Hollibaugh-2019 - How Effective Are Political Appointees

How Effective are Political Appointees?

Gary E. Hollibaugh Jr., Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of
Pittsburgh
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1395
Published online: 30 September 2019
Summary
Research in public administration and political science in the late 20th century and early 21st
century has identified several factors influencing the effectiveness of political appointees,
with a particular emphasis on the United States (given the outsized role of political appointees
in the American system relative to those of other industrialized democracies). Within the
American system, the advice and consent process means that acting and interim officials often
run agencies and departments while nominees await Senate confirmation; however, that these
individuals lack the perceived legitimacy that accompanies Senate confirmation means they
are (often) less effective at ensuring bureaucratic acquiescence to the preferences of the
president. Additionally, confirmed nominees can also run into trouble, as many are often
appointed by presidents to “rein in” the departments or agencies they are chosen to oversee;
this can result in deterioration in the relationship between themselves and careerists, which
ultimately reduces the effectiveness of appointees. Individual variations in the leadership style
of appointees in the United States can also affect their effectiveness and abilities to work with
careerists. And scholars should spend time and effort considering the theoretical foundations
of what it means to be “effective” and perhaps consider the development of new empirical
operationalizations thereof. Accordingly, there is merit in assessing pertinent experience in
other jurisdictions, including in Britain and South Korea to which brief reference is made in
the discussion.
Keywords: American politics, political appointees, bureaucracy, public administration and policy,
bureaucratic effectiveness, bureaucratic politics, executive politics, separation of powers
Subjects: Policy, Administration, and Bureaucracy, Political Institutions
At the outset of each new presidential administration in the United States, the Office of
Presidential Personnel attempts to accomplish the Herculean task of finding appointees to fill
the more than 2,000 administrative positions that require senatorial confirmation, as well as
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several thousand more that do not. Doing so involves balancing multiple political, policy,
electoral, demographic, and other interests, as well as considering how the appointees might
interact with the millions of career bureaucrats employed in the civil service, many of whom
they will oversee in their official capacities as executive branch appointees. The choices made
by the president, the Office of Presidential Personnel, and other stakeholders ultimately
influence the abilities of appointees to do the jobs for which they were selected.
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Before discussing the myriad factors influencing the effectiveness of political appointees in
the United States, it is useful to consider how they are selected; here, the focus is on the
United States, given the outsized role of political appointees in the American system relative
to those of other industrialized democracies, though comparisons are made to other countries
when appropriate. Within the United States, there are, broadly speaking, two main routes by
which appointees can begin their positions: they can be nominated by the president and
confirmed by the Senate, or they can be given more “unilateral” appointments that escape
confirmation. Within the former category, one often finds individuals named to the most
prominent and policy-relevant positions (e.g., cabinet members, members of independent
boards and commissions, ambassadors, judges, etc.). However, not all individuals serving in
positions that typically require Senate confirmation are themselves confirmed by the Senate.
For example, under the Recess Appointment Clause of the Constitution, the president can fill
appointed vacancies during congressional recesses, with the recess-appointed individuals
staying in their positions until the end of the next congressional session. However, it should be
noted that the Supreme Court decision in Noel Canning v. NLRB (National Labor Relations
Board; 2014) placed significant restrictions on what counted as a “recess” for the purpose of
the Recess Appointment Clause, and recess appointments have since dwindled in importance
