U.S.

-China Educational Exchange

 U.S.-China
Educational
Exchange
State, Society, and Intercultural

Relations, 1905–1950

Hongshan Li

Rutgers University Press

New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Li, Hongshan.
U.S.-China educational exchange : state, society, and intercultural relations, 1905–1950 /
Hongshan Li.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8135-4199-0 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Educational exchanges—United States. 2. Educational exchanges—China. 3. United
States—Relations—China. 4. China—Relations—United States. I. Title.
LB2376.3.C6L5 2008
370.116'—dc22 2007008408

A British Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

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Copyright © 2008 by Hongshan Li

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 Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction: Educational Exchange

and the Visible Hand 1

1 Emerging as Facilitator 7

2 Tearing Down the Barriers 34

3 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 60

4 From Central Administration to Party Control 92

5 Maintaining the Educational Front 122

6 From Expansion to Termination 148

7 A Historical Perspective 176

Epilogue: Restoring Educational Relations

with the Visible Hand 202

Appendix 209
Notes 217
Bibliography 253
Index 273

v
 Acknowledgments

The completion of this book has finally given me an opportunity to express my

gratitude to at least some individuals and institutions that have provided invalu-
able assistance at different stages of this project.
First of all, I want to thank Professors Liu Xuyi, Wu Yujin, and many
other outstanding scholars at Wuhan University, the People’s Republic of China,
who have ignited my interest in educational exchange between the United States
and China with their own experiences and successes as American returnees,
and helped eventually propel me across the Pacific as an exchange participant.
Their teachings and writings about the United States and world history not only
opened a window to the outside world for many Chinese to look through when
the nation was still pretty much isolated, but also inspired me to start and com-
plete this study of U.S.-China educational exchange in the twentieth century,
which has dramatically changed their lives and altered the lives of many other
people, including mine.
My thanks also go to Robert Collins, Jerry Barrier, Noble Cunningham,
Herbert Tillema, Susan Benson, David Roediger, William Kirby, and Stephen
Averill, who have offered constructive feedback on the whole or part of the
earlier version of the manuscript. Gerard Clarfield deserves a special thank-you
since he is the one who has given me unwavering encouragement, generous
support, and wise advice that have kept me devoted to the completion of this
project and free from many errors. The insightful comments and savvy sugges-
tions from two outside reviewers were also extremely helpful in the fine tuning
of the book.
As a researcher, I owe a great deal to numerous unsung heroes in many
research institutions and archives. From the Library of Congress, National Ar-
chives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Harry S. Truman Presidential
Library, Harvard University Library, and Yale University Library in the United
States, to the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, the National Histor-
ical Center, and the Central Library in Taipei, and to the University Archives at
vii
 viii Acknowledgments

Qinghua University in Beijing, archivists have offered most generous assistance

in my research, guiding me through the sea of historical documents in English
as well as Chinese. Librarians at the University of Missouri–Columbia and Kent
State University have been most efficient in helping me get all sorts of research
materials through interlibrary loans and other venues.
Finally, I am indebted to Kimberly Watt, who offered me most generous
technical and clerical assistance, and to Carol Mace, who helped me in proofreading
the endnotes and bibliography. I have also greatly benefited from professional ad-
vice and friendly guidance from Kendra Boileau, my acquisition editor at Rutgers
University Press. They have helped make the publication of this book an enjoyable
and rewarding experience.
U.S.-China Educational Exchange
 Introduction

Educational Exchange and the Visible Hand

T he most striking phenomenon in the re-

lations between the United States and China in the twentieth century was the
emergence of educational exchange as the strongest tie despite sharp differences
in their cultural, political, and economic systems. Originating as part of Ameri-
can missionary enterprise in China, educational exchange between the two na-
tions drastically expanded beginning around 1900. By the end of the 1940s,
China had sent more students and scholars to the United States than to any
other country for higher education and advanced training. At the same time, the
United States devoted more attention and resources to expanding and maintain-
ing educational interactions with China than with any other nation in the world.
As a result, the United States and China became chief partners in educational
exchange, a status that had never been achieved in the commercial or military
relations between the two nations. Although educational exchange came to a
complete stop after the United States and China entered the Korean War on
opposite sides, the two nations began to rebuild their educational ties by fol-
lowing the patterns established in the earlier decades when they reestablished
diplomatic relations at the end of the 1970s. Within two decades, educational
exchange reemerged as the strongest tie between the two nations, as hundreds
of thousands of students and scholars crisscrossed the Pacific, creating the most
massive flow of educational personnel between any two different civilizations
in world history.
Both the dramatic expansion and the abrupt termination of educational
exchange in the first half of the twentieth century hold the key to a better un-
derstanding of U.S.-China relations in particular and intercultural interactions
in general. However, neither has received adequate attention from scholars on
either side of the Pacific. Most traditional studies of U.S.-China relations have
focused on economic, political, and military aspects. Although there has been
increasingly strong desire among Chinese scholars to widen the scope of their
studies of U.S.-China relations, “politics and political economy have remained
1
 2 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

the focus of most scholars’ studies.”1 More American scholars, as William

Kirby recognized, have made an effort to address the “subject outside the realm
of high politics.”2 However, most of them have kept their focus either on mis-
sionary schools in China, or on personal experiences of Chinese students in the
United States, overlooking the crucial role played by the government.3 When
government, on rare occasions, is put in the center of study, the focus has al-
ways been on the American side, leaving an impression that the expansion of
educational relations between the United States and China was achieved single-
handedly by Washington.4 The continuing inattention to the crucial role played
by the government and the dichotomous treatment of educational relations from
just one side have made an accurate and comprehensive understanding of U.S.-
China relations extremely difficult, if not impossible.
This book offers a comprehensive examination of the crucial role played
by both governments in the expansion and the termination of educational ties
between the United States and China in the first half of the twentieth century.
Based on careful study of the actions taken by the visible hand, the governments
of both nations, I will argue that the drastic expansion as well as the abrupt ter-
mination of educational relations between the two nations in the first half of the
twentieth century were largely the result of unprecedented intervention from the
American and Chinese governments; that the purpose of their deep and direct
intervention was to deal with various problems in domestic politics and crises
in diplomatic relations; and that their intervention effectively transformed edu-
cational exchange from a private enterprise into a state function, which helped
reshape the development of both societies and relations between the two na-
tions. If the large-scale expansion of educational exchange proved that knowl-
edge and ideas could be diffused and shared by peoples in different civilizations
with assistance from the visible hand, I also want to point out that the complete
termination of educational interactions revealed that both governments could
break all ties between the two nations to achieve short-term political or diplo-
matic goals.
The drastic expansion of educational relations between the United States
and China, and the increasingly deep government intervention all have further
proved that international relations, as Akira Iriye has eloquently argued, are in
essence intercultural relations.5 While trade, travel, and even war all can carry
cultural messages, educational exchange is most effective in spreading knowl-
edge and ideas across the civilizational divide, as it does within national bor-
ders. Although formal education, as the core component of high culture, was
only rarely integrated as part of international relations prior to the nineteenth
century, the value and effectiveness of educational exchange had always been
fully appreciated by peoples of different civilizations. As the Greeks and Ro-
mans traveled far and wide for educational purposes about two millennia ago,
the Koreans and Japanese sent their students to attend schools in China between
the sixth and eighth centuries CE. However, educational interactions in ancient
times were generally small in scale and limited to adjacent geographic areas.
 Introduction 3

It is only in the past couple of centuries that large-scale educational exchanges

between peoples from different civilizations and faraway places have become
possible and popular. The United States and China have become the best ex-
amples since they have built the strongest and most enduring educational ties
despite great physical distances and sharp differences in their cultural, political,
and economic backgrounds.
Educational interactions between the United States and China began with
the arrival of American missionaries in Guangzhou (Canton) in 1830. The de-
velopment of educational relations between the two nations in the following
years could be divided into three distinct phases. In the first phase, 1830–1844,
educational interactions were purely a by-product of American missionaries’
religious effort in China. Only a few missionaries were involved in learning
and teaching because the Chinese government continued to ban foreigners from
engaging in any educational activities in China and the United States govern-
ment was unable to do anything about it. The second phase, 1844–1904, saw
significant growth of educational interactions between the two nations under
the protection of treaties signed by both governments. Although an increasingly
large number of American missionary schools were built in China and more
Chinese students were sent to the United States for education, Western-style
education remained marginal in China since it was incompatible with the tradi-
tional Chinese educational system supported by the Qing Court. The rest of the
twentieth century constituted the third phase, which was marked by the deep
and direct government intervention largely responsible for the dramatic expan-
sion and abrupt termination of educational interactions between the two nations.
The first half of the twentieth century will be the focus of this study since it was
during this period that government permanently replaced missionaries and pri-
vate institutions as the major promoter, sponsor, regulator, and coordinator for
educational exchange.
The large-scale expansion of educational exchange between the two na-
tions and deep intervention from both the American and Chinese governments
in educational interactions in the twentieth century was anything but acciden-
tal. Despite great physical distance and profound cultural differences, both the
Americans and the Chinese people valued education as the core component of
their culture and society, and the governments of both nations had a long his-
tory of promoting and supporting education at home and exchange activities
abroad. As early as the mid-seventeenth century, many colonial New England
legislatures adopted laws to establish schools in towns and villages to meet their
religious as well as practical needs. Once the United States was born, offering
education to all American children became a clear goal for government at all
levels in order to build a democratic and prosperous new nation. By the mid-
nineteenth century, “common schools” funded by tax revenues and regulated
by state government had become the norm of American education. The federal
government, while generally staying away from the day-to-day management
of schools, intensified its support for education by granting land to states for
 4 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

schools and colleges, establishing a special office in the federal government, and
running schools for Native Americans.6
The central government got involved in education much earlier and
deeper in China. It is well known that the government ran most schools (xue
zai guanfu) in the Shang (1775–1122 BCE) and Western Zhou (1122–771
BCE) Dynasties. Although private schools began to appear in the Eastern Zhou
Dynasty (771–221 BCE) and offered education for most Chinese students, the
central government was able to reestablish and maintain effective control over
education by designating Confucianism as the only official philosophy in the
Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) and installed the civil service examination
system in the Sui (581–618) and Tang (619–896) Dynasties. As a result, Con-
fucian classics were taught at all government and private schools to pass down
the teachings of ancient saints and prepare students for civil service examina-
tions. The government awarded students official degrees of xiucai (budding
talent), juren (elevated man), and jinshi (advanced scholar) if they passed ex-
aminations at county, provincial, and national levels, respectively. Most gov-
ernment offices were offered to those with higher degrees until the end of the
Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). Educational exchanges with neighboring nations,
such as Korea and Japan, were generally supported by the government as long
as the foreigners came to China only as students and had their activities there
subject to government control.7
The shared views on the importance of education and the strong tradition
of government intervention made it extremely easy for both the American and
the Chinese governments to resort to educational exchange as a new and more
effective way to cope with various political challenges and diplomatic crises
that they had to confront in the twentieth century. Faced with constant foreign
encroachment and continuing political and economic pressure at home, the Chi-
nese government, from the Qing Court to the Nationalist regime, was forced to
modernize Chinese education and send an increasingly large number of students
abroad for advanced education and training. It hoped that students trained in for-
eign countries with government sponsorship would not only bring back knowl-
edge and skills needed for the construction of a strong and prosperous nation,
but also become its staunchest political supporters. While the Chinese govern-
ment was making great efforts to send more students abroad, Washington felt
the strong need to educate more Chinese students in the United States because
of constant problems and crises in its relations with China. Unable and unwill-
ing to solve all the diplomatic challenges with “hard power,” including military
threats and force, as it had done in the nineteenth century, or abandon parts
of its China policy that were extremely unpopular among the Chinese people,
Washington sought to change Chinese views and attitudes toward the United
States and its policy through offering education to Chinese students in American
colleges and universities, the key component of America’s “soft power.”8 The
convergence of the needs on the part of both governments provided very fertile
soil for the rapid growth of educational exchange between the two nations.
 Introduction 5

The possibility of a dramatic expansion of educational relations between

the United States and China was turned into reality in the first half of the twen-
tieth century because both governments were able to put more institutional, ad-
ministrative, and financial resources at their disposal. With the establishment of
modern schools beginning around 1900, China was soon capable of sending thou-
sands of qualified students abroad for higher education. As China was moderniz-
ing its elementary and secondary schools, the United States saw the phenomenal
expansion of its higher education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. The number of four-year colleges and universities jumped from 563 in
1870 to 977 in 1900, and then soared to 1,708 in 1940.9 As a result, the United
States became one of the few industrialized nations, if not the only one, that
could offer quality higher education to a large number of Chinese students during
this period. The biggest supplier of international students and greatest provider
of international higher education were effectively connected when both govern-
ments were willing to provide the strongest administrative and financial support
for educational exchanges. Special offices were established by the American and
Chinese governments to be in charge of educational and cultural relations. At
the same time, huge amounts of government funds coming from various sources
were injected into numerous exchange programs, providing generous support for
thousands of students and scholars.
The impact of expanded educational exchange on both the American and
Chinese societies and on the relations between the two nations cannot be exagger-
ated. Since the United States offered higher education to more Chinese students
than any other nation in the world, it was only natural for an unmatched number
of students returned from America to become leading figures in almost all fields
in China. These American-educated students brought with them not only precious
knowledge and skills, but also new ideas and values when they returned to China.
They helped China adopt a new educational system modeled after American
schools and make Mr. “D” (Democracy) and Mr. “S” (Science) household terms
in the 1910s and 1920s. The new school system and new ideas laid the founda-
tion for reforms as well as revolutions in China throughout the twentieth century.
Although fewer American scholars and students went to China, the first half of
the twentieth century did see Americans begin to study the Chinese people and
culture from scholarly perspectives with scientific methods, which allowed them
to gain systematic, comprehensive, and balanced knowledge of China. As a re-
sult, at least some American officials and scholars with educational experiences in
China were able to have an accurate understanding of complex political and social
conditions in China during and after World War II and make appropriate policy
recommendations. Their effort to promote better mutual understanding among the
American people was assisted by Chinese students and scholars, especially those
who chose to stay permanently in the United States during the Cold War. As the
first large group of Chinese students who turned themselves into immigrants in a
foreign country, they made great contributions to the development of American
science, technology, economy, and especially the field of Chinese studies.
 6 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Despite its great contribution to the enhancement of mutual understanding

between the two peoples and to the social and economic development of both
nations, educational exchange was brought to a complete stop right at its peak.
All exchange programs between the United States and Mainland China were
terminated, and no students or scholars were allowed to cross the Pacific for ed-
ucation or research for over two decades from the beginning of the Korean War.
The first complete breakdown of educational relations between the two nations
was designed and implemented by the two governments for strategic and politi-
cal purposes. It had little to do with the differences between the two cultures
or peoples. American policy makers calculated that the severing of educational
ties would help keep American-trained students and scholars from returning to
China and serving the newly established Communist regime. For Communist
China, ceasing to send students and scholars to the United States was an im-
portant step to complete the revolution for an independent and powerful new
nation. It was the determined actions taken by both the American and Chinese
governments that made the sudden and complete break of educational relations
between the two nations possible. The destructive role played by government
caused great damage to mutual knowledge and understanding between the two
peoples during the Cold War years.
As the Cold War between the two nations drew to an end, the American
and Chinese governments began to rebuild their educational relations in the late
1970s. Within a decade, the United States and China rose as chief partners and
world leaders in educational exchange again. The reestablishment of educa-
tional interactions as the strongest tie between the two nations proved one more
time that peoples from different civilizations could share knowledge, ideas, and
values and live together peacefully. Having learned some lessons from their ex-
perience in the first half of the twentieth century, both Washington and Beijing
have tried not to allow the ups and downs of their political relations to affect
educational exchanges between the two nations. As a result, the expansion of
educational relations received little interruption from numerous political or dip-
lomatic crises, such as the Tiananmen incident in 1989 or the mid-air collision
of military airplanes in April 2001. The tightened security measures adopted
by Washington after September 11, 2001, did reduce the number of Chinese
students admitted to American colleges and universities for the first time since
the end of the 1970s. However, the strenuous public relations effort made by the
Department of State and the simplification of the visa review process adopted
by the Department of Homeland Security reversed that downward trend in 2005.
This recent fluctuation has provided another strong testimony to the power that
government has over educational exchange. The long history of educational ex-
change between the United States and China has proved that the growth and ex-
pansion of intercultural relations depends not only on close interaction between
the two peoples, but also on the constructive role played by both governments.
 Chapter 1

Emerging as Facilitator

T he arrival of the Empress of China in

Huangpu (Whampoa), an anchorage of Guangzhou (Canton), in August 1784,
marked the beginning of U.S.-China relations. The early contact between the
two peoples was limited mostly to commerce with little intervention from either
the American or the Chinese government. The diversification of the bilateral
relations only began to take place when American missionaries set foot in China
in the 1830s. However, they had to conduct their religious and educational ac-
tivities either among their own countrymen in China’s only open port or with
the local Chinese in secrecy. Educational and cultural interactions between the
two peoples only became legal after the first treaty was signed by the United
States government and the Qing Court in 1844. It was under the protection of
treaties signed by both governments in the second half of the nineteenth century
that American missionaries established more schools in China than in any other
nation and the Chinese sent their first educational mission to the United States.
Despite the legal protection provided by the government, the expansion of edu-
cational exchange continued to face numerous barriers. As a result, educational
interactions between the two nations remained mostly a private enterprise, small
in scale, low in level, and marginal in impact during this period.

Diversifying U.S.-China Relations

U.S.-China relations were kept largely one-dimensional for decades after
the Empress of China’s historical trip to Guangzhou. Although the profitable
China trade had attracted an increasingly large number of American merchants
and sailors, contact between the two peoples continued to be limited. While
the Qing Court did everything it could to minimize the interaction between the
two peoples, the Americans involved in the China trade showed little respect
for or interest in the Chinese people or culture. Foreign traders, as C. Y. Hsü
accurately described, were allowed in China not because there was any need
7
 8 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

for their goods, but because the Chinese emperors wanted to use it “as a mark
of favor to foreigners and as a means of retaining their gratitude.”1 In order to
keep foreigners under tighter control in China, the Qing Court issued a decree in
1759 to make Guangzhou the only port open for foreign commerce. By restrict-
ing international trade to the remote southern city, the Qing Court attempted to
minimize contact between foreigners and the Chinese people as well as between
itself and foreign governments.
As part of its effort to limit contact between foreigners and the local Chi-
nese, the Qing Court had set strict rules to regulate foreigners’ movement and
activities in Guangzhou. American merchants and sailors had to work and live
in the American factory, a facility rented from Chinese merchants for residential
and business purposes, during their stay in the port. Their free movement was
limited to one hundred yards from the factory and their visits to the garden and
temple across the river were set on three particular dates each month. Their stay
in Huangpu was made even harder because they were not allowed to bring their
families or any other women with them or to freely communicate with the local
Chinese other than their sponsoring merchants and servants. Foreigners were
banned from buying Chinese books and learning the Chinese language so as to
make their contact with the local people difficult if not impossible. As a result,
few Americans were willing or able to stay in Guangzhou for an extended pe-
riod. For those who had to extend their stay in Huangpu during the trade season,
they, as Tyler Dennett put it, became “voluntary prisoners.”2
Despite all the restrictions, most Americans were generally happy with the
Guangzhou trade system and careful in following Chinese rules. Since foreign
trade in Guangzhou was monopolized by a dozen or so private Chinese firms,
known as hang (hong), American merchants needed to deal with only a few
Chinese hang merchants, who helped sell all the American goods in Guangzhou
and purchase Chinese products for the return trip. Samuel Shaw, the supercargo
for the Empress of China, told his countrymen that doing business at Guang-
zhou “appears to be as little embarrassed, and is, perhaps, as simple as any in
the known world.”3 As law-abiding traders, American merchants got along well
with their Chinese counterparts. If there were any disputes, they were usually
settled by the merchants peacefully without any government intervention. Prior
to 1840, the Chinese government intervened only once, in a case involving an
Italian sailor working on an American ship who accidentally killed a Chinese
woman. When the sailor was handed over to the Chinese authority on October
23, 1821, trade between the two nations returned to normal.4 This incident, ac-
cording to Li Dingyi, did not cause any significant damage to the American im-
age as the “most obedient” foreigners in China.5
American merchants and sailors had limited contact with the local people
also because of their lack of interest in Chinese culture and language. Shaw
commented in his diary that Chinese merchants were knavish, the government
oppressive, and the people idolatrous and superstitious. Having observed a few
Chinese artists painting during his brief stay in China, he came to the conclusion
 Emerging as Facilitator 9

that “the Chinese, though they can imitate most of the fine arts, do not possess
any large portion of original genius.”6 Harboring all kinds of negative percep-
tions, no American merchants or sailors made any effort to learn the local lan-
guage or study Chinese culture. As a result, the American trade at Guangzhou,
as Tyler Dennett pointed out, “was conducted for more than forty-five years
before there was even one American citizen there who could read, write, under-
stand, or speak Chinese with any certainty.”7
Happy with the smooth growth of the China trade, the United States gov-
ernment did not see a need for much intervention. Congress did “elect” Samuel
Shaw as the first American consul at Guangzhou before his second trip back to
China. However, the position was more of a tribute to Shaw personally than an
effort to promote trade. Since the position remained unpaid until the mid-1850s,
it was merely a side job for Shaw and his successors. Fully aware of their status,
the Qing Court saw the American consuls merely as the chief “tai-pans” (super-
cargo) and refused to give them any official recognition. Unhappy with the lack
of diplomatic representation in China, some merchants petitioned that the consul
should be a full-time government official paid at $3,000 a year with a residence.
However, their demands were ignored by the United States government.8
The one-dimensional relations between the United States and China were
no longer acceptable to many Americans during the Second Great Awakening.
As a response to drastic social, economic, and political changes caused by in-
dustrialization and the westward expansion, many missionary societies were or-
ganized in New England, sending numerous missionaries to western frontiers to
save the souls of the perishing “Heathens.” In the first decade of the nineteenth
century, the eastern and northeastern revivals had “produced a conscious de-
sire on the part of the religiously oriented middle class,” as Murray Rubinstein
pointed out, “to change not only their own society but also the world that lay
beyond their nation’s shores.”9
The Americans showed their early interest in missionary work in China
through providing moral and financial support for Robert Morrison, a member
of the London Missionary Society. Unable to obtain a free voyage to China from
the East India Company, Morrison came to the United States for help in 1807. He
found open doors to churches on the east coast and generous endorsements from
merchants engaged in the China trade. Even Secretary of State James Madison
wrote a letter to the American consul at Guangzhou, instructing him to do all
that he could to assist the missionary.10 Morrison was warmly welcomed by the
American consul and allowed to stay in the American factory for months after his
arrival in Guangzhou on board an American ship in September 1807.
Providing support for an English missionary in China soon became inad-
equate for enthusiastic church leaders and young students in New England. The
leading members of the Congregational clergy attending the meeting of the Gen-
eral Association in June 1810 established the American Board of Commission-
ers for Foreign Missions. Within a couple of years, the American Board grew
into a national organization and sent its first group of missionaries to India.11 At
 10 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

the same time, it began to prepare for missionary work in the Central Kingdom
with help from Morrison, who believed that the time was right for Americans to
have “a plan for the evangelization of China.”12 Such an effort received strong
support from D.W.C. Olyphant, a successful American merchant and close
friend of Morrison, who promised that he would provide free passage, lodging,
and board for any missionaries sent by the American Board to China.13
With Olyphant’s help, the American Board and the Seamen’s Friend Soci-
ety were able to send Elijah C. Bridgman, a seminary student from Belchertown,
Massachusetts, and David Abeel, a young Dutch Reformed minister from New
Brunswick, New Jersey, to China. Arriving at Guangzhou on February 25, 1830,
the two missionaries started to work with Morrison the next day. As a veteran
minister who had worked in New York and the Virgin Islands, Abeel began to
serve as the seamen’s chaplain immediately. Bridgman, however, had to “return
to his earlier role as a student” before he could do any missionary work with the
Chinese.14 He began his study of Guangdong dialect on February 28, 1830, with
help from Morrison, who gave him a copy of Vocabulary of the Cantonese Dia-
lect, a Chinese Bible, all compiled and translated by Morrison himself, and the
Four Books, a set of Chinese classics used by all Chinese students. He started
to have hour-long lessons every day with the Chinese teacher who had taught
Morrison. Bridgman worked very hard on the language since he knew clearly
that only with good command of the Chinese language could he then be able to
preach, evangelize, produce tracts and books, and prepare the way for an open
China and an expanded Protestant mission enterprise.15 Having devoted most of
his time to studying Cantonese in the first eight months, Bridgman decided to
add Mandarin, a more popular form of Chinese language spoken by government
officials and intellectuals throughout the country. His grasp of Mandarin would
prove extremely helpful in later years.
Once rudimentary language skills were acquired, Bridgman began to
spread the Gospel among the Chinese close to him. He first gave a Bible and
several other religious books to his Cantonese teacher and the teacher’s father.
Then he offered lessons to the younger brother of the house comprador and the
son of Liang Fa, Morrison’s first Chinese convert. In order to keep in constant
contact with his audience, Bridgman set up a small school of six students at the
beginning of 1831. Teaching the Chinese students out of the Scriptures every
day immediately became the most important part of his work. When he went to
Macao for summer break in 1831, Bridgman took all his students with him so
that he could continue their instruction and have the students help him in trans-
lating the Scriptures into Chinese.16
Rigorous training in the Chinese language soon became a tradition for
many American missionaries working in China. Abeel also realized that the “lan-
guage is to be acquired before anything can be attempted” in China and that those
“who have not been toiling for years at the language, are not qualified for such an
undertaking.” Through his close contact with the local people and study of Chi-
nese culture, Abeel discovered that it was a Chinese tradition to value schooling
 Emerging as Facilitator 11

and education, and revere books and other written texts. He thus called the Chi-
nese “a reading and reflecting people.” He believed that if works on all important
subjects were translated into Chinese and made available throughout the empire,
“the good effected would, in all probability, be incalculable.”17 When Abeel left
for Southeast Asia, he was replaced by Edwin Stevens, a Yale graduate. Arriving
in China in October 1832, Stevens took over the services for seamen and began
to study Chinese immediately. Ira Tracy, an ordained minister, and Samuel Wells
Williams, a lay printer, did the same thing when they joined Bridgman and Ste-
vens in Guangzhou in 1833. In mid-January 1834, Bridgman observed that Tracy
had gained a footing in Mandarin while Williams had learned it the most easily
of all the missionaries. By the end of that year, all the missionaries were work-
ing toward fluency in Cantonese and improving their ability to read traditional
Chinese (guwen). Taking advantage of their newly acquired skills, they began to
revise an older Chinese version of the Bible.18
With improved language skills, American missionaries became more con-
fident about expanding their activities in China and less tolerant of restrictions
imposed by the Chinese government. When Lord Napier, the new British trade
supervisor in China, arrived in Guangzhou and demanded free trade in July
1834, American missionaries immediately offered their support. Bridgman reit-
erated in his letter to the American Board that “free intercourse with China is of
great interest to us,” and the “immediate success of this mission depends on it.”19
However, the strong reaction from the Qing Court dealt a heavy blow to Lord
Napier as well as the American missionaries. In response to the British demand,
the chief magistrate of the Nanhai District issued a clear order to reiterate the
traditional Chinese policy that prohibited heterodox works and the promulga-
tion of sectarian faith. In fear of severe punishment from the government, all
Chinese students and teachers left the American factory in early August. Lo-
cal officials arrested Liang Fa and confiscated all the tracts. Although released
within a few days, Liang Fa was forced to remove his family from Guangzhou to
Singapore for safety reasons.20 In response to the tense situation in Guangzhou,
the American mission set up its Chinese press in Singapore and Peter Parker, the
first medical missionary, also went there to study Chinese since no one dared to
risk his life to teach him the language in Guangzhou.
The American missionaries became more cautious with their religious
activities in Guangzhou beginning in the mid-1830s and put greater emphasis
on educational and medical efforts. Long planned as part of their campaign to
increase access to the local community, an ophthalmic hospital was opened by
Peter Parker in Guangzhou on November 4, 1835, right after his return from
Singapore. Over one thousand Chinese patients received treatment from Parker
within a few months. In order to better serve an increasingly large number of
Chinese patients, Parker rented a larger building and reopened it as the Hospital
of Universal Love in spring 1836. Even some Chinese officials, including Lin
Zexu, the Royal Commissioner sent by the Qing Court to ban the opium trade,
and their family members sought medical advice and treatment there. Parker’s
 12 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

hospital was welcomed by the local people and tolerated by government of-
ficials mainly because Western medicine was proving effective and offered free
to the Chinese. More importantly, Parker did not use his hospital openly for
religious activities.21
Inspired by Parker’s success in medical work in Guangzhou, American
missionaries resumed their effort to reach the Chinese youth through schools and
publications. Once the situation became calm enough, they managed to recruit
some young boys as students and offered them free education. While Protestant-
ism was included in the instruction, more attention was paid to the introduction
of Western history, literature, politics, technology, and science. Many American
missionaries also joined the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge,
which was founded in November 1834 to “publish such books as may enlighten
the minds of the Chinese, and communicate to them the arts and sciences of the
west.”22 Serving as the society’s Chinese secretary, Bridgman contributed numer-
ous articles to its journal, The Chinese Magazine, and published A Brief History
of the United States of America (Meilige Heshengguo Zhilüe) in 1838. As the first
systematic survey published in Chinese, the book covered history, agriculture,
industry, government, law, population, education, literature, and defense of the
United States, and became the most important source for Chinese students and
scholars to get to know the young republic in the mid-nineteenth century.23
The most remarkable educational program carried out by American mis-
sionaries in China in the early years was the establishment of the Morrison
Memorial School. Bridgman, as the senior missionary in Guangzhou after the
death of Robert Morrison, organized the Morrison Education Society in 1835.
In memory of Morrison, the society set out to “establish and support schools in
China, in which native youth should be taught, in connection with their own,
to read and write the English language; and thru this medium, to bring within
their reach all the varied learning of the Western world.”24 Unwilling to openly
challenge the Chinese authorities, Bridgman decided to set up the school in Ma-
cao, where Christian religion could be safely taught. His dream came true when
Samuel R. Brown, a Yale graduate of 1832, arrived in Guangzhou with his wife
in February 1839. The first thing Brown did was to study both the written and
spoken forms of Chinese. He wanted to master the language so that he could
know the Chinese mind and conduct “his pedagogics in the most philosophical
and effective manner.”25
Having studied the Chinese language for over half a year, Samuel Brown
finally opened the Morrison Education Society School in Macao on November
4, 1839. Only six students applied and entered the first class. With one excep-
tion, all the boys came from villages outside of Macao. They had to stay at
the school all year round except for a month of vacation during the Chinese
New Year. Brown used his study as the schoolroom and students were “there-
fore constantly under supervision.” He confined the students to the premises of
the school so that they could enjoy sports and stay away from “many influences
abroad which would injure their manners and morals.” The purpose, according
 Emerging as Facilitator 13

to Brown, was to “attach them to the school” and to “lay the foundation of a
long course of instruction.” What he did at the school, Brown explained in his
report, was to achieve the ultimate objects of the Morrison Education Society,
which “is not merely a teaching, but an education society,” aiming at “the
training of the entire man, physical, intellectual, and moral.”26
It was not easy to run a missionary school even in Macao. Although the
Morrison School managed to enroll six new students the next year, there were
only five students left when Yung Wing entered the school with fifteen new
classmates in 1841.27 Despite all the challenges, Samuel Brown was determined
to keep the school in China. Having paid a visit to Southeast Asia, he told his
colleagues at the third annual meeting of the Morrison Education Society on
September 29, 1841, that the founders had “selected the best spot for the sphere
of their operations.” He emphasized that “if we should hope to effect any great
change in the system of education prevalent in China, it must mainly be done
by efforts made in China itself.”28 He declared that “the post for us is here” and
“our point of attack, all friendly as it is, should be in China and nowhere else.”
Completely agreeing with Brown, the board of trustees passed a unanimous
resolution at the meeting to increase subscribing members and donations to the
funds of the society so that an additional teacher could be procured to prepare
for the desired “extension of pupils.”29 When Hong Kong was ceded to England
in 1842, the school moved to the island at the end of the year. Once in the new
location, the school was finally able to recruit an increasingly large number of
qualified students. By 1844, it had thirty-two students, making it easily the larg-
est missionary school in China.30
As the American Board continued to expand its activities in China, begin-
ning in the mid-1830s, many other Christian denominations in the United States
turned their attention to the most populous nation. With the constant arrival of
American missionaries, the United States soon surpassed Britain, counting for
over 70 percent of Protestant missionaries in China.31 Despite the sharp increase
in number, American missionaries were unable to convert a significant number
of Chinese or establish a church among the local people in the first decade. Their
most noticeable achievement during this period was the grasp of basic language
skills, the establishment of schools, and the translation and publication of religious
as well as educational materials in China. In other words, they were more success-
ful as students, teachers, and translators than preachers in China in the early years.
As the first American students and teachers in China, they helped expand relations
between the two peoples from the exchange of material goods to the dissemina-
tion of knowledge, ideas, beliefs, and values across the civilizational divide.

Engaging the Visible Hand

Although frustrated by the restrictions imposed by the Qing Court on their
movement and activities, American missionaries did not seek any favor from
the Chinese government, at least in the first half of the 1830s. In its instructions
 14 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

to Peter Parker in May 1834, the Prudential Committee of the American Board
made it very clear that the “Christian missionary is not, therefore, to expect,
and he is not to seek, the sanctions of heathen governments to his efforts to
extend the gospel, but he is to go, with its heavenly message, directly to the
people, wherever he can find them.” The committee expected missionaries in the
early years to persevere in proclaiming the message of salvation to any receiving
people, though “laws and magistrates forbid, and at the expense of liberty and
life.”32 However, American missionaries in China began to abandon the tradi-
tional tactics in the late 1830s as their effort to preach to the Chinese people di-
rectly without any regard for Chinese law had proved unsuccessful. They came
to realize that, in a country like China, successful proselytization did require the
favor, at least the legal protection, of the government, and that the best way to
get it was through assistance from Washington.
The need to get Washington more deeply involved in China became ur-
gent as the tension and confrontation between China and Britain was aggravated
over the opium trade at the end of the 1830s. Both American merchants and
missionaries saw the necessity and opportunity to expand their activities there
when the power of Qing China was under serious challenge from the British
Empire. Deeply concerned about the lack of protection of their interests, a group
of merchants petitioned Congress in January 1839 to send an official agent to
China with the authority to negotiate a treaty. This, they believed, would pro-
tect Americans in China from “acts of violence and aggression” on the part of
Chinese officials.33 Missionaries were also anxious to get government involved.
They published numerous letters and articles in church newsletters, praising
English military actions in China as “the use of the strong arm of civil power to
prepare the way for his [God’s] own kingdom.”34 They also lobbied in Washing-
ton for more government support during their home visits. Peter Parker returned
to the United States at the end of 1840 to marry Harriet Webster, a relative of
Daniel Webster, the newly appointed Secretary of State. Parker took advantage of
his reputation as a medical missionary and his new social connections resulting
from the marriage to meet with many top government officials and lawmakers
in Washington, including outgoing President Martin Van Buren and President-elect
William Harrison. In a written proposal sent to Daniel Webster, he suggested the
United States should send, without delay, a strong force and an American minister
plenipotentiary to China. He argued that having an American minister in China
could help bring about a peaceful solution, restore trade, stop the opium traffic,
and strengthen the American position.35
The aggressive lobbying effort made by missionaries and merchants
aroused serious attention at home. The House of Representatives called upon
President Van Buren for “information respecting the conditions of the citizens
of the United States doing business during the past year in China” on Febru-
ary 7, 1839.36 After war broke out between China and Britain, Washington, in
response to the joint demand from missionaries and merchants, sent the East
India Squadron, led by Commodore Lawrence Kearny, to Guangzhou to protect
 Emerging as Facilitator 15

American interests in 1842. When the Treaty of Nanking was signed between
China and Britain on August 29, 1842, Kearny immediately sent a note to Chi-
nese officials, demanding most-favored-nation status for the United States so
that American merchants would be able to trade in those ports newly opened to
the British.37
The British victory in the Opium War forced many in Washington to re-
examine American policy toward China. They began to realize that, once the
British had occupied Hong Kong, the problem of Asia had become “political”
rather than “purely commercial.”38 Caleb Cushing, an influential member of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to President John Tyler on
December 27, 1842, proposing to send a diplomatic mission to China. Three
days after receiving Cushing’s letter, President Tyler sent a message to Con-
gress requesting that a commissioner be sent to China to obtain through a formal
treaty the same privileges that Britain had just gained through the war.39 Once
Edward Everett, then the American minister to Britain, refused to accept the
appointment as the first commissioner to China, Caleb Cushing, a close friend
of President Tyler, was awarded the position. In order to guarantee his success
in the negotiations for the treaty, Cushing left for China on the USS Missouri,
a newly constructed steam-powered warship. When the new ship caught fire on
the way, Cushing continued his trip on another warship, the USS Brandywine.
As the American ship arrived at Macao on February 24, 1844, the Chinese im-
mediately noticed that it had over five hundred sailors and sixty-four cannons.
Three days after his arrival, Cushing sent a letter to Cheng Jucai, the governor of
Guangdong Province, requesting a meeting with the Chinese emperor to deliver
a presidential letter and discuss a treaty.40
The original objective of the mission was to secure the entry of American
ships into the Chinese ports newly opened to British merchants on the same
favorable terms. That goal had actually been achieved while Cushing was still
on his way to China. On October 8, 1843, the Chinese government had signed
the Treaty of the Bogue with Britain, clearly providing that all foreign mer-
chants who had traded at Guangzhou would be allowed to engage in trade in
Fuzhou (Fuchow), Xiamen (Amoy), Ningbo (Ningpo), and Shanghai “on the
same terms as the English.”41 American merchants were extremely satisfied
with the Chinese decision. Edward King, an American resident merchant serv-
ing as the United States consul in Guangzhou, told the State Department that
it was not necessary to send a commissioner to China for a new treaty since
Americans “have now all the privileges granted to the British and the feelings of
the government and people of China continue to be favorably disposed toward
Americans.”42 Even after Caleb Cushing’s arrival at Macao, one American mer-
chant in Guangzhou was still strongly opposed to Cushing’s negotiations with
the Chinese government because the American merchants were “now on very
best terms possible with the Chinese.” He was worried that “a very few of his
[Cushing’s] important airs will make us hated by the Chinese and then we lose
all the advantages we now have over the English.”43
 16 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Unlike the merchants, American missionaries were far from satisfied

with the new open-port policy adopted by the Chinese government. According
to the Treaty of the Bogue, foreign merchants and their families were allowed
to reside in all open ports and foreign consuls were granted the power to punish
those who went beyond the city borders. However, missionaries and their rights
were not even mentioned in any of the treaties signed between China and Brit-
ain in 1842 and 1843.44 In other words, missionaries and their activities were
still not legally protected in the newly opened ports in China. This overt, if not
deliberate, neglect, while consistent with British tradition, was extremely dis-
appointing to American missionaries. Therefore, they continued to push Cush-
ing to sign a formal treaty with the Qing Court so that their activities in China
would be protected.
Neither the generous provisions of the Treaty of Bogue, nor the strenuous
arguments made by Chinese officials could persuade Cushing to leave China
without a formal treaty. With frequent threats of going to Beijing on board his
warship, Cushing succeeded in forcing the Qing Court to negotiate with him and
sign the first formal treaty in Wangxia (Wanghsia), a small village near Macao,
on July 3, 1844.45 With thirty-four articles, the Treaty of Wanghsia had not only
a greater length, but also wider scope than the Treaty of Nanking. While obtain-
ing all the commercial privileges enjoyed by the British, the Wanghsia Treaty
provided Americans with many new “rights.” These “rights” would allow the
Americans, as citizens of the “most favored nation,” to enjoy any additional
privileges that China might concede to any other countries in the future; to ob-
tain, rent, and construct houses, hospitals, churches, and cemeteries, making
missionary presence and activities legal for the first time in China’s open ports;
to employ Chinese to teach any of the languages of the empire and to purchase
any kinds of books in China; and to be tried in a court run by the American con-
sul according to American law.46
Cushing’s success was made possible with enthusiastic and capable as-
sistance from American missionaries in China. With little knowledge of Chi-
nese culture, history, or language, Cushing appointed Bridgman and Parker as
Chinese secretaries of the mission right after his arrival at Macao. Fully aware
of the historical significance of the position, Parker rushed to Macao to join
Cushing upon receiving the appointment despite ill health and mounting work
at his hospital.47 The two missionaries tutored Cushing before the negotiations.
Since no one in the Chinese delegation was able to speak English or any other
European languages, Bridgman and Parker worked together with Fletcher Web-
ster in drafting all the original forty-seven articles of the treaty, including the
provisions on religious and educational activities.48 Although seeking special
protection for missionary activities in China was not mentioned in the original
instructions from the State Department, Cushing had no problem accepting all
the articles regarding the missionaries. He believed that he went to China on
behalf of civilization and his purpose was to open the doors of three hundred
million Asiatic laborers to the Americans, including missionaries. He would be
 Emerging as Facilitator 17

happy to see the Americans “become the teachers of our teachers” and for “the
refluent tide of letters and knowledge to roll back from the West to the East.”49
The inclusion of provisions aimed at protecting missionary activities in
China caused serious concern among Chinese officials. Qi Ying, the commis-
sioner assigned by Emperor Daoguang to handle the treaty negotiations, man-
aged to turn down about ten “absolutely unacceptable” demands in the American
draft and reworked the rest into thirty-four articles. He also tried to get rid of all
the articles related to the missionaries, but was forced to give up when Cush-
ing insisted that Americans be allowed to have places to pray when they were
alive and to be buried when they died in China since they did not have a terri-
tory like Hong Kong, as the English did. Qi Ying reluctantly agreed to allow
missionaries to hire Chinese teachers and buy Chinese books since he believed
they had already done so for quite some time and it would be impossible to stop
them.50 Similar concerns were expressed by other high-ranking Chinese offi-
cials in Beijing during their review of the treaty. Mu Zhanga, the prime minister
(Junji Dachen and Da Xueshi), objected strongly to the articles that would allow
foreigners to hire Chinese teachers and buy Chinese books. He believed this
break with tradition would cause much trouble in the future. Unable to reject the
treaty, he proposed that the Court issue an order requiring those who were hired
by foreigners as teachers to register with the local government before they could
start teaching and those who sold books to foreigners to report the titles and
prices of the books bought by foreigners at the end of each year. He also recom-
mended that local officials be instructed to do everything possible to prevent
Chinese from accepting and practicing foreign rituals and religions.51
Despite grave concerns among Chinese officials over the articles on reli-
gious and educational activities, the Treaty of Wanghsia was approved by both
governments and became effective at the end of 1844. As the first treaty between
the two nations, it not only laid the foundation for U.S.-China diplomatic rela-
tions for many decades, but also started a new trend that made cultural and edu-
cational interactions a unique dimension in U.S.-China relations. Unlike most
other foreign powers, which expended their greatest efforts to gain trade privi-
leges or grab territory from China, the United States was the first to secure legal
protection for missionary activities and the only power for a long time to include
educational exchange in its treaties with China. The unique characteristics of
U.S.-China treaty relations reflected the increasing breadth and depth of rela-
tions between the two peoples.
Once the precedent was set, more treaties were signed by Washington
and the Qing Court in the following decades to confirm and expand the protec-
tion for religious activities and educational interactions. Taking advantage of
the new defeats suffered by China in the Second Opium War with Britain and
France, William Bradford Reed, the American commissioner to China, man-
aged to force the Qing Court to sign the Treaty of Tientsin (Tianjin) on June 18,
1858.52 Asserting the moral high ground of Christian religion, Article XXIX
provided that those who quietly profess and teach Christian doctrines “shall not
 18 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

be harassed or prosecuted on account of their faith,” and those, whether citi-

zens of the United States or Chinese converts, who “according to these tenets
peaceably teach and practice the principles of Christianity shall in no case be
interfered with or molested.”53 The inclusion of the article was the result of the
strenuous effort made by W.A.P. Martin and Samuel Wells Williams, missionar-
ies serving the American legation as interpreters. Martin offered his services to
make sure that the American commissioner would not “neglect the interests of
missions and the safety of native Christians.” When the first draft was rejected,
the missionaries called upon the Chinese officials, forcing them to make conces-
sions. The article was reluctantly accepted by Qing officials only hours before
the signing ceremony.54
Signed on July 28, 1868, by Anson Burlingame, the former American
minister to the Qing Court and the leading envoy of the first Chinese diplomatic
delegation sent to the West, and William Seward, the Secretary of State, the
Additional Articles to the Treaty of Tientsin comprised the third major treaty
between the two nations.55 While guaranteeing “free migration and emigration”
of the citizens and subjects of the two nations, the new treaty for the first time
included one whole article dealing specifically with schools, education, and
educational exchange. According to Article VII, the Americans and the Chi-
nese “shall enjoy all the privileges of the public educational institutions under
the control” of each other’s government and “may freely establish and maintain
schools” in each other’s country.56 By opening public educational institutions
to each other, the Burlingame Treaty sought to push educational exchanges be-
tween the two nations to a new level.
Once treaties were signed, Washington was serious in enforcing them. In
September 1872, a few Chinese were arrested in Hangzhou because of their prop-
erty deals with American missionaries. Believing that their religious and educa-
tional activities in that city were threatened by the local authorities, missionaries
asked for help from the American consul at Ningbo. On receiving the call, the
American consul rushed to Hangzhou and put pressure on the local officials,
forcing the release of all the Chinese and assurances of the rights of American
missionaries to stay and continue their religious and educational activities there.57
While always ready to protect missionary activities in China’s open ports, Wash-
ington generally opposed their efforts to extend their activities to the interior of
China prior to 1890. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish agreed with Frederick F.
Low, the American minister at Beijing, that “missionaries have no right to re-
side permanently away from the open ports,” and hoped that the Hangzhou case
would make missionaries realize “the risk which they incur by establishing sta-
tions in inland places and the embarrassment which follows the assumption of
privileges which cannot be claimed or defended under the treaty.”58
Washington began to abandon its strict interpretation of the treaties and
become a more aggressive supporter of missionary activities in the interior of
China in the early 1890s. This shift in Washington’s policy was largely the re-
sult of continuous pressure from the missionaries as well as its own increasing
 Emerging as Facilitator 19

interest in overseas expansion. While pressing American diplomats in China

for stronger protection, missionaries sent petitions directly to policy makers in
Washington, demanding “a new treaty be made distinctly affirming their right to
reside and hold property in the interior.”59 With increasing appreciation of mis-
sionary activities, diplomats in China and policy makers in Washington began
to show stronger support for missionary demands. Charles Denby, the American
minister to Beijing, pointed out in his report to the State Department in March
1895 that the missionaries, “inspired by holy zeal, go everywhere, and by de-
grees, foreign commerce and trade follow.”60 Agreeing with his evaluation, the
State Department instructed Denby to inform American missionaries in China
that when the occasion arose in cases of purchases of real property by them, he
would “take advantage of the provision of French arrangement and claim this
privilege” for them.61
Washington’s protection for missionaries culminated in its participation
in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. When the rebels gained
momentum, Washington first sent more warships to China to show its deter-
mination to protect the treaty rights granted to the Americans. Then it joined
the allied forces in the expedition to Beijing to relieve foreign diplomats un-
der siege. Having defeated the Boxers and occupied the capital, Washington
teamed with other powers in demanding severe punishment for Chinese pro-
rebel officials and a huge amount of indemnity, $25 million, to cover the losses
suffered by American missionaries and the costs of sending military forces to
China.62 Washington’s actions in 1900 clearly demonstrated that it was willing
to protect the treaty rights of missionaries and other Americans with force if it
was necessary.
Taking advantage of the new defeat suffered by China, Washington
signed the Commercial Treaty with the Qing Court in 1903. While taking care
of American commercial interests in China, the new treaty offered even stron-
ger protections for missionaries. According to Article XIV, both governments
agreed that the “principles of the Christian religion, as professed by the Protes-
tant and Roman Catholic Churches, are recognized as teaching men to do good.”
Therefore, any person, whether a citizen of the United States or Chinese con-
vert, who “peaceably teaches and practices the principles of Christianity shall
in no case be interfered with or molested therefore.” The article also provided
that “missionary societies of the United States shall be given the permission to
rent and lease in perpetuity, as the property of such societies, buildings, or land
in all parts of the Empire for missionary purposes.”63 American missionaries
finally received the legal sanction to conduct religious and educational activities
throughout the whole of China.

Taking Advantage of the Treaties

Although the treaties signed by Washington and the Qing Court after the
Opium War put most emphasis on promoting and protecting trade, missionaries
 20 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

were much more aggressive and efficient than merchants in expanding their ac-
tivities in China. They usually were the first Americans moving into the newly
opened ports and setting up permanent stations there. One of the first things they
did after their arrival in a new community was to establish schools for Chinese chil-
dren. By the end of the nineteenth century, they had established more schools and
enrolled more Chinese students than missionaries from any other nations. Despite
its strong resentment and distrust of missionary activities in China, the Qing Court
experimented with some Western learning courses in a few government schools,
hired American teachers, and dispatched its first educational mission to the United
States as part of its self-strengthening effort. As a result, educational exchanges
began to grow at a much faster pace than any other dimensions in U.S.-China rela-
tions in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Despite the strong protections offered by the treaties, American merchants
were relatively slow in moving into the newly opened port cities or expanding
their activities there. By the end of the nineteenth century, there were less than
fifty American firms operating in China, way behind Great Britain and Japan.64
American trade with China increased somewhat in terms of absolute value,
from $9 million in 1850 to $19 million in 1890.65 However, its weight in total
U.S. foreign trade declined from 3.15 percent in 1860 to 1.75 percent in 1894.66
American trade with China was not only far less than that with European nations
and Canada, but also falling behind Japan in the 1890s. Like trade, American in-
vestment in China remained small during this period. In 1902, American invest-
ment in China totaled $19.7 million, counting for only 1.2 percent of American
overseas investment in that year.67 American merchants and investors showed
much less interest in China because they, in Warren Cohen’s words, “consis-
tently preferred the surer profits to be found elsewhere.”68
Just like merchants and businessmen, few politicians or diplomats showed
strong interest in building close relations with China. Although the Treaty of
Wanghsia had established formal diplomatic ties between the two nations and
the Treaty of Tientsin had allowed the American minster to stay permanently
in Beijing, Washington had difficulties in finding qualified candidates to serve
as minister to China because of the “inadequacy of the compensation.”69 As a
result, Washington had to rely heavily on missionaries and merchants in staffing
its diplomatic offices in China, as it had done in the past.
Among all Americans, missionaries were the most aggressive in expand-
ing their religious and educational activities in China. Having learned Fujian
dialects from Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia, David Abeel and Wil-
liam Boone followed the English army to Gulangyu in 1842 and then relocated
across the sea to Xiamen when the port was officially opened to foreigners
in 1843. During his stay in Xiamen, Abeel came into contact with Xu Jiyu, a
high-ranking official and a scholar. Abeel offered materials and guidance in
Xu’s study of world history. Xu later published Yinghuan Zhilüe (A Brief His-
tory of the World), the first Chinese book on world history, geography, and
political systems.70
 Emerging as Facilitator 21

As soon as the Treaty of Wanghsia was signed in 1844, D. B. McCartee,

a missionary sent by the American Presbyterians, arrived in Ningbo, Zhejiang
Province. He organized a Presbyterian church and set up a school for boys the
next year. In 1847, a school for girls was established.71 William A. P. Martin, an-
other young missionary from Indiana, joined McCartee in 1850. Martin started
to learn Chinese immediately after his arrival. Once he had grasped some basic
skills in the Chinese language, including both the local dialect and Mandarin,
Martin set up two day schools. These schools, each with an attendance of about
twenty, employed various religious materials and some books on secular sub-
jects written by Martin and other missionaries.72 In order to help his students
learn Chinese writing systems more quickly, Martin even developed a method to
romanize the Ningbo vernacular. The romanization was so effective that it was
adopted by all other missionary schools in Ningbo.73
Judson Collins, a Methodist missionary from Michigan, reached Fuzhou,
another port city in Fujian Province, in1846. Having studied local dialects for
over a year, he opened a boys’ school in 1848 with the assistance of his fel-
low missionary Moses White. They were soon joined by Robert Maclay and
his wife, who first opened a day school for girls in 1850 and then established a
boarding school for boys in 1856. By 1853, the American Board alone had four
schools with about one hundred students in the city.74 According to an incom-
plete list compiled by Xiong Yuezhi, American missionaries established twenty-
five schools in open ports between 1845 and 1860, counting for three-quarters
of all missionary schools in China.75
Education continued to be the focus of missionary activities in China
because schools remained the most effective way to penetrate Chinese com-
munities. Although they were free to proselytize among the Chinese under the
treaties, it took missionaries about a decade to baptize the first convert in Fuzhou.
By 1860, they only managed to convert sixty-six Chinese in the city. A similar
situation could be found in all other open ports during this period. Unable to at-
tract a large number of Chinese to their churches, missionaries turned to schools
for help. Stephen Johnson, one of the pioneering American missionaries in Fu-
zhou, recognized schools “as a means of procuring permanent Sabbath congre-
gations.” C. C. Baldwin, another missionary in the same city, confessed that the
schools provided an opportunity for “preserving application of truth to the same
minds from day to day and week to week.” By keeping students in school for an
extended period, missionaries, Baldwin believed, were able to “pass the barri-
ers which excluded them from carefully guarded Chinese households and exert
there an abiding influence, which will long be felt.” Similar conclusions were
reached by John Livingston Nevius, an American missionary who had worked at
schools in Ningbo between 1854 and 1861. Missionary schools, Nevius pointed
out, supplied the churches with more than half of the converts in Ningbo while
costing only one-quarter of the mission’s budget.76
Fully aware of their importance, American missionaries did everything
possible to make missionary schools acceptable and attractive. In addition to
 22 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

students from poor families, missionary schools, especially those in large cities,
took in a large number of homeless children and offered them free education.
This allowed missionaries to put their schools in the category of benevolent
school (yixue), which was a traditional venue to help poor and homeless chil-
dren in China. When Shanghai County surveyed benevolent schools in 1869,
missionary schools were included.77 Claiming the status of benevolent school
helped reduce the resentment and resistance from the Chinese and make mis-
sionary schools acceptable at least to the people at the margin of Chinese society
in the earlier years.78 In order to attract and retain more students, missionaries
offered many other incentives. Some gave a bowl of rice after class, which was
irresistible to starving children. Others paid each student ten cents each day
for their attendance at the school.79
With concerted effort from missionaries, their schools kept growing in
the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1850, there were only a few hun-
dred students in a dozen or so missionary schools located mainly in major open
ports. By the mid-1870s, there were forty-one American Protestant Missions
in China running 294 schools with 5,227 students. The American emphasis on
education became more impressive when compared with the British missions
in China. Despite the fact that the British had slightly more missions in China
at the time, the British only had 146 schools, less than half of those run by the
Americans, with 4,428 students, about 18 percent less than those in American
schools.80 When foreign missionaries held their conference again in 1890, there
were 9,757 Chinese students in schools run by American missionaries, repre-
senting an increase of 86.7 percent in thirteen years.81 By 1904, thirty Ameri-
can missionary societies were running 944 day schools and 186 institutions of
higher learning in China. The number of students in all schools totaled about
sixty thousand.82
As the number of students in elementary schools increased, American
missionaries began to put greater emphasis on offering secondary and even
higher education for the Chinese beginning in the 1880s. Calvin Mateer and his
wife opened the Dengzhou (Tengchou) School upon their arrival in 1864. In the
early 1870s, the school was divided into primary and secondary departments. In
1882, it changed its name to Dengzhou College and adopted a new curriculum
for six-year education.83 Thus, Mateer became the founder of the first Christian
colleges in China. Following Dengzhou College, which later became a part of
the Shandong Christian University, or Qilu (Cheeloo) University, the Method-
ist Mission opened Peking University in 1888. The next year, the American
Congregationalists set up North China College in Tongzhou (Tungchow), a
city near Beijing. Besides the three colleges in the North, two more colleges
were opened in the South by the end of the nineteenth century. The American
Episcopalians established St. John’s College in Shanghai in the 1880s, with
Samuel Schereschewsky as its first president, and founded the Hangzhou Pres-
byterian College in the 1890s. At the same time, some junior colleges were set
up by missionaries in Guangzhou, Fuzhou, and Nanjing. Many of them evolved
 Emerging as Facilitator 23

into full collegiate institutions in the early years of the twentieth century. Al-
though belonging to different denominations, all these colleges were founded
by American missionaries, further demonstrating their unmatched interest in
Chinese education.84
American missionaries began to send some of their students to the United
States for education in the 1840s. The first group of Chinese students was
brought to the United States by Reverend Samuel Brown, who was forced to
leave China because of his poor health. He and his three students, Yung Wing
(Rong Hong), Wong Foon (Huang Kuan), and Wong Shing (Huang Xin), landed
in New York City in April 1847. After a brief stay in Manhattan, Yung Wing
and his schoolmates entered Monson Academy in Massachusetts. As Wong
Shing returned to China because of illness in 1848 and Wong Foon went to
study medicine at the University of Edinburgh, Yung Wing entered Yale College
and graduated in 1854 with distinction. He thus became the fist Chinese student
to receive an undergraduate degree from a distinguished college in the United
States.85 After Yung Wing, more Chinese students, including women, were sent
by missionaries to the United States for education.86
Although unhappy to see American missionaries expand their educational
activities in China, the Qing Court, taking advantage of the existing treaties,
hired American teachers for government schools and sent the first group of
government-sponsored students to the United States for education. Having suf-
fered numerous defeats by foreign powers since the Opium War, some reform-
minded Chinese officials were forced to take extraordinary steps to defend and
strengthen their motherland. In addition to the building of modern arsenals, fac-
tories, and shipyards, Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo Zongtang, leaders
of the self-strengthening movement, began to see the practical significance of
Western education. Guo Songtao, a high-ranking Qing official, suggested in his
memo to the emperor on February 26, 1859, that a special school be established
to teach students foreign languages.87 However, Guo’s proposal received little
attention until the Second Opium War, when the Qing Court suddenly realized
that it could not find even one official who was able to write a letter in English to
propose a peace talk with the British and French commanders.88
Tongwenguan, a foreign language school aimed at training interpreters
and diplomats, was finally established after the war. According to the Treaty
of Tientsin, signed by China with Britain and France in 1860, all official com-
munications and documentations should be in English and French, and foreign
diplomats would have permanent residency in Beijing.89 In order to train the
desperately needed officials who could communicate with foreign diplomats,
the Court quickly approved the establishment of Tongwenguan and put it di-
rectly under the newly established Zongli Yamen (Tsungli Yamen), the Foreign
Affairs Office, headed by Prince Gong.90 Unable to find capable Chinese to teach
foreign languages, Zongli Yamen hired J. S. Burdon, an English missionary, as
the first teacher.91 Burdon gave the first lesson to the first class of ten students on
June 11, 1862. Dr. John Fryer, another English missionary, replaced Burdon in
 24 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

1864. When Fryer resigned in 1865, the Zongli Yamen turned to Anson Burlin-
game, the American minister to Beijing, for more devoted teachers.92
Minister Burlingame willingly offered his assistance by recommending
W.A.P. Martin. The young missionary accepted the position as the first Ameri-
can instructor at the Tongwenguan in 1865 after Burlingame convinced him that
he could “make it great.” However, he turned in his resignation within a few
months because of the low pay, small classes, and limited subjects being taught
at the school. Unwilling to lose another foreign teacher, two high-ranking Chi-
nese officials from Zongli Yamen had a long meeting with Martin. He finally
decided to stay after he received promises from the Chinese officials that the
number of students would increase in the future and began to believe that his
position at Tongwenguan would “open a field of influence much wider than I
could find in the wayside chapels of Peking.”93 Two years later, Martin became
an instructor in international law. After returning from a year’s study of interna-
tional law at Yale, he was appointed zong jiaoxi (head instructor or provost) of
Tongwenguan in 1869 and remained in that position until 1894.94
It was during Martin’s tenure as provost that Tongwenguan experienced
a major expansion. With enrollment reaching one hundred, many new subjects
such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, navigation, international
law, political science, world history, world geography, and translation were
added by 1876.95 In order to accommodate the extended offerings, W.A.P. Mar-
tin abandoned the old two-year program for language training and established
two longer programs to allow students to study various subjects. The eight-year
program enrolled younger students, who studied both foreign languages and
other subjects in Western learning. The five-year program took in older stu-
dents, who studied only the nonlanguage subjects.96 As a result, Tongwenguan
turned itself from a mere language school into a modern comprehensive college
focused on Western learning. Most of its graduates, five hundred in total, oc-
cupied significant positions in government offices, especially those in foreign
affairs. Among all the envoys sent abroad by the Qing Court between 1892 and
1911, thirteen, about one-third of the total, were graduates of Tongwenguan.
A much larger number of its graduates served as consuls or interpreters. Two
students from Tongwenguan began to teach Guangxu Emperor English in 1891.
By 1898, there were at least twenty-five Tongwenguan graduates teaching at
modern schools.97 In 1902, Tongwenguan was merged into Jingshi Daxuetang
(Capital University), which would later become Beijing University.
The establishment and expansion of Tongwenguan in Beijing and similar
schools in Guangzhou and Shanghai marked the official recognition of the value
of Western learning by the Qing Court.98 In order to expand the experiment in
modern education, in 1871 the Qing Court approved the daring proposal initi-
ated by Yung Wing and endorsed by Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, sending
the first Educational Mission to the United States.99 These reform-minded Chi-
nese officials were clearly aware that sending students abroad was “an unprec-
edented move by the Chinese and unheard of undertaking in China’s history.”100
 Emerging as Facilitator 25

However, they strongly supported the endeavor because they believed that was
the only way to allow Chinese students to grasp the knowledge and skills in
military affairs, shipbuilding, mathematics, and manufacturing that would help
China become a strong and powerful nation. In order to appease conservative
officials, students were also required to study Chinese classics while attending
schools in the United States. Chen Lanbin, a member from the Hanlin Yuan who
had successfully passed the highest level of civil service examinations, was ap-
pointed as the commissioner of the Chinese Educational Mission. Yung Wing
was named only as the vice-commissioner.101
Following Yung Wing’s plan, the Qing Court sent 120 students to the
United States in four installments between 1872 and 1875. The students were
supposed to stay in the United States for fifteen years so that they could com-
plete education from elementary school to college. Given the length of the pro-
gram, the Court tried to recruit young students between twelve and twenty years
of age. However, despite the generous financial support from the Qing Court,
few families were willing to see their boys leave the country for fifteen years.
Yung Wing had to lower the minimum age to ten and go to Guangdong to get
enough students for the mission. In the end, most students, eighty-four of them,
came from Guangdong Province. The average age of all the students was twelve
and a half years old.102
Although the American minister to Beijing expressed his welcome to the
Chinese students, there was no formal cooperation or coordination between the
Qing Court and Washington. Since China did not have an embassy in the United
States, or in any foreign countries at that time, Yung Wing had to leave China
one month earlier to make arrangements for the first group of thirty Chinese
students and his colleagues. Having spent almost all his years as a student in
New England, Yung Wing went directly to Hartford and met with Mr. B. G.
Northrop, the Commissioner of Education for Connecticut. After discussion
with Mr. Northrop, Yung Wing decided to build the headquarters of the Chinese
Educational Mission in Hartford. Before the building was completed, Chinese
students were placed with families around Springfield, Massachusetts, in order
to be close to Dr. A. S. McClean, an old friend of Yung Wing. In January 1875,
the Chinese Educational Mission moved into its new headquarters on Collins
Street, Hartford. The magnificent building had offices as well as classrooms
specially designed to offer Chinese courses for students. It was designed by
Yung Wing to “have the educational mission as deeply rooted in the United
States as possible.”103
The Chinese Educational Mission was anything but permanent. From the
very beginning, Yung Wing’s arrangements received strong criticism from Chen
Lanbin, who was deeply concerned when he saw Chinese students living in Amer-
ican homes, playing with American children, wearing Western-style clothes, and
going to church with their host families. He was so worried about the American-
ization of the students that he supported the construction of the big Mission head-
quarters, which would give him enough space to teach students Chinese all year
 26 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

round.104 Similar concerns were shared by most of Chen’s successors. Commis-

sioner Wu Zideng (Woo Tsze Tung) issued strict orders in April 1880, requiring
students to study Chinese for six weeks at the Mission headquarters during the
summer; continue to practice Chinese writing and composition during the regular
school year; stop taking classes “useless” for Chinese students, such as American
geography, piano performance, and composition of English poems; and turn in
the titles of textbooks for approval before purchase. Unsatisfied with the imple-
mentation of his orders, Wu proposed the termination of the Educational Mission
since it was almost impossible to prevent students from becoming “demoralized”
in the United States. Many officials in Beijing also strongly recommended the
recall after hearing that many students had become Christians.105
Besides the increasing concern over the “corruption” and “demoraliza-
tion” of Chinese students, Chinese officials were deeply hurt by the rising anti-
Chinese sentiment in the United States. In the original proposal presented to the
emperor, it was clearly stated that the president of the United States should be
informed of the purpose of the mission and that once Chinese students reached
the required level of knowledge they should be admitted to the military and
naval academies based on their ability.106 To Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang,
having students trained in those academies was the main, if not the only, goal for
the Educational Mission to the United States. Therefore, when some students
were advanced enough for college education, Yung Wing sent their applications
for the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis
to the State Department in 1878. Their applications were turned down and Yung
Wing was told that there was “no room for Chinese students.” Disgusted by the
overt racial discrimination and violation of the Burlingame Treaty, Yung had to
report his failure to Li Hongzhang. From Li’s angry reply Yung was convinced
immediately that “the fate of the Mission was sealed.”107
A total recall of all students in the United States was finally issued by
the Qing Court in June 1881. By the early fall, all but a handful of students
left for China in three groups. At that time, only two students had completed
their college education. Over sixty were still in college while the rest were in
high school.108 Although China’s first Educational Mission was not completed
as Yung Wing originally planned, most students were able to use whatever they
had learned in the United Sates to serve their motherland. Most rose to become
leading figures in various fields in China. Among the recalled students, one be-
came the prime minister, one foreign minister, two ambassadors, eleven diplo-
mats, two university presidents, sixteen navy officers, including four admirals,
twenty railroad managers, including four division directors, ten senior managers
in the telegraph industry with four bureau chiefs, and seventeen entered business
and industry. Despite the fact that none of them attended the Naval Academy at
Annapolis, six recalled students participated in the naval battle with the French,
mostly as weapons officers, in 1884. Four of them lost their lives. Ten years
later, eleven recalled students participated in the naval battle with Japan. Three
of them were killed.109
 Emerging as Facilitator 27

Besides the educational experiment, the Educational Mission led to the

establishment of the first permanent Chinese embassy in a foreign country and
the first educational program on Chinese language and literature in the United
States. Although the Qing Court had sent some officials abroad on two differ-
ent tours in the 1860s, China did not keep diplomatic representatives in any
foreign countries. When Yung Wing arrived in United States in summer 1872,
he became the first Chinese government official to be permanently stationed in
a foreign nation. Soon both Chen Lanbin and Yung Wing were ordered to inves-
tigate the conditions of Chinese laborers in Cuba and Peru, respectively, since
they were the only Chinese officials close to those countries.110 In December
1875, the Qing Court appointed Chen as the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary to the United States, Cuba, and Peru. Yung Wing was given the
position of Deputy Minister. Chen took his new office in September 1878. Yung
Wing joined Chen in Washington, DC, with great reluctance since he had to
give up his daily involvement in the Educational Mission.111 Therefore, it is not
an exaggeration to say that the Chinese Educational Mission gave birth to the
Chinese embassy in the United States.
While devoting himself to the education of Chinese students in the United
States, Yung Wing made a great effort to promote the teaching and study of
Chinese language and literature at Yale. In February 1877, Yung Wing wrote a
letter to A. Van Name, the director of the library of Yale College, proposing the
establishment of a chair professorship in Chinese language and literature. He
promised that once the chair professorship was established, he would donate
all his Chinese books to the Yale Library. He kept writing to Mr. Van Name and
other people at Yale for over a year. Finally, Yale decided to hire Samuel Wells
Williams as the first Chair Professor of Chinese Language and Literature in
1878. Fulfilling his promise, Yung Wing immediately sent over twelve hundred
volumes of Chinese books to the Yale Library. Largely because of Yung Wing,
Yale established the first chair professorship for Chinese studies and obtained
the “nucleus of a respectable Chinese library.”112
Under the protection of the treaties, educational exchange between the two
nations did grow significantly in the second half of the nineteenth century. While
continuing their efforts to study Chinese language and culture, American mission-
aries brought modern, Western-style education to China through various schools
and colleges. The United States also attracted the first groups of Chinese students
sent by American missionaries as well as the Qing Court. Although the recall of
all the government-sponsored students brought the official Educational Mission to
the United States to an end, educational exchanges between the two nations con-
tinued as a dominantly private enterprise under the protection of the treaties.

Facing the Barriers

Despite its growth, educational exchange between the United States and
China remained small and sporadic until the beginning of the twentieth century.
 28 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

The resistance came mostly from cultural traditions as well as government poli-
cies. In the second half of the nineteenth century, most Chinese scholars and
students still believed that China was the center of the universe and the Chinese
were the only civilized people in the world. Therefore, they strongly opposed the
establishment of missionary schools in China and the spread of Western learning
among Chinese students. While the popular opposition created great challenges,
stronger barriers to the expansion of educational exchange were actually erected
by the Chinese as well as the United States government. Their conservative edu-
cational policies, difficult financial conditions, and discriminative immigration
laws made significant and lasting expansion of educational exchange between
the two nations extremely difficult, if not impossible.
The expansion of U.S.-China educational interactions was impeded by the
strenuous effort made by the Qing Court to preserve traditional Chinese educa-
tion and civil service examination systems. The establishment of missionary
schools marked the first close contact between two fundamentally different ed-
ucational systems in China. With completely different objectives, curriculum,
organization, and methods, missionary schools presented great challenges to
the Chinese educational system, the strongest pillar of Chinese culture, society,
and state. The strong religious tone permeating missionary schools and the lack
of respect demonstrated by American missionaries for Chinese culture and au-
thorities caused great alarm and strong resentment among the Chinese officials
and literati. They worked together to preserve the traditional Chinese education,
which pushed students to study Confucian classics, pass the examinations given
by the state, and receive appointments to government offices.
The traditional Chinese education was most effectively protected by the
continuation of the Chinese civil service examinations. Impressed by the practi-
cal usefulness of Western learning, Li Hongzhang and some other reform-minded
officials sent numerous proposals to the Qing Court, requesting that mathemat-
ics and natural sciences be included as part of government examinations. They
believed that if the proposed changes were approved the entire examination sys-
tem could be placed on a new basis that would “inaugurate an intellectual revo-
lution whose extent and results would be difficult to predict.”113 However, the
Qing Court turned down their proposals and kept Chinese civil service examina-
tion largely unchanged in the second half of the nineteenth century. As a result,
few students were interested in attending Western-style schools. Tongwenguan
was actually forced to abandon its plan to enroll students with official degrees
in 1866. Students who did attend the Tongwenguan had to prepare themselves
for traditional civil service examinations in order to qualify for government
positions even though much of their study was focused on Western languages
and sciences. By 1894, thirteen Tongwenguan graduates passed provincial- and
national-level examinations, moving one step further toward successful careers
through the traditional venue.114
Since Western learning was not included in civil service examinations,
it became extremely difficult, if not impossible, for graduates from missionary
 Emerging as Facilitator 29

schools and students returned from the United States to receive either recog-
nition or office appointments from the Qing Court. Without official degrees,
graduates from missionary schools were usually banned from serving in the
government. Students returned from foreign countries might have opportunities
to work for the government. However, they were usually given the lowest posi-
tions, especially in the earlier years. For example, students who were recalled to
China by the Qing Court in 1881 were assigned various government positions
with a minimal pay of four taels of silver a month despite the fact that over half
of them were already college students and two of them had received bachelor’s
degrees in the United States. After four years of hard work and repeated evalu-
ations, they were finally rewarded with official ranks in accordance with the
strong recommendations from Li Hongzhang in 1885. Most of them were pro-
moted to cong jiuping (associate, ninth degree) and bazong (platoon leader), the
lowest ranks for civil and military services, respectively.115
With such strong resistance from the Qing Court, the expansion of edu-
cational exchange between the two nations was greatly limited. Missionaries
could build many schools and colleges. However, neither the modern education
offered in those schools nor the degrees granted to their graduates were recog-
nized by the Chinese government. As a result, missionary schools, as Marianne
Bastid accurately pointed out, were only “a kind of appendix to the traditional
education system, without ever being properly integrated into it or being able to
substitute for any of its functions.”116 For the same reason, schools in the United
States were not attractive to most Chinese students in those years either. Yung
Wing had to go to Hong Kong in order to get enough students to send to the
United States in the 1870s.117 Until the beginning of the twentieth century, most
Chinese students still had to pursue traditional education and pass civil service
examinations in order to have successful careers in China.
While traditional Chinese education and civil service examinations pro-
vided little incentive for Chinese students to attend missionary schools in China
or colleges in the United States, anti-Chinese immigration laws made it dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for Chinese students to be admitted into this country
for education beginning in the early 1880s. The Chinese, like all other peoples,
enjoyed free immigration to the United States in the early years. Their right of
free immigration was further guaranteed by the Burlingame Treaty of 1868.118
However, an anti-Chinese frenzy, emerged first in California in the early 1870s,
became a popular movement across the nation by the end of the decade. In May
1882, Congress passed An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to
Chinese, suspending the immigration of Chinese laborers, skilled and unskilled,
for ten years.119 The Chinese Exclusion Act was amended in 1884, expanded in
1888, renewed for another decade in 1892, and extended indefinitely in 1904.120
As a result, the Chinese became the first people whose entrance to the United
States was denied based solely on their race.
Although Chinese students, like officials, teachers, merchants, and travel-
ers, were allowed to enter the United States by law, their admission was often
 30 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

rejected by immigration officers at American ports. The most difficult time came
when Terence Powderly, the former leader of the Knights of Labor, was appointed
the Commissioner General of Immigration in August 1897. During his tenure,
Powderly time and again asked Congress to pass laws to exclude all Chinese. He
also defended the Bureau of Immigration’s ill treatment of Chinese and placed in
key posts, as Mary Coolidge put it, “ignorant and narrow-minded men whose idea
of effective enforcement was simply to shut out more Chinese, no matter of what
class, by constant severity, suspicion, and intimidation.”121 Powderly’s efforts to
keep as many Chinese people, including students, as possible out of the United
States were sanctioned by his bosses in the Department of the Treasury. The
Secretary of the Treasury, through the State Department, instructed the American
consuls in China in 1899 that they should only issue student visas to those who
were younger than twenty-one, had actually been attending school for some time
immediately prior to the date of their application, and could and did designate the
school or college they intended to attend in the United States.122 In mid-1900, the
Treasury Department issued a more comprehensive official definition for Chinese
students. It stipulated that Chinese students may only pursue higher education in
the United States that is not available in China, have adequate financial support,
and return to their homeland upon graduation.123
The tough new definition gave American consuls in China and immigra-
tion officers at American ports a free hand in rejecting Chinese students who
were seeking education in the United States. The American consulate at Guang-
zhou issued over forty visas to Chinese students in July 1900. When the official
definition of eligible Chinese students reached the consulate in August, only
thirteen student certificates were issued that month. After August, the Ameri-
can consuls became very reluctant to grant any student visas to Chinese ap-
plicants.124 Immigration officers at American ports did everything they could to
deny or delay the admission of Chinese students to the United States. Yip Wah,
arriving in San Francisco on October 28, 1900, was denied the right to land as
a student even though immigration officers could not find anything wrong with
his travel documents. On October 21, 1901, Tong Tseng, another Chinese stu-
dent, was forced to return to China because he told the Collector of the Customs
that he was going to pursue his education first at the Chinese-American school
in Honolulu instead of going to college immediately.125
The most notorious case involved the admission of Fei Qihe (Fu Chi Ho)
and Kong Xiangxi (Kung Hsiang Hsi). Having attended missionary schools in
China and saved many American missionaries during the Boxer Rebellion, they
were sent by their American teachers to attend Oberlin College in Ohio. Arriv-
ing in San Francisco on September 12, 1900, they were first denied the right to
land because their passports were issued by Li Hongzhang, the Chinese prime
minister, rather than a local port official, and there were minor mistakes and
omissions in the English translations made by the American consul at Tianjin.
Later, through the intercession of an influential friend, they were allowed to
land, but they were sent to the detention shed, known as “China Jail,” on Angel
 Emerging as Facilitator 31

Island, to wait for a decision by the Treasury Department. They stayed there
for an entire week before being released at the request of a prestigious doctor
on the grounds that the suffering they experienced in the “Jail” was too great for
their physical endurance.126 The Chinese consul general in San Francisco was
required to put up a bond of two thousand dollars to guarantee their good behav-
ior. It took a year and a half before they were finally allowed to enter the country
and start their schooling.127
The rejection and mistreatment of Chinese students provoked a strong
protest from the Qing Court. Wu Tingfang, the Chinese minister to Washington
between 1898 and 1903, sent numerous letters to Secretary of State John Hay,
repeatedly challenging the official definition of Chinese student issued by the
Treasury Department. He reminded Hay that the Treaty of 1894 between the
United States and China “expressly stipulates that students, without qualifica-
tion, are to be admitted.” He also clearly pointed out that “this definition of
student with its various conditions reads very strange in contrast with the simple
phrase of the Treaty” and that no Chinese students could get admitted to the
United States simply because there were many institutions in China in which in-
struction in almost every branch of knowledge was given either in Chinese or in
English.128 Thus, he warned that if the Treasury Department’s definition of Chi-
nese student was allowed to stand, it would mean “a virtual nullification of the
Treaty” and the closing of “the doors of American universities and colleges” to
the Chinese race.129 Wu Tingfang tried to get President Roosevelt involved so as
to reverse the decision made by immigration officials in San Francisco and sus-
tained by H. A. Taylor, assistant secretary of the Treasury, regarding Yip Wah.
However, Hay told him that the president did not have the power to interpose in
the matter and the Treasury Department decision was final.130
Many American missionaries, educators, and businessmen strongly criti-
cized the harsh exclusion laws and regulations. One missionary in Shantou
(Swatow) wrote to Hay in March 1900, telling him that missionaries in China
were bothered by the exclusion of Chinese students. He argued that getting Chi-
nese students into the United States would not only give the country an edu-
cational ascendancy there in China, but also increase American prestige and
stimulate commercial as well as intellectual intercourse.131 An American educa-
tor in Shanghai submitted a written statement to a Senate committee, complain-
ing about the difficulties that they had experienced in sending students to the
United States. He told the committee that his college had a strong desire to send
selected Chinese students to complete their education in the United States. How-
ever, they, instead, had to send their graduates, many of whom would become
leaders of China in the future, to England because of the restrictions placed on
Chinese students by Washington. He predicted that “these young men will grow
up full of English prejudices and notions, and at all events they will be entirely
lacking in the American predilection which they would otherwise be obtained
[sic].”132 On June 20, 1902, the International Missionary Union adopted a res-
olution asking the Secretary of the Treasury to modify the regulations so as
 32 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

to remove any “unnecessary obstacle” placed in the way of Chinese students

and preachers of the Gospel coming to this country.133 The Boston Chamber of
Commerce and Merchants Association also passed resolutions in January 1902,
asking Congress to let the Chinese exclusion laws expire in 1904, because the
Treasury Department’s definition of “student” was “absolutely inconsistent with
the present treaty” as well as any definition of the word “accepted in any civi-
lized nations in the world.”134 However, the criticism and demands were gener-
ally ignored by Washington and it remained difficult for Chinese students to
pursue education in the United States during this period.
The lack of cooperation between the two governments and their difficult
financial circumstances also prevented educational interactions between the
two nations from further expansion. Despite its generous land grant for schools
and colleges right after the American Revolution and during the Civil War, the
United States government generally stayed away from the day-to-day manage-
ment of schools in the United States and from educational interactions with
other nations during this period. China did have a long history of training for-
eign students. However, the Chinese government had no experience of sending
students abroad. Having always treated education as a purely domestic issue, the
Qing Court sought no assistance from Washington when it sent its first Educa-
tional Mission to the United States in the 1870s. Instead of contacting federal
officials, Yung Wing made arrangements for the Chinese students directly with
state and local officials and friends in Connecticut. With little understanding
of the real purpose of the Chinese Educational Mission, Washington refused to
admit Chinese students to military academies, forcing China to recall all its stu-
dents. President Arthur did try to keep the Chinese students. However, his effort
was too little and too late.
The setback suffered by the first Educational Mission had a lasting im-
pact on U.S.-China educational exchanges. No Chinese students were sent to the
United States for the rest of the 1880s and throughout the 1890s. When China
finally began to value modern education after its defeat in the Sino-Japanese
War, it sent thousands of students to Japan between 1896 and 1903.135 Although
few received higher education, students returned from Japan exerted tremen-
dous influence on China’s political life and educational reform. Under their
leadership, the Qing Court adopted a modern educational system patterned after
the Japanese model in 1902.136 When the Qing Court became concerned about
Japan’s overwhelming influence in the early 1900s, it began to divert students to
European nations. For example, Zhang Baixi, the superintendent of the Capital
University, sent four students to each of the four major European nations, in-
cluding Britain, France, Germany, and Russia in 1903. However, none was sent
to the United States.137
The lack of strong financial support from either public or private sources
further limited educational interactions between the two nations. Although mis-
sionaries and private foundations were all deeply committed to educational ex-
changes, neither had adequate resources to support a large number of students
 Emerging as Facilitator 33

pursuing education across the Pacific. The situation was no better for either gov-
ernment in the second half of the nineteenth century. Short of resources and
authority, the United States government was unable to support any meaning-
ful educational exchanges with foreign nations during this period. The Qing
Court was willing to send more students at the end of the 1890s. However, the
Boxer Rebellion drew the nation into a military confrontation with all major
foreign powers in 1900 and the Qing government was further weakened both
politically and financially by another humiliating defeat. Having been beaten
by Japan and the Eight-Power Alliance, the Qing Court was forced to pay two
hundred million taels of silver to the former in 1895 and four hundred million
taels to the latter in 1901. Indemnity payments created huge holes in the Qing
Court’s budget every year beginning in the mid-1890s. Half of the Qing Court’s
annual revenues had to go to the payments for indemnities and other debts after
the Boxer Rebellion.138 Heavily burdened by all those payments, the Qing Court
was no longer able to support a large number of students studying abroad for a
long period. It had to appeal to provincial governors for more assistance.
Unfortunately, financial conditions for most Chinese provinces were not
much better during this period. Although some provincial governors, like Zhang
Zhidong and Duan Fang, were known as strong supporters of study abroad, pay-
ing one thousand dollars a year for every student in the United States was too
heavy a burden on them, too. In a memo sent to the Court in 1903, Duan Fang,
governor of Hubei Province, reported that it would cost over fifty thousand taels
annually to support the twenty-three students sent abroad by the province. He
had to order all departments to make every effort to tighten their budgets so that
money could be saved for this important enterprise.139 In some cases, provincial
governments had to recall their students from abroad when they were finally
unable to come up with the necessary funds. In 1900, the Fujian Shipyard termi-
nated its study abroad program and withdrew its students from Europe because
of financial difficulties.140 In order to save money, many provinces sent their
students to Japan since it was closer to China and the cost was only one-third of
that in the United States. Therefore, the Qing Court’s lack of financial resources
not only put more control of study abroad in the hands of provincial governors,
but also directed more students to Japan instead of the United States.141
By signing a series of treaties, government became a facilitator for ed-
ucational exchanges between the United States and China beginning in the
mid-1840s. Under the protection of the treaties, missionary schools prolifer-
ated in China and many Chinese students sailed across the Pacific for educa-
tion. However, the visible hand, while offering legal protection for educational
interactions between the two nations, was still responsible for the existence of
a number of major barriers to their further expansion. These barriers not only
made the educational exchange of a large number of students and scholars im-
possible, but also led to a major crisis in U.S.-China relations around the turn
of the twentieth century, which would require further adjustment in government
roles and policies.
 Chapter 2

Tearing Down the Barriers

A ny substantial expansion in educational

interactions between the United States and China depended very much on gov-
ernment since almost all major barriers were set up by the visible hand. The
devastating defeats suffered by China and the serious crisis that emerged in U.S.-
China diplomatic relations around the turn of twentieth century forced the Qing
Court as well as Washington to make some changes in their domestic and for-
eign policies. While the Qing Court took steps to abolish the traditional Chinese
civil service examination system and establish modern schools, Washington be-
gan to stop its officials from mistreating Chinese students at American ports and
negotiated the return of a large portion of the Boxer Indemnity to China for the
education of Chinese youth in the United States. These government actions, all
begun in 1905, helped remove or at least lower all the major institutional, legal,
and financial barriers to the development of strong educational interactions be-
tween the two nations. The unprecedentedly deep government intervention not
only paved the road for a drastic expansion of U.S.-China educational exchange,
but also brought fundamental changes in its nature and function.

