FREITAS JÚNIOR; SILVA – The Brazilian far-right populism and the International

Labor Organization (ILO): debates on social dialogue and political popularity

Revista LTr 2021

The Brazilian far-right populism and the International Labor

Organization (ILO): debates on social dialogue and political
popularity1

Antonio Rodrigues de Freitas Júnior 2

Victor Raduan da Silva 3

Abstract: Brazil is a founding member of the International Labor Organization

(ILO) and opened the first ILO office in Latin America. One of the pillars of the
Organization is social dialogue, which requires governments to take into account
the perspective of employers’ and workers’ representatives when deciding and
implementing any relevant socioeconomic public policy. In economic issues, the
World Bank evaluated in 2020 that Brazil made some good decisions, but
projected a GDP contraction of 5.4% due to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, which
is significantly intense. The far-right populist President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-
present) has been promoting legal provisions to deal with this scenario, and many
of them tend to weaken the role of unions – like the Provisional Measure (MPv)
No. 927/2020. Economic problems, however, started even before the pandemic
crisis; the Brazilian GDP has been showing instabilities for many years. During

1 It is a modified version of the paper presented at the “5th Labour Law Research Network
Conference (LLRN5),” which was planned to take place from June 27th-29th, 2021, in Warsaw
and Lodz, Poland, but ended up occurring online because of the COVID-19 pandemic
(https://llrn5poland.uni.lodz.pl/). Some of the ideas shared in this paper had already been
expressed in another one, called “Freedom of association in Brazil according to the International
Labor Organization (ILO): predicting labor reforms amid/after the COVID-19 pandemic.” It was
presented at the “2021 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting (LSA2021),” which
happened from May 26th-30th, 2021, and was changed from an in-person format in Chicago,
USA, to an online one (https://www.lawandsociety.org/chicago-2021/).
We translated the Brazilian norms from Portuguese to English and apologize in advance for any
mistake and misunderstanding. Moreover, we thank Prof. Lorena de Mello Rezende Colnago for
her gentle attention to this paper.
2 Associate Professor. Department of Labor Law and Social Security Law, School of Law,

University of Sao Paulo (USP), Brazil. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4006-627X; CV Lattes

– Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) (in
Portuguese): http://lattes.cnpq.br/1935382452547604. Email: arfreit@usp.br.
3 Doctoral student, Labor Law and Social Security Law. School of Law, University of Sao Paulo

(USP), Brazil. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0113-5324; CV Lattes – Brazilian National

Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) (in Portuguese):
http://lattes.cnpq.br/2595440643850179. Emails: victor.raduan.silva@usp.br;
victor.raduansilva@gmail.com.

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the Government of President Michel Temer (2016-2018), this situation offered

conditions to pass the 2017 Labor Reform – Law No. 13,467/2017 –, which
improved flexibilization to the labor market, allegedly to foster job creation. This
paper aims to briefly discuss the far-right populism of the Bolsonaro
Administration, to what extent some international labor guidelines have been
observed, and how the Brazilian public opinion evaluated Presidents Temer and
Bolsonaro amid the mentioned legal provisions.

Keywords: far-right populism; social dialogue; political popularity.

1. Introduction

We start this paper by highlighting the research Faria did about some
declarations of the in-office Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro:

“I respect the institutions, but I owe only loyalty to you, the Brazilian
people,” said the President of the Republic in the City of Itapira, in
August 2019. “I am the Constitution,” he stated in April 2020, in front of
the Palácio do Planalto [the Brazilian Presidential House], in Brasilia.
“The temperature is rising. Brazil is at the limit. The staff [sic] say that I
must take action. I am waiting for the people to give a signal because
hunger, misery, and unemployment are there,” he said, in the second
half of April 2021, also in Brasilia. 4

Bolsonaro represents the “charisma” of the current far-right populism

in Latin America. As we saw with US President Donald Trump, this populism
relies on a daily induced political polarization between “friends” and “enemies,”
which is significantly different from what happened during the 1930s and 1940s
in the region. At that moment, populist leaders as Juan Domingo Perón, in
Argentina, and Getulio Vargas, in Brazil, were more “centrist”: they considered
social actors – like the trade unions – relevant to maintain and expand their
power. However, Bolsonaro disregards political/institutional mediation – not only
via trade unions, but also via the media, political parties, and new social

4FARIA, José Eduardo. A “sinalização do povo.” Estadão - Estado da Arte, Sao Paulo, Apr. 24th,
2021. Available at: https://estadodaarte.estadao.com.br/sinalizacao-povo-jef/. Accessed on: Aug.
6th, 2021.

