Hardik Khattar

1886
Semester 3
End Semester Examinations

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

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Q1. Critically analyse the minority decision in the case of Regina v Brown (Anthony)
[1993]
2 W.L.R. 556, [1994] 1 A.C. 212.

A1.

First let us lay down the material facts of the following case :-

• The appellants, a group of sado-masochists, willingly and enthusiastically participated in

the commission of acts of violence against each other for the sexual pleasure it
engendered in the giving and receiving of pain.
• They pleaded not guilty on arraignment to counts charging various offences under
sections 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 ,1 relating to the infliction
of wounds or actual bodily harm on genital and other areas of the body of the consenting
victim.
• It was ruled by the trial judge that, in the particular circumstances, the prosecution did not
have to prove lack of consent by the victim, the appellants were re-arraigned, pleaded
guilty, some to offences under section 20 and all to offences under section 47 and they
were convicted.
• Following this, they appealed against conviction on the ground that the judge had erred in
his rulings, in that the willing and enthusiastic consent of the victim to the acts on him
prevented the prosecution from proving an essential element of the offence.
• Now the House of Lords, dismissing the appeals in a ratio of 3:2 (Lord Mustill and Lord
Slynn of Hadley dissenting), that although a prosecutor had to prove absence of consent
in order to secure a conviction for mere assault it was not in the public interest that a
person should wound or cause actual bodily harm to another for no good reason

Masochism: the tendency to derive sexual gratification from one's own pain or humiliation.

Sadism: the tendency to derive pleasure, especially sexual gratification, from inflicting pain,
suffering, or humiliation on others.

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Having taken into consideration the facts, we must also look at the arguments given for the
judgement, or, we must understand why ‘Consent’ as per the house of lords cannot be a valid
defence under article 47.

Lets take a look at the judgement given by the court :- The court denied, concluding that
consent could not be used as a defence in these cases. The court stated that it was unclear to
them whether the appellants' actions constituted exercises of rights relating to private and
family life. However, presuming that the appellants claim to be exercising those rights, they
did not consider that Article 8 invalidates a provision prohibiting intentional assault against
the body and mind. A society has the right and obligation to defend itself against a cult of
violence. Pleasure received from pain infliction is a bad thing. Cruelty is barbaric. The acts
were found to be "unpredictably hazardous and demeaning to body and mind, developed with
growing barbarity and taught to those whose consents were questionable or worthless,"
according to the ruling.

Minority/Dissenting Judgements

Lord Mustill believes that consensual, private sexual acts, up to and including those
involving ABH, should be considered outside of criminality, and that the case should be
about the criminal law of private sexual relations, if anything at all, leaving aside repugnance
and moral objection, both of which are perfectly natural but neither of which are grounds on
which the court could properly create a new crime.

Lord Slynn agreed with him and emphasised that everyone has the right to consent to the
infliction of bodily injury that does not amount to a maim on oneself.

Analysis
The dissenting opinion ignores the fact that, despite consent, the two are inextricably linked in
this case - sexual enjoyment can only be obtained when harm is being perpetrated. As a result,
it was thought that prohibiting people from repeatedly inflicting grievous physical damage on
others only because they wish to repeat the transient sexual thrill they get was not irrational.

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This reasoning, however, does not appear to apply to ABH. Those who inflict ABH on
themselves on a regular basis by smoking and drinking excessively are not prosecuted, and
neither are those who supply them with the instruments of injury.

The desire to use unlawful force to the victim is the mental element required to establish guilt;
consequently, the act must be accompanied by a hostile intent calculated to generate
apprehension in the victim's mind. In some cases, hostile intent can be inferred from an
intentional conduct, although this is a question of fact depending on the facts of the case. When
there is consent, using force is not illegal; nonetheless, the prosecution must negate consent or
a key component of the actus reus is missing.

