and brought to the police station. She went to the
police station to examine the baby. She found that the newborn baby girl had her placenta intact and her umbilical cord
was uncut. In her opinion, the baby would have sustained a life of its own because it was already fully developed. Based
on her estimate, the baby died about 2 to 3 days from the time it was discovered. Dr. Futalan recommended the burial of
the baby since she was already decomposing and developing gas.
An information was later filed against appellant alleging that appellant, after giving birth to a live baby girl, with intent to kill,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously CARRY said baby girl who was still less than 3 days of age and
THROW her into the Arabe Creek in order to drown and be killed.
Pending trial, the prosecution moved to exhume the body of the baby which was vehemently opposed by the appellant.
RTC: Guilty as charged and sentenced appellant to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The trial court found that although there was no direct evidence that appellant slayed her own child, all the attendant
circumstances, especially the actions of appellant and Rogelia before and after the child’s birth lead to no other
conclusion but that appellant was pregnant, gave birth, and threw her child into the creek to die.
Contention on appeal to CA: Appellant argued that the prosecution failed to categorically prove she was
pregnant. That Dr. Futalan even initially ruled out pregnancy and instead diagnosed her with uterine mass. Dr. Futalan
recanted her diagnosis only when a dead infant was found in the creek. Her neighbor’s testimonies as to her alleged
pregnancy should not be given credence as these witnesses were not experts in the field of gynecology or medicine. Too,
the prosecution miserably failed to prove that the child found in the creek belonged to her or whether the child was
actually alive at birth. The prosecution witnesses merely testified they allegedly heard a baby crying in the shanty but
nobody saw a baby there. Thus, absent any proof that the baby was alive when born, one cannot logically conclude that it
was killed. She was merely a "convenient suspect" in the killing of the child found floating in the Arabe Creek.
OSG: Jurisprudence does not preclude a finding of guilt on the basis of circumstantial evidence and
circumstances show the appellant’s guilt. Considering the nature of the crime, the same is usually done in utmost
secrecy. Thus, it is not surprising here that there were no actual eyewitnesses. But it does not mean that the crime did not
happen. The following circumstances show that appellant was guilty of infanticide:
(a) Appellant’s neighbors noticed her bulging belly. Some of them even elicited admission from appellant herself. Too,
after she did a physical examination on July 2010, Dr. Futalan concluded that appellant had recently given birth.
Appellant herself admitted that her last menstrual period was 9 months ago;
(b) Appellant’s unusual conduct during pregnancy, i.e., consistently denying her pregnancy, insisting to Dr. Futalan
that her last pregnancy was in March 2010, imputing her condition on evil spirit, and confiding to Maruya that she
would strangle whatever creature was inside her tummy - all indicate her sinister plot to conceal her pregnancy;
(c) Appellant’s actuations on July 17, 2010 spoke one indubitable fact: she gave birth to a child. The testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses were lengthy, thus, could not have been rehearsed; and
(d) Dr. Futalan already opined that appellant had signs of having recently given birth even before she learned about
the discovery of a dead infant found in the Arabe Creek.
CA: Affirmed in the main, albeit it pronounce appellant to be ineligible for parole and made her liable for damages. While
there was no direct evidence pointing to appellant's culpability, the prosecution had sufficiently presented a
series of unbroken chain of circumstances which led to the conclusion that appellant had given birth and killed
her child. Dr. Futalan's findings corroborated this conclusion.
Contention to SC: Appellant maintains that there was no direct evidence that she indeed killed the baby. It must be noted
that she is ignorant or uneducated about motherhood and her pregnancy and the child had no proper pre-natal care and
was only born in a small shanty. These were aggravated by the fact that her family was very poor. Under these
circumstances, it can be reasoned that the baby lived just for a very short while. Too, having just given birth, she was
bleeding, very weak, and too much in pain to even have the strength to kill an infant and throw it into the creek.
PDFelement
She also questioned the penalty of reclusion perpetua to be a harsh penalty when the RPC itself provides that when
infanticide is committed in order to conceal the dishonor of the accused, the latter shall only suffer the lower penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
ISSUE: WON defendant-appellant Adalia is guilty of infanticide
HELD: YES.
To convict an accused charged with infanticide under Article 255 of the RPC, the following elements must be
proved:
(a) a child was killed;
(b) the deceased child was less than 3 days old; and
(c) the accused killed the child
The chain of events, sufficiently proved by prosecution witnesses, leads to no other conclusion but that appellant was
pregnant and gave birth to a child whom she killed at birth because she and her mother believed the child belonged to an
"evil spirit." After killing the child, she threw it into the Arabe Creek.
Absence of direct evidence
The absence alone of direct evidence against an accused does not per se compel a finding of innocence. Circumstantial
evidence may be offered to take the place of direct evidence, especially in cases involving crimes which by their nature
are usually committed in utmost secrecy. Simply put, an accused may be convicted when the circumstances are
established from an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion and pointing to the accused - to the
exclusion of all others - as the guilty person.
Appellant opposed the exhumation of the baby
It is baffling why appellant vehemently opposed the exhumation of the child’s body when, as she claimed, she was not
guilty. In fact, the conduct of DNA testing would even be beneficial to her plea of not guilty and her persistent denial that
she was the mother of the child found floating on the Arabe creek, in case the result show that she had no relations with
the infant.
Notably, too, it could not be just a coincidence that after the trial court ordered for the exhumation of the child, its remains
suddenly disappeared from the grave. One thing for sure, there would be no one more interested in stealing and hiding
the remains of the child other than appellant herself, who was the one on trial for the death of that child and who would be
the most adversely affected should a DNA be done and its result turn out to be positive. She would also be the only one to
benefit from the loss of the child's remains from the grave because it meant that DNA test could never take place ever.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were all unrefuted
The prosecution witnesses may not be medical experts, but they saw appellant's tummy growing big like a pregnant
woman. They saw the inculpatory actuations of appellant and her mother before and after she gave birth. They, too, heard
what appellant and her mother uttered on several occasions pertaining to her pregnancy, her giving birth to the child, and
her over-all behavior during the period material to this case. From what they observed and heard from appellant and her
mother, these prosecution witnesses need not be medical experts to get a grasp of what was really going on with
appellant.
Issue of negative pregnant
Appellant speculates that the prosecution failed to prove that the child was born alive. According to her, the child could
have been born dead. This is a negative pregnant. Appellant is denying and admitting a fact at the same time. If this is not
an admission of guilt, what is?
At any rate, 2 of appellant's neighbors heard a baby crying from the shanty of appellant's family. Ranie Japon even saw
appellant and her mother inside said shanty with bloodied rags around them. Again, appellant did not present any
countervailing proof that the baby was still born. Sans any evidence to the contrary, the trial court aptly found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible.
PDFelement
Appellant supposedly killed the child to conceal her dishonor
If the crime penalized under Article 255 of the RPC be committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing
her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be
committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be prison mayor.
In this case, however, there is absolutely no evidence on record showing that appellant killed her child supposedly to
conceal her dishonor for being an unwed mother or a woman who bore a child although she did not have a boyfriend. This
alleged circumstance, not being found on the record cannot be used to benefit appellant by reducing the imposable
penalty from reclusion perpetua to prision correccional.
Penalty
Verily, both the trial court and the CA correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua. It is unnecessary, however, to
specify that appellant is not eligible for parole. The qualification “without eligibility for parole” is only specified when the
proper penalty would have been death were it not for the enactment of RA 9346. Here, in view of the absence of any
aggravating circumstance, appellant should not be sentenced to reclusion perpetua only, not death.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with modification. Appellant Giralyn
P. Adalia is found GUILTY of Infanticide under Article 255 of the RPC. She is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
She is further required to pay the child’s qualified heirs damages.
5. Cruz v. People | Rape | G.R. No. 166441 | Oct. 8, 2014 | Kate
petitioner: NORBERTO CRUZ Y BARTOLOME | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Victim(s): AAA (Attempted Rape), BBB (Acts of Lasciviousness) Location: La Union Date of Incident: 12-21-1993
Information: Attempted Rape (AAA) and Acts of Lasciviousness (BBB)

RTC: Guilty of Attempted Rape (AAA) and Acts of Lasciviousness (BBB)
CA: Affirmed the conviction for Attempted Rape (AAA); Acquitted him for Acts of Lasciviousness (BBB)
SC: Guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness (AAA)
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: None

DOCTRINE: The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and
acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness
does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely
climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in
a position to penetrate the female's vagina.
FACTS: [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of plastic wares and
glass wares in different municipalities around the country. Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in
selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. AAA and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney
owned by Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben (driver) and a sales boy by the name
of "Jess". Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, they parked in front of Maroon enterprises. They brought out all the goods
and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded
to Manila in order to get more goods to be sold.
At around 1AM, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less than an hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody
was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of
her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she’ll be killed. AAA tried to push
Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice.
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not to tell the incident to her
mother; otherwise, she would be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to
wake him up.
PDFelement
30 minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her
companion awake but her hands were shaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early morning. Later still, while they were
on their way to fetch water, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where they met a policeman by the name of
"Sabas". They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned to the police station
where he personally confronted his accusers. When Norberto’s wife, Belinda, arrived at the police station, an argument
ensued between them.
The police investigator ordered the complainants to return at 6AM. Norberto and Belinda were still able to bring AAA and
BBB home with them and worked for them for 9days, after which they were sent back to Lingayen, Pangasinan.
After a week, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their respective sworn statements against Norberto.
Thereafter, Information for attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness.
Defense: The accused maintains that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled against him. On the date of
the alleged incident, there were many people around who were preparing for the "simbang gabi". Considering the location
of the tents, which were near the road and the municipal hall, he could not possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open,
not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them. He
believes that the reason why the complainants filed these cases against him was solely for the purpose of extorting
money from him.
Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the accused argues that there is not enough
evidence to support such accusation. BBB did not testify and neither her sworn statement was formally offered in
evidence to support the charge for acts of lasciviousness.
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness
CA: Affirmed the RTC in convicting petitioner of attempted rape with respect to AAA, but acquitted him for the
acts of lasciviousness with respect to BBB
In this case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient to substantiate the charge of acts of lasciviousness
against the accused appellant. The basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the sworn statement of BBB to the
effect that the accused-appellant likewise molested her by mashing her breast and touching her private part. However,
she was not presented to testify. While AAA claims that she personally saw the accused touching the private parts of BBB,
there was no testimony to the effect that such lascivious acts were without the consent or against the will of BBB.
Contention to SC: The petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA. He argues that AAA still continued working
for him and his wife until December 30, 1994 despite the alleged attempted rape in the early morning of December 21,
1994, thereby belying his commission of the crime against her; that he could not have undressed her without rousing her if
she had gone to sleep only an hour before, because her bra was locked at her back; that her testimony about his having
been on top of her for nearly an hour while they struggled was also inconceivable unless she either consented to his act
and yielded to his lust, or the incident did not happen at all, being the product only of her fertileimagination; that the record
does not indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his penis was poised to penetrate her; and that she and her mother
demanded from him ₱80,000.00 as settlement, under threat that she would file a case against him.
The petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA that cast doubt on her veracity.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of attempted rape (AAA)
HELD: GUILTY OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS (AAA)
The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as "the act
of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman," which explains why the slightest penetration of the female
PDFelement
genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.
In People v. Campuhan, the Court has defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in rape in the following terms:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a
slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There
must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which
are required to be "touched" bythe penis, are by their natural situsor location beneath the mons pubisor the vaginal
surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion
that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of
having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted
stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing
all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused
can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with
the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through
his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts
demonstrating the intent to lie with the female.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did not include equivocal
preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter,
whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the
preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts could include his
putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant,
and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no
direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as
they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty
what the perpetrator’s intent really was.
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of lasciviousness?
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’sintent to
lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of
lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the
intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
committed.
Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is consummated when the following
essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person
of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii)
when the offended party is deprived ofreason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12
years of age. In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality
that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.
The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing
and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and
touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his
erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to
lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
PDFelement
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME guilty of ACTS
OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, and ACCORDINGLY, PENALIZES him with the indeterminate sentence of 3 months or
arresto mayor, as the minimum, to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as the maximum;
ORDERS him to pay moral damages and civil indemnity.
6. People v. Chavez | Rape | G.R. No. 235783 | Sept. 25, 2019 | Louise
plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

defendants-appellants: Anthony Chavez y Villareal @ Estong (Estong) and Michelle Bautista y Dela Cruz (Bautista)
Victim(s): AAA, 13 years old and BBB, 14 years od Location: Pasig City Date of Incident: May 15, 2009
Information: Criminal Case No. 140189 Estong for Rape under Article 266-A, par.1 of AAA;
In Criminal Case No. 140190, Estong and Bautista were both charged with violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 of BBB
RTC: Estong convicted of rape under Article 266-A, par.1; Estong and Bautista convicted of violating Section 5 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610
CA: both decisions for conviction affirmed

SC: Estong acquitted for Rape in Crim. Case No. 140189; Estong and Bautista convicted in Crim Case No 140190, of
sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610
FACTS: AAA testified that on 15 May 2009, Estong invited her to his house to watch television. BBB went inside but left
after a while. After BBB left, Estong played an x-rated film. While Estong and AAA were watching the x-rated film, Estong
started to remove AAA's panty. After undressing AAA, Estong then inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. AAA allegedly
resisted but Estong held her two hands. According to AAA, the sexual abuse lasted for twenty-five minutes. Estong then
gave AAA Twenty Pesos (P20) after the incident. AAA claimed that the incident on 15 May 2009 was not the first time
Estong sexually abused her. AAA claimed that there were five (5) prior incidents of sexual advances against her by
Estong but despite of which, she still heeded the invitation of Estong inside his house.
BBB, the second victim, testified that on 17 May 2009 at around 8:30 in the evening, Bautista called BBB to buy ice and
softdrinks and brought them to the house of Estong and Bautista. Bautista then closed the door and told BBB that they
would just play cards. Estong, who was in the same room, then undressed BBB and caressed BBB's vagina. Estong then
mashed and licked BBB's breast. According to BBB, Bautista was just watching while she was being sexually abused by
Estong. The daughter of BBB's neighbor saw them and kicked the door, forcing Estong to open it. The said neighbor then
requested the barangay officials to arrest Estong. Galvez, a neighbor, testified and confirmed that she saw Estong
molesting BBB and said that Bautista was in the same room watching and not doing anything.
Defense: The defense presented Estong and Bautista who interposed denial and alibi.
RTC: Convicted of both charges. The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of rape and child abuse Galvez immediately went down to verify the information and Galvez saw Estong and
BBB naked. Estong was sitting on the chair while holding his penis and one of his
CA: The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. hands was mashing the breast of BBB. Bautista was in the same room washing and
slicing meat
ISSUES:
(1) WON Estong is guilty of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353. (NO)
(2) WON Estong and Bautista are guilty of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610. (YES)
HELD: In Criminal Case No. 140189, this Court reverses the ruling of the CA and acquits Estong of the crime of rape on
the ground that the element of force or intimidation is absent. The prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of force or intimidation as an element of rape under Article 266-A, par.1 (a) In AAA's testimony, she claimed that
she freely and voluntarily went to Estong's house to watch television. AAA also alleged that it was not the first time she
had carnal knowledge with Estong. The action of Estong in placing an x-rated film which both Estong and AAA watched, if
PDFelement
any, amounts to inducement or enticement 19 under sexual abuse cases under RA 7610 but not to force or intimidation as
an element of rape under the Revised Penal Code. In this case, what is clear is that AAA was aware of previous sexual
advances by Estong and yet AAA still heeded the invitation of Estong. The existence of willingness on the part of the
victim, AAA, shows reasonable doubt that the carnal knowledge between AAA and Estong was not un-consensual.
In Criminal Case No. 140190, the Court sustained the ruling of the CA and convicts both Estong and Bautista. Bautista
participated in the crime of sexual abuse as an accomplice.
The elements of sexual abuse are the following, to wit: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the
child, whether male or female, is below eighteen (18) years old. Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of RA 7610, lascivious conduct is defined as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. (Boldfacing and italicization
supplied)
The Court agreed with the CA that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that Estong committed sexual
abuse on BBB. According to BBB's testimony, Estong undressed her, mashed and sucked her breasts and caressed her
vagina. Bautista cooperated in the commission of the sexual abuse against BBB by inviting BBB, by assisting in the
commission of the crime, and by assisting in Estong's escape.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the appeal. The Decision of the CA finding appellant Anthony Chavez y
Villareal @ Estong guilty of the crime of rape (of AAA) punishable under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the RPC, as
amended by RA No 8353, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Anthony Chavez y Villareal @ Estong is
ACQUITTED in so far as his criminal liability for the crime of rape is concerned.
The Court AFFIRMS the Decsion of the CA finding appellant Anthony Chavez y Villareal @ Estong and Michelle Bautista
y Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexual abuse (of BBB) under Section 5(b), Article III of RA No. 7610.
PDFelement
7. People v. Lucena | Rape | G.R. No. 190632 | Feb. 26, 2014 | Jolo
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | defendants-appellants: MANOLITO LUCENA

Victim(s): AAA Location: Paranaque City Date of Incident: April 28, 2003
Information: 3 counts of Rape

RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 3 counts of Rape
CA: Sustained appellant’ conviction
SC: Affirmed the conviction but with modification to the damages awarded
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS:
On or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above–named [appellant], a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his position to facilitate the
commission of the crime, by means of force, threat or intimidation and with the use of a gundid then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and
consent.
Prosecution:
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child Protection Unit, University of
the Philippines – Philippine General Hospital (UP–PGH), who examined the victim. The testimonies of the above–named
prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old,
was walking and chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Parañaque City, two (2) barangay
tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed them that they were being arrested for violating a city
ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAA’s companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was
apprehended. AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night
in jail, AAA pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit any offense as she was just chatting with her friends.
AAA’s plea, however, remained unheeded. AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the
San Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went inside the barangay hall. The
appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a while, the barangay tanod, the one who went
inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her
house.
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio, Parañaque
City. While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle.
Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he would do with her but
the former did not respond. The appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He
subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put
the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied,
the appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis
into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted again his penis into AAA’s vagina.
Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA
that he would kill her should she tell anyone about what happened between them.
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in front of a school in Parañaque City.
But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat to kill her should she tell anyone about the incident.
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay kagawad, who simply advised her to
just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the appellant. AAA and her mother subsequently went to
PGH, where she was subjected to physical examination by Dr. Tan, which showed tht there was disclosure of sexual
abuse and genital findings show clear evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma. AAA also went to the Coastal Road
Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn statement accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify
PDFelement
the appellant as her assailant because the former was wearing a jacket emblazoned with “Barangay Police,” as well as a
Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the incident.
Defense:
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense. In the course of Corpuz’s direct
examination, however, the parties made the following stipulations: (1) that Lucena was the assigned barangay radio
operator on that date, and he stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2) that the witness was there
up to 12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left and returned after two (2) hours, at 2:00 o’clock a.m.; and (3) that
when he woke up at 5:00 o’clock in the morning, Lucena was still there. The appellant, for his part, could only muster the
defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a different version of the story.
The appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at the barangay hall. His task as such was to receive
complaints from the residents of the barangay, as well as to receive calls from fellow barangay officials who are in need of
assistance. On the same day, he received a call from his companion, who is also a barangay tanod. He cannot, however,
recall any unusual incident that transpired on that day. The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a
complaint against him but he denied that he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the following: (1) that he
raped AAA; (2) that he was one of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for violating the curfew ordinance of
their barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle in going to the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant
claimed that after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he was shocked when he was arrested
on 25 September 2003 as he did not commit any crime.
RTC:
The trial court, giving credence to the categorical, straightforward and positive testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical
findings of sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph
1(a) of Article 266–A, in relation to Article 266–B, of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended.
CA:
The Court of Appeals sustained appellant’s conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as well as the damages awarded to
AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that the facts revealed that the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting
his penis into AAA’s vagina. The said three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an interval of five (5) minutes,
wherein the appellant would take a rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength would again rape AAA.
Undoubtedly, the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault on AAA. Thus, his
conviction for three (3) counts of rape is irrefutable.
Contention to SC:
The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation attended the commission of rape.
Records revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his alleged sexual advances over her person. Instead, AAA
opted to remain passive throughout her ordeal despite the fact that during the three (3) episodes of their sexual
intercourse he was unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape, which she never did. These reactions of
AAA were contrary to human experience, thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity of her testimony and on her credibility
as a witness.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening period of five (5)
minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He
maintains that what is of prime importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal intent.
PDFelement
ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Lucena of Rape despite the prosecution’s failure to prove the
element of force and intimidation and if so, whether or not the trial court erred in convicting him of three counts of rape
HELD: No.
ART. 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266–B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For
rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted
– it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind. Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the
crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into
submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.
In the case at bar, AAA’s testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her
while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and
personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina,
not only once but thrice. This happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant
threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first
made by the appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.It cannot be denied,
therefore, that force and intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he committed the act, the same
does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA as the gun was
still within the appellant’s reach.
Physical resistance is not an essential element of rape and need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon
the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and personal
safety. The victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal
acts of her aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape victim can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with
the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable;
people react differently.
As to the number of rapes committed, the Court agreed with the trial court’s ruling convicting appellant of three counts of
rape. The three penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five minutes wherein the appellant would rest
after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape AAA. Hence, it can be
clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual
assault upon AAA, he was not motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction
for three counts of rape is indubitable as opposed to the case of People vs. Aaron raised by the defense wherein it was
held that there is no indication from which it can be inferred that the accused decided to commit those separate and
PDFelement
distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was
committed.
As to penalty, it was properly alleged and proved that the appellant used a gun in order to consummate his evil desires
thus, both lower courts correctly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 3 counts of rape
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS as to damages.
8. People v. AAA | Rape | G.R. No. 248777 | July 7, 2020 | JL
plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines | defendants-appellants: AAA (Biological father of BBB)

Victim(s): BBB 15-year old Location: Misamis Oriental Date of Incident: December 2015
Information: rape in violation of Article[s] 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
RTC: Guilty
CA: CA affirmed the RTC Decision
SC: Affirmed CA and RTC
Mode: Appeal
Modifying Circumstance/s: qualified by the circumstance that the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is the
parent of the victim.
FACTS: The prosecution evidence shows that sometime in December 2015, after attending one of the early morning
masses or misa de gallo, BBB saw her father AAA as she passed by a wake. AAA asked her to stay and offered her
coffee. After drinking it, she went home. While she was changing her clothes, AAA arrived home. He went to her room
and told her to lie down. He undressed her pants and took off his pants too. He lay on top of her, kissed her lips, took off
her panties, and took off his briefs. Then, he inserted his penis into her vagina, BBB felt pain as he was doing it to her.
Afterwards, he casually walked away. BBB admitted that it was not the first time that her father did that to her. But it was
only after the December 2015 incident that she reported it to the DSWD with her aunt. The social worker thereat
accompanied them to the nearest police station to report the rape incident. After taking BBB's statement, a team of police
officers went to the residence of AAA to arrest him. But he had already left to work as a driver of a passenger multicab.
The police officers eventually arrested AAA at Gingoog City and brought him to the police station.
Defense: For his part, AAA denied the accusation against him. He countered that on the day of the alleged rape, he was
busy driving his multicab during the day and sleeping at the waiting shed near their house at night. In support thereof,
AAA's son testified that he lived with his father and siblings when his father was arrested. He said that during the time of
the alleged rape incident, he also attended the misa de gallo. According to him, he went home immediately after the mass,
but his sister BBB stayed behind with her friends.
Contention to SC: Assailed the constitutionality of his warrantless arrest for immediately arresting him without a warrant
and in the absence of the circumstances provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court. As to the rape
charge, AAA maintains his innocence assailing BBB's testimony for being too simplistic, lacking the details as to what
happened after she was raped or how she reacted during the same.
ISSUE: Whether AAA is guilty of the crime of qualified rape.
HELD: Yes. A rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic
and horrifying experience she had undergone. Inaccuracies and inconsistencies in her testimony are generally expected.
Neither can BBB's alleged delay in reporting the incident save AAA's plight. Delay in revealing the commission of a crime
such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep
PDFelement
quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or
unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a), in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC. Pursuant to said Article 266-A, paragraph 1
(a), the crime of rape may be committed: (1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: (a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) When the offended
party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present. Pursuant to Article 266-B, paragraph 1, moreover, the rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim. Thus, the elements of the offense charged are
that: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when
she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.
As duly proven by the prosecution, BBB was merely fifteen (15) years old when she was raped by her father, AAA, in their
very home. Thus, the moral ascendancy AAA has over BBB takes the place of violence and intimidation due to the fact
that force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the
parties but also on their relationship with each other. Indeed, a rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear
rather than reason.
9. People v. Caga | Rape | G.R. No. 206878 | Aug. 22, 2016 | Vee
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | defendants-appellants: MARCELINO CAGA y FABRE