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movements –, seeking direct popular legitimacy and often challenging any social
dialogue.

To what extent the nowadays populism affects social protection and

how it happens? Perhaps we have a tentative answer to this question. This paper
approaches aspects of these themes: (i) charisma, electoral appeal, and types of
populism – far-left vs. far-right ones, “state corporatist” vs. “neoliberal-
neoconservative-type” ones –; (ii) the good old relations between Brazil and the
International Labor Organization (ILO), highlighting the guidelines of the
Organization on social dialogue; (iii) the viewpoint of the World Bank on the
Brazilian economic scenario, which brings us a comprehensive analysis of
positive and negative perspectives; and (iv) the discrepant outcomes of two
controversial measures to weaken the role of trade unions during the Government
of President Michel Temer (2016-2018) – namely the Law No. 13,467/2017, the
so-called 2017 Labor Reform – and the one of President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-
present) – the Provisional Measure (MPv) No. 927/2020.

2. Populism

Before talking about populism, it is useful to bring some ideas of Max

Weber on “charisma,” which is perhaps the foundation of any populist experience
– anytime, anywhere. Weber pointed out that, denying the bureaucratic structure
ideal-type, the charismatic one ignores regular activities – such as specialized
training and career –, means of control and judgment, and permanent institutions.
A charismatic leader only knows internal restraint, choosing missions – and
perhaps partially accomplishing them – that are relevant not only for him/her, but
for his/her followers, for the group that he/she defends – demanding by doing so
the loyalty of the followers/group. The followers do not need to “elect” this leader;
the leader, instead, demands the followers to acknowledge his/her

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determination. 5 But how is charisma translated into votes nowadays? Is it

appealing to the young?

Graph 1 – The young in favor of far-left/far-right ideas, annual percent change

Source: MOUNK, Yascha. The people vs. democracy: why our freedom is in
danger and how to save it. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. p.
121.

As we may notice, charisma is still a very powerful element in politics.

Both far-left and far-right populisms attract the young even in countries that
deeply suffered from authoritarian/totalitarian regimes in the 20th Century – such
as Romania, Slovenia, Italy, and Germany – and in traditional liberal democracies
– which helps us to understand the popular appeal, for example, of Donald Trump
in the USA, of Marine Le Pen in France, and of Nigel Farage in the UK.
Nonetheless, Halikiopoulou, mainly talking about the European context, mentions
a study from The Guardian which showed that 25% of the Europeans vote for
populists. The economic crises – and the resulting social inequalities – in this

5 WEBER, Max. A Sociologia da autoridade carismática. p. 284-285. In: GERTH, Hans H.;
WRIGHT MILLS, C.. Max Weber: ensaios de Sociologia. Translation: Waltensir Dutra. Rio de
Janeiro: LTC, 1982. p. 281-291.

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region did not lead – curiously – to a rise of the left-wing populism; the far-right
populists, in a somewhat surprising move, strongly emerged, promising to stand
by “the people” and “the national sovereignty” and, thus, symbolizing stability in
times of many insecurities. 6

Moving from Europe to Latin America, we may list political leaders and
movements exhibiting features that could be indicated as populist ones. Populism
has flourished in this region at least since the 1930s: Getulio Vargas (1930-1945,
1951-1954) in Brazil, Juan Domingo Perón (1946-1952, 1952-1955, 1973-1974)
in Argentina, Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) in Mexico, etc. We should be careful
to distinguish a populist leader from an openly populist experience, i.e. a populist
persona is not equal to a political system governed by a populist hegemony –
especially if we are considering their impacts on democratic institutions, political
parties, socioeconomic development, etc. This remark is important because, in
nowadays Latin America, there are two paradigmatic populist Governments:
Bolivarianism in Venezuela – a usually labeled far-left populist regime symbolized
by Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013-present) – and the
Bolsonaro Administration in Brazil.

However, we may take aside these far-left vs. far-right categories and
think about another differentiation. Approaching Brazilian History, we notice that
Vargas started his Era almost a century before Bolsonaro was elected; we are
naturally dealing with different populist experiences. But how different are they?
It is worth opposing here the “state corporatist” populism – as defined by Philippe
Schmitter 7, about Vargas – and a “neoliberal-neoconservative-type” populism –
a tentative category to describe Bolsonaro, as he often disregards core social
rights in the name of the Economy and has the firm support of some radical
traditionalist sectors of the society.