In other cases, like as in R v. Wilson (1997), a wife agreed to her husband branding her buttocks
with a hot knife. Her skin, however, grew infected, and she went to her doctor, who informed
the authorities. Actual Bodily Harm was prosecuted against her spouse. Due to the similarity
of the branding to tattooing and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which
provides a right to respect for one's "private and family life, his home and his correspondence"
and "there shall be no interference by a public authority" and "there shall be no interference by
a public authority," the charges were dropped after an appeal, as the actions were lawful and
occurred in the privacy of a matrimonial home. This case raises the possibility of prejudice,
which was raised in the R v. Brown case. This is because both defendants were convicted of
S.47, however the charges against the heterosexual guy were dismissed while the charges
against the homosexual male were not.

However, one could argue that consenting to suffer damage is permissible and legal in specific
instances, such as when obtaining piercings or participating in violent sports such as boxing or
wrestling. Although there is an intent to harm in these sports, the activities are considered legal
due to the consent obtained.

The activities that took place during the session were private and hence did not come under the
category of public indecency, as they were carried out between consenting adults. When it
comes to prejudice and R v. Brown, there is a lot of discussion about homosexuality and
whether or not it influenced the judges' decision. When dealing with such a significant matter,
you must ensure that you are concentrating on every detail that influenced the judges'

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judgement. After then, I believe prejudice influenced the case's conclusion, and the dissenting
opinion presented a better, broader, and more neutral understanding of the law.

Q3. Read the decision in the case of Padmini Mahendrabhai Gadda vs. State of Gujarat
(2017) 14 SCC 587 and argue from the side of Appellant and Respondent before the larger
bench

Answer 3

Appellant

Baby vs State of Maharashtra lays down the ingredients to attract the application of Section as
four – the commission of an offence; knowledge of such offence (including reason to believe
that such offence had been committed) by the accused; the causing of any evidence with respect
to that offence to disappear, or give any information with respect to the commission of the
offence knowing it to be false; and doing so with the intention of screening the offender from
legal punishment.

Respondent

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Now herein Baby vs State of Maharashtra lays down the ingredients to attract the application
of Section as four –

• the commission of an offence;

• knowledge of such offence (including reason to believe that such offence had been
committed) by the accused;
• the causing of any evidence with respect to that offence to disappear, or give any
information with respect to the commission of the offence knowing it to be false;
• and doing so with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment.

It is an undisputed matter of fact that the appellant or A-2 had knowingly given false
information to her brother (PW-3). The sole eyewitness testimony by Ami (PW-34) confirms
that the Appellant A-2 had asked her to use another bathroom in order that the accused A-1
might be able to utilize the first bathroom with the ultimate purpose of disposing off the dead
body. The testimonies of PW-6 and PW-7 have established that Appellant A-2 paid money to
them in order to enable the purchase of various articles of clothing for A-1 while they were
absconding. In the given circumstances that A-1 had escaped wearing garments only on his
lower half, and could not return to his own place for fear of being discovered, such purchases
become a part of the escape from law in which A-2 was playing an enabling role.

Witness Statements

Now, the Appellant A-2 has not denied the above facts, but pleaded that they were performed
under duress and fear of harm, thereby negating the necessary mental element required to
constitute criminal liability. We do not deny, as the evidence of eyewitness Ami (PW-32)
shows, that there was the presence of threat and coercion applied by A-1 and his absconding
accomplice to secure the participation of A-2 in their crime. The trial Court has held, and it is
not being challenged, that there was no previous meeting of minds nor was A-2 a consenting
party in the murder of the victim.

However, the State is of the opinion that, by continuing to participate in shielding the accused
A-1 beyond the point at which he may have reasonably caused any harm to her or her children,

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A-2 developed the necessary mens rea and actively participated in shielding A-1 from the law.
At various points, A-2 was beyond the physical reach of A-1.

