CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
CONSPIRACY
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED CONSPIRACY
G.R. NO. L-19069            OCTOBER 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS.
AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL.,  DEFENDANTS,
ANDRES FACTORA, LEONARDO DOSAL,
ANGEL PARUMOG, AMADEO PERALTA,
FLORENCIO LUNA AND GERVASIO
LARITA, DEFENDANTS-REVIEW.
Assistant Solicitors General Vicente A. Torres and Antonio
Ibarra for plaintiff-appellee.
J. R. Nuguid for defendants-review.
PER CURIAM:
In the decision in criminal case 7705 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal,subject of the present automatic
review, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal,
Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six
among the twenty-two defendants 1 charged therein with
multiple murder) were pronounced guilty, and all sentenced
to death, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each
of the victims, namely, Jose Carriego, Eugenio
Barbosa and Santos Cruz, in the sum of P6,000, and each to
pay his corresponding share of the costs.
The information recites:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1958, in
the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, who
are convicts confined in the New Bilibid Prisons by
virtue of final judgments, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping and aiding one another, with
evident premeditation and treachery, all armed with
deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kill Jose Carriego,
Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts
confined in the same institution, by hitting,
stabbing and striking them with ice picks, clubs and
other improvised weapons, pointed and/or
sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims
multiple serious injuries which directly caused their
deaths.
That the aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism is present in the commission of the
crime in that the crime was committed after the
accused have been convicted by final judgments
and while they are serving the said judgments in
the New Bilibid Prisons.
Contrary to law with the following aggravating
circumstances:
1. That the crime was committed with insult to
public authorities;
2. That the crime was committed by a band;
3. That the crime was committed by armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity;
4. That use of superior strength or means was
employed to weaken the defense;
5. That as a means to the commission of the crime
doors and windows have been broken;
6. That means was employed which add ignominy
to the natural effects of the act;
7. That the crime was committed where public
authorities were engaged in the discharge of their
duties.
Upon motion of the provincial fiscal before trial, the lower
court dismissed the charge against one of the accused 2 for
lack of evidence. After the prosecution had rested its case,
the charges against six of the accused 3 were dismissed for
failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case
against them. One of the defendants died 4 during the
pendency of the case. After trial, the court a quo acquitted
eight5 of the remaining defendants.
As early as in 1956, a great number of inmates confined in
the national penitentiary at Muntinglupa arrayed themselves
into two warring gangs, the "Sigue-Sigue" and the "OXO",
the former composed predominantly of Tagalog inmates, the
latter comprised mainly of prisoners from the Visayas and
Mindanao. Since then the prison compound has been rocked
time and time again by bloody riots resulting in the death of
many of their members and suspected sympathizers. In an
effort to avert violent clashes between the contending
groups, prison officials segrerated known members of the
"Sigue-Sigue" from those of the "OXO". Building 1 housed
"Sigue-Sigue" members, while a majority of the prisoners
confined in Bldg. 4 belonged to the "OXO". Even in Bldg.
4, which is composed of four brigades, namely, 4-A and 4-B
(upper floor) and 4-C and 4-D (first floor), inmates from
Visayas and Mindanao, from whom the "OXO" drew most
of its members, were confined in 4-A.
It was at about 7:00 a.m. on February 16, 1958, while the
inmates of the penitentiary were preparing to attend Sunday
mass, that a fight between two rival members of the "Sigue-
Sigue" and "OXO" gangs occurred in the plaza where the
prisoners were assembled, causing a big commotion. The
fight was, however, quelled, and those involved were led
away for investigation, while the rest of the prisoners were
ordered to return to their respective quarters. Hardly had
conditions returned to normal when a riot broke out in Bldg.
1, a known lair of the "Sigue-Sigue". The inmates thereof
tried to invade Bldg. 4, where many members and
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
sympathizers of the "OXO" gang were confined. The timely
arrival of the guards forced the invading inmates to retreat
and return to Bldg. 1. Moments later, another riot erupted in
Bldg. 4, as the inmates of brigade 4-A destroyed the lock of
their door and then rampaged from one brigade to another.
The invading prisoners from 4-A, mostly "OXO" members
and sympathizers, clubbed and stabbed to death Jose
Carriego, an inmate of 4-B. Afterwards, they forcibly
opened the door of 4-C and killed two more inmates,
namely, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
The three victims sustained injuries which swiftly resulted in
their death — before they could be brought to the hospital.
Jose Carriego: (a) lacerated wound on the lower lip, 5 cm.
in length and 3 cm.in depth; (b) contusion and hematoma of
the back of the neck, about 2 inches in diameter; and (c) five
punctured wounds in the chest, penetrating the lungs. Cause
of death: internal hemorrhage from multiple fatal wounds in
the chest.
Eugenio Barbosa: (a) lacerated wound in the occipital
region, 3 inches in length and 1 cm. in depth; (b) two
penetrating wounds in the abdomen, puncturing the
intestines; (c) lacerated wounds on the right oxilla, 3 cm. in
length and 2 cm. in depth; and (d) several bruises at the right
and left lower extremities. Cause of death: shock, secondary
to internal hermorrhage in the abdomen.
Santos Cruz: (a) lacerated wound on the head, 2 inches in
length; (b) fractured skull; (c) wound on the upper lip
cutting the lip in two; (d) seven punctured wounds in the
chest, two of which were penetrating; (e) hematoma on the
right hand; and (f) three punctured wounds on the left hand.
Cause of death: fractured skull.
Romeo Pineda, an inmate and first quarter-in-charge of
brigade 4-B, testified that while he was taking his breakfast
with Jose Carriego, who was at the time the representative
of the prisoners confined in 4-B to the inmate carcel, he
"suddenly heard commotion" near the door of their brigade;
that his fellow prisoners started shouting "pinapasok na
tayo," as the invading inmates from brigade 4-A stampeded
into 4-B; that he and Carriego took hold of their clubs and
stood at the end of the passageway; that he saw Carriego
surrender his club to Andres Factora, an "OXO" member
from 4-A; that as Carriego started to walk away, Factora
clubbed Carriego on the nape causing the latter to fall; that
Factora turned up the face of his fallen victim and struck
him again in the face; that while Carriego was in this
prostrate position, Amadeo Peralta and Leonardo Dosal,
companions of Factora, repeatedly stabbed him.
The testimony of Pineda was corroborated in all its material
points by Juanito Marayoc and Avelino Sauza, both inmates
of 4-B. These two prosecution witnesses identified Factora,
Peralta and Dosal as the assailants of Carriego.
From 4-B, the invading inmates of 4-A went down and
forcibly entered 4-C. According to Oscar Fontillas, an
inmate of 4-C, he saw the prisoners from 4-A rushing
toward their brigade; that among the invading inmates who
forced open the door of 4-C, with help from the inside
provided by Visayan prisoners confined in 4-C, were
Factora, Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervacio Larita, Ernesto
Fernandez and Jose Tariman; that he saw Factora, Larita and
Fernandez kill Barbosa, while the rest of their companies
instructed the Visayans to leave their cell and ordered the
"Manila boys" (Tagalogs) to remain. Antonio Pabarlan,
another inmate of 4-C, declared that he saw Peralta stab
Barbosa, as Dosal, Larita, Florencio Luna, Parumog and
Factora clubbed the hapless victim. Another inmate of 4-C,
Jose Halili, not only corroborated the testimony of Fontillas
and Pabarlan but as well added grim details. He declared
that while Barbosa was trying to hide under a cot, he was
beaten and stabbed to death by Dosal, Parumog, Factora and
Fernandez, with Luna, Larita, Pedro Cogol and Eilel Tugaya
standing guard, armed with clubs and sharp instruments, in
readiness to repel any intervention from the Tagalog
inmates. Carlos Espino, also confined in 4-C, declared that
he saw Parumog, Peralta Factora and Larita assault and kill
Barbosa.
The same witnesses for the prosecution testifies that after
killing Barbosa, the invading "OXO" members and
sympathizers proceeded to hunt for Santos Cruz, another
Tagalog like Carriego and Barbosa. Halili testified, that he
saw Peralta, Larita, Cogol and Tugaya take Santos Cruz to
4-A from 4-C; that Santos Cruz knelt down and pleaded for
his life, saying, "Maawa kayo sa akin. Marami akong anak;"
that Luna and Peralta were unmoved as they stabbed Santos
Cruz to death. Pabarlan declared that after the death of
Barbosa, Santos Cruz was brought to 4-A by the invading
inmates but Cruz was able to slip back to his cell only to be
recaptured by Factora, Dosal and Luna and brought to near
the fire escape where he was clubbed and stabbed to death
by Parumog, Dosal, Factora and Peralta. Fontillas and
Espino corroborated the declarations of Halili and Pabarlan
with respect to the killing of Santos Cruz, and both
mentioned Larita as one of the assailants of Cruz.
The trial judge summarized the evidence for the prosecution,
thus:
"... it clearly appears that the three killings in
question were an offshoot of the rivalry between
the two organizations. All those who were killed,
namely, Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz, were
Tagalogs and well known as members if not
sympathizers of the Sigue Sigue, while the accused
so charged with their killing were mostly members
if not sympathizers of the Oxo organization. These
three killings were sparked by the commotion that
happened in the plaza between 8:00 and 9:00 in the
morning, while the prisoners were preparing to go
the mass ... It was evident that the clash that
occurred in the plaza produced a chain reaction
among the members and followers of the two
organizations. The inmates of Building No. 1,
known lair of the Sigue Sigues bolted the door of
their cells and tried to invade Building No. 4 where
a big number of the Oxo members and their
sympathizers were confined, but, however, were
forced to retreat by the timely arrival of the guards
who sent them back to their building. When the
members of the Oxo in Building No. 4 learned
about this, they went on a rampage looking for
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
members of the Sigue Sigue or their sympathizers
who were confined with them in the same building.
As the evidence of the prosecution shows, the
accused who were confined in Brigade 4-A of
Building No. 4 led the attack. They destroyed the
lock of their dormitories and with the help of their
companions succeeded in bolting the door of the
different brigades, and once they succeeded in
bolting the doors of the different brigades, they
went inside and tried to segregate the Tagalogs
from their group; that as soon as they discovered
their enemies they clubbed and stabbed them to
death ...
Admitting that he was one among several who killed Jose
Carriego, Peralta nevertheless claims self-defense. He
testified that on the morning of the riot he was attacked by
Carriego and Juan Estrella near the door of 4-A while he
was returning to his brigade from the chapel with some
companions; that Carriego clubbed him on the head; that he
was able to parry the second blow of Carriego and then
succeeded in squeezing Carriego's head with his hands; that
forthwith he whipped out an improvised ice pick and
stabbed Carriego several times; that when he (Peralta) was
already dizzy due to the head wound he sustained from the
clubbing, Carriego managed to slip away; that he then
became unconscious, and when he regained consciousness
he found himself on a tarima with his head bandaged.
Peralta's declarations do not inspire belief. The impressive
array of prosecution witnesses who saw him actively
participate in the killing of the three victims pointed to him
as the aggressor, not the aggrieved. Pineda, Marayoc and
Sauza positively identified him as one of the assailants of
Carriego. Contrary to the pretensions of Peralta, Carriego an
alleged "Sigue-Sigue" member, would not have attacked
him, knowing fully well that Building No. 4 was an "OXO"
lair where the "Sigue-Sigue" members were outnumbered.
Anent the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz, Peralta failed
to offer any explicit defense to rebut the inculpatory
declarations of prosecution witnesses Pabarlan and Espino
who saw him participate in the killing of Barbosa and those
of Halili, Fontillas and Espino who identified him as one of
the murderers of Santos Cruz.
For his part, Leonardo Dosal stated that he killed Santos
Cruz, but also claims self-defense in exculpation. He
declared that Santos Cruz, Jose Carriego, Juanita Espino,
Carlos Espino and Oscar Fontillas invaded 4-A where he
was confined; that a free-for-all forthwith ensued; that he
then heard Santos Cruz call Carlos Espino, and advise the
latter to go away as "I will be the one to kill that person
(Dosal);" that with a sharp instrument, Cruz hit him on the
head and then on the nose; that as Cruz was about to hit him
again, he got hold of his ice pick and stabbed Cruz
repeatedly until the latter fell.
Dosal's avowal is clearly belied by the positive testimonies
of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino who saw him participate in
the killing of Santos Cruz. If it is true that Dosal killed
Santos Cruz in self-defense when the latter together with his
companions supposedly invaded Dosal's brigade (4-A), why
is it that the body of Santos Cruz was found at the fire
escape near the pasillo between 4-C and 4-D of the first
floor of Bldg. 1 instead of in 4-A which is located in the
upper floor? Moreover, Dosal failed to explain why he was
seen in 4-C, which he does not deny, since he was an inmate
of 4-A where he was allegedly attacked. With respect to the
murder of Carriego and Barbosa with which Dosal was also
charged, he did not offer any evidence in his behalf. Hence,
the testimonies of Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza identifying
him as one of the killers of Carriego and those of Pabarlan,
Halili and Espino implicating him in the death of Santos
Cruz, stand unrebutted.
Andres Factora declared that he clubbed Carriego and
Santos Cruz under compulsion of his co-accused who
threatened to kill him if he disobeyed their order; that he did
not hit Barbosa anymore because the latter was already
dead; that it was his co-accused who actually killed the three
victims. Again, the declarations of the prosecution
witnesses, which were accorded full credence by the trial
court, expose the guilt of Factora beyond reasonable doubt.
In fact, according to Pineda, whose testimony was
corroborated by Marayoc, it was Factora who started the
mass assault by clubbing Carriego treacherously. Fontillas,
Halili, Pabarlan and Espino pointed to Factora as one of the
killers of Barbosa, while at least three prosecution witnesses,
namely, Pabarlan, Fontillas and Espino, saw Factora
participate in the slaying of Santos Cruz. The active
participation of Factora in the killing, which is clear index of
voluntariness, thus negates his claim of compulsion and fear
allegedly engendered by his co-accused.
Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna take
refuge in the exculpatory device of alibi. Parumog testified
that he did not participate in the killing of the three inmates
because he stayed during that entire hapless day in the office
of the trustees for investigation after the fight in the plaza;
that he was implicated in the killing by the prosecution
witnesses because of his refusal to accede to their request to
testify against his co-accused; that he is not a Visayan but a
Tagalog from Nueva Ecija. Larita claims that he did not
know about the killing until he was informed that three
inmates had died; that on the day in question he was brought
to the police trustee brigade for investigation after the
incident in the plaza; that he was escorted back to his
brigade only in the afternoon. Luna likewise disclaims any
knowledge of the killing and asserts that for the entire
duration of the riot he remained in his cell (brigade 4-A).
The alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna merit no credence
when set against the positive testimonies of prosecution
witness identifying them as participants in the killing of
Barbosa and Santos Cruz. Pabarlan, Espino and Fontillas
declared that Larita was one of the killers of Barbosa;
Espino and Fontillas declared that they saw Larita kill
Santos Cruz; Pabarlan, Halili and Espino testified that they
saw Parumog participate in the murder of Barbosa; Espino,
Fontillas and Pabarlan stated that Parumog took part in the
killing of Santos Cruz. Pabarlan and Halili declared that
Luna participated in the fatal assault on Barbosa and Santos
Cruz.
The alibis of the accused are thus sufficiently overcome by
strong evidence to the contrary. The defense of alibi is
generally weak since it is easy to concoct. For this reason,
courts view it with no small amount of caution, and accept it
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
only when proved by positive, clear and satisfactory
evidence.6 In the case at bar, if Parumog and Larita were
really confined in the police trustee brigade for investigation
on the day of the incident, there should have been a record
of the alleged investigation. But none was presented. The
testimony of Luna that throughout the riot he stayed in his
cell is quite unnatural. He claims that he did not even help
his cellmates barricade their brigade with tarimas in order to
delay if not prevent the entry of the invading inmates.
According to him, he "just waited in one corner."
The rule is settled that the defense of alibi is worthless in the
face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses
pointing to the accused as particeps criminis.7 Moreover, the
defense of alibi is an issue of fact the resolution of which
depends almost entirely on the credibility of witnesses who
seek to establish it. In this respect the relative weight which
the trial judge accords to the testimony of the witnesses
must, unless patently inconsistent without evidence on
record, be accepted.8 In the case at bar, the trial court, in
dismissing the alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna, said that
"their mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony
of the witnesses who saw them participate directly in the
execution of the conspiracyto kill Barbosa, Carriego and
Santos Cruz."
The killing of Carriego constitutes the offense of murder
because of the presence of treachery as a qualifying
circumstance: Carriego was clubbed by Factora from
behind, and as he lay prostrate and defenseless, Peralta and
Dosal stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. The blow on the
nape and the penetrating chest wounds were all fatal,
according to Dr. Bartolome Miraflor. Abuse of superior
strength qualified the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz to
the category of murder. The victims, who were attacked
individually were completely overwhelmed by their
assailants' superiority in number and weapons and had
absolutely no chance at all to repel or elude the attack. All
the attackers were armed with clubs or sharp instruments
while the victims were unarmed, as so found by the trial
court. In fact, Halili testified that Barbosa was clubbed and
stabbed to death while he was trying to hide under a cot, and
Santos Cruz was killed while he was on his knees pleading
for his life.
The essential issue that next confronts us is whether
conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. The
resolution of this issue is of marked importance because
upon it depends the quantity and quality of the penalties that
must be imposed upon each of the appellants.
For this purpose, it is not amiss to briefly restate the doctrine
on conspiracy, with particular emphasis on the facets
relating to its nature, the quantum of proof required, the
scope and extent of the criminal liability of the conspirators,
and the penalties imposable by mandate of applicable law.
Doctrine. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. 9 Generally, conspiracy is not
a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor as in treason,10 rebellion11 and sedition.12 The crime
of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable
offense in the Philippines.13 An agreement to commit a
crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality,
but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in
furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of
the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public
remains undisturbed. However, when in resolute execution
of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal
importance in the determination of the liability of the
perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in
criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and
Barreto14 opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed
for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime
unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty
therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy
to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital
importance, when considered together with the
other evidence of record, in establishing the
existence, of the consummated crime and its
commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their respective active participation
in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of
law the act of one is the act of all.15 The foregoing rule is
anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more
persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will
actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible
for the whole, the same as though performed by himself
alone."16 Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for
acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the
acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy."17 The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case18 where this
Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability
of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of
each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common
agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of
the solidarity of the act and intent which existed
between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of
the band or party created by them, and they are all
equally responsible ...
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors
conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators
attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene
of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was
remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn
within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved
that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out
the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in
the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the
imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in
this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a
separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability.
The ensnaring nature of conspiracy is projected in bold
relief in the cases of malversation and rape committed in
furtherance of a common design.
The crime of malversation is generally committed by an
accountable public officer who misappropriates public funds
or public property under his trust. 19 However, in the classic
case of People vs. Ponte20 this Court unequivocally held that
a janitor and five municipal policemen, all of whom were
not accountable public officers, who conspired and aided a
municipal treasurer in the malversation of public funds
under the latter's custody, were principally liable with the
said municipal treasurer for the crime of malversation. By
reason of conspiracy, the felonious act of the accountable
public officer was imputable to his co-conspirators, although
the latter were not similarly situated with the former in
relation to the object of the crime committed. Furthermore,
in the words of Groizard, "the private party does not act
independently from the public officer; rather, he knows that
the funds of which he wishes to get possession are in the
latter's charge, and instead of trying to abstract them by
circumventing the other's vigilance he resorts to corruption,
and in the officer's unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most
reprehensible means of accomplishing a deed which by
having a public officer as its moral instrument assumes the
character of a social crime." 21 In an earlier case22 a non-
accountable officer of the Philippine Constabulary who
conspired with his superior, a military supply officer, in the
malversation of public funds was adjudged guilty as co-
principal in the crime of malversation, although it was not
alleged, and in fact it clearly appeared, that the funds
misappropriated were not in his custody but were under the
trust of his superior, an accountable public officer.
In rape, a conspirator is guilty not only of the sexual assault
he personally commits but also of the separate and distinct
crimes of rape perpetrated by his co-conspirators. He may
have had carnal knowledge of the offended woman only
once but his liability includes that pertaining to all the rapes
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, in People
vs. Villa,23 this Court held that
... from the acts performed by the defendants front
the time they arrived at Consolacion's house to the
consummation of the offense of rape on her person
by each and everyone of them, it clearly appears
that they conspired together to rape their victim,
and therefore each one is responsible not only for
the rape committed personally by him, but also that
committed by the others, because each sexual
intercourse had, through force, by each one of the
defendants with the offended was consummated
separately and independently from that had by the
others, for which each and every one is also
responsible because of the conspiracy.
The rule enunciated in People vs. Villa was reiterated
in People vs. Quitain24 where the appellant Teofilo Anchita
was convicted of forcible abduction with double rape for
having conspired and cooperated in the sexual assault of the
aggrieved woman, although he himself did not actually rape
the victim. This Court observed:
We have no doubt all in all that Teofilo Anchita
took part in the sexual assault ... the accused
inserted his fingers in the woman's organ, and
widened it. Whether he acted out of lewdness or to
help his brother-in-law consummate the act, is
immaterial; it was both maybe. Yet, surely, by his
conduct, this prisoner conspired and cooperated,
and is guilty.
With respect to robbery in band, the law presumes the
attendance of conspiracy so much so that "any member of a
band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the
band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults
committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted
to prevent the same."25 In this instance, conspiracy need not
be proved, as long as the existence of a band is clearly
established. Nevertheless, the liability of a member of the
band for the assaults committed by his group is likewise
anchored on the rule that the act of one is the act of all.
Proof of conspiracy. While conspiracy to commit a crime
must be established by positive evidence, 26 direct proof is
not essential to show conspiracy. 27 Since by it nature,
conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can seldom be
proved by direct evidence.28 Consequently, competent and
convincing circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish
conspiracy. According to People vs. Cabrera,29 conspiracies
are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the
purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the
defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one
performing one part and another another part of the same, so
as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same
object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were
engaged in a conspiracy to effect the object." Or as
elucidated in People vs. Carbonel30 the presence of the
concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may
be inferred from "proofs of facts and circumstances which,
taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts
of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected
and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy
may be inferred though no actual meeting among to concert
means is proved ..." In two recent cases, 31 this Court ruled
that where the acts of the accused, collectively and
individually, clearly demonstrate the existence of a common
design toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful
purpose, conspiracy is evident.
Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived
plan or agreement; however, to establish conspiracy, "it is
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to
commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors
committed shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective."32 Hence, conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors
committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective
pursued in concert.
Liability of conspirators. A time-honored rule in
the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of
the common design are liable as co-principals.33 This rule of
collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring
nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the
conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a
patent display of their evil partnership, and for the
consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held
solidarity liable.
However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal
by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
either by actively participating in the actual commission of
the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators
as to move them to executing the conspiracy. The difference
between an accused who is a principal under any of the three
categories enumerated in Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code
and a co-conspirator who is also a principal is that while the
former's criminal liability is limited to his own acts, as a
general rule, the latter's responsibility includes the acts of
his fellow conspirators.
In People vs. Izon, et al.,  this Court acquitted appellant
34
Francisco Robles, Jr., who was convicted by the trial court
of robbery with homicide as a conspirator, on the ground
that although he may have been present when the conspiracy
to rob was proposed and made, "Robles uttered not a word
either of approval or disapproval. There are authorities to the
effect that mere presence at the discussion of a conspiracy,
even approval of it, without any active participation in the
same, is not enough for purposes of conviction." In a more
recent case,35this Court, in exonerating one of the appellants,
said:
There is ample and positive evidence on record that
appellant Jose Guico was absent not only from the
second meeting but likewise from the robbery
itself. To be sure, not even the decision under
appeal determined otherwise. Consequently, even if
Guico's participation in the first meeting
sufficiently involved him with the conspiracy (as
he was the one who explained the location of the
house to be robbed in relation to the surrounding
streets and the points thereof through which
entrance and exit should be effected), such
participation and involvement, however, would be
inadequate to render him criminally liable as a
conspirator. Conspiracy alone, without the
execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable
by law, except in special instances (Article 8,
Revised Penal Code) which, however, do not
include robbery.
Imposition of multiple penalties where conspirators commit
more than one offense. Since in conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all, then, perforce, each of the conspirators is
liable for all of the crimes committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Consequently, if the conspirators commit three
separate and distinct crimes of murder in effecting their
common design and purpose, each of them is guilty of three
murders and shall suffer the corresponding penalty for each
offense. Thus in People vs. Masin,36 this Court held:
... it being alleged in the information that three
crimes were committed not simultaneously indeed
but successively, inasmuch as there was, at least,
solution of continuity between each other, the
accused (seven in all) should be held responsible
for said crimes. This court holds that the crimes are
murder ... In view of all these circumstances and of
the frequently reiterated doctrine that once
conspiracy is proven each and every one of the
conspirators must answer for the acts of the others,
provided said acts are the result of the common
plan or purpose ... it would seem evident that the
penalty that should be imposed upon each of the
appellants for each of their crimes should be the
same, and this is the death penalty ... (emphasis
supplied).
In the aforesaid case, however, the projected imposition of
three death penalties upon each of the conspirators for the
three murders committed was not carried out due to the lack
of the then requisite unanimity in the imposition of the
capital penalty.
In another case,37 this Court, after finding that conspiracy
attended the commission of eleven murders, said through
Mr. Justice Tuason:
Some members of this Court opine that the proper
penalty is death, under the circumstances of the
case, but they fall short of the required number for
the imposition of this punishment. The sentence
consequently is reclusion perpetua; but each
appellant is guilty of as many crimes of murder as
there were deaths (eleven) and should be sentenced
to life imprisonment for each crime, although this
may be a useless formality for in no case can
imprisonment exceed forty years. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In People vs. Masani,38 the decision of the trial court
imposing only one life imprisonment for each of the accused
was modified by this Court on appeal on the ground that
"inasmuch as their (the conspirators') combined attack
resulted in the killing of three persons, they should be
sentenced to suffer said penalty (reclusion perpetua)
for each of the three victims (crimes)." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is significant to note that in the abovementioned cases,
this Court consistently stressed that once conspiracy is
ascertained, the culpability of the conspirators is not only
solidary (all co-principals) but also multiple in relation to
the number of felonies committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. It can also be said that had there been a
unanimous Court in the Masin and Macaso cases, multiple
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
death penalties would have been imposed upon all the
conspirators.
Legality and practicality of imposing multiple death
penalties upon conspirators. An accused who was charged
with three distinct crimes of murder in a single information
was sentenced to two death penalties for two murders, 39 and
another accused to thirteen (13) separate death penalties for
the 13 killings he perpetrated. 40 Therefore there appears to
be no legal reason why conspirators may not be sentenced to
multiple death penalties corresponding to the nature and
number of crimes they commit in furtherance of a
conspiracy. Since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is
established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all,
then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the
felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy,
regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate
penalties prescribed by law.
The rule on the imposition of multiple penalties where the
accused is found guilty of two or more separate and distinct
crimes charged in one information, the accused not having
interposed any objection to the multiplicity of the charges,
was enunciated in the leading case of U.S. vs. Balaba,41 thus:
Upon conviction of two or more offenses charged in the
complaint or information, the prescribed penalties for each
and all of such offenses may be imposed, to be executed in
conformity with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal
Code [now article 70 of the Revised Penal Code]. In other
words, all the penalties corresponding to the several
violations of law should be imposed. Conviction for
multiple felonies demands the imposition of multiple
penalties.
The two conceptual exceptions to the foregoing rule, are the
complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
and the special complex crime (like robbery with homicide).
Anent an ordinary complex crime falling under article 48,
regardless of the multiplicity of offenses committed, there is
only one imposable penalty — the penalty for the most
serious offense applied in its maximum period. Similarly, in
special complex crimes, there is but a single penalty
prescribed by law notwithstanding the number of separate
felonies committed. For instance, in the special complex
crime of robbery with hommicide the imposible penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death42 irrespective of the number of
homicides perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the
robbery.
In Balaba, the information charged the accused with triple
murder. The accused went to trial without objection to the
said information which charged him with more than one
offense. The trial court found the accused guilty of two
murders and one homicide but it imposed only one death
penalty. In its review en consulta, this Court modified the
judgment by imposing separate penalties for each of the
three offenses committed. The Court, thru Mr. Justice
Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm dissenting with respect to
the imposition of two death penalties), held:
The trial judge was erroneously of the opinion that
the prescribed penalties for the offenses of which
the accused was convicted should be imposed in
accord with the provisions of article 89 of the Penal
Code. That article is only applicable to cases
wherein a single act constitutes two or more
crimes, or when one offense is a necessary means
for committing the other. (U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil.
Rep., 56)
It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine what
penalty or penalties should have been imposed
upon the accused upon conviction of the accused of
three separate felonies charged in the information.
There can be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the convict of two separate crimes
of asesinato (murder) marked with the generic
aggravating circumstances mentioned in the
decision of the trial judge ... It follows that the
death penalty must and should be imposed for each
of these offenses ...
Unless the accused should be acquitted hereafter on
appeal of one or both the asesinatos with which he
is charged in the information, it would seem to be a
useless formality to impose separate penalties for
each of the offenses of which he was convicted, in
view of the nature of the principal penalty; but
having in mind the possibility that the Chief
Executive may deem it proper to grant a pardon for
one or more of the offenses without taking action
on the others; and having in mind also the express
provisions of the above cited article 87 of the Penal
Code, we deem it proper to modify the judgment