6 HALIKIOPOULOU, Daphne. Understanding the far-right populists: focus on their political

message. Social Europe, May 16th, 2019. https://socialeurope.eu/far-right-populists. Accessed

on: Aug. 6th, 2021.
7 SCHMITTER, Philippe C.. Still the century of Corporatism? The Review of Politics, v. 36, n. 1,

p. 85-131, Jan. 1974. p. 104. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/1406080. Accessed on: Aug. 8th,
2021.

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The populism of Vargas controlled and manipulated trade unions and

political parties – partially via the social protection displayed on the Consolidation
of Labor Laws (CLT), a trademark of his Era –, but the one of Bolsonaro pushes
to undermine, replace, and even block them. Bolsonaro shows the strategy of
governing directly connected with his followers, rejecting the political mediation
played by the institutions of liberal democracies – such as the independent
Legislative and Judicial bodies, which take part in the regular check-and-balance
procedures – and associations – the press, trade unions, political parties, NGOs,
universities, etc. This feature may explain his frequent aggressive posts on social
media, blaming “the system” for the failures of his Government. Another
emblematic case: the Federal Senate has been conducting a Parliamentary
Inquiry Commission (CPI) on the COVID-19 pandemic; the disease has sadly
killed more than 550,000 people in the country. Some witnesses testifying before
the CPI pointed out that a group outside the Ministry of Health has secretly
advised Bolsonaro, underestimating the potential of the pandemic to create
Public Health chaos. 8 These advisors may not be affiliated with any political party,
as Bolsonaro has been in this situation since 2019. 9

The populist persona is often depicted as an “outsider,” someone not

involved with “the elites”; curiously, they are often also wealthy and famous. In
line with this, Bolsonaro introduced himself as someone against the “traditional
politics” in the 2018 Presidential Campaign, but he was Federal Deputy for almost
30 years. 10 This contrast between speech and practice makes the populist leader
entirely unpredictable, incapable of middle/long-term commitments, ethically
unreliable – except for his/her followers, according to the intensity of their faith.
Another populist habit is labeling people as “friends” and “enemies,” which

8 URIBE, Gustavo. CPI apura se integrantes do governo atuavam em alinhamento a “gabinete

paralelo.” CNN Brasil Política, July 6th, 2021. Available at:
https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/2021/07/06/cpi-apura-se-integrantes-do-governo-atuavam-
em-alinhamento-a-gabinete-paralelo. Accessed on: Aug. 7th, 2021.
9 DALL’AGNOL, Laísa. Sem partido desde 2019, Bolsonaro diz ser cortejado por duas siglas.

Veja - Blog Radar, July 12th, 2021. Available at: https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/radar/sem-partido-

desde-2019-bolsonaro-diz-ser-cortejado-por-duas-siglas/. Accessed on: Aug. 8th, 2021.
10 POTTER, Hyury. A trajetória política de Jair Bolsonaro. Deutsche Welle, Oct. 28th, 2018.

Available at: https://www.dw.com/pt-br/a-trajet%C3%B3ria-pol%C3%ADtica-de-jair-bolsonaro/a-

45986001. Accessed on: Aug. 8th, 2021.

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generates hostilities on many issues and against many groups – e.g. Bolsonaro
is frequently involved in controversies with representatives of indigenous, black,
and LGBT+ people, migrants, women, etc. Although we may find some populist
experiences that generated positive outcomes – mainly in the short run –,
populism tends to be disastrous.

3. Brazil, the ILO, and social dialogue

Brazil took part in the International Labor Organization (ILO)

foundation, hosted the first Latin American field office of the Organization in 1950,
and ratified more than 95 ILO Conventions. One of the remarkable partnerships
between the country and the ILO was about the promotion of decent work,
advancing autonomy, inclusion, dignity, as well as wealth distribution. The
National Decent Work Agenda was launched in 2006 prioritizing: (i) the
eradication of child and forced labor; (ii) the generation of more good jobs; and
(iii) the empowerment of social dialogue. Consequently, we had e.g. the 2010
National Plan for Employment and Decent Work, the 2012 National Conference
on Employment and Decent Work – when around 20,000 participants assisted –
, subnational agendas in the States of Mato Grosso and Bahia and in the City of
Sao Paulo. 11

Social dialogue gathers all types of consultation, negotiation, and

information exchange between/among representatives of employers,
governments, and workers about socioeconomic issues of common interest. It
may occur via tripartite – in which the government takes part – and bipartite
processes – between employers’ and workers’ organizations only, being admitted
some government interaction –, using formal and informal means. Moreover,
social dialogue may comprehend enterprise, regional, and national levels, so it

11INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION. The ILO in Brazil. Geneva: International Labor

Organization, June 2016. [p. 1]. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
americas/---ro-lima/---ilo-brasilia/documents/publication/wcms_496601.pdf. Accessed on: Aug.
8th, 2021.

