An alternative model for ethical

decision-making in design:
A Sartrean approach
Philippe d’Anjou, School of Architecture, Florida Atlantic University,
111 East Las Olas Blvd, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301, USA

Ethical decision-making models grounded in ethical frameworks comprehend

elements of moral philosophy such as utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue
ethics. This paper proposes an ethical decision-making model in design based on
Sartre’s philosophy and ethics. The model aims at having the designer gain
awareness and acceptance of his/her freedom and responsibility in design
practice. The paper argues that the model’s achievement rests on how it addresses
ethical dilemmas in design practice in relation to individual freedom and
responsibility, and on its acknowledgment of complete subjectivity.
Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Philosophy of design, Design process, Design ethics,

Reflective practice, Decision-making

T
he study of design ethics can be applied to the development of ethical
decision-making models that might enable designers to make
ethical design decisions in both profession and education.1 A number
of ethical decision-making models exist in the literature of professional and ap-
plied ethics, which can be used to help designers in making ethical decisions.2
Ethical decision-making models are usually based on theories of ethics, how-
ever, existentialist philosophy is largely excluded from these models. This pa-
per develops on this, and draws specifically on the existentialist philosophy
and ethics of Jean-Paul Sartre to propose an ethical decision-making model
for design practice. Design has a projective nature and is aimed at changing
and transforming the world; design is an exercise of freedom in an existentialist
sense. As such, this paper is in line with some recent research on design ethics
from a Sartrean existentialist perspective and extends that research into the
realm of methodology (d’Anjou, 2009, 2010). Even if Sartre’s existentialism
is mostly of a descriptive nature, his efforts address the issue of existence in
‘bad faith’, or self-deception, and its avoidance towards ‘authenticity’. In
the sense that ‘bad faith’ can be prevented or at least reduced, the philosophy
of Sartre can contribute to a normative decision-making model.

Corresponding author:
Philippe d’Anjou The first part of the paper focuses on a brief critical review of ethical decision-
pdanjou@fau.edu making models found in much of the literature on professional ethics and
www.elsevier.com/locate/destud
0142-694X $ - see front matter Design Studies 32 (2011) 45e59
doi:10.1016/j.destud.2010.06.003 45
Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 applied ethics. The second part consists of a brief discussion of the important
aspects of Sartre’s existentialism relevant to an ethical decision-making model
for design. It also indicates some previous incorporations of Sartrean existen-
tialism within the area of design. Finally, based on Sartre’s philosophy, an
ethical decision-making model for design is proposed with a discussion of sig-
nificant issues that such a model might reveal.

1 Ethical decision-making models

Traditional ethical theory perspectives usually inform ethical decision-making
models in professional practice in design. Most of these models indicate how
design decision-making should be carried out in order to achieve an ethically
satisfactory outcome. In order to validate their prescriptions, such models usu-
ally draw upon some sort of traditional moral philosophy such as utilitarian-
ism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc. (Fisher, 2008; Harris, Pritchard, & Rabins,
2009; Wasserman, Sullivan, & Palermo, 2000). They also aim at demonstrating
how ethical decision-making takes place in practice in order to make possible
explanations and reliable predictions of ethical decision-making. Surely, to be
able to understand the different processes and characteristics of ethical deci-
sion-making brings definite benefits. But it is also beneficial to understand dif-
ferent approaches, and in particular the ones that offer alternatives to
traditional ethical theories.

Most texts in applied ethics and professional ethics provide guidelines and pro-
cesses to engage in ethical decision-making. Their form, structure, and ap-
proach are quite similar (Findeli, 1994, pp. 60e61). The decision-making
process usually follows a standard cycle: setting the problem, analysis, pro-
posed solution, and evaluation. If a case is complex, this process might need
a series of iterations and to be resumed several times before reaching a final
decision. The book by Caroline Whitbeck, Ethics in Engineering Practice
and Research, is a typical example of this process (Whitbeck, 1998). The steps
that she proposes are: research of the questions, analysis of the situation, pro-
posal generation, evaluation, and choice. In Ethics and the Practice of Archi-
tecture, Barry Wasserman et al. propose a similar process for ethical
decision-making in architectural practice (Wasserman et al., 2000, p. 94).
The process they propose is: definition of the dilemma at hand, assessment
of the ethical content of the situation, development of a set of proposals, de-
liberation, and resolution. Regardless of the numerous variations proposed,
and of the sometimes very complex methods required by the various phases
of the process, especially with analysis and evaluation, this simple and basic
structure seems to be the standard everywhere.