Abolishing the Traditional Civil Service Examination System

The traditional Chinese civil service examinations had served the state
rather effectively in two capacities since the Sui and Tang Dynasties. One was
to select qualified candidates for government offices. The other was to provide
guidelines for educators and students, who saw passing the examinations and
service in the government as their ultimate success. It was through the civil ser-
vice examinations that the Chinese government was able to make sure that only
Confucian classics were taught in school and in appropriate ways. Therefore,
no serious reforms could take place in Chinese education until the traditional
civil service examination system was changed or terminated. As modern educa-
tion and new schools were finally seen as the key to its survival, the Qing Court
34
 Tearing Down the Barriers 35

decided to abolish the civil service examinations in 1905 so that it could adopt
a new and modern educational system in China. With thousands of new schools
shooting up all over China and Western learning integrated as part of the new
curriculum, there was a desperate need to have more Chinese students trained
in foreign countries. As a result, Western educational experience and diplomas
replaced traditional examinations and degrees as a new short-cut to successful
careers for Chinese students.
The rise of modern schools presented the greatest challenge to the Chi-
nese civil service examination system. Although American missionaries were
pioneers in introducing modern education to China, the strongest driving force
behind revolutionary changes in China’s educational system came from re-
form-minded Chinese officials and intellectuals. Having suffered humiliating
defeats by foreign powers in the nineteenth century, some officials saw the
study of Western learning as the only way to enrich the nation and build power-
ful military forces (fuguo qiangbin). In order to have engineers, technicians,
and officers trained to build warships, command a modern army and navy, and
establish transportation and communication enterprises, they sent some stu-
dents abroad and set up a number of modern schools beginning in the 1860s. In
addition to Tongwenguan and Jiangnan Zhizaoju, several military academies,
such as Naval Academy of the North Sea (Beiyang Shuishi Xuetang) and Tian-
jin Military Academy (Tianjin Wubei Xuetang), were founded between the late
1870s and the mid-1890s. By the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, there were
about twenty-five modern schools run by the Chinese with an enrollment of
two thousand.1 However, these early schools were narrowly focused on a few
military-related subjects and run like a traditional Chinese academy. Their im-
pact on China’s traditional education or the civil service examination system
was minimal.
The demand for modern schools and significant reforms in civil service
examinations surged after China’s defeat in the war against Japan in 1895. The
Japanese victory clearly demonstrated the power of modern science, technology,
industry, and education. In order to catch up with Japan, more modern schools
were established throughout the nation. In 1896, the Public College of South
Sea (Nanyang Gongxue) was established by Sheng Xuanhuai in Shanghai. With
American-style textbooks, it was the most comprehensive modern school estab-
lished by the Chinese.2 In the following two years, fifty-eight modern schools
opened their doors in China.3 Zhang Zhidong, one of the highest-ranking
Han Chinese officials in the Qing Court, published Persuasion for Education
(Quanxue Pian) in 1898, proposing that universities should be established in the
national and provincial capitals, middle and high schools in seats of prefectures,
and primary schools at the county level. The curriculum, Zhang recommended,
should include both Chinese and Western learning, with Chinese as the essence
and Western knowledge providing the tools (zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong).
He also demanded that old eight-leg essays (bagu) be replaced by tests on cur-
rent events and common knowledge in national examinations.4 Although similar
 36 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

proposals might have been presented by other reformers before, Zhang was the
first to provide a comprehensive national plan for educational reform.5
Modernizing Chinese education was made a center issue in the Hun-
dred-Day Reform (Bairi Weixin) in 1898. Sharing Zhang’s view that Western
practical knowledge could be learned and practiced while following tradi-
tional Chinese principles, Guangxu Emperor ordered the establishment of new
schools, including the first national university, the Capital University (Jingshi
Da Xuetang), the replacement of traditional academies with modern primary,
middle, and high schools, and a ban on the use of the eight-leg essay format in
official examinations. Intended as a model for new schools throughout China,
the Capital University was established in 1898. Sun Jianai was appointed as
the Superintendent of Education (Guanxue Dachen), responsible for the es-
tablishment and management of the new university.6 In order to show the
new emphasis on Western learning, Sun appointed W.A.P. Martin, the former
American missionary and provost of Tongwenguan, as the first provost (zong
jiaoxi) for the Capital University.7 Following the example of the Capital Uni-
versity, over one hundred new schools were founded and many students were
enrolled within a few months.8 While supporting the establishment of a new
National University, Li Duanfen recommended to the Court in a memoran-
dum on June 12, 1898, that qualified graduates from modern schools be sent
abroad for education. Li’s proposal was so well received in the Court that it
was incorporated in the Bylaws of the Capital University (Jinshi Da Xuetang
Zhangcheng) in July 1898.9
Although educational reform received setbacks after Emperor Guangxu
was placed under house arrest in September 1898, Empress Cixi was unable to
bring about a complete reversal. Despite her orders to stop building new schools
and to revive the use of the eight-leg essay format in official examinations, new
schools kept growing in China. A machinery school was established in Hubei
in November 1898, teaching students how to operate steam engines and lathes,
as well as other special skills. Modern education offered in new schools also
became more popular among Chinese students. When the Nanyang Gongxue
announced its plan to admit seventy new students in 1900, over one thousand
students applied for admission.10 Even Empress Cixi changed her policy after
another humiliating defeat in 1900. Right after signing the humiliating Treaty
of 1901 (Xinchou Heyue) with eleven foreign powers, the Qing Court ordered
all provinces to establish military academies to train officers in modern science
and technology. In another order issued on August 2, 1901, the Qing Court in-
structed that all traditional academies in provincial capitals should be turned into
universities, and that prefectures and counties should establish modern middle
and primary schools. At the same time, the eight-leg essay format was finally
banned in examinations for good. In order to encourage students to attend mod-
ern schools, the Qing Court issued a new regulation in October 1901, awarding
traditional degrees of gongsheng, juren, and jinshi to students at modern schools
after passing graduation tests there.11
 Tearing Down the Barriers 37

With unprecedented sanction and promotion from the Qing Court, the
growth of modern schools picked up speed after 1901. In order to provide guide-
lines for modern schools in the country, the Qing Court approved a series of
regulations drafted by Zhang Baixi, the new Superintendent of Education, in
July 1902. According to these regulations, all schools, from primary schools
to universities, were required to teach mathematics, science, geography, and
physical education, among other subjects.12 As a result, Western learning was
officially included in the new curriculum for all schools in China. In November
1903, Zhang Zhidong and Zhang Baixi drafted a more comprehensive set of
regulations and plans, spelling out a universal curriculum for Chinese schools at
all levels. The Qing Court approved the requirements and regulations immedi-
ately and ordered instant implementation by all provinces.13
Despite the strong endorsement from the Qing Court, the establishment
of modern schools did not go as smoothly or rapidly as expected. The reform-
minded officials soon realized that the development of modern education was
blocked by the traditional civil service examination system. In a memo sent to
the Court on March 13, 1903, Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong reported that
most provinces were slow in establishing new schools. While recognizing fi-
nancial difficulties and the lack of qualified teachers faced by all provinces, they
pointed out that the greatest obstacle was the traditional civil service examina-
tion system. They argued that as long as students were rewarded through tra-
ditional examinations, it would be almost impossible for modern schools to be
widely established in China.14 In another memo sent to the Court on January
13, 1904, Zhang Baixi, Rong Qing, and Zhang Zhidong emphasized that the
continuation of civil service examinations made it impossible to raise money for
new schools since local elites were still watching.15
It had become increasingly clear that modern education could not be firmly
established in China until the traditional civil service examination system was
removed. A number of the highest-ranking officials, including Zhang Zhidong,
Yuan Shikai, Zhang Baixi, and Rong Qing, first recommended gradual reduc-
tion and eventual elimination of the imperial examination system in 1903 and
1904.16 However, a more urgent memo was sent to Empress Cixi on September
2, 1905, recommending immediate abolition of all traditional examinations in
order to promote the development of modern schools. Yuan Shikai and Zhang
Zhidong argued that their original plan to eliminate the imperial examination
system in ten years was too slow and too costly for China. They pointed out
that if China waited for another ten years to abolish the imperial examination
system, it would have to wait for over twenty years before a large number of
graduates from modern schools could be employed by the government and pri-
vate enterprises. They reminded the Court that China could not afford to waste
another twenty years while so many foreign powers were casting their greedy
eyes on her. They strongly argued that a powerful and prosperous China could
only be built after the traditional examination system was abolished and mod-
ern schools were established everywhere in the nation. Despite opposition from
 38 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

some officials and many intellectuals, the Qing Court approved the recommen-
dation and ended traditional civil service examinations in 1905.17
The abolition of the civil service examinations finally made revolution-
ary changes in China’s educational system possible and drastic expansion of
educational exchange necessary. As traditional civil service examinations were
terminated and natural sciences and Western learning became an integral part
of education, modern schools finally prevailed in China. By 1907, there were
33,605 primary schools and 398 middle schools with about one million stu-
dents.18 Anyone who wanted to have a successful career now had to attend new
schools and study both Chinese classics and natural and social sciences. As thou-
sands of new schools were established, they needed a huge number of teachers
and administrators with modern educational backgrounds and experience. Un-
able to train all the instructors and administrators in China, the Court directed
that more teachers and administrators should be sent abroad for education and
observation.19 As early as 1903, the Capital University sent thirty-one students
to Japan and sixteen students to Europe to be trained as future instructors for the
university.20 Other schools and many provincial officials also sponsored students
for education in foreign countries in order to meet the needs of new schools.
The establishment of the Ministry of Education made it possible for the
Chinese government to exert centralized control over educational exchanges.
In order to continue government control over education, Zhang Zhidong and
several other high-ranking officials repeatedly recommended the establishment
of the Ministry of Education in 1903 and 1904. They proposed that a Minister
of Education (Zongli Xuewu Dachen) should be appointed to supervise new
schools in all provinces, set up the curriculum, evaluate school regulations,
review and approve textbooks, and oversee all other educational matters. He
should be assisted by a ministry staffed with competent officials in six sections.
One of them should be the Section of Studying Abroad.21 The Qing Court ap-
proved the establishment of the Ministry of Education in November 1905, right
after the abolition of the civil service examinations. Rong Qing was appointed
the first Minister of Education. When he organized the new ministry in 1906, the
Section of Special Affairs, one of the five sections in the ministry, was assigned
to handle all matters related to study abroad.22
Once the new ministry was established, it started to assume a central role
in promoting and regulating study abroad programs in China. Emphasizing the
importance of learning from the Western nations in China’s educational reform,
the Ministry of Education required all Superintendents of Education at the pro-
vincial level to take a three-month tour abroad prior to reporting to their offices.
Later, it also instructed all provinces to send selected capable officials overseas
to observe teaching and management of schools before appointing them to edu-
cation offices or new schools.23 In order to get more students interested in study
abroad and make better use of the students returned from foreign countries, the
ministry began in 1905 to give official examinations to those who had received
education overseas. By 1911, the ministry had given seven examinations and
 Tearing Down the Barriers 39

awarded degrees to 1,388 returnees. All returned students who had successfully
passed the examinations received government appointments.24 Yan Huiqin, a
graduate from Virginia University who won second place in the examination in
1906, clearly felt that they had received much better treatment than those who
returned to China in 1881.25 Chinese students returned from the United States
did extremely well in these examinations. In the examination given in 1906,
seven out of the eight top scorers were returnees from America. Between 1906
and 1909, thirty out of thirty-six American-educated Chinese students who par-
ticipated in the four examinations received the highest grades. However, their
number was small when compared with students returned from Japan. During
the period, 376 Chinese students trained in Japan passed the examinations.26
This disparity clearly demonstrated that the United States lagged far behind in
educational exchanges with China at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The Ministry of Education also took action to guide China’s study abroad
programs through setting qualification requirements and directing students to
different nations. Although more Chinese students sailed to Japan than to any
other countries in the early years of the twentieth century, the Chinese govern-
ment and educators were not impressed by either the quality of the Chinese stu-
dents or the education they received there.27 Deeply concerned by the fact that
most Chinese students sent to Japan had attended only language or elementary
schools, Yang Shu, the Chinese minister to Japan, recommended that a national
policy be adopted to cope with the problem.28 Responding to Yang’s recommen-
dation, the Ministry of Education issued an order in 1906, requiring students
seeking education in foreign countries to be graduates of middle school, fluent
in foreign languages, and of proven good character and health.29 The imple-
mentation of the new regulations effectively slowed down the flow of Chinese
students to Japan.30 In 1908, the Ministry of Education joined with several other
ministries in sending a memorandum to the Court, recommending that an im-
perial decree be issued to order various ministries and all provinces to send
students abroad for specialized education. Attached to the memo was a list of
subjects for students to choose from, including machinery manufacturing, navi-
gation, guns and rifles, business, mining, and agriculture. Sharing the concerns,
the Qing Court ordered the provinces to send more students to European coun-
tries and the United States as early as 1902 to correct the over-concentration of
Chinese students in Japan. Following the order, many provinces began to send
students to Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium in 1903. While France at-
tracted more students than other European countries, Belgium, although small,
got an disproportionately large share because of its outstanding schools, lower
tuition fees, and equal treatment of Chinese students. By 1905, there were about
sixty Chinese students in Belgium.31
Compared with Japan and many European countries, the United States
took in a very small number of Chinese students during this period. Most of
them were sponsored by either Christian churches or provincial officials. In
1901, Sheng Xuanhuai sent nine graduates from the Beiyang Xuetang to the
 40 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

University of California at Berkeley. Dr. John Fryer was appointed as the su-
pervisor for the students. They were the largest group of Chinese students to
enter American colleges since 1876.32 In 1903, Governor Duan Fang of Hubei
Province sent ten students to the United States. The next year, about twenty Chi-
nese students from a number of modern schools in the city of Tianjin and Hunan
Province entered American schools.33 The lack of promotion and support from
the central government, Qu Lihe argued, kept the number of Chinese students
sent to the United States much smaller than that to Japan and Europe.34

Revising Immigration Policy toward Chinese Students

The rapid growth of new schools and the increasing demand for edu-
cational interactions with foreign nations, including the United States, made
Washington’s anti-Chinese immigration laws and regulations even more unac-
ceptable to Chinese officials as well as students. While Qing officials contin-
ued to lodge their strong protests, students in modern schools, including those
run by American missionaries, began to play a more active role in organizing
grass-roots movements against American immigration policy toward China.
The most powerful movement led by students and merchants was the national
anti-American boycott in 1905. The possibility of losing the China market,
and more importantly, the hearts and minds of the future Chinese leaders,
forced Washington to take serious steps to make sure that students, merchants,
and other exempt classes of Chinese could be admitted smoothly into the United
States. Although his efforts to have the anti-Chinese immigration laws repealed
ended in failure, President Theodore Roosevelt did manage to stop overt abuse
and mistreatment of Chinese students by American officials through a series of
strict executive orders in 1905. Once clear rules and procedures for admission of
Chinese students were established, it became relatively easy for an increasingly
large number of Chinese students and scholars to attend colleges and universi-
ties in the United States.
Washington continued to strengthen its anti-Chinese immigration laws and
regulations at the beginning of the twentieth century. In early 1902, the Treasury
Department reaffirmed Washington’s policy toward Chinese immigrants through
the publication of A Compilation of Laws, Treaties and Regulations and Rulings
of the Treasury Department Relating to the Exclusion of Chinese. Wu Tingfang,
the Chinese minister to the United States, immediately sent a long note to John
Hay on May 19, 1902, demanding the modification of several regulations in order
to make sure that only laborers would be prohibited from entering the United
States. Wu particularly requested the immediate abolition of the official defini-
tions of students and merchants specifically designed for the Chinese. He even
warned Hay that “if the regulations enforced lately by the Immigration Bureau
be continued, the Chinese Government, in due reciprocity, would be expected
to prohibit the coming into China of all missionaries, whether clergymen or lay-
men, of all bankers, of all civil and mining engineers, of all railroad contractors,
 Tearing Down the Barriers 41

builders, or operators, of all commercial brokers, and of all merchants who did
not have an established place of business.”35 The State Department did pres-
ent Wu’s demands to President Theodore Roosevelt and transmit them to the
Department of the Treasury. In his reply to Wu, David J. Hill, acting secretary
of the Treasury Department, defended every regulation of his department and
declared that he was “unable to make any desired modifications.”36
Angered by Washington’s refusal to revise any of its anti-Chinese immi-
gration laws or regulations, the Qing Court became more reluctant to send stu-
dents to the United States and more determined to terminate the Gresham-Yang
Treaty, which was signed in 1894 to extend the suspension of the admission
of Chinese laborers to the United States for another ten years. The American
legation noticed that the Qing Court sent students to Britain, France, Germany,
Japan, and Belgium in 1903. When the legation asked why the United States did
not receive any, the Qing Court replied that there was no need to send students
to both Britain and the United States since they all spoke the same language.37
The real cause, of course, was its concern over possible rejection and mistreat-
ment of Chinese students in the United States. That concern was validated again
by a petition sent by fifty-six thousand Chinese immigrants in the United States,
reporting insults and humiliations suffered in America and demanding the ter-
mination of the Gresham-Yang Treaty at the end of its term in 1904.38 Backed by
popular support, Prince Qing (Ch’ing) sent a note to Minister Conger in Beijing
on January 24, 1904, informing him that the Chinese government would not
extend the existing immigration treaty, which allowed Washington to set a tem-
porary ban on Chinese laborers.39 Since 1904 was an election year, China soon
offered to extend the treaty for another year so as to avoid undue influence on a
political campaign.40 Unwilling to give up the existing treaty, Hay ask the Qing
Court to withdraw the expiration notice and warned that if the new treaty did not
come into force before the old one expired there would be nothing to stop Con-
gress from passing even harsher exclusion laws against the Chinese.41
Hay’s warnings had little impact on Chinese officials. Prince Qing, while
keeping open the one-year offer, resolutely refused to allow the treaty to be ex-
tended for another ten years. The Court, he announced, had to listen to appeals
from the Chinese in the United States. They, he believed, had suffered so much
that things could not be worse for them even if the existing treaty did expire.
China would like to negotiate a more favorable treaty before the existing one
elapsed. However, if a new treaty could not be signed in time, the Chinese gov-
ernment preferred to let the existing treaty die.42 The Chinese officials believed
that all Chinese should be admitted to the United States freely under the terms
of the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 if the current immigration treaty should ex-
pire. They warned that if any Chinese were delayed or maltreated at American
ports, the United States government would be held responsible for the losses
involved. Liang Cheng, the new Chinese minister to Washington, even designed
and distributed a form for those who had encountered trouble on entering the
United States so that he could seek reparation for them from Washington. In
 42 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

order to address serious problems faced by Chinese in the United States, Liang
Cheng sent the Chinese draft of the treaty to the State Department in August
1904, providing a clear definition of laborers and allowing all Chinese except
laborers to enter the United States freely.43
The negotiation of the new treaty did not go very well from the beginning.
Unimpressed with the Chinese draft, the State Department rejected all the major
articles proposed by China and insisted that only five exempt classes of Chinese
could come to the United States.44 Unwilling to accept Washington’s counter-
proposal, Liang Cheng sent a strong note to the State Department, warning that,
if reciprocity was applied, almost all Americans would be excluded from China
and commerce between the two countries would be paralyzed. Thus, he asked
the State Department to “reexamine the negotiations with a view to securing a
better basis for our treaty relations than that proposed in the amended draft.”45
Hay transmitted Liang Cheng’s note to Victor Metcalf, Secretary of Commerce
and Labor, who was responsible for the enforcement of the exclusion laws. Met-
calf refused to make any significant changes in the American position. As a re-
sult, the difference between the two sides remained so great that the negotiations
came to a stop.
In order to break the stalemate, the State Department decided to shift the
negotiations from Washington to Beijing. Many American policy makers be-
lieved that Liang Cheng’s toughness in the negotiations was unauthorized and
that it would be easier to deal with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing.
Hay ordered William Rockhill, the new American minister to China, to ask per-
mission for American immigration officials to work in American consulates in
China to verify and issue certificates for Chinese seeking to enter the United
States. Other terms of the treaty were not to be discussed at that time. Hay’s
decision to shift the talks to Beijing not only antagonized Liang Cheng, but
also alarmed Chinese merchants, students, and intellectuals on both sides of the
Pacific Ocean. Distrusting the weak Qing government, Chinese merchants and
students believed that they had to do something to prevent another unfavorable
immigration treaty from being forced on China. On May 10, 1905, the board
of directors of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce held a meeting and passed
two resolutions. One urged the Chinese government not to sign a new treaty
with the United States that might continue the exclusion of Chinese laborers.
The other warned Washington that it had to either modify its exclusion laws
within two months to guarantee equal treatment for Chinese, or face a boycott in
China. The proposed boycott would stop the purchase and use of all American
products, cancel the employment of American ships in transporting goods, keep
workers from American firms and merchants, and withdraw all Chinese students
from American schools and colleges in China. In order to guarantee the success
of the boycott, the board sent telegrams to twenty-one cities, urging them to join
the movement.46
A boycott was nothing new in U.S.-China relations. White American set-
tlers in the West had frequently used the method to drive their Chinese neighbors
 Tearing Down the Barriers 43

out of the communities shared by both in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The longest anti-Chinese boycott took place in Silver Bow County,
Montana. Thousands of white Americans in the county were organized to boy-
cott Chinese shopkeepers, launderers, chefs, servants, and laborers from 1876
to 1901.47 In 1902, the miners’ union in Ouray, Ouray County, Colorado, or-
ganized a boycott to drive the Chinese out of that town. The union stationed
persons around Chinese stores, warned anyone who intended to deal with Chi-
nese, and circulated threatening notices demanding the departure of all Chi-
nese within a fixed period. Some Chinese moved out of the town because of
fear, but most could not move since they had property, merchandise, and vested
interests there.48 In both cases those Chinese who were affected by the boy-
cotts had to appeal to Wu Tingfang, the Chinese minister in Washington, for
help.49 Having suffered from anti-Chinese boycotts in the United States, Chi-
nese-Americans began to advocate the use of the method as a weapon against
the exclusion laws. In 1903, Yikan Chen, the editor in chief of the Xinhua Bao
(New China Newspaper) in Honolulu, supported an anti-American boycott be-
cause it could put real pressure on Americans while breaking no treaty com-
mitments.50 In order to win support for his proposal, Chen traveled throughout
the United States to make speeches among the Chinese. Similar speeches were
also given by his followers to merchants and students in China. Therefore, the
seeds for the national anti-American boycott in 1905, Zhang Cunwu argued,
were imported from the United States.51
Using the boycott as a tool to fight against Washington’s Chinese ex-
clusion laws was well received among at least some Chinese government of-
ficials. Both Wu Tingfang and Liang Cheng believed that China needed to take
a stronger stand against the exclusion policy in order to “regain the respect for
the country and redress the grievances of the Chinese people.”52 In early 1905,
Liang Cheng reported that Chinese-Americans were talking about a boycott
against American products. He supported the idea because he believed that a
boycott would threaten America’s lifeline, cause fear among Americans, and
lead to the immediate modification of the Chinese exclusion policy. At the very
least, he argued, it would help China in negotiating a new treaty with the United
States. Aware of the concerns of other government officials, he pointed out that
it would be easy for the government to reject any American complaints since
the boycott was organized by merchants. Several high-ranking officials in the
Ministry of Commerce shared similar views. After a meeting with leading mer-
chants in May, Yang Shiqi, Deputy Minister of Commerce, sent a telegram to
urge the ministry to persuade the Foreign Ministry not to sign the immigration
treaty with Washington, and wait to allow the boycott to take effect. The Min-
istry of Commerce immediately sent a note to the Foreign Ministry, asking it to
consider the merchants’ demands and follow Yang’s suggestions.53
Although the anti-American boycott was formally initiated by merchants,
Chinese students, with their unparalleled dedication, determination, and ability,
soon emerged as the most active and effective leaders of the movement. To a
 44 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

large extent, they were responsible for turning the boycott from a plan on paper
into a mass movement on the ground.54 Students in Shanghai were among the
first to show their absolute support for the boycott. On May 22, students shut
down several schools to protest the American exclusion policy. The dean of the
Fong-wang-tu Academy (Fanwangdu Shuyuan) was forced by students to ca-
ble the American government demanding the abrogation of the Gresham-Yang
Treaty.55 Five days later, over one hundred students, representing twenty-seven
Shanghai high schools and colleges, met to discuss boycott strategies. The rep-
resentatives signed a declaration pledging that their schools would not buy any
American products. They also formed a liaison committee that would work with
the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, print pictures of the suffering Chinese
in the United States, raise funds for the boycott, and teach consumers how to
identify American goods.56
Similar actions were taken by students in many other cities throughout
China. On June 2, 1905, over 250 students in the Anglo-Chinese school in Fu-
zhou forced the principal to send messages to President Theodore Roosevelt,
the State Department, and some Congressmen, demanding the repeal of unfair
articles in the Chinese exclusionist laws. They promised to quit the school if
no positive response was heard from Washington.57 Students in Beijing wrote
letters to their fellow students and merchants in other cities promoting the boy-
cott, investigated American products and brands for future action, and donated
money for boycott activities so as to “enhance the dignity of the Chinese.”58
Guangzhou students not only participated in all the planning and agitation of the
boycott movement, but also took the first boycott action in the area. Following
the resolutions passed at a meeting held at the Guangji (Kwang Chi) Hospital on
May 27, students took action to identify the trademarks and brands of American
goods, published a list in the newspapers, and stopped buying American goods
themselves.59 On June 15, 1905, students in Tianjin urged everyone in schools
not to buy American products and demanded that their teachers instruct students
in how to recognize American products as part of classroom teaching. Very
soon, no American products could be found in schools in these cities.60
As organizers, leaders, and participants, students were more determined
and devoted than merchants in the boycott. When Yuan Shikai sent police to
stop any preparation for the boycott in Tianjin, most local merchants followed
the order with little resistance. But students in Japan sent a telegram to the Qing
Court demanding the execution of Yuan. When Rockhill, the new American
minister to Beijing, proposed that the boycott should be postponed at least to
October so as to give Congress some time to revise the Chinese exclusion pol-
icy, some merchants were willing to grant the American request. 61 It was the
students who were vehemently against such a delay. On July 19, the Shanghai
Student Association (Hu Xue Hui) organized a rally to make sure that the na-
tionwide boycott would start on time. All 1,450 attendees, mostly students from
twenty-one schools, agreed that the two-month waiting period had come to an
end and the boycott of American products should start immediately.62 It was
 Tearing Down the Barriers 45

under pressure from students that the vast majority of members of the Chamber
of Commerce voted against the delay on July 20. As a result, the boycott finally
started as scheduled.63
Once the boycott got started, students worked even harder to make sure
that it would continue until all their goals were achieved. While some merchants
kept selling and ordering American products to avoid immediate or future fi-
nancial losses, students took action to completely stop their importation and
sale. In Guangdong, they went from store to store persuading merchants to sign
the covenant promising not to buy or sell American products. They wanted to
deal a heavy blow to the American government so that the Chinese exclusion
laws would be abolished completely and all Chinese, including laborers, would
be treated fairly and equally in the United States.64 Female students at Wuben
School in Shanghai adopted a resolution right after the boycott started to encour-
age men and women in their families to participate in the boycott until a success-
ful end.65 After the Qing Court issued a decree to stop the boycott, students from
the Capital University sent telegrams to Zeng Zhu and anti–exclusion policy as-
sociations throughout the country, urging them to continue the boycott. They
tried to convince the merchants and other people that the Qing Court was only
concerned about possible riots associated with the boycott. As long as they used
peaceful methods, they should be able to continue the movement.66 When an
increasingly large number of merchants deserted the boycott and resumed trade
with the United States, students replaced them as leaders of the diminishing
boycott movement.
The differences between Chinese students and merchants, and the shift
of leadership from the latter to the former, did not escape the observing eyes
of American diplomats in China. Following instructions from President Roos-
evelt, they sent frequent and detailed reports back to Washington on the “Chi-
nese Exclusion Treaty agitation” and the role played by Chinese students in it.
In those reports, American diplomats showed clear concern about the strong
anti-American feelings among Chinese students.67 Julius Lay, the American
consul general at Guangzhou, repeatedly told the State Department that Chinese
merchants were calculating businessmen who would not give up a single dollar
and were not likely to sustain a boycott for any length of time. But the students,
who were interested in having the exclusion laws and regulations modified or
repealed, were entirely different. He observed that it was not the “importers
of American goods but literati, or college students who exert a strong influ-
ence among the people and officials” at an important meeting held on June 27.68
Similar observations and reports were made by James L. Rodgers, the American
consul general at Shanghai. In a memo sent to the State Department a week after
the boycott officially began, Rodgers reported that the views and actions of Chi-
nese students were “less conservative and their intentions much more hostile.”69
About two weeks later, Rodgers cabled the State Department again to inform it
that the Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai was very anxious to stop the boy-
cott and students were “responsible for continuance.”70 In a follow-up telegram,
 46 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Rodgers confirmed that the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was powerless and
that Chinese students controlled the boycott situation.71
The strong anti-American sentiment among Chinese students and the
leading role played by them in the boycott also caused deep concern among
American missionaries, educators, and businessmen. In November 1904, over
230 Americans in China signed a petition and sent it to the State Department
through John Goodnow, the American consul general at Shanghai. These Amer-
icans urged that “the Treasury Regulations be so amended to foster the desire
of the bona fide Chinese students to come to the U.S., by removing the humilia-
tions which they consider are inflicted on them by the present method of enforc-
ing the Exclusion Acts.”72 Goodnow, sharing their view, reported that there were
at least fifty bona fide students, to his own knowledge, who had gone to Europe
mainly because they did not want to submit themselves to humiliating American
entrance examinations. On May 19, 1905, all American members attending the
annual conference of the Educational Association of China in Shanghai wrote
a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt. They claimed that their teaching in
China had begun to suffer from the mistreatment of Chinese students in the
United States. The strong resentment of Chinese students, they observed, had
become increasingly widespread. As more and more Chinese students began
to seek education overseas, most of them, they noticed, chose to go to other
countries instead of the United States because of the difficult admission process
at American ports. As a result, over five thousand Chinese students went to Ja-
pan, with three thousand receiving government scholarships. Since most of the
students came from upper-class families, they would definitely become future
leaders of China. If the United States intended to maintain its influence and
position in China’s politics, commerce, and education, the American educators
argued, it had to win the goodwill of Chinese students and scholars. In order to
achieve this goal, they argued, Washington needed to not only remove the harsh
and unreasonable articles in the immigration policy, but also extend a warm and
courteous welcome to Chinese students.73
American diplomats in China shared the same concerns and views. Fully
aware of the confusion and resentment among the Chinese students, Julius
Lay put the blame squarely on immigration officers backed by Sargent, the
Commissioner of Immigration, who interpreted “the law, treaty, and the vague
regulations in such a way that practically every one [of Chinese origin] is ex-
cluded.” He demanded that the immigration regulations should be made clear
and immigration officers should cooperate with diplomats in China. He warned
that there would always be bad feelings among the Chinese unless there was a
“complete understanding between us.”74 William W. Rockhill, the new Ameri-
can minister to Beijing, made the demand even more explicit. Shortly after ar-
riving in Beijing, Rockhill cabled Washington urging that all Chinese persons
who were not laborers should be allowed to enter and reside in the United
States. He emphasized that “all Americans in China advocate strongly liberal
treatment” for the Chinese.75
 Tearing Down the Barriers 47

The disturbing reports from China also caused serious concern among
many educators and businessmen in the United States. Presidents of many pres-
tigious universities wrote to President Roosevelt demanding better treatment
for Chinese students. A group of businessmen, representing a large segment
of corporate interests in the country, visited Roosevelt at the White House on
June 12, 1905. They delivered a prepared statement asking him to change the
Chinese exclusion policy.76 A New York Times editorial made the even more
radical suggestion that “the best possible policy of our government would be
to repeal the oppressive features of our laws which are in contradiction to our
treaty pledges.”77
Under the heavy pressure from missionaries, business leaders, and the
media, and faced with the possibility of losing the huge China market and an-
tagonizing a whole generation of young Chinese, American policy makers were
forced to make some changes in the Chinese exclusion policy. In his letters to
Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge emphasized that the exclusion
of Chinese and Japanese laborers should be done “discretely and reasonably.”78
In a speech given at the eighty-first commencement of Miami University at Ox-
ford, Ohio, on June 15, 1905, William Howard Taft, the Secretary of War, asked
his audience to consider whether it was “just that for the purpose of excluding
one hundred Chinese coolies from slipping into this country we should subject
an equal number of Chinese merchants and students of high character to an
examination of such an inquisitorial, humiliating, insulting, and uncomfortable
character as to discourage altogether the coming of merchants and students?”79
Having been pushing for an Open Door in China, Secretary of State John Hay
believed that the implementation of harsh Chinese exclusion laws had impeded
the expansion of commercial and cultural ties with China and undermined his
China policy. Thus, he wanted the president to “put a stop to the barbarous
methods of the Immigration Bureau.”80
John Hay’s concern was shared by President Roosevelt. Although Roos-
evelt had been a staunch supporter of Chinese exclusion laws, he cared very
much about America’s trade with China and wanted to keep the door of the China
market open to American commercial and industrial interests. Only a few months
ago, Roosevelt had delivered his Annual Message to Congress, urging it to
send a commission to China to investigate its market and to set up a perma-
nent display of American products in commercial centers there.81 The last thing
Roosevelt wanted to see was the loss of the China market because of the harsh
administration of the exclusion laws and regulations. Well informed of the de-
velopments in China and fully aware of students’ role in the organization of the
anti-American boycott, President Roosevelt sent a letter to Victor Metcalf, the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor, on June 16, 1905, ordering him to “issue spe-
cific and rigid instructions” to the officials of the Bureau of Immigration that no
discourtesy or harsh treatment in connection with Chinese merchants, travelers,
or students would be tolerated. He made it clear that American consuls in China
were responsible for certifying those Chinese immigrants who were not laborers
 48 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

and that these certificates must be taken as prima facie evidence unless there was
the clearest possible ground for overriding them.82 In order to deny MetCalf any
opportunity for delay, Roosevelt wrote him again three days later, telling him
that he “must arrange for a circular of instructions sufficiently drastic to prevent
the continuance of the very oppressive conduct of many of our officials toward
Chinese gentlemen, merchants, travelers, students, and so forth.”83
Once the boycott formally began in July 1905, Roosevelt worked even
harder to bring it to a quick end. On one hand, he put heavy pressure on the
Chinese government, forcing it to take action to stop the boycott. Rockhill sent a
note to the Chinese government on August 28, pointing out that it was Beijing’s
responsibility to stop the boycott and to protect Americans in China. He urged
the Qing Court to severely punish Zeng Zhu and warned that it would be held
responsible for any American damages.84 Roosevelt even considered the pos-
sibility of using military force to end the boycott.85 On the other hand, he began
a strenuous effort to make serious adjustments to the Chinese exclusion policy.
In a letter sent to Rockhill on August 22, 1905, Roosevelt emphasized that he
had taken “a far stiffer tone with my own people than any President has ever yet
taken,” and that he intended “to do the Chinese justice.” However, he insisted
that his chance to get favorable action by Congress would be “greatly interfered
with by the failure of Chinese to do justice themselves in such important matters
as the boycott and the Hankow concession.”86 In addition to executive actions,
he made strong appeals to the public and Congress. In a speech given in At-
lanta on October 20, 1905, Roosevelt admitted that the “chief cause of bringing
about the boycott of our goods in China was undoubtedly our attitudes towards
the Chinese who came to this country.” He insisted that it was right to exclude
Chinese laborers. However, he wanted to see the American laws and treaties “be
so framed as to guarantee to all Chinamen, save of the excepted coolie class,
the same right of entry to this country, and the same treatment while here, as is
guaranteed to citizens of any other nation.”87
In order to bring the Chinese exclusion laws in line with his views, Theo-
dore Roosevelt asked Congress to take action. In his State of the Union Message
of 1905, he confessed to Congress that “grave injustice and wrong have been
done by this nation to the people of China,” and that “the main factor in produc-
ing this boycott has been the resentment felt by the students and business people
of China.” Thus, he asked Congress to pass a new law that “should be penned,
not so as to put people in the exempt classes, but to state that we will admit all
Chinese, except Chinese of coolie class, Chinese skilled and unskilled labor-
ers.”88 His recommendations were included in a bill introduced by David J. Fos-
ter, a Congressman from Vermont. However, the Roosevelt administration was
forced to withdraw its support for the bill under pressure from western states and
union leaders. Without strong support from the president, the Foster bill died in
the Foreign Affairs Committee. Although the Chinese government refused to
renew the Gresham-Yang Treaty, the United States continued to enforce all the
anti-Chinese immigration laws without treaty permission until World War II.89
 Tearing Down the Barriers 49

Despite his failure to repeal all the Chinese exclusion laws, President
Roosevelt managed to put a quick end to the boycott and keep the American
door open for Chinese students. Pressed by Washington, the Qing Court issued
a decree on August 31, 1905, ordering businessmen to stop the boycott, and lo-
cal officials to punish those who would disobey the order. The murder of five
American missionaries in Lianzhou (Lienchow), Guangdong Province, in Oc-
tober, 1905, gave Washington another opportunity to put even heavier pressure
on Beijing. In early 1906, Cheng Cunxuan, the governor of Guangzhou and a
sympathizer with the boycott, was removed from office and many leaders of
the movement were arrested. As a result, the boycott lost its momentum by the
beginning of 1906 and came to a final collapse at the end of the year.90 At the
same time, the strict executive orders from President Roosevelt put an effective
check on the “the harsh treatment of and unwarranted discrimination against
the Chinese in or seeking admission to our country,” and brought about “a more
reasonable enforcement of the laws and regulations.”91 Following the president’s
order, the Bureau of Immigration, as Adam McKeown pointed out, “backed
away from its aggressive reforms in which the success was measured by number
of rejections and deportations” and put more emphasis on the need for courtesy
and fair treatment. As a result, the rejection rate for Chinese seeking admission
to the United States was reduced from 15–20 percent a year prior to 1905 to
about 5–6 percent a year between 1905 and 1924.92 Another major obstacle to
broader educational interactions between the two nations was thus lowered, if
not completely removed.
Taking advantage of the more amicable conditions created by President
Roosevelt’s executive orders, more Chinese students, including government-
sponsored ones, began to come to the United States for education in 1905. By
the end of the year, about forty students from Guangdong and Shanghai were
sent to the United States.93 The Capital University finally sent its first group
of four students to the United States in 1906 and four more in the following
year. By 1908, about four hundred students, an unprecedented number, were
sent to the United States by Chinese central and provincial governments. 94 Fol-
lowing the government’s lead, many privately sponsored students also came to
the United States. By the end of 1906, over one hundred self-sponsored stu-
dents had reported to the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC.95 Although
the Chinese exclusion laws and regulations remained in effect for the follow-
ing decades, President Roosevelt’s executive orders did make the admission of
Chinese students less problematic and the expansion of educational exchange
legally possible.

Returning the Excessive Part of the Boxer Indemnity

The termination of the civil service examination system and the establish-
ment of clear rules and regulations for admitting Chinese students helped re-
move the institutional and legal barriers and demonstrated the willingness of the
 50 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Qing Court and Washington to expand educational exchanges between the two
nations. However, more financial resources were still needed for any significant
expansion of educational interactions. Since Chinese students could only draw
on limited resources from their families, schools, and other private institutions,
financial support from government became the key for the expansion of educa-
tional exchanges. The surplus part of the Boxer Indemnity paid by China to the
United States offered a possible solution. After long negotiations, China agreed
to accept Washington’s return of the excessive part of the indemnity and to use
it to educate Chinese students in the United States. With tens of millions of dol-
lars flowing back to China, the Boxer Indemnity remission became the biggest
single source of financial support for educational exchanges between the two
nations for decades to come. More importantly, the remission of the Boxer In-
demnity for educational purposes pushed both the United States and the Chinese
government to transform their role from a facilitator into a sponsor, regulator,
and supervisor of educational exchanges.
Neither the Qing Court nor Washington had the resources to provide
meaningful financial support for educational exchange between the two nations
at the beginning of the twentieth century. In a memo sent to the Qing Court in
September 1906, the Ministry of Education reported that it needed at least half
a million taels each year to run the schools directly under its jurisdiction and
support students abroad. However, it could only get about one hundred thousand
taels from the provinces each year. As a result, the ministry had to ask for help
from provincial governors like Yuan Shikai and Duan Fang directly to cover
its expenses in 1906. In order to guarantee minimum revenue for the future,
the ministry proposed to have large provinces send in fifty thousand taels and
small provinces twenty thousand taels each so that it could have a budget of six
hundred thousand taels each year.96 The ministry’s dependence upon provincial
government for financial support clearly revealed its limited ability to imple-
ment educational reforms and to send students abroad. Washington’s situation
was not much better. Although it did give land to support education in the past,
the federal government had never provided direct financial assistance to schools
or students, especially foreign ones. Therefore, Washington had to look for fi-
nancial resources beyond its regular revenues and budget.
Washington found it in the overpayment made by the Qing government for
the Boxer Indemnity. As an ally in the Chinese Relief Expedition of 1900, the
United States joined other major powers in demanding a huge indemnity from
the Chinese government in 1901 to cover the losses and expenses caused by the
Boxer Rebellion. Like all other foreign powers, Washington tried to get as much
money from the weak Qing Court as possible. When Minister Conger received
the telegram from Hay instructing him to ask for $25 million for the United
States, he thought that the figure must be a mistake because it was obviously ex-
cessive for American diplomats and generals in Beijing.97 He sent a telegram to
Hay seeking verification. Conger only officially presented the figure after receiv-
ing Hay’s confirmation.98 Hay did instruct Conger to seek the reduction of the
 Tearing Down the Barriers 51

total of the indemnity and cut the American demand by half if all other powers
would do the same. However, Hay’s effort failed because of strong opposition
from Germany and other powers who believed that Hay was being hypocritical
on the issue.99 Eventually, China had to pay 450 million taels to foreign powers
and the United States got 32,939,055 taels, equivalent to $25 million, about 7.32
percent of the total. As claims came in over the next year, Hay began to realize
that he had asked too much from China. Somewhat embarrassed by the excessive
demand, Hay promised that Washington might return part of the indemnity after
covering all losses and costs.100
The possible return of the surplus part of the Boxer Indemnity resurfaced
when the immigration treaty between the United States and China was about to
expire and the negotiation of a new treaty went nowhere. In order to find ways
to reduce the tension between the two countries and jump-start the negotiation,
Hay informed Liang Cheng on November 25, 1904, that the United States, while
insisting on accepting only gold as the indemnity payment, might consider the
possibility of returning a portion of the Boxer Indemnity to China.101 Three days
later, Hay went through the American draft of the immigration treaty written
by the Department of Commerce and Labor. He immediately realized that the
American draft “departs so far from the Chinese draft that it cannot possibly be
negotiated before Dec. 7 when the old treaty expires.”102 Handing the American
draft to Liang Cheng a few days later, Hay asked him to see Victor Metcalf, the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Hay was sure that “[t]here will be trouble on
the 7th December unless we can sign a modus vivendi.”103
Predicting trouble in the treaty negotiations, Hay decided to take some
positive steps to keep Liang Cheng in the process. At the Cabinet meeting on De-
cember 2, Hay proposed that Liang Cheng should be informed that “we are con-
templating a reduction in the indemnity” and that a recommendation would be
sent to Congress to “release China from one half of the portion coming to us.”104
Having received a mostly positive response at the meeting, Hay instructed Wil-
liam Rockhill to prepare a document that would be presented to Congress by the
president, asking for the return of part of the Boxer Indemnity.105 When Liang
Cheng met Hay on December 5, and complained about the American draft of
the treaty, Hay made no defense. Instead, he tried to make Liang Cheng believe
that “we would before long announce our purpose to give them important relief
in the indemnity matter.”106 Obviously, Hay was trying to tie the negotiation of
the new immigration treaty with the return of part of the indemnity. He knew
that the Chinese government was struggling to come up with enough money to
make the indemnity payments and thought that it might be possible to use the
remission as a leverage to seduce the Chinese government into making some
concessions or, at least, to keep it from going too far in its actions against the
exclusion policy. Hay’s tactics appeared to have some immediate effect. When
Liang Cheng went to see Hay again on December 19, he talked more about the
remission than the treaty. Liang Cheng’s tone was so mild that Hay thought that
he might be making some progress with Metcalf.107
 52 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

The talk on the indemnity remission continued in early 1905. However, the
two sides had quite different focuses. While the Chinese government wanted to
receive the return of the indemnity from the United States immediately so as to
reduce its financial burden, Washington was more concerned about how the re-
turned money would be used by the Chinese government. During meetings with
Liang Cheng, Rockhill, the newly appointed minister to China, kept reminding
Liang that President Roosevelt wanted to know how the money would be used.
Regarding the future use of the returned Boxer Indemnity as China’s internal
affair, Liang Cheng openly objected to the American interference. Rockhill had
to explain to him that President Roosevelt could make a stronger appeal in Con-
gress for the remission if he knew how the money would be used by the Chinese
government ahead of time. He also hinted that the president wanted China to use
the money for educating Chinese youth in the United States.108
While insisting that the use of the returned money was a Chinese domes-
tic decision and that he would not make an advance declaration, Liang Cheng,
a skilled diplomat with educational experience in the United States, liked to
see the returned money be used for educational purposes. In his report to the
Foreign Ministry, he recommended that China should inform Washington of its
decision to use the returned money to establish schools in China and send stu-
dents to the United States for education. Liang Cheng supported the educational
use of the returned money himself because it would help get the money back
sooner, benefit China through training a large number of experts in American
colleges and universities, and prevent the returned money from being pocketed
by Chinese local officials.109 However, Liang’s proposal was not well received
among all Qing officials. Immediately after receiving Liang’s report, Yuan Shi-
kai, the Commissioner of the Northern Seas (Beiyang Dachen), sent a memo to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rejecting the educational plan. He argued that
the returned indemnity money would be better spent in developing mines and
building railroads and that only the profits from these endeavors should be used
to support modern schools in China.110 Yuan’s recommendations were positively
received in the Foreign Ministry. Believing that education did not need such
a huge amount of money, the ministry instructed Liang to present the essence
of Yuan’s proposal if conditions were favorable in Washington. Otherwise, he
should tell the Americans that the money would be used for various kinds of
meaningful “new deals” (xinzheng).111
Before Liang could go further on the issue, the negotiations over the
Boxer Indemnity remission were interrupted, first by the Hankou-Guangzhou
(Hankow-Kuangchow) railroad incident and then by the boycott of 1905. On
December 22, 1904, Liang Cheng sent a formal note to Hay informing him that
the Chinese government had decided to “cancel and annul the agreements made
with the American China Development Company,” which allowed that company
to build a railroad from Hankou to Guangzhou. He defended the Chinese action
on the grounds that the American company had violated the agreement by trans-
ferring the rights to Belgians, proved incompetent with the construction of only
 Tearing Down the Barriers 53

twenty-eight miles of track in seven years, and allowed its foreign employees to
recklessly murder many Chinese with firearms.112 Although President Roosevelt
worked hard to keep the concession in the hands of American companies, J. P.
Morgan and other business leaders accepted the Chinese offer of $6.75 million
and sold the rights back to the Chinese.113 Roosevelt was so angry about the loss
of the Hankou railroad concession that he decided to discontinue the negotia-
tions over the Boxer Indemnity remission.
The beginning of the boycott movement gave Roosevelt another excuse
to stop the negotiations. On July 12, 1905, Rockhill wrote to Roosevelt from
Beijing reminding him of Hay’s desire to return the excessive portion of the
Boxer Indemnity to China. He suggested that 75 percent of the indemnity be
returned and that the money should not be used for the Chinese currency re-
form.114 Roosevelt disapproved of Rockhill’s proposal “on account of the action,
or its [China’s] inaction, in the matter of the boycott and in the matter of this
Hankou railway concession.”115 A week later, Roosevelt again wrote to Rock-
hill, telling him that he was “very much dissatisfied with the Chinese attitude”
and “in very great doubt how far to go in returning the indemnity to China.”116
Obviously, Roosevelt was trying to use the indemnity remission to force the
Chinese government to make concessions on both the Hankou railroad and the
boycott. Following Roosevelt’s instructions, Rockhill met with Chinese officials
on several occasions, telling them that no part of the Boxer Indemnity could
be returned to China so long as the boycott continued. The suspension of the
negotiations over the Boxer Indemnity remission helped press the Qing Court to
issue a decree on August 31, 1905, prohibiting the boycott and restoring normal
commercial relations with the United States.117
Despite the strong action taken by the Qing Court to suppress the boy-
cott, the negotiations over the return of the Boxer Indemnity were further
delayed by the Lianzhou (Lienchou) incident, in which five American mission-
aries were killed in November 1905. Obviously upset by the news, Roosevelt
discussed the incident with W.A.P. Martin on November 16, 1905. He strongly
believed that the Lianzhou incident was related to the boycott. Based on such
a belief, he announced that the continuation of the boycott and the killing of
missionaries had made the remission of the Boxer Indemnity impossible, at
least for the moment.118
The negotiations over the return of the surplus portion of the Boxer In-
demnity finally resumed in early 1906. Roosevelt approved the resumption of
the negotiations for several reasons. First, more details about the activities of
the American China Development Company were revealed, which helped jus-
tify the Chinese cancellation. Second, the Chinese government took swift ac-
tion in handling the aftermath of the Lianzhou massacre, thus satisfying most
Americans. Third, the Qing Court adopted increasingly severe measures to stop
the boycott, including another edict, issued in March 1906, which prohibited
students from organizing anti-American meetings and agitation. Fourth, hav-
ing failed to secure moderate exclusion legislation from Congress, Roosevelt
 54 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

desperately needed something else to appease the Chinese students and mer-
chants, who were forced by their government to stop the boycott. Therefore,
when Dr. Arthur Smith, a prominent missionary in China, recommended that
part of the Boxer Indemnity be returned to China for the education of Chinese
youth in the United States, Roosevelt was quick to promise that he would take
it up with Secretary of State Elihu Root.119
Once the negotiations were restarted, how the money might be used be-
came the focus again. The Roosevelt administration went back to its original
stand that the returned funds should be used to educate Chinese students in the
United States. The American position was best articulated by Rockhill, who had
the full support of Roosevelt, and other high-ranking officials in the govern-
ment. Although the negotiations over the return of the indemnity money were
interrupted after his arrival in Beijing, Rockhill never gave up hope and fol-
lowed China’s educational reform very closely. While in Beijing, he requested
and received translations of all imperial decrees regarding education from Yuan
Shikai. He strongly believed that China’s people “must have education on mod-
ern lines, which alone can insure them independent existence.”120 At the same
time, officials in Washington shared the view that the United States would gain
a great deal from educating Chinese youth in this country since they would be-
come leaders after their return to China.
The educational use of the returned money also received strong support
from educators as well as missionaries. Arthur Smith, a veteran missionary in
China, was one of its staunchest supporters. Fully aware of the educational
reform China was undergoing and the effect of the Chinese exclusion policy
on Chinese students, Smith, at his meeting with President Roosevelt at the end
of 1905, strongly recommended that the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity
be returned to China. He also insisted that Washington should “propose to the
Chinese government to use this sum (which will fall due annually for a genera-
tion to come), or at least a part of it, in educating Chinese students in the United
States.” He believed that if the money was handed back to China without condi-
tions the funds “would at once be applied to purposes which would distinctly
endanger the peace of the world.”121 American educators began to take more
concrete actions in the wake of the anti-American boycott. In February 1906,
presidents of Harvard, Yale, and Wellesley announced that their institutions
would offer ten, twelve, and three four-year scholarships to Chinese students,
respectively. The editors of the Outlook highly praised such generous offers.
They believed that “nothing has yet been done in this country which will have
a greater or more lasting effect in persuading the Chinese that Americans are
friendly and not hostile to them.” They also hoped that similar offers could be
made by “every American educational institution which has the ability to carry
it out.” Drawing from the experience of the first Chinese Education Mission, the
editors believed that “[e]very Chinese student to whom we can now give a fairly
complete university course would be, not only a promoter of friendship between
America and China, but a guide and inspiration to China’s new civilization.” 122
 Tearing Down the Barriers 55

No other American educator had made the importance of educating Chi-

nese students in the United States clearer at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury than Edmund J. James, president of the University of Illinois. In a privately
circulated memorandum submitted to President Roosevelt in early 1906, James
recommended that the United States government should send an educational
commission to China. The purpose was to extend, through the Chinese author-
ity, to the young Chinese “a formal invitation on the part of our American insti-
tutions of learning to avail themselves of the facilities of such institutions.” He
believed that “[t]he nation which succeeds in educating the young Chinese of
the present generation will be the nation which for a given expenditure of ef-
fort will reap the largest possible returns in moral, intellectual, and commercial
influence.” Blaming the Chinese exclusion policy and the unfriendly spirit in
administering the Chinese exclusion laws and regulations for the loss of Chinese
students to Japan and European countries, James was confident that the United
States could win over the goodwill of the Chinese in a large and satisfactory way
with only a very small effort. The small effort that should be made by the United
States, James insisted, was to “treat the Chinese student decently, and extend to
him the facility of our institutions of learning.” Once the attendance of Chinese
students at American colleges and universities was secured, James felt certain
that wholly beneficial results “would flow from such an opportunity to influ-
ence the entire current of their thoughts and feelings.”123 Although James did not
mention the use of the Boxer Indemnity remission in his memo, he did show his
strong confidence in American education and his willingness to get Washington
involved in enlarging educational exchange with China.
With strong support from missionaries and educators, and approval from
President Roosevelt, Rockhill made great efforts to get the Chinese government
to commit itself to the use of the returned money for educational purposes. He
managed to defeat all other proposals presented by some Americans and Chi-
nese officials and businessmen who supported the use of the returned money for
different purposes. One was the proposal made by Professor Jeremiah Jenks of
Cornell University, who wanted to use the indemnity remission to assist the Chi-
nese in their currency reform. In order to stop Jenks, Rockhill sent two memos
to President Roosevelt denouncing the scheme as impracticable.124 Another plan
was put forth by Willard Straight, a former American consul general at Shenyang
(Mukden), who advocated that the money be used to set up a bank in that region.
He tried to obtain support directly from President Roosevelt through Secretary
of War William Taft. However, Taft had difficulties selling the bank scheme to
Roosevelt and Root. Straight’s superiors in the State Department warned him
not to meddle in the matter any further.125 The most challenging plan was initi-
ated by Fleming D. Cheshire, the incumbent American consul at Shenyang. His
proposal won hearty support from Secretary of State Elihu Root, who sent a
letter to Shelby M. Cullom, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, on May 8, 1906, asking that a portion of the indemnity remission be used
to build American consulates in East Asia. Although Root’s recommendation
 56 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

was endorsed by the Foreign Relations Committee, it died in the Appropriations

Committee.126 By mid-1906, having defeated these competing American plans
for different uses of the returned Boxer Indemnity, Rockhill could concentrate
on handling challenges from the Chinese.
The opposition to the educational use of the returned Boxer Indemnity
among some Chinese officials was at least as strong and persistent. In addition
to Yuan Shikai, Xu Shichang (Hsu Shi-ch’ang), governor general of Manchuria,
and Tang Shaoyi (T’ang Shao-i), governor of Fengtian (Fengtien) Province, both
tried to convince the Court as well as Washington to use the returned money for
the establishment of a bank in Manchuria. In order to sell their plan, Tang paid a
visit to Rockhill in Beijing in early 1908. Unimpressed by Tang’s presentation,
Rockhill rejected the plan outright.127 The greater challenge for Rockhill was
to “persuade” the Qing Court to make an explicit and permanent commitment
to the use of the returned indemnity for educating Chinese youth in the United
States. His task was made difficult since the Court favored Yuan Shikai’s pro-
posal. Although disappointed with the lack of Court support for the educational
use of the returned Boxer Indemnity, Liang Cheng followed the instructions and
asked Washington to allow China to determine the use of the returned money.128
His strategy was to be vague on the use of the Boxer Indemnity while actively
pursuing the return of the indemnity from Washington. When negotiations
finally resumed in 1907, Liang Cheng and his successor, Wu Tingfang, both
focused more on the technical issues of the return. The usage of the returned
money was intentionally avoided.129
While keeping pressure on the Qing Court for open commitment to the
educational use of the returned money, Rockhill took steps to make sure that
American control over the funds would last even after the return. As early as
July 1905, Rockhill urged President Roosevelt to see to it that the money was
returned in “annual installments.” In this way, Rockhill pointed out, “we would
retain our full interest in the indemnity and our rights” and “resume in position
to exercise a beneficial and restraining influence whenever necessary, both on
China and the beneficiary powers.” In addition to control of the purse, Rockhill
sought to require the Chinese government to accept American advice and as-
sistance in selecting and sending Chinese students to the United States. To guar-
antee direct American control over the education projects, Rockhill insisted that
Americans should be appointed to key positions from which they could control
the educational mission.130
Rockhill’s efforts were, of course, fully supported by his superiors in
Washington. As a former lawyer, Secretary Root strongly believed that the
United States should have the right to control the use of the indemnity money re-
turned to China because the money was “given as our money and not as China’s
money or as money to which we have a doubtful title.”131 Huntington Wilson,
Assistant Secretary of State, agreed that “[t]he return of the indemnity should be
used to make China do some of the things we want. Otherwise I fear her grati-
tude will be quite empty.”132 Such a view was fully represented in Roosevelt’s
 Tearing Down the Barriers 57

State of the Union Message sent to Congress on December 3, 1907. While re-
questing Congressional authorization to return the excessive part of the Boxer
Indemnity, Roosevelt clearly indicated that the returned funds would be used
for educational purposes and that sending Chinese students to the United States
would be one of the ways. He argued that educating a large number of Chinese
in this country would help the vast and populous Chinese empire “adapt itself
to modern conditions” and become a more attractive market for American com-
mercial interest.133
Although Chinese officials were vague on the future use of the returned
indemnity, they had never openly rejected the idea of using the money for edu-
cational purposes. That was enough for Theodore Roosevelt to formally ask
Congress to return the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity to China in De-
cember 1907. As the return of the money became imminent from the beginning
of 1908, Rockhill began to put more pressure on the Chinese government. In
April, he warned the Foreign Ministry that any actions on the part of China
that might indicate a disposition to ignore its assurance for the educational use
of the returned indemnity money “might indefinitely delay final action in the
matter.”134 In order to show that he was serious about this, Rockhill refused to
take any action after Congress passed the special resolution for the return of the
Boxer Indemnity on May 25, 1908. Instead of informing the Qing Court of the
passage of the resolution or recommending the start of the remission, he held a
meeting with Chinese officials, reminding them of the conditions of the remis-
sion. Rockhill only officially informed the Qing Court of the resolution on July
11, 1908. At the meeting, he told the Chinese officials that the Secretary of State
was authorized by Congress to decide when and how the money should be re-
turned to China and that he was instructed to find out how the money would be
spent before any further action might be taken.135
Realizing the seriousness of the matter, the Qing Court finally decided to
make the commitment demanded by Washington so that the return of the Boxer
Indemnity would not be further delayed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent
a reply to Rockhill on July 14, expressing its gratitude for the friendly action
taken by Washington and pledging to send a large number of students to the
United States for education.136 In order to meet specific demands from Rockh-
ill, the Foreign Ministry attached to its memo a supplemental letter, elucidating
the Chinese plan. The letter clearly spelled out that the Chinese government
would send one hundred students to the United States every year in the first
four years after the remission started and at least fifty students every year until
all the returned money was exhausted. Foreseeing difficulties in sending such
an unprecedentedly large number of students to the United States, the Foreign
Ministry sought personal advice from Rockhill on selecting Chinese students,
locating appropriate housing and schools, and obtaining official assistance
from Washington.137
The clear and detailed reply from the Chinese government was well re-
ceived in Washington. Deputy Secretary Bacon instructed Rockhill to express
 58 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Washington’s appreciation for the Qing Court’s willingness to send a large num-
ber of students to the United States. He also wanted to assure the Chinese that they
could “count on the entire sympathy and hearty cooperation of the United States
in this most commendable undertaking.”138 In another telegram sent to Rockhill,
Secretary Root had extremely high praise for the Chinese plan to send students to
the United States beginning with the first remission of the Boxer Indemnity. He
regarded the Chinese plan as a new indication of trust and friendship.139
While enjoying the successful handling of the return of the Boxer Indem-
nity to China, Rockhill was ready to do anything to prevent anyone from derail-
ing the process. When he learned that Tang Shaoyi was appointed as a special
envoy to Washington to express China’s gratitude and expected to continue his
efforts on behalf of a Manchurian bank, Rockhill warned Root and other high-
ranking officials in Washington not to cooperate with Tang. He pointed out that
“the carrying out of the educational mission is, in the long run, an infinitely more
valuable return for the money than the wildcat schemes it would be employed
by the ‘Manchurian Bank.’”140 Rockhill’s strong and clear argument received
wide support in the State Department. Having succeeded in preventing Tang
from sabotaging his educational plan, Rockhill forced the Chinese government
to openly declare that the indemnity would definitely be used to send students
to the United States and that it would not alter that commitment no matter what
happened in the future.141
In order to prevent any other possible distractions, Rockhill pushed the
Qing Court to work out a more comprehensive and concrete plan to start send-
ing Chinese students to the United States. Responding to Rockhill’s request,
the Foreign Ministry completed a draft of Proposed Regulations for Students
to Be Sent to America (Xuansong Xuesheng Liumei Zhangcheng) in October
1908. While confirming the number of Chinese students to be sent to the United
States, as it had promised, the Chinese document stipulated that “[t]he offi-
cials appointed by the Board of Foreign Affairs and the American legation will
be jointly responsible for the selection of the students who were to be sent to
America and for their distribution in American educational institutions.”142 It
also called for the establishment of a school in Beijing to train students to be
sent to the United States. The document was sent to Rockhill for consultation.
After careful review, Rockhill corrected some “errors” and then sent the docu-
ment back to the Foreign Ministry with some recommendations.143 Only one of
Rockhill’s proposals was partially rejected. The Foreign Ministry insisted on ap-
pointing a Chinese rather than an American superintendent for Chinese students
in the United States. However, it promised to give the office only to those who
had “graduated from an American university.”144 Having completed the revision,
the Foreign Ministry sent the Proposed Regulations officially as a Supplemen-
tary Note to the American minister in October 1908.
Happy with the comprehensive plan, Rockhill pronounced it “perfectly
satisfactory” and took action to start the remission of the Boxer Indemnity. At-
taching a translation of the Chinese plan to his report to the State Department,
 Tearing Down the Barriers 59

he recommended that “the remission of the indemnity should begin from Janu-
ary 1 next.” He believed that the Chinese government could start implementing
the plan immediately and send the first group of Chinese students to the United
States for the next fall semester if the State Department approved his recom-
mendation.145 The Chinese plan and Rockhill’s recommendation were both well
received in Washington. President Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive
order on December 28, 1908, initiating the return of the excessive part of the
Boxer Indemnity to China.146 According to Roosevelt’s order, the Boxer Indem-
nity would be reduced from $24,440,778 to $13,655,492, the exact amount paid
to cover all losses and expenses incurred during the Boxer Rebellion. About
$12 million should be returned to China, according to the plan. However, since
Congress decided to hold $2 million for possible future claims, only $10 million
would be returned to China, beginning in 1909. Authorized by the law, Roos-
evelt decided that China would have to make monthly rather than bi-annual pay-
ments to the United States at the full amount set by the International Protocol of
1901, ranging from 1 to 1.6 million U.S. dollars a year until 1940. The United
States government would accept $539,588.67 each year and return the rest to
China. Since the annual payment varied from year to year, China would receive
$483,095 beginning in 1909, $790,196 each year between 1916 and 1931, and
$1,380,378 annually from 1932 to 1940.147 (See Appendix A.)
This special arrangement for the return of the excessive part of the Boxer
Indemnity did not reduce a penny of the payment for all American claims or
lighten the financial burden for the Chinese government since it had to make the
same amount of payment each month. However, it did provide the largest single
source of financial support for educational exchanges between the two nations
and laid the foundation for direct government intervention and cooperation in
the first half of the twentieth century. If the removal of the institutional and
legal barriers made the expansion of educational exchanges possible, the return
of the Boxer Indemnity made direct and deep government intervention neces-
sary. With such a huge amount of public funds in hand, the government was
able to launch the largest-scale and longest-lasting exchange programs between
the two nations. The unprecedented government intervention and cooperation
also marked the beginning of the transformation of educational exchange from
a predominantly private enterprise into a largely state function. Educational in-
teractions between the United States and China were ready for their most drastic
expansion in the following decades.
 Chapter 3

Qinghua:
The First Joint Experiment

T he first Boxer Indemnity remission

check was delivered by an American diplomat to Chinese officials in Beijing in
January 1909, marking the beginning of the first joint experiment in educational
exchanges conducted by the American and the Chinese governments. With hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in hand, Beijing and Washington worked together
to make sure that large groups of qualified students were selected and admitted
to colleges and universities in the United States without any incidents. Begun
as a training school to prepare Chinese students for education in the United
States, Qinghua received the most resources and attention from both the Chi-
nese and the American governments, and sent thousands of Chinese students
to the United States for higher education within two decades. Although Qing-
hua completed its transformation from a preparatory school into a national uni-
versity and forced Washington out of its direct management at the end of the
1920s, educational exchange programs sponsored by government continued to
expand. China and the United States became chief partners in the area of edu-
cation within a couple of decades. It was during this period when government
replaced missionaries and other private institutions as major sponsor, regulator,
and supervisor of educational exchange between the two nations.

The Indemnity Students

Once Washington began to return part of the Boxer Indemnity, the Chi-
nese government had to take concrete steps to select and send students to the
United States as it had promised. Concerned more about the possible American-
ization of Chinese students, officials in the Ministry of Education insisted that
only a limited number of adult students with firm grasp of Chinese literature and
language should be sent to the United States for a short period. In sharp contrast,
officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Liang Dunyan, one of the
child students who had studied in the United States in the 1870s, wanted to send
60
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 61

a large number of young students who could really grasp the English language
and Western learning. With strong resentment toward students returned from
Japan, who had usually studied political science and law, Liang and many of
his colleagues insisted that students sent to the United States should focus more
on science, engineering, agriculture, and business so that they could make real
contributions to China’s reform and reconstruction.1 Such deep divisions among
Chinese officials made it difficult, if not impossible, for them to work out a plan
acceptable to both sides.
Impatient with the prolonged debate and inaction among the Chinese offi-
cials, William Rockhill decided to intervene. He openly disapproved of the stand
taken by officials in the Ministry of Education, urged the Qing Court to accept
the plan drafted by the Foreign Ministry as soon as possible, and demanded that
he be allowed to become involved in the matter. In a note sent to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs in May 1909, Rockhill informed the Chinese government
that he had appointed the Chinese secretary of the legation to assist in student
selection and other related matters. He also informed the foreign minister that
the American government had ordered the Commissioner of Education to help
Chinese students in choosing and entering American schools and universities.2
Encouraged by Rockhill, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs went ahead,
presenting its draft of the Outline of the Regulations on Selecting and Sending
Students to the United States (Qianpai YouMei Xuesheng Banfa Dagang) to the
Throne on May 29, 1909. While the Court was still waiting to hear from the
Ministry of Education, the American legation sent another note to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in early June, demanding that the Chinese government should
begin selecting and sending students to the United States immediately. It warned
that further delay would prevent the students from entering American universi-
ties in the fall of 1909.3 Under the American pressure, the Ministry of Education
finally co-signed the memorandum drafted by the Foreign Ministry and re-pre-
sented it to the Qing Court on July 10, 1909. The Outline received approval
from the Court on the same day.4
The Chinese plan was succinct and comprehensive. Believing that send-
ing students to the United States was important “not only to express our grati-
tude to America, but also to train more useful talents for ourselves,” the officials
wanted to set up Youmei Xuewuchu, the Office of the China Educational Mission
to America (OCEMA), in Beijing. Staffed with officials from the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs and Education, the OCEMA would be in charge of testing and
selecting students, and supervising them while they were in the United States.
According to the plan, 80 percent of students sent to the United States should
be required to major in agriculture, engineering, business, and mining. The rest
could study law, political science, natural sciences, and education. With such a
large number of students in the United States, a superintendent would be assigned
to manage their finances, supervise their activities, and provide care for them.
The number of students from each province should be determined by its contri-
bution to the Boxer Indemnity payment. In order to make sure that educational
 62 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

exchange could be carried out smoothly and efficiently, the OCEMA was in-
structed to consult with American diplomats in Beijing.5
The real focus of the Chinese plan was on the establishment of Yiyeguan,
a preparatory school for students to be sent to the United States. The new school
would be located in a suburb of Beijing with one hundred students enrolled in
both upper and lower divisions through strict examinations given in the prov-
inces as well as in the capital. The upper division would admit students twenty
years old or younger with fluent Chinese and adequate knowledge of English as
well as science equivalent to that of college freshmen in the United States. The
lower division would enroll students fifteen years old or younger with fluent
Chinese and special abilities. All subjects should be taught by American teach-
ers and the school should be run like an American school so that its graduates
could easily enter American colleges and universities. After brief training, about
a year, and rigorous assessment, fifty students from each division would be se-
lected and sent to the United States every year.6
Once the Court’s approval was received, the Foreign Ministry took swift
action to implement the plan. Its first step was to appoint Zhou Ziqi, one of its
deputy ministers, as the director (zongban) to head the OCEMA in July 1909.
Within ten days, Zhou set up his office in a rented house in the eastern section
of the city and completed a plan to select the first group of students to be sent
to the United States through a series of qualification examinations. Pressed for
time, Zhou proposed to immediately select the first group of students from the
upper-division candidates applying in Beijing and recommended by provinces.
Accepting Zhou’s plan, the Foreign Ministry sent telegrams to each province
instructing officials there to select and send upper-division candidates to Beijing
immediately for qualification examinations.7 In late August, Tang Guoan and
Fan Yuanlian were appointed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Educa-
tion respectively as deputy directors of OCEMA.8 The appointment of Zhou and
Tang, both with educational experience in the United States, made it clear that
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have a greater say in the management of
educational exchange with the United States and that it wanted to proceed with
the program as fast as possible.
The Qing Court’s decision to send more students to the United States re-
ceived great attention and support from provincial officials, who saw it as a
good opportunity to train the experts to meet their own needs. In order to take
advantage of the grandest exchange program sponsored by the central govern-
ment in modern Chinese history, Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces sent a joint
memorandum to the Ministry of Education, urging it to adopt and publicize the
regulations on the selection of students to be sent to the United States so that
they could start their selection process. As the most developed provinces along
the East Coast, Jiangsu and Zhejiang showed the greatest appreciation for send-
ing students for education in the United States. While accepting the principle
that the number of students sent by each province should be determined by its
contribution to the Boxer Indemnity payment, they made it clear that they could
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 63

provide more students if the less developed inland provinces could not find
enough qualified candidates.9
Fully aware of the concerns of the provinces, the OCEMA adopted the
Rules for Student Selection (Kaoxuan Xuesheng Banfa) and sent them to the
Bureaus of Education in all the provinces in summer 1909. According to the
Rules, all students in upper and lower divisions would be selected through ex-
aminations. The former had to take examinations in Chinese, English, history,
geography, mathematics, physics, German, or French. All tests would be given
in English except those for Chinese, German, or French. The latter would be
examined in Chinese, English, history, geography, and mathematics at a lower
level. The enrollment of the training school was set at four hundred in order
to provide enough qualified students to be sent to the United States. While the
number of upper-division students was not limited, each province was assigned
a quota for the lower division based on the contribution made by the province
to the Boxer Indemnity payment. Jiangsu Province, with the largest annual con-
tribution, could send twenty-six candidates to the school, while Yunnan and
Guizhou Provinces could only send two each. The OCEMA also made some
changes, including adopting a four-year curriculum for both the upper and lower
divisions and awarding diplomas to those who successfully completed each cur-
riculum.10 By offering a combined eight-year curriculum, the school could eas-
ily evolve later into a full-blown institution providing education at secondary
and junior college levels.
The selection of the first group of students to be sent to the United States
was organized by the OCEMA in Beijing in mid-August 1909. Over six hundred
upper-division applicants took the tests. The first tests were on the Chinese and
English languages. Only those who had passing scores were allowed to take the
second round of tests on natural sciences, other foreign languages, and foreign
history and geography. While sixty-eight students survived the first round of
tests, only forty-seven were able to pass the final round, less than half the num-
ber of students intended to be sent to the United States that year. Because of the
emphasis on English language and foreign history and geography, students with
educational experience in modern schools, including missionary schools, had a
great advantage in the examinations. As a result, about two-thirds of the quali-
fied students came from Jiangsu (twenty-one) and Zhejiang (nine) Provinces.11
Although fewer than expected, these forty-seven students still broke the record
as the largest single group of Chinese entering the United States.
As the first group of Chinese sponsored by the government with the Boxer
Indemnity remission, the students left Shanghai for San Francisco on board the
China in October 1909, under the supervision of Tang Guoan, deputy director of
OCEMA. Arriving in Washington, DC, on November 13, the students were too
late to be enrolled in colleges and universities for the fall semester. Tang took all
the students to Springfield, Massachusetts, where Tang and his fellow students
had spent most of their years in the United States three decades ago. Working
with Rong Kui, a former classmate and the newly appointed superintendent for
 64 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Chinese students in the United States, Tang managed to send most students to
universities and high schools to take preparatory lessons. All of them were able
to enter colleges and universities the next year.12
Recipients of government scholarships, the indemnity students (Geng-
kuansheng) followed instructions and requirements from the Qing Court closely.
A vast majority of the students chose to study science, engineering, agriculture,
and mining. Only three students majored in humanities, one in political science,
and one in educational psychology. More importantly, all the students, except
one who died of disease in the United States, were able to earn academic degrees
from American colleges and universities, including Harvard, the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology, Princeton, Columbia, Cornell, the University of Wisconsin,
and the University of Illinois.13 Therefore, they became the first large group of Chi-
nese who were able to complete higher education in the United States. Besides
their painstaking efforts, the success of the Chinese students was made possible
by the generous support from and close cooperation between the American and
Chinese governments. With the returned indemnity money, the Chinese govern-
ment was able to cover all expenses for each student, including clothing, trans-
portation, tuition, and medical insurance. In addition, each student also received
a monthly stipend of $64 to cover their food and lodging. Government support
could last for at least five years and extension was possible if it was needed to
complete education and training.14 With annual stipends higher than the annual
wages of average American workers, these students were able to concentrate on
their studies and complete their education on time.15
The smooth admission of such a large group of Chinese students to the
United Sates should also be credited to the special arrangement made by Wash-
ington. In order to make sure that the first group of Chinese students could enter
this country without any trouble, the State Department proposed to the Chinese
government that they should be sent as diplomatic and consular officials.16 The
Qing Court gladly accepted the proposal and issued special official certificates
to the students. This cautious arrangement made by both governments not only
guaranteed the safe admission of Chinese students, but also served as the stron-
gest testimony to the official nature of this new exchange program.