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may approach sectoral and inter-professional matters. Its main objective is to

promote democracy and consensus among stakeholders, and its success may
encourage best practices on governance, resolve sensitive socioeconomic
problems, and foster development, stability, and peace. 12

The conditions that enable social dialogue are: (i) political

commitment; (ii) independent, strong, well-structured organizations representing
employers and workers; (iii) institutional support; and (iv) respect for collective
bargaining and freedom of association. As we may notice, the governments shall
not remain passive: stable civil and political climates, institutional and legal
frameworks, all these background aspects rely upon the governments – averting
the fear of reprisal, even in bipartite processes. And the ILO offers its expertise
to foster social dialogue around the world. 13

4. The Brazilian economic performance

The Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased 1.1% in 2019

and 1.3% in 2018 and 2017, but shrank 3.3% in 2016 and 3.5% in 2015. In 2019,
agriculture experienced a 1.3% growth, industry, a 0.5% one, and services, a
1.3% one, making the GDP totals BRL 7.3 trillion – around USD 1.4 trillion – in
2019. 14 However, the COVID-19 pandemic changed this scenario of steady – and
considerably low – development:

12 Id.. Social dialogue. Areas of work, n.d.. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/areas-of-

work/social-dialogue/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed on: Aug. 6th, 2021.
13 Ibid.. The 2019 ILO Centenary Declaration stresses the importance of social dialogue, for

example, in the following: “II. The Conference declares that: [...] B. Social dialogue, including
collective bargaining and tripartite cooperation, provides an essential foundation of all ILO action
and contributes to successful policy and decision-making in its member States.”
(INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION. ILO Centenary Declaration for the future of work.
Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2019. p. 3, 6. Available at:
https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/mission-and-objectives/centenary-declaration/lang--
en/index.htm. Accessed on Aug. 9th, 2021.).
14 INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA. PIB cresce 1,1% em 2019 e

fecha o ano em R$ 7,3 trilhões. Agência IBGE Notícias, March 4th, 2020. Available at:
https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-sala-de-imprensa/2013-agencia-de-
noticias/releases/27006-pib-cresce-1-1-em-2019-e-fecha-o-ano-em-r-7-3-trilhoes. Accessed on:
Aug. 6th, 2021.

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Graph 2 – GDP at market prices, accumulated rates in each quarter (q)

3,2

2,1 2
1,9 1,8
1,7 1,6 1,6
1,3 1,4 1,4
1,2
1
0,5
RESULT

0,1

-0,7
-0,9
-1,3
-1,9
-2,2 -2,1

-3,3 -3,4
-3,5
-4,1 -4,1
-4,4 -4,5

2014, 2014, 2014, 2014, 2015, 2015, 2015, 2015, 2016, 2016, 2016, 2016, 2017, 2017, 2017, 2017, 2018, 2018, 2018, 2018, 2019, 2019, 2019, 2019, 2020, 2020, 2020, 2020,
1q 2q 3q 4q 1q 2q 3q 4q 1q 2q 3q 4q 1q 2q 3q 4q 1q 2q 3q 4q 1q 2q 3q 4q 1q 2q 3q 4q
RESULT 3,2 2,1 1,2 0,5 -0,7 -1,3 -2,2 -3,5 -4,4 -4,5 -4,1 -3,3 -1,9 -0,9 0,1 1,3 1,7 1,9 2 1,8 1,6 1,6 1,4 1,4 1 -2,1 -3,4 -4,1
PERIOD
Adapted from: INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA. Séries históricas. SCNT - Sistema de Contas
Nacionais Trimestrais, 2021. Available at: https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/economicas/contas-nacionais/9300-contas-
nacionais-trimestrais.html?=&t=series-historicas. Accessed on: Aug. 6th, 2021.