Some works though propose more complex and flexible models that recog-
nize the non-linear, open-endedness, complex, and messy nature of ethical sit-
uations in professional practice, and point to a sense of invention, autonomy,
and freedom in the ethical decision-making process (Dorst & Royakkers,

46 Design Studies Vol 32 No. 1 January 2011

 2006; Harris et al., 2009; Lloyd, 2009; and Van de Poel & Royakkers, 2007).
In that sense, ethical decision-making can be analogous to the design process.
In their work, Dorst and Royakkers (2006) demonstrate this analogy through
the use of a moral problem-solving process based on a design method, i.e.,
the ‘basic design cycle’ which consists of four phases: analysis, synthesis, sim-
ulation, and evaluation. In Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases, Harris
et al. introduce the analogy between ethical problems and design problems
in engineering (Harris et al., 2009, pp. 75e80). Just like in design, an absolute
‘best solution’ cannot be determined; an ethical solution is rather an approx-
imation in terms of better or worse depending on a given professional situa-
tion. This calls for creativity from the part of the professional, and this
acknowledges complete subjectivity and freedom of choice to find not the
best ethical resolution but an appropriate one, i.e., a ‘creative middle way’
(p. 84). Another interesting model for moral problem-solving called ‘the eth-
ical cycle’ is developed and proposed by Van de Poel and Royakkers (2007).
Their ethical decision-making model provides a systematic approach that rec-
ognizes and deals with the messy character of moral problems. The model is
based on the fact that moral problems are ill-structured problems, and they
cannot be fully described beforehand (p. 1); problem-setting and problem-
solving inform each other in a mutual way. The ethical cycle consists of dif-
ferent phases that are not linear, but rather iterative. The phases are: moral
problem statement, problem analysis, options for actions, ethical judgment,
reflection, and morally acceptable action (Van de Poel & Royakkers, 2007,
pp. 4e7). Although similar to steps and phases of more traditional ethical de-
cision-making models, the important element of this model rests on its flex-
ibility of non-linear iteration, wherein the moral problem is not stated in the
absolute but discovered and to some extent designed as the process goes.
Here we find a reference to creativity and subjectivity in ethical decision-mak-
ing in relation to the design process. This finds an illustration in architecture
and engineering. In exploring the relationship between design thinking and
ethical thinking, Lloyd (2009) e through the analysis of transcripts of archi-
tectural and engineering design meetings e shows that it is possible to find
that ethics is both implicit and explicit in the design process, and that design
imagining ‘functions as a way of thinking about and resolving ethical
problems’.

This is exemplary of the fact that ethical decision-making is not very different
from any other decision-making process. But a Sartrean analysis shows that
any process of ethical decision-making, choice, and action in design rests on
one fundamental aspect (d’Anjou, 2010). It calls for total engagement and ac-
ceptance of both freedom and responsibility on the part of the individual in-
volved in such process, and implies that it has to start over again for each
individual case since there is no universal or objective truth; subjectivity is
constitutive and intrinsic.

An alternative model for ethical decision-making in design: A Sartrean approach 47

 Usually, design practice is where ethical decision-making in design takes place.
Therefore, the development of relevant models for designers could greatly ben-
efit their practice. Models that are based on traditional theoretical approaches
of ethics have been developed and appear in different forms. They aim at
giving practitioners means that are somehow easy to comprehend, and can
be used without having to appreciate the complexities of ethical theory
(Legault, 2006).