From Yiyeguan to Qinghua School

The inability to send enough qualified students to the United States in 1909
gave more urgency to the establishment of the preparatory school. Even before
the first group of indemnity students left for the United States, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the Throne on September 28, 1909, re-
porting the seriousness of the lack of qualified students to be sent to America and
the urgent need to open the preparatory school in the coming spring or summer.
In order to have the school opened as soon as possible, the Foreign Ministry
requested that the Qinghua Garden, a piece of royal property located in a north-
western suburb, be granted as its campus. With about four hundred mu, just under
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 65

seventy acres, the Qinghua Garden was ideal for the school because of its avail-
able buildings and space, beautiful environment, and easy access.17 The request
was approved by the Court on September 30, and the Qinghua Garden was taken
over by the OCEMA on October 25. Happy with the campus site, the OCEMA
immediately started to build new classrooms, dormitories, and offices, and repair
the old buildings so that the school could be ready for students the next year.18
Expecting the completion of the construction work by the coming fall, the
OCEMA decided to select more students through examinations in 1910. Fol-
lowing the format established a year ago, it first gave two rounds of examina-
tions to applicants for the advanced division (diyige) in July. Although there was
more time to get the examinations publicized, the OCEMA was still unable to
get one hundred students qualified for education in the United States. In the end,
seventy students with passing grades were sent to the United States in August
as the second group of indemnity students.19 Through the same examinations,
sixty-three students who had received lower grades were chosen as alternate
candidates. After taking some brief courses, they became the third group of in-
demnity students, who were sent to the United States in July 1911.20
The OCEMA was unable to open the new training school in 1910 because
of a labor dispute and the late arrival of American teachers. However, it did take
steps to change the name, scale, and even the nature of the school during the
waiting period. Instead of Youmei Yiyeguan, Preparatory School for Students to
Be Sent to the United States, the new school was named Qinghua Xuetang, or
Qinghua Academy, in December 1910. The name change, the OCEMA argued,
would pay tribute to the emperor who granted the royal garden to the school
and reflect the changed nature of the new school. In its new vision, the school
would have an enrollment of five hundred, offering advanced education for up-
per-division students in accordance with an American university curriculum.
The advanced training at the school would not only allow the graduates to enter
American universities and graduate schools, but also prepare a larger number
of students who could not go to the United States to work as experts in various
fields in China. The new name and goal for the school were approved by both
ministries and the Court in April 1911. Zhou Ziqi was appointed the superinten-
dent (jiandu) of the Qinghua Academy and his two associates, Fan Yuanlian and
Tang Guoan, were appointed vice-superintendents (fu jiandu).21 These changes
aroused little concern from Washington since the academy was still expected to
send a large number of Chinese students to the United States.
The arrival of American teachers in early 1911 finally allowed the Impe-
rial Qinghua Academy (Diguo Qinghua Xuetang), an official English transla-
tion used by the Qing government, to open its doors. With help from the United
States Bureau of Education and the Young Men’s Christian Association, the
academy hired sixteen American teachers. Arriving in Shanghai on February
11, 1911, they received a warm welcome from Shanghai’s mayor (daotai), Y. C.
Tong.22 When they reached Beijing on February 22, the American legation noted
that they had aroused “interest among foreigners and natives throughout the
 66 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

country in the practical monopoly which America is securing in the matter of

educating the Chinese youth, both in China and in America.” Proud of the expan-
sion of educational exchanges, the American chargé at the legation confidently
predicted that “the inculcation of American ideals and ideas in the minds of the
coming men of China cannot fail to bring the two countries into closer and more
friendly relations, and which will increase tremendously our prestige in China.”
The Qinghua Academy officially opened with 468 students on April 1, 1911.
While the middle division (zhongdeng ke), which replaced the lower division at
the Ministry of Education’s request, had 325 students, the advanced division had
143 students.23 With such a large enrollment, American teachers had to focus on
teaching students in the advanced division, while twenty Chinese teachers were
hired to instruct in most subjects for all middle-division students.24
Although American diplomats and teachers liked to treat Qinghua solely
as a preparatory school for students to be sent to the United States, Chinese
officials continued their efforts to build the school as a modern educational
institution with a broader mission. According to the Regulations for the Qing-
hua Academy (Qinghua Xuetang Zhangcheng) drafted by the OCEMA and ap-
proved by the Court in 1911, the mission of the academy was to train all-round
talents and enhance the national power. To Chinese officials, sending students to
the United States was only part of its function. Modeled after middle and high
schools in China as well as the United States, the academy changed the school-
ing for the two divisions from four years each to three years for the advanced
division and five years for the middle division. Students were selected through
special examinations and all costs were covered by the government except for
books and gym uniforms. Adopting the credit-hour system popular in the United
States, the academy offered courses in over a dozen fields, including philoso-
phy, literature, art, music, history, political science, math, astronomy, physics,
chemistry, biology, geometry, geography, and physical education. Since some
graduates from the advanced division might not have the opportunity to go to
the United States, the academy planned to establish special departments to meet
their needs for further education at home.25
Once established, the Qinghua Academy immediately became the new
center for educational exchanges between the United States and China. It
quickly took over the responsibilities from the OCEMA in selecting students
through examinations, offering education for students at different levels, and
sending graduates to the United States for higher education. The third group of
indemnity students actually spent about ten weeks at the Qinghua before they
sailed for San Francisco in August 1911. However, the official transition of re-
sponsibility from the OCEMA to Qinghua was interrupted by the Revolution
of 1911. With the country gripped by war, most students went back home for
safety. At the same time, the Qing government used that year’s remission to
cover part of its expenses in suppressing the rebellion. With neither students nor
money, Qinghua Academy was shut down on November 9, 1911, and remained
closed until May 1, 1912.26
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 67

The transition was finally completed after Qinghua reopened its doors in
May 1912. In a memorandum sent to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Educa-
tion of the new Republic of China, the OCEMA recommended that the office be
terminated immediately since the Qinghua Academy was able to take care of all
exchange matters. The termination of the office, the OCEMA pointed out, could
also streamline the administration and reduce the cost.27 The recommendation
was accepted by both ministries without any hesitation. Having issued an order
to terminate the office, they sent a memorandum to Mr. Huang and Mr. Zhang,
the representative from the Foreign Ministry and the superintendent of Chinese
students in the United States, on May 23, 1912, instructing them to report to the
Qinghua Academy in the future for all business matters.28 Qinghua thus became
the sole institution responsible for selecting, preparing, dispatching, and super-
vising Chinese students involved in educational exchange with the United States
funded by the Boxer Indemnity remission beginning in mid-1912.
Qinghua assumed all these responsibilities in a difficult time. Right after
reopening its doors, Qinghua had to send the fourth group of indemnity students
to the United States as specified in the original plan. Although it managed to
select a few dozen students, the group was only able to go as far as Shanghai.
The political and financial chaos in the aftermath of the 1911 Revolution forced
them to return to Beijing. They had to wait two more years before they could
leave for the United States with Qinghua graduates of 1913 and 1914.29 The lack
of qualified students and the political turmoil made it impossible for China to
send one hundred students each year in the first four years as it had agreed upon.
However, the first three groups of students sent to the United States, totaling
180, already exceeded the total number of Chinese students sent to the United
States in the 1870s by 50 percent. Older and much better prepared, the indemnity
students were able to go to colleges and universities in the United States directly
and finish their college education within a few years. They were the pioneers of
a new era in educational exchange between the United States and China.
The establishment of the Republic of China after the Revolution of 1911
brought significant changes to the nation as well as Qinghua. As part of its edu-
cational reform effort, the new Ministry of Education ordered all the elemen-
tary and secondary educational institutions to change their names from academy
(xuetang) to schools (xuexiao). Following the order, Qinghua changed its name
again from Qinghua Xuetang to Qinghua Xuexiao in October 1912. Although
Qinghua School is a more accurate translation in English, Qinghua College was
more commonly used in an English context. Besides the name, Qinghua saw its
first major change in leadership. After the 1911 Revolution, Zhou Ziqi was ap-
pointed governor of Shandong Province and Fan Yuanlian the Minister of Edu-
cation. As Zhou and Fan left Qinghua, Tang Guoan became the first president
of the Qinghua School. Zhou Yichun, another high-ranking official from the
Foreign Ministry with a master’s degree from the University of Wisconsin, was
appointed as vice-president. With no officials from the Ministry of Education
working in Qinghua, Fan decided that his ministry would no longer be involved
 68 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

in the management of the Qinghua School.30 The withdrawal of the Ministry

of Education, the emergence of new leadership, and the broad mission of the
school made the rapid growth of Qinghua possible after 1911.31

Building an American School in China

The most remarkable growth of Qinghua began after the collapse of the
Qing Court. In winter 1913, Qinghua obtained the neighboring Jinchun Garden
from the government, doubling the size of the campus. After purchasing another
two hundred mu of land, Qinghua expanded to twelve hundred mu, equivalent
to two hundred acres, within a few years.32 With more land and money at hand,
Qinghua was able to add new buildings and new equipment. In 1917, Qinghua
launched the construction of four major buildings, the gymnasium, library, au-
ditorium, and science building. At the same time, Qinghua began to offer more
junior college–level courses to its students. The expansion of Qinghua during
this period had a very clear goal: building an American-style school in China.
The goal was achieved with the joint effort made by the Chinese and American
governments. For many Chinese officials, especially in the earlier years, it was
necessary to make the educational experience at Qinghua as much like that in
the United States as possible since almost all graduates were sent to the United
States for higher education. Therefore, Tang Guoan (May 1912–August 1913)
and Zhou Yichun (October 1913–January 1918), the first two presidents of Qing-
hua, hired more American teachers, adopted an American-style curriculum,
used American textbooks, applied American teaching methods, and introduced
American extracurricular activities to Qinghua students. Zhou Yichun even or-
dered chairs, blackboards, and chalk from the United States. When the well-
known English philosopher Bertrand Russell visited Qinghua in 1919, he told
his host that he saw a grand American school transplanted in China.33
The Americanization of Qinghua was also the result of the direct inter-
vention and close supervision from the American policy makers in Washington
and diplomats in Beijing. With a tight grip on the purse strings and backed by
clear official agreement, the United States government exerted direct control
over the operation of Qinghua School in almost every aspect from the very
beginning. In the earlier years, the Chinese secretary of the American legation
was designated to represent the American minister in handling all issues related
to Qinghua, especially the use of the returned indemnity funds. In 1914, the
American legation persuaded the Chinese government to establish the Qinghua
College Committee (Qinghua Xuexiao Weiyuanhui), on which the legation was
represented again by its Chinese secretary. The purpose of that committee, as
the American minister Paul Reinsch (1913–1919) stated, was to enable “the
Legation to keep in touch with the officials concerned and to discuss with them
from time to time the general policy of [the] development [of Qinghua Col-
lege].”34 The committee was charged to discuss and decide on all important
issues related to Qinghua.
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 69

While the Chinese secretary served as the front man for American control
over Qinghua, the American minister to Beijing was the true field commander.
In order to carry out Washington’s instructions, the minister never hesitated to
involve himself directly in handling important issues related to Qinghua. Every
now and then he would meet with high-ranking Chinese officials and the presi-
dent of Qinghua to make sure that the school was run according to American
standards. Of course, he would report all important issues to the State Depart-
ment and follow the department orders closely. As a result, Washington was
able to efficiently manage its educational relations with China through the exist-
ing offices and personnel.
Extremely happy with the operation of Qinghua, Paul Reinsch took ac-
tion to make certain that the school would never be dismantled or fall into other
hands. In early 1915, he urged the Chinese officials to begin “an endowment
fund which would ultimately make the institution independent after the annual
return payments of indemnity money shall cease.”35 Reinsch’s suggestion was
approved by the Chinese government. The Foreign Affairs Ministry appointed
ten officials to form the Preparatory Committee on Qinghua School Endowment
in August 1917.36 Within two weeks, the committee drafted the bylaws for the
new board of directors of Qinghua College, eliminated a number of projects,
and cut budgets for others. In order to save money, the committee also limited
monthly expenditures for Qinghua School and the student supervisor’s office in
the United States to $29,000 and $30,000, respectively. With these measures,
the committee projected that the Qinghua endowment could accumulate $10
million from the Boxer Indemnity remission in the next twenty-two years.37 The
Foreign Ministry accepted all the recommendations made by the committee and
appointed all ten committee members as directors of the new board to safeguard
the endowment.38
While fully supporting the establishment of the Qinghua College endow-
ment, Washington strongly opposed the appointment of an all-Chinese board of
directors for Qinghua. Worried about the emasculation of the power of the Qin-
ghua College committee, which was under American influence, Reinsch called
on the Chinese foreign minister in January 1918, protesting the interference in
educational activities at Qinghua by the newly created board and demanding the
American legation’s representation on the board if it would continue to func-
tion. Offended by Reinsch’s protest, Wang Daxie, the Chinese foreign minister,
responded that the American legation had no right to interfere in the manage-
ment of Qinghua. Extremely unhappy with Wang’s answer, Reinsch, backed by
a recent clear policy statement from the State Department, replied with equal
clarity and firmness that the advisory capacity of the legation, agreed upon by
both governments, was not confined to the initial stage of the college and should
continue in the future.39
Unable to dispute Reinsch’s position regarding Washington’s role in ed-
ucational exchanges funded with the Boxer Indemnity remission, the Foreign
Ministry backed down. In the subsequent meetings, the foreign minister assured
 70 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Reinsch time and again that the newly organized board would only be respon-
sible for the auditing of Qinghua accounts and the investment of any surplus as
an endowment, and that it would not concern itself with matters of educational
administration and policy. In a meeting with Reinsch in April 1918, the foreign
minister further declared that the “informal committee composed of the Vice-
Minister, the President of Qinghua College, and the Chinese Secretary of the
American Legation, served so useful a purpose in facilitating interchange of
views upon [Qinghua] College questions that there was no idea to suggest its
discontinuance.”40 Thus, the Qinghua College committee continued to play a
crucial role in the management of the college while the function of the board of
the Qinghua College endowment was very much limited. In January 1920, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs reorganized the board of directors of the Qinghua
College endowment, leaving it with only three members, two Chinese officials
from the Foreign Ministry, and the Chinese secretary from the American lega-
tion. While the number of directors was reduced, the power of the board grew
drastically. In addition to budgetary matters, it now had the power to nominate
the president of the college and assist him in handling everything. Since any de-
cision made by the board had to be unanimous, the American director thus had
veto power over every issue.41
In order to further safeguard the Qinghua endowment, a new Commit-
tee on the Preservation of the Endowment for Qinghua School and Educational
Mission in the United States was established in 1921. The committee also had
three members, including the minister and the vice minister of the Foreign Min-
istry, and the American minister to Beijing.42 In addition to the safekeeping and
proper investment of the Qinghua endowment, the committee had the power
to ask the board of directors of Qinghua to investigate the use of the endow-
ment and other matters.43 With its members’ higher status, the Committee on the
Preservation of the Endowment had the highest authority over Qinghua and the
related exchange matters. Thus, Qinghua’s organizational chart had been drasti-
cally changed. The president of Qinghua, who used to have the highest author-
ity, was put under the board of directors and the Committee on the Preservation
of the Endowment.44
In order to make sure that Qinghua would always be run like an American
school, Washington insisted from the very beginning that only those who had
educational experience in the United States could become its president. Zhou
Ziqi, the director of the OCEMA and superintendent of Qinghua Academy, and
Tan Guoan and Zhou Yichun, the first and second presidents of the Qinghua
School, received no objection from Washington since they all met that criterion.
When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to have Fan Yuanlian, the former
Minister of Education, take the office after Zhou Yichun was forced to resign
in early 1918, Paul Reinsch strongly opposed the nomination because Fan had
received education in Japan instead of the United States.45 Reinsch’s opposition
was strongly supported by Washington. In its instructions to Reinsch, the State
Department told the minister to demand that the legation “be consulted in regard
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 71

to the selection of Dr. [Zhou’s] successor,” and to “urge the importance of this
upon the Foreign Office.”46 Besides Fan’s educational experience, the depart-
ment could not forget the fact that Fan and his friends had tried several years ago
to place Qinghua under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education so that they
could establish complete control over the school.
With strong support from Washington, Reinsch stepped up the pressure
on the Chinese government. In his meeting with the Chinese foreign minister on
January 16, 1918, he insisted that Zhou’s successor should be trained in Ameri-
can educational methods. Although Chinese officials believed that the American
legation did not have any right to interfere with the appointment of the presi-
dent of Qinghua College, they could not afford to antagonize the legation. As a
gesture of compromise, the Foreign Ministry offered to send Fan to the United
States for a month to acquire knowledge of the American system of popular
education. Reinsch welcomed the proposal, believing that it would provide an
opportunity for the United States to influence Chinese education. He suggested
that the State Department provide all possible assistance to Fan and assign an
expert to accompany him during his stay in the United States.47 While welcom-
ing Fan’s visit to the United States, the State Department was still unwilling to
endorse the appointment of Fan as Qinghua president. Washington’s continuing
opposition forced the Foreign Ministry to abandon Fan and nominate Zhang
Yuquan for the position. Reinsch immediately approved the new nomination
since Zhang had received his college education at the University of California
and got a master’s degree from Yale.48 As a result, the tradition set at the begin-
ning of Qinghua was able to continue. Among twelve officials who ran Qinghua
between 1911 and 1928, eleven had received education in the United States. The
only person who did not have this kind of educational experience was Wang
Wenxian, who graduated from the University of London. He was only able to
run Qinghua briefly between 1921 and 1922 as an executive officer without the
formal title of president.49 (See Appendix B.)
Qinghua presidents had to receive the approval of the American govern-
ment not only in the selection process, but also throughout their tenures. No pres-
ident could hold his office long at Qinghua without the support of the American
legation. In 1920, Qinghua students demanded that President Zhang Yuquan be
replaced because of his interference in the establishment of the student union.50
Despite a massive demonstration and strike organized by students, the Foreign
Ministry refused either to meet Qinghua student representatives, or to dismiss
Zhang. However, Zhang’s handling of Qinghua, especially the student issues,
caused strong resentment among American teachers. Having heard the concerns
of the American teachers, the legation turned quickly to the Chinese govern-
ment, demanding the removal of Zhang Yuquan. It was under pressure from
the American legation that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally agreed to let
Zhang resign.51
Besides its direct dealings with the Chinese government over major fi-
nancial and personnel decisions at Qinghua, the American legation managed to
 72 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

exert its influence on curriculum development and campus construction through

American teachers at the school. With unfailing help from the legation and their
dominant role in Western learning courses, American teachers had a big say in
Qinghua’s curriculum from the very beginning. Immediately after the Qinghua
School reopened in mid-1912, Hu Dunfu, the first provost, proposed that Qing-
hua should put more emphasis on science and engineering. But his proposal met
strong resistance from American teachers, especially P. I. Wold, who insisted
that students should take more courses in English, American literature, history,
and geography. When neither side was willing to give up their positions, they
appealed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Backed by the American minister
to Beijing, the American teachers won the battle and Provost Hu was forced
to resign.52 As a result, more emphasis was put on non-science courses, which
were taught mostly by American teachers in the morning hours, when students
were fresh and concentrated. Chinese courses were few in the 1910s and usually
scheduled in the afternoon, when students were exhausted from the morning
courses. Students would lose the opportunity to go to the United States if they
failed to pass any Western study courses, including physical education.53
Fully appreciating the crucial role played by the American teachers in
maintaining American influence and control over Qinghua, the American le-
gation worked hard to make sure that there was a large number of Americans
teaching at the school. In its communications with the Chinese government,
Washington insisted that the president of Qinghua should have “the advice and
assistance of the American Minister” in the selection of teachers for the college
and that “the proportion of American teachers should remain approximately as
heretofore.”54 Partly because of Washington’s intervention, Qinghua kept a large
number of American teachers throughout the 1910s and fired no Americans no
matter how unpopular or unqualified they were. For example, E. K. Smith was
regarded by many students as a bad English teacher. They did not want to take
his courses and desired to see him out of Qinghua. However, the school did
nothing and let him stay for thirteen years until he left China voluntarily.55
The American legation was concerned not only with what should be
taught at Qinghua, but with what Qinghua should look like. Under pressure
from the American legation, American architects were hired to design all the
major new buildings, including the auditorium, the library, the classroom build-
ing, the gymnasium, the science hall, and even living quarters for the American
teachers. The houses built for the American teachers were so much like those
in the United States that they were called “American Land (Meiguo Di)” by the
Chinese at Qinghua. In order to make the new buildings truly American, most
construction materials and equipment, such as wood floors, chairs in the audito-
rium, glass for the skylights, sports equipment for the gymnasium, steel book-
shelves, staircases, and thick glass floors in the library, were all imported from
the United States. These American-style buildings cost Qinghua dearly. It had
to pay over one million U.S. dollars for the construction of its first four major
buildings: the auditorium, the library, the gymnasium, and the science hall.56 The
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 73

open and direct intervention from the American legation, as Su Yunfeng pointed
out, did contribute to the rapid growth of Qinghua and protect it from disorder
and destruction during the warlord period.57 At the same time, it aroused such
strong resentment from Chinese students, teachers, and administrators that they
began to take action to get rid of American interference and complete control
over the school in the late 1910s.

Beyond the Walls of Qinghua

While establishing control over the operation and development of Qing-
hua, Washington made great efforts to extend its influence over education
throughout the whole of China. Its ultimate goal was to reshape the national
educational system in China. The method adopted by the American government
during this period was to throw the Qinghua examinations open to students from
all other schools and colleges, promoting and building a central library in Bei-
jing, assigning academic emphases to different institutions of higher education
in the capital, and getting more Chinese students admitted to the United States.
Although part of its efforts ended with little success because of the lack of abil-
ity and interest from the Chinese government, Qinghua did become a model for
modern Chinese schools, and educational exchanges between the two nations
went far beyond the walls of Qinghua.
Even when the educational use of the returned Boxer Indemnity was still
under negotiation, American diplomats in China and officials in the Bureau of
Education in Washington were mobilized to get more Chinese students to the
United States. Taking “deep interest in the progress and influence of American
educational ideas among the Chinese people,” American diplomats in China sent
frequent and urgent inquiries to the Bureau of Education under the Department
of Interior, asking about “the opportunities open to Chinese students in Ameri-
can colleges and universities.”58 In response to their inquiries, Elmer E. Brown,
the Commissioner of Education, requested John Fryer, a former missionary in
China and a professor of Oriental literature and language at the University of
California at Berkeley, to prepare an account of the educational advantages and
opportunities offered to Chinese students by American colleges and universi-
ties. Based on survey results from about one hundred colleges and universities,
John Fryer edited a book entitled Admission of Chinese Students to American
Colleges, which was published by the Bureau of Education in 1909. As the first
and only government publication specially designed to attract students from a
particular foreign country, the book was expected by Elmer Brown to “be widely
useful in fostering the new educational relations between the American and the
Chinese people.”59
While providing detailed information on American colleges and universi-
ties, the Bureau of Education used the book to promote and justify educational
exchange between the United States and China. Having taken a trip to China in
1908, John Fryer reported in the book that there was a “‘wild craze’ for western
 74 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

learning prevailing [in] all classes of society,” and that there was a “want of
competent Chinese teachers and suitable Chinese textbooks.” He supported Chi-
na’s effort to send the most intelligent young men and women abroad, who, after
their return, would prepare new textbooks in Chinese, fill important positions in
schools and colleges, and hold offices in various branches of the government.
However, he disapproved of the Chinese practice of obtaining knowledge of
Western learning indirectly from Japan. Fryer strongly advised that “it would be
preferable for China also to get her knowledge from those countries (the United
States and European countries) at first hand.”60 He emphasized that many draw-
backs that had existed in the past had fortunately been entirely removed and that
leading colleges and universities in the United States had expressed their will-
ingness to “receive Chinese students on the most friendly terms and aid them
in every possible way.”61 In order to make his argument more convincing, Fryer
included essays by Chinese students who testified that the American colleges
and universities furnished “the Chinese youth the best chance” for Western-style
higher education.62
The publication of the college guide was only part of Washington’s ef-
fort to expand educational exchanges with China beyond the walls of Qinghua.
While continuing to give its full support for Qinghua, Washington wanted to
make the returned Boxer Indemnity funds available for graduates, both men and
women, from all other colleges and schools in China. In April 1911, Mrs. Bur-
ton St. John, a teacher at Tianjin Intermediate School, wrote a letter to President
Taft, suggesting that part of the returned indemnity be used to educate Chinese
women in the United States.63 Mrs. St. John’s suggestion received a positive
response from the president and the Secretary of State. In his instructions, Sec-
retary of State Philander Knox told W. J. Calhoun, the American minister at
Beijing, that the American government would be glad to see some Chinese
women educated in the United States. Since Knox believed that it would be
inappropriate for the American government to make such a proposal directly,
he instructed the minister in May 1911 to give Mrs. St. John “all the assis-
tance she needs to have a hearing before Chinese authorities.”64 Upon receiving
Knox’s instructions, Calhoun, who cared much less about the appropriateness
of making demands upon the Chinese government, sent a note to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs immediately, urging the Chinese government to send women
students to the United States.65 Although Chinese women had never been part
of the official educational system and Qinghua only enrolled boys until the late
1920s, the Chinese government, clearly feeling the pressure from the American
minister, had no choice but to agree to send ten women students selected from
schools all over the country to the United States every other year as Qinghua
scholarship recipients.
The Chinese government set up a special program for women and sent the
first group of female students to the United States in 1914. While meeting the
same strict academic requirements as male graduates from Qinghua, female stu-
dents had to follow the rules specially designed for them. For example, female
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 75

students had to be between eighteen and twenty-five years old and unengaged
when they were sent to the United States. The subject fields for women students
were limited to education, preschool education, physical education, home eco-
nomics, and medicine. They had to attend colleges and universities chosen for
them by Qinghua and their stay in the United States was limited to four years,
while male graduates from Qinghua were allowed to attend colleges and uni-
versities chosen by themselves for five years with possible extended stays.66
However, many female students widened their choice of majors and extended
their stay in the United States beginning at the end of the 1910s. Chen Heng-
zhe, one of the first ten female students sent to the United States by Qinghua,
spent six years at Vassar College to get her B.A., and then went to the Univer-
sity of Chicago to obtain her master’s degree.67 Deemed less important than
other exchange programs, the scheme to send women students to the United
States was extremely vulnerable to financial difficulties and political changes
at Qinghua. The program was postponed in 1920 and the number of female
students sent to the United States was reduced from ten to five every other year
from 1923. Under this program, a total of fifty-three female students in seven
groups was sent to the United States by 1927.68 The special program for female
students was terminated as Qinghua ended its mission as a preparatory school
at the end of the 1920s.
As soon as the special program for women was up and running, Reinsch
began to press the Chinese government to throw open the examinations for the
selection of students to be sent to the United States to graduates from all other
colleges in China so that educational exchanges between the two nations could
be greatly broadened. During the autumn of 1915, Reinsch made repeated rec-
ommendations to the president of Qinghua that the selection of students to be
sent to the United States should not be limited to just one school. He insisted
that those who had graduated from other Chinese professional colleges should
have the opportunity to continue their education in the United States if they
could pass the examinations given by Qinghua.69 Reinsch’s proposal was not
well received among the Chinese officials. Although they were willing to send
more Chinese students abroad, they wanted it done properly. They did not want
to send too many students to any one country since it would give that coun-
try a dominant position in China. In order to use government funds, including
the Boxer Indemnity remission, more efficiently and maintain China’s inde-
pendence, the Chinese government contemplated, as early as 1914, to expand
Qinghua from a high school to a four-year university so that students could
have their undergraduate training at home. In this way, Qinghua students only
needed to go to the United States for graduate education, which would save a
lot of money and time.70
Washington did not like the plan to shorten Chinese students’ stay in the
United States or transform Qinghua into a university. It continued to put pressure
on the Chinese government to spend as much of the returned money as possible
in supporting students in America. In the end, the Chinese government gave in,
 76 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

agreeing to send some advanced students from other colleges every other year to
pursue postgraduate education in the United States. According to the regulations
specially designed for them, those entering the professional student program
had to be graduates from professional schools, such as for mining, electrical,
mechanical, and civil engineering. They should have the academic capability to
enter graduate schools (da xueyuan) in the United States and limit their stay to
three years.71 The first group of professional students (zhuanke xuesheng) were
selected and sent to the United States in 1916. By 1929, nine groups of profes-
sional students, totaling sixty-seven, were able to pass the examinations and
continue their education in America.72 Although the number of women and pro-
fessional students sent to the United States was relatively small, this expanded
selection process had a great impact on other schools and students throughout
China. In order to give their students a better chance to pass the examinations,
many schools adjusted their curricula to correspond more closely to that of Qing-
hua. By the end of the 1910s, it had become a great honor for any student who
could pass the Qinghua examinations for study in the United States.
While keeping a close eye on the operation of Qinghua, the American
legation also tried to intervene in the educational and cultural development in
Beijing. When Reinsch met with high-ranking officials from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the president of Qinghua College on January 2, 1915, he not
only laid out his plan for the future development of Qinghua, but also made sug-
gestions about the development of higher education in the Beijing area in gen-
eral. Because the National University and the Union Mission University were to
be located in Beijing, he suggested that “it would be wise to develop the [Qin-
ghua] College in scientific and technical lines, leaving the National University
to emphasize literature and legal training.” In order to assist the development
of higher education in Beijing, Reinsch urged that, besides a working library
at Qinghua, “the Chinese government should establish a large central library at
[Beijing] and that arrangements should be made by which the students of all the
different institutions located here could avail themselves of its advantages.”73
He also made it clear that the central library should be very much like the Li-
brary of Congress in Washington, DC, with a large collection of Western books
and journals. The modern library project remained high on Washington’s list of
priorities throughout the 1920s. The State Department even promised favorable
“consideration to a plan to devote surplus sums of the returned Boxer Indemnity
to the establishing of such a library.”74 However, the library project did not go
anywhere because of the lack of interest from the Chinese government.75
Once more Chinese students came to the United States, Washington
worked closely with the Chinese government and American institutions so those
students could overcome financial difficulties and complete their educational
programs in this country. Suffering from political disorder and economic de-
pression after World War I, many Chinese provincial governments and minis-
tries in the central government had difficulty continuing their financial support
for students in the United States. In May 1919, the Ministry of Education asked
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 77

for a loan from the State Department to help these students. Having never made
such a loan, the State Department sent the Chinese request to the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace and suggested that the Chinese government
deal with that organization directly. Reinsch, now retired from his minister’s
position in Beijing, also sent a letter on behalf of the Chinese government to
the Carnegie Endowment. Elihu Root, the former Secretary of State, was serv-
ing as the endowment’s chairman. With Root’s quick approval, the Chinese
government got interest-free loans amounting to $70,000 from the Carnegie
Endowment between February and August 1920.76 With help from the State
Department, the Chinese government also secured loans from several banks,
totaling over $180,000.77 These loans allowed the Chinese government to help
hundreds of students overcome financial difficulties and complete their educa-
tion in the United States.
Besides its cooperation with the Chinese government, the State Depart-
ment worked hard to help American companies and individuals to bring more
Chinese students to the United States. In the summer of 1919, some Seattle
businessmen tried to get a large number of students from Shanghai to attend the
University of Washington. As part of the agreement to help pay the costs, each
student would work half-time for certain commercial firms in Seattle during
their first two years in the United States and full-time for two more years. The
American consul general at Shanghai fully supported the arrangement and asked
for permission to grant these Chinese students the Section Six visa, which was
usually granted to the exempt classes of Chinese.78 The State Department passed
the telegram to the Department of Labor for its approval. However, the Labor
Department advised that no student visas should be granted to these young men
because they could not be considered as students under the law.79 In a long note
to the State Department at a later date, the Labor Department clarified the defini-
tion of “student” by emphasizing that a student should be a person “for whose
maintenance and support as a student in the United States adequate financial
provision has been made or satisfactorily assured.”80 The Labor Department fur-
ther ruled that no Chinese students would be allowed to pursue any other occu-
pation while in the United States unless approved by Immigration officers.
The response from the Labor Department received strong protests from
American diplomats in Beijing. The American minister there sent a dispatch to
Washington asking the department to reconsider the policy. Refusing to accept
the decision from the Labor Department, Edwin S. Cunningham, the American
consul general in Shanghai, continued to send dispatches to the State Depart-
ment arguing for the admission of Chinese students into the United States with
as few impediments as possible. On June 9, 1920, the consul informed the State
Department that British subjects in Shanghai had organized the Anglo-Chinese
Educational Committee to encourage the training of Chinese students in Great
Britain. Warning that these students would likely become friends of British
manufacturers, he urged the immigration authorities to give serious attention
to the issue. He insisted that if Chinese students were allowed to work to pay
 78 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

part of their expenses, more Chinese students could come and “it would very
materially assist in all Sino-American educational matters.”81 James Huston, the
American vice consul in Hankou (Hankow), who was also aware of the Brit-
ish effort to train Chinese students in England, suggested that Washington send
an educational mission to China to lay before the central as well as provincial
governments the many opportunities that existed in the United States. In order
to attract more Chinese students, he suggested that “the commission should con-
sult with the Chamber of Commerce in various American industrial centers with
a view to placing students during vacations.” He urged that, while excluding
Chinese laborers, the United States should “treat the Chinese students decently
and extend to them the facilities of all of our institutions of learning.” In this
way, Huston argued, the United States could influence the future development
of China “through the intellectual and spiritual domination of its leaders.”82
The strong appeals from diplomats in China finally produced a positive
response from the Justice Department. On February 27, 1922, Harry M. Daugh-
erty, the attorney general, ruled that a Chinese student could be allowed to come
and stay in the United States if he worked only in order to provide funds to en-
able him to maintain his student status.83 The new ruling made it possible for
at least some Chinese students to earn part of their tuition in the United States
and have extended practical training after graduation. Having failed to pass the
Qinghua examinations for professional students, Chen Lifu was able to come
to the United States in 1923 with limited support from a relative because of the
new ruling. He earned his tuition by working in Chinese restaurants and worked
in coal mines in Pennsylvania for over a year after gradation.84 However, with
the adoption of new discriminatory immigration laws in the 1920s and the strict
enforcement of the exclusion laws, Chinese students did not receive legal per-
mission to work until World War II. The State Department’s attempt to expand
educational exchange with China through allowing Chinese students to work
part-time while attending school failed.

The May Fourth Movement and the Second Remission

Although some Chinese might not like the way in which the returned funds
were used, the United States did gain some positive impression among the Chi-
nese officials and students since it was the first foreign power that was willing
to return part of the Boxer Indemnity.85 The positive image of the United States
as a generous and just power was reinforced during World War I, especially by
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which emphasized national self-determina-
tion and equality among the nations. However, such a positive image was soon
seriously damaged when President Wilson agreed to allow the Japanese to con-
tinue their control of China’s Shandong Province at the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919. As a result, the United States became the prime target of the national
protest organized by Chinese students on May 4, 1919. In order to repair its re-
lations with China, Washington decided to return the rest of the surplus Boxer
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 79

Indemnity. Following the precedent, the second remission was to be used to im-
prove educational and cultural exchanges between the two nations.
Having entered World War I on the Allied side, China sought to regain
its control over Shandong Province at the Paris Peace Conference. Immediately
after the war broke out, Japan forced Germany to transfer to it the “entire leased
territory of [Jiaozhou] which Germany had leased from China in 1898 for ninety-
nine years.”86 The Japanese control over Jiaozhou and later the greater part of
Shandong Province was confirmed through a treaty imposed on China in May
1915. Inspired by President Wilson’s peace plan, the Chinese believed that they
could take back the control of Shandong with help from other allied powers,
especially the United States, after the war. Many student organizations and intel-
lectuals sent telegrams to the Chinese delegation in Paris supporting their effort
to recover Shandong. A telegram sent by students at Beijing read, “11,500 stu-
dents of institutions of higher learning in [Beijing] pledge themselves [to] sup-
port you defending our national rights. Desire you remain firm to end.” Another
telegram from the Shandong Provincial Chamber, the Shandong Educational
Association, and the Shandong Chamber of Commerce emphasized that secret
agreements regarding Shandong directly violated President Wilson’s Fourteen
Points and demanded that “China be saved from those perils into which traitors
have betrayed her.”87 However, China’s hopes were soon crushed as all major
powers at the Peace Conference, including the United States, gave in to the Jap-
anese pressure. President Wilson abandoned his support for self-determination
in order to save his grand plan for the League of Nations, when Japan threatened
to withdraw from the Peace Conference if its conditions were not fully met.88
Despite the vehement opposition from the Chinese delegation, the Council of
Three decided to endorse the Japanese position on April 30, 1919.
When the humiliating news reached Beijing, the Chinese people, espe-
cially the young intellectuals and students, were shocked and angered. On May
4, 1919, a massive student demonstration was held in Beijing. Thousands of
students gathered in Tiananmen Square and then marched toward the American
legation to protest the American policy. Since the American minister was not in
the office, student representatives left a protest letter and continued their dem-
onstration.89 This demonstration sparked a massive student movement through-
out the country. In The Students’ Strike—An Explanation, a pamphlet published
in English by the Shanghai Student Union, the students clearly expressed their
disappointment in Woodrow Wilson and the United States. They had had great
faith in Wilson’s promise of “supporting the weak and giving courage to the
struggling,” and rejecting “all secret covenants and forced agreements.” How-
ever, nothing was done to help China at the Paris Peace Conference. The Chi-
nese people “looked for the dawn of this new era; but no sun rose for China.
Even the cradle of the nation was stolen.”90 Many Chinese students thus came to
the conclusion that the United States, like other foreign powers, was selfish and
untrustworthy and that China “could no longer depend upon the principles of
the so called great leader like Woodrow Wilson.”91
 80 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

The same resentment toward Washington’s decision on Shandong was

shared by Qinghua students. Although absent from the May 4th demonstration
because of the school’s remote location, all students at Qinghua were aroused
once they heard the news and jumped into the movement immediately. On the
evening of May 4, Wen Yiduo, a sophomore in the upper division, copied and
posted a poem written by Yue Fei, a general in the Song Dynasty famous for his
heroic defense of the nation, to express his determination to recover the lost ter-
ritories.92 On the next morning, a meeting of all student leaders was held and a
delegation was sent to the city to establish contact with students at other schools.
At a rally held at Beijing University, Qinghua delegates declared that Qinghua
students would join all other schools in protests.93 At a school-wide rally held in
front of the gymnasium, Qinghua students passed a resolution calling for a strike
to begin the next day. Students of the graduating class declared that they would
not go to the United States until the Shandong problem was resolved. On May 9,
all students agreed to send a telegram to Paris urging the Chinese delegates not
to sign the Paris Peace Treaty. They swore that they would sacrifice their lives to
protect the people, the land, and the sovereignty of the Republic of China.94
Woodrow Wilson’s endorsement of the Japanese position on Shandong
troubled not only the Chinese people, but also many American leaders. Three
out of five American Commissioners at the Peace Conference, Robert Lansing,
Henry White, and Tasker H. Bliss, wrote Wilson expressing their disagreement
with him immediately after he had made up his mind to support Japan on the
Shandong question. Having denounced Japan’s position, the three Commission-
ers concluded their letter with these words: “It can’t be right to do wrong even to
make peace. Peace is desirable but here are things dearer than peace, justice, and
freedom.”95 The American minister in Beijing was sickened, disheartened, and
deeply dejected when he received news of the Shandong settlement. He knew
that the decision made at Paris would blast Chinese hopes and destroy their con-
fidence in the equity of nations.96
The rise of anti-American feelings among the Chinese people, especially
students, and the decline of American influence in China disturbed many Amer-
ican policy makers, especially those who disapproved of Wilson’s actions at the
Paris Peace Conference. Although they wanted to do something to improve the
situation, they were too busy fighting over the Paris Peace Treaty in 1920 and
early 1921 to take any other action. When the battle over the Peace Treaty came
to an end, Henry Cabot Lodge, a Republican senator and the archrival of Wood-
row Wilson, believed that it was time to do something about China. On May 25,
1921, he sent a letter to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, urging him to
remit immediately the unclaimed portion of the $2 million of the Boxer Indem-
nity that had been held to cover further American claims for the losses incurred
during the Boxer Rebellion.97 According to the Congressional resolution passed
in 1908, the unclaimed part of the money should be remitted to China in one
year.98 However, nothing was done for more than a decade. As the Congress-
man who had introduced the original resolution for the first remission, Lodge
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 81

believed that Americans had never done anything “that caused a better feeling
toward us in China.” He was certain that the further remission of the Boxer
Indemnity would be “a very good political move, and would strengthen still fur-
ther our hold in China.” He offered to introduce a resolution and push it through
both houses if the proposal was approved by the State Department. He reminded
Hughes that there was a very friendly feeling toward China in Congress “owing
to our sympathy with China in the Shandong business.”99
Lodge’s proposal was well received in the State Department. After study-
ing the proposal for about two months, Hughes expressed his “heartily [sic]
sympathy” and sent the senator a draft of a resolution to be introduced in the
Senate.100 Lodge brought the bill to the Senate within a couple of days. Blaming
the Germans for the punitive indemnity imposed upon China in 1901, Lodge
called for a remission at the discretion of the president to assure its proper use.
Although some lobbied for a more clearly stated condition attached to the remis-
sion, the resolution passed the Senate unamended on August 11, 1921.101 The
resolution encountered strong resistance in the House of Representatives. The
House Foreign Affairs Committee did nothing about the resolution for months.
In order to find out the reason for this inaction, John Van MacMurray, an of-
ficial of the Far Eastern Affairs Section of the State Department, paid a visit to
Stephen D. Porter, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on March
31, 1922. Porter explained that a further remission of the Boxer Indemnity was
tactically inexpedient at that time because Washington was pushing all Euro-
pean countries to pay their war debt to the United States. Many representatives
feared that further remission of the indemnity might send the wrong signal to
those countries. Thus, he preferred delaying the action on the remission resolu-
tion until March 1923, hoping that by then the heat on the war debt problem
would be reduced and that his colleagues could act with more freedom at the
end of the session.102
Porter’s explanation and plan were not well received by the State Depart-
ment. Secretary of State Hughes continued to urge Porter to act on the resolution
without any delay. The department was anxious to push the resolution through
mainly for two reasons. One was that Russia had formally repudiated its por-
tion of the Boxer Indemnity when it established diplomatic relations with China
in 1920. This caused deep concern in the State Department. It was feared that
the Russian action might set a precedent for renouncing other treaty rights that
Americans enjoyed in China, and draw China closer to Russia.103 A second re-
mission, the State Department believed, would offer the United States a chance
to kill two birds with one stone: separating China from Russia and setting an ex-
ample in handling treaty rights. The other reason was that Great Britain, France,
Japan, and a number of other powers were also contemplating the return of part
of the Boxer Indemnities to China. The State Department wanted to reinforce
the impression that the United States was the first nation that started the return
of the Boxer Indemnity. Hughes wanted Congress to take positive action imme-
diately so that substantive discussion could be started in Beijing soon.104
 82 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Porter was not convinced by Hughes. He told the Secretary of State that he
would not take the resolution to the floor until its success was assured. He also
warned that a defeat in Congress would be embarrassing to American prestige.105
Porter’s concerns were not unfounded. In addition to the fear that the further
remission of the Boxer Indemnity would send the wrong message to European
countries that owed huge debts to the United States, many Americans were di-
vided on when the money should be returned and how it should be used. Some
diplomats, like John Van MacMurray and Edwin Cunningham, believed that the
returned money should be used on projects that would benefit both China and the
United States, such as the improvement of the Grand Canal and the Huai River,
or the building of a railroad between Guangzhou and Beijing.106 Others, like Ja-
cob Gould Schurman and Willys Peck, who resented the apparent indifference
of the Chinese toward debts, suggested that the money be used to repay the huge
debts that the Chinese government owed Americans.107 Without Porter’s support,
the State Department did not have any chance to push the resolution for the sec-
ond remission through the House of Representatives.
While politicians were debating the timing of the second remission, many
Americans involved in China entered heated discussions of the use of the re-
turned funds. George Danton, an American teaching literature and German at
Qinghua, wrote a letter to the State Department in the summer of 1920, sup-
porting the educational use of the returned money and arguing that educational
projects funded by the remitted indemnity were good business for the United
States.108 J. C. Huston, the American consul general at Hankou, argued that
“[t]he nation which succeeded in educating the greatest number of Chinese . . .
will be the nation which for the minimum expenditure of effort will reap the
greatest return in moral, intellectual and commercial influence.”109 Mary Eliza-
beth Wood, the librarian of Boone University at Wuchang, wanted to devote
a part of the remission to establish a model public library in China. With the
endorsement from the China National Association for the Advancement of Edu-
cation, she visited Schurman, the American minister at Beijing, to advocate her
plan. After the meeting, she traveled back to Washington and spent six months
there lobbying for her plan. She visited eighty-two senators and talked to over
four hundred representatives. Deeply impressed by her determination, Repre-
sentative J. Charles Linthicum promised to amend the resolution to stipulate that
the remission should be used for “educational and other cultural activities.”110
Although Americans might be divided on how the returned money
should be used, they all agreed that the remission should be conditional. Aware
of the fact that other powers were contemplating similar remissions, MacMur-
ray preferred to maintain American control over the remission without openly
stating it in the Congressional resolution. He believed that the conditional re-
mission would set a precedent that other powers would use to obtain more
control over China.111 Others, including diplomats in China, were less cau-
tious than MacMurray. Willys Peck, the Chinese secretary of the American
legation at Beijing, urged that any new remissions require a “tacit or explicit
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 83

understanding” and definite American cooperation and supervision.112 Agree-

ing with Peck, Schurman warned the State Department that any unconditional
remission “would almost certainly be used for military purposes or wasted on
unjustifiable objects.” He recommended that the returned money be earmarked
in order to prevent its misuse.113
After long debate, Washington finally took action to return the rest of the
surplus part of the Boxer Indemnity to China. In December 1923, Lodge rein-
troduced the remission resolution in the Senate. Fulfilling his promise, Porter
allowed an identical resolution to be introduced in the House.114 Following a
spirited three-day hearing and debate in the House, the proponents of the edu-
cational and cultural use of the remission prevailed. Most witnesses told the
House that American education was helping create a republic similar to the
United States in China.115 Soon, the House passed the resolution amended by
Congressman Linthicum, clearly stipulating that the returned money should be
used for educational and cultural purposes. On May 12, 1924, the Senate passed
the amended resolution without debate.116 However, President Coolidge refused
to sign the executive order to implement the resolution until the educational
and cultural use of the remission was secured. Dr. Paul Monroe, a professor at
Columbia University, offered his help by proposing a scheme in January 1924.
He suggested that the remission be paid to an independent and self-perpetuating
board with nine to fifteen Chinese and Americans members who would control
the returned money and use it exclusively for educational purposes.117 Monroe’s
plan could prevent the misuse of the money by the unstable Chinese govern-
ment while making American involvement permanent. Therefore, it was well
accepted by the State Department and MacMurray collaborated closely with
Monroe in working out the details.
Monroe’s plan was also approved by the Chinese government, though
with some reluctance. The Chinese government accepted the plan for an in-
dependent board in order to get more money back as soon as possible. But
it did not like to include Americans on the board. In his meeting with Jacob
Schurman and Willys Peck on May 28, 1924, foreign minister Wellington Koo
clearly showed his desire for complete Chinese control over the remission and
mentioned no Americans when he talked about the organization of the board
that would handle the remission.118 Under pressure from the American lega-
tion, however, the Chinese government finally agreed to commit the money
to a Chinese-American foundation for the advancement of educational and
cultural pursuits.119 Once the plan was accepted by the Chinese government,
MacMurray worked with Monroe on a constitution for the foundation. Having
finished a draft document, Monroe took a special trip to China. With help from
the American diplomats, Monroe succeeded in selling his plan to the Chinese
government. Based on the constitution drafted by Monroe, the Chinese presi-
dent issued an order on September 17, 1924, creating the Chinese Foundation
for the Promotion of Education and Culture (CFPEC). Ten Chinese and five
Americans were appointed as the first trustees.120
 84 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Although the establishment of the CFPEC was approved by the State De-
partment, Hughes concluded that its constitution was too broad to ensure the
safety of the funds. Therefore, he sent Monroe back to China to revise the con-
stitution. In order to make sure that the revision was taken seriously by the Chi-
nese government, Hughes, following the advice of MacMurray, decided to delay
any further action on the remission, waiting for new reports from Beijing.121
At the request of Washington, the CFPEC board of trustees held its first meet-
ing on June 3, 1925. At the meeting, the board unanimously adopted a resolu-
tion stating clearly that the remission should be “devoted to the development
of scientific knowledge and to the application of such knowledge to the condi-
tions in China through the promotion of technical training of scientific research,
experimentation, and demonstration, and training in science teaching, and to
the advancement of cultural enterprises of a permanent character such as librar-
ies and the like.”122 The board also decided that secondary education should be
its major focus.123 Having met all American demands, the Chinese minister in
Washington went to the State Department on June 11, 1925, asking for the im-
mediate remission of the indemnity. The State Department finally promised that
it would start the second remission right after receiving the formal report from
MacMurray in Beijing.124
On his arrival in Beijing, MacMurray, the new American minister, met
with J. E. Baker, Roger Greene, C. R. Bennett, and Monroe, the American trust-
ees of the CFPEC. After careful review of reports from the trustees as well as
other documents relating to the CFPEC, MacMurray believed that all the de-
mands of the State Department had been met. He then sent his report back to
Washington on July 10, 1925, recommending that the remission be started as
soon as possible.125 At the same time, MacMurray suggested that, in order to
strengthen American control, the payments should be handled directly by the
American minister in Beijing.126 MacMurray’s suggestion was immediately ap-
proved by both the Treasury and State Departments. The Treasury Department
believed that, with the American minister transferring the funds directly, the
American government would be able to detect any problem in payments im-
mediately and put pressure on the Chinese government. Secretary of State Frank
B. Kellogg immediately instructed the Shanghai Commissioner of Customs to
send the monthly indemnity check to the American minister in Beijing, who
would then endorse the check and deliver it directly to the CFPEC.127 President
Coolidge finally signed the executive order and the first check was handed to
C. R. Bennett and Zhou Yichun, trustees of the CFPEC, on August 27, 1925.128
Some minor changes were made by the two governments later. According to the
final arrangement approved by the Chinese Maritime Customs and the United
States Treasury Department, the National City Bank would draw two checks on
the customs account to the American minister, who would then deliver them to
Qinghua College and the CFPEC separately. 129
The new payment arrangement might help prevent the returned funds from
being used by the Chinese government for noneducational purposes. However,
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 85

the American effort to gain more control over the returned indemnity funds also
aroused strong resentment among the Chinese people and officials. Washington
had expected to see a great outpouring of gratitude from the Chinese after the
second remission began. Instead, MacMurray reported only apathy and apparent
indifference on the part of the Chinese. Unlike the first return of the Boxer In-
demnity, the second remission never received any open gratitude from the Chi-
nese government. When MacMurray tried to discuss the second remission with
the Chinese foreign minister at a meeting, the latter ignored him and switched
the conversation to other topics.130 Responses from students, intellectuals, and
rebels were much less polite. Sun Yat-sen, the Nationalist leader based in Guang-
zhou, insisted that the real purpose of the second American remission was to
undermine the influence of the Russian Revolution and counter the effect of the
cancellation of Chinese debts by Soviet Russia.131 Minbao (People’s Newspa-
per), a popular newspaper in Beijing, ridiculed the American gift as an attempt
to undermine the nationalist movement. It declared that “[t]he time when such
a gesture could evoke an answering act of cordiality and gratitude is past and
gone. . . . What we want,” the paper went on, “is not gold but Liberty.”132 Such a
strong sentiment would later be translated into actions aimed at reducing Ameri-
can influence on China’s schools and educational exchanges.

From a Preparatory School to a University

One of the effective ways adopted by Chinese students, educators, and
officials to reduce American influence on Chinese education and exchanges was
to transform Qinghua from a preparatory school into a university. Despite Qing-
hua’s success in preparing students for higher education in the United States,
Chinese students and educators had deep concerns for its future as well as strong
resentment of American control and Qinghua’s status and image as a prepara-
tory school. The first attempt to turn Qinghua into a university was made at the
inception of the school. However, the official transformation did not begin until
1925 when the second remission of the Boxer Indemnity started. If the lack of
financial support from the second remission made the transformation necessary,
the rising nationalist sentiment among Chinese students, educators, and officials
made the transformation inevitable.
Although Qinghua started as a small school designed to prepare Chinese
students to be educated in the United States, its leaders contemplated growing it
into a university from its very early years. As soon as Zhou Yichun became the
president of Qinghua in 1913, he announced his intention to upgrade the school
academically. In the summer of 1916, Zhou sent a formal memorandum to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, outlining his plan to enlarge the enrollment and
turn Qinghua into a university. He listed three reasons for his plan. First of all,
transforming Qinghua into a university would allow it to send students directly
to American graduate schools, which would not only raise the education level
of students at Qinghua, but also reduce the cost by shortening their stay in the
 86 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

United States. Secondly, receiving undergraduate education at home would help

students keep in touch with their own society, a necessary condition for success-
ful careers in the future. Thirdly, building a university now, Zhou argued, would
allow Qinghua to survive after the Boxer Indemnity remission stopped in 1940.
If Qinghua built all the necessary infrastructure for a university by that time, it
could continue its operation with donations from numerous graduates returned
from the United States for a long, long time.133
Zhou’s plan, while gaining support from the Ministry of Education,
received strong opposition from the United States government. Washington
wanted Qinghua to maintain its status as a preparatory school for as long as
possible so that its graduates had to come to the United States for their higher
education. Therefore, Reinsch openly disapproved of Zhou’s plan, insisting
that “the enlargement of the College into a university should be a gradual
growth rather than a plan to be publicly announced at this time.”134 Without
support from Washington, the transformation of Qinghua into a university re-
mained only a plan among Chinese officials and educators for many years.
Washington’s opposition, while successful in putting the formal transforma-
tion on hold, failed to prevent Qinghua administrators like Zhou Yichun from
adopting a high standard in updating its curriculum, hiring its faculty, con-
structing its classroom buildings, laboratories, and library, and purchasing
equipment in the second half of the 1910s and the first half of the 1920s.135
Partly because of his ambitious expansion of Qinghua, Zhou received strong
criticism and had to leave Qinghua in 1918. However, when all four major
buildings were completed by 1921, Qinghua did have the basic facilities for
a university.136 Many students found out after their arrival in the United States
that Qinghua’s facilities were at least as good as many first-rate American col-
leges and universities.
The effort to build Qinghua as a college continued under Zhang Yuquan,
the new president of the school. Less concerned about American opposition in
the wake of the Paris Conference, Zhang appointed a University Planning Com-
mittee (Daxue Choubei Weiyuanhui) and sent the transition plan proposed by
the committee to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1920. In his report
to the ministry, Zhang argued that eight years after the establishment of Qinghua
there was no need for Qinghua to continue the offering of middle school–level
education since a huge number of graduates at that level could be produced in
all provinces. Following the committee’s proposal, Zhang recommended that
the enrollment of middle school–level (zhongdeng ke) students be reduced and
stopped so that the saved money could be used to increase the enrollment of
high school–level (gaodeng ke) students. A new university section (daxue bu)
should be established at Qinghua to take in graduates from the high school sec-
tion.137 Having received approval from the Foreign Ministry, Qinghua stopped
admitting middle school–level students in 1920, and renamed seniors in the high
school section as freshmen of the university section. As a result, Qinghua fi-
nally had its first university-level classes. However, the nature of Qinghua was
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 87

not completely changed since it continued to send most of its graduates to the
United States, just with more advanced education than before.138
The official transformation of Qinghua from a preparatory school into a
university finally took place during Cao Yunxiang’s tenure as the president. En-
tering the office in 1922, Cao appointed an investigation committee to study all
matters related to the transformation. In 1923, a curriculum committee was or-
ganized to work out concrete plans and steps for the transformation. In Febru-
ary 1924, Cao invited five nationally known educators and scholars, including
Hu Shi, Fan Yuanlian, Zhang Boling, and Ding Wenjiang, as advisors (guwen)
for the founding of the Qinghua University. The University Preparation Com-
mittee came up with its first draft of An Outline for the Operation and Orga-
nization of Qinghua University (Qinghua Daxue Gongzuo Ji Zuzhi Gangyao
[Caoan]) in October. A revised version was approved by the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs in April 1925. Following the Outline, a Temporary Committee of
University Affairs was organized immediately and the official transformation
of Qinghua began.139
In accordance with the Outline, Qinghua was reorganized into three sec-
tions: university, preparatory, and graduate studies. The University Section
(Daxuebu) was formally established in May 1925. It enrolled ninety-three stu-
dents in its first freshman class in the fall. The Preparatory Section (Liumei Yu-
beibu) included all students admitted to Qinghua prior to 1925. Since it stopped
enrolling any students in 1925, the section would be eliminated in 1929 after the
last class left school for the United States. In the future, students to be sent to the
United States on Qinghua scholarships would be selected through a national ex-
amination open to all university graduates in China.140 On the recommendation
of Hu Shi and other scholars, Qinghua established a section for graduate studies
in August 1925. Since the most important subject for a Chinese university must
be the Chinese classics (guoxue), Hu insisted that Qinghua’s graduate section
should first focus on the field of Chinese classics and even recommended Wang
Guowei, one of the most prominent scholars in Chinese classics, as an adviser
(daoshi). With the full support of Cao Yunxiang and diligent work of Wu Mi, the
Graduate Section was able to hire, besides Wang, Liang Qichao, Chen Yinke,
and Zhao Yuanren, the four best-known scholars in China, as its advisers. Over
thirty graduate students were accepted through examinations in July.141
Qinghua’s transformation from a preparatory school into a university
marked fundamental changes in its mission, curriculum, operation, and manage-
ment. The new Qinghua was no longer merely a preparatory school for students
to be sent to the United States. Instead, it became a comprehensive university
aimed at training badly needed experts and leaders in all fields in China. As a
university, Qinghua originally offered three levels of training: general, special,
and graduate. The general section (putongke) was established in 1925 and stu-
dents were required to spend two to three years on general studies once they
entered Qinghua. Since it failed to generate any serious interest among students,
Qinghua had to eliminate the general section and reduce the required general
 88 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

studies to just one year in 1926. Students were assigned to departments for spe-
cialized training in the second year. They could earn baccalaureate degrees after
receiving at least four years of undergraduate education at Qinghua.142
Dramatic changes also could be seen in the new curriculum for under-
graduates. The most noticeable one was the sharp reduction of English and in-
crease of Chinese lessons for undergraduate students. Only preparatory students
continued much of the tradition, taking English lessons for about one-sixth of
the total class hours each week and half as many hours for Chinese lessons. Un-
dergraduate students in the university section began to have an equal number of
units, two each, for both languages. With eighteen units in a week, each counted
for three hours of teaching and self-study. Therefore, university students at Qing-
hua only spent one-ninth of their time on English language and literature, a 50
percent reduction from the past. Although the history of the United States was
included as part of the world history course, it was no longer listed as a four-
hour course required for all students. More pragmatic courses like machinery
technology, contemporary Chinese issues, and sociology were added to the new
curriculum. In addition to regular physical education classes, freshman under-
graduate students were required to take military training in the second semes-
ter.143 All these changes were made to train future leaders for China, not just
high school students to be sent to the United States.
Besides the changes in the mission and curriculum, Qinghua tried to reor-
ganize the administration of the school and give more power to its faculty. In Sep-
tember 1925, an Administrative Committee of College Affairs (Xiaowu Guanli
Weiyuanhui) was appointed by Cao Yunxiang to help run the school. With four
of its ten members from the faculty, the committee marked the beginning of fac-
ulty participation in the administration of Qinghua. In early 1926, the Qinghua
School Reorganization Committee (Qinghua Xuexiao Gaizu Weiyuanhui) was
organized by Cao Yunxiang. After a number of meetings, the committee adopted
the Bylaws of Qinghua University (Qinghua Daxue Zuzhi Dagang), offering the
roadmap for the reorganization of Qinghua.144 The Bylaws gave more power to
the newly organized Senate (Pingyihui) and the Faculty Council (Jiaoshouhui).
The former, with the president, provost, and seven senators elected by the Faculty
Council as its members, had the power to set educational policy for the school,
establish and eliminate academic and administrative departments, formulate all
regulations for the school, award degrees, and discuss and decide on the appoint-
ment and dismissal of professors, lecturers, and heads of administrative depart-
ments. They also had the power to review and approve the budget for the school.
Sharing the power with the Senate was the Faculty Council. With all profes-
sors and directors of all administrative departments as its members, the Council
had the power to elect Senate members and the provost, determine the curricu-
lum, discuss and determine the matters needed to be presented to the Senate,
and decide on other teaching-related matters.145 All these reforms, as Su Yunfeng
convincingly argued, gave professors at Qinghua more power than government
regulations had stipulated and marked the drastic change of Qinghua from a
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 89

school run mostly by staff members to a school run mostly by the professors
(jiaoshou zhixiao).146 At the same time, they made American interference in the
management of Qinghua very difficult, if not impossible.
The transformation of Qinghua that took place in the 1920s was made
possible by a confluence of many forces. One of them was the rapid growth of
higher education in China in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The rise of
many new colleges and universities put huge pressure on Qinghua, which kept
its status as a preparatory school despite its world-class facilities and unmatched
resources. In 1912, only four Chinese colleges and universities were in opera-
tion. By 1925, there were forty-seven universities in China with over twenty
thousand students. Cao Yunxiang clearly realized that if Qinghua did not grow
into a university, it would definitely lag behind and lose its validity as a model
modern school in China. In order to remain competitive with other educational
institutions and maintain its influence in China, Qinghua, as most students, edu-
cators, and administrators agreed, had to flow with the tide.147
Another factor was the increasingly strong criticism of the operation of
Qinghua and the educational mission to the United States in the mid-1920s. Some
scholars and officials believed that Qinghua was wasting money by spending so
much as a middle/high school while all other universities and colleges were
suffering from tight budgets. With only about six hundred students, Qinghua’s
annual budget was usually several times larger than that of other Chinese uni-
versities, including Beijing University and Southeastern University, which had
two or three times more students. The average educational cost for a Qinghua
student was 1,300 yuan in 1916, 1,722 yuan in 1918, and 2,000 yuan in 1925. In
the same years, the average educational cost for a student at Beijing University
was 299, 388, and 500 yuan, respectively, less than a quarter of the cost for a
Qinghua student.148 Criticism of the extremely high cost of sending Qinghua
students to the United States was even stronger. By the mid-1920s, Qinghua sent
about one thousand students to the United States at a cost of about twenty million
yuan. Averaging twenty thousand yuan per student, Qinghua again exceeded the
average cost of sending a student to the United Stats by about four times. (See
Appendix C.) Since most Qinghua students enrolled in undergraduate programs
rather than enter graduate schools directly, they, not only prolonged their stay
in the United States, the critics claimed, but also reduced their contributions
to China’s advanced research in science and technology. Therefore, Qinghua
should turn itself into a university and send more graduate students to the United
States in the future.149
The increasing resentment toward American influence and control was
the third major force that pushed Qinghua onto the road of becoming a uni-
versity. With the rise of nationalism in China in the 1910s, there came a strong
movement aiming at recovering China’s educational sovereignty. Chinese edu-
cators openly expressed their resentment toward American influence on Chinese
education, especially its control over the use of the returned Boxer Indemnity.
At the tenth annual conference of the Chinese Educational Association, held at
 90 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Kaifeng, Henan Province, in October 1924, Chinese educators passed several

resolutions regarding the future of foreign schools in China and the manage-
ment of the Boxer Indemnity remission. In Resolution No.7, the association de-
manded that the government take over all existing foreign schools and colleges
and that foreigners should not be permitted to establish educational agencies in
China thereafter.150 Responding to the popular sentiment, the Chinese govern-
ment issued orders in 1924 and 1925 to require all missionary schools to register
with the government, appoint Chinese as their presidents or vice presidents, stop
requiring students to take religious courses in the schools, and make Chinese the
majority on boards of trustees.151 In another resolution, educators demanded a
change in the name, rules, and bylaws of the CFPEC so that the Chinese could
have complete control of the foundation and the money. They also requested
that three boards of directors should be established to handle the Boxer Indem-
nity funds and that 90 percent of the funds should be apportioned mainly among
the provinces, which would have the sole power to decide how the funds should
be used in education.152
The resentment against American control was rising among Chinese stu-
dents and faculty members at Qinghua after the May 4th movement. Although
most Qinghua students were still eager to pursue higher education in the United
States, they wanted to reduce or, better yet, eliminate American intervention in
Qinghua. They became more concerned with current political affairs and the
management issues of the school beginning in 1919. Like students in many
other schools in China, they organized more than fifty student societies on
campus and the Student Association began to play an active role in the admin-
istration of Qinghua. They managed to force President Zhang Yuquan to resign
in December 1921 for his opposition to the Student Association, and drive Jin
Bangzheng, Zhang’s successor, out of office on similar grounds.153 In Decem-
ber 1923, the secretary of the Qinghua Student Association sent an article to
the Peking Leader, an English newspaper in Beijing, protesting the American
interference in the management of Qinghua. He was especially angry about the
fact that a secretary from the American legation had more power and prestige
than the president of Qinghua simply because he was a member of the board
of directors.154
Students’ protests against American control at Qinghua received the
strongest support from Chinese faculty members. Since the late 1910s, Qing-
hua hired an increasingly large number of Chinese teachers with master’s or
doctoral degrees from prestigious colleges and universities in the United States.
In 1914, there were only seven Chinese teachers in the Western learning section
(Xixuebu). By 1924, the number jumped to thirty-three, with sixteen Qinghua
graduates returning from the United States. Among these Chinese teachers, there
were four doctoral, fourteen master’s, and seven bachelor’s degree holders.155
With better educations and higher degrees than most of the American teachers
at Qinghua, these young Chinese faculty members were capable of teaching
all major courses at the school. They strongly believed that Qinghua could be
 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment 91

run as an American-style university without depending on American teachers or

American intervention. Therefore, they strongly supported the transformation of
Qinghua and the recovery of complete Chinese control over the school. To them,
turning Qinghua into a regular four-year university would not only enhance its
prestige, reduce cost, and shorten students’ stay in the United States, but also
gave them a bigger say and better treatment at Qinghua.156 As students, faculty,
and administrators began to share the same vision for Qinghua, Washington’s
direct intervention in the management of the school faced its first serious chal-
lenge. However, the fate of the university and Washington’s role in its future
development had to be determined by the interaction between the two govern-
ments since Qinghua was, after all, their first joint experiment.
 Chapter 4

From Central Administration

to Party Control

T he expansion of U.S.-China educational

interactions was shaped not only by the diplomatic relations between the two
nations, but also by political and social forces within each country. In China,
the development of education as well as educational exchanges with foreign
countries was, to an even greater extent, determined by the central government.
Although strenuous effort was made by all Chinese regimes in the first half of
the twentieth century, only the Nationalist government managed to build an ef-
fective central control over education as well as all the study abroad programs.
Taking advantage of its control over schools and educational exchanges, the Na-
tionalist government included its party doctrines in qualification examinations
required for study abroad, forced students and scholars to join the Nationalist
Party (Guomindang) before leaving the country, and imposed close supervision
on students and intellectuals in China as well as in the United States. As a result,
educational exchanges were turned into an integral part of state as well as party-
building efforts by the Nationalist Party. If the effective central administration
helped keep China’s educational interactions with the United States growing
until the Japanese invasion, the Nationalist effort to exert thought control in-
creasingly alienated the Chinese students and scholars.

Taking Over Qinghua University

Having purged the Communists in mid-1927, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-
shek) continued the Northern Expedition with his Nationalist army. With help
from the military forces led by Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan, the Nationalist
army entered Beijing in June 1928, forcing Zhang Zuolin, a major warlord, to
flee back to his home base in Manchuria. When Zhang Xueliang, the young
marshal who took over the control of Manchuria after Zhang Zuolin was killed
in an explosion engineered by the Japanese army, pledged his allegiance to
the Nationalist government in August, China was largely unified under Jiang.1
92
 From Central Administration to Party Control 93

Faced with challenges from dissident politicians and rebellious “new warlords,”
as well as threats from the Communists and the Japanese militarists, the Nation-
alists made great efforts to consolidate their power through the establishment
of a modern state apparatus and reforms in China’s finance, education, com-
munication, defense, and light industry. In order to meet the need for highly
trained experts and specialists in various fields, further expansion of educational
exchanges with foreign countries, especially the United States, became essential
to the survival and success of the Nationalist regime.
Qinghua, as a unique institution in China’s higher education and interna-
tional educational exchange, was the prime target for political control and edu-
cational reform under the new Nationalist regime. However, its early effort to
impose tight control over Qinghua was impeded by infighting among competing
government offices. Legally, the University Council (Daxueyuan) had authority
over all educational institutions in China, including Qinghua. The Foreign Min-
istry, claiming its special historical ties, refused to give up its control over the
school completely. Unwilling to damage his relations with the Foreign Ministry
or interrupt students’ education at Qinghua, Cai Yuanpei, the director of the Uni-
versity Council, agreed to put Qinghua under joint jurisdiction. Recognizing the
concession made by Cai, the Foreign Ministry allowed the University Council to
play a major role in managing Qinghua.2 Once the agreement was reached, the
two offices began to work on the reorganization of Qinghua immediately. By the
end of July 1928, the Bylaws of the National Qinghua University (Guoli Qinghua
Daxue Tiaoli) were completed, providing a new framework for Qinghua.
The Nationalist reform effort at Qinghua was not well received in Wash-
ington. Tang Yueliang, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, did contact John
MacMurray before the new Bylaws were made public. However, MacMurray
refused to give his support because he believed that all the drastic changes were
made without consulting the American legation and that the request for his
approval was done “apparently as a matter of courtesy.” Unwilling to give up
American influence and control over Qinghua so easily, MacMurray tried to
press the Chinese government, as he and many of his predecessors had done
in the past, to alter its decisions. He deplored the abolition of the old board of
directors of Qinghua College and warned that if the proposed changes were im-
plemented by the Nationalist government, he would consider it a “violation of
the understanding upon which the American government was giving the money
month by month” and reconsider “whether the Board thus set up by the national
government was in fact the same legal entity as that to which I am, for my part,
authorized to pay the monthly installment.” MacMurray urged Tang to contact
Dr. Wang Zhengting (C. T. Wang), the foreign minister, “explaining the matter
and asking him to proceed slowly and to do whatever might be possible to avoid
the presentation of such an issue, with the appearance of having slapped in the
face of those who have desired to be helpful to China.”3
MacMurray’s warning had little effect on the new Nationalist government.
Tang told the American minister that the Government Council (Zhengfuyuan)
 94 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

had committed itself and would not withdraw from the position it had taken.4
Infuriated by Tang’s response, MacMurray took steps to increase pressure on the
Nationalist regime. On August 1, 1928, he sent a note to Tang, denouncing the
elimination of the old board of directors of Qinghua and declaring that he would
not sit on the board of trustees of the Qinghua Endowment Fund, as the new By-
laws provided.5 A few days later, MacMurray also revealed his discontent over
the appointment of Luo Jialun (Chia Lun Lo), a former secretary of Jiang Jieshi
and deputy provost of the Central Party School (Zhongyang Dangwu Xuexiao) of
the Nationalist Party, as the new president of Qinghua University by refusing to
express any opinion on the issue.6 Caring little about MacMurray’s opposition, the
Nationalist government went ahead, announcing the appointment of Luo Jialun
in mid-August, and issuing the new Bylaws a couple of weeks later.7 According
to the new Bylaws, the school was renamed as the National Qinghua University
(Guoli Qinghua Daxue) and would be run jointly by the University Council and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a national university, its mission was to “seek
the independent development of Chinese scholarship for the construction of a
new China.” Since the American minister refused to serve on the board of trustees
for the Qinghua Endowment Fund, the Bylaws did not include it as part of the
organizational structure of Qinghua. The management of Qinghua was put in the
hands of a new board of directors composed of nine Chinese members appointed
by the University Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.8
Despite the absence of endorsement from the American legation, Luo Jia-
lun was sworn in as the first president of Qinghua University appointed by the
Nationalist government on September 18, 1928. The ceremony was attended by
numerous high-ranking Nationalist officials and officers. In his inaugural speech,
Luo told his audience that the goal of the Nationalist revolution was to obtain
independence, freedom, and equal status for China. In order to gain such a status,
Luo continued, China’s academia had to be independent and free first. It was for
that purpose, Luo explained, that Qinghua was changed into a national univer-
sity. He formally declared that “Qinghua’s life as a preparatory school for Chi-
nese students to be educated in the United States has come to an end and its life
as a complete and comprehensive national university has started.” As a national
university, Luo emphasized, Qinghua should naturally be devoted to the study
and development of Chinese culture. Studying sciences and Western culture was
important to Luo. However, he believed that it could be done more effectively
through inviting top-ranked scholars from the West to teach at Qinghua.9
With strong support from the Nationalist government, Luo started his re-
form of Qinghua right after the inauguration. Within a few months, he managed
to reorganize many departments and administrative offices, increase enroll-
ment, require all students to pay tuition fees, revise the curriculum, start military
training for all students, and raise salaries for professors, especially those with
national reputations. Besides organizational and curricular changes, Luo termi-
nated all employment contracts signed by the old Qinghua School. New one-
year contracts were issued by the university to all faculty members, including
 From Central Administration to Party Control 95

American teachers, on October 29, 1928. Although the step was taken to make
sure that only qualified teachers would be hired to teach at the new national uni-
versity, it effectively ended the guaranteed employment enjoyed by American
teachers at Qinghua.10 As a result, the number of American teachers dropped
from twenty-five in 1918 to about a handful in 1928. Like their Chinese coun-
terparts, American teachers had to have college degrees, preferably a master’s or
doctorate.11 With the reduction in number, the influence and power of American
teachers at Qinghua quickly declined.
Besides the immediate changes, Luo worked out a comprehensive and
long-term reform plan for Qinghua. In order to turn Qinghua into a real national
university, Luo wanted to add science labs, enlarge the library, build more dor-
mitories, and buy more books and experimental instruments. The huge amount
of money needed for the expansion, according to Luo, should come from Qing-
hua’s exchange programs with the United States. He proposed to reduce the
number of students sent to the United States each year between 1929 and 1931
to ten and to limit their stay in the United States to three years. Whether any
students would be sent to the United States after 1931 was a decision that would
be made later. Unhappy to see that three-fifths of Qinghua’s annual revenue was
spent to support a huge number of students in the United States, Luo wanted to
limit the budget for educational exchanges to $480,000 a year. To Luo, cutting
the exchange program with the United States would not only help the current
transformation of Qinghua, but also secure a solid financial foundation for the
future of the university.12
Luo’s plan to expand Qinghua at the expense of educational exchanges
with the United States was vehemently opposed by the board of directors.
Dominated by members appointed by the Foreign Ministry who deeply cared
about China’s relations with the United States, the board did not want to
further antagonize Washington right after throwing the Americans out of the
management of Qinghua. Openly rejecting Luo’s expansion plan, the board
refused to approve the Qinghua Endowment funds for construction projects at
its first meeting in Nanjing on November 29, 1928.13 Unable to get any sup-
port from the board of directors, Luo had to get loans from banks to build the
desperately needed dormitory, biology hall, library addition, and the weather
station.14 Unhappy about Luo’s insistence on expansion and his planned reduc-
tion of exchange programs, the board decided to cut the university’s budget at
its second meeting, in April 1929, so that Qinghua could send thirty students
to the United States every year.15
The board’s decisions, aimed at maintaining amicable relations with
Washington, deeply antagonized professors and students at Qinghua, who be-
lieved that the future of the university was threatened. As soon as they heard
the rumor that half of Qinghua’s funds had fallen victim to mismanagement
and graft, Qinghua students and faculty launched a movement demanding the
abolition of the board of directors, an audit of all Qinghua accounts, and termi-
nation of the administrative supervision by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On
 96 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

April 6, the Faculty Council met and decided to resign collectively to protest
the board’s rejection of the development plan approved by the faculty and to
urge the reorganization of the board of directors. On the next day, Qinghua
students held a meeting, making similar demands. In addition to the abolition
of the board of directors, the students asked the government to give the com-
plete charge of Qinghua to the Ministry of Education, which had replaced the
University Council in October 1928. They believed that placing the university
under the control of the Ministry of Education would make American interfer-
ence almost impossible and make Qinghua a completely Chinese institution.16
The Senate articulated its concerns at a meeting on April 8, insisting that fac-
ulty should have the power to run the university and sending two professors to
Nanjing to petition the government.17
Luo Jialun showed his indignation at the board’s decision by turning in
his resignation in April 1929. In his resignation letter and his interview with
reporters in Shanghai, Luo continued his attack on the drastic budget cut, the
confusing affiliation of Qinghua under both Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Education, and the mismanagement of Qinghua funds by the Foreign Ministry
and the American legation.18 Luo’s open criticism further intensified the debate
over the future of Qinghua. The Ministry of Education gave its sympathy and
support to the anti-board movement. Jiang Mengling, the Minister of Education,
issued an order on April 20, 1929, praising the reforms made by Luo at Qinghua
and asking him to stay in office. In order to have Luo withdraw his resignation,
Jiang promised to review Qinghua’s budget with the Foreign Ministry and make
sure that Qinghua would have enough funds to add buildings and equipment.
Jiang especially emphasized that the reforms at Qinghua should be carried out
according to Luo’s original plan.19
Greatly encouraged by the support from the Ministry of Education, Luo Jia-
lun took his case directly to the top Nationalist leaders. It was with the approval
of the National Affairs Council (Guowu Weiyuanhui), the highest government
office, with Jiang Jieshi, Dai Jitao, and Chen Lifu among its members, that Qing-
hua was finally put under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education on
May 10, 1929. Once in control, the Ministry of Education took immediate steps
to complete the transformation of Qinghua. It first formally abolished the board
of directors, removing the obstacle to further reforms at Qinghua. Secondly, it
transferred the Qinghua Endowment to the CFPEC, with Washington’s reluctant
approval. Thirdly, it fixed the budget for Qinghua at 1.2 million Chinese yuan
a year and limited the number of Qinghua students in the United States to forty
after 1934 so as to safeguard funds for Qinghua. On August 20, 1929, as the
transfer of the Qinghua Endowment funds was completed, the board of trustees
of the Qinghua Endowment was abolished.20 With the abolition of these two
boards, Washington could no longer exert any direct control over Qinghua.
Although unhappy with what was happening at Qinghua, the American
diplomats and officials had to recognize and accept the changes. MacMur-
ray complained that what happened in Qinghua was lawless and anarchical,
 From Central Administration to Party Control 97

believed that the chaos in Qinghua was condoned and supported by govern-
ment officials, and worried that Washington would lose all of its influence on
Qinghua if many American faculty members resigned.21 The State Depart-
ment was unhappy with MacMurray’s handling of the matter and questioned
his earlier decision to refuse serving on the board of trustees of the Qinghua
Endowment.22 However, when the mechanism for direct American interven-
tion in the management of Qinghua was removed in May 1929, the Division
of Far Eastern Affairs agreed with MacMurray that the United States govern-
ment “could not avoid being placed in the embarrassing position of having to
assume responsibility without being able to exercise any real influence” over
developments at Qinghua. It therefore recommended that the State Department
abandon the “attempts to interfere in the enterprises of education maintained
by the use of the 1908 indemnity remission” and that “participation by the
Legation in matters related to the 1908 indemnity remission should be con-
fined to the actual mechanics of the remission, unless the Chinese authorities
themselves should consult the Legation or the Department in regard to some
unusual circumstances.”23
The Division of Far Eastern Affairs made its recommendations with great
reluctance and deep consideration. It was forced to give up the “right” that
Washington had held so dear for two decades for several strong reasons. First, it
recognized that with twenty years of experience in handling the remissions, the
Chinese no longer needed the State Department to provide its advice and assis-
tance. Second, it had become more difficult for the State Department, especially
in more recent years, to provide such advice and assistance without provoking
strong resentment and even protest from Chinese educators, students, and offi-
cials because of the rising nationalism in China. Third, the Chinese government
wanted to reduce the number of students to be sent to this country because “the
policy initiated in 1908 of sending young Chinese students to the United States
had not, in the opinion of many persons, proved of advantage to China.”24 The
division’s analysis and explanation were so convincing that they were accepted
by the State Department immediately and completely.
Qinghua officially ended its mission as a preparatory school in 1929 and
began its rapid rise as one of the most prestigious national universities in China.
Although much of the concern and criticism from some Chinese educators and
students on the educational use of the returned Boxer Indemnity were well
founded, the significance of the first joint experiment carried out by the United
States and Chinese governments should not be overlooked. With the return of
the Boxer Indemnity and the support from both governments, educational ex-
changes between the two nations expanded to an unprecedented level within
two decades. Qinghua was able to send 1,289 students, including 180 indemnity
students, 53 female students, and 67 graduate students to the United States be-
tween 1909 and 1929.25 It also provided scholarships for another 1,876 private
students who were studying in the United States to help them complete their
education.26 In other words, Qinghua managed to provide full or partial financial
 98 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

support for over three thousand Chinese students pursuing higher education in
the United States during this period. According to the original plan, China was
expected to send one hundred students to the United States each year in the first
four years beginning in 1909 and fifty each year in the following years until
1940. A total of eighteen hundred Chinese students would be sent to the United
States during the thirty-two-year period. Although Qinghua was unable to send
one hundred students in any of the first four years, it did dispatch more than fifty
students in most of the following years.27 As a result, Qinghua, by 1929, had
already sent 76 percent more students to the United States than the total planned
for thirty-two years. (See Appendix D.)
The number of students sent by Qinghua to the United States is more im-
pressive when it is put in comparative and historical perspectives. Between 1909
and 1929, Qinghua sent ten times more government-sponsored students to the
United States than during the previous six decades. Since all Qinghua students
entered colleges and universities in America, they outnumbered those who sought
higher education in the United States between 1847 and 1909 by over two times.
According to a survey done in 1954, American colleges and universities admit-
ted 5,293 Chinese students between 1909 and 1929. Since all Qinghua students,
including scholarship students, attended colleges and universities in the United
States, they accounted for about 60 percent of that total.28 It was these Qinghua
students, Wang Shuhuai convincingly argued, who not only helped keep a high
percentage of government-sponsored students in the United States, but also sur-
passed the number of students sent to Europe and caught up with that in Japan
by the end of the 1920s. As a result, the United States replaced Japan as the top
choice for Chinese students seeking higher education overseas.29
With high-quality education received in China, Qinghua graduates were
able to enter and graduate from 128 colleges and universities in thirty-two
states in the United States, including the most prestigious ones. For example,
Columbia University admitted 179 Qinghua students, Harvard University 113,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 112, University of Wisconsin 95, and
University of Chicago 92.30 With strong academic abilities and superior financial
support, the vast majority of Qinghua students obtained college degrees in the
United States.31 According to the available statistics of 1,289 Qinghua students,
254 of them, about 20 percent, earned doctoral degrees; 544, about 42 percent,
won their master’s degrees; and 336, about 26 percent, received baccalaureate
degrees. Between 1909 and 1936, about six hundred Chinese students received
doctoral degrees from American colleges and universities; Qinghua graduates
accounted for 42 percent.32
The vast majority of Qinghua graduates returned to China right after
completing their educational programs in the United States and played impor-
tant roles in almost all fields. According to statistics provided by Qinghua Uni-
versity in the late 1920s, about eight hundred Qinghua students had returned
from the United States by 1926. Most of them, about three hundred in total,
served in the field of education. Ten of them became university presidents and
 From Central Administration to Party Control 99

forty served as provosts or department chairmen. About one hundred Qinghua

students worked in engineering, with twenty serving as principal engineers.
Among the sixty Qinghua students who engaged in business, fifteen held po-
sitions as president or manager. Ten of the fifty Qinghua students who were
employed in the banking industry became bank directors. Fifty Qinghua stu-
dents worked in government as diplomats. Given the fact that the first Qing-
hua students only began to return to China in the mid-1910s, Cao Yunxiang
proudly claimed that “Qinghua would not be humbled when its achievements
were compared with that of any foreign universities.”33
Hu Shi is probably one of the best examples of the many Qinghua grad-
uates who became leaders in their fields after their return to China. Having
passed the examination for the indemnity scholarship with a great score in Chi-
nese composition, Hu left for Cornell University as one of the second group
of indemnity students in 1910. After losing interest in agriculture, his origi-
nal major, Hu turned to the study of philosophy, earning his B.A. from Cornell
and Ph.D. from Columbia University. Influenced by Harriet Monroe’s Poetry:
A Magazine of Verse, Hu began to advocate and practice literary writing in ver-
nacular language (baihua) instead of classical language (wenyanwen) while he
was a student at Cornell. As soon as he returned to Beijing in 1917, Hu became
one of the most prominent leaders of the New Cultural Movement (Xin Wenhua
Yundong), critically reevaluating Chinese heritage, and advocating Western learn-
ing and ideas.34
The impact and influence of Qinghua students returned from the United
States increased exponentially with time. When Chinese scientists elected the
first group of fellows for the Academia Sinica in 1948, fifty-two of the eighty-
one fellows were scholars returned from the United States. Among the fifty-
two American-educated fellows, twenty-nine, about 56 percent of them, were
Qinghua graduates.35 Eight of them served in the Section of Mathematics and
Physics, nine in the Section of Biology, twelve in the Section of Humanities.
If Qinghua students who graduated after 1929 and Qinghua professors were
counted, the number would reach thirty-four, very close to half of the total.36
There was no other Chinese school that could match Qinghua’s achievement
and contribution.
The decisive actions taken by the Nationalist government helped Qing-
hua complete the transformation from a preparatory school into a national uni-
versity and end Washington’s direct intervention in its management. However,
these significant changes did not prevent China’s educational exchanges with
the United States from expanding during the Nationalist era. For the National-
ists, sending students to foreign countries, especially the United States, was not
only important for maintaining good diplomatic relations, but also essential for
consolidating their rule in China. Aimed at building a strong and independent
nation under the leadership of their own party, the Nationalists were determined
to establish an effective central administration over educational exchange and
use it for their own political gain.
 100 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

