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Hany Caplan

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 L. ANNAEUS SENECA

TREATISES

ON PROVIDENCE
ON TRANQUILLITY OF MIND
ON SHORTNESS OF LIFE
ON HAPPY LIFE

TOGETHER WITH

SELECT EPISTLES EPIGRAMMATA AN INTRODUCTION COPIOUS

NOTES AND SCRIPTURE PARALLELISMS

BY JOHN F. HURST, LL.D.

AND

HENRY C. WHITING , Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF LATIN AND GERMAN IN DICKINSON COLLEGE, CARLISLE , PA .

REVISED EDITION

URIS LIBRARY
JUN 28 1984 }
NEW YORK :: . CINCINNATI CHICAGO

AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY

 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1877, by
HARPER & BROTHERS,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
W. P. I
 PREFACE.

The present edition of the leading Moral Essays of

Lucius Annaeus Seneca is designed as a text-book for
use in the colleges and schools of the United States.
The editors were first attracted towards its preparation
by the fact that no edition of the Latin text of any one
of the essays of the great Roman moralist had ever
appeared in this country. Even in England the neg
lect has been marked ; for, although several good
translations were published during the 17th and 18th
centuries, there has appeared in that country only one
essay of Seneca in the original text for more than
three centuries - viz ., Ad Gallionem de Remediis For
tuitorum (Lond. 1547). * This disregard , in the Anglo
Saxon countries, of the authentic works of the greatest
Roman philosopher, is in decided contrast with the
attention which they have received in the Continental
countries, particularly in Gerinany, Italy, Holland,
France, and Sweden. Graesse occupies not less than
fourteen of his folio pages, in double columns, with the

* Graesse, Trésor de Livres Ráres, Vol. VI. pp. 346 ff.

ii PREFACE .

n.ere titles of the editions of the text or translation

of Seneca's real and alleged works, from the revival
of classical learning, at the beginning of the 16th
century, down to the present time. In Holland the
most critical editorial care has been bestowed . Har
wood says that the Elzevir edition , containing the notes
of Lipsius, Gronovius, and others (Amsterdam , 1672),
was printed from silver types.
The editors trust, therefore, that they are supplying
a real want when they offer to the American public
some of the best writings of the long unfamiliar Seneca.
The text einployed is that of Fickert (Leipzig, 1842–5),
because, though not the most recent, it is by far the
most critical, as it is derived from MS. authority. The
readings of Haase's edition (Leipzig, 1851-3) and of
other editions are referred to in the Notes as occasion
has seemed to require. The orthography is conformed
to that now generally agreed upon by scholars as the
most correct.
The Introduction has been prepared as a special aid,
not only for the better understanding of the personal
relations of Seneca to his times, but for acquaintance
with the ethical and philosophical thought of Rome at
the time of the appearance of Christianity, and with
the entire border -land of classic culture and Christian
truth . The Notes are intended to supply erery proper
want of the student ; at the same time, care has been
taken not to overburden him with help, and thereby
 PREFACE . ii)

interfere with or discourage individual study and re

search . It is the bane of true and thorough scholarship
to make the learner a mere recipient, all the work hav
ing been done to his hand. Specially difficult or un
usual forins of words are explained in the Notes. It
is hoped that the constant references to the principal
Latin Grammars and works on philology, history, and
philosophy, will open up the way for the student to
make himself master of the whole range of topics in
Seneca's Moral Treatises. *
To the Moral Treatises have been added Select
Epistles and Epigrammata. These are not annotated,
since, if the student have read the preceding, he will
find no difficulty in reading and enjoying these. As
* The liberty may be taken here to recall a singular circumstance con
nected with the publishing house from whose press the present volume
is issued. When the two senior brothers, James and John Harper,
commenced business, they confined themselves to printing books, and
entered into a printing partnership in Dover Street, New York, in 1817.
The first book which they printed was an English translation of Seneca's
Morals, and their first triumph in business was in delivering to Mr.
Evert Duyckinck, the publisher for whom they printed, 2000 copies of
that work, on August 5th , 1817. In the following year, however, we
find the energetic brothers entering into more important relations with
the public ; for they issued a work of like grare import with Seneca
Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding - having the modest im
print of “ J. & J. Harper ." The little Seneca, every type of which was
set by the founders of the Harper publishing house, is now a very rare
volume. The house which thus began soon enlarged, and its rise and
steady growth, like that of Perthes in Germany, and of the Chambers
Brothers in Edinburgh, are simply an index of that growing interest in
literature which, during the present century , has been a distinguishing
feature in the development of all the aggressive and educating nations.
iv PREFACE .

matter of curions interest, the Letters snpposed to have

passed between St. Paul and Seneca are subjoined.
In addition to the list of works referred to in the
two following pages as having been consulted in the
preparation of the present volume, ample use has been
made of many editions and monographs on the subject
in Continental libraries. The University libraries of
Halle and Heidelberg, which are especially rich in the
older editions of Seneca, were consulted when making
the first preparations for the present edition of the
chief essays of the Roman Moralist.
The editors, in this revised edition, have made im
portant changes in the whole body of the annotations.
The references are more numerous, and are made to
correspond with the latest editions of Madvig, Zumpt,
and other grammarians. The student is thus furnished
with the newest aids in interpreting the text. Addi
tional attention has been given to the grammatical and
rhetorical figures, which are abundant in Seneca's writ
ings, and which make him an attractive and profitable
author to the student in language. The editors have
received important suggestions from the best of all
judges—the professors in our colleges and universities
-whose kindly and valuable aid has grown out of their
use of the volume in the class-room . It is hoped that
the work, in its present form, will be found more
worthy of the generous favor which it received at the
hands of practical classical instructors and of students
throughout the country.
April, 1884.
WORKS USED AND REFERRED TO IN PREPARING
THE PRESENT EDITION.

L. Annaei Senecae Philosophi : et M. Annaei Senecae Rhetoris : quae

extant opera. Two vols. folio . Parisiis. 1607.
Justi Lipsii, Manuductionis ad Stoicam Philosophiam , libri tres ; Physi
ologiae Stoicorum, libri tres : folio. Antverpiae. 1605.
The Workes of Lucius Annaeus Seneca, both Morall and Naturall. By
Thos. LODGE, M.D. One vol. folio . London . 1614.
L. A. Senecae Opera. Cum Notis. ELSEVIR's ed. Two vols. 8vo.
Amstelodami. 1673.
The Epistles of Lucius Annaeus Seneca, with large Annotations. By T.
MORELL, D.D. Two vols. folio. London. 1786.
Abrégé Analytique de la Vie et des Oeuvres de Sénèque. Par A. VERNIER.
One vol. 8vo. Paris. 1812.
De L. Annaei Senecae Vita atque Scriptis. C. G. Vaight edidit. One
vol . 8vo . Jenae . 1816.
Seneca's Morals : by Way of Abstract. One vol. 8vo. London. 1818.
Specimen Literarium Inaugurale exhibens Senecae Librum de Provi
dentia. B. A. Nauta edidit. One vol. 8vo. Lugd. Batav. 1825.
L. Annaei Senecae Opera ( Lemaire's Bibliotheca Classica Latina ). Ed
ited, with Notes, etc. , by M. N. BOUILLET. Nine vols. 8vo. Parisiis.
1827.
History of Roman Literature. By John DUNLOP. Two vols. 8vo.
Philadelphia. 1827.
L. A. Senecae Opera. C. R. FICKERT recensuit. Three vols . 8vo.
Lipsiae. 1842–45.
Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities. By W. Smith, LL.D.
Revised by Prof. Chas. ANTHON. 8vo. New York. 1843.
Gallus. By W. A. BECKER. 8vo. London. 1849.
L. Annaei Senecae Opera, quae supersunt. (Bibliotheca Teubneriana .)
Recognovit F. HAASE. Three vols. 12mo. Lipsiae. 1851-53.
Philologus : Zeitschrift für das klassische Alterthum . Göttingen. 1852,
1853.
Saint Paul et Sénèque. Recherches sur les Rapports du Philosophe avec
l'Apôtre. Par AMEDÈE FLEURY. Two vols. 8vo. Paris. 1853.
On the Study of Words. By ABP. TRENCH. New York. 1854 ; 15th
ed. 1874 .
A 2
vi LIST OF WORKS USED, ETC.
Athens and Attica. By CHRISTOPHER WORDSWORTH . One vol. 8vo.
London . 1854.
History of Greece. By ConnoP THIRLWALL, D.D. 8 vols. 8vo. Lon
don . 1855.
New Brunswick Review . New York. 1855.
L. Annaei Senecae Disciplinae Moralis cum Antoniniana Contentio et
Comparatio. A. DOErgens edidit. One vol. 8vo. Lipsiae. 1857.
Biographical History of Philosophy. By G. H. Lewes. 2 vols. 8vo.
New York. 1857.
Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie. By Rev. A. HILGENFELD.
Vol . I. 8vo. Jena. 1858.
History of the Romans under the Empire. By CHARLES MERIVALE.
Seven vols. 8vo. New York. 1863-65.
Saint Paul in Rome. By Rev. C. M. BUTLER, D.D. 12mo. Phila
delphia. 1865.
Essay on the Ancient Stoics, in Ethics of Aristotle. By Sir A. GRANT.
Two vols. 8vo . London . 1866.
Westminster Review. New York (reprint). 1867.
History of Greece. By GEORGE GROTE. Twelve vols. New edition.
London . 1869 .
History of Rome. By THEODOR MOMMSEN. Four vols. 8vo. New
York . 1869, 1870.
Sénèque et Saint Paul. Étude sur les Rapports supposés entre le Philo
sophe et l'Apôtre. Par C. AUBERTIN. One vol. 8vo . Paris. 1869.
Life of M. T. Cicero. By W. FORSYTH. Two vols. New York.
1871 .
The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. By E. ZELLER. Translated from
the German by 0. T. REICHEL. London. 1870.
Socrates and the Socratic Schools. By the same author. London.
1868.
Historical Essays. Second series. By E. A. FREEMAN . 8vo. Lon
don . 1873.
The Epistle of St. Paul to the Philippians. With Dissertations, etc.
By J. B. LightrooT, D.D. 8vo. London . 1873 .
Seekers after God . By W. A. FARRAR , D.D. London . 1874 .
God in Human Thought. By E. H. GILLETT. Two vols. 8vo. New
York . 1874 .
History of Philosophy. By F. UEBERWEG. Two vols. 8vo. New
York. 1874.
The Life of the Greeks and Romans. Described from Antique Monu
ments. By E. Guhl and W. KONER . Translated from the German.
With 543 Woodcuts. 8vo. New York . 1875.
Life and Epistles of St. Paul. By THOMAS LEWIN. Two vols. folio .
Second edition. London and New York . 1875.
 CONTENTS .

Page
INTRODUCTION . 9

SCRIPTURE PARALLELS 40

AD LUCILIUM DE PROVIDENTIA 47

AD SERENUM DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI.. 67

AD PAULINUM DE BREVITATE VITAE . 103

AD GALLIONEM DE VITA BEATA .... 133

EPISTULAE SELECTAE 167

EPIGRAMMATA . 187

NOTES 197
 A
V

Bust of Seneca. From the Museum at Naples.

 INTRODUCTION.

LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA.

I. His RELATION TO ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY.
LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA was the last great represente
ative of the Stoic philosophy. To the student of the
philosophical and religious relations of paganism to
Christianity, his writings — although they reflect in a
measure the decadence of the post -Augustan period
are of more importance than those of any Greek or
Roman author. For this there are two reasons : First,
because his philosophy is the final and hopeless exhibi
tion of the inability of the pagan mind, after its long but
futile attempt, both to solve the mysteries of our being
and to establish safe rules of conduct ; and , second ,
Seneca's moral philosophy embodies the unconscious and
mysterious approach of pagan wisdom to Christianity.
It was, to the Roman world of thought, the Baptist pre
paring the way for a system mightier than any it had
known. Here, too, we find some explanation of the fact
that no man has ever received from his fellows, both of
his own and later times, a more diverse judgment than
Seneca. The Roman authors who describe him , taking
Tacitus and Quintilian as examples, were generally un
favorable, though Juvenal dared to express a preference
of him to Nero, the Roman emperor :
“ Libera si dentur populo suffragia, quis tam
Perditus, ut dubitet Senecam praeferre Neroni. "
10 INTRODUCTION .

Early Christian writers, as Jerome, Lactantius, Augus

tine, and Tertullian, refer to him in terms of high com
mendation. Augustine speaks of his being conversant
with the apostles, and Jerome says he deserves to be
ranked among the saints. Lactantius, who elsewhere
calls him a “ divine pagan , ” thus gives him a rank above
all the Stoics : “ Seneca, who was the sharpest of all
the Stoics—how great a veneration has he for the Al
mighty ! ” Indeed, so warm was the admiration of him
by the primitive Church that the tests of historical criti
cism were forgotten, and he was regarded as practically
a Christian, if not an intimate friend and an admirer of
Paul himself, during the closing period of his life. The
Roman Catholic Church has always held him in high
veneration , and at the Council of Trent he is referred to
as one of the Fathers of the Church. The French critics,
as a rule, have been extremely favorable to him . Mon
taigne prefers him to Cicero, and, in his “Defense of
Seneca and Plutarch,” thus acknowledges his great ob
ligation to the two : “ The familiarity I have had with
these two authors, and the assistance they have lent to
my age and to my book, which is wholly compiled from
what I have borrowed from them, oblige me to stand up
for their honor.” Diderot reverses his previously un
favorable judgment, and passes a high eulogy upon him.
Rollin, often called the French Quintilian, commends the
variety of his attainments, the depth and exactness of
his philosophy, the wealth of his imagination, and the
general purity of his style. The most recent criticism ,
such as that of Zeller in Germany, and of Martha and
Aubertin in France, partakes more of the judicial spirit,
and praises and blames according to the requirements of
justice.*
* Cf. Westminster Review , 1867, pp . 43, 44 .
 INTRODUCTION . 11

II. PERSONAL HISTORY,

Marcus Aurelius Seneca, the father of Lucius Annaeus,
was a native of Spain, and belonged to the strong and
rich Roman colony of Corduba (Cordova), which was
planted on the banks of the Baetis (the modern Guadal
quivir) by Marcus Marcellus when praetor in Spain . It
was afterwards elevated to the dignity of Colonia Patri
cia, by which it had the privilege of sending senators to
Rome. The family were of the equestrian order, and
possessed considerable wealth. Helvia, the wife of Mar
cus Aurelius Seneca, was a woman of many endowments
of mind, and is frequently alluded to in the writings of
her son . Lucius Annaeus was born at Corduba about
B.C. 7. He had two brothers, the older being Marcus
Annaeus Novatus (afterward changed by adoption to
Junius Gallio), and the younger, Lucius Annaeus Mela,
who became the father of the celebrated poet Lucan.
Martial thus speaks of this triple character of the
family : “ Et docti Senecae tres memoranda domus. "
The family removed to Rome when Lucius Annaeus was
about two years of age. His youth was passed during
the reign of Tiberius, and he enjoyed all the literary and
social advantages which the station, wealth, and person
al care of his father, himself an orator of great culture,
could afford. He made a visit to Egypt, probably of
considerable length, while his uncle was prefect of that
province. To this fruitful episode in Seneca's life are
due the frequent references in his writings to that coun
try, particularly in his “ Natural Questions ; ” and very
likely he was the real author of Nero's organization of
an expedition for the discovery of the sources of the
Nile—the first attempt in history to solve the mysteries
of that wonderful river. Livingstone, Barth, Baker,
12 INTRODUCTION .

Rohlfs, Speke, and Schweinfurth have only followed in

Roman footsteps.
The studies of Seneca were first in the department of
eloquence and the affiliated sciences. But he exhibited
gradually a taste for philosophy, from which the per
suasions of his own wife were not strong enough to
alienate him. His father, likewise, was loath to see his
talented son devote himself to a class of studies then in
decline, and not promising either political or social ad .
vancement, and used his influence to have his son be
come an advocate. Seneca, however, seems to have had
a large measure of liberty, for he enjoyed the instruc
tions of the best Roman interpreters of the Greek
philosophy, such as Papirius Fabianus, Attalus, Deme
trius, and Sotion. Of this last he was very early a dis
ciple, as he says in one of his epistles : " Modo apud So
tionem puer sedi.” So great was the influence of the
Pythagorean philosophy, as represented by Sotion, upon
him , that he became an ardent believer in the trans
migration of souls, and proved his faith for a time by be
coming a vegetarian, as the eating of animal food could
be hardly less than parricide to one of that belief.
The first public labors of Seneca, however, were ac
cording to the wishes of his father, for we find him ex
ercising the functions of the public advocate, acquiring
a just celebrity for eloquence, and even producing his
first literary fruit in this department. The same pater
nal influence is also perceptible in Seneca's becoming a
candidate for the quaestorship or treasurership, in which
he was successful. During his incumbency of this office
he became an object of jealousy on the part of the Em
peror Caligula, who grew angry with him on the sole
ground that the young orator pleaded too ably one day
before the Senate in his presence. That emperor was
 INTRODUCTION . 13

only prevented from putting him to death by representa

tions of one of his mistresses that it was hardly worth
while, as Seneca was a hopeless consumptive, and would
soon die at all events. Caligula was succeeded by his
uncle, Claudius, and the latter was in power but a short
time before his wife, the corrupt Valeria Messalina, who
became jealous of the favor shown by her husband to his
niece, the beautiful Julia, took her revenge by charging
Seneca with an illicit intrigue with the latter. The result
was that Seneca was banished to the island of Corsica,
where he remained eight years.
This exile was a transitional period in Seneca's mind
and life. He had been married, and had two children,
His wife, whose name is unknown, was now dead. He
married a second time, his wife being Paulina. One of
his children, a boy, died twenty days before his father's
exile to Corsica. The other, Novatilla, was committed by
her father to the care of his mother, Helvia, with these
words : “ Fold her to your bosom ; she has lost her
mother ; she seems to have lost her father. Care for her.
Love her for me.” Once in Corsica, Seneca betook him
self closely to the study of his much - loved philosophy.
This proved to be a productive period of his life. Of his
lonely home he had nothing good to say. He satirized
every thing about him , and thus complained that Corsica
was poor in every thing - but exiles :
Barbarous land which rugged rocks surround,
Whose horrent cliffs with idle wastes are crowned,
No autumn fruit, no tilth the summer yields,
Nor olives cheer the winter-silvered fields :
Nor joyous spring her tender foliage lends,
Nor genial herb the luckless soil befriends;
Nor bread, nor sacred fire, nor freshening wave ;
Naught here-save exile, and the exile's grave !” (Epig. II.)
Polybius, now the favorite at court, lost his brother,
14 INTRODUCTION .

and Seneca addressed him from his lonely Corsica an epis

tle on “ Consolation,” in which he shrewdly combined the
good advice of bearing patiently what we can not escape,
with fulsome adulation of Claudius Caesar. But this flat
tering proved quite unnecessary , for either it was never
reported to the emperor by Polybius, or, if that man had
the temerity to do it, it had not the slightest effect upon
his master to recall the philosopher from exile. Now
came Messalina's day of retribution , for, having formed
an illicit alliance with the young and handsome Caius
Silius, she died a wretched fugitive, and Agrippina, the
daughter of Germanicus, succeeded her as empress. This
latter made use of her influence with the emperor for se
curing the return of Seneca from exile. It was a stroke
of policy on her part to gain popular favor for herself and
her son, Domitius (Nero) , for Seneca was a great favorite
in Rome, and no more adroit management could have
been adopted by the empress for the accomplishment of
her plans. The ļife of Seneca henceforth became inti
mately connected with Nero. He became praetor, and the
tutor of young Nero. Tacitus, who is the chief authority
for what we know of the life of both Nero and his precep
tor, thus states the purposes of Agrippina : “ Agrippina
obtained for Seneca a revocation from exile, and with it
the praetorship , favors which she supposed would be well
pleasing to the public on account of his signal eloquence
and accomplishments; besides her own private views,
namely, the education of her own son, Domitius, under
such a master, and the use they should make of his coun
sels, both to obtain the empire and to govern it.” Agrip
pina secured the death of her husband by poison , and
now the great plan of her life was successful—her son,
Nero, became Roman emperor. Farrar says of her ab
sorption in the interests of her son : Whatever there
 INTRODUCTION . 15

was of possible affection in the tigress nature of Agrip

pina was now absorbed in the person of her child. For
that child , from its cradle to her own death by his means,
she toiled and sinned. The fury of her own ambition,
inextricably linked with the uncontrollable fierceness of
her love for this only son, henceforth directed every ac
tion of her life. Destiny had made her the sister of one
emperor, intrigue elevated her into the wife of another.
Her own crimes made her the mother of a third ." *
Claudius was no sooner dead than Seneca, true to his
temporizing character, made bim the object of his keen
satire, and at the same time bestowed fulsome eulogy on
the young Nero. This ruler did, indeed , promise well
until his seventeenth year, but soon afterwards he man
ifested a restiveness and recklessness that gave Seneca
good ground for fearing that his imperial disciple might
any moment become his oppressor. Agrippina prided
herself on her influence over her son ; but when she found
that he had become weary of his wife, Octavia, and formed
a secret alliance with the freed-woman Acte, her indig
nation became violent and public, for she was shrewd
enough to see that this change in Nero was fatal to her
own share in the empire. She directed her hostility par
ticularly at Seneca and Burrhus, the joint tutors of Nero,
who, according to Tacitus, did what they could to re
strain the vices of the young emperor, and saw only evil
in the general influence of his wicked mother.t The
mother, out of revenge for her son's throwing off her in
fluence, threatened to bring forward Britannicus, the son
of Claudius, as the real heir to the throne. Nero now
needed to act promptly, and the result was, as there is
every reason to believe, that the speedy death of Britan
* Seekers after God, p. 113.
+ Annales, xiii, 2, etc.
16 INTRODUCTION .

nicus was caused by Nero, who was then only in the first
year of his wretched reign. Imputations have been cast
by various writers — Merivale among the rest — upon both
Burrhus and Seneca as probable accomplices ; but there
is no proof that such was the fact. This much is certain ,
however, that Seneca soon afterwards wrote his Essay on
Clemency, dedicating it to his pupil, Nero, in which he
extols that virtue as especially beautiful in rulers, and
represents Nero as a remarkable illustration of it.
Agrippina became an object of just suspicion on the
part of her son, Nero, and the question was only one of
time which should succeed in ridding the world of the
other. A report was brought to Nero one night that

Seneca, as tutor of Nero, caricatured as a butterfly driving a dragon .

From the Museum at Naples.

Agrippina was plotting for his overthrow by the substi

tution of Plautus on the throne. The charge was unjust,
and Agrippina was successful in having her accusers con
demned , and herself restored to the favor of her son. The
calm lasted four years, the end of which marked the com
on of Nero's golden age --" the famous Quinquen
nium "--during which Seneca and Burrhus had been the
actual rulers, and the affairs of the government had been
administered with an ability and success that command
 INTRODUCTION . 17

ed universal admiration. But now Nero broke loose

from all restraint, the occasion being another charge that
Agrippina was plotting against her son . Nero promptly
resolved upon his mother's death , and his plan was wor
thy of his general inhumanity ; for he arranged that a
pretended public reconciliation between his mother and
himself should take place at Baiae, but that the bolts of
the vessel on which she should return to her retreat
should be loosened , and his victim drowned . She es
caped death by water , but shortly after fell by the
blows of assassins . Anicetus was the first to strike her,
and she replied : " Strike my womb , for it bore Nero ."
Her supreme passion for her son's ruling continued ,
however, to the last , and it is said that she uttered the
words : “ Occidat dum imperet ” —Let him slay me if he
only reign ! Recently an attempt has been made to
justify Nero against the charge of parricide ; but the
deliberate judgment of Tacitus , Josephus, Dion, and Sue
tonins is unequivocal in the admission of his guilt .
What part did Seneca play in these scenes of blood ?
On this subject the opinion of his contemporaries was
divided. First, there were many who believed that he
was cognizant of the attempt of Nero to drown his
mnother. The weight of testimony here is in his favor.
Even Dion admits that “ there was no proof of Seneca's
complicity in the imputed crime of Nero ." Second, it
was alleged that Seneca was an abettor in the murder
of Agrippina at the hands of Anicetus and his soldiers.
This is not proved, and the probability is against it.
There is no likelihood that he attempted to dissuade
Nero from the crime, for he was pretty sure that “ if the
son did not kill the mother, the mother certainly would
kill the son . ” Tacitus reports that Seneca not only
charged Nero with the crime, but repudiated all share
18 INTRODUCTION .

of responsibility for himself. But no amount of charity

can acquit Seneca of writing Nero's statement to the
Roman Senate that Agrippina did fall by her own hand.
This was not only false, but amounted to a direct con
nivance at the crime.
It was now Seneca's turn to become involved in hope
less difficulties. Nero having become weary of his wife,
Octavia, determined to substitute Poppaea for her. It
was this woman who, by " her tears, her blandishments,
and even her sarcasms," was the real author of Nero's
murder of his mother, for the great aspiration of her life
was to become empress, and she knew that so long as
Agrippina lived this hope could never be realized . In
Nero's proposition to cast aside Octavia and take Pop
paea as his wife, he was gently opposed by Seneca. The
nobles, long jealous of the philosopher, now found it easy
to alienate the emperor's mind from him. Seneca saw
his danger, and offered to surrender his just wealth to his
master, and withdrew from the city, pleading his delicate
health and love of study. Nero gave no formal consent,
but Seneca lived in comparative retirement. The enemies
of Seneca reported to Nero that the philosopher was a
participant in Piso's conspiracy. Seneca succeeded in
disproving all share in the plot, but again begged per
mission to retire, for Nero's burning of the city and per
secution of the Christians, and the great prevalence of
social disorders and crimes, proved that the old teacher
no longer had the slightest influence over him . Again
his request was denied. The conspiracy of Piso now as
sumed threatening proportions, and charges were brought
against Seneca with greater plausibility. Nero resolved
on his death. The philosopher was found at his villa,
Nomentanum , in the society of his beloved wife, Paulina.
He heard his sentence with Stoic calmness, and begged
 INTRODUCTION . 19

only the privilege of making some additions to his will.

This was refused . For the particulars of his death we
are indebted to Tacitus. The philosopher said to his
friends that, since he was disabled from requiting their
benefits, he bequeathed them that which alone was left
him, yet something more glorious and amiable than all
the rest — the pattern of his life. He begged them not to
weep for him. He implored his wife to “ moderate her
sorrow , to beware of perpetuating such a dismal sorrow ,
but to bear the death of her husband by contemplating
his life spent in a steady course of virtue, and to support
his loss by all worthy consolations.” But Paulina would
not be comforted, and attempted to put an end to her
life. Seneca, seeing her deep devotion, gave his consent
in these words : “ I have laid before thee the delights and
solaces of living ; thou preferrest the renown of dying.
I shall not envy thee the honor of the example. Let
us equally share the fortitude of an end so brave ; but
greater will be the splendor of thy particular fall.” At
the same moment the two had the veins of their arms
opened. Seneca's blood flowed very slowly, and then he
ordered the veins of his legs to be opened. His suffer
ings becoming intense, he persuaded bis wife to with
draw to an adjoining room, lest the courage of each
might fail by witnessing the agony of the other. Nero
ordered that Paulina's death be prevented, and so her
wounds were bound up. She lived but a few years, in
feeble health, her greatest joy being the memory of her
husband. But no clemency was visited upon Seneca.
His death coming too slowly, he requested his friend and
physician, Statius Annaeus, to administer poison to him.
This was unnecessary , for it failed to act upon his thin
body. He then had recourse to a hot bath, but this
failing, he was removed to a vapor bath, or sudatorium ,
20 INTRODUCTION .

where he expired amid the fumes. His secretaries and

slaves were about him, and on them he sprinkled water,
with the formula of a libation : " To Jove the Liber
ator !” His body was burned privately, without any
funeral ceremonies, according to the arrangements he
had made when in the splendor of his power and full
enjoyment of his great wealth. Some writers, as Sicco
Polentone, who have imagined that Seneca was a Chris
tian at heart, represent that his final words were an in
vocation to Christ, and that he baptized himself with
the water of the bath. But this is only a beautiful
fiction .

III. ESTIMATE OF SENECA'S LIFE AND CHARACTER.

Seneca can not be judged properly without a careful
regard to the times in which he lived. Every great
character reflects his period. This reflection need not
be that of the prevailing sentiment. Sometimes, as in
the case of great reformers, it is that of a protest against
it. Even then, however, it is the reflection of the pro
test which the better spirit of the age bears within it
self. Martin Luther, one man standing out in antag
onisin to his contemporaries, was but the embodiment
and reflection of Europe's aspiration of reform for three
centuries. Seneca's chosen field was that of a moral
teacher, and it is unreasonable to expect that, with only
a pagan culture, and that at a time of Rome's moral
decadence, he should exhibit either in his personal life
or philosophy such an example as we could fairly ex
pect from the simpler and purer Roman days, to say
nothing of any Christian period. No age has surpassed
that of the Caesars, particularly the later ones, in splen
did iniquity. Horace could well say : " The age of our
fathers, worse than that of our grandsires, has produced
 INTRODUCTION . 21

us, who are yet baser, and who are doomed to give birth
to a still more degraded offspring. ” Juvenal, fifty years
later, could affirm : “ Posterity will add nothing to our
immorality ; our descendants can but do and desire the
same crimes as ourselves.” Farrar, in referring to this
testimony of contemporary witnesses, groups the evil
characteristics of the times of Seneca under five heads :
1. The violent contrasts in social condition ; 2. Atheism
and superstition ; 3. Excessive luxury ; 4. Deep sadness ;
and, 5. Boundless cruelty. It was in the midst of such a
civilization that Seneca lived and wrote, and the wonder
is that we find so much in him that contrasts favorably
with the spirit and life of his times. His genius, posi
tion, and the wishes of his father, first brought him with
in the circle of the political maelstrom . He frequently
strove, later, to escape all contact with political life, and
we must suppose his efforts sincere. We fully believe
that the most unfavorable opinion of Seneca's complic
ity with Nero's guilt can apply only to the latest period
of his life, when he found himself involved in the meshes
of that emperor's cruel policy. Lipsius well exclaims :
“ How happy would Rome have been if Nero had con
tinued to follow the advice of Seneca as he began ! For
what could be more commendable than the earlier years
of his life, while under the direction of Seneca ?” That
he was a willing party to any wrong act, even his most
severe critic, Dion Cassius, seems hardly to believe ; but
that he was a party at all was both his crime and misfor
tune, and from the two there is no possibility of acquit
ting him. The most that can be done is to give him the
benefit of a careful weighing of the palliating circum
stances which surrounded him . Much stress has been
laid upon Seneca's enormous wealth. Tacitus refers to
it, but declares that Seneca's wealth had no effect upon
B
22 INTRODUCTION .

his temperate and even austere life : “ Seneca, with a

diet exceedingly simple, supported an abstemious life,
satisfying the call of hunger by wild fruit from the
wood, and of thirst by a draught from the brook . ” The
philosopher began life with great wealth, and after his
return from exile, and during his tutorship of Nero, there
came vast accessions to it from the hands of that ruler.
He had treasures in other lands, as Egypt and Britain,
and, like his wealthy contemporaries, derived immense
revenue from money at interest. Tacitus nowhere charges
Seneca with guilt in the acquisition or retention of it.
Seneca, even requesting Nero to take from him his for
tune, used the following noble language : “ Order the
auditors of thy revenue to undertake the direction of my
fortune, and annex it to thine own ; nor shall I by this
plunge myself into indigence and poverty ; but, having
only surrendered that wondrous opulence which exposes
me to the offensive blaze of so much splendor, I shall re
deem the time which at present is employed in the care
of pompous feasts and gardens, and apply it to the repose
and cultivation of my mind .”
The misfortune of Seneca's career was his tutorship
of Nero, and while in the early exercise of this office he
used every means to guard his pupil against wickedness.
Later, however, when he could no longer control him , he
seems not to have hesitated to approve of the misdoings
of Nero. He was, perhaps, still in the hope that, by this
means, he might moderate the violence of the youthful
despot. But this was no sufficient ground for vacillation,
or for practical approval of wrong, even though exile or
death was the certain penalty.
 INTRODUCTION . 23

IV . SENECA'S PHILOSOPHY .
The position which Seneca occupies as a philosopher
is not that of an originator so much as an expounder.
We must content ourselves here with merely indicating
his relation, as a philosopher, to his times, and his posi
tion as a believer in the Divine Being, and in the moral
laws which he has imposed upon the universe. While
Seneca adopted the general principles of the Stoic sys
tem, he by no means adhered strictly to them, but seems
to have reserved to himself the large rights of the
eclectic thinker. The Roman mind was not at all
adapted to the repose and equanimity which form a
fundamental element in Stoicism. It was only after
popular liberty was lost, when the government became
a thing that lay within the reach of the most ambitious
and unscrupulous , and morals became corrupt, that we
find any tendency to fall back upon the resources of the
mind itself. Says M. Aubertin :
“ The establishment of the empire, while pacifying elo
quence and suppressing liberty, did not enteeble philos
ophy. It gave it, on the other hand , a higher impor
tance, a less uncertain credit, and more faithful par
tisans. In the general abasement, in the mental waste
and the incurable ennui where so soon the ardor of the
noblest souls was chilled, philosophy, the sole consoler
amid this fearful disgrace, offered to the conquered, if
not an impossible hope, at least a refuge and an indemni
fication. Hence, says Horace, the faithful interpreter of
the delights of the contemporary mind, it became the
work of all the days, of all the ages, and of all the con
ditions. This world, grown old and condemned , there
found its remedy and salvation. Philosophy gathered
up the fragments from the irreparable shipwreck of
liberty."*
* Sénèque et Saint Paul, p. 103.
24 INTRODUCTION .