However, practical decision-making models should be grounded in solid and

coherent frameworks if they are to claim any justifiability. There are two im-
portant issues that can be stressed in regard to most existing ethical decision-
making models. On the one hand, they try to integrate a number of ethical
philosophies and, on the other hand, they are expected to apply to all ethical
dilemmas regardless of the particularities of situations. Models that incorpo-
rate apprehensions of the consequences of the possible actions, concerns about
duties to be performed, issues of rights, justice, or care to be taken into account
are exemplary of the first case. These models seem to imply that the incorpo-
ration of multiple ethical philosophies into the model will likely lead to a more
‘ethical’ decision. As for the second critical point, it implies that there are im-
plicit characteristics shared by all dilemmas and that, although these are not
obvious on a daily basis, they can be revealed through the use of the model,
which lead to the resolution of the dilemma.

An ethical decision-making model for design grounded in Sartre’s existentialist

philosophy is proposed herein. It is based essentially on his early work that in-
cludes Being and Nothingness and Existentialism is a Humanism. This refers to
what scholars call Sartre’s ‘First Ethics’ (Anderson, 1993). The model aims at
providing an additional layer and a complement to the existing models by ad-
dressing head on the very issue of freedom and responsibility and its conse-
quences for ethical decision-making in design.

2 Sartrean existentialism at a glimpse

Without being exhaustive, it is essential to introduce the central tenets of
Sartre’s philosophy in order to present and comprehend a sound model based
on it. This aims at identifying the areas that are most relevant for the develop-
ment of a Sartrean ethical decision-making model in design. It is possible to
identify five central tenets in Sartre’s existentialism that form the core of his
thought. They are: projectiveness, freedom, subjectivity of values, the subjec-
tivity of experiences, and ‘authenticity’.3

The first tenet is that humans are always, and fundamentally, projective or
goal oriented, whereas objects that are not human are complete in themselves,
they do not project their becoming. Sartre coins two concepts to describe this
ontological reality of being: ‘Being-for-itself’ and ‘Being-in-itself’. ‘Being-for-
itself’ refers to beings with consciousness, i.e., humans, which, because of

48 Design Studies Vol 32 No. 1 January 2011

 consciousness, cannot coincide with themselves. Humans project their becom-
ing. ‘Being-in-itself’ identifies beings that coincide with themselves (Sartre,
1956). These are non-human beings. From an ontological perspective, Sartre
sees that the desire of the individual to be an essential being, rather than con-
tingent, is the manifestation of this duality. Existential goals or projects, which
include the individual’s fundamental project, i.e., how he/she chooses to try to
become essential, and his/her secondary projects, i.e., projects of everyday life
that are coherent with the fundamental project, are the ways by which this
desire is achieved.

The reality of humans, because they are conscious and projective beings, is to
continually make free choices. Freedom is the very condition of humans, re-
gardless of the situation one finds him/herself in. The individual is free to
make choices, including how a given situation is interpreted. Sartre declares
that we are ‘condemned to be free’ and that freedom is the ‘foundation of
all values’ (Sartre in Kaufmann, 1956, pp. 295e307).

Sartre stresses the fact that there is a significant difference between facts and
values. He asserts that values are subjective and relative. Facts are things
that simply are what they are and values are ideals and states of affairs that
do not as yet exist. According to Anderson (1979, p. 23),

since values . are beyond what is, what reality they have can be due only
to a being that is itself able to transcend what is and posit what is not. Such
a being is, of course, human consciousness. Hence values are due to human
consciousness.

The fact that values are attributed to human consciousness implies, according
to Sartre, that absolute and objective justifications for one’s choices do not
exist; it also means that there are no absolute rules or principles that one
can rely on in order to support one’s choices. The individual encounters ab-
surdity at his/her essential existence that is characterized by free choice but
that lacks any objective foundation.

It is in the mode of subjects, and not as interplay of laws, that are objective and
scientific, that individuals experience their existences. The experience of the
person is totally subjective. This defies the view that ‘the differing interests
and concerns of people can be satisfied through their comprehension within
an all-embracing objective understanding of the universe’ (Baldwin in
Honderich, 1995, pp. 257e261). Envisioning existence as totally subjective
greatly differs with traditional ethical approaches that pretend to objectivity
as well as with ethical decision-making models that offer universal rules to
guarantee ethical actions.