The CFPEC and Educational Exchanges

Although Qinghua continued to send students to the United States after it
became a national university, the CFPEC began to play a more important role
in promoting and sponsoring educational and cultural exchanges between the
United States and China. Just like Qinghua, the CFPEC went through dramatic
reorganization after the Nationalists took power. Once the Nationalist govern-
ment had put its handpicked members on the board of directors, it actually al-
lowed the CFPEC to continue and even expand educational exchanges with the
United States without too much interruption. Although concerned about the Na-
tionalist interference, Washington stayed away from direct intervention as long
as the CFPEC could carry out its normal functions. As a result, educational
exchanges between the two nations continued to expand under the tight control
of the Nationalist Party during the first decade of the Nationalist era.
The Nationalists had problems with the organization of the CFPEC from
the very beginning. Yang Xingfo, the secretary of Nationalist leader Sun Yat-
sen, openly expressed his distrust of the original members of the board of direc-
tors appointed by the northern warlord government in 1924. He demanded that
Cai Yuanpei and Wang Jingwei, two scholars with close ties to the Nationalist
Party, be placed on the board; that special committees be set up with Chinese
scholars in various fields to determine the use of the returned Boxer Indemnity;
and that the Bylaws of the China Foundation be revised so that one-third of the
directors would be elected every year by educational and scholarly societies.37
Since Sun’s Nationalist government had little influence outside of Guangdong
Province at that time, Yang’s demand was ignored.
The Nationalists’ position could no longer be ignored once they estab-
lished control over large parts of South China and set up their capital in Nanjing.
When the Nationalist government sought immediate reorganization of the
CFPEC in mid-1927, its demand was treated seriously. Fully aware of the changes
in China’s political environment, Paul Monroe, the vice president of the board
of directors of the CFPEC, took a special trip to China. His main object was to
discuss the organization of the CFPEC with Nationalist government officials.
At the request of the government, Huang Yanpei and Ding Wenjiang resigned
from the board. Cai Yuanpei and Hu Shi, two intellectuals who were trusted by
the Nationalist Party, were elected to replace them in June 1927. However, such
a minor change failed to satisfy the Nationalists, especially when their army
pushed further north and got closer to Beijing. In July 1928, the Nationalist gov-
ernment announced that the CFPEC approved by a warlord government should
be abolished, that its Bylaws should be revised so that all future directors would
be appointed by the government rather than elected by the board, and that five
more new directors would be added by the Nationalist government.38
The Nationalist decision received a strong protest from the Americans.
Paul Monroe sent telegrams and letters to the new Chinese government asking
for the delay of the reorganization of the CFPEC. He warned that such a drastic
 From Central Administration to Party Control 101

reorganization would have a negative impact on the friendly relations between

the two nations.39 Paul Monroe’s warning was quickly reinforced by Washing-
ton. Having heard the Nationalist government’s plan to change the Bylaws of the
CFPEC, which had been laid out by the United States government, MacMur-
ray sent a report to Washington recommending that the indemnity remission be
stopped.40 With strong support from the State Department, MacMurray sent a
telegram to the Nationalist government in early October, issuing a formal warn-
ing that the return of the Boxer Indemnity would be stopped if the Bylaws of the
CFPEC were unilaterally revised by the Chinese government.41
The serious warnings from Washington finally caught the attention of
the Nationalist leaders. Although it insisted that it had the power to change the
Bylaws and the organization of the CFPEC board of directors without consult-
ing Washington, the Nationalist government began to look for a way out. Jiang
Mengling, a former Qinghua scholarship recipient and the new Minister of
Education, decided to invite all former directors to convene a board meeting of
the CFPEC. Although Jiang’s decision in effect recognized the legitimacy of
the CFPEC and its board of directors appointed by the previous regime, Paul
Monroe believed that the abolition order issued by the Nationalist government
in July could not be formally repealed by a letter from the Minister of Educa-
tion. He demanded more formal action from the Nationalist government, warn-
ing that the Department of the Treasury might not be able to return the Boxer
Indemnity to China any longer since the original receiving agency had been
abolished by the Chinese government. In order to avoid any possible delay of
the Boxer Indemnity remission, the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist govern-
ment issued a formal order on December 25, 1928, to convene the old board
of directors.42
The third executive meeting of the CFPEC board of directors was finally
held in early January 1929. In order to keep the foundation alive, the directors
had to swallow the humiliation and make necessary compromises. Although
the five directors disliked by the Nationalists resigned and the five candidates
appointed by the government were all elected to the board, Hu Shi resigned so
as to make the election look better. Aware of the American resentment toward
Wang Jingwei, Hu Shi persuaded the directors to assign to Wang the shortest
term, which would last less than six months. As for the Bylaws, no serious re-
visions were made.43 Since the legal status of the board of directors was fully
recognized and the Bylaws remained basically intact, the CFPEC was able to
receive the remission of the Boxer Indemnity without interruption and continue
to play an important role in educational exchange with the United States.
Through the reorganization of the board of directors, the Nationalist gov-
ernment gained more influence and control over the CFPEC. Confident in its
control, the government transferred the management of the Qinghua Endow-
ment to the CFPEC on August 2, 1929. Taking its new responsibilities seriously,
the CFPEC examined Qinghua’s books carefully. When it found out that the
university had borrowed over 1.6 million Chinese yuan in the past, the CFPEC
 102 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

sent a letter to Qinghua on August 22, 1929, reminding it of the debt and inform-
ing it of the decision made by the CFPEC board that payment would be made
from the indemnity remission beginning in 1932.44 Although the CFPEC was in
charge of receiving all of the Boxer Indemnity remission and managing the Qin-
ghua Endowment, only the Nationalist government had the power to decide how
much could be spent on supporting Qinghua students in the United States.45 In
order to put more money into building Qinghua University, the Nationalist gov-
ernment stopped sending Qinghua students to America beginning in 1930. As
a result, Qinghua’s expenditure for supporting students in the United States de-
clined quickly from 1,223,824 yuan in 1928 to 573,096 yuan in 1932. With the
drastic savings, Qinghua’s annual budget for the University itself was increased
from 743,262 yuan in 1928 to 1,654,800 yuan in 1930, and then to 1,843,737
yuan in 1931. By the early 1930s, Qinghua spent two-thirds of its funds for the
maintenance and development of the university, a complete reversal from the
traditional practice prior to 1929.46
Once the further expansion of Qinghua was guaranteed, the Nationalist
government authorized it to send students to the United States for three years
beginning in 1933. Officially named Qinghua University Government Scholar-
ship Students Sent to the United States (Qinghua Daxue LiuMei Gongfeisheng),
the first group had twenty-four students. The number decreased to twenty in
1934 and then jumped to thirty in 1935. Although the Ministry of Education
issued an order in 1936 to extend the program for another three years, only
eighteen students were sent in that year.47 By sending a much smaller number
of students to the United States in the 1930s, Qinghua was able to keep the cost
at a lower level. In the 1933–34 fiscal year, Qinghua spent only about 470,000
yuan to support students in the United States. The cost dropped to 280,000 yuan
the next year and remained at 220,000 a year between 1935 and 1940, averaging
about one-fifth of the university’s annual expenditure.48
When Qinghua was preparing to select the fifth group of students to be
sent to the United States, Japan launched its attack on Chinese troops at Lugou
(Marco Polo) Bridge on July 7, 1937. The Japanese troops occupied Beijing
by the end of the month and moved into Qinghua in August. As the Japanese
troops turned the campus into barracks and stables, Qinghua students and fac-
ulty fled to the South.49 Following orders from the Nationalist government, Qing-
hua joined with Peking University and Nankai University to form a Temporary
University (Linshi Daxue) in Changsha, Hunan Province, in August 1937.50
When the Temporary University was ready for classes on November 1, 1938,
over six hundred Qinghua students had arrived from different parts of China. In
February 1938, the Temporary University was ordered to move further west to
Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, as the Japanese army was approach-
ing Changsha. Once the students and faculty members arrived in Kunming in
April, the Temporary University was renamed by the Nationalist government as
the Southwest Associate University (Xinan Lianhe Daxue). The new Associate
University was run by an executive committee, with presidents from the three
 From Central Administration to Party Control 103

universities serving as its members. Mei Yiqi, the president of Qinghua, served
as the chairman of the executive committee in the first two years.51
Unable to send any students abroad in the early years of war because of
extreme financial difficulties, Qinghua, with help from the CFPEC, managed to
continue its support for forty plus students already in the United States. When
the Nationalist government decided to stop paying the Boxer Indemnity to for-
eign powers beginning in 1939 because of its war with Japan, Qinghua lost its
most important source of revenue since Washington had no money to return to
China. In order to deal with Qinghua’s budget problems, Chen Lifu, the new
Minister of Education, issued a strict order on April 24, 1939, asking the
CFPEC to allow Qinghua to use the interest earned by the Qinghua Endowment
in the previous years for its daily operation. The gap between the interest earnings
and the budget would be filled with bank loans backed by the central govern-
ment.52 Although the CFPEC was not happy with Chen’s order, it broke the
general rule of the Qinghua Endowment, which banned the use of the principal
and interest before the remission was completed, and sent the money to Qinghua
as required by the government.53 Upon receiving the funds, Qinghua decided to
spend US$35,000, over half of the American dollars given by the CFPEC, to
support Qinghua scholarship students in the United States.54
Once its financial condition became stabilized with funds from the
CFPEC, Qinghua University began to plan the selection of the fifth group of
students to be sent to the United States. Following a vague instruction from the
Ministry of Education issued in August 1939, the University Affairs Commis-
sion of Qinghua adopted a resolution on November 2, 1939, announcing that the
university would resume the program of sending students to the United States
and that the number would be kept at twenty.55 Early the next year, the sub-
ject fields in which students would be selected were determined by the Senate
and approved by the Nationalist government. President Mei Yiqi made it very
clear that sending students to the United States would not only meet the nation’s
needs for highly trained experts, but also continue the thirty-one-year-old mis-
sion of Qinghua.56
Following Qinghua’s tradition, the selection was handled with strict rules.
A special committee was organized with the permission of the Ministry of Edu-
cation. With Mei as its chairman, seven professors and one official from the
Ministry of Education were appointed as members. The committee had the au-
thority to make the rules for the examination, set the criteria for the selection,
and appoint test givers and graders. After several months of preparation, the
examinations were given in Kunming and Chongqing in August 1940. Students
taking the examination at Chongqing had to switch the test site because of the
Japanese air raid. Since graders were scattered throughout the Southwest, it took
several months to have all the tests graded. Once all test scores came out in mid-
February 1941, the committee chose sixteen students to be sent to the United
States. Because of the low scores of students who chose to take examinations in
warship making, weaponry, hydraulic power stations, and airplane engines, the
 104 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

committee decided that no students should be sent to the United States in those
fields that year.57 All sixteen candidates were college graduates with working
experience. Nine of them graduated from Qinghua University.58 They left for the
United States in summer 1941. Only fourteen managed to arrive in America that
year. Two were delayed by disease and transportation difficulties.
As soon as the selection of the fifth group was completed, preparation for
the examination for the sixth group of students to be sent to the United States
began at Qinghua in April 1941.59 However, the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor
and the freezing of foreign assets in the United States forced Qinghua Univer-
sity to postpone the selection to 1943. The examinations were finally held in
Kunming, Chongqing, Guilin, and Chengdu in August 1943. The grading of the
tests was only completed in summer 1944. Among 370 plus applicants, only
twenty-two qualified with passing grades.60 Although the selected students be-
gan to apply for their passports, exit visas, foreign currency, and transportation
tickets in summer 1944, they were unable to get any of these until mid-1945.
They were finally able to take their trips to the United States later that year with
help from Mei Yiqi.61
In addition to sending new government-sponsored students to the United
States, Qinghua offered subsidies for privately sponsored students who were at-
tending American colleges and universities during the war years. According to
the regulations adopted by the university Senate on February 5, 1940, privately
sponsored students with excellent grades could apply for Qinghua subsidies
if they had financial difficulties while attending colleges in the United States.
Qualified students could receive US$40 a month for up to a year. Renewal
of the subsidy was allowed only if there was a surplus of grants. The num-
ber of recipients was capped at fifteen a year. The University planned to run
the program for three years and the China Institute in America was authorized
to accept applications from students in the United States.62 Established by the
CFPEC in New York City in 1924, the China Institute was charged to enhance
educational and cultural relations between the United States and China.63 It
was reorganized by activists in 1930 and began to receive subsidies from the
CFPEC beginning in 1930, ranging from 10,000 to 30,000 yuan annually.64
When Qinghua began to send students to the United States again in 1933, Mei
Yiqi appointed Meng Chih, the chairman of the board of directors of the China
Institute, as director of the Chinese Educational Mission in the United States.
Therefore, it was natural for Qinghua to ask the China Institute to accept and
evaluate applications for its scholarships. With the help from Meng Chih, Qing-
hua awarded ten scholarships to self-sponsored Chinese students in the United
States in 1940. In 1941, the China Institute forwarded thirty-six applications
for Qinghua scholarships to the university and six got the scholarship.65 How-
ever, the scholarship for self-sponsored students in the United States was termi-
nated by Qinghua at the end of 1942.66
The scholarship for self-sponsored students soon attracted attention from
many junior faculty members at Qinghua who wanted to use the funds to further
 From Central Administration to Party Control 105

their own education. Xia Xiang (Hsia Hsiang), a young teacher in the Depart-
ment of Physical Education, sent a formal letter to the university Senate on April
18, 1941, asking for a university subsidy for a research trip to the United States.
Aware of the tight budget for the university, Xia proposed to have a subsidy
equivalent to a scholarship for a self-sponsored student.67 Xia’s application was
strongly endorsed by his supervisor, Professor John Mo.68 The university soon
approved applications from Xia as well as five other junior faculty members.
Since the scholarship for self-sponsored students was less than half the amount
offered to regular government-sponsored students, the junior faculty members
sent to the United States were called semi-government-sponsored students (ban
guanfeisheng).69 While appreciating the opportunity given by the university,
many junior faculty members criticized the inadequate financial support from
Qinghua. Thirteen instructors sent a letter to the president, complaining that
they had to work for five years with the heaviest workload and lowest pay at
Qinghua before they could have the opportunity to further their education in
the United States with less than half of the scholarship enjoyed by students who
only needed to pass just a few examinations. They demanded that the university
increase the number and amount of the scholarships for junior faculty members,
provide subsidies to cover their return tickets, tuition, and clothing needed for
international travel, and come up with a loan plan so that they could borrow
American dollars from the university.70
Besides helping Qinghua maintain educational ties with the United States,
the CFPEC itself sponsored and ran numerous programs promoting educational
exchanges between the United States and China since the end of the 1920s.
Among all the programs operated directly by the CFPEC, the Scientific Re-
search Fellowships cost the most money and had the most recipients. Proposed
by Fan Yuanlian in 1927, the fellowships were first awarded in three categories
in 1928.71 The Class A fellowships, amounting to 3,000–4,000 Chinese yuan
annually, were awarded to established scientists capable of conducting scientific
research independently. The Class B fellowships, offering 1,000–2,000Chinese
yuan annually, were granted to junior researchers with at least college degrees to
conduct scientific research under the guidance of senior experts. With a minimal
annual subsidy of 250–500 Chinese yuan, the Class C fellowships were given
to those who were interested in research but were short of funds. Between 1928
and 1941, the CFPEC awarded 594 fellowships to Chinese scholars and stu-
dents. Of these, 330 recipients used their fellowships to conduct their research
abroad. Over half of those who did research overseas, 173 to be exact, chose to
go to the United States. The CFPEC sent many American-trained scientists to
European countries in order to give them “a chance to see how scientific work
was conducted in Europe.”72
As the war with Japan made international travel increasingly more diffi-
cult, the CFPEC began to award Foreign Fellowships to Chinese students and
scholars overseas in 1938. In 1939, the CCFPEC renewed the fellowships for
twelve Chinese students and scholars studying overseas. Seven of the recipients
 106 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

were in the United States. All the new fellowships awarded in that year, ten
in total, were given to Chinese students and scholars in American colleges
and universities.73 The trend continued in 1940. Among thirty-nine fellowships
awarded, nine were given to Chinese students and scholars in the United States
and nine were given to the Chinese students and scholars planning to go to the
United States. In addition to the eight hundred Chinese yuan regularly com-
ing with the fellowship, recipients in 1940 began to receive two hundred yuan
to cover their trip to or from the United States.74 It is clear that the Scientific
Research Fellowships and Foreign Fellowships offered by the CFPEC during
the early war years made it possible for a large number of Chinese students
and scholars to conduct and complete their research in the United States and
other foreign countries. In his review of the work done by the CFPEC, Ren
Hongjuan, the executive secretary of the CFPEC, concluded that the success of
the Scientific Research Fellowship was unmatched by any other study abroad
programs during this period.75
In addition to the Scientific Research Fellowships, the CFPEC provided
generous help for a large number of American-trained scientists to conduct and
maintain their research in China through the Scientific Teaching Fellowships
(Kexue Jiaoxi). Improving science education was one of the most important
goals for the CFPEC since its inception. During his investigation of Chinese
education in 1921, Paul Monroe pointed out that there were serious problems in
China’s science education. The worst was seen in secondary education with too
much dependence on textbooks and too little experimental experience in labs.
Monroe’s observation was reiterated by George Twiss, a professor of education
at Ohio State University, who visited 190 schools in China between 1922 and
1924. Twiss concluded that the best way to improve China’s science education
was to enhance the quality of science teachers through various kinds of train-
ing.76 His proposal was not only applauded by Chinese educators, but also ad-
opted by the CFPEC as a blueprint to improve China’s science education.77
In order to help as many schools as possible, the CFPEC subsidized uni-
versities to train secondary school science teachers. It began to award Scientific
Teaching Fellowships to faculty members at six major universities in Beijing,
Nanjing, Shenyang, Chengdu, Wuchang, and Guangzhou in 1926. It originally
planned to set up thirty-five professorships every year for seven years. Although
the foundation was unable to grant as many fellowships as it desired, the pro-
gram lasted much longer than originally planned. According to the CFPEC
rules, the fellowship was granted in one- to three-year terms. The term could
be renewed and a year-long sabbatical leave would be paid by the CFPEC with
travel subsidies after serving six years. Each year, the recipient would not only
receive a full salary, about three thousand yuan, but also a large allowance of
between ten and thirty thousand yuan from the CFPEC. The generous support
from the CFPEC attracted a large number of highly qualified candidates, includ-
ing many scholars returned from the United States. Among all 161 scientists
who received the Scientific Teaching Fellowships from the CFPEC between
 From Central Administration to Party Control 107

1926 and 1935, forty-four had educational experiences in foreign countries and
twenty-five of them returned from the United States.78 With the support from the
CFPEC, many American-trained scientists were able to continue their research
and teaching in China during a very difficult period.
Through Qinghua and numerous other programs, the China Foundation
was able to support scores of Chinese students and scholars to receive educa-
tion in the United States and conduct research in both countries. The absolute
number might not be that impressive, especially in the late 1930s. However, it
represented a large percentage of students and scholars sent by China to the
United States during those years. Once the war with Japan started, the CFPEC
soon became the only agency that still had some financial resources to support
educational exchanges between the two nations.

Establishing Central Administration over Exchanges

Taking over Qinghua and reorganizing the CFPRC were only the first
steps for the Nationalist regime to establish effective central administration
over China’s educational exchanges with foreign nations. While education was
deemed vital by the Nationalists in establishing a new state and maintaining
their party’s dominant position on China’s political stage, sending students
abroad was viewed as an important venue to train high-level experts and win
staunch political supporters for the Nationalist cause. As it gradually consoli-
dated its power in education, finance, and foreign affairs, the Nationalist regime
took steps to put study abroad under effective central control. It was during the
Nationalist era that the central government was finally able to tell all students
what criteria they had to meet in order to pursue education abroad, what they
should study in foreign colleges and universities, how long they could stay over-
seas for educational purposes, and what they should do after the completion
of their educational programs in foreign countries. The Nationalist success in
establishing central control over educational exchanges was truly remarkable
given its relatively weak political and military positions outside eastern and cen-
tral provinces during the same period.
Although the Qing Court and all the regimes during the early Republic
years played an important role in China’s study abroad programs, none of them
was able to establish an effective central control over education or educational
exchanges with foreign nations because of their lack of political and financial
resources. In the final years of the Qing Dynasty, the real power, as Sally Borth-
wick accurately pointed out, was “to a large extent delegated to regional and
provincial leaders.”79 As a result, provincial and local officials sent more stu-
dents abroad than the central government. With more students going abroad, the
Qing Court tried to set up rules to regulate China’s study abroad programs. Yet,
the early regulations were usually brief and never seriously enforced. In 1904,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Superintendent for Education issued a
set of regulations approved by the Throne. However, it did not set any academic
 108 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

or foreign language requirements for students to be sent abroad. The only thing
that the Court was concerned about was the government supervision over the
students. It made it clear that if provinces could not afford to send supervisors
with their students, the Court would require Chinese diplomats in European
countries to keep an eye on the students.80 The Ministry of Education did issue
an order in March 1906, requiring that only middle school graduates with flu-
ency in the Japanese language should be allowed to go to Japan to attend high
school or college.81 The new rule helped reduce the flow of Chinese students to
Japan. However, its scope was narrow and its implementation still largely de-
pendent on provincial governments.
Various warlord regimes also tried to put all the study abroad programs
under centralized administrative control in the early years of the Republic. In
October 1916, a comprehensive set of regulations on study abroad was issued
by the government, giving the Ministry of Education the authority to select and
send students abroad, decide what they should study and for how long, and
supervise their activities in foreign countries. It also required students to send
their diaries to the ministry every month for examination and return to China
immediately after finishing their program abroad. All government-sponsored
students had to accept appointments made by the Ministry of Education after
their return.82 Besides the rules for government-sponsored students, the Minis-
try of Education announced regulations for self-sponsored students in 1924. It
required that self-sponsored students be middle school graduates or have a min-
imum of two years’ work experience in schools. They should apply for a certifi-
cate of study abroad from the Ministry of Education before leaving the country.
Once abroad, they should report to the Chinese agency in charge of educational
affairs and have their certificates stamped by officials. After their return to the
country, they should report to the Ministry of Education with the certificates so
that they could get another certificate that would allow them to enjoy the same
treatment as government-sponsored students in job assignment.83 It is clear that
the goal of these regulations was to put all self-sponsored students under the
control of the central government.
Many Chinese students with educational experience overseas actually
supported the government’s effort to establish effective centralized administra-
tive control over study abroad in the early years of the Republic. In an edi-
torial published in the Chinese Students’ Monthly, a journal published by the
Chinese Students Alliance in the United States, in 1914, the editor praised a
recent order issued by President Yuan Shikai that established a special office
to recruit returned students to work for the government. He believed that it was
the government’s responsibility to make every possible use of the returned stu-
dents. The editor believed that the laissez-faire policy of the central government,
which allowed the returned students “to shift for themselves after they have
come back to China,” was responsible for the failure of the study abroad pro-
grams in the past four decades.84 Despite students’ support, the warlord regimes
in Beijing were never able to implement all the regulations because of their lack
 From Central Administration to Party Control 109

of resources and control. As a result, China’s study abroad programs remained

very much decentralized until the Nationalists came into power in 1928.
Aiming at building an independent and unified China, the Nationalists
were more determined to establish centralized administrative control over all
study abroad programs from the very beginning. The new Ministry of Education
set up a special office in the Section of Higher Education to take charge of study
abroad programs.85 Qinghua, with the largest number of students in the United
States, naturally became the first target for the new regime. In December 1928,
only a couple of months after the Nationalist government took over Qinghua, the
ministry issued a new set of regulations, establishing a new office, the Student
Supervision Office of Qinghua University in the United States (Qinghua Daxue
LiuMei Xuesheng Jianduchu). According to the new regulations, the superin-
tendent would be appointed by the Minister of Education in consultation with
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than by the president of Qinghua.86 In
addition to the traditional charges, the superintendent was authorized to check,
guide, and supervise the conduct of all Qinghua students, and investigate and
report on their performances in American colleges and universities. In order to
improve the communication and supervision, the new regulation also clearly
required that all the communications between the superintendent’s office and
Qinghua University be conducted in Chinese.87
On the recommendation of Luo Jialun, Mei Yiqi, a former Qinghua gradu-
ate, was appointed superintendent by the Nationalist government in November
1928. Once in office, Mei streamlined personnel by letting go the driver, reduc-
ing the hours for the domestic assistant, reassigning the cooking responsibil-
ity to his wife, who joined him about a year later, without pay, and asking the
secretary to pick up more of the workload without increasing the salary. While
doing everything he could to cut spending, Mei opened up his office to Chinese
students in Washington, DC, and all over the United States. In order to keep stu-
dents away from “indecent” recreations like going to the dance halls, Mei orga-
nized a lot of interesting activities to attract more students.88 With his experience
as provost and then superintendent at Qinghua, Mei was fully aware that the re-
turned students had a hard time to get themselves employed while employers in
China were unable to find experts to fill their positions. In order to help Qinghua
students find suitable jobs back in China, Mei collected detailed information
on over three hundred Qinghua students in the United States and sent it back to
China in 1930 as a reference for employers. Knowing that there were thousands
more Chinese students in the United States, he pledged to include more of them
in his data bank in the future.89
Having successfully taken over Qinghua and reorganized its superinten-
dent’s office in the United States, the Nationalist government began to concen-
trate on the development of a national policy for all of China’s study abroad
programs. The Ministry of Education first conducted a survey to gather data
from students who were studying overseas as well as those who had returned to
China.90 Based on the information gathered through the survey, Zhu Jiahua, the
 110 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

education minister, reported that with over fifty-four hundred Chinese students
overseas, the nation spent about twenty million yuan annually to support them,
an amount much larger than the annual budget for all universities in China. Since
there were no strict regulations on age, qualifications, or major areas, many stu-
dents went abroad seeking general undergraduate education, rather than special-
ized graduate training. Thus, he proposed that only those with college education
and work experience, as well as those with assistant professorships, should be
sent abroad as government-sponsored students. Students sent by provincial gov-
ernments had to pass examinations given by the Ministry of Education. As for
private students, Zhu demanded that only those with college diplomas should
be sent. He hoped that, with higher qualification requirements, study abroad
would focus on training specialists needed by the nation, spending less money
and shorter time.91
The Ministry of Education began to tighten its control on study abroad
in 1929. It promptly sent orders to all provinces requiring that all students sent
abroad by provincial governments should focus on science and engineering and
be strictly tested. In order to give the central government more control over
these students, it also required that they apply for special Study Abroad Per-
mits (Liuxue Zhengshu) from the ministry before they could leave the coun-
try.92 Following the new rules, the Nationalist government issued 1,657 permits
to government-sponsored students and 1,577 self-supported students in 1929.93
In 1931, the Ministry of Education revised the regulations, requiring all stu-
dents, including government-sponsored students (gongfeisheng), self-sponsored
students (zifeisheng), and government-subsidized students (ban gongfeisheng),
to apply for Study Abroad Permits. Without the permits, students would not
be allowed to apply for student passports, government subsidies, or Indemnity
Scholarships before they left the country, or receive government jobs or official
diplomas after their return to China.94
Tougher policies on study abroad were adopted throughout the 1930s. As
part of the effort to modernize the Chinese economy and education, the minis-
try planned, in 1930, to send more students abroad for higher education in the
next six years. The exact number of students to be sent abroad and the subjects
to be studied by them would be determined by the ministry based on the need
and financial conditions.95 The new plan required that 70 percent of govern-
ment-sponsored students should study sciences, agriculture, engineering, and
medicine in order to meet the needs of economic reconstruction at home and
prepare faculty members for colleges and universities. The Nationalist govern-
ment also encouraged self-sponsored students to do the same by offering them
subsidies to study in those fields. In sharp contrast, no subsidies would be given
to students majoring in humanities or social sciences until they entered graduate
school. It also required that all government-sponsored students be experienced
and well-established professors and professionals with strong foreign language
ability. The qualification for self-sponsored students was lower. However, they
 From Central Administration to Party Control 111

still needed to be at least high school graduates and to pass language tests in
order to receive Study Abroad Permits.96
The most comprehensive regulations on study abroad were adopted in
1933. With forty-six articles, the Central Government’s Regulations on Sending
Students Abroad (Zhongyang Zhengfu Paiqian Xuesheng Liuxue Zhangcheng)
required that all government-sponsored students had to be graduates from a
recognized three-year college with more than two years’ work experience, or
from a four-year university. They should enroll in upper-division classes or
graduate schools once abroad. As for self-supported students, they had to be
graduates from three-year colleges or advanced vocational schools with two
years’ work experience. Both government- and self-sponsored students had to
apply for Study Abroad Permits from the Ministry of Education before they
could leave the country. The government-sponsored students had to complete
their educational programs in two to six years. If they refused to serve in the
province that had provided for their education, they would have to repay all
the expenses. All students were required to register their graduation diplomas
with the Ministry of Education after their return to China.97 Provincial govern-
ments could send as many students abroad as they wished. However, they had
to strictly follow the rules set up by the central government in selecting and
sending their students. Each self-sponsored student was required to have, in
addition to the Study Abroad Permit, a guarantee letter from either a firm or
an established businessman or professional who had the financial resources to
cover all the expenses for the student. A guarantor had to pledge that he would
be responsible for the financial needs and the behavior of the student while the
student was abroad.98
Once adopted, the new regulations were very rigorously enforced by the
Nationalist government. When it approved Qinghua University to send students
to the United States again in 1933, the Ministry of Education made sure that
Qinghua opened its examinations to students from all schools in China, applied
the qualifications set by the central government, chose students only in the fields
approved by the ministry, and allowed them to stay in the United States for
only two years, with the possibility of a one-year extension. Once chosen, the
candidates were required to remain in China for at least six months to identify
domestic needs. They would be allowed to leave for the United States only after
they had proved that their education abroad would help meet the needs at home.
During their stay in the United States, the students had to send their grade re-
ports back to Qinghua at the end of each semester. After their return to China,
they had to accept jobs assigned to them by the central government and work
there for at least three years.99
Even greater effort was made to keep all provinces in compliance with the
new regulations set by the central government. Each province had to submit its
revised provincial regulations on study abroad to the Ministry of Education for
review and approval before it could send any students abroad. The ministry went
 112 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

through all the provincial regulations very carefully and imposed changes wher-
ever it deemed necessary. For example, Guangdong Province sent its revised
rules on study abroad to the Ministry of Education on February 28, 1935. After
a quick review, the Ministry of Education instructed Guangdong to make four
more corrections and submit another revised version for further review.100 Fully
aware of the seriousness of the matter, the Bureau of Education of Guangdong
made all the changes required by the Ministry. It replaced the word “Rules”
(Guicheng) with “Regulations” (Zhangcheng) so as to be consistent with the
term used by the ministry. It added a clause in article three to make sure that the
examination dates, number of students to be selected, countries to which stu-
dents would be sent, years allowed to study abroad, and subjects to be studied,
would not only be determined by the Bureau of Education, but also be approved
by the Ministry of Education. In addition, it created a new article clearly stating
that all students who had passed the preliminary examinations in the province
had to pass tests given by the Ministry of Education before they could be sent
abroad. The last correction was to add a sentence at the end stating that any
items that were not covered by this document would be handled according to
the Regulations issued by the ministry.101 The provincial regulations were finally
approved by the ministry after the second round of revisions.
The central government always kept a close eye on the implementation
of the revised regulations by provinces. On April 11, 1935, Zhongyang Ribao
(Central Daily), published by the Nationalist Party, reported that Guangdong
Province was planning to give examinations to select the second group of gov-
ernment-sponsored students to be sent abroad. On the next day, the Ministry
of Education sent a telegram to Guangdong seeking verification of the plan. It
emphasized that if Guangdong did have such a plan, the Bureau of Education
of Guangdong should follow the previously approved regulations and send the
plan to the ministry for approval.102 Upon receiving the scolding from the min-
istry, Guangdong sent its plan immediately to Nanjing. The ministry approved
the plan after making some minor corrections.103 Learning from this experience,
Guangdong Province sent the plan for the selection of the third group of stu-
dents to the ministry for approval before it made the public announcement the
next year.104 Following the new regulations, the Ministry of Education started in
1934 to give verification examinations to all students who had passed provincial
tests. In that year, thirty-eight students from Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Henan
Provinces took and passed verification examinations. All but one student chose
to study sciences, engineering, medicine, or agriculture. Over half of the stu-
dents, twenty-one in total, were sent to the United States. None went to Japan.
Verification examinations became another effective tool for the Ministry of Edu-
cation to implement its study abroad policies.105
The central control over study abroad was reinforced by the new passport
system established by the Nationalist government. Until the end of the Qing
Dynasty, Chinese passports were issued by customs officials at various open
ports in handwriting without a standardized format. The lack of a centralized
 From Central Administration to Party Control 113

office in charge of the issuance of passports in a uniform format had not only
caused confusion among American immigration officials and frustration among
Chinese students, but also denied the Qing Court an effective way to have real
control over students seeking education in foreign countries. A modern passport
system began to emerge during the early Republic period. However, the central
government only managed to put the issuance of passports under its tight con-
trol after the Nationalists came to power. Even Feng Yuxiang, one of the most
powerful military leaders, who had the real control over the Northwest of China,
had to ask for approval from the central government in order to send his two as-
sistants to study in the United States in 1928 and 1929, since he could no longer
get passports for them from any customs officials under his jurisdiction.106
The Nationalist control over study abroad was further strengthened as
a result of monetary reforms carried out in the 1930s. China had about 110
different currencies issued by various banks before the Nationalists took over.
The political unification of China under the Nationalists made it possible for
thorough monetary reforms. The Nationalist government first replaced the tael
(liang) with silver dollars (yuan) in early 1933. With the rise in the price of sil-
ver on the world market, a large amount of silver flew out of China beginning in
1934. In order to stabilize China’s currency, the Ministry of the Treasury, led by
Kong Xiangxi, replaced silver dollars with a new Legal Paper Currency (Fabi)
in November 1935. According to the new regulations adopted by the National-
ist government, only four national banks, the Central Bank (Zhongyang Yin-
hang), the Bank of China (Zhongguo Yinhang), the Bank of Communication
(Jiaotong Yinhang), and the Farmers’ Bank (Nongmin Yinhang), were allowed
to issue the new paper currency and handle foreign exchange. As a result, for-
eign currencies and their exchange, for the first time in China’s modern history,
were put under central control.107 With the real power in hand, the National-
ist government demanded that all provincial governments send in their study
abroad budget for approval and provide financial support for students according
to the national standard. All self-sponsored students had to fill out a special
Foreign Currency Purchase Application Form to be reviewed and approved by
the Ministry of Education.108
The Nationalist effort to establish central control over study abroad was
rather effective. In order to secure their opportunities for study abroad and in-
crease the prospectus to find decent jobs after their return, the vast majority of
students followed the new regulations established by the central government.
Between 1929 and 1937, the Ministry of Education issued 7,594 Study Abroad
Permits to students. Following the government requirements, more students be-
gan to focus on science and engineering. In 1929, about two-thirds of students
studied humanities, law, business, and education abroad. Within two years,
about half of the students majored in science, engineering, medicine, or agri-
culture. Beginning in 1933, the number of students majoring in the latter fields
always exceeded those in the former. With the new emphases, the National-
ists were able to direct more government-sponsored students to colleges and
 114 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

universities in the United States in the 1930s. Between 1929 and 1937, Japan
still attracted more self-sponsored students, mostly because of its geographic
proximity, lower cost, and lower qualification requirements. However, China
sent 308 government-sponsored students to the United States while dispatching
only 75 to Japan.109 Among the students sent abroad by the Central Committee
of the Nationalist Party between 1930 and 1933, seventy-two entered colleges
and universities in the United States. Only nine of them ended up in Japan.110
The United States attracted more government-sponsored students than any other
country during this period.
The Japanese invasion, while drastically reducing the territory under Na-
tionalist rule, actually reinforced the central administrative control over study
abroad. No sooner had the Japanese launched their attack at the Marco Polo
Bridge in July 1937 than the Ministries of Education and the Treasury issued
a joint order to sharply reduce the number of students to be sent abroad in
order to save foreign currency for war purposes. Those who were allowed to
go abroad had to major in military science, engineering, medicine, or other
subjects related to military defense. Only graduates from universities and col-
leges with two years of research or work experience and graduates from three-
year junior colleges with four years of research or work experience would be
qualified for education abroad. Study Abroad Permits were still required for all
students. Those who were already in foreign countries would not be allowed to
get any foreign currency from the government if they had not received Study
Abroad Permits. However, the Ministry of Education would approve enough
foreign currency for the purchase of return tickets for those students who chose
to go back to China immediately.111
The study abroad policy was revised by the Nationalist government in
April 1939. The new policy basically banned the dispatch of any government-
sponsored students abroad during the war against Japan except those with spe-
cial approval. No self-supported students would be allowed to go abroad unless
they could receive full foreign scholarships and would not purchase any foreign
currency from the Chinese government. At the same time, they still had to meet
the qualification requirements listed in the earlier regulations. Students who
were sent abroad to study military science had to receive approval from Jiang
Jieshi, the chairman of the Central Military Committee. Those who were sent to
study engineering, sciences, and medicine had to be approved by the Executive
Yuan. In order to save foreign currency, those government-sponsored students
who had studied abroad for three years or failed to receive decent grades had
to return to China immediately. No foreign currency would be provided for
those who refused to return after receiving the orders. Those who were study-
ing military science, engineering, other sciences, or medicine abroad would
continue to receive foreign currency to cover all their expenses after verifica-
tion conducted by the Ministry of Education. As for self-supported students,
government would provide help for those who made excellent grades at school
but had financial difficulties.112
 From Central Administration to Party Control 115

The new study abroad policy was implemented immediately and effec-
tively. Upon receiving the instructions from the Ministry of Education, Guang-
dong Province sent orders to the thirteen students who were studying abroad
with provincial support. Following the new regulations, it allowed four students
who were abroad less than three years to continue their study, and permitted six
students who had studied abroad for three years to extend their stay for another
year since they were studying engineering. The other three, who had also stud-
ied overseas for three years, were ordered to return to China immediately.113 Of
those ten students who were allowed to continue their study abroad, half were
attending colleges and universities in the United States. Zhao Shanhuan, one of
the three students who were ordered to return to China, pleaded for an extension
of another year so that he could complete his Ph.D. in entomology. Although he
had strong recommendation letters from the president of Cornell University and
Hu Shi, the Chinese ambassador to the United States, Zhao failed to get support
from Chen Lifu, the Minister of Education.114
The implementation of the new study abroad policy led to an immediate
and drastic reduction in the number of Chinese students sent abroad during the
war years. The number of Study Abroad Permits issued to students going abroad
by the Ministry of Education dropped from 894 in 1936 to 366 in 1937, and then
to 59 in 1938. Of course, educational exchanges with Japan came to a complete
stop after the war broke out. The United States also saw a sharp reduction of
Chinese students arriving at its colleges and universities. However, most of the
Chinese students who did go abroad during the early war years ended up in the
United States.115 As a result, the United States finally replaced Japan as the chief
partner in educational exchange at the beginning of World War II.
The Nationalist government also took strong steps to get as many stu-
dents back home as possible. The Ministry of Education issued two orders in
1938 requiring all students who had studied abroad for three years to return
to China within six months. Besides appealing to students’ patriotic feelings,
the ministry did not hesitate to take advantage of the financial difficulties
faced by students or the central control of all foreign currencies. The Minis-
try of Education decided to give seven hundred Chinese yuan to all students
sponsored by provinces that were under the Japanese occupation. The money
could be used as a three-month stipend or for the purchase of return tickets for
those who had studied abroad for three years. Self-supported students from
Japanese-occupied provinces could also receive two hundred Chinese yuan a
month for up to three months from the Ministry of Education. However, the
relief was only a one-time offer. Therefore, most of them had to use the gov-
ernment money to buy return tickets.116
While sharply reducing the number of students overseas, the Nationalist
government succeeded in getting students to focus on academic areas closely
related to China’s war effort. Among about one thousand students sent abroad
in 1936, 46 percent still chose to study humanities, law, business, and educa-
tion.117 Drastic changes took place after the war broke out. Among the sixteen
 116 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

government-sponsored students sent by Qinghua University to the United States

in 1941, only one majored in economic history and another in business adminis-
tration. The rest focused on science, engineering, medicine, and agriculture. At
least half of them chose to study military-related subjects.118 The same could be
found among the self-sponsored students who received Qinghua scholarships in
1940. Only two of the ten students studied political science and economics. The
rest all majored in sciences and engineering, with three in aviation.119
Coupling strict rules with patriotic appeal and financial assistance, the
Nationalist government was rather effective in implementing its wartime study
abroad policy and further consolidating its control over students and scholars
involved in educational exchanges. About three hundred students followed the
instructions and bought their return tickets with government subsidies by the
end of 1939. Most of those students who chose to return to China had been
studying in Japan and European countries. In sharp contrast, most applications
for government support for extended stays came from students in the United
States.120 At the same time, a considerable number of students managed to relo-
cate themselves from Japan and Europe to the United States in order to continue
their pursuit of higher education. However, they had to follow the rules set by
the Nationalist government in order to make sure that they would receive their
financial support regularly. The beginning of the war, while reducing the number
of students sent abroad by China, actually allowed the Nationalist government
to further tighten its control over China’s study abroad programs and strengthen
its educational ties with the United States.

Exerting Party Control

Establishing effective central control over schools and study abroad was
important to the Nationalists as part of their state-building effort. However, their
ultimate goal was to use the schools and educational exchange programs to in-
still the official ideology of the Nationalist Party in the minds of students and
turn them into staunch supporters of the Nationalist cause. Once all the schools
were put under effective supervision of the central government, the National-
ist regime began to impose increasingly tight control over students’ thought
through a series of administrative, curricular, and institutional changes. Such
an effort, termed partification (danghua) of education by Wen-shin Yeh, was
also extended to all study abroad programs.121 By the early 1930s, the Three
Principles of the People (Sanmin Zhuyi) were included as part of the test for all
government-sponsored students and steps were taken by the Nationalist regime
to establish thought control over Chinese students and scholars in the United
States as well. As Zhang Yufa sharply observed, the biggest change made by the
Nationalist government in education was its emphasis on ideology.122 The same
could be said about its handling of China’s study abroad programs.
Fully aware of the important role played by students and scholars in Chi-
nese politics and society, the Nationalists began their effort to establish tight
 From Central Administration to Party Control 117

control over schools and students when they were still rebelling revolutionaries
in Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces in the mid-1920s. While preparing for the
Northern Expedition in March 1926, the Nationalists established the Council
of the Educational Administration (Jiaoyu Xingzheng Weiyuanhui) to handle
educational affairs. One of its first orders was to instruct the Bureau of Educa-
tion of Guangxi Province to add Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People
as a course to the curriculum of all schools in that province. In July, the coun-
cil adopted several important policies requiring students and teachers from all
schools to join the Nationalist Party. It also called upon local party leaders in
each county to serve as directors of the Bureau of Education and organize local
party branches in schools.123 They intended to use schools to help them mobi-
lize students and the masses, and win popular support for their military action
against warlords.124
As the Northern Expedition Army marched victoriously to the North and
put more provinces under its jurisdiction, the Nationalist Party took further steps
to exert political control over schools and impose party education (danghua ji-
aoyu) on students. Tighter party control became needed when party purification
(qingdang) was started by Jiang Jieshi in April 1927, causing frustration and
disillusion among many people, especially intellectuals.125 In August 1927, the
Central Committee of the Nationalist Party approved the Rules on Party Educa-
tion at Schools (Xuexiao Shixing Danghua Jiaoyu Banfa), which were enforced
in the territories controlled by the Northern Expedition Army. Soon, the Univer-
sity Council adopted a national regulation to impose party education and politi-
cal advising at all schools.126
Establishing tight party control over education and people’s thoughts
became the top priority of the Nationalist Party after Jiang Jieshi rose as the
top leader. According to Sun Yat-sen, the national revolution and reconstruc-
tion should go through three stages: military government, political tutelage, and
constitutional government. Having defeated the warlords in the Northern Ex-
pedition, Jiang declared in 1928 that the Nationalist revolution had entered the
second stage—political tutelage, which meant that the Nationalist Party should
teach the people, including students and scholars, how to act and think.127 With
authoritarian military training and strong belief in the Confucian ideal of social
order, Jiang openly announced that the first task for the Nationalist Party was
to strive for “the unity of the Chinese public’s thought, and to firmly estab-
lish Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People as the nation’s only thought
so that they will not desire a second system of thought to create disorder in
China.”128 To Jiang, tighter and broader party control was needed and justified
since the Nationalist Party “is the headquarters of our national reconstruction”
and “China’s destiny is entrusted to the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party).” He
declared that during the period of reconstruction the Nationalists “must proceed
with the same spirit and by the same methods as in our Revolution and armed
resistance,” which meant tight party control.129 In July 1928, the Executive Cen-
tral Committee of the Nationalist Party passed a resolution requiring all schools
 118 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

in China to add a special course on party education in order to make sure that the
party’s ideology was accepted by all Chinese.130
The push for party control and party education was also extended to
missionary schools. While forcing all missionary schools to register with the
government and put Chinese in leading positions, the Nationalist government
refused to register any elementary or middle schools that taught religion or held
religious services in order to protect China’s educational sovereignty and the
dominant position of the Nationalist ideology. Beginning in 1933, Western mis-
sionaries were banned from running elementary schools for Chinese children.
As a result, thousands of missionaries left China and many missionary schools
were either turned over to Chinese private groups or abandoned.131 Those mis-
sionary schools that were allowed to remain open had to drop mandatory Sunday
services and remove religious materials from their libraries. When the National-
ist regime made party education a part of the national curriculum, missionary
schools had to accept political instructors appointed by the local government,
who would teach party education courses and report any political deviation from
official policies.132
Despite an internal power struggle between Nationalist leaders at the na-
tional and local levels, the Nationalists’ effort to exert thought control reached
colleges and universities throughout China. Seeing it as a good opportunity to
expand their political power, many local Nationalist leaders were very enthusi-
astic about establishing party control over schools and students. The Nationalist
Party Committee in Beijing sent a telegram to the central government in July
1928, asking for direct supervision of all universities and colleges in Beijing. Its
proposal was politely turned down by the University Council of the central gov-
ernment. In its reply to the local leaders in Beijing, the University Council made
it clear that the local Party Committee might have the authority to intervene
only when there was a security emergency.133 In order to make sure that it had
complete control over higher education, the Nationalist regime soon appointed
new leaders of many colleges and universities, including Qinghua. General Bai
Congxi, a key Nationalist leader, did not hide the real purpose of the change of
leadership of colleges and universities. He openly told his audience at the inau-
gural ceremony that the appointment of Luo Jialun as the president would “turn
Qinghua into an integral part of the Party’s mission, and make everyone of you
a loyal comrade of the Party.”134
As Jiang Jieshi’s former secretary, Luo did not waste any time in introduc-
ing party education to Qinghua University. One of the first things that he did was
to make the Three Principles of the People a required course for all students and
demand that the Departments of Political Science and Economics tailor their
curricula to the needs of that course.135 Following the orders from Nanjing, Luo
Jialun started military training at Qinghua in November 1928. Qinghua students
were organized into four teams and forced to wear uniforms and salute admin-
istrators and faculty members on the campus. Following strict schedules, they
had morning and evening roll calls every day and drills on school playgrounds
 From Central Administration to Party Control 119

as well as in the camp every week. Students were punished if they broke any
rules.136 The purpose, of course, was to train the students to be obedient follow-
ers of the Nationalist Party. Luo’s effort to unify students’ thoughts with Nation-
alist principles received high remarks from Jiang Jieshi.137
The party education and indoctrination were also extended to students
selected for educational exchange. As early as October 1928, the Mass Train-
ing Department (Minzhong Xunlianbu) of the Central Committee of the Na-
tionalist Party worked out The Plan for the Implementation of Party Education
(Dangzhi Jiaoyu Shishi Fangan). In the special section on study abroad, it
required higher educational qualifications as well as a strong grasp of the party
doctrines for all students to be sent abroad.138 In 1933, the Nationalist govern-
ment adopted a new set of regulations requiring all candidates for government-
sponsored study abroad programs to take party doctrine (Dangyi) as part of the
qualification tests. As the top subject in the preliminary examinations, party
doctrine, together with Chinese language, history, and geography, counted for
25 percent of the total grade. Students might still be able to go abroad if they
had failed some tests in their own subject fields or foreign languages. How-
ever, no students would be allowed to go abroad if they could not pass the test
on the party doctrine.139
All schools in China, including Qinghua University, were forced to follow
the regulations on thought control adopted by the central government. When
it received the approval to send students to the United States again in 1933,
Qinghua revised its regulations on examination contents and selection process.
The revised regulations required that all candidates who were competing for the
government scholarship had to take tests in general subjects as well as in their
specialties. As required by the central government, the test on party doctrine
was listed as the first that students had to take. According to the new rules,
students had to score at least 60 percent to pass the party doctrine test. While
lower grades could be accepted in any other subjects, failure on the test of party
doctrine would cost them the candidacy for government scholarships.140
Besides the inclusion of party education as part of the examination, the
Nationalist government tried to send as many Nationalist Party members abroad
as possible and encouraged them to continue their party activities while abroad.
Following instructions from the central government, all provinces asked ap-
plicants to clearly list whether they were Nationalist Party members when ap-
plying for study abroad. Party members would be selected as long as their test
scores were close to those of nonmembers. Some party members did continue
their activities while studying in foreign countries. Liu Fukang, a student sent
by Guangdong Province to study shipbuilding in England, was very active in the
local Nationalist branch. Having organized a “Youth League for Industrial De-
velopment in China (Zhonghua Gongye Jianshe Qingniantuan),” he sought guid-
ance from Chen Lifu, Minister of Education. Chen was very interested in Liu’s
political activities. He instructed Liu to report on the current local situation and
future plans to the General Branch of the Nationalist Party in Britain so that the
 120 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Overseas Division of the party could provide guidance for him in the future.141
Similar activities were reported in the United States, too.
The Nationalists intensified their efforts to exert tighter political control
over students at the beginning of the war against Japan. As the Japanese pushed
further inland, more and more student demonstrations were organized to protest
the Nationalist policy that had given higher priority to fighting the Communists
than the Japanese invaders.142 To the Nationalists, the student protest movement
was fueled and organized by the Communists. Fully aware of the political power
and influence that students and intellectuals had in Chinese society, the Nation-
alist leaders were determined to do everything within their power to keep stu-
dents from the Communists and make them staunch supporters of the Nationalist
Party.143 In order to strengthen political control over students, Jiang appointed
Chen Lifu, head of the Bureau of Central Investigation (Zhongguo Guomindang
Tongji Diaocha Ju), former party secretary, and director of the party’s Organiza-
tion Department, as the Minister of Education in early 1938.
As one of Jiang’s closest confidants, Chen believed that the foremost task
of education during the war was to win over the youth. Under Chen’s leadership,
the Ministry of Education made a lot of changes in higher education to strengthen
thought control during the war years. First of all, it standardized the curriculum
and made the Three Principles of the People one of the required courses for all
students. Secondly, it put the writing and publication of all textbooks, which used
to be handled by private publishers, under its control. All schools had to use
textbooks adopted and published by the central government. Although Chen Lifu
argued that the measure was taken to improve higher education and save paper,
most students and scholars believed that it was done to tighten thought control.144
Thirdly, it institutionalized party control by appointing party members to key ad-
ministrative positions and establishing special offices at schools and universities.
According to The Basic Principles for the Administration of University and Col-
leges (Dazhuan Yuanxiao Xingzheng Zuzhi Yaodian), adopted in 1939, all chief
administrators of universities and colleges had to join the Nationalist Party, and
all schools had to set up a Department of Student Supervision (Xundao Chu) as
one of the three administrative departments. The sole responsibility of the new
department was to carry out party education and provide political and ideological
supervision on behalf of the party among the students.145
While strengthening the party’s control, Chen was instrumental in intro-
ducing the Youth League of the Three People’s Principles (Sanmin Zhuyi Qing-
nian Tuan) to higher and secondary educational institutions. The Youth League
was based on the Blue Shirt Society (Lanyi She), composed of young military
officers, and the League of Purity (Qingbai Tuan), headed by Chen. Formally
established in 1938, the Youth League served as the front organization for the
Nationalist Party. Its purpose was to recruit as many students as possible and
train them to become Nationalist Party members. When Chen became the Min-
ister of Education, the Youth League was given the responsibility to help the
party supervise students at all schools.146
 From Central Administration to Party Control 121

The leaders of the Youth League also tried to expand their political ac-
tivities among Chinese students and scholars at colleges and universities in the
United States. In 1938, General Zhang Zhizhong (Chang Chi-chung), one of the
major leaders of the Youth League, appointed Meng Zhi (Chih Meng), director
of the China Institute in America, as an advisor for the league’s branch in the
United States. Zhang urged Meng to use his influence to recruit Chinese stu-
dents for the league. Meng refused to take the position because he found some
of the league’s regulations unacceptable. One of the rules that he did not like
was that a member had to pledge absolute loyalty to the commandant and his
deputies personally. He was also offended by another rule, which provided that
a member would be deprived of liberty after two warnings for violation of any
regulations. Although Meng explained his decision to the Youth League lead-
ers in New York, his rejection put him on the black list of the Nationalist Party.
Meng was regarded as anti-Nationalist and untrustworthy by the Nationalist
government until mid-1942, when he was finally cleared by a special committee
that had reviewed his records.147
The Youth League’s activities were only part of the Nationalist grand
strategy to exert tighter control over students and scholars in foreign countries.
Right after taking over the Ministry of Education, Chen Lifu set up a new of-
fice within the Division of Higher Education charged with the responsibility to
handle study abroad and cultural exchange programs. While reducing the num-
ber of students sent abroad, the new office worked hard to tighten its supervision
and control over Chinese students and scholars overseas. Through agents in the
United States, Chen Lifu kept a close eye on all activities of Chinese students
and scholars. For example, Meng Zhi commented at a Chinese student confer-
ence that “America’s two-party system and the checks and balances built into
its governmental structure were more congenial to our Chinese tradition of the
Mandate of the Heaven than the current one-party dictatorship of the Nationalist
Party without universal suffrage.” Meng’s speech was reported back to the Na-
tionalist regime and recorded in the secret file kept by the Ministry of Education.
It became part of evidence proving that Meng was not politically trustworthy.148
The exertion of party control was made possible and relatively easy with
the establishment of effective central administrative control over education and
study abroad. The Nationalist government never hesitated to use its power to
extend the party indoctrination to all schools in China or exert tight control
over Chinese students overseas. The purpose, of course, was to maintain the
dominant position of the Nationalist Party in the nation as well as in the govern-
ment. Although few students, especially those who were seeking higher educa-
tion overseas, openly challenged the Nationalist effort for party control, many,
especially those who had received liberal education at American colleges and
universities, resented it from the very beginning. It was such a strong resentment
that gradually tore Chinese students and intellectuals away from the National-
ist causes and forced Jiang Jieshi, as John Israel pointed out, to “rely on a crum-
bling military-bureaucratic coalition incapable of sustaining him.”149
 Chapter 5

Maintaining the
Educational Front

W orld War II created difficulties as well

as opportunities for educational interactions between the United States and
China. As allies, the two nations not only fought shoulder to shoulder against
the common foe on the battlefield, but also collaborated in education and edu-
cational exchanges, another important front in the war. Washington drastically
increased its support for the Chinese effort at preserving the nation’s educa-
tional system and for sustaining educational exchanges between the two na-
tions to deal with the crisis in diplomatic relations with China caused by its
Europe First strategy. The Nationalist government cooperated with Washing-
ton, not without reluctance, in order to maintain good relations with a major
ally and to protect Chinese schools, a unique front in China’s war against Ja-
pan. With strong support from both governments, most Chinese colleges and
universities managed to survive the war, and educational exchange between the
two nations continued and even expanded. By the end of World War II, China
was ready to send thousands of students to the United States to be trained for
the postwar reconstruction. While the military cooperation between the two al-
lies was impressive, the United States and China were true chief partners only
in educational exchanges.

Initiating the Cultural Relations Program

The relations between China and the United States were strained by the
lack of American assistance to the Chinese war effort against Japan prior to Pearl
Harbor. Although Jiang Jieshi appointed Hu Shi as the ambassador to Washing-
ton to obtain more tangible assistance right after the Japanese invasion, China
got only two small loans, totaling $45 million, from the United States between
February 1939 and April 1940.1 When Congress extended the Lend-Lease aid to
China in March 1941, Song Ziwen (T. V. Soong) was sent to Washington asking
for one thousand airplanes and equipment for thirty infantry divisions. Song’s
122
 Maintaining the Educational Front 123

requests were largely rejected by officials in the War Department, who did not
believe that China could effectively utilize such a large amount of aid.2 The
lack of trust in the Nationalist government, coupled with the effective Japanese
blockade and poor road conditions in Burma, greatly impeded the allotment and
flow of Lend-Lease supplies to China. By the end of 1941, China had received
only $26 million worth of aid from the United States, counting for 1.7 percent
of the total supplies offered to all foreign countries.3 Frustrated by the lack of
substantial American aid, Jiang warned Washington in late November 1941 that,
without strong support from the United States, the morale of Chinese troops was
certain to go down and the spirit of resistance of both the people and the army
might collapse.4 However, Jiang’s complaints gained neither sympathy nor in-
creased material aid from Washington.
Washington’s aid to China remained limited even after the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor. Although it was Japan that inflicted the first heavy losses on
American forces and brought the United States officially into the war, President
Franklin Roosevelt and his advisors adopted the Europe First strategy. Roos-
evelt made it clear to his advisors that he “would rather lose anything else than
have the Russians collapse.”5 In a memorandum to the president, Admiral Har-
old Stark and General George Marshall articulated the view that “[t]he primary
objective of the two nations [United States and Britain] is the defeat of Ger-
many.”6 They emphasized that in any case an unlimited offensive war should not
be undertaken against Japan since such a war would weaken the effort to defeat
Germany. They advised that no American armed forces be sent to China, that
material aid to China be accelerated only if consonant with the needs of Russia,
Britain, and America’s own forces, and that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.7
Following such a strategy, Washington continued to provide minimal military
assistance to China. Although Jiang managed to obtain a $500 million loan to
support China’s currency (yuan) and ease the Chinese economic situation right
after Pearl Harbor, China received only a trickle of military supplies from the
United States. In May 1942, only 80 tons of supplies were sent to China, 160
tons in June, and 73 tons in July.8
The lack of substantial American military assistance aroused the stron-
gest protest from Jiang Jieshi. On June 25, 1942, he ordered General Joseph
Stilwell, his Chief of Staff appointed by President Roosevelt, to transmit a note
to Washington, listing the minimum requirements essential for the maintenance
of the Chinese Theater. Jiang demanded that the United States send three Amer-
ican divisions to India to help establish communication lines through Burma,
supply and maintain five hundred planes in China, and fly at least five thousand
tons of supplies to China over “the Hump” every month from August on.9 Pres-
ident Roosevelt, while sending Lauchlin Currie back to China to soothe Jiang,
promised to provide only 265 planes to China, which were actually not deliv-
ered until almost the end of the war. Unable to get what he believed that China
deserved from the United States, Jiang revealed his anger by forcing Roosevelt
to recall Stilwell. On several occasions, Jiang Jieshi even threatened to make a
 124 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

separate peace with Japan if he could not get adequate aid for his country.10 It is
clear that by the end of 1942, the alliance between the two nations was actually
in serious trouble.
Keenly aware of China’s important role in the war against Japan, the
State Department was more sensitive to China’s needs and anxious to maintain
friendly relations with the Asian ally. With little influence over the deployment
of troops or allocation of military supplies, it had to resort to some other means
to improve Washington’s relations with China. Expanding educational and cul-
tural ties with China quickly became the top choice for the State Department.
The department was much better equipped to handle educational and cultural
exchanges because of the Division of Cultural Relations, a new office estab-
lished several years earlier to manage cultural exchange programs with Latin
American countries, designed to counter German cultural penetration in that
part of the world.11 Under the auspices of the State Department, Washington
began to assist student exchange programs with sixteen Latin American coun-
tries in 1939. Despite their enormous publicity, the exchange programs were
relatively small. By the end of 1943, the State Department had funded sixty-
three students from Latin American countries studying in the United States and
sponsored twenty-nine American students to study in those countries.12
No sooner had the Division of Cultural Relations been established than the
State Department was pressed to adopt a cultural relations program with China.
As early as March 1938, Roger S. Greene, who had served as consul general in
China and on the board of directors of the CFPEC for over a decade, wrote to
Benjamin Cherrington, chief of the newly established Division of Cultural Rela-
tions, recommending that cultural attachés be sent abroad, including to China,
to provide the cultural scope for political officers. He observed that the Japanese
army paid much attention to Chinese educational movements and institutions
in peacetime and that during the war it purposefully sought out and destroyed
those institutions. Therefore, Greene insisted that the United States should not
overlook the cultural and educational aspects of its relations with China.13 On
May 2, 1941, George Cressey, a professor of Asian geography at Syracuse Uni-
versity, met with Stanley Hornbeck, the senior advisor of the Division of Far
Eastern Affairs, proposing that American professors be sent to universities in
unoccupied China to give short series of lectures on matters of current interest,
particularly those that would improve relations between the two countries.14
Proposals from scholars like Cressey aroused strong interest among of-
ficials in the State Department. Hornbeck first invited Willys Peck, a veteran of
U.S.-China educational exchange and the newly appointed minister to Thailand,
to join the discussion with Cressey. Impressed by Cressey’s idea, Peck got both
Maxwell Hamilton, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and Charles A.
Thomson, chief of the Division of Cultural Relations, interested in it. A man
of action, Peck quickly put three projects in a written budget proposal: plan to
send American educators to unoccupied China to lecture on subjects of mutual
interest, provide Chinese educational institutions with motion pictures depicting
 Maintaining the Educational Front 125

industrial operations and social betterment in the United States, and present to
Chinese educational institutions books, periodicals, and scientific equipment.
The purpose of the program was to serve as a “continual reminder of the good
will of the Government and people of the United States.”15 Peck even consulted
Hu Shi, the Chinese ambassador in Washington, about the projects. His plan
received hearty approval from Hu.16
While Cressey and Peck were advocating a China cultural relations pro-
gram in Washington, many American educators and diplomats in China made
similar recommendations. In June 1941, four American professors working at
Nanking (Nanjing) University sent a memorandum to the State Department pro-
posing in detail a program of technical training and assistance to be undertaken
by the department.17 In July, Clyde B. Sargent, associate professor and chairman
of the Foreign Languages Department at Qilu (Cheeloo) University, relocated at
Chengdu, Sichuan, recommended that a bureau of Sino-American cultural rela-
tions be established in the State Department. The American embassy at Chongq-
ing forwarded Sargent’s proposal to the department for consideration.18
The concrete plans from Peck and strong recommendations from Ameri-
can educators and diplomats helped the State Department make up its mind on
adopting a China cultural relations program. On July 31, 1941, Stuart E. Grum-
mon, an experienced Foreign Service officer, was appointed to organize and head
such a program.19 With limited experience in China and minimal knowledge of
Chinese culture and language, Grummon had to depend on his colleagues and
staff members of the Division of Cultural Relations in developing the China pro-
gram. As a result, his first comprehensive report on the proposed China cultural
relations program included not only almost all the recommendations made by
Peck, but also some new projects copied from the recent educational exchange
programs with Latin American nations. One of the new projects called for the
training of Chinese technical and administrative experts through aid to Chinese
students. He insisted that this project should be “analogous to the project under
which a number of young electrical engineers from the other American republics
were brought to the United States under the auspices of the Rural Electrification
Administration for special training in that field.” Another project was Chinese-
language radio programs that would focus on “life in the United States.” The
last was to hold a special conference on cultural relations between the United
States and China. Attended by government officials with experience in China
and representatives from universities, libraries, and museums, the conference,
he suggested, should be “similar to those on inter-American relations held under
the auspices of the Department in the fall of 1939.”20
Grummon’s plan to build the China cultural program after the Latin
American model received both support and criticism. Most members of the ad-
visory committee to the Division of Cultural Relations approved Grummon’s
plan and added some new projects, including a survey of Chinese-American
cultural relations, which had been essential to cultural relations programs with
Latin American countries at a meeting held in November 1941. The only open
 126 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

criticism came from James T. Shotwell, a professor at Columbia University.

He argued that, since a large number of Chinese students had been trained in
the United States, the cultural relations program should emphasize practical
assistance instead of the presentation of American culture and the American
way of life, which were already familiar to them. Despite Shotwell’s oppo-
sition, the committee recommended the enlarged program to the Division of
Cultural Relations.21
The strong support from the advisory committee and key officials in the
Department of State failed to win funding for the China cultural program from
the Lend-Lease Aid program, which was limited to military purposes. Thus,
Grummon was forced to turn to other sources for funding. As an experienced
diplomatic officer and administrator, Grummon keenly recognized the oppor-
tunity created by the Japanese sudden attack on Pearl Harbor. Three days after
the attack, he sent a memorandum to the State Department urging that since
“China has become an ally of the United States, the program should receive
even greater emphasis.” He stressed that “it is now not merely a question of
keeping China fighting against Japan but becomes an important contributory el-
ement in our own struggle [against] Japan.”22 Concerned with the possibility that
China might opt for a separate peace with Japan, he pointed out that the China
cultural relations program would “have an important bearing upon the continu-
ance of China’s will to fight” and “contribute to maintaining the morale of the
intellectual classes in China, whose influence upon China’s continued partici-
pation in hostilities is of great importance.”23 Grummon’s plan and argument
helped policy makers not only see clearly the significance of educational and
cultural exchanges in the war against Japan, but also find a new instrument for
dealing with the crisis looming large in U.S.-China diplomatic relations. Finally,
the China cultural program got its first appropriation of $150,000 for the coming
fiscal year from the president’s Emergency Fund on January 14, 1942.
With money in hand, the State Department wanted to get the China cul-
tural program started as soon as possible. Realizing the important role that the
American embassy would play in implementing the program, the department
decided to send Grummon’s plan to the embassy at Chongqing before any con-
crete actions were taken. In order to help diplomats in China fully understand
the importance of the program, the department sent Ambassador Clarence Gauss
a long telegram on January 29, 1942, elaborating that
during the past year the Department has given increasing attention to the
desirability of supplementing the aid which this Government has been
extending to China along the line of what may be conveniently termed
cultural assistance, designed during the emergency, primarily to bolster
Chinese morale and secondarily to assist China in many different ways
in which American scientific, technical, social, educational, industrial
and other experience may be of use to China in raising the standard
of living, improving the condition of its rural population, assisting in
 Maintaining the Educational Front 127

the development of educational, social and administrative programs and

thus contributing to China’s war effort.24
After explaining the grandiose purposes of the program, the department listed
all the major projects proposed by Grummon and invited comments and criti-
cism from the ambassador.
As an experienced diplomat in China, Gauss saw flaws in the cultural pro-
gram immediately. In his reply to the department, Gauss rejected the purpose of
the China program as approved by the department. He warned Washington that
“having in mind Chinese sensitivity, it is desirable to avoid any suggestion now
of a ‘cultural’ mission to China.” Believing that the proposed projects “would do
little toward bolstering morale,” he suggested that “the least said publicly in the
direction at the present time the better.” With a clear understanding of what the
Chinese needed at the time, Gauss proposed to redesign the whole program so
that it would be “fashioned as an effort to contribute toward maintaining China’s
educational front during the war period, and should be calculated to ensure as
beneficial results as possible under existing difficult conditions.” Gauss’s advice
reflected his understanding of the Chinese attitude toward foreign cultural aid
and China’s real wartime needs. What China most needed, Gauss pointed out,
was more American military and financial assistance. He insisted that “the pri-
mary concern is how to meet those needs so far as possible.” 25
Gauss also shared his strong criticism of many projects proposed by Grum-
mon. He did not support the comprehensive survey of America’s current cultural
relations with China because the Chinese would have no time for such a survey
during the war and there were not very many cultural programs carried out by
American organizations in unoccupied China anyhow. Gauss also doubted that
much good would come from the exchange of technical and educational leaders.
He argued that technical or expert surveys and reports, the most important re-
sponsibility for American visitors, could readily be done by fully qualified Chi-
nese specialists and experts, or by American specialists in missionary schools
in China. Gauss’s strongest opposition was directed at the propaganda-oriented
projects. He believed that sending light trucks equipped with full-size projectors
and sound systems was impractical because it was impossible to get this heavy
equipment shipped to China and motion pictures would reach only a small au-
dience. He suggested instead that the department send the much lighter 16mm
movie projectors to Chinese educational institutions, where they could be used
by the Chinese for academic purposes.26 Gauss dismissed the radio project be-
cause he doubted that there were more than two thousand radio sets in the entire
country. He believed that most owners of radio sets were “members of the of-
ficial educated class who prefer to hear American and international news rather
than purely cultural programs at the present time.” Therefore, he recommended
abandoning the radio project completely. 27
Gauss did approve some of Grummon’s projects, but not without serious
revisions. Gauss supported exchanges in such fields as medical science, public
 128 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

health, and agriculture, areas in which China had an immediate need for Ameri-
can expertise. However, he insisted that once these experts and specialists were
in China, they should stay there long enough, at least one year, to enter into
constructive collaboration with their Chinese counterparts.28 He also endorsed
the aid to Chinese students pursuing technical, administrative, and educational
studies in the United States, but on a much larger scale. He suggested that fi-
nancial aid be given to all Chinese students who needed help. Since there were
about one thousand Chinese students in the United States at that time and many
had severe financial difficulties, hundreds of grants would be needed. As for
the exchange of qualified leaders in educational fields, Gauss proposed that the
project be postponed until transportation between China and the outside world
had improved. He supported the idea of sending American professors to lec-
ture at Chinese universities, but emphasized that the lectures should focus on
subjects that China might not have been able to keep abreast of because of its
isolation during the war.29
Donating needed materials to the refugee universities in Southwest China
received the strongest endorsement from Gauss. Having served in China for
many years, Gauss was fully aware of the importance of these universities for
China. He knew that the Japanese had made painstaking efforts to destroy higher
education in China and the Chinese government had worked hard to preserve its
universities and colleges. Many important universities had moved from Beijing,
Shanghai, and other big cities in coastal regions to the Southwest just before the
Japanese occupation. In order to train and preserve the intellectuals for postwar
reconstruction, these refugee universities reopened their doors in southwestern
cities and villages, keeping professors and students from fighting on the battle-
field. The Chinese regarded their effort at maintaining universities and colleges
as an important front in the war against Japan. Thus, Gauss believed that helping
China support their colleges and universities should be the major focus of the
China cultural program. Realizing the transportation problems in China, he rec-
ommended that Washington send microfilms of current scientific and engineer-
ing publications instead of textbooks and scientific equipment. He believed that
it was these publications that would be most helpful to university professors,
who had for so long been cut off from the outside world.30
Having shared his views with the State Department, Gauss offered his
vision. Based on his own experience and observation in China, Gauss argued
that the China program should focus on maintaining China’s “educational
front” during the war. He believed that this was the best way to “bolster morale
amongst a class of Chinese whose influence in the present and for the future
is important both to China and the United States.” In order to accomplish this
goal, Gauss suggested that grants-in-aid be provided to faculties in free China
so as to “alleviate individual cases of distress and hardship amongst Chinese
members of the teaching profession and their families” and, if funds permitted,
to help particularly promising students. He stressed that the teaching profession
had been most seriously affected by the war. Most highly educated specialists
 Maintaining the Educational Front 129

and experts, many with education in the United States, could no longer support
their families and were abandoning the profession in favor of other employ-
ment. Grants-in-aid, Gauss argued, “would be a real assistance to this important
and influential Chinese class” and would help keep them in their profession.31
Compared with Grummon’s proposal, Gauss’s suggestions were more focused
and practical. They resembled in striking ways the first American cultural ex-
periments in China funded with the Boxer Indemnity remissions, which aimed
at improving Sino-American relations through helping Chinese intellectuals and
universities. Since a large number of faculty members in Chinese universities
received their education in the United States, Gauss’s plan would not only con-
tinue and enlarge the educational exchange between the two nations, but also
protect a large number of American returnees, the greatest achievement of the
first joint cultural experiments.32
Gauss’s arguments were so eloquent that the State Department accepted
his evaluation and vision completely. In a telegram drafted by Grummon, the
State Department told Gauss that it fully shared his view that “under present
circumstances the purpose of strengthening China’s morale, which need not be
mentioned in your conversations [with Chinese officials], is best achieved by
the method of assisting China in the most practical fashion during the present
emergency.” Agreeing with Gauss’s suggestion on the exchange of technical ex-
perts, the department directed him to invite the Chinese government to express its
needs, promised to utilize experienced American experts in China, and decided
to extend the stay of Americans in China from six months to a year. While ask-
ing for more recommendations regarding motion pictures and radio from Gauss,
the department agreed to send 16mm motion picture projectors to the embassy
immediately. However, the department insisted that if possible it would also send
sound equipment and generators to China, which would be useful for showing
sound pictures. The department told Gauss that the Office of the Coordinator of
Information was working with the Library of Congress concerning the possibility
of supplying microfilms of current learned journals, especially those in scientific
fields. The department also promised Gauss that it would study his recommenda-
tion regarding grants-in-aid to faculties and universities in free China. It asked
Gauss to estimate the number of persons who should receive aid and the amount
of money needed for the project.33 With the approval of Gauss’s plan, the China
cultural program began to enter the implementation phase.