How this change in the condition of Roman political

life invoived a new employment of the mind, and that
in the direction of Stoicism—the last resort in sorrow
for every unchristian heart — has been very strongly
stated by a writer in the Westminster Review :
“ In the age of Seneca the fashionable Epicureanism of
the earlier empire had been supplanted by the philoso
phy of the Porch. Roman independence had been de
stroyed ; Caesar sat like an embodied destiny on the
throne of the world, the terrestrial correspondent of the
overruling Fate, the great cosmical unity, the general
ized expression for the irrevocable order and irrevocable
succession of individual or collective causes, in which
men were inserted at the hour of their birth. A philoso
phy that encouraged political action could not but give
offense. The true wisdom was to conquer the troubles
of life by silent endurance ; the true compensation for
the abandonment of power or place was to be sought in
retirement, resignation, the inward serenity which can
neither be given nor taken away. The Stoical disin
clination to a public career, or any form of political
activity, tended, with more or less consciousness, towards
the ideal of Apollonius of Tyana, who announced that
he had no interest in the republic, but lived under the
rule of the gods. From criminal preoccupation, from
enervating luxury, from the satiety, the danger, and
corruption of the times, the young, the ardent, the aspi
rant to a higher life turned away to seek a refuge in the
internal resources of the Stoical retreat, a predisposition
typifying the ultimate separation of the temporal and
spiritual power. Stoicism thus became a religious phi
losophy, a code of moral precepts, of prudential regula
tions accommodated to the various exigencies of life.
Of this school of practical wisdom and pious speculation
Seneca was for a considerable time the distinguished
chief: *

Between Cicero and Seneca this Stoic philosophy took

* Vol. for 1867, pp. 71 , 72.
 INTRODUCTION . 25

root in Rome. The period was resplendent with a group

of minds that seem to have derived all their inspiration
from Greece, and yet to have comprehended well the
moral needs of their own day. Says M. Aubertin :
“Leaving Cicero, and coming right to Seneca and his
neo-Stoical contemporaries, what do we find ? A philos
ophy abundant in new perspectives and of vast conse
quences. The basis of doctrine has undergone a trans
formation. The spiritualism of these philosophers has
a character of mystical exaltation, impassioned raving,
and religious enthusiasm unknown to the author of the
Tusculan orations. Whence comes this new character,
marked by such visible characteristics ? It is the nat
ural result of the labor of these eighty -six years that
separate Cicero and Seneca. ... The latter has left us a
lively picture of these fruitful years ; he is full of the
reading of his masters ; he hears their voices, cites frag
ments of their discourses, and reproduces their opinions
with that vividness of imagination which is the domi
nant faculty of his remarkable mind." *

These philosophers did not neglect metaphysical study,

but their taste lay chiefly in the department of morals.
Seneca, while he was a careful gleaner from his immedi
ate Roman predecessors, and always cites them in sup
port of his opinions, went far beyond any of them in the
development of his system.
Seneca's view of Deity is essentially that found in the
Stoic system in its best state. There is a supreme God ,
who is the soul of the world . He has operated on mat
ter as organizer, not as creator. Matter is eternal, but
disordered, and only waited for the divine soul to bring
it into harmony. Matter has no soul ; it is simply inert
and passive, and subject to the power of God. God is
the divine reason, placed in the world. While God has
* Sénèque et Saint Paul, pp. 101, 102.
26 INTRODUCTION .

made the world out of pre-existent matter, he has not

been able to change its essence. This accounts for the
reign of evil, for matter has essentially an evil principle.
God has supreme control over human affairs. He de
scends to men , and dwells with them. Our condition
is fully known to him . It is to him that we live, and
to him that we must approve ourselves. We must so
live that God will see only good in us, for he sees just
what we are. “ There is no need,” says Seneca to Lu
cilius, “ to lift your hands to heaven, or to pray the
aedile to admit you to the ear of an image, that so your
prayers may be heard the better. God is near thee ; he
is with thee. ... A boly spirit resides within us, the ob
server of good and evil, and our constant guardian. As
we treat him , he treats us. At least no man is without
God. Can any one ever rise above the power of for
tune without his assistance ? It is he that inspires us
with thoughts upright, just, and pure. We do not, in
deed, pretend to say what god ; but that a god dwells
in the breast of every good man is certain . " * This uni
verse could only be restrained from ruin by the presence
of God. The least events and the lowest lives are
known to him. We must, therefore, submit fully to
God . Our condition may be wretched , but this is
sometimes a necessity for our discipline. God could
relieve us from misery, but then that would not always
be best. We are in a condition which requires train
ing and the highest culture.
Seneca, in his entire ethical system, went far beyond
his times. “ He seems,” says Gillett, “ as if by a flash of
intuition, to apprehend the moral relations of men, and
the proper aims and duties of human life. He sets him.
self up as a teacher - not an example, for he confesses his
* Epistula xli.
 INTRODUCTION . 27

imperfections and deficiencies and his words are mem

orable ulike for their terseness and their worth . That
he stood aloof from Christianity — that the vigor of his
years had passed before he could have had any knowl
edge of Christianity — adds to our surprise.” * The
ethics of Seneca are based upon God's identification with
the universe and his presence in human life. Here be
longs the brotherhood of man. We are not isolated in
any sense , for the whole family of humanity is united by
the bonds of a common origin. Nature made us rela
tives when it begat us from the same materials and for
the same destinies. It planted in us a mutual love, and
fitted us for a social life.
What is Roman knight, or
freedman, or slave ? These are but names that spring
from ambition or injury. Our country is the world, and
our guardians are the gods. Slavery, therefore, is to be
condemned as a crime against God. “ Seneca ," says
Lecky, “ has filled pages with exhortations to masters
to remember that the accident of position in no degree
affects the real dignity of men ; that the slave may be
free by virtue, while the master may be a slave by vice ;
and that it is the duty of a good man to abstain not only
from all cruelty, but even from all feeling of contempt
towards his slaves.” + All exhibitions of a man's rights
to make another suffer are cruel in the extreme. Gla
diatorial contests, therefore , have no possible apology.
Such amusements are “ brutalizing, savage, and detest
able . ” Man must imitate the natural world , where each
has his right and his own part to play. In nature we
find apparent disturbances and irregularities . Earth
quakes , volcanic eruptions , and violent storms would
seem to be abnormal. But this is not the fact. They are
* God in Human Thought, vol. i, p. 253.
† History of European Morals, vol. i, p. 324.
28 INTRODUCTION .

only the evidences of the reign of cosmic law. To show

this order in nature was the design of the “ Natural
Questions ” of Seneca, perhaps more than any other
work of antiquity the direct forerunner of Humboldt's
“ Cosinos.” That work of Seneca was valued by Mon
taigne more highly than any other, because of its having
been written in old age, after the temptations to the en
joyment of popular and imperial favor had ceased. We
close our reference to Seneca's philosophy by citing the
general view, as just as it is forcible, of a writer, already
referred to in the Westminster Review :
" Free from the superstitions of the populace, exalted
above the illusions of Stoical orthodoxy, replacing the
multiplicity of gods by the unity of the divine nature,
and substituting for external worship the spiritual
adoration which lies in the knowledge of God and the
humble imitation of his perfection, Seneca, as a com
petent authority observes, holds a foremost rank among
those who represent in its bighest purity the elevated
moral conception which classical antiquity attained.
True to the old Stoical traditions, he yet gave pre
dominance to the religious point of view, introducing
into his teaching a difference in degree that was almost
a difference in mind. Hence his theology became more
buman - his deity more personal. Contemporaneously
with the missionaries of a new faith , he insisted on the
necessity of obedience to the will of God, of a life in
harmony with the divine nature, of the presence of God
in the soul of man , of the slave as well as the free, of
self-surrender to the Providence that orders the world,
as the ground of all internal freedom and peace. The
practical character of his morality, his conviction of
human weakness and imperfection, his lessons of mercy
and forgiveness, his doctrine of forbearance and indul
gence to human infirmity, his ideal of the married life,
his estimate of true friendship, his spirit of universal love
and divine impartiality, at once attest the nobleness of
bis moral aspirations, and illustrate the mutual approach
 INTRODUCTION . 29

of the wisdom of the Greek and Roman world, and of

the enlarging piety of a less exclusive Palestine. The
work that Seneca endeavored to do, however imperfect
ly, must always have a profound interest for the student
of that great religious revolution which formed a crisis
in the history of the human race , not only on general
grouuds, but because, to borrow the remarkable expres
sion quoted by M. Martha from the eloquent Tertul
lian , it was ' testimonium animae naturaliter Christia
nae , '"*

V. WORKS OF SENECA.
Seneca's writings have not all been preserved. We
bave the greater part, however, and from those still ex
tant we can well appreciate Quintilian's statement con
cerning him , “ that he treated on almost every subject of
study ; for both orations of his, and poems, and epistles,
and dialogues, are extant.” It is not probable that any
leading work of Seneca has been lost, for being a great
favorite in the early Church, the interest in his writ
ings served to preserve them , while those of less -favored
Roman authors were neither copied nor cared for. The
list of his works, as given by George Long in Smith's
“ Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and My
thology ,” forms the basis of our catalogue.
1. De Ira. In three books. This was addressed to No
vatus, and was one of Seneca's earliest works. 2. De Con
solatione ad Helviam Matrem Liber. Written to his
mother during his banishment to Corsica. One of his
purest and best works. 3. De Consolatione ad Polybium
Liber. Composed in the third year of Seneca's Corsican
exile. Diderot and others maintain that it is not by Sen
eca, because it is unworthy of him . But the external
evidences are too strong. 4. De Consolatione ad Marci
am Liber. Written after Seneca's return from exile, and
* Vol. for 1867, p. 84. + Inst. Orat., x, 1 , § 129.
B2
30 INTRODUCTION .

designed to console Marcia for the loss of her son. Mar.

cia was the daughter of A. Cremutius Cordus. 5. De
Providentia. “ A Golden Book , ” says Lipsius. Seneca's
design here is to prove that Providence has a power
over all things, and that God is always present with
us.
6. De Tranquillitate Animi. Written shortly after
Seneca's return from banishment, when he was prae
tor, and had become Nero's tutor. The object is to dis
cover the true means by which peace of mind can be at
tained. The author, surrounded by all the splendors of
the court, writes as one very ill at ease. 7. De Constantia
Sapientis, seu quod in Sapientem non cadit Injuria. Ad
dressed to Serenus, and founded on the Stoic doctrine of
the wise man's impassiveness. Lipsius says of it : “ This
book betokens a great mind, as great a wit, and much
eloquence; in a word, it is one of his best.” 8. De Cle
mentia ad Neronem Caesarem Libri duo. There is too
much flattery in this work. It is here that Seneca relates
the anecdote of Nero's unwillingness to sign a sentence
of execution, and his exclamation : “ I would I could
neither read nor write !” The second book is incomplete.
9. De Brevitate Vitae. Written to Paulinus, and recom
mending the proper employment of time, and the best
means to derive wisdom from our life. 10. De Vita Be
atu. Addressed to his brother, L. Junius Gallio, and
pleading that there is no happiness without virtue, though
health and riches have their value. The conclusion is
lost. 11. De Otio. Sometimes joined to De Vita Beata.
12. De Beneficiis. In seven books, addressed to Aebucius
Liberalis, and explaining the way of conferring a favor,
and the duties of the giver and recipient. 13. Epistulae
Morales. One hundred and twenty -four, written to Lucil
ius, and consisting of moral maxims. Composed for the
most part in the latter period of Seneca's life, and com
 INTRODUCTION . 31

prising his moral reflections after losing imperial favor.

14. Apocolocyntosis. A satire on the deceased Emperor
Claudius. It is a play on the word pumpkin, and means
pumpkinification, or the reception of Claudius among the
pumpkins. 15. Quaestiones Naturales. In seven books,
addressed to Lucilius : the work deals with questions of
natural history, and comprises copious extracts from va
rious Greek and Roman authors. 16. Tragoediae. Ten
tragedies are attributed to Seneca by various Latin writ
ers, Quintilian among the number. (Inst. Orat., ix, 2, § 8.)
They bear the following titles : Hercules Furens, Thyestes,
Thebais or Phoenissae, Hippolytus or Phaedra, Oedipus,
Troades or Tlecuba, Medea, Agameninon , Hercules Oetaeus,
and Octavia. As the titles indicate, the subjects are
mostly from the Greek mythology. They are written in
iambic senarii, interspersed with choral parts, in anapaes
tic and other metres. None of these tragedies are adapt
ed to the stage, and were never intended for that purpose.
They were designed for reading or recitation, after the
fashion of the Roman rhetorical training. Moral senti
ments abound in them all, as with every thing that Seneca
wrote .
VI. EDITIONS.
The Editio Princeps of Seneca was issued in Naples,
1475, in folio . The edition of J. F. Gronovius (Leyden),
1649–58, is in 4 vols. 12mo ; that of Ruhkopf (Leipzig),
1797–1811 , 5 vols. 8vo ; and that of C. R. Fickert (Leip
zig), 1842–45 , 3 vols. 8vo. The French writers, as stated
above, probably through the impulse of Montaigne, have
bestowed great attention on Seneca, both in textual crit
icism and translation. Lagrange's version is the best.
In England, the first edition of The Workes of L. An
naeus Seneca, both Morall and Naturall, translated by
Thomas Lodge, appeared in London in 1614, with a Latin
32 INTRODUCTION ,

dedication to Chancellor Ellesmere. An English trans

lation of the Tragedies, by several hands, appeared as
early as 1581. Bähr, in his Geschichte der römischen Li
teratur, vol. i, gives a copious bibliography relating to
Seneca.

VII. RELATIONS OF SENECA AND ST. PAUL.

To the student of sacred and ecclesiastical history the
question of the relations of Seneca and St. Paul is one of
the most interesting connected with the boundary line
between Christianity and the pagan philosophy. The co
incidences between the writings of the two are among the
unsolved problems of literary history. Every writer on
the subject concedes them to be striking, and those who
do not admit an acquaintance have difficulty in explain
ing the parallelism . The most common solution of the
latter class is thus expressed, by the writer already refer
red to, in the Westminster Review :

“This resemblance is only one among many instances of

the drift of the common consciousness, under the same im
pelling winds of motion, to a similar or analogous intel
lectual and moral deliverance. The common thought, the
common feeling, the common misery, the common aspira
tion-in a word , the common development of the human
mind, had manifestations unlike, yet not all unlike, in
Greece and in Judaea ; and Saul of Tarsus and Seneca of
Rome, each in his own way, acknowledged the smiting
presence of the new light that was dawning on a half-ex
pectant world .”

Of the co- operative character of the writings of St.

Paul and Seneca as great moral teachers, Merivale thus
speaks :
“Far different as was their social standing-point, far dif
ferent as were the foundations and the presumed sanctions
 INTRODUCTION . 33

of their teaching respectively, Seneca and St. Paul were

both moral reformers; both, be it said with reverence,
were fellow -workers in the cause of humanity, though the
Christian could look beyond the proximate aims of mo
rality, and prepare men for a final development on which
the Stoic could not venture to gaze. Hence there is so
much in their principles, so much in their language, that
agrees together ; so that the one has been thought, though
it must be owned without adequate reason, to have bor
rowed directly from the other. But the philosopher, be
it remembered, discoursed to a large and not inattentive
audience; and surely the soil was not all unfruitful on
which his seed was scattered , when he proclaimed that
God dwells not in temples of wood or stone, nor wants
the ministrations of human hands ; that he has no delight
in the blood of victims; that he is near to all his creat
ures ; that his spirit resides in men's hearts ; that all men
are truly his offspring ; that we are members of one body,
which is God or nature ; that men must believe in God
before they can approach him ; that the true service of
God is to be like unto him ; that all men have sinned, and
none performed all the works of the law ; that God is no
respecter of persons, ranks, or conditions; but all, bar
barian and Roman , bond and free, are alike under his all
seeing providence. *
The early faith of the Church attached much impor
tance to the acquaintance and friendship of these two
men — the one representing all that was vital, aggressive,
and hopeful in primitive Christianity, and the other all
that was truthful and worthy in the latest Stoic philoso
phy. We can, therefore, look upon the production and
wide circulation of a spurious correspondence of fourteen
letters between them as only natural results of a fond de- .
sire to see in the pagan mind a willing acquiescence in re
vealed truth, on the first propagation of it, in the metrop
olis of the world . " From the age of St. Jerome," says
Lightfoot, “ Seneca was commonly regarded as standing
* History of the Romans under the Empire, vol. v, pp. 457 , 438.
34 INTRODUCTION .

on the very threshold of the Christian Church, even if he

had not actually passed within its portals. In one eccle
siastical council at least, held at Tours in the year 567,
his authority is quoted with a deference generally ac
corded only to fathers of the Church. And even to the
present day, in the marionette plays of his native Spain ,
St. Seneca takes his place by the side of St. Peter and St.
Paul in the representations of our Lord's passion ." * Je
rome took note of this correspondence in the following
language: “ Quem non ponerem in catalogo sanctorum ,
nisi me illae epistulae provocarent quae leguntur a pluri
mis, Pauli ad Senecam et Senecae ad Paulum .” + This, of
course, decides nothing as to the authenticity of the let
ters ; but the credulous spirit of the whole mediæval
Church was only too ready to adopt this revered father's
language as a strong endorsement of the correspondence.
The internal character of the letters is thoroughly de
cisive of their spuriousness. The barrenness of thought,
the impurity of the style, the errors in matters of fact, and
especially the frequent violations of historical and chron
ological accuracy, prove them unworthy the place they
have occupied in ecclesiastical literature. ( These letters
are given at the end of the present volume.) Of all writ
ers, the French have manifested most confidence in the
authenticity of the correspondence ; and in cases where
they have not gone to this extreme, they have discussed
the question with an animation and wealth of research
that have attracted the admiration of the learned world.
The most complete treatise on the subject is that of
Fleury. This author, while claiming that Paul and Sen
eca were on intimate relations, concedes the improbabil
ity of the correspondence, on the ground of its being " a
composition of very inferior grade, a sort of school-boy
* Epistle to the Philippians, pp. 296, 297, 3d ed. + Vir. Illust., 12.
 INTRODUCTION . 35

exercise, abundant in rhetorical excesses, couched in very

poor language, now containing borrowed expressions from
Tacitus, and now others from the existing version of
Paul's epistles.” * Fleury enriches his treatise by a de
scription of the whole literature of this special subject,
and by his excellent bibliography of the manuscripts and
editions containing the alleged correspondence between
St. Paul and Seneca .I The most recent French writer on
this subject is Charles Aubertin, who enters into the full
criticism of the contemporary philosophy, and concludes
not only that the correspondence is without any claim to
authenticity, but that Seneca's writings no more prove
him to have been a Christian than do the works of Plato,
Cicero, and other Greek and Roman philosophical and
moral writers prove them to have been followers of Christ.
Lightfoot points out the untenability of Seneca's parallel
ism with St. Paul on the ground of the former's frequent
priority to Paul's writings, the existence of the same par
allels in previous authors, the many fallacious coincidences,
and the depth of the opposition of his tenets to those of
Paul. However, Lightfoot thus concludes that there are
many coincidences which can not be explained on these
grounds:
" But after all allowance made for the considerations
just urged, some facts remain which still require expla
nation . It appears that the Christian parallels in Seneca's
writings become more frequent as he advances in life.
It is not less true that they are much more striking and
more numerous than in the other great Stoics of the Ro
man period, Epictetus and M. Aurelius ; for though in
character these later writers approached much nearer to
the Christian ideal than the minister of Nero, though
* Saint Paul et Sénèque, vol. ii, pp. 281 , 282.
† Vol. i, pp. 2–9. | Vol. ii, pp. 283–297.
$ Epistle to the Philippians, 3d edition, pp. 289–296. London, 1873.
36 INTRODUCTION .

their fundamental doctrines are as little inconsistent with

Christian theology and ethics as his, yet the closer resem
blances of sentiment and expression, which alone would
suggest any direct obligations to Christianity, are, I be
lieve, decidedly more frequent in Seneca. Lastly : after
all deductions made, a class of coincidences still remains,
of which the expression " spend and be spent may be
taken as a type, and which can hardly be considered
accidental. If any historical connection (direct or in
direct) can be traced with a fair degree of probability,
we may reasonably look to this for the solution of such
coincidences. I shall content myself here with stating
the different ways in which such a connection was possi
ble or probable, without venturing to affirın what was
actually the case, for the data are not sufficient to justify
any definite theory.*
The weakest part of Lightfoot's criticism is his en
deavor to show that these coincidences are due to the
Semitic origin of Stoicism , and that Tarsus, especially,
being a seat of Stoic philosophy, Paul became acquainted
with that system , and used the religious vocabulary of
the Stoics in his epistles, or “found in the ethical lan
guage of the Stoics expressions more fit than he could find
elsewhere to describe in certain aspects the duties and
privileges, the struggles and the triumphs, of the Chris
tian life.” Lightfoot really attributes the remarkable
coincidences between Paul and Seneca to Paul's using
Stoical terminology, a thing which can not be admitted
for a moment. Had there been no Stoa, there could have
been, just as easily, the great structure of the Pauline
theology. Paul used the Greek language, with all its
charm of imagery and subtle force, as the vehicle of his
thoughts ; but he placed no dependence, in the construc
tive part of his theology, on the poor resources of any
system of pagan philosophy. It was Seneca, and not any
* Epistle to the Philippians, pp. 300, 301.
 INTRODUCTION . 37

other writer of his entire school, or of all paganism, who

used, in the same sense as Paul, such words as flesh, angel,
*
holy spirit, and offspring of God.*
It is not at all improbable that Paul and Seneca were
acquainted with each other. Paul long had in mind a
visit to Rome, and regarded that metropolis as a point
of departure for missionary labors in Spain, if not in the
North (Romans i, 13 ; xv, 23, 24) , and we can not suppose
him to have been without interest in the prevailing relig.
ious thought of the time and place. This would account
for an independent interest in the best contemporary
moral writer, Seneca, and would make their meeting no
undesirable event on the apostle's part. Seneca, too,
would be equally interested in the man who stood at the
head of the new faith , and of whose writings he might
well have had some knowledge. Once, when an impor
tant crisis had arrived in Paul's ministry, in Corinth , and
when the issue of an important Jewish persecution of
him had to be decided by the governor of Achaia, to
whom appeal had been made, the result was favorable to
Paul ; for, after the Jews had made their charge, and
Paul was about to open his mouth in his own defense,
this governor or deputy, Gallio by name, regarded it un
necessary, and dismissed the charge in these words : “ If
it were a matter of wrong, or wicked lewdness, O ye
Jews, reason would that I should bear with you ; but if it
be a question of words and names, and of your law, look
ye to it : for I will be no judge of such matters.' The re
sult was, he drove them from the judgment-seat. Now
who should this Gallio be but Seneca's own brother,
M. Annaeus Novatus, who took the name Junius Annaeus
Gallio on passing by adoption into another family. Far
rar, not without good ground, says : “ We can easily im
* See Parallelisms, at end of Introduction.
38 INTRODUCTION .

agine that Gallio was Seneca's favorite brother, and we

are not surprised to find that the philosopher dedicated
to him his three books on ' Anger,' and his charming
little treatise ' On a Happy Life !' " * Seldom has a broth
er paid to another such a tribute as Seneca thus pays to
his brother Gallio : “ I used to say to you that my brother
Gallio ( whom every one loves a little, even people who
can not love him much) was wholly ignorant of other
vices, but even detested this. You might try him in any
direction. You began to praise his intellect - an intellect
of the highest and worthiest kind, ... and he walked
away ! You began to praise his moderation ; he instant
ly cut short your first words. You began to express ad
miration for his blandness and natural suavity of man
ner, ... yet even here he resisted your compliments ; and
if you were led to exclaim that you had found a man who
could not be overcome by those insidious attacks which
every one else admits, and hoped that he would at least
tolerate this compliment because of its truth, even on this
ground he would resist your flattery ; not as thongh you
had been awkward, or as though he suspected that you
were jesting with him, or had some secret end in view,
but simply because he had a horror of every form of adu
lation .” + Must we not suppose that the relations between
two such brothers were very intimate ? | And is there not
excellent ground for the conjecture of Schoell, in his His
toire de la Littérature Romaine : " In all probability the
propraetor, in his correspondence with his brother, had
mentioned this Jewish teacher, who had preached the
Gospel for eighteen months in the capital of his prov
* Seekers after God, pp. 20, 21 . + Quaestiones Naturales, lib. iv.
$ On the relations of Paul and Gallio, and the character of the latter,
comp. Lewin , Life and Epistles of St. Paul. Second edition. Vol. i,
pp. 291 , 292.
 INTRODUCTION . 39

ince !" It must also be borne in mind that the most

striking parallels between Seneca and St. Paul occur in
the later works of Seneca, such as his De Vita Beata and
De Beneficiis, both of which were composed after A.I
61 -the year when Paul arrived in Rome-and , above all,
in his epistles, written near the close of his life. * When
Paul arrived in Rome he was placed in charge of the pre
fect of the Praetorian Guards, who allowed him to dwell
in a private house with a soldier, who kept him in sight,
and gave him liberty to see his friends. Now this prefect
was none other than Burrhus, whom we have already
mentioned as an intimate friend of Seneca, and associate
of the latter at Nero's court. " Is it not natural,” M.
Schoell well asks, " to suppose that their conversation
would have turned upon this bold and eloqnent Jewish
teacher, who, on account of new religious opinions, had
been persecuted in Palestine, and had appealed to the tri
bunal of the emperor ? Would not Seneca have been
curious to see and hear this extraordinary man ?” We
do not regard it necessary to suppose that any special
intimacy existed between the Christian Paul and the
Stoic Seneca, in order to account for parallelism in their
writings. The tradition, deep-rooted, and often repeated
through many centuries, is at least very significant. Or,
as De Maistre says : “ The tradition concerning the Chris
tianity of Seneca, and on his relations with St. Paul , with
out being finally decisive, is nevertheless far more than
nothing, if one connect with it certain other presump
tions.” + Seneca's mental altitude and achievements prove
him to have been ready for at least a guarded inter
* Fr. Ch. Gelpe, Tractatiuncula de familiaritate qnae Paulo apostolo
cam Seneca philosopho intercessisse traditur, verisimillima. Lips. , 1813,
4to . Quoted in New Brunswick Review, Feb. , 1855.
† Soirées de Saint Petersbourg, IXe Entretien .
40 INTRODUCTION .

change of opinions with Paul, and it may well have hap

pened that the influence of the philosopher at Nero's
court had weight in securing such delay of the Apostle's
trial as resulted later in the latter's liberation, and in his
making one more missionary tour.

PARALLELS OR RESEMBLANCES TO HOLY SCRIPTURE

IN SENECA'S WRITINGS .
1. God's MERCY AND GOODNESS.
“ He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and
sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.” Matt. v, 45.
“ The earth is full of the goodness of the Lord." Psalm
xxxiii , 5 .
“ He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children ofmen ."
Lam . iii , 33.
“How many are unworthy of the light ; and yet the day dawns
See what great things the gods bring to pass daily, what great
gifts they bestow, with what abundant fruits they fill the earth
with what suddenly falling showers they soften the ground. If
you imitate the gods, confer benefits even on the unthankful : for the
sun rises even on the wicked, and the seas are open to pirates." De
Benef. i, 1, 11 ; iv, 25, 26 ; cf. also vii , 31 .
“ The deity wants not ministers. How 80 ? He himself minis
tereth to the human race. He is at hand everywhere, and to all
men . " “ The man is mistaken who thinks that the gods afflict any
one willingly." Epist. 95, 47, 48.
2. OMNISCIENCE OF GOD.
“ Shall not God search this out ? for he knoweth the secrets
of the heart." Ps. xliv, 21 .
“ All things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with
whom we have to do.” Heb . iv, 13.
“ Pray to thy Father which is in secret ; and thy Father which
seeth in secret shall reward thee openly.” Matt. vi, 6.
 INTRODUCTION. 41

“ For the Lord seeth not as man seeth ; for man looketh on
the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart.”
1 Sam. xvi, 7 ; see also Luke xvi, 15.
Certainly we ought so to live as if we were living in the very
sight of man ; we ought so to think as if some one were able to gaze
into the inmost recesses of our heart. And, indeed , there is one able
80 to do. For what avails it to keep any thing secret from man ?
Nothing is hid or closed to god : he is present to our minds, and en
ters into the midst of our thoughts." Epist. 83, 1 .
“No one knows god ; many entertain strange and wicked opin
ions about him, even with impunity ." Epist. 31, 9.
3. INDWELLING OF GOD's SPIRIT .
Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the
Spirit of God dwelleth in you ? " 1 Cor. iii , 16.
“ He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken
your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you .” Rom.
viii , 11 .
“ God is near thee ; he is with thee ; he is within thee. . . A
holy spirit resides within us, and is the guardian and observer of
our good and evil deeds.” Epist. 41 , 1.
66
Do you wonder that man goes to the gods ? God comes to men ;
nay, what is nearer , he comes into men . No good mind is without
god . " Epist. 73, 14.
4. FORGIVENESS OF INJURIES.
" Then came Peter unto him and said, Lord , how oft shall
my brother sin against me and I forgive him ? Till seven
times ? Jesus saith unto him , I say not unto thee until seven
times, but until seventy times seven .” Matt . xviii , 21 ; Luke
xvii , 4.
66
If thine enemy hunger, feed him ; if he thirst, give him drink ;
for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head .” Rom.
xii, 20.
“ A wise man will pardon an injury, though it be great, and if he
can do it without breach of piety andfidelity, that is, if the whole in
jury shall pertain to himself .” Epist. 81 , 14.
“ Let him , whoever wishes, treat you with reproach and injury ;
you will suffer nothing so long as you adhere to virtue. If you wish
to be happy, to be a good man in good faith, suffer it that any one
(who chooses) contemn or despise you." Epist. 71, 7.
42 INTRODUCTION .