(Ostrander, 2015). Additionally, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 provides the
president additional leeway when it comes to filling vacancies on an acting or interim basis.
Other positions, such as Schedule C positions, noncompetitive Senior Executive Service (SES)
positions, and various positions within the Executive Office of the President (including various
policy “czars” responsible for formulating a significant amount of presidential policy [Vaughn
& Villalobos, 2015]) do not require Senate confirmation.
That some positions require Senate confirmation and others do not dictates many of the
strategies used by presidents and their administrations when choosing appointees, and often
has major ramifications for appointees’ ultimate effectiveness. Indeed, there often are two
parallel personnel processes in modern presidential administrations—one focused on finding
jobs for “necessary-to-place” individuals and one focused on finding individuals for higher-
profile positions that are often more policy relevant (Hollibaugh, 2017; Lewis, 2008). The
former process is often focused on finding positions for those who volunteered on the
campaign, are being supported by prominent or important politicians, are potentially
important for electoral reasons, or are otherwise politically important (Gump, 1971;
Hollibaugh, 2017; Hollibaugh, Horton, & Lewis, 2014; Lewis, 2008; Tolchin & Tolchin, 2010).
Nonetheless, the latter process (i.e., the more professional one) is not immune from political
concerns. However, the desire to place politically compatible individuals in appointed
positions often causes delay in the confirmation process because of senatorial resistance and
often causes clashes with careerists; this is especially true when the administration’s goal is
to politicize or otherwise politically reorient the agency or department in question. Moreover,
delays in confirmation often mean that agencies are led by acting or interim individuals
without the perceived legitimacy that comes with formal Senate confirmation.
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Here, how these dynamics might affect the effectiveness of political appointees in the United
States is unpacked, though the relevant dynamics in other democratic systems is briefly
discussed when appropriate. In conclusion, “A Need for Better Measures and More Explicit
Theory” discusses broader considerations regarding the literature’s use of multiple definitions
of “effectiveness” and the implications for both theoretical expectations and empirical
measurement.
Political Considerations and Effectiveness
In many cases, appointees are not chosen solely for their ability to increase agency
performance in a narrow, technocratic sense. In the United States and many other countries,
political appointees are chosen by elected officials. As such, appointees are often chosen for a
wide variety of political reasons, which may range from ensuring political control of an agency
to establishing or maintaining relationships with important political stakeholders, to signaling
to (potential) campaign volunteers, as well as many others.
For many scholars of executive appointments, at least those focused on the United States,
Moe (1985) is often the starting point for analyzing the relationship between appointees and
political control of the executive branch. In this seminal book chapter, Moe argues that there
is an inherent tension between policy responsiveness and policy competence (the “neutral
competence” discussed by Heclo [1975] and others); he notes that although presidents like
competence, all else being equal, they seek out responsiveness within the executive branch.
As such, they choose individuals they believe will be able to ensure responsiveness. This often
results in the highest-ranking appointees within executive agencies being chosen more for
loyalty to the president and/or the president’s program as opposed to technocratic expertise.
As such, there exists an inherent “loyalty-competence trade-off” within the American
appointments process (Edwards, 2001; Gallo & Lewis, 2012; Hollibaugh, 2015a; Hollibaugh et
al., 2014; Krause & O’Connell, 2016; Lewis, 2007, 2008; Mackenzie, 1981; Moynihan &
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Roberts, 2010).
Scholars have since spilled much ink examining Moe’s claim. For example, Lewis (2008)
shows that bureaucratic politicization increases when presidents perceive policy
disagreement between themselves and the bureaucracy, especially in the immediate aftermath
of a change in the party of the presidency. This suggests that presidents believe, at least at