Assisting China on the Educational Front

The State Department’s acceptance of Gauss’s proposal to focus on main-
taining the educational front ensured that its China cultural relations program
would follow the tradition established by the two nations in the earlier decades
rather than the Latin American model. Although some State Department offi-
cials later tried to insert a few relatively small projects that were similar to those
undertaken in Latin America, the China cultural relations program remained
 130 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

focused throughout the war on aiding Chinese students, faculties, and universi-
ties. Since the war made it impossible for any self-sponsored students to study
abroad, educational exchanges became completely a state function. Spending
part of its budget on educational exchange with China for the first time in his-
tory, Washington helped Chinese students and scholars stranded in the United
States and brought more to the United States during the war. At the same time,
it offered assistance to faculties and universities in unoccupied China that were
experiencing extreme hardship caused by the war. The joint effort to maintain an
educational front in the war against Japan thus became an important dimension
in U.S.-China diplomatic relations during World War II.
One of the first things done by the State Department was to offer financial
assistance to Chinese students in the United States. As more provinces in North-
ern and Eastern China fell into the hands of the Japanese, an increasingly large
number of Chinese students could neither continue their education in the United
States because of the lack of funding, nor return home because of the Japanese
occupation. The Chinese government did extend financial assistance to about
two hundred students through the Committee on Wartime Planning with the ad-
ministrative help of the China Institute by January 1944.34 Unable to provide
financial support for all Chinese students stranded in the United States, it turned
to Washington for help. In his meeting with State Department officials on their
China cultural program in September 1941, Hu Shi directed their attention to the
financial problems faced by Chinese students in this country. He warned them
that these financial difficulties would become “the most serious handicaps in ef-
fecting a student exchange.”35 In response to Hu’s request, the State Department
set aside some money to help twenty Chinese students with $1,000 each in 1942
and doubled the number in 1943.36
As the Japanese sped up their invasion of Southeast Asia after Pearl Har-
bor and cut China off from the outside world completely, more Chinese students
in the United States fell into financial despair. Ten days after the United States
declared war on Japan, Meng Zhi went to see Hornbeck and Grummon. As the
official caretaker appointed by the Chinese government, he formally pleaded for
help for Chinese students stranded in the United States. While concerned about
all the students, Meng worried most about the two hundred students in the hu-
manities who would graduate soon but could not go back to China. Even those
students who had technical skills and were working in American plants still had
difficulties supporting themselves because the current immigration laws forbade
Chinese students from working in the United States. As a result, many of them
did not receive pay for their work. To alleviate the students’ plight, Meng sug-
gested that the State Department grant needy Chinese students $75 a month to
defray their living expenses.37
Meng’s suggestion received a quick and favorable response from the State
Department.38 The Division of Cultural Relations set up a special committee
to advise it on the assistance to Chinese students. Committee members in-
cluded Meng Zhi, Stephen Drygan, the director of the Institute of International
 Maintaining the Educational Front 131

Education, and Roger Greene. Meng would select and present the students
who needed help to the committee. The committee would then recommend
them to the State Departmental for financial aid. Of course, the department
had established guidelines for the selection, which included the importance
of the student’s field to China, the student’s ability, and the student’s financial
need.39 The grant-in-aid project was formally started in April 1942 when the
State Department mailed the first checks to the selected Chinese students in the
United States. In the first year, over two hundred Chinese students received aid
from the United States government. Most of them were studying at universities
and colleges. Less than 10 percent of them were receiving practical training in
American plants.40 By May 1, 1944, the total number of Chinese students who
had received grants-in-aid from the United States government reached 376.41
This number was far bigger than Grummon had first proposed and the State
Department had originally budgeted.
While obtaining monetary assistance from the United States government,
Meng Zhi worked hard to help Chinese students get practical training or em-
ployment in this country so that they could not only gain precious work expe-
rience, but also support themselves financially. His effort received assistance
and sanction from universities, private companies, and the State Department.
Karl Compton, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, helped
Meng place a considerable number of the Chinese students in industrial plants.42
At the beginning of 1942, Professor Compton visited Purdue University and
the University of Michigan. After discussing the financial problems of Chinese
students, the presidents of these two universities agreed with Compton that the
assistance provided for them “should be, as far as possible, in the form of op-
portunities for work rather than a money grant.”43 Many American corporations
were very interested in hiring the highly educated Chinese students to alleviate
the shortage of skilled laborers caused by the war. An official of American Air-
lines telephoned Grummon on January 27, 1942, telling him that the Engineer-
ing and Maintenance Departments of the company were “favorably disposed to
giving positions to between six and twelve Chinese engineering students.” In
order to avoid any possible problems with the company’s labor unions as well
as government regulations, the company wished to have clear approval from
the State Department. The company promised that it would pay the Chinese
students the prevailing salary rate.44
The American Airlines’ desire to hire Chinese students received strong
support from Grummon. He brought the matter to the attention of other in-
terested officials in the State Department and argued that this type of practi-
cal training for Chinese students in the United States was a contribution to
China’s war effort. It was, Grummon pointed out, “in harmony with the general
program of so-called cultural assistance to China which the Department is de-
veloping at the present time.”45 In response to American Airlines’ request, he
drafted a formal letter on behalf of the Secretary of State, seeking official ap-
proval from the Justice Department for the employment of Chinese students in
 132 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

this country.46 The letter was sent to Francis Biddle, the attorney general, on
February 18, 1942, urging that some administrative solution should be found to
solve the problem faced by Chinese students.47
The response from the Justice Department was positive. Lemuel B.
Schufield, special assistant to the attorney general, issued an instruction to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service on February 27, 1942, informing it
of the decision made by the Department of Justice that “consideration may
be given to permitting such students [who are unable to return home or obtain
funds from abroad] to discontinue school for the duration of the war or until
their circumstances change and to accept full-time employment with an or-
ganization or individual approved by this service.”48 In his reply to Secretary
of State Cordell Hull on March 19, 1942, Schufield suggested that Chinese
students should apply directly to the Certifications Branch at the Central Of-
fice in Philadelphia. They should provide information regarding their financial
circumstances, their intended employers, the character of their employment,
compensation to be received, and any other facts that might be deemed perti-
nent in particular cases.49 The positive reply from the Justice Department did
away with an obstacle that for decades had prevented Chinese students from
being employed in this country.
Happy with Justice Department’s decision, the State Department began
to do its best to help Chinese students locate positions in American industry,
commerce, government, and schools. The China Section of the Division of Cul-
tural Relations was most active. In February 1943 alone, it helped one Chinese
student with practical training, three with full-time employment, eight with em-
ployment records, and obtained assurance of employment opportunities from
five companies. 50 By the end of 1943, the State Department had helped over
three hundred Chinese students find positions in American industry and com-
merce where they could receive practical training and earn their own living. The
department also assisted some Chinese students to find positions in American
government. By March 1944, it had placed thirty-three Chinese students with
the Department of Agriculture, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bureau of
the Census, the Farm Credit Administration, the Library of Congress, and the
Treasury Department. 51 With the cooperation of the Office of Education, the
department managed to get assignments for a few Chinese graduate students as
visiting teachers of Chinese history, literature, language, culture, and daily life
in public schools all over the country. The department even made arrangements
for three Chinese students involved in the teaching project to have tea with Mrs.
Roosevelt, who had given her blessing to the project.52
The placement of Chinese students in American businesses and govern-
ment became much easier after Congress abolished all Chinese exclusion laws
in the fall of 1943. Chinese students would no longer be subject to the definition
specially promulgated for them by the United States government. They could seek
practical training in the United States just like other students and even change
their status from nonimmigrant student to immigrant staying permanently in the
 Maintaining the Educational Front 133

United States. However, they had to compete for the immigrant quota of a mere
105 set aside for the Chinese.
The assistance from the State Department in the form of financial aid and
employment placement helped Chinese students survive the most difficult years
during World War II. Such massive and direct aid to foreign students in the
United States was unprecedented in history. In a similar situation during World
War I, the State Department, instead of offering direct aid, asked the stranded
Chinese students to seek help from private institutions. A sharper contrast could
be seen when the United States educational exchange with Latin American
nations was compared. While providing financial aid to hundreds of Chinese
students, the State Department suspended its exchange programs with Latin
American countries. The special treatment that the State Department gave to the
Chinese students during World War II clearly revealed the importance of educa-
tional exchanges as part of American assistance to China’s war effort.
While providing financial support for Chinese students in the United
States, Washington attempted to help universities and faculties in unoccupied
China through grants-in-aid in early 1942. Accepting Ambassador Gauss’s pro-
posal, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs made every effort to push the Chinese
government to provide financial assistance to Chinese faculties and students
with the Lend-Lease aid from the United States.53 However, the State Depart-
ment was soon forced to give up its original plan because of strong opposition
from the Chinese government as well as teachers, who did not want to receive
direct grants from the United States government. The Chinese teachers, although
appreciating the American intention, believed that their well-being and main-
tenance should be the concern of their own government, and that they ought
not to depend upon the charity of another country for their daily livelihood.54
The Chinese government welcomed foreign aid, but it insisted that all financial
help from abroad should be distributed by the Chinese Ministry of Education.
The Chinese proposal was unacceptable to Americans officials, especially dip-
lomats, since they had little confidence in the corrupt Nationalist government.55
Besides, the Chinese government vehemently opposed the American plan to
direct part of the Lend-Lease funds to help Chinese universities and faculties. It
wanted to use all the American aid for military and economic purposes, which it
deemed more important to their immediate war effort.
Unable to win support from the Nationalist government, the State Depart-
ment cooperated with private organizations, such as the United China Relief, in
offering aid to Chinese universities and faculties. According to Wilma Fairbank,
the first American cultural attaché at the American embassy in China, the of-
ficials of the American embassy and the United China Relief met frequently to
discuss the needs of Chinese educational institutions and ways in which they
might be helped.56 With the cooperation and coordination of the Division of
Cultural Relations, the United China Relief began providing financial aid to
Chinese universities, teachers, and students in 1942. In order to help Chinese
students fleeing the occupied areas, it established committees in eight cities,
 134 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

including Xian (Sian), Guiyang (Kweiyang), and Guilin (Kweilin), to aid those
traveling to inland provinces. It allocated $1.5 million for medical education
in China and spent $706,000 of that sum by the end of 1942. This money was
divided among the Emergency Medical Training Schools of the Chinese Army,
the medical schools and colleges under the Ministry of Education, and the Na-
tional Health Administration.57
Keeping aid to Chinese universities and faculties high on its list of priori-
ties, the United China Relief had to be innovative in order to cover all universi-
ties in China. It was easy to work with Christian universities in China, which
received about $600,000 from the United China Relief between April 1, 1942,
and March 31, 1943, and $900,000 the next year. Most of the money was used
to supplement the salaries of faculty members. The United China Relief also
allocated $200,000 for direct aid to faculty members in all other Chinese univer-
sities in early 1943. However, no national universities were allowed by the gov-
ernment to accept American funds for the same reason it had rejected previous
offers from the United States government.58 Instead of waiting for the Chinese
government to change its policy, the United China Relief donated one million
Chinese yuan to the CFPEC in the fall of 1943. Having just lost the income from
the Boxer Indemnity remission, the CFPEC found it difficult to reject such a
generous contribution. Accepting the donation, the CFPEC set up an internal
committee as requested by the United China Relief to manage the funds. After a
brief meeting, the committee decided that the funds should be used to subsidize
important individuals in educational and research institutions in Kunming since
the city had the highest cost of living in unoccupied China. In order to help iden-
tify the important individuals and determine the distribution of subsidies, the
committee set up an advising council to recommend candidates and comment
on the management of the funds.59
Having provided aid for Chinese national universities for about two de-
cades, the CFPEC received no objection from the Nationalist government when
it started to distribute funds donated by the United China Relief. It first invited
Jiang Mengling, Mei Yiqi, and Li Shuhua as advisers. The Advisory Council
met on October 3, 1943, and worked out Rules for the Special Research Subsi-
dies (Tebie Yanjiu Buzhujin Banfa). According to the Rules, applicants for the
subsidies had to be well-established professors and researchers conducting re-
search or writing at universities and research institutes who were experiencing
extreme financial difficulties and without outside income greater than one thou-
sand yuan a month.60 In 1944, eighty scholars received twelve thousand yuan
each. In 1945, the subsidy funds were expanded to seventy million yuan and
offered to 936 scholars from all universities and research institutions in unoccu-
pied China.61 The United China Relief succeeded in circumventing the Nation-
alist government in providing direct aid to Chinese faculties, including those at
national universities.
While cooperating with private agencies in providing financial aid to Chi-
nese scholars, the State Department implemented a number of programs that
 Maintaining the Educational Front 135

helped improve the work and life of Chinese professors during the war. One of
them was to invite Chinese scholars to visit the United States. The American
embassy at Chongqing sent the first invitation letters to presidents of Southwest
Associated University, Central University, Wuhan University, Zhejiang Univer-
sity, Sichuan University, and Yunnan University on November 4, 1942, asking
them to select their representatives to be sent to the United States. All the uni-
versities responded swiftly and the first group of Chinese representatives was
composed entirely of faculty members, mostly in social and political sciences.
They finally left China for the United States via India in June 1943 after over-
coming some political obstacles. Having learned a lesson from the selection of
the first group, the State Department reluctantly got the Nationalist government
involved in the process. As a result, more university administrators were sent to
the United States in the following years. Between 1943 and 1946, four groups
of Chinese educators and artists, totaling twenty-six, were brought to the United
States.62 (See Appendix E.)
Besides personnel exchanges, the State Department strongly supported the
Microfilm Project. Although still in its infancy, microfilm technology allowed
hundreds of pages of documents to be contained in a single role of microfilm
and read with a microfilm reader. John King Fairbank, a young officer assigned
by the Coordinator of Information as a special assistant to the American am-
bassador, was formally instructed to help the embassy staff in carrying out the
Microfilm Project before he left for China. Deeply interested in the project, he
brought with him the first model projector to Chongqing in August 1942. He
also took with him some electric light bulbs and lenses so that more readers
could be assembled in China.63 Once arrived in Chongqing, Fairbank worked
closely with Yuan Tongli (T. L. Yuan), one of his old friends and currently the
director of the National Library, to set up special offices under the American em-
bassy and the Ministry of Education to provide and receive microfilms.64 With
close collaboration from the Chinese government, a number of reading rooms
equipped with microfilm readers were soon established at all major national
universities in unoccupied China.65 The State Department began to regularly mi-
crofilm about sixty leading journals recommended by the National Research
Council in science, engineering, social sciences, and humanities. By the end of
1943, over one million pages of microfilmed materials were sent to these read-
ing rooms.66 Over 150 people, almost all faculty members, used the two projec-
tors at the National Central University Library in the first month. Because of
the high demand, each person was allowed to use a reader for at most two hours
at each sitting. They had to make reservations more than a week in advance to
guarantee their access.67
In order to better meet the needs of Chinese researchers, the American
embassy began to forward to Washington specific requests for microfilm nega-
tives for individually identified articles in March 1943. By special arrange-
ment with the State Department, the library of the Department of Agriculture
searched for and microfilmed those articles to be sent to China. This kind of
 136 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

personal service became increasingly popular among Chinese researchers in

1944 and was deeply appreciated.68 Because of the success of the Microfilm
Project, the State Department helped establish two more reading rooms, one
for general reading and the other for microfilms, at the faculty center at North-
eastern Associated University in mid-1945.69
Another step taken by the American embassy to assist Chinese universi-
ties in unoccupied China was to provide funding for research projects on various
wartime issues. The American embassy solicited and approved six research pro-
posals from faculty members at Southwestern Associate University in 1945. The
projects included a survey of the remains of ancient architecture in the South-
west and a study of wartime labor, inflation, prices, and cost of living in unoccu-
pied China. The budget for the proposals ranged from US$1,000 to US$3,000.70
When the university was slow to pick up the approved funds, the American con-
sul at Kunming paid a visit to the university on June 26, 1945, urging immediate
action.71 A few days later, the American consulate at Kunming sent six sets of
vouchers amounting to US$13,000 to President Mei Yiqi, asking for signatures
from payees. Afraid of missing the deadline, Mei, following the instructions
from the American consul, sent the directors of the six projects to the American
consulate immediately to sign the papers.72
The State Department found still another way to help Chinese scholars
through subsidizing the translation of Chinese scholarly manuscripts into Eng-
lish. With help from a committee composed of eleven leading Chinese schol-
ars, a large number of manuscripts, reflecting the current research of Chinese
scholars in unoccupied China, were sought out for translation and publication in
the United States. Each scholar, if his article was selected, would receive $100,
a huge amount during the war years. Then, staff members from the Division
of Cultural Relations would try to place these articles in appropriate American
journals so as to bring them and their authors to the notice of the outside world.
By March 1944, the division had received sixty-one manuscripts. At that time,
thirteen had been published, eight were pending publication, and the rest were
still under consideration.73 In this way, the division was able not only to keep
scholars outside of China informed of the work done by the Chinese during
the war, but also to provide desperately needed financial assistance to Chinese
scholars without hurting their pride.
In addition to the well-planned and organized assistance programs, some
staff members at the American embassy offered their help to Chinese faculties
in many innovative ways. Having spent about a week at Lianda in Kunming on
his way to Chongqing in August 1942, John King Fairbank gained some first-
hand knowledge about the desperate situations of Chinese faculties at Qinghua
and other colleges after meeting with dozens of his old friends and colleagues.
Deeply troubled by their horrible conditions, he immediately cried for help
from Washington. In one of his earliest reports to the State Department, Fair-
bank strongly argued that Qinghua University “represents an American interest
in China because several million dollars of the returned portion of the Boxer
 Maintaining the Educational Front 137

Indemnity have been invested in it.” Thus, he insisted that the Qinghua faculty,
as “the living agents of American educational influence” and as “the only re-
maining asset of an investment made by the United States Government over a
period of more than thirty years” after the Japanese invasion, deserved special
consideration and support. He warned that if the United States failed to help
these people, it would be a shameful stain upon the American record.74
While pushing Washington for more help, Fairbank soon made it his own
“private war aim” to help preserve American-educated Chinese professors. Fair-
bank and his wife, Wilma, tried many different ways to help the Chinese faculty
members. They managed to get a large shipment of vitamin B-1, with help from
Lauchlin Currie, to Qinghua in August 1943. It allowed the Qinghua medics to
help counter a widespread vitamin deficiency. Greater effort was made to find
more income for the Chinese faculties. Fairbank persuaded Lauchlin Currie to
ask the Army Special Services to set up a fund of $5,000 to pay Chinese profes-
sors to deliver lectures to American troops in Kunming. Wilma Fairbank kept
up a flow of drugs and other valuable hardware, such as pens and watches, to
the American consulate in Kunming. She distributed them to Qinghua faculty
members as salary supplements through Chen Daisun, a Qinghua professor of
economics living next door to the Fairbanks. When the six exchange professors
from China arrived in the United States in late 1943, Fairbank urged the Har-
vard-Yenching Institute to give each an additional $1,000 so that their financial
conditions could be substantially improved.75
By carrying out various cultural relations programs, Washington got itself
deeply involved in helping China maintain its educational front during World
War II. The Nationalist government cooperated with the United States govern-
ment as long as the American involvement was limited and the Nationalist con-
trol over Chinese colleges and universities was not weakened or challenged.
With Washington’s help, China was able to keep its key universities running
and connected with the outside world during the war years. The maintenance
of the educational front not only preserved and prepared a large group of highly
trained specialists for China’s postwar reconstruction, but also made the further
expansion of educational exchange between the United States and China at the
end of the war possible and necessary.

Expanding Educational Exchanges and Party Control

The collaboration on maintaining China’s educational front clearly dem-
onstrated that the alliance between the United States and China during World
War II went far beyond military and economic aid. As the end of the war was in
sight in mid-1943, both the Chinese and American governments began to take
steps preparing for the further expansion of educational exchanges after the
war. While the new alliance made the expansion of educational exchange rela-
tively easy, the Nationalist effort to exert tighter control over Chinese students’
thoughts and behavior caused concern in Washington and provoked strong
 138 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

criticism from American educators. Although Washington soon dropped the

issue to keep exchange programs alive, the preparation and implementation of
large-scale educational exchange was delayed. Large numbers of government-
sponsored Chinese students began to arrive in the United States only at or after
the end of World War II.
As the war took a favorable turn for China and its allies in mid-1943,
Jiang Jieshi began to plan for the postwar reconstruction in China. In the first
ten years, Jiang estimated, China would need 500,000 high-ranking cadres
(gaoji ganbu). It would be impossible to have all the cadres trained at universi-
ties in China within a short period of time because of the lack of faculty and
equipment. Therefore, Jiang concluded that China needed to continue its study
abroad programs. He issued a secret order on April 28, 1943, instructing various
ministries to prepare long-term plans for selecting and sending students abroad
to be trained as cadres at all levels.76 Following Jiang’s order, the Ministry of
Education worked out a five-year study abroad plan in 1943, proposing to send
two thousand government- and self-sponsored students to the United States and
Great Britain every year for five years. Once completed, China would have an
additional ten thousand foreign-trained experts for its reconstruction. For 1943,
the ministry decided to send seven hundred students to the United States and
three hundred to England.77
The Chinese plan aroused strong interest and quick responses from the
United States. Clarence Gauss gave his full approval for the program even be-
fore the Chinese government could complete the planning process. He also sent
a report back to the State Department, strongly suggesting that the United States
government facilitate the training of the Chinese students in this country.78 The
embassy’s enthusiasm was echoed in Washington. Eager to get the plan started,
Willys Peck, the head of the China Section in the Division of Cultural Relations,
drafted a letter for the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury, asking
for the latter’s opinion in regard to the use of the unspent portion of the $500
million credit established for China for the training of Chinese technical students
in this country.79 Having received the green light from the Treasury Department,
the State Department let the embassy know that the Treasury Department had
allowed the Chinese government to finance the plan to train technical students
in the United States with funds from the $500 million credit already provided by
the American government, and that the Division of Cultural Relations would co-
operate with the Chinese government in carrying out the plan. The department
instructed the embassy to informally convey to Chinese officials that Washing-
ton would welcome an official notification of the Chinese plan.80
Despite the strong hint and encouragement from Washington, the Chinese
government was reluctant to notify the State Department of its plan and slow
in its implementation. The lack of an enthusiastic response from the Nation-
alist government and the delay of the implementation of the plan had many
causes. First, the Chinese government was still busy fighting the war against
Japan. Thus, training students for postwar reconstruction was low on its priority
 Maintaining the Educational Front 139

list. Second, Chinese government agencies could not reach an agreement on the
training of experts overseas. While the Ministry of Education wanted to send
more regular students and scholars abroad, other agencies, like the Ministries
of Transportation and the Economy, all insisted on sending out more admin-
istrators and technicians for practical training. Third, the Nationalist govern-
ment was not quite willing to spend a significant portion of the $500 million
credit that it had obtained from the United States on this project. The Ministry of
Education’s plan alone would cost over $4 million a year and over $20 million
in five years.81
The greatest impediment to the implementation of the educational exchange
plan was the controversy aroused by the Nationalist Party’s effort to impose
“thought control” on Chinese students studying abroad. The Nationalist Party
had been trying to exert thought control on students since the very beginning.
Such an effort became more open and intensified during the war years. Following
Jiang’s orders, the Ministry of Education included more political requirements in
its selection of students and scholars to be sent abroad and tightened supervision
over them while they were in foreign countries. In its five-year plan, the Ministry
of Education explicitly mandated that all privately as well as government-spon-
sored students receive training in the Party Affairs Training Class (Dangzheng
Xunliangban) at the Central Training Corps (Zhongyang Xunliangtuan) for
a month before leaving the country. Those who had gone abroad without such
training had to make it up upon their return to China. All government-sponsored
students should also be induced to join the Nationalist Party or the Youth League.
The ministry would establish student guidance offices overseas to supervise stu-
dents’ research, training, thoughts, and behavior.82
The Nationalist government was serious in implementing the political
training requirement aimed at thought control. Few people, including top schol-
ars and administrators, were able to skip it. The Chinese scholars who were
invited by the State Department for a one-year visit to the United States and
American diplomats in Chongqing learned that the hard way in 1943. When the
American embassy was ready to send the six selected Chinese professors to the
United States on May 1, 1943, it found out that five of them had not received
their passports. Despite pleas from the American embassy, the Nationalist gov-
ernment insisted that it would not issue passports to the professors until they
completed the required political training at the Central Training Corps. As a
result, the professors had to cancel their flight arrangements and go to the Train-
ing Corps for two weeks.83 The training was focused on the basic doctrines of
the Nationalist Party, which were neither new nor interesting to most of the
scholars. However, Jiang Jieshi, serving as the general director of the Central
Training Corps himself, was very serious about the training and saw it as an op-
portunity for the Nationalist Party to win over the scholars and students. At the
end of the training, he met with all the professors and reminded them that they
should all join the Nationalist Party. The professors were finally allowed to start
their trip to America on June 5, 1943.84
 140 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Having learned from this experience, the State Department modified the
selection process the next year. Instead of attempting to circumvent the Chinese
government, the American embassy sent copies of the invitations first to the
Foreign Ministry and announced the departure date at the very beginning. Many
Chinese scholars recommended and welcomed the change in order to avoid de-
lays and difficulties in getting passports and foreign currency.85 Once the Chi-
nese government was included in the process, things went much more smoothly
and more university administrators, mostly appointed by the government, were
selected for the program.86 Hua Luogeng, a young mathematician at Qinghua,
was invited to do research at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in the
fall of 1943. Hua attended the Central Training Corps on the recommendation
of President Mei Yiqi in November with little resistance. Actually, he enjoyed
staying in the Training Corps not only because he was well treated there, but
also because he could take a break from his work and concentrate on making
arrangements for his study in the United States. From the training camp, Hua
wrote letters to the president and provost of Qinghua, asking them to apply for
a passport for him as a government official and book his airline ticket.87 He ar-
rived in Princeton in 1946 after a visit to Soviet Union.88
While forcing all government-sponsored students and scholars to receive
political training, the Nationalist government also tightened its control over
self-sponsored students. The Regulations on Sending Self-Sponsored Students
Abroad (Guowai Liuxue Zifeisheng Paiqian Banfa), issued by the Ministry of
Education on November 8, 1943, emphasized the ministry’s authority over all
self-sponsored students overseas. The new regulations limited the number of
self-sponsored students to be sent abroad each year to six hundred, with 60 per-
cent majoring in engineering, science, agriculture, or medicine. All self-sponsored
students, according to the new regulations, were required not only to attend the
Central Training Corps after passing all the examinations, but also to “abso-
lutely subject all of their thoughts and behavior abroad to the guidance and con-
trol of the [Student] Supervisor and the Embassy.” Students would be recalled
back to China “if they had uttered any words contrary to the Three People’s
Principles or misbehaved.”89
American diplomats in China did not like the tight political or thought
control imposed by the Nationalist regime on students and scholars. However,
there was little that they could do to stop it. After meeting two officials from the
Ministry of Education at the American embassy in Chongqing on May 1, 1943,
Philip Sprouse, a political officer, reported that he was officially informed of
the new requirements established by Jiang Jieshi about a month earlier. Al-
though the Chinese officials tried to convince him that Jiang made the decision
without any input from either the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Sprouse blamed Chen Lifu for the new requirements. He believed
that the delay of Chinese exchange scholars “may arise from Dr. Chen Li-fu’s
desire to place all hindrances possible in the path of a project which doubt-
lessly does not have his approval in that the group, with exception of National
 Maintaining the Educational Front 141

Szechwan University’s appointee, consists of outstanding Chinese scholars

who have already received western training and presumably entertain western
liberal ideas.”90 John S. Service, the second secretary of the embassy, reported
on June 8, 1943, that intellectuals who attended the training felt embarrassed
and expressed strong dislike of it.91 After the publication of the regulations on
self-sponsored students, Ambassador Gauss openly expressed his fear that “un-
der such a rigorous system of selection and control, students of known liberal
political beliefs or those suspected of a questioning or critical attitude toward
the Kuomintang will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the
approval of the Ministry of Education for studying abroad.”92
Despite its concern about the Nationalist effort to extend political and
thought control over Chinese students in the United States, Washington re-
sponded with restraint. When the Chinese government’s new requirements
were exposed in American newspapers, the State Department instructed Am-
bassador Gauss on March 14, 1944, that he should indicate to the Chinese
government that “the Department would view with disfavor such political sur-
veillance of Chinese students in this country.”93 About the same time, the Of-
fice of Far Eastern Affairs received a report revealing that some departments of
the Chinese government, including Dai Li’s Secret Service, had taken action to
supervise and control Chinese communities, especially Chinese students in this
country. This action, the report pointed out, intimidated Chinese and violated
American laws. The office agreed that “to permit the continued development
of the above-described Chinese Government Organizations in the United States
would result in the obstruction of the American cultural relations program in so
far as it has to deal with Chinese students in the United States and to a large ex-
tent would therefore render its aims barren.” It even warned the department that
“the development per se is contrary to the American principle of freedom, not
only as essential in the Atlantic Charter but also practical throughout Ameri-
can history, with reference to both thought and activity.” However, despite the
seriousness of the matter, the Office of Far Eastern Affairs opposed any legal
action against the Chinese police organization in the United States. The only
advice it gave to the department was to make a “general presentation of the
Chinese Embassy at Washington with the aim of checking the growth of that
unhealthy political organization.”94
While Washington was reluctant to challenge thought control imposed by
the Nationalist government on students in China as well as in the United States,
some American professors did not hesitate to launch a vigorous attack on such a
practice. Having read news reports on the newly publicized Chinese government
regulations on Chinese students, professors of the American Defense–Harvard
Group, an antifascist organization, adopted a resolution on March 29, 1944, de-
manding verification of the reports from the United States government. If the
reports were accurate, the committee urged Washington to inform the Chinese
government that it would not admit any Chinese students and would send back
those who accepted such a form of control.95 Once the Chinese regulations were
 142 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

confirmed, Professor Ralph B. Perry, chairman of the American Defense–Har-

vard Group, prepared another memorandum and sent it to several universities,
denouncing the regulations as “regrettable and unacceptable,” and calling them
a violation of “the basic principles of freedom for which China and the United
States are now fighting both in Europe and Asia” and inimical to “the best tradi-
tion of American education and scholarship and to that of liberty of thought and
of teaching to which American colleges and universities are devoted.” There-
fore, he demanded that all the regulations should be “rescinded or revised.”96
Professor Perry’s memorandum received unanimous approval from all the
universities that were involved in educational exchange with China. Dr. Car-
rington Goodrich, acting director of admissions at Columbia University, took
steps to notify Chinese students at the university that when they arrived at Morn-
ingside Heights they were expected to be free of outside interference. He be-
lieved that “we will get nowhere if our universities permit anyone to control the
thought of these students, or keep them from saying what they think they ought
to say.”97 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology did not take specific action,
but Dean Robert Caldwell said that the institute would give visiting Chinese
students complete intellectual freedom.
The American protest reached Chongqing through various channels. The
story of the action taken by American professors against thought control was
first published by the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury at Chongqing on
April 9, 1944, arousing considerable discussion and debate in official, educa-
tional, and journalistic circles. Responding to the criticism, Chen Lifu, the Min-
ister of Education, gave an interview on April 11, 1944, declaring that he had
never believed in thought control and that the Ministry of Education had never
made any attempt to institute such a control. However, he also insisted that “the
educational authorities have the responsibility of supervising the thought and
controlling the action of the students.” Realizing the latter statement was too
close to the accusation made by American professors, the Central News Agency
(Zhongyang Xinwenshe), run by the Nationalist government, published a “cor-
rection” the next day. It changed Chen’s statement to read “guiding the thought
and supervising the conduct of students.”98 The Central News Agency conve-
niently blamed the mistake on a bad English translation.
Frustrated and infuriated by the American criticism of thought control,
Jiang Jieshi ordered a stop to sending Chinese students to the United States in
April 1944.99 The action was taken, according to the explanation from a high-
ranking Chinese official, because the Chinese government felt that criticism
from American educators would increase if more students were sent to United
States.100 In July 1944, the Chinese embassy in Washington officially informed
the State Department that China had indefinitely postponed the plan to send a
large number of government-sponsored students to America for education and
training. It would not, however, forbid private students to come to the United
States.101 Although Chinese officials tried to prove that China stopped sending
students to America for some other reasons, Ambassador Gauss believed that
 Maintaining the Educational Front 143

the main reason was its resentment toward American criticism over the issue
of thought control. He told Song Ziwen that to bar students from going to the
United States because of the recent publicity over thought control would simply
give emphasis to the subject.102
Nevertheless, Jiang’s decision to stop sending students to the United States
was seen as a serious setback in educational relations between the two countries.
The State Department soon felt heavy pressure from other government agencies
as well as many universities that desired to have more Chinese students and re-
sume educational exchanges with China. In his instructions to Gauss, Secretary
of State Cordell Hull noted that the department did not desire to lessen whatever
salutary effect might have resulted from the opposition expressed by American
educators here at home to the thought control regulations. However, Hull em-
phasized that “it would be equally undesirable to permit this situation to con-
tinue indefinitely as a stalemate.” He ordered Gauss to estimate whether there
was any possibility that Chinese students and trainees would be permitted to
come to the United States in the near future. He reminded the embassy that “the
Department and other agencies of the American government continue to be in-
terested in the program of educating and training Chinese in this country.”103 On
Hull’s instructions, Peck and Charles Bennett met with the Chinese ambassador
in Washington on August 4, 1944, discussing a plan to train a large number of
Chinese technical students in the United States. They told the Chinese ambassa-
dor that the Foreign Economic Administration had received an appropriation of
$4,800,000 to partially cover the expenses of training twelve hundred Chinese
students in this country. They also emphasized that the war was moving so rap-
idly to its end that if the Chinese government still desired to train a large number
of experts for the postwar reconstruction, it should start at once.104
Impressed by the American offer, the Chinese ambassador promised to
telegraph Chongqing immediately, urging his government to take steps with-
out delay. However, he did voice his concern about the American criticism of
the thought control of the Chinese students. The answer from Peck was simple
and clear. The department believed that the training project had no connection
with the thought control measure.105 Apparently happy with the department’s
stand on the issue, the Nationalist government took steps to restart educational
exchanges with the United States. In late August 1944, it first allowed self-
sponsored students to go to study in the United States. In September, the ban
on Chinese students going abroad was completely lifted.106 In December, Zhu
Jingnong (Chu Chin-nung), the Vice Minister of Education, formally declared
that the Ministries of Education, Communication, and Economic Affairs would
jointly send twelve hundred students abroad for research and practical training.
The examination would be given in December. But he also told the public that
some of the students would go to Britain and Canada and that supervising of-
fices would be established in all three countries.107
In order to make sure that educational exchange between the two na-
tions would not be interrupted again, the State Department chose to ignore
 144 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Nationalists’ illegal activities in the United States and take steps to attract more
Chinese students. In February 1945, the Justice Department informed Peck that
the Chinese government continued to maintain secret police in this country
and that it had taken further action to control Chinese students and Chinese
communities.108 However, the State Department did nothing to check or stop
their activities. What the Division of Cultural Relations did do was to design
a “University Application Form” for Chinese students that could be accepted
by most institutions in the United States, making it easier for Chinese students
to apply to American colleges and universities. The division sent two thousand
copies of the form to the American embassy at Chongqing to be distributed
to American consular officers and put in university administration offices and
other places where they could be given to individual students upon request. It
also suggested that the information should be shared with the Chinese press
and with the public through the media.109 At the same time, the State Depart-
ment approved Meng Zhi’s proposal that the China Institute in America be
permitted to issue admission certificates to Chinese students so that they could
apply for student visas with the certificates and come to the United States as
soon as possible.110 These steps helped prepare for the huge influx of Chinese
students immediately after World War II.

Building a Two-Way Street

The deep intervention of the American and the Chinese governments
helped not only maintain the educational front in China in the war years, but
also turn educational exchanges between the two nations into a two-way street.
As close allies, both the American and Chinese leaders became increasingly
aware of the importance of better mutual understanding between the two peo-
ples in their effort to win the war. While continuing to support a large number of
Chinese students and scholars in the United States, they took steps to encourage
American scholars and students to study in China and to have Chinese scholars
teaching Chinese language, culture, history, and other subjects in American col-
leges and universities. Although the number of people involved in studying and
teaching China-related subjects was still relatively small during the war years,
the government effort did help make educational and cultural exchanges be-
tween the two nations an increasingly reciprocal process.
Educational exchange, by nature, is always a two-way street since every
participant, no matter what official role he or she might play, is a “student” and
a “teacher” at the same time. However, the flow of students or teachers is never
absolutely equal in number, especially between two nations with huge gaps in
economic and social development. Educational exchanges between the United
States and China, the greatest industrial power and the largest developing coun-
try since the late nineteenth century, had been heavily focused on teaching the
Chinese. While an increasingly large number of Chinese students attended mis-
sionary schools in China or colleges and universities in the United States as part
 Maintaining the Educational Front 145

of their modernization effort, few Americans chose to study Chinese literature,

language, culture, and history in China. Although some American missionaries
did make efforts to study China-related subjects, their main purpose was to use
the knowledge and skills to spread the Gospel and teach the Chinese. By the eve
of World War II, thousands of Chinese students and scholars had attended col-
leges and universities in the United States. However, only a handful of American
students and scholars had studied or taught in China. The lack of reciprocity in
educational exchanges between the United States and China during this period
was seen as cultural imperialism by many Chinese and some American schol-
ars.111 Government was usually the chief target of their criticism.
During their stay in the United States, many Chinese students took initia-
tives to help the Americans enhance their understanding of China. In an article
published by the Chinese Students’ Monthly in March 1915, Y. L. Tong stressed
that a Chinese student studying in the United States was charged with a two-fold
mission. One was to learn and acquire knowledge. The other was to “represent
his country unofficially.” Since there were no adequate Chinese news agencies
or any Chinese exchange professors in this country, he believed that “it is the
duty of Chinese students not only to try to remove as many misconceptions and
misunderstandings as possible about our country when they are brought to our
attention, but also to disseminate a correct and true knowledge of the conditions
that are obtaining and the events that are transpiring in our country.”112 Tong’s
view was shared by many Chinese students in the United States. While pursuing
their educational goals, many students worked hard to disseminate information
about China and represent the country by making public speeches, publishing
pamphlets and articles, and participating in all kinds of social and political ac-
tivities.113 Hu Shi gave numerous speeches on a wide range of topics on China
and wrote letters to newspapers and magazines while studying at Cornell Uni-
versity as an indemnity student in the 1910s.114 Hu, like many other students,
served as representatives of Chinese culture in the United States.
The beginning of World War II made the better understanding of China
an urgent task for both governments. The Nationalist government called upon
Chinese students overseas to spread the news of war conditions in China so as
to win more sympathy and support for its war effort. In early 1938, the Minis-
try of Education instructed all students studying overseas to work at least five
hours a week to inform their schoolmates and professors about the war situation,
and pass the information to the public outside of universities.115 When the State
Department invited Chinese scholars to visit the United States, the Chinese gov-
ernment chose to send eighteen scholars and educators in humanities and social
sciences out of a total of twenty-six visitors between 1943 and 1946.116 These
scholars were expected to teach at American colleges and universities, and in-
form the American scholars and students of Chinese research during the war
years.117 As one of the first group of Chinese exchange visitors selected by the
Yunnan University, Fei Xiaotong completed the translation of his work Lucun
Nongtian (Farm Fields of Village Lu) into English within three months after
 146 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

his arrival at Columbia University. With the help of Greta Redfield, an Ameri-
can professor at the University of Chicago, he also translated and edited Zhang
Zhiyi’s Yicun Shougongye (The Handicraft Industry in Village Yi) and Yucun
Nongye He Shangye (The Agriculture and Commerce of Village Yu). During his
stay at Harvard University, he managed to translate a study completed by Shi
Guokui, another Chinese professor. The book was published by Harvard Uni-
versity Press in 1944 under the title China Enters the Machine Age.118
As soon as the United States declared war on Japan, Washington felt the
increasing need to know more about China and the Chinese people. The Office
of Education under the Department of the Interior immediately took steps to
introduce Far Eastern studies, especially Chinese studies, to American schools.
On November 2, 1942, C. O. Arndt of the Office of Education met with Willys
Peck to discuss cooperation between the two offices in promoting the study and
understanding of China in the United States. Arndt suggested that Chinese cul-
ture should be taught in American schools, that various subject bibliographies
relating to China be compiled for use by schoolteachers, that Chinese exhibits,
including books, maps, clothing, toys, utensils, and artwork should be prepared,
and that radio shows or talks about China should be arranged.119 About a month
later, Arndt called upon the Division of Cultural Relations again, proposing that
Chinese students be placed as “floating teachers” in public schools.120 Respond-
ing to Arndt’s request, the division selected and prepared a number of Chinese
students to teach at schools. The first group of three students was sent to schools
all over the country as “cultural ambassadors.” Fook Tim Chan, one of the first
three, was sent first to Springfield, Massachusetts, then to the Lincoln School
of Teachers College in New York City, and finally to the public school system
of Berkeley, California. While he was in Springfield and Berkeley, Chan taught
Chinese language and literature, gave radio talks, and demonstrated Chinese
cooking. After Chan’s stay at Berkeley, Dr. Virgil Dickson, the Berkeley Su-
perintendent of Schools, commented that in six months “Mr. Chan brought to
our people an understanding of China far beyond any other type of experience
which we could have planned for a similar length of time.”121
Washington’s efforts to enhance American understanding of China re-
ceived strong support and genuine cooperation from the Chinese government
as well as scholars from both nations. In December 1942, John King Fairbank
and his friend Yuan Tongli prepared a memorandum on cultural relations be-
tween the United States and China. In the memorandum, they suggested that
“in addition to present programs aimed at winning the war, there is urgent need
for a long range program in the field of education and the exchange of ideas.”
They insisted that the long-range program should be built on two principles.
One was that “ideas are as important as technics [sic].” The other was that
programs of “intellectual relations with China must be reciprocal.” In order to
make educational and cultural exchanges reciprocal, they recommended sev-
eral projects, such as the re-publication in the United States of bibliographical
and other materials appearing in Chinese publications and granting fellowships
 Maintaining the Educational Front 147

to American students for postgraduate study in China. They sent copies of the
memorandum to the State Department as well as various influential persons in
the United States. 122
Some of their proposals received strong backing from both the American
and Chinese governments. Madame Jiang Jieshi met with Fairbank in October
1943 to show her strong support for the translation project. She even came up
with a book proposal that would collect, translate, and publish essays written
by Chinese students on their impressions of the United States. She emphasized
that the essays should be critical so that Americans could know how the Chinese
saw them. Fairbank praised the proposal because he believed that one objective
of the American cultural program was to help Americans understand Chinese
attitudes toward them. Having been critical of Chinese life for generations, Fair-
bank thought it only fair that Americans should now learn how the Chinese
viewed American life.123
While intensifying its effort to help Americans have a better understand-
ing of China through Chinese students and scholars in the United States, the
Nationalist government began, for the first time in modern Chinese history, to
offer education on Chinese culture to American students. In November 1943, an
official from the Ministry of Education told Fairbank that the ministry was con-
sidering providing twenty to thirty scholarships for Americans studying Chinese
language and civilization in the United States and perhaps some travel grants for
further study in China. He also proposed sending some Chinese books to Ameri-
can institutions.124 While appreciating the offer made by the Nationalist govern-
ment, Washington could not send any students to China because no American
students were allowed to study abroad since 1942. However, in order to help an
increasingly large number of Americans who sought education on Chinese lan-
guage, history, and culture during the war years, the National Library of Beijing
did send six parcels of Chinese books to the Library of Congress through the
American embassy in November 1944.125
Although no American students were able to go to China for education
during World War II, both governments made efforts to help Americans enhance
their knowledge and understanding of China. It was the first time in modern his-
tory that the American and the Chinese governments took concrete steps to pro-
mote and improve the teaching of China-related subjects in the United States.
Their action not only helped stimulate greater interest in Chinese culture among
the American people, but also further broadened government intervention in
educational exchange. As both governments gained experience in promoting,
sponsoring, and regulating educational exchanges on both ends, they completed
their experiment successfully by the end of World War II. Once the war came to
an end, both governments were ready to make educational exchange a perma-
nent dimension of their relations and push the exchange of students and scholars
to an unprecedented level.
 Chapter 6

From Expansion to Termination

T he end of World War II saw the begin-

ning of an explosive expansion in educational exchanges between the United
States and China. Over one thousand students and scores of scholars were sent
by China to the United States every year in the second half of the 1940s, setting
a new record. While extending its arms to all the Chinese students and scholars,
Washington signed the first Fulbright Agreement with China, sending dozens
of scholars and students to China with government funding for the first time in
history. However, with the Communist victory in China and outbreak of war in
Korea, educational exchange between the two nations, which had just reached
its peak, came to a complete stop in mid-1950. The newly established People’s
Republic of China stopped sending students to the United States, which was
seen as a hostile nation for its support for the Nationalist regime in China’s civil
war. Viewing Communist China as a strategic threat, Washington first halted the
Fulbright Program and then did everything possible to keep Chinese students in
the United States from returning to China. The American and Chinese govern-
ments were largely responsible for the drastic postwar expansion of educational
exchange as well as the first complete termination of educational relations be-
tween the two nations.

Expanding Educational Exchanges

Having won the war as allies, the United States and China saw the op-
portunity to further expand educational exchanges between the two nations.
Following its reconstruction plan worked out during the war, the Nationalist
regime began to send thousands of students and scholars to the United States
for education and training. The outbreak of the civil war, while creating some
distraction, did not prevent the implementation of various exchange programs.
Washington supported the Nationalist effort by extending some of the World
War II programs and offering permanent financial support for Chinese students.
148
 From Expansion to Termination 149

As a result, educational exchange reached an unprecedented level and educa-

tional relations continued to be the strongest tie between the two nations in the
second half of the 1940s.
Sending more students to the United States for education was a key el-
ement in the Nationalist postwar reconstruction plan. Such a plan was made
publicly known in the speech delivered by Hu Shi, the former Chinese ambas-
sador to the United States and the newly appointed chief delegate of China to
the United Nations Education Conference, to be held in London on December
28, 1945. Speaking in front of an audience of about 550 Chinese students and
scholars in the United States who gathered in the Hotel Roosevelt in New York
City to celebrate the victory in the war and the success of Chinese-American
educational and cultural relations, Hu Shi emphasized that “the most important
relations during the past forty years between the United States and China have
been the education and training of about 10,000 Chinese students in American
colleges and universities.” He told his audience that “Chinese students educated
in the United States are occupying positions of importance in all walks of life in
China.” Partly because of that, an increasingly large number of Chinese students
and professors, he announced, would come to this country in the coming years.
He also hoped that more Americans interested in Chinese culture would go to
China for education.1
Dr. Hu’s prediction was soon turned into reality as both the American
and Chinese governments continued their support for the existing exchange pro-
grams and kept starting new ones. The State Department continued to invite
Chinese educators and artists to visit the United States in 1945 and 1946. The
number of Chinese visitors actually increased from six to eight a year in 1946.
Among the eight visitors who stayed in this country between 1946 and 1947
were three of China’s most celebrated artists. One was Shu Sheyu (Shu Sheh-
yu), a famous novelist better known as Lao She in China. Another was Wan Jia-
bao (Wan Chia-pao), the most distinguished playwright in China, known by his
pen name Cao Yu. The last was Ye Qianyu (Yeh Chien-yu), a noted painter and
cartoonist.2 During their stay in the United States, the artists visited universi-
ties, museums, and studios, attended writers’ conferences, and gave speeches on
Chinese writers during the war. They also continued their creative work in the
United States. While Cao Yu worked with an American playwright to adapt his
play Peking Man (Beijing Ren) for a possible Broadway show, Lao She decided
to extend his stay for another year to complete another novel, Four Generations
under One Roof (Sishi Tongtang).3
The Nationalist government continued to provide assistance to Chinese
students in the United States and drastically increased the number of students
sent to this country after the war. When the Committee on Wartime Planning for
Chinese Students in the United States was established in 1942, it only planned to
offer financial assistance to Chinese students stranded in the United States dur-
ing the war for two years.4 However, the grant-in-aid scholarships offered by the
committee were continued well into 1947 and the number of scholarships peaked
 150 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

in December 1946, totalling about fifty.5 The most ambitious single exchange
program carried out after the war would bring over one thousand Chinese techni-
cal personnel to the United States for practical training and education. As part
of the Lend-Lease agreement reached by the two governments during the last
year of the war, the Chinese technicians, engineers, managers, and administrator
would spend a year in the United States, studying transportation and industrial
development and techniques. Under the arrangements made by the China Sup-
ply Commission and the Foreign Economic Administration of the United States,
the Chinese industrial trainees arrived in the United States in the summer and
fall of 1945 and were placed in railway organizations, industrial plants, facto-
ries, and offices in twenty or so large cities across the nation.6 Although they did
not attend regular colleges or universities for degrees, their program was edu-
cational in nature and instrumental in expanding educational exchange between
the two nations.
Both the Chinese and American governments had high hopes for the
training of Chinese technical personnel in the United States. The Nationalist
government expected the trainees to “acquire specialized, first-hand knowledge
about railway, mechanical, electrical, and automotive engineering; forestry;
aeronautics; oil refining; and many other technological skills.”7 It wanted to see
the trainees make major contributions to China’s reconstruction as soon as they
returned to China. The Department of State recognized the importance of tech-
nical education. However, it “also deems of vital importance that these young
men acquire a feeling of friendship for this country, based on an understanding
of what is best in American life,” since they would be future leaders in industry
and labor in China. In order to achieve this goal, the State Department had asked
the China Institute in America to organize a series of programs that would give
the trainees opportunities to meet and mingle socially with members of the com-
munities in which they were living.8 The China Institute appointed Benjamin
Grant, an American who had lived in Beijing for years, as the field representa-
tive in charge of all hospitality programs. With help from leaders in industry,
education, finance, religion, and civic organizations, Grant was able to organize
Hospitality Committees in all major cities. Under the coordination of the Hospi-
tality Committees, the trainees were invited to concerts, plays, church suppers,
baseball games, Thanksgiving and Christmas parties, and special English con-
versation classes. The committees’ work was so successful that most Chinese
trainees left the United States with not only newly acquired knowledge, but also
“the memory of American friendship.”9
Following the industrial trainees, eighteen Qinghua students who were se-
lected through the special examination in 1944 finally arrived in the United States
in May 1946. Chosen during the war years, most of these students, fifteen of them,
majored in engineering and sciences. One of them was Yang Zhenning (Yang
Chen-ning), a physicist who would win a Nobel Prize in about a decade.10
Having taken care of all the educational exchange programs planned dur-
ing the war years, both the American and Chinese governments were ready to
 From Expansion to Termination 151

put more resources into expanding the exchange. Washington offered many
new programs sponsored by various federal government offices. The State De-
partment awarded thirty-five scholarships to Chinese students in China on a
competitive basis in 1946. In the same year, it also awarded nine agricultur-
alscholarships to Chinese students. The China Institute quickly noticed the dif-
ferences between these new scholarships and the old ones. In a news release
published in December 1946, the China Institute pointed out that the new schol-
arships marked a “new departure from the type of scholarship awarded by the
State Department following Pearl Harbor and up to the beginning of 1946, when
scholarships were given to members of Chinese students in the United States
who were stranded here and needed financial assistance to continue their stud-
ies.”11 In other words, the State Department started a new trend in educational
exchange by awarding scholarships directly to Chinese students in China. It also
meant that offering financial support for Chinese students was no longer just a
wartime emergency measure.
As Washington continued to provide strong support for educational ex-
change with China, the Nationalist government made every effort to implement
its original plan to send about one thousand students abroad every year. Having
sent more than one thousand technical students to the United States in 1945, the
Nationalist government announced in July 1946 that another round of national
examinations would be given to select government—as well as self-sponsored
students to be sent abroad. Qualification requirements for candidates seeking
education abroad remained the same as those promulgated by the government
for the first national examinations given in 1944. However, the Nationalist gov-
ernment, for the first time in history, did away with most restrictions on the sub-
ject fields that could be chosen by students. As a result, self-sponsored students
could choose their majors from fifty subject fields approved by the government
while the government-supported students could choose from fifty-three.12 The
reasonable qualification requirements and increased freedom to choose majors
attracted 4,463 students competing for 190 government scholarships. Hav-
ing taken examinations on the Three People’s Principles, Chinese history and
geography, Chinese language, foreign languages, and three additional tests in
their subject fields plus an oral examination in foreign languages, only 131 ap-
plicants earned passable scores. Most of these government-sponsored students
went abroad by early 1948. The largest group, thirty-three of them, left for the
United States.13
Because of the civil war, after 1946 the Nationalist government was no
longer able to hold any national examinations for study abroad or to send a large
number of students overseas each year. However, unwilling to completely give
up educational exchange, especially that with the United States, the Nationalist
government continued to send smaller but more select groups of young people
across the Pacific. The first group that received the special treatment were the
young students who served in the military forces during the war. Although the
Nationalist government had tried to keep most college students in school during
 152 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

the war years, some students were so determined to fight the Japanese and de-
fend their nation that they left classrooms for the battlefield. As part of the reward
for their bravery and service, the Nationalist government decided to send the best
student soldiers to study abroad once the war came to an end. Having taken ex-
aminations in various subjects, twenty-five students were chosen and sent to the
United States. Most of them chose to study English, history, economics, law, and
business administration.14
Young military interpreters who provided their services during the war
also received special treatment from the Nationalist government. During World
War II, many young college students were recruited by the government to work
with American military personnel as interpreters. When they first formed the
Bureau of Foreign Affairs under the Military Commission headed by Jiang
Jieshi in 1943, there were only four or five hundred of them. The number was
drastically increased when the government conscripted 1,224 seniors from for-
eign language departments at various universities in March 1944. Some of them
were sent to the United States during the war to train American pilots or to
work for the American government.15 Their extraordinary work helped establish
a close working relationship between the two allies and received high praise
from Washington. In order to reward these interpreters, the Nationalist govern-
ment decided to hold special study abroad examinations for them in 1947. Un-
der the rules for this special program, military interpreters needed only to be
high school graduates to qualify for the government scholarship and take two
examinations in their subject fields. The examinations were given in early April
and ninety-eight applicants passed the tests. Most of them continued their edu-
cation in the United States.16
In addition to large numbers of students selected through formal examina-
tions, the Nationalist government sent smaller groups abroad on special mis-
sions. One of them was organized by the Ministry of Military Affairs. Shocked
by the power of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan, General Chen Cheng,
Minister of Military Affairs, wanted to jump-start China’s defense technology.
He called a meeting with Zeng Zhaolun, Wu Dayou, and Hua Luogeng, three
leading professors from the Southwest Associated University, in November
1945. At the meeting, Professor Wu argued that China had to train more spe-
cialists before it could build its own defense technology and industry. Agreeing
with Wu’s evaluation of the situation, Chen decided to send the three professors
with a few students to spend two years in the United States. With the Ministry
of Military Affair paying for all their expenses, the professors led five care-
fully selected students to the United States in July 1946.17 While Zeng, Hua, and
Wu continued to rise as the leaders in their respective fields in China, all five
students, including Li Zhengdao, Tang Aoqing, and Zhu Guangya, would gain
their own fame and status either as a Nobel laureate in the United States or as
internationally known scientists in China.18
Unable to send a large number of government-sponsored students because
of the civil war, the Nationalist government tried to let more self-sponsored
 From Expansion to Termination 153

students go abroad. The examinations for self-supported students were given

at the same time as those for government-sponsored students in 1946. Among
2,774 students who took the examinations, only 2,649 completed all the tests
and 1,216 earned passing scores. Given the fact that more students took the tests
for government scholarships and with better scores, a special order was issued to
allow those who scored lower than the requirement for government-sponsored
students, but higher than the minimum requirement for self-sponsored students,
to join the latter to go to study in foreign countries. Therefore, the total number
of those qualified as self-sponsored students reached 1,934 in 1946.19
Earning the official status of self-sponsored student was essential for the
young Chinese who were seeking higher education and training abroad. That
status would not only allow them to apply for passports and visas needed for
international travel, but also give them the privilege of purchasing foreign cur-
rencies at the official rate.20 Ma Daren, a journalism student who came to the
United States in 1947, believed that many poor students were able to do this be-
cause they were allowed to exchange US$2,000 at the official rate. The official
exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Chinese fabi (legal currency) at
that time was one to twenty while the black market rate was one to two hundred.
The huge discrepancy allowed self-sponsored students to find many creative
ways to take advantage of their privilege. The most popular one was to borrow
money to buy American dollars at the official rate and then sell a small por-
tion of the American dollars on the black market so that they could pay off the
debt and use the rest of the American dollars for their education in the United
States.21 Tong Te-kong, a self-sponsored student who also came to the United
States in 1947, openly acknowledged that all Chinese students should be con-
sidered government-sponsored because the official exchange rate they enjoyed
gave them a free ride.22
The United States remained the top choice for Chinese students seeking
education overseas after World War II. While some government-sponsored stu-
dents were sent to different countries by the Nationalist government in order to
maintain educational and cultural ties with them, most self-supported students
chose the United States because it had more resources and better opportunities
in higher education than any other country at the time. Having suffered no dam-
age to its educational facilities, the United States was able to offer education
in almost all fields with the highest quality and efficiency. By October 1947,
the Chinese Ministry of Education had issued 1,163 study abroad certificates to
self-supported students who had passed national examinations more than a year
earlier. Among them, 1,018 students, 87.5 percent of the total, chose to come to
the United States.23
Difficult financial conditions forced the Nationalist government to explore
new ways to expand educational exchanges. Having received financial help from
foreign foundations and medical institutions during the war years, the Ministry of
Education sought and gladly accepted scholarships offered to students at medi-
cal schools by foreign institutions in 1945. Excited by the Chinese government’s
 154 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

new policy, the Rockefeller Foundation and other American institutions began
to offer scholarships to Chinese students immediately. They provided twenty
scholarships in 1945, twenty-two the next year, and eighty-seven the year after.
Although the scholarships were offered by foreign private institutions, the selec-
tion of students was handled by the Chinese government. Since all students had
to take examinations, only five students were able to make the trip to the United
States in 1945. The next two groups left China in full number and on time.24
While supporting as many Chinese students for study abroad as possible,
the Nationalist government became increasingly enthusiastic about sending pro-
fessors to teach or conduct research in the United States. As soon as the war
came to an end, the Ministry of Education sent ten well-known professors from
ten different universities across the Pacific.25 The Nationalist regime made it
easy for professors and researchers to go abroad on foreign appointments and
scholarships. When ten Chinese professors received fellowships from the United
Service to China for one year of research in the United States in 1947, they were
able to make the trip without any trouble.26 They were even allowed to exchange
foreign currency at the official rate to cover unpaid travel or living expenses.27
With such strong encouragement and support from the Nationalist government,
the number of Chinese scholars who left China to take positions abroad jumped
from 130 in 1945 to 270 in 1946, and reached 450 in 1947. Most Chinese pro-
fessors came to the United States and a large number of them studied and taught
China-related subjects.28 By 1947, according to a survey conducted by the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations, at least twelve Chinese were on the faculty at different
universities and colleges in the United States, counting for about 20 percent of
the specialists in the field of Chinese studies.29 (See Appendix F.)
As with its handling of Chinese students, the Nationalist government set
up strict rules to regulate the professors who went abroad for teaching and re-
search. According to regulations adopted by the Ministry of Education in No-
vember 1945, only full or associate professors with at least five years’ work
experience and scholarly publications and contributions could go abroad on for-
eign invitation. As for those who would conduct research in foreign institutions,
they had to be lecturers for at least two years or instructors for at least five years
with extraordinary service records. The ministry also required those who would
teach at foreign institutions to focus on Chinese culture and history and those
who would conduct research in foreign countries to choose subjects predeter-
mined by the Ministry of Education. The professors were generally allowed to
stay abroad for one year of teaching and research. They needed to have approval
from the ministry if extension of stay was desired. Like all the students, profes-
sors were required to make frequent reports to the government on their teaching
and research abroad.30
While sending more students and professors to the United States, the Na-
tionalist government offered scholarships to American students for Chinese stud-
ies for the first time after World War II. In early 1946, the Ministry of Education
announced that ten scholarships would be offered to American servicemen who
 From Expansion to Termination 155

had served in China to pursue Chinese studies. The scholarships aroused strong
interest among American veterans. The China Institute in America, which was
authorized to handle application matters, received seventy-nine applications by
May 31, 1946. Over twenty applications came in after the deadline. The in-
stitute had to return the late application materials to the applicants and advise
them to reapply next year.31 After careful review, the institute presented the first
scholarships from the Chinese government to American servicemen at a cer-
emony on September 27, 1946. Dr. Wellington Koo, the Chinese ambassador
to Washington, and Howard Peterson, Assistant Secretary of War, attended
the ceremony. Although the scholarships were small in number, Ambassador Koo
emphasized in his speech that they clearly showed “a genuine desire on the part
of the Chinese Government to stimulate the interest of the Americans in the
study of China and things Chinese and thereby promote the cause of mutual un-
derstanding between our two peoples.”32 One of the first scholarship recipients
was Lucian W. Pye, a second lieutenant in the Naval Reserve, who would later
become a leading scholar in Chinese studies in the United States.
Benefiting from the old as well as new exchange programs, about ten
thousand Chinese students, professors, technical trainees, and researchers ar-
rived in the United States between 1945 and 1950, almost doubling the prewar
total. The influx of the unprecedentedly large number of Chinese students into
the United States clearly demonstrated that educational exchange between the
two nations had entered a new stage. The increasingly close educational ties not
only allowed the Nationalist regime to obtain a large number of highly trained
experts in various fields, but also further enhanced the mutual understanding
between the two peoples. The drastic expansion was again made possible with
strong support from and close cooperation between the United States and Chi-
nese governments.

Implementing the First Fulbright Program

While the Nationalist government invested much of its resources in send-
ing an unprecedentedly large number of students and scholars to the United
States right after World War II, Washington took the initiative to sign the first
Fulbright Agreement with China, committing itself, for the first time in history,
to sending a substantial number of American students and scholars to China. As
with all other educational exchange programs during this period, the planning
and implementation of the Fulbright Program in China was directly affected by
the civil war fought between the Nationalists and the Communists. While Wash-
ington’s deep involvement in China’s civil war made the inception of the Ful-
bright Program in China necessary and possible, the defeat of the Nationalists
brought the program to an abrupt end. Although only a relatively small group of
Americans went to China as Fulbright scholars and students, the United States
government role as a promoter, sponsor, and regulator of educational exchanges
with foreign countries was perpetuated.
 156 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Although the Nationalists and Communists formed a united front in the

war against Japan, they entered a civil war almost immediately after the Japa-
nese surrendered. Washington began to abandon its nonintervention policy es-
tablished during World War II and provide strong and unequivocal support for
the Nationalist regime. American assistance to Jiang Jieshi came in three forms.
First, President Truman ordered Japanese military forces to surrender only to Ji-
ang Jieshi and American commanders in Mainland China and Taiwan. Second,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered General Wedemeyer, the commander of Ameri-
can military forces in China, India, and Burma, to “assist the Central Govern-
ment in the rapid transportation of Central Chinese Government forces to key
areas in China” once the Japanese surrendered.33 By the end of August 1945, he
had moved two Nationalist armies trained and equipped by the United States to
the East Coast and helped them take Shanghai, Nanjing, and other large coastal
cities.34 In December, President Truman approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s
plan to lift six more Nationalist armies, about 200,000 men, to North China
and Manchuria, move 50,000 tons of supplies for those troops each month, and
increase the number of ships in Chinese waters to transport the troops and sup-
plies.35 Third, American military forces took over Shanghai, Tianjin, Qingdao
(Tsintao), and Qinhuangdao (Chinhuangtao), accepting the Japanese surrender
on behalf of the Nationalist government. The American occupation of these
coastal cities and ports not only denied the Communists the opportunity to take
them, but also made it possible to transport more government troops from the
Southwest to Northern China.
Washington’s policy change caused concerns and debates among Ameri-
can political and military leaders. General Wedemeyer noticed the contradiction
in the orders given to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sought clarifica-
tion.36 The Joint Chiefs of Staff made it clear that “[i]t is U.S. policy to assist the
Chinese Government in the establishment of essential Chinese troops in liber-
ated areas, particularly Manchuria, as rapidly as practicable.”37 However, senior
officers in the State Department, such as Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of
State, and John Carter Vincent, the director of Far Eastern Affairs, viewed the
increased military assistance to Jiang as undesirable. They reached a consensus
that unification in China should be achieved through democratic and peaceful
means by broadening the basis of the government and that American aid to Ji-
ang should come only after he made necessary political and economic reforms
in China.38 The prevailing view among senior State Department officials was not
shared by Patrick Hurley, the American ambassador at Chongqing. As a staunch
supporter and admirer of Jiang, Hurley believed that the United States should
support him unconditionally. He maintained this position even after Jiang broke
the peace agreement that he had painstakingly arranged between the Nationalists
and the Communists. Having failed to broker a peace in China, Hurley resigned
in November 1945. In his resignation address, Hurley charged that the career
diplomats in Chongqing and Washington were betraying the United States and
responsible for the failure of China’s unification.
 From Expansion to Termination 157

In order to control the political damage caused by Hurley, President Tru-

man decided to send General George C. Marshall to China to “steal the headlines
away” from Hurley.39 Before Marshall left Washington, Truman had approved
the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s plan to increase American aid for Jiang. He also in-
structed Marshall that the United States should still aid Jiang even if he refused
to make any concessions and broke off the negotiations.”40 Following Truman’s
instructions, Marshall decided, before he went to China, that he would do his
best to increase American military aid to Jiang first and only then hold him “to
action in the matters more purely political.”41 Arriving in China on December
18, 1945, Marshall requested to keep the Marines in Chinese ports, send an
American Military Assistance Advisory Group to China, and transfer 271 naval
craft as well as other surplus property to the Chinese government. By March
1946, the United States had transported more than 145,000 Nationalist troops
into Manchuria and provided $600 million in Lend-Lease aid to Jiang, a figure
that almost matched the amount of aid given to China during World War II. At
the same time, Marshall worked to win more economic and financial aid for
China, including a $500 million loan from the Export-Import Bank.42
The increased American aid did not bring the expected political results.
On the contrary, it helped Jiang speed up his campaign to wipe out the Com-
munists on the battlefield. As soon as the Russians withdrew from Manchuria,
Jiang flew in his best troops to take over the area. Fighting broke out in Manchu-
ria between the Nationalist and Communist troops in the spring of 1946. When
Marshall hurried back from Washington to stop the fighting, the Communists
complied, but Jiang refused to order a cease-fire.43 Frustrated by the situation in
China, Marshall took Acheson and Vincent’s advice and began a serious effort
to use American aid as a tool to force the Nationalists into peace negotiations
sponsored by him. When fighting erupted once again in July 1946, Marshall
placed an embargo on the shipment of arms and ammunition to the Nationalist
government. President Truman sent Jiang a personal message warning him that
“unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is being
made toward a peaceful settlement,” he might be forced to redefine America’s
policy toward China.44 However, neither the embargo nor the stern message
from Truman could stop Jiang. A full-scale civil war broke out in summer 1946.
Having failed in his last try at bringing about a peaceful political settlement in
China, Marshall decided to leave it to the Chinese themselves and returned to
Washington in December 1946.45
General Marshall was appointed Secretary of State upon his return from
China. His personal experience had convinced him that China’s problem “could
only be solved by the formation of all minority parties into one patriotic, highly
organized, liberal party under selfless leadership and devoted to peace, genuine
democratic government and maintaining the rights of the people.” Based on that
belief, he was determined to strengthen the liberal elements in China and offer
only “limited and conditional” American aid to the Central government.46 With
strong backing from the president, Marshall rejected Jiang’s request for combat
 158 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

planes in July 1947.47 The new China policy of limited and conditional assis-
tance to Jiang was officially established, allowing Washington to continue its
support for Jiang while keeping it from direct participation in China’s civil War.
Over three decades later, John King Fairbank still believed that the limited as-
sistance policy advocated by Marshall “saved us from intervening in what could
only have been a super-super-Vietnam.”48
The policy of limited assistance to Jiang Jieshi aroused serious criticism
and challenge immediately both within and outside the administration. While
the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to push the president for more military aid
to China, Republicans in Congress kept pressure on both Marshall and Truman.
On February 20, 1948, Marshall was questioned before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs about the embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions
to China.49 At the same time, many in Congress insisted that additional military
equipment be made available for Jiang and that China be put in the same cat-
egory as Greece with respect to military aid and advisory assistance.50 When the
administration refused, Congress made aid to China a precondition for support
for the European Recovery Act, the so-called Marshall Plan.
The Chinese Nationalists also pressed Washington for large-scale eco-
nomic and military aid. On November 17, 1947, General Zhang Qun (Chang
Chun), the Chinese prime minister, sent a letter to Marshall telling him of the
critical military and economic situation in China and urging both emergency
assistance and a long-range aid program from the United States. When Mar-
shall replied that $300 million would be made available beginning in June 1948,
the Chinese government was not happy. In a memorandum handed to Leigh-
ton Stuart, the American ambassador, on December 22, 1947, the Nationalist
government demanded that “[t]he American plan for aid to China should be a
long-range four year project, the purpose of which would be to assist China to
achieve political and economic stability, including currency reform.” To achieve
that goal, the Chinese government requested $500 million for each of the first
two years, $300 million for the third year, and $200 million for the fourth, to-
talling $1.5 billion. In addition to economic aid, China asked for an immediate
loan of $100 million to buy military materials in 1948.51
Marshall rejected the Chinese demand for large-scale and long-range eco-
nomic aid without any hesitation. He believed that such a program would rep-
resent “a commitment by the U.S. government from which it would have been
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to withdraw, regardless of future develop-
ments.”52 As a military man with recent experience in and personal knowledge
of the country, Marshall knew that it would be disastrous for the United States
to involve itself too deeply in China. At a National Security Council meeting
on February 18, 1948, Marshall pointed out that “we cannot afford to withdraw
entirely from our support of Chiang Kai-shek government and that neither can
we afford to be drawn in an unending drain upon our resources.”53 What he re-
ally wanted was to disengage from China. But he knew that he had to do it cau-
tiously because the anti-Communist sentiment in the United States was rising
 From Expansion to Termination 159

and the Republicans were going to make China policy a big issue in the coming
presidential campaign. In order to win reelection in 1948, the Truman adminis-
tration had to find a way to show its sympathy and support for Jiang while steer-
ing clear of China’s civil war.
Further expansion of educational exchanges became an attractive alterna-
tive for the Truman administration in such a challenging political environment.
Marshall was aware of and involved in educational exchanges while he was
mediating in China in 1946. As part of his effort to arrange a peaceful settle-
ment between the Nationalists and the Communists, Marshall approved a plan,
under the cultural relations program, to invite educators from the Communist-
controlled areas to study at American colleges and universities for a year. He
believed that such a plan could show his “evenhandedness” in dealing with the
two parties. The invitation was gladly accepted by General Zhou Enlai (Chou
En-lai), the representative of the Communist Party in the peace negotiations.54
In order to get the Communist visitors into the United States before the end of
the fiscal year, Wilma Fairbank flew to Zhangjiakou, one of a few larger cit-
ies under Communist control, to interview the four candidates selected by the
Communist Party.55 Satisfied with the representatives, she made arrangements to
fly them to Nanjing so that they could apply for passports from the Nationalist
government as soon as possible. However, the Nationalist government refused
to issue passports to the Communist appointees despite pressure from American
officials. Jiang had no intention of allowing the Communist representatives to
go to the United States, speaking on behalf of their cause. Unable to get pass-
ports, the Communist representatives were forced to abandon their trip to the
United States.56
Although Marshall failed to get the Communist representatives into the
United States in 1946, his experience in China made him aware of the increas-
ing resentment among the war-weary Chinese people, especially Chinese stu-
dents and scholars, of the civil war launched by Jiang and supported by the
United States. The anti-American sentiment was aggravated in late December
1946, when an American soldier raped Shen Cong, a female student at Pe-
king University, in Dongdan Square, Beijing. On the evening of December 28,
the Student Union of Qinghua University decided to hold an anti-American
demonstration on December 30, and passed ten declarations. In a “Letter to
Our Fellow Countrymen,” Qinghua students wrote: “We really can not believe
that after eight years of bloody fighting, we have only replaced the Japanese
imperialists with an enslaving Ally.” In a “Letter to the Fellow Students in
the Whole Country,” they warned that “as long as the American troops stay in
China, the unification of China will be impossible and the Chinese Civil War
will never stop.”57 Despite warnings from the government, over ten thousand
students from all colleges and universities in Beijing held their demonstration
as planned on December 30. The demonstrators marched to the executive head-
quarters of Military Mediation, where American officers stayed. They shouted
in English: “American troops go home!” “China doesn’t need you!” Inspired
 160 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

by demonstrations in Beijing, over 500,000 students in dozens of other cities

boycotted their classes and protested in the streets. In February 1947, students
started a national signature campaign urging the United States to change its
China policy and withdraw its troops.58
The students’ protest reinforced Marshall’s determination to find a new
way to allow the United States to show its support for Jiang and to withdraw its
troops from China at the same time. The Fulbright Act quickly came to Mar-
shall’s attention. Sponsored by J. William Fulbright, a freshman Senator from
Arkansas, the Fulbright Act had a very simple beginning. At the end of World
War II, many millions of dollars worth of American equipment was piled up
in warehouses all over the world. It was too expensive to ship all the materials
back to the United States. Moreover, most of them could not be used at home.
But the equipment was desperately needed in countries that had been devas-
tated by the war. Thus, Congress passed the Surplus Property Act of 1944, au-
thorizing the sale of surplus war materials at prices as close as possible to their
fair value.59 Senator Fulbright introduced a bill to amend the existing law in
late November 1945. The Fulbright Bill did not attract any attention in Wash-
ington, DC. After a short discussion in the Committee of Military Affairs, the
Fulbright Bill passed the Senate by unanimous consent without a roll call vote.
It sailed through the House of Representatives with a “whoop and a holler” af-
ter Representatives made sure that it would not involve supporting international
education at the expense of domestic education.60
The Fulbright Bill amended the Surplus Property Act of 1944 in three
significant ways. First, it made the Department of State responsible for the dis-
posal of the surplus property. Second, it authorized the Secretary of State to
accept payment in foreign currencies, credit, or any other way deemed proper
by him. Third, it authorized the secretary to enter into agreements with foreign
governments to use part of their payments to finance educational and cultural
exchanges between the United States and other countries.61 The purpose of the
Fulbright Act was to commit the United States government to international edu-
cational and cultural exchange and make it a permanent part of American for-
eign policy. Fulbright’s support for educational use of the funds was based on
the American success with the Boxer Indemnity remission and his personal ex-
perience as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University in Great Britain. He believed
that promoting educational and cultural relations between the United States and
foreign countries would be a superb investment for Americans.62
Although the Fulbright Act authorized a new source of funding for edu-
cational exchanges, the State Department showed little interest in the funds
until General Marshall became Secretary of State. On April 5, 1947, less than
three months after he assumed the office, George Marshall informed Welling-
ton Koo, the Chinese ambassador in Washington, of his desire to negotiate and
sign the first bilateral Fulbright Agreement with China.63 At the same time, he
instructed American ambassador Leighton Stuart to immediately begin nego-
tiations in Nanjing. On April 16, 1947, the department invited the embassy
 From Expansion to Termination 161

to estimate the number of grants and the amount of each grant needed for the
program, and to propose standards for the selection of Chinese and Ameri-
can recipients. It instructed the embassy to get the Chinese government to pay
the first $250,000 immediately and to find an executive secretary locally for
the United States Educational Foundation in China (USEFC), the agency that
would handle the program in the future.64 In order to speed up the negotiation,
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs suggested that it would be wise to reach a
simple form of agreement first and leave the details to be taken care of by char-
ter and bylaws in the future.65
Busy fighting the civil war, the Nationalist regime was not excited about
the new exchange program or the terms proposed by Washington. After three
months of painful negotiation, the Chinese Ministry of Education finally agreed
to accept the new educational exchange program. However, the Foreign Minis-
try demanded several changes in the agreement drafted by the State Department.
First, it insisted that the name of the agency handling the program should be
the Sino-U.S. Educational Foundation instead of the United States Educational
Foundation in China so as to indicate that the two countries were cooperating
as equals in the project. Second, the USEFC should spend at least $1 million a
year so that the program could be terminated within twenty years. Third, Chi-
nese educators and officials should be included on the board of directors of the
USEFC so that the program could be implemented in the same way as earlier
programs sponsored by the Boxer Indemnity remission.66
The State Department refused to accept any of the demands from the Chi-
nese government. It insisted that the name should remain unchanged and that
only Americans could be members of the board of directors since the USEFC
was supported by American money. Chinese educators and officials, the State
Department contended, could be allowed to serve on an advisory committee.
The department also stood fast on its original proposal that yearly expenditures
of the USEFC should be under $1 million, with any unexpended funds to be
used in the future.67 In that way, the exchange program could be sustained for
decades since China, as the largest buyer of American “surplus property,” had
to pay tens of millions of dollars to the United States. While refusing to make
any concessions, the State Department put increasing pressure on the National-
ist leaders. At a dinner hosted by the China Institute in America to honor Wang
Shijie (Wang Shih-chieh), the foreign minister of China, Marshall focused on
educational relations in his speech. Openly expressing his admiration for the
Chinese students, Marshall pointed out that education had beyond any doubt
the greatest influence on U.S.-China relations, and that it might be the greatest
stabilizing force. Therefore, he challenged Wang to “do all we can to promote
and stimulate the carrying forward of this work.”68
Under the pressure from Washington, the Chinese government had little
choice but to accept the agreement as it stood. To Jiang, using Chinese currency
to fund the Fulbright Program posed no problem. Furthermore, Jiang could not
afford to be too tough on the Fulbright Agreement, fearing that he might lose the
 162 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

American aid completely. In the end, the Chinese foreign minister asked only
that officials of the foundation should not be granted tax exemptions or other
immunities enjoyed by American diplomats in China.69 By the end of Septem-
ber, all issues had been settled. The Chinese government agreed to allow the
program to go on after 1967 if there was a surplus of funds. It also promised to
make the first payment of $250,000 in Chinese currency within thirty days of
the signing of the agreement so that the program could be started immediately.70
Having resolved all the differences, the United States and China signed the first
Fulbright Agreement on November 10, 1947.
The State Department hurried to get the Fulbright Program into operation
because the situation in China was deteriorating rapidly. With Jiang spending
almost every penny he had on the civil war, Chinese higher education was on
the brink of bankruptcy in 1947. Salaries for professors remained extremely
low and often went unpaid. After the price of food doubled in May 1947, most
professors and students were unable to feed themselves or their families. Dis-
content among intellectuals led to an antihunger and antiwar movement in
mid-1947, in which students and scholars demanded an end to the war. Un-
happy with such activities, the Nationalist government issued orders to pro-
hibit student demonstrations. Jiang himself gave a speech on May 20, 1947,
calling students “rioters” and threatening those who disobeyed the order with
“severe punishments.”71
While the student movement surged in cities controlled by the National-
ists in July 1947, the Chinese Communists began a major offensive. By No-
vember, lines of communication in Manchuria had been cut and Jiang’s troops
were isolated in a few large cities. Aware of the seriousness of the situation,
Jiang turned to Washington for more military aid. Although Marshall lifted the
embargo on the shipment of arms and ammunition in May 1947, he refused to
provide the unconditional and large-scale military aid that Jiang requested. Even
though he was planning military aid for Greece and Turkey and economic aid to
European countries at this time, Marshall did not include China in his plan. The
only plan Marshall showed any interest in with regard to China at that time was
the Fulbright Program.
The State Department moved to carry out the Fulbright Agreement as
quickly as possible. On November 8, 1947, the State Department instructed
the embassy at Nanjing to provide a list of institutions in China deemed eli-
gible by the still nonexistent USEFC for educational exchanges with the United
States and a draft of the exchange program recommended for 1948.72 Within
a few weeks, the department ordered the embassy to provide administrative
supplies and equipment for the USEFC and transmit its communications to
the department so that the USEFC could begin its work before the first pay-
ment from the Chinese government was received.73 On December 5, 1947, the
embassy released the names of the members of the USEFC board of directors.
Leighton Stuart was the chairman and its members included two officials from
the embassy and two private American citizens representing educational and
 From Expansion to Termination 163

business interests in China.74 On the next day, George Harris, the cultural at-
taché of the embassy and the secretary of the USEFC, sent to the department a
long telegram listing Chinese and American institutions in China eligible for
the Fulbright Program and recommending the exchange projects for 1948. He
suggested that grants be awarded according to the following order of prior-
ity: American professors teaching educational techniques, English language,
and American literature and history in Chinese institutions; American graduate
students specializing in the area of Chinese studies; Chinese students studying
in American colleges in China; American scholars conducting special research
or field projects in China; and travel grants for Chinese students and scholars
coming to the United States.75
As the USEFC’s proposal was approved by the State Department, the
Board of Foreign Scholarships was appointed by President Truman to select
American scholars and students to be sent abroad to study under the Fulbright
Program. At the urgent request of the State Department, the USEFC worked
out a concrete exchange plan for 1948 with assistance from the United States
Information Service and the embassy.76 It recommended that grants be offered
to twenty American professors who would teach in Chinese universities, twenty
American students who would study in China, one hundred Chinese students
who would attend American colleges and universities in China, ten American
researchers who would conduct research in China, and thirty Chinese students
and scholars who would come to study in the United States.77 As the most ambi-
tious educational exchange program funded by the federal government, the first
Fulbright exchange projects received approval from the State Department and
the Board of Foreign Scholarships. In March 1948, Derk Bodde, a professor of
Chinese intellectual history at the University of Pennsylvania, was selected as
the first Fulbright Fellow to study and teach in China.78
The Fulbright Program officially began with Bodde’s arrival in Beijing in
August 1948. By the end of that year, forty-one Americans had been awarded
Fulbright grants. But only twenty-seven were able to accept them. This first group
of Fulbright grantees included four visiting professors, seven research scholars,
and sixteen graduate students. Two-thirds of them chose to go to Beijing.79 By
1948, Beijing had reestablished itself as the cultural and educational capital of
the nation since most universities and research institutes that had fled the city
during the war returned to the city. Soon after his arrival in Beijing, Bodde began
his collaboration with Professor Feng Youlan at Qinghua University in translat-
ing the second volume of Feng’s History of Chinese Philosophy. The translation
was later published by the University of Pennsylvania Press in 1951.
Both the USEFC and the Fulbright Fellows had to make tough decisions
as the military and political situations changed drastically at the end of 1948.
On November 1, the Communists took Shenyang (Mukden), which marked the
complete defeat of the Nationalists in Manchuria. With the fall of Manchuria
and the beginning of another major Communist offensive in Shandong and An-
hui Provinces, Beijing was under direct threat. In mid-November, the USEFC,
 164 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

concerned about the Fulbright Fellows in Beijing, sent a chartered plane to pick
up those who desired to leave, but allowed those who did not want to leave to
stay.80 Actually, it encouraged the Americans to stay by paying their grants in
full in American dollars so that the Fulbright Fellows would not be cut off from
their financial resources. This was another unorthodox measure since the State
Department had previously insisted that no American dollars be used in the Ful-
bright Program in China.81
The State Department had a number of reasons to continue the Fulbright
Program during this period of revolutionary change in China. The first was the
strong desire of the USEFC to complete the Fulbright projects that it had been
working on for such a long time. It did not want to force the Fulbright Fellows
to leave the work they had just started. The second was the American need for a
large number of Americans “professionally qualified to deal with China matters
on the levels of government, business and education.”82 The USEFC believed
that the only way to obtain these professionals was to continue the educational
exchange with China. The third was the important role that the Fulbright Fellows
might be able to play in countering Communist attacks on the United States. Af-
ter the Communists took Beijing and Nanjing, American diplomats, as well as
American businessmen and missionaries, were isolated from the Chinese com-
munity. The Fulbright scholars and students studying and working among the
Chinese at various universities were the only Americans who were able to move
freely within Chinese student and academic circles. George Harris believed that
“this small group of American students and scholars, in maintaining the friend-
ship and respect of numerous individual Chinese, stands in some part as a liv-
ing refutation of the virulent propaganda attack levelled on all things American
throughout the Communist area.”83
Despite its effort to keep the Fulbright Program alive in China, the USEFC
soon found it impossible to continue its work there. On August 31, 1949, the
USEFC suspended its operations due to the exhaustion of its funds and its in-
ability to acquire further support from the Chinese Nationalist government,
which was fleeing to Taiwan. By October, all grants allocated for the year were
exhausted and all American staff of the USEFC left for home. The first Fulbright
Program lasted only a year in China. The short-lived enterprise did benefit a few
American scholars, like Derk Bodde, who later made great contributions to Chi-
nese studies in the United States.84 But its quick demise marked the beginning of
the end of Washington’s strong support for educational exchanges with China.