“ I will be agreeable to friends, gentle and yielding to enemies."

De Vit. Beat. 20, 4.
5. SELF - EXAMINATION .
“ Examine yourselves, whether ye be in the faith ; prove your
own selves . ” 2 Cor. xiii, 5.
“ Let a man examine himself,” etc. 1 Cor. xi, 28.
“ Let us search and try our ways, and turn again to the Lord . ”
Lam. iii, 40.
“ As far as thou canst, accuse thyself, try thyself : discharge the
office, first of a prosecutor, then of a judge, lastly of an intercessor.”
Epist. 28, 7.
“When the light is removed out of sight, and my wife, who is by
this time aware of my practice, is now silent, Ipass the whole of my
day under examination, and I review my deeds and words. I hide
nothing from myself, Ipass over nothing." De Ira, iii, 36, 3.
6. SELF -SACRIFICE FOR OTHERS.
" I will very gladly spend and be spent for you. ” 2 Cor. xii,
15.
“ I am the good shepherd : the good shepherd giveth his life
for the sheep.” John x, 11.
“ Good men toil, they spend, and are spent, willingly indeed .” De
Prov . 5, 3.
“ Let us use these things ( intrusted to us) ; let us not boast of
them ; and let us use them sparingly, as a loan deposited with us
which will soon depart." Epist. 74, 18.
7. DUTIES TOWARDS OTHER MEN .
“ Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye
even
66
so unto them . ” Matt. vii, 12.
Masters, give unto your servants that which is equal and
just, knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven . ” Col. iv, 1 .
“ And if it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably
with all men .” Rom. xii, 18.
“ Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” Matt. xxii, 39.
“ Be kindly affectioned one to another. Recompense no
man evil for evil.” Rom. xii, 10, 17.
“ This is the sum of what I would prescribe ; live 80 with an in
ferior as you would have a superior live with you. ” Epist. 47, 9.
“ Man is born for mutual assistance ." De Ira, i, 5, 2.
 ----
INTRODUCTION . 43

“ You must live for another, if you would live for yourself."
Epist. 48, 2.
“ While we are among men let us cultivate kindness ; let us not be
to any man a cause ofperil or of fear." De Ira, iii, 43, 5.
I will so live as if I knew that I was born for others, and will
give thanks to Nature on this score. ” De Vit. Beat. 20, 2.
“ How must we behave ourselves toroards men and how do we be
have ? What precepts do we give in this respect ? To abstain from
shedding human blood ? But what a small thing is it not to hurt
him to whom we ought to do all the good that lies in our power ? It
is indeed praiseworthy for men to be kindly disposed towards one
another. Shall we, then, direct a man to reach out his hand to the
shipwrecked, to show the wandering traveller his way, and to divide
our bread with the hungry ? Yes, certainly.” Epist. 95, 50, 51.
8. OBEDIENCE TRUE LIBERTY .
“ If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed. . .
Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.”
John viii , 36, 32.
“ Whoso looketh into the perfect law of liberty and continueth
therein .” James i, 25.
“ Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.” 2 Cor. iii,
17.
“ The liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free. " Gal. V,
1.
“ To obey God is ( true) liberty.” De Vit. Beat. 15, 6.
“ It is necessary for you to serve philosophy, in order that true
liberty may fall to your lot” (quoted from Epicurus). Epist. 8, 6.
9. DOMINION OF SIN .
“ The imagination ofman's heart is evil from his youth. ” Gen.
viii, 21 .
“ If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the
truth is not in us." 1 John i, 8.
You hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and
sins.” Gal. ii, 1 , 5 .
“ Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries,”
etc. Matt. xv, 19.
“ If we would be upright judges of all things, let us first persuade
ourselves of this, that not one of us is without fault.” " No one
will befound who can acquit himself; and any man calling himself
44 INTRODUCTION .

innocent, has regard to the witness, not to his own conscience. ” De

Ira, ii , 27,5 ; i, 14, 3.
“We shall ever be obliged to pronounce the same sentence upon our
selves, that we are evil, that we have been evil, and, I will add it un
willingly, that we shall be evil.” “ All vices exist in all men , but
all do not exist in each and every man (alike).” De Benef. i, 10, 3 ;
iv, 27, 2.
" Thefirst and greatest punishment ofsinners is thefact of having
sinned .” Epist. 97, 12.
10. CHASTISEMENTS FOR DISCIPLINE ,
“Behold, happy is the man whom God correcteth ; therefore
despise not thou the chastening of the Almighty.” Job v, 17.
“ For whom the Lord loveth , he chasteneth, and scourgeth
every son whom he receiveth . ” Heb. xii, 6.
“ It is better, if the will of God be so, that ye suffer for well
doing, than for evil doing.” 1 Pet. iii, 17.
“ Blessed are ye when men shall revile you, and persecute you,
and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake : re
joice, and be exceeding glad ; for great is your reward in heav
en .” Matt . v, 11 , 12.
" The gods, however, sometimes chastise, and coerce, and lay heavy
penalties on some men, and punish them under the appearance of
some good. Do you desire to propitiate the gods ? Be a good man .
He has sufficiently and properly worshipped the gods who has imi
tated them ( to the extent of his power ).” Epist. 95, 50.
“ Nature (i. e., the deity) has commanded justice and equity to
us : by her appointment it is more wretched to do an injury than to
suffer one ; and by her command our hands are ever ready to assist
( a brother ).” Epist. 95, 53.
“ God has a fatherly mind towards good men, and loves them
stoutly : and, he says, let them be harassed with toils, with pains,
with losses, that they may gather true strength .” De Prov . 2, 4.
“ Those therefore whom God approves, whom he loves, them he
hardens, he chastises, he disciplines.” De Prov. 4, 7.
“ A life free from care and from any buffetings of fortune is a
dead sea ." Epist. 67, 14.
11. AVARICE, OR LOVE OF MONEY.
“ And he said, This will I do : I will pull down my barns, and
build greater ; and there will I bestow all my fruits and my
 INTRODUCTION . 45

goods. And I will say to my soul, Soul, thou hast much goods
laid up for many years ; take thine ease, eat, drink , and be mer
ry. But God said unto him, Thou fool, this night thy soul shall
be required of thee ; then whose shall those things be which
thou hast provided ?" Matt. xii, 17–19.
“ The love of money is the root of all evil. " 1 Tim. vi, 10.
“ It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle,
than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.” Matt.
xix, 24 .
“Godliness with contentment is great gain .” 1 Tim. vi, 6.
“ Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth
and rust dotlı corrupt for where your treasure is, there will
your heart be also . ” Matt. vi, 19–21 .
Apply thyself to the true riches. It is shameful to depend for a
happy life on silver and gold.” Epist. 110, 18.
“ Let thy good deeds be invested like a treasure deep buried in the
ground , which thou canst not bring to light, except it be necessary.”
De Vit. Beat. 24, 2.
“ O how greut is the madness of those who embark on distant hopes :
Iwill buy, I will build , I will lend out, Iwill demand payment, Iwill
bear honors ; then at length Iwill resign my old age, wearied and sated,
to rest.” Epist. 101 , 4.
“We shall be wise if we desire but little ; if each man takes count
of himself, and at the same time measures his own body, he will know
how little it can contain, and for how short a time. ” Epist. 114, 26.
12. LIFE A WARFARE.
“ Is there not a warfare to every man upon earth ? ” Job vii, 1.
“ So fight I, not as one that beateth the air ; but I keep under
my body, and bring it into subjection, lest that by any means
when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway.”
1 Cor. ix, 26, 27.
Dearly beloved, I beseech you, as strangers and pilgrims, to
abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul.” 1 Pet.
ii , 11 .
“ Thou therefore endure hardness, as a good soldier of Jesus
Christ.” 2 Tim . ii, 3.
' Fight the good fight of faith .” 1 Tim. vi, 12.
“ This I say, brethren , the time is short. It remaineth ..
that (ye) use this world as not abusing it. For the fashion of
this world passeth away.” 1 Cor. vii, 29, 31.
С
46 INTRODUCTION .

“ Life itself, my Lucilius, is a warfare." Epist. 96, 3. See Epist.

120, 13 ; 51 , 5.
“We can never quarrel enough with our vices, which, I beseech you ,
Lucilius, to persecute perpetually. Throw away from you everything
that tears the heart ; and if you cannot otherwise get rid of it, spare
not the heart itself.” Epist. 51 , 13.
“What blows do athletes receive in their face,what blows all over
their body. . . . Yet they bear all the torture from thirst of glory.
Let us also overcome all things, for our reward is not a croron or a
palm -branch, or the trumpeter proclaiming silence for the announce
ment of our name, but virtue and strength of mind, and peace ac
quired ever after .” Epist. 78, 15.
“ The end of all things is at hand ; that (period ), I say, is near ,
whence the happy man is cast out, and the unhappy released .” Epist.
110, 4 .
13. NEED OF DIVINE GRACE .
“By grace are ye saved through faith ; and that not ofyour
selves ; it is the gift of God." Eph. ii, 8.
“ Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as
of ourselves ; but our sufficiency is of God. ” 2 Cor. iii, 5. See
also Rom. vii , 18, 19.
“ Without me ye can do nothing ." John xv, 5.
“ What is it, Lucilius, that, as we are intentionally going one way,
still drives us another ? What is it that detains us there, where we
have no inclination to stay ? What is it that thwarts our will, nor
permits us to determine upon any one thing seriously ? Our thoughts
are ever wavering ; we will nothingfreely, nothing absolutely and al
ways. But horo or when shall we get cured of this (malady) ?
No one has strength enough of himself to emerge ( from it).” Epist.
52, 1. See also Epist. 102.
 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

AD LUCILIUM

QUARE ALIQUA INCOMMODA BONIS VIRIS

ACCIDANT CUM PROVIDENTIA SIT
SIVE

DE PROVIDENTIA

LIBER UNUS.
 Si quis autem volet scire plenius, cur malos et iniustos deus poten
tes, beatos, divites fieri sinat, pios contra humiles, miseros, inopesque
esse patiatur ; sumat eum SENECAE librum , cui titulus est : Quare bonis
viris multa mala accidant, cum sit providentia : in quo ille multa, non
plane imperitia saeculari, sed sapienter ac paene divinitus elocutus est.
LACTANTIUS.
 AD LUCILIUM

DE PROVIDENTIA.

I. QUAESISTI a me, Lucili, quid ita, si providentia

mundus ageretur, multa bonis viris mala accidere ?
Hoc commodius in contextı operis redderetur, cum
praeesse universis providentiam probaremus et inter
esse nobis deum : sed quoniam a toto particulam re
velli placet et unam contradictionem manente lite inte
gra solvere, faciam rem non difficilem , causam deorum
agam . 2. Supervacuum est in praesentia ostendere non
sine aliquo custode tantum opus stare, nec hunc side
rum coetum discursumque fortuiti inpetus esse, et quae
casus incitat saepe turbari et cito arietare, hanc inoffen
sam velocitatem procedere aeternae legis imperio tan
tum rerum terra marique gestantem, tantum clarissimo
rum luminum et ex dispositore lucentium : non esse
, materiae errantis hunc ordinem , nec quae temere coie
runt, tanta arte pendere, ut terrarum gravissimum pon
dus sedeat inmotum et circa se properantis coeli fugam
spectet, ut infusa vallibus maria molliant terras nec
ullum incrementum fluminum sentiant, ut ex minimis
seminibus nascantur ingentia. 3. Ne illa quidem quae
videntur confusa et incerta, pluvias dico nubesque et
elisoram fulminum iactus et incendia ruptis montium
50 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

verticibus effusa, tremores labantis soli et alia quae tu

multuosa pars rerum circa terras movet, sine ratione,
quamvis subita sint, accidunt : sed suas et illa causas
habent non minus quam quac clienis locis conspecta
miraculo sunt, ut in mediis fluctibus calentes aquae et
nova insularum in vasto exsilientium mari spatia. 4.
Iam vero si quis observaverit nudari litora pelago in se
recedente eademque intra exiguum tempus operiri, cre
det caeca
cemite
quadam volutatione modo contrahi undas et
introrsum agi, modo erumpere et magno cursu repetere
sedem suam : cum interim illae portionibus crescunt et
ad horam ac diem subeunt ampliores minoresque, prout
illas lunare sidus elicuit, ad cuius arbitrium oceanus
exundat. Suo ista tempori reserventur eo quidem ma
gis, quod tu non dubitas de providentia, sed quaeris. 5 .
In gratiam te reducam cum dis adversus optimos opti
mis. Neqne enim rerum natura patitur ut umquam
bona bonis noceant. Inter bonos viros ac deos amicitia
est conciliante virtute : amicitiam dico ? immo etiam
necessitudo et similitudo : quoniam quidem bonus tem
pore tantum a deo differt, discipulus eius aemulatorque
et vera progenies, quam parens ille magnificus, virtu
tum non lenis exactor, sicut severi patres, durius edu
cat. 6. Itaque cum videris bonos viros acceptosque dis
laborare, sudare, per arduum escendere, malos autem
lascivire et voluptatibus fluere; cogita filiorum nos mo
destia delectari, vernularım licentia : illos disciplina
tristiori contineri, horum ali audaciam . Idem tibi de
deo liqueat : bonum virum in deliciis non habet: expe
ritur, indurat, sibi illum parat.
II. Quare multa bonis viris adversa eveniunt ? Ni
hil accidere bono viro mali potest : non miscentur contra :
 DE PROVIDENTIA . CAP . II. 51

ria. Quemadmodum tot amnes, tantum superne deiec.

torum imbrium, tanta medicatorum vis fontium non
mutant saporem maris, ne remittunt quidem : ita ad
versarum inpetus rerum viri fortis non vertit animum .
Manet in statu et quicquid evenit, in suum colorem tra
hit. Est enim omnibus externis potentior. Nec hoc
dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit et alioquin quietus pla
cidusqne contra incurrentia adtollitur. 70mnia adversa
exercitationes putat. 2. Quis autem , vir modo et erec... !
tus ad honesta, non est laboris adpetens iusti et ad offi
cia cum periculo promptus ? cui non industrio otium
poena est ? Athletas videmus, quibus virium cura est,
cum fortissimis quibusqne confligere et exigere ab his
per quos certamini praeparantur, ut totis contra ipsos
viribus utantur : caedi se vexarique patiuntur et, si non
inveniunt singulos pares, pluribus simul obiciuntur. 3.
Marcet sine adversario virtus : tunc adparet quanta sit
quantumque polleat, cum quid possit patientia ostendit.
Scias licet idem viris bonis esse faciendum, ut dura ac
difficilia non reformident nec de fato querantur : qnic
quid accidit, boni consulant, in bonum vertant. Non
quid, sed quemadmodum feras interest. Non vides,
quanto aliter patres, aliter matres indulgeant ? illi ex
ercitari iubent liberos ad studia obeunda mature, feri
sphere
atis qnoque diebus non patiuntur esse otiosos et sudo
rem illis et interdum lacrimas excutiunt : at matres
fovere in sinu, continere in umbra volunt, numquam
flere, numqnam contristari, numquam laborare . 4. Pa
trium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum et illos
fortiter amat et, operibus , inquit, doloribus , dainis exa
gitentur, ut verum colligant robur. Langnent per iner
siam saginata nec labore tantum , sed motu et ipso sui
52 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

onere deficiunt. Non fert ullum ictum inlaesa felici.

tas : at ubi adsidua fuit cum incommodis suis rixa, cal
lum per iniurias duxit nec ulli malo cedit, sed etiam si
cecidit, de genu pugnat. 5. Miraris tu, si deus ille bo- t
norum amantissimus, qui illos quam optimos esse atque
excellentissimos vult, fortunam illis cum qua exerce
antur adsignat ? Ego vero non miror. Si aliquando in
petum capiunt, spectant di magnos viros conluctantes
cum aliqua calamitate. Nobis interdum voluptati est, si
adulescens constantis animi inruentem feram venabulo
excepit, si leonis incursuin interritus pertulit: tantoque
hoc spectaculum est gratius, quanto id honestior fecit.
6. Non sunt ista, quae possint deorum in se voltum
convertere, puerilia et humanae oblectamenta levitatis.
Ecce spectaculum dignum ad quod respiciat intentus
operi suo deus ; ecce par deo dignum , vir fortis cum
fortuna mala conpositus, utique si et provocavit. Non
video, inquam , quid habeat in terris Iupiter pulchrius,
si convertere animum velit, quam ut spectet Catonem
iam partibus non semel fractis stantem nihilominus
inter ruinas publicas rectum. 17. Licet, inquit,'omnia
in unius ditionem concesserint, custodiantur legionibus
terrae, classibus maria, Caesarianus portas miles obsi
deat : Cato qua exeat habet. Una manu latam liberta
ti viam faciet : ferrum istud, etiam civili bello purum
et innoxium , bonas tandem ac nobiles edet operas : li
bertatem quam patriae non potuit, Catoni dabit. Ad
gredere, anime, diu meditatum opus, eripe te rebus hn
manis. 8 / Iam Petreius et Inba concucurrerunt ia
centqne alter alterius manu caesi : fortis et egregia fati
conventio, sed quae non deceat magnitudinem nostram :
tam turpe est Catoni mortem ab ullo petere quam vi
 DE PROVIDENTIA . CAP . III. 53

tam . Liquet mihi cum magno spectasse gandio deos,

cum ille vir, acerrimus sui vindex, alienae saluti consulit
et instruit discedentium fugam ; dum studia etiam nocte
ultima tractat, dum gladium sacro pectori infigit, dum
viscera spargit et illain sanctissimam animam indig.
namque quae ferro contaminaretur, manu educit . 9.
Inde crediderim fuisse paruın certum et efficax volnus :
non fuit dis inmortalibus satis spectare Catonem semel:
retenta ac revocata virtus est, ut in difficiliore parte se
ostenderet. Non enim tam magno animo inors inicitur
quam repetitur. Quidni libenter spectarent alunnum
suun tam claro ac memorabili exitu evadentem ? mors
illos consecrat, quorum exitum et qui timent laudant.
III. Sed iain procedente oratione ostendam , quam
non sint quae videntur mala. Nunc illud dico, ista
quae tu vocas aspera, quae adversa et abominanda, pri
mum pro ipsis esse quibus accidunt, deinde pro uni
versis, quorum maior dis cura quam singulorum est :
post hoc volentibus accidere ac dignos malo esse, si
nolint. His adiciam fato ista sic et recte eadem lege
bonis evenire qua sunt boni. Persuadebo deinde tibi,
ne nimynam boni viri miserearis : potest enim miser dici,
non potest esse. 2. Difficillimum ex omnibus quae pro
posui videtur quod primun dixi , pro ipsis esse qnibus
eveninnt ista, quae horremus ac tremimus. Pro ipsis
est, inqnis, in exilium proici , in egestatem deduci, libe
ros, coningem ecferre, ignominia adfici, debilitari ? Si
miraris haec pro aliquo esse, miraberis quosdam ferro
et igne cirari nec minus fame ac siti . Sed si cogitare
ris tecum , remedii causa quibusdam et radi ossa et legi
et extrahi venas et quaedam amputari membra , quae
sine totius pernicie corporis haerere non poterant ; hoe
02
54 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

quoque patieris probari tibi, quaedam incommoda pro

his esse quibus accidunt, tam mehercules quam quae
dam quae laudantur atque adpetuntur, contra eos esse
quos delectaverunt, simillima cruditatibus ebrietatibus
que et ceteris quae necant per voluptatem . 3. Inter
multa magnifica Demetrii nostri et haec vox est, a qua
recens sum : sonat adhuc et vibrat in auribus meis.
Nihil, inquit, mihi videtur infelicius eo, cui nihil
umquam evenit adversi. Non licuit enim illi se expe
riri. Ut ex voto illi fluxerint omnia, ut ante votum,
male tamen de illo di iudicaverunt: indignus visus est
a quo vinceretur aliquando fortuna, quae ignavissimum
quemque refugit, quasi dicat: Quid ergo istum mihi
adversarium adsumam ? statim arma submittet : non
opus est in illum tota potentia mea : levi conminatione
pelletur : non potest sustinere voltum meum. 4. Alius
circumspiciatur cum quo conferre possimus manum :
pudet congredi cum homine vinci parato. Ignominiam
iudicat gladiator cum inferiore conponi et scit eum
sine gloria vinci, qui sine periculo vincitur. Idem facit
fortuna ; fortissimos sibi pares quaerit, quosdam fas
tidio transit. Contumacissimum quemque et rectissi
mum adgreditur, adversus quem vim suam intendat.
5. Ignem experitur in Mucio, paupertatem in Fabricio,
c .6.283
exilium in Rutilio, tormenta in Regulo, venenum in
Socrate, mortem in Catone. Magnum exemplum nisi
mala fortuna non invenit. Infelix est Mucius, quod
dextera ignes hostium premit et ipse a se exigit erroris
sui poenas ? quod regem quein armata manu non po
tuit, exusta fugat ? Quid ergo ? felicior esset, si in sinu
amicae foveret manum ? 6. Infelix est Fabricins , quod
rus suum , quantum a republica vacavit, fodit ? quod
 DE PROVIDENTIA . CAP . III . 55

bellum tam cum Pyrrho quam cum divitiis gerit ? quod

ad focum coenat illas ipsas radices et herbas, quas in
repurgando agro triumphalis senex vulsit ? Quid ergo ?
felicior esset, si in ventrem suum longinqui litoris pisces
et peregrina aucupia congereret ? si conchyliis superi admaits
atque inferi maris pigritiam stomachi naustantis erige
ret ? si ingenti pomorum strue cingeret primae formae
feras, captas multa caede venantium ? 7. Infelix est
Rutilius, quod qui illum damnaverunt, causam dicent
omnibus seculis ? quod aequiore animo passus est se pa
triae eripi quam sibi exilium ? Quod Sullae dictatori
solus aliquid negavit et revocatus non tantum retro
cessit, sed longius fugit? Viderint, inquit, isti quos Ro-.
mae deprehendit felicitas tua. Videant largum in foro
sanguinem et supra Servilianum lacum id enim pro
scriptionis Sullanae spoliarium est) senatorum capita et
passim vagantis per urbem percussorum greges et multa
milia civium Romanorum uno loco post fidem , immo
per ipsam fidem trucidata. Videant ista qui exulare
non possunt. 8. Quid ergo ? felix est L. Sulla, quod illi
descendenti ad forum gladio submovetur, quod capita
sibi consularium virorum patitur ostendi et pretium
caedis per quaestorem ac tabulas publicas numerat ? et
haec omnia facit ille, ille qui legem Corneliam tulit.
Veniamus ad Regulum : quid illi fortuna nocnit, quod
illum documentum fidei, documentum patientiae fecit ?
Figunt cntem clavi et qnocumque fatigatuin corpus re
clinavit, volneri incumbit, in perpetnam vigiliam sus 1 ...
pensa sunt lumina. 9. Quanto plus tormenti tanto
plus erit gloriae. Vis scire quam non poeniteat hoc
pretio aestimasse virtutem ? Refice illum et mitte in se
Datum : eamdem sententiam dicet. Feliciorem ergo tu
56 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

Maecenatem putas, cui amoribus anxio et morosae uxo

ris cotidiana repudia deflenti somnus per symphonia
rum cantum ex longinquo lene resonantium quaeritur ?
Mero se ' licet sopiat et aquarum fragoribus avocet et
mile voluptatibus mentem anxiam fallat; tain vigilabit
in pluma quam ille in cruce. Sed illi solatium est pro
honesto dura tolerare et ad causam a patientia respicit:
hunc voluptatibus marcidum et felicitate nimia labo
rantem magis his quae patitur, vexat causa patiendi.
10. Non usque eo in possessionem generis humani vitia
venerunt, ut dubium sit, an electione fati data plures
nasci Reguli quam Maecenates velint. Aut si quis
fuerit, qui andeat dicere Maecenatem se quam Regn
lum nasci maluisse ; idem iste, taceat licet, nasci se
Terentiam maluit. Male tractatum Socratem iudicas,
quod illam potionem publice mixtam non aliter quam
medicamentum inmortalitatis obduxit et de morte dis
putavit usque ad ipsam ? male cum illo actum est, quod
gelatus est sanguis ac paulatim frigore inducto vena
rum vigor constitit / 11. Quanto magis huic inviden
dum est quam illis, quibus gemma ministratur, quibus
exoletus omnia pati doctus exsectae virilitatis aut du
biae suspensam auro nivem diluit ? Hi quicquid bibe
runt, vomitu remetientur tristes et bilem suam re
gustantes ; at ille venenum laetus et libens hauriet.
Quod ad Catonem pertinet, satis dictum est summam
que illi felicitatem contigisse consensus hominum fate
bitur : quem sibi rerun natura delegit cum qno metu
enda collideret. 12. Inimicitiae potentium graves sunt ? XХ
opponatur simul Pompeio, Caesari , Crasso. Grave est
a deterioribus honore anteiri ? Vatinio postferatur .
Grave est civilibus bellis interesse ? toto terrarum orbe
 DE PROVIDENTIA . CAP. IV . 57

pro causa bona tam infeliciter quam pertinaciter mili

tet. Grave est sibi manus adferre ? faciat. Quid per
haec conseqnar ? ut omnes sciant non esse haec mala,
qnibus ego dignum Catonem putavi.
IV. Prospera in plebem ac vilia ingenia deveni
unt: at calamitates terroresque mortalium sub iugum
mittere proprium magui viri est. Semper vero esse
felicem et sine morsu animi transire vitain ignorare est
rerum naturae alteram partein. Magnus es vir : sed
unde scio, si tibi fortuna non dat facultatem exhi
bendae virtutis ? 2. Descendisti ad Olympia, sed nemo
praeter te : coronam habes, victoriam non habes. Non
gratulor tamquam viro forti, sed tamquam consulatum
praeturam ve adepto : honore auctus es. Idein dicere et
bono viro possum , si illi nullain occasionem difficilior
casus dedit in qua una vim sui animi ostenderet. 3.
Miserum te iudico, quod numquam fuisti miser : tran
sisti sine adversario vitam. Nemo sciet quid potueris:
ne tu quidein ipse. Opus est enim ad notitiam sui ex
perimento : quid quisque posset nisi temptando non
didicit. Itaque quidam ipsi ultro se cessantibus malis
obtulerunt et virtuti iturae in obscurum occasionem per
quam enitesceret quaesierunt./ 4. Gaudent, inqnam, 19
magni viri aliquando rebus adversis, non aliter quam
fortes milites bellis triumphant. Ego murmillonem sub
Tiberio Caesare de raritate munerum audivi queren
tem : Quam bella, inquit, aetas perit ! Avida est peri
culi virtns et quo tendat,non quid passura sit cogitat :
quoniam etiam quod passura est, gloriae pars est. Mili
tares viri gloriantur volneribus, laeti fluentem meliori
casu sanguinem ostentant. Idem licet fecerint qui in
tegri revertuntur ex acie, magis spectatur qui saucius
58 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

redit. 5. Ipsis, inquam, deus consulit, quos esse quam

honestissimos cupit, quotiens illis materiam praebet ali
quid animose fortiterqne faciendi ; ad quam rem opus
est aliqua rerum difficultate. Gubernatorem in tem
pestate, in acie militem intellegas. Unde possum scire,
quantum adversus paupertatem tibi animi sit, si divitiis
diffluis ? Unde possum scire, quantum adversus igno
miniam et infamiam odiumqne populare constantiae
habeas, si inter plausus senescis ? si te inexpugnabilis et
inclinatione quadam mentium pronus favor sequitur ?
6. Unde scio, quam aequo animo laturus sis orbitatem ,
si quoscumque sustulisti, vides ? Audivi te, cum alios
consolareris : tunc conspexissem , si te ipse consolatus
esses, si te ipse dolere vetuisses. Nolite, obsecro vos, ex
pavescere ista, quae di inmortales velut stimulos admo
vent animis. Calamitas virtutis occasio est. Illos me
rito quis dixerit miseros, qui nimia felicitate torpescunt,
quos velut in mari lento tranquillitas iners detinet. 7.
Quicquid illis inciderit, novum veniet : magis urgent
saeva inexpertos : grave est terere cervicibus iugum .
Ad suspicionem volneris tiro pallescit ; audacter vete
ranus cruorem suum spectat, qui scit se saepe vicisse
post sanguinem. Hos itaque deus quos probat, quos
amat, indurat, recognoscit, exercet : eos autem quibus
indulgere videtur, quibus parcere, molles venturis malis
servat. Erratis enim, si quem iudicatis exceptum : ve
niet ad illum diu felicem sua portio. 8. Quisquis vide
tur dimissus esse, dilatus est. Quare deus optimum
quemque ant mala valitudine ant luctu aut aliis incom
modis adficit ? Quia in castris quoque periculosa fortis
simis imperantur, dux lectissimos mittit qui nocturnis
hostes adgrediantur insidiis aut explorent iter aut prae
 DE PROVIDENTIA . CAP. IV . 59

sidium loco deiciant. Nemo eorum qui exeunt dicit,

Male de me imperator meruit ; sed, Bene iudicavit.
Idem dicant quicumque iubentur pati timidis igna
visque flebilia ; Digni visi sumus deo in quibus expe
riretur, quantum humana natura posset pati. Fugite
delicias, fugite enervatam felicitatem , qua animi perma .al
descunt, nisi aliquid intervenit quod humanae sortis ad
moneat, velut perpetua ebrietate sopiti. 9. Quem specu
laria semper ab adflatu vindicaverunt, cuius pedes inter
fomenta , subinde mutata tepuerunt, cuius coenationes
subditus et parietibus circumfusus calor temperavit,
hunc levis aura non sine periculo stringet. Cum omnia
quae excesserunt modum noceant, periculosissima felici
tatis intemperantia est. Moret cerebrum, in vanas
mentes imagines evocat, multum inter falsum ac verum
mediae caliginis fundit. 10. Quidni iis satius sit perpe
tuam infelicitatem advocata virtute sustinere quam infi
nitis atque inmodicis bonis rumpi ? Lenior ieiunio mors
est : cruditate dissiliunt. Hanc itaque rationem di se
quuntur in bonis viris, quain in discipulis suis prae
ceptores ; qui plus laboris ab iis exigunt, in quibus
certior spes est. Numquid tu invisos esse Lacedaemo
niis liberos suos credis, quorum experiuntur indolem
publice verberibus admotis ? Ipsi illos patres adhor
tantur, ut ictus flagellorum fortiter perferant et lace
ros ac semianimes rogant, perseverent volnera praebere
volneribus. 11. Quid mirum, si dure generosos spiritus
deus temptat ? numquam virtutis molle documentum
est. Verberat nos et lacerat fortuna : patimur: non est
saevitia, certamen est : quod si saepius adierimus, for
tiores erimus. Solidissima corporis pars est quam fre
quens usus agitavit. Praebendi fortunae sumus, ut
60 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

contra illam ab ipsa duremur. Paulatim nos sibi pares

faciat: contemptum periculorum adsiduitas periclitandi
dabit. Sic sunt nanticis corpora a ferendo mari dura ;
agricolis manus tritae ; ad excutienda tela militares
lacerti valent; agilia sunt membra cursoribus. Id in
quoque solidissimum est quod exercuit. 12. Ad con- x
temnendam inalorum potentiam animus patientia perve
nit : quae quid in nobis efficere possit scies, si adspexe
ris, quantum nationibus nudis et inopia fortioribus labor
praestet. Omnes considera gentes, in quibus Romana
pax desinit, Germanos dico et quicquid circa Istrom
vagarum gentium occursat. Perpetua illos liems, triste
coelum premit, maligne solum sterile sustentat, imbrem
culmo ant fronde defendunt, super durata glacie stagna
persultant, in alimentum feras captant. 13. Miseri tibi
videntur ? nihil iniserum est qnod in naturam constie
tudo perduxit: paulatim enim voluptati sunt qnae
necessitate coeperunt. Nulla illis domicilia nullaeque
sedes sunt, nisi quas lassitudo in diem posuit: vilis et
hic quaerendus manu victus, horrenda iniquitas coeli,
intecta corpora : hoc quod tibi calamitas videtur, tot
gentium vita est. 14. Quid miraris bonos viros, ut con
firmentur, concuti ? Non est arbor solida nec fortis,
nisi in qnam frequens l'entus incursat : ipsa eniin vexa
tione constringitur et radices certius figit. Fragiles sunt
quae in aprica ralle crererunt. Pro ipsis ergo bonis
viris est, ut esse interriti possint, multum inter forinido
losa versari et aequo animo ferre quae non sunt mala
nisi male sustinenti.
V. Adice nunc, quod pro omnibus est optimum
quemque, ut ita dicam , militare et edere operas. Hoc
est propositum deo quod sapienti viro, ostendere haec
 DE PROVIDENTIA . CAP. V. 61

quae volgus adpetit, quae reformidat, nec bona esse

nec mala : adparebunt autem bona esse, si illa non
nisi bonis viris tribuerit, et mala esse , si tantum ma
lis inrogarerit. Detestabilis erit caecitas, si nemo
oculos perdiderit, nisi cui eruendi sunt. Itaqne ca
reant luce Appius et Metellus. Non sunt divitiae
bonum . 2. Itaque habeat illas et Elius leno, ut ho
mines pecuniam , cum in templis consecraverint, vi
deant et in forpice. Nullo modo magis potest denis
concupita traducere, quam si illa ad turpissiinos bede ds
fert, ab optimis abigit. At iniquum est virum bo
num debilitari aut constringi aut adligari , malos inte
gris corporibus solutos ac delicatos incedere. 3. Quid
porro ? non est iniquum fortes viros alma sumere et
in castris pernoctare et pro vallo obligatis stare vol
neribus, interim in urbe securos esse praecisos et
professos inpudicitiam ? Quid porro ? non est ini
quum nobilissimas virgines ad sacra facienda nocti
bus excitari, altissimo somno inqninatas frui? Labor
optimos citat. Senatus per totum diem saepe consu
litur, cum illo tempore vilissiinus quisqne ant in
campo otium suum oblectet aut in popina lateat ant
tempns in aliquo circulo terat. Idem in hac magna
republica fit : boni viri laborant, inpendunt, inpen
duntur et volentes quidem ; non trahuntur a fortuna,
sequuntur illam et aequant gradus: si scissent, ante
cessissent. 4. Hanc quoque animosam Demetrii for
tissimi viri vocem audisse me memini : Hoc unum ,
inquit, de vobis, di inmortules, qucri possum , quod
non ante mihi voluntatem vestram notam fecistis.
Prior enim ad ista venissem , ad quae nunc vocatus
adsum . Vultis liberos sumere ? vobis illos sustuli.
62 L. ANNAEI BENECAE