the outset of administrations, that political appointees might be effective at establishing
political control, though actions later in administrations suggest that priorities change and/or
presidents learn more about what might actually work in terms of protecting and advancing
their agendas. Recent work by Krause and O’Connell (2016) suggests that presidents engage
in experiential learning, and learn better how to manage the administrative state over the
course of their time in office. In their paper, Krause and O’Connell show that how presidents
value loyalty and competence (both policy and managerial)—and how much uncertainty they
are willing to tolerate with respect to said traits—varies over time. At the outset of their
administrations, presidents “appoint individuals who are more loyal than competent” (Krause
& O’Connell, 2016, p. 920), though they soon begin to prize appointees who are more
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competent (on both policy and managerial grounds). Moreover, presidents become more
attuned to the effects of uncertainty about appointee traits over the courses of their
administrations, in time requiring more certainty about one trait (e.g., loyalty) in order to
justify trading off another trait (e.g., managerial competence). They conclude this is indicative
of presidents becoming better at demanding risk premiums as they learn how to manage the
bureaucracy, focusing on different avenues for ensuring the effectiveness of their appointees.
That said, the political relevance of executive appointees extends beyond the ability to
establish or maintain political control of agencies. Indeed, there exists a long tradition of
providing jobs to those who volunteered on presidential campaigns, important party officials
and other individuals relevant to the president’s political coalition (or individuals suggested by
them; see Rottinghaus & Bergan [2011]), and numerous others (Gump, 1971; Weko, 1995). On
average, such appointees have less expertise, though many of them are viewed as “absolutely
deserving, and “if they [want] an appointment or some other consideration . . . [they will] get
it” (Untermeyer, 1999). To address the concerns of these “necessary-to-place” individuals,
separate personnel processes exist for those considered for patronage as opposed to policy
concerns (Lewis, 2008, p. 30), with “one process revolv[ing] primarily around filling positions,
and the other process revolv[ing] primarily around placing persons.”
However, given the lower levels of expertise among those chosen for patronage appointments,
the existence of a person-centered (as opposed to position-centered) personnel process likely
implies that the agencies in which such individuals are placed will suffer as a result, a
proposition supported by recent work. For example, Gallo and Lewis (2012) and Hollibaugh
(2015a) suggest that agencies administered by patronage appointees exhibit lower levels of
performance, though others suggest that agencies headed by appointees in general—as
opposed to career executives—tend to exhibit lower levels of performance on average
(Gilmour & Lewis, 2006; Lewis, 2007); however, within the subset of appointees, patronage
appointees tend to perform particularly poorly. Perhaps more worryingly, Hollibaugh (2017)
suggests agencies targeted by presidents for patronage purposes can get caught in an
“incompetence trap” wherein they maintain low levels of performance because of presidents
facing numerous “necessary-to-place” individuals and yet not wanting to diminish
performance within higher-performing agencies.
Given these potential negative outcomes from patronage appointments, as well as their
political necessity, presidents have adopted strategies to place patronage appointees in
positions where they might be most useful (or provide the least amount of harm). For
example, Hollibaugh et al. (2014) show that agencies and departments with higher
concentrations of patronage appointments tend to be agencies off the president’s agenda, in
agencies that share the president’s policy views, and where individual appointees are least
able to affect agency performance because of the nature of the agency’s workforce (but see
Lewis & Waterman [2013] for an important contextualization of this claim). Additionally,
Hollibaugh (2018) suggests presidents place fewer patronage appointees in agencies whose
structures provide greater job protections for political appointees.
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Notably, tension between bureaucratic responsiveness and professionalism/expertise is not