Victim(s): AAA = Randy’ GF (Randy is Caga’s niece) Location: Manila Date of Incident: 09-17-2006
Information: rape
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Article 266-A, par. 1 of RPC
CA: affirmed RTC
SC: affirmed CA but modified the damages
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: none
FACTS: An Information was filed charging Caga with the crime of rape for having carnal knowledge of “AAA” after having
a drinking spree with her and her boyfriend. Caga is the uncle of Randy, “AAA’s” boyfriend. The Information alleged that
Caga used force, violence and intimidation to commit the sexual assault on AAA while the latter is sleeping.
(Prosecution) Caga was already asleep on a foam cushion on the floor when “AAA” and Randy slept beside him. While
still intoxicated and asleep, “AAA” felt someone kiss her vagina. At first, she thought it was her boyfriend Randy who did it.
She tried to push him away as she had menstruation at that time, but failed to stop him as this person proceeded to kiss
her on the lips and then went on to take undue liberties with her person. Caga succeeded in mounting her and in
penetrating her private parts with his penis. All the while, “AAA” thought that it was her boyfriend Randy who was having
coitus with her.
When “AAA” slowly opened her eyes, a tiny glimmer of light coming from the window revealed that it was Caga who had
copulated with her while she was in a drunken stupor. “AAA” then became hysterical. She started hitting and slapping
Caga and accused him of violating her. She also kicked Randy who was still asleep on the floor. She yelled at Randy
exclaimiang, “Bakit mo ako pinabayaan?”
“AAA” immediately reported the incident at the Barangay Hall and the Police Station in Pandacan, Manila and thereafter
submitted herself to a medical examination at the PGH. The examination revealed that “AAA” did sustain physical injuries,
and that this was indicative of a possible sexual assault.
During trial, “AAA” positively identified Caga in open court as the person who raped her.
PDFelement
Barangay Kagawad Aquino testified that “AAA” appeared at the Barangay Hall where she declared that Caga had raped
her. After this, he accompanied “AAA” to the Police Station in Pandacan. Then Aquino went to Caga’s house and
confronted him with “AAA’s” accusation that Caga had raped her. According to Aquino, Caga admitted that he did rape
“AAA” - an admission that Caga repeated at the Police Station
Defense: Caga alleged that he slept ahead of Randy and “AAA” and had no idea that the couple would spend the night in
his house and he was even surprised upon waking up that the two were sleeping beside him.
He tried to rouse them up so they could transfer to a bed. When “AAA” was awakened, she immediately asked him if he
did something wrong to her. He denied doing anything wrong to her. “AAA” nevertheless became hysterical. Caga then
roused up Randy who tried to pacify “AAA.”
When Randy and "AAA" left his house, he (Caga) cleaned up and ate breakfast outside his house. He had another
drinking spree at a friend's house nearby. Upon returning to his house at around 10:00 am., he met Barangay Kagawad
Aquino who invited him to the Barangay Hall. From there, the two of them went to the Pandacan Police Station where he
was informed that he was accused of a crime. It was during the Inquest proceedings when he learned that he was
accused of raping "AAA."
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Article 266-A, par. 1 of RPC
CA: affirmed RTC
Contention to SC: Caga argues that while the Information alleged that force, violence, and intimidation were
employed to consummate the alleged rape, the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the existence thereof.
He claims that “AAA” did not offer any resistance against his sexual advances, “because she thought that it was her
boyfriend (Randy) who was then making love with her.”
ISSUE: WON Caga is guilty as charged
HELD: YES.
Under Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force, threat, or intimidation;
2. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious’
3. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
This case calls for 2nd paragraph of rape
This Court finds that Caga did have sexual intercourse with "AAA" when she was asleep and still under the
influence of alcohol. The case thus falls under the second paragraph of rape: "when the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious." It is altogether immaterial that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish the
presence of physical force, threat, or intimidation because, as the evidence at bar shows, Caga raped an
unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman - a fact that was duly alleged in the Information and duly
established by the prosecution's evidence during the trial.
In the case at bench, physical force, threat or intimidation is not necessary, for the simple reason that an unconscious and
extremely intoxicated woman cannot freely and voluntarily give her consent to engaging in sexual intercourse.
Complainant “AAA’s” credibility as a witness
There is nothing in the records to render suspicious the evidence put forth by the complainant. The accused-appellant is
the uncle of her boyfriend. She has no known ill-motive to impute such a grave crime to him and, like the trial court, [ w ]e
did not find any motive why she would fabricate a story that could, in fact, subject herself to public ridicule and humiliation.
PDFelement
Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the presumption
is that they were not so actuated and 1hat their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
Besides, the records are reflective of the complainant's version that she was initially sleeping at the time she was ravished
right after a drinking spree of hard liquor. There is even no dispute that complainant was at such intoxicated condition.
Interestingly, not even the accused-appellant has ever put in issue the [level] of intoxication that the complainant might be
at the time of the crime.
The complainant's credibility is further strengthened by the subsequent events that transpired. That she immediately
reported the matter to the authorities and submitted herself readily to physical examination are indications of the truth of
her accusation.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED, subject to MODIFICATIONS as to
damages.
10. People v. Baay | Rape | G.R. No. 220143 | June 7, 2017 | Ivy
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | accused-appellants: JONATHAN BAAY y FALCO (“Junjun”)

Victim(s): AAA (mentally redardate - 22 yo at the time of the incident
Location: Brgy. Bungsi, Mambusao, Capiz Date of Incident: July 2005
Information: Rape
RTC: guilty of statutory rape
CA: affirmed RTC
SC: sustained conviction but modified the designation of the crime committed to SIMPLE RAPE
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: retardation of the victim did not convert the crime to Statutory Rape (as
per SC)
Doctrine:
The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of
age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple
rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) as she is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is
equivalent to that of a person under 12.
FACTS:
Prosecution:
AAA testified that sometime in July 2005, she was drying palay when the accused-appellant invited her to go to the forest.
Upon arrival thereat, the accused-appellant pulled down her shorts and underwear, then inserted his penis in her vagina
and started a pumping motion. It lasted quite long, after which, a white liquid came out of the penis of the accused-
appellant. Thereafter, she went home. After the incident, AAA got pregnant.
On cross-examination, she testified that she practiced and was coached by her mother on what she had to say in court
and to point to the accused-appellant as the one who had sex with her but in fact, the accused- appellant did not have sex
with her
The trial court noted that as AAA's examination continued, AAA made conflicting answers to the query as to whether or
not accused- appellant had sex with her, which prompted the court to reset the hearing to give the witness time to rest.
BBB testified that she came to know that her daughter was pregnant when she brought her to Dr. Hector Flores for a
medical check-up and therein, AAA told her about the rape incident in the forest. BBB also brought AAA to Dra. Leah
Florence Adicula-Sicad to assess AAA's mental/psychological status and then to the police for the purpose of filing the
complaint. On April 21, 2006, AAA delivered a baby. This is AAA's second child, the first was fathered by a certain DDD.
PDFelement
Dra. Adicula-Sicad testified that the mental faculties of AAA are severely deficient in areas where the executive
functioning judgment and other areas of intellect are concerned. According to Dra. Adicula-Sicad's assessment, AAA's
age is comparable to a child of around 4-5 years old as a result of mental retardation, which is congenital in nature. It
being congenital in nature, the victim could not have consented or would not be in any position to give consent as to the
consequences of a certain act.
Defense:
Accused-appellant denied the allegations against him.
1. He testified that AAA's house is about 500 meters away from their house and that he knew that AAA is mentally
retarded.
2. He could not have raped AAA in July 2005 because from May 15 to August 30, 2005, he was working on the farm of a
certain Motet Monajan which is about 1 KM away from the forested area where the alleged crime took place. He stayed in
a hut beside the said farm and bought his needs at a store near the place.
3. He further averred that AAA's family accused him of rape because of the trees he planted beside the pigpen owned by
AAA's family.
The other defense witnesses testified on the whereabouts of accused- appellant during the month when the incident
allegedly occurred to corroborate accused-appellant's testimony. In addition, Teresita Baay testified that the conflict with
AAA's family started in September 2005 when they discovered that AAA was pregnant and the latter's family was
ashamed that the child to be born had no father. Also, AAA's family has issues with accused-appellant's family because
the former claimed ownership over the trees planted by the latter.
RTC: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape which is defined and punished under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (d) in relation to Article 266-B, par. I of the RPC (STATUTORY RAPE)
1. found that the prosecution was able to prove that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with AAA, a mental
retardate
2. found AAA's testimony credible despite the apparent inconsistencies, explaining that the same was due to her mental
condition. The RTC observed that AAA had the tendency to agree with leading questions asked. However, despite some
discrepancies, AAA was consistent and positive in identifying accused- appellant as the person who raped her.
3. in the case study conducted by Veronica Martinez, Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer, AAA was
consistent in pointing to the accused-appellant as the person who abused her.
CA: affirmed conviction but increased awarded damages
Contention to SC:
1.Accused-appellant faults the RTC for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping AAA. He insisted that he
should be acquitted of the charge because doubts linger as to whether or not he had sex with AAA or the rape incident
happened, considering AAA's conflicting responses to the queries regarding the same.
2. The defense claims that the case was filed against accused-appellant because AAA's family got angry with the
accused-appellant's family because they claimed ownership over the trees planted by the latter. It is also alleged that the
conflict between the parties started when the accused-appellant's family discovered that AAA was pregnant and her family
was ashamed that the child would be born without a father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA, in affirming the decision of the RTC, erred in convicting the accused-appellant of
Statutory Rape
HELD: Conviction is SUSTAINED but the crime committed is not statutory rape but SIMPLE RAPE.
The fact of AAA's mental retardation is undisputed. Even the accused- appellant admitted that he knew of AAA's mental
condition. Essentially, thus, the appeal boils down to the credibility of AAA's testimony as to the fact of sexual congress
PDFelement
between the accused-appellant and AAA. We stress, at the outset, that prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that
findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding upon Us. The trial court is in the best
position to discern if the witnesses were telling the truth. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact, or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not
be disturbed.
In the case at bar, even though AAA's testimony was not flawless in all particulars, We do not find any justifiable reason to
deviate from the findings of the lower court. The fact that AAA's testimony was practiced and instructed by her mother to
impute such serious charge against the accused-appellant does not sway this Court. Given the victim's mental condition,
being a 22-year old woman with a mental age of 4-5 years old, We find it highly improbable that she had simply concocted
or fabricated the rape charge.We neither find it likely that she was merely coached into testifying against accused-
appellant, precisely, considering her limited intellect. In her mental state, only a very startling event would leave a lasting
impression on her so that she would be able to recall it later when asked.
Likewise, the conflicting responses of AAA to the questions on whether the accused-appellant had sex with her were
succinctly explained by the trial court. According to the trial court's observation, when AAA was asked leading
questions, she has the tendency to merely agree with such leading question asked. on leading Qs
argument
The accused-appellant then used the said observation to argue that the reason why AAA pointed to the accused-appellant
as the perpetrator was because she was asked leading questions to that effect.
We do not agree. Notably, AAA's statements that accused-appellant indeed raped her or had sex with her were not
entirely solicited from leading questions in her direct testimony. During AAA's cross, re-direct, and re-cross examinations,
the trial court also propounded clarificatory questions (which are not leading questions) in which the victim consistently
said she was raped and that Jonathan Baay raped her.
We also could not disregard the study dated January 4, 2006 conducted by Veronica D. Martinez, Municipal Social
Welfare and Development Officer of Mambusao, Capiz, that AAA was consistent in identifying accused-appellant as the
person who abused her.
Court’s ruling on the contention of the defense the case was filed because AAA’s family got angry because of
ownership dispute over planted trees and that the case was only filed because AAA’s family was ashamed that
AAA bore a child w/o a father: (The SC did not agree with the defense) on trees argument
We find such conflict as regards the "trees planted" too flimsy and insignificant for AAA or her family to charge accused-
appellant of such a serious crime and to make AAA publicly disclose that she had been raped and undergo the
concomitant humiliation, anxiety, and exposure to a public trial. Likewise, We find no reason nor wisdom in filing a criminal
case by mere reason that AAA's family was ashamed that AAA bore a child without a father. Indeed, AAA's family would
be subject to the same, if not worse, situation in filing the case as such would inevitably put AAA in public scrutiny.
CRIME COMMITTED WAS NOT STATUTORY RAPE; Crime committed is SIMPLE RAPE under Art 266-A par. 1(b)
(Main Issue)
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape under the said provision is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12
years old. To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the victim;
second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the victim.
In this case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 22 years old when she was raped albeit she has a mental age of 4-5
years old. It should, however, no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1 (b), not
Section 1 (d), of the said provision as the same, precisely, refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason."
In the case of People v. Dalan the SC ruled that: the term statutory rape should only be confined to situations where the
victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) as she is considered "deprived of
reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent to that of a person under 12.
PDFelement
Qualifying circumstance of knowledge by the accused of the mental disability of the victim was NOT ALLEGED IN
THE INFORMATION - Hence, penalty cannot be increased to death.
The penalty is increased to death only when the qualifying circumstance of knowledge by the accused of the mental
disability of the victim, among others, is alleged in the information. In this case, while it was proven and admitted during
trial that accused- appellant knew of AAA's mental retardation, the same was not alleged in the Information, hence, cannot
be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as to the crime committed and the amount of exemplary damages awarded (increased from
30,000 to 75,000)
11. People v. Deniega | Rape | G.R. No. 212201 | June 28, 2017 | Enzo
plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines | defendants-appellants: Rodolfo Deniega y Espinosa

Victim(s): AAA - 16 y.o. but with mental capacity of 6 y.o.
Location: San Pedro, Laguna | Date of Incident: May 2, 2007
Information: Statutory Rape (Par 1 (d))

RTC: Guilty
CA: Guilty
SC: Guilty
Mode:
Modifying Circumstance/s: "when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime,"
FACTS:
AAA was a young lass suffering from mental retardation. Around 7 o'clock in the evening of May 2, 2007, AAA who, was
then sixteen years old but with a mental capacity of a six (6)-year-old child, went out of their house with some neighbors to
watch a basketball game in a nearby basketball court. Upon returning home at approximately 11 o'clock in the evening of
the same date, BBB, AAA's mother noticed that the latter's pants were wet. When BBB asked AAA what caused the
wetting of her pants, the latter simply dismissed her mother's query and said that it was nothing (wala lang). Prompted by
suspicion, BBB asked AAA to remove her pants, thereupon, she smelled her underwear which emitted the scent of semen.
When quizzed by her mother, AAA eventually admitted that herein accused-appellant, whom she calls Dodong, and
who was known to them as a delivery boy in their neighborhood, invited her to go to another basketball court where
they could talk with each other but, instead, upon arriving at the said place, he undressed her and made her lie down.
When they went to the barangay authorities, AAA later revealed that, at the said basketball court, accused-appellant
undressed her, made her lie down, removed his pants and underwear, went on top of her, inserted his penis in her vagina
and made "up-and-down" movements."
Upon questioning by the authorities, accused-appellant admitted in front of his employer and BBB that he had sex with
AAA and that he loves AAA and he offered to marry her. He also requested BBB and the barangay authorities not to
file a case against him. BBB, however, refused accused-appellant's offer and request.
Defense:
Alibi. Appellant contended that between the hours of 8 o'clock in the morning and 12 o'clock midnight of May 2, 2007, he
busied himself by painting the house of a neighbor, then he went to GMA Cavite to have his electric fan repaired and,
subsequently, had a drinking session with his friend at the latter's house.
PDFelement
Also, accused-appellant also questions AAA's credibility by contending that it is very hard to believe that no one could
have seen or noticed him having sexual intercourse with AAA in the nearby basketball court, considering that AAA herself
testified that the said basketball court, was near the one where people were watching the ongoing game.
RTC: GUILTY
The RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish through clinical and testimonial evidence that AAA is suffering
from moderate mental retardation, with an IQ of 43 and with a mental age of a six-year-old child. The trial court also
noted that, as admitted by accused-appellant, he knew of the condition of the victim. The RTC ruled that the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with the victim.
CA: GUILTY
The CA held, among others, that: the observation of the trial judge, coupled with the evidence of the prosecution,
confirms the mental retardation of the victim; AAA's narration of the rape incident is consistent; and accused-
appellant's denial is unsubstantiated, thus, cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim.
Contention to SC:
Accused-appellant contends that he was wrongly convicted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He questions the credibility of the victim and insists that the trial court erred in not giving due
consideration to his defense of alibi.
ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of statutory rape.
HELD: YES.
Statutory rape is committed when:

(1) the offended party is under twelve years of age; and
(2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation, whether the
victim was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority.
In determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A(1)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance
with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual
disability is established.
It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. It is also a settled rule that sexual
intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory
rape. ito na yata yung RELEVANT RULING. So
this prevails over Baay Case
In the present case, it is true that based on the medical and psychiatric evaluation of AAA, she has moderate mental
retardation and that she has the mental age of a six-year-old child. Accused-appellant makes much of this fact to discredit
the testimony of AAA. This Court has, nonetheless, held that competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims
as witnesses have been upheld where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. It
even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously
and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused.
What makes the case stronger for the prosecution is that the testimony of AAA is corroborated by the medical findings of
the presence of a "deep healing laceration" in her hymen which was caused by a blunt object. Such medico-legal findings
bolsters the prosecution's testimonial evidence. Together, these pieces of evidence produce a moral certainty that
accused- appellant indeed raped the victim.
PDFelement
Accused-appellant also questions AAA's credibility by contending that it is very hard to believe that no one could have
seen or noticed him having sexual intercourse with AAA in the nearby basketball court, considering that AAA herself
testified that the said basketball court, was near the one where people were watching the ongoing game.
The Court is not persuaded. There is no evidence to show that there were people present at the basketball court where
the crime was committed. Moreover, it is probable that people did not notice accused-appellant having sexual intercourse
with AAA because there was then an ongoing basketball game at another court and the attention of the persons present
were directed at the said game. Besides, as testified by the victim, it only took a minute for accused-appellant to
consummate his carnal desire, after which they immediately went back. In any case, as correctly cited by the OSG, this
Court has held that lust is no respecter of time and place and that rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants and
even in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to
award of damages.
12. People v. Niebres | Rape | G.R. No. 230975 | Dec. 4, 2017 | Vee
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | accused-appellants: RICO NIEBRES y REGINALDO

Victim(s): AAA - 16yo, mentally retarded, mental age of 9yo
Location: Bula, Camarines Sur | Date of Incident: August 2010
Information: qualified rape

RTC: simple Rape in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610. did not appreciate QC of relationship by affinity
CA: Qualified Rape
SC: simple rape only
Mode: Ordinary Appeal

Modifying Circumstance/s: qualifying circumstance of knowledge of mental disability not proved by the prosecution (per
SC)
FACTS: (Prosecution) In October 2010, Niebres, together with his wife (AAA’s sister) and 6 children went to the house of
his parents-in-law in La Victoria, Bula, Camarines Sur (La Victoria) to participate in a traditional palay harvesting. After
dinner, Niebres went out to drink with his father-in-law and brother-in-law and came home at around midnight. He directly
went to the room where AAA and his family were sleeping and lied beside her to sleep. At about 5AM of the following day,
AAA suddenly woke up and noticed Niebres kissing her on the cheeks, neck, and down her body. Niebres then pulled
down her shorts, unzipped his pants, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. After repeatedly making a push
and pull motion on AAA, Niebres finally pulled out his penis and dismounted from her. AAA claimed that the incident
produced so much pain, and it caused her vagina to bleed profusely. This notwithstanding, she could not tell anyone
about it, as she was afraid of what Niebres and her parents would do to her. According to AAA, this was not the first time
Niebres sexually abused her, claiming that Niebres also raped her several weeks before the said incident in his house at
Panoypoyan, Bula, Camarines Sur.
Subsequently, when AAA complained of abdominal pains, her mother, BBB, brought her to Naga Health Care Diagnostic
Center. After conducting an ultrasound examination on AAA, the doctors discovered that she was approximately 5 to 6
months pregnant. When AAA finally admitted to BBB that Niebres raped her, they reported the amtter to the police and
filed the instant complaint for Qualified Rape.
Later, AAA went to a psychiatrist, Dr. Laguidao, who revealed that she was suffering from a mild mental retardation with
an IQ equivalent of a 9-year old child.
Defense: Niebres verbally denied raping AAA in October 2010. Niebres maintained that at the time of the incident, he
went out of the room of his parent-in-law’s house, drank coffee, and proceeded to continue harvesting palay without
waiting for his other companions. Moreover, he averred that the only time AAA slept in their house in Panoypoyan was
when he was in Batangas from March to August 2010. Niebres insisted that the filing of the case against him was
PDFelement
actuated by ill motive, considering that his parents-in-law were angry at him when he demanded his share in the proceeds
of the cow, which was purportedly sold to cover the wedding expenses of his brother-in-law.
RTC: guilty of simple rape in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Did not appreciate the qualifying circumstance
of relationship by affinity between Niebres and AAA even if it was proven in court given that it was not alleged in
the Information
Prosecution was able to present testimonial and documentary evidence to support AAA's claim of rape against Niebres.
Meanwhile, Niebres’s unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi failed to create reasonable doubt in light of the positive
and categorical testimony and identification of AAA.
CA: upgraded Niebres’s conviction to that of Qualified Rape.
It was highly improbable for AAA to fabricate the charges against Niebres, considering that a traumatizing experience like
rape would definitely leave a lasting impression on her given her mental condition.
However, the CA ruled that Niebres should be convicted for Qualified Rape, considering that: (a) the state of mental
retardation of AAA was competently established on account of the testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Laguidao
on AAA; and (b) Niebres failed to dispute AAA’s mental retardation during trial. Accordingly, the CA deemed it proper to
hold Niebres guilty of Qualified Rape.
ISSUE: WON Niebres’s should be convicted of qualified rape?
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that Niebres’s is guilty of simple rape only.
For the successful prosecution of the crime of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, it is
necessary that the elements thereof are proven beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
(a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(b) he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when the victim was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or when the victim is
under 12 years of age or is demented.
Moreover, case law states that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below 12
years old, constitutes statutory rape. In People v. Deniega, the Court clarified that if a mentally-retarded or intellectually-
disabled person whose mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed under paragraph 1 (d)
and not paragraph 1 (b), Article 266-A of the RPC.
In this case, the prosecution competently established the elements of the crime of Rape, as it was shown that: (a)
AAA was suffering from mild mental retardation, which has an I.Q. equivalent to a 9-year old child; (b) Niebres
successfully had carnal knowledge of AAA sometime in October 2010; and (c) Niebres was able to accomplish the said
act because AAA, being a mental retardate, was deprived of reason at the time of the incident.
The CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Niebres’s knowledge of AAA’s mental disability at
the time of the commission of the crime, there being no sufficient and competent evidence to substantiate the same.
Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of rape is a
special qualifying circumstance, which makes it punishable by death. Such qualifying circumstance, however, must be
sufficiently alleged in the indictment and proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court. It must be proved
with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified
form.
In this case, while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of AAA’s mental retardation was specifically
alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was adduced by the prosecution. The fact that Niebres did not dispute
AAA’s mental retardation during trial is insufficient to qualify the crime of rape, since it does not necessarily create moral
certainty that he knew of her disability at the time of its commission.
Additionally, mere relationship by affinity between Niebres and AAA does not sufficiently create moral certainty
that the former knew of the latter's disability. Here, the prosecution did not present any evidence that AAA exhibited
PDFelement
external manifestations of her mental condition. On the contrary, records reveal that the mental retardation of AAA only
became noticeable the moment Dr. Laguidao conducted the requisite psychological test on her. When AAA engaged in
other activities, she actually performed and functioned like a normal person.
Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Niebres was aware of AAA’s mental
disability at the time he committed the crime and, thus, he should be convicted of the crime of Simple Rape only.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Rico Niebres y Reginaldo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape.
13. People v. Catig | Rape | G.R. No. 225729 | March 11, 2020 | Vee
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | accused-appellants: VALENTINO CATIG Y GENTERONI