entered in the court below by substituting for the
penalty imposed by the trial judge under the
provisions of article 89 of the Code, the death
penalty prescribed by law for each of the two
separate asesinatos of which he stands convicted,
and the penalty of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal (for the separate crime of
homicide) ... these separate penalties to be executed
in accord with the provisions of article 87 of the
Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
The doctrine in Balaba was reiterated in U.S. vs.
Jamad43 where a unanimous Court, speaking again thru Mr.
Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm concurring in the
result in view of the Balaba ruling), opined:
For all the offenses of which the accused were
convicted in the court below, the trial judge
imposed the death penalty, that is to say the penalty
prescribed for the most serious crime committed, in
its maximum degree, and for this purpose made use
of the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code
[now article 48 of the Revised Penal Code]. But as
indicated in the case of the United States vs.
Balaba, recently decided wherein the controlling
facts were substantially similar to those in the case
at bar, "all of the penalties corresponding to the
several violations of law" should have been
imposed under the express provisions of article 87
[now engrafted in article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code] and under the ruling in that case, the trial
court erred in applying the provision of article 89
of the code.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court
below should be reversed, ... and that the following
separate penalties should be imposed upon him [the
accused Jamad], to be executed in accordance with
article 87 of the Penal Code: (1) The penalty of
death for the parricide of his wife Aring; (2) the
penalty of life imprisonment for the murder of
Labonete; (3) the penalty of life imprisonment for
the murder of Torres; (4) the penalty of 12 years
and one day of cadena temporal for the frustrated
murder of Taclind ...
The doctrine in Balaba was reechoed in People vs.
Guzman,44 which applied the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, where this Court, after finding the
accused liable as co-principals because they acted in
conspiracy, proceeded to stress that where an "information
charges the defendants with the commission of several
crimes of murder and frustrated murder, as they failed to
object to the multiplicity of the charges made in the
information, they can be found guilty thereof and sentenced
accordingly for as many crimes the information charges
them, provided that they are duly established and proved by
the evidence on record." (Emphasis supplied.)
The legal and statutory justification advanced by the
majority in Balaba for imposing all the penalties (two deaths
and one life imprisonment) corresponding to the offense
charged and proved was article 87 of the old Penal Code
which provided:
When a person is found guilty of two or more
felonies or misdemeanors, all the penalties
corresponding to the several violations of law shall
be imposed, the same to be simultaneously served,
if possible, according to the nature and effects of
such penalties.
in relation to article 88 of the old Code which read:
When all or any of the penalties corresponding to
the several violations of the law can not be
simultaneously executed, the following rules shall
be observed with regard thereto:
1. In the imposition of the penalties, the order of
their respective severity shall be followed so that
they may be executed successively or as nearly as
may be possible, should a pardon have been
granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed,
or should they have been served out.
The essence and language, with some alterations in form and
in the words used by reason of style, of the above-cited
provisions have been preserved in article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code which is the product of the merger of articles 87
and 88 of the old Penal Code. Article 70 provides:
When the culprit has to serve two or more
penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the
nature of the penalties will so permit; otherwise,
the following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their
respective severity shall be followed so that they
may be executed successively or as nearly as may
be possible, should a pardon have been granted as
to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should
they have been served out.
Although article 70 does not specifically command, as the
former article 87 clearly did, that "all the penalties
corresponding to the several violations of law shall be
imposed," it is unmistakable, however, that article 70
presupposes that courts have the power to impose multiple
penalties, which multiple penal sanctions should be served
either simultaneously or successively. This presumption of
the existence of judicial power to impose all the penalties
corresponding to the number and nature of the offenses
charged and proved is manifest in the opening sentence of
article 70: "When the culprit has to serve two or more
penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of
the penalties will so permit ..." (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously, the two or more penalties which the culprit has
to serve are those legally imposed by the proper court.
Another reference to the said judicial prerogative is found in
the second paragraph of article 70 which provides that "in
the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective
severity shall be followed ..." Even without the authority
provided by article 70, courts can still impose as many
penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses
committed, since for every individual crime committed, a
corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single
crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter,
thru the courts ofjustice, has the power to impose the
appropriate penal sanctions.
With respect to the imposition of multiple death penalties,
there is no statutory prohibition or jurisprudential injunction
against it. On the contrary, article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code presumes that courts have the power to mete out
multiple penalties without distinction as to the nature and
severity of the penalties. Moreover, our jurisprudence
supports the imposition of multiple death penalties as
initially advocated in Balaba and thunderously reechoed
in Salazar where the accused was sentenced on appeal to
thirteen (13) death penalties. Significantly, the Court
in Balaba imposed upon the single accused mixed multiple
penalties of two deaths and one life imprisonment.
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by
some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is
contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict like all
mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this
physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned
that the imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical
and futile because after the service of one capital penalty,
the execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally
be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the
multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four
basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing
multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between
imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores
the fact that multiple death sentences could be served
simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of
imposing multiple death penalties.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are
two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of the
proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature,
gravity and number of offenses charged and, proved,
whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity
and character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the
imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does
not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the
service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency
subject to varied factors like successful escape of the
convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the
prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper
penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and
number of the offenses charged and proved and the
corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because
they will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory
reading of article 70 will show that there are only two modes
of serving two or more (multiple)
penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is
that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if
the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of
multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions
does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous
service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a
useless formality, has practical importance. The sentencing
of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible
badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be
accurately projected by the imposition of only one death
sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for
which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character
of the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a
grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no
small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death
penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to an
improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the
utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary
authorities would exercise judicious restraint in
recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise
of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential
prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to
commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life
imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict
has to serve the maximum of forty (40) years of multiple life
sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is
commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to
serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a
single life sentence.
Reverting now to the case at bar, it is our considered view
that the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended
the commission of the murders. We quote with approval the
following incisive observations of the court a quo in this
respect:
Although, there is no direct evidence of conspiracy,
the Court can safely say that there are several
circumstances to show that the crime committed by
the accused was planned. The following
circumstances show beyond any doubt the acts of
conspiracy: First, all those who were killed,
Barbosa, Santos Cruz and Carriego, were Tagalogs.
Although there were many Tagalogs like them
confined in Building 4, these three were singled out
and killed thereby showing that their killing has
been planned. Second, the accused were all armed
with improvised weapons showing that they really
prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused
accomplished the killing with team work precision
going from one brigade to another and attacking
the same men whom they have previously marked
for liquidation and lastly, almost the same people
took part in the killing of Carriego, Barbosa and
Santos Cruz.
It is also important to note that all the accused were inmates
of brigade 4-A; that all were from either the Visayas or
Mindanao except Peralta who is from Masbate and Parumog
who hails from Nueva Ecija; that all were either "OXO"
members or sympathizers; and that all the victims were
members of the "Sigue-Sigue" gang.
The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the
accused acted in concert from the moment they bolted their
common brigade, up until the time they killed their last
victim, Santos Cruz. While it is true that Parumog, Larita
and Luna did not participate in the actual killing of Carriego,
nonetheless, as co-conspirators they are equally guilty and
collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of one is the act
of all. It is not indispensable that a co-conspirator should
take a direct part in every act and should know the part
which the others have to perform. Conspiracy is the
common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in
all the details of the execution of the crime. All those who in
one way or another help and cooperate in the consummation
of a felony previously planned are co-principals. 45 Hence, all
of the six accused are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego,
Barbosa and Santos Cruz — each is guilty of three separate
and distinct crimes of murder.
We cannot agree, however, with the trial court that evident
premeditation was also present. The facts on record and the
established jurisprudence on the matter do not support the
conclusion of the court a quo that evident premeditation "is
always present and inherent in every conspiracy." Evident
premeditation is not inherent in conspiracy as the absence of
the former does not necessarily negate the existence of the
latter.46 Unlike in evident premeditation where a sufficient
period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for
meditation and reflection for the perpetrator to deliberate on
the consequences of his intended deed, conspiracy arises at
the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith decide to commit it. 47 This
view finds added support in People vs. Custodia,48 wherein
this Court stated:
Under normal conditions, where the act of
conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the
attendant deliberation and selection of the method,
time and means of executing the crime, the
existence of evident premeditation can be taken for
granted. In the case before us, however, no such
evidence exists; the conspiracy is merely inferred
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of
the crime. There is no proof how and when the plan
to kill Melanio Balancio was hatched, or what time
elapsed before it was carried out; we are, therefore,
unable to determine if the appellants enjoyed
"sufficient time between its inception and its
fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept
the consequences." (cf. People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil.
91.) In other words, there is no showing of the
opportunity of reflection and the persistence in the
criminal intent that characterize the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation (People vs.
Mendoza, 91 Phil. 58; People vs. Iturriaga, 47 Off.
Gaz., [Supp to No. 12] 166; People vs. Lesada 70
Phil., 525.)
Not a single extenuating circumstance could be appreciated
in favor of any of the six accused, as they did neither allege
nor prove any.
In view of the attendance of the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six accused at
the time of the commission of the offenses were serving
sentences49 in the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa by
virtue of convictions by final judgments the penalty for each
offense must be imposed in its maximum period, which is
the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code. Viada observes, in apposition, that the
severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified
because of his perversity and incorrigibility.50
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as
follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal,
Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are
each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes
of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties;
all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs
of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of
P12,000;51 each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
G.R. NO. 183652               FEBRUARY 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
AAA, PETITIONER,
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION,
MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND
MOISES ALQUIZOLA,  RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and
set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28,
2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private
respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and
Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's
failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004,
private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola
werecharged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel
dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy,
and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,3 to wit:
That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25,
2004 at Alson’s Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an
intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA
at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging
house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once inside said
lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and
JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge
against the will of AAA while accused MOISES
ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her
will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective
counsels, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. 5
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused
Christian John Lim, however, remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her
high school graduation ceremony. Afterwards, they had a
luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del
Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to
the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates
had to perform for an election campaign. She went home at
around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA
told her father that she would be attending a graduation
dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim,
Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one
Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating,
Lim invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which was merely
a walking distance away from Gemeno’s house. Outside the
Alson’s Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco,
Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they
went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor
where they again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy,
Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a
certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they
have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to
which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought
the drinks – two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they
arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two
(2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing
the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never
tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared
their problems with each other. When it was AAA’s turn,
she became emotional and started crying. It was then that
she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and
she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador
Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down
on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and
they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she
told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the
cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed
her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still
forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand up
and make her drink. She even heard Lim say, "Hubuga na,
hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk).
She likewise heard someone say, "You drink it, you drink
it." She leaned on Oporto’s lap again, then she fell asleep.
They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy
bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to
refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly from the
bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying
her down the stairs, and then she was asleep again. When
she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at
the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place
because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall
back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times
that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her,
kissing her on different parts of her body, and having
intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist
when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw
Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room,
watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up
while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private
organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined
and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell
unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day.
She was all alone. Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She
found herself with her shirt on but without her lower
garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed
but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on
her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went
home. When AAA reached their house, her father was
waiting for her and was already furious. When she told them
that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They
brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her
medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital
examined AAA in the morning of March 26, 2004, and
found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and
hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal
smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA.
According to the defense witnesses, in the evening of March
25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner
at Gemeno’s house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend
the graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alson’s Palace,
owned by the latter’s family. When they reached the place,
Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay
Tenazas to fetch one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m.,
Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alson’s Palace but
could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended,
but the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas,
Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles
of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi. Several
persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana,
Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and
Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking were
Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego,
Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain
Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did
not listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During
the drinking session, AAA rested on Oporto’s lap. She even
showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her
legs grazed Batoctoy’s crotch, she remarked, "What was
that, penis?" Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the
latter kissed him back. Oporto did the sameand AAA also
kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other
again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m.,
Moises Alquizola was at the Alquizola Lodging House
drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They
stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested
Alquizola to accompany her to Alson’s Palace to see her
friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and there
they saw AAA lying on Oporto’s lap. Fiel told AAA to go
home because her mother might get angry. AAA could not
look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, "I just stay
here." Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging
house. After thirty minutes, they went to Alson’s Palace
again,and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA
was lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently,
they went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But
she refused and instead instructed them to take her to the
Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem.
AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the
lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached
Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep here for the
meantime." Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where
AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were two
beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay
down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The
latter approached her and they kissed. He then removed her
shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way.
Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while,
Oporto was at the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also
removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it
easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went
to AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the
other hand, placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had
intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts
and went back to Alson’s Palace to get some sleep. When he
left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then
entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said, "Come
Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem." Alquizola
thus started kissing AAA’s breasts. Oporto stood up and
opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio
on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions.
Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name.
Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola
on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two
more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson’s Palace to
sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went
back to the lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up, but
she did not move so they just left and went home. Alquizola
had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m.
However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents
Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted
Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure
of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion
perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00
for and by way of civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of
prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum
of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and another
amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in the
commission of the crime charged, and the court
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to
pay AAA the amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages and another sum of ₱30,000.00 for and by
way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel
Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy and Joseph
Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
therefor beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the
Court acquits them of said charge; and e) Ordering
accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to
pay, jointly and severally, the amount of
₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused
Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola shall be credited to
them and deducted from their prison terms provided they
comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on
26 March 2004 and detained since then up to the present.
Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26
March 2004 and detained since then up to this time, while
accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered
voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered released to the
custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March
2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for his provisional
liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this court,
thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from the
custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files
without prejudice on the prosecution to prosecute the case
against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is
apprehended.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents
brought the case to the CA. On June 6, 2008, the appellate
court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial
court’s ruling and, consequently, acquitted private
respondents. The decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the
Decision on appeal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL
OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove
private respondents’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave
more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that
AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake
and aware of what private respondents were doing before
the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance,
never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged
ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the medical
report which showed the presence of an old hymenal
laceration on AAA’s genitalia, giving the impression that
she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The
CA also stressed that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of
hitting her when she discovered what happened to her
daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who
found out that her child just had premarital sex rather than
one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a
Petition for Certiorari 9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA
Decision which reversed private respondents’ conviction
and ardently contending that the same was made with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
The private respondents present the following arguments in
their Comment dated November 7, 2008 to assail the
petition:
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY
FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION
CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE
IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART
OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED. IV. THE OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE
COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN
ALL CRIMINAL CASES.11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own
Comment on April 1, 2009. It assigns the following errors:
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY
APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE
CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL
AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN
EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.12
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are
meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of
proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the
way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their
purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process
and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally
construed.13 Liberal construction of the rules is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The
relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the
exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when
compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice
requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on their merits and not on sheer technicalities.14
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring
error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment
of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the
prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. 15 Section
21, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the
accused may appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect
of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of
due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null
and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting
petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private
respondents in double jeopardy.17
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the
action, the Court said in People v. Santiago:18
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended
party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or
the private offended party is limited to the civil liability.
Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's
role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General.
Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said
offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect
despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the
trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the
rules state that the petition may be filed by the person
aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State
and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so
he may file such special civil action questioning the decision
or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds.
In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19 Private
respondents argue that the action should have been filed by
the State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against
him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on
behalf of the State. This is because the authority to represent
the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme
Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG.20
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
albeit at the instance of her private counsel, primarily
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved
party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her
name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an
immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely
because she is the subject of the violation. Further, as held in
Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained the private
offended party’s right in a criminal case to file a special civil
action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment
of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor General’s
intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the
complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in
her own name and not in that of the People of the
Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause
in its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling the requirement that all
criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor.23
Private respondents further claim that even assuming,
merely for the sake of argument, that AAA can file the
special civil action for certiorari without violating their right
against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for
petitioner’s failure to previously file a motion for
reconsideration. True, a motion for reconsideration is a
condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for
certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity
to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by
reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-
defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte
or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.24
Here, petitioner’s case amply falls within the exception.
AAA raises the same questions as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of
the private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to
resolve the issues, for any further delay would prejudice the
interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the
Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA
decision is a patent nullity for lack of due process and for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must
be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is
considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is
shown that the prosecution’s right to due process was
violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden
is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that
the respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to
deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice.25
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display
of grave abuse of judicial discretion, totally disregarded her
testimony as well as the trial court’s findings of fact, thereby
adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents’
narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning.
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the
disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of
discretion thus effecting an injustice.27
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently
discharged the burden of proving that the respondent
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely
relied on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly
disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that
its narration of the facts28 of the case was meticulously
culled from the evidence of both parties. But a more careful
perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether
parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that
of Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the accused-
appellants in the case before it. The appellate court merely
echoed the private respondents’ testimonies, particularly
those as to the specific events that transpired during the
crucial period - from the dinner at Gemeno’s house to the
following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a
result, it presented the private respondents’ account and
allegations as though these were the established facts of the
case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling
of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal
must consider the entire evidence presented, regardless of
the party who offered the same. 32 It simply cannot
acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of
the other. It cannot appreciate one party’s cause and brush
the other aside. This rule becomes particularly significant in
this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions
of the incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are
saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the
CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and
outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave
abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioner’s right
to due process.33
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the
observations of the RTC and made its own flimsy findings
to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact,
conscious during the whole ordeal. The fact that she never
showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and
never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the
claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed
consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily
intoxicated at the time of the assault. Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is
committed–
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting
his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital
or anal orifice of another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1)
the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2)
such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of
age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume
hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her
to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated.
They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but
the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at
the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA,
however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act
simply because she did not shout or offer any physical
resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered
weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the
commission of the crime.35 The appellate court never
provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should deserve
scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any
credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the
victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a
judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has
been established that when a woman declares that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean
that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the
test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis
alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the
sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the
guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony
itself.36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not
truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself
to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly
not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as
she narrated her harrowing experience.37
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the
ones who violated her. She tried to resist, but because of the
presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC
found AAA’s testimony simple and candid, indicating that
she was telling the truth. The trial court likewise observed
that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions
were simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of
a rehearsed testimony.38 Thus:
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
xxxx
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you
that you went asleep, when did you regain your
consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the
remaining wine inside the bottle of Emperador
Brandy.
xxxx
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to
drink the remaining contained (sic) of the bottle of
Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to
refuse but they insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can
remember?
A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the
bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
A: When somebody was carrying me down to the
spiral stairs.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who
was or who were carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda
and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened, if any?
A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went
downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember
anymore?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when again did you regain your
consciousness?
A: When we entered the room and the light was
switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the flash of
light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when
you were awakened that (sic) flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the
flash of light, what happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found
that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic)
your reaction?
A: I was saying don’t because I feel pain my
private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic)
those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my
body then he sexually abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on
record, Your Honor, that the witness is crying.
xxxx
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your
Honor.
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto
was found (sic) on top of you, who else was there
inside that room?
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana,
sir.
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what
was he doing?
A: He was at my feet while looking at us.
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?
A: Dressed up, sir.
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he
doing?
A: He was beside us standing and looking at me,
sir.
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?
A: I could not remember, sir.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened?
A: I went asleep again, sir.
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did
you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic)pain something inside my
private part (sic), I saw Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: On top of you?
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.
Q: What was your reaction?
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him
don’t.
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room
when you found Raymund Carampatana?
A: Only the three of them, sir.
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Then after that, what happened?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what
did you feel when you said that you feel (sic)
something in your private part when you saw
Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 o’clock a.m in the next
(sic) day, sir.39
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the
explanation of the defense. It noted that their account of the
events was seemingly unusual and incredible.40 Besides, the
defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and
seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability.
The accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial
stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it
was their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court
by surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized that
when the accused in a rape case claims that the sexual
intercourse between him and the complainant was
consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to
him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative
defense that needs convincing proof, it must be established
with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed
consensual.42 Generally, the burden of proof is upon the
prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime
and that it is the accused who is responsible for its
commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction
must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.43 Burden of evidence
is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any
particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in
his favor or to overthrow one when created against him. A
prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of
proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding
and adjudication for him of the issue in
litigation.44 However, when the accused alleges consensual
sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love
notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the
romantic or sexual relationship between the offender and his
supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of
the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to
prove his defense by substantial evidence. 45
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal
knowledge of AAA but unfortunately failed to discharge the
burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that upon
reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on
the bed and looked at him. He then approached her and they
kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere. Thereafter,
Oporto also removed AAA’s lower garments and then went
to kiss AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in between
AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her.46 On the other
hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse
with AAA three times. While Carampatana was removing
AAA’s shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot
of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and
AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to
pull the clothes down. When Carampatana left after having
sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then
stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so that
AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to
have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went
outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few
minutes, he woke up and went back to the room and again
had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after
some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting.
Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and
last time.47 Despite said shameless admission, however, the
accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any
physical resistance on AAA’s part amounts to approval or
permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual
intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not
simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time,
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
and therefore could not have given a valid and intelligent
consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense
witnesses, was showy and exaggerated when testifying, even
flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her
testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness. 48 To be
believed, the testimony must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the attending circumstances.49
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial
court is in a better position than the appellate court to
properly evaluate testimonial evidence. 50 Matters of
credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in
a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the
weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses
who have personally appeared before him.51 The appellate
courts are far detached from the details and drama during
trial and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its
review. On the matter of credence and credibility of
witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said
limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court
whose findings must be given due deference. 52 Since the CA
and the private respondents failed to show any palpable
error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact
of the trial court, these findings deserve great weight and are
deemed conclusive and binding.53
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining
physician found old hymenal laceration on AAA’s private
organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is
expected to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is
involuntary, could mean that AAA actually consented to the
fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is
consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion
of the penis will not cause any laceration. It presumed that
complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent considering
the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have
resulted from her previous sexual encounters. The defense,
however, failed to show that AAA was sexually
promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex
orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17
years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated
from high school on that same day. In a similar case, 54 the
Court held: x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented
to have sexual intercourse with two men — or three,
according to Antonio Gallardo — in the presence of each
other, unless she were a prostitute or as morally debased as
one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication
that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student,
can be so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in
court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her
youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason
why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the
commission of the crime charged.55
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her
claim were not true.56 And even if she were indeed highly
promiscuous at such a young age, the same could still not
prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a
complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still
be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim of
rape. The victim’s moral character in rape is immaterial
where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was
deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through
intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex
with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal
knowledge of a woman against her consent. 57 A freshly
broken hymen is not one of its essential elements. Even if
the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of
rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry
into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration
of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To
repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the
woman’s genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for
rape.58 Neither does AAA’s mother’s act of hitting her after
learning about the rape prove anything. It is a truism that
"the workings of the human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react
differently."59 Different people react differently to a given
type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the
frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her
daughter had been defiled after partying late the night
before. It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that
private complainant was impelled by improper motive in
making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is
entitled to full faith and credence. 61 So if AAA in fact
consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to
immediately tell her parents about it when she could have
just kept it to herself? Why did she ever have to shout rape?
She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the
private respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a
relationship with any of them of which her family
disapproved.63 She never became pregnant as a result of the
deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why
would she have to drag the private respondents into the case
and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance
indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the
private respondents simply because she was, in fact, violated
and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the
case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private
respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks justice
for her honor that has been debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA
chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings
are against the logic and effect of the facts as presented by
AAA in support of her complaint,65 contrary to common
human experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant
laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not
part of the conspiracy because his participation in the crime
was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his
participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to
commit the crime of rape. 68 The Court, however, finds that
the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola’s liability is not of a
conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient
that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to
the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors
committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective
pursued in concert.69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest
on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the
collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission
of the offense.70
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to
Gregorio's and Dominador's participation in the crime
conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were
carrying weapons during the mauling and whether they
participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the
victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that
they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal
blow is not necessary.1âwphi1 In this case, the rule is not
applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and
Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation in the
crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of
the lower courts that there was conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually
ravished the victim based on the testimony of the private
complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis
to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie
Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private parts,
accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the
bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three
of them conspired and mutually helped one another in
raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with
[AAA], his tacit and spontaneous participation and
cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep,
molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission
of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was
properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of the
crime.73
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola’s
participation in the crime is not at all uncertain. As the
caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a
room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and
furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently
watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused
AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his
companions. He even admitted to kissing AAA’s lips,
breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was
conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to
sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act
of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally
guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC
found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he
appealed from the decision of the trial court, 74 he waived the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw
the whole case open to the review of the appellate court,
which is then called upon to render such judgment as law
and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
accused-appellant.75
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed
only a single Information, it, however, actually charged the
accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or
information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the
same is defective.76 The rationale behind this rule
prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give
the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against
him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense.
The State should not heap upon the accused two or more
charges which might confuse him in his defense. 77 Non-
compliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule117 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the
same in a motion to quash before he enters his
plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.80 The
accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply
because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the
validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus,
they are deemed to have waived their right to question the
same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the
accused are merely different counts specifying the acts of
perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is
no duplicity to speak of.81 There is likewise no violation of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against them because the Information, in fact, stated that
they "took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will
of AAA" on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations made
and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that
AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here,
according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA,
Carampatana positioned himself in between her legs and had
intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted
that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When
two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial,
the court may convict him of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper
penalty for each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and
Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of
rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy
extant among the three of them during the commission of
each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be
held liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But
while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual
organ into AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot convict him of
rape through sexual assault therefor because the same was
not included in the Information. This is, however, without
prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual
assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape
committed by two or more persons is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC.
But in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender and the absence of an aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them, 84 for each
count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper
imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the
penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a
divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the
minimum of which shall be within the range of prision
mayor(the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion
temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the
range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there
being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance. 85
With that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of
rape committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No.
9344,87which extends even to one who has exceeded the
age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed
the crime when he was still a child, 88 and provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:89
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict
with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower
court, the foregoing provision should be taken into
consideration by the judge in order to accord children in
conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond
twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment
envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary
damages of ₱30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of
an example and to deter others from committing the same
bestial acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders
judgment:
a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund
Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each case;
b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four ( 4)
counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, in each
case; and
c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four ( 4)
counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each
case.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay
AAA, jointly and severally, the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4)
counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344. Let the records of this case be
forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
DIRECT PROOF IS NOT NECESSARY
G.R. NO. 209373               JULY 30, 2014
JOEL YONGCO AND JULIETO
LAÑOJAN, PETITIONERS,
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  RESPONDENT.
X-- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- X
G.R. NO. 209414
ANECITO TANGIAN, JR., PETITIONER,
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This treats of the consolidated Petitions for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 125 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision 1 and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00549-MIN, dated
January 21, 2013 and September 10, 2013, respectively.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Said rulings affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Decision convicting petitioners of qualified theft.
The Facts
Petitioners Joel Yongco, Julieta Lafiojan, and Anecito
Tangian, Jr. were employees of the City Government of
Iligan. Tangian worked as a garbage truck driver for the city,
while Yongco and Lañojanwere security guards assigned to
protect the premises of the City Engineer’s Office (CEO).
On November 14, 2005, an Information was filed before the
RTC, Branch 5 in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte charging the
three with Qualified Theft. The information docketed as
Crim. Case No. 12092 reads:
That on or about April 16, 2005, in the City of Ilagan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then regular and casual
employees of the City government as drivers and helpers
respectively, of a garbage truck with Plate No. 496,
conspiring and confederating togetherand mutually helping
each other, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon
them by the city government, and with intent to gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away the following articles, to wit: one (1)
unit transmission, boom, differential of Tamaraw and l-
beam of Nissan with a total value of ₱40,000.00, belonging
to the City government of Ilagan, represented by Atty.
Rommel Abragan of the City Legal Office, Iligan City,
withoutthe consent and against the will of the said owner in
the aforesaid sum of ₱40,000.00, Philippine Currency.2
During the arraignment held on February 16, 2006, accused
petitioners entered a plea of not guilty tothe offense charged.
Pre-trial was then conducted and closed on July 25, 2006.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented as one ofits witnesses a casual
employee of the city government, Pablo Salosod,who
testified that on April 16, 2005 at around 1:30 a.m., while
attending a wake at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor, he was
fetched and requestedby petitioner Tangian to accompany
him to the CEO. At the office garage, Salosod and his fellow
garbage collectors were allegedly directed by petitioners
Tangian and Yongco to load car parts that petitioners
considered aswaste items, the subject items of the theft, on
the truck driven by Tangian. They then drove to Tominobo,
Iligan City where the materials were unloaded in front of
Delfin Junk Store, and before the truck left the shop,
Salosod allegedly saw petitioner Lañojan giving a thumbs-
up sign to Tangian. On the way back, Tangian allegedly
confessed to Salosod that it was Lañojan who requested that
the items be brought at the junk shop. Another employee,
Rommel Ocaonilla, corroborated the testimony of Salosod.
Prosecution witness Oliveros Garcia meanwhile testified
witnessing the unloading of the items in front of the junk
store, after which, Lañojan covered the items up with a sack.
The following morning, he allegedly saw Lañojan’s brother-
in-law, who coincidentally works at the shop, take the items
inside.
Witnesses Dioscoro Galorio and Atty. Ulysses Lagcao,
employee and consultant of the city government,
respectively, testified that they conducted investigations
relative to the incidentand found out that the items stolen
consisted of one Nissan transmission,one unit boom, one
Nissan I-beam, and one differential of Tamaraw, with total
valuation of PhP 12,000. Upon their investigation, they
recommended tothe city legal officer the filing of the present
criminal case against the three petitioners.
Version of the Defense
In defense, petitioners testified intheir behalves. Their
testimony is summarized by the CA in the Decision now on
appeal in the following wise:
Joel Yongco, 34, single, x x x and a casual employee,
testified that, on August 9, 2004, he was issued a Job Order
and detailed at the Civil Security Unit (CSU). He was
assigned to guard the building installation of the CEO. On
April 15, 2005, he was on duty with his companion, one Mr.
Quintana. They relieved Lañojan and one Mr. Enumerables.
Lañojan gave him (Yongco) four gate passes and saidthat
the area would have to be cleared because the "Bacod"
Iliganvehicle would be arriving. Yongco read the entries on
one of[the] gate passes. Theyread: "Loaded assorted scraps
with remark to be thrown atthe dump site." At the bottom of
the gate pass was the "note" of EngineerCabahug with the
signatures of the guards, Lañojan and Enumerables. From
5:00 PM to 12:00 midnight on April 15, 2005, there was
only one shipment of scrap iron to the dump site. The dump
truck driven by Tangian entered the CEO premises at around
11:00 o’clock in the evening of the same date. Tangian went
to the yard where the scrap iron were situated and asked
Yongco to accompany and help him. Tangian gathered the
scrap materials and the four of them (Tangian, Yongco, and
the 2 helpers of Tangian) loaded the said scrap to the dump
truck. At around 12:45 P.M., after loading the items,
Tangian drove away without giving a gate pass to the guards
on duty. Yongco did not ask Tangian for a gate pass because
Yongco had one companion in the guard house to get the
gate pass.
Julieto Lañojan, 48, who was working in the CSU division
for 20 years and assigned to guard the CEO, testified that he
was not on duty on April 15 and 16, 2005; he was on duty
on April 14, 2005 at 7:00 A.M. up to April 15, 2005 of the
same time. When Yongco and Quintana relieved him on
April 15, 2005 at 7:00 in the morning, he gave the four gate
passes which were used to ship outassorted scrap irons to
them to be kept for the file. Engineer Cabahug was the one
who directed the removal of the scrap iron because the area
of the CEO would have to be cleared since new trucks for
the government were coming. His house, which was along
the national highway, was about 40-50 metersaway from
Delfin Junk Store. He knew Oliveros Garcia who was a
kagawad of Tominobo, Iligan City. Aside from that, Garcia
had filed an ejectment case against him (Lañojan), which
was still pending in court.
xxxx
Anecito Tangian, Jr., 59, garbage truck driver at the City
Engineer’s Office for 16 years, testified that his highest level
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
of educational attainment was Grade I. It was his tour of
duty on April 15, 2005 at 9:00 o’clock in the evening up to
April 16, 2005 at 6:00 o’clock in the morning. At around
5:30 in the morning of April 15, 2005, Lañojan asked him to
load scrap materials onto the garbage truck and to bring
them to the Delfin Junk Store in Tominobo. He asked
Lañojan if there were any problems about the loading ofthe
said items. Lañojan answered that there were no problems
about the loading of the same, that the City Garbage would
have to be cleared considering that "BACOD" trucks would
be arriving at thatarea. He followed Lañojan because the
latter was the guard at the City Garage. When hearrived for
duty at the City Garage at around 9:00 in the evening,
Yongco asked him if Lañojan already informed him about
the loading of the items. After that he checked up the
garbage truck while Yongco and the two helpers were
loading the items. He did not know how many items were
loaded because he only helped the three of them during the
loading of the differential. After loading the scrap materials,
Tangian and the two helpers drove away from the City
Garage. They dropped by the Cosmo Funeral Homes for
more than an hour before they proceeded to Tominobo.
When they reached Delfin Junk Store, Lañojan gave a
thumbs-up sign to Tangian, which meant okay. He then left
and started his work collecting garbage.3
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 11, 2008, the RTC held petitioners liable for
qualified theft via conspiracy. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused Julieto Lañojan, Anecito Tangian, Jr., and Joel
Yongco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Theft defined and penalized under Article 310 in
relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and the
said accused are hereby sentencedto a penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years, eight (8) monthsand twenty
(20) days of prision correccionalmaximum as the minimum
term, to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision
mayormaximum, as the maximum term, of their
indeterminate sentence including the accessory penalties
thereof.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, petitioners, in their appeal, prayed that the CA
reverse the RTC Decision. Petitioner Tangian reiterated in
his Brief that he should not be considered as a conspirator
since he merely innocentlyobeyed Lañojan’s instructions on
the assumption that the latter was his superior and that
Lañojan was authorized to get rid of the scrap materials in
the CEO premises and that he had no criminal intent
whatsoever.
In their joint brief, Yongco and Lañojan also disclaimed the
existence of a conspiracy. Yongco, in his defense, argued
that Tangian and his two other helpers asked for his
assistance which he extended ingood faith, in view of
Lañojan’s statement earlier that day that the office garage
has to be cleared. Lañojan, on the other hand, insisted that
he cannot be considered as a conspirator since he was not
present at the time of taking, and that the mere giving of a
thumbs-up sign to Tangian when the latter delivered the
materials to the junk shop does not amount to conspiracy.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 21, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision
denying petitioners’ appeals. In affirming the RTC Decision
in toto, the CA ruled that there was indeed conspiracy
because Tangian could nothave taken out the items without
a gate pass, but with the security guard Yongco’s
participation, he was able to do justthat. The CA also ruled
that it is implausible that Tangian would just leave the items
in front of the junk shop unattended. Thus, the appellate
court appreciated the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that Lañojan’s presence was not merely
coincidental and that his thumbs-up and his subsequent act
of covering the materials with sacks indicate that the plan
was for him to receive the said items. Petitioners, via motion
for reconsideration, sought the CA’s reversal of the Decision
only for the appellate court to deny the same through its
challenged Resolution dated September 10, 2013.
Not contented with the adverted Decision of the CA as
reiterated in the Resolution, petitioners Yongco and Lañojan
jointly filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari while
petitioner Tangian separately filed his own.1âwphi1 The two
petitions were later consolidated by this Court for resolution
herein.
The Issue
As with most criminal cases, the main issue in the instant
case is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining petitioners’
conviction. Central to resolving this issue is determining
whether or not there indeed existed conspiracy between
petitioners in committing the offense charged.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are bereft of merit.
Article 310, in relation to Art. 308,of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) defines Qualified Theft, thusly:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft.—Theft is committed by
any person who, with intent to gain but without violence,
against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property,
shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously
damaged the property of another, shall remove or
make use of the fruits or objects of the damage
caused by him; and
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or
a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its
owner, shall hunt or fishupon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals, or other forestor farm
products.
xxxx
ART. 310. Qualified Theft.—The crime of theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if
committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fishtaken from a fishpond or
fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (emphasis
added)
Synthesizing the foregoing provisions, the elements of
Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of discretion,
can simply be enumerated as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.5
As correctly observed by the appellatecourt, all of the
elements of Qualified Theft are present in this case, viz:
There is no dispute that the items (transmission, boom arm,
differential assembly, and I-beam) which are the subject
matter of this case belong to the CEO of Iligan
City.1âwphi1 There is no dispute that these items, although
considered "heap of scrap," have not yet been declared
unserviceable or waste by the proper authority or office. Nor
have they been marked for proper disposal. Unless properly
disposed in accordance with Section 379 of the Local
Government Code, these items are still government
properties or owned by the City of Iligan.
There is also no dispute that these items were taken away
from the CEO and were already under completeand effective
control of the persons taking the same. This is because these
items were loaded onto the garbage truck driven by Tangian
and brought to Tominobo at the Delfin Junk Store.
Apparently, the taking of these items was without the
consent of the CEO of Iligan City because there was no gate
pass issued to that effect. Evidence shows that when the
garbage truck left the premises of the CEO, no gate pass was
surrendered by Tangian. Yongco did not bother to ask for a
gate pass on the pretext that there was another guard on duty
at the gate.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act that is
presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the
thing subject to asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. Since these
items werebrought to the junk store, intent to gain becomes
obvious. The presumption of animus lucrandihas not been
overturned.
It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done
with grave abuse of confidence. The accused in this case,
itbears stressing, were guards and drivers with access tothe
entrance and exit of the CEO premises. In other words,they
enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed on them by their
employer (the City ofIligan) to haveaccess throughout the
CEO premises on account of their respective duties. More so
since the primary function of the CSU is to guard the
properties, including the said items, of the CEO. It was this
trust and confidence that was gravely abused by them that
makes the theft qualified.6
Concisely stated, the fact of taking without consent is
indubitable. Indeed, petitioners hinge their plea for acquittal
and supporting argument primarily on their lack of criminal
intent and the observed conspiracy.
Addressing the issue head on, We uphold the findings of the
appellate court. No error can be ascribed to the CA when it
determined the existence of conspiracy between and among
petitioners in this case.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit
it.7 Well-settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of
a previousagreement is not necessary as it may be deduced
from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated.8 It may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during, or after the commission of the crime
which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a
community of criminaldesign, as the proof of conspiracy is
frequently made by evidenceof a chain of circumstances.9
In the case at bar, even though there is no showing of a prior
agreement among the accused, their separate acts taken and
viewed together are actually connected and
complementedeach other indicating a unity of criminal
design and purpose.10
Tangian’s complicity in the illicit deedwas manifest from
the fact, as he himself admitted, that he was the one who
personally transported the stolen items from the CEO to the
junkshop. His claim that he was not aware of any
irregularity in the act he performed is rendered dubious by
his 16 years of service as truck driver for the City of Iligan.
To be sure, his record of service argues against his claim of
ignorance of the standard protocol that a gate pass to be
issued by the CEO property custodian should first be
secured before taking out items from the CEO compound,
including alleged waste materials. He should also know
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
better than to assume that Lañojan can authorize the
withdrawal of items without the requisite gate pass since
Lañojan’s duty, as security guard, is precisely to prevent the