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The World Bank pointed out that the COVID-19 pandemic led – in
2020, second quarter – to a contraction of historic 9.7% due to impacts on the
service and manufacture sectors. In the labor market, the scenario was no
different: the unemployment rate reached 13.3%, informal workers faced worse
living conditions. Fiscal and monetary policies stimulated consumption and were
successful in preventing deeper economic contractions, but the amount of public
expending contributed to the national currency Real (BRL) devalue – losing over
20% of its value even with the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) intervention on
foreign exchange. Nonetheless, the account deficit decreased from 2.7% in 2019
to 2% in July 2020, the inflation declined to 2.4% in August 2020, and the BCB
reduced in the same month the policy rate to 2% – a record low. Although the
Federal Government used emergency measures observing the expenditure
ceiling, its fiscal performance ended up deteriorated – a package of 11.1% of the
GDP to support the economy was adopted – and its gross debt rose from 75.8%
in 2019 to 85.5% in June 2020. 15

The economic projections in Brazil were better than previously

expected, and the GDP contraction would be 5.4% in 2020. The World Bank
revised its projection at that moment as the interest rates were low, households
received economic support, and lockdowns and other restrictive measures were
lifted. However, limitations on face-to-face economic activities revealed that the
service sector would recover heterogeneously. Brazil would show a +3%
recovery in 2021 and a +2.5% one in 2022, its account deficit would soften in
2020, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows would continuously play an
important role, and inflation would remain low until 2022 – the output gap may
increase to 4%. In 2020, the Federal Government emergency responses and its
lower tax revenues were expected to generate an 11.6% primary deficit; in 2022,
in turn, the historically low interest rates would not suffice to stabilize public debt,
which would reach 96% of the GDP. Regarding poverty, it would diminish in 2020
because of the Government’s economic support to households, but it would

15 WORLD BANK. Semi-annual Report of the Latin America and Caribbean region: “the cost of
staying healthy.” Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. p. 60. Available at:
https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/publication/el-costo-de-mantenerse-sano. Accessed
on: Aug. 6th, 2021.

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escalate again when these emergency measures expire – as the labor market
may not absorb all the unemployed. 16

The astonishing numbers of COVID-19 cases in Brazil are also

approached by the World Bank: the economic recovery still depends on
improvements in the Public Health scenario, as the pandemic may long persist
and push to new social distancing measures – affecting international capital flows
and trade channels to the country. Moreover, the recovery refers to the labor
market vitality to include the 10 million people – 7.9 million of them in the informal
economy – expelled from the workforce. In the name of efficiency, the Federal
Government should constrain public spending, keep the temporary nature of the
fiscal emergency measures, and make the medium-term public debt still
anchored in the expenditure norms. The World Bank goes on to indicate that
inclusive and sustained recovery demands education strategies to regain ground
on learning processes – via measures to reopen schools – and structural reforms
to promote productivity. Some pillars for all these policies would be firmly rooted
in monetary measures, in a robust position concerning international reserve, in
exchange rates buffering against effective shocks, and in highly capitalized
banks. 17

5. Controversial labor measures in Brazil

In this section, we focus on two legal provisions, namely the 2017

Labor Reform – Law No. 13,467/2017, enacted during the Government of
President Michel Temer (2016-2018) – and the Provisional Measure (MPv) No.
927/2020 – issued during Jair Bolsonaro Administration (2019-present). Has their
political popularity been impacted at the times of these measures?

5.1. President Michel Temer

16 Ibid., p. 60.
17 Ibid., p. 60.

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President Temer led the passing of the 2017 Labor Reform – enacted
in July 2017 and effective 120 days later –, which represented perhaps the
deepest change on the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT). After one year – and
this evaluation is still up to date –, it was possible to say that turbulent times arose
because of some aspects, e.g.: (i) the benefits of this Reform to boost the labor
market were doubtful; (ii) its application has generated debates; and (iii) the
regulation of some provisions has not been fully elaborated. 18

The Federal Government presented the Reform in December 2016 to

the Legislative, which quickly approved it, as the debates lasted four months in
the Chamber of Deputies – proposing 850 amendments – and less than three
months in the Senate. The opposition complained that the Reform was not
addressed to Thematic Commissions, but only to a Special one; the Chamber of
Deputies, however, argued that the Reform would involve four Commissions, and
a Special Commission would be designated in such case. In the Senate, the
Commissions on Economic Affairs (CAE), on Social Affairs (CAS), and –
afterward – on Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship (CCJ) were responsible for
analyzing the text. The Reform received 864 amendment suggestions, but none
of them ended up adopted. The Government articulated the text approval with no
changes to avert a new analysis by the Deputies, but it pledged to veto
controversial provisions before the Reform sanction. The most contested ones
were: (i) allowing the pregnant to work in unhealthy environments; (ii) making
collective bargaining prevail over the general labor norms; (iii) regulating the so-
called “12/36 working scheme” – the employee may straightly work for 12 hours,
as long as he/she has a 36-hour rest afterward –; and (iv) establishing the
“intermittent work” – perhaps similar to the “zero-hour contract”, with its inactivity
periods. 19