Victim(s): AAA-15 yo, mentally retardate, mental age of 4-5yo Location: Zambales Date of Incident: 07-23-2008
13 yo
Information: rape not mentioned under what par., ang sinabi lang retarded yung vctim
RTC: simple rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d) under "demented"
CA: simple rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(b) under deprived of reason
SC: simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b)
Mode: Appeal
Modifying Circumstance/s: QC of mental retardation not alleged in the Information, hence, not appreciated (SC)
FACTS: (Prosecution) On the day of the incident, BBB, AAA’s sister, asked AAA to fetch water from appellant’s house.
AAA complied. Upon arriving at appellant’s house, the latter instructed her to go inside. Once inside, he laid her on the
bed, took off her shorts and toucher her vagina, and raped her. After he was done with his bestial act, appellant gave AAA
money and sugarcane. AAA then went home.
When she arrived at their house, BBB noticed AAA’s shorts were worn backwards with bloodstains on it. When BBB
asked what happened, AAA suddenly cried and told BBB that she was raped by appellant. She further narrated that
appellant gave her money and sugarcane.
After hearing the horrid story, BBB and AAA immediately sought assistance from barangay authorities and the MSWDO.
AAA was brought to the Municipal Health Center for a physical examination. Dr. Yap found hymenal bleeding and
laceration indicative of a recent penetration of the victim’s vaginal canal. Subsequently, BBB and AAA went to the police
to report the incident.
An Information for Qualified Rape was filed against appellant Catig.
Defense: Appellant denied raping AAA. He alleged that on the day of the incident, he was sleeping and was awakened by
AAA calling her daughter who was not there. AAA then asked for sugarcane from appellant. During their conversation,
appellant noticed bloodstains on AAA’s hand and shorts which the latter simply ignored after he asked about it. In the
afternoon, 3 policemen went to their house informing him that someone is accusing him of rape. Appellant voluntarily went
with the police. It was only then that he learned that AAA was his accuser. Appellant claimed that he was being accused
of the crime because he refused to lend BBB his bicycle and to give her his dog which she previously asked from him.
statutory rape
RTC: guilty as charged of rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d). It gave credence to AAA's testimony on how she was
allegedly raped by appellant. The RTC observed that despite the victim's mental handicap, she properly conveyed her
ideas and intelligently answered the questions propounded to her during the trial. Her testimony which was corroborated
by the results of her medical examination was given greater probative weight than appellant's defense of denial.
CA: affirmed but found appellant liable for the crime of simple rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(b).diff between par 1b and 1d
as ruled by CA
The CA reasoned that Article 266-A, par. 1 (d) refers to a person who is suffering from dementia which is a condition of
deteriorated mentality characterized by marked decline in the individual's intellectual level and often emotional apathy,
madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase "deprived of reason" under Article 266-A, par. 1(b), has been
interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. AAA, as ruled by the appellate
PDFelement
court, is mentally deficient. Thus, she should be considered a person "deprived of reason" which falls under Article 266-A,
par. 1(b), and not one who is "demented".
Contention to SC: appellant avers that the prosecution failed to duly prove how the alleged rape was committed. AAA
merely made a general reference to rape during her testimony. She did not mention that appellant's penis penetrated her
vagina. Neither did she state in her testimony if appellant kissed or touched her. Further, appellant insists that the
presence of laceration of general reference to rape which was repeatedly stated by AAA does not prove defloration which
can be caused by several factors other than sexual abuse.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution sufficiently established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
HELD: YES.
The elements of the crime of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC are as follows:
(1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(2) the said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
1st element - accused had carnal knowledge of the victim based on victim’s testimony
Although AAA did not describe the incident of rape in more detail, it is apparent from her testimony that appellant was
successful in having carnal knowledge of her. Her simple narration was indicative of her honesty and innocence.
Interestingly, AAA attested without any inkling of hesitation that she felt pain in her vagina when she was being raped by
appellant. "Moreover, in cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court had consistently enunciated that
rape was nevertheless consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain. The pain could be nothing but the result
of penile penetration, sufficient to constitute rape."
The presence of a hymenal laceration at 3 o'clock position due to penetration further strengthens AAA's testimony that
she was raped. It is worthy to note that the results of AAA's physical examination which was conducted on the very same
day that the rape incident happened corroborates her testimony that she was sexually molested by the appellant. Dr. Yap
even categorically stated that AAA's vagina was still bleeding when she was brought to him for personal examination, thus
proving that the act of rape was consummated.
2nd element - victim’s mental age is a 4-5 year old child
Although AAA was 13 years old, she had the mental capacity of a 4-5-year old child. The lower courts, and this Court as
well, could therefore not expect AAA to narrate and describe the exact details of how she was raped the way a 13-year
old child could do.
Notably, appellant even admitted that he knew of AAA's mental state. Dr. Yap also declared that AAA's physical
built clearly manifested that she is indeed mentally retardate. Further, the trial court judge duly observed that she was
suffering from mental impairment based on her demeanor and manner of answering the questions propounded to her
during her examination while in the witness stand.
However, although it was proven and admitted during trial that appellant knew of AAA's mental retardation, the
same cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance for it was not specifically alleged in the Information that
he was aware of AAA's mental retardation.
All told, the Court finds that the appellate court correctly found that appellant is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Simple Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the CA finding appellant Valentino Catig y Genteroni
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION and that the appellant is ordered to pay AAA civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages.
PDFelement
14. People v. Gutierez | Rape | G.R. No. 208007 | April 2, 2014 | Jammy
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

accused-appellant: RODRIGO GUTIEREZ Y ROBLES ALIAS "ROD AND JOHN LENNON"
Victim(s): AAA Location: Baguio City Date of Incident: November 29, 2005
Information: statutory rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
RTC: guilty
CA: guilty
SC:guilty
FACTS: (Prosecution) The prosecution presented the victim, AAA, who was then 10 years old and a Grade 2 student at
Camp 7 Elementary School in Baguio City. She testified that on November 29, 2005, she went home from school at
around 12 noon to have lunch. On the way home, she met Rodrigo at his house. He brought her to his room and laid her
down on the bed. He then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He pulled down his pants and then inserted his penis
into her vagina. According to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew his penis, white
liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos (₱5.00) before she went back to school. AAA went back to school at about
2:10 p.m. Her adviser, Agustina Chapap, asked her where she came from because she was tardy. AAA initially did not
answer. When asked again why she was tardy, AAA admitted she came from "Uncle Rod." She also admitted that she
went there to ask for money. Chapap then brought AAA to Rona Ambaken, AAA's previous teacher. Together, they
brought AAA to the principal's office. AAA was brought to the comfort room where Ambaken inspected her panties. The
principal was able to confirm that AAA was touched since AAA's private organ was swelling. Her underwear was also wet.
Another teacher, Jason Dalisdis, then brought AAA to Baguio General Hospital where her underwear was again inspected.
Dr. Anvic Pascua also examined her. On the way to the hospital, Dalisdis passed by the barangay hall and the police
station to report the incident. AAA also disclosed during trial that the accused-appellant had done the same thing to her
about 10 times on separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten (₱10.00) or five (₱5.00) pesos.
Defense: Rodrigo denied that AAA went to his house at 12 noon on November 29, 2005 and claimed he was already at
work at 1:30 p.m. He has known AAA for a long time since his family rented the house of AAA's grandfather from 2001 to
2004. When the police came and asked him if he knew AAA, he answered in the affirmative. He was then brought to
Baguio General Hospital where he was told that AAA identified him as the one who raped her.
Rodrigo admitted that he had a relationship with AAA's sister, and they even lived together as common-law spouses. He
also admitted that a similar complaint was filed against him by AAA's mother when AAA was eight years old, but they
settled the case at the barangay level.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Statutory Rape?
HELD: YES. Rape is defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. ― Rape is committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused has carnal
knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason
PDFelement
or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim
is proven and that there was sexual intercourse.
Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape.
What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force,
intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of
her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern
good from evil.
The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at the time of the incident. Her birth certificate was
presented before the trial court. What is critical in this case, therefore, is whether there is a showing that Rodrigo had
carnal knowledge of AAA.
AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the ordeal that was done to her. As a child-victim who has
taken significant risks in coming to court, her testimony deserves full weight and credence.
AAA's ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her teachers whose concern for her led to the discovery of the crime.
The medical certificate presented in court, together with the testimonies of the physicians, is consistent with the finding
that she was sexually abused.
Rodrigo asserted that AAA's failure to cry out for help shows reasonable doubt. He noted that her house was just near his
house where the incident happened.
Rodrigo was referred to by the child-victim as "Uncle Rod." He admitted that AAA's family had known him for a long time.
Rodrigo had the trust and respect that any elder in the family of AAA had. Instead of providing the moral guidance that his
status allowed him, he took advantage of AAA's youthful innocence to satiate his illicit carnal desires. To cover this up and
seemingly justify his actions, he gave his child-victim the measly sum of five pesos. Rodrigo knew that what he did was
wrong; AAA would have probably doubted whether such act was normal among adults.
With his moral ascendancy, it would not be unreasonable to assume that even the child-victim's desire for help would be
muffled by her fear of her "Uncle Rod." To a young 10-year-old, the ordinary world can be daunting. To be so young and
silently aware that one is the victim of such callous depravation by Rodrigo, who she could have expected to take care of
her, can create the kind of lasting fear that diminishes the development of her own person and her own convictions.
In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape since [t]he law presumes that such a
victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA finding the accused-appellant Rodrigo Gutierez y Robles guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages.
PDFelement
15. People v. Bay-od | Rape | G.R. No. 238176 | Jan. 14, 2019 | Jolo

defendants-appellants: RAMON BAY-OD
Victim(s): AAA Location: Lagawe City Date of Incident: 2011
Information: Statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) as qualified by item 5 of the fifth paragraph of Article 266-B
RTC: Guilty of Qualified Statutory Rape
CA: Affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC
SC: Affimed in toto the ruling of the CA
FACTS:
That on or about the year 2011, at CCC, hence within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [appellant], DID then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of AAA, a minor, 6 years of age at the time, by
inserting his penis into the vagina of the victim.
Prosecution:
Sometime in the year 2011, AAA, who was then 6 years old, was looking for playmates along their neighborhood when
[appellant] called her to go inside the latter's house at "CCC." Once inside, [appellant] forcibly had sex with AAA by
removing the latter's clothes and by inserting his penis into AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain and cried and so [appellant]
stopped. Afterwards, AAA put on her clothes and went home but decided not to tell her parents about the incident
because she was afraid of the [appellant] who warned her not [to] tell the incident to anybody. However, she told her
brother about what [appellant] did to her.
Sometime in October 2013, while AAA and her brother were having an argument, BBB, the victim's mother, heard her son
teasing AAA saying "op-opya ah te iniyut da-ah eh Lamon," which means "shut up because you were sexually abused by
Lamon." Upon hearing such words, BBB immediately confronted AAA about the veracity of her brother's statement to
which AAA confessed that she was indeed raped by the [appellant].
On November 15, 2013, [Dr. Bentrez], medical officer of the Municipal Health Office of Lagawe, Ifugao, conducted a
physical examination on AAA and issued a medical certificate attesting that upon examination of the victim, she found no
noted laceration, hematoma and bleeding on the victim's genital area. Nevertheless, she testified that despite 1he
absence of laceration on the victim's vagina and that even if the vagina remains intact, it is still possible that AAA was
raped because not all patients have the same shape of hymen and not all penetrations injure the hymen.
Defense:
The defense relied on the sole testimony of the appellant. The appellant flat out denied having raped AAA. He claims that
the charge against him was merely fabricated by the family of AAA - his distant relatives - out of envy
RTC:
The RTC accorded full weight and credence on the version of the prosecution and found the appellant guilty of qualified
statutory rape as charged
CA:
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Contention to SC:
The appellant claims that the RTC and the CA erred in according full weight and credence to the version of the
prosecution, particularly to the accusation of rape by AAA. He argues that such accusation was actually disproved by the
results of the medical examination conducted by Dr. Bentrez on AAA.
PDFelement
The appellant points out that AAA's hymen was medically found to be still intact. On this end, he relies on and cites Dr.
Bentrez's testimony wherein the latter stated that she, in her medical examination of AAA, found no laceration or scar in
the latter's hymen. Such findings, the appellant posits, are actually inconsistent with the conclusion that he had carnal
knowledge of AAA and, hence, should be considered fatal to the charge of statutory rape.
In view of the apparent incredibility of AAA's testimony, the appellant, thus, urges this Court to instead give recognition to
his alternate version of the events as the truth of what happened in this case and, ultimately, to acquit him of the crime
charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the AAA’s claim of Rape is negated by the medical finding that her hymen is intact.
HELD: No. The medical finding of Dr. Bentrez that AAA has no injury in her hymen is not fatal to the accusation of rape
against Bay-od. AAA’s narration that Bay-od had intercourse with her is not, in and of itself, inconsistent with such finding.
In not a few cases already, the Court has affirmed convictions for rape despite the absence of injury on the victim’s hymen
in view of the medical possibility for a hymen to remain intact despite history of sexual intercourse.
In People v. Opong [577 Phil. 571 (2008)], the Court had ran down some of these cases:
In People v. Gabayron, we sustained the conviction of accused for rape even though the victim’s hymen remained intact
after the incidents because medical researches show that negative findings of lacerations are of no significance, as the
hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. It was noted that many cases of pregnancy had been reported about
women with unruptured hymens, and that there could still be a finding of rape even if, despite repeated intercourse over a
period of years, the victim still retained an intact hymen without signs of injury.
In People v. Capt. Llanto, citing People v. Aguinaldo, we likewise affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape despite
the absence of laceration on the victim’s hymen since medical findings suggest that it is possible for the victim’s hymen to
remain intact despite repeated sexual intercourse. We elucidated that the strength and dilatability of the hymen varies
from one woman to another, such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse; on the other
hand, it may be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse can ensue.
In People v. Palicte and in People v. Castro, the rape victims involved were minors. The medical examination showed that
their hymen remained intact even after the rape. Even then, we held that such fact is not proof that rape was not
committed.
Moreover, in People v. Pamintuan, We recognized that the absence of injuries in a rape victim’s hymen could also be
attributed to a variety of factors that do not at all discount the fact that rape has been committed. As Pamintuan observed:
The presence or absence of injuries would depend on different factors, such as the forcefulness of the insertion, the size
of the object inserted, the method by which the injury was caused, the changes occurring in a female child’s body, and the
length of healing time, if indeed injuries were caused.
Thus, the fact that AAA did not sustain any injury in her sex organ does not ipso facto mean that she was not raped.
Accordingly, the Court find the medical finding of Dr. Bentrez regarding the absence of laceration in AAA’s hymen to be,
by itself, insufficient to disprove AAA’s claim of rape against the appellant. The absence of laceration or injury to AAA’s
hymen during the time she was examined may have been caused by a number of reasons – none of which, however,
would have any definitive bearing on whether appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA or not.
It should be emphasized at this point that carnal knowledge, as an element of rape under Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, is
not synonymous to sexual intercourse in its ordinary sense; it implies neither the complete penetration of the vagina nor
the rupture of the hymen. Indeed, jurisprudence has held that even the slightest penetration of the victim’s genitals – i.e.,
the “touching” by the penis of the vagina’s labia – is enough to satisfy the element.
Carnal knowledge has been defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman; sexual
intercourse. An essential ingredient thereof is the penetration of the female sexual organ by the sexual organ of the male.
In cases of rape, however, mere proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum or lips of the
female organ is sufficient to constitute a basis for conviction.
PDFelement
The crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the man’s penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ
or, as once so said in a case, by the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the
sexual act.
Here, the fact that Bay-od had carnal knowledge of AAA had been clearly established by the latter’s testimony. Such
testimony stands independently of the medical findings of Dr. Bentrez.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED in toto.
16. People v. Fetalco | Rape | G.R. No. 241249 | July 28, 2020 | Issa
plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

defendants-appellants: Ryan Fetalco
Victim: AAA Location: Malabon City Date of Incident: July 17, 2005
Information: Statutory Rape

RTC: Guilty
CA: Affirmed
SC: Affirmed
FACTS: AAA, a 4 year old minor, executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, stating that Ryan Fetalco inserted his hairy male
organ resembling a rat, which she described as a “daga” 6 days prior. In October 2007, 2 years after the incident, AAA
testified in court that she knew Fetalco because they used to be neighbors in Malabon. In 2008, she testified that she was
sleeping at the house of Fetalco when she was awakened and she saw her private part bleeding. She stated that Fetalco
inserted a “daga” in her vagina then inserted a “pantusok ng fishball”. However in 2010, when she was cross-examined,
AAA testified that Fetalco inserted a fishball stick on her vagina, not a finger nor a “daga”; that there was no bleeding and
it happened in her house. AAA also admitted that her family was renting from the family of Fetalco and that their
relationship was not good.
Prosecution: BBB, AAA’s mother, testified during trial that she was at their house when the incident happened and AAA
told her that while in Fetalco’s house, he inserted something that resembles a rat in her vagina. AAA described it as “titi ni
kuya na maitim parang daga may balahibo”. Dr. Sabino-Dingson, the Medicolegal Officer, testified that based on the
examination performed by Dr. Carpio, it can be deduced that AAA’s hymen has shallow healed lacerations at 9 o’clock
that shows clear evidence of penetrating trauma.
Defense: Fetalco testified that he was cleaning his brother’s house (1 house away from AAA’s house) with his cousins
from 9:00-11:00 am then had lunch at around 11:30 am. He alleged that he was only accused of rape because AAA’s
family could not pay rentals for 3 months.
RTC: Guilty of Statutory Rape
The RTC held that while there were discrepancies in AAA’s statements, the court is inclined to give considerable latitude
to the the child witness, noting that it is highly improbable that a girl of tender years would impute to any man a crime as
serious as rape if what she claims is not true. The court further held that any doubt was erased by the result of the
medico-legal exam performed on AAA.
CA: Affirmed the RTC’s decision but modified the amount of damages
As to the contention that AAA’s inconsistencies cast doubt on the accusation of rape, the court highlighted the fact that
AAA executed the Sinumpaang Salaysay when she was only 4 years old, 6 days after the commission of the crime.
Considering that what happened was still fresh in AAA’s mind at the time, AAA’s statement that Fetalco inserted a “daga”
into her genitals cannot be disregarded. As to Fetalco’s contention that the testimony of the medico-legal iis hearsay since
he was not the one who [ppersonally examined AAA, the CA held that the medical examination of the victim or the
presentaton of medical certificate is not essential to prove the commission of rape since the testimony of the victim alone,
if credible, is sufficient to convict.
PDFelement
Contention to SC: AAA’s inconsistencies cast serious doubt on the guilt of Fetalco and that the medico-legal report must
not be given probative weight because the medico-legal officer who prepared the medical certificate was not presented in
court.
ISSUE: W/N Ryan Fetalco’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: YES.
Art. 266-A of the RPC- Rape; When and How Committed

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the
Statutory rape is committed when:

1. the offended party is under 12 years of age;
2. the accused had carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation, whether
the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of
authority.
In statutory rape, it is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. It is not
necessary to prove that the victim was intimidated or that force was used against her, because in statutory rape the law
presumes that the victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own. In this case, both the
RTC nad CA found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of statutory rape and
the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from these findings.
The presence of the 1st element is unquestionable. AAA’s birth certificate shows that she was born on January 9, 2001.
AAA was only 4 years old when the crime was committed in 2005.
The 2nd element was duly proven by the prosecution with the testimony of AAA. AAA positively identified the accused as
the one who ravaged her and she clearly narrated her harrowing experience in the hands of Fetalco. Time and again, the
SC has held that when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true. A young girl would
not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination
of her private parts; and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial,
had she in fact been raped and been truly moved to preserve her honor. At such a young age, it is only natural for AAA to
forget some details of her horrors to cope with the trauma.
Further, AAA’s inconsistencies are too thin for the Court to question AAA’s credibility. Simply because AAA failed to
mention the fishball stick one time during the trial does not mean that she was lying during all the other times when she
clearly conveyed that she was raped. As to the inconsistency on the place where the crime happened, the place of the
commission is not an essential element in the crime of rape.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility
of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. Unfortunately for
Fetalco, he was clearly in the immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS as to award of damages.
17. People v. Laoag | Rape | G.R. No. 178321 | Oct. 5, 2011 | Enzo
plaintiff-appellee: AAA | defendants-appellants: Conrado Laog

Victim(s): AAA (Raped) and Jennifer Rosal (Killed) Location: Malolos, Bulacan Date of Incident: June 6, 2000
PDFelement
Information: Rape and Murder

RTC: Guilty
CA: Guilty
SC: Special Complex Crime of Rape with Homicide
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: Aggravating: Abuse of Superior Strength (Only Generic)
FACTS: AAA, the rape victim who was 19 years old at the time of the incident, testified that at around six o'clock in the
evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way
to apply for work at a canteen near the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who
was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a
concrete wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall
down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking
her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with thick grass.
Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face.
While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up
her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping
AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out.
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she reached her uncle's farm at
daybreak on June 8, 2000. When she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then
brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that
Jennifer had died.
Defense: Appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the
time the crimes were committed.
The defense also presented appellant's nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that he went to appellant's house on June 5,
2000, at around three o'clock in the afternoon, and saw AAA and Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer
before at his uncle's house about seven times because AAA and his uncle had an illicit affair.
RTC: GUILTY for Rape AND Murder
CA: GUILTY for Rape AND Murder
Contention to SC: Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of AAA. He assails AAA's credibility, the prosecution's main witness, and
points out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. He argues that for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated in the killing of Jennifer, the physical
attributes of both the accused and the victim should have been shown in order to determine whether the accused had the
capacity to overcome the victim physically or whether the victim was substantially weak and unable to put up a defense.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the accused is guilty of rape and homicide. (NO, but guilty of special complex crime of rape with homicide)
(2) Whether the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present. (YES)
HELD: Appellant guilty of special complex crime of rape with homicide.
1. NO, but guilty of special complex crime of rape with homicide not separate charges of rape and murder.
R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim
is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed;["] and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the composite acts of rape and
the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.
PDFelement
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer
both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer
to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely
so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated,
appellant purposely covered AAA's body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifer's body, so that it may not be
easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA
were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellant's barbaric deeds were soon
enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were consummated, and it is
immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the woman victim of the rape.
2. YES. In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its generic
sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence,
even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in
the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder
and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is notorious inequality
of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and
purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. In this case, as personally
witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she
was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting
her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly,
unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to his unarmed victim.
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic aggravating circumstance to be
considered in the imposition of the penalty. The penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines" the Court is mandated to impose on the
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with Homicide under
Article 266-B of the RPC and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
PDFelement
18. People v. Villaflores | Rape | G.R. No. 184926 | April 11, 2012 | Ivy

accused-appellant: EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO
Victim(s): Marita (4 years and eight months)
Location: Bagong Silang, Caloocan Date of Incident: July 2, 1999
Information: rape with homicide