same.
Similarly, Yongco’s claim of good faith is belied by his own
admission that he knew of the office procedure that a gate
pass is required every time something is taken out of the
CEO premises. In fact, four gate passes were given to him
that morning by Lañojan, covering waste materials
withdrawn during the latter’s shift. At the very least, this
should have reminded him of his duty to demand a gate pass
for property leaving the CEO premises. Neither memory
lapses orlapses in the performance of his duty will explain
Yongco’s failure to demand a gate pass.The only viable
explanation is that he was in connivance with other
petitioners.11
Lastly, the RTC, with valid reason, tagged Lañojan as
having instigated and marshalled the entire scheme. To
quote the trial court:
x x x As shown above, it appears that Lañojan broached the
idea to Yongco that the items subject of this case will be
withdrawn under the pretext of clearing the CEO scrap yard
of unserviceable waste materials. Then Lañojan gave
Yongco 4 gate passes apparently to be used to coverup or
camouflage the actual withdrawallater that evening. Then
Lañojan told Tangian to load the items under the same ploy
of clearing the scrap yard of unserviceable waste materials
and that they will not encounter any problem. Finally,
Lañojan was seen by Brgy. Kag. Oliveros Garcia at 1:30
o’clock in the morning of April 16, 2005 receiving the items
as they were dumped near the Delfin Junk Store,Tominobo,
Iligan City. After the items were dumped, Lañojan then gave
Tangian the "thumbs-up" sign, meaning everything is okay –
clear proof of meeting of minds between Tangian and
Lañojan, and their collusion to steal the items under the
pretext of disposing unserviceable waste materials. This
non-verbal "thumbs-up" sign was also seenby the truck
helper Salosod.12 x x x
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Once
conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are answerable
as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their
participation.13 The guilt of one is the guilt of all. It is
common design which is the essence of conspiracy—
conspirators may act separately or together in different
manners but always leading to the same unlawful result. The
character and effect of conspiracy are not to be adjudged by
dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by
looking at it as a whole—acts done to giveeffect to
conspiracy may be, in fact, wholly innocent acts. 14 Applying
this doctrine in the case at bench, it can reasonably be
concluded that despite Lañojan’s lack of physical
participation in hauling the items to Tangian’s truck and
bringing them to the junk shop, he can still be liable for
Qualified Theft via conspiracy. All told, there is no cogent
reason for us todisturb the findings of the appellate court,
affirmatory of those of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated
petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The CA's
January 21, 2013 Decision and September 10, 2013
Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 00549-MIN are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 205298               SEPTEMBER 10, 2014
EOPOLDO QUINTOS Y
DELAMOR, PETITIONER,
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the
Decision2 dated 31 July 2012 and Resolution3 dated 11
January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
33776, affirming the Joint Decision4 dated 20 October 2010
of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (trial
court) in Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342.
The Facts
Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor (p~titioner) was
charged, in conspiracy with his brothers Pedro, Rolly and
Lando, all surnamed Quintos, and Narciso Bµni for
frustrated homicide and homicide.
The Information5 in Criminal Case No. L-8341 reads, in
part:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy.
Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in
conspiracywith each other, with intent to kill, did then and
there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul
and hack with bolo and samurai Robert M. dela Cruz who
suffered hacking wounds, several lacerations and contusions
on the different parts of his body, thus, the accused
performedall the acts of execution which would produce
homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention
applied on him that prevented his death, to the prejudice and
damage of the said Robert dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Information6 in Criminal Case No. L-8342 reads, in
part:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy.
Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in
conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and
there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul
and hack with bolo and samurai Felomina dela Cruz who
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
suffered hacking wounds and several lacerations on the
different parts of her body, thus, the accused performed all
the acts of execution which would produce homicide as a
consequence but which,nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of the timely medical intervention applied on him
that prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice and damage
of the said Felomina dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In Criminal Case No. L-8340, an Amended
Information7 was filed when the victim Freddie dela Cruz
died:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy.
Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in
conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and
hack with bolo and samurai Freddie dela Cruz who suffered
hacking wounds on the different parts of his body, which
caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Freddie dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni and
petitioner were arrested. Rolly and Lando evaded arrest and
remainat large. Petitioner, Pedro and Narciso all pled not
guilty to the charges brought against them.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Eduardo
Oyando, Felomina dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Police
Officer Bernardo Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez.
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, petitioner and
Pedro Quintos. Narciso Buni jumped bail before he could
testify. Petitioner’s sister was also scheduled to testify, but
since her testimony would only be corroborative, the
prosecution admitted her testimony.8
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution established that at about 3:30 p.m. of 15
January 2008, Freddie dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz,
Felomina dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando were walking
along the barangay road of Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan.
They were on their way to the town proper when they were
accosted by Pedro Quintos, Rolly Quintos, Lando
Quintos,Narciso Buni and petitioner. Pedro was wielding a
samurai, Lando, Narciso and petitioner were carrying bolos,
and Rolly was holding a big stone. Robert, Freddie,
Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando ran
back towards their house, but the five attackers caught up
with them.
Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz withthe samurai, but the latter
parried the attack with his left hand. Robert dela Cruz
attempted to gain control of the samurai, but Rolly hit him in
the face, near the jaw, with the stone Rolly was carrying.
Robert dela Cruz lost his hold of the samurai and fell to the
ground.
Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his head,
which caused the latter to fall face up. Petitioner joined
Lando in hacking Freddie dela Cruz, who, while defending
himself with his hands, sustained injuries on his right hand
and lost a few fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed Freddie
dela Cruz’s chest with the same stone he usedto hit Robert
dela Cruz in the face.
Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as the latter
moved towards Robert dela Cruz. Pedro pulledFelomina
dela Cruz’s hair, slashed her nape with the samurai, and then
kicked her to the ground.
Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and was
prevented from helping the dela Cruzes because Narciso
Buni was aiming a bolo at him. The attackers left when they
were done, and only then was Eduardo Oyando able to
approach the victims and call for help.
Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were
brought to the hospital. They were treated for the injuries
sustained from the attack.
After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz diedfrom his injuries.
Before he died, Freddie dela Cruz identified Pedro and
Lando Quintos as his attackers.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented a different version of the events. In
the afternoon of 15 January 2008, Robert, Freddie,
Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando
came to the Quintos’ house looking for trouble. Pedro, who
was in the front portion ofthe house, went out to try and
pacify them. Robert dela Cruz punched Pedro first, hitting
him in the face. Robert dela Cruz then went to Felomina
dela Cruz and took a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter
was holding. Pedro and Robert dela Cruz grappled for the
bolo. Felomina dela Cruz approached the two and tried to
help Robert dela Cruz, and in the process got slashed with
the bolo. The scuffle resulted in Robert dela Cruz falling to
the ground and Pedro gaining control of the bolo.
Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding
a bolo, was fighting with Lando. Pedro hurried over and
hacked Freddie dela Cruz to defend his brother Lando.
According to Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not
remember how many times hehacked Freddie dela Cruz. His
brothers pacified him, and Pedro went with them back to the
house; while Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed
dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the
prosecution. Petitioner was found guilty for the crime of
homicide for the death of Freddie dela Cruz. However, the
trial court held that the uncertainty on the nature of the
wounds of Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
warrants the appreciation of a lesser gravity of the crime
from frustrated homicide to attempted homicide.9
The dispositive portion ofthe Joint Decision dated 20
October 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court
finds:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8340
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and
NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for Homicide is
reclusion temporalwhich is from twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from
the penalty one (1) degree lower than the imposable penalty
which is Prision Mayorin its full extent, the range of which
is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Appreciating no mitigating circumstances in favor of the
accused, the accused is accordingly sentenced from EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as maximum.
Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie
Dela Cruz, the amounts of (a) Php 75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php
57,286.00 as actual damages; (d) and Php 15,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8341
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and
NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an
indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day
of arresto mayoras minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccionalas maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz
actual damages in the amount of Php 1,650.00and moral
damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8342
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and
NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an
indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day
or arresto mayoras minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccionalas maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela
Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php 3,750.00 and
moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo
Quintos have undergone preventive imprisonment,they shall
be credited in the service of their sentences with the time
they have undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the
conditionsprovided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court gravely erred
in convicting them despite the prosecution’s failure to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of merit, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the
assailed Joint Decision dated October 20, 2010of the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39,
inCriminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342 is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: (1) affirming the
conviction, despite the prosecution’s failure to prove
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) finding
that conspiracy exists, in particular, that a finding of
conspiracy should not be leftto conjecture, in light of the
alleged failure of the prosecution to present evidence that
petitioner took part in inflicting injuries on the victims in
furtherance ofa common design to kill.12
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Review of Questionsof Fact Improper
The review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is limited to questions of law. This Court does not weigh all
over again the evidence already consideredin the
proceedings below.13 The narrow ambit of review prescribed
under this rule allows us to swiftly dispose of such appeals.
This rule, of course, admits of exceptions applicable to those
rare petitions whose peculiar factual milieu justifies
relaxation of the Rules such as based on speculation or
conjectures, or overlooked undisputed facts which, if duly
considered, lead to a different conclusion.14
In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the decisions of
the trial and appellate courts, alleging that had the said
courts given weight to the defense evidence, conviction
would not have been justified. This is clearly an invitation
for the Court to review the probative value of the evidence
presented in the proceedings below.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
A question of law arises when there isdoubt as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.15 For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants.16 Once it is clear that
the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact.17
Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts by alleging
that the courts a quo indulged in conjectures and surmises.
However, a careful reading of the decisions of the trial and
appellate courts shows that such is not the case here. The
discussion of the trial court deals extensively with evidence
from both sides, weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the
appellate court evaluated the evidenceof the prosecution and
the defense alike.
Uniform findings of factof the trial and appellate courts
deserve grave respect, and in the absence of any compelling
reason to deviate therefrom, are final and conclusive upon
this Court. We thus proceed with our review without
disturbing the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Petitioner avers that his conviction was not supported by
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His
argumentrevolves mainly on self-defense, defense of
relatives and absence of conspiracy.
We are not persuaded. The records of this case show that the
prosecution witnesses Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz
and Felomina dela Cruz positively and consistently
identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events.
Their testimonies are corroborated by the evidence
presented by the doctors who attended the hacking victims,
as well as by the police officer who took the statement
ofFreddie dela Cruz before the latter died.
We must emphasize that the trial court found the
prosecution witnesses credible. The assessment ofthe trial
court on this point is generally binding on this Court, and
noneof the exceptions to this rule are obtaining here.
Further, the trial court found that the prosecution witnesses
did not have any motive to testify falsely against the
accused.
Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert dela Cruz and
Freddie dela Cruz, and hitting Felomina dela Cruz, invoking
self-defense. Because of Pedro’s admissions, he and his co-
conspirators assumed the burden to establish such defense
by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, the same admissions would lead to their
conviction.18
We held in People v. Nugas:
x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it
is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence
or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the
accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on
the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the
State’s evidence, because the existence of self-defense is a
separate issue from the existence ofthe crime, and
establishing selfdefense does not require orinvolve the
negation of any of the elements of the offense itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (a) the victim
committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or
imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming
self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and
(c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation
executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the
proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression. 19
Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked
Freddie in defense of their brother Lando.20 The defense of
relatives argument likewise fails in light of the lack of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. For the
accused to be entitled to exoneration based on defense of
relatives, complete or incomplete, it is essential that there be
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if there is
no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent
or repel.21
The discussion of the Court of Appeals on this point is well-
taken:
We are hardly persuaded by accused-appellants’ allegations
that they were acting in self-defense because the victims
were committing unlawful aggression. We foundthe
following loopholes:
First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela Cruzes were
shouting for the brothers of Pedro tocome out of the house.
No actual sudden or imminent attack, however, was
performed. It has been ruled that mere intimidating or
threatening words, even if said aloud, do not constitute
unlawful aggression. Thus, in People vs. Cajurao, the
Supreme Court held that:
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless
there is clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression
on the partof the victim. The unlawful aggression, a
constitutive element of self-defense, must be real or at least
imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person
is about to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating
or threatening attitude is by no means enough. Unlawful
aggressionpresupposes an actual or imminent danger on the
life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an[d] intimidating or
threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack
that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very
least is clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or
merely a threatening stance or posture.
Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were
shouting for his brothers to go out, but then, Pedro was the
one who went out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes had some
anger or aggression at that time, it was definitely not
directed at Pedro.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro
and Robert dela Cruz engaged in a fist fight. Robert turned
and ran towards his mother, Felomina to allegedly get a bolo
which was in Felomina’s possession and concealed under a
towel. Ifthis is true, Robert had already retreated and was
trying to arm himself to level the supposed fight with Pedro.
Thus, from Pedro’s narration, itcannot be definitely said that
the dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants
with the determined intention to inflict serious harm on
Pedro.
Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to defend his
brother Lando Quintos who was lying on the ground and
being attacked by the deceased Freddie dela Cruz.
According to him, he hacked Freddie before the latter could
stab Lando. Pedro would like to impress upon the court that
Lando was also involved in the fight against the dela Cruzes.
However, in the same testimony, Pedro said that it was he
alone who was fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and
that his brothers, including Lando, were "just there, sir,
pacifying."
Third, despite the alleged savagery that transpired,
surprisingly, accused-appellants did not report the incident
to the police. During crossexamination, Pedro admitted that:
Q: After you were threatened and you did not report of the
alleged incident that happened on January 15 as what you
are telling now?
A: No sir.
Q: In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the
hospital and you were treated you did not even rel[a]y to the
police or even to your barangay the alleged incident which
you are now narrating, am I correct?
A: I was not able to report anymore because after I was
treated to the hospital I was brought directly to the jail, sir.
It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances. We find it difficult to believe that
accused-appellants, who vehemently claim to be the
aggrieved parties, did not report the incident tothe police.
Pedro’s alleged treatment or confinement in the hospital did
notprevent them from doing so. Pedro had at least three
brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando; not to mention his mother
and sister, who could have easily gone to the police to report
the alleged attack upon them by the delaCruzes. This
omission, therefore, casts doubt on the veracity of the
account of the accused-appellants.
Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased
and the other victims negate[s] the accused-appellants’
claim of self-defense. According to the medical certificate of
Freddie dela Cruz, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest,
septicemia and multiple hacking wounds. Then, in the death
certificate, it was further stated that Freddie dela Cruz
suffered "amputation of left and right hand." Meanwhile,
with respect to Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician,
Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez, testified that the victim suffered
lacerated wounds on the forehead, lower lip and left hand.
As for Felomina dela Cruz, she also suffered almost similar
lacerated wounds.
It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of
wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location
disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined
effort to kill the victim[s]. In the case at bar, as already
explained, the wounds on Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all
surnamed dela Cruz, negate accused-appellant’s claim of
self-defense.
We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to the evidence
presented by the prosecution and this Court believes that the
version of the latter is more credible and consistent with the
truth. As a matter of fact, by simply admitting that they
attacked Freddie dela Cruz and the two other victims, the
case against the accused-appellants had become irrefutable.
x x x.22
Existence of Conspiracy
Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not present
evidence of his participation in the attacks on Robert dela
Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz. He also argues that his mere
presence during the said attacks does not by itself show
concurrence of wills and unity of purpose.
Petitioner’s presence during the commission of the crime
was wellestablished as he himself testified to that
fact.1âwphi1 Assuming that he was merely present during
the attack, inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt
himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have
performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from
the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the
commission thereof.23
Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy.
However, neither does it indicate the lack thereof
Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts
of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest.24 In fact, the prosecution established that petitioner
was actively involved in the attack on Freddie dela Cruz.
In People v. De Leon,25 we held:.
x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every
act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by
the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks
which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact,
constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their. common
criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or
mo[r]ality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on
Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz disclose his
agreement with the joint purpose and design in the
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
commission of the felony. The facts, found by the trial and
appellate courts,.establish that petitioner, together with his
brothers and Narciso Buni, all of them armed, accosted the
dela Cruzes, and gave chase even as the latter were
retreating towards their house. During the attacks, each
conspirator had a different task. After the attacks, all the
accused left the felled dela Cruzes for dead, clearly showing
their united purpose in the felonies committed. The act of
one is the act of all. With the conspiracy proved, the
conviction of petitioner was in order.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 2012 and the
Resolution dated 11 January 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No.
33776.
SO ORDERED.
DETACHING FROM CONSPIRACY
1. BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME,
EFFECT THEREOF.
G.R. NO. 112429-30 JULY 23, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS.
MICHAEL NUÑEZ Y SEVILLA,  ACCUSED.
RODOLFO CAYETANO Y
PANGILINAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
ROMERO, J.:
Stealing with intent to gain, from being a simple,
uncomplicated act in times past, albeit unlawful, has evolved
into more elaborate schemes guaranteed to filch money from
a person with the least risk of being caught on the part of the
felon.
Those with grandiose designs of victimizing the wealthy
have, with alarming frequency, resorted to kidnapping,
snatching not only their intended victims, but the families of
the latter, as well. Within the past few years, so steep has
been the incidence in the crime of kidnapping for ransom
that on December 31, 1993, Republic Act No. 7659 went
into effect, categorizing the same as a heinous crime
punishable by death.1
In the instant case which occurred before said law was
passed, two high school lads were duped by the accused into
going with him. One was to be used for purposes of
extricating ransom from his businessman father. But the
other, the son of impecunious parents, was subsequently
bound hands and feet, gagged and drowned in a river like a
rat, with absolutely no chance of survival.
The facts of this shocking case are as follows:
Accused-appellant Rodolfo Cayetano, together with his co-
accused Michael Nuñez (Nuñez) and Ismael
Santos alias "Ka Tony," were charged with the crimes of
Kidnapping for Ransom (Criminal Case No. 12778-
MN)2 and Kidnapping with Murder (Criminal Case No.
12779-MN).3 Only accused-appellant and Nuñez were
convicted and accordingly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to pay damages. Accused Santos remains at
large.
The prosecution was able to establish that at around 1:15 in
the afternoon of January 21, 1993 inside the compound of
Immaculate Concepcion Parochial School, accused Nuñez
persuaded the victim, fourteen-year old high school student
Joseph Rivera, to go with him on the pretext that he would
turn over the proceeds of the sale of a gun to the latter's
father. He was likewise able to persuade Joseph Rivera to
bring along the latter's classmate, another fourteen year-old
student Neil Patrick Quillosa on the pretext that Neil would
be Joseph's companion in going home later.
The two boys were brought to a nipa hut in the middle of a
fishpond in Dampalit, Malabon to await a certain "Ka
Tony." As the two boys attempted to go home, they were
told to go back as "Ka Tony" was coming. When they were
asked in jest about their preference if they were to be killed
either with a knife of with a gun, Neil answered that he
would prefer a gun pointed at his head.
Thereafter, accused Nuñez told them that "Ka Tony" would
not enter the hut unless they were blindfolded and tied. They
protested but were assured by accused Nuñez that they
would not be harmed. Both victims' hands and feet were tied
with wire and rope.
Accused-appellant came and checked if the two victims
were tied securely, after which, accused Nuñez played a tape
demanding three million pesos in five hundred and one
thousand peso bills from the parents of Rivera in exchange
for his release. Rivera was likewise made to record his own
voice pleading to his parents to pay the ransom demanded.
Thereafter, accused Nuñez, who was then in possession of a
gun, fired the same towards the window, hitting the casette
recorder.
The victims were then brought to the river by accused and
accused-appellant. Accused Nuñez dragged Neil by the neck
towards the middle of the river and left him there to drown
while accused-appellant stood guard over Rivera. Quillosa's
cries for help and Rivera's pleas for their captors to save
Quillosa went unheeded.
In the nipa hut, Rivera was made to record his own voice
saying, "Mommy, Daddy, para makilala ninyo na sanay
silang pumatay, pinatay na nila si Neil." Thereafter, he
managed to untie his feet and asked accused-appellant to
remove the wire around his hands on the assurance that he
would not escape. The following morning, accused Nuñez
went to deliver the tape to Rivera's house.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
While accused-appellant was busy cutting grass near the
river, Rivera escaped the proceeded to the house of accused
Nuñez where he called up his grandmother. Thereupon, he
was fetched by his grandmother and with his father, they
proceeded to the Malabon Police Station and reported the
kidnapping. The policemen who responded recovered the
casette recorder from the nipa hut but failed to find both
accused and accused-appellant.
Neil Patrick Quillosa's body was recovered on January 23,
1993 at Chungkang Rivera, Malabon with both hands and
feet still bound with wires and his mouth gagged. Dr.
Juanito Sacdalan testified that the cause of death was
asphyxia due to strangulation and that the wire tied around
the hands of the victim was the same wire tied around the
neck.
Accused-appellant, however, denied the accusation against
him claiming that on the day he arrived at the nipa hut,
accused Nuñez poked a gun at him and threatened to kill
him if he squeals. He also claimed that accused Nuñez
recorded something on a casette and he saw two children
with him whose hands and feet were tied with wires.
Thereafter, accused Nuñez instructed one of the children,
whom he came to know during the trial of this case to be
Joseph Rivera, to record something which he did not hear as
accused Nuñez ordered him to keep his distance. He averred
that when Nuñez brought the children to the river, he was
just watching and following them; that from his position
atop the paddy, he saw accused Nuñez in the middle of the
river release one of the children, whom he came to know
during the trial to be Neil Patrick Quillosa, as a result of
which the latter drowned.
The following morning, accused Nuñez told him to guard
Rivera after which the former left. However, he claimed that
he left Rivera inside the nipa hut to cut grass around the
fishpond. When accused Nuñez returned and learned from
him that Rivera had left, the former likewise disappeared.
Moments later, accused Nuñez' father arrived and told him
that he would get the casette. He was likewise told to leave
as policemen will be coming. As a result, he left and went to
his grandmother's place, after which he was surrendered by
his uncle to Vice President Joseph Estrada. He likewise
claims that he does not know how to read and that he can
write only his name and count up to fifty only. He claims to
know Michael Nuñez as he usually sees him when he buys
"Kakanin" from the latter's family.
The lower court in a joint decision 4 convicted both accused
and accused-appellant with Kidnapping for Ransom and
accordingly sentenced both to reclusion perpetua. Both were
also found to have committed the complex crime of
Kidnapping with Murder and sentenced each of them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They were also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount
of P50,000.00, to pay actual damages in the amount of
P41,700.00 and the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, as
well as the costs of the suit.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant claims that the lower
court erred:
1. In not finding that accused-appellant's
low level of intelligence/state of imbecility
exempts him from any criminal liability.
2. In not finding that the records of the
case are not sufficient to hold a finding of
conspiracy against the accused-appellant.
3. In not acquitting the accused by reason
of an exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury.
In the first submission of error, accused-appellant claims
that he possesses a very low level of intelligence as revealed
in his direct testimony and cross-examination, indicating a
mental age of between six (6) to ten (10) years of age. To
prove his imbecility, he cited his act of cutting grass when
he should be guarding his victim. As such, he should be
exempted from criminal liability under the Revised Penal
Code. Even assuming that he is liable, the lower court
should have proceeded against him pursuant to the Child
and Youth Welfare Code.
In his second submission, accused-appellant declares that he
could not have conspired with accused Nuñez for the
following reasons: (1) accused-appellant would rather cut
grass than guard his victim, as indicative of his low mental
age; (2) the act of kidnapping itself was already executed
and perfected by accused Nuñez when the accused-appellant
arrived in the nipa hut several hours after the kidnapping; (3)
the testimonies of private complainant Joseph Rivera and the
accused-appellant were consistent with the fact that accused-
appellant was nowhere near accused Nuñez when he was
recording the alleged demand for payment.
In his third submission, accused-appellant testified that
accused Nuñez poked a gun at him and threatened him with
death; so he had no alternative but to follow the orders of
accused Nuñez, especially considering his mental capacity.
The Court is not persuaded by such remonstrations. The
defense counsel's attribution of imbecility is not supported
by evidence. Imbecility, one of the exempting circumstances
under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, is defined as
feeblemindedness or a mental condition approaching that of
one who is insane. It is analogous to childishness and
dotage. An imbecile, within the meaning of Article 12, is
one who must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of will at the time of committing
the crime.5 He is one who, while advanced in age, has a
mental development comparable to that of children between
two and seven years of age.6
Accused-appellant's act of cutting grass rather than guarding
his victim could hardly be indicative of imbecility. Rather, it
may be considered as negligence but definitely not
childishness or even that of one completely deprived of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will. In fact,
accused-appellant admitted on cross-examination that he can
tell what is right and what is wrong.7 Assuming arguendo
that accused-appellant is an imbecile or a feebleminded
person, in the case of People v. Formigones,8 it was held
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
that feeblemindedness is not exempting, because the
offender could distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile or
an insane cannot. In any case, Article 800 of the Civil Code
provides that "the law presumes that every person is of
sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary." The
allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved.
Moreover, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is
improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously.9
Neither will this Court subscribe to accused-appellant's third
submission that he was prompted to act the way he did due
to uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. Accused-
appellant's claim that accused Nuñez poked a gun at him and
threatened him with death is belied by testimonial evidence.
Granting that accused-appellant was forced to do what he
did on account of fear, duress or intimidation such that he
could not possibly have any opportunity to defend himself in
equal combat, testimonial evidence show that he had at least
four opportunities to escape. The first was when accused
Nuñez allegedly brought the two victims to the river while
he remained on the rice paddy. 10 The second was when
accused Nuñez and the victim Joseph Rivera were sleeping
in the nipa hut. 11 The third was when accused Nuñez asked
him to look for the necklace of Neil Patrick Quillosa on the
river bank while the former was in the nipa hut together with
the victim Joseph Rivera. 12 The fourth was when accused
Nuñez left him and the victim the following morning to
deliver the taped or recorded ransom demand to the victim's
family. 13 Accused-appellant could have easily taken
advantage of any of these opportunities considering that
only accused Nuñez threatened him. By not availing of these
chances to escape, his allegation of fear or duress becomes
incredible under the circumstances.
In People v. Villanueva, 14 this Court stated that:
Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be
available as a defense, must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act is not done. A threat of
future injury is not enough. (16 C.J., 91).
To be available as a defense, the fear must
be well-founded, an immediate and actual
danger of death or great bodily harm must
be present and the compulsion must be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity
to accused for escape or self-defense in
equal combat. It would be a most
dangerous rule if a defendant could shield
himself form prosecution for crime by
merely setting up a fear from or because
of a threat of a third person. (Wharton's
Criminal Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 384).
Fear as an excuse for crime has never been
received by the law. No man, from fear or
circumstances to himself has the right to
make himself a party to committing
mischief upon mankind. (Lord Denman in
Reg. vs. Tyler, 8 Car. and P. [Eng.] 616,
vs. Duddely, L.R. 14, Q.B. Div. [Eng.]
273).
Accused-appellant's knowledge of what is right or wrong, as
well as his failure to escape bolsters the prosecution's
evidence that he conspired with accused Nuñez to commit
the crimes being charged against them, contrary to the
former's second submission. The records show the presence
of conspiracy. First, when accused-appellant arrived at the
hut where the victims were being held, the first thing he did
was to check if the victims were securely tied. 15 Second,
accused-appellant carried the victim Neil Patrick Quillosa to
the river. 16 Third, accused-appellant kicked the victim
Joseph Rivera when the latter was ordered to go to the
river. 17 It may be deduced from those acts by accused-
appellant that he conspired with accused Nuñez to commit
the crimes. While it is true that a finding of criminal
conspiracy must be supported by evidence constituting proof
beyond reasonable doubt, it is equally true that such
evidence need not be direct evidence. It may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated. The conditions attending its commission and the