unique to the United States. For example, Blondel (1985) notes that, in contrast to other
Western European nations, British ministers were historically among the least likely to be
chosen for their specific expertise, as few positions require specific, formal qualifications.
Rather, British ministers historically have been chosen from Parliament itself. However, this
dynamic began to change in the 1980s, with ministers becoming more involved in
policymaking and developing “grander plans to introduce permanent change in the general
directions of their department[s]” (Marsh, Richards, & Smith, 2000, p. 324). These changing
dynamics, and the resulting need for more policy-specific expertise, likely had some influence
on then-prime minister Gordon Brown’s decision to build a “government of all talents” and
appoint many individuals from outside Parliament to the House of Lords in order to make
them ministers. Unfortunately for many of those selected, despite their policy expertise, their
lack of political expertise often hampered their effectiveness, and relations with Parliament
and the public often suffered as a result (Yong & Bennister, 2011).
Overall, although other countries are not immune to negative consequences from the
fundamental tension between responsiveness and professionalism/expertise, the
consequences often manifest in different ways. Within the American system, appointees and
the agencies or departments they oversee are often hampered by a lack of policy-specific
expertise, whereas within the British system it can be the lack of political expertise that leads
to negative consequences, as “ministers are not required to immerse themselves in
minutiae . . . [but] they need to grasp the basic issues, inject the government’s political
priorities into departments’ thinking and subject officials’ proposals to the litmus test of
political acceptability” (James, 1999, p. 18). Indeed, “the few attempts to bring in expert
ministers have not been great successes” (James, 1999, p. 18).
The Role of the Legislature and Implications for Effectiveness
As mentioned at the outset, and although numbers vary depending on time and source as well
as the definition of “executive appointee,” at least 2,000 executive (i.e., non-military and non-
judicial) appointees are subject to presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation in the
United States (Lewis, 2008). Moreover, although there have been variations over time for
numerous reasons, the number of positions subject to presidential appointment has generally
trended upward over the past several decades. This expansion of the administrative state (or
“thickening”) has largely been driven by increasing federal authority in various policy realms,
as well as because of a desire for more political control of extant and new policy areas (Light,
1995, 2008).
Recently, the coupling of the Senate confirmation requirement with seemingly ever-increasing
levels of political polarization has resulted in successive administrations facing more
vacancies as well as vacancies that take longer to fill. Part of this is due to presidents
spending more time searching for nominees that might placate hostile Senates more willing to
use all procedural tools at their disposal; this is because confirmation duration increases and
confirmation success decreases during times of high partisan or ideological polarization,
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especially when nominees are seen as ideologically divisive (Bonica, Chen, & Johnson, 2015;
Chiou & Rothenberg, 2014; Hollibaugh, 2015b; Hollibaugh & Rothenberg, 2017, 2018;
McCarty & Razaghian, 1999). Additionally, the somewhat decentralized nature of the Senate’s
process also has a role to play, as nominees have to face questioning and mandated
questionnaires by relevant Senate committees, the Senate at large, the FBI as part of the
background check process, the Office of Governmental Ethics, and potentially other agencies
and departments (e.g., Sullivan, 2009). As a result, the process itself often deters potential
nominees, with few satisfied by the process as a whole (Light, 2008).
Because of the increased inter-chamber conflict over the nominations process, as well as the
growth of the administrative state, the sub-cabinet has increased in importance. These
positions, which include positions such as deputy secretaries and deputy attorneys general,
have become more important as a result of increased vacancies in the highest ranks; as such,
members of the sub-cabinet often find themselves serving as acting or interim cabinet
members, which makes them more susceptible to the partisan warfare that has engulfed
cabinet nominees. However, as these positions are themselves not cabinet rank, presidents
lack the ability to effectively go public on their nominations, which further slows down their
confirmations (Hollibaugh & Rothenberg, 2018; Ostrander, 2016). And when these individuals
find themselves confirmed to the sub-cabinet, yet serving as acting cabinet members, their
status as acting or interim officials means they often lack the perceived legitimacy necessary
to enact substantial policy change (Vaughn & Villalobos, 2009).
Also worthy of discussion, though much less prominent post-2006, are recess appointments to
positions that otherwise require Senate confirmation. Although presidents have often used
recess appointments to fill positions in important independent agencies (Black, Madonna,
Owens, & Lynch, 2007), especially when they have had little partisan support in the Senate
(Corley, 2006), recent Senates have found ways to circumvent the ability of presidents to make
such appointments (Black, Lynch, Madonna, & Owens, 2011); moreover, the 2014 Canning v.
NLRB decision by the Supreme Court has, according to one author, “relegated [such
appointments] to the status of a constitutional relic” (Ostrander, 2015, p. 571). However, it is
unclear whether careerists perceive recess appointees to be more like Senate-confirmed
appointees (with all the perceived legitimacy that entails) or acting/interim appointees,
though agencies led by recess appointees tend to perform worse on average (Miller, 2015).
Regardless, these dynamics suggest the effectiveness of political appointees may be

