Introduction

States have traditionally employed a range of means to pursue

their objectives in international relations. The most extreme is war
- organised force exercised from outside in order to change the
policies of an adversary or to destroy it. Less extreme is interven-
tion - the coercive attempt to change the internal political balance
of another state. This may take different forms: in order to remove
an uncooperative or hostile government, one might support its
domestic adversaries. Alternatively, the desire to preserve an allied
or friendly govenunent threatened by internal dissent might evoke
external assistance to that govenunent in its internal struggle.
This paper examines the place of inte~entionin contempor-
ary world politics. It asks whether the role and nature of interven-
tion has changed in the post-Cold War era, and, if so, in what
ways. One key issue here is the extent to which intervention has
been transformed from its traditional role as a vehicle for the
promotion of the political interests of states into a mechanism for
the promotion of purportedly universal norms. There are two
aspects to the post-Cold War normative dimension of intervention.
The first is the defence of human rights; in particular, to what
extent is there evidence of an emerging solidarist' norm concerning
humanitarian intervention to protect civilian populations threat-
ened by civil war, to protect relief supplies and the personnel
delivering them, or, more strongly, to coerce states and other
parties involved in civil conflict to cease their violations of the
individuaI and group rights of those living under their authority?
Rosalyn Higgins noted in the mid-1980s that 'Human rights have
shifted from being a matter traditionally of solely domestic concern
into a matter of legitimate international concern1? ~icholas
Wheeler went further in a work published in 2000: 'Humanitarian
claims were not accepted as a legitimate basis for the use of force
.
in the 1g70s but ..a new norm of UN-authorised intervention
developed in the ~ggos'.~ Kofi h a n concurred, identifying a
'developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect
civilian^'.^ Secondly, in a number of cases in the 1990s (e.g., Haiti
in 1994 and Sierra Leone in xgg7), interventions were ostensibly
undertaken to restore democratic regimes that had fallen victim to
military coups. It may be becoming legitimate for international
actors to use force to promote particular forms of internal state
arrangements.
Hedley Bull once noted the general presumption in inter-
national relations that intervention was wrong, in that it violated
the normal jurisdiction of states.' The moral basis of the principle
of non-intervention was summarised by Adam Roberts:

It provides clear guidelines for limiting the uses of armed

force and reducing the risk of war between armies of di&-
ent states. If inwlves respect for dzrmenf societies with
va"/z'ng religions, cultures, economic systems and political
arrangements. It acts as a brake on the crusading, territmbl
and imperial ambitions of state^.^

Bull and Roberts also recognised that most reasonable people

would accept that in particular instances there might be compelling
reasons to override this general presumption on normative or other
grounds. The emergence of solidarist norms legitimating interven-
tion would considerably broaden the category of exceptions and
would correspondingly weaken the principle of non-intervention.
In the extreme, it might be suggested that these solidarist concerns
are displacing more political and self-interested considerations
as motivations for interferefice in the domestic affairs of other
states. The latter remain largely proscribed by the principle of
non-intervention; the former may be gaining legal status and
general acceptance in international society.
 Intervention in Contemporary World Politics 9

That this enhancement of the normative nature of interven-

tion is considered a very important aspect of its evolution in the
international system is evident in the burgeoning literature on the
ethics and law of intervention. However, the normative dimension
is only part of the broader question of the role of interventicm as a
political/military instrument that states use to pursue their per-
ceived interests. Here one might ask whether the changing struc-
tural (and normative) conditions of the post-Cold War era altered
states' predisposition to engage in intervention and the ways in
M
which they did so. Finally, the discussion of intervention has been
8 overwhelmingly focused on state practice and on the norms per-
taining to states. Yet a number of other groups have emerged that
engage in interventionist behaviour. Moreover, the activities of
$
transnational groups, interventionist or not, may create new incen-
hl
m tives for intervention. How has the emergence or growing
fm
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significance of non-state (transnational or multilateral) actors in the
post-Cold War era affected the practice of intervention and its
m
significance in international politics? To put the matter more sim-
.3
ply, has the development of the international system brought new
or different answers to these questions:
cu
0
0
.* 1. who intervenes?
m
2. where do they intervene?
.' 3. how do they intervene?
5
Y

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4. why do they intervene?
There are several possible approaches to a general discussion
of intervention, including the legal, ethical, and political. As was
noted above, the post-Cold War discussion of intervention has
been dominated by the first two of these perspectives,' with
particular reference to the concepts of sovereignty and hurnani-
tarian intervention. In legal analysis, what matters is the definition
and elaboration of norms that are deemed to have the status of law
and compliance with or in violation of these norms. As regards
intervention, the key issue is whether and to what extent elements
of intenational law might permit violation of the codified and
customary rights of sovereign states. Discussion of the ethics of
intervention focuses on the extent to which moral principles (e.g.,
the protection of human dignity) may serve as a legitimate basis
 10 S. Neil MacFarlane

for interference in the domestic affairs of states. In political analysis,

what matters is the self-interested effort to influence the internal
affairs of a state, either on behalf of a government and with the
consent of recognised authorities or in opposition to a government
and without consent; and the extent to which and ways in which
states are motivated or constrainedby normative frameworks in their
definition of interest and policy choices regarding such intrusions.
One fundamental problem with the literature on intervention
is that there are few efforts to merge legal and ethical with political
CI
CI
perspectives. The different approaches proceed along parallel
0
m tracks with little cross-fertilisation. This paper recognises the im-
8
P portance of legal and ethical approaches to intervention. However,
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it seeks to situate these perspectives within a political logic, view-
E
Z ing intervention as a coercive application of power directed at
3
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modification of political processes or authority structures within
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other states. The motivations underlying intervention may be self-

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4-
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interested or they may reflect the pursuit of particular or general
normative principles. Intervention proceeds in a legal and norma-
3 tive context that may (or may not) influence the conduct and
B frequency of intervention, But at its root, intervention is a political
2o act and is considered as such here.
5
.r(
V1 In pursuing these questions, the starting point is the
8i=-
.+
r:
definition of the principal terms of analysis. This is followed by a
2 summary of the place of intervention in international history. The
h
P paper then turns to an examination of the normative context and
-8 the practical role of intervention in the international relations of
70 the Cold War era. The third section analyses the evolution of the
1 theory and pra&ce of intervention after the Cold War. The paper
a" concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for
assessing of the place of intervention in world politics.
The paper argues that the displacement of raison #&at by
international norms is more apparent than real. Intervention in the
1990s and at the beginning of the new century continues to be
motivated substantially by considerations of state and alliance
interest. Where such interest is not perceived to be present, inter-
vention tends not to occur, whatever the prevailing humanitarian
situation. In this ,sexbe, intervention remains a fundamentally pol-
itical form of behaviour.
 Intervention in Confemporay World Politics 11

