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VIII - Non State Actors
VIII - Non State Actors
Generally non state actors are classified as coercive and benign actors
depending on their inclinations but the following kinds of coercive and
cohesive non-state actors have emerged on the national and international
stage:
• International Organizations (IGOs)
• Multinational Corporations (MNC)
• Non- Governmental Organizations (NGO)
• International Media
• Religious Groups
• Transnational Diaspora Communities
• Terrorist and Criminal Networks
• Drug Cartels
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Non-State actors are all those entities which are not under the control or part
of state, yet they play a role like a state in the international domain.
Hence these entities are not recognized as ‘state’ by the international
community.
In the present context, various international NGOs, multinational
corporations, religious groups, terrorist groups like Islamic state, operating
under international domain are generally referred to as ‘non-state actors’.
A non-state actor is an individual or organization that has significant political
influence but is not allied to any particular country or state.
ISIS is a good example of a non state actor. It is an organization which had
the potential to bring heavy change in the world, especially the political
scenario. At the same time it is not associated to a single country.
Main Non-State Actors in Pakistan
• Tahreek e Taliban
• Haqani network
• Lashkar e Taiba
• Sepah e Sahaba
• Balochistan liberation Army
• Separatist groups in Sindh
• Operation of proxies sponsored by external enemies in different parts of
Pakistan
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2. Non-state actors are posing more threat to Pakistan’s national security than
threats from external state actors
Till this point, Pakistan’s engagement with non-state actors hadn’t caused
much trouble. But 9/11 changed everything. Two major events are worth
mentioning:
• First, when the US hammer came down on Afghanistan there was no
anvil on the Pakistani side to stem the influx of escaping Al-Qaeda
and Taliban personnel. They scurried into the country as they
wanted to.
• Second, when General Musharraf decided to ‘abandon’ the Taliban, he
made two tactical errors:
1) he chose to stick with groups which were not operating there;
and
2) in siding with the US, he created enemies for himself and
Pakistan
1. Propagating extremism
2. Planning and executing terrorist attacks
3. Causing the deterioration of relations
4. Tarnishing the image of country
5. Augmenting sectarian conflicts
6. Misusing blasphemy laws
7. Being financed and sponsored by anti-Pakistan stakeholders
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The west has long pointed an accusing finger at Pakistan’s policy of dealing
with terrorists, alleging that:
a. the state differentiates between those that directly attack the country,
it’s citizens, soldiers and institutions – the bad Taliban – and those that
operate across the eastern border in Afghanistan, and westwards in
Occupied Kashmir and beyond – the good Taliban; and
b. This accusation has come to be known as Pakistan’s good and bad Taliban
policy. Pakistan have nurtured and used civilians to either supplement
certain requirements of the state or act in a certain manner on the state’s
behest as non-state actors.
1. It all started back in 1947/48, A motley crew of tribal fighters from
FATA and the then NWFP, coupled with state irregulars, moved towards the
state of Kashmir when Hari Singh solicited the help of our neighbours, who
agreed to help, with the caveat انتباہof Singh signing off on the accession to
India.
This incursion had been a potent mix of patriotism and religion: nationalistic
Islam, shall we say.
2. In 1970/71, when General Yahya Khan, with the Jamaat-e-Islami,
formed, trained, armed and unleashed on the hapless Bengalis, two
organisations: Al-Badr and Al-Shams. These two are the first instance of an
organised non-state organization used by the state.
3. General Zia decided to use religion as jihad. From 1979 onwards,
Pakistan became the landing ground and launching pad for any Muslim who
wanted to fight in Afghanistan. The quintessential jihadist outfit was formed,
Harkatul Jihad al Islami. (HuJI).
4. Not only focused on the Russians, Zia, being a perfect opportunist seeing
their success, after the Soviet retreat, but also recalibrated their focus
towards Kashmir. It is widely believed that three groups: the HuJi, Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT) and the JeM emerged from HuJi.
5. By this time, hundreds of jihadi outfits had emerged. Some were fighting in
Afghanistan, others in Kashmir. Many had disbanded and many small ones had
grouped together. Thousands of seminaries were operating unchecked and
churning out crop after crop of young men, brainwashed with a skewed
version of religion, and trained in the use of weapons.
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