18 AGÊNCIA SENADO. Reforma trabalhista completa um ano sob questionamentos e sem

desfecho. Senado Notícias, Brasilia, Nov. 9th, 2018. Available at:

https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2018/11/09/reforma-trabalhista-completa-um-
ano-sob-questionamentos-e-sem-desfecho. Accessed on: Aug. 6th, 2021.
19 Ibid.. The 2017 Labor Reform added the following article in the CLT: “Art. 611-A. The collective

labor convention and the collective labor agreement have prevalence over the law when, among

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President Temer did not veto the controversial points, but passed on
November 14th, 2017, a Provisional Measure – more specifically the MPv No.
808/2017 – further regulating the Reform. This MPv received no debating plan
and no Rapporteur, which avoided it to be voted and made it expire. The general
intention of the Reform was to induce simpler relations between employers and
workers and flexibility in the labor market, which would generate more jobs.
However, its expectations were not met because the Brazilian Economy has been
experiencing low and unstable performance since 2014. 20 The expression of
discontent in the public opinion was clear:

other issues, they provide for: I - pact regarding the working hours, observing the constitutional
limits; II - annual compensatory time off; III - rest break, respecting the minimum of thirty minutes
for working time longer than six hours; IV - adhesion to the Program for Employment Maintenance
(PSE), referred to in Law No. 13,189, of November 19th, 2015; V - plan for positions, salaries,
and functions which are compatible with the employee’s personal condition, as well as
identification of positions that qualify as of trust; VI - undertaking’s statutes; VII - workers’
representative in the workplace; VIII - telework, work on call, and intermittent work; IX -
compensation for productivity, including tips received by the employee, and compensation for
individual performance; X - manner of recording the working time; XI - transfer the holiday to
another date; XII - establishing the degree of unhealthy conditions; XIII - extension of working
hours in unhealthy environments, without prior license from the competent authorities of the
Ministry of Labor; XIV - incentive awards for goods or services, occasionally granted in incentive
programs; XV - profit sharing.” (BRAZIL. Lei nº 13.467, de 13 de julho de 2017. Altera a
Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT), aprovada pelo Decreto-Lei nº 5.452, de 1º de maio de
1943, e as Leis nº 6.019, de 3 de janeiro de 1974, 8.036, de 11 de maio de 1990, e 8.212, de 24
de julho de 1991, a fim de adequar a legislação às novas relações de trabalho. Presidência da
República. 2017. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-
2018/2017/lei/l13467.htm. Accessed on: Aug. 9th, 2021.).
20 AGÊNCIA SENADO. Reforma trabalhista completa um ano sob questionamentos e sem

desfecho. Senado Notícias, Brasilia, Nov. 9th, 2018. Available at:

https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2018/11/09/reforma-trabalhista-completa-um-
ano-sob-questionamentos-e-sem-desfecho. Accessed on: Aug. 6th, 2021. Id.. Aprovada em
2017, reforma trabalhista alterou regras para flexibilizar o mercado de trabalho. Senado Notícias,
Brasilia, May 2nd, 2019. Available at:
https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2019/05/02/aprovada-em-2017-reforma-
trabalhista-alterou-regras-para-flexibilizar-o-mercado-de-trabalho. Accessed on: Aug. 6th, 2021.

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Graph 3 – President Michel Temer, excellent/good public opinion

16%
14%
14% 13% 13%
EXCELLENT/GOOD OPINION

12%
10%
10%

8%
6%
6% 5% 5% 5%
4% 4%
4% 3%

2%

0%
2016, 2016, 2016, 2017, 2017, 2017, 2017, 2018, 2018, 2018, 2018,
Jun Sep Dec Mar Jul Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec
EXCELLENT/GOOD
13% 14% 13% 10% 5% 3% 6% 5% 4% 4% 5%
OPINION

PERIOD
Adapted from: CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DA INDÚSTRIA; INSTITUTO
BRASILEIRO DE OPINIÃO PÚBLICA E ESTATÍSTICA. Dados: evolução dos
Presidentes. Brasilia: Confederação Nacional da Indústria, Dec. 2020. Available
at: https://www.portaldaindustria.com.br/estatisticas/pesquisa-cni-ibope-
avaliacao-do-governo/. Accessed on: Aug. 6th, 2021.