According to Sartrean ethics, individuals should strive to achieve ‘authentic-

ity’ and avoid ‘bad faith’.4 An existence in ‘bad faith’ means that individuals

An alternative model for ethical decision-making in design: A Sartrean approach 49

 do not acknowledge and try to flee from their freedom and responsibility, they
refuse free choice and go along with external pressures and demands.5 To live
authentically is to acknowledge, accept, and embrace that one is free and fully
responsible for his/her choices and actions and their consequences.

Instead of living in bad faith, individuals should develop a clear awareness of

the impossibility to avoid individual freedom and complete responsibility for
their own choices. This implies that the individual is fully committed to his/her
choices, which are open to change, to the consequences that they entail, and to
the related existential projects. The individual can also carry this out by not
allowing external pressures to choose for him/her and by considering that
he/she can always choose something different in all situations (Cooper, 1999).

Thus, values do not determine choices, but are their consequence. According
to Sartre, values are more accurately comprehended as a consequence of the
individual’s ethical decisions than as a determinant of the individual’s choices.
This is due to the nature of values, which is subjective, and to the way in which
the individual constructs his/her own existence through exercising his/her free
choices. For instance, one’s life is characterized by the value of courage if one
acts courageously in a consistent manner through his/her life. Acting coura-
geously makes one courageous, one does not act courageously because one
is courageous.

3 Sartrean existentialism in architectural design

There is some incorporation of existentialist themes in architectural design
ethics (d’Anjou, 2009, 2010; in Willis, 2008, pp. 13e20; in Cheng and
Tripeny, 2006, pp. 465e470; Johnson, 2000). In The Theory of Architecture,
Johnson presents a section on ethics as a theoretical category of architecture
theory in which he uses quotes and insights from Sartre’s work and philoso-
phy. But it is not the intention of the book to enter into the development of
any practical decision-making model for architecture. In his work, d’Anjou
emphasizes the contribution that existentialist concepts and considerations
can make in design, but does not propose a formulation of these consider-
ations into a practical ethical decision-making model. His considerations ad-
dress ontological and epistemological issues of design ethics in relation to
Sartrean existentialism. An interesting instance of an ethical decision-making
model approach that partly draws on existentialism can be found in the engi-
neering field, which is, according to Herbert Simon, a design-centred discipline
(Simon, 1996). In Professionnalisme et deliberation ethique, Legault includes
existentialist elements as a step incorporated in a larger ethical decision-mak-
ing model. In the ethical decision-making approach that he suggests, existen-
tialism is placed as one among a number of ethical factors, including
pragmatism, to be considered (Legault, 2006). Nonetheless, the addition of
existentialist considerations to a model that draws on other philosophical
approaches is not in accordance with existentialist philosophy. Indeed,

50 Design Studies Vol 32 No. 1 January 2011

 existentialism rejects outright the universalism encountered in most traditional
ethical philosophies. An ethical decision-making model in a Sartrean perspec-
tive would suggest the acknowledgement and advocacy of freedom and its
associated responsibility as the encompassing ethical concerns.

4 Designing ethically: a Sartrean model

For an ethical decision-making model for design to be developed and orga-
nized according to the Sartrean themes discussed above, it has to recognize
that an ethically right decision cannot be objectively discovered or determined
through the utilization of an ethical theory such as utilitarianism or deontol-
ogy. Rather, the model’s emphasis is on the designer’s awareness of his/her de-
sign freedom, design responsibility, prior design choices, existential projects,
external and contextual demands, and the practical limitations of the design
situation. For Sartrean ethics, freedom is the prevailing ethical value.

The proposition of an ethical decision-making model for design can be per-

ceived as being an attitude of ‘bad faith’, in the sense that such model is utilized
by decision-makers to flee freedom of choice and responsibility. When Sartre
asserts that ‘When I deliberate . the chips are down’, he means that objective
reasoning is useless (Sartre, 1956, p. 451). The model proposed herein engages
reflective process instead of presenting objective criteria. Its goal is to further
awareness of freedom and responsibility in design so as to achieve, according
to Sartrean ethics, an ‘authentic’ design practice.