Nonetheless, the political use of intervention appears to be

constrained by two important factors that have emerged in the
post-Cold War period. In the first place, although unilateral
intervention against an established sovereign government was
normatively (and legally) proscribed under the principle of non-
intervention for much of the twentieth century, this had little
effect on the practice of states during the Cold War. Competitive,
unilateral, self-interestedintervention was common practice for the

-
-
two superpowers and for many other actors in world politics.
In contrast, in the post-Cold War period, such intervention is
8 more rare (though hardly absent). Intervention increasingly occurs
in a multilateral context, on the basis of authorisation by inter-
@ national organisations, above all the United Nations. The need to
build support within such organisations in turn requires a greater
(U
m degree of sensitivity to, and accommodation of, the perspectives
m
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m
of other states. This l i i t s state flexibility to a degree. Of course,
the Kosovo case suggests that the necessity of a mandate from the
id
.;; United Nations is not absolute. However, in this instance too, the
United States situated its project within a multilateral context
(NATO) and accepted a degree of consequent constraint on its
b,
0 behaviour in order to create and sustain consensus on its preferred
X
course of action.
This leads to the second point. For intervention to be
'2
2 legitimately mandated, it must be justified in terms of normative
3 principles that are generally accepted in international society.
Although such justification may to some extent be spurious and
% mask power-political or other self-centred motivations, the need to
k justify again narrows the behavioural parameters of states? To be
6 seen to be acting in a manner inconsistent with the stated
justification canies potential political costs. Hence, the principal
motivation of French intervention in Rwanda in mid-19% may
have been political. At the international level, this amounted to
the salvaging of a longstanding ally in the hope that France
would continue to play a role in the politics of Central Africa.
Domestically, the intervention was an attractive means for the
Socialists to take the moral high ground in their impending elec-
toral contest with the right. Nonetheless, the action took on a
limited but effective humanitarian role and saved many people
12 S. Neil MacFarlane

who otherwisk,might have perished. Elsewhere, had the United

States sought to capitalise on the successful military campaign
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by pushing for Kosovar
independence, it would have fractured its alliance while causing
still greater difficulties in its relationship with Russia, China and
the countries of the non-aligned movement. In this respect,
perhaps the most significant aspect of the evolution of intervention
in the 1990s has been not the emergence of new rationales for
action, but the deepening of societal constraints on the practice of
intervention.
However, as is discussed in an afterword to this paper, the
American-led iritervention in Afghanistan raises questions about
this conclusion. Although the United States secured a multilateral
mandate for its intervention in Afghanistan, its conduct of the
campaign was largely unilateral. Its contemplation of follow-on
action against Iraq betrayed little concern over multilateral frame-
works for action. Its questioning of the applicability of the Geneva
Convention to Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees raised doubts about
the strength of normative constraints on the one remaining super-
power when it perceives vital interests to be at stake.
 Chapter 1

6
4

e8 The Terms of the Debate

Discussion of the place of intervention in international politics
presumes an understanding of what intervention is.' Different
disaplines have differing views on this point. From a political
perspective, intervention is an engagement in the domestic affairs
of a state intended to change (or to preserve) the structure of
power and authority within it. In attempting to influence the
internal politics of another state, intervenors may use political,
economic or military instruments. In general, however, discussion
of intervention focuses on military action. In legal discourse on
intervention, the focus is on military action that is not requested
and is not apgroved by the authorities of a state? Hence, for
example, the 1964 French deployment to Gabon 'to put down an
uprising led by the leader of the opposition party3 would not, in
a legal sense, be an intervention.
This may be appropriate in the consideration of the permissi-
bility or non-permissibility in law of a particular intrusion. From
a political perspective, however, the focus is the influence on
domestic political balances and outcomes. Military engagement
may or may not be consensual, but the concept of intervention
generally implies a coercive act. When a government invites
or consents to intervention, it is with the intention that military
means from outside be used to coerce their domestic adversaries.
When an opposition movement acts likewise, it is with similar
intent and, generally, consequences. This understanding of the
term reflects common usage outside legal circles. In the paper cited
14 S. Neil MacFarlane

earlier, for example, although France acted at the request of the

recognised government of Gabon, Chipman refers to the French
action as an intervention. The French called the unit they devel-
oped for such support of incumbent govements the Force
d'intervention a m ~ e ?
The problems with such a definition are obvious. At what
moment does military assistance to a govemment become interven-
tion? The provision of arms and training in how to use them may
be as, or more effective than, the dispatch of combat units. Econ-
4
H
omic and financial pressure can be as effective in modifying the
Fi domestic policies of a government, or in causing that government
3
P to fall, as military action. Propaganda can also have an important
E
effect on the intemal political process of a target country. The
g
Z failure to act can have consequences for the domestic political
N
cv balance of a target country that are as significant as those of an a d
5
Q\
of intervention. It is for reasons such as these that Stanley Hoff-