PW-23’s testimony shows at a point even after A-2 was aware that her brother, PW-3, and his
wife, had suspected something and had involved themselves in the matter, thereby giving her
the option of denying A-1 further compliance. As per PW-3’s testimony, A-1 met A-2 in a
public area, presumably around a crowded closing-bell time when at least some parents such
as PW-3 were present at the school to pick up their children, where A-2 had every reasonable
opportunity to deny A-1 further acquiescence. At this moment, it was also highly unlikely that
there was any danger to her children from any of the other accused, with the crime having
already been likely exposed by the arrival of PW-3 to the victim’s house, and the children being
safe at either home with her brother, or in the school in a public area. PW-19’s testimony that
she was kept under lock and key and hence could not escape do not justify prior instances, such
as at the above mentioned time, at which she was at perfect liberty.

The fact that at this point she made the decision to voluntarily enter the autorickshaw with
A-2 may be attributable to a variety of apprehensions. It has been mentioned that due to her
illicit relationship with A-1, she feared that her family and the police will consider her an
accomplice to the murder. One can be sympathetic to such a view, but it does not in any way
constitute a valid defence for abetment of a crime. To claim that one performed or abetted a
crime because one lacked faith in the legal system to deliver justice and uphold the truth cannot
be allowed to stand as an argument.

Now, It could have been argued that the harrowing experience of a brutal murder in her own
home, and her own unwilling and complicated role in it, for a woman whose only crime was
marital dissatisfaction, was enough to alter the balance of her mind such that she cannot be held
responsible for the decision to mindlessly accompany A-1 in his absconding’s. But there is no
such plea, either under Section 84 or any other Section, which has been raised. No defence
under Section 95 has been raised either, and the appropriate response to any such argument is
to be found in the actions of the Appellant A-2 at the point of time of her rendezvous with A-
1 outside Vandana School, as shown by both PW-23’s testimony and A- 2s circumstantial
evidence.

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In view of the above therefore, it is argued that the appellant Padmini Gadda had lear mens
rea and fulfilled all the ingredients to satisfy her conviction under Section 201. The fear of
police bias and social judgement, exist and likely constitute the motive for continued
participation, but this can have no bearing on her guilt.

Therefore, her conviction under Section 201 has been rightly upheld by the honourable High
court. As to the enhancement of the sentence, the decision has been taken by the High Court in
its wisdom, based on social need and the heinousness of the crime, and well within it’s powers.
We see no reason to that it should be overturned.

Q4. Do you agree that common intention (S-34) and common object (S-149) under the
Indian Do penal codes resemble and overlap with each other? Explain in detail with the
help of decided Cases.

A4. Let us first define both sections of the IPC in order to understand the same better.

Section 34 of IPC, 1860 is defined as– “Acts done by several persons in furtherance of
common intention.

The section can be explained as if two or more people commit any criminal offense and with
the intent of committing that offense, then each of them will be liable for that act as if the act
was committed by them individually.

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Section 149 of IPC, 1860 can be defined as - Every member of unlawful assembly guilty
of offence committed in prosecution of common object.

This Section can be understood as, where an offense is committed by any member of an
unlawful assembly in the prosecution of the common purpose of that assembly, or as the
members of that assembly knew likely to be committed in the prosecution of that purpose, any
person who is a member of the same assembly at the time of the commission of that offense
shall be guilty of that offense.

At first glance, we can probably say that these two sections resemble each other, but let us try
to understand the ingredients of each section.

• Criminal Act Done By Several Persons: The said criminal act must have been
performed by more than one person.
• Common intention: The core of joint liability under Section 34 resides in the
presence of a common intention to commit a criminal act in support of the
common goal of all group members.

Relevant Case Law

In the case of Mahboob Shah v. Emperor, appellant Mahboob Shah was 19 years old and was
convicted of the murder of Allah Dad by the Session Judge of the charge Section 302 with
Section 34. He was convicted for death by the Session tribunal. The death sentence was also
upheld by the High Court of Judicature. The conviction for murder and death sentence was
overturned on appeal to the Lordship. It was argued before the appellant that–”when Allah Dad
and Hamidullah attempted to run away, Wali Shah and Mahboob Shah came next to them and
fired” and thus there was proof at the spur of the time that they formed a common intention.
The lordship was not happy with this perspective and cordially advised his Majesty that his
appeal had been successful, the appeal must be allowed and the conviction of him for murder
and death sentence should be set aside

Difference between Common Intention and Common Object

Under the IPC, both Section 34 and Section 149 impose vicarious liability on each individual
for acts which are not necessarily done by them. There is, however, a distinction in the scope
and nature of operation of both offenses.