Vultis aliquam partem corporis ? sumite. Non

magnam rem promitto : cito totum relinquam .
Vultis spiritum ? Quidni ? nullam moram faciam ,
quo minus recipiatis quod dedistis : a volente fere
tis quicquid petieritis. Quid ergo est ? maluissem
offerre quam tradere. Quid opus fuit auferre ?
accipere potuistis. Sed ne nunc quidem auferetis,
quia nihil eripitur nisi retinenti. Nihil cogor,
nihil patior invitus nec servio deo, sed adsentior :
eo quidem magis, quod scio omnia certa et in ae
ternum dicta lege decurrere. 5. Fata nos ducunt et
quantum cnique temporis restat, prima nascentium
hora disposuit. Cansa pendet ex causa , privata ac
publica longus ordo rerum trahit. Ideo fortiter omne
patiendum est, quia non, ut putamus, incidunt cuncta,
sed veniunt. Olim constitutum est quid gaudeas, quid
fleas ; et quamvis magna videatur varietate singulorum
vita distingui, summa in unum venit ; accipimus peri
tura perituri. 6. Quid itaque indignamur ? quid que
rimur ? ad hoc parati sumus. Utatur ut vult suis na
tura corporibus : nos laeti ad omnia et fortes cogite
mus nihil perire de nostro . Quid est boni viri ? prae
bere se fato. Grande solatium est cum universo rapi.
Quicquid est quod nos sic vivere, sic mori iussit, eadem
necessitate et deos adligat : inrevocabilis humana pari
ter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium condi
tor et rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur : sem
per paret, semel inssit. 7. Quare tamen deus tam
iniquus in distributione fati fuit, ut bonis viris pau
pertatem et volnera et acerba funera adscriberet ?
Non potest artifex mutare materiam : haec passa est.
Quaedam separari a quibusdam non possunt, cohaerent,
 A
tle TI

enud rse DE PR
O VI
DEN
. CA
P
. VI . 63

individua sunt. Languida ingenia et in somnum itura

aut in vigiliam somno simillimam inertibus nectuntur
elementis : ut efficiatur vir cum cura dicendus, fortiore
co fato opusest. Non eritilli planum iter: sursum opor
tet ac deorsum eat, fluctuetur ac navigium in turbido
regat : contra fortunam illi tenendus esť cursus. 8.
Multa accident dura, aspera, sed quae molliat et con
planet ipse. Ignis aurun probat, miseria fortes viros.
Vide qnam alte escendere debeat virtus : scies illi non
per secura vadendum esse.
Ardua prima via est et quam vix mane recentes
Enituntun equi : medio est altissima coelo,,
Unde mare et terras ipsi mihi saepe videre
Sit timor et pavida trepidetformidine pectus.
Ultimaprona via est et eget moderamine certo :
Tunc etiam quae me subiectis excipit undis,
Neferar in praeceps, Tethys solet ima vereri.
9. Haec cum audisset ille generosus adulescens, Pla
cet, inquit, via : escendo : est tanti per ista ire casuro .
Non desinit acrem animum metu territare :

Utque viam teneas nulloque errore traharis,

Per tamen adversi gradieris cornua tauri
mahall
Haemoniosque arcus violentique ora leonis.
agittornes
Post haec ait, Iunge datos currus : his quibus de
terreri me putas, incitor : libet illic stare ubi ipse Sol
trepidat : humilis et inertis est tuta sectari : per alta
virtus it.
VI. Quare tamen bonis viris patitur aliquid mali
dens fieri ? Ille vero non patitur. Omnia mala ab
illis removit, scelera et flagitia et cogitationes impro
64 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

bas et arida consilia et libidinem caecam et alieno

inminentem avaritiain : ipsos tuetur ас vindicat.
Nunquid hoc quoque aliquis a deoexigit, nt boño SA112

rum virorum etiam sarcinas servet ? reinittunt ipsi

erna contemuunt. Democritus
hanc deo curam ; externa contemnunt.
divitias proiecit onus illas bonae inentis existimans :
quid ergo miraris, si id dens bono viro accidere pa
titur, quod vir bonus aliquando vult
yn sibi accidere ?
2. Filios amittunt viri boni: quidni, cum aliquando et
occidant ? In exilium mittuntur : quidni , cum ali
quando ipsi patriam non repetituri relinquant ? Oc
ciduntur : quidui, cum aliquando ipsi sibi manus ad
ferant ? Quare quaedam dura patiuntur ? ut alios
pati doceant : nati sunt in exemplar: 3. Puta itaqne
deum dicere : Quid habetis quod de me qneri possi
tis vos quibus,recta,placuerunt? Aliis bona falsa cir
cumdedi et animos inanes velut longo fallacique som
nio lusi : auro illos et argento et ebore adornavi :
intus boni nihil est. Isti quos pro felicibus adspici
tis, si non qua occurrunt, sed qua latent videritis, mi
serisunt, sórdidi,turpes ad similitudinem
suor extr cult .
felicitasinse
cera um i 'on est ista solida et sin
cus a est
: crust *

tenuis.' 4. Ita
qne dum illis licet stare et ad arbitrium snum ostendi,
nitent et inponunt : cum aliquid incidit quod disturbet
ac detegat, tunc adparet quantum altae ac verae foedi
tatis alienus splendor absconderit. Vobis dedi bona
certa, mansura , quanto magis versaverit aliqnis et un
diqne inspexerit, meliora maioraque. Permisi vobis
metuenda contemnere, cnpiditates fastidire : non ful
getis extrinsecus ; bona vestra introrsus obversa sunt.
Sic mundus exteriora contempsit spectaculo sui laetus :
 DE PROVIDENTIA . CAP . VI . 65

intus omne posuit bonum. Non egere felicitate fe

licitas vestra est. 5. At multa incidunt tristia, hor
renda, dura toleratu . Quia non poteram vos istis
subducere, animos vestros adversus omnia armavi.
Ferte fortiter : hoc est quo deum antecedatis :
ille extra patientiam malorum est, vos supra patien
tiam . Contemnite paupertatem : nemo tam pauper
vivit quam natus est. Contemnite dolorem : aut sol.
vetur ant solvet. Contemnite mortein': qnae vos aut
finit aut transfert. Contemnite fortunam : nullum
illi telum quo feriret animum , dedi. 6. Ante omnia
cavi, ne quis vos teneret invitos : patet exitus. Si
pugnare non vultis, licet fugere. Ideo ex omnibus
rebus quas esse vobis necessarias volui, nihil feci fa
cilius quain mori. Prono animam loco posui ; tra
hitur. Adtendite modo et videbitis quam brevis ad
libertatem et quam expedita ducat via. Non tam
longas in exitu vobis quam intrantibus moras posui :
alioquin magnum in vos regnum fortuna tenuisset, si
homo tam tarde moreretur quam nascitur. 7. Omne
tempus, omnis vos locus doceat, quam facile sit re
nuntiare naturae et munus illi sunm inpingere. Inter
ipsa altaria et sollemnes sacrificantium ritus, dum
optatur vita, mortem condiscite. Corpora opina
taurorum exiguo concidunt volnere et magnarum
virium animalia humanae manus ictus inpellit : tenui
ferro commissura cervicis abrumpitur, et cum arti
culus ille qui capnt collumqne committit incisus est,
tanta illa moles corruit. 8. Non in alto latet spiritus
nec ntiqne ferro ernendus est : non smt volnere peni
tus inpresso scrutanda praecordia : in proximo mors
est. Non certum ad hos ictus aestimavi locum ; qua
66 L. ANNAEI SENECAE DE PROVIDENTIA . CAP. VI.

cumque via pervium est. Ipsum illud quod vocatur

mori, quo anima discedit a corpore, brevius est, quain
ut sentiri tanta velocitas possit. Sive fauces nodus
elisit, sive spiramentum aqua praeclusit, sive in caput
lapsos subiacentis soli duritia conminuit, sive haustus
ignis cursum animae remeantis interscidit : quicquid
est, properat. Ecquid erubescitis ? quod tam cito fit,
timetis diu ?

KWONDO
AIN

P A N

Genius of the Roman People. From a coin of Antoninus Pius, in the

British Museum .
 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

AD SERENUM

DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI

LIBER UNUS.
 In ipsa eloquentia, Seneca, duae tuae virtutes eximiae ; copia in
brevitate, vehementia in facilitate. De copia, bonus iudex et sagax
statim agnoscit, et Fabius (Quintil. ) ut peculiarem virtutem etiam
alibi adsignat. At de vehementia egy eius miror : et est tota
oratio fere accincta, intenta, et robur in ea et acrimonia, qua vel ad
Demosthenem se iactet. .. Iudica sic , bone Lector, et bono tuo
Senecam ama. LIPSIUS.
 AD SERENUM

DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI.

I. INQUIRENTI mihi in me qnaedam vitia adpare

bant, Seneca, in aperto posita quae manu prenderem ,
quaedam obscuriora et in recessu, quaedam non con
tinua, sed ex intervallis redeuntia ; quae vel molestis
sima dixerim , ut hostes vagos et ex occasionibus adsi
lientes, per qnos neutrum licet, nec tamquam in bello
paratum esse nec tamquam in pace securum . Illum
tamen habitum in me maxime deprendo (quare enim
non verum ut medico fatear ?) nec bona fide libera
tum eis, quae timebam et oderam , nec rursus obnox
ini . 2. In statu ut non pessimo, ita maxime que
rnlo et moroso positus sum : nec aegroto nec valeo.
Non est, quod dicas omnium virtutum tenera esse
principia, tempore illis duramentum et robur acce
dere. Non ignoro etiam quae in speciem laborant,
dignitatein dico et eloquentiae famam et quicquid
ad alienum suffragium venit, mora convalescere : et
quae veras vires parant et qnae ad placendum fuico
quodam subornantur, exspectant amnos, donec paula
tin colorem diuturnitas ducat : sed ego vereor, ne
consuetndo, qnae rebus adfert constantiam , hoc vi
tiuin mihi altius figat. 3. Tain malorum quam bo
D
70 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

norum longa conversatio amorem induit. Haec ani

mi inter utrumque dubii nec ad recta fortiter nec ad
prava vergentis infirmitas qualis sit, non tam semel
tibi possum quam per partes ostendere. Dicam quae
accidant mihi : tu morbo nomen invenies. Tenet me
summus amor parsimoniae, fateor : placet non in am
bitionem cubile conpositum, non ex arcula prolata
vestis, non ponderibus ac mille tormentis splendere
cogentibus expressa, sed domestica et vilis, nec serva
ta nec sumenda sollicite. 4. Placet cibus, quem nec
parent familiae nec spectent, non ante multos impe
ratus dies nec multorum manibus ministratus, sed
parabilis facilisque, nihil habens arcessiti pretiosive,
ubilibet non defuturus, nec patrimonio nec corpori
gravis, non rediturus qua intraverit. Placet minister
incultus et rudis vernula, argentum grave rustici patris
sine ullo nomine artificis, et mensa non varietate ma
cularum conspicua nec per multas dominorum ele
gantium successiones civitati nota, sed in usum po
sita, quae nullius convivae oculos nec voluptate more
tur nec accendat invidia. 5. Cum bene ista placue
runt, praestringit animum adparatus alicuius paeda
gogii, diligentius quam in tralatu vestita et auro
culta mancipia et agmen servorum nitentium : iam
domus etiam qua calcatur pretiosa et divitiis per
omnes angulos dissipatis, tecta ipsa fulgentia et ad
sectator comesque patrimoniorum pereuntium popu
lus. Quid perlucentis ad imum aquas et circumflu
entes ipsa convivia, quid epulas loquar scena sua
dignas ? 6. Circumfudit me ex longo frugalitatis situ
venientem multo splendore luxuria et undique circum
sonuit. Paulum titubat acies : facilius adversus illam
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP . I. 71

animum quam oculos adtollo. Recedo itaque non

peior, sed tristior ; nec inter illa frivola mea tam altus
incedo tacitusque morsus subit et dubitatio, numquid
illa meliora sint : nihil horum me mutat, nihil tamen
non concutit. Placet vim praeceptorum sequi et in
mediam ire rempublicam : placet honores fascesque
non scilicet purpura aut virgis adductum capessere,
sed ut amicis propinquisque et omnibus civibus, omni
bus deinde mortalibus paratior utiliorque sim. 7.
Promptus, coppositus sequor Zenona, Cleanthen, Chry
sippum ; quorum tamen nemo ad rempublicam acces
sit et nemo non misit. Ubi aliquid aniinam insolitam
arietari percussit, ubi aliquid occurrit aut indignum,
ut in omni vita humana multa sunt, aut parum ex
facili fluens, aut multum temporis res non magno ae
stimandae poposcerunt, ad otium convertor et quem
admodum pecoribus fatigatis quoque velocior do
mum gradus est, placet intra parietes suos vitam co
ercere. 8. Nemo ullum auferat diem nihil dignum
tanto inpendio redditurus : sibi ipse animus haereat,
se colat, nihil alieni agat, nihil quod ad iudicem
spectet : ametur expers publicae privataeque curae
tranquillitas. Sed ubi lectio fortior erexit animum
et aculeos subdiderunt exempla nobilia, prosilire libet
in forum , commodare alteri vocem , alteri operam,
etiam si nihil profuturam , tamen conaturam prodesse,
alicuius coercere in foro superbiam male secundis re
bus elati. 9. In studiis puto mehercules melius esse
res ipsas intueri et harum causa loqui, ceterum verba
rebus permittere, ut qua duxerint hac inelaborata se
quatur oratio. Quid opus est seculis duratura con
ponere ? Vis tu non id agere, ne te posteri taceant ?
72 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

morti natus es : minus molestiarum habet funus ta

citum : itaque occupandi temporis causa, in usum
tuum , non in praeconium aliquid simplici stilo scribe :
minore labore opus est studentibus in diem . 10. Rur
suis ubi se animus cogitationum magnitudine levavit,
ambitiosus in verba est altiusque ut sperare ita elo
qui gestit et ad dignitatem rerum exit oratio : oblitus
tum legis pressiorisque iudicii sublimius feror et ore
iam non meo . Ne singula diutius persequar, in omni
bus rebus haec me sequitur bonae mentis infirmitas :
cui ne paulatim defluam vereor, ant quod est sollici
tius, ne semper casuro similis pendeam et plus for
tasse sit quam quod ipse pervideo. Familiariter enim
domestica adspicimus et semper iudicio favor officit.
11. Puto multos potuisse ad sapientiam pervenire,
nisi putassent se pervenisse, nisi qnaedam in se dissi
mulassent, quaedam opertis oculis transsiluissent. Non
est eniin , qnod magis aliena iudices adulatione nos pe
rire quain nostra. Quis sibi verum dicere ausus est ?
quis non inter laudantium blandientiumque positus
greges plurimum tamen sibi ipse adsentatus est ? 12.
Rogo itaque, si quod habes remedium quo hanc fluctu
ationem meam sistas, dignum me putes, qui tibi tran
quillitatem debeam . Non esse periculosos motus ani
mi nec quicquam tumultuosi adferentis scio : ut rera
tibi similitudine id, de quo qneror, exprimam , non
tempestate vexor, sed nausia . Detrahe ergo, quic
quid hoc est mali, et succurre in conspectu terrarum
laboranti .
II. Quaero mehercules iam dudum , Serene, ipse
tacitus, oni talem ad fectum animi similem pntein ; nec
ulli propius admoveriun exemplo quam eorum , qui ex
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP . II. 73

longa et gravi valitudine expliciti motiunculis levi

busque interim offensis perstringuntur et, cum re
liquias effugerunt, suspicionibus tamen inquietantur
medicisque iam sani manum porrigunt et omnem
calorem corporis sui calumniantur. Horum , Serene,
non parum sanum est corpuis, sed sanitati parum ad

suevit : sicut est qnidam treinor etiam tranquilli ma

ris, utque lacus, cum ex tempestate requievit. 2. Opus
est itaque non illis durioribus, quae etiam transcucurri
mus, ut alicubi obstes tibi, alicubi irascaris, alicubi in
stes gravis : sed illud, quod ultimum venit, ut fidem
tibi habeas et recta ire te via credas, nihil avocatus
transrersis multorum restigiis passim discurrentium ,
quorumdam circa ipsam errantium viam. 3. Quod
desideras autem , magnum et summum est deoque vi
cinum , non concuti. Hanc stabilem animi sedem
Graeci súduulav vocant, de qua Democriti rolumen
egregium est : ego tranquillitatem voco : nec enim
imitari et transferre verba ad illorum formam necesse
est : res ipsa, de qua agitur, aliquo signanda nomine
est, qnod adpellationis Graecae vim debet habere, non
faciem . 4. Ergo quaerimus, qnomodo animus sem
per aequalis secundoqne cursu eat propitiusque sibi
sit et sua laetus adspiciat et hoc gaudium non inter
rumpat, sed placido statu maneat nec adtollens se um
quam nec deprimens. Id tranquillitas erit. Quo
modo ad hanc perveniri possit, in universum quae
ramus : sumes tu ex publico remedio quantum voles.
Totum interim vitium in medium protrahendum est ;
ex quo agnoscet quisque partem suam : simul tu in
telleges, quanto minus negotii habeas cum fastidio
tui quam hi, quos ad professionem speciosam adliga
74 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

tos et sub ingenti titulo laborantis in sua simulatione

pudor magis quam voluntas tenet. 5. Omnes in ea
dem causa sunt, et hi qui levitate vexantur ac taedio
adsiduaque mutatione propositi, quibus semper magis
placet quod reliquerunt, et illi, qui marcent et osci
tantur. Adice eos, qui non aliter quam quibus diffi
cilis somnus est, versant se et hoc atque illo modo
conponunt, donec quietem lassitudine inveniant : sta
tum vitae suae formando subinde in eo novissime ma
nent, in quo illos non mutandi odium, sed senectus ad
novandum pigra deprendit. Adice et illos, qui non
inconstantiae vitio parum leves sunt, sed inertiae. Vi
vunt non quomodo volunt, sed quomodo coeperunt.
Innumerabiles deinceps proprietates sunt, sed unus
effectus vitii, sibi displicere. 6. Hoc oritur ab intem
perie animi et cupiditatibus timidis aut parum pros
peris ; ubi aut non audent, quantum concupiscunt,
aut non consequuntur et in spem toti prominent, sem
per instabiles mobilesque sunt, quod necesse est acci
dere pendentibus ad vota sua : omni vita pendent et
inhonesta se ac difficilia docent coguntque ; et ubi
sine praemio labor est, torquet illos inritum dedecus,
nec dolent prava, sed frustra voluisse. 7. Tunc illos
et poenitentia coepti tenet et incipiendi timor subre
pitque illa animi iactatio non invenientis exitum, quia
nec imperare cupiditatibus suis nec obsequi possunt,
et cunctatio vitae parum se explicantis et inter desti
tnta vota torpentis animi situs. Quae omnia graviora
sunt, ubi odio infelicitatis operosae ad otium perfu
gerunt et ad secreta studia, quae pati non potest ani
mus ad civilia erectus agendique cupidus et natura
inquietus, parum silicet in se solatiorum habens : ideo
 DE TRANQUILLI'TATE ANIMİ. CAP . II. 75

detractis oblectationibus, quas ipsae occupationes dis

currentibus praebent, domum , solitudinem , parietes non
fert, invitus adspicit se sibi relictum . 8. Hinc illud
est taedium et displicentia sui et nusquam residentis
animi volutatio et otii sui tristis atque aegra patientia ;
utique ubi causas fateri pudet et tormenta introrsus
egit verecundia, in angusto inclusae cupiditates sine
exitu se ipsae strangulant. Inde moeror marcorque
et mille fluctus mentis incertae, quam spes inchoatae
habent suspensam , deploratam , tristem : inde ille ad
fectus otium suum detestantium querentiumque nihil
ipsos habere quod agant, et alienis incrementis inimi
cissima invidia . 9. Alit enim livorem infelix inertia
et omnes destrui cupiunt, quia se non potuere prove
here : ex hac deinde aversatione alienorum processu
um et suorum desperatione obirascens fortunae ani
mus et de seculo querens et in angulos se retrahens
et poenae incubans suae, dum illum taedet sui piget
que. Natura enim humanus animus agilis est et pro
nus ad motus : grata omnis illi excitandi se abstra
hendique materia est, gratior pessimis quibusque in
geniis, quae occupationibus libenter deteruntur. 10.
Ut ulcera quaedam nocituras manus adpetunt et tactu
gandent et foedam corporum scabiem delectat quic
quid exasperat : non aliter dixerim his mentibus, in
quas cupiditates relut mala ulcera eruperunt, voluptati
esse laborem vexationemque. Sunt enim quaedam ,
quae corpus quoque nostrum cum quodam dolore de
lectent, ut versare se et mutare nondum fessum latus,
et alio atque alio positu ventilari. 11. Qualis ille
Homericus Achilles est, modo pronus, modo supinus,
in varios habitus se ipse conponens, quod proprium
76 L. ANNA EI SENECAE

aegri est, nihil diu pati et mutationibus ut remediis

uti. Inde peregrinationes suscipiuntur vagae et litora
pererrantur et modo mari se, modo terra experitur
semper praesentibus infesta levitas. Nunc Campani
am petamus : iam delicata fastidio sunt : inculta vi
deantur. Bruttios et Lucaniae saltus persequamur :
aliquid tamen inter deserta amoeni requiratur, in quo
luxuriosi oculi longo locorum horrentium sqnalore
relerentur. 12. Tarentum petatur laudatusque por
tus et hiberna coeli mitioris, regio vel antiquae satis
opnlenta turbae. Iam flectamus cursum ad urbem :
nimis diu a plansu et fragore aures vacaverunt ;
iuvat iam et humano sanguine frui. Aliud ex alio
iter suscipitur et spectacula spectaculis mutantur, ut
ait Lucretius,
Hoc se quisque modo semper fugit.
13. Sed quid prodest, si non effugit ? sequitur se ipse
et urget gravissimus comes . Itaque scire debemus
non locorum vitium esse qno laboramus, sed nostrum .
Infirmi sumns ad omne tolerandum , nec laboris pati
entes nec voluptatis, nec nostrae nec ullius rei dintins.
Hoc quosdam egit ad mortem , quod proposita saepe
mutando in eadem rerolrebantur et non reliquerant
novitati locum . Fastidio esse illis coepit vita et ipse
mundus ; et subit illud rabidarum deliciarum , Quous
que eadem
III. Adrersus hoc taedium quo auxilio pntem uten
dum quaeris. Optimum erat, ut ait Athenodorus, ac
tione rerum et reipublicae tractatione et officiis civi
libus se detinere : nam it quidam sole atque exercita
tione et cura corporis diem ducunt athletisque longe
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP . III. 77

utilissimum est lacertos suos roburque, cui se uni dica

verunt, maiore temporis parte nutrire : ita nobis ani
mum ad rerum civilium certamen parantibus in opere
esse non longe pulcherrimum est ? nam cum utilem se
efficere civibus mortalibusque propositum habeat, simul
et exercetur et proficit, qui in mediis se officiis posuit
communia privataque pro facultate administrans. 2.
Sed quia in hac, inquit, tam insana hominum ambitione
tot calumniatoribus in deterius recta torquentibus pa
rum tuta simplicitas est et plus futurum semper est,
quod obstet quam quod succedat, a foro quidem et pub
lico recedendum est ; sed habet, ubi se etiam in privato
laxe explicet magnus animus : nec ut leonum animali
umque inpetus caveis coercetur, sic hominum , quorum
maxime in seducto actiones sunt. 3. Ita tamen deli
tuerit, ut ubicumque otium suum absconderit, prodesse
velit singulis universisque ingenio, voce , consilio. Nec
enim is solus reipublicae prodest, qui candidatos extra
hit et tuetur reos et de pace belloque censet, sed qui
iuventutem exhortatur, qui in tanta bonorum praecep
torum inopia virtute instituit animos, qui ad pecuniam
luxuriamqne cursu ruentis prensat ac retrahit et, si
nihil alind, certe moratur, in privato publicum nego
tium agit. 4. An ille plus praestat, qui inter peregri
nos et cives aut urbanus praetor adeuntibus adsessoris
verba pronuntiat, quam qui quid sit iustitia, quid pietas,
quid patientia, quid fortitudo, quid mortis contemptus,
quid deorum intellectus, quam gratuitum bonum sit
bona conscientia ? Ergo si tempus in studia conferas,
quod subduxeris officiis, non deserueris nec munus de
trectareris. 5. Neque enim ille solus militat, qui in
acie stat et cornu dextrum laevumque defendit, sed qui
D 2
78
L. ANNAEI SENECAE

portas tuetur et statione minus periculosa, non otiosa

tamen fungitur vigiliasque servat et armamentario prae
est : quae ministeria quamvis incruenta sint, in nume
rum stipendiorum veniunt. Si te ad studia revocaveris,
omne vitae fastidium effugeris nec noctem fieri optabis
taedio lucis, nec tibi gravis eris nec aliis supervacuus:
multos in amicitiam adtrahes adfluetque ad te optimus
quisque. 6. Numquam enim quamvis obscura virtus
latet, sed mittit sui signa : quisquis dignus fuerit, vesti
giis illam colliget. Nam si omnem conversationem
tollimus et generi humano renuntiamus vivimusque in
nos tantum conversi, sequetur hanc solitudinem omni
studio carentem inopia rerum agendarum . Incipiemus
aedificia alia ponere, alia subvertere et mare submovere
et aquas contra difficultatem locorum educere et male
dispensare tempus, quod nobis natura consumendum
dedit. 7. Alii parce illo utimur, alii prodige : alii sic
inpendimus, ut possimus rationem reddere, alii, ut nul
las habeamuis reliquias ; qua re nihil turpius est. Saepe
grandis natu senex nullum aliud habet argumentum ,
quo se probet din vixisse, praeter aetatem. Mihi, caris
sime Serene, nimis videtur snbmisisse temporibus se
Athenodorus, nimis cito refugisse. Ne ego negaverim
aliquando cedendum ; sed sensim relato gradu et salvis
signis, salva militari dignitate. Sanctiores tutioresqne
sunt hostibus suis, qui in fidem cum armis veniunt. 8.
Hoc puto virtuti faciendum studiosoque virtutis. Si
praevalebit fortuna et praecidet agendi facultatem ,
non statim aversus inermisque fugiat latebras quae
rens, quasi ullus locus sit in quo non possit fortuna
persequi, sed parcius se inferat officiis et cum delectu
inveniat aliquid, in quo utilis civitati sit. Militare non
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP . III. 79

licet ? honores spectet: privato vivendum est ? sit orator:

silentium indictum est ? tacita advocatione cives iuvet :
periculosum etiam ingressu forum est ? in domibus, in
spectaculis, in conviviis bonum contubernalem , fidelem
amicum, temperantem convivam agat. 9. Officia si ci
vis amiserit, hominis exerceat. Ideo magno animo nos
non unius urbis moenibus clusimus, sed in totius orbis
commercium emisimus patriamque nobis mundum pro
fessi sumus, ut liceret latiorem virtuti campum dare.
Praeclusum tibi tribunal est et rostris prohiberis aut
comitiis ? respice post te quantum latissimarum regio
num pateat, quantum populorum : numquam ita tibi
magna pars obstruetur, ut non maior relinquatur. 10.
Sed vide, ne totum istud tuum vitium sit : non vis enim
nisi consul aut prytanis aut ceryx aut sufes administrare
rempublicam . Quid si militare nolis nisi imperator aut
tribunus ? etiam si alii primam frontem tenebunt, te sors
inter triarios posuerit; inde voce, adhortatione, exemplo,
animo milita. Praecisis quoque manibus ille in proelio
invenit, quod partibus conferat, qui stat tamen et cla
more iuvat. Tale quiddam facias : si a prima te reipub
licae parte fortuna submoverit, stes tamen et clamore
iuves et, si quis fauces oppresserit, stes tamen et silentio
iuves. 11 , Numqnam inutilis est opera civis boni :
anditus eius visusqne voltu, nutu, obstinatione tacita
incessuque ipso prodest. Ut salutaria, qnae citra gus
tum tactumque odore proficiunt, ita virtus utilitatem
etiam ex longinquo et latens fundit, sive spatiatur et
se utitur suo iure, sive precarios habet excessus cogi
turque vela contrahere, sive otiosa mutaque est et an
gusto circumsepta, sive adaperta : in quocumque habitu
est, prodest. Quid ? tu parum utile putas exemplum
80 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

bene quiescentis ? 12. Longe itaque optimum est mis

cere otium rebus, quotiens actuosa vita inpedimentis
fortuitis aut civitatis condicione prohibetur. Num .
quam enim usque eo interclusa sunt omnia, ut nulli
actioni locus honestae sit. Numquid potes invenire
urbem miseriorem quam Atheniensium fuit, cum illam
triginta tyranni divellerent ? mille trecentos cives, op
timum quemque occiderant nec finem ideo faciebant,
sed inritabat se ipsa saevitia. 13. In qua civitate erat
Areos pagos, religiosissimuin iudicium, in qua senatus
populusque senatu similis coibat cotidie carnificum
triste collegium et infelix curia tyrannis angusta. Po
teratne illa civitas conquiescere, in qua tot tyranni
erant quot satellites essent ? Ne spes quidein ulla re
cipiendae libertatis animis poterat offerri ; nec ulli
remedio locus adparebat contra tantam vim malorum :
unde enim miserae civitati tot Harmodios ? 14. Soc
rates tamen in medio erat et lugentes patres consola
batur et desperantes de republica exhortabatur et divi
tibus opes suas metuentibus exprobrabat seram pericu
losae avaritiae poenitentiam et imitari volentibus mag
num circumferebat exemplar, cum inter triginta do
minos liber incederet. Hunc tamen Athenae ipsae in
carcere occiderunt ; et qui tuto insultaverat agmini
tyrannorum eius libertatem libertas non tulit : ut scias
et in adflicta republica esse occasionem sapienti viro
ad se proferendum et in florenti ac beata pecuniam ,
invidiam , mille alia inermia vitia regnare. 15. Ut
cumque ergo se respnblica dabit, utcumque fortuna
permittet, ita ant explicabimus nos aut contrahemus :
utique movebimus nec adligati metu torpebimus. Im
mo ille vir fuerit, qui periculis undique inminentibus,
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP . IV , V, 81

armis circa et catenis frementibus non adliserit virtu

tem nec absconderit. Non est enim servare se obruere.
16. Ut opinor, Curius Dentatus aiebat, Malle esse se
mortuum quam vivere. Ultimum malorum est vivo
rum numero exire, antequam moriaris. Sed facien
dum erit, si in reipublicae tempus minus tractabile
incideris, ut plus otio ac literis vindices : nec aliter
quam in periculosa navigatione subinde portum petas
nec exspectes, donec res te dimittant, sed ab illis te ipse
diiungas.
IV. Inspicere autem debebimus primum nosmetipsos,
deinde ea quae adgrediemur negotia, deinde eos quo
rum causa aut cum quibus. Ante omnia necesse est
se ipsum aestimare, qnia fere plus nobis videmur posse
quam possumus. Alius eloquentiae fiducia prolabitur;
alius patrimonio suo plus imperavit quam ferre posset;
alius infirmum corpns laborioso pressit officio. 2. Quo
rumdam parum idonea est verecundia rebus civilibus,
quae primam frontem desiderant: quorumdam contu
macia non facit ad aulam : quidam non habent iram in
potestate et illos ad temeraria verba quaelibet indigna
tio offert: quidam urbanitatem nesciunt continere nec
periculosis abstinent salibus. Omnibus his utilior nego
tio quies est : ferox inpatiensque natura inritamenta
nociturae libertatis evitet.
V. Aestimanda sunt deinde ipsa, quae adgredimur , et
vires nostrae cum rebus, quas temptaturi sumus, conpa
randae. Debet enim semper plus esse virium in actore
quam in onere : necesse est opprimant onera, quae fe
rente maiora sunt. 2. Quaedam praeterea non tam
magna sunt negotia quam fecunda multumque negoti
orum ferunt : et haec refugienda sunt, ex quibus nova
82 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

occupatio multiplexque nascetur. Nec accedendum eo ,

unde liber regressus non sit : iis admovenda manus est,
quorum finem aut facere aut certe sperare possis : re
linquenda, quae latius actu procedunt nec ubi proposu
eris desinunt.
VI. Hominum utique delectus habendus est : an
digni sint quibus partem vitae nostrae inpendamus, an
ad illos temporis nostri iactura perveniat. Quidam
enim ultro officia nobis nostra inputant. Athenodorus
ait, ne ad coenam quidem se iturum ad eum, qui sibi
nil pro hoc debiturus sit. Puto intellegis multo minus
ad eos iturum, qui cum amicorum officiis paria mensa
faciunt, qui fericula pro congiariis numerant, quasi in
alienum honorem intemperantes sint. 2. Deme illis tes
tes spectatoresqne, non delectabit popina secreta. Con
siderandum est, utrum natura tua agendis rebus an oti
oso studio contemplationique aptior sit, et eo inclinan
dum quo te vis ingenii feret. Isocrates Ephorum in
iecta manu a foro subduxit utiliorem conponendis mo
numentis historiarum ratus. Male enim respondent
coacta ingenia : reluctante natura inritus labor est.
VII. Nihil tamen aeque oblectaverit animum quam
amicitia fidelis et dulcis. Quantum bonum est, ubi
sunt praeparata pectora , in quae tuto secretum omne
descendat, quorum conscientiam minus quam tuam ti
meas, quorum sermo sollicitudinem leniat, sententia
consilium expediat, hilaritas tristitiam dissipet, con
spectus ipse delectet ? Quos scilicet vacuos, quantum
fieri poterit, a cupiditatibus eligemus. 2. Serpunt enim
vitia et in proximum quemqne transsiliunt et contactu
nocent. Itaqne, ut in pestilentia curandum est, ne
correptis iam corporibus et morbo flagrantibus adsi
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP. VIII. 83

deamus, quia pericula trahemus adflatuque ipso labora

bimus : ita in amicorum legendis ingeniis dabimus ope
ram , ut quam minime inquinatos adsumamus. Initium
morbi est aegris sana miscere. Nec hoc praeceperim
tibi , ut neminem nisi sapientem sequaris aut adtrahas :
ubi enim istum invenies, quem tot seculis quaerimus ?
pro optimo est minime malus. 3. Vix tibi esset facul
tas delectus felicioris, si inter Platonas et Xenophontas
et illum Socratici fetus proventum bonos quaereres, aut
si tibi potestas Catonianae fieret aetatis, quae pleros
que dignos tulit, qui Catonis seculo nascerentur, sicut
multos peiores quam umquam alias maximorumque
molitores scelerum . Utraque enim turba opus erat,
ut Cato posset intellegi: habere debuit et bonos, qui
bus se adprobaret, et malos, in quibus vim suam expe
riretur. 4. Nunc vero in tanta bonorum egestate mi
nus fastidiosa fiat electio : praecipue tamen vitentur
tristes et omnia deplorantes, quibus nulla non causa in
querelas placet. Constet illi licet fides et benevolen
tia ; tranquillitati tamen inimicus est comes perturba
tus et omnia gemens.
VIII. Transeamus ad patrimonia, maximam huma
narum aerumnarum materiam . Nam si omnia alia,
quibus angimur, conpares, mortes, aegrotationes, me
tus, desideria, dolorum laborumque patientiam , cum iis
quae nobis mala pecunia nostra exhibet, haec pars mul
tum praegrarabit. Itaque cogitandum est, quanto le
vior dolor sit non habere quam perdere: et intellege
mus paupertati eo minorem tormentorum quo mino
rem damnorum esse materiam . 2. Erras enim , si putas
animosius detrimenta divites ferre : maximis minimis
que corporibus par est dolor volneris. Bion eleganter
84 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

ait non minus molestum esse calvis quam comatis

pilos velli. Idem scias licet de pauperibus locupleti
busque, par illis esse tormentum : utrisque enim pe
cunia sua obhaesit nec sine sensu revelli potest. Tol
erabilius autem est, ut dixi, faciliusque non adquirere
quam amittere ; ideoque laetiores videbis quos num
quam fortuna respexit, quam quos deseruit. 3. Vidit
hoc Diogenes, vir ingentis animi, et effecit, ne quid sibi
eripi posset. Tu istud paupertatem, inopiam , egesta
tem voca, quod voles ignominiosum securitati nomen
inpone : putabo hunc non esse felicem , si quem mihi
alium inveneris, cui nihil pereat. Aut ego fallor, aut
regnum est inter avaros, circumscriptores, latrones, pla
giarios unum esse, cui noceri non possit. Si quis de
felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de
deorum inmortalium statu, an parum beate degant,
quod illis nec praedia nec horti sint nec alieno colono
rura pretiosa nec grande in foro fenus. 4. Non te
pndet, quisquis divitiis adstupes ? respice agedum mun
dum : nudus videbis deos, omnia dantes, nihil habentes.
Hunc tu pauperem putas an dis inmortalibus similem,
qui se fortuitis omnibus exuit ? Feliciorem tu Deme
trium Pompeianum vocas, quem non puduit locupleti
orem esse Pompeio ? Numerus illi cotidie servorum
velut imperatori exercitus referebatur, cui iam dudum
divitiae esse debuerant duo vicarii et cella laxior. 5.
At Diogeni servus unicus fugit nec eum reducere, cum
monstraretur, tanti putavit. Turpe est, inquit, Manen
sine Diogene posse vivere, Diogenen sine Mane non
posse. Videtur mihi dixisse : age tuum negotium , for
tuna : nihil apud Diogenen iam tui est. Fugit mihi
servus ? immo liber abiit. Familia petit vestiarium
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP. IX. 85

victumque : tot ventres avidissimorum animalium tnen

di sunt : emenda vestis et custodiendae rapacissimae
manus et flentium detestantiumque ministeriis uten
dum . 6. Quanto ille felicior, qui nihil ulli debet, nisi
quod facillime negat sibi ? Sed quoniam non est nobis
tantum roboris, angustanda certe sunt patriinonia, ut
minus ad iniurias fortunae simus expositi. Habiliora
sunt corpora in bello, quae in arma sua contrahi pos
sunt, quam quae superfunduntur et undique magnitudo
sua volneribus obiecit. Optimus pecuniae modus est,
qui nec in paupertatem cadit, nec procul a paupertate
discedit.
IX. Placebit autem haec nobis mensura , si prius
parsimonia placuerit, sine qua nec ullae opes suffi
ciunt, nec ullae non satis patent, praesertim cum in
vicino remedium sit et possit ipsa paupertas in divi
tias se advocata frugalitate convertere. Adsuesca
mus a nobis removere pompam, et usus rerum, non
ornamenta metiri. Cibus famem domet, potio sitim,
libido qna necesse est fluat. Discamus membris nos
tris inniti, cultum victumque non ad nova exempla
con ponere, sed ut maiorum mores suadent. 2. Dis
camus continentiam augere, luxuriam coercere, gulam
temperare, iracundiam lenire, paupertatem aequis ocn
lis adspicere, frugalitatem colere, etiam si similes nos
pudebit esse populo, desideriis naturalibus parvo pa
rata remedia adhibere, spes effrenatas et animum in
futura eminentem velut sub vinculis habere, id agere,
ut divitias a nobis potius quam a fortuna petamus.
Non potest umquam tanta varietas et iniquitas ca
suum ita depelli, ut non multum procellarum inruat
magna armamenta pandentibus : cogendae in artum
86 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

res sunt, ut tela in vanum cadant. 3. Ideoque exilia

interdum calamitatesque in remedium cessere et le
vioribus incommodis graviora sanata sunt, ubi parum
audit praecepta animus nec curari mollius potest.
Quidni consulitur, si et paupertas et ignominia et
rerum eversio adhibetur ? malo malum opponitur.
Adsuescamus ergo coenare posse sine populo et ser
vis paucioribus serviri et vestes parare in quod in
ventae sunt, habitare contractius. Non in cursu tan
tum circique certamine, sed in his spatiis vitae inte
rius flectendum est. 4. Studiorum quoque quae libe
ralissima inpensa est, tamdiu rationem habet, quam
diu modum. Quo innumerabiles libros et bibliothe
cas, quarum dominus vix tota • vita indices perlegit ?
Onerat discentem turba, non instruit ; multoque sati
us est paucis te auctoribus tradere, quam errare per
multos. Quadraginta milia librorum Alexandriae ar
serunt, pulcherrimum regiae opulentiae monumentum :
alius laudaverit, sicut et Livius, qui elegantiae regum
curaeque egregium id opus ait fuisse. 5. Non fuit
elegantia illud aut cura , sed studiosa luxuria ; immo
ne studiosa quidem, quoniam non in studium, sed
in spectaculum conparaverant, sicut plerisque igna
ris etiam servilium literarum libri non studiorum
instrumenta, sed coenationum ornamenta sunt. Pa
retur itaque librorum quantum satis sit, nihil in ad
paratum. 6. Honestius, inquis, hocce inpensae quam
in Corinthia pictasque tabulas effuderint. Vitio
sum est ubique, quod nimium est. Quid habes,
cur ignoscas homini armaria citro atque ebore cap
tanti, corpora conquirenti aut ignotorum auctorum
aut inprobatorum et inter tot milia librorum oscitanti,
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP . X. 87

cui voluminum suorum frontes maxime placent tituli

que ? 7. Apud desidiosissimos ergo videbis quicquid
orationum historiarumque est, tecto tenus exstructa
loculamenta : iam enim inter balnearia et thermas
bibliotheca quoque ut necessarium domus ornamen
tum expolitur. Ignoscerem plane, si studiorum ni
mia cupidine oriretur : nuno ista conquisita, cum ima
ginibus suis descripta et sacrorum opera ingeniorum
in speciem et cultum parietum conparantur.
X. At ad aliquod genus vitae difficile incidisti et
tibi ignoranti vel publica fortuna vel privata laque
um inpegit, quem nec solvere posses nec erumpere.
Cogita conpeditos primo aegre ferre onera et inpedi
menta crurum : deinde ubi non indignari illa, sed
pati proposuerunt, necessitas fortiter ferre docet, con
suetudo facile. Invenies in quolibet genere vitae ob
lectamenta et remissiones et voluptates, si nolueris,
malam putare vitam potius quam invidiosam facere.
2. Nullo melius nomine de nobis natura meruit, quam
quod, cum sciret quibus aerumnis nasceremur, calami
tatum mollimentum consuetudinem invenit, cito in
familiaritatem gravissima adducens. Nemo duraret,
si rerum adversarum eamdem vim adsiduitas haberet
quam primus ictus. Omnes cum fortuna copulati
sumus : aliorum aurea catena est, aliorum laxa, ali
orum arta et sordida. 3. Sed quid refert ? eadem
custodia universos circumdedit adligatique sunt etiam
qui adligaverunt ; nisi forte tu leviorem in sinistra
catenam putas. Alium honores, alium opes vinciunt :
quosdam nobilitas, quosdam humilitas premit : quibus
dam aliena supra caput imperia sunt, qnibusdam sua :
quosdam exilia uno loco tenent, quosdam sacerdotia.
88 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

Omnis vita servitium est. 4. Adsuescendum est ita

que condicioni suae et quam minimum de illa que
rendum et quicquid habet circa se commodi , ad
prendendum . Nihil tam acerbum est, in quo non
aequus animus solatium inveniat. Exiguae saepe
areae in multos usus describentis arte patuerunt et
quamvis angustum pedem dispositio fecit habitabi
lem . Adhibe rationem difficultatibus : possunt et
dura molliri et angusta laxari et gravia scite . ferentis
minus premere . 5. Non sunt praeterea cupiditates
in longinquum mittendae, sed in vicinum illis egredi
permittamus , quoniam includi ex toto non patiuntur.
Relictis his, quae aut non possunt fieri aut difficulter
nassunt, prope posita speique nostrae adludentia se
quamur ; sed sciamus omnia aeque levia esse, extrinse
cus diversas facies habentia, introrsus pariter vana.
Nec invideamus altius stantibus : quae excelsa vide
bantur, praerupta sunt. 6. Illi rursus, quos sors ini
qua in ancipiti posuit , tutiores erunt superbiam de
trahendo rebus per se superbis et fortunam suam ,
quam maxime poterunt , in planum deferendo. Mul
ti quidem sunt, quibus necessario haerendum sit in
fastigio suo, ex qno non possunt nisi cadendo descen
dere : sed hoc ipsum testentur maximum onus suum
esse, quod aliis graves esse cogantur, nec sublevatos
se, sed suffixos : institia, mansuetudine humana, larga
et benigna manu praeparent multa ad secundos casus
praesidia, quorum spe securius pendeant . 7. Nihil
tamen aeque nos ab his animi fluctibus vindicaverit ,
quam semper aliquem incrementis terminum figere :
nec fortunae arbitrium desinendi dare, sed ipsos mul
to quidem citra exempla hortentur consistere. Sic et
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP. XI. 89

aliquae cupiditates animum acuent et finitae, non in

inmensum incertumque producent.
XI. Ad inperfectos et mediocres et male sanos hic
meus sermo pertinet, non ad sapientem . Huic non
timide nec pedetention ambulandum est : tanta enim
fiducia sui est, ut obviam fortunae ire non dubitet nec
umqnam loco illi cessurus sit : nec habet, ubi illam
timeat, quia non mancipia tantum possessionesque
et dignitatem , sed corpus quoque suum et oculos et
manum et quicquid cariorem vitam facturum seque
ipsum inter precaria numerat vivitque ut commoda
tus sibi et reposcentibus sine tristitia redditurus. 2.
Nec ideo vilis est sibi, quia scit se suum non esse ;
sed omnia tam diligenter faciet, tam circumspecte ,
quam religiosus homo sanctusque solet tueri fidei com
missa. Quandocumqne autem reddere iubebitur, non
queretur cum fortuna, sed dicet : Gratias ago pro eo,
quod possedi habuique. Magna quidem res tuas
mercede colui, sed quia imperas, do, cedo gratus li
bensque: si quid habere me tui volueris, etiam nunc
servabo : si aliud placet, ego vero factum signatum
que argentum , domum familiamque meam reddo,
restituo. 3. Adpellaverit natura quae prior nobis
credidit, et huic dicemus : Recipe animum meliorem
quain dedisti : non tergiversor nec refugio : paratum
habes a volente, quod non sentienti dedisti : aufer.
Reverti unde veneris quid grave est ? male vivet,
quisquis nesciet bene mori. Huic itaque primum
rei pretium detrahendum est et spiritus in servilia
numerandus. Gladiatores, ut ait Cicero, invisos ha
bemus, si omni modo vitam inpetrare cupiunt : fa
vemus, si contemptum eius prae se ferunt. Idem
90 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

evenire nobis scias : saepe enim causa moriendi est

timide mori. 4. Fortuna illa, quae ludos sibi facit,
Quo, inquit, te reservem , malum et trepidum animal ?
eo magis convolneraberis et confodieris, quia nescis
praebere ingulum . At tu et vives diutius et mori
eris expeditius, qui ferrum non subducta cervice nec
manibus oppositis, sed animose recipis. Qui mortem
timebit, nihil umquam pro homine vivo faciet : at
qui sciat hoc sibi cum conciperetur statim condictum,
vivet ad formulam et simul illud quoque eodem ani
mi robore praestabit, ne quid ex iis, quae ereniunt,
subitum sit. 5. Quicquid eniin fieri potest, quasi fu
turum sit, prospiciendo malorum omnium inpetus
molliet ; qui ad praeparatos exspectantesque nihil ad
ferunt novi, securis et beata tantum spectantibus gra
ves veniunt. Morbus enim, captivitas, ruina, ignis,
nihil horum repentinum est. Sciebam , in quam tu
multuosum me contubernium natura clusisset : to
tiens in vicinia mea conclamatum est, totiens praeter
limen inmaturas exsequias fax cerensque praecessit :
saepe a latere ruentis aedificii fragor sonuit : mul
tos ex iis, quos forum , curia, sermo mecum contrax
erat, nox abstulit et iunctas ad sodalitium manus
capulus interscidit. 6. Mirer ad me aliqnando pe
ricula accessisse, quae circa me semper erraverint ?
Magna pars hominum est, quae navigatura de tem
pestate non cogitat. Numquam me in bona re mali
pudebit auctoris. Publius, tragicis comicisque vehe
mentior ingeniis, quotiens mimicas ineptias et verba
ad summam caveam spectantia reliquit, inter multa
alia cothurno, non tantum sipario fortiora, et hoc ait ;
Cuivis potest accidere quod cuiquam potest,
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP. XL. 91

7. Hoc si quis in medullas demiserit et omnia aliena

mala, quorum ingens cotidie copia est, sic adspexerit,
tamquam liberum illis et ad se iter sit ; multo ante
se armabit quam petatur. Sero animus ad periculo
rum patientiam post pericula instruitur. Non putavi
hoc futurum : et umquam tu hoc eventurum credi
disses ? Quare autem non ? Qnae sunt divitiae, quas
non egestas et fames et mendicitas a tergo sequatur ?
Quae dignitas, cuius non praetextam et augurale et lora
patricia sordes comitentur et exportatio, notae et mille
maculae et extrema contemptio ? 8. Quod regnum
est, cui non parata sit ruina et proculcatio et dominus
et carnifex ? nec magnis ista intervallis divisa, sed ho
rae momentum interest inter solium et aliena genua.
Scito ergo omnem condicionem versabilem esse et
quicquid in ullum incurrit, posse in te quoque incur
rere. Locuples es ? numquid divitior Pompeio ? cui
cum Caius, retus cognatus, hospes novus, aperuisset
Caesaris domum, ut suam cluderet, defuit panis, aqua :
cum tot flumina possideret in suo orientia, in suo ca
dentia, mendicavit stillicidia : fame ac siti periit in
palatio cognati, dum illi heres publicum funus esuri
enti locat. 9. Honoribus summis functus es ? num
quid aut tam magnis aut tam insperatis aut tam uni
versis quam Seianus ? Quo die illum senatus de
duxerat, populus in frusta divisit : in quem , quicquid
congeri poterat, di hominesque contulerant, ex eo
nihil superfuit, quod carnifex traheret. Rex es ? non
ad Croesum te mittam , qui rogum suum et escendit
iussus et exstingui vidit, factus non regno tantum ,
sed etiam morti suae superstes : non ad Ingurtham ,
quem populus Romanus intra annum, quam timuerat,
92 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

spectavit. 10. Ptolemaeum Africae regem, Armeniae

Mithridaten inter Caianas custodias vidimus : alter in
exilium missus est, alter ut meliore fide mitteretur,
optabat. In tanta rerum sursum ac deorsum eunti
um versatione si non quicquid fieri potest, pro futuro
habes, das in te vires rebus adversis, quas infregit,
quisquis prior vidit. 11. Proximum ab his erit, ne
aut in supervacuis aut ex supervacuo laboremus, id
est, ne aut quae non possumus consequi, concupisca
mus, aut adepti vanitatem cupiditatium nostrarum
sero post multum pudorem intellegamus : id est, ne
aut labor inritus sit sine effectu aut effectus labore
indignus. Fere enim ex his tristitia sequitur, si aut
non successit aut successus pudet.
XII. Circumcidenda concursatio, qualis est magnae
parti hominum domos et theatra et fora pererran
tium . Alienis se negotiis offerunt, semper aliquid
agentibus similes. Horum si aliquem exeuntem e
domo interrogaveris, Quo tu ? quid cogitas ? responde
bit tibi : Non mehercules scio : sed aliquos videbo,
aliquid agam. Sine proposito vagantur quaerentes
negotia nec quae destinaverunt agunt, sed in quae in
currerunt. Inconsultus illis vanusque cursus est, qua
lis formicis per arbusta repentibus, quae in summum
cacumen , deinde in imum inanes aguntur. 2. His ple
rique similem vitam agunt, quorum non inmerito quis
inquietam inertiam dixerit. Quorumdam quasi ad
incendium currentium misereris : usque eo inpellunt
obrios et se aliosque praecipitant, cum interim cu
currerunt ant salutaturi aliquem non resalutaturum
ant funus ignoti hominis prosecnturi, ant iudicium
saepe litigantis aut sponsalia saepe nubentis, et leo
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI . CAP. XIII . 93

ticam adsectati quibusdam locis etiam tulerunt : de

inde domum cum supervacua redeuntes lassitudine
iurant nescisse se ipsos, quare exierint, ubi fuerint,
postero die erraturi per eadem illa vestigia. Omnis
itaque labor aliquo referatur, aliquo respiciat. 3 .
Non industria, inquietos et insanos falsae rerum ima
gines agitant: nam ne illi quidem sine aliqua spe
moventur, proritat illos alicuius rei species, cuius
vanitatem capta mens non coarguit. Eodem modo
unumquemque ex his, qui ad augendam turbam ex
eunt, inanes et leves causae per urbem circumducunt
nihilque habentem, in quod laboret, lux orta expellit ;
et cum multorum frustra liminibus illisus nomencu
latores persalutavit, a multis exclusus neminem ex
omnibus difficilius domi quam se convenit. 4. Ex
hoc malo dependet illud teterrimum vitium , auscul
tatio et publicorum secretorumque inquisitio et mul
tarum rerum scientia, quae nec tuto narrantur nec
tuto audiuntur. Hoc secutum puto Democritum ita
coepisse ; Qui tranquille volet vivere, nec privatim
agat multa nec publice, ad supervacua scilicet re
ferentem . Nam si necessaria sunt, et privatim et
publice non tantum multa, sed innumerabilia agenda
sunt : ubi vero nullum officium sollemne nos citat,
inhibendae actiones.
XIII. Nam qui multa agit, saepe fortunae potesta
tem sui facit ; quam tutissimum est raro experiri, ce
terum semper de illa cogitare et nihil sibi de fide eius
promittere. Navigabo, nisi si quid inciderit : et prae
tor fiam , nisi si quid obstiterit : et negotiatio mihi
respondebit, nisi si quid intervenerit. 2. Hoc est
quare sapienti nihil contra opinionem dicamus ac
E
94 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

cidere : non illum casibus hominum excerpimus, sed

erroribus ; nec illi omnia ut voluit cedunt, sed ut co
gitavit : inprimis autem cogitavit aliud posse pro
positis suis resistere. Necesse est autem levius ad
animum pervenire destitutae cupiditatis dolorem , cui
successum non utique promiseris.
XIV. Faciles etiam nos facere debemus, ne nimis
destinatis rebus indulgeamus; transeainusque in ea, in
quae nos casus deduxerit, nec mutationes aut consilii
ant status pertimescamus, dummodo nos levitas, inimi
cissimum quieti vitium, non excipiat. Nam et perti
nacia necesse est anxia et misera sit, cui fortuna saepe
aliquid extorquet, et levitas multo gravior nusquam se
continens. Utrumque infestum est tranquillitati, et
nihil mutare posse et nihil pati. 2. Utique animus ab
omnibus externis in se revocandus est : sibi confidat,
se gandeat, sua suspiciat, recedat, quantum potest, ab
alienis et se sibi adplicet, damna non sentiat, etiam ad
versa benigne interpretetur. Nuntiato naufragio Ze
non noster, cum omnia sua audiret submersa, lubet,
inquit, me fortuna expeditius philosophari. Minaba
tur Theodoro philosopho tyrannus mortem et quidem
insepultain. Habes, inquit, cur tibi placeas : hemina
sanguinis in tua potestate est : nam quod ad sepultu
ram pertinet, o te ineptum , si putas mea interesse su
pra terram an infra putrescam . 3. Canus Iulius, vir
inprimis magnus, cuius admirationi ne hoc quidem
obstat, quod nostro seculo natus est, cum Caio diu al
tercatus, postqnam abennti Phalaris ille dixit, Ne forte
incpta spe tibi blandiaris, duci te iussi : Gratias, in
quit, ago, optime princeps. Quid senserit dubito : mul
ta enim mihi occurrunt. Contumeliosus esse voluit et
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP . XIV . 95

ostendere, quanta crudelitas esset, in qua mors benefi

cium erat ? An exprobravit illi cotidianam demen
tiamn ? agebant enim gratias et quorum liberi occisi et
qnorum bona ablata erant. 4. An tamquam libertatem
libenter accepit? Quicquid est, magno animo respon
dit. Dicet aliquis : Potuit post hoc iubere illum Caius
vivere. Non timuit hoc Canus : nota erat Caii in ta
libus imperiis fides. Credisne illum decem medios
usque ad supplicium dies sine ulla sollicitudine exe
gisse ? verisimile non est, quae vir ille dixerit, quae
fecerit, quam in tranquillo fuerit. Ludebat latruncu
lis, cum centurio agmen periturorum trahens illum
quoque excitari iuberet. Vocatus numeravit calculos
et sodali suo, Vide, inquit, ne post mortem meam men
tiaris te vicisse. 5. Tum adnuens centurioni, Testis,
inquit, eris uno me antecedere. Lusisse tu Canum illa
tabula putas ? inlusit. Tristes erant amici talem amis
suri virum . Quid moesti, inquit, estis ? Vos quaeri
tis an inmortales animae sint : ego iam sciam : nec
desiit veritatem in ipso fine scrntari et ex morte sua
quaestionem habere. Prosequebatur illum philosophus
suus nec iam procul erat tumulus, in quo Caesari deo
nostro fiebat cotidianum sacrum . Is, Quid , inquit, Ca
ne, nunc cogitas ? aut quae tibi mens est ? Observare,
inquit Canus, proposui illo velocissimo momento an
sensurus sit animus exire se : promisityne, si quid ex
plorasset, circumiturum amicos et indicaturum, quis
esset animarum status. 6. Ecce in media tempestate
tranquillitas : ecce animus aeternitate dignus, qui fa
tum suum in argumentum veri vocat ; qui in ultimo
illo gradu positus exeuntem animam percunctatur nec
usque ad mortem tantum, sed aliquid etiam ex ipsa
96 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

morte discit : nemo diutius philosophatus. Sed non

raptim relinquetur magnus vir et cum cura dicendus:
dabimus te in omnem memoriam, clarissimum caput,
Caianae cladis magna portio !
XV. Sed nihil prodest privatae tristitiae causas abie
cisse. Occupat enim nonnumquain odium generis hu
mani et occurrit tot scelerum felicium turba, cum cogi
taveris, quam sit rara simplicitas et quam ignota inno
centia et vix umquam, nisi cum expedit, fides, et libidi
nis lucra damnaque pariter invisa et ambitio usqne eo
iam se suis non continens terminis, ut per turpitudinem
splendeat. Agitur animus in noctem et velut eversis
virtutibus, quas nec sperare licet nec habere prodest,
tenebrae oboriuntur. 2. In hoc itaque flectendi sumus,
ut omnia volgi vitia non invisa nobis, sed ridicula vide
antur et Democritum potius imitemur quam Heracli
tum . Hic enim , quotiens in publicum processerat, fle
bat, ille ridebat : huic omnia, quae agimus, miseriae, illi
ineptiae videbantur. Eleranda ergo omnia et facili ani
mo ferenda : humanius est deridere vitam quam deplo
rare. 3. Adice qnod de humano quoque genere melius
meretur qui ridet illnd, quam qui luget. Ille et spei
bonae aliquid relinquit; hic autem stulte deflet, quae
corrigi posse desperat: et universa contemplatus maio
ris animi est, qui risum non tenet quam qui lacrimas,
quando levissimum adfectum animi movet et nilıil mag
num , nihil sererum , ne serium qnidem ex tanto paratu
putat. Singula propter quae laeti ac tristes sumus, sibi
quisque proponat et sciet rerum esse quod Bion dixit,
Omnia hominum negotia similia initiis esse nec vitam
illorum magis sanctam aut severam esse quam concep
tum. 4. Sed satius est publicos mores et humana vitia
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP. XV. 97

placide accipere nec in risum nec in lacrimas exciden

tem. Nam alienis malis torqueri aeterna miseria est,
alienis delectari malis voluptas inhumana : sicut illa
inutilis humanitas flere, quia aliquis filiam efferat, et
frontein suam fingere. In suis quoque malis ita gerere
se oportet, ut dolori tantum des, quantum poscit, non
quantum consuetudo. Pleriqne eniin lacrimas fun
dunt, ut ostendant, et totiens siccos oculos habent, quo
tiens spectator defuit, turpe iudicantes non flere, cum
omnes faciant. 5. Adeo penitus hoc se malum fixit, ex
aliena opinione pendere, ut in simulationem etiam res
simplicissima, dolor, veniat. Sequetur pars, quae solet
non inmerito contristare et in sollicitudinem adducere,
ubi bonorum exitus mali sunt: ut Socrates cogitur in
carcere mori, Rutilius in exilio vivere, Pompeius et
Cicero clientibus suis praebere cervicem , Cato ille, vir
tutum viva imago, incumbens gladio simul de se ac de
republica palam facere. 6. Necesse est torqueri tam
iniqua praemia fortunam persolvere : et quid sibi quis
que nunc speret, cum videat pessima optimos pati ?
Quid ergo est ? vide quomodo quisque illorum tulerit;
et si fortes fuerunt, ipsorum illos animos desidera : si
muliebriter et ignave perierunt, nihil periit. Aut digni
sunt, quorum virtus tibi placeat, aut indigni, quorum
desideretur ignavia. Quid enim est turpins quam , si
maximi viri timidos fortiter moriendo faciunt ? Lau
demus totiens dignum laudibus et dicamus : Tanto for
tior, tanto felicior ! hominis effugisti casus, lirorem,
morbum : existi ex custodia : non tu dignus mala for
tuna dis visus es, sed indignus, in quem iam aliquid
fortuna posset. 7. Subducentibus vero se et in ipsa
morte ad vitam respectantibus manus iniciendae sunt.
98 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