RTC: convicted Villaflores of rape with homicide (penalty:death)
CA: affirmed RTC (lowered penalty to reclusion perpetua)
SC: sustained conviction (but added “not eligible for parole” and exemplary damages)
Mode: | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS:
It is gathered that in the afternoon of July 3, 1999, the lifeless body of a 5-year old child, Marita born on October 21, 1994
was discovered by her father, Manito (hereinafter Manito) beside a toilet bowl at an unoccupied house about 5 houses
away from their residence in Phase 9, Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The day before at about noon time his wife called
him up at his work place informing him that their daughter was missing, prompting Jessie to hie home and search for the
child. He went around possible places, inquiring from neighbors but no one could provide any lead until the following
morning when his wife in desperation, consulted a "manghuhula" at a nearby barangay. According to the "manghuhula"
his daughter was just at the 5th house from his house. And that was how he tracked down his daughter in exact location.
She was covered with a blue sack with her face bloodied and her body soaked to the skin. He found a yellow sack under
her head and a white rope around her neck about 2 and a half feet long and the diameter, about the size of his middle
finger.
Prosecution:
Testimonies of witnesses presented:
Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum (ito plus medico legal yung testimonies na super na-discuss ng SC. The rest, hindi
halos nabanggit.)
Two (2) witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum, came forward and narrated that at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning of July 2, 1999, they saw Edmundo Villaflores, known in the neighborhood by his Batman tag and a neighbor of
the [victim's family], leading Marita by the hand ("umakay sa bata"). At about noon time they were at Batman's house
where they used shabu for a while. Both Aldrin and Jovie are drug users. While in Batman's place, although he did not
see Marita, Jovie presumed that Batman was hiding the child at the back of the house. Jovie related that about 3:00 PM of
the same day, he heard cries of a child as he passed by the house of Batman. At about 7:00 PM, Jovie saw again Batman
carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant house. He thought that the child must have been in the sack because it appeared
heavy. It was the sack that he saw earlier in the house of Batman.
SPO2 PROTACIO MAGTAJAS (investigator)
They saw the body of the child at the back portion of an abandoned house where he himself recovered pieces of evidence
such as the nylon rope (Exhibit N) and the yellow sack inside the comfort room. The child appeared black and blue,
(kawawa yong bata wasak ang mukha"). He saw blood stains on her lips and when he removed the sack covering her
body, he also saw blood stains in her vagina. The yellow sack that he was referring to when brought out in court had
already a greenish and fleshy color. The sack was no longer in the same condition when recovered, saying, when asked
by the Court: "medyo buo pa, hindi pa ho ganyang sira-sira." There was another sack, colored blue, which was used to
cover the face of the child while the yellow sack was at the back of the victim. He forgot about the blue sack when SOCO
Team arrived because they were the ones who brought the body to the funeral parlor.
PO3 RODELIO ORTIZ
PDFelement
Ortiz caused the confrontation between Bautista and Villaflores. He brought Bautista to the detention cell from where
Bautista identified and pointed to Villaflores as the one who abducted the child. Villaflores appeared angry.
PO1 HAROLD BLANCO
They were informed that the group of Aldrin could shed light on the incident. Blanco and the other police officers returned
to the crime scene and asked the people around, who kept mum and were elusively afraid to talk. When they went to the
house of Batman, it was already padlocked. They went to the place of SPO1 Alfredo Antonio nearby to avoid detection
and asked a child to look out for Villaflores. Soon enough, a jeep from Phase 1 arrived and a commotion ensued as
people started blocking the way of Villaflores, who alighted from the said jeep. The officers took him in custody and
brought him to Sub-station 6. The wife of Villaflores arrived at the station. Blanco remembered the wife saying, "noong
gabing nakita niya si Villaflores, may sako sa silong ng bahay nila, tapos pagdating ni Villaflores, inayos niya yong sako at
nilapitan niya raw, nakita niya may siko, tapos tinanong niya si Villaflores, ano yon? Sabi niya, wala yon, wala yon." The
wife was crying and she said that her husband was also on drugs and even used it in front of their children. The wife
further narrated that upon checking the sack again, she saw that there was a child
PO1 SONNY BOY TEPACE
Tepache, assigned at the NPD Crime Laboratory, SOCO, Caloocan City Police Station also went to the crime scene and
testified that he saw the child covered with a blue sack and a nylon cord tied around her neck.
DR. ARNEL MARQUEZ
Dr. Marquez conducted the autopsy on the body of Marita. Postmortem findings indicate several wounds found in the
child’s Head, Neck and Trunk. Also, there are multiple deep fresh lacerations at the hymen. Cause of death was
STRANGULATION. The external injuries could have been caused by contact with a blunt object like a piece of wood.
There were also punctured wounds which could have been caused by a barbecue stick or anything pointed.
Defense:
Testimonies of the witnesses presented:
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES,
Villaflores denied raping the victim. At around 10:00 AM of July 2, 1999, he was at the market place at Phase 10 to get
some plywood for his Aunt Maring. His residence is some 5 houses away from the place of the child. He knows the child
because sometimes he was asked by the wife of Manito to fix their electrical connection. He corrected himself by saying
he does not know Marita but only her father, Manito. He denied carrying a sack and throwing it at the vacant lot.
He testified that he is friends with Aldrin and Jovie and that they use shabu together.
When he was arrested, he was carrying some food items which they brought in Bayan. They did not tell him why he was
being arrested.
SHERWIN BORCILLO, an electronic technician and neighbor of Edmundo Villaflores told the court that the charges
against Villaflores were not true, the truth being, that on the night of July 2, 1999 he saw Aldrin and Jovie at the back of
his house holding a sack containing something which he did not know. They were talking to Batman and offering a dog
contained in the sack and then they left the sack near the comfort room outside the door of the house of Batman. They
came back and took the yellow sack. He said he was sure that the sack contained the child because he saw the head of
the child, it seemed like she was staring at him and asking his help.
HOWEVER, on cross examination, he testified that on July 2, he left the house at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning to go
to school in PMI at Sta. Cruz, Manila. He did not see Batman, nor Aldrin, or Jovie about noon time of July 2. He admitted
that Batman is his uncle being the brother of his mother. His uncle is a known drug addict in the area.
RTC:
RTC convicted Villaflores of rape with homicide, holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but
that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of DEATH. (May 2004)
PDFelement
CA:
Affirmed conviction but lowered the penalty to reclusion perpetua
Contention to SC:
Villaflores now reiterates that the RTC and the CA gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
with homicide because the State did not discharge its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact and
circumstance constituting the crime charged.
ISSUE: Whether Villaflores is guilty of the crime of rape with homicide
HELD: YES.
I. Nature of rape with homicide as a composite crime, explained
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is
composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a
single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or
complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC.
Distinctions:
1. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or compound crime, the
combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being
the necessary means to commit the other.
2. For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound
crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period.
3. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of
a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate information.
The law on rape defines and sets forth the composite crimes of attempted rape with homicide and rape with homicide. In
both composite crimes, the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of rape. As can be noted, each of said
composite crimes is punished with a single penalty, the former with reclusion perpetua to death, and the latter with death.
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial in determining whether the crime is a
composite crime or a complex or compound crime. The phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the notion that
the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender originally designed to commit.
In contrast, the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. During the floor
deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No. 8353, the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of
the rape to refer to a killing that occurs immediately before o r after, or during the commission itself of the attempted or
consummated rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as the
killing is linked to the rape, became evident.
II. The State discharged its burden of proving the rape with homicide beyond reasonable doubt
The State must \prove the concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that Villaflores had carnal knowledge of
Marita;(b) that he consummated the carnal knowledge without the consent of Marita; and (c) that he killed Marita by
reason of the rape.
Under Article 266-A, supra, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a female under 12
years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving
consent to the carnal knowledge. In the case at bar, statutory rape was committed (Victim 4 yo and 8 months)
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the victim is left to testify on the
circumstances of its commission. The difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide, because
there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed. However, the Rules of Court allows
circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the culprit. No greater degree of
PDFelement
certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
Section 4, Rule 133, of the ROC specifies when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz.:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is
more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered several circumstances, which when "appreciated
together and not piece by piece," according to the CA, were seen as "strands which create a pattern when interwoven,"
and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was
guilty of rape with homicide. We concur.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following:
1. Firstly, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand (akay-akay) at around 10:00
am on July 2, 1999,leading the child through the alley going towards the direction of his house about 6 houses
away from the victim's house.
2. Secondly, Marita went missing after that and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body on the
following day.
3. Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores' house at about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and heard the crying and moaning
(umuungol) of a child coming from inside.
4. Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his house carrying a yellow sack
that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned house where the child's lifeless body was later
found.
5. Fifthly, the father of Marita identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered the head of his
daughter at the time he discovered her body; He also mentioned that a blue sack covered her body.
6. Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed between the abandoned house where Marita's body was found and Villaflores'
house, because his house had a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house without having to pass
any other houses. This indicated Villaflores' familiarity and access to the abandoned house.
7. Seventhly, several pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like the white rope around the
victim's neck and the yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the same rope tied to the door of
his house, and the yellow sack was a wall-covering for his toilet.
8. Eighthly, the medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by strangulation, which cause
of death was consistent with the ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries.
9. Ninthly, Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood from her genitalia. The
vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body tested positive for spermatozoa.
10. And, tenthly, the body of Marita was already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her
cadaver at 8 pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings indicated that such stage of flaccidity confirmed that
she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or at the latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.
These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has brought to us a moral certainty of the guilt of
Villaflores for rape with homicide. As to the rape, the fact that the vaginal and periurethral smears taken from Marita tested
positive for spermatozoa confirmed that the blunt object inserted to her vagina was an adult human penis. As to the
homicide, her death was shown to be caused by strangulation with a rope, and the time of death as determined by the
medico-legal findings was consistent with the recollection of Solidum of seeing Villaflores going towards the abandoned
house at around 7 pm of July 2, 1999.
On Borcillo’s testimony
We note that the RTC and the CA disbelieved the exculpating testimony of Borcillo. They justifiably did so. For one, after
he stated during direct examination that Villaflores was only his neighbor, it soon came to be revealed during his cross-
examination that he was really a son of Villaflores' own sister. Borcillo might have concealed their close blood relationship
to bolster the credibility of his testimony favoring his uncle. Borcillo deserved no credence as a witness. Also, Borcillo's
implicating Solidum and Bautista in the crime, and exculpating his uncle were justly met with skepticism.
PDFelement
On penalty imposed and damages
The CA reduced the penalty of death prescribed by the RTC to reclusion perpetua in consideration of the intervening
enactment on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act No. 9346. Nonetheless, we have also to specify in the judgment that
Villaflores shall not be eligible for parole, considering that Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 expressly holds persons
"whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act" not eligible for parole under Act No. 4103
(Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended. The awards of damages allowed by the CA are proper. However, we add
exemplary damages to take into account the fact that Marita was below seven years of age at the time of the commission
of the rape with homicide.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals finding and pronouncing
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO guilty of rape with homicide.
19. People v. Cial | Rape | G.R. No. 191362 | Oct. 9, 2013 | Enzo
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | accused-appellant: MARCIANO CIAL y LORENA

Victim(s): AAA Location: Atimonan, Quezon Date of Incident: December 2002
Information: Qualified Rape (Relationship and minority)

RTC: Guilty
CA: Affirmed
SC: Modified to rape
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: NONE
FACTS: AAA is one the the children by BBB and CCC. After CCC died, BBB cohabited with Appellant Cial. Appellant and
BBB have two children.
In 2002, "AAA", then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing with her family and appellant in . . .
Quezon Province. "AAA'' calls appellant "Papa."
Sometime in December 2002, appellant called "AAA" and told her to go to the bedroom inside their house. Once inside,
appellant took off "AAA's" shorts and panty and spread her legs. Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and
inserted his penis into the little girl's vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain but she did not try to struggle because appellant had a
bolo on his waist. After satiating his lust, appellant threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if she reported the incident to
anyone. At that time, "AAA's" maternal grandmother was in the house but was unaware that "AAA" was being ravished.
Unable to endure the torment, "AAA" confided her ordeal to her mother. But "AAA's" mother did not believe her. "AAA" ran
away from home and went to her maternal uncle's house. There, she disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother's
siblings. Her uncle appeared to be angered by appellant's wrong doing. But nonetheless her uncle allowed appellant to
bring her home when appellant fetched her.
For fear that she might be raped again, "AAA" ran away and went to the house of her aunt. Her aunt helped her file the
complaint against her stepfather.
Based on the Medico-Legal Report “she was negative to pubic hair; there was a negative physical injury at the pubic area,
with normal external genitalia.” According to Dr. Imperial, the negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report
means that the victim has not yet fully developed her secondary characteristics which usually manifests during puberty. Dr.
Imperial explained that the easy insertion of one finger into her vagina means that the child was no longer a virgin and that
it would be difficult to insert even the tip of the little finger into the private part of a virgin as she would have suffered pain.
On the absence of spermatozoa on the victim's genitals, Dr. Imperial explained that a sperm has a life span of three (3)
days. The lapse of almost four months from the time of the rape would naturally yield negative results for spermatozoa.
Defense: As to be expected, appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated "AAA" as his own daughter. He also
claimed that "AAA's" aunt fabricated the charge because appellant called her a thief.
PDFelement
RTC: GUILTY
CA: AFFIRMED
The CA found that the elements of rape have been duly established. "AAA's" testimony proved that appellant had carnal
knowledge of her against her will and without her consent. The examining doctor corroborated "AAA's" narration by
testifying that the hymenal lacerations could have been possibly caused by an erect penis. The CA disregarded
appellant's contention that he could not have raped "AAA" in the presence of "AAA's" grandmother as "lust is no respecter
of time and place." Moreover, the appellate court found that the prosecution satisfactorily established "AAA's" minority as
well as the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant being the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother.
ISSUE: Whether the appellant is guilty of qualified rape.
HELD: NO. ONLY RAPE. The prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship.
In its Formal Offer of Evidence, the prosecution mentioned "AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth. Also attached to the Folder of
Exhibits marked as Exhibit "B" is "AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth showing that "AAA" was born on October 31, 1991.
However, upon closer scrutiny, we note that the said Certificate of Live Birth was never presented or offered during the
trial of the case. Records show that the prosecution presented only "AAA" and Dr. Imperial as its witnesses. Dr. Imperial
never testified on "AAA's" age. On the other hand, "AAA" even testified on the witness stand that she does not know her
age.
The same is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship. The prosecution likewise miserably
failed to establish "AAA's" relationship with the appellant. Although the Information alleged that appellant is the common-
law husband of "AAA's" mother, "AAA"' referred to appellant as her step-father.
Even the RTC interchangeably referred to appellant as the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother 23 as well as the
step-father of "AAA". 24 Moreover, the RTC failed to cite any basis for its reference to appellant as such. In fact, the RTC
Decision is bereft of any discussion as to how it reached its conclusion that appellant is the common-law husband of
"AAA's" mother or that "AAA" is his step-daughter.
The CA committed the same error. Notwithstanding appellant's claim that he is married to "AAA's" mother, it went on to
declare, without any explanation or justification, that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother, viz.:
. . . Also, given that Marciano and AAA's mother were not legally married, the qualifying circumstance that the
accused is the common- law husband of the victim's mother may be properly appreciated.
The terms "common-law husband" and "step-father" have different legal connotations. For appellant to be a step-father to
"AAA," he must be legally married to "AAA's" mother.
Suffice it to state that qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the crime itself. In this
case, the prosecution utterly tailed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship. As such, appellant should only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, the penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the CA is MODIFIED. Appellant Marciano Cial y Lorena
is hereby found guilty of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
20. People v. De Guzman | Rape | G.R. No. 224212 | Nov. 27, 2019 | Vee
plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | accused-appellant: ROMEO DE CASTRO DE GUZMAN
PDFelement
Victim: AAA - 8yo during the first incident, and 15 during the last incident; Step-daughter of accused De Guzman
Location: Las Pinas Date of Incident: 05-09-2011
Information: 2 Informations for qualified rape in relation to RA 7610; by means of force, threat and intimidation
RTC: guilty of 2 counts of qualified rape. Minority and relationship appreciated as QC
CA: guilty of 2 counts of qualified rape. modified the award of exemplary damages
SC: Simple Statutory Rape and Simple Rape upder par. 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC. Relationship not appreciated as
QC was not sufficiently proved during trial
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
DOCTRINE: The crime is simple rape, although the State successfully proves the common-law relationship,
where the information does not properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused
and the female.
FACTS: Two separate Informations charging De Guzman with Qualified Rape in relation to RA 7610 was filed for the two
occasions that De Guzman had carnal knowledge of AAA using violence, threat, intimidation and taking advantage of his
moral ascendancy over the latter.
After the separation of the mother BBB, with her biological father, BBB cohabited with appellant, who acted as stepfather
to AAA. Appellant also has 2 biological children with BBB.
The first incident of rape happened when AAA was only 8 years old. At that time, BBB was out of their house doing
laundry. AAA’s siblings were also asleep. AAA approached appellant who made her lie down on the floor and removed
her shorts and underwear. Appellant then inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. AAA felt pain but did not shout because
prior to this, appellant warned AAA against reporting the incident to anyone, including her mother. Appellant also told AAA
not to make any noise. Out of fear, AAA did not report the rape to her mother.
AAA was repeatedly raped on separate occassions, which she did not also report to her mother. AAA transferred to her
aunt’s house and she was able to reveal the unfortunate events to her aunt CCC.
Another incident of rape occured when AAA returned to their new house and she was 15 years old. Appellant approached
AAA while she was sorting out her younger brothers’ toys. AAA did not shout because she was scared. No one was home
at the time of the said incident because she was scared. No one was home at the time of the said incident because AAA’s
mother was doing laundry at her employer’s house, while her brothers were playing outside.
The following day, AAA’s aunt DDD went to their house when she learned from CCC about what happened. Afterwards,
DDD brought AAA to her own house where she confronted AAA regarding the sexual abuse committed by appellant. AAA
then confirmed that appellant indeed raped her.
Soon after, AAA and her aunt DDD went to her uncle EEE. They then proceeded to the DSWD and to the Las Pinas
Police Station for purposes of reporting AAA’s rape.
During trial, AAA’s birth certificate was presented which revealed that she was only around 7 yo (not yo as indicated in the
Information) when the first rape was committed against her in 2003.
Defense: Denied the accusations against him. He alleged that AAA was a problematic child and even joined a gang so
much so that her mother shaved her head. Due to this, de Guzman and BBB sent AAA to live with her aunt CCC. He
likewise claimed that AAA was angry at him because he always scolds her, especially since AAA was seeing her
boyfriend. He claimed that AAA’s aunts, the ones who helped AAA filed the case, were averse to him.
RTC: victim’s testimony established the existence of the elements of rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of the RPC. That
in an incestous rape of a minor, there is no need to prove employment of actual force or intimidation since the
overpowering moral influence of the father (supposedly in this case, stepfather) would suffice. The RTC appreciated the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
CA: twin circumstances of minority and her relationship to the offender concurred and raised the offense to
qualified rape.
PDFelement
Contention to SC: De Guzman contends that it should not be assumed that AAA’s hymenal lacerations resulted from
rape incidents as these may have been caused by something else. Moreover, even if the lacerations were caused by
forcible sexual intercourse, it does not automatically mean that De Guzman was the perpetrator considering that she has
a boyfriend.
ISSUE: WON De Guzman is guilty of 2 counts of qualified rape
HELD: NO. Supreme Court ruled that De Guzman is guilty of simple statutory rape and simple rape only.
The elements of qualified rape are:

(1) sexual congress;
(2) with a woman;
(3) done by force and without consent;
(4) the victim is under 18years of age at the time of the rape; and
(5) the offender is either a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted), guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the 3rd civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The minority of the victim and his or her relationship with the offender should both be alleged in the Information and
proven beyond reasonable doubt during trial in order to qualify the rape charge as these circumstances have the effect of
altering the nature of the rape and its corresponding penalty. Otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon the
offender.
In this case, AAA’s minority was properly alleged and indisputably proven during trial. She was below 18 years old at the
time the crimes were committed against her. Moreover, it was proven by evidence that De Guzman forced AAA into
engaging in sexual congress by using threats and intimidation and without her consent, in addition to his moral
ascendancy over her.
Corollarily, it was alleged in the Information that De Guzman was AAA’s “stepfather.” It presupposes a legitimate
relationship between the appellant and the victim’s mother.
However, during trial, the prosecution failed to establish this step-parent-stepdaughter relationship between De Guzman
and AAA. No proof of marriage was presented in order to establish De Guzman’s legal relationship with BBB. In
other words, De Guzman cannot be considered as the stepfather of AAA as alleged in the Informations. On the contrary,
records show that De Guzman was actually the common-law spouse of BBB as he was not legally married to her.
Since De Guzman’s relationship with AAA as alleged in the Information was not proven beyond reasonable doubt,
De Guzman cannot be convicted of Qualified Rape, only Simple Statutory Rape and Simple Rape. The crime is
simple rape, although the State successfully proves the common-law relationship, where the information does not properly
allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the female. This is because the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is inviolable. De Guzman cannot be held
liable for qualified rape since the prosecution failed to properly designate in the Informations that De Guzman is actually
BBB’s common-law husband (which was proven during the trial) and not AAA’s stepfather.
Elements of simple statutory rape and simple rape are present in this case.
AAA was below 18years old at the time of the commission of the crimes against her. The evidence showed that De
Guzman had carnal knowledge of the victim on 2 occasions by using threats and intimidation and his moral ascendancy
over her. Upon assessment, the manner by which AAA narrated the commission of the felonies, which was corroborated
by the medico-legal officer, confirmed that De Guzman was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Statutory Rape and
Simple Rape.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS in that accused-appellant Romeo De Castro De Guzman is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Simple Statutory Rape and Simple Rape upder par. 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC.
PDFelement
21. People v. Jumawan | Rape | G.R. No. 187495 | April 21, 2014 | Jammy

defendants-appellants: EDGAR JUMAWAN
Victim(s): Location: CAGAYAN DE ORO Date of Incident: OCTOBER 10 1998
Information: RA 8353 ANTI RAPE LAW OF 1997 2 COUNTS

RTC: GUILTY
CA: GUILTY
SC: GUILTY
FACTS:
Version of the prosecution
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers. They got married after
a year of courtship. When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store. Later
on, they engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for
the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality,
however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods. Accused-
appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Conjugal intimacy did not
really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He
treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal
in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged
method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into
submission. In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to
attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay
at home because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her
goal of providing a good future for the children. Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK
and the accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By
October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro City. On October 16, 1998, the accused-
appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at
about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine
of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the living room. OOO and MMM then
prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal
bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied. Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the
bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "Why are you lying on the cot?", and to instantaneously order:
"You transfer here to our bed." KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain
due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted
the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her
pillow and transferred to the bed. The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she
was not feeling well. The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding
on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her
legs. The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She
tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal
desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: "Don 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well.” With a
concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom, KKK's pleas were
audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake. Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting:
"Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me," MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room. MMM
hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama
is crying?" The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "Don 't
PDFelement
interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it again. Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM
ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it. A furious accused-appellant
opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!"
Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and
asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is
torn?"
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened. KKK relayed: "your father
is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let
her rest."
2nd incident
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK
and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner
elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary.
KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-
appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the
children. He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid P 1,000.00."
She dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.
He returned 15 minutes later and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed
and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here? Lets go to our bedroom." When
she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to
Mama because we are in front of you." The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who
yelled, "Even in front of you, I can have sex of your mother because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his
daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the
pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and
panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "Don 't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot
do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex." After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs,
held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants
and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "It’s nice, that is what you deserve
because you are a flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom. Sensing that the commotion in their
bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window,
inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO
found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are
you crying?" KKK replied: "Your father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel
well. "
Defense: The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father.
He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975,
he was a high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard work
and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established their own businesses that included a rice
mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com.
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on
October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan
de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some com.
PDFelement
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the
control and management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The
accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The
entries in their bank account showed the balance of ₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on
November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly ₱9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately report to the police also
belies her rape allegations.
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior.
While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse.
He was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-
tech," because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to
him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself
and would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went out.
Bebs, KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love letters purportedly
addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or
Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a government employee, a certain
Fernandez and three other priests. Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted her
or them about it because he trusted her.
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was
listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the
volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's
head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because
the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant
because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and
was old, and ugly.
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the
accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through because the accused-appellant's parents intervened.
Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before
the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action
dated February 18, 1999.
RTC: RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous
and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two
daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime such as
rape if the same was not truly committed. The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the
accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK.
CA: CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did
not negate the commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape. The CA rejected
the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and right to
sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation
used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external injures is not indispensable to
prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with
the accused. In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the
truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it
were not true.
PDFelement
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of Rape?
HELD: YES. In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the
CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines
assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global
concerns. The country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and
agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to
this end, undertook:
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that
R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the
law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape'
due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize
marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,'
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal brief
before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape,
were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting
couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is
proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and
that the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual
community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his
wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that
he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full
and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative
yet irrational notions on marital activities that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion.
Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of
family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long
way in deepening marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a
felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate
PDFelement
justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested
wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual
intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the
crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed,
by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b)
sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all
three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed
without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other
man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried rape
victims because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all
rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by
herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife
with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman.128 She can
give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from
her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters
related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Women
do not divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable.
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for different definition
or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere
of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter
evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify
them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any
differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral
certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his
accuser.
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human
being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to
anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed
against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to
wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his
wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy
PDFelement
over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved
by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her
yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological
incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves the
marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual
cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as
a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in
place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious
charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
22. People v. Briones | Rape | G.R. No. 240217 | June 23, 2020 | Louise

defendants-appellants: REGGIE BRIONES y DURAN
Victim(s):FFF, a 12-year-old Location: Masbate City Date of Incident: July 19, 2006
Information: Rape under Article 266-A, par (1)