diminished by their sheer numbers and range of responsibilities. The latter often means that
strong incentives exist for the Senate to delay and/or otherwise stymie the nominations
process, especially if partisan and/or ideological disagreements are present. Additionally, the
former means that confirmation delay results in large swaths of the federal administrative
state in the United States being led by acting or interim officials who lack the legitimacy that
comes from being confirmed by the Senate.
Outside of the United States, the formal selection process is obviously quite different, and the
ability (and willingness) of other political actors to stymie the wishes of the appointing
principal is generally more limited. In stark contrast to the American system are Westminster
systems, though some variance exists in the extent to which ex ante control exists. Within the
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British system, for example, the prime minister has the effective power to both appoint and
dismiss ministers at will. This results in far fewer ex ante controls on ministerial selection.
However, because British ministers are typically drawn from the House of Commons and
maintain their seats while serving as ministers, there is typically a greater amount of ex post
control or influence, both from fellow members of Parliament as well as the Party. Indeed,
effective ministers may have to shepherd legislation through the House of Commons and, as
such, need to have expertise in parliamentary minutiae. As such, civil servants view ministers’
performance in Parliament as key to ensuring the viability of departmental priorities (James,
1999; Marsh et al., 2000). Given the centrality of legislative duties to many political
appointees outside of the American system, effective appointees maintain good relations with
the legislature and possess significant amounts of legislative skill.
Appointee-Careerist Relations and Effectiveness
The effects of political appointees can reach beyond constructs defined by political control,
technocratic conceptions of performance, or the structure of the appointments process itself.
Indeed, one needs to consider that agencies are collections of people, and political appointees
—especially those not attuned to the cultures of the agencies in which they are placed—can
often have deleterious effects on agency morale and intellectual capital. As such, presidents
need to be particularly careful when selecting appointees—and appointees need to pay special
attention to how they interact with careerists—to mitigate any potential negative effects.
That said, despite efforts that may or may not be undertaken by appointees, it is often their
mere presence that negatively affects agency performance. For example, simply by virtue of
their status as individuals who serve at the pleasure of the president, as opposed to career
bureaucrats with stronger job protections, appointed managers serve for less time in their
positions than do comparably situated careerists (Ban & Ingraham, 1990; Dull & Roberts,
2009; Heclo, 1977). As such, agencies led by appointees are less likely to have deep founts of
institutional memory. Moreover, appointed managers are less likely to be able to credibly
commit to longer-term agency goals or reform initiatives (Gallo & Lewis, 2012; Lewis, 2008).
And vacancies created by appointee turnover are tied to lower agency performance (Lewis,
2008; O’Connell, 2009).
Given all of these deleterious effects, it is no surprise that agencies with appointed leadership
often have more trouble attracting and retaining top-quality careerists who have attractive
outside options (Bertelli & Lewis, 2013; Gailmard & Patty, 2007). In general, career
bureaucrats are distrustful of political appointees and often believe that greater
concentrations of appointees will result in more work being placed on the shoulders of
careerists, thus making them more likely to leave for the private sector. For example, in a
2007 survey of state-level career bureaucrats, only 4 percent of respondents agreed with the
claim that “increased numbers of political appointees enhance government effectiveness,” and
no respondents agreed that “a politically responsive, patronage-based, partisan civil service is
superior to a politically neutral, merit-based, impartial career civil service” (Bowman & West,
2009, pp. 24–25).
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That these dynamics persist despite higher levels of education and management experience
among appointees provides strong evidence that the lack of institutional memory possessed
by most appointees (though exceptions do exist) and their inability to credibly commit to long-
term planning are proximate causes of lower agency performance (Lewis, 2007). These
conclusions are further supported by quantitative studies of agency performance linking
longer appointee tenure to higher performance (Gallo & Lewis, 2012; Lewis, 2008).
All of this is important because political appointees are rarely those who actually implement
government policy. Rather, this is typically within the purview of careerists, who are overseen
by appointees; as such, in order for appointees to be effective in ensuring that policies are
implemented in accordance with the wishes of the appointing president—especially in cases
where the appointee has been brought in to change or otherwise reorient the policy direction
of the agency in question—appointees need to ensure that careerists trust them and otherwise
sanction their legitimacy (Carpenter & Krause, 2015; Resh, 2015). This is particularly
important because lack of trust in agency leadership is associated with lower levels of agency-
level intellectual capital capacity (Resh, 2015), which inhibits the abilities of appointees to
ensure implementation of the president’s policy agenda.
Dovetailing back to the previous discussion about political considerations, it must be