Neminem flebo laetum , neminem flentem : ille lacri

mas ineas ipse abstersit, hic suis lacrimis effecit, ne ullis
dignus sit. Ego Herculein fleam , quod vivus uritur,
aut Regulum , quod tot clavis transfigitur, aut Catonem ,
quod volnere suo ? Omnes isti levi temporis inpensa
invenerunt, quomodo aeterni fierent, et ad inmortalita
tem moriendo venerunt. 8. Est et illa sollicitudinum
non mediocris materia, si te anxie conponas nec ullis
simpliciter ostendas; qualis multorum vita est, ficta,
ostentationi parata . Torquet enim adsidua observatio
sui et deprehendi aliter ac solet, metuit ; nec umquam
cura solvimur, ubi totiens nos aestimari putamus, quo
tiens adspici. Nam et multa incidunt, quae invitos
denudent, et, ut bene cedat tanta sui diligentia, non
tamen iucunda vita aut secura est semper sub persona
viventium . 9. At illa quantum habet voluptatis sin
cera et per se inornata simplicitas, nihil obtendens mo
ribus suis ? Subit tamen et haec vita contemptus
periculum, si omnia omnibus patent: sunt enim qui
fastidiant, quicquid propius adierunt. Sed nec virtuti
periculum est, ne admota oculis revilescat, et satius est
simplicitate contemni quam perpetua simulatione tor
qneri. Modum tamen rei adhibeamus : multum inter
est, simpliciter vivas an neglegenter. Multum et in
se recedendum est : conversatio enim dissimiliui bene
conposita disturbat et renovat adfectus et quicquid in
becillum in animo nec percuratum est, exulcerat. 10.
Miscenda tamen ista et alternanda sint, solitudo et fre
quentia. Illa nobis faciet hominum desiderium , haec
nostri ; et erit alteri alterius remedium : odium turbae
sanabit solitudo, taedium solitudinis turba. Nec in
eadem intentione aequaliter retinenda mens est, sed
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP . XV . 99

ad iocos devocanda. Cum puerulis Socrates ludere

non erubescebat ; et Cato vino laxabat animum curis
publicis fatigatum . 11. Et Scipio triumphale illud
ac militare corpus movet ad numeros, non molliter se
infringens, ut nunc mos est etiam incessu ipso ultra
muliebrem mollitiam fluentibus, sed ut antiqui illi viri
solebant inter lusum ac festa tempora virilem in mo
dum tripudiare, non facturi detrimentum, etiam si ab
hostibus suis spectarentur. Danda est animis remis
sio : meliores acrioresque requieti surgent. Ut fertili
bus agris non est imperandum (cito enim illos exhau
viet numquam intermissa fecunditas), ita animorum
inpetus adsiduus labor franget. Vires recipient pau
lum resoluti et emissi. 12. Nascitur ex adsiduitate la
borum animorum hebetatio quaedam et languor : nec
ad hoc tanta hominum cupiditas tenderet, nisi natu
ralem quamdam voluptatem haberet lusus iocusque :
quorum frequens usus omne animis pondus omnem
que vim eripiet. Nam et somnus refectioni necessa
rius est : hunc tamen si per diem noctemque con
tinues, mors erit. Multum interest, remittas aliquid,
an solvas. Legum conditores festos instituerunt dies,
ut ad hilaritatem homines publice cogerentur, tam
quam necessarium laboribus interponentes tempera
mentum. 13. Et magni, ut dixi, viri quidam sibi men
struas certis diebus ferias dabant ; quidam nullum non
diem inter otium et curas dividebant : qualem Polli
onem Asinium, oratorem magnum , meminimus quem
nulla res ultra decumam retinuit : ne epistulas,qui
dem post eam horam legebat, ne quid norae curae
nasceretur ; sed totius diei lassitudinem duabus illis
horis ponebat. Quidam medio die interiunxerunt et
100 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

in postmeridianas horas aliquid levioris operae dis

tulerunt. 14. Maiores quoque nostri novam relatio
nem post horam decimam in senatu fieri vetabant.
Miles vigilias dividit et nox inmunis est ab expedi
tione redeuntium . Indulgendum est animo dandum
que subinde otium , quod alimenti ac virium loco sit :
et in ambulationibus apertis vagandum, ut coelo li
bero et multo spiritu augeat adtollatque se animus.
Aliquando vectatio iterque et mutata regio vigorem
dabunt convictusque et liberalior potio : nonnumquam
et usque ad ebrietatem veniendum , non ut mergat
nos, sed ut deprimat. 15. Eluit enim curas et ab
imo animum movet et ut morbis quibusdam ita tris
titiae medetur. Liberque non ob licentiam linguae
dictus est inventor vini, sed quia liberat servitio cu
rarum animum et adserit vegetatque et audaciorem
in omnes conatus facit. Sed ut libertatis ita vini sa
lubris moderatio est. Solonem Arcesilaumque indul
sisse vino credunt. Catoni ebrietas obiecta est : faci
lius efficiet, quisquis obiecerit, hoc crimen honestum
quam turpem Catonem . Sed nec saepe faciendum
est, ne animus malam consuetudinem ducat, et ali
quando tamen in exsultationem libertatemque extra
hendus tristisque sobrietas removenda paulisper. 16.
Nam sive Graeco poetae credimus, aliquando et in
sanire iucundum est ; sive Platoni, frustra poeticas
fores conpossui pepulit ; sive Aristoteli , nullum
magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiae fuit :
non potest grande aliqnid et super ceteros loqui nisi
mota mens. Cum volgaria et solita contempsit in
stinctuque sacro surrexit excelsior, tunc demum ali
quid cecinit grandius ore mortali. 17. Non potest
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. CAP. XV. 101

sublime quicquam et in arduo positum contingere,

quamdiu apud se est : desciscat oportet a solito et
efferatur et mordeat frenos et rectorem rapiat suum
eoque ferat, quo per se timuisset escendere.
Habes, Serene carissime, quae possint tranquillita
tem tueri, quae restituere, quae subrepentibus vitiis
resistant. Illud tamen scito, nihil horum satis esse
validum rem inbecillam servantibus, nisi intenta et
adsidua cura circumit animum labentem .
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 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

AD PAULINUM

DE BREVITATE VITAE

LIBER UNUS.
 The spirit of Stoicism existing by itself is narrow and harsh ; it
has too great affinity ta pride and egotism ; it is too repressive of the
spontaneous feelings, of art, and poetry, and geniality of life. On the
other hand, it is the stimulus to live above the world . Hence while the
bare Stoical spirit, in whatever form, produces only an imperfect and
repulsive character, a certain leaven of it, to say the least, is necessary :
else would a man be wanting in all effort and aspiration of mind.
SIR ALEX. GRANT.
 AD PAULINUM

DE BREVITATE VITAE.

I. Maior pars mortalium , Pauline, de naturae ma

lignitate conqueritur, quod in exiguum aevi gignimur,
quod haec tam velociter, tam rapide dati nobis tem
poris spatia decurrant, adeo ut exceptis admodum
paucis ceteros in ipso vitae adparatu vita destituat.
Nec huic publico, ut opinantur, malo turba tantum
et inpndens volgus ingemuit : clarorum qnoqne vi
rorum hic adfectus querelas evocavit. Inde illa maxi
mi medicorum exclamatio est, Vitam brevem esse, lon
gam artem . 2. Inde Aristotelis cum rerum natura
exigentis minime conveniens sapienti viro lis est : ait
istam animalibus tantum indulsisse, ut quina aut
dena secula educerent ; homini in tam multa ac
magna genito tanto citeriorem terminum stare. 3 .
Non exiguum temporis habemus, sed multum perdi
dimnus. Satis longa vita et in maximarum rerum
consummationem large data est, si tota bene conloca
retur. Sed ubi per luxum ac neglegentiam diffluit,
ubi nullae bonae rei inpenditur ; ultima demum ne
cessitate cogente, quam ire non intelleximus, transisse
sentimus. 4. Ita est, non accepimus brevem vitam ,
sed fecimus ; nec inopes eius, sed prodigi sumus. Sic
106 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

ut amplae et regiae opes, ubi ad malum dominum

pervenerunt, momento dissipantur, at quamvis modi
cae, si bono custodi traditae sunt, usu crescunt : ita
aetas nostra bene disponenti multum patet.
II. Quid de rerum natura querimur ? illa se be
nigne gessit : vita, si uti scias, longa est. Alium in
satiabilis tenet avaritia, alium in supervacuis labo
ribus operosa sedulitas : alius vino madet : alius in
ertia torpet : alium defatigat ex alienis iudiciis sus
pensa semper ambitio : alium mercandi praeceps cu
piditas circa omnes terras, omnia maria spe lucri
ducit. Quosdam torquet cupido militiae numquam
non aut alienis periculis intentos aut suis anxios : sunt
quos ingratus superiorum cultus voluntaria servitute
consumat. 2. Multos aut adfectatio alienae fortunae
aut suae odium detinuit : plerosque nihil certum se
quentis vaga et inconstans et sibi displicens levitas per
nova consilia iactavit. Quibusdam nihil, quo cursum
dirigant, placet, sed marcentis oscitantisque fata de
prehendunt, adeo ut quod apud maximum poetarum
more oraculi dictum est, verum esse non dubitem :
Exigua pars est vitae quam nos vivimus.
Ceterum quidem omne spatium non vita, sed tempus
est. 3. Urgentia circumstant vitia undique nec re
surgere aut in dispectum veri adtollere oculos sinunt
et mersos et in cupiditatem infixos premunt. Num
quam illis recurrere ad se licet, si quando aliqua for
tuito quies contigit : veluti profundo mari , in quo
post ventum quoque volutatio est, fluctuantur nec
umquam illis a cupiditatibus suis otium instat. De

istis me putas disserere, quorum in confesso mala

 DE BREVITATE VITAE . CAP . III . 107

sunt ? adspice illos, ad quorum felicitatem concur

ritur : bonis suis effocantur. 4. Quam multis di
vitiae graves sunt ? quam multorum eloquentia co
tidiano ostentandi ingenii spatio sanguinem educit ?
quam multi continuis voluptatibus pallent ? quam
multis nihil liberi relinquit circumfusus clientium
populus ? Omnis denique istos ab infimis usque ad
summos pererra : hic advocat, hic adest : ille pericli
tatur, ille defendit, ille iudicat. Nemo se sibi vindi
cat : alius in alium consumimur. 5. Interroga de
istis, quorum nomina ediscuntur : his illos dignosci
videbis notis : Ille illius cultor est, hic illius : suus
nemo est . Deinde dementissima quorumdam indig
natio est : queruntur de superiorum fastidio, quod
ipsis adire volentibus non vacaverint. Audet quis.
quam de alterius superbia queri, qui sibi ipse num
quam vacat ? Ille tamen te, quisquis est, insolenti
quidem voltu, sed aliquando respexit : ille aures suas
ad tua verba demisit : ille te ad latus suum recepit :
tu non inspicere te umquam , non audire dignatus es.
III. Non est itaque, quod ista officia cuiquam in
putes ; quoniam quidem , cum illa faceres, non esse
cum aliquo volebas, sed tecum esse non poteras.
Omnia licet quae umquam ingenia fulserunt in hoc
unum consentiant, numquam satis hanc humanarum
mentium caliginem mirabuntur. Praedia sua occu
pari a nullo patiuntur et, si exigua contentio est de
modo finium , ad lapides et arma discurrunt : in vitam
suam incedere alios sinunt, immo vero ipsi etiam
possessores eius futuros inducunt. Nemo invenitur,
qui pecuniam suam dividere velit : vitam unusquis
que quam multis distribuit ? 2. Adstricti sunt in
108 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

continendo patrimonio, simul ad iacturam temporis

ventum est, profusissimi in eo, cuius unius honesta
avaritia est. Libet itaque ex seniorum turba conpre
hendere aliquem. Pervenisse te ad ultimum aetatis
humanae videmus : centesimus tibi vel supra premi
tur annus : agedum, ad conputationem aetatem tuam
revoca . Dic, quantum ex isto tempore creditor, quan
tum arnica, quantum rex, quantum cliens abstulerit :
quantum lis uxoria, quantum servorum coercitio , quan
tum officiosa per urbem discursatio. 3. Adice morbos,
quos manu fecimus : adice quod et sine usu iacuit :
videbis te pauciores annos habere quam numeras .
Repete memoria tecum , quando certus consilii fueris ;
quotus quisque dies ut destinaveras recesserit ; quando
tibi usus tui fuerit ; quando in statu suo voltus, quan
do animus intrepidus; quid tibi in tam longo aevo
facti operis sit ; quam multi vitam tuam diripuerint
te non sentiente quid perderes ; quantum vanus do
lor, stulta laetitia, avida cupiditas, blanda conversa
tio abstulerit ; quam exiguum tibi de tuo relictum
sit : intelleges te inmaturum mori.
IV. Quid ergo est in causa ? tamquam semper victu
ri vivitis : numquam vobis fragilitas vestra succurrit :
non observatis, quantum iam temporis transierit : vel
ut ex pleno et abundanti perditis, cum interim for
tasse ille ipse qui alicui vel homini vel rei donatur
dies ultimus sit. Omnia tamquam mortales timetis,
omnia tamquam inmortales concupiscitis. Audies
plerosque dicentes ; A quinquagesimo anno in otium
secedam : sexagesimus me annus ab officiis dimittet.
Et quem tandem longioris vitae praedem accipis ? quis
ista sicut disponis ire patietur ? 2. Non pudet te re
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . CAP. V. 109

liquias vitae tibi reservare et id solum tempus bonae

menti destinare, quod in nullam rem conferri possit ?
Quam seruin est tunc vivere incipere, cum desinen
dum est ? quae tam stulta mortalitatis oblivio in quin
quagesimum et sexagesimum annum differre sana con
silia et inde velle vitam inchoare, quo pauci perduxe
runt ? 3. Potentissimis et in altum sublatis homini
buis excidere voces videbis, quibus otium optent, lau
dent, omnibus bonis suis praeferant. Cupiunt inte
rim ex illo fastigio suo, si tuto liceat, descendere.
Nam ut nihil extra lacessat aut quatiat: in te ipsa
fortuna ruit .
V. Divus Augustus, cui di plura quam ulli praesti
terunt, non desiit quietem sibi precari et vacationem
a republica petere. Omnis eius sermo ad hoc semper
revolutus est, ut speraret otium. Hoc labores suos,
etiam si falso, dulci tamen oblectabat solatio, aliquan
do se victurum sibi. In quadam ad senatum missa
epistula, cum requiem suam non vacuam fore digni
tatis nec a priore gloria discrepantem pollicitus esset,
haec verba inveni: 2. Sed ista fieri speciosius quam
promitti possunt : me tamen cupido temporis op
tatissimi mihi provexit, ut quoniam rerum laetitia
moratur adhuc, perciperem aliquid voluptatis ex
verborum dulcedine. Tanta visa est res otium , ut il
lam, quia usu non poterat, cogitatione praesineret.
Qui omnia videbat ex se uno pendentia, qui homini
bus gentibusque fortunam dabat, illum diem laetissi
mus cogitabat, quo magnitudinem suam exueret.
Expertus erat, quantum illa bona per omnes terras
fulgentia sudoris exprimerent, quantum occultarum
sollicitudinum tegerent : cum civibus primum , deinde
110 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

cum collegis, novissime cum adfinibus coactus armis

decernere mari terraque sanguinem fudit : per Ma
cedoniam , Siciliam, Aegyptum , Syriam Asiamque et
omnis prope oras bello circumactus Romana caede
lassos exercitus ad externa bella convertit. 4. Dum
Alpes placat inmixtosque mediae paci et imperio
hostes perdomat, dum ultra Rhenum et Euphraten et
Danubium terminos movet, in ipsa urbe Murenae,
Caepionis, Lepidi, Egnatiorum in eum mucrones acu
ebantur. Nondum horum effugerat insidias : filia et
tot nobiles invenes adulterio velut sacramento adacti
iam infractam aetatem territabant : plusque et iterum
timenda cum Antonio mulier. 5. Haec ulcera cum
ipsis membris absciderat ; alia subnascebantur : velut
grave multo sanguine corpus, partes semper aliquae
rumpebantur. Itaque otium optabat: in huius spe
et cogitatione labores eius residebant: hoc votum erat
eius, qni voti conpotes facere poterat. Marcus Cicero
inter Catilinas, Clodios iactatus Pompeiosque et Cras
sos, partim manifestos inimicos, partim dubios amicos,
dum fluctuatur cum republica et illam pessum euntem
tenet, novissime abductus, nec secundis rebus quietus
nec adversarum patiens, quotiens illum ipsum consula
tum suum non sine causa, sed sine fine laudatum de
testatur ? 6. Quam flebiles voces exprimit in quadam
ad Atticum epistula iam victo patre Pompeio, adhuc
filio in Hispania fracta arma refovente ? Quid agam ,
inquit, hic quaeris ? moror in Tusculano meo semi
liber. Alia deinceps adicit, quibus et priorem aeta
tem conplorat et de praesenti queritur et de futura
desperat. Semiliberum se dixit Cicero : at meheren
les numquam sapiens in tam humile nomen procedet,
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . CAP. VI. 111

numquam semiliber erit ; integrae semper libertatis

et solidae, solutus, et sui iuris et altior ceteris. Quid
enim supra eum potest esse, qui supra fortunam est ?
VI. Livius Drusus, vir acer et vehemens, cum leges
novas et mala Gracchana movisset, stipatus ingenti
totius Italiae coetu, exitum rerum non pervidens , quas
nec agere licebat nec iam liberum erat semel inchoatas
relinquere, exsecratus inquietam a primordiis vitam
dicitur dixisse, Uni sibi ne puero quidem umquam
ferias contigisse. Ausus est enim et pupillus adhuc
et praetextatus iudicibus reos commendare et gratiam
suam foro interponere tam efficaciter quidem, ut quae
dam iudicia constet ab illo rapta. 2. Quo non erum
peret tam inmatura ambitio ? scires in malum ingens
et privatum et publicum evasuram praecoquem auda
ciam . Sero itaque querebatur nullas sibi ferias conti
gisse a puero seditiosus et foro gravis. Disputatur,
an ipse sibi manus adtulerit : subito enim volnere per
inguen accepto conlapsus est, aliquo dubitante, an mors
eius voluntaria esset, nullo, an tempestiva. 3. Super
vacuum est commemorare plures qui , cum aliis felicis
simi viderentur, ipsi in se verum testimonium dixerunt,
perosi omnem actum annorum suorum. Sed his que
relis nec alios mutaverunt nec se ipsos. Nam cum
verba eruperunt , adfectus ad consuetudinem relabun
tur. Vestra mehercules vita , licet supra mille annos
exeat, in artissimum contrahetur . Ista vitia nullum
non seculum devorabunt : hoc vero spatium quod ,
quamvis natura currit, ratio dilatat, cito vos effugiat
necesse est. 4. Non enim adprehenditis nec retinetis
nec velocissimae omnium rei moram facitis, sed abire
ut rem supervacuam ac reparabilem sinitis . In primis
112 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

autem et illos numero, qui nulli rei nisi vino ac libidini

vacant : nulli enim turpius occupati sunt : ceteri et
iam si vana gloriae imagine teneantur, speciose tamen
errant. 5. Licet avaros mihi, licet vel iracundos enume
res vel odia exercentes iniusta vel bella : omnes isti vi
rilius peccant : in Venerem ac libidinem proiectorum
inhonesta tabes est. Omnia istorum tempora excute :
adspice quamdiu conputent, quamdin insidientur,
quamdiu timeant, quamdiu colant, quaindiu colantur,
quantum vadimonia sua åtque aliena occnpent, quan
tum convivia, quae iam ipsa officia sunt: videbis, quem
admodum illos respirare non sinant vel mala sua vel
bona. 6. Denique inter omnes convenit nullam rem
bene exerceri posse ab homine occupato, non eloquen
tiam, non liberales disciplinas, quando districtus ani
mus nihil altius recipit, sed omnia velut inculcata re
spuit. Nihil minus est hominis occupati quam vivere :
nullius rei difficilior scientia est.
VII. Professores aliaruin artium volgo multique
sunt : quasdam vero ex his pneri admodum ita perce
pisse visi sunt, ut etiam praecipere possent : vivere
tota vita discendum est et, quod magis fortasse mira
bere, tota vita discendum est mori. Tot maximi viri
relictis omnibus inpedimentis, cum divitiis, officiis,
voluptatibus renuntiassent, hoc unum in extremam
usque aetatem egerunt, ut virere scirent : plures ta
men ex his nondum se scire confessi vita abierunt ;
nedum ut isti sciant. 2. Magni, mihi crede, et supra
humanos errores eminentis viri est nihil ex suo tem
pore delibari sinere : et ideo eius vita longissima est,
quia, quantumcumque patuit, totum ipsi vacavit. Ni
hil inde incultum otiosumque iacuit, nihil sub alio
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . CAP. VII. 113

fuit : neque enim quicquam reperit dignum, quod

cum tempore suo permutaret custos eius parcissimus.
Itaque satis illi fuit : his vero necesse est defuisse, ex
qnorum vita multum populus tulit. 3. Nec est quod
putes hinc illos aliquando intellegere damnum suum :
plerosque certe audies ex his, quos magna felicitas
gravat, inter clientium greges aut causarum actiones
aut ceteras honestas miserias exclamare interdum , Vi
vere mihi non licet. Quidni non liceat ? omnes illi,
qni te sibi advocant, tibi abducunt. Ille reus quot
dies abstulit ? quot ille candidatus ? quot illa anus ef
ferendis heredibus lassa ? quot ille ad inritandam ava
ritiam captantium simulatus aeger ? quot ille potentior
amicus, qui vos non in amicitiam , sed in adparatu ha
bet ? 4. Dispunge, inquam , et recense vitae tuae dies :
videbis paucos admodum et reiculos apud te resedisse.
Adsecutus ille quos optaverat fasces cupit ponere et
subinde dicit, Quando hic annus praeteribit ? Facit
ille lndos, quorum sortem sibi obtingere magno aesti
mavit : Quando, inquit, istos effugiam ? Diripitur ille
toto foro patronus et magno concursu omnia ultra,
quam audiri potest, conplet : Quando, inquit, res pro
ferentur ? 5. Praecipitat quisque vitam suam et fu
turi desiderio laborat, praesentium taedio. At ille qui
nullum non tempus in usus suos confert, qui omnes
dies tamquam ritam ordinat, nec optat crastinum nec
timet. Quid enim est, qnod iam nlla hora novae vo
luptatis possit adferre ? omnia nota, omnia ad satieta
tem percepta sunt. De cetero fors fortuna, ut volet,
ordinet : vita iam in tuto est : huic adici potest, de
trahi nihil : et adici sic, quemadmodum saturo iam ac
pleno aliquid cibi : qui quod nec desiderat capit.
114 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

VIII. Non est itaque quod quemquam propter ca

nos aut rugas putes diu vixisse : (non ille diu vixit,
sed ] diu fuit. Quid enim, si illum multum putes na
vigasse, quem saeva tempestas a portu exceptum huc
et illuc tulit ac vicibus ventorum ex diverso furen
tium per eadem spatia in orbem egit ? non ille mul
tum navigavit, sed multum iactatus est. Mirari soleo,
cum video aliquos tempus petentes et eos, qui rogan
tur, facillimos. 2. Illud uterque spectat, propter quod
tempus petitum est ; ipsum quidem neuter. Quasi
nihil petitur, quasi nihil datur, res omnium pretiosissi
ma luditur. Fallit autem illos, quia res incorporalis
est, quia sub oculos non venit ; ideoque vilissima
aestimatur, immo paene nullum eius pretium est. An
nua congiaria homines carissime accipiunt et his aut
laborem aut operam aut diligentiam suam locant :
nemo aestimat tempus : utuntur illo laxius quasi
gratuito. 3. At eosdem aegros vide, si mortis peri
culum propius est admotum, inedicorum genua tan
gentes : si metuunt capitale supplicium, omnia sua,
ut vivant, paratos inpendere : tanta in illis discordia
adfectuum est. Quodsi posset quemadmodum prae
teritorum annorum cuiusque numerus proponi, sic fu
turorum : quomodo illi, qui paucos viderent superesse,
trepidarent, quomodo illis parcerent ? Atqui facile est
quamvis exiguum dispensare quod certum est : id de
bet servari diligentius, qnod nescias quando deficiat.
4. Nec est tamen, quod putes illos ignorare, quam
cara res sit. Dicere solent eis, quos valdissime di
ligunt, paratos se partem annorum suorum dare.
Dant nec intellegunt: dant autem ita, ut sine illo
rum incremento sibi detrahant: sed hoc ipsum an
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . CAP . IX . 115

detrahant nesciunt : ideo tolerabilis est illis iactura

detrimenti latentis. Nemo restituet annos, nemo
iterum te tibi reddet. 5. Ibit, qua coepit, aetas nec
cursum suum aut revocabit aut supprimet : nihil tu
multuabitur, nihil admonebit velocitatis suae : tacita
labetur. Non illa se regis imperio, non favore populi
longius proferet: sicut missa est a primo die, curret :
nusquam devertetur, nusquam remorabitur. Quid fiet ?
tu occupatus es, vita festinat : mors interim aderit cui,
velis nolis, vacandum est.
IX. Potestne quisquam , dico hominum eorum qui
prudentiam iactant operosius occupati sunt, quam ut
melius possint vivere ? Inpendio vitae vitamin
struunt, cogitationes suas in longum ordinant. Maxi
ma porro vitae iactura dilatio est : illa primum quem
que extrahit diem, illa eripit praesentia, dum ulterio
ra promittit. Maximum vivendi inpedimentum est
exspectatio, quae pendet ex crastino. Perdis hodier
num : quod in manu fortunae positum est, disponis,
quod in tua, dimittis. Quo spectas, quo te extendis ?
omnia quae ventura sunt, in incerto iacent : protinus
vive. 2. Clamat ecce maximus vates et velut divino
ore instinctus salutare carmen canit :
Optima quaeque dies miseris mortalibus aevi
Prima fugit.
Quid cunctaris, inquit, quid cessas ? Nisi occupas, fu
git, et cum occupaveris , tamen fugiet. Itaque cum
celeritate temporis utendi velocitate certandum est et
velut ex torrenti rapido nec semper ituro cito haurien
dum. Hoc quoque pulcherrime ad exprobrandam in
finitam cogitationem , quod non optimam quamque
116 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

aetatem, sed diem dicit. 3. Quid securus et in tanta

temporum fuga lentus menses tibi et annos et lon
gam seriem , utcumque aviditati tuae visum est, ex
porrigis ? de die tecum . loquitur et de hoc ipso fugi
ente . Non dubium est ergo, quin prima quaeque
optima dies fugiat mortalibus miseris, id est occupa
tis : quorum pueriles adhuc animos senectus opprimit,
ad quam inparati inermesque perveniunt. 4. Nihil
enim provisum est : subito in illam nec opinantes
inciderunt : accedere eam cotidie non sentiebant.
Quemadmodum aut sermo aut lectio aut aliqua in
tentior cogitatio iter facientis decipit et pervenisse
ante sciunt quam adpropinqnasse : sic hoc iter vitae
adsiduum et citatissimum , qnod vigilantes dormientes
que eodem gradu facimus, occupatis non adparet nisi
in fine.
X. Quod proposui si in partes velim et argumenta
diducere, multa mihi occurrent, per quae probem bre
vissimam esse occupatorum vitam. Solebat dicere
Fabianus, non ex his cathedrariis philosophis, sed ex
veris et antiquis, Contra adfectus inpetu, non subtili
tate pugnandum , nec minutis volneribus, sed incursu
avertendam aciem non probam : cavillationes enim
contundi debere, non vellicari. Tamen ut illis error
exprobretur suus, docendi , non tantum deplorandi sunt.
2. In tria tempora vita dividitur : quod fuit, quod est,
quod futurum est. Ex his qnod agimus, breve est,
quod acturi sumus, dubium , quod egimus, certum .
Hoc est enim , in quod fortuna ius perdidit, quod in
nullius arbitrium reduci potest. Hoc amittunt occu
pati : nec enim illis racat praeterita respicere, et si
vacet, iniucunda. est poenitendae rei recordatio. In
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . CAP. X. 117

viti itaque ad tempora male exacta animum rerocant

nec audent ea retemptare, quorum vitia, etiam quae
aliquo praesentis voluptatis lenocinio snbripiebantur,
retractando patescunt. Nemo, nisi a quo omnia acta
sunt sub censura sua, quae numquam fallitur, libenter
se in praeteritum retorquet. 3. Ille qui multa am
bitiose concupiit, superbe contempsit, inpotenter vicit,
insidiose decepit, avare rapuit, prodige effudit, necesse
est meinoriam suam timeat. Atqui haec est pars
temporis nostri sacra ac dedicata, omnes humanos
casus supergressa, extra regnum fortunae subducta,
quam non inopia, non metus, non morborum incur
sus exagitet. 4. Haec nec turbari nec eripi potest :
perpetna eius et intrepida possessio est. Singuli tan
tum dies, et hi per momenta , praesentes sunt : at prae
teriti temporis omnes, cum iusseris, aderunt, ad arbitri
um tuum inspici se ac detineri patientur; quod facere
occupatis non vacat . Securae et quietae mentis est
in omnes vitae suae partes discorrere : occupatorum
animi , velut sub iugo sint, flectere se ac respicere non
possunt. 5. Abit igitur vita eorum in profundum et
ut nihil prodest, licet quantumlibet ingeras, si non
subest, quod excipiat ac servet, sic nihil refert quan
tum temporis detur, si non est, ubi subsidat : per
quassos foratosque animos transmittitur. 6. Praesens
tempus brevissimum est, adeo qnidem , ut quibusdam
nullum videatur : in cursu enim semper est, fluit et
praecipitatur : ante desinit esse quam venit ; nec ma
gis moram patitur quam mundus aut sidera, quorum
inrequieta semper agitatio numquam in eodem ves
tigio manet. Solum igitur ad occupatos praesens
pertinet tempus ; quod tam breve est, ut adripi
F
118 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

non possit, et id ipsum illis districtis in multa sub

ducitur.
XI. Denique vis scire quam non diu vivant ? vide
quam cupiant diu vivere. Decrepiti senes paucorum
annorum accessionem votis mendicant : minores natu
ipsos esse fingunt : mendacio sibi blandiuntur et tam
libenter se fallunt quam si una fata decipiant. Iam
vero cum illos aliqua inbecillitas mortalitatis admo
nuit, quemadmodum paventes moriuntur, non tam
quam exeant de vita, sed tamquam extrahantur ?
stultos se fuisse, ut non vixerint, clamitant et, si
modo evaserint ex illa valitudine, in otio victuros.
2. Tunc quam frustra paraverint, quibus non fru
erentur, quam incassum omnis ceciderit labor, cogi
tant. At quibus vita procul ab omni negotio agitur,
quidni spatiosa sit ? nihil ex illa delegatur, nihil alio
atque alio spargitur, nihil inde fortunae traditur,
nihil neglegentia interit, nihil largitione detrahitur,
nihil supervacuum est : tota, ut ita dicam , in reditu
est. Quantulacumque itaque abunde sufficit et ideo,
quandoque ultimus dies venerit, non cunctabitur sa
piens ire ad mortem certo gradu. 3. Quaeris fortasse,
quos occupatos vocem ? non est quod me solos putes
dicere, quos a basilica inmissi demum canes eiciunt,
quos aut in sua vides turba speciosius elidi ant in
aliena contemptius, quos officia domibus suis evocant,
ut alienis foribus inlidant, quos hasta praetoris infami
lucro et quandoque suppuraturo exercet. Quorum
dam otium occupatum est : in villa aut in lecto suo,
in media solitudine, quamvis ab omnibus recesserint,
sibi ipsi molesti sunt : quorum non otiosa vita dicen
da est, sed desidiosa occupatio.
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . CAP . XII. 119