RTC: Rape under Article 266-A, par (1)
CA: Rape,RTC affirmed, Reclusion Perpetua penalty
SC: Rape, Reclusion Perpetua penalty
FACTS:FFF, 4 a twelve (12)-year-old girl, 5 was alone in their house when Briones (19 y.o.) arrived to watch television.
Since Briones was their neighbor whom she considered her "kuya," FFF let Briones inside the house. Upon arriving,
Briones asked FFF to increase the volume of the television as he closed the front door. He then embraced FFF, pushed
her to the door, and forcibly removed her underpants. While they were in a standing position, he was able to insert his
penis into her vagina. FFF tried to push Briones away and pleaded for him to stop, but he was still able to consummate
his sexual desire. Subsequently, Briones told FFF not to tell anybody what happened or he would kill her and all the
members of her family. The sexual encounters between FFF and Briones were repeated eight (8) more times. But FFF did
not tell anyone what Briones had been doing to her for fear for her life and the lives of her family. Despite this, her parents
still learned of her ordeal in December 2006 when she missed her monthly period. Consequently, her parents brought her
to the City Health Office where the examination by Dr. Natividad Isabel R. Magbalon conducted on January 1, 2007
revealed that FFF was pregnant with completely healed old hymenal lacerations at 1, 6, and 9 o'clock positions. FFF's
father asserted the Briones is their neighbor and a close family friend who had free access to their house as he was
treated like a member of the family.
Prosecution:
Defense: Briones denied the accusation against him. He insisted that he and FFF became sweethearts in July 2006, but
they hid their relationship from FFF's parents as she was only around thirteen (13) years old at that time. To prove that
they were indeed lovers, Briones presented letters written by FFF. The defense also presented Briones' cousin, Mary Ann
Briones, to corroborate his claim.
RTC: RAPE, sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
CA: RTC affirmed. A testimony as to an apparent sweetness between two people does not instantly prove consent to a
sexual encounter.
Contention to SC: While the body of the decision found him guilty of violating an unspecified provision of R.A. No. 7610,
its fallo, however, indicates that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. But according to him, rape
under the RPC cannot be complexed with a violation of R.A. No. 7610, a special law. Thus, the trial court erred in
PDFelement
concluding that his "sweetheart theory" is not a defense to offenses under R.A. No. 7610. But even assuming that the
RTC convicted him of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, Briones claimed that the trial court had no basis to do so. He
maintained that he was able to establish by convincing proof his "sweetheart defense" and that the sexual intercourse that
transpired between him and FFF was free and voluntary on their part given that they are lovers.
Briones insists that FFF's testimony cannot be given credence. For one, it is contrary to human experience that she did
not shout during that long time when he allegedly raped her. For another, FFF's conduct after the alleged rape belies her
claims, specifically, when she washed her bloodied underwear, went to school, and even had more sexual encounters
with him. According to Briones, these were all indicative of FFF's love for him. In the end, he claimed that it is only the
scandal of their love affair and FFF's consequent pregnancy that motivated FFF's family members to pursue the case
against him.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution duly established, by competent evidence, Briones' guilt of the crime as charged in the
Information. Yes
HELD: On the defense that rape under the RPC cannot be complexed with a violation of R.A. No. 7610, a special
law: In People v. Tulagan, the Court ruled that "force, threat or intimidation" is the element of rape under Article 266-A (1)
(a) 14 of the RPC, while "due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" is the operative phrase for a child
to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," which is the element of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b)
15 of R.A. No. 7610. In the event where the elements of both violations of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 and of Article
266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC are mistakenly alleged in the same Information and proven during the trial in a case
where the victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not consent to the sexual intercourse, Tulagan directs that the
accused should still be prosecuted and penalized pursuant to the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more
recent and special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the policies of R.A. No. 7610.
In the present case, while there may be inconsistencies in the decision of the RTC, We sustain the finding of the CA that
the same would be of little significance in view of the fact that the prosecution duly established, by competent evidence,
Briones' guilt of the crime as charged in the Information, “by means of force and intimidation.”
On the defense that not all elements are present: The elements of rape are provided under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)
(a) of the RPC which provides that rape is committed: "(1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances: (a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) When the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present."
Accordingly, the Court concurred with the findings of the lower courts that the prosecution was able to prove these
elements through the credible testimony of FFF who painstakingly recalled, in a sincere and convincing manner, how
Briones succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her through force, threat, and intimidation. (FFF has been crying from
the start of her testimony while narrating the events on the witness stand.) force or intimidation, as an element of rape,
need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind or is of such a degree as to impel the
defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission|Thus, We cannot adhere to Briones' argument that FFF and her
family were merely motivated by the scandal and shame of their love affair and FFF's consequent pregnancy. On the
contrary, it is even more scandalous for FFF to undergo the arduous process of putting Briones, their family friend, behind
bars.
On the "sweetheart defense": The Court has held that in rape, the "sweetheart" defense must be proven by compelling
evidence: first, that the accused and the victim were lovers; and, second, that she consented to the alleged sexual
relation|. Briones can offer love letters to prove that FFF was his lover, but the fact that they were sweethearts does not
necessarily establish FFF's consent to the sexual act. To repeat, FFF categorically testified in open court that she tried
pushing Briones away and even pleaded for him to stop. Mary Ann never testified that the sexual relations between
Briones and FFF were with the latter's consent. Records merely show that all Mary Ann testified to was that there was one
time when FFF and Briones went inside the latter's bedroom for about thirty (30) minutes. Unfortunately for Briones,
however, Mary Ann's testimony can barely save his plight. First of all, she categorically stated that she did not know what
PDFelement
happened therein. Yet, as the CA ruled, agreeing to enter one's room is far from consenting to any sexual act that may
have happened therein. Second, this encounter that Mary Ann testified to was, in fact, not the act FFF complained of in
this case. Indeed, a testimony as to an apparent sweetness between two people does not instantly prove consent to a
sexual encounter.
23. Ricalde v. People | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610

| G.R. No. 211002 | January 21, 2015 | Issa
plaintiff-appellee: RICHARD RICALDE

defendants-appellants: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Victim(s): XXX (10 year old boy) Location: Sta. Rosa, Laguna Date of Incident: January 31, 2002
Information: Rape Through Sexual Assault

RTC: GUILTY
CA: AFFIRMED BUT MODIFIED AWARD OF DAMAGES
SC: AFFIRMED BUT MODIFIED THE DURATION OF IMPRISONMENT
Mode: Petition for Review | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS: XXX, a 10 year old boy, requested his mother to pick up Richard Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa past
8:00 pm on January 30, 2002. At the time, Ricalde was 31 years old, a distant relative (XXX’s mother is the cousin of
Ricalde’s cousin, Arlan Ricalde) and a textmate of XXX. After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to sleep at their house as
it was already late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor. At around 2:00 am, XXX awoke as he felt
pain in his anus and stomach and felt something inserted in his anus. He saw that Ricalde fondled his penis. When
Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran to his mother to tell him what happened and that Ricalde played with his penis.
XXX’s mother, armed with a knife, confronted Ricalde but he remained silent. She asked him to leave. XXX and his
mother went to the barangay hall where they were directed to report the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station. The latter
referred them to the municipal health center for medical examination. Dr. Roy Camarillo examined XXX and found no
signs of recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice and was also negative for spermatozoa.
Defense: Ricalde testified that he met XXX during the town fiesta of Calaca, Batangas. He and XXX became textmates
and the latter invited Ricalde to stay at their house. He denied the alleged rape.
RTC: GUILTY OF RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT
CA: AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION BUT LOWERED THE AMOUNTS OF DAMAGES AWARDED
Contention to SC:
1. Reasonable doubt
Ricalde argued the medico-legal testified that he found no physical signs of external trauma in XXX’s anus and there was
no trace of spermatozoa
2. XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted in his anal orifice or that he saw a penis or any object inserted
in his anal orifice
XXX was also able to push him away; thus, no push and pull movement happened that would explain XXX’s stomach
ache. Ricalde argued that XXX was also inconsistent with his testimony. XXX claimed that the penis was inserted inside
the anus but also stated in the salaysay that the penis reached only the periphery of the anus.
3. XXX’s testified that after he pushed Ricalde away, he saw Ricalde wearing pants with the zipper open. Ricalde
contends that performing anal coitus while wearing pants with an open zipper poses a challenge- the risk of
injuring the sexual organ or having pubic hair entagled in the zipper.
PDFelement
4. The court should have applied the variance doctrine, and the court would have found him guilty of acts of
lasciviousness and not rape. Ricalde argues that masturbation could have caused an irritation that XXX mistook as
penetration. XXX could have also mistook overreaching fingers as a male organ trying to enter his anus.
ISSUE: W/N the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt Richard Ricalde’s guilt for the crime of rape through sexual
assault.
HELD: YES.
Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed- Rape is Committed-
1)By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or
anal orifice of another person.
Rape under the 2nd paragraph of Art. 266-A is also known as “instrument or object rape”, “gender-free rape”, or
“homosexual rape”. The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into another person’s genital or anal orifice.
First, Ricalde’s argument on XXX’s alleged inconsistencies fails to convince. In a long line of cases, the SC has given full
weight and credit to testimonies of child victims. XXX, then only 10 years old, had no reason to conduct lies against
Ricalde. In this case, XXX testified that Ricalde fully penetrated his anus.
Second, Ricalde’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice or any trace of
spermatozoa lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection
and penetration. This does not contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural and
consistent with human nature. In any case, the medico-legal also testified that the anal sphincter exhibits a certain
flexibility such that it can resist any object inserted and that the area is very vascular- it is rich in blood supply so that
wounds would be healed in 24 hours or less.
Third, the variance doctrine does not apply in this case.
Sec. 4, Rule 120; Rules of Criminal Procedure
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Here, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during trial. The prosecution established
beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault. XXX testified that he felt something
inserted in his anus. The slightest penetration on one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from rape. The
gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is not important.
PENALTY IMPOSED
PDFelement
ART. III, SEC. 5 (B) OF R.A. NO. 7610- SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
Children, whether male or female, who for money or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence
of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse; Provided, that when the victim is under 12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Art. 335 for rape and Art. 336 of Act No. 385 as amended, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be. Provided,
that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under 12 years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
Rape through sexual assault:
RPC- prision mayor
RA No. 7160- Reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
Acts of Lasciviousness:
RPC- prision correccional
RA No. 7160- reclusion temporal
In enacting R.A. No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher penalty when the victim is a child. The fact that
XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by his birth certificate, and was admitted by the
defense. The higher penalty under R.A. No. 7610, applies in this case. Having sex with a 10-year old is child abuse and is
punished by a special law. It is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide greater protection for
children.
(Justice Velasco disagrees and argues that aside from the actual coerced sexual act, the child must also be exploited by
prostitution and other sexual abuse. Justice Leonen argued that it does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of
a child as child abuse. If his view is to be adopted, it would amount to their collective official sanction of the idea that a
single act of rape is not debilitating to a child. Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearlym definitely and universally child
abuse.)
24. Lutap v. People | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610

| G.R. No. 204061 | Feb. 5, 2018 | Jolo
plaintiff-appellee: EDMISAEL C. LUTAP | defendants-appellants: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Victim(s): AAA Location: Quezon City Date of Incident: April 27, 2004
Information: Rape under Art. 266-A

RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A paragraph 2 in relation to Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance that the victim was only six (6) years old
at the time of the commission of the offense
CA: Modified the ruling of the RTC and held that accused is only guilty of attempted rape
SC: Reversed the ruling of the CA and held that the accused is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC in relation to Section 5 of R.A. 7610 since the minor victim in this case is below 12 years old and the imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Mode: Petition for Review on Certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s:
PDFelement
FACTS:
That on or about the 27th day of April 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault upon the person of AAA,
6 years of age, a minor, by then and there inserting his finger into complainant's genital organ against her will and without
her consent, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
Prosecution:
At the time of the incident, AAA was only six (6) years old. Petitioner, who was also known as "Egay", frequently visits the
house of AAA’s family, being the best friend of AAA's father. Around 6:30 o'clock in the evening of April 27, 2004, AAA
and her younger siblings, BBB and CCC, were watching television in their sala, together with petitioner. Meanwhile, their
mother DDD was cooking dinner in the kitchen separated only by a concrete wall from the sala. AAA was then wearing
short pants and was sitting on the floor with her legs spread apart while watching television and playing with "text cards."
BBB, on the other hand, was seated on a chair beside CCC, some five steps away from AAA. Petitioner was seated on
the sofa which was one foot away from AAA. Petitioner then touched AAA's vagina. AAA reacted by swaying off his hand.
BBB saw petitioner using his middle finger in touching AAA's vagina. Upon seeing this, BBB said "Kuya Egay, bad iyan,
wag mong kinikiliti ang pepe ni Ate." BBB then went to where DDD was cooking and told her that petitioner is bad
because he is tickling AAA's vagina. DDD then called AAA, brought her inside the room and asked her if it were true that
petitioner tickled her vagina. AAA answered, "but I swayed his hand, Mama." DDD again asked AAA how many times
have petitioner tickled her vagina and AAA answered, "many times in [petitioner's] house" and that he also "let her go on
the bed, remove her panty, open her legs and lick her vagina." As such, DDD confronted petitioner and asked why he did
that to AAA. Petitioner said that it was because AAA's panty was wet and that he was sorry.
Defense:
Petitioner denied the accusations against him. Petitioner testified that he merely pacified AAA and BBB who were
quarreling over the text cards. When petitioner separated the children, BBB then said, "bad yan, bad." After which, DDD
talked to her two children in the kitchen and when she came out, she asked petitioner if he touched AAA. Petitioner
denied having touched AAA and suggested that AAA be examined. The testimony of Melba Garcia, a Purok Leader, was
also presented to the effect that she personally knows petitioner and that the latter enjoys a good reputation. DDD, on the
other hand, was the subject of several complaints from the neighbors.
RTC:
The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The RTC gave full credit to AAA's and BBB's candid testimonies that
petitioner inserted his finger in the vagina of AAA. The RTC emphasized that BBB graphically demonstrated the act
committed by petitioner by moving his middle finger constantly.
CA:
The CA found that there was no insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's vagina as it was merely slightly touched or
touched without too much pressure by petitioner. The CA went on to conclude that since petitioner's finger merely touched
AAA's vagina and that there was no penetration, petitioner can only be held liable for attempted rape.
Contention to SC:
Petitioner questions the CA's finding that the crime of attempted rape was committed considering that there is absolutely
no showing in this case that petitioner's sexual organ had ever touched the victim's vagina nor any part of her body.
Petitioner likewise argues that there is no clear, competent, convincing and positive evidence that petitioner touched the
vagina of the victim with the intention of forcefully inserting his finger inside. Petitioner directs the Court's attention to the
fact that at the time of the alleged incident, AAA was well clothed, her vagina fully covered as she was then wearing a
panty and a short pants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in convicting petitioner for the crime of attempted rape
PDFelement
HELD: The Court partly agreed with the ruling of the CA. The Court agreed with the CA's ruling that the fact of insertion of
petitioner's finger into AAA's sexual organ was not established beyond reasonable doubt to support petitioner's conviction
of rape by sexual assault. The Court also agreed with the CA that there was sexual molestation by petitioner's established
act of touching AAA's vagina. Be that as it may, the act of touching a female's sexual organ, standing alone, is not
equivalent to rape, not even an attempted one. At most, therefore, petitioner's act of touching AAA's sexual organ
demonstrates his guilt for the crime of acts of lasciviousness, an offense subsumed in the charge of rape by sexual
assault. Absent any showing that there was actual insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's vagina, petitioner cannot be
held liable for consummated rape by sexual assault.
People v. Mendoza explains that for a charge of rape by sexual assault with the use of one's fingers as the assaulting
object, as in the instant case, to prosper, there should be evidence of at least the slightest penetration of the sexual organ
and not merely a brush or a graze of its surface, being that rape by sexual assault requires that the assault be specifically
done through the insertion of the assault object into the genital or anal orifices of the victim. What was established beyond
reasonable doubt in this case was that petitioner touched, using his middle finger, AAA's sexual organ which was then
fully covered by a panty and a short pants. However, such is insufficient to hold petitioner liable for attempted rape by
sexual assault. As above intimated, the mere touching of a female's sexual organ, by itself, does not amount to rape nor
does it suffice to convict for rape at its attempted stage.
Applying by analogy the above pronouncements to attempted rape by sexual assault, petitioner's direct overt act of
touching AAA's vagina by constantly moving his middle finger cam1ot convincingly be interpreted as demonstrating an
intent to actually insert his finger inside AAA's sexual organ which, to reiterate, was still then protectively covered, much
less an intent to have carnal knowledge with the victim. An inference of attempted rape by sexual intercourse or attempted
rape by sexual assault cannot therefore be successfully reached based on petitioner's act of touching AAA's genitalia and
upon ceasing from doing so when AAA swayed off his hand.
Instead, petitioner's lewd act of fondling AAA's sexual organ consummates the felony of acts of lasciviousness. The
slightest penetration into one's sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. Since there
was neither an insertion nor an attempt to insert petitioner's finger into AAA's genitalia, petitioner can only be held guilty of
the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness following the variance doctrine enunciated under Section 446 in relation to
Section 547 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Acts of lasciviousness, the offense proved, is included in
rape, the offense charged.
Pursuant to Article 336 of the RPC, acts of lasciviousness is consummated when the following essential elements are
present: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act
of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of age.49 As thus used,
lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral
impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.50 All of these elements are present in the instant case.
It is likewise undisputed that at the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was six (6) years old which calls for
the application of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 defining sexual abuse of children and prescribing the penalty
therefor, as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xx xx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is· under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; xxx
PDFelement
Section 2(h) of the rules implementing R.A. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as the intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area of a person.
In Quimvel v. People, the Court En Banc pronounced that Section 5(b) covers not only a situation where a child is abused
for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. Further, the case instructs that the term "coercion and influence" as appearing under the law is broad
enough to cover "force and intimidation". In this case, the Information specifically stated that: (a) AAA was a 6- year old
minor at the time of the commission of the offense; (b) that petitioner inserted his finger into AAA's genitalia; and (c)
petitioner employed force, threats and intimidation. At the trial it was established that petitioner committed a lewd act by
fondling AAA's vagina who, at the time of the incident, was alleged and proved to be only 6 years old. Here, it was also
established that AAA, being of tender age, knew and trusted petitioner who frequents their house being the best friend of
her father, thus, satisfying the element of "influence" exerted by an adult which led AAA to indulge in lascivious conduct.
Petitioner's defense of denial, apart from being inherently weak, is demolished by AAA's and BBB's testimonies which the
RTC and the CA unanimously regarded as straightforward and credible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2012 and Resolution dated October 25,
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33630 finding petitioner Edmisael Lutap guilty of attempted rape is
REVERSED. The Court finds herein petitioner Edmisael Lutap GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of R.A. 7610 and hereby sentences
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in ·its medium period as
maximum. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY private complainant moral damages, exemplary damages and fine in the
amount of PhP15,000.00 each and civil indemnity in the amount of PhP20,000.00.
25. People v. Tulagan | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610

| G.R. No. 227363 | March 12, 2019 | Aubrey
plaintiff-appellee: Salvador Tulagan

defendants-appellants: People of the Philippines
Victim(s): AAA – 9 year old Location: San Carlos City Date of Incident: September 2011 and October 8, 2011
Information: 2 information were filed (Art. 266-A (2) of the RPC in relation to RA 7610); and Art. 266-A (1(d)) of the RPC
in relation to RA 7610
RTC: Found the accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (d), in relation to R.A. 7610 and rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 2
CA: Affirmed with modification Tulagan’s conviction of sexual assault and statutory rape.
SC: Appeal denied. Affirmed CA’s decision
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: Force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength (based on the
information)
FACTS:
An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the joint decision of RTC finding accused-appellant
Salvador Tulagan (Tulagan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of sexual assault and statutory rape as defined
and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraphs 2 and 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, in relation to
Article 266-B.
Note: There were 2 information filed:
PDFelement
1. Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 - by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength forcibly laid
complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor in a cemented pavement, and did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
inserted his finger into the vagina of the said AAA, against her will and consent. Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610.
2. Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 - That on or about October 8, 2011 and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor against her will and
consent to the damage and prejudice of said AAA, against her will and consent. Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610.
Accused pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crimes charged.
Prosecution:
Prosecution presented BBB, the aunt of the victim. She testified that around 10:30 a.m. of October 17, 2011, she noticed
a man looking at AAA outside their house. When AAA asked her permission to go to the bathroom located outside their
house, the man suddenly went near AAA. Out of suspicion, BBB walked to approach AAA. As BBB came close to AAA,
the man left suddenly. After AAA returned from the bathroom, BBB asked what the man was doing to her. AAA did not
reply. She then told AAA to get inside the house. She asked AAA to move her panties down, and examined her genitalia.
She noticed that her genitalia was swollen. AAA then confessed to her about the wrong done to her by appellant whom
AAA referred to as Badong or Salvador Tulagan. AAA cried hard and embraced BBB tightly. AAA asked BBB for her help
and even told her that she wanted Badong to be put in jail.
AAA, nine (9) years old, testified that sometime in September 2011 while she was peeling corn with her cousin who lived
adjacent to her grandmother's house, Tulagan approached her, spread her legs, and inserted his finger into her private
part. She said that it was painful, but Tulagan just pretended as if he was just looking for something and went home.
Moreover, at around 11:00 a.m. of October 8, 2011, while she was playing with her cousin in front of Tulagan's house, he
brought her to his house and told her to keep quiet. He told her to lie down on the floor, and removed her short pants and
panties. He also undressed himself, kissed AAA's cheeks, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She claimed that it was
painful and that she cried because Tulagan held her hands and pinned them with his. She did not tell anyone about the
incident, until her aunt examined her private part.
Upon genital examination by Dr. Brenda Tumacder on AAA, she found a healed laceration at 6 o'clock position in AAA's
hymen, and a dilated or enlarged vaginal opening. She said that it is not normal for a 9-year-old child to have a dilated
vaginal opening and laceration in the hymen.
Defense:
Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well, but admitted that he lived barely five (5) meters away from AAA's
grandmother's house where she lived. He added that the whole month of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.,
he was gathering dried banana leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m. at their terrace, while his mother cut the
banana leaves he gathered at the back of their kitchen. He said that he never went to AAA's house and that he had not
seen AAA during the entire month of September 2011. Tulagan, likewise, claimed that before the alleged incidents
occurred, his mother had a misunderstanding with AAA's grandmother, who later on started spreading rumors that he
raped her granddaughter.
RTC:
RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in two offenses of rape against AAA. It held
that all the elements of sexual assault and statutory rape was duly established. The trial court relied on the credible and
positive declaration of the victim as against the alibi and denial of Tulagan.
CA:
PDFelement
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification Tulagan's conviction of sexual assault and statutory rape. CA affirmed the
decision subject to the following modifications:
1. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 (Rape by Sexual Assault), appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12
years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of moral damages is
increased to P30,000.00; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, are likewise granted.
2. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 (Statutory Rape), the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are increased to
P100,000.00 each. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, too, are granted.
3. All damages awarded are subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% [per annum] from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
Contention to SC:
Tulagan invoked the same arguments he raised before the CA in assailing his conviction. He alleged that the appellate
court erred in giving weight and credence to the inconsistent testimony of AAA, and in sustaining his conviction despite
the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To support his appeal, he argued that the testimony
of AAA was fraught with inconsistencies and lapses which affected her credibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal is meritorious.
HELD:
No, the appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the nomenclature of the crime, the penalty imposed, and the
damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, and a reduction of the damages awarded in
Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, are in order.
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, both the RTC and the CA also found that the elements thereof were
present, to wit:
(1) accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, and
(2) said act was accomplished when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age.
Indubitably, the courts a quo found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt Tulagan's guilt for the
crime of rape. Jurisprudence tells us that a witness' testimony containing inconsistencies or discrepancies does not, by
such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such testimony. In fact, the variance in minor details has the net effect of
bolstering instead of diminishing the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony.
Instead, what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the
positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same. As correctly held by the CA, the fact
that some of the details testified to by AAA did not appear in her Sinumpaang Salaysay does not mean that the sexual
assault did not happen. AAA was still able to narrate all the details of the sexual assault she suffered in Tulagan's hands.
AAA's account of her ordeal being straightforward and candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining
physician, as well as her positive identification of Tulagan as the perpetrator of the crime, are, thus, sufficient to support a
conviction of rape. As for Tulagan's imputation of ill motive on the part of AAA's grandmother, absent any concrete
supporting evidence, said allegation will not convince us that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the victim and
her supporting witness was tainted with arbitrariness or blindness to a fact of consequence. No young girl, such as AAA,
would concoct a sordid tale, on her own or through the influence of her grandmother as per Tulagan's intimation, undergo
an invasive medical examination then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was
other than a fervent desire to seek justice.
Rejection of Tulagan’s defense of denial
Being a negative defense, the defense of denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, as in the instant
case, deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses,
like AAA, who testified on affirmative matters. Since AAA testified in a categorical and consistent manner without any ill
motive, her positive identification of Tulagan as the sexual offender must prevail over his defenses of denial and alibi. He
PDFelement
failed to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis when the rape incidents took place.
"Physical impossibility" refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the
accused when the crime was committed. There must be a demonstration that they were so far away and could not have
been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. In this regard,
Tulagan failed to prove that there was physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene when the rape was
committed. Further, although the rape incidents in the instant case were not immediately reported to the police, such
delay does not affect the truthfulness of the charge in the absence of other circumstances that show the same to be mere
concoction or impelled by some ill motive.
Court emphasized the reconciliation of the provisions on Acts of Lasciviousness, Rape and Sexual Assault
The term lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude
sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of
which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or
lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a
precise definition.
Note: Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 on October 22, 1997, acts constituting sexual
assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, were punished as acts of lasciviousness under Article No. 336 of the
RPC or Act No. 3815 which took effect on December 8, 1930. For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness,
the confluence of the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness
or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when
the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age.
R.A. No. 7610 or The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act took effect on
June 17, 1992 and its Implementing Rules and Regulation was promulgated in October 1993, the term "lascivious
conduct" was given a specific definition to wit:
the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or
the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with
an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353, specific forms of acts of lasciviousness were no longer punished under Article 336
of the RPC, but were transferred as a separate crime of "sexual assault" under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC.
Committed by "inserting penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or
anal orifice of another person" against the victim's will, "sexual assault" has also been called "gender-free rape" or "object
rape." However, the term "rape by sexual assault" is a misnomer, as it goes against the traditional concept of rape, which
is carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent or against her will. In contrast to sexual assault which is a broader
term that includes acts that gratify sexual desire (such as cunnilingus, felatio, sodomy or even rape), the classic rape is
particular and its commission involves only the reproductive organs of a woman and a man. Compared to sexual assault,
rape is severely penalized because it may lead to unwanted procreation; or to paraphrase the words of the legislators, it
will put an outsider into the woman who would bear a child, or to the family, if she is married.
Interpellation of Mr. Damasing - Mr. Apostol pointed out that the main difference between the aforementioned sections is
that carnal knowledge or rape, under Section 1, is always with the opposite sex. Under Section 2, on sexual assault, he
explained that such assault may be on the genitalia, the mouth, or the anus; it can be done by a man against a woman, a
man against a man, a woman against a woman or a woman against a man.
R.A. No. 8353 defined specific acts constituting acts of lasciviousness as a. distinct crime of "sexual assault," and
increased the penalty thereof from prision correccional to prision mayor. But it was never the intention of the legislature to
redefine the traditional concept of rape. The Congress merely upgraded the same from a "crime against chastity" (a
private crime) to a "crime against persons" (a public crime) as a matter of policy and public interest in order to allow
prosecution of such cases even without the complaint of the offended party, and to prevent extinguishment of criminal
PDFelement
liability in such cases through express pardon by the offended party. Thus, other forms of acts of lasciviousness or
lascivious conduct committed against a child, such as touching of other delicate parts other than the private organ or
kissing a young girl with malice, are still punished as acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to R.A.
No. 7610 or lascivious conduct under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.
While R.A. No. 8353 contains a generic repealing and amendatory clause, the records of the deliberation of the legislature
are silent with respect to sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct against children under R.A. No. 7610, particularly those
who are 12 years old or below 18, or above 18 but are unable to fully take care or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. In instances where the
lascivious conduct committed against a child victim is covered by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, and the act is
likewise covered by sexual assault under paragraph 2,Article 266-A of the RPC, the offender should be held liable for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
NOTE:
Article 226-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, punishes inserting of the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person if the victim did not consent either it was done
through force, threat or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority as sexual assault as a form of rape. However, in instances where the
lascivious conduct is covered by the definition under R.A. No 7610, where the penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and
the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision
mayor , the offender should be liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where the law provides for
the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a child victim. But if the victim is at least eighteen
(18) years of age, the offender should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No. 7610, unless the
victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in which case, the offender
may still be held liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610.
• Child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act, taking into
account the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social
well-being of the youth, as well as, in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child's best interests in all
actions concerning him or her.
Under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges
in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. This statutory provision must be distinguished from Acts
of Lasciviousness under Articles 336 and 339 of the RPC. As defined in Article 336 of the RPC, Acts of Lasciviousness
has the following elements:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.
Article 339 of the RPC likewise punishes acts of lasciviousness committed with the consent of the offended party if done
by the same persons and under the same circumstances mentioned in Articles 337 and 338 of the RPC, to wit:
1. if committed against a virgin over twelve years and under eighteen years of age by any person in public
authority, priest, home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be
entrusted with the education or custody of the woman; or
PDFelement
2. if committed by means of deceit against a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but
under eighteen years of age.
Therefore, if the victim of the lascivious acts or conduct is over 12 years of age and under eighteen (18) years of age, the
accused shall be liable for:
1. Other acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC, where the victim is a virgin and consents to the
lascivious acts through abuse of confidence or when the victim is single or a widow of good reputation and
consents to the lascivious acts through deceit, or;
2. Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of lasciviousness is not covered by lascivious conduct as
defined in R.A. No. 7610. In case the acts of lasciviousness [are] covered by lascivious conduct under R.A. No.
7610 and it is done through coercion or influence, which establishes absence or lack of consent, then Art. 336 of
the RPC is no longer applicable
3. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where there was no consent on the part of the victim to the lascivious
conduct, which was done through the employment of coercion or influence. The offender may likewise be liable
for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take
care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition.
NOTE:
• It is only when the victim of the lascivious conduct is 18 years old and above that such crime
would be designated as "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC" with the imposable
penalty of prision correccional.
• If the acts constituting sexual assault are committed against a victim under 12 years of age or is
demented, the nomenclature of the offense should now be "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article
266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" and no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," because sexual assault as a
form of acts of lasciviousness is no longer covered by Article 336 but by Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353. Nevertheless, the imposable penalty is still reclusion temporal in its medium
period, and not prision mayor.
• If the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and above under special
circumstances, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua,
but it should not make any reference to the provisions of the RPC. It is only when the victim of the sexual
assault is 18 years old and above, and not demented, that the crime should be called as "Sexual Assault
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision mayor.
Sexual Intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years old or is demented is statutory rape
Under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the proper penalty when sexual intercourse is committed with a victim who is under
12 years of age or is demented is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to paragraph 1(d),[31]Article 266-A in relation to Article
266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353,[32] which in turn amended Article 335.
● Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
PDFelement
While the first clause of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 is silent with respect to the age of the victim, Section 3, Article
I thereof defines "children" as those below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability.
One may be held liable for violation of Sec. 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 despite a finding that the person did not
commit rape, because rape is a felony under the RPC, while sexual abuse against a child is punished by a special law.
Said crimes are separate and distinct, and they have different elements. Unlike in rape, however, consent is immaterial in
cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 7610. The mere fact of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. A child
cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws because she can easily be a victim of fraud as she is not capable of
full understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions, the harm which results from a child's bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. He should not be deemed to have
validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which
seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. In sum, a child is presumed by law to
be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious conduct or sexual intercourse.
HOWEVER. Here are the exceptions (Malto case):
1. that "a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious conduct or
sexual intercourse" and
2. that "consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610" because they would virtually eradicate the concepts of statutory rape and statutory acts of lasciviousness,
and trample upon the express provision of the said law.
NOTE:
• Consent is immaterial in cases under R.A. No. 7610 where the offended party is below 12 years of
age. The Court clarified that consent of the child is material and may even be a defense in criminal cases
involving violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or
below 18, or above 18 under special circumstances. Such consent may be implied from the failure to
prove that the said victim engaged in sexual intercourse either "due to money, profit or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group."
IMPORTANT POINTS:
There’s a need to examine the evidence of the prosecution to determine whether the person accused of rape should be
prosecuted under the RPC or R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18.
1. If sexual intercourse is committed with an offended party who is a child less than 12 years old or is demented,
whether or not exploited in prostitution, it is always a crime of statutory rape; more so when the child is below 7 years old,
in which case the crime is always qualified rape.
2. When the offended party is 12 years old or below 18 and the charge against the accused is carnal knowledge
through "force, threat or intimidation," then he will be prosecuted for rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC. In contrast,
in case of sexual intercourse with a child who is 12 years old or below 18 and who is deemed "exploited in prostitution or
other sexual abuse," the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of
statutory rape, and the victim indulged in sexual intercourse either "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," which deemed the child as one "exploited in prostitution or other
sexual abuse.
3. The Court dissected the phrase “children exploited in prostitution” as an element of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610. As can be gathered from the text of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 and having in mind that the term "lascivious
conduct"has a clear definition which does not include "sexual intercourse," the phrase "children exploited in prostitution"
contemplates four (4) scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other consideration,
indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a female child, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual
PDFelement
intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge
in sexual intercourse.
4. “Other sexual abuse” is construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of R.A.
No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases. n the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
Rape under Article 266-A(1)(a,b,c) under the RPC Section 5(1) of R.A. No. 7610
Offender is a man; Offender is a man;
Carnal knowledge of a woman; Indulges in sexual intercourse with a female child

exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse, who is 12
years old or below 18 or above 18 under special
circumstances;
Through force, threat or intimidation; when the offended Coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group is
party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and employed against the child to become a prostitute
by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority
Designation of the Crime & Imposable Penalty
Age of the victim Under 12 years old or 12 years old or below 18, or 18 years old and above
demented 18 under special
circumstances
Crime Committed:
Acts of Lasciviousness Acts of Lasciviousness Lascivious conduct under Not applicable

committed against children under Article 336 of the Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
exploited in prostitution or RPC in relation to Section 7610: reclusion temporal in
other sexual abuse 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610: its medium period to
reclusion temporal in its reclusion perpetua
medium period
Sexual Assault committed Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct under Not applicable
against children exploited in Article 266-A(2) of the RPC Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
prostitution or other sexual in relation to Section 5(b) of 7610: reclusion temporal in
abuse R.A. No. 7610: reclusion its medium period to
temporal in its medium reclusion perpetua
period
Sexual Intercourse Rape under Article 266-A(1) Sexual Abuse under Not applicable
committed against children of the RPC: reclusion Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
exploited in prostitution or perpetua, except when the 7610: reclusion temporal in
other sexual abuse victim is below 7 years old its medium period to
in which case death penalty reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed
PDFelement
Rape by carnal knowledge Rape under Article 266-A(1) Rape under Article 266-A(1) Rape under Article 266-A(1)
in relation to Art. 266-B of in relation to Art. 266-B of of the RPC: reclusion
the RPC: reclusion the RPC: reclusion perpetua
perpetua, except when the perpetua
victim is below 7 years old
in which case death penalty
shall be imposed
Rape by Sexual Assault Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct under Sexual Assault under
Article 266-A(2) of the RPC Section 5(b) of R.A. No. Article 266-A(2) of the RPC:
in relation to Section 5(b) of 7610: reclusion temporal in prision mayor
R.A. No. 7610: reclusion its medium period to
temporal in its medium reclusion perpetua
period
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is DENIED.
26. Bangayan v. People | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610

| G.R. No. 235610 | September 16, 2020 | Kate
petitioner: RODAN A. BANGAYAN | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Victim(s): AAA (12 year old minor) Location: Province of Quirino Date of Incident: January 2012
Information: Violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act 7610

RTC: Guilty of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act 7610
CA: Affirmed conviction
SC: ACQUITTED
Mode: Petition for Review | Modifying Circumstance/s: None
FACTS: During trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) PO2 Rosalita Manilao (PO2 Manilao); (2)
BBB; and (3) Dr. Luis Villar (Dr. Villar). The following documents were likewise submitted in evidence: (1) Malaya at
Kusang Loob na Salaysay of AAA; (2) Malaya at Kusang Loob na Salaysay ni BBB; (3) Medical Certificate issued by Dr.
Villar; and (4) Certificate of Live Birth of AAA.
Prosecution: AAA's brother, BBB, upon arriving home from the farm, saw Bangayan laying on top of AAA. Bangayan and
AAA were both naked from the waist down. BBB shouted at Bangayan and told him that he would report what he did to
AAA but the latter allegedly threatened to kill him if he tries to tell anyone. AAA was born on December 14, 1999 and was
more than 12 years old at the time of the incident.
AAA, accompanied by her aunt, CCC, reported the incident to the police. On the same date, Dr. Villar examined AAA.
When Dr. Villar testified, he confirmed that AAA admitted to him that she had sexual intercourse with Bangayan on
several occasions even prior to January 5, 2012. He explained that the "opening" noted during his examination is not a
normal occurrence. For a young patient like AAA, it should have been closed. He further testified that AAA was already
pregnant when she was examined because her fundus is 15 centimeters in height and the presence of 151 beats per
minute at the last lower quadrant of her abdomen was observed. These indicate that, at the time of the examination, she
was two (2) to three (3) months pregnant, which could be compatible with the claim that she had sexual intercourse with
Bangayan in January 2012, the date stated in the information, or even before said date. On October 2, 2012, AAA gave
birth to a baby boy.
Defense: Notably, during arraignment on September 4, 2014, the counsel of Bangayan manifested that AAA, who was
then 14 years old, executed an Affidavit of Desistance stating that she has decided not to continue the case against
Bangayan because they "are living [together] as husband and wife and was blessed with a healthy baby boy." Thus, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordered that the Office of the Municipal Social Welfare Development Officer conduct a case
study on AAA.
On May 4, 2015, their second child was born.
PDFelement
RTC: In convicting Bangayan, the RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. 7610. Bangayan had sexual intercourse with AAA who was born on December 14, 1999 and was 12
years, one (1) month, and 14 days old at the time of the incident.
For the RTC, the moral ascendancy or influence of Bangayan over AAA is beyond question due to their age gap of 15
years, and the fact that he is her brother- in-law, he being the brother of the husband of her older sister.
The RTC ruled that it will not matter if AAA consented to her defloration because as a rule, the submissiveness or consent
of the child under the influence of an adult is not a defense in sexual abuse.
The RTC also considered the Affidavit of Desistance AAA executed as hearsay evidence because she did not testify
regarding its execution. The RTC added that an Affidavit of Desistance is like an Affidavit of Recantation which the court
does not look with favor.
CA: In affirming Bangayan's conviction, the Court of Appeals held that the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5,
Article III of R.A.7610 were established as follows: (1) BBB positively identified Bangayan as the person who had sexual
intercourse with his minor sister and AAA was confirmed to be 2-3 months pregnant at the time of her medical
examination; (2) AAA was subjected to sexual abuse under the coercion and influence of Bangayan because he was
already 27 years old or 15 years her senior, thus making her vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults; and (3) It
was proven that, at the time of the incident, she was only 12 years and one (1) month old – a minor not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that consent of the child is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III
of R.A. 7610. It was held that the Sweetheart Theory is a defense in acts of lasciviousness and rape that are felonies
against or without the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. However, for
purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under R.A. 7610, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the Sweetheart Theory defense is unacceptable.
Contention to SC: He insists that he was able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he should not be held
criminally liable for the act complained of because they were in a relationship at the time of its commission. For Bangayan,
the fact that they were allowed to be together after the alleged sexual -abuse and that AAA conceived their second child
right after the complaint was filed in court negate the claim that AAA was unwilling. Bangayan posits that his continuing
relationship with AAA should be considered an absolutory cause. Invoking the best interest of their family, Bangayan
prays that he be acquitted and be allowed to help raise their family.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bangayan may use as a defense the consent of AAA and his on-going relationship with her which
had already produced two children to exonerate himself from the charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of-R.A.
7610
HELD: YES. The records of this case show that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of sexual abuse
contemplated under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 which provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The following requisites must concur: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the
act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or
female is below eighteen (18) years of age. This paragraph "punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only
with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation
where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
Pursuant to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7610, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual
PDFelement
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. The present case does not fall
under any of the circumstances enumerated. Therefore, not all the elements of the crime were present to justify
Bangayan's conviction.
Taking into consideration the statutory construction rules that penal laws should be strictly construed against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused, and that every law should be construed in such a way that it will harmonize with existing
laws on the same subject matter, We reconcile the apparent gap in the law by concluding that the qualifying circumstance
cited in Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610, which "punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited
in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse," leave room for a child between 12 and 17 years of
age to give consent to the sexual act. An individual who engages in sexual intercourse with a child, at least 12 and under
18 years of age, and not falling under any of these circumstances, cannot be held liable under the provisions of R.A. 7610.
The interpretation that consent is material in cases where victim is between 12 years old and below 18 years of age is
favorable to Bangayan.
Recently, in Monroy v. People, We adopted the ruling in Tulagan, to wit:
xxx [I]t bears to point out that "consent of the child is material and may even be a defense in criminal cases" involving the
aforesaid violation when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18 years old, as in AAA's case. The concept of
consent under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 peculiarly relates to the second element of the crime - that is, the act of
sexual intercourse is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is
considered "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse when the child is predisposed to indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct because of money, profit or any other consideration or due to the coercion of any adult,
syndicate, or group.
Therefore, it is now clear that consent is a material factor in determining the guilt of Bangayan.
Accordingly, the Court deems it prudent to rectify the difference between the concept of consent under contract law and
sexual consent in criminal law which determines the guilt of an individual engaging in a sexual relationship with one who is
between 12 years old or below 18 years of age. These are concepts that are distinct from each other and have differing
legal implications.
The law limits, to varying degrees, the capacity of an individual to give consent. While in general, under the civil law
concept of consent, in relation to capacity to act, all individuals under 18 years of age have no capacity to act, the same
concept cannot be applied to consent within the context of sexual predation. Under civil law, the concept of "capacity to
act" or "the power to do acts with legal effects" limits the capacity to give a valid consent which generally refers to "the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the case which are to constitute the contract." To apply
consent as a concept in civil law to criminal cases is to digress from the essence of sexual consent as contemplated by
the Revised Penal Code and R.A. 7610. Capacity to act under civil law cannot be equated to capacity to give sexual
consent for individuals between 12 years old and below 18 years of age. Sexual consent does not involve any obligation
within the context of civil law and instead refers to a private act or sexual activity that may be covered by the Revised
Penal Code and R.A. 610.
Where the age of the child is close to the threshold age of 12 years old, as in the case of AAA who was only 12 years and
one month old at the time of the incident, evidence must be strictly scrutinized to determine the presence of sexual
consent. The emotional maturity and predisposition of a juvenile, whose age is close to the threshold age of 12, may
significantly differ from a child aged between 15-18 who may be expected to be more mature and to act with
consciousness of the consequences of sexual intercourse.
In this case, there are special circumstances that reveal the presence consent of AAA. The sexual congress between
Bangayan and AAA was not limited to just one incident. They were in a relationship even after the incident alleged in the
Information and had even produced two (2) children. To Our mind, these are not acts of a child who is unable to discern
good from evil and did not give consent to the sexual act.
PDFelement
Contrary to the ruling of the RTC, it cannot be said that Bangayan exercised moral ascendancy over AAA simply because
of their 15-year age gap and the fact that he is her "brother-in-law." Following the concept of brother-in-law in its ordinary
sense, Bangayan is not AAA's brother-in-law because a brother-in-law refers only to a wife's brother or a sister's husband.
It does not include a brother of the husband of AAA's older sister.
We must take into account Bangayan's defense that, at the time of the incident, he and AAA were lovers. The conduct of
Bangayan and AAA, which is the subject of the Information against him, is not the sexual abuse punished by the law.
While placed in an unusual predicament, We recognize that Bangayan and AAA are in a relationship that had produced
not just one (1) offspring but two (2). While AAA was a child, as defined under R.A. 7610, being under 18 years of age at
the time she and Bangayan engaged in sexual intercourse, there was no coercion, intimidation or influence of an
adult, as contemplated by the law. AAA consented to the sexual act as reflected in her conduct at the time of the
commission of the act and her subsequent conduct shown in the records.
AAA did not testify during the trial. Had she testified, the trial court would have been able to confirm the veracity of the
allegations in the sworn statement she executed and the statements she allegedly made to Dr. Villar during her medical
examination on April 24, 2012. We cannot simply accept the statement of Dr. Villar that AAA admitted to him that she had
sexual intercourse with Bangayan even before 2012. This statement is hearsay as he has no personal knowledge of it.
Moreover, this is not even alleged in the Information filed against him.
A careful study of the records reveals that the RTC received the Social Case Study Report. Although the testimony of
the social worker was included in the Pre-Trial Order, the document was never properly" identified, authenticated by the
social worker who prepared the report, and included in the formal offer of evidence. The social worker never testified in
open court and the defense was never given an opportunity to test her credibility and verify the correctness and accuracy
of her findings. To Our mind, giving credence to evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the
other party of due process. Thus, evidence not formally offered has no probative value and must be excluded by the court.
Even assuming that the Social Case Study Report was properly presented and formally offered, it cannot be made the
basis for establishing the absence of AAA's sexual consent. The report did not accurately reflect the living condition and
the state of her relationship with Bangayan. It did not negate the presence of AAA's sexual consent at the time the
alleged offense was committed. Noticeably, she was already pregnant with their second child when she was interviewed
for the Social Case Study Report and later gave birth while he was incarcerated. The contemporaneous and subsequent
acts of AAA, which are more consistent with the claim of Bangayan that AAA consented to the sexual encounter, outweigh
the contents of the Social Case Study Report which are not yet verified.
It is worthy to note that even when Bangayan was presented in the witness stand, AAA was present in court, presumably
to show support for him. AAA conceived a second child with Bangayan despite the charge against him. Both children were
conceived before he was incarcerated. She did not testify against Bangayan even if she was present during the hearings.
These acts of AAA, and the Affidavit of Desistance she executed, when taken as a whole, bolsters the claim of Bangayan
that they were in a relationship when the act complained of was committed and even lived together without the benefit of
marriage after the case against him was filed. Her acts are consistent with the claim of Bangayan that their relationship
existed at the time of commission of the act complained, during trial, and even continued after he was convicted by the
lower court. To Our mind, these factors are clear manifestations that she was not subjected to any form of abuse, and
prove that she consented to the act complained of.
Applying the ruling in Tulagan there is no crime committed because AAA freely gave her consent to the sexual
intercourse, and no money, profit, consideration, coercion or influence is involved. Due to the prosecution's failure
to establish and prove beyond reasonable doubt the requisites for the charge of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610,
Bangayan must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the RTC as well as the Decision of the CA are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodan A. Bangayan is ACQUITTED.
PDFelement
27. Bongalon v. People | Child Abuse | G.R. No. 169533 | March 20, 2013 | Toby
petitioner: George Bongalon

respondent: People of the Philippines
Victim(s): Jayson Dela Cruz Location: Legazpi City, Philippines Date of Incident: 11th day of May 2000
Information: Violation of Section 10 (a) of RA 7610

RTC: Guilty of Child Abuse
CA: Affirmed conviction but modified penalty to 6 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum
term
SC: Set Aside the Decision of CA, Guilty of Slight Physical Injuries
Mode: Petition for Certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS:
When Jayson Dela Cruz and Roldan, both joined the evening procession for the Santo Nino at Oro Site in Legazpi City,
and when the procession passed in front of George Bongalon’s house, George’s Daughter threw stones at Jayson and
called him “sissy”. When George confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them name like “strangers” and “animals”,
George struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face. George then went to Jayson and
Roldan’s house and challenged Rolando Dela Cruz, the father of Jayson and Roldan, to a fight but Rolando did not come
out of the house, Rolando brought Jasyson Dela Cuz to the Police station. Jayson underwent Medical treatment at the
Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital. Jayson was issued medical certificates attesting that he received a
contusion in the scapular area and zygomatic area.
Defense:
George denied physically abusing Jayson, he explained that he only talked with him after his daughters told about him
that Jayson and Roldan threw stones at them. He denied shouting at them and also denied that he challenged their father
to a fight.
RTC:
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GEORGE
BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to
undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor in its minimum period.
CA:
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9 of
Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to
six (6) years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount of ₱5,000 as moral
damages.
Contention to SC:
Petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged and that assuming he was guilty, his liability should be
mitigated as he was acting in protection of his daughters.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of Child Abuse.
PDFelement
HELD:
The Supreme Court took cognizance of the case stating that they could not ignore the fact that George Bongalon’s right to
liberty is in danger. In using Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the SC explained that it should have been a petition for review
under Rule 45.
According to the SC, The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had
been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done
at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the
loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
The SC then stated that the crime should have been Slight Physical Injuries.
28. Calaoangan v. People | Child Abuse | G.R. No. 222974 | March 20, 2019 | JL
Petitioner: Jeffrey Calaoagan | Respondent: People of the Philippines

Victim(s): AAA (male; 15 y/o) and BBB (male;17 y/o) | Location: Rosales, Pangasinan
Date of Incident: 31st day of October, 2004 at around 12:00 midnight
Information: Two separate Informations for violation of R.A. No. 7610