-2
0
*
a
0
mann once observed that:

o The subject lintementionl is practically the same as that of

B
o international politics in general from the beginning of time
cu
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...
to the present Anything can constitute an intmention,
.*
Vi indeed even non-acts can constitute intmenti~n.~
.a!?
-
5
h
Recognising these problems, this analysis focuses on the direct and
coercive application of military force in internal conflicts to affect
P
-8 their course and outcome, since this appears to be the undisputed
-3
core of the issue of intervention. The element of coercion in the
i
8
definition is necessary to differentiate intervention from the pleth-
ora of other actions taken by states or multilateral organisations to
influence the intemal affairs of other statesO6The stress on military
interference distinguishes intervention from other forms of coerc-
ive pressure on states (e.g., sanctions and conditionality).
If one sees intervention to be a coercive application of force
intended to affect domestic political processes and outcomes, then
it is not immediately clear whether intervention for explicitly
normative purposes falls within the category. On the face of it,
humanitarian intervention is intended to protect civilians rather
than to affect domestic political balances. However, the application
 lntmention in Contemporay World Politics 15

of coercion is frequently designed to alter the behaviour of politico-

military actors through compulsion or deterrence; it can have the
effect of constrainingor enabling particular parties to civil confiicts;
and, in extreme circumstances, it may reflect the judgement that
political change is necessary to achieve humanitarian ends. More-
over, as we shall see below, 'governmental involvement in humani-
tarian action owed much to political considerations that were often
tinged with an element of realpolitik'? For all of these reasons,
humanitarian intervention is considered to be consistent with the
definitional focus of this paper.
There are also clear difficulties in defining the boundary
between intervention (coercive military interference in the internal
affairs of another state) and war (military conflict between states).
Classification of an action as intervention or war depends in
considerable measure on the perspective from which it is being
viewed. As one analyst put it: 'Regarded from the point of view of
the state intruded upon, it [intervention] must always remain an
a d which, if not consented to, is an act of war." An act's status as
intervention may also depend on how one perceives the threat to
which it is a response. In the case of South Vietnam, for example,
to the extent that the challenge to the political status quo in
Vietnam was an insurrection on the part of the Vietcong, US
action qualifies as intervention; if one views it to have been North
Vietnamese aggression, then it was war. And action in
South Vietnam spilled over in 1964-65 into air war against the
North Vietnamese states.
NATO action in Kosovo is frequently considered to be inter-
vention, and, in the sense that it was a response to Serb treatment
of 'the Albanian minority in that region of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia through assistance to that minority, it was. None the
less, it involved a direct attack on another state from outside,
which looks very much like war. This would suggest that, in
practice, there is no clear line between the two.
Discussion of the concept of iniervention is tightly l i e d to
the question of sovereignty. The traditional understanding of
sovereignty is that states have jurisdiction (some would say
absolute jurisdiction) over their territory and that, because states
are legally equal members of an international society that lacks
 16 S.Neil MacFarlane

a supreme authority, this jurisdiction is recognised by other

states. This understanding is the basis for the principle of non-
intervention.
However, one should recognise that this principle is diluted
in some aspects of the legal and ethical discussion of intervention
Consideration of the issue dates back at least to the work of
Grotius in the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century, as
will be seen below, there was much amongst statesmen
of the desirability of intervention for humanitarian purposes. The
-
3

0
question arose in the context of the Greek war of independence
w (1821-1830), where decisive Anglo-French and Russian interven-
e
5 tion was justified in part by the cruelty of the Ottomans towards
8+ their Greek subjects. It appeared again in the 1870s with reference
i2 to Ottoman treatment of subject populations in the Balkans? These
C.l
~ \ 1 cases are arguably early manifestations of a solidarist critique of
?Ch! international pluralism in which it is asserted that there are certain
0
c
.'
m universal values, the defence and promotion of which is more
n
o important than the defence of sovereignty as a constitutive prin-
3
0 ciple of international society.'' For those holding this view, it
.,+
0
U follows that in cases where these values are violated in a systematic
(k
0
fashion, other states have a right to intervene to stop the actions in
ir
.r(
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L4 question. This would imply that sovereignty is limited and con-
a2
.-> ditional, rather than absolute. Consideration of conditions placed
-5
P
h
upon sovereignty in the 1990s produced the notion of 'sovereignty
as responsibility'?' From this perspective, the extent of a state's
z sovereignty depends on the manner in which that state conducts its
2
relations with its citizens.
i
8
The final point to mention concerns the actors (who inter-
venes?). The initiator of an act of intervention has traditionally
been the state,12although the recipient of assistance may be either
an incumbent government or its non-state adversaries. In the
twentieth century, however, the cast has broadened. The activities
of Cornintern in Germany and China in the 1920s and Spain in the
1930s raised the possibility that4transnationalpolitical movements
might also engage in intervention, although the close ties between
Comintern and the Soviet communist party and state raised legit-
imate doubts about the degree to which the organisation was
anything more than a non-traditional extension of state policy.
 Intentention in Contemporary World Politics I 7

The post-Cold War era has provided possibly clearer exam-

ples of the interventionist role of non-state and transnational actors
in world politics. One variant is private military companies, which
have intervened in a number of civil conflicts, supporting govern-
ments in return for profit.13Another is al-Qaeda, which, during the
~ggos,played a significant financial and military role in supporting
the TaIiban effort to consolidate control over Afghanistan. In
return, al-Qaeda received sanctuary in a sympathetic environment.
In turn, the activities of these transnational movements have
e
at times provoked varying degrees of intervention on the part of
states threatened by their activities. In the last stages of the Cold
War, Manuel Noriega's connections to international drug cartels
* provided one reason for American intervention in Panama to
overthrow him. Colombia's role as a venue for narcotics trafficking,
2 and the links between traffickers and opposition guerrilla move-
ments, provided the Clinton administration with a strong motiv-
0\
ation to grant substantial military assistance to the Colombian
d
-- government in its civil war. And the al-Qaeda attack on New York
8i and Washington in September zoo1 provoked American interven-
.,.
6
+
' I
tion in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban. The emergence of
o non-state actors as significant elements in the practice of interven-
$ tion and of transnational groups and processes as factors motivat-
.-! ing the interventionist behaviour of states raises questions about
-3 the utility of a purely state-centric focus in the study of interven-
tion and about the adequacy of statist legal/normative frameworks
% related to inter~ention.'~
2o The second category of non-state actor taking an increasingly
significant role is that of international institutions. The role of such
8 organisations was minimal prior to the twentieth century. Their
capacity to exercise effective security roles during the Cold War
was greatly constrained by the bipolar division in world politics
and - more fundamentally - by the reluctance of states to cede
responsibility and power to them. In the period prior to the end of
the Cold War, there were very few-instances of intervention by
such organisations. Nor did these bodies have much practical
si@cance in the provision of mandates. The post-Cold War era
witnessed substantial change in both regards. The United Nations
and multilateral regional organisations (e.g., the Commonwealth of
18 S. Neil MacFarlane

Independent States (CIS), the Economic Community of West

AErican States (ECOWAS), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organis-
ation (NATO))became heavily involved both in mandating and in
implementing interventions.
Chapter 2