XII. Illum tu otiosum vocas qui Corinthia, pauco

rum furore pretiosa, anxia subtilitate concinnat et
maiorem dierum partem in aeruginosis lamellis con
sumit ? qui in ceromate (nam , proh facinus, ne Ro
manis quidem vitiis laboramus) sectator puerorum
rixantium sedet ? qui vinctorum suorum greges in
aetatium et colorum paria diducit ? qui athletas no
vissimos pascit ? Quid ? illos otiosos vocas, quibus
apud tonsorem multae horae transmittuntur, dum
decerpitur, si quid proxima nocte succrevit, dum de
singulis capillis in consilium itur, dum aut disiecta
coma restituitur aut deficiens hinc atque illinc in
frontem conpellitur ? 2. Quomodo irascuntur, si ton
sor paulo neglegentior fuit, tamquam virum tonde
ret ? Quomodo excandescunt, si quid ex iuba sua
decisum est, si quid extra ordinem iacuit, nisi omnia
in anulos suos reciderunt ? Quis est istorum qui non
malit rempublicam suam turbari quam comam ? qui
non sollicitior sit de capitis sui decore quam de sa
lute ? qui non comptior esse malit quam honestior ?
Hos tu otiosos vocas inter pectinem speculumque
occupatos ? 3. Quid illi qui in conponendis, audi
endis, dicendis canticis operati sunt ; dum vocem , cu
ius rectum cursum natura et optimum et simplicissi
mum fecit, inflexu modulationis inertissimae torquent ?
Quorum digiti aliquod intra se carmen metientes
semper sonant ; quorum , cum ad res serias, saepe
etiam tristes adhibiti sunt, exauditur tacita modula
tio ? non habent isti otium , sed iners negotium. 4.
Convivia mehercules horum non posuerim inter va
cantia tempora , cum videam, quam solliciti argen
tum ordinent, quam diligenter exoletorum suorum
120 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

tunicas succingant, quam suspensi sint quomodo aper

a coco exeat, quanta celeritate signo dato glabri ad
ministeria discurrant, quanta arte scindantur ares in
frusta non enormia, quam curiose infelices pueruli
ebriorum sputa detergeant. Ex his elegantiae lau
titiaeque fama captatur et usque eo in omnes vitae
secessus mala sua illos sequuntur, ut nec bibant sine
ambitione nec edant. 5. Ne illos quidem inter otio
sos numeraveris, qui sella se et lectica huc et illuc
ferunt et ad gestationum suarum, quasi deserere illas
non liceat, horas occurrunt: quos quando lavari de
beant, quando natare, quando coenare, alius admonet;
et usque eo nimio delicati animi languore solvuntur,
ut per se scire non possint, an esuriant. 6. Audio
quemdam ex delicatis ( si modo deliciae vocandae sunt
vitain et consuetudinem humanam dediscere ), cum ex
balneo inter mauus elatus et in sella positus esset,
dixisse interrogando, lam sedeo ? Hunc tu ignoran
tem , an sedeat, putas scire an virat, an videat, an
otiosus sit ? non facile dixerim , utrum magis miserear,
si hoc ignoravit, an si ignorare se finxit. 7. Multa
rum quidem rerum oblivionem sentiunt, sed multarum
et imitantur : quaedam vitia illos, quasi felicitatis ar
gumenta, delectant. Nimis humilis et contempti ho
minis videtur scire quid faciat. I nunc et mimos
multa mentiri ad exprobrandam luxuriam puta. Plu
ra mehercules praetereunt quam fingunt et tanta in
credibilium vitiorum copia ingenioso in hoc unum
seculo processit, ut iam mimorum arguere possimus
neglegentiam . Esse aliquem , qui iisque eo deliciis
interierit, ut an sedeat alteri credat ?
XIII. Non est ergo hic otiosus : aliud nomen in
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . CAP . XIII. 121

ponas : aeger est, immo mortuus est. Ille otiosus est,

cui otii sui et sensus est : hic vero semivivus, cui ad
intellegendos corporis sui habitus indice opus est :
quomodo potest hic ullius temporis dominus esse ?
Persequi singulos longum est, quorum aut latrunculi
aut pila aut excoquendi in sole corporis cura con
sumpsere vitam. 2. Non sunt otiosi , quorum volupta
tes multum negotii habent. Nam de illis nemo du
bitabit, quin operose nihil agant, qui literarum inu
tilium studiis detinentur ; quae iam apud Romanos
quoque magna inanus est. Graecorum iste morbus
fuit quaerere, quem numerum Ulixes remigum ha
buisset : prior scripta esset Ilias an Odyssea : praeter
ea an eiusdem esset auctoris : alia deinceps huius
notae ; quae sive contineas, nihil tacitam conscientiam
iuvant, sive proferas, non doctior videaris, sed moles
tior. 3. Ecce Romanos quoque invasit inane studium
supervacua discendi. His diebus audivi quemdam
referentem , quae primus quisque ex Romanis ducibus
fecisset. Primus narali proelio Duillius vicit, primus
Curius Dentatus in triumpho duxit elephantos. Et
iamnunc ista, etsi ad veram gloriam non tendunt, circa
civilium tamen operum exempla versantur. 4. Non
est profutura talis scientia ; est tamen , quae nos spe
ciosa rerum vanitate detineat. Hoc quoque quae
rentibus remittamus, quis Romanis primus persuaserit
narem conscendere ? Claudius is fuit, Caudex ob hoc
ipsum adpellatus, quia plurium tabularum contextus
caudex apud antiquos vocatur ; unde publicae tabulae
codices dicuntur et naves nunc quoque, quae ex anti
qua consuetudine commeatus per Tiberim subrehunt,
codicariae vocantur. 5. Sane et hoc ad rem pertineat,
122 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

quod Valerius Corvinus primus Messanam vicit et

primus ex familia Valeriorum urbis captae in se
translato nomine Messana adpellatus est paulatim
que volgo permutante literas Messalla dictus. Num
et hoc cuiquam curare permittes, quod primus L.
Sulla in circo leones solutos dedit, cum alioquin ad
ligati darentur, ad conficiendos eos missis a rege
Boccho iaculatoribus ? et hoc sane remittatur. 6.
Num et Pompeium primum in circo elephantorum
duodeviginti pngnam edidisse commissis more proelii
noxiis hominibus ad ullam rem bonam pertinet ?
Princeps civitatis et inter antiquos principes, ut
fama tradidit, bonitatis eximiae, memorabile putavit
spectaculi genus novo more perdere homines. De
pugnant ? parum est : lancinantur parum est : in
genti mole animalium exterantur. Satius erat ista
in oblivionem ire, ne quis postea potens disceret in
videretque rei minime humanae.
XIV. O quantum caliginis mentibus nostris obicit
magna felicitas !
Ille se supra rerum naturam esse
tunc credidit, cum tot miserorum hominum catervas
sub alio coelo natis beluis obiceret, cum bellum inter
tam disparia animalia committeret, cum in conspectu
populi Romani multum sanguinis funderet mox plus
ipsum fundere coacturus. At idem postea Alexandri
na perfidia deceptus ultimo mancipio transfodiendum
se praebuit, tum demum intellecta inani iactatione
cognominis sui. 2. Sed ut illo revertar, unde decessi,
et in eadem materia ostendam supervacuam quorum
dam diligentiam : idem narrabat Metellum victis in
Sicilia Poenis triumphantem unum omnium Romano
rum ante currum centum et viginti captivos elephan.
 DE BREVITATE VITAE. CAP. XIV. 123

tos duxisse. Sullam ultimum Romanorum protulisse

pomoerium , quod numquam provinciali, sed Italico
agro adquisito proferre moris apud antiquos fuit. 3.
Hoc scire magis prodest, quam Aventinum montem
extra pomoerium esse, ut ille adfirmabat, propter al
teram ex duabus causis, aut quod plebs eo secessis
set, aut quod Remo auspicante illo loco aves non
addixissent. Alia deinceps innumerabilia, quae aut
farta sunt mendaciis aut similia. Nam ut concedas
omnia eos fide bona dicere, ut ad praestationem
scribant : tamen cuius ista errores minuent ? cuius
cupiditates prement ? quem fortiorem , quem iustio
rem , quem liberaliorem facient. 4. Dubitare se in
terim Fabianus noster aiebat, an satius esset nullis
studiis admoveri quam his inplicari. Soli omnium
otiosi sunt qui sapientiae vacant : soli vivant : nec
enim suam tantum aetatem bene tuentur : omne

aevum suo adiciunt. Quicquid annorum ante illos

actum est, illis adquisitum est. Nisi ingratissimi
sumus, illi clarissimi sacrarum opinionum conditores
nobis nati sunt , nobis vitam praeparaverunt. 5. Ad
res pulcherrimas ex tenebris ad lucem erutas alieno
labore deducimur : nullo nobis seculo interdictum
est, in omnia admittimur et, si magnitudine animi
egredi humanae inbecillitatis angustias libet, multum ,
per quod spatiemur, temporis est. Disputare cum
Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicuro
quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum
Cynicis excedere, cum rerum natura in consortium
omnis aevi patiatur incedere. 6. Quidni ab hoc exi
guo et caduco temporis transitu in illa toto nos de
mus animo, quae inmensa, quae aeterna sunt, quae
124 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

cum melioribus communia ? Isti, qui per officia dis

cursant, qui se aliosque inquietant, cum bene insanie
rint, cum omnium limina cotidie perambulaverint nec
ullas apertas fores praeterierint, cum per diversissi
mas domos meritoriam salutationem circumtulerint ;
quotum quemque ex tam inmensa et variis cupiditati
bus districta urbe poterunt videre ? quam multi erunt,
quorum illos aut somnus aut luxuria ant inhumanitas
submoveat? 7. Quam multi qui illos, cum diu torse
rint, simulata festinatione transcurrant ? quam multi
per refertum clientibus atrium prodire vitabunt et
per obscuros aedium aditus profugient ? quasi non
inhumanius sit decipere quam excludere : quam multi
hesterna crapula semisomnes et graves, illis miseriis
somnum suum rumpentes, ut alienum exspectent, vix
adleratis labris insusurratum millies nomen oscitatione
superbissima reddent ? 8. Hos in veris officiis morari
licet dicamus, qui Zenonem, qui Pythagoran cotidie et
Democritum ceterosque antistites bonarum artium , qui
Aristotelem et Theophrastum volent habere quam fa
miliarissimos : nemo horum non vacabit, nemo non
venientem ad se beatiorem amantioremque sui dimit
tet : nemo quemquam vacuis a se manibus abire pa
tietur. 9. Nocte conveniri et interdiu ab omnibus
mortalibus possunt. Horum te mori nemo coget,
omnes docebunt : horum nemo annos tuos conterit,
suos tibi contribuit: nullius ex his sermo periculosus
erit, nullius amicitia capitalis, nullius sumptuosa ob
servatio.
XV. Feres ex illis, quicquid voles : per illos non
stabit, quo minus plurimum quantum ceperis haurias.
Quae illum felicitas, quam pulchra senectus manet,
 DE BREVITATE VITAE. CAP. XV . 125

qui se in horum clientelam contulit ? habebit, cum qui

bus de minimis maximisque rebus deliberet, quos de se
cotidie consulat, a quibus audiat verum sine contume
lia, laudetur sine adulatione, ad quorum se similitudi
nem effingat. Solemus dicere non fuisse in nostra
potestate, quos sortiremnur parentes, forte nobis datos :
nobis vero ad nostrum arbitrium nasci licet. 2. No
bilissimorum ingeniorum familiae sunt ; elige in quam
adscisci velis : non in nomen tantum adoptaberis, sed
in ipsa bona : quae non erunt sordide nec maligne
custodienda ; maiora fient, quo illa pluribus diviseris.
Hi tibi dabunt ad aeternitatem iter et te in illum lo
m, ex quo nemo deicitur, sublevabunt; haec una
ratio est extendendae mortalitatis, immo in inmortali
tatem vertendae. Honores, monumenta, quicquid ant
decretis ambitio iussit aut operibus exstruxit, cito sub
ruitur : nihil non longa demolitur vetustas et moret.
3. At iis, qnae consecravit sapientia, noceri non potest :
nulla abolebit aetas, nulla diminuet : sequens ac deinde
semper ulterior aliquid ad venerationem confert ; qno
niam quidem in vicino versatur invidia ; simplicius
longe posita miramur. Sapientis ergo multum patet
vita : non idem illum qui ceteros terminus cludit : so
lus generis humani legibus solvitur : omnia illi secula
ut deo serviunt. 4. Transit tempus aliquod ? hoc re
cordatione conprehendit : instat ? hoc utitur : ventu
rum est ? hoc praecipit. Longam illi vitam facit om
nium temporum in unum conlocatio. Illorum bre
vissima ac sollicitissima aetas est, qui praeteritorum
obliviscuntur, praesentia neglegunt, de futuro timent :
cum ad extrema venerunt, sero intellegunt miceri,
tamdiu se, dum nihil ayunt, occupatos fuisse.
F2
126 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

XVI. Nec est, quod hoc argumento probari putes

longam illos agere vitam , quia interdum mortem in
vocant. Vexat illos inprudentia incertis adfectibus
et incurrentibus in ipsa quae metuunt : mortem saepe
ideo optant, quia timent. Illud quoque argumentum
non est, quod putes, diu viventium, quod saepe illis
longus videtur dies, quod, dum veniat condictum tem
pus coenae, tarde ire horas queruntur : nam si quando
illos deseruerunt occupationes, in otio relicti aestuant,
nec quomodo id disponant aut extrahant, sciunt. 2.
Itaque ad occupationem aliquam tendunt et quod in
teriacet omne tempus grave est, tam mehercule, quam
cum dies muneris gladiatorii edictus est, aut cum ali
cuius alterius vel spectaculi vel voluptatis exspectatur
constitutum , transilire medios dies volunt. Omnis illis
speratae rei longa dilatio est ad illud tempus, quod
amanti breve est et praeceps breviusque multo suo vi
tio : aliunde enim alio transfugiunt et consistere in
una cupiditate non possunt: non sunt illi longi dies,
sed invisi. 3. At contra quam exiguae noctes viden
tur, quas in conplexu scortorum aut vino exigunt ?
Inde etiam poetarum furor fabulis humanos errores
alentium , quibus visus est Iupiter voluptate concubi
tus delenitus duplicasse noctem. Quid aliud est vitia
nostra incendere quam auctores illis inscribere deos et
dare morbo exemplo divinitatis excusatam licentiam ?
4. Possunt istis non brevissimae videri noctes, quas
tam care mercantur ? diem noctis exspectatione per
dunt, noctem lucis metu. Ipsae voluptates eorum
trepidae et variis terroribus inquietae sunt subitque
cum maxime exsultantis sollicita cogitatio, Haec quam
diu ? Ab hoc adfectu reges suam flevere potentiam :
 DE BREVITATE VITAE , CAP. XVII. 127

nec illos magnitudo fortunae suae delectavit, sed ven

turus aliquando finis exterruit. 5. Cum per magna
camporum spatia porrigeret exercitum nec numerum
eius, sed mensuram conprehenderet Persarum rex in
solentissimus, lacrimas profudit, quod intra centum an
nos nemo ex tanta iuventute superfuturus esset. At
illis admoturus erat fatum ipse, qui flebat, perditurus
que alios in mari, alios in terra, alios proelio , alios fuga
et intra exiguum tempus consumpturus illos, quibus
centesimum annum timebat .
XVII. Quid, quod gaudia quoque eorum trepida
sunt ? non enim solidis causis innituntur, sed eadem ,
qua oriuntur, vanitate turbantur. Qualia autem putas
esse tempora etiam ipsorum confessione misera, cum
haec quoque, quibus se adtollunt et super hominem
efferunt, parum sincera sunt ? Maxima quaeque bona
sollicita sunt nec ulli fortunae minus bene quam opti
mae creditur. Alia felicitate ad tuendam felicitatem
opus est et pro ipsis, quae successere, votis vota faci
enda sunt. 2. Omne enim, quod fortuito obvenit, insta
bile est : quod altius surrexerit, opportunius est in oc
casum : neminem porro casura delectant. Miserrimam
ergo necesse est, non tantum brevissimam vitam eorum
esse, qui magno parant labore, quod maiore possideant ;
operose adsequuntur, quae volunt, anxii tenent, quae
adsecuti sunt. Nulla interim numquam amplius re
dituri temporis ratio est. 3. Novae occupationes ve
teribus substituuntur, spes spem excitat, ambitionem
ambitio : miseriarum non finis quaeritur, sed materia
mutatur. Nostri nos honores torserunt ? plus temporis
alieni auferunt. Candidati laborare desimus ? suffra
gatores incipimus, Accusandi deposuimus molestiam ?
128 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

iudicandi nanciscimur. Iudex desiit esse ? quaesitor

est. Alienorum bonorum mercenaria procuratione
consenuit ? suis opibus detinetur. Marium caliga di
misit ? consulatus exercet. 4. Quintius dictaturam
properat praevadere ? ab aratro revocabitur. Ibit in
Poenos nondum tantae maturus rei Scipio, victor Han
nibalis, victor Antivchi, sui consulatus decus, fraterni
sponsor, ni per ipsum mora sit, cum Iove reponetur ?
civiles servatorem agitabunt seditiones et post fastidi
tos a iuvene dis aequos honores iam senem contuma
cis exilii delectabit ambitio. Numquam deerunt vel
felices vel miserae sollicitudinis causae : per occupa
tiones vita rodetur otium : numquam agetur, semper
optabitur.
XVIII. Excerpe itaqne te volgo, Pauline carissime,
et in tranquilliorem portum non pro aetatis spatio
iactatus tandem recede. Cogita, quot fluctus subieris,
quot tempestates partim privatas sustinueris, partim
publicas in te converteris. Satis iam per laboriosa et
inqnieta documenta exhibita virtus est : experire, quid
in otio faciat. Maior pars aetatis, certe melior reipub
licae data sit : aliquid temporis tui sume etiam tibi.
Nec te ad segnem ant inertem quietem voco : non ut
somno et caris turbae voluptatibus, quicquid est in te
indolis vivae, demergas. 2. Non est istud adqniescere :
invenies maiora omnibus adhuc strenue tractatis ope
ribus, quae repositus et securus agites. Tu quidem
orbis terrarum rationes adıninistras tam abstinenter
qnam alienas, tam diligenter quam tuas, tam religiose
quam publicas : in officio amorem conseqneris, in quo
odium vitare difficile est : sed tamen, mihi crede, satius
est vitae suae rationem quam frumenti publici nosse.
 DE BREVITATE VITAE. CAP . XIX . 129

3. Istum animi vigorem , rerum maximarum capacissi

mum , a ministerio honorifico quidem , sed parum ad
beatam vitam apto ad te revoca et cogita non id egisse
te ab aetate prima omni cultu studiorum liberalium , ut
tibi multa milia frumenti bene committerentur : ma
ius quiddam et altius de te promiseras. Non deerunt
et frugalitatis exactae homines et laboriosae operae.
Tanto aptiora exportandis oneribus tarda iumenta sunt
quam nobiles equi; quorum generosam pernicitatem
quis umquam gravi sarcina pressit ? Cogita praeterea,
quantum sollicitudinis sit ad tantam te molem obicere :
cum ventre tibi humano negotium est. 4. Nec ratio
nem patitur nec aequitate mitigatur nec ulla prece
flectitur populus esuriens. Modo intra paucos illos
dies, quibus C. Caesar periit, si quis inferis sensus est,
hoc gravissime ferens, quod decedebat populo Romano
superstite, septem aut octo certe dierum cibaria super
esse ? dum ille pontes navibus iungit et viribus impe
ri ludit, aderat ultimum malorum obsessis quoque, ali
mentorum egestas. 5. Exitio paene ac fame constitit
et, quae famem sequitur, rerum omnium ruina furiosi
et externi et infeliciter superbi regis imitatio. Quem
tunc animum habuerunt illi , quibus erat mandata fru
menti publici cura ? saxa, ferrum , ignes, Caium excep
turi summa dissimulatione tantum inter viscera laten
tis mali tegebant, cum ratione scilicet : quaedam enim
ignorantibus aegris curanda sunt : causa multis mori
endi fuit morbum suum nosse.
XIX. Recipe te ad haec tranquilliora, tutiora, maio
ra. Simile tu putas esse , utrum cures , ut incorruptum
et a fraude adrehention et a neglegentia frumentum
transfundatur in horrea, ne concepto humore vitietur
130 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

et concalescat, ut ad mensuram pondusque respondeat,

an ad haec sacra et sublimia accedas sciturus, quae
materia sit dis, quae voluptas, quae condicio, quae for
ma ? quis animum tuum casus exspectet, ubi nos et a
corporibus dimissos natura conponat ? quid sit quod
huius mundi gravissima quaeque in medio sustineat,
supra levia suspendat, in summum ignem ferat, sidera
vicibus suis excitet ? cetera deinceps ingentibus plena
miraculis. 2. Vis tu relicto solo mente ad ista respi
cere ? nunc, dum calet sanguis, vigentibus ad meliora
eundum est. Exspectat te in hoc genere vitae multum
bonarum artium , amor virtutum atque usus, cupidita
tum oblivio, vivendi ac moriendi scientia, alta rerum
quies. Omnium quidem occupatorum condicio misera
est; eorum tamen miserrima, qui ne suis quidem labo
rant occupationibus, ad alienum dormiunt somnum, ad
alienum ambulant gradum , amare et odisse, res omni
um liberrimas, inbentur. 3. Hi si volent scire quam
brevis ipsorum vita sit, cogitent ex quota parte sua sit.
Cum videris itaque praetextam saepe iam sumptam ,
cum celebre in foro nomen , non invideris. Ista vitae
dainno parantur : ut unus ab illis numeretur annus,
omnis annos suos conterent. Quosdam, antequam in
summum ambitionis eniterentur, inter prima luctantis
aetas reliquit : quosdam cum in consummationem dig
nitatis per mille indignitates erupissent, misera subit
cogitatio laborasse ipsos in titulum sepulcri : quorum
dam ultima senectus, dum in novas spes ut inventa
disponitur, inter conatus magnos et inprobos invalida
defecit.
XX. Foedus ille, quem in iudicio pro ignotissimis
litigatoribus grandem natu et inperitae coronae ad
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . CAP. XX . 131

sensiones captantem spiritus liquit : turpis ille, qui vi

vendo lassus citius quam laborando inter ipsa officia
conlapsus est : turpis, quem accipiendis inmorientem
rationibus diu tractus risit heres. Praeterire quod
mihi occurrit exemplum non possum : 2. Turannius
fuit exactae diligentiae senex, qui post annum nona
gesimum, cum vacationem procurationis ab C. Caesare
ultro accepisset, conponi se in lecto et velut exani
mem a circumstante familia plangi iussit. Lugebat
domus otium domini senis nec finivit ante tristitiam ,
quam labor illi suus restitutus est. Adeone iuvat
occupatum mori ? Idem plerisque animus est : diuti
us cupiditas illis laboris quam facultas est : cum in
becillitate corporis pugnant : senectutem ipsam nullo
alio nomine gravem iudicant, quam quod illos seponit.
3. Lex a quinquagesimo anno militem non legit, a sex
agesimo senatorem non citat : difficilius homines a se
otium inpetrant quam a lege. Interim dum rapiuntur
et rapiunt, dum alter alterius quietem rumpit, dum
mutuo miseri sunt, vita est sine fructu, sine voluptate,
sine ullo profectu animi : nemo in conspicuo mortem
habet, nemo non procul spes intendit. 4. Quidam vero
disponunt etiam illa, quae ultra vitam sunt, magnas
moles sepulcrorum et operum publicorum dedicationes
et ad rogum munera et ambitiosas exsequias. At me
hercule istorum funera, tamquam minimum vixerint,
ad faces et cereos ducenda sunt.
 ARIA
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L. ANNAEI SENECAE

AD GALLIONEM

DE VITA BEATA

LIBER UNUS.
 By undeceiving, enlarging, and informing the intellect, Philosophy
sought to purify and to elevate the moral character. . . . Across the
night of Paganism, Philosophy fitted on, like the lantern -fly of the
Tropics, a light to itself, and an ornament, but, alas, no more than an
ornament, of the surrounding darkness. COLERIDGE .
 AD GALLIONEM

DE VITA BEATA.