remembered that trust is a two-way street, and many political appointees begin their tenures
distrustful of the careerists within the bureaucracy (Pfiffner, 1987). And presidents often fear
“that their appointees will ‘go native’ and become coopted by the departments they
head” (Pfiffner, 1983, p. 633), not necessarily an unfounded fear because careerists often
select into particular agencies based on their agreement with the agency’s mission; this
dynamic often results in ideological alignment between an agency’s mission and the
preferences of its careerists, which can lead to initial friction between careerists and
appointees sent in with the goal of politicization and control (Clinton et al., 2012; Clinton &
Lewis, 2008; Edwards, 2001; Maranto, 1993; Richardson, Clinton, & Lewis, 2017). Although
some of the initial friction can abate over time in a cycle of accommodation (Maranto, 1991),
this is often modulated by the administration’s—and therefore appointees’—ideological
convergence with agency missions, as appointee-careerist relationships tend to be better
where convergence is greater (Maranto, 1993). To wit, a 2014 survey of federal executives
found that when civil servants view greater ideological divergence between themselves and
politically appointed principals, they are less likely to build policy expertise and more likely to
exit the agency (Richardson 2019). This strongly suggests that political differences can, over
time, translate into diminished agency capacity.
In contrast to civil servants in the American system, those in other systems often appreciate—
and desire—the more political nature of appointees. For example, British civil servants often
see ministers as effective if they possess “decisiveness and political judgment” (Marsh,
Richards, & Smith, 2000, p. 313). Indeed, civil servants view politically astute ministers as
necessities because they strengthen the department, and those without political expertise are
viewed as liabilities (Marsh, Richards, & Smith, 2000), as effective ministers must “go out and
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argue for resources” (Rhodes, 2005, p. 12). As with other differences between the American
and British systems, this difference is likely due to the greater influence of British ministers in
the legislative process than their American counterparts.
Leadership Style and Effectiveness
As mentioned, appointees in the American system who begin their tenures with notions of
shaking things up and disturbing the relationship between careerists and appointed
leadership often find themselves running less effective agencies because of negative effects
on appointee-careerist trust. These dynamics indicate that the leadership style of political
appointees has important ramifications for the effectiveness of both individual appointees and
agencies more generally.
For example, at the individual level, Park and Rainey (2008) use the 2000 Merit Principles
Survey to examine the relationship between leadership style within U.S. federal agencies and
several employee-level variables, including job satisfaction, performance, quality of work, and
turnover intention. Across all outcome variables, they consistently find that employees benefit
when they perceive their supervisors as engaging in transformation-oriented leadership,
“where the leader informs the respondent, supports her or his development and personal
welfare, emphasizes high standards, and helps poor performers improve” (Park & Rainey,
2008, p. 130). These findings are supported by Wolf (1993), who finds that American agencies
led by individuals with greater leadership skills tended to exhibit higher levels of
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effectiveness.
These dynamics reinforce the findings of Resh (2015) and others who argue for the
importance of trust within organizations. As discussed, Resh argues that trust in agency
leadership is important to perceptions of an agency’s intellectual capital. Particularly relevant
here is that Resh’s intellectual capital capacity measure includes components that might
plausibly be related to leadership style; examples include “whether employees are satisfied
with their involvement in decisions that affect their work,” “whether employees are satisfied
with the information they receive from management on what’s going on in their organization,”
and “whether employees know how their work relates to the agency’s goals and
priorities” (Resh, 2015, p. 84). To wit, trust in an agency’s political leadership is positively
associated with federal employees’ extrinsic motivation and public service motivation
(Ugaddan & Park, 2019).
Collectively, the evidence suggests that appointees who practice a leadership style consistent
with fostering trust among employees may find themselves leading higher-performing
agencies because of better-motivated employees. This, however, may be at odds with the goals
of the appointing president who, presumably, views his or her appointees as important to
fulfilling his or her policy agenda and who therefore might choose them based on different
criteria from what rank-and-file employees might find optimal. Indeed, career executives are
more likely to have priorities and goals more in line with organizational and departmental
advocacy positions, whereas political appointees tend to be more focused on policy promotion
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and career advancement (Brewer & Maranto, 2000). As such, appointees’ leadership styles
might also be a proximate cause of the oft-discussed “loyalty–competence trade-off.”
Nevertheless, whether leadership style taps into managerial competence or some nebulous
notion of non-ideological fealty (or both) remains to be seen.
Unsurprisingly, the importance of bureaucratic leadership is not limited to the United States.
For example, in examining South Korean appointees, Jung, Moon, and Hahm (2008) use the
2002 Korean Minister Survey (KMS) and find that transformational leadership styles are
strongly associated with higher performance of all types (overall, policy design, policy
implementation, and internal management); using the 2007 version of the KMS, Lee, Moon,
and Hahm (2010) find that appointees more responsive to their departments (versus being
more responsive to the president) are viewed as particularly effective at managing their
departments and are also seen as effective agenda setters and policy implementers. However,
in the United Kingdom, there is less emphasis on ministers and appointees as leaders, given
the dual roles of ministers as both cabinet members and members of Parliament. In this
context, civil servants value ministers who are able to effectively work within the legislature
and the broader public for the agency’s goals (Marsh et al., 2000). Nevertheless, there exists a
copious amount of public administration research—both in the American and comparative
contexts—suggesting the importance of leadership styles to agency performance and
appointee effectiveness, though the specific type of leadership desired varies by institutional
context.
A Need for Better Measures and More Explicit Theory
One thing that should not go unnoticed to the reader is that various definitions of
“effectiveness” have been used throughout the course of this article. This is by design, in part
because political appointees wear different hats, and effectiveness on one dimension may be
orthogonal to effectiveness on another dimension. Alternatively, given the myriad incentives
(political, managerial, and the like), it may be that effective bureaucrats from the perspective
of the appointing president—or the appointees themselves—are those viewed by the broader
civil service or public management scholars as being wholly ineffective. Indeed, there may
exist circumstances where the selection of less effective appointees is purposeful and desired
(Jo & Rothenberg, 2012).
Within political science, there is a significant amount of research on bureaucratic