Intervention in Pre-Cold War

International Historv
In the chapters that follow, this paper examines the evolving
normative framework of intervention and juxtaposes that frame-
work with the politics and practice of intrusion into the internal
affairs of other states. The current wisdom is that international
society is moving from a reasonably unequivocal embrace of the
principle of non-intervention to a situation where this principle
(and the attendant understanding of sovereignty) can be attenu-
ated in the face of violations of other norms (e.g., human rights) by
states. From a historical perspective, the reality is much more
complex. Periods of normative consensus regarding intervention
have been interspersed with periods of intense disagreement.
There has been considerable variation concerning the strength of
the principle of non-intervention, ranging from its near absence in
classical Greece and pre-Westphalian Europe through its emphatic
embrace during much of the post-Second World War era of de-
colonisation. In periods where the principle of non-intervention
was contested, one sees a marked variety in normative
jtktifications for overriding it. One recurring historical variant is
the conservative argument that political change within a state
might threaten legitimate political order in bthers (during the
period of the Holy Alliance in the nineteenth century or during the
Cold War). Another is the liberal argument that democracy within
states is conducive to order among them (as was argued by
Woodrow Wilson and later democratic peace theorists). A second
liberal qualification of the principle of non-intervention is that
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a q 'aldoad ~ e q p ~ ki qd p a s s m s p ale slatleu a s a q u a q '~J e q
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5
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- &p e JO s~re3je a q q aJapawq 03 1q2u a q pey ywo3 -
s
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aAgeuuou aplg peq uogualualq 30 uo!ssnr>qp s , s a p ! p h n u
' w e d s 03 Ury 0 3
t p u p o 3 pasnm $zafap ~ ~ u 1 . raq? o 3pue ' s u a q v q ~ a i uml p ul
wwo3 p m e a b i o 3 uaaM3aq q x ~ u 0 3e st?panugum s n m e p
-!d3 aprsq a$3Sn;rts e se m 8 a q ~ e i ~qs a ~p u rSPM U o g u a N q q
a n g g a d w o ~30 3 p e d p h o t e p x a ~ e p u a ~ oa-d .pa$eiado d a q
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S ~ Ma@n.qs l m a j q a q 30 a w o y n o aq? pq uogdaaiad i r a q
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ayl paqaagaz u o g u a ~ a ~ q - u o30ualdlaupd a q 30 & p n b pappaqura
X p @ a a~ u Ssaldpupd aA!qemou % p ~ e q u oaJaM a s.ra~od3ea.B
a w 1319 snoyqo ?ou W M 2~ 'smoq@.fau qayl jo sqejje puuaqq
ayl o l y suo.fsnyy nay3 q . u o y u a ~ a l q03 aauqs;rsaJ aAgeuuou
30 aauappa apqg S\?M amyl J ~ MsmaA ayl 8 q m p pue
03 loud l a ~ o q passrusp
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pue uapaMS ' y ~ u n ~ a' sap u e l ~ a q aatp) ~ s r a ~ o dIewalxa JO apxp
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% m q s q e ayl)
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' e ~ @ y & s 30 a ~aaead ayl q gueqsaqo~du e m a 3 ayl y l ! ~pawas \O
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tQ
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(D

a q ) p%npod pue quopqea q qIoAaJ 'suo~ssassodpfuo103 s,qeds

S
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0,
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.aaue.rd oqtq JVMayt 30 Squappi e

pue aauerd dq u o y u a m ~ pq a q p a y o ~ o ~urn d q s;nll, .so€9r aq?
q u p d s q qq8no~qe y s n y 01 aSua11ap flquap+w a u .aauass Lq
lil@pu~ugpaqroddns ' s a p a ~ ayl s uayl pue sauea a q 'y3qna a q
d q uogua~.1a1q-ra~unoa ~q8norq 3r9r q s a a ~ y dJueqsaqosj
s,epayoa Xq qIoAar a ssa~ddns04 vojja S m q s q w e q ! m ~8 a q
z e smaA ~ a u .dumxua3 uo a q syp S q m j 'pamns
-3J UOOS a@f3lXQs a q 'laAaM0H ' h . J ~ a WUWJUaAaS3 t3yt 30 %v
-+aq a q qe apnpaqq ja!rq e v.$Inorq uogsneqxa % n q s q e ~
 Intentention in Contemporary World Politics 23

interpenetrated conception of sovereignty characteristic of the

period prior to the consolidation of absolutist monarchies and
nation states. One might go further to suggest that intervention -
far from being proscribed - was normatively justified on religious
grounds. There appeared to be little questioning of the proposition
that it was legitimate for states to M e r e in the affairs of other
states in order to promote their particular view of Christian univer-
salism.

- The outcome of the war was the termination of the Habsburg

bid for hegemony in Europe and the crystallisation of a pluralist
system in Europe. This formed the core of an international
h
g system that expanded eventually to a global level. The damage and
$ the cost associated with the Thirty Years War were such that
2 the major players in the international system concurred that issues
and processes within countries were off limits. International
rn
relations became what went on between states rather than within
a
them? This was expressed normatively in the principle of cuius
-
+
0
Q

0
rex, eius religio, to the effect that each ruler could decide his
state's own religion. Importantly, in terms of the discussion of
the place of individual rights in the evolving politics of interven-
tion, this right of choice was not extended to the subjects of
2 particular rulers. Although the possibility that the principle of
.- non-intervention could be relaxed on humanitarian grounds was
Y
discussed among international lawyers: this view did not obvi-
P
ously affect state practice during the century that followed the
3 Thirty Years War.
3
V