RTC: guilty of 2 counts of Sec 10 RA 7610
CA: guilty of 1 count of Sec 10 RA 7610 w/respect to AAA; guilty of slight physical injuries with w/respect to BBB
SC: guilty of 2 counts of slight physical injuries
Mode: appeal by certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s: n/a
FACTS:
Prosecution: AAA and BBB alleged that at around 12:00 midnight on October 31, 2004, they were on their way home to
Barangay Poblacion, Rosales, Pangasinan, when they encountered petitioner accompanied by two persons. Petitioner,
seemingly annoyed by AAA and BBB, brought AAA near the church and hit AAA's right shoulder with a stone. BBB
followed petitioner and AAA, which prompted petitioner to punch BBB on the right cheek. Dr. Castaños , the medico-legal
officer found that AAA suffered from "confluent abrasion" on the left shoulder and "soft tissue contusion" in the deltoid
area; while BBB bore a "soft tissue contusion" on the left periorbital area and on the right occipital parietal area of the
head.
Defense: Petitioner averred that he and his two companions passed by a group of persons which included AAA and BBB,
which he group shouted "Hoy!" at them, which impelled him to shout back "Hoy!" at the group. Thereafter, AAA and BBB's
group started hurling stones at him and his companions, which made them run to petitioner's house. AAA and BBB's
group then pelted stones at petitioner's house, prompting petitioner to call the police. After the police had responded and
left, AAA and BBB returned to petitioner's house. Petitioner claimed that he saw BBB carrying a knife and attempting to
attack his sister, Jennifer Malong, petitioner picked up a bamboo stick and swung it towards AAA and BBB. However, he
claimed that he did not know whom he hit while swinging the bamboo stick. Thereafter, when he saw other persons
entering his gates, petitioner ran inside his house. After the incident, Jennifer went to the police station to report the
incident.
RTC: RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Other Acts of Child Abuse, as defined and
penalized under Sec. 10, par. (a) of R.A. No. 7610
PDFelement
CA: affirmed petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 4877-R for physically maltreating AAA but the CA held that
petitioner was not liable for violating Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 for assaulting BBB. Instead, it ruled that petitioner was
only guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the RPC because BBB was allegedly already eighteen (18)
years old at the time of the incident
Contention to SC: AAA's testimony was not consistent with the results of the medical examination showing that the injury
sustained was "confluent abrasion, shoulder left, soft tissue contusion deltoid area." Likewise, he claims that the CA erred
in convicting him of slight physical injuries under the RPC because BBB's testimony was contrary to the medical
examination findings that the injury sustained was "soft tissue contusion, shoulder left, soft tissue contusion, occipital
parietal area head, right."
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of Sec. 10 0f RA no. 7610
HELD: The SC partly found the petition to be partly meritorious.
Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 requires an ntent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of a child victim.
Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes an act when it constitutes as child abuse. In relation thereto, Sec. 3 (b)
of the same law highlights that in child abuse, the act by deeds or words must debase, degrade, or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. Debasement is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality,
or purity of something; degradation, on the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character or quality;
while demean means to lower in status, condition, reputation, or character. When this element of intent to debase,
degrade or demean is present, the accused must be convicted of violating Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, which carries
a heavier penalty compared to that of slight physical injuries under the RPC.
The records do not show that the petitioner's act of hitting the victims had been intended to place the latter in
an embarrassing, shameful, and demeaning situation. There was no indication that petitioner had any specific intent
to humiliate and degrade AAA and BBB. However, the Court finds that petitioner inflicted the injuries in the heat of
argument and that the altercation between AAA, BBB, and petitioner only occurred when their groups met on the
street without any prior confrontation. As observed in the cases of Bongalon, Jabalde, and Escolano, when the
infliction of physical injuries against a minor is done at the spur of the moment, it is imperative for the prosecution to
prove a specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child; otherwise, the accused cannot
be convicted under Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610. In this case failed to specify any intent to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth of AAA and BBB, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable under Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. No.
7610.
Petitioner committed the crime of slight physical injuries.
Even though there was no intent to debase, degrade or demean, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC
and the CA that petitioner struck AAA with a stone on his shoulder and hit BBB, causing physical injuries, therefore in
Criminal Cases No. 4877-R and 4878-R, petitioner is found guilty of slight physical injuries under the RPC for
assaulting AAA and BBB. Petitioner's act of hitting BBB resulted in the latter's injuries requiring medical attendance for
one (1) to nine (9) days, which is within the definition of slight physical injuries. And even if there was no proof as to
the period of AAA's incapacity for labor or of a required medical attendance, under Art. 266 of the RPC, an offender
may still commit slight physical injury even if the inflicted injuries did not require medical assistance or there was no
proof of the victim's incapacity.|||
The crime of slight physical injuries is punishable under Article 266 of the RPC as amended by R.A. No.
10951,
Section 61. Article 266 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
PDFelement
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries
shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate
the offended party for labor from one (1) day to nine (9) days, or shall require medical attendance
during the same period.
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) and censure
when the offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from
engaging in his habitual work nor require medical assistance.
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.
29. Rosaldes v. People | Child Abuse | G.R. No. 173988 | Oct. 8, 2014 | Ivy
Petitioner: FELINA ROSALDES (Public School Teacher)

Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Victim(s): Michael Ryan Gonzales - Grade 1 pupil of Rosaldes (physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped
Rosaldes’ knee while she was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom.
Location: Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo Date of Incident: February 13, 1996,
Information: child abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610

RTC: guilty of child abuse
(4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor.
CA: affirmed RTC with modification as to penalty
(increased maximum period to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor.)
SC: affirmed conviction but modified penalty
(four years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor.)
Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: ***Offense was aggravated because petitioner was a public school
teacher. Hence, maximum penalty was imposed
FACTS:
On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School
located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the
knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner
asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner went to
Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell,
Michael Ryan's body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his
ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried. After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach
her class.
During lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went
home crying and told his mother about the incident. His mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to
their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan
was brought to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise,
reported the incident to the Police Station
Defense:
Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries to maltreat or malign Ryan in a manner that
would debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as an act of discipline.
PDFelement
RTC: Petitioner was convicted for the crime of child abuse.
CA: Affirmed RTC with modifications as penalty (increased)
Contention to SC:
Petitioner contends that:
1. The CA erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and not under the Revised Penal Code.
2.The CA erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioner's constitutional right to due process and her right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not violated when the essential elements of the
crime charged were not properly recited in the information.
Hence, the court must resolve whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse under R.A. 7610 in light of the
Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the Philippines that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic
Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse under R.A. 7610
HELD: YES.
Petitioner contends that the maltreatment was an act of discipline that she as a schoolteacher could reasonably do
towards the development of the child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit. Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy
even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less
than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher
or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority.
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner's physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr. Teresita
Castigador who examined the child. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the ears of the victim could have
been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no.
2), the doctor testified that during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put pressure on the said area.
She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on the victim's left
inner thigh. According to her this could not have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is located
on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds
or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;(3)
Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give
medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death. xxx xxx xxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual.
The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy,
PDFelement
when she pinched him hard on the left thigh and held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell
down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-
appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor." The trial judge said that the physical pain
experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school
altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust
again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by
deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan's physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or only
maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had also
experienced the petitioner's cruelty.The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City for maltreatment of another
child named Dariel Legayada. Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence,"
On petitioner’s contention that her right to due process was violated (procedural issue, but I included it just in case
matanong)
The petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form and substance, in that
the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory
right to due process of law was consequently violated. The petitioner's submission deserves scant consideration.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against the petitioner in the context of the statutory
definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements
of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner's challenge
against the sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the
time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not conform
substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the
challenge.
On penalty imposed (SC ruled that CA’s modification as to the penalty imposed (maximum period - increased to
10 years) was ERRONEOUS
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the RTC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and one
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that
the offense was aggravated by the petitioner being a public schoolteacher. It cited Section 31 (e) of Republic Act No. 7610,
which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public
officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the information and established by evidence as well
as admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610
punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose three periods are six
years and one day to six years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to seven
years and four months, for the medium period; and seven years, four months and one day to eight years, for the
maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the
Court fixes it at seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence
should come from prision correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum
period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one
day of prision mayor.
On Civil Liability
According to the SC, the lower courts committed an error in not granting any civil damages in favor of Michael Ryan. The
child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. SC ruled that
petitioner should pay Michael Ryan P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00
as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each item of the civil liability reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment.
PDFelement
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to the MODIFICATIONS as to the
penalty imposed and award of damages.
30. Delos Santos v. People | Child Abuse | G.R. No. 227581 | Jan. 15, 2020 | Enzo
Petitioner: JOSEPH DELOS SANTOS Y PADRINAO respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Victim(s): AAA and Daluro Location: Valenzuela City Date of Incident: August 31, 2007
Information: Slight Physical Injuries in relation to RA 7610

RTC: Guilty
CA: Affirmed
SC: Affirmed
Mode: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS:
AAA, the victim, testified that at around 11:00 p.m. on August 31, 2007, she and Daluro were on their way to her house
along Padrinao Street, Karuhatan, Valenzuela when Delos Santos and his group confronted them. Delos Santos' brother,
Bob Delos Santos (Bob), said "nag-iinit na ako," as he wanted to punch Daluro.
Delos Santos attempted to punch Daluro, but he dodged it and AAA was hit on the right cheek instead. Bob punched AAA
on the chest causing her to hit a wall. AAA asked Delos Santos' companions to call her mother for help, but Bob
interrupted and said "tama lang yan sa inyo pagtripan dahil dinemanda n'yo kami." Delos Santos hurled invectives at AAA,
who was calling her mother on her way to her house with Daluro. AAA suffered a “contusion at the right supraorbital area,
secondary to mauling.”
Daluro corroborated AAA's testimonies that Delos Santos' group approached them and that Bob uttered "nag-iinit na ako."
Bob said he was holding a rock and threatened to hit him, but AAA got in the way causing her to be hit instead. AAA
asked them why they were "making fancy of them," to which Bob replied, "Dapat lang sa inyo yan dinemanda kami ng
nanay n'yo." AAA and Daluro went away, but Delos Santos' group followed them to her house. When the terrace light was
turned on, Delos Santos' group ran away.
Defense:
Delos Santos denied the charge against him and testified that at around 11:30 p.m. of August 31, 2007, he was in his
sister's store resting and smoking when a barangay official came to arrest him because he allegedly hurt AAA. Delos
Santos claimed that AAA's accusation was due to the confrontation of their respective mothers at the barangay.
Magbanua testified that he was a purok leader of Purok 31 from 2006 to 2007. He kept a log of incidents within his
jurisdiction, and there was no incident recorded on August 31, 2007.
RTC: GUILTY
CA: AFFIRMED
ISSUE:
1. Whether the appellant is guilty as charged - YES
2. Whether the appellant should be convicted only of Slight Physical Injuries - NO
HELD:
YES.
Delos Santos was charged, tried, and found guilty of violating Section 10 (a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610, which states:
PDFelement
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59
of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall
suffer the penalty of [prision mayor] in its minimum period. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 (b) of the same law defined child abuse as: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. —
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
1. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
2. Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being[.] (Emphases supplied)
Debasement is defined as "the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of something." Degradation, on the other hand,
means the "lessening of a person's or thing's character or quality."
Intent is a state of mind that accompanies the act. Since intent is an internal state, the same can only be verified through
the external acts of the person. In this case, there are several circumstances that reveal the intent of Delos Santos to
debase or degrade the intrinsic worth of AAA.
First, AAA and Daluro testified that Delos Santos' group approached them and Bob said "nag-iinit na ako." The initial
move came from Delos Santos' group without provocation on the part of AAA or Daluro. The act of approaching with
the words "nag-iinit na ako" indicates that there was intent to confront or to challenge AAA and Daluro to a fight.
This is contrary to Delos Santos' claim that the incident was accidental.
Second, Bob threatened to hit Daluro with a stone and Delos Santos attempted to punch him, which unfortunately landed
on AAA. Then Bob punched AAA on the chest causing her to hit a wall. These acts are obviously aimed to hurt, harass,
and to cause harm, either physically, mentally, emotionally, or psychologically, on AAA and Daluro.
Third, Bob said "tama lang yon sa inyo pagtripan dahil dinemanda n'yo kami." Then Delos Santos hurled invectives at
AAA and Daluro. Their words reveal that they were motivated by revenge, which is their justification for their
actions. Hurling invectives on a person is debasing, degrading, and demeaning as it reduces a person's worth.
Fourth, Delos Santos' group followed AAA and Daluro home, which implies that they had no intention to stop their
misdeeds had it not been for the timely intervention of AAA's mother.
Lastly, Delos Santos and Bob did not apologize to AAA and to Daluro during the confrontation at the barangay. If indeed
the incident was unintentional, they could have explained so during the confrontation. However, there was no
trace of remorse from them.
Delos Santos and Bob's words and actions characterized physical and psychological child abuse, and emotional
maltreatment, all of which debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.
2. Whether the appellant should be convicted only of Slight Physical Injuries - NO
NO.
PDFelement
Delos Santos was mistaken when he cited the case of Bongalon v. People. The factual backdrop of that case is different
from the instant case. In Bongalon, the accused was convicted of the crime of slight physical injuries instead of violation of
Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, because of the absence of intent to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child.
The physical harm committed against the minor was committed "at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his
being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters x x x."
Here, the accosting and laying of hands are deliberately intended by Delos Santos and his group. As interpreted by the
CA, the word "pagtripan" signified an intention to debase or degrade that did not result from an unexpected event. The
acts of Delos Santos were offshoots of an intent to take revenge arising from the conflict existing between his mother and
AAA's mother. Delos Santos did not lose his self-control and the acts were not done at the spur of the moment.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that the moral
damages imposed by the Regional Trial Court shall earn an interest of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
31. Dabalos v. RTC | VAWC | G.R. No. 193960 | Jan. 7, 2013 | Vee
plaintiff-appellee: KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO

defendants-appellants: REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR,
ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC
Victim(s): private respondent ABC Location: Angeles City Date of Incident: 07-13-2009
Information: violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262

RTC: denied motion for judicial determination of probable cause with motion to quash the information
SC: orders of the RTC affirmed. RTC is directed to continue with the criminal proceedings
Mode: petition for certiorari and prohibition | Modifying Circumstance/s: NONE
DOCTRINE: It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence
showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed.
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 alleging that petitioner was then the boyfriend of
the complainant and he pulled complainant’s hair, punched complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye.
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest
against petitioner.The latter posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty and then filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged
incident he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent, hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident.
She narrated that she sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then
inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private
respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the information.
RTC: denied petitioner’s motion. It cannot consider the fact that the parties’ dating relationship had ceased prior to the
incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical
injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.
Contention to SC: petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered
by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed
was only slight physical injuries under the RPC which falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC.
ISSUES:
1. WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense; (YES)
PDFelement
2. WON RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused; (NO) and
3. WON the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted should be quashed. (NO)
HELD:
Immaterial whether the relationship had ceased
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act
or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against
her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a
crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely:
1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he
has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and
2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman;
and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman,
for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against
women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient
evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to
petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.
The Court cannot construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity because there is no ambiguity in RA
9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly,
the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm
women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting
the protection of women and children.
RTC had jurisdiction per Sec. 7 of RA 9262
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating relationship
between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting
physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in
accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders of the RTC are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with the proceedings in the subject
criminal case.
PDFelement
32. Melgar v. People | VAWC | G.R. No. 223477 | Feb. 14, 2018 | Jammy
plaintiff-appellee: CELSO MELGAR

Victim(s): Location: CEBU CITY Date of Incident: AUGUST 2001
Information: sec 5 RA 9262
RTC: guilty
CA: guilty
SC: guilty
FACTS: An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of RA 9262, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having the means and capacity to give financial support, with
deliberate intent, did then and there commit acts of economic abuse against one [AAA] and her minor son, [BBB] (12
years old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation,
to AAA and her son.
After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and AAA entered into a compromise
agreement on the civil aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval of the compromise agreement on June 24, 2010, the
criminal aspect of the case was provisionally dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, or on June
24, 2011, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement and to revive the criminal action, on the ground
that Melgar sold the property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son, BBB,
from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement. Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the
case and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence.
The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB, an
illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as
well as numerous photographs showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the
latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support,
prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give
support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar.
To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to provide support of P8,000.00 per month because he
has a lavish lifestyle with his family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled in. On the other hand, her
son, BBB, is a scholar at and she spends the amount of P20,000.00 a month for his needs, of which she asked Melgar for
P8,000.00 as support.
RTC: The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their son, BBB, when he stopped
supporting them. Worse, he sold the property which was supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010.
CA: CA affirmed Melgar's conviction. It held that Melgar is legally obliged to support BBB. As such, when he deliberately
and with evident bad faith deprived BBB of support, he committed economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. In this
regard, the CA observed that the reinstatement of the criminal case was prompted by Melgar's evident refusal to comply
with the judgment based on compromise agreement, particularly, in providing support to his son; and worse, in conveying
to another person the parcel of land which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son
from 2001 to 2010. Lastly, the CA ruled that Melgar's acts "has clearly caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule
or humiliation to [AAA] and her child[, BBB]."
ISSUE: whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262?
HELD: YES. Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband, former husband, or any
PDFelement
person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in, inter alia,
economic abuse. The said law defines economic abuse as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - x x x.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as
defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation of support of a common child of
the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not.[26] This specific act is penalized
by Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, pertinent portions of which read:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children
is committed through any of the following acts:
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the
right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to
restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but
not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's
movement or conduct:
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against
women and children. Notably, case law instructs that the act of denying support to a child is a continuing offense.
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as it
was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely
acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year
old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property which
was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate
from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best
position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties and, hence, due deference
should be accorded to the same. In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues, inter alia, that he
was charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as the Information alleged that the acts complained of "caused mental
or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and her son[, BBB]." As such, he contends that he cannot be
convicted of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,punishes the act of "causing mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children." Notably,
PDFelement
"[p]sychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the
victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect
caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime,
it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts. And to establish
mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to
this party."[32] Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the accused's denial thereof - which is, by itself,
already a form of economic abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to the woman-victim and/or to their
common child.
In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence
was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore,
Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into consideration
the variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily
included in the crime charged - the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the
deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element of psychological violence, is already
specifically penalized therein.
33. Reyes v. People | VAWC | G.R. No. 232678 | July 3, 2019 | Louise
Petitioner: ESTEBAN DONATO REYES

Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Victim(s): AAA Location: Quezon City Date of Incident: July 2005
Information: Section 5 (e) of R.A. No. 9262 (VAWC) -- economic abuse

RTC: Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 (VAWC)
CA: affirmed Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 (VAWC)
SC:
Mode: Petition for Review on Certiorari | JEMAA:
FACTS: AAA and Reyes were married on May 15, 1969. Four children were born out of this union, of whom only three
are living, and who are all now of legal ages. Reyes was seldom at home since he used to render military service as a
Philippine Air Force pilot, and later he worked as a commercial pilot for the Philippine Airlines. At the time the complaint
for violation of the VAWC was filed against him, Reyes was employed as a pilot based in Angola, Africa tasked to deliver
relief goods by air. Sometime in 2005, AAA learned that Reyes got married to a certain Marilou Osias Ramboanga who
had borne him four children and with whom he is living with up to the present.
AAA claimed that Reyes used to give her and their children monthly financial support, ranging from Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but he suddenly ceased giving the same in July 2005. On top of
this unpleasant situation, AAA got sick of various illness such as hypertension, cardio-vascular disease, diabetes and
osteoarthritis. Due to her advancing age, AAA's health condition further deteriorated requiring her to take maintenance
medicines and to undergo regular consultation, monitoring and treatment to prevent organ damage, stroke, renal failure
and heart attack. According to AAA, what impelled her to file the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 9262 against Reyes
was due to the latter's failure to provide her with monthly financial support.
Defense: The defense presented petitioner as its lone witness.Petitioner alleged that he lived with AAA in a common-law
relationship, which produced three daughters and a son. He narrated that he met AAA when he went for a vacation at her
aunt's house in Bicol where AAA was a housemaid. He averred that he gave AAA monthly financial support of P20,000.00.
In addition, he also gave her Christmas bonuses, shouldered the expenses for her cataract operation, her denture and
vacation in Tagaytay, as well as paid for the matriculation of her grandchildren and the materials of their second daughter.
He admitted that he no longer provides AAA with financial support since July 2006 because he was disappointed with her
for instituting a criminal case for Bigamy against him which he considered as an act of ingratitude. In 2007, he stopped
flying as a pilot after he was prevented from leaving the Philippines by virtue of a Hold Departure Order issued against
him at the instance of AAA.
RTC: Guilty of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 (VAWC)
PDFelement
The RTC ruled that on the basis of the allegations in the Information, Reyes is being charged with violation of Section 5 (i)
of R.A. No. 9262 and not with violation of Section 5 (e), par. 2. Consequently, the RTC directed the Office of the City
Prosecutor to amend the Information by designating the proper crime to which Reyes should be charged. The RTC held
that the amendment of the Information was proper, since Reyes has not been arraigned at that time, and inclusion sought
would not prejudice his rights being merely formal in nature. Reyes' Motion to Quash was denied by the trial court.
CA: affirmed Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 (VAWC). Reyes committed psychological violence against his wife AAA when
he suddenly stopped giving her financial support and by reason of which, she suffered emotional and mental anguish.
According to the CA, Reyes has an obligation to financially support his wife AAA and their marriage is valid until annulled
by the court. It held that Reyes could not escape liability by the mere expedient of claiming that his marriage with AAA is
void because violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 can be committed even against a woman with whom the accused
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child. The CA opined that Reyes can also be
convicted for violation of Section 5 (e), assuming that he is indicted for the said crime, because said provision
criminalizes the mere act of depriving a woman of financial support legally due her.
Contention to SC: The Information should have been quashed by the RTC for lack of the essential elements of the crime
of violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262, it effectively deprived him of his right to due process.Reyes is essentially
averring that the recital of facts therein do not constitute the offense charged.
OSG: The OSG submits that the CA is correct in not only affirming the conviction of Reyes under Section 5 (i), but in
finding that he can be also held criminally liable under Section 5 (e), par. 2 because his purpose in depriving AAA with
support is to cow her from further filing cases against him or to withdraw those already filed. The OSG asserts that
petitioner's guilt for violation of the provisions of Section 5 (e), par. 2 and 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 has been established by
the prosecution beyond cavil of a doubt.
ISSUE: WON Reyes can be held liable for violation of R.A. No. 9262 YES
HELD: On the supposed quashal of information: The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments
in a complaint or information is whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the
offense.In the context of Section 6, Rule 110, the Court finds that the afore-quoted Information contains the recital of facts
necessary to constitute the crime charged. The June 5, 2006 Information stated in no uncertain terms that: (1) the
offended party, AAA, is the wife of the offender Reyes; (2) AAA sustained mental and emotional anguish; and (3) such
anguish is inflicted by offender Reyes when he deliberately and unlawfully denied AAA with financial support.
Psychological violence is certainly an indispensable element of violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally
essential is the element of the mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. Psychological violence
is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional suffering is the effect caused to or the damage
sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence, it is necessary to adduce proof of the commission of
any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar of such acts. We concur with the similar findings of the courts a quo
that the prosecution had duly proved, through the clear and convincing testimonies of AAA and her daughter, that Reyes
committed psychological violence against AAA when he deprived her of financial support beginning July 2005 and
onwards which caused her to experience mental and emotional suffering to the point that even her health condition was
adversely affected.
On the defense that he has no obligation to financially support AAA since he never contracted marriage with her.
Petitioner is mistaken. We find that the National Statistics Office certified copy of a marriage certificate presented by the
prosecution serves as positive evidence of the existence of the marriage between Reyes and AAA. Reyes is obliged to
support his wife, AAA, the amount of which shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the said petitioner and to
the needs of the latter.
Reyes will not be exonerated even assuming that his marriage is declared void ab initio by the court. R.A. No. 9262
defines and criminalizes violence against women and their children perpetrated by the woman's husband, former husband
or any person against whom the woman has or had a sexual or dating relationship with, or with whom the woman has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or
likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse or psychological harm or suffering. Thus, the offender need not be related
or connected to the victim by marriage or former marriage, as he could be someone who has or had a sexual or
PDFelement
dating relationship only or has a common child with the victim. In the case at bench, it is undisputed that AAA had
borne Reyes four children out of their relationship.
The Court agrees with the observation of the CA that if properly indicted, Reyes can also be convicted of violation of
Section 5 (e), par. 2 for having committed economic abuse against AAA.Criminal liability for violation of Section 5 (e)
of R.A. No. 9262 attaches when the accused deprives the woman of financial support which she is legally entitled to.
Deprivation or denial of support, by itself, is already specifically penalized therein. 24
Here, we note that Reyes, although gainfully employed after June 2005, deliberately refused to provide financial support
to AAA. According to Reyes, he stopped giving monetary support to AAA because she filed a Bigamy case against him.
The Court finds his excuse unacceptable and will not at all exculpate him from criminal liability under the VAWC. It is
noteworthy that AAA charged Reyes with Bigamy not merely to torment or harass him but to enforce her right and protect
her interest as petitioner's legal wife considering that he contracted a second marriage with one Marilou Osias
Ramboanga during the subsistence of his marriage with AAA. Evidently, the denial of financial support is designed to
subjugate AAA's will and control her conduct, either to pressure her to withdraw said criminal case for Bigamy or dissuade
her from pursuing it, or at least, to discourage her from filing additional cases against him. It bears stressing that not an
iota of evidence was adduced by him to show that he is no longer employed and/or he failed to obtain another gainful
employment and/or that he has no resources or means to provide the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner
Esteban Donato Reyes is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No.
9262.
34. Ang v. CA | VAWC | G.R. No. 182835 | April 20, 2020 | Issa
plaintiff-appellee: RUSTAN ANG | defendants-appellants: COURT OF APPEALS & IRISH SAGUD

Victim(s): Irish Sagud Location: Maria Aurora, Aurora Date of Incident: June 5, 2005
Information: Violation of the Anti-VAWC Act (R.A. No. 9262)