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 • The charge under Section 149 is replaced by Section 34 of the IPC, particularly if
some of the accused are acquitted and the number of the accused drops below 5. In
this case, the tribunal would have to scrutinize the proof closely to see if there is
some aspect of common intention for which it can be held responsible under
Section 34.
• Section 34 does not constitute a particular offense but sets out only the principle of
joint criminal culpability. Whereas Section 149 generates a particular offense and
being a member of an unlawful assembly is itself a criminal offense punishable
under Section 143.This is one of the main differences. Section 149 can be
mentioned in a charge sheet on its own but section 34 cannot
• Common intention needs a preliminary meeting of mind and unity of purpose, and
open action has been taken to promote the common intention of all. If the common
object of the members of the unlawful assembly is one but the participants’
intention is different, a common object can be formed without a prior meeting of
mind. It only needs a criminal act to promote a common purpose.
• Number of People :- For invoking S.34 it is adequate that two or more individuals
were involved. However, to impose section149 there must be at least 5 people.
• ‘Participation’ is a key factor for S.34, whereas active involvement in S.149 of the
IPC is not required.
• Section 34 requires common intention of any kind. One of the items listed in
Section 141 must be a common object under Section 149.
• Another important point is that Section 34 requires some active involvement,
particularly in the case of a crime involving physical abuse. Section 149 does not
involve active involvement and the responsibility comes from the mere
membership of the unlawful assembly with a common objective.

Common object and common intention may overlap or resemble each other in a general sense,
but they are nevertheless distinct from a legal point of view. We can, at most, say that common
intention is a special case of common object (notwithstanding the other requirements of
unlawful assembly). But, as usually both are to be proved in differing circumstances, it does
not help us to understand them as related concepts. It is better to understand both concepts as
separate tests that are to be applied to the case as relevant. As only one of them may apply at
time, it is more fruitful to understand them through their differences than their commonalities.

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Unlike common intention, which must be definite in shape and nature, the common object of
an unlawful assembly is more fluid and evolving. It may be modified or altered at any stage,
and sharing the common object at an initial stage does not mean that the same object is shared
once it has evolved. Moreover, the members of an unlawful assembly may share the common
object only up to a certain point and from thereon differ in their understanding of it based upon
the information they possess.

For an offence under Section 141, it is not necessary that it is immediately and explicitly
connected with a view to attain the common object; it is sufficient that the offence is one that
the members of the assembly knew was likely to be committed given the nature of the assembly
and it’s object. The word knew implies more than a knowledge of mere possibility. There is a
parallel here with common intention, where, while the nature of the criminal intention must be
clear, each person may play any or no part in actualizing that intention.

Another commonality between common object and intention is that both are mental states, and
therefore have to be deduced either from direct evidence or, in it’s absence, from the actions
and consequences thereof. A third similarity is that both common object and common intention
may develop on the spot.

In conclusion Section 34 merely defines joint liability and does not impose any penalties for
the same. This section has to be read with multiple other sections of IPC such as Section 120A
defining criminal conspiracy, Section 120 B providing a penalty for criminal conspiracy, and
Section 149 dealing with unlawful assembly. This Section 34 cannot be implemented alone
and must be implemented together with some other section in order to make an individual
jointly liable for the offense. There is no need for people to always share the common
intention and commit a crime It might be possible that they are present at the scene just
by mere chance and shared no common intention which is the core ingredient of Section
34 of IPC.

Fixing vicarious liability under Section 34 or Section 149 depends on their method adopted
to furnish the crime. There are two sections managing ‘common intention’ and ‘common
object’ beneath two chapters of IPC ‘General Explanation’ and ‘Of Offences against Public
Tranquillity’ respectively.