The French Revolution and the Concert of Europe

o" It took the French Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath to
bring into question once again the normative dimension of inter-
vention.'These events highlighted how change within a major state
could be destabilising to the system as a whole. The French
revolutionaries, at least initially, saw their security to be tied to the
internal transformation of their neighbours. In 1792, the Conven-
tion declared its commitment to providing 'fraternity and assist-
ance to all peoples who shall wish to recover their independence'.
It then asked the Executive to give orders to its generals 'to furnish
assistance to these peoples'. France's adversaries naturally saw
-1oAaz $0 guauxaAappa a q 30 IEssahaJ a q oj p a j a q a p ' a ~ m ~
LIOH a $03 ~asodozda pampozd salajs OM) a q 2awaSoL -aIoyM a SE
ura~sXsatp q h q ~ q a 0% ~ sa ~ ~ n p u oa:q, 01 pa~1a3iadazaM j q sazw ~
-3111)s 1eusaja.q jo u o g e ~ a s a r da q jnq 'saJqsJO zno!Aqaq p o g e u
-3ap.q a q 30 uogap2a.x atg Xpo IOU SEM adorn3 30 pa31103 a q
30 asodmd a v ' M a p q q q -.rap20 p o g m a J q JO )uaura~amura*
jo JuauJaIa a ~ e q ! S ap ~w h s s a s u a S ~ MUognloAaI paaqg pun
u 1 ~ 3 g q n d a . )sqeSe
x s a w z e u o w a ~ g e ~ a s u 0~ 3a ~ o 0z )duoytua~
-zajq a e q d ~ % u o qpan%z~
s ( a r s s n ~p w e!s)snv) s x a ~ o dva3uoa
ro(aur OML ' s a ~ a 30~ s sq1~f@leuxalq a q q uogmma)u! pya;>zorf
y s n o n q raplo q e ~ s n s0 ) s z a ~ o dJ e a B ahry?uasuo2 30 )wd a q
u o aqsap a q pun &&!azanos 30 Sqpmassapun pattqmsm sq ~ F M i;
O,

qdpq.xd j q m ~ da q y q q e w - a s 03 vojp a q uaanyaq u o ~ m a ~

alqazapTsuo3 ~ X Ma z a q 5rsr q u~31sXsw a d o m 3 a w 30 u1q~um1d
P
e
Y
a q 0) a~ua1leq3s , u o a ~ o d a30~ S q p u a a w saJ@ 'X12qq~d.m~ JON
s2.
CI

Q
;s.wmod
Supnoqq2pu aqljo &Jvs gay? S u ~ d u v p w#dLr u! a9uv.q
3
%
Jo l q l sv y ~ n s1gwws~puvr8$vtvaB puv wppns Jo sasv~ (3

uj jua?adw3 pauwap aq hluo u v ~?y+r a u sanlasuwy? E

ojun ajus s8u!y?Jo rapro uv /b uo!?v.iolsar aqj la~ua.w@~u! 5
U

R
afgsoy fiq ' t d q v oj jy&r v a n q /$y? 'srnoqy8lau llv 0
\O
oj aaL8ap y8!y v u! snoraguvp 'ajv?S v Jo arnpnys ~vtuatu! VI
m
aq) u! azqd say214 la8uvp ?vaBpun uappns v ranauayM &I
N

3C
: , ~ a % w pa ) a p u m q
fi!
ut. o q a pue ' ~ s a p u rpue qeasS e, jo a x 3 a q h s s a 3 a u aq $
3yFdpn u o y u r a ~ a l~vqq adas3v 03 a m a y l u o y n ~ o q~3am~z s a q jo w
E:
a3aj ay) u~.,a3uapuadapq alqelopq, 30 uuou a papuajap X ~ ~ e g p q L

O ~ M ' w q S n o s g p z g 30 q s o ayl ~ q X~mal:, uoguamavq qnoqa

81
- uo UoytnIoAax v u a ~ gay* p 93afja a q = a w
i , s ~ a ~ oah)l?MaSU03
d pa!fSl#?S30
pasoduro~una)sXs e wyl u o g u a m q q OJ ~ u a w a 2 e z n o ~ ura~ea.8 a e
aq aqMayn ~ @ onbys w s s a q aSuapyr, swawaaow Jspojs!Aaz
T ~ M tq IurajsLs puopeusaaq h a u o g n l o n a ~a, lay) uogehlrasqo
s , ~ u a 3 q30~3gawojdwris sr W M 3 p I 0 a l 0 d ~a~ q pue uoyn1oAax
puasd a q 30 pouad atg ' ~ ~ a d s aqq? z u~ -amezd 30 (uopazo~saz)
u o g m a r o j s u e ~p m a n q aqi 01 pa9 d ~ ~ q aq s ! ~0 ) &"was q a q
IOU Apuanbasuo:, aTaM A a u .&apos ~ m x o y e u r ~30q aaqmaur
pnba parap!suo:, lou araM pad pow ayi 303 sapls ueadornz-UON
.saqals jo Xlapos wadom3 a q apisjno uoguau3t.q 30 h e q @ a ~
aw su~a:,uo31s.q a u 'passaqs aq ppoys popad q uog
-uamalq 30 uo!ssrwslp aAgmurou a q jo quamala .xay)oOML
.(raylo a q uo uoiBejuos h u o g n ~ o ~ (dqejuo3
ar
p w p u q auo ay) w a:,uajapjlas)sa~!)~a[qo le:,ggod jo jmsmd a q
q +uaumyse avmq@al pue Trqasn a se uoguaNapq 30 srqqs a q
paada:,ae alsqap slyl q sapls woq 'JanaMoH ;s:,gyod ueadozn~
q mqeuasuo:, p m urspraqn uaawaq uo!sua~sapeorq a jo
luaurap auo s e suogelaz
~ leuogeuralq t.q uoguamajq jo a:,qd
ayq JaAo ~uamaaBesla,fi3npuo:, Iauogmuaqq JO a p e p q a r
3
rEo
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0) parap~suo:,aq IOU ppo:, p w ~euogda:,xaaraM datp 'paajsu~
IE
-jySu paqsraua8, e uo paseq lou axaM ' r a ~ a ~ 'spe o y qns Yu
Zia:,uafap-nas Ityasn punoj Aneuo!se3m 7
peq 4~*norg S ~ M O ~'pue O ~ '3s ud uoguauajq asoddo lou 2.
pip q e p a palou +eaTanse3 u o g u a m l q JOJ apuogw a:,uegn;r
4 0 ayi~ 30 Supogsanb e s e qr~s ~ ?uoguauatq-uou 30 aldp-d 3
'-b
aw jo a:,uapp e V n t u os qou W M q q ' r a ~ a .,q:,ll?uom ~ o ~ 0
i$
~ua3yauaqssal, 30 spueq a q q , d m & p a n p m , lo3 a d p r e
auroaaq q@pu asne:,aq oste jnq 'MBI ysgBq 04 hequo3 Mati" s g -I
q SEM s q asnmaq
~ d p o qou 'a3ua1aplq 1eraua8 30 uuou e jsqe8e 5
dpya31oj p a d m @earaI~se3 .uognIoAar 4supSe uoguaualq
m
jo wou paqe~aua8e 30 gap? a q jnoqe :,gse!snqluaun dp:,ugq
SI?M (quamgred pw) ~uaunua~o8 y q u g a y ) ' ~ s q u o 3tq 3
's~q2pm y ~ e s r a ~ p i$
se uaas aq 0%auo:, a ~ e q4eqM 30 ppap a y ) plre lonb m q s a*
$
oq s a 8 u a p ~xqndod 30 uo!ssarddns a q ysnonp lapzo a~asardoq w
paau ayi JO swaq q paggsnj S ~ M uoguamalq 'ICnyua3 q a p i w q 2
+