Providing Emergency Aid to Chinese Students

The devastating defeat suffered by the Nationalists in the civil war not
only caused the premature death of the first Fulbright Agreement, but also forced
Washington to provide emergency aid for Chinese students stranded again in the
United States. Starting with a temporary program with limited scope, the State
Department soon had to tap various resources to provide massive and extended
 From Expansion to Termination 165

financial relief for an unprecedented number of Chinese students. The unusually

generous aid was provided for humanitarian as well as strategic purposes. With
millions of dollars dispersed among thousands of Chinese students, Washington
was able to help the majority of them to complete their education in the United
States. Their extended stay in the United States denied the Chinese Communists
the services of a large number of highly trained experts and professionals.
With strong support from both the Chinese and American governments,
the number of Chinese students in the United States kept increasing after the
end of World War II. Even the civil war did not slow down the influx of Chinese
students and scholars as more Chinese intellectuals sought to escape the danger
and chaos under the authoritarian Nationalist regime. In 1945, there were about
one thousand Chinese students in this country. By 1948, the number soared to
3,900.85 According to statistics gathered by Congress in mid-1949, there were
only eighty-three Chinese students in the United States who could still receive
full financial support from the Chinese government. Another fourteen hundred
were government-certified self-sponsored students who came to the United
States with US$1,800 purchased at the official rate. The largest group, about
twenty-one hundred, were private students who had to obtain sufficient financial
support on their own before they were allowed to leave the country for the United
States.86 Some students, especially privately sponsored ones, began to have finan-
cial problems in early 1948 because of the civil war. Beginning in the autumn,
an increasing number of Chinese students were faced with financial difficulties
also because of economic reforms implemented by the Nationalist government.
In order to stop the inflation and stabilize the economy, the Nationalist regime
replaced the yuan, the unit of currency then in use, with the new “gold yuan” at
a rate of one to three million in August 1948. At the same time, it ordered the
people to exchange all their gold, silver, and foreign currencies for gold yuan
notes at the Central Bank.87 This reform, representing sheer robbery, stripped the
Chinese people, especially the middle class, of their assets. Few Chinese families
were able to continue their support for their children in the United States.
Unable to receive financial support from their families, Chinese students
in the United States first turned to seek help from their colleges and universities.
Sympathetic to the Chinese students, most schools did what they could to help,
offering them scholarships, loans, and part-time employment on campus. It soon
became clear, however, that the challenge was too big for the schools to handle.
Lacking the funds to provide help for all needy Chinese students, universities
and colleges had to turn to the federal government for assistance.88
The State Department, which was aware of the financial problems suf-
fered by Chinese students since the beginning of 1948, did become deeply con-
cerned. However, the department had no funds or authorization to provide help.
In mid-1948, the State Department managed to get a pathetic $8,000 from the
appropriation for the implementation of the Smith-Mundt Act and authorized
the Office of Education to use the money to assist Chinese students. But with
such a small amount, the office was able to award each grantee only $100.
 166 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Even that little assistance was gone by the end of the year when the fund was
exhausted.89 As the situation deteriorated in China, even government-sponsored
students had difficulties receiving their payments in full and on time. On De-
cember 31, 1948, Meng Zhi sent a memorandum entitled “Estimated Financial
Needs of Chinese Students in the United States” to several officials in the Of-
fice of Educational Exchange of the State Department. Ten days later, Meng
wrote Secretary of State George Marshall, formally requesting emergency aid
for Chinese students in the United States. Meng estimated that among all the
Chinese students in this country, about twenty-five hundred would need finan-
cial assistance within six months. Basing his estimate on a calculation done by
the National Association of Foreign Student Advisors, Meng pointed out that
the average amount needed for each student was $500 exclusive of all other
sources of income. Therefore, an emergency aid fund of $1,250,000 would be
required to cover the second half of 1949.90
Meng’s letter formally placed the financial problems faced by Chinese
students before the State Department. Aware of the strong sentiment in Con-
gress to cut government spending, especially foreign aid, the State Department
managed to work out an agreement with the Economic Cooperation Admin-
istration (ECA) to assist Chinese students with funds originally appropriated
for economic aid to China. It was relatively easy for the department to obtain
approval from the Nationalist government for the arrangement. Aware of the
financial difficulties faced by Chinese students in the United States, the Nation-
alists welcomed any measures that could help alleviate the pain caused by its
economic reforms at home. On February 12, 1949, Wellington Koo, the Chinese
ambassador in Washington, formally requested the ECA to allocate $500,000 to
the State Department to assist Chinese students.91 In order to make certain that
the ECA would cooperate with the State Department, the Chinese government
managed to get support for the arrangement from Roger Lapham, the chief of
the ECA’s China Mission. At the request of the Chinese government, Lapham
headed home on February 17, 1949, to persuade Paul Hoffman, head of the
ECA, and Congress to transfer the funds.92 Having received the request from
the Chinese government and a formal supporting letter from James Webb, the
Under Secretary of State, the ECA allocated the money to the State Department
on March 23, 1949. With a half million dollars in hand, the State Department
was able to start the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students officially
on April 1, 1949.93
As cosponsors, the State Department and the ECA, while sharing a com-
mon vision for the program, did have some minor disagreements. One was about
the criteria for selecting Chinese grantees. As the former emphasized individual
merit and the usefulness of their specialty, the latter focused on assisting techni-
cal students who came to the United States mostly with financial support from
the ECA. Despite the disagreement, both agencies believed that the fund should
be used as a temporary stop-gap measure to aid only a relatively few persons.94
However, their shared original vision for the program soon proved impractical.
 From Expansion to Termination 167

As the disastrous results of the Nationalist economic reforms came into full
bloom and Communist control expanded rapidly in China, almost all Chinese
students and scholars were cut off from their financial resources by mid-1949.
Receiving no money from either their government or families in China, the Chi-
nese students had to turn to the American government for help. By the end of
June, the State Department had received twenty-two hundred applications for
assistance from Chinese students in technical and related fields. All of them had
been approved and endorsed by the universities and colleges.95 With such a large
number of applicants, the entire $500,000 was earmarked for accepted grantees
by August 8, 1949.96
Although the entire fund was gone, applications for financial aid from
Chinese students continued to pour in. The State Department had to seek addi-
tional funding to meet the need. Following the advice of his legal counsel, Paul
Hoffman indicated that further use of the ECA appropriations without Congres-
sional sanction was impossible.97 The State Department had no choice but to
turn to Congress for the money needed by the Emergency Aid Program. Its task
was made easier when it found enthusiastic collaborators on Capitol Hill. As
staunch supporters of Jiang Jieshi, Representatives Walter Judd of Minnesota
and Mike Mansfield of Montana were also concerned about Chinese students
in the United States and willing to help them. They introduced two similar bills
in the Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 2, 1949, proposing the allocation
of $4 million for the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students from
funds previously appropriated for aid to China.98 The Judd-Mansfield proposal
received immediate endorsement from the State Department as well as the me-
dia. On July 8, Assistant Secretary of State Ernest A. Gross sent a letter to the
chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs appealing for federal as-
sistance to meet “the emergency needs of the Chinese students stranded in the
United States.”99 The New York Times called the proposed assistance the best
investment the United States could make, arguing that providing financial aid
to the students would help make new friends and counteract the anti-American
propaganda that was the stock in trade of the Chinese Communists.100
With strong support from the State Department and the media, the House
passed the combined bill prepared by the chairman and incorporated it in the
Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1950, which passed the Senate on September
29. The act was signed into law by President Truman on October 6, 1949.101 The
new legislation provided desperately needed funds for the Program of Emer-
gency Aid to Chinese Students and helped expand its scale and scope. In the
1949–1950 fiscal year, the State Department awarded grants to 2,164 new appli-
cants. Prior to this, only about three hundred Chinese students had received aid
from the department.102 Unlike the program funded under the old ECA arrange-
ment, which required the grantees to be technical students, the new legislation
extended coverage to all students regardless of their field of study.103
Despite its strong support for the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese
Students, Congress still conceived of it as a temporary measure. In its report to
 168 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

the House, the Committee on Foreign Affairs emphasized that the program was
“based on the recognition that something must be done now to meet present exi-
gencies.” It insisted that there was no intention to extend the aid to any student
beyond the limit of the academic course that he or she had undertaken. Since the
committee believed that the course of events in China was still unpredictable,
it was not sure whether it was necessary to change the immigration laws and
regulations in order to allow all Chinese students to work after completing their
education here. However, it approved the State Department’s view that Chinese
students should not be forced to return to China. 104
More money was needed when the $4 million appropriated by Congress
ran out again on June 30, 1950. At that time, there were still a rather large num-
ber of Chinese students who had not completed their education. Moreover, fa-
vorable changes in the situation in Mainland China were viewed as increasingly
unlikely. The State Department therefore went back to Congress seeking more
financial support for the Emergency Aid Program. The further extension of the
program drew criticism in Congress. As part of their effort to cut the Truman ad-
ministration’s foreign aid program, some members of Congress, including Rep-
resentative Francis Bolton of Ohio, questioned Secretary of State Dean Acheson
as to the desirability of extending the program. Acheson insisted that additional
funds were definitely needed. Again, Walter Judd came to the aid of the State
Department. In discussing the ECA’s appropriation bill for 1951, Judd proposed
an amendment that allocated $6 million from funds previously appropriated for
the China Aid Act of 1948 to assist Chinese students. His amendment was in-
corporated into the China Aid Act of 1950 and approved on June 5, 1950, three
weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War.105
This new legislation expanded the Program of Emergency Aid to Chi-
nese Students in almost every direction. First, an unprecedentedly huge sum was
appropriated to provide financial aid for Chinese students and scholars in the
United States for an extended period. Unlike earlier legislation, which required
a clear time limit for the spending, the new China Aid Act of 1950 would allow
the funds for the program to “remain available until expended.”106 Second, the
new legislation permitted the program to be further expanded to cover post-
doctoral students, research workers, teachers, and professors. For the first time,
all four hundred or so visiting Chinese scholars and professors in this country
were eligible to apply for American government grants. By 1955, 286 Chinese
scholars had received grants under the program. Third, the program allowed
the State Department to use the funds to bring advanced Chinese students and
scholars stranded in Hong Kong or other East Asian countries to the United
States. The department instructed American embassies in the Far East to help
these Chinese students and allocated $200,000 for the first year’s operation.107
Last but not least, the legislation officially opened the door for Chinese students
to stay in this country permanently by permitting Chinese students to work after
completing their education here. In order to avoid making Chinese students per-
manent public charges, the act authorized and directed the attorney general “to
 From Expansion to Termination 169

promulgate regulations providing that such selected citizens of China who have
been admitted for the purpose of study in the United States, shall be granted
permission to accept employment upon application filed with Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization.”108
With millions of dollars spent on emergency aid to Chinese students,
Washington replaced the Nationalist regime, which was defeated and forced to
flee to Taiwan, as the sponsor and caretaker for thousands of Chinese students
and hundreds of Chinese scholars in the United States. The unprecedented fi-
nancial assistance from the American government not only allowed a vast num-
ber of Chinese students to earn master’s or doctoral degrees after completing
their undergraduate education program at American colleges and universities,
but also effectively extended their stay in the United States. Yet as Washington
reversed its traditional policy and worked hard to keep Chinese students and
scholars in this country, it helped bring educational exchange between the two
nations close to its complete termination.

Terminating Educational Exchange

Although the Emergency Aid Program was originally designed to provide
temporary help for Chinese students and scholars in this country, the outbreak
of the Korean War in June 1950 set a new path for diplomatic relations be-
tween the two nations and brought fundamental changes to the emergency aid
program for Chinese students. As the United States and the newly established
People’s Republic of China entered the war in the Korean Peninsula on opposite
sides, normal educational exchanges between the two nations became impos-
sible. While refusing to allow any students or scholars to go across the Pacific
for educational purposes, both sides fought to win over the Chinese students
stranded in the United States. As the Communists made patriotic calls in order
to lure as many Chinese students and scholars as possible back to China, Wash-
ington did its best to keep all Chinese students in this country. With generous
financial aid, complete reversal of immigration policy, plenty of employment
opportunities, and strict orders to ban some Chinese from leaving this country,
Washington managed to keep an unprecedentedly large number of Chinese stu-
dents and scholars staying permanently in the United States. As a result, both
the American and the Chinese governments turned themselves from promot-
ers and sponsors into blockers and terminators of educational exchanges. They
worked together to sever not only diplomatic relations, but also educational ties
between the two nations for the first time in history.
Despite its claim that the “immediate purpose” of the financial assistance
provided for the Chinese students in the United States was “a humanitarian
one,” Congress made it very clear from the beginning that the relief effort was
developed to safeguard American interests in China. Defending its decision to
support the Emergency Aid Program for the Chinese students, the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations pointed out that since the Chinese students “had an
 170 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

opportunity to observe and experience the democratic way of life,” and occu-
pied leadership positions in Chinese society as scholars always had, they were
“in the unique position to exert a profound influence on the future course of
their country.” Therefore, the committee emphasized that there was “no ques-
tion that it is in the interest of the United States to assist these individuals who
can play such a vital role in shaping China’s future.”109 When the bill intro-
duced by the committee passed the House on August 1, 1949, Representative
Judd, a staunch supporter of the program, told the public that the objective of
the legislation was to help Chinese students “become advocates of our system
as to the Communists.”110
From the very beginning, the State Department had difficulties in com-
ing up with evidence to prove that any students who returned to China from the
United States were in fact persecuted. Reports received by the State Depart-
ment actually showed the opposite. Six weeks after the founding of the People’s
Republic of China, Walter McConaughy, the acting American consul general
at Shanghai, told the State Department that he had “not heard of any incidents
where Chinese students returning from abroad have experienced difficulties re-
entering Communist China due [to] obstacles imposed by Communist authori-
ties or of any unreasonable pressure imposed on them after arrival.”111 A year
later, the New York Times reported that Chinese students who returned from the
United States received a warm welcome once they crossed the border between
Hong Kong and China.112 The nice treatment that returned students received
in China helped explain at least partly why many students went back to their
homeland despite employment opportunities in the United States.
The State Department was alarmed by the welcome given to the returned
students by the Communist regime and by students’ willingness to embrace the
new People’s Republic of China. According to McConaughy’s report, not only
were the returned students enthusiastically received, they appeared to accept
the new regime whole-heartedly. He pointed out that the emphasis of “present
Communist policy seems to be on welcoming back trained personnel and on
utilization [of] technical skills acquired abroad, which [is] quite natural [given
the] extreme shortage [of] trained manpower in Communist China.”113 Deeply
concerned about the situation, the State Department became increasingly reluc-
tant to allow Chinese students to return to China. In order to prevent Chinese
students from becoming Communist supporters, the department increased its
efforts to expose Chinese students to the democratic way of life in this country
and to keep them here.
Upon receiving the report from McConaughy, William Johnstone, Jr., di-
rector of the Office of Educational Exchange at the State Department, proposed
to invite presidents of a dozen or so major universities to meet with department
officials in Washington. The purpose of the meeting was to solicit their views on
how to deal with Chinese students so as to “strengthen and encourage democratic
forces in China.”114 Johnstone wanted to discuss three major issues with the uni-
versity presidents. The first was the participation of universities and colleges in
 From Expansion to Termination 171

the effort to enhance Chinese students’ understanding of American democratic

institutions and life through visits to American communities and homes, partici-
pation in American student activities, and close relations with faculty members.
The second was to have newspapers and magazines published at colleges and
universities, with assistance from the State Department, providing more informa-
tion for Chinese students. The increased information on developments in China
as well the United States, Johnstone argued, would help keep the students away
from Communist propaganda and prepare them for combat against Communism.
The third was to encourage civilian organizations to set up hospitality projects in
which Chinese students would be “adopted” by American families.115
While giving strong support for the meeting initiated by Johnstone and
other activities, the State Department believed that the best way to deny the
Communists the highly trained experts from the United States and to preserve a
democratic force for the future was to help Chinese students complete their edu-
cation here and prevent them from returning to Communist-controlled China.
Although consistent with its Cold War policy, the State Department’s plan to
extend the Chinese students’ stay in this country beyond their education met
resistance from other government agencies that were still unwilling to give up
traditional immigration policy toward the Chinese. For instance, at the inception
of the Emergency Aid Program, Chinese students had to sign a statement before
receiving grants, pledging that “upon termination of the award I promise to re-
turn to China.” The ECA insisted on the pledge because the $500,000 fund used
to help Chinese students came from the appropriation made for economic aid to
China. It believed that the funds were properly used only if the students who had
received aid would return to China and use their training in China’s economic
reconstruction. The Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange shared the
same view. It recommended that no federal funds be granted unless arrange-
ment was made for the grantees’ return to China. Because of this requirement,
about one thousand Chinese students returned to China between 1949 and 1950.
Over six hundred of them went back home with travel grants paid by the United
States government.116
The State Department vehemently opposed the forcible return of Chinese
students. The Department’s Advisory Committee on Emergency Aid to Chinese
Students argued that students should not be required to return to areas under
Communist control and that they should be permitted to postpone their return
until conditions had stabilized. Under pressure from the State Department, ECA
administrator Hoffman agreed to modify the pledge so that the grantees would
only return to China “as soon as practicable.”117 Although Chinese students had
to sign this provisional pledge as a condition of receiving grants from the federal
government, they knew that their extended stay in the United States would be
safe since political stability in China was anything but near in sight. The pledge
was finally rendered meaningless when the China Aid Act of 1950 passed Con-
gress. The new law permitted all Chinese students, including those who had
completed their education here, to seek employment in the United States for a
 172 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

prolonged stay.118 Realizing the contradiction between the pledge and the act,
the Advisory Committee on Emergency Aid to Chinese Students recommended
the abolition of the pledge in May 1950. Four months later, Assistant Secretary
of State Edward W. Barrett made the same recommendation to Congress.119 It
is clear that the United States government was ready by mid-1950 to abandon
its traditional policy requiring Chinese students to return to China immediately
after their graduation. Chinese students, for the first time in history, were en-
couraged to extend their stay in the United States.
The beginning of the direct military confrontation between the United
States and China on the Korean Peninsula further strengthened Washington’s
determination to keep Chinese students in the United States. Prior to the fall
of 1950, the State Department tried to keep Chinese students from returning
to Communist-controlled China mainly through offering them financial aid for
education and employment opportunities in this country. Once the war broke out
in Korea, the State Department, with the strong belief that China was behind the
North Korean attack, began to take more forceful steps to keep all Chinese stu-
dents and scholars in the United States. As early as September 1950, the State
Department banned any Chinese students and scholars with science and engi-
neering education that might be a possible threat to American military forces
from returning to China. It did not want to see American-trained students go-
ing back home and helping Chinese Communists in the war against the United
States. Furthermore, it hoped to preserve these students as democratic forces
and use them for the future reconstruction of a free China. As a result, at least
150 detention orders were issued to prohibit the departure of Chinese students
during the first year of the Korean War.120
The detention orders had a grave impact on many Chinese students and
scholars, including Qian Xuesen (Tsien Hsueh-shen), a renowned jet-propul-
sion scientist and professor at the California Institute of Technology. In July
1950, Professor Qian, despite his involvement in and contribution to top secret
research for the Army and Navy during the war, was accused of being a member
of the Communist Party and stripped of his security clearance for defense-re-
lated projects. Irritated by the unfounded attacks leveled against him and angry
at the loss of the right to continue his research, Qian decided to leave the United
States, where he had studied and worked for over two decades. After he and
his family had put their luggage on the ship and prepared to return to China at
the end of August, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an order
to prohibit their departure. Their luggage was removed from the ship and Qian
was accused of stealing secret documents. On September 6, 1950, Qian was ar-
rested at his home in Altadena, California, as a spy.121 Having stayed in jail for
a few weeks, Qian was released on a $15,000 bond. As part of the deal, Qian
had to report to the Immigration Service every month and stay within the county
border. Although no evidence was found to prove Qian’s connections with the
Communists, the FBI kept him under tight surveillance in the next five years
before he was finally allowed to leave.122
 From Expansion to Termination 173

While putting Qian in prison, the federal government arrested Zhao

Zhongyao, Shen Shanjong, and Luo Shijun, three Chinese scholars and students
who had worked and studied at the California Institute of Technology, on Sep-
tember 12, 1950, on their way back to China. American agents searched and
interrogated the Chinese scholars on board the President Wilson, docked at Yo-
kohama, Japan, and then took them away from the ship, which was heading to
Hong Kong. Accused of stealing American defense secrets, the three Chinese
were put in a jail for prisoners of war run by the United States Eighth Army in
Japan.123 They were pressed to confess their relations with Qian and to make
false accusations against the scientist. Unable to produce any evidence against
the detainees after careful search of their luggage and long interrogations, the
United States government had to release them to the Chinese embassy, con-
trolled by the Nationalist government, in Japan. The Nationalist diplomats tried
to persuade the three scholars either to go back to the United States or to accept
the offer from Fu Sinian, the president of the National Taiwan University, to
teach at that institution. Neither option was acceptable to the Chinese detainees.
Following persistent requests from the detained Chinese scholars and strong
protests from the new Communist government, the three scholars were finally
allowed to leave Japan for China on November 15, 1950.124
In contrast to the swift and strong actions taken by the State Department,
the Department of Justice, despite the direction and authorization from Con-
gress, was slow in promulgating the necessary immigration regulations that
would permit Chinese students to work after completing their education in the
United States. As late as March 1951, those students who left school for lack
of funds or accepted jobs after graduation were “very likely to be served with
a warrant of arrest, forced to return to his campus under the custody of some
officials there, and even served with a warrant of deportation.” Ironically, the
Justice Department took this action because it too was trying to be tough with
Communists. It believed that some Chinese students were sympathetic to Com-
munism since they were members of student organizations such as the Chinese
Students’ Christian Organization and the Scientific Workers Association of En-
gineering and Chemistry. Branding the leaders of these organizations as subver-
sive, the attorney general’s office tried to get Communist sympathizers out of
this country.125
The Justice Department’s tactics drew strong criticism from universities,
the State Department, and Congress. According to the New York Times, one
professor, who had seen the different approaches taken by the State and Justice
Departments in dealing with Chinese students, vehemently opposed sending
Chinese students back to China no matter what their political views were. The
professor pointed out that “it is criminal to send back our friends and idiotic to
send back our enemies—since all of them are highly trained.” He told James
Reston, the well-known columnist, that “[n]o sensitive government would let
any of them go near Peiping, whether they wished to go or not.”126 The State
Department and many in Congress shared the same view. The State Department
 174 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

repeatedly urged the Justice Department to put the act which permitted Chinese
students to work into force. Receiving no positive response from the Justice De-
partment, the State Department took the issue to Capitol Hill in order to prevent
Chinese students from being deported by the Immigration Service. On February
1, 1951, Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington introduced a bill to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, providing that no Chinese students should be deported
for a period of three years and that they should be allowed to work during that
period.127 An identical bill was introduced by Representative Arthur G. Klein
from New York to the House Judiciary Committee on March 12.128
Under the heavy pressure, the Justice Department finally revised the im-
migration regulations on April 13, 1951, allowing Chinese students to remain
indefinitely and work in the United States rather than forcing them to return to
Communist China. But it still required Chinese students to apply for work per-
mits and report their whereabouts and the nature of their jobs to the Immigration
Service every three months.129 In mid-April 1951, Immigration officials began
meeting with State Department officials to discuss “the question of forbidding
Chinese students to leave the United States, especially those with scientific and
certain kinds of technical knowledge and skills.”130 By mid-June, officials from
the two departments had reached an agreement under which the State Depart-
ment would establish a list of Chinese students and scholars who should be pro-
hibited from leaving the country. The Immigration and Naturalization Service,
under the Justice Department, would be authorized to control the departure of
these Chinese.131
The cooperation from the Justice Department finally insured the full im-
plementation of the Emergency Aid Program for Chinese Students. By 1955,
3,498 Chinese students had received 7,777 grants from the Emergency Aid Pro-
gram.132 With generous government grants, almost all Chinese students were
able to complete their education in the United States and many got graduate
degrees. Their higher degrees, in turn, helped them obtain satisfactory employ-
ment in this country. In a survey conducted by the State Department of ex-grant-
ees for the period between July 1951 and June 1953, 46 percent had finished
their studies and were employed. Of those who were employed, over 97 percent
were satisfied with their jobs. About 70 percent of them were employed in their
own fields. Fewer than 3 percent were unsatisfied with their jobs since they had
to work as laborers, waiters, etc.133 With decent jobs, stable lives in the United
States, and considerable fear of the unstable economic and political situation in
China, most Chinese students decided to change their legal status from student
to immigrant and stay in this country permanently. Therefore, when Washington
finally lifted all 150 detention orders in 1955, only 39 of the Chinese students
and scholars affected by the orders chose to return to China.134
Although some Chinese as well as American students and scholars con-
tinued to find ways to go back to their motherland in the early 1950s, neither
China nor the United States sent any students or scholars across the Pacific
after 1949. All exchange programs were terminated and all American schools
 From Expansion to Termination 175

in China were closed. As a result, educational interactions between the two na-
tions came to a complete stop for the first time since the 1830s. The total sever-
ing of the century-long educational ties clearly demonstrated that the American
and Chinese governments were capable not only of fostering the most drastic
expansion of educational exchange across the Pacific, but also of bringing it
to an abrupt end. With government playing such a pivotal role, intercultural
relations between the Americans and Chinese were no longer merely interac-
tions between the two peoples. Instead, the expansion and even the existence of
cultural interactions between the United States and China were largely shaped
and determined by the intervention of the governments of the two nations since
the mid-nineteenth century.
 Chapter 7

A Historical Perspective

E ducational exchanges between the

United States and China experienced the most drastic expansion and abrupt ter-
mination, all within the first half of the twentieth century. As the linchpin of
China’s modernization and the strongest tie between the two peoples, educa-
tional interactions—their rise and fall—inevitably had a lasting impact on the
political, social, economic, and educational development of both societies and on
the relations between the two nations. If the continuing expansion of educational
exchange throughout this period proved that it is possible for peoples with very
different cultural and historical backgrounds to share knowledge and ideas, the
sudden breakdown of the educational ties at the beginning of the 1950s revealed
that government had become the dominant player, whose domestic as well as
foreign policies largely determined the fate of U.S.-China educational relations.
An accurate assessment of the impact of educational exchange and a thorough
analysis of the causes for its expansion as well as termination will help us not
only have a better understanding of a key dimension in the modern history of the
United States, China, and their relations during this period, but also avoid another
catastrophic breakdown of educational ties between the two nations.
Although few scholars would deny the large-scale expansion of U.S.-
China educational interactions in the first half of the last century, they were di-
vided on the significance and impact of educational exchanges. Some scholars,
like Shu Xincheng and Y. C. Wang, believed that China’s study abroad program,
especially educational exchange with the United States, was a complete failure
because of its extremely high cost, unfair distribution of resources, and the lack
of usefulness of the knowledge and skills obtained by Chinese students from
American colleges and universities. Wang even argued that the lack of economic
growth and the victory of the Communists in China were mainly caused by the
returned students, who became too specialized in skills, too individualistic in atti-
tudes, too aloof from the masses, and too dependent on government.1 Some other
scholars, like Li Xisuo and Su Yunfeng, saw China’s educational exchanges with
176
 A Historical Perspective 177

foreign countries, especially those programs with the United States, as a huge
success. They credited returned students for the rapid development of science
and technology, and the emergence of modern education and economy in China.2
The conflicting views reflected the multidimensional nature of educational ex-
change resulting from deep government intervention in the first half of the twen-
tieth century. While the former overlooked the specific goals set for educational
exchanges at different times and the importance of the enhancement of mutual
understanding between the two peoples, the latter failed to pay enough attention
to the role played by government in U.S.-China educational exchange.
From a historical perspective, U.S.-China educational exchange in the first
half of the twentieth century was an unprecedented success as well as an aston-
ishing failure. Both the success and the failure depended not only on the partici-
pation of the students and scholars, but also on the role played by the American
and Chinese governments. There is no doubt that with generous support from
both governments educational exchange between the two nations succeeded in
training a large number of experts in various fields to meet the needs of China’s
modernization effort in the first half of the twentieth century. However, neither
the Chinese nor the American government was successful in dealing with their
political or diplomatic crises through the expansion of educational exchange.
Actually, all the Chinese regimes collapsed despite their support for study
abroad because they alienated the returned students and scholars by rejecting
serious political and social reforms. The United States was eventually forced
out of China completely when educational exchange between the two nations
was at its peak because Washington kept most Chinese students and scholars
angry by refusing to abandon or revise its China policies, which were perceived
as hostile by the Chinese. Therefore, in order to turn educational exchange into
an enduring bridge between the two peoples and two cultures, stronger support,
closer collaboration, broader interaction, and better understanding of the nature
and function of intercultural relations from both the American and Chinese gov-
ernments are needed.

Educational Success
As major sponsor, regulator, promoter, and coordinator, both the Ameri-
can and Chinese governments set many goals for educational exchange pro-
grams between the two nations. Although Chinese regimes and Washington
might have slightly different political or diplomatic motifs, they all wanted to
see more students and scholars involved in exchanges so that knowledge and
ideas could be shared across the Pacific and education on both sides of the ocean
could be benefited. Right after its establishment, the Ministry of Education of
the Qing government made it clear that the goal for study abroad was to train
highly specialized experts in various fields while domestic schools aimed at uni-
versal and general education.3 Such a policy was actually inherited by all suc-
ceeding regimes.4 In order to achieve that goal, China sent an increasingly large
 178 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

number of Chinese students and scholars to the United States for higher educa-
tion beginning in 1905. With knowledge and ideas obtained from the United
States, Chinese students became leaders in almost all fields after their return to
China. Their contribution to the modernization of Chinese education, science,
technology, economy, and politics during this period could never be overesti-
mated. While learning from their American teachers and schoolmates, they also
served as unofficial envoys for China, disseminating information and knowledge
of Chinese culture and history to an increasingly larger American audience. To-
gether with American scholars and students, they contributed to the construction
of a cultural bridge across the Pacific, bringing the mutual knowledge and un-
derstanding between the two peoples to an unprecedented level.
With strong support from both the American and Chinese governments,
educational exchange between the two nations succeeded in training a large
number of experts in all fields for China in the first half of the twentieth century.
According to a survey published by the China Institute in America in 1954, only
51 Chinese students were admitted to colleges and universities in the United
States between 1900 and 1904. The number increased about seven times, to-
taling 353 in the next five years. The sharp increase continued in the next two
decades, reaching 1,661 in the 1910s, and 3,632 in the 1920s. Although the
beginning of the war with Japan reduced the number of Chinese students enroll-
ing in American colleges and universities to a trickle, the decade as a whole still
saw 2,031 Chinese students entering American institutions of higher education.
As soon as World War II came to an end, Chinese students began to pour into
the United States for education and training. By the end of the 1940s, Ameri-
can colleges and universities took in an unprecedented 5,739 Chinese students.
As a result, the number of Chinese students that came to the United States for
education in the first half of the twentieth century increased twenty times com-
pared with those in the previous fifty years.5 With less than a hundred attending
colleges and universities in the United States in the academic year 1904–05,
Chinese students counted for less than 4 percent of the total of 2,673 foreign stu-
dents in this country and ranked fifth after Canada’s 614, Mexico’s 308, Cuba’s
236, and Japan’s 105.6 As their number shot up to 549 in the academic year
1911–12, their ranking moved up to third place.7 By the academic year 1920–
21, there were 1,443 Chinese students in American colleges and universities,
making them the largest foreign student body.8
As their number increased, more Chinese students pursued undergraduate
as well as graduate education in the United States. Prior to 1905, most Chinese
entered preparatory schools or secondary schools for education in the United
States. Among roughly 1,000 Chinese students who came to the United States
between 1847 and 1904, only 105 were admitted to colleges and universities
and fewer received baccalaureate degrees.9 A master’s was the highest academic
degree earned by Chinese students in the United States and only three of them
achieved such an honor during this period.10 Beginning with the indemnity stu-
dents, almost all Chinese students who came to the United States after 1905
 A Historical Perspective 179

sought higher education and a majority of them earned baccalaureate and gradu-
ate degrees. This trend was reinforced during the Nationalist era. Among the
3,610 Chinese students enrolled in 402 American colleges and universities in
the spring of 1949, there were 2,280 graduate students and 935 undergradu-
ates.11 Such a high percentage of graduate students was unheard of among any
other groups of foreign students or the Americans. According to Yuan Tongli’s
study, a total of 2,751 Chinese students earned their doctoral degrees in this
country between 1905 and 1960.12 There is no doubt that more Chinese students
completed undergraduate as well as graduate programs in the United States than
in any other nations in the world.
Chinese students also widened their choice of subject fields during this
period. Prior to 1905, students were required to study only defense-related sub-
jects like “military, ship making, mathematics, and manufacturing.”13 Although
the Qing Court still wanted to focus on science, agriculture, engineering, and
medicine after 1905, the indemnity students and Qinghua graduates did have
more choices for their majors. A large percentage of them chose to study busi-
ness, law, arts, education, history, languages, etc.14 By the end of the 1940s,
Chinese students could pick almost any subject fields that were available in
American colleges and universities.15 Among 3,610 Chinese students enrolled at
American universities in the spring of 1949, 24 percent of them were registered
in pure and applied sciences, 20 percent in engineering, 17 percent in arts and
humanities, 12 percent in business and management, 10 percent in social and
political sciences, and 7 percent in education.16
With advanced education and degrees received in the United States, many
returned students and scholars quickly became leading figures in various fields
in China. Who’s Who of China (Zhongguo Mingrenlu) included 176 American
returnees in its 1925 edition. The number jumped to 392 in 1931. These numbers
were quite impressive, especially when compared with students returned from
Japan. Despite the fact that far more Chinese students had received education in
Japan by this time, only 111 and 203 of them were included in the same publica-
tion in 1925 and 1931, respectively. Among those famous American returnees,
university professors counted for 30.1 percent and 34.4 percent, government of-
ficials 20.5 percent and 18.1 percent, and engineers 13.1 percent and 9.4 percent
in respective years. In sharp contrast, most students who returned from Japan
became well-known as government officials. University professors only counted
for 4.5 percent in 1925 and 9.9 percent in 1931.17 When Academia Sinica was es-
tablished in 1948, forty-nine, 60.5 percent, of the eighty-one fellows had received
their education in the United States, five times more than in second-ranked Brit-
ain and ten times more than in fifth-ranked Japan.18 (See Appendix G.)
Since a large percentage of American returnees became teachers and pro-
fessors, their influence on Chinese education, especially higher education, was
most profound. With advanced education and updated knowledge, the Ameri-
can-returned students were recruited by all major colleges and universities as
administrators and professors. American-returned students served as presidents
 180 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

not only at Qinghua, which was known for the dominant role played by students
educated in the United States, but also at Beijing University, formerly the Capi-
tal University (Jingshi Daxuetang), Nankai University, Jiaotong University, and
Southeast University (Dongnan Daxue) beginning in the 1920s. In those univer-
sities, professors graduated from American colleges and universities were domi-
nant either in number or in influence. In 1930, Nankai had forty-one professors.
Thirty-one of them had returned from the United States.19 Southeast University,
led by Guo Binwen (Pin-wen Kuo), who served as the president of the Chinese
Students’ Alliance, the largest organization for Chinese students in the United
States, while studying at Columbia University, was able to collect about fifty
American-returned students. John Leighton Stuart, a famous American educator
and diplomat in China, observed that all American returnees were outstanding
in their own fields and that they gave “the impetus to education based on [the]
American model.”20
With such a high concentration, the American-returned students drastically
changed the theory, contents, curriculum, and direction of Chinese education.
Beginning in the 1920s, several major new educational movements rose in China,
including vocational education, village education, and science education. The
leaders of all these movements had received their education in the United States.
The best-known one was the science education movement started by a group
of Chinese students studying at Cornell University in 1914. Sharing the belief
that the poverty and backwardness of Chinese society was caused by the lack of
science, the students decided to do their part to promote science education and
research in China. In January 1915, they published the first volume of the Jour-
nal of Science (Kexue) in Shanghai. On October 25, they organized the Chinese
Society of Science (Zhongguo Kexueshe) with Hu Mingfu, Zhao Yuanren, Bin
Zhi, Ren Hongjuan, and Zhou Binwen, all students in the United States, as the
founding members.21 While the Journal of Science was the first and remained
for a long time the only comprehensive science journal in China, the Society of
Science was the first national society for Chinese scientists. As more students
joined them and returned to China, science education and education with scien-
tific methods and contents began to change all the schools in China.
When more American-returned students resumed teaching and adminis-
trative positions at universities and schools, they tried to change not only the
content of teaching, but also the educational system in China. Right after his
return from Columbia, Hu Shi began to push for the adoption of credit hour and
elective systems to replace the old grade system at Beijing University. Impressed
by Hu’s proposal, Cai Yuanpei, the president of Beijing University, sent Hu as
the university’s representative to attend the meeting held at the Ministry of Edu-
cation so that he could introduce his plan to all other universities. Hu’s proposal
received unanimous support from university presidents attending the meeting.
With the approval of the Ministry of Education, Beijing University adopted the
American-style systems immediately and many other universities followed suit
in the 1920s.22 In 1924, the Ministry of Education issued the Regulations on
 A Historical Perspective 181

National Universities (Guoli Daxuexiao Zhangcheng), requiring all universities

to use the elective system and to establish a Board of Directors (Dongshi Hui),
Senate (Pingyi Hui), and Faculty Council (Jiaoshou Hui).23 These institutions,
directly borrowed from American colleges, existed in Chinese universities until
the early 1950s.
Although most American-returned scholars taught at colleges and univer-
sities, they cared very much about elementary and secondary education. Un-
happy with the old school system patterned after the Japanese model in the wake
of the Revolution of 1911, many American-returned students wanted to change
the system and curriculum of elementary and secondary schools in China.24 Hu
Shi joined with many other educators, such as Cai Yuanpei, Tao Xingzhi, and
Jiang Mengling, in formulating the School System Reform Bill, which was first
endorsed by delegates at the annual conference of Provincial Societies of Edu-
cation and then adopted by the Ministry of Education in 1922. Following the
School Reform Decree of 1922, China replaced the old Japanese-style school
system with a new one. With six years for elementary school, three years for
middle school, and three years for high school, the new system was clearly mod-
eled after the public schools in the United States.25 Such a system has remained
largely unchanged until today.
Education in the United States had not only turned thousands of Chinese
students into experts in various fields, but also made them go-betweens for both
cultures. In order to prepare themselves for their education in the United States,
most Chinese students studied English, American history, literature, geography,
and politics before they left their motherland. Once they arrived in America,
they worked very hard to learn as much as they could in and outside the class-
room. Many did so well that they won prestigious awards as students. Zhao Yu-
anren and Hu Da were inducted to both Sigma Xi and Phi Beta Kappa at Cornell
University in 1914, a rare honor even for the brightest American undergradu-
ate students.26 Hu Shi won the Corson Browning Prize, an English composition
contest, in 1914 and the American Association for International Conciliation
essay contest in 1916.27 Like many of his peers, Hu Shi showed great interest
in American culture, politics, and society. Deeply involved in local and national
political campaigns in 1912 and 1916, Hu went to many campaign meetings in
Ithaca, New York, and wore the Bull Moose pin for two months to support the
Progressive Party in the election of 1912. Hu saw his participation not only as
the best way to get to know American politics, but also as a necessary step to get
himself interested in public affairs. He believed that if a person had no interest
in public affairs in his community in the United States, it would be difficult for
him to become enthusiastic about public affairs after his return to China.28
Besides learning through their personal experiences, quite a number of
Chinese students made the United States their research subject. After China, the
United States was the second most popular subject among the Chinese students
as a dissertation topic. Numerous theses and dissertations were written on Amer-
ican culture, education, economy, philosophy, politics, and society during this
 182 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

period.29 While some came out as books in the United States, most of the stud-
ies were published in China. These scholarly works helped lift Chinese study
of the United States to a level much higher than that in the nineteenth century.
In addition to their own original study of the United States, many Chinese stu-
dents made great efforts to translate American books into Chinese. While study-
ing at Cornell University, Zhao Yuanren translated Alice in Wonderland into
Chinese, which instantly became a popular book among Chinese youth. Yang
Enzhan, another student returned from the United States, translated many books
on American politics and education. These books helped introduce American
culture, history, politics, and educational system to the Chinese.30 A collective
effort was made by the Business Publisher (Shangwu Yinshuguan) in the 1920s
and 1930s. Since the vast majority of its editors and department heads, including
Zhu Jingnong, Hu Shi, Zhu Kezhen, and Tang Yue, were American returnees, it
published a whole set of textbooks from elementary to high school in 1923 for
the newly reformed educational system. Many of the new textbooks were “bor-
rowed” from the United States.31
Chinese students in the United States served not only as eyes, but also as
unofficial envoys for China. They worked hard to help the Americans have a
better knowledge and understanding of the Chinese culture, history, and people
through speeches delivered on various occasions, articles published in news-
papers and journals in both Chinese and English, and completed dissertations
and theses on China. Many Chinese students, like Chen Dingmo, Wu Jiagao,
Zhang Zuchun, and Huang Tianfu, gave numerous speeches on Confucianism,
Daoism, Chinese mathematics, railroads, and agriculture while studying in the
United States.32 Hu Shi sent letters to national magazines and local newspa-
pers to denounce the view that Japan should be allowed to direct the affairs of
China.33 The most systematic introduction to Chinese culture and history was
provided by the theses and dissertations on China written by Chinese students
pursuing graduate degrees in the United States. Between 1905 and 1950, Chi-
nese students completed about three hundred dissertations on Chinese history,
economics, politics, education, law, literature, and language.34 Many of those
dissertations were later published in the United States, providing new sources
and different perspectives for American scholars and the public in their study
and understanding of China.
As an increasingly large number of Chinese students and scholars came to
the United States for education, more Americans went to China for educational
purposes in the first half of the twentieth century, improving the dissemination
of knowledge and exchange of personnel. Unlike the missionaries, they were
engaged in educational activities in China for academic purposes. Over sixty
Americans taught Western learning courses at the Qinghua Academy in the
1910s.35 At the invitation of his former students, John Dewey, a well-known pro-
fessor of philosophy at Columbia University, lectured in China between 1919
and 1921, making pragmatism one of the most popular philosophical trends
among the Chinese during this period.36 John King Fairbank, a graduate of Har-
 A Historical Perspective 183

vard University and a D.Phil. candidate at Oxford University, was one of the first
American students who studied the Chinese language, history, and culture in the
early 1930s.37 The largest number of American students, scholars, and experts
arrived in China with sponsorships from the State Department during and after
World War II. As one of the first Fulbright scholars, Derk Bodde offered the
most intimate and insightful observations on the revolutionary changes brought
by the Communists in 1949 in his Peking Diary: A Year of Revolution.38
Educational exchange between the United States and China in the first half
of the twentieth century was a huge success in terms of the transfer of knowl-
edge and the enhancement of mutual understanding. The success was made pos-
sible with direct, persistent, sometimes concerted intervention by the Chinese as
well as the American government. Government support and promotion of edu-
cational exchange came in many different ways. One was financial assistance.
Fully aware of the importance of educational exchange, both the Chinese and
American governments injected huge financial resources into various exchange
programs. In addition to about $28 million from the Boxer Indemnity remission,
tens of millions of U.S. dollars were spent by both governments on educating
Chinese students in the United States during this period.39 A rather large number
of Chinese and American students and scholars were benefited by the gener-
ous government support. Among the twenty thousand or so Chinese students
who entered American colleges and universities for education between 1905
and 1950, about one-third of them were recipients of government scholarships,
subsidies, stipends, and assistance. As the most popular program, the Qinghua
scholarship was awarded to about four thousand students, around 20 percent
of the total. If the official exchange rate offered by the Chinese government to
self-sponsored students is counted as a form of government assistance, then the
majority of Chinese students received government support.
Besides financial support, both the United States and the Chinese govern-
ments made institutional and legal changes to pave the road for educational ex-
changes. The Qing Court’s abolition of the traditional examination system and
replacement of traditional academies with new Western-style schools removed
the greatest barrier to educational exchange with other nations and created the
unprecedented need for experts with modern training and education. As the in-
stitutional barriers were removed by the Qing Court, the executive branch of the
United States government made great efforts to lower and eventually remove
the legal obstacles created by the Chinese exclusion laws and regulations. Such
an effort, while insufficient to eliminate the racial discrimination against the
Chinese in this country, did make it easy to admit Chinese students to American
colleges and universities during this period.
The governmental support for educational exchange became most effec-
tive and productive when the two central governments were able to collaborate
with each other. The cooperation first began with educational exchange programs
funded with the returned Boxer Indemnity, beginning in 1908. The two govern-
ments worked together to make sure that large groups of Chinese students could
 184 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

enter the United States with few incidents and that a school could be established
and run to prepare Chinese students for higher education in the United States.
Although the closeness of the cooperation was reduced as the Chinese govern-
ment successfully put Qinghua and China’s study abroad programs under its
complete control in the 1930s, both governments continued to give their support
to educational exchange between the two nations. As war broke out in the Pa-
cific, the collaboration between the two central governments entered a new era.
Despite extreme difficulties caused by the war, both governments made great
efforts to maintain the flow of students and scholars across the ocean. As soon
as the war came to an end, the two governments further expanded and deepened
their cooperation in educational exchange, bringing it to an unprecedentedly
high level until the defeat of the Nationalist government.
While fully recognizing the significance of government support and col-
laboration, it is equally important to see that government intervention and coop-
eration could only be effective with a positive response and active participation
from students and scholars involved in exchange programs. With the adop-
tion of a modern educational system in China, Chinese students and scholars
showed an increasingly strong desire to pursue education and training in the
United States in the first half of the twentieth century. Actually, as the staunchest
supporters and participants, they pushed both the Chinese and American gov-
ernments for greater support for educational exchanges. The strong desire of
Chinese students and scholars to pursue higher education and training in the
United States was generated and reinforced by various political, social, and eco-
nomic forces. First, they saw American education and training as the best way to
prepare themselves for the construction of a powerful and prosperous China. As
members of China’s educated elite, they shared the strong sense of obligation
to serve their nation. Second, with the termination of traditional education and
examinations, Western-style education obtained in foreign countries, especially
the United States, became a new “short-cut” for successful careers. Many Chi-
nese students and scholars competed for the rare opportunities to study in the
United States for their own individual success. Third, the generous support from
government and other institutions and superior study and research conditions in
the United States had great appeal for Chinese students and scholars, who had
suffered tremendously from frequent wars, political instability, and demeaning
working and living conditions in China. To many, educational experience in the
United States would not only help enhance their knowledge and research, but
also allow them to get away, at least for a short period, from difficult political
and financial situations in China.

Political Failure
Expectations for educational exchange from both the American and Chi-
nese governments went far beyond knowledge transfer and personnel exchange.
While Washington expected that the education of China’s future leaders in the
 A Historical Perspective 185

United States would help alleviate and eliminate various kinds of crises and
problems in its relations with China, the Chinese government, from the Qing
Court to the Nationalist regime, tried to turn students and scholars into its
staunch supporters through generous financial assistance and tight political
control. Although government support for educational exchange was appre-
ciated by most Chinese students seeking education abroad, the political and
thought control imposed by the government kept alienating them. The Chi-
nese government’s persistent efforts to use only the technical expertise of the
returnees and reject their demands for serious political, social, and economic
reforms greatly limited the success of educational exchange and irreversibly
turned many students and scholars into the strongest critics of the regime that
had generously paid for their education and training overseas. As a result, the
Chinese government, while enjoying the great educational success brought by
the exchanges with foreign countries like the United States, failed to achieve
any of its political goals. Since the Nationalists sent more students and schol-
ars abroad, and sought tighter control over students and scholars than any
other regime in the first half of the twentieth century, their political failure was
thus most striking.
Compared with the Qing Court and the warlord regimes in the early Re-
public years, the Nationalist government had much more effective control over
education in general and study abroad in particular. Through the establishment
of national qualification standards, the requirement for numerous examinations,
control over passports and foreign currencies, and issuance of Study Abroad
Permits for all students leaving the country, the Nationalist government suc-
ceeded in putting all study abroad programs under its control. Its success de-
pended not only on the new administrative mechanisms, but also on the support
of students and scholars, who favored a strong central administration over study
abroad programs, at least in the earlier years. They believed that a strong central
administration would help get rid of foreign interference in Chinese education
and study abroad programs, and provide greater financial support for educational
exchanges. It was based on such a belief that students and scholars at Qinghua
warmly welcomed the new president appointed by the Nationalist government
and supported the effort to remove the Americans from the direct management
of Qinghua. They even accepted the new regulations adopted by the Nationalist
government to raise the qualifications for study abroad, shorten the time allowed
for overseas education, require permits for all students studying abroad, and
limit the amount of foreign currency allowed for each student.
Students and scholars quickly turned against the regime once the Nation-
alists tried to impose stringent party education and tight thought control. While
supporting Luo Jialun’s fight for central administrative control over Qinghua
and its study abroad program, Qinghua students vehemently opposed his effort
to establish party control at the university. Many refused to attend morning
and evening roll calls, which were part of the military training required by
Luo, at the risk of being penalized or even expelled. More rejected the party
 186 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

education courses offered by the university. Faculty members showed their

strong resentment toward party control by refusing to have meals with the
party education teachers at the same table. Due to students’ protests, Luo was
forced to cancel the military training for junior and senior students in Febru-
ary 1929. From then on, only freshmen and sophomores had to go through the
much relaxed training.40 Still unhappy with Luo’s leadership, Qinghua stu-
dents passed a resolution on May 20, 1930, urging Luo to resign. At the top of
the complaint list was his effort to restrict student activities and deprive them
of freedom of speech. Two days later, Luo handed his resignation to the Min-
istry of Education and left office.41
More frequently, students responded to the Nationalist control with quiet
resistance. Qian Xuesen was greatly disappointed by the Nationalist rule when
he was a student at the Jiaotong University in Shanghai in the early 1930s. In
order to escape the boring speeches made by Li Zhaohuan, the president of the
university, at Monday morning meetings, Qian quickly joined the brass band so
that he and other members could withdraw from the gathering immediately after
their performance at the beginning of each meeting.42 When students and schol-
ars could not find a way to escape the party education, they would go through
the training with their minds closed. They memorized the Nationalist doctrines
and attended the political training camps run by the government simply for
the purpose of making their trips to the United States. The obvious lack of ef-
fectiveness of the Nationalist effort was easily observed by Relman Morin, an
American student attending college at Guangzhou and Beijing around 1930. He
noticed that the Nationalists had made Sun Yat-sen’s writings required reading
and ordered schools to observe a moment of silence in his memory every morn-
ing. However, he also sharply pointed out that “something more than his image
was needed to win the full loyalty and support of the student class.”43
Many students openly challenged government control once they were
abroad. Despite strong government opposition, a large number of students,
like Hu Shi, changed their majors after entering colleges and universities in the
United States.44 As a result, over one-third of Chinese students chose to study
humanities, social sciences, law, and education between 1905 and 1953, much
higher than the 20 percent limit set by the Chinese central government.45 Many
Chinese students and scholars even took advantage of the newly found freedom
to organize various civil societies and criticize the Nationalist government and
its policies. One of the best examples was the students’ protest against the Na-
tionalist nonresistance policy toward the Japanese invasion. In August 1935,
delegates from all Chinese Student Associations, representing two thousand
Chinese students in the United States and Canada, held a conference in Chicago,
urging the Nationalist government to resist the Japanese invasion immediately.
The Chinese Students Association of North America issued “China Must Fight
Japan: A Proclamation” at the conference on October 10, 1935, the National
Day of the Republic of China. It was published in all Chinese newspapers in
China, South Asia, and North America, and sent to the Chinese government.
 A Historical Perspective 187

Drawing on world and Chinese history, the manifesto tried to prove that China
should and could fight Japan. They demanded that the Nationalist leaders form a
united front against Japan and warned them that “[w]hen statesmen concentrate
on internal problems and fail to oppose inimical outside forces, the people tend
to lose their confidence in the central government.”46
Besides denouncing the nonresistance policy, Chinese students studying
in the United States challenged Nationalists’ attempt at thought control. They
warned that “to try to suppress public opinion is like seeking to dam [the] Ni-
agara; to attempt to stifle the public sentiment is like trying to extinguish a forest
fire by fanning the flames. He who tries it succeeds only in burning himself.”47
Enjoying the freedom of speech in the United States, Chinese students published
a monthly journal in both English and Chinese in December 1935. The editors
declared in the opening issue that the monthly would represent Chinese students
and nationals in the United States and Canada, the only group who could express
the general will of the Chinese people since “the voice and patriotic activities of
the Chinese people [have] been suppressed” in China. The purpose of the publi-
cation, the editors made it very clear, was to present not only student activities,
but “a nationalistic movement which is chiefly directed against the Japanese
militaristic and imperialistic invasions in China.”48 Many Chinese students did
use the Monthly as a rare forum to express their views on major issues in China.
In the April 1936 issue, Ba Yin openly urged the Nationalist government to stop
the war against the Communists and include them in the united front against
Japan. A former Nationalist Party member and petty official from a landlord
family, Ba knew that the Communists would compete with the Nationalists for
power after the war. However, he argued that the Nationalists should not worry
so much about it if they really believed that the Three Principles of the People
were better than Communism.49
Having exposed themselves to American culture and society beyond
classrooms, Chinese students and scholars returned from the United States de-
termined not only to apply their knowledge and skills in economic reconstruc-
tion of their nation, but also to carry out fundamental reforms of the Chinese
political system. For most returnees from America, government, as Jerome
Grieder pointed out, should be “an agency through which individuals of talent
are recruited and given the opportunity to exercise their expertise in the interest
of society at large.”50 However, the Chinese government was always reluctant to
carry out any of the major political reforms prescribed by the returned students,
even though it might be willing to put their expertise to use. As a result, many
American returnees, while holding respectable positions in various public and
private institutions, became strong critics of the government. John Dewey ob-
served as soon as he arrived in China that the “uniform attitude of the educated
class toward their government . . . is critical.”51
The discontent among the returned students over the lack of political re-
forms remained constant throughout the period. Hu Shi became a leader in the
Literary Revolution right after his return to China in 1917. As a contributor and
 188 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

editor of liberal journals like New Youth (Xin Qingnian), the Endeavor (Nuli
Zhoubao), and the Independent Critic (Duli Pinglun) between the 1910s and
1930s, Hu constantly warned of the dangers of authoritarianism and demanded
freedom of thought and expression.52 The criticism from Luo Longji, another
student of John Dewey and Qinghua graduate, was even more pointed. Immedi-
ately upon his return, Luo complained that he had been more free as a foreigner
abroad to criticize the governments of the United States or Great Britain than
he was as a citizen of the Republic of China. Undeterred by the Nationalist
high-handedness, Luo joined with other Anglo-American-educated academics
in publishing the Crescent Moon (Xinyue) and played an important role in turn-
ing the magazine into a political review. In his articles, Luo openly criticized
the Nationalists for their violation of civil liberties, practice of rule by men,
and insistence on “tutelage government.” He advocated a political system based
on the principles of “entrusted power” (renmin weituo de zhiquan) and “expert
service” (zhuanjia zhishi de xingzheng). Irritated by his sharp criticism, the Na-
tionalist government arrested Luo in Shanghai and raided the journal’s office in
Beijing, confiscating hundreds of copies of the magazine, which carried another
article by Luo chastising the theory and practice of party tutelage. As a result,
publication of the Crescent was stopped completely.53
In addition to public criticism, American returnees challenged authoritar-
ian rule in China in many different ways. Yan Yangchu (James Yen), with a B.A.
from Yale and M.A. from Princeton, devoted himself to the Mass Educational
Movement (Pingmin Jiaoyu Yundong) after he returned to China in 1920. His
experiment in rural education in Ding County (Ding Xian), Hebei Province, fo-
cused not only on establishment of schools and dissemination of new farming
technology, but also on self-government. When he was asked to lead a gov-
ernment-sponsored program of local self-government and mass education by
Song Ziwen, the acting president of the Executive Yuan (Xingzheng Yuan), in
early 1945, Yan rejected the offer because of his lack of trust in the Nationalist
regime.54 His distrust proved well founded when his plea for support for a pub-
lishing house and a national training network for rural reconstruction, including
self-government, was rejected by Jiang Jieshi in 1946. Yan warned Jiang that the
Communists were fighting on both the military front and the people’s front, and
that China would be lost if he could “see only the power of the army, and not the
power of the aroused peasants.”55 Unable to win support from Jiang, Yan had to
turn to his colleagues as well as Washington for help.
If Jiang’s lack of interest in rural reconstruction and reform alienated
Yan, who would not want to see the Nationalist leader again, the heavy-handed
measures taken by the Nationalist regime dashed the hopes of many intellectu-
als, who demanded participation in public life on their own enlightened terms.
Many returned students and scholars lost confidence in the regime and some of
them even became staunch opponents. Wen Yiduo was one of the best exam-
ples. Coming from a rich family, Wen graduated from Qinghua and studied in
the United States in the 1920s. While he was in the United States, he became a
 A Historical Perspective 189

Nationalist and vowed to fight the Communists in China. After his return, Wen
was devoted to the writing of new-style poems and cared little about politics in
the 1930s. However, he was increasingly alienated by the Nationalist corrup-
tion, nonresistance policy, mistreatment of the people, and the run-away infla-
tion. He had to work as a stamp maker to subsidize his mere professor’s salary
during the war years. As a result, he became a strong anti-Nationalist leader in
1943 and joined the Democratic League of China with many other American
returnees. He opposed the authoritarian rule of the Nationalist Party and vowed
to build a democratic China after World War II.56
Many American-educated scholars became completely alienated when
the Nationalist government responded with force. Having received his education
in the United States, Li Gongpu returned to serve as a college administrator and
faculty member. He became nationally known in 1935 when he was arrested
for demanding immediate resistance to the Japanese invasion and freedom of
speech. In the following years, Li became a leader of the Democratic League,
fighting for democratic reforms in China. Perceived as a threat by the Nation-
alist Party and Jiang Jieshi, he was assassinated in Chongqing in July 1946.
Deeply angered by the murder of his friend and colleague, Wen Yiduo pub-
licly denounced the Nationalist regime at Li’s funeral and challenged the secret
agents who were widely believed to be responsible for his death. His challenge
was met quickly. Within hours Wen was assassinated not far from his home.57
The killings of Li and Wen shocked students and scholars throughout the whole
nation. Even Mei Yiqi, president of the Southwest United University, was an-
gered by the assassinations and feared for his own future.58 The heavy-handed-
ness of the Nationalist regime aggravated the alienation and drove more students
and intellectuals into the opposing camp.
Neither the Nationalist effort at party control nor the Chinese intellectuals’
resistance escaped the eyes of sharp American observers. Immediately after his
arrival in China in 1942, Fairbank noticed that Chen Lifu had made persistent
efforts to gain control over the policies of Qinghua as well as other universities
in order to control intellectual life in China. He reported that the Nationalists
had urged younger faculty members to join the party and that those who had
shown interest were entertained and “given special favor and attention.” There-
fore, he believed that Chen’s operation represented “China’s transition from
government by a dynastic family to government by a party dictatorship.” When
the rigid political regimentation combined with severe financial hardship, a lot
of intellectuals, Fairbank predicted, “will therefore get lost, some will die, and
others will become revolutionaries.”59
The strong resentment of Nationalist rule forced an increasingly large
number of Chinese students to seek extended stays overseas. When the Nation-
alist government ordered students who had studied abroad for over three years
to return home in 1938, many, including both government- and self-sponsored
students, applied to continue their study abroad rather than go back to China.60
More students prolonged their stay in the United States than in any other country
 190 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

during and after World War II. In 1942, the Natural Resources Commission of
China sent thirty-five senior technical trainees to the United States to study the
electricity industry. Only eleven returned to China as planned within two years.
The rest applied for and obtained extensions from the Chinese government. By
March 1946, about four years later, there were still twelve trainees working in the
United States.61
Many Chinese students and scholars were forced to give up their return
plans because of lack of trust in the government. Having lived in the United
States for twelve years, Qian Xuesen took his first trip back to China in the sum-
mer of 1947, looking for opportunities in his motherland. He was received by
Fan Xuji, an old friend and former president of Jiaotong University in Shanghai.
Jiaotong University wanted to appoint Qian as its new president. Although he
was received as a celebrity and invited to deliver several lectures at Qinghua,
Jiaotong, and Zhejiang Universities, Qian did not get the appointment. The of-
ficial explanation was that Qian was too young for the position. The real reason
was that the Nationalist officials, especially Chen Lifu, had little trust in Qian’s
loyalty to the Nationalist Party. Disappointed with the result and disheartened
by the economic and political disasters caused by the Nationalist civil war ef-
fort, Qian decided to return to the United States and continue his teaching at
MIT. He also urged his friends not to return to China, making extended stay
abroad a protest against the Nationalist regime.62
For those who had returned to China, it became increasingly popular to
leave the country again to escape the political persecution and corruption of the
Nationalist regime. Zhou Peiyuan, a graduate of Qinghua, came to the United
States in 1924. After receiving his Ph.D. from the California Institute of Tech-
nology in 1928, Zhou returned to his alma mater at the request of President Luo
Jialun to teach physics in 1929. He only took a one-year sabbatical in 1936 and
returned to Qinghua on the eve of the Japanese attack at the Marco Polo Bridge
in July 1937. During the war years, Zhou lost his confidence in the Nationalist
government and resented the control of the Nationalist Party. When he had the
opportunity to take a second sabbatical in 1943, he rejected the offer from the
Nationalists to go to the United States as a government official and enjoy numer-
ous privileges. He insisted that he would leave China as a private citizen so as to
avoid the political training required by the Nationalist government for officials.
Once he reached the United States, he extended his stay for over four years. He
returned to China in 1947 because of his confidence in the Communists, not the
Nationalists. Therefore, when the Nationalist regime fled the mainland in 1949,
Zhou, like most of the faculty members at Qinghua, refused to follow it. He
even tried to persuade Mei Yiqi, the president of Qinghua, to stay.63
Tired of its oppression and corruption, the vast majority of American re-
turnees refused to follow the Nationalist regime to Taiwan. Among the eighty-
one Academia Sinica fellows, sixty decided to stay on the mainland to work with
the new Communist government and about a dozen left for the United States.
Only a handful chose to go to Taiwan.64 Even Hu Shi refused to accept Jiang’s
 A Historical Perspective 191

appointments for offices in Taiwan and chose to live in New York City beginning
in mid-1949. He finally moved to Taiwan in 1958, mainly because of his poor
health.65 Although there were over four thousand Chinese students in the United
States by the end of 1949 and most suffered from financial difficulties, very few
considered the option of going to Taiwan.66 They either turned to the American
government for help in order to continue their education in the United States, or
returned to China despite the Communist control. Over three hundred students
successfully returned to China during the Korean War. When the detention policy
was rescinded in 1955 as part of the effort to gain the release of American POWs
from the People’s Republic of China, more students followed.67 By the end of the
1950s, over one thousand Chinese students returned to China from the United
States, providing China with highly trained scientists, engineers, and profession-
als in all fields.68
It is clear that by the end of the 1940s, the Nationalist government ef-
fort to win political support from students and scholars through offering them
educational experiences in the United States failed, as most American returnees
abandoned it. The failure was especially devastating because the Nationalists
had greater success in establishing strong central administrative control and
spent more money on supporting over ten thousand students and scholars for
higher education and training in the United States. Reexamining his defeat on
the mainland, Jiang Jieshi admitted that the greatest setback for the Nationalists
was their loss of the political support of students and scholars. The defeat in
education, Jiang concluded, was fatal to the Nationalist Party and the govern-
ment.69 While recognizing the devastating effect of the lack of political support
from students and scholars, many Nationalist leaders, like Chen Lifu, blamed
the United States for their failure. Chen believed that John King Fairbank was a
Communist conspirator who refused to support the Nationalists’ thought control
over students as well as the Chinese people. Therefore, the United States gov-
ernment, Chen claimed, should share a large part of the responsibility for the
defeat of the Nationalist regime.70
The Nationalists’ loss of political support from Chinese intellectuals, in-
cluding American returnees, and eventually their control of the mainland, was not
caused by American conspirators, but by their misunderstanding of educational
exchange, lack of willingness to make political reforms, and persistent efforts to
exert thought control on students and scholars. They never understood that edu-
cational exchange is a wholesome cultural experience for students and scholars,
who learned not only new knowledge and skills, but also different ideas and val-
ues while abroad. They could and did support the establishment of a strong central
administration over China’s educational system and its study abroad programs.
However, they were never willing to give up their political freedom, or their right
to participate in campus as well as national politics. The liberal education that
they had received in the United States and their strong sense of responsibility
to modernize Chinese education, politics, and economy made it more difficult
for them to accept any kind of thought control. The Nationalist government’s
 192 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

attempt to turn study abroad programs into “an ideological weapon in the hands
of the party” and to restrict the political freedom of the people naturally caused
the strongest opposition from the American returnees.71 Unwilling to carry out
democratic reforms or give up its efforts to exert thought control, the Nationalist
regime itself was responsible for losing political support from students, scholars,
and the masses.

Diplomatic Setbacks
While the Chinese government was unsuccessful in winning politi-
cal support through sending a large number of students to the United States,
Washington failed to resolve problems and crises in its diplomatic relations
with China by expanding educational interactions between the two nations. It
became a pattern in the first half of the twentieth century that whenever U.S.-
China relations were faced with a serious problem or new crisis, Washington
would take the initiative to expand America’s educational exchange with China
rather than make adjustments in its policy or strategy perceived as hostile by
the Chinese. Although an increasingly large number of Chinese students and
scholars came to the United States with Washington’s support, the expansion
of educational exchanges between the two nations did not remove the root
causes of any of the problems or crises in U.S.-China relations. As a result,
the educational experiences in the United States, which did generate deep love
among Chinese students for the American people and culture, were never able
to win good feelings from Chinese students for American policy toward China.
Eventually, the United States and the newly established People’s Republic of
China entered the military conflict in Korea and the ideological confrontation
of the Cold War.
Washington got deeply involved in educational interactions with China
way before the establishment of the Division of Educational and Cultural Af-
fairs in the State Department in 1936, which has been regarded by many schol-
ars as the beginning of government intervention in educational exchange.72 Its
deep and direct intervention in educational exchanges with China was mainly
caused by the new challenges in U.S.-China relations and new resources avail-
able to it at the beginning of the 1900s. The beginning of the national boy-
cott against American products led by students and merchants in China in 1905
forced Washington to find new ways to deal with the crisis caused by the Chi-
nese exclusion laws in the United States. Unable and unwilling to repeal or re-
vise its anti-Chinese immigration laws and regulations, Washington decided to
turn to educational exchanges to regain good feelings from the Chinese students
and officials so as to keep the huge China market open to American commerce.
While the huge surplus of the Boxer Indemnity paid by China gave Washing-
ton the needed financial resources at its discretion, the leading role played by
Chinese students in the boycott helped Washington make up its mind to use the
money for educational purposes. Washington believed that by educating a large
 A Historical Perspective 193

number of China’s future leaders in the United States it would never see another
boycott or any other anti-American movements in China.
Washington’s decision to return the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity
and ban mistreatment of Chinese students did bring an increasingly large num-
ber of Chinese students to the United States beginning in 1909 and won some
gratitude from the Chinese government and students. Hu Shi still felt strongly
about his educational experience in the United States decades later. In a speech
to a group of Chinese students in New York City, Hu told his audience that if “I
were a student who had perfect freedom to plan my study abroad once more, I
would go to America again for this very important reason: America is young,
while China is Old.” He insisted that it was desirable for Chinese students to
“assimilate some of the qualities which are found in youth and which are lack-
ing in our old age, such as curiosity, optimism, and energy.”73 Hu’s positive view
was shared by many American officials. In a telegram sent to the attendees at a
formal banquet held in New York City to honor American industrialists for their
assistance in training Chinese students during the war on January 27, 1947, Wil-
liam Benton, Assistant Secretary of State, clearly stated that he had “long be-
lieved that the exchange of students is the shortest way over decades to promote
understanding among peoples and is the best hope for peace.” Having examined
the implementation of the first official exchange programs since the beginning
of the century, Benton concluded that the student exchange with China was “an
example of what can be achieved, and an augury of what can be done on an
expanded scale.”74
Although educational exchanges continued to expand during and after
World War I, another diplomatic crisis emerged when Woodrow Wilson gave
his support for Japan’s occupation of Shandong Province at the Peace Confer-
ence at Versailles in 1919. Faced with the rise of a new anti-American move-
ment led by Chinese students, Washington, unwilling to change its policy
toward Japan, decided to cope with the new crisis with the return of the rest
of the surplus of the Boxer Indemnity to China in 1924.75 The second remis-
sion not only increased the amount of money that could be used for exchange
programs, but also perpetuated educational exchange through the establishment
of the CFPEC. The second remission elicited little applause from the public or
good feelings from Chinese students. Inspired by rising nationalism, Chinese
students and scholars, especially those at Qinghua, began their effort to gain
complete control of Qinghua in the mid-1920s through transforming it from a
preparatory school into a comprehensive university and limiting the number of
students sent to America. By the end of the decade, the transformation of Qing-
hua was completed and Washington was forced to give up its direct involve-
ment in the management of the school.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor turned the United States and China
into formal allies. However, the new alliance had serous troubles from the very
beginning. One of the major dividing issues was the lack of American military
and economic aid for China’s war effort. Despite its appreciation of China’s
 194 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

contribution to the war against Japan, Washington did not provide the kind
of military aid to China that Jiang Jieshi had expected. Angry at the minimal
American aid and sharp criticism from General Stilwell, his chief American ad-
visor, Jiang forced President Roosevelt to recall Stilwell and threatened to make
a separate peace with Japan if he could not get adequate aid for his country.76
Unwilling to change its Europe First strategy or send substantially more military
aid to China, Washington decided to intensify educational and cultural exchange
with the Chinese during the war. Under the China cultural relations program,
American technical experts were sent to China and Chinese professors, artists,
and educators were brought to the United States during the most difficult times
of the war. The implementation of the educational exchange programs allowed
Washington to demonstrate its close and special relations with China without
committing substantially more resources. China did receive some assistance in
maintaining its educational front. However, it never got all the support it needed
to fight the war. The relations between the two allies remained strained through-
out the war years.
The drastic expansion of educational exchange after World War II did not
prevent the emergence of a new crisis between Washington and the Nationalist
regime. Having failed to broker the peace in China and seeing the danger of deep
intervention in China’s civil war, the Truman administration decided to adopt a
policy of limited and conditional support for the Jiang Jieshi regime. The new
policy drew severe criticism from Jiang and his supporters in the United States.
Unwilling to change its policy, the Truman administration again responded with
the expansion of educational exchange. The signing of the first Fulbright Agree-
ment with China and the sending of what was so far the largest group of Ameri-
can scholars and students to China in 1948 showed Washington’s support for
the collapsing Nationalist regime without getting it further entangled in China.
While giving generous support and publicity to the Fulbright Program, Wash-
ington continued to reject the Nationalists’ demand for massive and prolonged
military and economic aid.
Although the military and economic aid provided by Washington was not
enough to make the Nationalist regime happy, it was definitely enough to an-
tagonize thousands of Chinese students and scholars, who wanted the civil war
to end as soon s possible. As early as November 1945, thirty thousand students
in Kunming, Yunnan Province, sent a letter to the American government, de-
manding that the United States fulfill its promise of noninterference in China’s
domestic affairs, withdraw its troops from China, stop providing weapons to
the Nationalist armies, and recall Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer.
In another letter, students from thirty-one universities and high schools, in-
cluding Qinghua University, called upon the American people directly to stop
Washington’s involvement in China’s civil war.77 Chinese students in the United
States shared similar sentiments. The Chinese Students’ Christian Association,
a popular Chinese student organization in North America, called for a coalition
government with agrarian reform in China and for the termination of American
 A Historical Perspective 195

military aid to the Nationalist government. Having suffered from numerous

wars over decades, Chinese students just wanted to see the war to come to an
end so that they could concentrate on rebuilding the Chinese economy and so-
ciety. Worried so much about the current sufferings of the Chinese people and
the future of China, many of them did not care if Jiang Jieshi and his regime
were defeated and replaced by a Communist government.78
As the defeat of the Nationalist regime became increasingly certain,
Washington shifted its focus from promoting exchange to preventing Chinese
students in the United States from returning to China. Millions of dollars were
spent and immigration policies were revised to make it easier for the Chinese
students to extend their stay in the United States so that these American-trained
talents could be kept away from the Communist regime and saved for the build-
ing of a democratic China in the future. Such an effort was intensified when both
the United States and China were dragged into the war in Korea in 1950. Some
Chinese students were detained by the United States to prevent them from leav-
ing the country. Most Chinese students, while taking the opportunity to com-
plete their education in the United States, were antagonized by the American
policy toward China and accusations against themselves. Qian Xuesen, who was
accused of being a Communist and forbidden to continue his research in his
lab, was arrested in September 1950 right before his journey back to China. Ex-
tremely humiliated, Qian finally got back to China with the help of the Chinese
government in 1955. Within four months, he presented a proposal for the estab-
lishment of China’s “space industry” to Zhou Enlai, the Chinese prime minister.
Under Qian’s leadership, China launched its first missile in 1960, first missile
with a nuclear warhead in 1966, first satellite in 1970, and first intercontinental
ballistic missile in 1980.79
Although educational exchange between the United States and China kept
expanding in the first half of the twentieth century with Washington’s deep in-
tervention and strong support, the United States government was unable to win
the good feelings of the Chinese students or maintain friendly relations with the
Chinese government. The complete breakdown of diplomatic relations between
the United States and the new People’s Republic of China, and the hostile con-
frontations between the two nations throughout the Cold War years marked a
serious setback in Washington’s efforts to manage the crises and problems in
U.S.-China relations through the expansion of educational exchange. Such a
failure proved that educational exchange was not an effective instrument for
dealing with diplomatic crises, that educational experiences in the United States
alone were not enough to win good feelings from Chinese students or scholars,
or maintain friendly relations with China, and that government could become a
most destructive force once it turned itself from a promoter and sponsor into a
blocker and terminator of educational exchanges.
Educational exchange, by its very nature, could never be an ideal instru-
ment for the management of diplomatic crises. There is no doubt that educational
exchange between the United States and China was able to generate some good
 196 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

feelings among the participants, especially when their experience was pleasant
and rewarding. However, the development of such good feelings depended on
many factors, such as the age of the participants, their individual experiences in
the host country, and the host nation’s policy toward their motherland. It usually
takes a long time to build good feelings and even longer for those good feel-
ings to become a shaping force in the relations between two nations. Therefore,
educational exchange might play a positive role in the long run through the en-
hancement of mutual knowledge and understanding. It was not suitable, how-
ever, to serve as an instrument for dealing with day-to-day diplomatic crises.
Its failure could come fast and complete, especially when nothing was done to
tackle any of the root causes of the crises.
Winning good feelings from Chinese students was not as easy as Wash-
ington perceived since most Chinese students who went abroad during this pe-
riod were much older than those the first Chinese Educational Mission sent to
the United States in the 1870s. According to a study of Western influence on
Chinese students completed by Zhao Xinshu and Xie Yu, the older the Chinese
students were, the less likely they were to change their world outlook, including
their attitude toward the United States. Even though their study was done on
Chinese students in the United States in the 1990s, their findings were actually
very accurate when applied to earlier students.80 Having learned a lesson from
sending child students to the United States in the earlier decades, the Chinese
government set up rules to send older and more mature students overseas from
the beginning of the twentieth century in an effort to prevent them from being
“denationalized.” When the Chinese government turned Qinghua from a prepa-
ratory school into a university in the 1920s, its main purpose was to make sure
that no high school graduates would be sent to the United States. In the 1930s,
the Nationalist government allowed only those who had a college education and
two years of work experience to go abroad for higher education.81 As a result,
the average age of Chinese students would be in the mid-twenties, double that of
the child students sent to the United States in the 1870s.
The greater maturity of the Chinese students made it difficult to convince
them of the good intentions of American policy and easy for them to sense any
mistreatment. At a time when racial prejudice was the norm and discrimina-
tion against Chinese widely practiced, it was not difficult for Chinese students
to have at least some bad memories from their stay in the United States. Liang
Shiqiu, a Qinghua student who attended Colorado College in Colorado Springs,
remembered that barbers refused to serve Chinese students simply because they
were Chinese. When a student sued a barber shop and won, the student was still
told by the barber not to come to his shop since it would hurt his business. Liang
and five other male Chinese students had to line up with themselves at their
commencement since no white female students at Colorado College were will-
ing to line up with them. Affected by these kinds of experiences, Liang observed
that most young Chinese students began to have stronger patriotic feelings to-
ward their own motherland after they came to the United States.82
 A Historical Perspective 197