acts executed may be indicative of the common design to
accomplish a criminal purpose and objective. If there is a
chain of circumstances to that effect, then, conspiracy has
been established. 18
To exempt himself from criminal liability, the conspirator
must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the unlawful plan to commit the
felony. 19 Nowhere in the records does it show that accused-
appellant ever did anything to dissuade accused Nuñez from
killing Neil Patrick Quillosa or to escape in order to report
the crime despite at least four opportunities to do so.
This Court fully agrees with the lower court that Kidnapping
for Ransom was committed against Joseph Rivera, as the
essential element that the victim must have been restrained
or deprived of his liberty was present when
both victims were tied and when the gun was brandished and
fired to intimidate them. 20 In addition, accused Nuñez and
accused-appellant recorded a ransom demand with the
intention of sending it to Rivera's parents. 21 The records
indicate that accused Nuñez accused-appellant intended to
detain only Rivera and hold him for ransom as he was the
son of a gasoline owner having a net income of P24,000.00
a month and owning several properties. 22
The same, however, cannot be said of Neil Patrick Quillosa.
The records show that the intent of accused Nuñez and that
of accused-appellant was to kill Quillosa and not to detain
him for ransom. Quillosa was a stranger to them and they
merely persuaded Rivera to take him along so he could have
a companion in going home. 23 In any case, they could not
have possibly intended to detain Quillosa and hold him for
ransom as he was only a son of a jeepney driver. 24
Thus, the crime committed by accused Nuñez and accused-
appellant with respect to the victim Quillosa should be
Homicide and not kidnapping with Murder since they never
intended to hold Quillosa for ransom. Nuñez' query as to
Quillosa's preference on the manner of his death shows the
formers' intention to kill the latter. As treachery was not
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
alleged in the information, then it could not have qualified
the crime to murder.
However, treachery should be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Article 14, Paragraph 16 of the
Revised Penal Code states that there is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In the instant case,
treachery was evident when the accused Nuñez led the
victims to believe that it was necessary for them to be
blindfolded and tied first with wires and a rope before a
certain Ka Tony would agree to meet them. Having thus
placed the victims, particularly Quillosa, in a helpless
condition, accused Nuñez and accused-appellant were able
to carry out with ease their common design to kill Quillosa
without any risk to themselves arising from any struggle the
boy might make.
Craft should also be appreciated as aggravating the crime of
homicide since it was shown that the victims, particularly
the unsuspecting Quillosa, were lured by the accused into
coming with them on the pretext that the former would only
accompany Rivera to accept the proceeds of the sale of a
gun.
With respect to accused-appellant, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated
in his favor.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 12778-MN, the
decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case
No. 12779-MN, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED
in that accused-appellant Rodolfo Cayetano y Pangilinan is
CONVICTED of the crime of homicide and IMPOSING
upon him the prison term ranging from 10 years and 1 day to
12 years, prision mayor maximum, as minimum up to 18
years, 6 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal maximum,
as maximum.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
2. WHILE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME IS
IN PROGRESS.
G.R. NO. L-44112 OCTOBER 22, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE,
VS.
CRISPULO DE LOS REYES, PERFECTO GULO,
CRESENCIO SINGUE AND FAUSTINO DE LOS
REYES, ACCUSED. CRISPULO DE LOS REYES
AND PERFECTO GULO, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS do not deny their participation
in the Robbery with Homicide. However, they seek
exculpation from criminal liability by interposing irresistible
force as an exempting circumstance.
Meanwhile, a third accused bewails his reinclusion in the
Information; he was previously discharged to become a
witness for the state.
On 16 July 1969, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening,
Faustino de los Reyes, Cresencio Singue, Crispulo de los
Reyes and Perfecto Gulo, armed with revolvers and a
hunting knife, arrived at the house of Kapi Baotao in
Timbuligue, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur.1 There
were six (6) occupants in the house: Kapi, his wife Sandiali,
his daughter Rosa, his son Tibulao and Sumpian, and
granddaughter. 2 Crispulo and Perfecto positioned
themselves behind the bushes, while Faustino and Cresencio
walked towards the stairs. 3 Then one of them shouted,
"Nay, Nay." Kapi, who thought that it was on a son-in-law
shouting, told Tibulao to open the door. 4
As the door was opened, Faustino and Cresencio barged in.
Cresencio immediately grabbed Tibulao and struck him on
the head with a revolver, causing the latter to slump on the
floor. Alarmed by the ensuring commotion, Sumpian, who
was in another room, rushed at Cresencio and tried to push
him; Sumpian got hacked instead. 5 Kapi and Rosa also
tried to help but Faustino shot Kapi several times and pistol-
whipped Rosa in the mouth, rendering her unconscious.
Sandiali grabbed her granddaughter and jumped through the
window for safety.
The wounded Sumpian managed to escape and sought cover
downstairs. Rosa, now conscious, followed suit. While
hiding, Sumpian saw another person stationed below the
window reaching for the loot being lowered from their
house. 6
Meanwhile, inside the house, Tibulao got hold of a bolo and
hacked Cresencio. Wounded, Cresencio scurried out of the
house and ran away.
As the robbers fled, Sumpian entered the house and saw the
prostate figure of his father. He called for the other members
of the household. Then they discovered that P10,000.00 in
paper bills kept by their father inside a suitcase was missing.
The money which the victim had saved from the harvest of
his 24-hectare coconut plantation was intended for the
construction of a new house. 7
That same night, the incident was reported to the authorities.
In the early morning of 17 July 1969, a combined PC-police
team went to the crime scene to investigate. They found the
lifeless body of Kapi. While combing the area for evidence,
some members of the team noticed a trail of blood leading to
the fields and promptly tracked it. There, they found
Cresencio sitting in the bushes, wounded. During the
interrogation, he claimed that Faustino shot him four (4)
times after he blamed the latter for their misadventure. He
then named his other companions, Faustino, Crispulo and a
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
third party who turned out to be
Perfecto. 8
Thereafter, Crispulo was arrested in his house, where the
police found one of the revolvers used in the crime as well
as P40.15 in coins. In their sworn statements, Cresencio and
Crispulo admitted being with the group that robbed and
killed Kapi. In addition, Crispulo implicated Perfecto as the
fourth member. Upon his arrest, Perfecto gave a sworn
statement corroborating the information given earlier by
Cresencio and Crispulo.
On 16 March 1970, an Information charging Crispulo de los
Reyes, Perfecto Gulo, Cresencio Singue and Faustino de los
Reyes with robbery in band with homicide and multiple
physical injuries was filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur. With the exception of
Faustino, who remains at large, all the accused were
arraigned. They pleaded not guilty.
On 14 July 1970, the then Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Zamboanga del Sur filed a motion for the discharge of
accused Cresencio Singue to be a state witness. The motion
was granted.
On 27 February 1973, Atty. Ernesto Q. Organo, counsel for
accused-appellants Crispulo and Perfecto, orally moved for
reconsideration of the order of discharge, contending that
accused Cresencio appeared to be the most guilty. On same
date, the trial court ordered the reinclusion of Cresencio in
the Information. 9
It was only after Cresencio's counsel de oficio, Atty.
Emiliano R. Deleverio, had begun his cross-examination of
the second prosecution witness that said counsel moved to
quash the Information against Cresencio on the ground of
double jeopardy. On 12 March 1974, the trial court denied
the motion, ruling that "(t)he objection of the accused
[Cresencio] in this instance is too late as he is deemed to
have waived his right against double jeopardy."
Furthermore, the trial court claimed that Cresencio "failed to
comply with his commitment to act as state
witness." 10 Cresencio's counsel de oficio then manifested
that he believed that the issue on double jeopardy could be
raised on appeal. 11
On 24 May 1976, the trial court convicted the accused
Cresencio, Crispulo and Perfecto of robbery with homicide
and physical injuries. The court did not consider that
robbery was committed in band, as an aggravating
circumstance, as there was no evidence presented to prove
that there were more than three (3) armed felons who
perpetrated the crime. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the herein accused
Cresencio Singue, Crispulo de los Reyes
and Perfecto Gulo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide and Physical Injuries, the
Court hereby sentences the said accused
Cresencio Singue, Crispulo de los Reyes
and Perfecto Gulo to RECLUSION
PERPETUA to be served in the National
Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal, with
other accessory penalties under the law; to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs
of Kapi Baotao the sum of P12,000.00,
Philippine Currency, and to further pay the
said heirs, jointly and severally, the sum of
P10,000.00, Philippine Currency,
representing the cash money taken during
the robbery, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
each to pay proportionate costs . . . 12
Of the three (3) convicted accused, only Crispulo de los
Reyes and Perfecto Gulo filed a notice of appeal. Accused
Cresencio Singue did not appeal.
Accused-appellants contend in this appeal that the court a
quo erred in disregarding their defense that accused
Faustino de los Reyes forced and intimidated them into
joining him in the commission of the crime, and the
mitigating circumstances of minority in favor of Perfecto
Gulo, and being non-christians in their favor. Quite
interestingly, counsel for accused-appellants, who
previously moved for the reinclusion of accused Cresencio
Singue in the Information, now invokes double jeopardy in
his behalf.
Crispulo and Perfecto testified that Faustino was the
mastermind of the robbery, and that he threatened to kill
them if they refused to join him in the perpetration of the
crime. But the trial court found incredible their effort to
exculpate themselves.
We agree with the factual presentation of the prosecution.
On the other hand, We discredit the theory of the defense.
Notably, accused-appellants, including accused Cresencio,
differed in their testimonies as to who followed whom
during the trek towards the house of their intended victim.
Crispulo, 13 Perfecto, 14 and even Cresencio, 15 all claimed
that as they walked single file, Faustino was directly behind
them. In an effort to give credence to their declarations, each
alleged that the order assisted Faustino in exerting force and
intimidation upon his person. These diametrically opposed
allegations, as correctly held by the trial court, are not only
contrary to common sense but are "also not in accord with
human behavior and the natural course of things." For, it
would have been physically impossible for Faustino to
commit the robbery and, at the same time, see to it that the
others performed their specific assignments. As pointed out
by the Solicitor General —
. . . it is highly improbable, if not
ridiculous, for Faustino de los Reyes to
have been able to force and intimidate
Perfecto Gulo and Crispulo de los Reyes
into joining him to commit the crime
charged. For, he was alone against three
including the accused Cresencio Singue.
Besides, what help can Faustino expect
from the three by forcing them to join him
if after all he cannot rely on their loyalty
and cooperation? Moreover Gulo is a
nephew of the victim Kapi Baotao . . . and
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
unless he was a party to the plan to rob,
Faustino would not have informed him
about it, much less forced him to join the
group. Otherwise, his presence would
deter, rather than help, the
accomplishment of their plan. In the case
of Crispulo he is a younger brother of
Faustino . . . . 16
Moreover, to be exempt from criminal liability, a person
invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable fear must show
that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument who acted not only without will but against his
will. 17 That compulsion must, thus be of such character as
to leave the accused no opportunity for self-defense in equal
combat or for escape. Unfortunately, accused-appellants
failed to convince Us that they were left no choice but to
follow the order of Faustino. Before and during the robbery,
they did not take advantage of the many opportunities
available to them to escape from Faustino or at least avoid
being involved with him in his criminal design.
They did not attempt to escape while walking towards the
scene of the crime, despite the fact that the footpath was
surrounded by tall grasses. As Faustino and Cresencio
entered the house, Crispulo and Perfecto stayed behind.
They could have simply run away but they did not. Instead,
Perfecto helped in carting away the stolen goods lowered
from the house. 18 Crispulo, in turn, took hold of part of the
lot before finally going home. 19 These actuations belie the
claim that the participation of Crispulo, Cresencio and
Perfecto was involuntary. Their failure to deter the
commission of the crime, or to report it at least, militates
against their pretensions.
As regards Crispulo, while he may indeed be the least guilty
among the malefactors, he failed to alert the combined PC-
Police team that his brother Faustino had just left his house
when the arresting team arrived. Such omission enabled
Faustino to elude capture. Besides, when the conspiracy was
first broached to Crispulo, he himself admitted, as shown in
his sworn statement, that it was he who suggested that
Perfecto be included in the group. 20 The only evidence
adduced by Crispulo that would buttress his contention that
he refused to join the conspiracy are his own self-serving
statements, which may not be given much weight.
Assuming arguendo that Crispulo was indeed the least
guilty, still it is of no consequence. Once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the
act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes
secondary. 21
To extricate himself from criminal liability, the conspirator
must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the unlawful plan to commit the
felony. 22 While Crispulo did leave the scene of the crime
while it was in progress, such abandonment came too late. In
legal contemplation, there was no longer a conspiracy to be
repudiated since it had already materialized.
With respect to Perfecto, he never left the scene of the crime
during the robbery. As a matter of fact, he admitted having
received the goods from one of his companions upstairs.
Thereafter, he helped carry the wounded Cresencio to safer
grounds. 23 He also brought some of the spoils to the house
of Crispulo where they were later found by the police. He
was, therefore an active and willing participant.
Perfecto assails the trial court for its failure to consider his
minority in imposing upon him a person term of reclusion
perpetua. He argues that under P.D. 603, otherwise known
as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code", he was still a
youthful offender when the crime was committed, being
then only 19 years old, so that the implementation of his
sentence should have been suspended.
This is untenable. To benefit from P.D. 603, the accused
must be a youthful offender not only at the time of
commission of the crime but also at the time of trial. In the
instant case, Perfecto was already 26 years old when he was
convicted. Under the Code, where an accused is no longer a
youthful offender at the time of sentencing, he cannot
anymore avail of the benefit of suspension of his
sentence. 24 Neither can his minority at the time of
commission of the crime be appreciated as a mitigating
factor.
The original version of Art. 189 of P.D. No. 603, which was
the law then applicable at the time the accused were
sentence by the trial court, provides that "[a] youthful
offender is one who is over nine years but under twenty-one
years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense . . . The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the provisions of
this chapter" (Emphasis ours). Incidentally, what Art. 189 of
P.D. 603 modifies is Art. 80 of the Revised Penal Code, on
suspension of sentence, and not par. 2, Art. 13, of the same
Code, which treats of minority as a mitigating circumstance.
Paragraph 2 states "[t]hat the offender is under eighteen
years of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor,
he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the
provisions of Article 80" (Emphasis supplied).
Thus, for minority of be considered a mitigating
circumstance, the offender must be under eighteen years of
age at the time the crime was committed. In the case at bar,
Perfecto was already nineteen years old when he committed
the crime. He did not therefore qualify as a minor. Be that as
it may, P.D. 1179 amended P.D. 603 by reverting the
maximum age of a youthful offender from twenty-one years
to eighteen years.
Similarly, the fact that Crispulo and Perfecto are non-
christians cannot be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance in their favor. The appreciation of this
circumstance lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court considering all facets of the case that would best serve
the interest of justice. Both appellants admitted having
received formal education: Crispulo reached first year high
school, while Perfecto finished sixth grade. Even if their
education be ignored, such attenuating circumstance is
nonetheless unavailing. In People v. Salip Manla, 25 We
held:
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Counsel de oficio submits that the
defendants belong to the cultural
minorities and that this should be
considered as a mitigating circumstance in
their favor. This fact cannot conceivably
reduce, from the subjective point of view,
the defendants' awareness of the gravity of
their offense, for robbery and killing are
by their very nature just as wrong to the
ignorant as they are to the
enlightened (Emphasis supplied).
With regard to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling,
this should have been taken into account in the imposition of
the proper penalty because robbery with homicide can be
committed without necessarily transgressing the sanctity of
the home. 26
Attention should be focused particularly on the case of
Cresencio Singue who after arraignment was, on motion of
the Acting Provincial Fiscal, discharged to be a state witness
but who, after two and a half (2 1/2) years, was reincluded in
the Information on motion of his two (2) co-accused on the
ground that he appeared to be the most guilty. Their
contention was anchored on the sworn statement of
Cresencio where he admitted his participation in the
robbery. Strangely, after his discharge and subsequent
reinclusion, and after his counsel de oficio had cross-
examined the first witness for the prosecution and having
started with the second, his counsel moved for the quashal
of the Information on the ground of double jeopardy. But the
court, upon objection of counsel for his co-accused, denied
the motion as the accused allegedly did not appear on the
date he was to testify. However, the accused countered that
he did not receive the notice for his appearance. A check
with the records fails to show that Cresencio was notified of
the hearing on 27 February 1973 when he was supposed to
testify as his name was not even among those listed in the
subpoena. 27 Nonetheless, the court denied his motion, thus,
prompting his counsel to manifest that he would elevate the
matter on certiorari to the Court of Appeals. But he failed to
do so, informing the court instead that he would just raise
the issue of double jeopardy on appeal. Again, he failed as
he did not even file a notice of appeal.
After trial, the court convicted all three (3) accused. As
previously adverted to, accused Faustino de los Reyes was
not even arraigned as he became a fugitive from justice.
While accused Crispulo de los Reyes and Perfecto Gulo
appealed, Cresencio Singue did not, although counsel for the
two accused-appellants, who earlier sought the recall of his
discharge, included Cresencio in their brief.
The gross negligence of Cresencio's counsel de oficio in the
performance of his professional duties, resulting in his
client's languishing in jail for the past seventeen (17) years
without regard for his constitutional right to due process,
constrains Us therefore to include Cresencio in the
resolution of the present appeal. The unfortunate
mishandling of his defense by his assigned counsel should
not leave Cresencio without recourse from this Court.
The reasons advanced for the discharge of Cresencio were
that (a) the prosecution did no have direct evidence with
which to convict all the accused: (b) there was an absolute
necessity for the testimony of Cresencio Singue which could
be corroborated in its material points; and, (c) the said
accused did not appear to be the most guilty.
It may be observed that the trial court initially found these
grounds to be well-taken and, consequently, granted the
discharge of Cresencio. 28 On the other hand, his
reinclusion in the Information made two and half (2 1/2)
years after his discharge was based solely on the oral motion
of the defense that he was the most guilty considering that
he had a written confession where he admitted that he and
Faustino (who is still at large) were the ones who entered the
house they robbed, while their co-accused were left
downstairs. Specifically, the Order of 27 February 1973
recalling his discharge states —
When this case was called for trial today, .
. . counsel of the accused Perfecto Gulo,
moved for the reconsideration of the Order
of this Court, discharging Cresencio
Singue as one of the accused in this case
on ground that said accused appeared as
one of the most guilty considering that he
had a written confession . . . wherein he
had admitted that he and Faustino de los
Reyes, one of the accused who is still at
large, were the ones who entered the
house they robbed, while the other co-
accused were left downstairs . . . 29
However, in denying the motion to quash, the court a
quo considered another ground, i.e., that Cresencio "failed to
comply with his commitment to act as state witness" which,
as the records will show, is not correct. For, the truth of the
matter is that no notice was given him for his appearance in
court.
It bears stressing that under Sec. 10 of Rule 119, the only
instance where the trial court may validly recall its order
discharging an accused to become a state witness is when he
subsequently fails to testify against his co-accused. That,
certainly, is a violation of the condition for his discharge.
But, once his discharge from the Information is effected, the
legal consequence of acquittal follows and persists unless
the accused so discharged fails or refuses to testify pursuant
to his commitment. The fact that not all the requisites for his
discharge are present is not a ground to recall the discharge
order. Unless and until it is shown that the discharged
accused failed or refused to testify against his co-defendants,
subsequent proof showing that any or all of the conditions
listed in Sec. 9 of Rule 119 were not fulfilled would not
wipe away the resulting acquittal. 30 Besides, Cresencio
does not appear to be the most guilty but Faustino, who
remains at large.
As the records clearly disclose, despite his reinclusion in the
Information and the denial of his motion to quash, Cresencio
proceeded to testify, not in his own behalf but as a state
witness against his co-accused, with the tacit conformity of
the prosecution and the express approval of the court. Thus
—
Atty. Deleverio —
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
In view of these Exhibits 1 [motion for the
discharge of Cresencio as state witness]
and 2 [order of discharge], this witness is
being presented in order to comply with
the said order of the court utilizing him as
state witness. So he will now testify as to
what happened, as state witness.
Court — Proceed. 31
Consequently, even if the order of discharge was recalled,
although We seriously doubt the validity of such recall
considering the reason therefor, the express approval by the
court of the presentation of Cresencio to be a state witness
amounts to the nullification of its recall order and the
consequent reinstatement of the order for his discharge.
Under the facts of this case, We have no alternative but to
decree the exoneration of accused Cresencio Singue and
reiterate the rule that the discharge order amounted to his
acquittal and effectively barred future prosecution for the
same offense.
A word more. Without breached the condition for his
discharge, as in fact he did testify as state witness, his
discharge amounted to an acquittal. As such, his reinclusion
in the Information was illegal, improper, infirm, and his
subsequent conviction rendered sans authority, without
jurisdiction. Consequently, all proceedings against him
thereafter are a complete nullity, hence, can incriminate him
no longer. Any adverse ruling on his case cannot attain
finality, otherwise, We would be adopting and confirming a
serious transgression of his fundamental right to due
process. With this conclusion, it is no longer valid issue that
he did not even file a notice of appeal. The ineptitude, if not
incompetence, of his counsel de oficio should not deprive
Cresencio Singue of his earned liberty for turning ally of the
state.
Atty. Emiliano R. Deleverio, by his lackadaisical attitude,
indifference, abandonment and neglect in espousing
Cresencio's defense has violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Canon 18 which mandates every
lawyer "to serve his client with competence and diligence",
as well as Canon 19 which demands that "a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law."
By failing to file a notice of appeal in his client's behalf
despite being aware that the question on double jeopardy
was a genuine constitutional issue that could have set his
client free and averted his unwarranted incarceration for
seventeen (17) years, Atty. Deleverio should be severely
censured with a reminder that if he desires to remain a
member of good standing of the Bar, he should observe his
professional responsibilities to his clients with fealty, fervor
and fidelity. He should be warned that a repetition of the
same or similar unprofessional conduct will warrant a more
drastic sanction from this Court.
While We sustain the conviction of the accused Crispulo de
los Reyes and Perfecto Gulo, We except to the designation
of the offense charged. Instead of convicting the accused for
"robbery with homicide and physical injuries", "physical
injuries" should be deleted therefrom, so that the offense
should be denominated plainly "robbery with homicide",
regardless of the number of persons killed, maimed or
injured. The term homicide found in par. 1, Art. 294, of the
Revised Penal Code should be understood in its generic
sense; it includes murder and physical injuries, whether
serious or slight, committed during the robbery, which
crimes are merged in robbery with homicide.32
Under par. 1, Art. 294, of the Revised Penal Code, when
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, the imposible penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no mitigating circumstance of dwelling,
the proper penalty then was death and not reclusion
perpetua as incorrectly imposed by the trial
court. 33 However, with the abolition of the death penalty in
the 1987 Constitution, the appellant should be sentenced just
the same to reclusion perpetua.
With respect to the civil indemnity, conformably with recent
jurisprudence, the amount of P12,000.00 should be
increased to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo with respect
to accused-appellants CRISPULO DE LOS REYES and
PERFECTO GULO is AFFIRMED with the modification
that the designation of the special complex crime committed
by them should be robbery with homicide, and that the civil
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Kapi Baotao is
increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The reinclusion of accused CRESENCIO SINGUE in the
Information is hereby NULLIFIED and his order of
discharge therefrom is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Consequently, he is ordered immediately released from
custody unless held for another cause.
ATTY. EMILIANO R. DELEVERIO is SEVERELY
CENSURED for his professional misconduct with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
misbehavior will warrant a more drastic sanction from this
Court.
Costs against accused-appellants Crispulo de los Reyes and
Perfecto Gulo.
3. AFTER THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
G.R. NO. 149372             SEPTEMBER 11, 2007
RICARDO BACABAC, PETITIONER,
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In the evening of December 23, 1990, Hernani Quidato (the
victim) was at a dance hall in Purok 4, San Joaquin, Iloilo
City in the company of Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Melchor Selibio (Melchor). And so were Jonathan Bacabac
(Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel).1
Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the
victim and his companions also left and on their way home,
they encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It appears that the two
groups then and there figured in a misunderstanding.
On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), who was
also at the dance hall, noticed a commotion. He soon saw
that Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later "tying"
Jonathan "with his hands." Still later, he saw the victim hit
Edzel with a "stick."2 He thus told the victim and his
companions that Edzel is the son of Councilor Jose
Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), whereupon Eduardo 3 told him
(Jesus) to go away for they might shoot him. Jesus thus left
and proceeded to Edzel's residence to report to his father
what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and Jonathan
managed to flee.
The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home
in the course of which they met Pat. Ricardo Bacabac
(herein petitioner), together with Edzel and Jonathan who
are his nephews, and Edzel's father, Jose, his mother, and
two sisters at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Sto. Domingo
Streets. Petitioner and Jose were carrying M-16 armalites,
while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying a piece of wood and
a revolver, respectively.
Jesus thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as
the ones who had manhandled Jonathan and Edzel. The
victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions
mistook Jonathan and Edzel for other persons. Jesus blurted
out, however, "You are just bragging that you are brave.
You are only bullying small children."4 Petitioner, at that
instant, fired his armalite into the air, while Jose fired his
armalite ("as if spraying his rifle from right to left") at the
victim and Eduardo, even hitting Jonathan in the thigh as he
(Jonathan) "was on the move to strike [the victim] with a
piece of wood." Eduardo fell. And so did the victim who
was in a kneeling position, and as he was raising his hands
in surrender, Jose shot him again.
Meanwhile, Melchor escaped.5
The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the
hospital. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival.
Eduardo died two hours later.
Post-mortem examination showed that the victim sustained
two bullet wounds in the thoraco-abdominal regions and one
bullet wound in the extremities, and that he died due to
"maceration of the internal organs due to bullet
wounds."6 Eduardo sustained two bullet wounds in the
thoraco-abdominal region, and died of "hemorrhage due to
gunshot wounds."7
Two Informations for Murder were filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City against Jose, Edzel,
Jonathan, Jesus, and the herein petitioner. The accusatory
portion of the first Information, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 35783, reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1990, in
the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Ilo-
ilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another to better realize their purpose, armed with
two (2) M16 [a]rmalite [r]ifles and one (1) nickel-
plated revolver of unknown make and caliber, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation and without
any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and shoot one HERNANI QUIDATO with the
firearms they were then provided, inflicting upon
the latter gunshot wounds on the different parts of
his body which caused the immediate and
instantaneous death of said Hernani Quidato.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The accusatory portion of the second Information, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 35784, reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1990, in
the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another to better realize their purpose, armed with
two (2) M16 [a]rmalite [r]ifles and one (1) nickel-
plated revolver of unknown make and caliber, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation and without
any justifiable cause or motive, did then and
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and shoot one EDUARDO SELIBIO with the
firearms they were then provided inflicting upon
the latter gunshot wounds on the different parts of
his body which caused the immediate and
instantaneous death of said Eduardo Selibio.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
The cases were jointly tried.
By Decision of April 30, 1993, Branch 39 of the Iloilo RTC,
finding the presence of conspiracy among petitioner and his
co-accused,10 convicted them of murder qualified by
treachery.11 The dispositive portion of the decision of the
trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 35783, all the accused,
namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr., Edzel Talanquines,
Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus
Delfin Rosadio are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and there
being no aggravating circumstances with one
mitigating circumstance [immediate vindication for
Jose and Jesus; voluntary surrender for Pat. Ricardo
Bacabac12], and applying the indeterminate
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
sentence law, accused Jose Talanquines, Jr.,
Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are
hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for a
period of 10 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day as maximum; while
accused Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac
who are entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority and the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication
of a grave offense are hereby sentenced each to
suffer imprisonment for a period of four (4) years,
2 months, and 1 day, as minimum, to 10 years and
1 day as maximum. All the accused are ordered to
pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased
Hernani Quidato, the amount of P50,000.00 for his
wrongful death; P20,000.00 for moral
damages; P10,000.00 for attorneys fees; and the
costs of the suit. (Underscoring supplied)
In Criminal Case No. 35784, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
All the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr.,
Edzel Talanquines, Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo
Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby
found guilty of the crime of Murder and there being
no aggravating circumstance with one mitigating
circumstance, accused Jose Talanquines,
Jr., Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are
hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for a
period of 10 years and 1 day as minimum, to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day, as maximum; while
accused Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac
who are entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority and the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication
of a grave offense, are hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period of 4 years, 2 months and
1 day, as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as
maximum. All the accused are ordered to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased
Eduardo Selibio, the amount of P50,000.000 for his
wrongful death; P20,000.00 for moral
damages; P10,000.00 for attorney's fees; and the
costs of the suit. (Underscoring supplied)
Accused Jesus Delfin Rosadio, who is detained, is
hereby credited with the number of days he spent
under detention, if he is qualified.
SO ORDERED.13
While petitioner and his co-accused filed a Notice of
Appeal14 which was given due course, 15 only petitioner filed
a Brief, albeit beyond the extensions granted to him,
drawing the Court of Appeals to dismiss his appeal. 16 The
conviction of petitioner's co-accused had thus become final
and executory.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration17 of the dismissal of
his appeal having been denied,18 he filed a Petition for
Review with this Court which, by Resolution of October 22,
1997, directed the Court of Appeals to reinstate petitioner's
appeal.19
By Decision20 of June 28, 1999, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision. Entry of final judgment
was made by the Court of Appeals on July 22, 1999.21
The trial court thereafter issued a February 7, 2000 Order
directing the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused.22 Except petitioner, all were arrested.23
On February 24, 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate
court a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Order, and/or
Denial of Appeal24 which was granted,25 hence, the Entry of
Judgment issued by the appellate court on July 22, 1999 was
set aside. He thereafter filed a Motion for
Reconsideration26 of the appellate court's June 28, 1999
Decision which was denied by Resolution of August 8,
2001;27 hence, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.28
Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' decision as follows:
First: Contrary to its conclusion on the basis of the
facts of the case, Petitioner may not be deemed to
be in conspiracy with the other Accused.
Second: Contrary to its conclusion, there was no
treachery.
Third: Contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner,
assuming in gratis argumenti the correctness of the
pronouncement of guilt, should have been credited
with the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense, in the same
manner that the other Accused were so credited.
Fourth: Contrary to its conclusion, the guilt of the
Petitioner has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt; hence, by the equipoise rule, should have
been acquitted.
Fifth: Contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner is not
civilly liable.29 (Emphasis in the original)
The Court notes that the first, second, and fifth arguments of
petitioner were, in the main, raised before the appellate
court.30
During the pendency of the present petition, petitioner,
through counsel, filed before the trial court an "Urgent Ex
Parte Alternative Motions (Re: Pat. Ricardo Bacabac's
Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Vacate the Order
dated February 7, 2000 [directing the arrest of the
accused] and to Recall the Warrant of Arrest Dated the
Same Date in so far as the Accused Pat. Ricardo Bacabac
Only is Concerned)."31 The trial court denied32 the motion as
it did deny33 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration,  drawing petitioner to file before this Court
34
on October 5, 2006 a "Motion to Vacate Order for the Arrest
of the Accused and the Warrant of Arrest Issued by the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 39) of Iloilo City."35
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
In his "Motion to Vacate Order for the Arrest of the Accused
and the Warrant of Arrest Issued by the Regional Trial Court
. . . ," petitioner argues that
[T]he basis of the RTC's Order of February 7,
2000 was the Entry of Judgment by the Court of
Appeals dated 25 November 1999.36 BUT THE
SAID ENTRY OF JUDGMENT was
ALREADY VACATED and SET-ASIDE BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS ITSELF ON ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 13 DECEMBER
2000. Therefore, the RTC's Order of 7 February
2000 was ipso facto vacated.37 (Emphasis in the
original)
and that
[T]he second sentence of Section 7, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court cited by the Order of 13 July 2006
does not apply to the case at
bench because the main case on the merits which
originated in the RTC as Criminal Cases Nos.
35783-84, went to the Court of Appeals as CA-
G.R. No. 16348 and is now pending in the Supreme
Court (Third Division) as G.R. No. 149372 because
of the Petition for Review On Certiorari filed by
Movant herein x x x. THE MAIN CASE IS NO
LONGER PENDING IN THIS HONORABLE
COURT [sic]. THEREFORE, THE RTC HAS
NO JURISDICTION TO REITERATE AND
EXECUTE THE ORDER OF 7 FEBRUARY
2000.38 (Emphasis in the original)
As this Court hereby affirms petitioner's conviction,
resolution of his "Motion to Vacate . . ." is rendered
unnecessary.
Petitioner, denying the presence of conspiracy on his part,
argues:
[The petitioner] affirms that he was at the scene of
the incident and merely fired a warning shot into
the air to respond to a public disturbance, and
his firing a warning shot into the air was
intended to avert further acts of violence; both
circumstances, therefore, being merely and solely
in pursuance to his avowed duty to keep peace and
order in the community and clearly not to be part of
any alleged community of design to kill the
victims.
xxxx
Another indication that there was no unity of
purpose and of execution  in so far as the
Petitioner is concerned is his conduct after Jose
Talanquines, Jr. shot the victims. Eyewitness
accounts state that after that lone warning shot,
closely followed by Jose Talanquines, Jr. firing at
the victims, the petitioner merely stood there and
did nothing and said nothing. This is obviously
because he was himself stunned by the fast
happening of events. The investigating police
officer, PO3 NESTOR SANTACERA, on
rebuttal, likewise, admitted to the facts that ten (10)
minutes after the incident, they (the police)
responded and upon arrival thereat, learned that the
Petitioner already reported the incident to their
station and that it was the Petitioner who first
reported the shooting incident officially to their
office. The aforedescribed proven conduct of the
Petitioner during and immediately after the incident
in question are, Petitioner respectfully
submits, inconsistent with what a co-conspirators
is [sic] wont to do under the circumstances. It is
submitted instead that his conduct on the contrary
underscores the lack or want of community of
purpose and interest in the killing incident to make
him criminally liable under the conspiracy theory.
Finally, in connection with the conspiracy theory
and anent the finding below that the Petitioner and
his Co-Accused waited for the victims' arrival at
the corner of St. Domingo and M.H. del Pilar
Streets, it is asserted that the same runs counter to
the natural and ordinary experience of things
and event [sic], and raises a cloud of doubt over
the correctness of the lower Courts decision which
are based on the Prosecution's version of the
incident. Since, according to the prosecution, the
Petitioner and the other Accused were armed with
high-powered firearms (armalite rifles and
revolver); they waited at the stated street corner
for thirty (30) minutes; the stated street corner was
well lighted; accompanying them were the wife
and two (2) young daughters of Jose Talanquines,
Jr; and they stood there conversing with the group
of Elston Saquian [a prosecution witness who
testified that he saw the petitioner and his co-
accused waiting for the victims39 and admitting that
they were waiting for certain persons who mauled
Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac.
In other words, the lower Courts gave credence to
an improbable scenario painting the Petitioner,
known to the place as a police officer, and co-
accused to have recklessly and uncaringly
displayed, for all and sundry to see, their alleged
criminal intentions. It would indeed be the height
of foolishness for them to be by a well lighted
street corner, perhaps even well traversed,
conspicuously fully armed, waiting for persons
who were not even sure would pass by such place,
and apparently willing to admit to other passers-by
that they were indeed waiting for the persons who
mauled Edzel and Jonathan, and consequently give
out the impression that they were intending to
retaliate – which is what the lower Courts
regrettably observed.
xxxx
Likewise, the presence of the wife and two (2)
young daughters of the accused Jose
Talanquines, Jr. at the scene of the alleged
crimes, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses
and believed by the lower Courts, assumes
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
importance in the matter of determining which
version of the incident is correct.
The Prosecution places the wife and the daughters
with the alleged fully armed Petitioner and Co-
Accused at Sto. Domingo Streets, also waiting
during the same length of time as the men for the
(probable) arrival of the group of the victims. But
such a scenario is, likewise, unnatural. Because,
will the male relatives unhesitatingly expose
their defenseless womenfolk to imminent
danger?40 (Citations omitted, emphasis in the
original, and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's argument that it is improbable for him and his
co-accused to have waited for the victims at a well-lighted
street corner does not persuade. Crimes are known to have
been brazenly committed by perpetrators, undeterred by the
presence of onlookers or even of peace officers, completely
impervious of the inevitability of criminal prosecution and
conviction.41
From the mode and manner in which the crimes were
perpetrated, the conduct of petitioner before, during, and
after their commission,42 and the conditions attendant
thereto,43 conspiracy, which need not be proved by direct
evidence, is deduced.44 Petitioner's firing of his armalite
could not have amounted to none other than lending moral
assistance to his co-accused, thereby indicating the presence
of conspiracy.45
As the appellate court observed which is quoted with
approval:
In the present recourse, when informed that
Jonathan and Edzel were being manhandled and
assaulted by male persons, Appellant armed
himself with an M-16 armalite. Jose Talanquines,
Jr., the father of Edzel, followed suit and armed
himself with an M-16 armalite gun. Jesus armed
himself with a revolver while Jonathan armed
himself with a piece of wood. Jonathan and Edzel
were nephews of the Appellant who resided in the
house of Jose Talanquines, Jr. All the Accused
including the Appellant then proceeded
posthaste to the corner of M.H. del Pilar corner
Sto. Domingo Streets where the culprits would
pass by and waited for the advent of the culprits.
Even as Hernani apologized for his and his
companions' assault of Edzel and Jonathan,
Jesus berated Hernani and his
companions. Almost simultaneously, the
Appellant fired his gun into the air as Jonathan
lunged at Hernani and his companions to hit
them with the piece of wood. Almost
simultaneously, Jose Talaquines, Jr. fired his gun at
Hernani and shot Eduardo hitting them and, in the
process, hitting his nephew, Jonathan Bacabac. The
Appellant did not lift a finger when Jose fired at
and shot Hernani and Eduardo. He stood by as
Jose shot Hernani anew when the latter on
bended knees, raised his two (2) hands, in
surrender. The Appellant and the other Accused
then fled from the scene, with their respective
firearms and weapons. The overt act of the
Accused and the Appellant in conjunto, constitute
proof of conspiracy.
The Appellant and Jose were armed with high-
powered guns. Jesus was armed with a
revolver. The nature of the weapons of the
Accused evinced a common desire to do away
with the culprits, not merely to scare them.
What is outrageous is that the Appellant was a
policeman. He could very well have just arrested
the culprits as they sauntered by and brought
them to the police station for the requisite
investigation and the institution of criminal
complaints, if warranted. He could have
dissuaded Jose and Jesus and assured them that
the culprits will be duly investigated and
charged if warranted. The Appellant did not. He
armed himself with an M-16 armalite x x x. [T]he
three (3) positioned themselves at the corner of
M.H. del Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets for the
culprits to arrive. Hernani and his companions were
doomed. It may be true that the Appellant did not
aim his gun at the deceased but the same is peu de
chose. By his overt acts, in unison with the other
Accused and his kinship with Jonathan and Edzel,
We are convinced that he conspired with Jose
Talanquines, Jr. and the other Accused to achieve a
common purpose to kill Hernani and
Eduardo.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's failure to assist the victims after the shooting
reinforces this Court's appreciation of community of design
between him and his co-accused to harm the victims. That it
was he who first officially reported the shooting to the
police station47 does not make him any less a conspirator.
Voluntary surrender and non-flight do not conclusively
prove innocence.48 Besides, a conspirator who wants to
extricate himself from criminal liability usually performs an
overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful
plan to commit the felony while the commission of the
felony is in progress.49 In petitioner's case, he reported the
shooting incident after it had already taken place. In legal
contemplation, there was no longer a conspiracy to be
repudiated since it had already materialized.50
Contrary to petitioner's assertion,51 the appellate court did
not err in appreciating the presence of conspiracy despite its
finding that there was no evident premeditation. This Court's
pronouncement that conspiracy presupposes the existence of
evident premeditation52 does not necessarily imply that the
converse ─ that evident premeditation presupposes the
existence of a conspiracy ─ is true. In any event, a link
between conspiracy and evident premeditation is presumed
only where the conspiracy is directly established and not
where conspiracy is only implied, as in the present case. 53
Neither did the appellate court err in finding the presence of
treachery. Treachery, under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the
Revised Penal Code, is present "when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make."
What is decisive in treachery is that "the attack was
executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the
victim to retaliate."54 In the case at bar, petitioner, a
policeman, and his co-accused were armed with two M-16
armalites and a revolver. The victim and his companions
were not armed.55 The attack was sudden and
unexpected,56 and the victim was already kneeling in
surrender when he was shot the second time. Clearly, the
victim and his companion Eduardo had no chance to defend
themselves or retaliate.
Petitioner nevertheless argues that he not being the trigger
man, it is not logical nor legal to hold him guilty of
treachery.57 This argument falls in the face of the settled
doctrine that once conspiracy is established, the act of one is
the act of all even if not all actually hit and killed the
victim.58
As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance
of "immediate vindication of a grave offense," it fails. For
such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should
be, following Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity
within the same degree."59 The offense committed on Edzel
was "hitting" his ear with a stick60 (according to Jesus),
a bamboo pole (according to Edzel).61 By Edzel's own
clarification, "[he] was hit at [his] ear, not on [his]
head."62 That act would certainly not be classified as "grave
offense." And Edzel is petitioner's nephew, hence, not a
relative by affinity "within the same degree" contemplated
in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
IMPUTABILITY DOCTRINE.
IN THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION
G.R. NO. L-5952             OCTOBER 24, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT,
VS.
RUFINO PONTE, ET AL.,  DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey, for appellant.
No appearance for appellees.
CARSON, J.:
Rufino Ponte, Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida, Ignacio
Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban
Verata, were charged with the crime of malversation of
public funds, as defined and penalized in Act No. 1740, in
an information couched in the following terms:
That on or about the 6th day of September, 1909,
the defendant Rufino Ponte was a bonded
employee of the provincial and municipal
government of Calabanga, Ambos Camarines, and
as municipal treasurer of said pueblo had in his
possession and in his charge the sum of P3,795.53
and safe valued at P50. The defendant Pedro
Pedraza was the janitor or porter of the municipal
treasury of Calabanga, and Juan Alamida, Ignacio
Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram and
Esteban Verata were municipal policemen of said
pueblo of Calabanga, Ambos Camarines, and as
such officers had committed to them the
guardianship and custody of the municipal treasury
of Calabanga, where the said sum of P3,795.93 and
the safe containing it were kept.
That the said defendant Rufino Ponte did
maliciously, criminally and unlawfully
misappropriate and make personal use of the said
sum of P3,795.93, and refused and failed to render
account of the same, as well as of the safe
containing it.
That the defendants Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida,
Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro
Metram, and Esteban Verata, did, each and every
one of them, maliciously, criminally and
unlawfully, directly aid said Rufino Ponte in this
malversation by taking said safe with the said
amount from the municipal treasury and carrying it
to the sitio of Inarian: in violation of law.
Counsel for the defendants Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades,
Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata,
demurred to the information on the ground that as to these
defendants the facts set out in the information did not
constitute the crime with which they were charged. The
grounds upon which they base this contention are stated by
counsel as follows:
The crime with which the above-named defendants
are charged is provided for and penalized by a
special Act, No. 1740, which has repealed such
provisions of the Penal Code relating to
malversation and misappropriation as conflict with
the provisions of said Act.
According to the information cited, the above-
named accused were municipal policemen of
Calabanga, where the crime was committed, and
their sole participation therein was that they
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
directly aided Rufino Ponte, the municipal
treasurer, in said malversation by taking the safe
with the sum misappropriate and carrying it from
the municipal treasury to the sitio of Inarian.
It is evident from what has just stated that the
question relates to the guilt of the accused Alamida,
Narvasa, Cada, Metram and Verata
as accomplices in the crime of malversation. (3
Phil. Rep., 6; art. 14, Penal Code.)
As accomplices, said defendants are not liable
under Act No. 1740, because this Act only punishes
the principals, the officers, whether bonded or not,
who misapply or misappropriate the funds they
may have in their possession by reason of their
office.
The provisions of the Penal Code regarding the
criminal responsibility of accomplices in crimes are
applicable to this case, because the crime under
consideration is penalized by a special Act, which
is the only law that should govern.
Therefore, in view of the arguments adduced, the
court is requested to sustain this demurrer and order
the dismissal of this cause with reference to the
accused municipal policemen of Calabanga.
The court below sustained the demurrer in the following
order:
Careful perusal of section 1 of Act No. 1740 shows
that it refers to bonded officers or employees and
any other persons who, having charge, by reason of
their office or employment or by operation of law,
of funds or property of the Government, who
misappropriate, fail to render account, etc.
Two requisites are therefore necessary for the
existence of the crime of malversation, according to
Act No. 1740, to wit: (1) That a bonded officer or
employee or any other person by reason of his
office or employment or by operation of law have
charged of funds or property of the Government;
and (2) that said officer or person refuse or fail to
render account, or make personal use of the same
or misappropriate them, etc.
Are these requisites applicable to the accused
policemen?
No: for the office of the municipal policemen does
not carry with it any duty of guardianship or
custody of Government funds, nor is there any law
which prescribes that by reason of being policemen
they must take charge of and guard Government
funds, nor is it alleged in the complaint that the
funds in question were turned over to them; it
merely appears that it was their duty as policemen
to guard the safe, or municipal treasury. The
information itself avers that "as such officials they
had committed to them the guardianship and
custody of the municipal treasury of Calabanga,
where the said sum of P3,795.93 and safe
containing it were kept." More clearly: the law does
not refer to those who guard or care for the
municipal building or treasury, but to those who are
intrusted with or have in their charge funds or
property of the Government.1awphil.net
Accordingly, if the policemen abstracted the money
and the safe containing it, and carried it to another
place, as is alleged in the complaint, they
committed the crime of robbery, or some other
crime against property, but not the crime of
malversation as defined in Act No. 1740.
Therefore the court sustains the demurrer, declaring
this cause dismissed with reference to the
policemen Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades,
Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban
Verata, with five-sixths of the costs de oficio, and
orders the provincial fiscal again to investigate the
facts and then present an information against said
policemen for robbery or some other crime against
property.
We are agreed with the trial judge in so far as he refused to
give any weight to contention of counsel for the defense that
the information merely charges these defendants as
accomplices in the commission of the crime defined and
penalized in Act No. 1740, and that there is nothing in the
Act which penalizes the assistance rendered by accomplices
in the commission of this crime; it will be seen that the
information expressly alleges that "the defendants did, each
and every one of them, maliciously, criminally and
unlawfully, directly aid said Rufino Ponte in this
malversation by taking said safe with the said amount from
the municipal treasury and carrying it to the sitio of
Inarian," thus charging them with having taken a direct part
in the commission of the crime, which could not have been
successfully carried out had it not been for their direct
participation and cooperation. Clearly these defendants are
charged in the information as coprincipals and not as
accomplices.
But we can not agree with the trial court in sustaining the
demurrer on the ground that the accused, not having had the
money in question in their charge by reason of a public
office held by them, could not commit the crime of
malversation of public funds as defined in Act No. 1740, the
true nature of the crime committed by them being, in the
opinion of the trial judge, "robbery" or some other of the
offenses against property defined and penalized in the code.
It may be that the acts committed by these defendants
constituted the crime of robbery, but under all the
circumstances, we have no doubt that these acts also
constituted the crime of malversation of public funds as
defined in Act No. 1740.
Groizard, in his Commentaries on article 405 of the Spanish
Penal Code, which is substantially identical with article 390
of the Philippine Code, says that:
Doubt, weighty doubt may arise, nevertheless,
regarding the definition of the crime and of the
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
penalty to be imposed upon the private party who
abstracts funds with the consent of the officer
charged with their custody. Shall the person so
doing be guilty of the crime of malversation here
provided for, and shall he suffer the same penalty
as the unfaithful officer, or shall he be guilty only
to the crime of theft and undergo the punishment he
deserves therefor?
x x x           x x x           x x x1awphil.net
Without overlooking the force of the arguments we
have just cited, we are inclined to take the first
point of view. We are led thereto by the
consideration that in contending for the imposition
of the same penalty upon the private party who
abstracts public funds as upon the employee who
gives his consent thereto we recognize the
differentiation with which crimes are always
described and penalized in the code. In the action
which the text describes as a crime there is perfect
unity: the private party does not act independently
from the public officer: rather, he knows that the
funds of which he wishes to get possession are in
the latter's charge, and instead of trying to abstracts
them by circumventing the other's vigilance he
resorts to corruption, and in the officer's
unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most
reprehensible means for accomplishing a deed
which by having a public officer as its moral
instrument assumes the character of a social crime.
If the article were not so interpreted, it would be
necessary to agree that the act, in spite of its
evident unity, would constitute not one but two
distinct crimes, and the persons participating
therein, although they acted together throughout,
would be guilty of two different kinds of
wrongdoing. Moreover, the rule of article 80,
which prevents extension from some culprits to
others of the responsibility that arises from their
personal qualities, is restricted by fundamental
principles and by the article itself, wherein it is
applied to the consideration of the extenuating and
aggravating circumstances which may affect the
persons respectively responsible for the crime, and
it neither can nor must influence in any way the
characterization of the facts. One who helps a son
kill his father is an accomplice of parricide: one
who plans with a servant to commit a theft (hurto),
and does commit it, is guilty of hurto domestic.
When the law clearly defines a crime, as it has here
defined the crime of malversation, those who in
any way participate therein must be principals,
accomplices or abettors thereof. (Vol. 4, p. 275.)
Viada, in his Commentaries upon the same article, says:
Shall the person who participates or intervenes as
co-perpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the crime
of malversation of public funds, committed by a
public officer, have the penalties of this article also
imposed upon him? In opposition to the opinion
maintained by some jurists and commentators
(among others the learned Pacheco) we can only
answer the question affirmatively, for the same
reasons (mutatis mutandis) we have already
advanced in Question I of the commentary on
article 314. French jurisprudence has also settled
the question in the same way on the ground that the
person guilty of the crime necessarily aids the other
culprit in the acts which constitute the crime. (Vol.
2, 4th edition, p. 652.)
The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support their
views as to the correct interpretation of the provisions of the
Penal Code touching malversation of public funds by a
public official, is equally applicable in our opinion, to the
provisions of Act No. 1740 defining and penalizing that
crime, and we have heretofore, in the case of the United
States vs. Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4), imposed the penalty
prescribed by this section of the code upon a public official
who took part with another in the malversation of public
funds, although it was not alleged, and in fact clearly
appeared, that those funds were not in his handy by virtue of
his office, though it did appear that they were in the hands of
his coprincipal by virtue of the public office held by him.
The order of the lower court sustaining the demurrer should
be and is hereby overruled.
IN THE CRIME OF RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL
ASSAULT
G.R. NOS. 121213 AND 121216-23            
JANUARY 13, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  APPELLEE,
VS.
BUTCHOY DE LA TORRE AND FE DE LA
TORRE, APPELLANTS.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The present cases are remarkably different, if not altogether
unique, in two aspects. Appealed are nine (9) rape
convictions of the same accused for ravishing the same
hapless young girl. And found guilty are a husband and wife
tandem.
Appellant-spouses Butchoy and Fe de la Torre were charged
in nine (9) separate Amended Complaints with rape
committed during the months of September, October and
December 1992 in Barangay Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan.
The victim, Baby Jane Dagot, was then only sixteen (16)
years old.
The first Amended Complaint dated February 23, 1994
charged the appellants with rape as follows:
That on or about the 2nd week of September, 1992,
at Barangay Tumarbong, in the Municipality of
Roxas, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused Butchoy de la Torre, in conspiracy and
confederating with his wife, Fe de la Torre, by
means of force, threat and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with one BABY JANE
DAGOT, a girl of 16 years of age against her will
and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That Fe de la Torre is hereby accused as a co-
principal for indispensable cooperation in the
commission of the crime by threatening Baby Jane
Dagot with a bladed weapon if ever said minor
refused to submit to perform a sexual act with
Butchoy de la Torre.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The other Amended Complaints are similarly worded except
for changes in the dates of commission of the offenses. The
second to the seventh complaints charged the appellants
with rape perpetuated in the remaining weeks of the month
of September as well as the whole month of October. 2 The
last amended complaint charged the appellants with rape in
the second week of December 1992.3
The nine criminal cases were consolidated and joint trial
conducted before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47. On March 2, 1995 Judge
Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. found the appellants guilty of all
nine (9) counts of rape charged in the nine Amended
Complaints and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua for
each count. They were also ordered to indemnify the
complainant the sum of P5,000.00 as actual damages
and P90,000.000 as moral and exemplary damages, and to
pay the costs.
Appellant Fe de la Torre employed Baby Jane Dagot as
housemaid in July 1992 in Langogan, Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan. After a week’s stay in Langogan, Fe brought Baby
Jane to New Buncag, Puerto Princesa City. In September
1992, they transferred to Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan. It
was in Tumarbong where Baby Jane first met Fe’s husband,
appellant Butchoy dela Torre.4
As recounted by Baby Jane, the initial rape incident
occurred in the first week of September 1992. She could not
remember the exact date but in that fateful night, as in
previous nights, Baby Jane and the appellant-spouses were
asleep on the floor of the same bedroom. At around 12:00
o’clock midnight, appellant Fe de la Torre woke Baby Jane
and her husband Butchoy. Baby Jane was surprised to see
that Fe was holding a lighted kerosene lamp and a
scythe.5 Fe ordered her husband to transfer and lie beside
Baby Jane. As appellant Butchoy did not comply, Fe herself
transferred so that Baby Jane was between her and Butchoy.
Fe put down the scythe and the lamp and proceeded to take
Butchoy’s clothes off and then Baby Jane’s. Butchoy
offered no resistance but Baby Jane objected and cried to no
avail. Fe then ordered Butchoy to have sex with Baby Jane.
Baby Jane, fearful of the spouses and the dawning
realization of what would happen to her, could not ward off
his advances. Butchoy placed himself on top of Baby Jane,
inserted his penis into her vagina and did a push and pull
motion.6 Baby Jane felt pain. All the while, Fe was standing
beside them, holding the lamp and the scythe. 7 After the
sexual intercourse, Butchoy kissed her on the neck and
fondled her breasts.8 Baby Jane found it revolting but could
not do much to refuse him, as she was afraid of Fe. When
Butchoy was finished, he threw her clothes to her and got
dressed. Baby Jane immediately put on her clothes. She
wanted to leave the room but Fe prevented her from doing
so.9 They all went back to sleep. Baby Jane could not sleep.
The following morning, Baby Jane saw that there was blood
on her panty.10
The rape was repeated once a week from the second week of
September 1992 on to the fourth week of October 1992.
Baby Jane had her menarche in the month of November
1992 and was spared from the appellants’ abuse that
month.11 However she was again raped in the second week
of December. This was to be the last. Baby Jane testified
that the subsequent rape incidents were carried out in the
same manner as the first.12 She felt pain during the first and
second rapes, but did not feel pain anymore in the
succeeding rape incidents.13
In December 1992, Fe brought Baby Jane with her to
Langogan.14 When Fe went out to check on her rattan
business, Baby Jane was left alone in the house. Baby Jane
took the chance to slip out of the house and go to her
godmother Lucita Talamisan, who was then
the barangay captain of Langogan. She narrated her ordeal
to her godmother.15 While Baby Jane was at
the barangay captain’s home, Fe arrived and told Baby Jane
not to report the matter. Fe threatened to twist the facts
about the rape, that she caught Baby Jane and her husband in
the act and would file a complaint against them.16
Baby Jane thereafter proceeded to her parents’ home and
related to them her abuse in the hands of the appellant-
spouses. Her father brought her to the police station in San
Rafael, Puerto Princesa. They were advised to have her
medically examined. She underwent the medical
examination on February 1993 at the Provincial Health
Office of Palawan conducted by Dr. Joselito Vicente,
Municipal Health Officer. 17 The Medico-Legal Certificate
revealed the following:
External findings:
(-) signs of physical injuries
Pelvic examination:
External findings = minimal distribution of pubic
hair
Healed hymenal lacerations = 2:00 o’clock
4:00 o’clock
10:00 o’clock
Vaginal vault admits one finger with ease18
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
The prosecution presented Dr. Marideth de Leon, Assistant
Provincial Health Officer, to testify on the findings of Dr.
Joselito Vicente. Dr. de Leon concluded from the healed
lacerations that when Baby Jane was examined, there had
been sexual intercourse possibly two or three weeks before
the examination. Clearly there was previous insertion into
the vaginal canal, but she could not determine from the
medical findings when the first intercourse occurred. 19
The appellant-spouses denied the allegations of rape. In their
version of the events, from September to October 1992,
neither they nor Baby Jane were in Tumarbong but were in
Puerto Princesa instead. They stayed in Tumarbong for less
than a month.20 Butchoy asserts that they stayed there for
only a week.21 Fe explains that they had to leave for Puerto
Princesa since her daughter-in-law gave birth in October
1992. When they went to Puerto Princesa, they took Baby
Jane with them.22 In Tumarbong, Baby Jane and the
appellants slept in separate rooms divided by a sawali wall.
The appellants profess that they had no quarrel with Baby
Jane herself,23 but surmise that the imputations of rape
against them may have been instigated by Baby Jane’s
father, Rafael Dagot.
Rafael Dagot was employed by appellant Fe dela Torre as
a capataz in her rattan business. She allegedly caught him
stealing some of the rattan and selling them to others
without her consent. Fe claims that Rafael asked for
forgiveness and offered to have Baby Jane work for them as
their maid. She forgave him, allowed him to continue to
work for her and also employed Baby Jane as her maid.
Rafael also allegedly owes them a total of P11,500.00 in
cash which he borrowed on May 1991. However when Fe
tried to collect from Rafael through the barangay captain,
Rafael allegedly transferred to another place and she no
longer saw him.24 The appellants imply that Rafael filed the
complaints for rape against them to escape payment of his
debt.25
The appellants also insist that Baby Jane was already
married to one Eddie Tabi when they took her as their maid.
This explains why, according to them, Baby Jane was no
longer a virgin.26
In this appeal, the appellants impute error to the trial court in
believing Baby Jane’s account of the supposed rape, and in
not according them their right to be presumed
innocent.27 The appellants proceed from the theory that the
alleged rape as narrated by the complainant is fantastic and
unbelievable. In Baby Jane’s narration, it was Fe who
ordered Butchoy to have sexual intercourse with Baby Jane.
The appellant-spouses argue that it is unnatural for a wife
like Fe to intensely desire that her husband have sex with
their maid. There is no evidence of anything wrong or
unusual about the appellants’ marriage or their sexual habits
that would support the complainant’s story. Even assuming
that the sexual encounters had actually taken place, the
appellants insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they
did so against Baby Jane’s will. Evidence for the
prosecution fails to explain how all nine rapes could have
occurred over a period of several months unless Baby Jane
gave her full cooperation. The appellants insist that the trial
court merely relied on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense to convict them and hence deprived them of their
right to the presumption of innocence.
From the outset it should be noted that while the appellants
assail the credibility of the complainant’s testimony, they
actually do not point to specific inconsistencies or
contradictions in her testimony. True, the trial court relied
solely on the testimony of the complainant regarding the
rape incidents, but the determinative question before the trial
court was whether the complainant’s testimony is credible.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness
is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and
consistent with the experience of mankind. Further, the
credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the basis of
the substance of their testimony and the surrounding
circumstances.28
The appellants point to the unusual manner of commission
of the crime, involving as it did not only the sexual assault
by the man but also the participation of his wife, to discredit
the complainant’s testimony. Under the Revised Penal
Code,29 however, an accused may be considered a principal
by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable
cooperation. This is true in a charge of rape against a
woman, provided of course a man is charged together with
her. Thus, in two cases this Court convicted the woman as a
principal by direct participation since it was proven that she
held down the complainant in order to help her co-accused
spouse consummate the offense.
In People v. Villamala,30 the Court found the husband and
wife guilty for raping their neighbor and "kumare" in this
factual setting, viz: the wife visited the victim at her home
on the pretext of inquiring as to the whereabouts of her
husband. Once inside, she whistled for her husband and he
immediately appeared at the doorstep. The wife then
suddenly pinned her "kumare" to the floor. The husband
forcefully removed the victim’s skirt and panties, removed
his shorts, placed himself on top of the victim and
consummated the rape. In the more recent People v.
Saba,31 the accused married couple victimized a fourteen
(14) year-old epileptic who stayed at their home for
treatment by the wife who was a reputed healer. On the
pretext of conducting a healing session, the wife ordered the
victim to lie down on the floor then pinned the victim’s
hands to the floor and covered her mouth while her husband
removed his pants and briefs and the victim’s panties and
raped the young girl. These two cases show not only the
possibility but the reality of rape committed by a woman
together with a man.
A close look at the cited cases reveals a common thread that
not only links them but also explains why the offenses were
committed in the fashion they were. This consists of the
close relationship between the parties and the attendant
conducive environment. The victim and the felons were
familiar with each other and there was a certain bond of trust
between them. The same kindred relationship and suitable
setting are extant in the present case. Indeed, the proximity
of the victim to the accused spouses was established by the
particular circumstances of their relationship. The backdrop
presented the offenders with a tempting opportunity to
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
satisfy their twisted desires upon a conveniently placed PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
victim.
Q Now, this incident that happened to you, what is
The appellants argue that the prosecution failed to present this?
any evidence of aberrant sexual behavior on their part that
would justify the trial court’s conclusion that the rape A That was when Fe de la Torre told her husband
occurred as described by the complainant. This argument to use me but I resisted. But she removed our
must fail since the sexual habits of the appellant-spouses do clothes.
not constitute an essential element of the offense of rape.
The prosecution only has to prove that there was carnal COURT:
knowledge of the complainant and that it was done against
her will. The trial court’s evaluation of the evidence resulted
in the appellants’ conviction and a close scrutiny of its Q You mean Fe de la Torre.
judgment leads us to affirm it.
A Yes, Your Honor.
The greatest weight is accorded to the findings and
conclusions reached by the lower court regarding the Q Whose clothes?
credibility of witnesses and their testimony, owing to the
court’s unique position to see, hear and observe the A Both of us, Your Honor.
witnesses testify. Unless it is shown that the court
overlooked or misunderstood some facts or circumstances of Q You and who?
weight and substance which would affect the outcome of the
case, or that its findings of fact and conclusions on the
A Butchoy de la Torre, Your Honor.
credibility of witnesses are not supported by the evidence on
record, its determination is left undisturbed. 32 In the present
case, we see no need to overturn this well-settled principle. Q What do you mean by "to use me"?

