Macaya, Jose Albert C.

01/26/22
MT 32 A2 MGMT323
Case Study about the Herald of Free Enterprise Capsizing

I. Introduction
For the past decades countless accidents in the industry of shipping
have taken the lives of many crews and passengers. The IMO have
developed many codes, rules and regulations to further enhance
the safety of travelling by sea. the incident at hand is the Capsizing
of the MS Herald of Enterprise which occurred in Belgium in the
year of 1987 due to this incident and many more past ones which
led to the development of the ISM code or International Safety
Management Code which was developed only years after the
incident happened. In this Case study I will show you the history,
the errors, and how it could have been prevented.
II. Background information
The MS Herald of Free enterprise was a Roll on/Roll off vessel this
means that she can carry both passengers and wheeled cargo such
as Car, Trucks, Busses. The ship was considered as one of the most
modern and new RoRo Vessel it had 8 decks consisting of the
passenger and cargo compartment. Though the vessel did not have
any watertight compartments which was very common among ships
at that time. The ship had a crew of 80 and carried 459 passengers
and was carrying 81 cars, 3 busses and 47 trucks. The loading of
the vehicles into G was through very secure watertight doors at the
bow and stern of the ship. The wheelhouse was at the front end,
and the ship was equipped with a clam shell door instead of raising
the visor door, making it difficult to see the bow door. Vehicles on
decks E and F were loaded through the weatherable doors on the
bow and the open portal on the stern. Vehicles can be loaded and
 unloaded simultaneously on the E and G decks using the double
deck link spans used in Dover and Curry. The ship was built by
Schichau Unterweser AG in Bremerhaven, Germany. Propulsion was
provided by three 6,000 kW (8,000 hp) 12-cylinder medium-speed
Sulzer diesel engines driving variable-pitch propellers. The vehicle
deck bow doors were constructed by Cargospeed, Glasgow,
Scotland.
III. Probable Causes
According to the investigation that was formed by a British judge
Mr. Justice sheen together with Naval architect Tom Allen who
worked on the construction of the ship. During the investigations
the team of Mr. Sheen went to the capsized ship that was still
outside the harbor many theories were made on the reasoning of
the capsizing the very fist theory was that the ship collided with
another ship but this was dismissed because of the lack of damage
on the starboard side of the ship and when it was up righted there
was also no damage on the port side. Another theory was there was
a hole beneath the waterline which would explain the speed of the
ship sinking though from the vantage point of the investigators
there was no damage beneath the hull. On the other hand, one
Problem they could see was that the watertight bow doors were
wide open. According to some eye witnesses at the port the bow
doors were never closed when the vessel departed on the port of
Zeebrugge. According to the naval architect the ship was designed
to sail even if the watertight doors were open just like its sister ship
The Pride of Free Enterprise which at one point also sailed with it
bow doors open but had no incident in this severely confused the
investigators on why the ship sank so they did an experiment
pertaining to the very last moments of the ship using its sister ship
 the Pride the two ships have the exact same design and they also
loaded the ship to its maximum tonnage though the only difference
is that the bow doors are closed. As the test started even with the
ballast tanks fully loaded the freeboard of the ship was still fine and
no water would’ve possibly entered the cargo deck that is until the
investigators started to increase the speed to 18 knots the water
that was below started to come in the bow doors
IV. Solutions
The most probable solution to mitigate or avoid the incident is that
the officers should’ve promoted proper inspection of the loading of
cargo prior to leaving the voyage and also promoting leadership
skills among the crew especially the assistant boatswain. And as for
the boatswain who failed to close the watertight bow doors, he
should have more proper training and know the proper protocols
before getting off his duty onboard. In addition, the designer of the
ship should have invested in adding watertight compartments as
this would have likely decreased the chance of the ship capsizing.

V. Conclusions/Recommendations
In conclusion the main reason on why the MS Herald of Free
Enterprise Capsized is because of the poor workplace practices and
the failure for the captain to confirm with its crew that the
watertight bow doors are closed. And in relation to this incident the
crew failed to comply with the Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978, which was adopted
by the International Conference on Training and Certification of
Seafarers on 7 July 1978. This convention certifies that all officers
onboard the ship have the capability to man It
References:

https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/Pages/STCW-
Convention.aspx

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MS_Herald_of_Free_Enterprise

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_-ZgtixRghc