Five phases compose the model.6 The first phase is the awareness and accep-
tance of complete freedom and responsibility in design practice. The second
phase consists in reflecting on prior design choices. The third phase is to reflect
on external demands from actors involved in the design situation. Phase four is
to reflect on the practical limitations of the design situation. And, finally, the
fifth phase consists in enacting the design choice that most reveals awareness of
freedom and acceptance of personal responsibility.

The designer, in all circumstances, is always confronted with design choices

(related to budget, materials, aesthetics, etc.). Therefore, as the first phase,
in order to make an ethical design decision that is ‘authentic’, the designer
has to recognize that he/she has a choice. As soon as this fact is acknowledged,
the designer should determine a range of possible different design choices,
regardless of their impracticality. Such impracticality does not mean that the
design choice does not exist, but it could implicitly show that some design
choices conflict with a pre-existing goal.

As an example, an architect, who values sustainability, may be required, due to

some business interest connection, to design a building with materials that are
hazardous for the environment, and that are produced by underpaid children
working in questionable conditions in a factory in some developing country.

An alternative model for ethical decision-making in design: A Sartrean approach 51

 In order to avoid the obligation to select and use the hazardous material, the
architect has, among others, the option to resign. But this choice might not be
considered if the architect has previously maintained the goal and the career
project of being successful in the firm and becoming one of the principals.
The first phase calls for the awareness of all such choices even if they may
appear odd.

Practicing design in an authentic manner requires that the designer acknowl-

edge that what defines him/her is freedom. It also requires that in order to re-
ally exercise his/her design freedom, the designer has to accept that he/she is
responsible for his/her design choices. From a practical point of view, this sig-
nifies that decision-making structures, committees, codes or policies cannot
preclude the designer’s own personal responsibility to make a design choice.
In the same manner, the designer cannot rely on other actors involved in
any given design situation to make a choice for him/her, or he/she cannot
avoid making the choice in the hope that the ethically problematic design
situation will in some way resolve itself.

As such, the architect, in the case above, has to accept that he/she is fully re-
sponsible for all his/her design choices and actions. Appealing to the fact that
he/she does not have much of a choice because the principal of the firm is ‘forc-
ing’ him/her to use hazardous materials from a questionable provider, would
be unethical from a Sartrean point of view because not authentic. The authen-
tic architect has to accept that any design choice and action in this case e in-
cluding the design choice of using the materials to achieve his/her career goal,
or not to design the given project, or to resign, etc. e is his/hers, and that he/
she is fully responsible for it. The goal of achieving success in the firm is his/her
free choice and responsibility.

The second phase refers to the reflection on prior design choices. Typically, the
designer’s prior design choices reflect his/her personal existential goals and
projects. The design choices of the designer are not separate occurrences;
they are part of his/her goals at a relative level as well as at a fundamental
one. Even if the concept of freedom in design necessarily includes the possibil-
ity to begin a new existential project, through a design project (like a new
building), or to change his/her course of design action, it is beneficial that
the designer identify and take into account his/her existential goals and pro-
jects. Indeed, in the case that the designer chooses to maintain them as they
are, then a specific course of design action is likely to be suggested.

In this case, if the architect wants to pursue his/her goal of progressing within
the firm, then at this point he/she may not consider the option of resigning. On
reevaluating his/her career goals he/she may, however, consider that he/she
has gotten to a point at which the goal of progressing within the firm is not
relevant anymore and is in conflict with a different goal, such as to promote

52 Design Studies Vol 32 No. 1 January 2011

 sustainability. The decision to quit his/her position becomes, in this specific
case, significant.

The third phase involves reflection on external demands from actors involved
in the design situation e client, user, contractor, builder, etc e and ways they
can have an influence on the decision of the designer. In this phase, the aim is
to foster an individual design decision that is carried out in freedom and with
complete acceptance of responsibility. In professional design practice, such as
architecture, this would imply that the ‘believed to be intrinsic’ assumptions
that the professional title carries, which usually predetermines the actions
and practices expected by the profession, be critically reflected upon. Justifying
his/her design choices and actions on the basis that one is an architect, and that
is what architects do, would be an attitude of ‘bad faith’ and therefore not eth-
ical according to Sartrean ethics. The designer does not have to blindly reject
external demands, such as official regulation, codes of ethics, etc. But in order
for the designer’s decision to be ‘authentic’ it should not result from ‘following’
external demands for their own sake.