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Sometimes there arises difficulty in proving with proof that whether they shared common
intention or not and also how many individuals with the same common object were members
of the unlawful assembly. However, the Supreme Court abolished these ambiguities in various
instances after determining each case’s facts and condition.

In order to have a clear and better knowledge, India’s Law Commission also gave the
Legislature many suggestions to amend some parts of the statute. Finally, I can say that both
Section 34 and Section 149 make an individual vicariously responsible for his companions’
actions. Both sections cannot always be provided by direct proof, and it should be inferred from
the facts and conditions of the case.

Q5. Is there a change of view between the decisions of the Supreme Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793 and Kali Ram vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808?

A5

There is no essential logical or reasoning based difference between the opinions of the Court
in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade and Kali Ram v. State of Himachal.

I however believe that the supposed and apparent difference that does exist is simply due to
the differing styles of the two judges, an in particular because of Justice Krishna Iyer who was
famous for his use of literary prose to go beyond merely addressing legal points and slip into
philosophical musings and exasperated hectoring that, though consistent with his tendencies of
judicial activism, are not intended to actively alter the understood position of law in any way,
but merely impress upon the reader the full force of its nuances and implications.

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Judgement :- Now lets take the judgement in the first case which is Shivaji Sahebrao Bokade
which gives the apparent impression that the Court wishes to dilute the presumption of
innocence, particularly when it speaks in phrases such as “the dangers of exaggerated devotion
to the rule of benefit of the doubt”, or “golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which
runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch,
hesitancy and degree of doubt”, and especially the normative sentence that “our jurisprudential
enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal
justice potent and realistic.”

However, for each such hectoring phrase that seems to be complaining about the presumption
of innocence, there are other parts of the judgement that clarify beyond doubt that such
complains are only with respect to instances where the doubts are, in the view of Justice Iyer,
unreasonable or fanciful.

It is very clearly clarified in his judgement later that “A balance has to be struck between
chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic
of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents... Certainly, in the last analysis
reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the appellant.”

What can be regarded as the nail in the coffin is however is Justice Khanna’s own observation
while addressing the arguments made by the counsel for the State in Kali Ram that
“Observations (in) Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra... were not
intended to make a departure from the rule of the presumption of innocence of the accused and
his entitlement to the benefit of reasonable doubt in criminal cases.”

We may note – in defence of the proposition that Shivaji Bobade does in actuality change, if
subtly, the manner in which evidence is weighed – that there are some discrepancies in the way
that the facts of each case are dealt with, and the kind of reasoning used. What is hard to
pinpoint is whether such discrepancies are substantial, or merely an outcome of the literary
style of Shivaji Bobade contrasted with the plain clarity of Kali Ram. For instance, in Kali
Ram, the Court itself warns explicitly that “Whether or not a presumption can be drawn…
ultimately depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Human behaviour is so
complex that room must be left for play in the joints. It is not possible to formulate a series of
exact propositions”. In holds to this view in the judgment, which is hesitant to lay down easy

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general proposition and largely confines itself to the facts of the case, in comparison to Shivaji
Bobade which, while in the end arguably maintaining a similar view, goes around the matter
by liberally throwing out general propositions and then qualifying them for moderation’s sake.

What is very important to note is that in the above instance, Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade does
not in principle or otherwise do anything more than caution against unreasonable liberality – it
may be criticized on the very real grounds that its literary language has become a refuge for
other judges wishing to impose their own standard of ‘reasonable’ doubt who, in contrast to
Justice Khanna, sometimes cite the judgment approvingly as an excuse to impose a more
stringent standard, whether or not such standard is objective.