5.2. President Jair Bolsonaro

It is a considerable challenge to analyze the ongoing measures to

tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, mainly in a circumstance of far-right populism;
norms have been unpredictably changed. Nonetheless, President Jair Bolsonaro
issued MPv No. 927 on March 22nd, 2020, to establish new labor regulations.
One of the provisions allowed suspending employment contracts for four months
if the interested employers offered professional qualification programs to their
employees. But on March 23rd, at around 1:50 pm, President Bolsonaro said he

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revoked this MPv section. The Federal Government kept supporting the MPv
because it would avoid layoffs. 21

The MPv approaches many relevant themes, such as: (i) special
working scheme in case of service interruption; (ii) working
remotely/telecommuting; (iii) vacations and holidays in advance; (iv) holiday
suspension for essential workers, as health ones; (v) postponement of the
contribution to the Severance Indemnity Fund (FGTS); (vi) suspension of
administrative requirements on labor health and safety; and (vii) individual
agreements between employees and employers. This last point needs a closer
treatment: the MPv – observing its period of validity and the constitutional
guarantees – permitted that individual agreements would disregard the general
labor norms to protect employment relationships. 22 But the public opinion about
the Bolsonaro Administration remained basically the same throughout 2020:

21 NÉRI, Felipe. Coronavírus: Bolsonaro edita MP que altera regras trabalhistas em meio à

pandemia. G1, March 23rd, 2020. Available at:

https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/03/23/bolsonaro-edita-mp-que-permite-suspensao-de-
contrato-de-trabalho-por-ate-4-meses.ghtml. Accessed on: Aug. 6th, 2021.
22 Ibid.. “Art. 2. During the state of public calamity referred to in art. 1, the employee and the

employer may enter into an individual written agreement to guarantee the maintenance of the
employment relationship, which will have prevalence over the other normative, legal, and
negotiated instruments, respecting the limits established in the Constitution.” (BRAZIL. Medida
Provisória nº 927, de 22 de março de 2020. Dispõe sobre as medidas trabalhistas para
enfrentamento do estado de calamidade pública reconhecido pelo Decreto Legislativo nº 6, de
20 de março de 2020, e da emergência de saúde pública de importância internacional decorrente
do coronavírus (covid-19), e dá outras providências. Presidência da República. 2020b. Available
at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2020/mpv/mpv927.htm. Accessed on:
Aug. 9th, 2021.).

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Graph 4 – President Jair Bolsonaro, excellent/good public opinion

45% 40%
40% 35% 35%
EXCELLENT/GOOD OPINION

35% 32% 31%

29%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
2019, 2019, 2019, 2019, 2020, 2020,
Apr Jun Sep Dec Sep Dec
EXCELLENT/GOOD
35% 32% 31% 29% 40% 35%
OPINION

PERIOD
Adapted from: CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DA INDÚSTRIA; INSTITUTO
BRASILEIRO DE OPINIÃO PÚBLICA E ESTATÍSTICA, op. cit..

Why did it happen? Perhaps it was due to another provision, not

related to trade unions, but to a Universal Basic Income (UBI)-type program: the
Law No. 13,982/2020, establishing the Emergency Aid – Auxílio Emergencial.23