Herein appellants do not refer to any inconsistency in the A To have sexual intercourse ("ing bubuli") with
complainant’s testimony that would discredit her or would me, Your Honor.
lead this Court to doubt her version of the story. Baby Jane’s
testimony was straightforward and simple, positively PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
identifying the appellants as her abusers and clearly
narrating the circumstances of her defloration. Q Where did this happen?

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO: A At Tumarbong, Sir.

Q While you were residing with Butchoy de la Q Where in Tumarbong?

Torre and Fe de la Torre in Tumarbong, Roxas,
was there any incident that transpired sometime in A In the house of Fe de la Torre, Sir.
September 1992?
Q What happened next after that?
A Something happened, Sir.
A Butchoy de la Torre already used me, Sir.
COURT:
COURT:
Q When was this?
Q Be more specific. What is that "use me"?
A It happened in September, Your Honor, but I
cannot remember the exact date.
A After that Butchoy de la Torre had sexual
intercourse with me while Fe de la Torre was also
Q What year? present.

A 1992, Your Honor. Q And Fe de la Torre was doing what?

Q Can you remember what week? First, second or A Fe de la Torre was holding a big kerosene lamp
what? and also a scythe.

A I cannot remember, your Honor. Q Is that a weapon?

COURT: A Yes, Your Honor, a "karit" or "sangget" in

Cuyuno dialect, Your Honor.
Go ahead.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Q You mean Fe de la Torre was there while
Butchoy was having sexual intercourse with you
holding a scythe and a lamp?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Go ahead.
Q How? What were the words uttered by Fe de la
Torre in ordering her husband?
A We were sleeping in the same room, Your
Honor, on the floor and I heard Fe de la Torre
ordering her husband to transfer to my side but
Butchoy objected. So, Fe de la Torre was the one
who transferred to the other side of her husband
and Butchoy was already between us.

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO: PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q Was this Fe de la Torre saying something while Q After that what happened next?
the incident was going on?
A After that Fe de la Torre took off our clothes.
A Yes, Sir.
Q Was it not Butchoy de la Torre who took off
Q What was she saying? your clothes?

A That I can leave the house only if I marry A It was Fe de la Torre who took off Butchoy de la
Butchoy de la Torre, Sir. Torre’s clothes, Sir.

COURT: COURT:

Q Now, you said Fe de la Torre removed your Q What time of the night was this?
clothes and also that of Butchoy. While she was
doing that did you not object? A It was about 12:00 midnight.

A I objected, Your Honor. I resisted. I even cried, xxx

but she forced me.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q But Fe de la Torre is smaller than you, did you
not fight her? Q After your clothes were taken off, what
happened next, Madam Witness?
A How could I fight her when she was holding that
scythe, Your Honor. A Butchoy de la Torre placed himself on top of me.

Q Can you describe that scythe? COURT:

A It is sharp and we are using it in the house, Your Q While on top of you, what was happening?
Honor.
A While he was on top of me, Butchoy de la Torre
Q But Butchoy de la Torre was not threatening was doing the push and pull motion, Your Honor,
you? ("aga ayud-ayud") while Fe was holding a scythe
and a lamp.
A No, Sir.
Q Was Fe de la Torre lying down or standing while
Q Why did you allow Butchoy de la Torre to have this was going on?
sex with you without you resisting?
A She was standing holding a lamp, Your Honor.
A Fe de la Torre ordered him, Your Honor.
Q Only a lamp?
Q Butchoy de la Torre?
A Also the scythe.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q This push and pull motion, what was that?
Q You heard that?
A While he was having sex with me he was doing
A Yes, Your Honor. that motion, Sir.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Q Was his penis inside your vagina when he was Q But Butchoy did not complain that he did not
doing that push and pull motion? want to have sex with you?

A Yes, Your Honor. A He did not complain, Your Honor.

Q Did you enjoy it? xxx

A No, Your Honor. In fact I don’t want it. PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q What did you feel? Q This push and pull motion that Butchoy de la
Torre did, how long did it take?
A It was painful, Your Honor.
A For sometime, Sir.
Q Why was it painful?
COURT:
A Because of his penetration, Your Honor. He
inserted his penis inside my vagina. Q How many minutes?

Q Was that the first time you experienced sex? A I cannot tell, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor. PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q There was no blood? Q Did Butchoy de la Torre kiss you?

A Only my panty was filled with blood, Your A Yes, Sir, on my neck.
Honor.
Q Not on your face or lips?
Q But you said your clothes were taken off?
A No, Sir.
A After the rape I put on my panty and the next
morning I saw my panty with blood. COURT:

Q That was the first time he had sexual intercourse Q So Butchoy liked you also?
with you?
A I did not notice that, Your Honor, but he was
A Yes, Your Honor. ordered by his wife to do it.

Q That was about the first week of September PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

1992?
Q Was there any touching of your breasts or
A Yes, Your Honor. squeezing some parts of your body while he was
having sex with you?
Q The husband did not complain to the wife why
she was doing it? A Yes, Sir.

A He did not complain, Your Honor. COURT:

Q But you could feel the penis of Butchoy de la
Torre harden as it entered your vagina?
A Yes, Your Honor, it was painful.
Q So, it was not only Fe de la Torre who wanted
Butchoy to have sex with you, Butchoy also
wanted to do it?
Q Your breasts, for example?
A My nipple was fondled, Your Honor, by him.
Q That was before his penis was inserted in your
vagina or after?
A After, Your Honor.

A But he was also told by Fe de la Torre to have PROSECUTOR GUAYCO;

sex with me, Your Honor.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Q Do you like what Fe de la Torre and Butchoy de
la Torre did to you?
A No, Sir.
COURT:
Q Did you not feel, while Butchoy de la Torre’s
penis was inside you and doing the push and pull if
he finished his act?
A I did not feel, Your Honor.
Q He only suddenly stopped?
A Yes, Your Honor. 33
Baby Jane never wavered in her testimony even under
intense cross-examination by the defense. She forthrightly
answered the questions and re-affirmed her attestations
during the direct. The cross-examination only served to
clarify certain details in the commission of the offense and
reinforced the truth of her narration.
ATTY. PADON:
Q Madam Witness, you were awakened by Fe de la
Torre before the intercourse?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you were already awaken (sic), you saw her
holding a lamp and a scythe?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you said, Madam Witness, that Fe de la
Torre told her husband to rape you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was the exact words uttered by Fe de la
Torre?
A "Magpaluyo kaw sa kilid." (You move to the
other side.)
COURT:
Q But the Court thought she was holding a lamp
and a scythe, so she was not lying anymore?
A She was seated between us, Your Honor.
Q About the sexual intercourse, what was the
command of Fe de la Torre to Butchoy de la Torre?
A And then Fe de la Torre told him to undress or
remove his clothes, but Butchoy did not obey her.
So, this Fe de la Torre put down the scythe and the
lamp which she was holding and she was the one
who removed the clothes of Butchoy and my
clothes.
Q And immediately upon removal of the clothes of
Butchoy, you saw the penis of Butchoy already?
A No, Your Honor.
Q You did not see him naked?
A I saw him naked but I did not focus my eyes to
his penis.
Q Who was undressed first, Butchoy de la Torre or
you?
A It was Butchoy, your Honor.
Q You did not resist when you were being
undressed?
A I asked her why but she did not reply.
Q But you could feel that the private organ of
Butchoy de la Torre entered your body, is that
right?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. PADON:
Q What was the position of Butchoy de la Torre
when Fe de la Torre removed his clothes?
A He was standing and after Fe de la Torre
removed his clothes, he sat down already.
Q How about you what was your position when Fe
de la Torre removed your clothes?
A I was still lying down and then she pulled me to
stand up and then she removed my clothes.
Q When you were already standing, you just
allowed Fe de la Torre to remove your clothes?
A I cannot resist because I was afraid, Sir. Even her
husband was also afraid.34
The trial court noted that Baby Jane was only sixteen years
old when the incidents occurred, and had barely finished the
second grade of elementary schooling. She was young,
unlettered, and unsophisticated. Given her background she
was innocent in the ways of the world and incapable of
fabricating the charges of rape against the appellants, and
making up such a shocking tale of sexual perversity.
Additionally, the defense has not imputed to her any ill
motive to indict the appellants with trumped up charges. The
appellants have categorically manifested that they had no
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
quarrel with Baby Jane and effectively erased any evil COURT:
intention that may be attributed to her. Their claim is that the
charges were instigated by Baby Jane’s father, Rafael Dagot. Q When?
This is absurd. It is unnatural for a parent to use her
offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject A On the second week of September, Your Honor.
her to embarrassment, and even stigma, as in this case. 35 In
like manner, a father would not subject his daughter to the
indignities of a rape trial just to evade payment of a debt. Q 1992 also?