Once mistreated, Chinese students were more likely to articulate their re-
sentment through actions or publications. Wen Yiduo disliked his experience in
the United States almost from the very beginning. Unable to find a peaceful and
friendly environment in either Chicago or Colorado Springs, Wen decided that
he should return to China without completing any educational program in the
United States. He told his family that the United States was not a place for him
to stay for an extended period. He claimed that it was impossible to describe in
written words the experience and feelings of a Chinese youth with intellect in
the United States. He promised that he would pour out his accumulated resent-
ment and anger when he returned to China the next year.83 Wen did end his stay
the next year without getting a formal degree. Fei Qihe could not forget the mis-
treatment that he had received at his entrance into this country after spending six
years to earn his baccalaureate degree from Oberlin College and master’s degree
from Yale University. Before he left the United States in 1907, he published an
article in the Outlook, telling his readers that “America is not so good a friend to
China as I had mistakenly thought, because in no part of the earth are the Chi-
nese so ill treated and humiliated as in America.”84
While sensitive about their own mistreatment in the United States, Chi-
nese students and scholars were even less willing to tolerate any hostile policies
aimed at their motherland. Since the United States had never treated the Chinese
people or China as an equal in the first half of the twentieth century, there were
always elements in Washington’s China policy that kept antagonizing Chinese
students and scholars. However, Washington usually overlooked the destructive-
ness of its policy toward China and at the same time overestimated the favor-
able political impact that American returnees had on Chinese policy and society.
Although over twenty thousand Chinese students had received education in the
United States in the first half of the twentieth century, their political influence in
China was relatively small for various reasons. First, with higher degrees earned
from American colleges and universities, most American-trained scholars be-
came professional and technical experts rather than political leaders after their
return to China. According to a study of the Nationalist government officials
in the early 1930s, about 70 percent of the forty-five highest-ranking officials
received education overseas. Among those who were trained abroad, about 58
percent received education in Japan, only 13 percent in the United States.85 As
a result, the political influence of Western-educated men, Y. C. Wang argued,
declined while their number and prominence increased.86
Second, the sharp differences in political, economic, and social con-
ditions in the two nations meant that American returnees had to take a lon-
ger time to make the necessary adjustments and win political trust from the
government. That was probably why the Nationalist government rejected the
strong recommendation from Jiaotong University in Shanghai for the appoint-
ment of Qian Xuesen, a rising star in the field of rocket science in the United
States, as its new president in 1947.87 Even today, some scholars still suggest
that people should not expect students educated in the United States to make
 198 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

huge contributions to China right after their return because of the great differ-
ences between the two nations.88
Third, the political influence of American returnees was further limited
because of their small number. Although over twenty thousand Chinese students
attended colleges and universities in the United States in the first half of the
twentieth century, China only received a few hundred returnees in an average
year. The number was small for a country with a population of four hundred
million. The return of Chinese students was first reduced and then stopped by
Washington in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. By keeping thousands of
Chinese students and scholars in the United States for decades, the largest non-
returned group in Chinese history by that time, Washington actually helped min-
imize the political influence of American-trained Chinese students in China.
While devoting substantial resources to educational exchange with China,
Washington did little to take advantage of American scholars and officials who
had gained more knowledge and a better understanding of China through their
educational experience there. This further reduced the possible positive impact
of educational exchange between the two nations and led Washington down the
road of total diplomatic failure in China. The experiences of John S. Service, the
political officer in the American embassy at Chongqing during World War II,
and Derk Bodde, one of the first Fulbright Scholars sent to China in 1948, were
good examples.
Born to a missionary family in Chengdu, China, in 1909, John S. Ser-
vice learned to speak Sichuan dialect before he started formal education with
his mother. Having received his high school and college education back in the
United States, he returned to China right after his graduation in 1933. By the
time the United States formally entered World War II, Service had become an
experienced diplomat in China with wide contacts and keen eyes. Based on his
observations, Service sent back to Washington numerous insightful reports and
sharp analyses of China’s situation during the war. Sharing basic views with
other experienced Foreign Service officers in Chongqing, such as John Carter
Vincent and John Paton Davies, Jr., Service believed that China was rush-
ing toward a civil war and the Communist Party would be the certain winner.
Therefore, he suggested that the United States support both the Nationalists and
Communists in the war as long as they kept fighting the Japanese, and maintain
friendly relations with the latter. However, Service’s recommendation was ve-
hemently opposed by Patrick Hurley, the new American ambassador to China,
who had no knowledge of the Chinese language or culture, and rejected by Pres-
ident Roosevelt. Service and his friends were recalled from China and support-
ing Jiang Jieshi remained the core of Washington’s China policy.89 Accused of
being Communist sympathizers, Service and other “China Hands” in the State
Department who had prophetically predicted the defeat of Jiang were all purged
in the 1950s.
While the “alternative policy” proposed by Service and his diplomatic
colleagues was rejected, the close observations of the new Communist China
 A Historical Perspective 199

made by Derk Bodde were ignored by Washington. Arriving in Beijing in the

summer of 1948, Bodde began to translate Feng Youlan’s History of Chinese
Philosophy from Chinese into English. Fully aware of the epoch-making impor-
tance of events taking place in China during his stay, Bodde kept a detailed di-
ary, recording his experiences and observations. Taking advantage of his “ability
to hear and read what the Chinese were saying in their own language, without
depending on translation,” Dr. Bodde was able to observe the Chinese revolution
at its center and include a lot of information and insight in his diary. Disturbed
by the misconceptions about China that prevailed in the United States, Bodde
decided to have his diaries published in mid-1950 to help his fellow Americans
have a better understanding of what was going on in China.90
Equipped with his research skills as a philosopher and first-hand informa-
tion on China, Dr. Bodde offered a quite different picture of China in his diary.
Aiming at correcting Americans’ misperceptions of the Chinese revolution, Dr.
Bodde openly argued against the common belief that “Moscow was behind ev-
erything that has recently happened in China.” He told his readers that “when
I saw revolution first come to Peking, what I learned very clearly was the folly
and immorality of attempts by any outside power to support an indigenous re-
gime after that regime has lost the support of its own people.”91 He attempted
to prove that the Chinese revolution was a result of its own political, social,
and economic development, that Jiang Jieshi’s regime could not be saved with
more American aid, that the Chinese Communists rose because of their con-
structive contribution to China, and that the Chinese had good reason to distrust
the United States after its staunch support for the Nationalist regime.92 How-
ever, Dr. Bodde’s book was dead after a few thousand copies were sold in 1950
as a victim of the notorious attacks by Senator Joseph McCarthy. As scholars
and diplomats with knowledge and insight into China were expelled from the
State Department and silenced by McCarthy and his followers, the American
perception of China was based mostly on misinformation, bias, and fear, and
Washington’s China policy was formulated and implemented by those who had
little experience in or knowledge about China.
Washington’s lack of interest in having greater knowledge and under-
standing of China did not prevent it from feeling the need for increasing edu-
cational exchange with that country. Through its long experience in China,
Washington came to realize that Chinese students and scholars, because of the
traditional position of scholarly leadership in Chinese society, “are in the unique
position to exert a profound influence on the future course of their country.” It
was based on that observation that the House Committee on Foreign Relations
proposed in July 1949 to provide massive financial aid to Chinese students
stranded in the United States. They openly insisted that “it is in the interest of
the United States to assist these individuals who can play such a vital role in
shaping China’s future.”93
Expanding educational exchange was also compatible with Washington’s
general strategy and policy toward China. Although it occupied an important
 200 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

position in America’s global strategy, first as a market for American products

and then as an ally in the war against Japan, China was never important enough
for the United States to stage a military showdown there. Unable and unwilling
to make a military commitment in China, Washington had to depend on other
means to maintain its presence in that country. Educational exchange programs
met Washington’s needs perfectly. They helped show American support for and
interest in China without having Americans fighting on the battlefield in that
country. Of course, through providing education for a large number of Chinese
students, Washington was expecting to increase its influence over China and
reshape it in the image of the United States.
The relatively low cost of starting and maintaining educational exchange
programs helped make it a favorite instrument for Washington. Despite its po-
litical importance, the actual cost for educational exchange was low both in rela-
tive and absolute terms. The largest and longest educational exchange program
in the first half of the twentieth century was funded by the Boxer Indemnity
remission. It actually did not cost the United States a single penny. Washington
was able to initiate and participate in managing the program that sent thousands
of Chinese students to the United States simply because it claimed that it was
entitled to the indemnity overpaid by China. When Washington did spend some
of its own money to support educational and cultural programs during and after
World War II, the cost was relatively small. With limited scale and time, all
the educational and cultural programs implemented by Washington cost it only
about $800,000, less than 0.05 percent of the total American aid to China dur-
ing World War II. The relative weight of the outlay is even less if it is measured
against the total wartime expenditures of the United States.94 The most expen-
sive was the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students, which cost the
United States government about $10 million from 1948 to 1955.95 As large as
it was, this amounted to only one-sixth of the China aid appropriation for 1948
and 0.4 percent of all American aid to China from V-J Day to 1949.96 The State
Department was actually very happy to spend the money appropriated by Con-
gress for China aid in this way. It believed that the more money that was spent
in helping Chinese students, the less would be wasted by Jiang’s corrupt regime.
The low cost of educational exchange made it an attractive tool for Washington
to cope with crises in its relations with China.
Despite its great success in diffusing knowledge and ideas across the
civilizational divide, the drastic expansion of educational exchange between
the United States and China failed to win good feelings from Chinese students
and scholars for Washington, or prevent any of the Chinese regimes from col-
lapsing in the first half of the twentieth century. The success of educational
exchange depended not only on the initiative and dedication of students and
scholars, but also on the strong support of both the Chinese and American
governments. However, neither the complete breakdown of U.S.-China rela-
tions during the Cold War, nor the downfall of Chinese regimes was caused
by the expansion of educational interactions. Instead, they were the result of
 A Historical Perspective 201

Washington’s unwillingness to revise or abandon its China policies perceived

as unfair or hostile by the Chinese people as well as the Chinese government’s
refusal to implement necessary political and economic reforms. In another
words, the governments’ misperception of educational exchange as mere tool
rather than the goal in itself sowed the seeds for political failure and diplomatic
setbacks in the first half of the twentieth century.
 Epilogue
Restoring Educational Relations

with the Visible Hand

O n June 23, 1978, Deng Xiaoping, the

paramount Chinese leader, had a meeting with a few administrators from Qing-
hua University, trying to find ways to revive China’s higher education and re-
duce the gap between China and developed nations in science and technology.
Fully aware of the shortage of experts with advanced and updated education and
training at all universities and research institutes in China, Deng decided at the
meeting that China should “increase the number of students sent abroad” and
insisted that “students should be sent abroad not in dozens, but in thousands and
tens of thousands.”1 Beijing’s decision to send more students to foreign coun-
tries was warmly received in Washington. The two governments signed the first
agreement on the exchange of students and scholars in October 1978, weeks
before diplomatic relations were officially restored. With strong support from
both Beijing and Washington, hundreds and thousands of Chinese as well as
American students and scholars have crisscrossed the Pacific since the end of
1978. In 1989, students and scholars from Mainland China surpassed those from
Taiwan to become the largest foreign student body in the United States. Educa-
tional exchange reemerged as the strongest tie between the two nations.
The drastic expansion of educational exchange between the two nations
since the late 1970s, as David Lampton accurately pointed out, was “more a
renewal than a beginning.”2 With all foreign missionaries expelled from China
and all private schools incorporated into the state-run educational system, the
restoration and expansion of educational relations depended on active interven-
tion and generous support from both governments. Although Chinese as well as
American scholars began to exchange visits right after President Nixon’s his-
toric trip to China in 1972, these early visits, as Leo A. Orleans observed, were
“primarily short-term get-acquainted tours.”3 Serious and long-term exchange
of scholars and students did not begin until the end of the 1970s, when formal
exchange agreements were signed by Beijing and Washington. The Understand-
ing of Educational Exchange was the first of such agreements, signed by the
202
 Epilogue 203

United States Information Agency, Department of Education, National Science

Foundation, National Academy of Science, and National Endowment for the
Humanities with the Chinese Ministry of Education, National Academy of So-
cial Sciences, and State Science and Technology Commission in October 1978,
providing opportunities for undergraduate and graduate students and visiting
scholars from one country to study and do research in the other. Once diplo-
matic relations were normalized, about two dozen exchange agreements were
signed by numerous government agencies supporting various programs in al-
most all academic fields within six years.4
These agreements offered legal protection and financial support for the
restoration and expansion of educational exchange between the two nations.
Pressed by the urgent need for highly trained experts, China took the initiative
to send the first group of students and scholars to the United States. Unable to
find qualified students from colleges and universities since they had just en-
rolled their regular students earlier in the year for the first time in ten years, the
first group of fifty students and scholars was selected from the Chinese Acad-
emy of Science. Once the gate opened, Chinese students and scholars began to
pound American shores in tidal waves. According to State Department statistics,
1,330 visas were issued to Chinese students and scholars in 1979. The number
soared to 4,324 in 1980, reached 5,407 in 1981, and shot up to 12,711 in 1986.5
By 1987, about 56,000 Chinese students and scholars had come to the United
States, doubling the total between 1847 and 1949. The number of Chinese stu-
dents in the United States reached around 44,000 in 1993/94, climbed to 54,466
in 1999/2000, and passed 60,000 in 2001/02, making them the largest foreign
student body in most of the years since 1989.6
The growth of Chinese students and scholars in the United States was
impressive not only in terms of absolute numbers, but also in terms of their
relative weight among all students sent by China to foreign countries since the
late 1970s. Between 1979 and 1983, China sent about 26,000 government-spon-
sored students and scholars and 7,000 self-supported students abroad. Of this
total of 33,000 students and scholars, 19,872, 60 percent, came to the United
States, in sharp contrast to the number of students and scholars sent by China
to Japan, the country that had attracted most Chinese students at beginning of
the twentieth century. During the same period, only 1,439, about 4 percent of
Chinese students and scholars, went to Japan for training and education despite
the fact that Japan had closer economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties to China
at the time.7
As in the first half of the twentieth century, the Chinese as well as the
American government provided not only legal protection, but also generous
financial support for students and scholars involved in educational exchange.
Government sponsorship was absolutely essential for Chinese students, espe-
cially in the early years. Unlike other foreign students and scholars in the United
States, who were mostly, about 84 percent, F-1 visa holders receiving no finan-
cial support from their own government, about 63 percent of Chinese students
 204 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

and scholars who came to this country between 1979 and 1983 were J-1 visa
holders, depending mostly on government, at least in theory, for funding. The
Chinese government kept increasing its financial contribution to educational ex-
change with the United States every year during this period from about $4 mil-
lion in 1979 to $21.2 million in 1983. With a total of $65 million, the Chinese
government covered educational costs for 54 percent of J-1 students in 1979 and
32 percent in 1983. The United States government also offered financial support.
Between 1979 and 1983, Washington spent about $11.3 million to support about
6 percent of J-1 students and scholars from China. Although more continuing
J-1 students began to receive support from American colleges and universities
beginning in 1981 because of their outstanding performance, the government
continued to provide most support for new J-1 students until 1983.8
As the major sponsor, the government, as it did prior to 1949, had much
power to determine who could be sent to the United States, what they should
study at American universities, and how long they could stay abroad, especially
in the early years. In the first three years between 1979 and 1981, the govern-
ment wanted to focus on the training of middle-aged university instructors and
researchers in the United States. Therefore, visiting scholars counted for about
68 percent of all J-1 visa holders, while students comprised only 20 percent.
The percentage of students with J-1 visas rose sharply in 1983 as the Chinese
government began to focus on having more students receive graduate- and es-
pecially doctoral-level education in the United States.9 Such a shift of focus was
made possible by the graduation of the first class of college students, who were
admitted in 1978.
With more students depending on government for financial support, the
Chinese government was able to have an even higher percentage of Chinese stu-
dents and scholars focusing on science, technology, and other practical subjects
than in the first half of the twentieth century. Among all Chinese students who
had received education in the United States prior to 1954, only 25 percent chose
to major in humanities and social sciences.10 This trend intensified beginning in
the late 1970s, especially among J-1 students. Between 1979 and 1983, while
about 19 percent of F-1 students chose to study humanities and social sciences,
only 6 percent of all J-1 students and scholars selected majors in those fields.11
Little changed in the 1990s. According to statistics offered by the Institute of
International Education, among 18,418 Chinese graduate students in the United
States in the 1993/94 academic year, about 31.5 percent studied physical and
life sciences, about 24 percent majored in engineering, and about 12 percent
focused on mathematics and computer science. Only 10.9 percent of Chinese
graduate students chose to study humanities and social sciences. Among 3,584
Chinese undergraduate students, only 4.6 percent majored in humanities and
social sciences.12
Government also set clear time limits for Chinese students and schol-
ars in the United States. Normally, a J-1 visiting scholar was allowed to stay in
the United States for one to two years and a J-1 student for three to five years.
 Epilogue 205

The vast majority of J-1 students and scholars had to return to China right after
finishing their program in the United States because the Chinese government
had complete control over their jobs, salary, and housing. The so-called two-
year rule imposed on J-1 visa holders, with very few exceptions, by the Ameri-
can government required them to leave the United States for at least two years
before they could change to immigrant status. As a result, only 265 J-1 visa
holders, less than 2 percent of the total, managed to change their status between
1982 and 1987. In sharp contrast, 5,973 F-1 students, about 27 percent of the
total, adjusted their status during the same period.13
Like the Chinese government, Washington showed extreme enthusiasm for
the restoration and expansion of educational exchange in the 1970s. On January
31, 1979, only weeks after the normalization of diplomatic relations between
the two countries, President Jimmy Carter signed the Agreement on Coopera-
tion in Science and Technology with Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping,
providing the legal foundation for government participation and cooperation in
scientific, technological, and educational exchanges. It was under this historic
agreement that about two dozen American governmental agencies signed ac-
cords and agreements to institutionalize educational exchange with China.
Washington’s deep intervention and active participation in educational ex-
change with China easily dwarfed its pre-1949 record. While agreeing to give an
unlimited number of academic visas to Chinese students and scholars who were
accepted to academic programs in American institutions of higher education,
the United States International Communications Agency, known as the United
States Information Agency before April 1978 and after August 1982, designated
the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of
China (CSCPRC) to administer the National Program for Advanced Research
and Study in China in September 1978. The CSCPRC managed to send about
a dozen students and scholars to China in early 1979 and about 50 more by
the end of the year. By the academic year 1984/85, 258 American students and
scholars were sent under the National Program for year-long academic activities
in China. In 1980, the Fulbright Program began to send American scholars to
China. In 1984, 73 Fulbright lecturers went to teach at twelve universities and
colleges in eight Chinese cities.14 During this period, at least 3,000 American
students and scholars went to China for education and research. Although the
absolute number of American students in China was much smaller than that of
Chinese students in this country, the sharp growth was extremely impressive
when compared with the minimal pre-1949 total.
The restoration of educational relations and the reemergence of educa-
tional exchange as the strongest tie between the two nations were based on the
strategic needs of both nations and lessons learned from the past. The United
States and Chinese governments were able to take advantage of the complete
termination of all relations, including educational exchanges, between the two
nations during the Cold War years. The absence of direct interactions between
the two peoples allowed American policy makers to turn the Chinese from
 206 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

valuable allies in World War II into the “Red Menace” and “Yellow Peril” in the
minds of many Americans. It also made it possible for the Chinese Communist
leaders to convince their people that the majority of Americans lived in absolute
poverty, waiting for relief from China. The lack of mutual knowledge and un-
derstanding between the two peoples did make it easier for both governments to
carry out their Cold War strategies. However, it also contributed to military and
ideological confrontations that proved extremely costly and dangerous for both
nations. By the early 1970s, the United States was bogged down in Indo-China
by the Vietnamese Communists, backed by China, while the Chinese them-
selves faced political chaos, economic disasters, and educational breakdown
caused by the Cultural Revolution. As the threat from the Soviet Union loomed
large for both the United States and China since the late 1960s, Washington and
Beijing began to reexamine their policy toward each other and seek ways to
form a new alliance against their common potential foe. With changes in strate-
gic thinking, both the American and Chinese governments began to take action
to rebuild cultural and educational relations between the two nations.
The restoration of educational relations proved most popular among Chi-
nese officials and scholars since China was beginning to refocus on the Four
Modernizations—of its agriculture, defense, and science and technology indus-
tries—in the 1970s. In order to achieve that goal, China needed a huge num-
ber of scientists, engineers, and scholars with advanced education and training.
Many Chinese leaders and scholars came to agree with the conclusion reached
by Mao Zedong in the 1940s—that the United States was “not only the most
suitable country to assist this economic development of China, she is also the
only country fully able to participate.”15 Their belief was strongly supported
by the fact that American-trained scholars played a most important role in de-
veloping China’s science, technology, economy, and defense despite the harsh
political environment. Among twenty-three scientists who received national
medals for their contributions to the development of China’s nuclear bombs,
missiles, and satellites, ten of them, including Qian Xuesen, Deng Jiaxian, Zhu
Guangya, Wang Xiji, Zhou Guangzhao, and Qian Sanqiang, received education
in the United States.16 Therefore, reestablishment of educational relations with
the United States was among the top priorities for the Chinese government.
Once exchange programs were set up, Chinese leaders like Deng Xiaoping and
Jiang Zemin were among the first to send their own children to the United
States for education. Deng Jiaxian, the chief designer of China’ first atomic and
hydrogen bombs, also sent his daughter to study medicine in the United States
in the mid-1980s.17
As the Chinese began to show more appreciation for educational relations
with the United States, many American officials and scholars became increas-
ingly interested in rebuilding educational ties with China, even though with dif-
ferent goals and purposes.18 While strategic considerations remained prominent
in the reconstruction of educational relations, special effort was made to draw
lessons from past experience. Having studied Washington’s failure to utilize
 Epilogue 207

educational exchange as a crisis management instrument, the United States

Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange concluded in a report to Con-
gress in 1955 that cultural exchange programs could only be effective when
“unrelated to the necessary immediate, and frequently shifting, information and
propaganda objectives.” Therefore, they suggested that “educational exchange
and cultural relations activities should have to do primarily, not with typical
day-to-day development and passing currents of public opinion, but rather with
the more long-term activities in the fields of science, art, and education which
distinguishes the culture of one nation from that of another and which condi-
tions the long-range attitudes of every country in its foreign as well as domes-
tic policies.”19 Having clear long-term goals became a common theme in many
other reports from various scholars and organizations in the 1970s and 1980s.20
Therefore, once educational relations were reestablished, Washington intended
to make them last.
The deep personal involvement of Chinese leaders and firm commitment
of American policy makers and scholars helped the reestablished educational
relations survive many political and diplomatic challenges. Having shifted its
focus from political movement to economic development, the Chinese govern-
ment gradually relaxed its political control and adjusted study abroad policy in
order to attract more students and scholars back to China. It still held political
training classes for J-1 students and scholars in the 1980s. However, the training
served more as cultural orientation and preparation than ideological indoctrina-
tion. Realizing the deep concerns of Chinese students who had violated rules
or criticized the government while in the United States, Deng Xiaoping made
it clear in 1992 that he “hopes that all those who have gone abroad for educa-
tion return to China,” and emphasized that “no matter what political attitude
they have had in the past, all Chinese students and scholars are welcome to
come back.”21 Following Deng’s instructions, the Chinese government adopted
a new policy in the same year that would “support the Chinese to study abroad,
encourage them to return to China after graduation, give them the freedom to
come and go, and attract them to serve China (zhichi liuxue, guli huiguo, laiqu
ziyou, weiguo fuwu).”22
While showing more flexibility in adapting its policy toward Chinese stu-
dents and scholars studying abroad, Beijing worked with Washington to make
sure that educational exchange between the two nations would not be seriously
affected by diplomatic crises and problems. Despite substantial improvement,
U.S.-China relations in the last two decades were interlaced with frequent crises
and downturns. In response to the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the bombing of
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the collision of military planes
in 2001, high-level official visits were canceled or postponed, military coopera-
tion was reduced or stopped, economic sanctions were imposed, and massive
student demonstrations were held on university campuses and in city streets.
However, educational exchanges between the two nations went on without any
serious interruption. The most severe action taken by the Chinese government
 208 U.S.-China Educational Exchange

was to withhold the exchange students and scholars who had been selected for
the 1989/90 Fulbright exchange program in July 1989 as a protest against the
American sanctions. The number of exchange students and scholars affected
was very small and most of those who were withheld were able to come to the
United States the next year. The first downturn of educational exchange between
the United States and China took place in 2002 when a stricter process was im-
posed on the admission of Chinese students to the United States. Under strong
protest from Chinese students and American educators, Washington began to
take steps to streamline the security check process in 2003 and there was a 1
percent increase in Chinese students enrolling in American colleges and univer-
sities in 2005.23
The joint effort made by both Washington and Beijing has resurrected
educational exchange as the strongest tie in U.S.-China diplomatic relations.
The unprecedented number of students and scholars receiving education and
conducting research across the Pacific has contributed enormously to the trans-
fer of knowledge and enhancement of mutual understanding. However, such a
huge success has been stained by the fact that most Chinese students who came
to the United States for education in the 1980s and 1990s are still in this country,
becoming major contributors to China’s brain drain, and that the feelings and at-
titudes of Chinese students and scholars toward the United States have become
increasingly negative because of numerous clashes between the two nations in
the past two decades. In order to make educational exchange even more ben-
eficial to both nations, the Chinese government may need to make more politi-
cal and economic reforms in order to create more agreeable conditions for the
returning students as well as all the Chinese people. The United States govern-
ment, for the same purpose, should always be careful with its China policy so
that it would not humiliate the Chinese people and their nation. History has
clearly shown that educational exchange is most effective and fruitful when it
serves as a core component of intercultural relations rather than a crisis manage-
ment instrument for a particular foreign policy.
 Appendix A

Schedule of Annual Remission of the Boxer Indemnity from the

United States to China 1
Annual Annual Annual
Year Remission Year Remission Year Remission

1909 $483,094.90 1920 $790,196.00 1931 $790,195.99

1910 483,094.90 1921 790,195.99 1932 1,380,378.35
1911 541,198.78 1922 790,195.99 1933 1,380,378.34
1912 541,198.78 1923 790,195.99 1934 1,380,378.34
1913 541,198.78 1924 790,196.00 1935 1,380,378.35
1914 541,198.78 1925 790,195.99 1936 1,380,378.43
1915 724,993.42 1926 790,196.00 1937 1,380,378.43
1916 790,196.00 1927 790,195.99 1938 1,380,378.35
1917 790,196.00 1928 790,196.00 1939 1,380,378.34
1918 790,196.00 1929 790,195.99 1940 1,380,378.36
1919 790,196.00 1930 790,196.00

209
 Appendix B

Presidents of Qinghua, 1909–1929 2

Names Position Tenure Education Previous Positions

Zhou Qinghua 2/1911–1/1912 Studied Supervisor for

Ziqi Academy in U.S. students in U.S.
Superintendent
Yan Interim 1/1912–4/1912 U. Virginia Councillor, Chinese
Huiqing Superintendent Embassy in U.S.
Tang Qinghua 5/1912–8/1913 Child student Senior official,
Guoan School in U.S., 1872 Foreign Ministry
President
Zhao Interim 8/1913–10/1913 M.A., U. Vice President,
Guocai President Wisconsin Qinghua
Zhou President 10/1913–1/1918 M.A., U. Secretary,
Yichun Wisconsin Foreign Ministry
Zhang President 2/1918–2/1920 M.L., Yale Secretary,
Yuquan Foreign Ministry
Yan Interim 2/1920–9/1920 Ph.D., Secretary,
Heling President Columbia Foreign Ministry
Jin President 9/1920–10/1921 M.S., Councillor,
Bangzheng Cornell Foreign Ministry
Wang Officer- 10/1921–4/1922 B.A., Provost, Qinghua
Wenxian in-Charge U. London
Cao President 4/1922–1/1928 M.B.A., Secretary,
Yunxiang U. Virginia Foreign Ministry
Yan Interim 1/1928–4/1928 Ph.D., Secretary,
Heling President Columbia Foreign Ministry
Wen President 4/1928–6/1928 West Point Director, Baoding
Yingxing Military Police

210
 Appendix C

Annual Expenditures for Qinghua University and Qinghua Students in U.S.,

1912–1928 3
University Expenditure for Total Percentage for
Year Expenditure Students in U.S. Expenditure Students in U.S.

1912 234,048 392,827 626,875 62.6

1913 333,059 609,113 942,172 64.6
1914 382,179 626,500 1,008,679 62.1
1915 511,754 654,956 1,166,710 56.1
1916 750,070 648,139 1,398,209 46.4
1917 870,910 666,354 1,537,264 43.3
1918 654,882 708,805 1,363,687 53.0
1919 515,464 776,473 1,291,937 60.1
1920 531,356 852,417 1,383,773 61.6
1921 711,242 963,350 1,674,592 57.5
1922 565,603 1,092,861 1,658,464 65.9
1923 561,966 1,127,781 1,689,747 66.7
1924 610,771 1,151,199 1,761,970 65.3
1925 716,087 1,185,496 1,901,583 62.3
1926 766,011 1,178,090 1,944,101 60.6
1927 831,637 1,201,744 2,033,381 59.1
1928 725,682 895,175 1,620,857 55.2

211
 Appendix D

Students Sent to the United States by Qinghua, 1909–1929 4

Year Indemnity Preparatory Women Specialist Annual Total

1909 47 47
1910 70 70
1911 63 12 75
1912 16 16
1913 43 43
1914 34 10 44
1915 42 42
1916 31 10 10 51
1917 44 7 51
1918 58 8 7 73
1919 63 8 71
1920 81 81
1921 45 10 10 65
1922 94 94
1923 81 5 5 91
1924 67 67
1925 69 5 5 79
1926 61 61
1927 62 5 5 72
1928 48 48
1929 38 10 48
Total 180 989 53 67 1289

212
 Appendix E

Major State Department Exchange Programs During and After World War II 5
Programs Participants

American Specialists Sent to China (1942–1946) 30

Chinese Educators and Artists Invited to the United States (1943–1947) 26
Two-Year Fellowships Awarded to Advanced Chinese Students 22
(1943–1946)
Chinese Travel Grants to the United States (1945–1947) 18
Total 96

213
 Appendix F

Chinese Scholars on American Faculties in China-Related Fields, 1947 6

Fields Faculty No. of Chinese Percentage

History 19 4 20.1
Geography 10 2 20
Economics 4 1 25
Government/Politics 6 1 16.7
Ant/Arc/Art/Sociology 11 2 18.2
Language/Literature 6 1 16.7
Religion/Philosophy 5 1 20
Total 61 12 19.7

214
 Appendix G

U.S. Returnees Elected as Fellows in Academia Sinica, 1948–20017

Fellows Number of Percentage American- Percentage Percentage
Year Selected Returnees of Returnees Trained of Fellows of Returnees

1948 81 77 95 49 61 64
1953 172 158 92 87 51 55
1957 18 16 89 9 50 56
1980 283 199 70 128 45 64
1991 210 55 26 19 9 35
1993 59 17 29 5 8 29
1995 59 16 27 3 5 19
1997 58 11 19 2 3 18
1999 55 16 27 7 7 44
2001 56 19 34 9 9 47
Total 1051 584 56 318 30 54

215
 Notes

Introduction
1. Chen Jian, “Sino-American Relations Studies in China,” in Pacific Passage: The
Study of American–East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century,
ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 28.
2. Akira Iriye, “Americanization of East Asia: Writings on Cultural Affairs since
1900,” in New Frontiers in American–East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to
Dorothy Borg, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983),
45; William C. Kirby, “Sino-American Relations in Comparative Perspective,
1900–1949,” in Cohen, Pacific Passage, 173.
3. William Purvience Fenn, Christian Higher Education in Changing China,
1880–1950 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1976);
Jessie Gregory Lutz, China and the Christian Colleges: 1850–1950 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1971); Warren I. Cohen, The Chinese Connection:
Roger S. Green, Thomas W. Lamont, George E. Sokolsky and American–East
Asian Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Mary Brown
Bullock, An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union
Medical College (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Peter Buck,
American Science and Modern China, 1876–1936 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press, 1980); Weili Ye, Seeking Modernity in China’s Name: Chinese
Students in the United States, 1900–1927 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2001); Glen Peterson, Ruth Hayhoe, and Yongling Lu, Education, Cul-
ture, and Identity in Twentieth-Century China (Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press, 2001).
4. Wilma Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments in China, 1942–1949 (Wash-
ington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976).
5. Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1992), 4.
6. William J. Reese, American Public Schools: From the Common School to “No
Child Left Behind” (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 11–47.
7. Peng Deng, Private Education in Modern China (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997),
1–18.

217
 218 Notes to Pages 4–12

8. For detailed discussion of the definition and function of “hard power” and “soft
power,” please see Joseph Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World
Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 1–11.
9. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times
to 1957: A Statistical Abstract Supplement (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1960), 210–211.

Chapter 1 Emerging as Facilitator

1. Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2000), 142.
2. Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of United States’ Policy
in the Far East in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963), 49.
3. Foster R. Dulles, The Old China Trade (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930), 20–21.
4. Li Dingyi, A History of Early U.S.-China Diplomacy (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chu-
banshe, 1997), 53–58; Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 87–88.
5. Li, A History, 31.
6. Samuel Shaw, The Journal of Major Samuel Shaw (Boston: William Crisby and H.
P. Nichols, 1971), 1–10.
7. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 63.
8. Ibid., 75–77.
9. Murray A. Rubinstein, The Origins of the Anglo-American Missionary Enterprise
in China, 1807–1840 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1996), 196–206.
10. Ibid., 65–69; E. A. Morrison, Memoirs of the Life and Labors of Robert Morrison
(London, 1849), 1:106.
11. Clifton Jackson Phillips, Protestant America and the Pagan World: The First Half
Century of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1810–1860
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 20–32.
12. Rubinstein, The Origins, 220–221.
13. Ibid., 221; Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 110.
14. Rubinstein, The Origins, 285–287; George H. Danton, The Culture Contacts of the
United States and China: The Earliest Sino-American Culture Contacts, 1784–1844
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), 34–37; Kenneth Scott Latourette, A
History of Christian Missions in China (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 217–218.
15. Eliza Gillet Bridgman, The Pioneer of American Missions in China: The Life and
Labors of Elijah Coleman Bridgman (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 1864),
22–23.
16. Rubinstein, The Origins, 288–291.
17. David Abeel, Journal of a Residence in China and the Neighboring Countries, from
1829–1833 (New York: Leavitt, Lord & Co., 1834), 141–142.
18. Rubinstein, The Origins, 301–305.
19. Bridgman to Anderson, July 14, 1834, quoted in Rubinstein, The Origins, 309.
20. Frederick Wells Williams, Life and Letters of Dr. S. Wells Williams (New York: G.
P. Putnam’s Sons, 1889), 328.
21. Xiong Yuezhi, The Dissemination of Western Learning and the Late Qing Society
(Shanghai: Remin Chubanshe, 1994), 131–133; Danton, The Culture Contacts,
42–44; The Chinese Repository, 2:217.
22. The Chinese Repository, December 1834, 3:382.
 Notes to Pages 12–18 219

23. Suzanne Wilson Barnett and John King Fairbank, eds., Christianity in China: Early
Protestant Missionary Writings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985),
95–106; Xiong, The Dissemination, 117–118.
24. The Chinese Repository, 5:377.
25. William Elliot Griffis, A Maker of the New Orient: Samuel Robinson Brown, Pio-
neer Educator in China, America, and Japan, The Story of His Life and Work (New
York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1902), 70–77.
26. The Chinese Repository, 10:569–570.
27. Yung Wing, My Life in China and America (New York: Henry Holt, 1909), 13.
28. Ibid., 581–584; Griffis, A Maker, 70–77.
29. The Chinese Repository, 10:584.
30. Xiong, The Dissemination, 126–129; Yung, My Life, 13–16.
31. Samuel Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom (New York, 1948), 2:375–376.
32. Instructions of the Prudential Committee to Peter Parker, May 1834, quoted in Phil-
lips, Protestant America, 182–183.
33. Claude M. Fuess, The Life of Caleb Cushing (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1923),
402.
34. G. R. Williamson, ed., Memoir of the Rev. David Abeel, D.D. (New York: Robert
Carter, 1848), 215.
35. Parker to Daniel Webster, January 30, 1841, cited in Edward V. Gulick, Peter Parker
and the Opening of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 51–61.
36. Fuess, The Life, 402–404; Richard E. Welch, Jr., “Caleb Cushing’s Chinese Mis-
sion and the Treaty of Wanghsia: A Review,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 58, no. 2
(December 1957): 329.
37. Li, A History, 87–91.
38. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 181.
39. Fuess, The Life, 407–409; Welch, Jr., “Caleb Cushing’s Chinese Mission,” 332.
40. Li, A History, 101–102.
41. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign
States (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1917), 1:393.
42. Edward King to the Secretary of State, September 20, 1843, Department of State,
Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Canton, 1790–1906, National Archives, Washing-
ton, DC, RG 59, M101, Reel 3.
43. Niles’ National Register 67, no. 1721 (September 21, 1844): 36.
44. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:351–399.
45. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 150.
46. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:677–690.
47. Gulick, Peter Parker, 114.
48. Ibid., 119–121; Li, A History, 125.
49. Fuess, The Life, 414–415.
50. Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan, The Chronicle of Managing Foreign Affairs: Foreign
Affairs in Daoguang’s Reign (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1979), 72:16–18.
51. Ibid., 22–23.
52. Te-kong Tong, United States Diplomacy in China, 1844–60 (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1964), 210–254.
53. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:713–727.
54. Ralph Covell, W.A.P. Martin: Pioneer of Progress in China (Washington, DC:
Christian College Press, 1978), 90–93.
 220 Notes to Pages 18–22

55. Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward, December 17, 1867, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1868 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 1:494–495 (hereafter
cited as FRUS); Li, A History, 341–344.
56. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:729–732.
57. Lord to Low, September 27, 1872, FRUS, 1872, 120–122.
58. Low to Fish, October 23, 1872; Fish to Low, December 31, 1872; ibid., 118–119,
137–138.
59. Denby to Gresham, January 2, 1895, Department of State, Despatches from the
United States Legation at Peking, National Archives, Washington, DC, Record
Group 59, M92, Reel 98 (hereafter cited as Legation Despatches).
60. Denby to Gresham, March 22, 1895, FRUS, 1895, 197–198.
61. Adee to Denby, July 19, 1895, Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions from
the State Department to United States Diplomatic Representatives in China, Na-
tional Archives, Washington, DC, Record Group 59, M98, Reel 42 (hereafter cited
as China Instructions).
62. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:303–341.
63. Ibid., 745–763.
64. Peter Schran, “The Minor Significance of Commercial Relations between the
United States and China, 1850–1931,” in America’s China Trade in Historical Per-
spective: The Chinese and American Performance, ed. Ernest R. May and John K.
Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 245.
65. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times
to 1957 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), 550–553.
66. Duan Xiaohong, “A Study on U.S.-China Trade at the Turn of the Century, 1895–
1905,” in The United States and the Modern China, ed. Tao Wenzhao and Liang
Biying (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1996), 225.
67. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, 139, 542, 550–553, 565.
68. Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Rela-
tions, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 56.
69. James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents, 1789–1897 (Washington, DC, 1900), 5:122.
70. Xiong, The Dissemination, 164–166.
71. Ibid., 167–168; Peter Duus, “Science and Salvation in China: The Life and Work
of W.A.P. Martin (1827–1916),” in American Missionaries in China: Papers from
Harvard Seminars, ed. Kwang-Ching Liu (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1966), 15.
72. Covell, W.A.P. Martin, 60.
73. Duus, “Science and Salvation,” 18.
74. Ellsworth C. Carlson, The Foochow Missionaries, 1847–1880 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1974), 50.
75. Xiong, The Dissemination, 288–289.
76. Carlson, The Foochow Missionaries, 52–72, 168.
77. Zhu Guanqing, A Survey of Benevolent Schools in Shanghai (Taipei: Huawen
Shuju, 1968), 546–547.
78. Hu Weiqing, “A Study on the Educational Enterprises of American Methodist
Church in China, 1848–1911,” Jindaishi Yanjiu (Journal of Modern History Stud-
ies), no. 2 (1999): 226.
 Notes to Pages 22–25 221

79. Irwin T. Hyatt, Jr., Our Ordered Lives Confess: Three Nineteenth-Century Ameri-
can Missionaries in East Shantung (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1976), 10.
80. Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China, 1877
(Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1878), 480–486.
81. Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China, 1890
(Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1890), 733.
82. Harlan P. Beach, Dawn on the Hills of T’ang; or, Mission in China (New York:
Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1905), 203.
83. Lutz, Christian Colleges, 28–29.
84. Fenn, Christian Higher Education, 24–36.
85. Yung, My Life, 13–41.
86. Ye, Seeking Modernity, 116–129.
87. Guo Jingyi, ed., New Archives of Four Countries: Britain (Taipei: Institute of Mod-
ern History, Academia Sinica, 1966), 2:854.
88. Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan, The Chronicle of Managing Foreign Affairs: The
Xianfeng Reign, 38:36.
89. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:418, 816.
90. Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan, The Chronicle, 71:26–79.
91. Su Jing, Tongwenguan in the Qing Dynasty (Taipei, 1978), 16–17.
92. W.A.P. Martin, A Cycle of Cathay: China, South and North with Personal Experi-
ences (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1896), 296–297.
93. Ibid., 297–298.
94. Su, Tongwenguan, 34–35.
95. Mr. Martin to Mr. Seward, enclosed in Mr. Seward to Mr. Fish, February 5, 1877,
Department of State, FRUS, 1877, 91–93.
96. Su, Tongwenguan, 34–35; Xiong, The Dissemination, 304.
97. Su, Tongwenguan, 190–206.
98. Between 1868 and 1899, Guangdong Tongwenguan transferred forty-six students
to Beijing and Shanghai Guangfangyanguan sent twenty-eight. Xiong, The Dis-
semination, 313–315.
99. Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan, The Chronicle: Tongzhi, 15:32; Yung, My Life, 170–
179.
100. Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, “Selecting and Sending Young Students Abroad,”
in Studying Abroad: Historical Records of Sending Students Abroad, ed. Liu Zhen
(Taipei: National Institute of Translation, 1977), 1:18.
101. Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, “Memo on Selecting and Sending Young Students
Abroad and the Proposed Regulations,” ibid., 1:21; Gao Zhonglu, ed., A Collection
of Letters from and to the Chinese Child Students Educated in the United States
(Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1986), 2–4.
102. Yung, My Life, 185–186; Gao Zonglu, “Yung Wing (1828–1912) and the Chinese
Young Students in the United States (1872–1881),” in The History of Chinese
Studying in the United States: Education and Achievements in 150 Years, ed. Li
Youning (Bronxville, NY: Outer Sky Press, 1999), 57–59; Shi Ni, Ideals and Trag-
edy: An Analysis on the Fates of Chinese Child Students Sent to the United States in
the Late Qing Dynasty (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1999), 81–94.
103. Yung, My Life, 189–190.
 222 Notes to Pages 26–31

104. Ibid., 209–220.

105. Gao, “Yung Wing,” 69–73.
106. Zeng and Li, “Selecting and Sending Young Students,” in Liu, Studying Abroad,
1:16.
107. Yung, My Life, 207–209.
108. Wen Binzhong, “Reminiscence of a Child Student Educated in the United States,”
in Gao, A Collection of Letters, 80–81; Gao, “Yung Wing,” 75.
109. Gao, “Yung Wing,” 76–80.
110. Yung, My Life, 191–196.
111. Foreign Affairs Office, Historical Records of Qing Dynasty (Taipei: Wenhai Chu-
banshe, n.d.), 4:17–19; Huang Gang, The History of U.S.-China Diplomatic and
Consular Relations, 1786–1994 (Taipei: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1995), 63–64;
Yung, My Life, 197–210.
112. Gao, “Yung Wing,” 66–67.
113. W.A.P. Martin, Report on the System of Public Instruction in China (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1877), 26–27.
114. Xiong, The Dissemination, 304–305, 332–333.
115. Gao, A Collection of Letters, 8–84; Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:70–74.
116. Marianne Bastid, “Servitude or Liberation? The Introduction of Foreign Education
Practice and Systems to China from 1840 to the Present,” in China’s Education and
the Industrial World: Studies in Cultural Transfer, ed. Ruth Hayhoe and Marianne
Bastid (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 8.
117. Yung, My Life, 182–186.
118. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 731.
119. United States Congress, A Compilation of the Laws, Treaties and Regulations and
Rulings of the Treasury Department Relating to the Exclusion of Chinese, 57th
Congress, 1st sess., Senate Document No. 291, 8–12.
120. For a clear and detailed chronology of Chinese exclusion, please see William L.
Tung, The Chinese in America, 1820–1973 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publica-
tions, 1974), 7–32.
121. Mary R. Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 328.
122. Vice Consul in Charge to Assistant Secretary of State, November 2, 1899, Des-
patches from U.S. Consuls in Canton, China, 1790–1906, National Archives, Wash-
ington, DC, RG 59, M101, Reel 13.
123. United States Congress, A Compilation of the Laws, 8–12.
124. Calculation was based on the numbers provided in reports sent to the State Depart-
ment by the American consulate general at Guangzhou in 1900, Despatches from
Canton, Reel 13.
125. Wu to Hay, November 28, 1901, FRUS, 1902, 68–70.
126. Fu Chi Ho (Fei Qihe), “My Reception in America,” Outlook 86 (August 10, 1907):
771–772.
127. Wu to Hay, December 9, 1901, FRUS, 1901, 73; Fu, “My Reception,” 770–773.
128. Wu to Hay, November 28, December 10, 1901, FRUS, 1902, 69, 81.
129. Wu to Hay, December 10, 1901, ibid., 81.
130. Pippy to Wu, November 14 and 30, 1900, ibid., 60–63.
131. George Campbell to Hay, March 14, 1900, SCR, FB14, quoted from Delber L.
McKee, Chinese Exclusion versus the Open Door Policy, 1900–1906: Clashes over
Chinese Policy in Roosevelt Era (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977), 43.
 Notes to Pages 31–37 223

132. United States Congress, Chinese Exclusion: Testimony Taken before the Committee
on Immigration of Senate, 57th Congress, 1st sess., Senate Report 776, 17–18.
133. McKee, Chinese Exclusion, 78.
134. United States Congress, Chinese Exclusion, 13–15.
135. Wei Daozhi, A History of Chinese-Foreign Educational Exchange (Changsha: Hu-
nan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1998), 139–140.
136. John Cleverley, The Schooling of China: Tradition and Modernity in Chinese Edu-
cation, 2nd ed. (North Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1991), 37–39.
137. Shu Xincheng, The History of Chinese Overseas Students in Modern China (Shang-
hai: Zhonghua Shuju, 1926), 31.
138. Wang Shuhuai, The Boxer Indemnity (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Aca-
demia Sinica, 1985), 1–2.
139. Duan Fang, “A Memo on Sending Students to the United States, Germany, and
Russia, 1903,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:602–603.
140. Chen Qiongying, An Exploration of the Studying Abroad Policy of the Qing Dy-
nasty (Taipei: Wen Shi Zhe Chubanshe, 1989), 110–115.
141. Huang Fu-ch’ing, Chinese Students in Japan in the Late Qing Period (Taipei: Insti-
tute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1983), 4–6.

Chapter 2 Tearing Down the Barriers

1. Wang Fengkai, A Brief History of Chinese Education (Taipei: Shangwu Yinshu-
guan, 1990), 313–315; Sang Bing, Modern School Students and Social Transforma-
tion in the Late Qing (Taibei: Daohe Chubanshe, 1991), 37.
2. Ding Zhiping, ed., The Educational Records of China in the Last Seventy Years
(Taipei: Guoli Bianyiguan, 1961), 6.
3. Wang, A Brief History, 316; Sang, Modern School, 39.
4. Wang, A Brief History, 314–316; Ding, Educational Records, 7.
5. Qu Lihe, Studying Abroad in the Late Qing Dynasty (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju,
1973), 19.
6. “Report on the Preparation for the Establishment of the Capital University,” July
3, 1898, in Chen Xuexun, Historical Records for the Teaching of Modern Chinese
History of Education (Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1986), 434–445.
7. Sun Jianai, “A Brief Report on the Establishment of the Capital University,” August
9, 1898, ibid., 447–448.
8. Ding, Educational Records, 7; Sang, Modern School, 39.
9. Li Duanfen, “A Memorandum Pleading for the Promotion of Modern Schools,”
June 12, 1898, in Chen, Historical Records, 425–429.
10. Xu Xueyun et al., eds., A Brief History of Social and Economic Development in
Shanghai, 1882–1931 (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1985), 94.
11. Ding, Educational Records, 9.
12. Zhang Baixi, “Memorandum on Schools,” in Chen, Historical Records, 527–528.
13. Ding, Educational Records, 10–13.
14. Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong, “Memo on Gradual Elimination of Imperial Ex-
amination, March 13, 1903,” in Chen, Historical Records, 570–573.
15. Zhang Baixi, Rong Qing, and Zhang Zhidong, “Memo on Gradual Elimination of
Imperial Examination and Promotion of New Schools, January 13, 1904,” ibid.,
573–576.
 224 Notes to Pages 37–42

16. Yuan and Zhang, “Memo on Gradual Elimination,” ibid., 570–573; Zhang, Rong,
and Zhang, “Memo on Gradual Elimination,” ibid., 573–576.
17. Yuan Shikai et al., “Joint Memo on Immediate Abolition of the Imperial Examina-
tion System and on Promotion of New Schools, September 2, 1905,” ibid., 576–
578; Ding, Educational Records, 13–15.
18. Ministry of Education, The First Chart of Education by the Ministry of Education,
1907, pamphlet.
19. Zhang Baixi, Rong Qing, and Zhang Zhidong, “Outlines for Educational Affairs,
January 13, 1904,” in Chen, Historical Records, 533–534.
20. Chen, An Exploration, 104.
21. Zhang, Rong, and Zhang, “Outlines,” 550–551.
22. Ministry of Education, “Report on the Organization of the Ministry of Education,”
in Chen, Historical Records, 585–590.
23. Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:651.
24. Ibid., 2:698; Chen, An Exploration, 161–162.
25. Yan Huiqin, The Autobiography of Yan Huiqin, quoted in Liu, Studying Abroad,
2:699–700.
26. Chen, An Exploration, 158–159.
27. Huang, Chinese Students, 84.
28. According to Yang Shu, among all Chinese students in Japan, about 60 percent of
them entered condensed (sucheng) educational programs, 30 percent studied gen-
eral subjects in elementary and middle schools, 6–7 percent were always in transi-
tion, accomplishing nothing, 3–4 percent attended high schools or junior colleges,
and only one percent enrolled in universities. Yang believed that the lack of gradu-
ates from Japanese colleges and universities had a grave impact on Chinese educa-
tion. Yang Shu, “Riben Youxue Jihuashu (Plan for Sending Students to Japan),” in
Chen, Historical Records, 710–711.
29. Ministry of Education, Brief Collection of Memorials of the Ministry of Education,
1:3–4.
30. Huang, Chinese Students, 86–88.
31. Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:609–611, 702–704; Chen, An Exploration, 183–189.
32. Qu, Studying Abroad, 89.
33. Chen, An Exploration, 182–189.
34. Qu, Studying Abroad, 89.
35. Wu to Hay, May 19, 1902, FRUS, 1902, 215–217.
36. Hill to Wu, July 22, 1902, ibid., 218–220.
37. Qu, Studying Abroad, 71.
38. Zhang Cunwu, The Battle over the Sino-American Immigration Treaty, 1905 (Tai-
bei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1965), 12–13.
39. Prince Ch’ing to Conger, January 24, 1904, FRUS, 1904, 117.
40. Conger to Hay, February 6, 1904, Despatches from Legation, China, Reel 125.
41. Hay to Conger, February 19, 1904, Diplomatic Instructions from the State Depart-
ment to United States Diplomatic Representatives in China, Department of State,
National Archives, Washington, DC, Record Group 59, M98, Reel 45.
42. Conger to Hay, April 20, 1904, Despatches from Legation, China, Reel 128.
43. Liang Cheng to Hay, August 12, 1904, Notes from Foreign Legations, China,
Reel 6.
 Notes to Pages 42–46 225

44. Notes from Liang Cheng, received on September 12, 1905, Archives of the Foreign
Ministry, Taipei.
45. Liang Cheng to Hay, January 7, 1905, Notes from Chinese Legation, Reel 6.
46. Xinwen Bao, August 27, 1905.
47. Zhang, The Battle, 26–27.
48. Wu to Hay, March 6, 1902, Despatches from Legation, China, Reel 5.
49. Ibid., Wu to Hay, July 6, 1901, FRUS, 1901, 100–103.
50. Aying, The Literature of Anti-American Exclusion of Chinese Laborers (Beijing:
Zhonghua Shuju, 1962), 588–597.
51. Zhang, The Battle, 25–28.
52. Note from Liang Cheng received on February 11, 1905, File of Immigration Treaty,
Archives of the Foreign Ministry, quoted ibid., 30.
53. Ibid., 63–64.
54. Sang, Modern School, 254.
55. Xinwen Bao, May 24, 1905.
56. Ibid., May 24, June 7, 1905.
57. Gracey to Pierce, June 7, 1905, Despatches from United States Consuls in Foochow,
Department of State, Record Group 59, M105, Reel 10, National Archives, Wash-
ington, DC; Xinwen Bao, June 30, 1905.
58. Xinwen Bao, June 3, 9, 1905; Shi-shan Henry Tsai, China and the Overseas Chi-
nese in the United States, 1868–1911 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press,
1983), 111–112.
59. Lay to Loomis, May 31, 1905, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Canton, M101,
Reel 19.
60. Dagong Bao, June 10, 15, 26, 1905.
61. Zhang, The Battle, 63–85.
62. Xinwen Bao, July 20, 1905.
63. Zhang, The Battle, 87–89.
64. Shi Bao, September 10, 1905.
65. Ziling Xi Bao, July 29, 1905.
66. “A Telegram to the Public from Student Associations in Beijing,” Lingnan Ribao,
September 18, 1905.
67. Julius Lay to Rockhill, June 19, 1905, The William Rockhill Papers, Houghton Li-
brary, Harvard University.
68. Lay to Loomis, July 24, 1905, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Canton, Reel 19.
69. James L. Rodgers to the Secretary of State, July 27, 1905, State Department, Des-
patches from United States Consuls in Shanghai, China, 1847–1906, National Ar-
chives, Washington, DC, Record Group 59, M112, Reel 52.
70. Rodgers to the Secretary of State, telegram, August 5, 1905, ibid.
71. Rodgers to the Secretary of State, telegram, August 10, 1905, ibid.
72. Goodnow to Loomis, November 17, 1904, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Shang-
hai, Reel 51.
73. Rockhill to Hay, June 21, 1905, Despatches from Legation, Reel 128; McKee, Chi-
nese Exclusion, 113–114.
74. Julius Lay to Rockhill, June 19, 1905, The Rockhill Papers.
75. Rockhill to the Secretary of State, June 15, 1905, Despatches from Legation,
Reel 128.
 226 Notes to Pages 47–51

76. New York Times, June 13, 1905.

77. Ibid., June 8, 1905.
78. Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, June 3 and 18, 1905, Selections from
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884–1918 (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925), 2:127, 157.
79. New York Times, June 16, 1905.
80. The Diary of John Hay, June 19, 1905, Container 1, John Milton Hay Papers, Man-
uscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
81. Theodore Roosevelt, Presidential Papers and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt
(New York: P. F. Collier and Son), 15:159–160.
82. Theodore Roosevelt to MetCalf, June 16, 1905, The Letters of Theodore Roos-
evelt, ed. Elting E. Morrison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952),
235–236.
83. Ibid., 240.
84. Zhang, The Battle, 202–203.
85. Roosevelt to William H. Taft, Roosevelt, The Letters, 5:131–132.
86. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 22, 1905, The Rockhill Papers.
87. Roosevelt, Presidential Papers, 16:498–500; John Foster, “The Chinese Boycott,”
Atlantic Monthly 97 (January 1906): 126–127.
88. Roosevelt, Presidential Papers, 16:631–632.
89. Tsai, The Chinese Experience, 79.
90. Zhang, The Battle, 203–233.
91. Foster, “The Chinese Boycott,” 126.
92. Adam McKeown, “Ritualization of Regulation: The Enforcement of Chinese Ex-
clusion in the United States and China,” American Historical Review 108 (April
2003): 386–403.
93. Ding, The Educational Records, 21.
94. Chen, An Exploration, 187–196.
95. C. S. Walker, “The Army of Chinese Students Abroad,” World’s Work 13 (January
1907): 8471.
96. Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:731–733.
97. Hay to Conger, January 29, 1901, FRUS, 1901, Appendix, 356.
98. Conger to Hay, February 11, 1901, Despatches from Legation, Reel 112.
99. Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 10–19.
100. Besides the United States, many other powers, including Russia, Britain, France,
and Belgium, had demanded more from China than their actual losses and costs
caused by the Boxer Indemnity. However, the American surplus was the largest in
absolute amount. Ibid., 41.
101. “Memorandum from Minister to the United States Liang Cheng Received on Janu-
ary 19, 1905,” Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi, Selected Historical Records of
Qinghua University (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 1991), 1:73–74; Shou-
jun Li, “The First American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity,” in Essays on the
History of the Sino-American Relations, ed. Fudan Daxue Lishixi (Chongqing:
Chongqing Press, 1988), 163.
102. The Diary of John Hay, November 28, 1904.
103. Ibid., November 29, 1904.
104. Ibid., December 2, 1904.
105. Rockhill to Hay, July 12, 1905, The Rockhill Papers.
 Notes to Pages 51–57 227

106. The Diary of John Hay, December 5, 1904.

107. Ibid., December 19, 1904.
108. “Memorandum from Minister to the United States Liang Cheng Received on May
13, 1905,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:76–77.
109. Ibid., 77.
110. “Memo from Commissioner of Northern Ports Yuan Shikai to the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs Received on May 23, 1905,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:78; Michael Hunt,
“The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal,” Journal of
Asian Studies 31 (1972): 548–549.
111. “Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Minister Liang Cheng Sent on June
1, 1905,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:79.
112. Liang Cheng to Hay, December 22, 1904, FRUS, 1905, 124.
113. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power
(New York: Collier Books, 1956), 182–190.
114. Rockhill to Hay, July 12, 1905, The Rockhill Papers.
115. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 22, 1905, Roosevelt, The Letters, 4:1310.
116. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 29, 1905, The Rockhill Papers.
117. Zhang, The Battle, 205.
118. W.A.P. Martin, The Wakening of China (New York, 1908), 251.
119. Roosevelt to Smith, April 3, 1906, Roosevelt, Presidential Papers, 5:206.
120. Rockhill to Roosevelt, July 12, 1905, The Rockhill Papers.
121. Arthur H. Smith, China and America To-day: A Study of Conditions and Relations
(New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1907), 219–221.
122. Editors, “American Education for Chinese,” Outlook, February 24, 1906, 387–388.
123. Smith, China, 213–217.
124. Rockhill to Roosevelt, July 12, 1905, The Rockhill Papers.
125. Carr to Straight, February 10, 1908, Department of State, Numerical and Minor
Files of the State Department, 2413/92–94, National Archives, Washington, DC,
Record Group 59 (hereafter cited as Numerical Files).
126. United States Congress, Congressional Record 40:6607, 7277.
127. Rockhill to Root, April 28, 1908, Numerical Files, 2112/27.
128. “Memorandum from the Minister to the United States Liang to the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs Received on November 1, 1905,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:80–81.
129. See memos sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Liang Cheng and Wu Tingfang
during this period. Ibid., 81–87.
130. Rockhill to Roosevelt, July 12, 1905, The Rockhill Papers.
131. Root to Thompson, March 2, 1907, Numerical Files, 2413/21.
132. Huntington Wilson, memo, November 22, 1907, ibid., 2413/79.
133. Theodore Roosevelt, Presidential Message to Congress, December 3, 1907, House
Document No. 1275, 60th Congress, 2nd sess., 6; FRUS, 1907, ixvii–ixviii.
134. Rockhill to Root, April 28, 1908, Numerical Files, 2112/27.
135. Rockhill to Foreign Ministry, July 11, 1908, State Department, Record of United
States Legation in China: Copies of Communications from Chinese Government,
Record Group 59, T-898, Reel 10, p. 63, National Archives, Washington, DC.
136. “A Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Minister
Rockhill,” July 14, 1908, in Qinghua, Selected, 1:88.
137. Supplementary Letter from Chinese Foreign Ministry to Rockhill, July 14, 1908,
Rockhill to Root, July 16, 1908, Enclosure 3, Numerical Files, 2413/966.
 228 Notes to Pages 58–65

138. Bacon to Rockhill, July 17, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 69.

139. Root to Rockhill, August 3, 1908, ibid., 69–70.
140. Rockhill to Phillips, August 1, 1908, Numerical Files, 2413/148.
141. Archives of the Foreign Ministry, File 3476, cited in Li, “The First,” 163.
142. “Proposed Regulations for the Students to Be Sent to America,” enclosure in Rock-
hill to Root, October 31, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 71–73.
143. Rockhill to Root, October 31, 1908, ibid., 71.
144. United States Congress, Proposed Regulations for the Students to Be Sent to Amer-
ica, House Document, No.1275, 6th Congress, 2nd sess., 11.
145. Rockhill to Root, October 31, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 70.
146. Root to Rockhill, December 31, 1908, ibid., 72–73.
147. Root to Liang Cheng, December 31, 1908, ibid., 74–75.

Chapter 3 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment

1. W. W. Yen, East-West Kaleidoscope, 1877–1944: An Autobiography (New York:
St. John’s University Press, 1974), 56.
2. Li Shoujun, “The Selection of the First Group of Chinese Students to Be Sent to
the United States with the Returned Boxer Indemnity,” Historical Studies 4 (1989):
100.
3. Ibid., 101.
4. “A Joint Memorial on the Methods of Receiving American Remission and Sending
Students to the United States,” July 10, 1909, in Qinghua, Selected, 1:115–116.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 120–121.
7. “Report from Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education on the Beginning Opera-
tion,” ibid., 117; Li, “The Selection,” 101–102.
8. “Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Education,
August 25, 1909,” “Memorandum from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, August 24, 1909,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:1.
9. “Joint Memorandum from the General Education Associations from Jiangsu and
Zhejiang to the Ministry of Education on the Adoption of Regulations on the Selec-
tion of Students to Be Sent to the United States,” ibid., 122.
10. “Memorandum from the Ministry of Education to All Provincial Superintendents
of Education on the Rules of Selecting and Sending Students to the United States,”
ibid., 124–128.
11. “The First Group of Indemnity Students Sent to the United States,” in Liu, Studying
Abroad, 1:173–179.
12. “Report from the Foreign Ministry on Sending the First Group of Students to
American Schools, no date, 1909,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:131–132.
13. Li Mingsu, “Remembering Schoolmates Who Were Selected and Sent to the United
States in 1909,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:179–186.
14. “The First Group,” ibid., 179.
15. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics, 90.
16. Knox to Consul General at Shanghai, July 22, 1911, Decimal Files, 811.42793/14.
17. “Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Construction of a Preparatory
School for Students to Be Sent to the United States, September 28, 1909,” in Qing-
hua, Selected, 1:3–4.
 Notes to Pages 65–71 229

18. “The Qinghua Garden and the Qinghua School,” ibid., 19–22.
19. Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:186–193.
20. Qinghua, Selected, 1:134–135.
21. “Foreign Ministry’s Requests on Renaming the Preparatory School for Students to
Be Sent to the United States as Qinghua Academy and the Opening of the Acad-
emy, April 11, 1911,” ibid., 143–145.
22. Shanghai Mercury, February 13, 1911.
23. “Qinghua Garden,” “The Foreign Ministry’s Requests,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:24,
144.
24. Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Bianxiezu, Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshigao (A Preliminary
History of the Qinghua University), (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), 10–11.
25. “Regulations for the Qinghua Academy,” “Memo from the China Educational Mis-
sion to the United States on the Reasons for the Revision of the Regulations for the
Qinghua Academy,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:24, 146–155.
26. “The Qinghua Garden,” ibid., 24.
27. “Memorandum to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education on the Termina-
tion of the Educational Mission and Merge Its Responsibilities with the Academy
and on the Destroy of Official Seal of the Office, May 23, 1912,” ibid., 155–156.
28. “Memo to Representative Zhang and Superintendent Huang in the United States,
May 23, 1912,” ibid., 156–157.
29. Hu Guanglu, “A Historical Account of the ‘Children Students,’” in Liu, Studying
Abroad, 1:197–199.
30. “School History,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:48.
31. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 12–13.
32. “Survey of Qinghua,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:28–29.
33. Ibid., 27.
34. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 6, 1915, Decimal Files, 893.42/64.
35. Ibid.
36. “Orders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 27, 1917,” in Qinghua, Se-
lected, 1:239.
37. “A Report from the Preparatory Committee on the Qinghua School Endowment,”
ibid., 240–243.
38. “Orders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 14, 1917,” ibid., 245.
39. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 16, 1918, Decimal Files, 893.42/95.
40. Memorandum, April 10, 1918, ibid.
41. “The Bylaws of the Board of Directors of Qinghua School, February 5, 1920,” in
Qinghua, Selected, 1:247–248; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 14–15.
42. “Orders from the Foreign Ministry,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:253–254.
43. Su Yunfeng, From Qinghua Academy to Qinghua University, 1911–1929 (Taipei:
Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1996), 36–37.
44. “The Organizational Chat for Qinghua School, 1912–1913,” “The Organizational
Outline and Staff Assignments of Qinghua School, 1922,” “The Teaching and Ad-
ministrative Organizational Chart for Qinghua School, 1925–1926,” in Qinghua,
Selected, 1:255–258.
45. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 9, 1918, telegram, Decimal Files,
893.42/76.
46. Secretary of State to Reinsch, January 11. 1918, ibid.
47. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 17, 1918, ibid., 893.42/77.
 230 Notes to Pages 71–78

48. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, May 14, 1918, ibid., 893.42/93.
49. “The List of All Presidents, 1909–1929,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:16–18.
50. “School History,” 46.
51. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 18.
52. Ibid., 17.
53. Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:1092–1099.
54. Reinsch, memorandum, February, 1918; Reinsch to the Secretary of State, June 27,
1918, Decimal Files, 893.42/95.
55. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 17.
56. Ibid., 27, 59.
57. Su, From Qinghua Academy, 31–32.
58. Elmer Ellsworth Brown, “Letter of Transmittal,” in John Fryer, Admission of Chi-
nese Students to American Colleges, United States Bureau of Education Bulletin
No. 2, 1909 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909), ix.
59. Brown, “Letter of Transmittal,” ix–x.
60. Fryer, Admission, xi–xii.
61. Ibid., xii.
62. T. Y. Chang, “Chinese Students in American Universities,” ibid., 180–181.
63. Mrs. St. John to Taft, April 11, 1911, Decimal Files, 811.42793/11.
64. Knox to Calhoun, May 23, 1911, ibid., 811.42793/12.
65. Calhoun to Knox, July 6, 1911, ibid., 811.42793/16.
66. “Experimental Regulations on Female Students to Be Educated in the United
States,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:226–228.
67. Ye, Seeking Modernity, 146.
68. “Appendix II: Lists for All Kinds of Students from the Qinghua Academy in 1911
to the Preparatory Section in 1929,” in Qinghua, Selected, 4:637–647.
69. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, March 20, 1916, Decimal Files, 811.42793/76.
70. Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:146–147.
71. “Experimental Regulations on Professional Students to Be Educated in the United
States,” in Qinghua, Selected, 4:224–226.
72. Appendix II, ibid., 637–647; Shu, The History, 251–252.
73. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 6, 1915, Decimal Files, 893.42/64.
74. Secretary of State to Crane, June 28, 1920, ibid., 893.42/105.
75. Crane to the Secretary of State, September 24, 1920, ibid., 893.42/110.
76. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to MacMurray, December 13, 1920,
ibid., 811.42793/115.
77. Pope to MacMurray, August 12, 1923, ibid., 811.42793/181.
78. Dorsey to the Secretary of State, August 25, 1919, telegram, ibid., 811.42793/133.
79. Post to the Secretary of State, August 29, 1919, ibid.
80. Post to the Secretary of State, Mar 30, 1920, ibid., 811.42793/107.
81. Cunningham to the Secretary of State, June 9, 1920, ibid., 811.42793/113.
82. Huston to the Secretary of State, February 11, 1921, ibid., 811.42793/119.
83. The Secretary of State to Schurman, April 7, 1922, ibid., 811.42793/151.
84. Chen Lifu, Lessons from Success and Failure: Memoir of Chen Lifu (Taipei: Zheng-
zhong Shuju, 1994), 31–43.
85. See Heng Teow, Japan’s Cultural Policy toward China, 1918–1931: A Compara-
tive Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 32–62; Wang,
The Boxer Indemnity, 426–558.
 Notes to Pages 79–83 231

86. “Japanese Ultimatum to Germany, August 15, 1914,” in Treaties and Agreements
with and Concerning China, ed. John V. A. MacMurray (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1921), 2:1167.
87. Cai Yuanpei, “Divinity of Labor,” Chen Duxiu, “The Von Ketteler Monument,”
New Youth 5 (November 1918): 438, 449; Tse-Tsung Chow, The May Fourth Move-
ment: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1960), 20–91.
88. Wunsz King, China at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 (New York: St. John’s
University Press, 1961), 6–24.
89. Paul S. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
Page & Co., 1922), 361–362.
90. Kiang Wen-han, The Chinese Student Movement (New York: King’s Crown Press,
1948), 36.
91. Tsi C. Wang, The Youth Movement in China (New York, 1927), 161–162.
92. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 72–73.
93. “Patriotic Movement: The May Fourth,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:476.
94. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 73–75.
95. Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiation: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1921), 257–261.
96. Reinsch, An American Diplomat, 362.
97. Lodge to the Secretary of State, May 25, 1921, FRUS, 1921, 398–399.
98. Root to Rockhill, May 27, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 65.
99. Lodge to the Secretary of State, May 25, 1921, FRUS, 1921, 398–399.
100. Hughes to Lodge, July 17, 1921, ibid., 402–403.
101. United States Congress, Congressional Record, August 11, 1921, vol. 61, part 5,
4883.
102. Terence Brockhenser, “The Boxer Indemnity: Five Decades of Sino-American Dis-
sension,” Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1984, 208; Thomas G. Pat-
terson et al., American Foreign Policy: A History since 1900 (Lexington, MA: D. C.
Heath, 1983), 313–314.
103. Colby to Crane, September 21, 1920, FRUS, 1920, 763.
104. Hughes to Porter, April 7, 1922, Decimal Files, 493.11/820A.
105. Porter to Hughes, April 26, 1922, ibid., 493.11/823.
106. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, June 16, 1921, ibid., 493.11/767.
107. Schurman to the Secretary of State, September 30, 1921, ibid., 493.11/787.
108. Danton to Peck, July 27, 1920, Department of State, China Legation General Cor-
respondence, 1920, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.
109. Huston to the Secretary of State, February 11, 1921, Decimal Files, 811.42793/119.
110. Brockhauser, “The Boxer Indemnity,” 222–223.
111. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, August 15, 1921, Decimal Files, 493.11/776.
112. Peck to Schurman, September 12, 1921, File 400B, China Legation General Cor-
respondence, 1921.
113. Schurman to the Secretary of State, September 30, 1921, Decimal Files, 493.11/787.
114. United States Congress, Congressional Record, December 6, 1923, vol. 65, part 1, 89.
115. United States Congress, Chinese Indemnity, House Hearing, 68th Congress, 1st
sess., Serial No. 8228, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924.
116. United States Congress, Congressional Record, May 12, 1924, vol. 65, part 8,
8323.
 232 Notes to Pages 83–89

117. Monroe to MacMurray, January 15, 1924, Decimal Files, 493.11/971.

118. Schurman and Peck conversation with Koo, May 28, 1924, File 400B, China Lega-
tion General Correspondence, 1924.
119. Grew to Schurman, June 19, 1924, telegram, ibid.
120. Monroe to MacMurray, November 12, 1924, Decimal Files, 493.11/1096.
121. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, June 5, 1925, ibid., 493.11/1180.
122. Calvin Coolidge, Executive Order No. 4268, July 16, 1925, FRUS, 1925, 936–937.
123. Green to MacMurray, July 3, 1925, Decimal Files, 493.11/1191.
124. Lockhart conversation with Sze, June 11, 1925, ibid., 493.11/1179.
125. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, July 10, 1925, Despatches from China Lega-
tion, 1925.
126. Brockhauser, “The Boxer Indemnity,” 236.
127. Kellogg to MacMurray, July 30, 1925, telegram, File 400B, China Legation, 1925.
128. Executive Order 4268, July 16, 1925, Decimal Files, 493.11/1168.
129. Kellogg to MacMurray, October 8, 1927, Telegram, China Legation, 1927.
130. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, August 27, 1925, Decimal Files,
493.11/1191.
131. Bell to the Secretary of State, October 4, 1924, ibid., 493.11/1095.
132. Minbao, July 23, 1925.
133. Zhou Yichun, “A Memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Gradual
Elevation of Offering and Preparation for the Establishment of the University,” in
Qinghua, Selected, 1:276–277.
134. Memorandum, January 5, 1915, in Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 6,
1915, Decimal Files, 893.42/64.
135. “The Table of Major Buildings for Qinghua College,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:446;
Su, From Qinghua Academy, 24–25; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 45.
136. The library, gymnasium, and science buildings were completed in 1919, while the
auditorium was opened in 1921. “Four Major Buildings of Qinghua School,” in
Qinghua, Selected, 1:447.
137. Zhang Yuquan, “Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on University Planning,”
ibid., 278–280.
138. Cao Yunxiang, “Methods to Upgrade Qinghua School,” Supplement Issue of the
Tenth Anniversary of Qinghua Weekly, March 1, 1924, 69.
139. “Invitation to Serve as Adviser for the Founding of Qinghua University,” in Qing-
hua, Selected, 1:287; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 48.
140. “The Organization and Curriculum of the University Section,” in Qinghua, Select-
ed, 1:293; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 48–49.
141. Qi Jiaying, The Chronology of Qinghua Humanity Studies (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue
Chubanshe, 1999), 14–15; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 48–51.
142. “The Organization,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:293–294.
143. “New Regulations for the Beijing Qinghua School,” “The Organization,” ibid.,
1:159–164, 294–295.
144. Qian Duanshen, “Qinghua School,” Qinghua Weekly 362 (December 4, 1925):
791–798; Su, From Qinghua Academy, 48–53.
145. “The Bylaws of the Qinghua School,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:298–299.
146. Su, From Qinghua Academy, 49.
147. Cao Yunxiang, “The Reform Plan for Qinghua School,” The Supplementary Issue,
March 1, 1924, 69.
 Notes to Pages 89–97 233

148. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 56.

149. Shu, The History, 248–251.
150. Heintzleman to the Secretary of State, December 15, 1924, Decimal Files,
893.42/206.
151. Deng, Private Education, 73–79.
152. Heintzleman to the Secretary of State, December 15, 1924, Decimal Files,
893.42/206.
153. “School History,” 46.
154. Consul at Tianjin to the Secretary of State, December 13, 1923, Decimal Files,
893.42/192.
155. The 11th Supplement Issue of Qinghua Weekly, June 18, 1925, 89–92.
156. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 46–47.