Then, for the architect’s design decision to be ethical, i.e., authentic, he/she has
to make sure that choosing to use the hazardous materials for the project or to
resign his/her job for the project of sustainability come from his/her own
choices of his/her existential projects. The architect’s design choices and ac-
tions should not result from the influence of external demands such as the prin-
cipal’s request, economical crisis, judgment of colleagues and friends, etc. The
architect should be aware that he/she is always in the position where he/she
can refuse the request of the firm’s principal.

As for the fourth phase, the designer should consider the practical limitations
of the design situation and the way to engage them. Sartre calls ‘facticity’ the
practical limitations of the situation within which people operate. Facticity in-
cludes the constraining factors placed on individuals by physical features,
time, and place. No matter how much free choice the designer has in design
practice, it cannot change these practical constraints. So it is necessary for
the designer to take these into account before coming to a design decision
that could simply prove to be impossible to carry out. The problems encoun-
tered at this point in the process would require going back over the previous
phases in order to identify other possible design choices that could be
implemented.

Going back to the architect’s case, the possibility for him/her to resign his/her
position could have then been excluded because of practical constraints when
in reality it may reflect the underlying goal to progress within the architecture
firm, which had not yet been addressed.

An alternative model for ethical decision-making in design: A Sartrean approach 53

 The last phase, which consists in enacting the design choice that most reveals
awareness of freedom and acceptance of personal responsibility, calls for de-
signing in ‘authenticity’. Sartre puts a strong emphasis on the reflection of
the subject but he does not suggest that the subject is separated from the world.
As such, the reflection of the designer is embodied within the world, which is
effectively created by him/herself through his/her own interpretations and
actions.

If the architect freely chooses and accepts the existential project of becoming
successful in the firm as a principal partner, then not to resign his/her job and
going ahead with the integration and use of hazardous materials in the design
project he/she is designing represent an authentic and, therefore, ethical deci-
sion. Indeed the architect is authentic since he/she accepts his/her entire re-
sponsibility and freedom to make design choices. At this point, the architect
has considered his/her choices of existential projects and is aware that he/
she is able to refuse external demands.

From what is described above, it appears clearly that the main focus of the
model is on encouraging design awareness and reflection. What makes
the model flexible is that it is not prescriptive, it does not dictate a specific
course of design choices and actions in particular design circumstances.

5 Critical issues of the model

The model, which is heuristic and not absolute, is based on the core themes of
Sartre’s philosophy and ethics. Therefore, it affirms the phenomenological on-
tology of Sartre. One of the positive aspects of the model is the way in which it
could correspond with the manner in which the designer might perceive his/her
own practice and existence through it. It is possible to argue that this model is
more closely in tune with the design activity as it is experienced in professional
practice and education than models that are grounded in more abstract,
objective ethical principles.

The present ethical decision-making model based on Sartrean existentialism

encourages and allows for the individual circumstances that surround the eth-
ical dilemmas to be considered in design. This differs with many traditional
ethical decision-making models which aim at reducing ethical dilemmas to
their most basic form in order to subject them to objective rules or tests to
reach an ‘ethical’ decision.

Each designer and each situation in design is different, and ethical dilemmas in
these diverse and wicked situations cannot be appropriately resolved through
a trade-off of different ethical arguments. In this regard, the Sartrean-based
model proposed here is successful in its consideration of the designer’s own
personal goals and projects, in fostering individual design responsibility, and
in avoiding to simply follow the external ‘ethical’ impositions.