appointments and the role of the “loyalty–competence trade-off,”—though it is not always
referred to as such—in both nominations and as a determinant of agency performance
(Edwards, 2001; Hollibaugh, 2015a, 2017; Jo & Rothenberg, 2012). However, the way “loyalty”
is often conceptualized is in terms of ideological affinity, which is somewhat different from
what might be considered to be personal loyalty. Although operationalizing loyalty in terms of
ideological affinity allows models of bureaucratic politics to more easily utilize the standard
spatial model and empirical measures of ideology (Bonica, 2013, 2014; Bonica et al., 2015;
Hollibaugh & Rothenberg, 2018), there is somewhat of a conceptual mismatch between
personal loyalty and ideology. Nonetheless, at the time of this writing there are scholars
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working on estimating measures of loyalty not so explicitly tied to ideological concerns.

Krause and O’Connell (2016) and Ouyang, Haglund, and Waterman (2017) leverage
biographical data of appointees in the American system to generate measures of loyalty based
on appointee attributes (such as previous elective office and state-level bureaucratic service,
among others), and not ideology per se. Scholars of public administration and bureaucratic
politics could use these data—in conjunction with extant measures of ideology—to fruitfully
examine the loyalty–competence trade-off without conflating personal loyalty and ideological
affinity.
But in order to do so, scholars also need accurate measures of competence (broadly related to
effectiveness) and theoretical frameworks that distinguish between loyalty and ideology.
Previous empirical studies in the American context have often used appointees’ biographical
information to estimate individual-level competence, whereas formally inclined scholars have
often modeled individual-level effectiveness in terms of its contribution to agency-level
performance (Gallo & Lewis, 2012; Hollibaugh, 2017; Hollibaugh et al., 2014; Huber &
McCarty, 2004; Krause & O’Connell, 2016; Lewis, 2007, 2008; Ouyang et al., 2017). Measures
of agency- or departmental-level performance, on the other hand, have often used government
data, such as Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) scores (Gallo & Lewis, 2012; Gilmour &
Lewis, 2006; Hollibaugh, 2015a; Lewis, 2007, 2008), budget forecasting accuracy (Krause &
Douglas, 2006; Krause, Lewis, & Douglas, 2006), employee perceptions, and others.
Unfortunately, it is arguably the case that neither of these two constructs—individual