Chapter 4 From Central Administration to Party Control

1. Hsü, The Rise, 530–531.
2. “Report from Representatives Sent to the South (Capital),” in Qinghua, Selected,
vol. 2, part 1, 50–51.
3. Memorandum, July 31, 1928, MacMurray to the Secretary of State, August 2, 1928,
Decimal Files, 893.42/235.
4. Ibid.
5. MacMurray to Tong, August 1, 1928, ibid.
6. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, August 14, 1928, ibid., 893.42/232.
7. Luo Jialun, “The Plan and Process of the Rectification of the University Affairs,” in
Qinghua, Selected, vol. 2, part 1, 4.
8. “The Bylaws of the National Qinghua University,” ibid., 138–139; Qinghua, Pre-
liminary History, 93–94.
9. Luo Jialun, “Academic Freedom and the New Qinghua,” in Qinghua, Selected, vol.
2, part 1, 199–201.
10. Su, From Qinghua Academy, 146–155; Luo, “The Plan,” 8–13.
11. Su, From Qinghua Academy, 145.
12. Luo, “The Plan,” 16–19.
13. Luo Jialun, “President Luo’s Speech at the Anniversary Week, December 17, 1928,”
ibid., 154–158.
14. Luo Jialun, “The Past and the Present of Qinghua University,” ibid., 206–207.
15. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 79.
16. “Report from Representatives Sent to the South,” in Qinghua, Selected, vol. 2, part
1, 49–58.
17. “Minutes for the Seventh Meeting of the Senate, April 9, 1929,” ibid., 61–62.
18. “The Original Resignation Letter from President Luo,” ibid., 62–67.
19. “Instruction from the Ministry of Education of the National Government, No. 572,”
ibid., 76.
20. “A Talk Given by Luo Jialun at a Guiyang Qinghua Alumni Meeting, October 24,
1940,” ibid., 81.
21. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, November 2, 1928, Decimal Files,
893.42/246.
22. The Secretary of State to MacMurray, August 21, 1928, ibid., 893.42/232.
23. Division of Far Eastern Affairs, memorandum, May 6, 1929, ibid., 893.42/260.
 234 Notes to Pages 97–102

24. Ibid.
25. Qinghua, Selected, 4:636–647.
26. “Regulations of Qinghua School on Subsidizing Self-Support Students in the United
States,” ibid., 1:229–231; Su, From Qinghua Academy, 397; Wang, The Boxer In-
demnity, 316.
27. “The List of Various Students from Qinghua Academy to the Preparatory School
between 1911 and 1929,” in Qinghua, Selected, 4:637–647.
28. China Institute in America, A Survey of Chinese Students in American Universi-
ties and Colleges in the Past One Hundred Years (New York: China Institute in
America, 1954), 26–27.
29. Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 316–317; Huang, Chinese Students, 83–105.
30. Shen Xizhen, “A Study on Qinghua Students Sent to the United States: A Case
Study of Preparatory Students,” master’s thesis (Taiwan: Guoli Zhongxing Daxue
Lishi Yanjiusuo, 1994), 95–98, cited in Su, From Qinghua Academy, 382–383.
31. Cao, “The Past, Present, and Future of Qinghua School,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:40.
32. Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 317–318; Liang Shiqiu, About Wen Yiduo (Taipei:
Zhuanji Wenxueshe, 1967), 26–51.
33. Cao, “The Past,” 40–41.
34. Hsü, The Rise, 497.
35. Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 320.
36. The Academia Sinica, The List of the First Group of Fellows of the Academia Sinica
(Najing: Academia Sinica, 1948), 21–24.
37. Shanghai Daily, September 19, 1924.
38. New Daily of Current Affairs, July 28, 1928.
39. Paul Monroe to C. T. Wang, August 17, 1928, Monroe to Cai Yuan Pei, August 31,
1928, Papers of China Foundation, cited in Yang Tsuihua, Patronage of Sciences:
The China Foundation for Promotion of Education and Culture (Taipei: Institute of
Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1991), 24.
40. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, August 5, 1928, Decimal Files, 493.11/1349.
41. New Daily of Current Affairs, October 4, 1928.
42. Yang, Patronage, 26–28.
43. Ibid., 28–30.
44. “Letter from the Board of Directors of the CFPEC to Qinghua University, August
22, 1929,” in Qinghua, Selected, 2:686–687.
45. “Letter from the Board of Directors of the CFPEC to Ministry of Education, Sep-
tember 9, 1929,” ibid., 694–695.
46. “Expenditures for the University and Students Sent Abroad, 1912–1928,” ibid.,
432–433; Yang, Patronage, 64.
47. “The List of the First Group of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent to the
United States, 1933,” “The List of the Second Group of Government Sponsored
Students to Be Sent to the United States, 1934,” “The List of the Third Group of
Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent to the United States, 1935” “The List
of the Fourth Group of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent to the United
States, 1936,” in Qinghua, Selected, 2:679–680.
48. “Schedule of Accumulations, Qinghua University Endowment Fund,” ibid., 716–
717.
49. Mei Yiqi, “Qinghua during the War against Japan,” ibid., 3:17–21.
 Notes to Pages 102–105 235

50. “A Secret Order from the Ministry of Education Appointing the Leaders for the
Changsha Temporary University, August 28, 1937,” in Historical Records of the
National Southwest Associated University, ed. Beijing Daxue et al. (Kunming: Yun-
nan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1998), vol. 4, 3.
51. “The Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Southwest Associated Univer-
sity on the Appointment of Mei Yiqi as the Chairman of the Executive Committee,
December 21, 1938,” “The Resolution of the Executive Committee of the South-
west Associated University on the Reappointment of Mei Yiqi as the Chairman of
the Executive Committee,” ibid., 4.
52. “Order from the Ministry of Education, No. 9254, April 24, 1939,” in Qinghua,
Selected, 3:338–339.
53. “Memo from the China Foundation to the Ministry of Education on Transferring
Funds to Qinghua University, July 12, 1939,” ibid., 339–340.
54. “Minutes for the Twenty-Fifth University Affairs Committee Meeting, August 17,
1939,” ibid., 341–342.
55. “Resolutions Made by the Twenty-Sixth University Affairs Meeting on the Select-
ing and Sending the Fifth Group of Students to the United States, November 2,
1939,” ibid., 223–224.
56. Mei Yiqi, “Qinghua during the War against Japan (The Sequel),” ibid., 24.
57. Mei Yiqi, “Qinghua during the War against Japan (The Third Year),” ibid., 7–28.
58. “The Brief Table of Biographic Information of the Fifth Group of Students Selected
to Be Sent to the United States,” ibid., 229–232.
59. “Resolutions Made by the Thirteenth Senate on the Examination for the Sixth
Group of Government Scholarship Students to Be Sent to the United States,”
ibid., 238.
60. Mei Yiqi, “Qinghua during the War against Japan (The Fifth Year),” “Qinghua dur-
ing the War against Japan (The Sixth Year),” ibid., 8, 46.
61. “A Letter from Zhang Jianhou et al. to President Mei on Issues of Going Abroad,”
ibid., 261–263.
62. “Methods for Qinghua Scholarship for Privately Sponsored Students in the United
States, Adopted by the Senate on February 5, 1940,” ibid., 264.
63. CFPEC, A Summary of the Activities of the China Foundation for the Promotion of
Education and Culture, From 1925 to 1945, December 1946, 14–15.
64. Yang, Patronage, 98–100.
65. “The List of Students Chosen by the Fifteenth Senate to Receive the Scholarship
for Self-Sponsored Students in the United States, June 23, 1941,” in Beijing, The
Historical Records, 3:517.
66. “Resolution on the Termination of the Scholarship for Self-Sponsored Students in
the United States Adopted by the Nineteenth Senate, December 16, 194,” in Qing-
hua, Selected, 3:270.
67. “An Application Letter from Xia Xiang to the Senate for Research Overseas,” ibid.,
267–268.
68. “Recommendation Letter to President Mei from John Mo for Xia Xiang’s Studying
Abroad, April 19, 1941,” ibid., 266.
69. “A Brief Biographical Table for Lecturers, Teachers, and Assistant Instructors Sent
to the United States by Qinghua in 1941 with Semi-Government Scholarships, May
8, 1941,” ibid., 265–266.
 236 Notes to Pages 105–110

70. “A Letter to the President from Thirteen Teachers and Assistant Instructors Headed
by Zhu Hongfu for the Improvement of Treatments for Self-Sponsored Students
Studying Abroad, May 5, 1941,” ibid., 268–270.
71. CFPEC, The Third Report, 1928, 30–35.
72. CFPEC, A Summary, 11–12.
73. CFPEC, The Fourteenth Report, 1939, 11–18.
74. CFPEC, The Fifteenth Report, 1940, 10–15.
75. Ren Hongjuan, “A Business Review of the China Foundation,” Oriental Magazine
32, no. 7 (April 16, 1935): 19.
76. George R. Twiss, Science and Education in China: A Survey of the Present Status
and a Program for Progressive Improvement (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926),
17–24.
77. Yang, Patronage, 116.
78. Ibid., 117–121.
79. Sally Borthwick, Education and Social Change in China: The Beginnings of the
Modern Era (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 1983),
69–70.
80. “Brief Regulations on Sending Students to the West Approved by the Throne, Sep-
tember 15, 1904,” in Chen, Historical Records, 720.
81. Huang, Chinese Students, 86; “Memo on the Management of Chinese Students
Studying in Japan,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:270–276.
82. Ministry of Education, “Regulations for Selecting Students to Be Sent Abroad,”
ibid., 3:1002–1008.
83. Ibid., 1010–1014.
84. Editorial, “Government Services for the Returned Students,” Chinese Students’
Monthly, October 1914, 126–128.
85. “The Organizational Chart for the Ministry of Education, January 4, 1929,” “The
Revised Organization of Offices in All Sections in the Ministry of Education, July
22, 1932,” in The Collection of Historical Records of the Republic of China, ed.
Zhongguo Dier Lishi Danganguan (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1994), sec-
tion 5, vol. 1, 58–60.
86. “The Operation Regulations for the Qinghua School Office for the Superintendent
for Students in the United States,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:215–218.
87. “Detailed Regulations of Operation of the Office of Student Superintendent of Qin-
ghua University in the United States,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:1049–1052.
88. Huang Yanfu and Ma Xiangwu, Mei Yiqi and Qinghua University (Taiyuan: Shanxi
Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1999), 17–18.
89. Mei Yiqi, “A Letter to the Central University on Enabling Overseas Students to
Return and Serve in China after Finishing Education Abroad, May 15, 1930,” in
Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:393.
90. Huang Jilu, The Education and Research Prior to the Anti-Japanese War (Taipei:
Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1970), 152–153.
91. Zhu Jiahua, “A Statement on the Reform of the National Education,” in Liu, Study-
ing Abroad, 4:1663.
92. Du Yuanzai, ed., Revolutionary Documents: Higher Education Prior to the War
against Japan (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1971), 180–181; Liu,
Studying Abroad, 4:1661.
 Notes to Pages 110–115 237

93. “The Statistics of Students Sent Abroad between 1929 and 1937,” in Zhongguo,
The Collection, 1:394.
94. “Revised Regulations on Issuance of Studying Abroad Permits,” in Liu, Studying
Abroad, 4:1677–1679.
95. Ministry of Education, “The Improvement Plan for National Education,” in Liu,
Studying Abroad, 4:1661–1663.
96. Ibid., 161–163; Huang Jilu, Educational Policy and Reforms before the Anti-Japa-
nese War (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1971), 169–170.
97. “Regulations on Studying Abroad,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:381–385.
98. Ibid., 383–388.
99. “Regulations of National Qinghua University on the Selection of Students to Be
Sent to the United States,” in Qinghua, Selected, vol. 2, part 2, 667–671.
100. “The Revised Temporary Rules Regarding the Examination and Selection of Govern-
ment Sponsored Students to Be Sent Abroad Submitted by the Bureau of Education
to the Ministry of Education, February 28, 1935,” “Order from the Ministry of Edu-
cation on the Revisions to Be Made in the Revised Temporary Rules Regarding the
Examination and Selection of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent Abroad
Submitted by the Bureau of Education, March 14, 1935,” in Lin Ching-fen, Students
Selected by Provinces for Studying Abroad: Historical Records on Chinese Students
Studying Abroad during the Sino-Japanese War (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1994), 1:1–7.
101. “The Memo from the Bureau of Education of Guangdong Province on Following
the Order from the Ministry of Education in Further Revising the Regulations Re-
garding the Examination and Selection of Government Sponsored Students to Be
Sent Abroad, March 28, 1935,” ibid., 7–12.
102. “A Telegram from the Ministry of Education to the Bureau of Education of Guang-
dong, April 12, 1935,” ibid., 18–19.
103. “The Ministry of Education Order, No. 4750, April 16, 1935,” ibid., 19.
104. “The Brief Plan for the Examination and Selection of the Third Group of Govern-
ment Sponsored Students to Be Sent Abroad Submitted to the Ministry of Educa-
tion by the Bureau of Education of Guangdong, April 4, 1936,” ibid., 22–23.
105. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:1826–1828.
106. “Documents on Feng Yuxiang’s Recommendation for Sending Huang Shaogu, Guo
Chuntao Abroad for Education,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:390–392.
107. Yan Su and Dong Junfeng, Kong Xiangxi and Song Qingling (Beijing: Zhongguo
Dangan Chubanshe, 1994), 164–171; Hsü, The Rise, 566.
108. “A Letter from the Ministry of Education to the Consulate in Liverpool on Student
Lu Senjian’s Application for the Purchase of Foreign Currency, February 27, 1929,”
in Lin, Students, 1:160–161.
109. “The Statistics of Students Sent Abroad between 1929 and 1937,” in Zhongguo,
The Collection, 1:394–397.
110. “Students Sent Overseas or Subsidized by the Central Committee of the Nationalist
Party, 1930–1933,” ibid., 380.
111. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:1991–1992.
112. “Revised Temporary Methods to Restrict Studying Abroad,” ibid., 1992–1993.
113. “The Memo to the Ministry of Education from the Bureau of Education of Guang-
dong Province on the Recall or Extension of Government-Sponsored Students in
Europe and the United States, December 31, 1938,” in Lin, Students, 1:35–36.
 238 Notes to Pages 115–120

114. “Letter from the Chinese Embassy to the Ministry of Education, November 30, 1938,”
“Letter from the Ministry of Education, No. 11565,” ibid., 101–105, 109–111.
115. “The Statistics of Students Who Have Received Studying Abroad Permits in the
Past Decade,” in Du, Revolutionary Documents, 181–182.
116. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2003–2006.
117. Ibid., 2034.
118. “The Brief Table,” 229–234.
119. “Scholarships for Self-Sponsored Students to Be Sent to America, 1940,” in Qing-
hua, Selected, 3:265.
120. Liu, Studying Abroad, 1666–1667, 2004–2006.
121. Wen Hsin Yeh, The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China,
1919–1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 167–182.
122. Zhang Yufa, A History of the Republic of China (Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye
Gongsi, 1998), 195.
123. Ding, The Educational Records, 130–133.
124. John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927–1937 (Stanford, California: Stan-
ford University Press, 1966), 12.
125. Ibid., 14–15.
126. Ding, The Educational Records, 148–149.
127. Lloyd E. Eastman, “Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, 1927–1937,”
in The Nationalist Era in China, 1927–1949, ed. Lloyd E. Eastman (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9–10; Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny (New
York: MacMillan, 1947), 151.
128. Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–
1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 308–309; Israel, Student
Nationalism, 189.
129. Chiang, China’s Destiny, 151, 220.
130. “The Temporary Regulations Issued by the Nationalist Government in Nanjing on
the Addition of a Party Education Course, July 30, 1928,” in Zhongguo, The Col-
lection, 1:1030.
131. Deng, Private Education, 78–81.
132. Bulletin of the Ministry of Education 2, no. 7.
133. “A Telegram Sent to the Nationalist Government by the Political Committee of the
Nationalist Party in Beiping on Bai Congxi’s Proposal for the Implementation of
the Education of the Three Principles of the People, July 28, 1928,” in Zhongguo,
The Collection, 1:1010.
134. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 95.
135. Qinghua, Selected, 10–12.
136. “The Plan for the Implementation of Party Education,” in Zhongguo, The Collec-
tion, 1:1011–1015; Qinghua, Selected, 12–13.
137. Central Daily, March 20, 1931.
138. “The Plan for the Implementation of Party Education,” in Zhongguo, The Collec-
tion, 1:1020.
139. “Regulations on Studying Abroad,” ibid., 382–383.
140. “Rules for the Selection of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent to Ameri-
ca,” in Qinghua, Selected, 2:671–679.
141. “Informal Letter from the Ministry of Education, No. 6751, March 7, 1940,” in Lin,
Students, 1:124–125.
 Notes to Pages 120–125 239

142. Israel, Student Nationalism; Lincoln Li, Student Nationalism in China, 1924–1949
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994); Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Stu-
dent Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1991); Azhe, The Brief History of Student Movement in
Modern China (Hong Kong: Dasheng Chubanshe, 1983).
143. Wasserstrom, Student Protests, 156–159.
144. Chen, Lessons, 260–286.
145. The other two departments were the Department of Teaching (Jiaowu Chu) and the
Department of Services (Zongwu Chu). Fan Xiaofang, The Reign of the Jiang’s and
the Gang of Chen’s: The Art of Strategy of Jiang Jieshi, Chen Guofu, and Chen Lifu
(Taipei: Zhouzhi Wenhua, 1994), 192, 257; Chen, Lessons, 257–258.
146. Chen, Lessons, 224–226.
147. Chih Meng, Chinese American Understanding: A Sixty-Year Search (New York:
China Institute in America, 1981), 187–188.
148. Ibid., 187.
149. Israel, Student Nationalism, 192.

Chapter 5 Maintaining the Educational Front

1. Jung-chao Kuo, From Pearl Harbor to Yalta: The Tragedy of Sino-American Co-
operation During World War II (Taipei: Zhongguo Yanjiu Zhongxin Chubanshe,
1979), 10–16.
2. Charles E. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China (Washing-
ton DC: Government Printing Office, 1952), part 1, 14–15.
3. Hsü, The Rise, 600.
4. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission, part 2, 774.
5. Quoted in James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom 1941–1945 (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 248.
6. United States Congress, Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings before the Joint Committee
on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 1st Session, 79th Congress (Wash-
ington DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), part 14, 1061.
7. Ibid., 1061–1062.
8. Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor
to the Marshall Mission (New York: Atheneum, 1965), 42–43.
9. Ibid., 44.
10. Yin Zhou, “General Marshall’s Mission to China,” Historical Archives, February
1991, 129.
11. J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936–
1948, Department of State Publication 8854 (Washington DC: Government Print-
ing Office, 1976), 89–105.
12. The State Department’s sponsorship of American students was suspended in De-
cember 1942 for the duration of the war. Department of State, The Cultural Co-
operation Programs, 1938–1943, Publication 2137 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1944), 9–10.
13. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 9.
14. The Division of Far Eastern Affairs, memorandum of conversation, May 6, 1941,
Decimal Files, 811.42793/458.
15. Peck, memorandum, May 6, 1941, ibid., 811.42793/458.
 240 Notes to Pages 125–133

16. Peck, memorandum, May 26, 1941, ibid., 811.42793/467.

17. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 10.
18. Gauss to the Secretary of State, July 24, 1941, Decimal Files, 811.42793/473.
19. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 11.
20. Thomson, memorandum, October 17, 1941, Decimal Files, 811.42793/497.
21. Ibid.
22. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 13–14.
23. Grummon, memorandum, December 10, 1941, National Archives, RG 59, WHB,
Box 53, Folder: RC-China #1, quoted in ibid., 15.
24. State Department to American Embassy at Chongqing, January 29, 1942, Decimal
Files, 811.42793/527A.
25. Gauss to the Secretary of State, February 12, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/535.
26. Ibid.
27. Gauss to the Secretary of State, March 27, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/572.
28. Gauss to the Secretary of State, February 12, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/535.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Gauss to the Secretary of State, July 26, 1943, ibid., 811.42793/1302.
33. Secretary of State to Gauss, February 24, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/535.
34. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 115.
35. Pattee, memorandum, September 22, 1941, Decimal Files, 811.42793/484.
36. Thomson, memorandum, October 17, 1941, ibid., 811.42793/483.
37. Grummon, memorandum, December 19, 1941, ibid., 811.42793/509.
38. Ibid.
39. State Department, The Cultural Cooperation Programs, 12.
40. China Section of the Division of Cultural Relations, “Monthly Report, March 5,
1943,” Decimal Files, 811.42793/1067A.
41. State Department, The Cultural Cooperation Programs, 12–13.
42. Grummon, memorandum, December 19, 1941, ibid., 811.42793/509.
43. Grummon, memorandum of conversation, January 22, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/546.
44. Grummon, memorandum, January 27, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/548.
45. Ibid.
46. Grummon, memorandum, January 22, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/546.
47. Long to Biddle, February 18, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/549A.
48. Department of Justice, Instruction No. 47, February 27, 1942, ibid.
49. Schufield to Hull, March 19, 1942, ibid.
50. China Section, “Monthly Report, March 5, 1943,” ibid., 811.42793/1067A.
51. State Department, The Cultural Cooperation Programs, 14–17.
52. Division of Cultural Relations, memorandum, December 1, 1942, Decimal Files,
811.42793/941; W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 116–117.
53. Division of Cultural Relations, memorandum, March 17, 1942, Decimal Files,
811.42793/581.
54. Gauss to the Secretary of State, December 1, 1942, Decimal Files, 811.42793/924;
John Israel, Lianda: A Chinese University in War and Revolution (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1998), 307.
55. Cohen, America’s Response, 130–131.
56. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 37–38.
 Notes to Pages 134–140 241

57. Field Director of United China Relief to Chen Lifu, December 9, 1942, en-
closed in Gauss to the Secretary of State, December 16, 1942, Decimal Files,
811.42793/929.
58. Gauss to the Secretary of States, February 23, 1943, ibid., 811.42793/1039.
59. “A Letter from the China Foundation to Mei Yiqi, September 21, 1943,” in Beijing,
The Historical Records, 3:743.
60. “Letter from Jiang Menglin, Li Shuhua, Mei Yiqi to the Southwest Allied University
on the Distribution of ‘Subsidies from the United China Relief,’” ibid., 744–745.
61. Yang, Patronage, 110.
62. For details on the exchange program and the complete list of Chinese educators and
artists invited to the United States between 1943 and 1946, please see W. Fairbank,
America’s Cultural Experiments, 83–113. 217–218.
63. John K. Fairbank, Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir (New York: Harper & Row,
1982), 204–205; W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 46.
64. Gauss to the Secretary of State, December 1, 1942, Decimal Files, 811.42793/883.
65. Gauss to the Secretary of State, January 1, 25, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/960,
811.42793/980.
66. Fairbank, Chinabound, 209–210; W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments,
46–48.
67. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 47.
68. Ibid., 48.
69. “A Letter from Chen Daisun to President Mei Reporting on the Preparation of Re-
search Proposals,” in Beijing, The Historical Records, 3:751.
70. “A Letter from Chen Daisun to President Mei Reporting on the Preparation of Re-
search Proposals,” ibid., 746–751.
71. “A Letter from Chen Daisun to President Mei, June 27, 1945,” ibid., 746.
72. “A Letter from Hewang to Mei Yiqi, June 29, 1945,” “A Letter from Mei Yiqi to
Langdon, June 29, 1945,” ibid., 751–752.
73. Secretary of State to Gauss, April 4, 1944, cited in W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural
Experiments, 208–209.
74. Fairbank to Hiss, September 23, 1942, in Fairbank, Chinabound, 197–199.
75. Ibid., 231.
76. Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:2082.
77. Ministry of Education, “The Plan for Sending Government Sponsored Students to
England and the United States in 1943 by the Ministry of Education,” ibid., 2083–
2094.
78. Peck, memorandum, September 4, 1943, Decimal Files, 811.42893/1286.
79. Ibid., 811.42793/1286A.
80. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Chongqing, October 2, 1943, ibid.,
811.42793/1286.
81. “Ministry of Economy Regulations on Selecting and Sending Trainees in Industries
and Mining,” “Drafted Regulations by the Ministry of Transportation on Sending
Trainees Abroad,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:2099–2114.
82. Ministry of Education, “The Plan,” ibid., 2083–2099.
83. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 85–95.
84. Zhang Guansheng, The Biography of Fei Xiaotong (Beijing: Qunyan Chubanshe,
2000), 218–219.
85. Langdon to Gauss, May 24, 1944, Decimal Files, 811.42793/1828.
 242 Notes to Pages 140–145

86. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 218–219.

87. “A Letter from Hua Luogeng to President Mei, November 16, 1943,” “Letters from
Hua Luogeng to Provost Pan, November 16, 19, 1943,” “A Memo from Mei Yiqi to
the Ministry of Education on Hua Luogeng’s Application for Passport, November,
1943,” Qinghua, Selected, 3:315–317.
88. Zhen Renjia, “The Life of China’s Gifted Mathematician Hua Luogeng,” Biograph-
ical Literature 74 (1985, no. 2): 51; Chen Ningning, “Hua Luogeng: A Magnificent
Life,” in Zhu Jiping, Rooted in China: Reports on Famous Returned Scientists (He-
fei: Anhui Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1997), 155–156.
89. Jiaoyubu, “Regulations on Self-Sponsored Students Studying Abroad, November 8,
1943,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:2115–2118.
90. American Embassy to Secretary of State, May 5, 1943, quoted in W. Fairbank,
America’s Cultural Experiments, 93–94.
91. American Embassy to Secretary of State, June 8, 1943, ibid., 123.
92. Gauss to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1943, Decimal Files,
811.42793/1441.
93. Secretary of State to Gauss, March 14, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1403.
94. Office of Far Eastern Affairs, memorandum, March 21, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1699.
95. “Report of the Chairman,” American Defense–Harvard Group, from May 15, 1943,
to June 15, 1944, Harvard University Archives, HUD3139.244.
96. Benjamin Fine, “Colleges May Bar Chinese Students,” New York Times, May 11,
1944, 21.
97. Ibid., 21.
98. American Embassy at Chongqing to the Secretary of State, April 18, 1944, Decimal
Files, 822.42793/1713.
99. Gauss to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1766.
100. Gauss to the Secretary of State, April 25, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1696.
101. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Chongqing, July 5, 1944, ibid.,
811.42793/1816.
102. Gauss to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1766.
103. Hull to the American Embassy at Chongqing, July 5, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1816.
104. MacMurray, memorandum, August 21, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/8–2144.
105. Ibid.
106. American Embassy to the Secretary of State, September 24, 1944, National Ar-
chives, RG 84, 842-Education.
107. Chu Chin-nung, “Survey of Chinese Students Studying Abroad,” China at War 13
(December 1944, no. 6): 18–19.
108. MacKnight to Peck, February 13, 1945, Decimal Files, 811.42793/1345.
109. Shaw to Gauss, May 12, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1770C.
110. Peck, memorandum, May 26, 1945, ibid., 811.42793/3–2645.
111. “An Educational ‘Chop-Suey’ for China,” China Weekly Review 29 (July 12, 1924,
no. 6): 177; Teow, Japan’s Cultural Policy, 124–162.
112. Y. L. Tong, “The Chinese Students and the American Public,” Chinese Students’
Monthly 10 (March 1915, no. 6): 348–351.
113. About Chinese students’ efforts to unofficially represent China in the United States,
please see Hongshan Li, “The Unofficial Envoys: Chinese Students in the United
States, 1906–1938,” in Image, Perception, and the Mating of U.S.-China Relations,
 Notes to Pages 145–152 243

ed. Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1998), 153–159.
114. Hu Shi, Hu Shi Diary: The Years of Studying Abroad (Changsha: Yuelu Shushe,
2000), 128–236, 401–408.
115. Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:2046–2052.
116. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 217–218.
117. Zhang, Fei, 219.
118. The first three books were later included as the first volumes of Earthbound China, a
book series published by the University of Chicago Press in 1945. Ibid., 224–225.
119. Peck, memorandum, December 2, 1942, Decimal Files, 811.42793/966.
120. Dennis, memorandum, December 1, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/941.
121. Quoted in W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 118.
122. Gauss to the Secretary of State, January 30, 1943, Decimal Files, 811.42793/1006.
123. Gauss to the Secretary of State, October 7, 1943, ibid., 811.42793/1406.
124. Gauss to the Secretary of State, November 30, 1943, ibid., 811.42793/1449.
125. American Embassy at Beijing to the Secretary of State, November 20, 1944, ibid.,
811.42793/11–2044.

Chapter 6 From Expansion to Termination

1. “Chinese Victory Banquet in Honor of University Students and Faculty of China
and Chinese American Educational and Cultural Relations,” China Institute in
America, China Institute Bulletin 30 (January 1946): 1.
2. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 217–218.
3. “Chinese Author and Playwright Return Home,” China Institute Bulletin 41:2; “Lao
Sheh,” ibid., 43:9.
4. “Chinese Government Organizes Committee on Wartime Planning for Chinese Stu-
dents in the United States,” ibid., 8:5.
5. “Grant-in-Aid Scholarships,” ibid., 38 (December 1946): 4.
6. “The United States Extends Warm Welcome to Chinese Industrial Trainees,” ibid.,
27:1.
7. “The Chinese Industrial Trainees,” ibid., 35 (June 1946): 1.
8. “The United States Extends Warm Welcome to Chinese Industrial Trainees,” ibid.,
27:1.
9. “The Chinese Industrial Trainees,” ibid., 35:2.
10. “Tsin Hua Scholarship Students,” ibid., 34:8.
11. “Agricultural Scholarships,” “Scholarships and Fellowships for Chinese Students,”
ibid., 38:4, 9.
12. Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:2138, 2169–2170.
13. “The Regulations on Studying Abroad Examinations for Self-Supported Students
by the Ministry of Education in 1946,” ibid., 2162–2168, 2170.
14. Ibid., 4:2176–2177.
15. Ministry of Education, The Second Educational Annual, 1948, 567; Y. C. Wang,
Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872–1949 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1966), 133.
16. “The Regulations on Examinations to Select Interpreters for Studying Abroad by
the Ministry of Education,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2178–2181.
 244 Notes to Pages 152–157

17. Wu Dayou, “Hua Luogeng Was Sent by the Ministry of Military Affairs to the
United States for Research,” Biographical Literature 74 (1985, no. 3): 20.
18. All graduates were from Qinghua University. Li Zhengdao won the Nobel Prize in
physics with his schoolmate Yang Zhenning in 1958. Tang Aoqing and Zhu Guangya
became China’s top scientists in chemistry and nuclear physics, respectively.
19. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2138–2139.
20. “Regulations on the Purchase of Foreign Currency by Government and Self-spon-
sored Students Going Abroad,” ibid., 2189–2191.
21. Ma Daren, “From Studying Abroad to Staying Abroad: An Autobiography of a
Chinese Student in the United States,” in Studying in the United States for Eighty
Years, ed. Li Youning (New York: Outer Sky Press, 1999), vol. 2, 94.
22. Tong Te-kong, “An Account of a Student Worker,” ibid., 1:170.
23. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2139.
24. Ibid., 2192–2195.
25. “Arrival of Visiting Professors from China,” China Institute Bulletin 27:5–6.
26. “Chinese Professors and Research Workers Awarded U.S.C. Fellowships,” ibid.,
45:2.
27. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2190–2191.
28. Y. C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872–1949 (Chapel Hill: Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1966), 135–136.
29. American Institute of Pacific Relations, “Current State of American Research on
the Far East and the West Pacific,” Far Eastern Quarterly 7 (May 1948, no. 3):
272–281.
30. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 136; Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2186–2187.
31. “Sino-American Cultural Service Scholarship,” China Institute Bulletin 35:9.
32. “Chinese Government Awards Scholarships to American G.I.’s,” ibid., 1.
33. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wedemeyer, August 10, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 528.
34. Hurley to the Secretary of State, August 31, 1945, ibid., 544.
35. Harry S. Truman, memorandum, December 12, 1945, Papers of Harry S. Truman,
President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 173, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
36. Wedemeyer to Marshall, August 19, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 7:532.
37. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wedemeyer, September 18, 1945, ibid., 565.
38. Vincent to Acheson, September 20, 1945, ibid., 567; Gary May, China Scapegoat:
The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent (Washington, DC: New Republic
Books, 1979), 135–137.
39. Clinton Anderson, Outsider in the Senate: Senator Clinton Anderson’s Memoirs
(New York: World Publishing Co., 1970), 78.
40. FRUS, 1945, 7:767–770.
41. Marshall to Lehey, ibid., 748.
42. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 147–148.
43. Marshall to Truman, May 22, 1946, FRUS, 1946, 9:882; notes by Marshall, May
22, 1946, ibid., 9:880–881.
44. United States Congress, Committee on the Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
Hearing, 82nd Congress, 1st and 2nd sess., 15 parts (Washington DC: Government
Printing Office, 1951–1952), 2253–2254.
45. Marshall to Truman, December 25, 1946, FRUS, 1946, 10:665.
 Notes to Pages 157–163 245

46. Minutes of meeting between General Marshall and Professor Chou Tsien-chung at
Nanking, December 21, 1946, ibid., 648–649.
47. Marshall, memorandum of conversation, June 27, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 852.
48. May, China Scapegoat, 16.
49. State Department, U.S. Relations, 355.
50. Ibid., 351–353.
51. Ibid., 372–377.
52. Ibid., 387.
53. James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York: Viking Press,
1951), 372.
54. American embassy at Nanking to the Secretary of State, May 31, 1946, State De-
partment, Foreign Affairs Document and Reference Center, microfilm, cited in W.
Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 107.
55. The group was led by Zhou Yang, vice president of the North China Associate Uni-
versity. The other three members included a dramatist, a mechanical engineer, and
a chemist. Ibid., 108.
56. Ibid., 109.
57. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 464–465.
58. Ibid., 466.
59. Department of State, Regulations and Orders Pertaining to Foreign Surplus Dis-
posal, State Department Publication 2704 (Washington DC: Government Printing
Office, 1946), 2–3.
60. Walter Johnson and Francis Colligan, The Fulbright Program: A History (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1965), 20–21.
61. “Foreign Educational Benefits and Surplus Property,” Senate Report No. 1039, 79th
Congress, 2nd sess., March 12, 1946, 1.
62. Roger Swanson, “The Fulbright Program Is the Best Investment,” Kansas City Star,
May 17, 1952.
63. Marshall to Koo, April 5, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 7:1263.
64. Secretary of State to American Embassy at Nanking, April 16, 1947, ibid., 1264.
65. Bennett, memorandum, May 9, 1947, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, box 4.
66. American Embassy at Nanking to the Secretary of State, July 8, 1947, FRUS, 1947,
7:1279–1280.
67. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanjing, July 30, 1947, ibid., 1280–
1281.
68. “China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State Marshall Praise Work
of China Institute,” China Institute Bulletin 45 (October 1947): 2.
69. American Embassy to the Secretary of State, August 19, 1947, FRUS, 1947,
7:1282–1283.
70. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanking, ibid., 1289–1290.
71. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 467–469.
72. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanking, November 8, 1947, Deci-
mal Files, 811.42793 SE/11–847.
73. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanjing, December 1, 1947, ibid.,
811.42793/12–147.
74. American Embassy at Nanking to the Secretary of State, December 4, 1947, ibid.,
811.42793/12–447.
 246 Notes to Pages 163–168

75. American Embassy to the Secretary of State, December 5, 1947, cited in W. Fair-
bank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 167.
76. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanking, December 18, 1947, Deci-
mal Files, 811.42793/12–1847.
77. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanking, January 19, 1948, ibid.,
811.42793/1–1948.
78. Derk Bodde, Peking Diary: A Year of Revolution (New York: Henry Schuman,
1950), 1.
79. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 179.
80. American Embassy at Nanking to the Secretary of State, November 9, 1947, Deci-
mal Files, 811.42793 SE/11–948.
81. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 194–196.
82. American Embassy to the Secretary of State, July 16, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793
SE/769.
83. Ibid.
84. About the experiences and achievements of the first group of Fulbright fellows, see
W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 193–200.
85. China Institute in America, A Survey of Chinese Students in American Universi-
ties and Colleges in the Past One Hundred Years (New York: China Institute in
America, 1954), 18.
86. United States Congress, Relief of Chinese Students, July 13, 1949, House Report
1039, 81st Congress, 1st sess., 2.
87. Stuart to the Secretary of State, August 23, 1948, U.S. Relations, 877–878.
88. Chih Meng to the Secretary of State, January 10, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793
SE/1–1049; New York Times, January 27, 1949, 1.
89. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students, 1949–1955
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1956), 3–4.
90. Chih Meng to the Secretary of State, January 10, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793
SE/1–1049.
91. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 5.
92. New York Times, February 17, 1949, 11.
93. Webb to Hoffman, March 9, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/3–849; Hoffman
to Webb, March 23, 1949, ibid., 811.42793 SE/3–2349.
94. Ibid., 811.42793 SE/3–849, 811.42793 SE/3–2349.
95. United States Congress, Relief, 4.
96. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 6.
97. Hoffman to Cleveland, March 18, 1949, enclosure in Hoffman to Webb, March 23,
1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/3–2349.
98. Digest of Public General Bills, 81st Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Library
of Congress, 1949), 410.
99. United States Congress, Relief, 2.
100. New York Times, July 4, 1949, 12.
101. United States Congress, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st sess., vol. 95,
part 10, 13541–13543.
102. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 24.
103. United States Statutes at Large, vol. 63, pt. 1 (Washington DC: Government Print-
ing Office, 1951), 711.
104. United States Congress, Relief, 8.
 Notes to Pages 168–178 247

105. Ibid.
106. United States Statutes, vol. 64, pt. 1, 202.
107. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 27.
108. United States Statutes, vol. 64, 202.
109. United States Congress, Relief, 2.
110. New York Times, August 2, 1949, 12.
111. McConaughy to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1949, Decimal Files,
811.42793 SE/11–1649.
112. New York Times, September 21, 1950, 10.
113. McConaughy to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1949, Decimal Files,
811.42793 SE/11–1649.
114. Johnstone, memorandum, November 30, 1949, ibid., 811.42793 SE/12–549.
115. Ibid.
116. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 8–15.
117. Ibid., 16.
118. United States Statutes, vol. 64, 202.
119. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 16–17.
120. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 140.
121. Wang Wenhua, A Chronology of Qian Xuesen (Chengdu: Sichuan Wenyi Chuban-
she, 2001), 72–79; Wang Shouyun, “A Brief Biography of Qian Xueseng,” People’s
Daily: Overseas Edition, November 1, 1991, 2.
122. Wang, Qian Xuesen, 79–80.
123. New York Times, September 21, 1950, 10; Zhu, Rooted, 335–336.
124. Zhu, Rooted, 336.
125. New York Times, March 9, 1951, 3.
126. Ibid.
127. Senate Bill 748, 82nd Congress, 1st sess., February 1, 1951.
128. H.R. 3171, 82nd Congress, 1st sess., March 12, 1951.
129. New York Times, April 15, 1951, 9.
130. Holland, memorandum, undated, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, box 27.
131. Ibid.
132. United States Congress, Relief, 2; Committee on Educational Interchange Policy,
Chinese Students in the U.S., 1948–1955: A Study in Government Policy (New
York, 1956), 5.
133. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 22–23.
134. Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, Chinese Students, 10–11.

Chapter 7 A Historical Perspective

1. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, xii–xiv, 502–503; Shu, The History, 211.
2. Li Xisuo, Modern Foreign-Educated Students and Cultural Exchange between
China and Foreign Countries (Tianjin: Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), 4; Su, From
Qinghua Academy, 377–398.
3. “Memo on the Management of Chinese Students Studying in Japan,” in Liu, Study-
ing Abroad, 1:270–276.
4. Tian Zhengping, Returned Students and the Modernization of Chinese Education
(Guangzhou: Guandong Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1996), 406–411.
5. China Institute in America, A Survey, 28.
 248 Notes to Pages 178–183

6. William R. Wheeler et al., The Foreign Students in America (New York: Associa-
tion Press, 1925), 11.
7. Samuel Paul Capen, “Opportunities for Foreign Students at Colleges and Universities
in the United States,” United States Bureau of Education, Bulletin 27 (1915): 2–7.
8. Wheeler et al., The Foreign Students, 307.
9. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 43–45; China Institute in America, A Survey, 26.
10. China Institute in America, Theses and Dissertations by Chinese Students in Amer-
ica, n.d., 1.
11. China Institute in America, A Survey, 28–29; idem, China and America: A Chroni-
cle of Cultural Relations, April–May, 1949, 10.
12. T’ung-li Yuan, A Guide to Doctoral Dissertations by Chinese Students in America,
1905–1960 (Washington, DC: Sino-American Cultural Society, 1961).
13. Zeng and Li, “Memo on Selecting,” 112–115.
14. “A Joined Memorial,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:116.
15. China Institute in America, A Survey, 34–35.
16. Ibid., 10.
17. Tian, Returned Students, 107–108.
18. Bai Yuntao, “Foreign-Educated Students and the Quantitative Analysis on Chinese
Fellows,” Chinese Scholars Abroad, Februrary 25, 2005, http://www.chisa.edu.cn/
chisa/article/20050225/20050225002310_1.xml.
19. Nankai Daxue, The History of the Nankai University (Tianjin: Nankai Daxue Chu-
banshe, 1989), 119.
20. Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Mis-
sionary and Ambassador (New York: Random House, 1954), 101.
21. Ren Hongjuan, “A Brief History of the Chinese Society of Science,” in Selected
Records of Literature and History (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1961), 3.
22. Cai Yuanpei, “Autobiography,” in The Complete Collection of Cai Yuanpei’s Writ-
ings (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984), 332.
23. Tian, Returned Students, 441–442.
24. Ibid., 354–357.
25. Ibid., 388–389; Hubert O. Brown, “American Progressivism in Chinese Education:
The Case of Tao Xingzhi,” in Hayhoe and Bastid, China’s Education, 132.
26. Tian, Returned Students, 129.
27. Ibid., 128, 667–669; Xiao Tian and Ji Jin. A Biography of Hu Shi (Beijing: Tuanjie
Chubanshe, 1999), 121–125,
28. Hu, Hu Shi, 731–732.
29. Yuan, A Guide.
30. Li, Modern Foreign-Educated Students, 332–334.
31. Zhuang Yu, “A Discussion on the Changes in the Textbook Editing in China,”
in The Ninety Years of the Business Publisher (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan,
1987), 65.
32. Li, Modern Foreign-Educated Students, 337.
33. Hu, Hu Shi, 401–408.
34. Yuan, A Guide, 1–70.
35. Su, From Qinghua Academy, 313–331.
36. Xiao and Ji, Hu Shi, 129–136.
37. Fairbank, Chinabound, 38–40.
38. Bodde, Peking Diary.
 Notes to Pages 183–191 249

39. Root to Rockhill, December 31, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 72–75.

40. Luo, “The Plan,” 12–13.
41. Luo Jialun, “President Luo’s Resignation and the University Administration Transi-
tion,” in Qinghua, Selected, 2:77.
42. Wang, Qian Xuesen, 21–27; Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm (New York: Basic
Books, 1995), 27–34.
43. Relman Morin, East Wind Rising: A Long View of the Pacific Crisis (New York,
1960), 134–135.
44. Xiao and Ji, Hu Shi, 31–34.
45. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 510–511.
46. “China Must Fight Japan—A Proclamation,” Chinese Student 1 (1935, no. 1): 4.
47. Ibid., 5.
48. Editorial, ibid., 3.
49. Ba Yin, “Resisting Japan and Uniting with the Communists,” ibid. 1 (April 1936,
no. 7–8): 24–28.
50. Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China: A Narrative His-
tory (New York: Free Press, 1981), 340.
51. John Dewey, “Public Opinion in Japan,” New Republic, November 11, 1921.
52. Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shi and the Chinese Renaissance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1970), 247; Intellectuals, 340.
53. Grieder, Intellectuals, 341–344.
54. Stacey Bieler, “Patriots” or “Traitors”? A History of American-Educated Chinese
Students (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 259–260.
55. Charles W. Hayford, To the People: James Yen and Village China (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1990), 207.
56. Wu Han, “Wen Yiduo Who Smites the Table and Rises to His Feet with Anger,” in
Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi, Biographies of Qinghua Alumni (Beijing: Qing-
hua Daxue Chubanshe, 1983), 1:86–89.
57. Sun Dunhuan, “Wen Yiduo,” in Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi, Heroes and
Martyrs of Qinghua (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 1994), 174–188.
58. Huang Yanfu, “Mei Yiqi, 1882–1962,” in Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi, Biog-
raphies of Qinghua Alumni (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 1995), 3:18.
59. Fairbank, Chinabound, 198–199, 249–253.
60. Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:1665–1666, 4:2003–2006.
61. Chen Yufeng and Chen Yuhuang, eds., Historical Records of the Technical Person-
nel Sent by the Natural Resources Commission to the United States, 1942 (Taipei:
National Archives, 1988), 1:468–504.
62. Wang, Qian Xuesen, 62–64; Chang, Thread, 130–139.
63. Qinghua, Biographies, 3:152–162.
64. Zhong Feng, “The Corrupt Fellow System in the Mainland,” Xinyusi, http://www.
xys.org/xys/ebooks/others/science/dajia3/yuanshizhidu.txt.
65. Grieder, Hu Shi, 295–297, 311; Xiao and Ji, Hu Shi, 299–320.
66. Zhu, Rooted, 336.
67. Chang, Thread, 184–190.
68. Oumei Tongxuehui, Strive to Rejuvenate China: The Sequel (Beijing: Jingji Kexue
Chubanshe, 1993), 22–36.
69. Li Songlin, Jiang Jieshi and His Son in Taiwan (Beijing: Zhongguo Youyi Chuban
Gongsi, 1993), 29–30.
 250 Notes to Pages 191–200

70. Chen, Lessons, 310.

71. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 123; Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, 160.
72. J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936–
1948; W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments; William Kirby, “Intercultural
Connections and Chinese Development: External and Internal Spheres of Modern
China’s Foreign Relations,” in China’s Quest for Modernization: A Historical Per-
spective, ed. Frederick Wakeman Jr. and Wang Xi (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian
Studies, University of California–Berkeley, 1997), 208–223.
73. Meng Chih, “American Educational Influence on China: The American Returned
Students of China,” in Chinese American Cultural Relations, ed. Chi-pao Cheng
(New York: China Institute in America, 1965), 160.
74. “American Honored by Chiang Kai Shek for War Aid to China,” China Institute
Bulletin 40 (February 1947): 2.
75. Lodge to Secretary of State, May 21, 1921, FRUS, 1921, 98–99.
76. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission, 2:774; Zhou Yin, “General Marshall’s
Mission to China,” in Lishi Dangan (Historical Archives), February 1991, 29.
77. Qinghua, Selected, 3:520–523.
78. New York Times, March 9, 1951, 3.
79. Wei Gengfa and Qi Suying, Qian Xuesen: An Award-Winning Scientist for the Mak-
ing of the Missile, Atomic Bomb, and Satellite (Shijiazhuang, Hebei: Hebei Sha-
onian Ertong Chubanshe, 2001), 202–239; Wang, “Qian Xuesen,” 2.
80. Zhao Xinshu and Xie Yu, “Western Influence on (People’s Republic of China) Chi-
nese Students in the United States,” Comparative Education Review 36 (November
1992): 509–529.
81. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:663–664.
82. Liang, About Wen Yiduo, 26–27.
83. Ibid., 47–51.
84. Fu, “My Reception,” 770–773.
85. Pan Chaoxuan, “A Review and Analysis of China’s Studying Abroad History,” in
Selected Essays on Studying Abroad, ed. Fang Xiao (Xiamen: Xiamen Daxue Chu-
banshe, 1993), 116.
86. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 502–503.
87. Wang, Qian Xuesen, 62–63; Chang, Thread, 130–139.
88. Lin Cantian, “The Status and Analysis of Chinese Students in the United States,” in
Fang, Selected Essays, 108.
89. Joseph W. Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China (New York: Random House, 1974),
xiv–xix.
90. Bodde, Peking Diary.
91. Ibid., xiv.
92. Ibid., 267–271.
93. United States Congress, Relief, 2.
94. Between 1942 and 1945, the American government spent $800,000 on its cultural
relations program. At the same time, its total aid to China amounted to $1.5 billion.
Chih Meng to the Secretary of State, January 10, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793
SE/1–1049.
95. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 28.
96. The total amount of American aid to China from V-J Day to 1949 was over $2 bil-
lion, which included a large amount of weapons and equipment sold to China as
 Notes to Pages 200–210 251

“surplus” materials for only a fraction of the original cost. The Office of Far Eastern
Affairs, memorandum, January 16, 1950, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs,
box 26.

Epilogue
1. Xie Qigang, “For the Sake of Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s Request,” Chinese Schol-
ars Abroad, June 20, 2003, http://www.chisa.edu.cn/newchisa/web/0/2003–06–20/
news_2772.asp.
2. David M. Lampton, A Relationship Restored: Trends in U.S.-China Educational
Exchange, 1978–1984 (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1986), 20.
3. Leo A. Orleans, Chinese Students in America: Policies, Issues, and Numbers
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988), 23.
4. Lampton, A Relationship Restored, 233–238.
5. Orleans, Chinese Students, 88.
6. Institute of International Education, Open Door, 1993/94–2002/03.
7. Orleans, Chinese Students, 186.
8. Ibid., 44–49.
9. Ibid., 33–34.
10. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 510–511.
11. Lampton, A Relationship Restored, 38–39.
12. Institute of International Education, Open Door, 1993/94.
13. Orleans, Chinese Students, 38–39, 94–95.
14. Lampton, A Relationship Restored, 66–71.
15. John S. Service, “The Views of Mao Tse-tung: America and China,” in Esherick,
Lost Chance, 373.
16. Song Jian, ed., Biographies of the Heroes Who Built Missiles, Nuclear Bombs, and
Satellites (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 2001).
17. Wei and Qi, Qian Xuesen, 344–345.
18. Jonathan Spence, To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620–1960 (Bos-
ton: Little, Brown, 1969).
19. U.S. Congress, Fourteenth Semiannual Report on Educational Exchange Activities,
84th Congress, 1st sess., House Document No. 219 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1955), 7.
20. Lampton, A Relationship Restored, 11–12.
21. Li Ze, “Looking Back at the 25 Years of Studying Abroad at Academia Sinica,”
China Scholars Abroad, http://www.chisa.edu.cb/newschisa/wen/0/2003–06–20/
news_833.asp.
22. “Sources: The Four Phases for Chinese Students Seeking Education Abroad since
the Beginning of Opening and Reform,” ibid., http://www.chisa.edu.cn/newschisa/
wen/0/2003–06–20/news_2765.asp.
23. Institute of International Education, Open Door, 2005, http://opendoors.iienetwork.
org/?p=69736.

Appendix
1. Root to William Rockhill, December 31, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 74.
2. Data drawn from “A Complete List of all Presidents,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:16–18.
 252 Notes to Pages 211–215

3. Based on “A Comparative Table for Annual Expenditures for the University and
Students in the United States, 1912–1928,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:432–434.
4. This table is based on Special Issue on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Qinghua
National University, 1931, and on the student lists included in Appendix I–II, Qin-
ghua, Selected, vol. 2, part 1, 636–647.
5. Data drawn from Appendix IV–VII, W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments,
214–221.
6. Based on data from “Current State of American Research on the Far East and the
Western Pacific,” American Institute of Pacific Relations, Far Eastern Quarterly 7
(May 1948): 272–281.
7. Bai Yuntao, “Returnees and Fellows of Chinese Science Academy,” Chinese Scholars
Abroad, http://www.chisa.edu.cn/chisa/article/20050225/20050225002310_1.xml.
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 index

Abeel, David, 10, 20 Atlantic Charter, 141

Academia Sinica, 99, 179, 190, 215
Acheson, Dean, 156–157, 168 Ba, Yin, 187
Additional Articles to the Treaty of Tien- Bacon, Robert, 57
tsin, 18. See also Burlingame Treaty Bai, Congxi, 118
Administrative Committee on College Af- Baker, J. E., 84
fairs (Xiaowu Guanli Weiyuanhui), 88 Baldwin, C.C., 21
Advisory Commission on Educational Bank of China (Zhongguo Yinhang), 113
Exchange, 171 Bank of Communication (Jiaotong Yin-
American Airlines, 131 hang), 113
American Association of International Barrett, Edward B., 172
Conciliation, 181 Bastid, Marianne, 29
American Board of Commissioners for Beijing University, 24, 80, 89 180.
Foreign Missions, 9–11, 14, 21 See also Capital University; Jingshi
American China Development Company, Daxuetang
52–53 Beiyang Xuetang, 39
American Defense-Harvard Group, 141 benevolent school (yixue), 22
American-educated students, 5 Bennett, Charles R., 84, 143
American factory, 8–9, 11 Benton, William, 193
American Land (Meiguo Di), 72 Biddle, Francis, 132
American merchants, 7–10 Bin, Zhi, 180
American Military Assistance Advisory Bliss, Tusker H., 80
Group, 157 Blue Shirt Society (Lanyi She), 120
American Revolution, 32 Board of Directors (Dongshihui), 181
Anglo-Chinese Educational Committee, 77 Board of Foreign Scholarships, 163
anti-American boycott of 1905, 40, Board of Qinghua College Endowment, 70
43–44, 47, 52, 54 Bodde, Derk, 163–164, 183, 198–199
anti-Chinese boycotts, 43, 53 Bolton, Francis, 168
anti-Chinese immigration laws, 40–41 Boone, William, 20
Arndt, C. O., 146 Boone University, 82
Arthur, Chester A., 32 Borthwick, Sally, 107

273
 274
Boston Chamber of Commerce, 32
Boston Merchants Association, 32
Boxer Indemnity: control of, 89–90,
192–193; first return of, 34, 49–63, 67,
69; receiving of, 101–103, 134; second
return of, 78–87; success of, 160–161,
200, 223n138; use of, 73–76, 97, 129,
136, 183, 209
Boxer Rebellion, 19, 30, 33, 50, 59, 80
Bridgman, Elijah C., 10–12, 16
Brown, Elmer E., 73
Brown, Samuel R., 12–13, 23
Buck, Peter, 217n3
Bullock, Mary Brown, 217n3
Burdon, J.S., 23
Bureau of Census, 132, 218n9
Bureau of Foreign Affairs, 152
Burlingame, Anson, 18, 24
Burlingame Treaty, 18, 26, 29, 41. See
also Additional Articles to the Treaty
of Tientsin
Business Publisher (Shangwu Yinshu-
guan), 182
Cai, Yuanpei, 93, 100, 180–181
Caldwell, Robert, 142
Calhoun, W. J., 74
California Institute of Technology,
172–173, 190
Cao, Yunxiang, 87–89, 210
Cao Yu, 149
Capital University, 32, 36, 38, 45, 49,
223n7. See also Beijing University;
Jingshi Daxuetang
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 77
Carter, Jimmy, 205
Central Bank (Zhongyang Yinhang), 113,
165
Central Kingdom, 16
Central Military Committee, 114
Central News Agency (Zhongyang Xinw-
enshe), 142
Central Party School (Zhongyang Dan-
gwu Xuexiao), 94
Central Training Corp (Zhongyang Xunl-
iantuan), 139–140
Central University, 135
Index
Chan, Fook Tim, 146
Chen, Cheng, 152
Chen, Cunxuan, 49
Chen, Daisun, 137
Chen, Dingmo, 182
Chen, Hengzhe, 75
Chen, Jian, 217n1
Chen, Jucai, 15
Chen, Lanbin, 25, 27
Chen, Lifu, 78, 96, 103, 114, 120–121,
140, 142, 189–191
Chen, Yikan, 43
Chen, Yinke, 87
Cherrington, Benjamin, 124
Cheshire, Fleming D., 55
Chiang Kai-shek, 158. See also Jiang,
Jieshi
China, People’s Republic of, 148, 170,
191–192, 195
China Aid Act of 1948, 168
China Aid Act of 1950, 168, 171
China cultural relations program, 125,
127, 129, 194
China Enters the Machine Age, 146
China Institute in America, 104, 121, 130,
144, 150–151, 155, 161, 178
“China Jail,” 30–31
China Lobby, 198
China National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Education, 82
China Supply Commission, 150
Chinese Educational Association, 89
Chinese Educational Mission to the
United States, 24–27, 32, 54, 196
Chinese Exclusion Act, 29
Chinese exclusion laws, 31, 43–45,
47–49, 192
Chinese exclusion policy, 47–48, 54–55
Chinese Foundation for the Promotion
of Education and Culture (CFPEC):
cooperation with, 134; expansion of,
96; founding of, 83–84, 193; history
of, 234n39; reorganization of, 90,
100–107, 124
Chinese Relief Expedition, 50
Chinese Society of Science (Zhongguo
Kexueshe), 180
Chinese Students Alliance, 108, 180
 Index
Chinese Students Association of North
America, 186
Chinese Students’ Christian Organization,
173, 194
Chinese Students’ Monthly, 108
civil service examination system, 5,
28–29, 34–38, 49, 183
Cohen, Warren I., 20, 217n1
Cold War, 5–6, 171, 192, 195, 205, 206
Collins, Judson, 21
Colorado College, 196
Columbia University, 64, 83, 98–99, 142,
146, 180, 182
Commercial Treaty of 1903, 19
Committee on Scholarly Communication
with the People’s Republic of China
(CSCPRC), 205
Committee on the Preservation of the
Endowment for Qinghua School and
Educational Mission in the United
States, 70
Committee on Wartime Planning, 130, 149
common schools, 3
Communist China, 6, 170, 174, 198
Communist Party: American, 172; Chi-
nese, 159, 198
Communist regime, 6, 170
Compton, Karl, 131
Confucianism, 4, 182
Confucian classics, 4, 34
Conger, Edwin H., 41, 50
Coolidge, Calvin, 83–84
Coolidge, Mary, 30
Coordinator of Information, 135
Cornell University, 55, 64, 99, 115,
180–182
Corson Browning Prize, 181
Council of the Educational Administration
(Jiaoyu Xingzheng Weiyuanhui), 117
Council of Three, 79
credit-hour system, 66, 180
Crescent Moon (Xinyue), 188
Cressey, George, 124–125
Cullom, Shelby M., 55
cultural imperialism, 145
cultural interaction, 7
cultural relations, 104, 125, 127, 146, 149,
160, 206
275
Cultural Revolution, 206
Cunningham, Edwin S., 77, 82
Currie, Lauchlin, 123, 137
Cushing, Caleb, 15–16
Dai, Jitao, 96
Dai, Li, 141
Danton, George, 82
Daoism, 182
Daugherty, Harry M., 78
Davis, John Paton, 198
Democratic League of China, 189
Deng, Jiaxian, 206
Denby, Charles, 19
Deng, Peng, 217n7
Deng, Xiaoping, 202, 205–207
Dengzhou College, 22
Dengzhou (Tengchou) School, 22
Dennett, Tyler, 8–9, 218n2
Department of Agriculture, 132, 135
Department of Education, 203
Department of Homeland Security, 6
Department of Interior, 146
Department of Justice, 78, 131, 144,
173–174
Department of Labor, 77
Department of State: aid to Chinese
students in the United States dur-
ing and after World War II, 170–174,
192; China cultural relations program,
124–126, 128–136, 138 140–144, 149–
151, 213; establishment of diplomatic
relations with China, 15–16; Fulbright
program, 155, 160–168; impact of
McCarthyism, 199; involvement in the
education of Chinese students in the
United States, 26, 30, 192, 203; man-
agement of Qinghua, 69–71, 76–78;
negotiation of immigration treaty with
China, 41–42, 44–46; protection for
American missionaries in China, 19; re-
turn of the Boxer Indemnity, 55, 58–59,
64, 81–84; visa policy toward Chinese
students, 6
Department of Treasury, 30–31, 40–41,
84, 132, 138
Dewey, John, 182, 187–188
Dickson, Virgil, 146
 276
Ding, Wenjiang, 87, 100
Division of Cultural Relations, 124–126,
130, 132–133, 136, 138, 144, 146
Division of Educational and Cultural Af-
fairs, 192
Division of Far Eastern Affairs, 124, 133,
156. See also Office of Far Eastern
Affairs
Drygan, Stephen, 130
Duan, Fang, 33, 40, 50
East India Company, 9
East India Squadron, 14
Eastern Zhou Dynasty (771–221 BCE), 4
Economic Cooperation Administration
(ECA), 166–168, 171
educational exchange: as closet tie in
U.S.-China relations, 1–6, 176–177;
as a front in World War II, 122–124,
129, 133; as government experiment,
62, 66–67, 69, 73–75, 85; as a two-way
street, 145–151, 155, 158, 160, 163; as
provided by treaties, 17; beginning of,
32, 38; central administration of, 92,
99–100, 105, 107, 114; Chinese civil
war and, 169, 175; government support
for, 50, 59, 97, 183–185; historical
impact of, 191–195, 198–200, 202,
204–208; under the Nationalist Party
control, 119, 137, 139, 142–144. See
also educational interactions
educational front, 129, 144
educational interactions, 1–3, 6, 32, 59,
92, 122, 175, 192. See also educational
exchange
educational relations, 2–3; 5–6, 9, 104,
161, 176, 205–206
educational sovereignty, 118
educational ties, 1. See also educational
relations
eight-leg essay (bagu), 35–36
Eight-Power Alliances, 33
elective system, 180–181
Emergency Aid Program, 167–169, 171,
174. See also Program of Emergency
Aid to Chinese Students
emergency aid to Chinese students, 164,
166
Index
Emergency Medical Training School,
Chinese Army, 134
Emperor Daoguang, 17
Empress Cixi, 36–37
Empress of China, 7–8
Endeavor (Nuli Zhoubao), 188
Europe First Strategy, 122–123, 194
European Recovery Act (Marshall Plan),
158
Everett, Edward, 15
Executive Central Committee, Nationalist
Party, 117
Executive Yuan (Xingzheng Yuan), 101,
114, 188
Export-Import Bank, 157
Faculty Council (Jiaoshouhui), 88, 96,
181
Fairbank, John King, 135–137, 146–147,
158, 182, 189, 191
Fairbank, Wilma, 133, 137, 217n4,
Fan, Xuji, 190
Fan, Yuanlian, 62, 65, 67, 70–71, 87, 105
Farm Credit Administration, 132
Farmers’ Bank (Nongmin Yinhang), 113
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 172
Fei, Qihe (Fu, Chi Ho), 30, 197
Fei, Xiaotong, 145
Feng, Youlan, 163, 199
Feng, Yuxiang, 92, 113
Fenn, William Purvience, 217n3
Fish, Hamilton, 18
Fong-wang-tu Academy (Fanwangdu
Shuyuan), 44
Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1950,
167
Foreign Currency Purchase Application
Form, 113
Foreign Economic Administration, 143, 150
foreign exchange, 113
Foreign Fellowship, 105–106
Foreign Ministry: involvement in educa-
tional exchange, 57–58, 61–62, 65, 67,
69, 140, 161; protest of the Chinese
exclusion policy, 43; taking over of
Qinghua, 71, 93, 95–96. See also Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs
Foster, David J., 48
 Index
Four Books, 10
Four Generations under One Roof (Sishi
Tongtang), 149
Four Modernizations, 206
Fourteen Points, 78–79
freedom of speech, 186–187, 189
Fryer, John, 23, 40, 73–74
Fu, Sinian, 173
Fujian Shipyard, 33
Fulbright Act, 160
Fulbright Agreement, 148, 155, 160–162,
164, 194
Fulbright Bill, 160
Fulbright Fellow, 163–164
Fulbright, J. William, 160
Fulbright Program, 148, 155, 161–163,
194, 205
Fulbright Scholars, 155, 164, 183, 198
Gauss, Clarence, 126–129, 133, 138,
141–143
gongsheng, 36
Goodnow, John, 46
Goodrich, Carrington, 142
Government Council (Zhengfuyuan), 93
government-sponsored student (gong-
feisheng), 110–116, 138–140, 142,
153, 189
government-subsidized student (ban
gongfeisheng), 110
Grand Canal, 82
Grant, Benjamin, 150
Greeks, 2
Greene, Roger, 84, 124, 131
Gresham-Yang Treaty, 41, 44, 48
Grieder, Gerome, 187
Gross, Earnest A., 167
Grummon, Stuart E., 125–127, 129–131
Guangxu Emperor, 36
Guangzhou (Canton), 3, 7–12, 14–15,
23–24, 30
Guangzhou trade system, 8
Guo, Binwen (Kuo, Pin-wen), 180
Guo, Songtao, 23
Hamilton, Maxwell, 124
Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), 4
hang (hong), 8
277
Hangzhou Presbyterian College, 22
Hankou-Guangzhou (Hankow-
Kuangchou) railroad incident, 52
Hankow (Hankou) railroad concession,
48, 53
Hanlin Yuan, 25
hard power, 4, 217n8
Harris, George, 163–164
Harrison, William Henry, 14
Harvard University, 54, 64, 98, 146, 182
Harvard-Yenching Institute, 137
Hay, John, 31, 40–42, 47, 50–52, 226n80
Hayhoe, Ruth, 217n3
high culture, 2
Hill, David J., 41
History of Chinese Philosophy, 163
Hoffman, Paul, 166–167, 171
Hornbeck, Stanley, 124, 130
Hospital of Universal Love, 11–12
Hospitality Committees, 150
Hsü, C. Y., 7
Hu, Da, 181
Hu, Dunfu, 72
Hu, Mingfu, 180
Hu, Shi: as an advisor to Qinghua Uni-
versity, 87; as Chinese ambassador to
the United States, 115, 122, 125, 130,
145, 149; as a professor at Beijing
University, 180–182; educational ex-
perience in the United States, 99–101,
186–188, 193; relations with Jiang
Jieshi, 190
Hua Luogeng, 140, 152
Huai River, 82
Huang, Tianfu, 182
Huang, Yanpei, 100
Huangpu (Whampoa), 7–8
Hughes, Charles Evans, 80–82, 84
Hull, Cordell, 132, 143
Hundred-Day Reform (Bairi Weixin), 36
Hurley, Patrick, 156–157, 194, 198
Huston, James, 78, 82
Immigration and Naturalization Service,
132, 172, 174
Imperial Qinghua Academy (Diguo Qin-
ghua Xuetang), 65. See also Qinghua
Xuetang
 278 Index

Indemnity Scholarships, 110 Knox, Philander, 74

Indemnity students, 60, 64–67, 178–179 Kong, Xiangxi (Kung, Hsiang His), 30, 113
Independent Critic (Duli Pinglun), 188 Koo, Wellington, 83, 155, 160, 166
Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton Korean War, 1, 6, 168–169, 172, 191, 194
University, 140 Kuomintang, 117, 141. See also National-
Institute of International Education, 130, ist Party
204
intercultural relations, 3, 9, 175 Lampton, David, 202
International Missionary Union, 31 Lansing, Robert 80
International Protocol of 1901, 59. See Lao She (Shu, Sheyu), 149
also Treaty of 1901 (Xinchou Heyue) Lapham, Roger, 166
international relations, 2, 6 Lay, Julius, 45–46
Israel, John, 121 League of Nations, 79
Iriye, Akira, 2, 217n2 League of Purity (Qingbai Tuan), 120
Legal Paper Currency (Fabi), 113, 153
James, Edward J., 55 Lend-Lease aid, 122–123, 126, 133, 150,
Japanese, 2, 32 157
Jenks, Jeremiah, 55 Liang, Cheng, 41–43, 51–52, 56
Jiang, Jieshi (Chiang, Kai-shek): control Liang, Dunyan, 60–61
of educational exchange, 114, 117–119, Liang, Fa, 11
121, 138–140, 142–143; establishment Liang, Qichao, 87
of the Nationalist regime, 92; intellectu- Liang, Shiqiu, 196
als antagonized by, 188–191, 198–200; Lianzhou (Lienchou) incident, 53
relations with the United States,122–123, Li, Dingyi, 8
152, 156–159, 161–162, 167; taking over Li, Duanfen, 36
of Qinghua University, 94, 96 Li, Gongpu, 189
Jiang, Jieshi, Madame, 147 Li, Hongzhang, 23–24, 26, 28–30
Jiang, Mengling, 96, 101, 134, 181 Li, Shuhua, 134
Jiang, Zemin, 206 Li, Xisuo, 176
Jiangnan Zhizaoju, 35 Li, Zhaohuan, 186
Jiaotong University, 180, 186, 190, 197 Li, Zhengdao, 152
Jin, Bangzheng, 90, 210 Library of Congress, 76, 129, 132, 147
Jinchun Garden, 68 Lin, Zexu, 11
Jingshi Daxuetang (Capital University), 24 Linthicum, J. Charles, 82–83
jinshi (advanced scholar), 4, 36 Literary Revolution, 187
Johnson, Stephen, 21 Liu, Fukang, 119
Johnston, William, 170–171 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 47, 80–81, 83
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 156–158 London Missionary Society, 9
Journal of Science (Kexue), 180 Lord Napier, 11
Judd, Walter, 167–168, 170 Low, Frederick, 18
juren (elevated man), 4, 36 Lucun Nongtian (Farm Fields of Village
Lu), 145
Kearny, Lawrence, 14–15 Lu, Yongling, 217n3
Kellogg, Frank B., 84 Lugou (Marco Polo) Bridge, 102. See also
King, Edward, 15 Marco Polo Bridge
Kirby, William, 2, 217n2 Luo, Jialun, 94–96, 109, 118–119,
Klein, Arthur G., 174 185–186, 190
Knights of Labor, 30 Luo, Longji, 189
 Index 279

Luo, Shijun, 173 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 42, 52, 57,

Lutz, Jessie Gregory, 217n3
Ma, Daren, 153
Maclay, Robert, 21
MacMurray, John Van, 81–85, 93–94,
96–97, 101
Madison, James, 9
Magnuson, Warren, 173
Mansfield, Mike, 167
Manson Academy, 23
Mao, Zedong, 206
Marco Polo Bridge, 113, 190. See also
Lugou Bridge
Marshall, George C., 123, 157–162, 166
Marshall Plan (European Recovery Act),
158
mass education, 188
Mass Educational Movement (Pingmin
Jiaoyu Yundong), 188
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), 64, 98, 131, 142, 190
Mateer, Calvin, 22
Martin, W.A.P., 18, 21, 24, 36, 53,
219n54, 220n71
May Fourth Movement, 90
McCartee, D.B., 21
McCarthy, Joseph, 199
McConaughy, 170
McKeown, Adam, 49
McLean, A.S., 25
Mei, Yiqi, 103–104, 109, 134, 136, 140,
189–190
Meng, Chih (Meng Zhi), 104, 121,
130–131, 144, 166
Metcalf, Victor, 42, 47–48, 51
Miami University, 47
Microfilm Project, 135–136
Military Academy, West Point, 26, 209
Military Commission, 152
Ministry of Economy, 139, 143
Ministry of Education: dealing with foreign
aid, 133–135; establishment of, 38–39,
50; handling of educational exchange,
77, 108–115, 120, 138–140, 142–147,
153–154, 161, 177; management of Qin-
ghua, 60–61, 71, 96, 102–103; reform of
Chinese schools, 67, 180–181, 203
94–95, 107, 109, 140, 161. See also
Foreign Ministry
Military of Military Affairs, 152
Ministry of Transportation, 139
missionaries, American: arrival in China,
3, 7; involvement in treaty making,
16–18; saved by Chinese, 30; send-
ing Chinese students to the United
States, 23, 27; as students of Chinese
language, 10–11, 28; work in India, 9;
working among the Americans, 13–16.
See also missionary schools, American
missionary enterprise, American, 1, 218n9
missionary schools, American, 2, 13,
21–22, 27–29, 33, 40, 63, 118
Mo, John, 105
modern schools, in China, 5, 24, 34–37, 63
Monroe, Harriet, 99
Monroe, Paul, 83–84, 100–101, 106
Morgan, J.P., 53
Morin, Relman, 186
Morrison Education Society, 12–13
Morrison Memorial School, 12–13
Morrison, Robert, 9–13
Mr. “D” (Democracy), 5
Mr. “S” (Science), 5
Mu, Zhanga, 17
Nankai University, 102, 180
Nanking (Nanjing) University, 125
Nanyang Gongxue, 36. See also Public
College of South Sea
National Academy of Science, 203
National Academy of Social Sciences, 203
National Affairs Council, 96
National Association of Foreign Student
Advisors, 166
National Endowment of the Humanities,
203
National Health Administration, 134
National Library of Beijing, 147
National Program for Advanced Research
and Study in China, 205
National Qinghua University, 94
National Research Council, 135
National Science Foundation, 203
National Security Council, 158
 280 Index

National Taiwan University, 173 Open Door, 47, 222n131

Nationalist Party (Guomindang): control
of scholars, 92, 94; indoctrination by,
116–117, 119–121, 139; intellectuals
antagonized by, 187, 189–191; manage-
ment of educational exchange, 100;
newspaper published by, 112
Nationalist regime: administration of edu-
cational exchange, 4, 93–94, 107, 116,
121, 148, 154–156, 169; intellectual
antagonized by, 165, 199; reform of
missionary schools, 118; relations with
the United States, 194; thought control
imposed by, 140, 185, 188–192
Natural Resources Commission, 190
Naval Academy, Annapolis, 26
Naval Academy of the North Sea (Bei-
yang Shuishi Xuetang), 35
Nevius, John Livingston, 21
New Cultural Movement (Xinwenhua
Yundong), 99
new deals (xinzheng), 52
New England, 3, 9, 25
New Youth (Xin Qingnian), 188
Nixon, Richard, 202
Nobel Prize, 150
North China University, 22
Northeaster Associate University, 136
Northern Expedition, 92, 117
Northrop, B.G., 25
Nye, Joseph, Jr., 218n8
Oberlin College, 30, 197
Office of China Educational Mission to
America (OCEMA), 62–63, 65–67, 70.
See also Youmei Xuewuchu
Office of Coordinator of Information, 129
Office of Education, U.S. Department of
Interior, 132, 146, 165
Office of Educational Exchange, U.S.
Department of State, 166, 170
Office of Far Eastern Affairs: U.S. De-
partment of State, 141, 161. See also
Division of Far Eastern Affairs
official degrees, 4, 28–29. See also xiucai;
juren; jinshi
Ohio State University, 106
Olyphant, D.W.C., 10
Opium War, 15, 19, 23
Orleans, Leo, A., 202
Oxford University, 183
Paris Peace Conference, 78–80, 85–87, 193
Paris Peace Treaty, 80
Parker, Peter, 11–12, 14, 16
partification (danghua), Nationalist, 116
Party Affairs Training Class (Dangwu
Xunlianban), 139
party doctrine (dangyi), 119
party education (danghua jiaoyu),
117–120, 185–186
Peck, Willys, 82–83, 124–125, 138,
143–144, 146
Peking Men (Beijing Ren), 149
Peking Union Medical College, 217n3
Peking University, 22, 102, 159
Perry, Ralph B., 142
Peterson, Howard, 155
Phi Beta Kappa, 181
political tutelage, 117
Porter, Stephen D., 81–83
Peterson, Glen, 217n3
Powderly, Terence, 30
Preparatory Committee on Qinghua
School Endowment, 69
Prince Gong, 23
Prince Qing (Ch’ing), 41
Princeton University, 64, 140, 188
private schools, 4
Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese
Students, 166–168, 200. See also Emer-
gency Aid Program
Progressive Party, 181
Provincial Societies of Education, 181
Public College of South Sea, 35. See also
Nanyang Gongxue
Purdue University, 131
Pye, Lucian, 155
Qi, Ying, 17
Qian, Sanqiang, 206
Qian, Xuesen (Tsien, Hsueh-shen),
172–173, 186, 190, 195, 196, 206
Qilu (Cheeloo) University, 22, 125. See
also Shandong Christian University
 Index
Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), 4, 221n91,
107, 112
Qinghua, 60, 85–91, 94, 196
Qinghua College, 67–71, 76, 84, 93
Qinghua College Committee, 68–70
Qinghua endowment, 69–70, 94–97,
101–103
Qinghua examination for professional
students, 78
Qinghua Garden, 64–65
Qinghua Scholarships, 87, 116, 183
Qinghua School Reorganization Commit-
tee (Qinghua Xuexiao Gaizu Weiyua-
nhui), 88
Qinghua Students: achievements of,
97–99, 234n30; in May Fourth Move-
ment, 80; involvement in Qinghua
reorganization, 88–89, 96; in the United
States, 109, 150, 179, 211; in World
War II, 102; under the Nationalist rule,
118, 185–186, 188
Qinghua University (Qinghua Daxue):
anti-American movement in, 159;
establishment of, 87; impact of World
War II, 136–137; influence of, 180,
184; involvement in Fulbright Pro-
gram, 163; management of, 210–211,
226n101; Nationalist reform of,
93–105, 193–194; sending students
to the United States, 107, 109, 111,
116, 202; under the Nationalist rule,
118–119, 140, 185, 189–190
Qinghua Xuetang (Qinghua Academy),
65–67, 182
Qinghua Xuexiao (Qinghua School), 64,
67–76, 82, 94, 188, 232n144
Qu, Lihe, 40
Red Menace, 206
Redfield, Greta, 146
Reed, William Bradford, 17
Reese, William J., 217n6
Regulations on National Universities
(Guoli Daxue Zhangcheng), 181
Regulations on Sending Self-Sponsored
Students Abroad (Guowai Liuxue
Zifeisheng
Paiqian Banfa), 140
281
Reinsch, Paul, 68–71, 75–77, 86
Ren, Hongjuan, 106, 180
Revolution of 1911, 66–67, 181
Rockefeller Foundation, 154, 217n3
Rockhill, William, 42, 44, 46, 51–59, 61
Rodgers, James L., 45–46
Romans, 2
Rong, Kui, 63
Rong, Qing, 37–38
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 132
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 123, 198
Roosevelt, Theodore, 31, 40–41, 44–49,
52–57, 59, 222n131
Root, Elihu, 54–56, 58, 77
Rubinstein, Murray, 9, 218n9
Russell, Bertrand, 68
Russian Revolution, 85
Sargent, 46
Sargent, Clide B., 125
Schereschewsky, Samuel, 22
School Reform Decree of 1922, 181
School System Reform Bill, 181
Schufield, Lamuel B., 132
Schurman, Jacob Gould, 82–83
science education, 106, 180
Scientific Research Fellow, 105–106
Scientific Teaching Fellowship, 106
Scientific Workers Association of Engi-
neering and Chemistry, 173
Seamen’s Friend Society, 10
Second Great Awakening, 9
Second Opium War, 17, 23
self-sponsored student (zifeisheng),
110–111, 113–116, 138, 140, 153,
183, 189
self-strengthening movement, 23
Senate (Pingyihui), 88, 96, 181
Service, John S., 141, 198
Seward, William, 18
Shandong Chamber of Commerce, 79
Shandong Christian University, 22. See
also Qilu (Cheeloo) University
Shandong Educational Association, 79
Shang Dynasty (1775–1122 BCE), 4
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, 42,
44–46
Shanghai Evening News and Mercury, 142
 282 Index

Shanghai Student Association (Hu Xue Syracuse University, 124

Hui), 44
Shanghai Student Union, 79 Taft, William Howard, 47, 55, 74
Shaw, Samuel, 9, 218n6 Tang, Aoqing, 152
Shen, Cong, 159 Tang, Guoan, 62–65, 67–68, 70, 210
Shen, Shanjong, 173 Tang, Shaoyi (T’ang Shao-i), 56, 58
Sheng, Xuanhuai, 35, 39 Tang, Yue, 182
Shi, Guokui, 146 Tang, Yueliang, 93
Shotwell, James T., 126 Tang Dynasty (619–896), 4, 34
Shu, Sheyu (Shu, Shehyu or Lao She), 149 Tao, Xingzhi, 181
Shu, Xincheng, 176 Taylor, H.A., 31
Sichuan (Szechwan) University, 135, 141 Temporary Committee on University Af-
Sigma Xi, 181 fairs, 87
Sino-Japanese War, 35 Temporary University (Linshi Daxue), 102
Smith, Arthur, 54 Tennessee Valley Administration, 132
Smith, E. K., 72 Thompson, Charles A., 124
Smith-Mundt Act, 165 thought control, 118, 120, 139–143, 185,
Society for the Diffusion of Useful 187, 192
Knowledge, 11 Three Principles of the People (Sanmin
soft power, 4, 218n8 Zhuyi), 116–118, 140, 151, 187
Song Dynasty, 80 Tiananmen incident, 6, 207
Song, Ziwen (Song, T. V.), 122, 143, 188 Tianjin Intermediate School, 74
Southeastern University (Dongnan Tianjin Military Academy (Tianjin Wubei
Daxue), 89, 180 Xuetang), 35
Southwestern Associate University Tong, Te-kong, 153
(Xinan Lianhe Daxue), 102, 135–136, Tong, Y.C., 65
152, 189 Tong, Y. L., 145
space industry, 195 Tongwenguan, , 23–24, 28, 35–36, 221n91
Sprouse, Philip, 140 Tracy, Ira, 11
St. John, Burton, 74 Treaty of Bogue, 15–16
St. John’s University, 22 Treaty of 1894, 31
Stark, Harold, 123 Treaty of 1901 (Xinchou Heyue), 36. See
State Science and Technology Commis- also International Protocol of 1901
sion, 203 Treaty of Nanking, 15
Stevens, Edwin, 11 Treaty of Tientsin, 17, 20, 23
Stilwell, Jesoph, 123, 194 Treaty of Wanghsia, 16–17, 21
Straight, Willard, 55 Truman administration, 194
Stuart, John Leighton, 158, 160, 162, 180 Truman, Harry S., 156–159, 163, 167
Student Association, Qinghua, 90 Tseng, Tong, 30
Student Supervision Office of Qinghua tutelage government, 188
University, 109 Twiss, George, 106
Study Abroad Permit, 110–111, 113–115, Tyler, John, 15
138, 185
Sui Dynasty (581–618), 4, 34 Union Mission University, 76
Sun, Jianai, 36 United China Relief, 133–134
Sun, Yat-sen, 85, 100, 117, 186 United Nations Education Conference, 149
Su, Yunfeng, 73, 88, 176 United States-China relations, 1–2, 7, 17,
Surplus Property Act of 1944, 160 20, 33
 Index
United States Educational Foundation in
China (USEFC), 160, 162–164
United States Information Agency, 202,
205
United States Information Service, 163
United States International Communica-
tions Agency, 205. See also United
States Information Agency
University Affairs Committee, Qinghua
University, 103
University Council (Daxueyuan), 93, 96.
117–118
University of California, Berkeley, 40,
71, 73
University of Chicago, 75, 98, 146
University of Edinburgh, 23
University of Illinois, 55, 64
University of London, 71
University of Michigan, 131
University of Pennsylvania, 163
University of Wisconsin, 64, 67, 77, 98
University Planning Committee (Daxue
Choubei Weiyuanhui), 86
Van Buren, Martin, 14
Van Name, A., 27
Vassar College, 75
Village Education, 180
Vincent, John Carter, 156–157, 198
visa review process, 6
visible hand, 33
Vocabulary of the Cantonese Dialect, 10
vocational education, 180
Wah, Yip, 30–31
Wang, Daxie, 69
Wang, Guowei, 87
Wang, Jingwei, 100–101
Wang, Shijie (Wang, Shih-chieh), 161
Wang, Wenxian, 71, 210
Wang, Xiji, 206
Wang, Y. C., 176, 197
Wang, Zhengting (Wang, C. T.), 93
Wangxia (Wanghsia), 15
warlord period, 73
Webb, James, 166
Webster, Daniel, 14
Webster, Fletcher, 16
283
Webster, Harriet, 14
Wedemeyer, Albert Coady, 156, 194
Wellesley College, 54
Wen, Yiduo, 80, 188–189, 197
Wen, Yingxing, 210
Western-style education, 3, 27
Western Zhou Dynasty (1122–771 BCE), 3
White, Henry, 80
White, Moss, 21
Williams, Samuel Wells, 11, 18, 27
Wilson, Huntington, 56
Wilson, Woodrow, 78–80, 193
Wold, P. I., 72
Wong, Fong, 23
Wong, Shing, 23
Wood, Mary Elizabeth, 82
World War I, 76, 78–79, 133
World War II: abolition of anti-Chinese
immigration laws and, 48, 78; Chinese
conditions in, 5, 133; educational front
in, 137–138, 144; expansion of U.S.-
China educational relations after, 178,
183, 189–190, 194, 213; expansion
of U.S.-China educational relations
during, 115, 122, 130, 152, 165, 200;
Fulbright Program and, 145, 147–148,
154–157, 160, 198; United States and
China as allies in, 206
Wu, Dayu, 152
Wu, Jiagao, 182
Wu, Mi, 87
Wu, Tingfang, 31, 40–41, 43, 56
Wu, Zideng (Woo, Tsze Tung), 26
Wuben School (Wuben Xuetang), 45
Wuhan University, 135
Xia, Xiang, 105
Xie, Yu, 196
Xiong, Yuezhi, 21
xiucai (Budding talent), 4
Xu, Jiyu, 20
Xu, Shichang (Hsu Shi-ch’ang), 56
xue zai guanfu, schools run by govern-
ment, 4
Yale College, 23–24, 27
Yale University, 54, 71, 188, 197
Yan, Heling, 210
 284 Index

Yan, Huiqin, 39, 210 Yung, Wing, 13, 23–27, 29, 32, 221n102
Yan, Xishan, 92
Yan, Yangchu (Yen, James), 188 Zeng, Guofan, 23, 26
Yang, Enzhan, 182 Zeng, Zhaolun, 152
Yang, Shiqi, 43 Zeng, Zhu, 45, 48
Yang, Shu, 39 Zhang, Baixi, 32, 37
Yang, Xingfo, 100 Zhang, Boling, 87
Yang, Zhenning, 150 Zhang, Cunwu, 43
Ye, Qianyu (Yeh Chien-yu), 149 Zhang, Qun (Chang, Chun), 158
Ye, Weili, 217n3 Zhang, Yufa, 116
Yeh, Wen-shin, 116 Zhang, Yuquan, 71, 86, 90, 210
Yellow Peril, 206 Zhang, Zhidong, 33, 35–38
Yicun Shougongye (The Handicraft Indus- Zhang, Zhiyi, 146
try in Village Yi), 146 Zhang, Zhizhong, 121
Yinghuan Zhilue (A Brief History of the Zhang, Zuchun, 182
World), 20 Zhang, Zuolin, 92
Yiyeguan, 62, 64 Zhao, Guocai, 210
Youmei Xuewuchu (Office of China Edu- Zhao, Shanhuan, 115
cational Mission to America), 61 Zhao, Xinshu, 196
Youmei Yiyeguan (Preparatory School Zhao, Yuanren, 87, 180–182
for Students to Be Sent to the United Zhao, Zhongyao, 173
States), 65 Zhejiang University, 135, 190
Young Men’s Christian Association, 65 Zhou, Binwen, 180
Youth League of the Three People’s Prin- Zhou, Enlai (Chou, En-lai), 159, 195
ciple (Sanmin Zhuyi Qingnian Tuan), Zhou, Guangzhao, 206
120–121, 139 Zhou, Peiyuan, 190
Yuan, Shikai, 37, 44, 50, 52, 54, 56, 108, Zhou, Yichun, 67–68, 70–71, 84–86, 210
227n110 Zhou, Ziqi, 62, 65, 67, 70, 210
Yuan, Tongli (Yuan, T. L.), 135, 146, Zhu, Guangya, 152, 206
179 Zhu, Jiahua, 109–110
Yucun Nongye He Shangye (The Agri- Zhu, Jingnong, 143, 182
culture and Commerce of Village Zhu, Kezhen, 182
Yu), 146 Zongli Yamen (Office of Foreign Affairs),
Yue, Fei, 80 23–24
Yunan University, 135, 145 Zuo, Zongtang, 23–24
 About the Author

Hongshan Li is an associate professor of history at Kent State University

Tuscarawas. He has published a number of articles, book chapters, and edited
volumes on U.S.-China relations and modern Chinese history. He was the
president of the Chinese Historians in the United States between 1997 and 1999.