ale1 a q q uoguamaluy 30 u o ~ s m w payi t.q aIoi lue:,y@is a V n s

de~d0%auxo:, a A t q l e g saldpq.~d ~spspyosatp 30 uogeSau ayq
s e uoguamajq
~ jo uogwypsn[ s,a:,w!Ilv d l o ayi ~ ' a d s a ~s ~ q )
q -sqxeuou~a~geuasu03JO suog~sodaqj S q m ~ o r dlo asodmd
ayi pauas uogsanb q wou a w qeq auapya SBM a! @noq~a'sajeqs
raylo 30 sr!ejp :,!lsau~opa q uy uoguamluf 303 s!sr?q aAgaux.xou
e seM azag 'qsea1 qe a a ~ o dleaB a q jo amos XOJ 'poys UI
or'sleA"aq
-dn keuognlo~arm w n j 30 uogua~asda q pue 'adorn3 u f uogn
26 S. Neil MacFarlane

protected by Westphalian norms of non-intervention. As Gerrit

Gong put it:

In the minds of international lawyers, 'civilisation' became a

scale by which the countries of the world were categorized
into 'civilised', barbarous, and savage spheres. The legal
rights and duties of states in each sphere were based on the
legal capacity their degree of 'civilisation' supposedly enti-
tled them to possess ... CiDilised states alone were qualified
to be recognized with full international legal status and
personality, full membership in the Family of Nations, and
fill protection in international law."

In general, the European powers took the view that intervention

outside Europe to protect their citizens or property was their right.
Intervention and, for that matter, the broader project of European
colonialism were justified in a more profound sense by ideas of
European superiority and of Europe's mission civili~atrice?~
The second concerns humanitarian intervention, an issue that
arose first and foremost in the Concert's consideration of the
growing instabiity in the European possessions of the Ottoman
Empire. The case displays eloquently the tension between pluralist
and solidarist norms, between conservative (order-based) and lib-
eral (justice-based) principles of intervention, and the interweaving
of politics with principle that is so characteristic of the modem
practice of humanitarian intervention. The core issue was the
gradual Ottoman loss of control over their possessions in the
Balkans, starting in a revolt in the Danubian Principalities in 1821,
extending to Greece in the same year, and then on to Bosnia and
Bulgaria later in the centmy. The region was an area in which
Austrian and Russian interests intersected, giving both powers
strong (and potentially conflicting) concerns over the outcome of
the process. Matters were further complicated by Ottoman violence
against the Christian population of the region, many of whom
shared Russia's Orthodox confession.
Those rebelling against the Ottomans appealed to the tsar on
religious grounds to rescue them from the Turks. Alexander I
was strongly tempted to intervene in 1821. Austria, in contrast,
 Intervention in Contemporary World Politics 27

strongly opposed intervention, having declared the preservation of

the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans to be a matter of strategic
interest. Prince Metternich ultimately dissuaded Alexander from
intervention, arguing that the Balkan events were a distraction
from the major threat in Europe - ascendant liberali~m?~ Metter-
nich was joined in the effort to restrain Russia by Castlereagh. For
Britain, Russian territorial expansion towards the Mediterranean
and the Levant was anathema. Castlereagh's admonition to the
tsar concerning non-intervention is symptomatic of the nineteenth-
century statesman's view of order versus justice in international
relations:

Castlereagh did not deny that the atrocities committed by

the Turks 'made humanity shudder'. But, like Mefternich,
he insisted that humanitarian considerations were subordi-
nate to maintaining the 'consecrated structure' of Europe,
which would be jarred to the core by any radical inno-
vation."

The Greek War dragged on, however, and in 1827 Britain, France,
and Russia coerced the Ottoman Empire into accepting Greek
independence. As Wheeler points out, the humanitarian logic was
-
central to the justification of this line of policy?' What is important
here, however, is that the political constraints on what was osten-
sibly a humanitarian intervention had shifted dramatically in a
permissive dire~tion?~ The ensuing years had seen an increase in
the links between British and French liberals and the Greek rebels
and the growth of a considerable sympathy in Europe for the
plight of the Greeks, as typified by Lord Byron's fatal journey to
Greece. The emergence of a substantial domestic political constitu-
ency supporting Greek independence in both France and Britain
altered the calculations of leaders in both countries. Links between
British and French syrnpathisers and the Greek independence
movement also reduced the likelihood that an independent Greece
would be dependent on Russia, hence reducing the British strategic
interest in sustaining Ottoman power there. To put it another way,
this had become a liberal project of self-determination, rather than
an Orthodox project of defending the faithful.
28 S. Neil MacFarlane