In Sucha Singh and and v State of Punjab (2003) and State of Kerala vs Mujeeb Rahman
& Ors (2017), the Courts have cited Shivaji Sahebrao, and especially the above phrases
mentioned in para 2 of this answer to reject evidences or proof, without any mention of the
subsequent counter-balancing phrases referred to in para 3. In the latter case, the Kerala High
Court held that letting the accused off should not “destroy social defence”, and more
disturbingly that “proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline and not a fetish”. Very
interestingly, Justice Iyer uses both the terms “social defence” as well as “fetish” in Shivaji
Sahebrao Bobade in a similar context (but not to mean the same thing), highlighting the dangers
of judicial imitation. In this regard, we can say that Kali Ram is different primarily in that it’s
clear language and cutting observations do not lend itself to such misinterpretations

For instance, it declares that “the court which has seen the witnesses depose, has a great
advantage over the appellate judge … and regard must be had to this advantage enjoyed by the
trial judge of observing the demeanour and delivery” only to follow it shortly with “..Nor can
we make a fetish of the trial judge's psychic insight”. Read together, they perhaps come arrive
at the same place that Kali Ram does, only in more words.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the apparent battle between Shivaji Bobade and Kali Ram is seemingly one
between a strict and a lenient view of the innocence of an accused. Kali Ram creates a clear

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test for the same when it lays down that “If some material is brought on the record consistent
with the innocence of the accused which may reasonably be true, even though it is not
positively proved to be true, the accused would be entitled to acquittal.”

The main question that arises is whether Shivaji Bobade contains any clear contradiction of
this test. Here Shivaji Bobade isn’t very clear. It cautions against “exploitation of every
plausible suspicion as militating against the certitude of guilt” – indicating that the Court
believes that even ‘plausible’ suspicion is insufficient to dispel the guilt of an accused.
Similarly it would like to moderate the ‘jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence’.
Yet, it also liberally uses qualifying adjectives such as unmerited acquittals and exaggerated
devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt.

In its preliminary remarks, it also establishes a particular context for such observations – the
hesitancy of appellate courts to overturn acquittals by lower courts, in effect creating a different
burden of proof in appeal for those who had been convicted by lower courts vis-a-vis those
who had been acquitted. It is not unreasonable to understand the various admonishments
against ‘unmerited acquittals’ in this context. As mentioned previously, the Court also goes to
some length to clarify that “reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the appellant”
in cases that are on the margins. As also already mentioned, the presumption of innocence is
so fundamental to the idea of law, that it is unreasonable to imagine that the learned judge is
not merely cautioning against its occasional wrong implementation by the Courts, but
presuming to alter its contours.

Keeping all of the above in mind, it may be said in the final analysis that both Shivaji Sahebrao
Bobade and Kali Ram are operating upon the same foundations of criminal law and neither is
seeking to challenge them, or to fundamentally dispute each other’s view of them.

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Q.6. Critically analyse the decision in the case of Govindaswamy vs. State of Kerala (2016)
16 SCC 295
Answer 6:

Material Facts

In a nutshell, the facts of the case are that the victim was travelling in the Ernakulam-Shornur
passenger train on February 1, 2011, when the accused Charley Thomas aka 'Govindachamy'
observed she was alone in the ladies' compartment and assaulted her. He allegedly slammed
her head against the compartment walls and threw her over the speeding train, following which
he, too, leaped off and raped her. After that, he plundered her possessions and fled the scene
with her cellphone. The villagers discovered her on the railway tracks near Vallathol station,
unconscious. She suffered too many critical injuries and died five days after the incident in the
hospital.

Issues to be taken into consideration

Whether the accused had the required mens rea for the crime of murder?

Statute

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Section 302 of the IPC: provides for punishment for murder.
Section 376 of the IPC: provides for punishment for rape.

Judgement

The accused was sentenced to death by the Thrissur Fast Track Court under Sections 376, 302,
and 394 read with 397 of the Indian Penal Code, which was later affirmed by the Division
Bench of the Kerala High Court after two years.

However, when the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, the three-judge bench of Ranjan
Gogoi, P.C. Pant, and U.U. Lalit, JJ maintained the accused's conviction under Section 376
IPC but overturned the Kerala High Court's death sentence.