54 Design Studies Vol 32 No. 1 January 2011

 Finally, the proposed ethical decision-making model is rooted in a single
framework, Sartrean existentialism. Most models try to include several ethical
philosophies, without being careful with the shortcomings of each approach,
or without considering how these philosophies could be combined. For exam-
ple, a model may require that the designer consider whether the consequences
of the design decision will benefit the largest amount of people, which is a util-
itarian approach, followed by a question regarding whether the design deci-
sion treats others as a means to an end, which is in opposition to Kant’s
categorical imperative. Utilitarian ethics and Kant’s deontological ethics
conflict in some circumstances. In such cases, the ethical nature of the out-
comes is questionable.

The model presented can be questioned in regard to the same issues that Sar-
trean existentialism is, an example being the belief that all humans are funda-
mentally free. But on the other hand, the model can find support and
corresponds to human experience where Sartre’s philosophy does.

One of the principal criticisms of Sartre’s existentialism is that by rejecting the

objectivity of values, it must accept that everything can be permitted
(Anderson, 1979, p. 3). In the example previously described, if the architect
maintains his/her goals of effectively progressing in his/her career while staying
in the firm, he/she might undertake a course of action which involves under-
mining the firm’s principal. According to one way of looking at the model pre-
sented, this would be an ethical decision as long as it is made in ‘authenticity’.
This goes against what usually is ethically accepted, so this undermining
behavior is likely to be regarded as unethical.

We can further this kind of ethical relativism with an extreme example. If the
personal existential projects of the architect are geared only towards his/her
career advancement, is he/she then allowed to assassinate the principal if
this fulfills these projects? If the decision is made in ‘authenticity’, i.e., the ar-
chitect completely accepts his/her freedom and responsibility, then the model
has to answer affirmatively. It appears very clear that this opposes all common
sense of ethics. For instance, in architecture, if an architect discovers an oppor-
tunity to secretly misinform clients about design projects and this is consistent
with his/her personal goals of getting commissions, then the existentialist
model would again support the action as ethical only if the decision is made
in ‘authenticity’. But, for Sartre, to be ethical implies that one put freedom
as the ultimate goal, for both oneself and the other. The issue, therefore,
becomes whether the designer’s choice and action takes freedom as an end.
In this sense, killing or undermining the firm’s principal would be denying
him/her freedom.

In Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre addresses the ethical dilemma of a pu-

pil who has to decide between two courses of action, looking after his ailing

An alternative model for ethical decision-making in design: A Sartrean approach 55

 mother or joining the Free French resistance during the Second World War.
There exist traditional ethical approaches that could be looked at to support
any of these two courses of action; but Sartre’s recommendation to the pupil
is ‘You are free, so choose; in other words, invent. No general code of ethics
can tell you what you ought to do; there are no signs in this world’ (Sartre,
2007, p. 33). Notwithstanding the apparent relativism of this recommendation,
Cooper states that “Sartre would not, I am sure, have told his student ‘You are
free, therefore choose and invent’ if the ‘dilemma’ were between joining the
Free French and peddling heroin to children in Marseilles” (Cooper, 1999,
p. 175). Sartre (2007) indicates what can inform the judgment of competing
courses of action when he states:

And when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that
he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible
for all men (p. 23).

I am therefore responsible for myself and for everyone else, and I am fash-
ioning a certain image of man as I choose him to be. In choosing myself,
I choose man (pp. 24e25).

For Sartre, freedom is the ultimate, and not objective, value (Sartre in
Kaufmann, 1956). Freedom therefore becomes the standard to refer to for
judging actions. The issue at stake is whether or not the design choices and
actions are supportive of the designer’s fundamental freedom and of the other
actors’ fundamental freedom. For anyone in the field of design practice,
including profession and education, this remains difficult to apply, even if
this is in conformity with the core concepts of Sartre’s existentialism. In ref-
erence to the comment above, even if this may preclude the assassination of
the firm’s principal, since such action clearly denies somebody’s freedom, it
appears to be more ambiguous that misinforming clients about architectural
design projects is equivalent to a denial of freedom, or that underlying a prin-
cipal’s work is a denial of freedom. This problem is especially obvious in
reference to Sartre’s early ontology, where the individual is fundamentally
free in all circumstances.