There were also clear power-political calculations behind this

shift in policy.. Britain's foreign policy establishment, now under
Canning, had concluded that Russian aspirations in Greece could
be more effectively controlled through cooperation than through
confrontation. In addition, British opposition to the Holy Alliance
had stiffened under Canning. Given continuing Austrian oppo-
sition to intervention in the Ottoman Empire, cooperation with the
Russians was seen as a means of weakening the Alliance by
driving a wedge between its two principal adherents. Finally,
commercial considerations also intruded; the failure of the Turks to
protect British commerce was another factor motivating the British
shift of position. Though one would not wish to deny the
significance of the humanitarian dimension of i n t e ~ e n t i o n the
,~~
ations of outside powers in the Greek War of Independence
illustrate the strong element of politicostrategic interest in deci-
sions by states to defend the rights of other oppressed populations,
a theme that recurs in the late twentieth century in the consider-
ation of humanitarian intervention The Greeks deployed humani-
tarian arguments (and confessional ones) to secure external
support in their bid for independence. The Russians were tempted
to respond for reasons of prestige and l o n g s t d i g strategic
interest in the Balkans. The attitude of the other major players was
driven to a considerable degree by their concern over the balance
of power in Europe.
More generally, the practice of the Concert period within
Europe reflected the weakness of the principle of non-intervention
and the influence of the conservative norms mentioned above.
Intervention played a key role in the strategies of the European
great powers in the first half of the nineteenth century in
areas where their interests were perceived to be at stake, and
where others were either unwilling or unable to oppose them.
Austria intervened forcibly to suppress revolutions in Naples
and the Piedmont in 1821, and in Modena and Parma in 1831,
thereby consolidating Vienna's pre-eminence in Italy.21Spain and
Portugal were the scene of repeated competing interventions in
the 1820s, as liberals and conservatives battled for power in
both countries. Twenty years later - in an instance where British
and French interests were not in play - Nicholas I dispatched
-nua)js tq 'dpuanbasqns ' p m q q o d uaajmod s , u o q ~~ o i p o o ~
q uoyaquxa~ap-ass 30 a~dp-d ay? 30 a3aaqma a m .mggod
Ieuogeaaaq y u o g u a u a l y 01 aswAa1ax jo s a 3 w ~aAgamou
4 ~ 3 r g p 3 : s30 Jaqurnu s qy3no;rq reM p l . 1 0 ~ a q 30 pua a%
poyad renruaau! aya u! uo!auahtaaul

n * 0 3 p m ~q u o w e ue3rxau.r~q x o ~ e % j qs~gour
s se u o g s g e w o m a p 30 w a w a p a w Jqnop 01 uosaai s! aiayl
luogax ayl q q u a u n u a ~ 0 839snomap-uou a a q o ~ J ? Mmalqoid
ou pey sa)a?S palycxn a q a3qs pa)ou aaqadg aaqsM se I z a ~ a M o ~
' m o ~ 8qq s g a m u r a p r! pay y 3 '03"ay\1 ~ ~q uo3uahla)t.q ay)
s s uogdaaxa
~ auo ay,L 'aloz aINg paAs~dsuoga~ap~suo3 aApauuou
ia9.Ie1 '(dpuapgja sa3.Inosaa 1 3 s ~ x a04 pus s r a ~ o dlsuo$aa-s~xa
30 )uamaSs3ua a q ~ u a ~ a r01d 'uo!llar a n a ) e F o p 04 aqsap
sn a q k q a ~ o pu w ) 8saia)q pa~?aszad30 siausm uo q a % epastwo3
u o g u a N a ) q jo aulysop s,esuaua'J 'sa?t?$s w a d o ~ n g30 pyl a y l l
- W ~ Sp a w n a q dq pasodwl sp=pue4s Aq pap!qa Aaq~q s x ~
04 aaBap ayr uo papuadap p a p q p q EM u0fia.1 ay) ul, sajajs
r a q o 30 Apt53!a;ra~osa q ' a ~ p d s r a m v m o y 8 ~ apatsa9
d 3 u a ~ u ue q
-8ns o3pcax s p a ~ ~hog)o d s , u o q ~p m ks11oa03 qanasoox a w
'aq.q3oa a o m o m a u ' m a w aaolsaa o) p a u a m l y X ~ ~ u a n b asa)r!js
g
paqun ay) ' p a 8 u a ~ a t paraM asayl a z a w 6 , s a q d r a ~ u a- us ado^
-ng JO u%?azoj 01 pasoddo ss - w q a a q q a o jo~ s l p u a q a q
pue 'uopnlo~aa30 EM a q I~apao30 an?+ a q , u o p a m j Ahqua3
ylaguaw ayl 30 s a p m p ow 4s.q ayr q uogaa ay) u f epuaSe
~ 3 a u a'03~ayq
~ q~ qsaJa?q a 3pnouom ~ u e s a m v aqouro~d
pue puajap 04 p w o B q u o a o 3 u g d q qqap 30 ~ u a d e d a aaansua 01
lawvuvd 30 a p J s a q a p a w 03 'uo@ai a q q suo~ssassod%upqsurax
sq moy q e d s 30 ~ A O U K U ay) am- 04 pauaua4q swm!aauxv
a q , G a g m a ~OJUOW ayl oi hen0103 s,qaAasooy aiopoaq,
q p a ~ ~ u l w l rIw~ W J ~ M ~ 1 w 3u a v a q ~ 3 1 q3 s~e a m a q q ~ 3
a q q sa$elS p a a m ayl jo ~uaura8e8wSuyuadaap a n jo a m
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S q ~ q ~ s s oay)
 Intervention in C o n t m p o r ~ World
~ y Politics 31

with the allied powers 'an undertaking not to interfere in their

internal affairs'.
The USSR quickly retreated from its global revolutionary
pretensions into an essentially statist foreign policy. Where the
Soviet Union did intervene in domestic disputes (as in Germany in
1923, China in 1923-27 and Spain in 1g36-~g3g),these intrusions
appeared to have far more to do with leadership interpretation of
the Soviet state's (or their own personal) interest than with revol-