23 “Art. 2. During a period of 3 (three) months, counting from the publication of this Law, an
emergency aid in the amount of BRL 600.00 (six hundred reais) [around USD 113] per month will
be granted to the worker who cumulatively complies with the following requirements: I - he/she is
over 18 (eighteen) years of age, except in the case of teenage mothers; (Wording given by Law
No. 13,998 of 2020); II - he/she does not have an employment; III - he/she does not benefit from
social security or assistance or from a unemployment insurance, or from a federal program for
cash transfer, except, under the terms of §§ 1 and 2, the Bolsa Família [possibly translated as
Family Aid]; IV - whose monthly per capita family income is up to 1/2 (half) the minimum wage or
whose the total monthly family income is up to 3 (three) times the minimum wage [the minimum
wage in Brazil is currently BRL 1,100, around USD 208]; V - that, in 2018, he/she did not receive
taxable earnings above BRL 28,559.70 (twenty-eight thousand, five hundred and fifty-nine reais
and seventy centavos) [approximately USD 5,411]; and VI - who performs activity in the condition
of: a) individual micro entrepreneur (MEI); b) individual contributor to the General Scheme of
Social Welfare that contributes pursuant to the caput or item I, § 2, art. 21, Law No. 8,212 of July
24th, 1991; or c) worker in the informal economy, whether employed, self-employed or
unemployed, of any type, including the inactive one who performs an intermittent work, listed in
the Sole Record for Social Programs of the Federal Government (CadÚnico) until March 20th,
2020, or who, pursuant to self-declaration, complies with the requirement of item IV.” (BRAZIL.
Lei nº 13.982, de 2 de abril de 2020. Altera a Lei nº 8.742, de 7 de dezembro de 1993, para dispor
sobre parâmetros adicionais de caracterização da situação de vulnerabilidade social para fins de

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This Aid had been suspended and was reactivated considering not only the
essential socioeconomic relief, but also the success it generated in public opinion.
News from August 2020 indicated that the Aid was requested by 40% of the
Brazilians, reaching 75% of the unemployed who have been looking for a job,
71% of informal workers, and 61% of liberal professionals and independent
contractors. 24

6. Conclusion

We presented in this paper the ongoing political appeal of charisma

and, thus, of one of its products: populism. The “state corporatist” populism of
Getulio Vargas tries to control/manipulate political parties and trade unions, while
the “neoliberal-neoconservative-type” populism of Jair Bolsonaro ignores/fights
against them all. Vargas gave almost no room to ideas about freedom of
association, but Labor Law and social dialogue advanced in some issues.
Bolsonaro, in turn, tends to delegitimize this dialogue and the social protection it
generates.

The 2017 Labor Reform was not followed by strong improvements on

the Brazilian economic indexes neither on the political popularity of the former
President Michel Temer. Differently from what supported the framework of this
Reform, the 2020 measures of Bolsonaro enlarged substantially the number of
beneficiaries of UBI-type programs, expanding consistently the social protection
to reduce the impacts of the pandemic. The not-so-bad evaluation of the World
Bank about Brazil is partially due to the Emergency Aid. Nonetheless, provisions

elegibilidade ao benefício de prestação continuada (BPC), e estabelece medidas excepcionais

de proteção social a serem adotadas durante o período de enfrentamento da emergência de
saúde pública de importância internacional decorrente do coronavírus (Covid-19) responsável
pelo surto de 2019, a que se refere a Lei nº 13.979, de 6 de fevereiro de 2020. Presidência da
República. 2020a. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-
2022/2020/lei/l13982.htm. Accessed on: Aug. 9th, 2021.).
24 ARAGÃO, Murillo de. Puxada pelo auxílio emergencial, popularidade de Bolsonaro bate

recorde. Veja - Blog Murillo de Aragão, Aug. 14th, 2020. Available at:
https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/murillo-de-aragao/puxada-pelo-auxilio-emergencial-popularidade-
de-bolsonaro-bate-recorde/. Accessed on: Aug. 9th, 2021.

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against some core ideas of Labor Law have been passed according to political
initiatives from the Legislative and Executive Branches and with the confirmation
from the Federal Supreme Court (STF).

The contents of the 2017 Labor Reform and of the MPv No. 927/2020
did not observe ILO guidelines on social dialogue, which contradicts the close
relation that Brazil has been cultivating with the Organization since its foundation.
Despite all the political hostility and isolation characterizing the far-right populism
on the pandemic, they seem to result – to a certain extent – politically efficient so
far. By contrast to the political and economic outcomes from the 2017 Labor
Reform, the 2020 measures – gaining momentum due to the Emergency Aid –
substantially helped the political popularity of Bolsonaro.

Both the 2017 initiative and the 2020 ones were implemented by
political strategies that express contempt for social dialogue guidelines. However,
only the one that ignored the hopes on self-regulated markets and expanded the
UBI-type scheme succeeded. The objective of inflicting real damages on the
legitimacy of social dialogue requirements was then achieved. As we may see,
there is no simple answer to the different questions posed by this paper. A
populism that is still electorally appealing via the erosion of the labor system is
perhaps one of the biggest challenges to the legitimacy of Labor Law in our times.

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Labor Organization (ILO): debates on social dialogue and political popularity
Revista LTr 2021

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24