Based on the facts of the case and the evidence presented before the Court, it was determined
that there is no reasonable doubt that the accused appellant committed the rape offence under
Section 376 of the IPC. Given that the offence was committed on the deceased, who had already
sustained severe injuries to her body, the Court stated that the accused not only committed the
offence under Section 376 IPC, but did so in a most brutal and grotesque manner, justifying
the imposition of a life sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court and confirmed by the
High Court.

However, the Court took note of the doctor's conclusion that the dead's death was the result of
a combination of injuries induced by the assault, namely, putting the deceased in a supine
position for the conduct of sexual assault and the fall from the train. The Court considered the
oral testimony of an eye witness who stated that the girl had jumped from the train and made
good her escape, and stated that the circumstances pointing against the accused must be
weighed against the oral evidence on record, and that the conclusion reached must be the only
possible conclusion that admits of no other possibility.

In the case of keeping the deceased in a supine position for the purpose of sexual assault, the
Court concluded that an intention to cause death or knowledge that the accused's act is likely
to cause death is required to hold the accused accountable under Section 302 IPC. The accused
intended to hold the dead in a supine position in order to commit sexual assault on her.
Furthermore, the fact that the deceased lived for a few days after the incident before dying in

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hospital strongly suggests that the accused had no intention of causing death by holding the
deceased in a supine position. As a result, the Court determined that the offence under Section
302 IPC could not be shown against the accused, rendering him accountable.

Critical Analysis

There was no question that the accused had committed the crime of rape. It was a case of
murder that was being investigated. The Court noted that there was insufficient evidence that
the accused was the one who shoved her from the train. Because it was unclear if she had leapt
from the train herself, the damage suffered by jumping from the train was not considered for
determining guilt. The death was caused by a combination of injuries from hitting her head on
the wall, falling from the train, and aspiration of blood into the air due to the posture she was
kept in during sexual intercourse, according to the Court. The Court then considered whether
the accused planned or knew that holding the victim in that posture would almost certainly
result in her death. They replied in the negative, claiming that the objective was to commit rape
but that there was no knowledge or intention of causing death.
The accused is liable for punishment under Section 376 IPC but not under Section 302 IPC
because there was the intention to commit rape but no intention to cause death. Because
causality could not be proven, the question of purpose or knowledge for injuries caused by
falling from the train was not addressed.

In this case, the Supreme Court ignored Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, which defines
murder in four parts. The Supreme Court only considered the first section, which requires the
intent to kill, and overlooked the other three parts, which do not.

It wasn't simply any portion of the victim's body, like her hands or legs, that was targeted; it
was her head, which, in normal circumstances, causes death and so demonstrates the accused's
intent to kill the victim. Furthermore, the Court relied on the testimony of two witnesses who
were sitting in the train's adjacent compartment, one of whom said that the victim leaped from
the train herself. The Supreme Court ruled that because it was unclear whether the accused
pushed her or she jumped out of the train voluntarily, Govindachamy could not be held liable
for the injuries she incurred as a result of the fall. The Supreme Court's ruling implies that if
the victim had to leap out of the train to save herself from the horrific injuries she had incurred,

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the chain of causation has been broken. If the victim leapt out of the train to avoid rape and
serious injury, it is reasonable to expect that she would commit such an act, and this should not
be deemed a break in the chain of causation.

Conclusion

It is my belief that the Supreme Court's decision will go down in history as a classic example
of literal interpretation of the statute while acknowledging and safeguarding the rights of the
accused, in a socio-legal context and amid societal rage against the judgement, where
deterrence is required, especially for crimes such as rape and causing grievous bodily injury.

It is important to note, however, that the mens rea for inflicting rape is distinct from the mens
rea for causing death. In this case, the victim died as a result of the cumulative consequences
of bodily trauma and forced sexual intercourse, as well as abandonment. However, none of the
acts by themselves were sufficient to cause the victim's death. A circumstance emerged in
which there was a lack of evidence to show the accused's guilt. As a result, he was given the
benefit of the doubt in this situation.

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