-
.-(
utionary normative commitments. In the first instance, Soviet and
Cornintern support of the German left's challenge to Gustav Strese-
mann followed closely on the latter's decision to remove the
5 obstacles to a rapprochement with France and the UK, thereby
threatening the incipient Soviet-German alliance of have-nots. The
second involved an effort to create a Chinese nationalist counter to
N expanding Japanese and residual British influence along the
\O
~r! USSR's Asian frontier. And in the third, support for the Spanish
Q\
republicans was a means of diverting and tying down the growing
rd
threat from Germany, while providing Soviet agents with the
opportunity to extinguish a communist faction loyal to Stalin's
"
%o
nemesis, Leon Trotsky.
Recalling the questions posed in the introduction, the pre-
Cold War history of intervention was one in which political inter-
$s est dominated as a cause of intervention. intervention was seen as
.-
5 an instrument in the political struggle between states and groups
of states. In this respect, as a method of seeking relative gains at the
% expense of adversaries, it was a replacement for, and often a
2
q supplement to, war.
g At times, intervention had an important normative content.
6 In the Thirty Years War, in the period of the Holy Alliance and in
the inter-war period, intervention reflected normative or ideologi-
cal preference (Protestantism versus Catholicism, liberalism versus
conservatism, communism and socialism versus fascism). In these
cases, however, the ideological dirnaion was closely tied to the
power-political. The interweaving of motivations makes it difficult
to assess the causal weight of normative propositions. With the
exception of the intervention in the nineteenth century on behalf of
the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, there was little
evidence of any serious consideration of the liberal solidarist
32 S.Neil MacFarlane

norms that have been so prominent in discussion of intervention in

the post-Cold War period. And a closer examination of that exam-
ple reveals once again the dose connection between normative
arguments and'political interests and the insufficiency of humani-
tarian motives alone to produce coercive action
Finally, the variability in the influence of the principle of
non-intervention is clear. With the possible exception of the late
seventeenth and early and mid-eighteenth centuries, it was always
contested to varying degrees by the practice, and sometimes by the
normative arguments, of important players in the international
system. In this respect, the nonnative challenge to the principle of
.
non-intervention is nothing particularly new.
 Chapter 3

-7

0
C3

Intervention during the Cold War

5
2 Even *ough the international system was divided into two pro-
foundly hostile camps during the Cold War, the costs and risks of
P
5 total war, and the dubious rationality of great power war as an
(SI

-
+
0
(d

0
option of policy, discouraged direct military confrontation between
them. This effect was strengthened considerably by the presence of
nuclear weapons and the emerging concept of mutual assured
2
o
destruction. The limits on war as an instrument of policy enhanced
% the role of intervention as a means of altering or preserving the
. distribution of power in the system. Intervention was frequently
t:
used by both superpowers to sustain their spheres of influence
Y
(e.g., Hungary, the Dominican Republic, Czechoslovakia, and
P Grenada). Moreover, since the superpowers were in intense power-
political competition but were reluctant to risk total war, interven-
3
3
tion provided a potentially attractive means to pursue relative
$ gains, principally in the 'grey zones' of the Third World.'
8
The normative dimension
Turning hrst to the normative dimension of Cold War intervention,
it is curious that both solidarist conceptions of human rights and
the responsibilities of states and the international community,
on the one hand, and the pluralist conception of state sovereignty
and the associated principle of non-intervention, on the other, grew
in strength during the period. The Charter of the United Nations
evinces a strong concern for individual and collective human
rights, as well as some indication of UN and member-state obliga-
uo paseq si u o g q m S ~ ao q JEWsa,nl[apV I ~ M'(r)z a p w s p q
auo 'zaw\w ~ 1a 1 q OJ S u p w a x ' ~ p suoguauajq
q a03 adoas pSa1
a q q uo1~x.quo3 e dq papduroa~es e qqSp ~ m u m y 30 uorsuaux
-p puogewajy ayl q uoisutldxa s q ' ~ a n a ~ o'Ap3pxo.q q
iuogualllapq paseq-q@u JOJ s p q a~geulrouawos % w y
-oad dpgua~odpue suogepx Imroyewajq q aaeds jspepnos a q
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q a q 30 auauqvay ,sajeJs Stqxap~suoa103 uogepunoj 1eSal leg
-mjsqns e paqsgqqsa Alqen%ae I ~ M pl03 a q S u p p sjqSp mumy
%qu.~aauoa s~uaum.qsq1eSal 30 uognoAa a q 'pays UI . ~ m o 3 u
madomg a q p uogarpspnl hoqe2gqo a q pajdaaaa o y asoq
d p e p p w d lsauoj&ts 30 Su3taahos a q 30 uogeflozap juvpod&
~ 30
I5
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-
.c"
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3
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@
%
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&
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U

%
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h)

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8
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2
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q@p u m m y 30 stqe~sa q ajezoqula p m a s ~ oq ~n ?o plo3 ~~ ~
a q 3-p quauxahour map jnq ' ~ 0 1 es SEM arraq 'Aes OJ q qew
'sajqs 30 Jaqumu a~1qrha.xa q Aq u o g e a ~ lave ~ e ~axoj o ~ aqm 3
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p m @3ygOJ p m uo sU(39mAuo3 a q Aq sog6r a y ) PaMoI
-103 S ~ MU O ~ B J I a? m~ i~ q y 8 g mum^ 30 uogeqaaa paaa
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a q '8%r q 'sale1 sled a a .qqsy ~ asaq aqowo~d03 suog
 Intwvention in Contemporary World Politics 35

the principle of sovereign equality of states; Article 2 (4) which

declares that all members of the UN are obliged to 'refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State'; and Article 2 (7), which notes that
'nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the UN to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state ...'.
The last article, however, contained an important reservation:
that this principle did not prejudice the capacity of the Security
-- Council to a d under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression). The
k
g significance of this caveat was limited during the Cold War.
4
Although threats to the peace were not defined in the Charter, it
was none the less evident that the interpretation of the Charter
2 during the Cold War focused on threats or acts of inter-state
b
% aggression, and not on threats emanating from domestic processes
a
+ within states? Moreover, given bipolarity and members' power of
cd
-- veto, the council had little capacity to act coercively against threats
& to international peace and security. Its capacity to extend the
2
definition of threat in order to permit a response to crises within
rcl
o states or to the systematic violation of human rights by a recog-
.$i' nised government was still more limited?'
Other acts of the United Nations General Assembly and of
'E!
5
U
regional organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity
$ (OAU) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) also con-
% tributed to the apparent legal absolutisation of sovereignty and the
3 equally absolute proscription of intervention. The General As-
1 sembl?s Declaration on htervention (1965) began by asserting
that no state had a right to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the
internal or external affairs of another state. It continued by declar-
ing that armed intervention was equivalent to aggression. Five
years later, in the Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooper-
ation, the Assembly repeated this unequivocal position. The 8th
preambulary paragraph insists that intervention, in whatever form,
is a violation of the letter and the spirit of the Charter." These acts
of the General Assembly reflected the emergence of an ever-larger
grouping of post-colonial states seeking to protect their indepen-
dence. Since many were also weak, they sought normative protec-