RTC: GUILTY
CA: AFFIRMED
SC: AFFIRMED
Mode: Petition for Review on Certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS: Rustan Ang and irish Sagud were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora. They became “on-and-off”
sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish found out that Rustan had impregnated and taken a live-in partner,
Michelle, Irish broke up with Rustan. Before Rustan and Michelle got married, he tried to convince Irish to elope with him,
saying that he did not love Michelle. Irish rejected him and told him to take on his responsibility to Michelle and their child.
Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages using 2 numbers,
0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish asked Rustan to leave her alone. On June 5, 2005, Irish received a MMS of a
picture of a naked woman with spread legs, with her face superimposed. The sender’s number was 0921-8084768, one of
the numbers Rustan used. Irish thought that he copied a picture of her face from a shot he took in 2003 when they were in
Baguio. Irish got other text messages, with Rustan boasting that he could easily create scandalous pictures of her and
threatened to spread the picture in chatrooms. Irish sought the help of the Vice Mayor of Maria Aurora, who referred here
to the police. Under police supervision, Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort and he did. After parking
his motorcycle, the police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900
and several sim cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: “Malandi ka kasi!”
Prosecution: Presented Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert
in information technology and computer graphics. He testified that the picture had 2 distinct irregularities: the face was not
proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color.
Defense: Rustan admitted that he and Irish had a relationship but when it ended, Irish wanted to reconcile. They met in
December 2004 but after he told her that his girlfriend at the time (Michelle) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Later, Rustan got a text from Irish to meet her at the Lorentess Resort because she needed help in selling her cellphone.
PDFelement
Irish also asked his help to identify a prankster who was sending her malicious messages. Rustan got the sender’s
number and pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. He claims that he got back obscene messages from the
prankster and he forwarded them to Irish, that’s why it seemed that the obscene messages originated from his number.
Rustan further claims that it was Irish who sent the obscene picture.
Michelle Ang testified that she received pictures, deleted them and hid the memory card that contained them because she
was jealous and angry.
RTC: GUILTY. The RTC found Irish’s testimony to be credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. It was
observed that she wept while recounting her experience, and were tangible expression of her pain and anguish. Rustan
and Michelle testimonies were found to be incredible. It was unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he merely
helped her identify the sender. As to Michelle’s testimony, it did not make sense. She claimed that she deleted pictures
Irish sent but also said that she did not have time to delete them. If she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from
the memory card, then she had no reason at all to hide the memory card.
CA: AFFIRMED
Contention to SC: 1. Rustan Ang claims that being “romantically involved” implies having or had sexual relations.
2. Since the relationship between Rustan and Irish were “on-and-off”, their romance cannot be
regarded as having developed over time and on a continuing basis.
3. The one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of harassment as
today’s women are used to obscene communications.
ISSUE: 1. W/N a “dating relationship” existed between Rustan and Irish as defined in R.A. No. 9262.
2. W/N a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture already constitutes a violation of Sec. 5(h)
of R.A. No. 9262.
3. W/N the evidence obtained from Rustan was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights (just in case
Prosec asks)
HELD: 1. Yes.
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN THROUGH HARASSMENT:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman;
and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb “romance” that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender
must have “romanced” the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun “romance” to describe a couple’s relationship. Even
though the relationship between Rustan and Irish were “on-and-off” (away-bati), the two of them were romantically
involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December 2003. That would be enough time for nurturing a
relationship of mutual trust and love. An “away-bati” thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. This does not
mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.
2. Yes.
Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitute violence against women. This means that a
single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and
children. Surely, any woman like Irish who is not in the pornography trade would be scandalized and pained if she sees
herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the
internet.
3. No.
PDFelement
The prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the sim cards that the police officers seized from him
at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Rustan himself admitted that he sent
the malicious messages to Irish.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the CA.
35. AAA v. BBB | VAWC | G.R. No. 212448 | Jan. 11, 2018 | Jolo
plaintiff-appellee: AAA | defendants-appellants: BBB

Victim(s): AAA Location: Acts complained of happened in Singapore, AAA is in Pasig City
Information: Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262

RTC: Granted the Motion to Quash
SC: Set aside the resolutions of the RTC granting the Motion to Quash and reinstated the Information filed for Sec. 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262
Mode: Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court | Modifying Circumstance/s:
FACTS:
AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced 2 children. In May 2007, BBB
started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in September 2008. This petition
nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the
time they were married until March 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents’ house in Pasig City.
AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. This
allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight attendant. There
were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To
make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he
allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent
altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids. As can be gathered from earlier cited Information,
despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with
causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.
A warrant of arrest and hold departure order were issued but BBB continued to evade arrest. Consequently, the case was
archived. However, on November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to
Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed on behalf of BBB.
RTC:
The RTC granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case, the trial court
reasoned:
Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in this case and that [BBB]
is probably guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts
complained of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
Contention to SC:
Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case, AAA sought direct
recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in danger of
becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless law because with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands
of Filipino women have been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without fear of any consequence, as long as
they are carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the
offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-
marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of the case. In support of
PDFelement
her theory, AAA specifically cites Section 7 on Venue of R.A. 9262 and Section 4 on liberal construction of the law to
promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
In his Comment, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a
criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party, and that the petition should be dismissed for having been
brought before the Court by AAA instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in
appellate proceedings. BBB also asserts that the petition is belatedly filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is
occurring outside the country
HELD: Yes. As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
Information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v.
People, this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A.
No. 9262, as follows:
1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
2. The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had
a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
3. The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
4. The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or
omissions.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the
victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect
caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime,
it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to
establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are
personal to this party.
R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife, NOT marital infidelity
per se. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity
as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover,
depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be
causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and
distinct element in the commission of the offense.
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People, the Court explained that the place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental
rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information and once it is so show, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
Section 7, R.A. 9262 “Venue” pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case
may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While the
psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense,
PDFelement
equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. The resulting
mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:
The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused, as show in the
vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal action in
Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa. The
estafa involved in this case appears to be transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or
in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the
offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the
crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province
has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude
the others.
Acts of violence against women and their children may manifest transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts
material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur
in another. In such cases, the court wherein the any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the
other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed.
It is necessary for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (c) was committed outside the Philippine territory, that the victim be a
resident of the place where the complaint was filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense.
In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of
2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.
Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB’s marital infidelity must be
proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond
reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What
this case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be
filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged extra-marital affair
causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution
under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the RTC are SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is ordered REINSTATED.
36. Araza v. People | VAWC | G.R. No. 247429 | Jan. 7, 2013 | Aubrey
plaintiff-appellee: Jaime Araza y Jarupay

defendants-appellants: People of the Philippines
Victim(s): AAA – Lawful wife Location: City of Las Pinas, Philippines Date of Incident: September 2007
Information: Psychological abuse under RA 9262

RTC: Araza was found to be liable of RA. 9262
CA: Denied Araza’s appeal. Affirmed the decision of RTC
SC: Petition denied for failure to show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision
Mode: Petition for review on certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s: NO JEMAA; Under RA 9262, Araza was found
liable for PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE under RA 9262
FACTS:
Prosecution:
The prosecution presented 3 witnesses namely: AAA; Armanda Que; and Dr. Kristina Lindain
PDFelement
AAA’s testimony:
AAA testified that she and Araza were married on October 5, 1989 at Malate Catholic Church. Initially and at the onset of
their marriage, her husband was hardworking, loving and faithful. She had no marital issues with Araza until he went to
Zamboanga City in February 2007 for their networking business. Araza was formerly working as an Overseas Filipino
Worker but decided to stop in 1993 to join AAA in her business. Then, she noticed the change of behavior of Araza as
allegedly, he would act depressed and cry and always appeared absent-minded. She was concerned and would ask him
about it but he would just stay quiet and stare at her full of anxiety. Thereafter, AAA received a text message from a
certain Edna and Mary Ann who told her that her husband were having an affair with their best friend. Thus, she went to
Zamboanga which confirmed the accusations to her husband. As a result, she instituted a complaint against Araza and
his mistress for concubinage. The case was subsequently amicably settled and Araza again lived with AAA for a short
time. However, without saying a word he left in their conjugal home and returned to live with his mistress.
In the days to come, she would receive text messages from her husband's supposed mistress using various numbers.
The messages would tell her that Araza is sick and needed money for medicines. There was also another text message
threatening her that she will kill AAA's husband. Because of this, sometime in 2013, she sought a law firm who issued a
letter addressed to Fabillar, demanding for the release of Araza. [AAA] was emotionally depressed and anxious of her
husband's condition. She believed that Araza's liberty was being restrained by Fabillar. She was determined to bring her
husband home. Thus, in May 2014[,] she went to Zamboanga to search for Araza. She looked for him from one barangay
to another; she would ask help from police stations giving out pictures of her husband. She would promise a reward to
those who are able to locate Araza. She was desperate looking for him and she fell ill and was confined in a hospital. The
truth caused emotional and psycholigail suffering to AAA. She was suffering from insomnia and shtma. Allegedly, she is
still hurting and crying. She could not believe what had happened in their marriage as they were living harmoniously as
husband and wife. She also took anti-depressant and sleeping pills to cope with her severe emotional and psychological
turmoil brought about by the marital infidelity and having children with his mistress.
Armando Que’s testimony
He testified that while he has recruiting and selling items of Boardwalk in Zamboanga, he frequently saw Araza and
Fabillar together holding hands and he kept that information to himself because he know once AAA would know about it,
there would be trouble in their relationship.
Dr. Lindain’s testimony
She alleged that she saw AAA on an hour per session. Based on her assessment and expert opinion, the symptoms of
AAA was having was like the depressed mood; her occasional difficulty in sleeping are secondary to the relational distress
with Araza. It was her wanting to be with her husband that was causing those symptoms. However, Dr. Lindain clarified
that the manifestations exhibited by AAA are not sufficient to be considered as a psychiatric disorder and advides her to
undergo counselling or psychotheraphy in order to help her accept her situation.
Defense:
Araza argued that when AAA started earning money, her behavior changed and revealed that he did not earn anything
from recruiting agents who worked under AAA. All the commissions went to AAA’s account. He disclosed that when he
was in Cagayan de Oro to recruit agents for their business, AAA had told him that his sister had a stroke. He was
allegedly dismayed when his wife did not even offer any help as she claimed she has nothing to spare. He felt hurt about
it and sadly, his sister died. He testified that since 2007, his relationship with his wife has gone sour. Oftentimes, she
would believe rumors and accuse him of being a womanizer. He denied having an affair with Fabillar, who was acting as
his guide in his recruiting activities in Zamboanga. He revealed that when AAA went to Zamboanga, she filed a complaint
against him at the Women's Desk. He was arrested as a consequence and was forced to sign an agreement. He returned
to Manila with his wife hoping that she would change her ways towards him, but she did not.
PDFelement
RTC:
RTC found that all the elements of the crime of violence against women under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 were satisfied.
Araza and AAA were married, as required by the first element. The prosecution was able to establish through testimonial
and documentary evidence that Araza was the perpetrator of the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA. Araza
left their conjugal abode and chose to live with his mistress; and he reneged his promise to stop seeing his mistress,
contrary to the written agreement between him and his mistress. AAA's psychological and emotional sufferings due to the
said ordeals can also be gleaned from Dr. Lindain's testimony, who was presented as an expert witness.
With regard to AAA's testimony, the RTC is convinced by her sincerity and candor. Her testimony was able to show that
due to Araza's acts of infidelity, she suffered emotional and psychological harm. Since there are no facts and/or
circumstances from which it could be reasonably inferred that AAA falsely testified or was actuated by improper motives,
her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. On the other hand, Araza only offered the defense of denial, which cannot
be given greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.
CA:
CA denied Araza's appeal, and motion for reconsideration, in toto. The appellate court echoed the RTC's factual findings
and conclusions. The CA found that the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of the crime as defined in
Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, and as alleged in the Information filed against Araza. Psychological violence as an element
of the crime, and the mental and emotional anguish she suffered, were proven through the testimonies of AAA and Dr.
Lindain. The defense of denial of Araza, which were not supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over
the positive declarations of the victim. The CA concluded that R.A. No. 9262 does not criminalize acts such as the marital
infidelity per se, but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
Contention to SC:
Araza argued that nothing in the Information mentioned his alleged abandonment of the conjugal home, and his pretenses
that he was forcefully detained, specifically caused AAA's emotional anguish and mental suffering. For this reason, he
cannot be convicted based on these acts, which were not part of the charge against him.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the elements of violation of Sec. 5 (i) of RA No. 9262 were sufficiently alleged in the information
and thus liable under RA 9262.
2. Whether or not CA was correct in ruling that Araza committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing
marital infidelity.
HELD:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Court emphasized that the test in determining whether the information validly charges an
offense is whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined in the law. In order to determine the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information,
Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 must be referred to, being the law defining the offense charged in this case.
R.A. No. 9262 penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children
through the following acts:
PDFelement
i. Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the woman's child/children.
In Dimamling v. People, the elements of violation of Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262 are as follows:
1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
2. The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
3. The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
4. The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar acts or omissions.
It was stated on the information that Araza, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of psychological abuse upon
his wife by then and there committing acts of marital infidelity by having an affair with his paramour Tessie Luy Fabillar
and begetting three illegitimate children with his paramour thus causing [his] wife emotional anguish and mental suffering.
Araza is correct that he cannot be convicted based on acts of abandonment of the conjugal home, and pretenses that he
was forcefully detained. These were not alleged in the Information. However, there were other acts alleged in the
Information that caused emotional anguish and mental suffering on AAA.
In this case, the Court finds that the Information contains the recital of facts necessary to constitute the crime charged. It
clearly stated that: (1) The offended party AAA, is the wife of offender Araza; (2) AAA sustained emotional anguish and
mental suffering; and (3) such anguish and suffering is inflicted by Araza when he had an extramarital affair with Fabillar
and had three illegitimate children with her.
2.Yes. The Court ruled that Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the complainant.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the
effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became
psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish
and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the
testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such experiences are personal to this party. In order to establish
psychological violence, proof of the commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar of such acts, is
necessary.
Here, the prosecution has established Araza's guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that he committed psychological
violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA's testimony was strong and credible. She was able to confirm
that Araza was living with another woman. Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate
cause of AAA's emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was adversely affected.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for failure of the petitioner to show any reversible
error in the assailed CA Decision. The assailed Decision and the Resolution of the CA are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Jaime Araza y Jarupay is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
37. Dungo v. People | Hazing | G.R. No. 209464 | July 1, 2015 | Kate
plaintiff-appellee: DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR.

Victim(s): Marlon Villanueva Y Mejilla Location: Calamba City, Laguna Date of Incident: January 14, 2006
PDFelement
Information: Hazing by actual participation

RTC: Guilty of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law
CA: Guilty of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law
SC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Mode: Notice of Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: None
FACTS: The victim Marlon Villanueva (Villanueva) was brought to the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District
Hospital (JP Rizal Hospital). Dr. Ramon Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician at the
emergency room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat. Dr. Masilungan tried to
revive Villlanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did not respond to the resuscitation and was
pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several
injuries on his arms and legs. He further attested that Villanueva 's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer
running through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he saw large contusions on
both legs, which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to the couplexial portion, or back of the knees.
Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him that they found Villanueva
lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, and brought him to the hospital. When he asked
them where they came from, one of them answered that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City.
He questioned them on how they found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of the men
just said that they were headed somewhere else.
Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report. Due to the nature, extent and location of the injuries, he
opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing injuries because he had undergone hazing
himself when he was a student, and also because of his experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.
Prosecution: Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba City, in
front of Villa Novaliches Resort, which was barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006, at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, she was tending her store when she saw a jeepney with more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort.
Ignacio identified Dungo as the person seated beside the driver of the jeepney. She estimated the ages of these persons
in the group to be between 20 to 30 years old. They were in civilian clothes, while the other men wore white long-sleeved
shirts. Before entering the resort, the men and women shook hands and embraced each other. Three (3) persons, riding
on a single motorcycle, also arrived at the resort.
Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the resort who looked like they were praying, and
then the lights of the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy
some items. During her testimony, she was shown photographs and she identified Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two
of those who went to her store. It was only on the morning of January 14, 2006 that she learned from the policemen
visiting the resort that the deceased person was Villanueva.
Defense: The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners.
RTC: The RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court stated that the prosecution established the presence of
Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los Banos Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by the
testimony of Sunga and (2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day by the
testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo, the prosecution also proved that
Villanueva died from hazing injuries.
According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a UP Los Banos student, was a
neophyte of the APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal were members of the said fraternity; that on the
evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal, together with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought
and transported Villanueva and two other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba City, for the
final initiation rites; that the initiation rites were conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover of darkness and
secrecy; that due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, the fraternity members and the other two neophytes haphazardly
PDFelement
left the resort; and that Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital,
where Villanueva was pronounced dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to bodily assault and harm the
victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely
induce Villanueva to attend the final initiation rites, but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.
The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving negative assertions.
CA: The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding them guilty of violating
R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution. The CA painstakingly
discussed the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence to convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.
It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on the positive identification
made by the prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak, could not prevail over the positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. The CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only
convicted based on their presence in the venue of the hazing, but also in their act of bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches
Resort for the final initiation rites.
Contention to SC: Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon Villanueva y Mejilla." Yet,
both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049 because they "[i]nduced the victim to be present"
during the initiation rites. The crime of hazing by inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by
actual participation. Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the information. By
reason of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against them has been violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of violating Sec. 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law
HELD: YES. Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or
humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise
subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing
can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority
or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing
him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury.
From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an initiation rite or practice performed by the
fraternities, sororities or organization.
And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that initiation rites of fraternities,
sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the following requisites are met:
1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school authorities or head of
organization;
2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct of such initiation;
PDFelement
3. That the written notice shall indicate:
a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days;
b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and
c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation rites. Section 3
of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the head of the school or organization or their representatives
that they must assign at least two (2) representatives, as the case may be, to be present during these
valid initiations. The duty of such representative ,is to see to it that no physical harm of any kind shall be
inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.
Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or organizations that fail to comply with
the notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and organization administrators do not have a clear liability for non-
compliance with Section 3.
Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with Section 4 of the law, which provides
different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and accomplices.
The Information properly charged the offense proved
The petitioners claim that the amended information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual participation, but the only
offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their contention must fail.
The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information included the act of inducing
Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be understood to have different phases. Likewise, the
hazing activity had different stages and the perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to
the neophyte. One of the roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and
Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually brought him there. They fulfilled their roles
in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been
accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be present.
Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing. To require the prosecutor to indicate every
step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case, when details of the clandestine
hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task, if not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex
non cognit ad impossibilia).
The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime of hazing, the offenders, and
the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity which has been satisfied in the present case.
Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently informed the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their
roles in the planned initiation rite.
Conspiracy of the offenders was duly proven
The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove conspiracy.
Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.
Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This provision is unique because a
disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by
proving that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the hazing.
PDFelement
Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the crime of hazing. The
common design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that could be committed by the offenders would
be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of the victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend
the hazing; and (3) actually participate in the infliction of physical injuries.
In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing because of their presence in the
venue. As correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was
established by the testimony of Ignacio.
Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that they performed an overt act
in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they induce the victim to attend the hazing activity, the
petitioners also actually participated in it based on the prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their
roles in the conspiracy of hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Exceptionally, under
R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie
evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
The guilt of the petitioners was proven beyond reasonable doubt
Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the hazing, the petitioners’ guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. Their
involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not merely based on prima facie evidence but was also established by
circumstantial evidence.
After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable
doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down by the CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners'
participation in the hazing. They took part in the hazing and, together; with their fellow fraternity officers and members,
inflicted physical injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries eventually
took a toll on the body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young life lost.
With the fact of hazing, the identity of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly proven, the moral certainty that
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the CA are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Let
copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as guidance for the proper
implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
penalty for noncompliance with its Section 2 and 3, and the :penalty for the psychological harms to the surviving
victims of hazing.
38. People v. Bayabos | Hazing | G.R. No. 171222 | Feb. 18, 2015 | Toby
Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondents: LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG.
GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
Victim(s): Fernando C. Balidoy Location: PMMA Date of Incident: May 3, 2001
Information: 1 Count of Hazing

RTC: Dismissed the Information
SB: Sandiganbayan dismissed the information as there is no offense charged
SC: Dismissed the petition
Mode: Rule 65 petition for certiorari | Modifying Circumstance/s:
PDFelement
FACTS:
Fernando Balidoy was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. All new entrants were required to
successfully complete the mandatory indoctrination and orientation. Balidoy died during the period of indoctrination.
Prosecution:
Prosecution charged the respondents as accomplices to hazing. (As a background, in relation to this case, GR No.
174786, the respondents were charged with the crime of hazing as principals. In this case, the information was dismissed)
Defense:
The defense argued that the information did not contain all the essential elements of Hazing. They also pointed out that
there was no allegation that the act had been made a prerequisite for admission to PMMA, moreover the defenses
pointed out that there were no averment in the information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was a fraternity, a
sorority, or an organization, They also stated that there was absence in the information of any assertion that the alleged
hazing was not part of the Physical, Mental, and Psychological fitness of members. They also emphasized that there was
no allegation that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the activity. The defense
also alleged that there is no existence of the principals on the crime and the dismissal of the principals shall dismiss the
case against the accomplices.
RTC:
RTC dismissed the information, There being no more principals with whom they could have cooperated in the execution of
the offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed
SB:
SB quashed the information and dismissed the criminal case against them. According to the court, the fact that the charge
against the principal accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed with finality favorably carried with it the indictment against
those charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that before
there can be an accomplice, there must be a principal by direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal
design. In this case, as there were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom
they could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the case against the
principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as accomplices could no longer stand on its own.
SB also found that the information charged no offense and the allegations were mere conclusions of law.
Contention to SC:
1. The prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality
of the case against principal accused
2. The information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the prosecution of the crime of
accomplice to hazing
ISSUE: Whether the respondents are guilty of being accomplices to hazing
HELD:
The SC agreed with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on
the sole ground that the case against the purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case
against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the
dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in
fact been established.
However, the SC still agreed that the Motion to Quash must be granted as the information does not include all the material
facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for
PDFelement
admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of
the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a
technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly
committed and thus a mere conclusion of law.Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do
not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED and the petition for
certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan Resolutions are thus
AFFIRMED.

Title 8 Crimes Against Persons - Digest

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Title 8 Crimes Against Persons - Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Remove Watermark Wondershare

TITLE 8 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS DIGEST

2. People v. Oyanib | G.R. No. 130634 | March 12, 2001 | Jammy 5

3. Wacoy v. People | G.R. No. 213792 | June 22, 2015 | Aubrey 7

4. People v. Adalia | G.R. No. 235990 | January 22, 2020 | Vee 11

5. Cruz v. People | Rape | G.R. No. 166441 | Oct. 8, 2014 | Kate 14

8. People v. AAA | Rape | G.R. No. 248777 | July 7, 2020 | JL 22

23. Ricalde v. People | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610

24. Lutap v. People | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610

25. People v. Tulagan | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610

26. Bangayan v. People | Sexual Assault/Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610 | G.R.

1. People v. Abarca | G.R. No. 74433 | Sept. 14, 1987 | Issa

plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | defendants-appellants: FRANCISCO ABARCA

Information: MURDER WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER

2) W/N the killing was attended by treachery. (NO)

ART. 247 ELEMENTS:

2. People v. Oyanib | G.R. No. 130634 | March 12, 2001 | Jammy

plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines | accused-appellant: Manolito Oyanib

Information: PARRICIDE AND HOMICIDE

Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: Art. 247 absolutory cause

RTC: GUILTY OF HOMICIDE AND PARRICIDE

ISSUE: Whether or not 247 should be appreciated in this case?

3. Wacoy v. People | G.R. No. 213792 | June 22, 2015 | Aubrey

Information: Homicide; attended by aggravating circumstance of superior strength

Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray; NOT LIABLE

The elements are as follows:

a. that there be several persons;

d. that someone was killed in the course of the affray;

e. that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and

The elements are as follows:

a. a person was killed;

b. the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance;

c. the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;

Mitigating circumstance;present; praeter intentionem

4. People v. Adalia | G.R. No. 235990 | January 22, 2020 | Vee

plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | defendants-appellants: GIRALYN P. ADALIA

Information: Infanticide under Article 255 of the RPC

Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: none

ISSUE: WON defendant-appellant Adalia is guilty of infanticide

Absence of direct evidence

Appellant opposed the exhumation of the baby

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were all unrefuted

Issue of negative pregnant

Appellant supposedly killed the child to conceal her dishonor

5. Cruz v. People | Rape | G.R. No. 166441 | Oct. 8, 2014 | Kate

petitioner: NORBERTO CRUZ Y BARTOLOME | respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Information: Attempted Rape (AAA) and Acts of Lasciviousness (BBB)

Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: None

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of attempted rape (AAA)

HELD: GUILTY OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS (AAA)

plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

CA: both decisions for conviction affirmed

Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: None

plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | defendants-appellants: MANOLITO LUCENA

Information: 3 counts of Rape

Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s:

ART. 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

8. People v. AAA | Rape | G.R. No. 248777 | July 7, 2020 | JL

plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines | defendants-appellants: AAA (Biological father of BBB)

ISSUE: Whether AAA is guilty of the crime of qualified rape.

plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | defendants-appellants: MARCELINO CAGA y FABRE

Mode: Appeal | Modifying Circumstance/s: none