The appellants even tried to show that Baby Jane was a girl A Yes, Sir.
of loose morals, by having Rafael Dagot’s neighbor, Gloria
Mijares, testify that Baby Jane was already married to one Q It happened the same way as the first with the
Eddie Tabi and that Baby Jane had lived with said Eddie wife holding a lamp and a scythe?
Tabi for more than a year before working for the appellants
as a maid. But the witness testified to no such thing, saying A Yes, Sir.
only that allegedly Eddie Tabi had proposed marriage to
Baby Jane but she refused him.36 The testimony could not PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
even be given much credit for being hearsay.
Q How about the third week, did it happen again?
Baby Jane’s behavior during and after the rape incidents
reinforce the trial court’s findings of rape. She objected to
A Yes, Your Honor, the same thing happened
Fe’s acts of removing her clothes, but her resistance was
again.
restricted by her fear of the appellants. The scythe that Fe
held in her hands and threats of bodily harm should she
refuse effectively intimidated her into submitting to Q How about on the fourth week of September
Butchoy’s onslaught. Afterwards, she could tell no one of 1992, did it happen again?
the ordeal she had gone through as she was constantly under
Fe’s watchful eye. In addition, she did not know any of their A The same, Sir.
neighbors nor their neighborhood well enough to report the
incident. When the opportunity to escape presented itself, COURT:
she took it. She reported the matter to the authorities and this
led to the filing of the Amended Complaints against the Q It also happened on the fourth week?
appellants. Her actions testify to the truth of her allegations
of rape for a young girl would not make up a story of sexual
A Yes, Your Honor.
exploitation and undergo the humiliation of a medical
examination of her private parts and a court trial that would
dissect each and every aspect of the sexual abuse committed Q The same procedure? The same threats?
against her if it were not true.37
A Yes, Your Honor.
But then, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, the appellants may be convicted only of the xxx
rape committed in the first week of September 1992. The
evidence for the prosecution proves only the first charge of POSECUTOR GUAYCO:
rape. Baby Jane’s testimony on the commission of the eight
other charges does not satisfy the standard of proof beyond Q This incident that transpired in the first week of
reasonable doubt to justify the appellants’ conviction. We September 1992, did it happen again on the first
quote the transcript of the trial: week of October 1992?

COURT: A Yes, Sir.

Q You have just described your first sexual Q How about in the second week of October 1992,
intercourse which happened on September 1992, did it happen again?
was it done to you again the next week?
A Yes, Sir.
A It happened once every week, Your Honor.
COURT:
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q The same thing happened where Fe de la Torre
Q How about on the second week of September was holding a scythe and a lamp?
1992, did this happen to you again?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A Yes, Sir, it happened again.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Q And what happened the first time, happened
again several times?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So, in the month of October 1992, how many
times had this Butchoy de la Torre have sex with
you?
A Once every week, Your Honor.
Q So how many times?
A Four times, Your Honor.
Q So first, second, third and fourth week?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
COURT:
Q During the first intercourse and the second, did
you feel pain?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How about on the third time?
A It was not painful anymore.
Q And subsequently, no more?
A No more, Your Honor.
Q Why no more pain?
A I don’t know but I did not feel pain anymore.
Q Is it because you already approved of the
intercourse?
A No, Your Honor.
Q But you did not resist or struggle?
A I was between a woman and a man, Your Honor,
I could not struggle.
Q But you did not resist or struggle?
A I struggled but in vain, Your Honor.
Q Because you were afraid?
A I was afraid, Your Honor.
Q But Fe de la Torre did not injure you, why were
you afraid?
A She was threatening me with that scythe that she
would strike me with that scythe.
Q So because you were afraid of physical harm you
allowed yourself to be used by Butchoy de la
Torre?
A Yes, Your Honor, because despite my struggle
Fe de la Torre was there, armed.
xxx
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Now, did this incident also happen in the second
week of December?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q How about in November?
A There was none, Your Honor.
Q So you were free that November?
A Yes, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Now, in these nine incidents, did you really like
what was done to you by the accused?
A No, Sir.38
Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct
crime; hence, each of the eight other rape charges should be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is
required to establish, by the necessary quantum of proof, the
elements of rape for each charge. 39 Baby Jane’s testimony
on the first rape charge was explicit, detailing the
participation of each appellant in the offense and clearly
illustrating all the elements of the offense of rape. However
her simple assertion that the subsequent rapes occurred in
exactly the same manner as in previous incidents is clearly
inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish to a degree
of moral certainty the guilt of the appellants insofar as the
eight rape charges are concerned. Her testimony was too
general as it failed to focus on material details as to how
each of the subsequent acts was committed. Even her
testimony on cross-examination did not add anything to
support her accusations of subsequent rape. Thus, only the
rape alleged to have been committed on September 1992
was proven beyond reasonable doubt and the appellants may
be penalized only for this offense.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
The use by the appellants of a bladed weapon, alleged in
the Amended Complaint and sufficiently proven in this case,
qualifies the rape.40 In the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the penalty that the appellants
shall suffer is the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.41
In accordance with jurisprudential law, the complainant in a
rape case is entitled to civil indemnity, which is actually in
the nature of actual or compensatory damages, in the amount
of P50,000.00, as well as moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity42 and moral damages43 are
automatically granted once the fact of rape has been
established. Exemplary damages are awarded under Article
2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. Since the
commission of the rape was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of use of a deadly weapon, exemplary
damages of P25,000.00 should also be given to the
complainant.44
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City is MODIFIED. In
Criminal Case No. 11199, the appellants are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of rape qualified with the use of a
deadly weapon and are accordingly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the
offended party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000,00) as moral damages and Twenty-five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages. With respect to
Criminal Cases No. 11313 to No. 11320, the appellants are
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
VIOLATION OF B.P. 22
G.R. NO. 141066             FEBRUARY 17, 2005
EVANGELINE LADONGA,  PETITIONER,
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  RESPONDENT.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the
Decision,1 dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated
August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070
convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known
as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No.
7068 alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping with one another,
knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743
postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND
SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS
(₱9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter,
without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient
funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the
check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check
to Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the
aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the
check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused
with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch,
had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.2
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal
Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly worded, except for
the allegations concerning the number, date and amount of
each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744
dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of ₱12,730.00;3
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136
dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of ₱8,496.55.4
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When
arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two accused pleaded not
guilty to the crimes charged.5
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant
Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in 1989, spouses
Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular
customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City,
Bohol;7 sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post
dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; 8 sometime
in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of
May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan
of ₱12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744,
post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of ₱8,496.55,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July
22, 1990 issued by Adronico;10 the three checks bounced
upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem
the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal
complaint against them.12
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced
because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was
closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were
issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement
that Oculam should not encash the checks when they
mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks
and had no participation in the issuance thereof.14
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision
finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment
finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and
Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the
aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand
charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them
to imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an
imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them, and
a fine in the amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the
amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an
imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year and
a fine of ₱12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of
UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an
imprisonment of one year for each of them and a
fine of ₱8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of
UCPB Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly
and solidarily pay and reimburse the complainant,
Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00
representing actual expenses incurred in
prosecuting the instant cases; ₱10,000.00 as
attorney’s fee; and the amount of ₱30,302.10 which
is the total value of the three (3) subject checks
which bounced; but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 15
Adronico applied for probation which was granted. 16 On the
other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her
criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the
principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which
is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. 17
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of petitioner.18 It held that the provisions of the
penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in the
decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs.
Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs. Bruhez.21 It noted that Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall
be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide
the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P.
Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory
character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases
involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the
fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks
did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not
indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in
every act and knows the part which everyone performed.
The Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act
of one conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the
Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution dated
November 16, 1999.22
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for
resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO
WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE
THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER
CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE
LATTER’S ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD
LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE
THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE
IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY
INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code.
– Offenses which are or in the future may be punished under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.
This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN
TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS
CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY
CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO
SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.23
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held
criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she
had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the three
checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by
the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P.
Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of
conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and
include situations not provided for or intended by the
lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who
had no participation in the drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner
and echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that some
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the
addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable
to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide
any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory
character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.
– Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides
that offenses which in the future are made punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC,
while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such
laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a
sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be
reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the
special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses
therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the
elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal
provisions prevail over general ones.24 Lex specialis
derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a
superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The
second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea
and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that
the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the
latter should specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs.
Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs. Bruhez27 rests on a firm
basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of
principles under the then Penal Code to special laws. People
vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 22 28 of
the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law,
with reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they
favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of
Article 1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to the
participation of principals in the commission of the crime of
misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized
by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the
same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the
instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium
Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory
application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the
absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general
provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the
recent case of Yu vs. People,31 the Court applied suppletorily
the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article
3932 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in
this case is analogous to the application of the provision on
principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design
is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of
them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.33
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner
must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held
guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the complicity.34 The overt act or acts of
the accused may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute
or implement the criminal plan.35
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that
petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution
witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely
present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check
subject of Criminal Case No. 7068.36 With respect to
Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not
describe the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not
specify the nature of petitioner’s involvement in the
commission of the crime, either by a direct act of
participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or
cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be
attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first
check was issued. However, this inference cannot be
stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. 37 Conspiracy transcends
mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. 38 Even
knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is
not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy,
absent any active participation in the commission of the
crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.39
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent
vintage, People vs. Mandao:40
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be
taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept
that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as
such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing,
considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by
which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the
penal fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of
conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always be
founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. The
Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its
evidence against accused-appellant Franco, merely relied
and pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its sweeping
theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the
commission of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction
must be predicated on the strength of the evidence for the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere
possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the
accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak,
the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not
proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in
all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)41
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the
petitioner with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the
quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the
constitutional presumption of the petitioner’s innocence
must be upheld and she must be acquitted.1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision,
dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070
convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline
Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under
B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
VIOLATION AGAINST WOMEN
G.R. NO. 168852           SEPTEMBER 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN,  PETITIONER,
VS.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN AND JUANITA L.
TAN, RESPONDENTS.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005
which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and
Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.3 Out of this union,
two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen
Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)6 against
Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and
Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged
that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and
(i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as
the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an
Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection
Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they
were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on
Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that
respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal
interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and
safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing
the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the
parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under
the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration14 contending that the doctrine of necessary
implication should be applied in the broader interests of
substantial justice and due process.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration 15 arguing that
petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between
the offender and the alleged victim was an essential
condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying
petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned
that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No.
9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of
the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES
PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF
SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004".17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood
in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262
which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the
provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be
suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and
respondents had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically; that respondents should be
included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete
resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not
covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly
provides that the offender should be related to the victim
only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual
relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of
respondents require a factual determination which cannot be
done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents
cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary
parties, since their presence in the case is not only
unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-
inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against
women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has
a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under
the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for
the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act,
the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary
to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide
the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may
be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the
special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily
the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the
RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise
known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the
special law did not contain any provision that the defendant
could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily
the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70
of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of
multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as
the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of
similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily
Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words
"principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No.
8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were
not defined therein, although the special law referred to the
same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime
of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of
the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence
of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said
special law.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied
suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of
the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy
under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to
R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section
47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus,
general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A.
No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women
and their children may be committed by an offender through
another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children. - The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another,
that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or
her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering
outside the residence of the woman or her
child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling
or on the property of the woman or her
child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal
belongings or inflicting harm to animals or
pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or
violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the
woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders
that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or
all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening
to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
this Act; 1avvphi1.net
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly
or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal
construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally
construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and their children. (Emphasis
supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law 24 and
that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the
present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects
the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will
best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according
to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and
safety of victims of violence against women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the
maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no
application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is
only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of
universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent
which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted
to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.25
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great
length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the
conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to
cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her.
However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should
be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot
be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a
trier of facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue
evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only
on the determination of whether respondents may be
included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or
absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial
on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of
conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262,
the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may
be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so
would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition
against respondents is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE IMPUTABILITY
DOCTRINE.
1. People vs. Bucsit, G.R. No. 17865, March 15, 1922 -
(Parricide)
2.Qualified theft, if one of the perpetrators is an employee of
the victim.
WHEEL CONSPIRACY VS. CHAIN
CONSPIRACY.
G.R. NO. 148965               FEBRUARY 26, 2002
JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA,  PETITIONER,
VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application
to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is the
submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal
protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be
excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the
respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment
proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President
of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints
against the former President and members of his family, his
associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the
respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint
Resolution1 finding probable cause warranting the filing with
the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against
the former President and the other respondents therein. One
of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under
Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was
herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was
assigned to respondent Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on
July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioner’s provisional liberty
was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or
Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that the
Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and
that it charged more than one offense. Respondent
Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of
arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis,
petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the
law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion"2 alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put
him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that
he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not
in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as
required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from
the Amended Information and be discharged from custody.
In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed
to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court.3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve
Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An
Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In
The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense
As To Him."4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-
Called ‘Entry of Appearance,’ To Direct Ombudsman To
Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense
And To Resolve Pending Incidents."5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioner’s "Motion to Quash and
Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion."6 Petitioner’s
alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after
arraignment of all accused. The court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby
DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION TO
QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by
accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH
dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada;
and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information
dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused
Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND
SUSPEND of accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, his VERY
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1)
dropped from the information for plunder for want of
probable cause and (2) discharged from custody
immediately which is based on the same grounds mentioned
in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby
DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS
MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing
together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S.
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Serapio scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 o’clock in the Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane
afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused."7 Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized
under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No.
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for 7659, committed as follows:
reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied
the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner That during the period from June, 1998 to January,
refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
a plea of "not guilty" for him.8 this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or PHILIPPINES, by
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY wit
jurisdiction in: h his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS
FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
petitioner, and denying him the equal protection of TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
the laws; POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR
provide complete and sufficient standards; INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
with which and with whom he is not even remotely PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or
liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF
denial of substantive due process; OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
involvement in jueteng in one count of the A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
information which amounts to cruel and unusual acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described
punishment totally in defiance of the principle of as follows:
proportionality."9
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim. indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF
I. FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS,
FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional
FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
on its face and as applied to him and denies him the equal
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
protection of the laws.10
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connivance with co-
The contention deserves our scant attention. The accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
has been settled in the case of Estrada v. Edward Serapio, AN (sic)  JOHN DOES AND
Sandiganbayan.11 We take off from the Amended JANE DOES, in consideration OF
Information which charged petitioner, together with former TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
"Atong" Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the
crime of plunder as follows:
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING,
misappropriating,
"AMENDED INFORMATION converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC- PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in
Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or
Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG SALONGA" less, representing a portion of the TWO
AND a.k.a "JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur under
a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR
HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES
OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social
Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES
OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION
SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND
FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND
BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE
OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF
THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME
"JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001"12
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is
unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on
the premise that the Amended Information charged him with
only one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder.
He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination
of the Amended Information will show that it is divided into
three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former
President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder
together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie
"Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and
others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms
how the accused conspired in committing the crime of
plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d)
describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime
of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and
state the names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in
sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is
of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several
instances, money in the aggregate amount of
₱545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit
x x x." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy
with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of
receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling
amounting to ₱545 million. Contrary to petitioner’s posture,
the allegation is that he received or collected money from
illegal gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on
several instances" means the petitioner committed the
predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended
Information charged the petitioner with the commission of
only one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances"
is to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the
exact words "combination" or "series" as they appear in
R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held
that where these two terms are to be taken in their popular,
not technical, meaning, the word "series" is synonymous
with the clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a
repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in
Section 1 (d) of the law. The word "combination"
contemplates the commission of at least any two different
predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-paragraph
(a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with
plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act
under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the
Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable
cause to charge him with plunder together with the other
accused, he was alleged to have received only the sum of P2
million, which amount is way below the minimum of P50
million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not
borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the
Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against
petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
"x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of
San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also surreptitious
collection of protection money from jueteng operations in
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
Bulacan. This is gleaned from the statements of Gov.
Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least
two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an
emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling
P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1
million in February, 2000. An alleged "listahan" of jueteng
recipients listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as affirmed by
Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000
SBRC/SCI]."14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the
Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was delivered
to petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two
occasions." The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire
sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is
further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:
"x x x           x x x          x x x
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with
Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and Yolanda
Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the
aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng collections of
the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’
Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or
interference by law enforcers; x x x."15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue
that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable cause
against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan
itself has found probable cause against the petitioner for
which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him.
Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial.
The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the
Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be
resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not
provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the courts
in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the
offense."16 Thus, he posits the following questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at
least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose on one
who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is
it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser penalty? What
if another accused is shown to have participated in three of
the ten specifications, what would be the penalty imposable,
compared to one who may have been involved in five or
seven of the specifications? The law does not provide the
standard or specify the penalties and the courts are left to
guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what the
law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is supposed to
have intended."17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors
hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged with only
one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the
other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the
Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him
ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A.
No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on
an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however,
overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended
Information charges him to have conspired with former
President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His
alleged participation consists in the commission of the
predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of
petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that
of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with the members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for
"sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses
and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he
is not even remotely connected – contrary to the dictum that
criminal liability is personal, not vicarious – results in the
denial of substantive due process."18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that
petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in sub-
paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-
paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a
principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This
is purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs of
the Amended Information.19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the
allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-vis the
provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs,
charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime of
plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the
second paragraph describes in general how plunder was
committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime
itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the
predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in
particular the co-conspirators of former President
Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged
in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items
enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-
paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on
several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling,
and expressly names petitioner as one of those who
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense
described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act
of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos
Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the
enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph
does not mention petitioner but instead names other
conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c)
alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security
System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from
such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became
part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the
Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under
items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and
was allegedly committed by the former President in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-
paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former
President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts,
kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does,
and deposited the same under his account name "Jose
Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to
the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1
(d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information,
it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former
President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is
worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to
enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten
wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be
penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other
accused with the former President as related in the second
paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-
paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held
accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly
committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with
the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten
wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent
Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the
predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the
Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate
Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will
show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly
of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was
enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where
charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former
President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government
prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the
multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed
by the former President to acquire illegal wealth.20 They
also found that under the then existing laws such as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other special laws, the acts involved different
transactions, different time and different
personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate
crime and required a separate case and the over-all
conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal
and graft charges. The preparation of multiple
Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-
nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against
practically the same accused before the
Sandiganbayan.21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder
Law22 was enacted precisely to address this procedural
problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate
Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt
terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment,
committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but
in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may
involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch
so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or
omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple
cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion,
theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation
resulting in material damage to the national
economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in
Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a
legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of
the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to
those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting
influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire
nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of
crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different
parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case
at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts
have a commonality—to help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a)
to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different
participation of each accused in the conspiracy.
The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore,
is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money
from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion
of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the
GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and
receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly
enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President
Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several
accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two
structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy,
in which there is a single person or group (the "hub")
dealing individually with two or more other persons or
groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy,
usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other
contraband, in which there is successive communication and
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler,
then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer.23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar
appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub is former
President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and
the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the
overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the
charge against the petitioner on the ground that the
allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too
general. The fear is even expressed that it could serve as a
net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be
inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with
conspiracy in American criminal law and in common
law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be
understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is
not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime
only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such
as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and
sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the
agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the
offense.24 The essence of conspiracy is the combination of
two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a
criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself
criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. 25 Its
elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective,
coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the
illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the
underlying substantive offense.26
A study of the United States Code ought to be
instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of
conspiracy27 – conspiracy to commit any offense or to
defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede or
injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,28 as
follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
United States. If two or more persons conspire either to
commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud
the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the
object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the
maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18
U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or
more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or District
conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any
person from accepting or holding any office, trust or place
of confidence under the United States, or from discharging
any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of
the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an
officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his
person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the
duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge
thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt,
hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties,
each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than six years, or both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy
to commit any offense against the United States; and (2)
conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency
thereof. The conspiracy to "commit any offense against the
United States" refers to an act made a crime by federal
laws.29 It refers to an act punished by statute. 30 Undoubtedly,
Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws,
whether criminal or regulatory.31 These laws cover
criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic,
racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery,
etc. and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of
currency, copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries,
violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate
commerce and other areas of federal regulation. 32 Section
371 penalizes the conspiracy to commit any of these
substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is
generally separate and distinct from the substantive
offense,33 hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the
substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and
conviction for related conspiracy.34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily
to cheating the United States out of property or money. It
also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful
governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at
least by means that are dishonest.35 It comprehends
defrauding the United States in any manner whatever,
whether the fraud be declared criminal or not.36
The basic difference in the concept of
conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case
law on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it
is not necessary for the indictment to include
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in
stating the manner and means of effecting the object of
the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the
scope of a bill of particulars. 37 An indictment for
conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement;
(2) the offense-object toward which the agreement was
directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of
the agreement.38 To allege that the defendants conspired is,
at least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are
set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a
conspiracy is to allege an agreement. 39 The gist of the crime
of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where
conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the
criminal object with as great a certainty as is required in
cases where such object is charged as a substantive
offense.40
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference
on how Philippine courts and American courts deal with
cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on
the ground that they lack particularities of time, place,
circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as
aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information
as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as
constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is
alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the
allegations in the Information charging the offense is
governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for
this crime must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused, the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person,
all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the
name of the accused, designate the offense given by
statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate
date of the commission of the offense and the place where
the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or
omissions constituting the offense should be made in order
to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must
be designated by its name given by statute or by reference to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. 41 The
information must also state the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances.42 The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment.43 No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged. 44 Every element of the
offense must be stated in the information.45 What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of
the specified crimes.46 The requirement of alleging the
elements of a crime in the information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption
is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the
act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must
be set forth in the complaint or information. For example,
the crime of "conspiracy to commit treason" is committed
when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an
agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere
to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide
to commit it.48 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the
offender owes allegiance to the Government of the
Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the Philippines
is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons
come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the
government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid
and comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or
persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements
must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are
different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in
itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in
the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not
the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is
significant only because it changes the criminal liability of
all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them
answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their
participation in the crime.49 The liability of the conspirators
is collective and each participant will be equally responsible
for the acts of others,50 for the act of one is the act of
all.51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on how conspiracy
as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in
the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime
charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and
liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or
circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused
persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of
an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or
one that would impute criminal liability to an accused
for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order
to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent
of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or
others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy
exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts
done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary
importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others
(People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must
know from the information whether he faces a criminal
responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his
co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the
components of conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or
the facts connecting all the accused with one another in
the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive
offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a
statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the
offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much
certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a
manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same
facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held
sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and
reasonably informs the accused of the character of the
offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or,
following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes
defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
x x x           x x x          x x x
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very
instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit
the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the
information must state that the accused have
confederated to commit the crime or that there has been
a community of design, a unity of purpose or an
agreement to commit the felony among the accused.
Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of
the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase
"acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the
information in the form of definitive acts constituting
conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime,
the unity of purpose or the community of design among
the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of
the term "conspire" or its derivatives and
synonyms or  by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just
inferred, in the information on which basis an accused
can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be
confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence
that may be required to prove it. In establishing
conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it
need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may
be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
x x x           x x x          x x x."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it
is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the
commission of an offense in either of the following
manner: (1) by use of the word "conspire," or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive,
collude, etc;53 or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting
the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter
a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not
be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of
actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a
common purpose or design, a concerted action or
concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually
pursue it.55 A statement of this evidence is not necessary in
the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended
Information alleged in general terms how the accused
committed the crime of plunder. It used the words "in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused." Following the
ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the
conspiracy of the accused with the former President in
committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioner’s plea for bail. On August 14,
2002, during the pendency of the instant petition before this
Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an
"Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons."
Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his
serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if
he goes back to his place of detention.1âwphi1 The motion
was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner
replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001,
respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the
motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of
the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness for
petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court an "Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate Resolution of
Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Petition for Bail on
Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." Petitioner reiterated
the motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent
Sandiganbayan.56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the
motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution and
requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in
the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its
Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution dated
December 20, 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for bail for
"lack of factual basis."57 Basing its finding on the earlier
testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that
petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince
the court that the medical condition of the accused requires
that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be
allowed to post bail."58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as
amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is
strong, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
CASES FOR CONSPIRACY COMPILED
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required."

The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail

in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires
that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the
prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient
opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden
of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of
guilt.60

This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner

as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should be
conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which
respondent court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001
involved the reception of medical evidence only and which
evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago.
The records do not show that evidence on petitioner’s guilt
was presented before the lower court.

Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent

Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the
evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong as to warrant the
granting of bail to petitioner.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure

to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.