Another concern of such ethical decision-making model is that Sartre’s exis-

tentialist ethics is fundamentally individualistic. If ethics is understood as
the interaction of the good, the self, and the other, then the way that the model
takes into account considerations of the other actors in design if they are not
directly part of the designer’s own goals and projects is not clear. For Sartre,
‘Hell is other people’ (Sartre, 1946). In The Ethics of Ambiguity (1991) Simone
de Beauvoir offers an existentialist ethics, an ethics of freedom based on
Sartre’s existentialism, where she posits two levels of freedom: ‘ontological
freedom’ and ‘moral freedom’. Moral freedom entails a recognition of and
commitment to others’ freedom. It implies that one’s freedom has meaning
only in relation to the freedom of others. Beauvoir asserts that ‘the existence

56 Design Studies Vol 32 No. 1 January 2011

 of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of my
own freedom’ (p. 91) and that ‘to will oneself free is also to will others free’
(p. 73). In line with this issue, Cooper (1999) discusses how the idea of ‘recip-
rocal freedom’ can be utilized to define a social existentialist ethic.

Finally, ethical dilemmas in design comprise dilemmas of all kinds. Often, eth-
ical issues in design are related to professional activity, and it is unclear
whether the entire professional activity can be limited to some individuals’ de-
cisions. The culture of a design profession such as architecture can indeed go
on without much change despite changes in practice. The decision-making
structures in the architecture profession might grant ethical agency to the pro-
fession itself, independently of its practitioners, but the model presented is
grounded in Sartre’s phenomenological ontology, which is about the singular-
ity of human consciousness. The issue of ‘authenticity’ is accordingly based on
Sartre’s understanding of consciousness and absurdity; therefore, it cannot
simply incorporate the architecture profession as an entity since it lacks
consciousness and is a ‘being-in-itself’.

6 Conclusion
Compared to most ethical theories, Sartre’s existentialism and ethics offers
a singular view of human activity and human consciousness and of how indi-
viduals are to exist. Sartre’s philosophy shows human experience as completely
subjective. It fosters the awareness of individual freedom and responsibility.
Consequently, an ethical decision-making model for design grounded in
Sartre’s philosophy shows a very different set of phases compared to most
existing ethical decision-making models. Accordingly, such model can lead
to an insightful new range of ethical design choices, actions, and outcomes.

In this paper, an ethical decision-making model for design is proposed. It is

based on a Sartre’s existentialism and ethics. As such, it deals with having
the designer being aware and accepting individual freedom and responsibility,
contemplating his/her freely chosen existential projects, and being enabled to
freely and authentically refuse or accept external demands. Freedom, accord-
ingly, is the ultimate principle to any ethical judgment. Finally, critical issues
of the model are discussed.

Although the model shows important issues, it can be suggested as an addi-

tional and complementary decision-making means for ethical decisions in
the practice of design. This becomes particularly relevant if designers take
into consideration the multiplication of codes of ethics, and concerns related
to how to ‘enforce’ ethical practice. In this sense, an approach to ethical deci-
sion-making in design grounded in Sartre’s existentialism and ethics sheds
light on ethical dilemmas in terms of individual freedom and responsibility,
and in its acceptance and analysis of subjective experiences and personal

An alternative model for ethical decision-making in design: A Sartrean approach 57

 situations. In that sense, such an approach provides a complementary layer of
ethical consciousness in design practice so as to enrich design consciousness.

Notes
1. The paper uses the term design with an implicit reference to the discipline of architecture,
but the ideas and model presented can relate to any discipline of design. In that sense, it
refers to the professional practice of design in general.
2. In architecture there are two books that specifically focus on applied ethics for architec-
tural practice. See Wasserman et al. (2000) and Fisher (2008).
3. For a more detailed examination of Sartre’s philosophy, see Anderson (1979); Barnes
(1973); Cooper (1999); and Warnock (1967).
4. The term ‘bad faith’, which is ‘mauvaise foi’ in French, is the usual term used in English.
It is also translated as ‘self-deception’ by Kaufmann (1956).
5. Sartre calls this phenomenon ‘the look’ (Sartre, 1956, pp. 252e302).
6. Although the phases appear sequential, some that are more like action/activities can be
partly done in parallel.

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