competence or agency performance—necessarily capture individual effectiveness; rather, this
might be best described as the marginal effect of individual appointees on agency- or
department-level performance, though such a definition would ignore the notion that, in some
cases, “effectiveness” might be negatively related to agency performance, at least as
conventionally defined. Future research on this front is needed to better clarify the underlying
theoretical mechanisms and empirical operationalizations thereof. Such research should adopt
a sound comparative perspective, with comprehensive assessments of why, how, when, and
where various arrangements are adopted as potentially suited to contexts and traditions.
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Notes
1. This is because presidential transitions in the United States are typically characterized by large-scale turnover in
the executive branch. For example, Dull and Roberts (2009) present evidence suggesting that some agencies have
vacancy rates of over 90% in PAS positions (presidential appointments requiring Senate confirmation) during the first
quarter of an incoming president’s administration. Furthermore, Chang, Lewis, and McCarty (2001) note that
appointees are more likely to resign at the end of an administration.
2. Not discussed here is the idea that presidents may want appointees viewed as less competent in the conventional
sense, and that reductions in appointee competence might be due to the desire for presidents to control their
appointees in an effort to prevent them from “going native” (Pfiffner, 1983), as it will be harder for less-competent
bureaucrats to hide their true motives.
3. However, both “leadership skills” and “agency effectiveness” were somewhat vaguely defined within Wolf’s (1993)
study.
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How Effective are Political Appointees?

How Effective are Political Appointees?

Subjects: Policy, Administration, and Bureaucracy, Political Institutions

Political Considerations and Effectiveness

Notably, tension between bureaucratic responsiveness and professionalism/expertise is not

The Role of the Legislature and Implications for Effectiveness

Regardless, these dynamics suggest the effectiveness of political appointees may be

Appointee-Careerist Relations and Effectiveness

Dovetailing back to the previous discussion about political considerations, it must be

Leadership Style and Effectiveness

A Need for Better Measures and More Explicit Theory

Within political science, there is a significant amount of research on bureaucratic

working on estimating measures of loyalty not so explicitly tied to ideological concerns.

Unfortunately, it is arguably the case that neither of these two constructs—individual

Gump, W. R. (1971). The functions of patronage in American party politics: An empirical

Heclo, H. (1977). A government of strangers: Executive politics in Washington. Washington, DC:

Lewis, D. E. (2007). Testing Pendleton’s premise: Do political appointees make worse

Light, P. C. (1995). Thickening government: Federal hierarchy and the diffusion of

Maranto, R. (1991). Does familiarity breed acceptance? Trends in career-noncareer relations in

Miller, S. M. (2015). The relationship between short-term political appointments and

Pfiffner, J. P. (1987). Political appointees and career executives: The democracy-bureaucracy

Rhodes, R. A. W. (2005). Everyday life in a ministry: Public administration as anthropology.

Sullivan, T. (2009). Reducing the adversarial burden on presidential appointees: Feasible

Wolf, P. J. (1993). A case survey of bureaucratic effectiveness in U.S. cabinet agencies:

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