I. VIVERE, Gallio frater, omnes beate volunt, sed ad

pervidendum , quid sit quod beatam vitam efficiat, cali
gant : adeoque non est facile consequi beatam vitam,
ut eo quisque ab ea longius recedat, quo ad illam con
citatius fertur, si via lapsus est : quae ubi in contra
rium ducit, ipsa velocitas maioris intervalli causa fit.
Proponendum est itaque primum , quid sit quod adpe
tamus : tunc circumspiciendum , qua contendere illo
celerrime possimus, intellecturi in ipso itinere, si modo
rectum erit, quantum cotidie profligetur quantoque
propius ab eo simus, ad quod nos cupiditas naturalis
inpellit. 2. Quamdiu quidem passim vagamur non
ducem secuti, sed fremitum et clamorem dissonum in
diversa vocantium , conteretur vita inter errores brevis,
etiam si dies noctesque bonae menti laboremus. De
1

cernatur itaque, et quo tendamus et qua, non sine peri

to aliquo, cui explorata sint ea, in quae procedimus ;
quoniam quidem non eadem hic quae in ceteris pere
grinationibus condicio est. In illis conprensus aliquis
limes et interrogati incolae non patiuntur errare : at
hic tritissima quaeque via et celeberrima maxime de
cipit. 3. Nihil ergo magis praestandum est, quam ne
136 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

pecorum ritu sequamur antecedentium gregem , per

gentes non quo eundum est, sed quo itur. Atqui nulla
res nos maioribus malis iuplicat, quam quod ad rumo
rem conponimur, optima rati ea, quae magno adsensu
recepta sunt quorumque exempla nobis multa sunt,
nec ad rationem , sed ad similitudinem vivinnus ; inde
ista tanta coacervatio aliorum super alios ruentium .
4. Quod in strage hominum magna evenit, cum ipse
se populus premit, nemo ita cadit, ut non et alium in
se adtrahat, primique exitio sequentibus sunt, hoc in
omni vita accidere videas licet : neino, sibi tantummo
do errat, sed alieni erroris et causa et auctor est. No.
cet enim adplicari antecedentibus, et dum unusqnisque
mavult credere quam iudicare, numquam de vita iu
dicatur, semper creditur versatqne nos et praecipitat
traditus per manus error : alienis perimus exemplis.
5. Sanabimur, si modo separemur a coetu : nunc vero
stat contra rationem defensor mali sui populus. Ita
que id evenit quod in comitiis, in quibus eos factos
esse praetores iidem qui fecere mirantur, cum se mo
bilis favor circumegit. Eadem probamus, eadem re
prehendimus : hic exitus est omnis iudicii, in quo se
cundum plures datur.
II. Cum de beata vita agetur, non est quod mihi il
lud discessionum more respondeas : Haec pars maior
esse videtur. Ideo enim peior est. Non tam bene
cum rebus humanis agitur, ut meliora pluribus pla
ceant : argumentum pessimi turba est. Quaeramus
ergo, quid optimum factu sit, non quid usitatissimum :
et quid nos in possessione felicitatis aeternae consti
tuat, 11011 quid volgo, veritatis pessimo interpreti, proba
tum sit. Volgum autem tam chlamydatus quam co
 DE VITA BEATA. CAP. III. 137

ronatos voco. 2. Non enim colorem vestium, qnibus

praetexta sunt corpora , adspicio : oculis de homine
non credo : habeo melius et certius lumen , quo a
falsis rera diiudicem . Animi bonum animus inve
niat : hic, si umquam respirare illi et recedere in se
vacaverit, o quam sibi ipse verum tortus a se fate
bitur ac dicet : Quicquid feci adhuc, infectum esse
mallem : quicquid dixi cum recogito, in multis ri
deo : quicquid optavi, inimicorum exsecrationem puto :
quicquid timui, di boni, quanto levius fuit quam quod
concupivi ? 3. Cum multis inimicitias gessi et in gra
tiam ex odio, si modo ulla inter malos gratia est, re
dii : mihi ipsi nondum amicus sum . Omnem ope
ram dedi , ut me multitudini educerem et aliqua dote
notabilem facerem : quid alind quam telis me oppo
sui et malivolentiae qnod morderet ostendi ? Vides
istos qui eloquentiam laudant, qui opes sequuntur, qui
gratiae adulantur, qui potentiam extollunt ? omnes aut
sunt hostes aut, quod in aequo est, esse possunt . Quam
magnus mirantium tam magnus invidentium populus
est.
III. Quin potius qnaero aliquod usu bonum, quod
sentiam , non qnod ostendam : ista quae spectantur,
ad quae consistitnr, quae alter alteri stupens monstrat,
foris nitent, introrsus misera sunt. Quaeramus ali
quid non in speciem bonum , sed solidum et aequale
et a secretiore parte formosius. Hoc ernannus : nec
longe positum est ; invenietur : scire tantum opus est
quo manum porrigas. Nunc velut in tenebris rici
na transimus offensantes ea ipsa quae desideramus.
2. Sed ne te per circumitus traham , aliorum quidem
opiniones praeteribo : nam et enumerare illas longum
138 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

est et coarguere : nostram accipe : nostram autem cum

dico, non adligo me ad unum aliquem ex Stoicis pro
ceribus : est et mihi censendi ius. Itaque aliquem se
quar, aliquem iubebo sententiam dividere : fortasse et
post omnes citatus nihil inprobabo ex iis, quae priores
decreverint, et dicam, Hoc amplius censeo . Interim
quod inter omnis Stoicos convenit, rerum naturae ad
sentior : ab illa non deerrare et ad illius legem exem
Hostel
plumque formari sapientia est. 3. Beata est ergo vita
conveniens naturae suae : quae non aliter contingere
potest, quam si primum sana mens est et in perpetua
possessione sanitatis suae, deinde fortis ac vehemens,
tunc pulcherrima et patiens, apta temporibus, corporis
sui pertinentiumque ad id curiosa non anxie : tum ali
arum rerum quae vitam instrnunt diligens, sine admi
ratione cuiusquam usura fortunae muneribus, non ser
vitura. 4. Intellegis, etiam si non adiciam, sequi per
petuam tranquillitatem , libertatem depulsis iis quae
aut inritant nos aut territant. Nam voluptatibus et
pro illis quae parva ac fragilia sunt et in ipsis flagitiis
noxia ingens gaudium subit, inconcussum et aequale :
tum pax et concordia animi et magnitudo com man
suetudine : omnis enim ex infirmitate feritas est.
IV . Potest aliter quoque definiri bonum nostrum , id
est eadem sententia, non iisdem conprehendi verbis.
Quemadmodum idem exercitus modo latius panditur,
modo in angustum coartatur et aut in cornua sinuata
media parte curvatur aut recta fronte explicatur, vis
illi , utcumque ordinatus est, eadem est et voluntas pro
iisdem partibus standi : ita finitio summi boni alias
diffundi potest et exporrigi, alias colligi et in se cogi.
2. Idem itaque erit, si dixero : Summum bonum est
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP . V. 139

animus fortuita despiciens, virtute laetus, aut, Invicta

vis animi, perita rerum , placida in actu, cum humani
tate multa et conversantium cura . Libet et ita finire,
ut beatum dicamus hominem eum, cui nullum bonum
malumque sit nisi bonus malusque animus : honesti
cultor, virtute contentus, quem nec extollant fortuita
nec frangant ; qui nullum maius bonum eo quod sibi
ipse dare potest noverit, cui vera voluptas erit volupta
tum contemptio. 3. Licet, si evagari velis, idem in ali
am atque aliam faciem salva et integra potestate trans-,
ferre. Quid enim prohibet nos beatam vitam dicere
liberum animum et erectum et interritum ac stabilem ,
extra metum, extra cupiditatem positum , cui unum bo
num sit honestas, unum malum turpitudo ? 4. Cetera
vilis turba rerum nec detrahens quicquam beatae vitae
nec adiciens, sine auctu ac detrimento summi boni ve
niens ac recedens. Hoc ita fundatum necesse est, ve
lit nolit, sequatur hilaritas continua et laetitia alta at
que ex alto veniens, ut quae suis gaudeat nec maiora
domesticis cupiat. Quidni ista bene penset cum mi
nutis et frivolis et non perseverantibus corpusculi mo
tibus ? quo die infra voluptatem fuerit, et infra dolo
rem erit.
V. Vides autem , quam malam et noxiosam servitu
tem serviturus sit, quem voluptates doloresque, incer
tissima dominia inpotentissimaque, alternis posside
bunt. Ergo exeundum ad libertatem est : hanc non
alia res tribuit quam fortunae neglegentia. Tum illud
orietur inaestimabile bonum , quies mentis in tuto con
locata et sublimitas expulsisque terroribus ex cogniti
one veri gaudium grande et inmotum comitasque et
diffusio animi: quibus delectabitur non ut bonis,sed ut
140 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

ex bono suo ortis. 2. Quoniam liberaliter agere coe

pi , potest beatus dici , qui nec cupit nec timet benefi
cio rationis. Quoniam et saxa timore et tristitia carent
nec minus pecudes ; non ideo tamen quisquam felicia
dixerit, quibus non est felicitatis intellectus. Eodem
loco pone homines, quos in numerum pecorum et ani
malium redegit hebes natura et ignoratio sui. 3. Ni
hil interest inter hos et illa, quoniam illis nulla ratio
est, his prara et malo suo atque in perversuim sollers.
Beatus enim nemo. dici potest extra veritatem proiec
tus : beata ergo vita est in recto certoque iudicio sta
bilita et inmutabilis. Tunc enim pura mens est et so
luta omnibus malis, cum non tantum lacerationes, sed
etiam vellicationes effugerit, statura semper ubi consti
tit ac sedem suam etiam irata et infestante fortuna
vindicatura. 4. Nam quod ad voluptatem pertinet,
licet circumfundatur undique et per omnes vias influ
at animumque blandimentis suis leniat aliaque ex aliis
admoreat, quibus totos partesque nostri sollicitet : quis
mortalium, cui ullum superest hominis vestigium , per
diem noctemque titillari velit, deserto animo corpori
operam dare ? )

VI." Sed animus quoque , inquit, "voluptates habebit

suas.
Habeat sane sedeatque luxuriae et voluptatum
arbiter, inpleat se eis omnibus, quae oblectare sensus
solent : deinde praeterita respiciat et exoletarum vo
luptatum memor exsnltet prioribus futurisque iam in
mineat ac spes suas ordinet, et dum corpus in prae
senti sagina iacet, cogitationes ad futura praemittat :
hoc mihi
' videbitur miserior, quoniam mala pro bonis
legere dementia est. 2. Nec sine sanitate quisqnam
beatus est nec sanus cui futura pro optimis adpetuntur.
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP. VII . 141

Beatus ergo est iudicii rectus : beatus est praesentibus,

qualiacumque sunt, contentus amicusque rebus suis :
beatus est is, cui omnem habitum rerum suarum ratio
commendat. Videt: et in illis quisummum bonum dix
erint, quam turpi illud loco posuerint. Itaque negant
posse voluptatem a virtute deduci et aiunt nec honeste
quemquam vivere, ut non iucunde vivat, nec iucunde,
ut non honeste quoque. 3. Non video quomodo ista
tam diversa in eamdem copulam coniciantur. Quid
est, oro vos, cur separari voluptas a virtute non possit ?
videlicet quia omne bonis ex virtute principium est ,
ex huius radicibus etiam ea, quae vos et amatis et
expetitis, oriuntur. Sed si ista indiscreta essent, non
non ?
videremus quaedam iucunda, sed ,honesta ; quaedam non
vero honestissima, sed aspera , per dolores exigenda.
VII. Adice nunc, quod voluptas etiam ad vitam tur
pissimam venit ; at virtus malam vitam non admittit :
et infelices quidamn non sine voluptate, immo ob ipsam
voluptatem sunt : quod non eveniret, si virtuti se vo
luptas inmiscuisset, qua virtus saepe caret, numquam
indiget. Quid dissimilia, immo diversa conponitis ?
Altum quiddam est virtus, excelsum et regale, in vic
tum , infatigabile : voluptas humile, servile, in becillum ,
caducum, cuius statio ac domicilium fornices et popi
nae sunt. 2. Virtutem in templo convenies, in foro,
in curia, pro muris stantem , pulvernlentam , coloratam,
callosas habentem manus : voluptatem latitantem sae
pius ac tenebras captantem çirca balinea ac sudatoria
ac loca aedilem metuentia, mollem, enervem, mero at
que unguento madentem, pallidam aut fucatam et me
dicamentis pollinctam . 3. Summum bonum inmor
tale est, nescit exire : nec satietatem habet nec poeni
G
142 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

tentiam : numquam enim recta mens vertitur nec sibi

odio est : nec quicquam mutavit optima. At voluptas
tunc, cum maxime delectat, exstinguitur : non multum
loci habet ; itaque cito inplet et taedio est et post pri
mum inpetum marcet. Nec id umquam certum est,
cuius in motu natura est : ita ne potest quidem ulla eius
esse substantia, quod venit transitve celerrime in ipso
usu sui periturum . Eo enim pervenit ubi desinat, et
dum incipit, spectat ad finem .
VIII. Quid, quod tam bonis quam malis voluptas
inest ? nec minus turpes dedecus suum quam hones
tos egregia delectant. Ideoque praeceperunt veteres
optimam sequi vitam , non iucundissimam, ut rectae
ac bonae voluntatis non dux, sed comes sit voluptas.
Natura enim duce utendum est : hanc ratio observat,
hanc consulit. Idem est ergo beate vivere et secun
dum naturam. 2. Hoc quid sit, iam aperiam : si cor
poris dotes et apta naturae conservabimus diligenter
et inpavide tamquam in diem data et fugacia, si non
subierimus eorum servitutem nec nos aliena possede
rint, si corpori grata et adventicia , eo nobis loco
fuerint, quo sunt in castris auxilia et armaturae
leves. Serviant ista, non imperent : ita demum uti
lia sunt menti. Incorruptus vir sit externis et insu
perabilis miratorque tantum sui, fidens animo atque
in utrumque paratus artifex vitae. Fiducia eius non
sine scientia sit, scientia non sine constantia : mane
ant illi semel placita nec ulla in decretis eius litura
sit. 3. Intellegitur, etiam si non adiecero, conposi
tum dinatumque fore talem virum et in iis quae
aget, cum comitate magnificum . Erit vera ratio sen
sibus insita et capiens inde principia : nec enim habet
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP. IX. 143

alind, unde conetur aut unde ad verum inpetum ca

mundum quoque, cuncta
piat ; in se revertatur. Nam mundum
conplectens rectorque universi deus in exteriora qui
dem tendit, sed tamen in totum undique in se redit.
4. Idem nostra mens faciat, cum secuta sensus suos
per illos se ad externa porrexerit : et illorum et sui
potens sit. Hoc modo una efficietur vis ac potestas
concors sibi et ratio illa certa nascetur non dissidens
nec haesitans in opinionibus conprehensionibusque nec
in persuasione. Quae cum se disposuit et partibus
suis consensit et, ut ita dicam , concinuit, summum
bonum tetigit. 5. Nihil enim pravi, nihil lubrici su
perest : nihil in quo arietet aut labet. Omnia faciet
ex imperio suo nihilque inopinatum accidet ; sed quic
quid agetur, in bonum exibit facile et parate et sine
tergiversatione agentis. Nam pigritia et haesitatio
pugnam et inconstantiam ostendit. Quare audaciter
licet profitearis summum bonum esse animi concor
diam. Virtutes enim ibi esse debebunt, ubi consen
sus atque unitas erit : dissident vitia.
IX. Sed tu quoque, inquit, virtutem non ob aliud
colis, quam quia aliquam ex illa speras voluptatem.
Primum non , si voluptatem praestatura virtus est,
ideo propter hanc petitur : non enim hanc praestat,
sed et hanc, nec huic laborat, sed labor eius, quamvis
aliud petat, hoc quoque adsequetur. Sicut in arvo,
quod segeti proscissum est, aliqui flores internascun
tur : non tamen huic herbulae , quamvis delectet ocu
los, tantum operis insumptum est. 2. Aliud fuit se
renti propositum , hoc supervenit : sic et voluptas non
est merces nec causa virtutis, sed accessio : nec quia
delectat, placet, sed si placet, et delectat. Summum
144 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

bonum in ipso iudicio est et habitu optimae mentis ;

quae cum suum inplevit et finibus se suis cinxit, con
summatum est summum bonum nec quicquam am
plius desiderat. Nihil enim extra totum est, non
magis quam ultra finem . Itaque erras, cum interro
gas, quid sit illud, propter quod virtutem petam : quae
ris enim aliquid supra summum . 3. Interrogas, quid
petam ex virtute ? ipsam : nihil enim habet melius,
ipsa pretium sui. An hoc parum magnum est ? Cum
tibi dicam, Summum bonum est infragilis animi rigor
et providentia et subtilitas et sanitas et libertas et con
cordia et decor: aliquid etiamnunc exigis maius, ad
quod ista referantur ? Quid mihi voluptatem nomi
nas? Hominis bonum quaero, non ventris, qui pecu
dibus ac beluis laxior est.
X. Dissimulas, inquit, quid a me dicatur : ego enim
nego quemquam posse iucunde vivere, nisi simul et ho
neste vivit : quod non potest mutis contingere animali
bus nec bonum suum cibo metientibus. Clare, inquit,
ac palam testor hanc vitam , quam ego iucundam voco,
non sine adiecta virtute contingere. Atqui quis igno
rat plenissimos esse voluptatibus vestris stultissimos
quosque ? et nequitiam abundare iucundis animum
que ipsum non tantum genera voluptatis prava, sed
multa suggerere ? 2. In primis insolentiam et nimiam
aestimationem sui tumoremque elatum super ceteros et
ainorem rerum suarum caecum et inprovidum, delicias
fluentis et ex minimis ac puerilibus causis exsultatio
nem , iam dicacitatem ac superbiam contumeliis gau
dentem , desidiam dissolutionemqne segnis animi indor
mientis sibi. 3. Haec omnia virtus discutit et aurem
pervellit et voluptates aestimat, antequam admittat :
 DE VITA BEATA. CAP . XI. 145

nec qnas probavit magni pendit (utique enim admittit),

nec usu earum, sed temperantia laeta est : temperantia
autem cum voluptates minuat, summi boni iniuria est.
Tu voluptatem conplecteris, ego conpesco : tu voluptate
frueris, ego utor : tu illam summum bonum putas, ego
nec bonum : tu omnia voluptatis causa facis, ego nihil.
Cum dico me nihil voluptatis causa facere, de illo lo
quor sapiente, cui soli concedis voluptatem .
XI. Non voco autem sapientem , supra quem quic
quam est, nedum voluptas. Atqui ab hac occupatus
quomodo resistet labori et periculo, egestati et tot hu
manam vitam circumstrepentibus minis ? quomodo con
spectum mortis, quomodo doloris feret ? quomodo mun
di fragores et tantum acerrimorum hostium ? an molli
adversario victus ? Quicquid voluptas suaserit faciet.
Age, non vides quam multa suasıra sit ? Nihil , inquit,
poterit turpiter suadere, quia adiuncta virtuti est. Non
vides iterum , quale sit summum bonum , cui custode
opus est, ut bonuin sit ? 2. Virtus autem quomodo vo
luptatem reget, qnam sequitur, cum sequi parentis sit,
regere imperantis ? a tergo ponis quod imperat? Egre
ginm autem habet virtus apud vos officium voluptates
praegustare. Sed videbimus, an apud quos tam con
tumeliose tractata virtus est, adhuc virtus sit : quae ha
bere nomen suum non potest, si loco cessit : interim , de
quo agitur, multos ostendam voluptatibus obsessos, in
quos fortuna omnia munera sua effudit, quos fatearis
necesse est malos. 3. Adspice Nomentanum et Api
cium, terrarum ac maris, ut isti vocant, bona conqni
rentis et super mensam recognoscentis omnium gen
tium animalia. Vide hos eosdem e suggestu rosae
spectantis popinam suam, aures vocum sono, spectacu.
146 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

lis oculos, saporibus palatum suum delectantes : molli

bus lenibusque fomentis totum lacessitur eorum corpus
et, ne nares interim cessent, odoribus variis inficitur lo
cus ipse, in quo luxuriae parentatur. Hoc esse in vo
luptatibus dices : nec tamen illis bene erit, quia non
bono gaudent.
XII. Male, inquit, illis erit, quia multa interveniunt,
quae perturbent animum , et opiniones inter se contra
riae mentem inquietabunt: quod ita esse concedo : sed
nihilominus illi ipsi stulti et inaequales et sub ictu poe
nitentiae positi magnas percipient voluptates, ut faten
dum sit tam longe tum illos ab omni molestia abesse
quam a bona mente et, quod plerisque contingit, hila
rem insaniam insanire ac per risum furere. 2. At con
tra sapientium remissae voluptates et modestae ac pae
ne languidae sunt conpressaeque et vix notabiles, ut
quae neque accersitae veniant nec, quamvis per se ac
cesserint, in honore sint neque ullo gaudio percipien
tium exceptae : miscent enim illas et interponunt vitae
Desinant ergo incon
ut ludum iocumque inter seria . Desinant
venientia iungere et virtuti voluptatem inplicare, per
quod vitium pessimis quibusque adulantur. 3. Ille
effusus in voluptates, ructabundus semper atque ebri
us, quia scit se cum voluptate vivere, credit et cum
virtute : audit enim voluptatem separari a virtute non
posse : deinde vitiis suis sapientiam inscribit et abscon.
denda profitetur. Itaque non ab Epicuro inpulsi luxu
riantur, sed vitiis dediti luxuriam suam in philosophiae
sinn abscondunt et eo concurrunt, ubi audiant laudari
voluptatem . 4. Nec aestimatur voluptas illa Epicuri
( ita enim mehercules sentio) quam sobria ac sicca sit :
sed ad nomen ipsum advolant quaerentes libidinibus
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP . XIII. 147

suis patrocinium aliquod ac velamentum . Itaque quod

unum habebant in malis bonum perdunt, peccandi ve
recundiam : laudant enim ea , quibus erubescebant et
vitio gloriantur : ideoque ne resurgere quidem adu
lescentiae licet, cum honestus turpi desidiae titulus
accessit.
XIII. Hoc est cur ista voluptatis laudatio perniciosa
sit, quia honesta praecepta intra latent, quod corrumpit
adparet. In ea quidem ipsa sententia sum ( invitis hoc
nostris popularibus dicam) sancta Epicurum et recta
praecipere et, si propius accesseris, tristia : voluptas
enim illa ad parvum et exile revocatur et quam nos
virtuti legem dicimus, eam ille dicit voluptati. 2.
Iubet illam parere naturae : parum est autem luxuriae
quod naturae satis est. Quid ergo est ? ille quisquis
desidiosum otium et gulae ac libidinis vices felicitatem
vocat, bonum malae rei quaerit auctorem et, dum illo
venit blando nomine inductus, sequitur voluptatem, non
quam andit, sed quam adtulit ; et vitia sua cum coepit
putare similia praeceptis, indulget illis non timide nec
obscure : luxuriatur etiam inde aperto capite. Itaque
non dico, quod plerique nostrorum , sectam Epicuri fla
gitiorum magistram esse, sed illud dico, male andit, in
famis est, et inmerito. 3. Hoc scire quis potest nisi in
terius admissus ? Frons eius ipsa dat locum fabulae et
ad malam spem inritat. Hoc tale est, quale vir fortis
stolam indutus. Constanti tibi pudicitiae veritas salva
est ; nulli corpus tuum turpi patientiae vacat, sed in
manu tympanum est. Titulus itaque honestos eligatur
et inscriptio ipsa excitans animum ad ea depellenda
quae statim enervant cum venerunt vitia. 4. Quisquis
ad virtutem accessit, dedit generosae indolis spem : qui
148 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

voluptatem sequitur, videtur enervis, fractus, degene

rans vir, perventurus in turpia, nisi aliquis distinxerit
illi voluptates, ut sciat, quae ex eis intra naturale desi
derium desistant, quae praeceps ferantur infinitaeque
sint et, quo magis inplentur, eo magis inexplebiles.
Agedum, virtus antecedat : tutum erit omne vestigi
um. Et voluptas nocet nimia : in virtute non est ve
rendum, ne quid nimium sit, quia in ipsa est modus.
Non est bonum , quod magnitudine laborat sua .
XIV. Rationabilem porro sortitis naturam quae me
lius res quam ratio proponitur ? et si placet ista iunc
tura [si hoc placet ad beatam vitam ire comitatu] , vir
tus antecedat, comitetur voluptas et circa corpus ut
umbra versetur. Virtutem quidem, excelsissimam om
nium, voluptati tradere ancillam nihil magnum animo
capientis est. Prima virtus sit, haec ferat signa : ha
bebimus nihilominus voluptatem , sed domini eius et
temperatores erimus : aliquid nos exorabit, nihil coget.
2. At ei , qui voluptati tradidere principia, utroque ca
ruere : virtutem enim amittunt: ceterum non ipsi vo
luptatem , sed ipsos voluptas habet, cuius aut inopia tor
quentur aut copia strangulantur. Miseri, si deseruntur
ab illa, miseriores, si obruuntur ! sicut deprensi mari
Syrtico modo in sicco relinquuntur, modo torrente
unda fluctuantur. 3. Evenit autem hoc nimia intem
perantia et amore caecae rei : nam mala pro bonis pe
tenti periculosum est adsequi. Ut feras cum labore
periculoque venamur et captarum quoque illarum solli
cita possessio est ( saepe enim laniant dominos) : ita ha
bentes magnas voluptates in magnum malum evasere
captaeque cepere. Quae quo plures maioresque sunt,
eo ille minor ac plurium servus est, quem felicem vol
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP. XV . 149

gus adpellat. 4. Permanere libet in hac etiamnunc

huius rei imagine: quemadmodum qui bestiarum cubi
lia indagat et laqueo captare feras magno aestimat et
latos canibus circundare saltus, ut illarum vestigia
premat, potiora deserit multisque officiis renuntiat : ita
qui sectatur voluptatem, omnia postponit et primam
libertatem neglegit ac pro ventre dependit ; nec vo
luptates sibi emit, sed se voluptatibus vendit.
XV. Quid tamen, inquit, prohibet in unum virtutem
voluptatemque confundi et effici summum bonum, ut
idem et honestum et iucundum sit ? Quia pars honesti
non potest esse nisi honestum : nec summum bonum
habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se viderit dis
simile meliori. Ne gaudium quidem quod ex virtute
oritur, quamvis bonum sit, absoluti tamen boni pars est,
non magis quam laetitia et tranquillitas, quamvis ex
pulcherrimis causis nascantur. 2. Sunt enim ista bona.
sed consequentia summum bonum , non consummantia.
Qui vero virtutis voluptatisque societatem facit et ne
ex aequo quidem , fragilitate alterius boni quicquid in
altero vigoris est hebetat libertatemque illam, ita de
mum, si nihil se pretiosius norit, invictam, sub iugum
mittit. Nam , quae maxima servitus est, incipit illi
opus esse fortuna : sequitur vita anxia, suspiciosa, tre
pida, casum pavens : temporum suspensa momenta sunt.
3. Non das virtuti fundamentum grave, inmobile, sed
iubes illam in loco volubili stare. Quid autem tam
volubile est, quam fortuitorum exspectatio et corporis
rerumque corpus adficientium varietas ? Quomodo hic
potest deo parere et quicquid evenit, bono animo exci
pere nec de fato queri casuum suorum benignus inter
pres, si ad voluptatum dolorumque punctiunculas con
G 2
1

150 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

cutitur ? Sed ne patriae quidem bonus tutor aut vin

dex est nec amicorum propugnator, si ad voluptates
vergit. 4. Illo ergo summum bonum adscendat, unde
nulla vi detrahitur; quo neque dolori neque spei nec
timori sit aditus nec ulli rei, quae deterius summi boni
ius faciat. Escendere autem illo sola virtus potest :
illius gradu clivus iste frangendus est : illa fortiter sta
bit et quicquid evenerit, feret non patiens tantum , sed
etiam volens : omnemque temporum difficultatem sciet
legem esse naturae. 5. Et, ut bonus miles feret vol
nera , enumerabit cicatrices et transverberatus telis mo
riens amabit eum, pro quo cadet, imperatorem : habe
bit illud in animo vetus praeceptum , deum sequere.
Quisquis autem queritur et plorat et gemit, imperata
facere vi cogitur et invitus rapitur ad iussa nihilomi
nus. Quae autem dementia est potius trahi quam se
qui ? 6. Tam mehercules quam stultitia et ignorantia
condicionis est suae dolere, quod aliquid tibi incidit
durius, aut mirari aut indigne ferre ea, quae tam bonis
accidunt quam malis : morbos dico, funera, debilitates
et cetera ex transverso in vitam humanam incurrentia .
Quicquid ex universi constitutione patiendum est, mag
no usurpetur animo : ad hoc sacramentum adacti su
mus, ferre mortalia nec perturbari iis, quae vitare non
est nostrae potestatis. In regno nati sumus : deo pa
rere libertas est.
XVI. Ergo in virtute posita est vera felicitas. Quid
haec virtus tibi suadebit ? ne quid aut bonum aut ma
lum existimes, quod nec virtute nec malitia continget :
deinde, ut sis inmobilis et contra malum ex bono, ut
qua fas est, deum effingas. Quid tibi pro hac expedi
tione promittit? ingentia et aequa divinis. Nihil co
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP . XVII. 151

geris ; nullo indigebis ; liber eris, tutns, indemnis : ni

hil frustra temptabis, nihil prohibeberis ; omnia tibi ex
sententia cedent : nihil adversum accidet, nihil contra
opinionem ac voluntatem . 2. Quid ergo ? virtus ad
beate vivendum sufficit ? Perfecta illa et divina quidni
sufficiat, immo superfluat ? Quid enim deesse potest
extra desiderium omnium posito ? quid extrinsecus opus
est ei , qui omnia sua in se collegit ? Sed ei, qui ad vir
tutem tendit, etiam si multum processit, opus est aliqua
fortunae indulgentia adhuc inter humana luctanti, dum
nodun illum exsolvit et omne vinculum mortale. Quid
ergo interest ? quod alii adligati sunt, alii adstricti, alii
destricti quoque. Hic, qui ad superiora progressus est
et se altius extulit, laxam catenam trahit nondum liber,
iam tamen pro libero.
XVII. Si quis itaque ex istis, qui philosophiam con
latrant, quod solent, dixerit : Quare ergo tu fortius lo
queris quam vivis ? Quare superiori verba submittis et
pecuniam necessarium tibi instrumentum existimas et
damno moveris et lacrimas audita coniugis ant amici
morte demittis et respicis famam et malignis sermoni
bus tangeris ? 2. Quare cultius rus tibi est quam natu
ralis usus desiderat? cur non ad praescriptum tuum coe
nas ? cur tibi nitidior supellex est ? cur apud te vinum
aetate tua vetustins bibitur ? cur annuum disponitur ?
cur arbores nihil praeter umbram daturae conservan
tur ? quare uxor tua locupletis domus censum auribus
gerit ? quare paedagogium pretiosa veste subcingitur ?
quare ars est apud te ministrare nec temere et ut libet
conlocatur argentum, sed perite servitur et est aliquis
scindendi obsonii magister ? 3. Adice, si vis, cur trans
mare possides ? cur plura quam nosti ? turpiter aut tam
152 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

neglegens es, ut non noveris pauculos servos, ant tam

luxuriosus, ut plures habeas quam quorum notitiae me
moria sufficiat. Adiuvabo postmodo, convicia et plura
mihi quam putas obiciam, nunc hoc respondeo tibi : Non
suin sapiens et, ut malivolentiam tuam pascam , nec ero.
4. Exige itaque a me, ut non optimis par sim , sed ut
malis melior : hoc mihi satis est, cotidie aliquid ex vi
tiis ineis demere et errores meos obiurgare. Non per
veni ad sanitatem, ne perveniam quidem : delenimenta
magis quam remedia podagrae meae conpono, conten
tus, si rarius accedit et si minus verminatur. Vestris
quidem pedibus conparatus debilis cursor sum .
XVIII. Haec non pro me loquor ; ego enim in alto
vitiorum omnium sum ; sed pro illo, cui aliquid acti
est. Aliter, inquit, loqueris, aliter vivis. Hoc, malig
nissima capita et optimo cuique inimicissima, Plato
ni obiectum est, obiectum Epicuro, obiectum Zenoni.
Omnes enim isti dicebant non quemadmodum ipsi vi
verent, sed quemadmodum esset ipsis vivendum . De
virtute, non de me loquor, et cum vitiis convicium fa
cio, in primis meis facio : cum potuero, vivam quomo
do oportet. 2. Nec malignitas me ista multo veneno
tincta deterrebit ab optimis : ne virus quidem istud,
quo alios spargitis, quo vos necatis, me inpediet, quo
minus perseverem laudare vitam , non quam ago, sed
quam agendam scio, quo minus virtutem et ex inter
vallo ingenti reptabundus sequar. 3. Exspectabo scili
cet, ut quicquam malivolentiae inviolatum sit, cui sacer
nec Rutilius fuit nec Cato ? Cur et aliqui non istis ni
mis dives videatur, quibns Demetrius Cynicus parum
pauper est ? virum acerrimum et contra omnia naturae
desideria pugnantem , hoc pauperiorem quam ceteros
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP. XIX . 153

Cynicos, quod, cum sibi interdixerit habere, interdixit

et poscere, negant satis egere. Vides enim ? non vir
tutis scientiam , sed egestatis professus est.
XIX. Diodorum, Epicureum philosophum , qui intra
paucos dies finem vitae suae manu sua inposuit, negant
ex decreto Epicuri fecisse, quod sibi gulam praesecuit :
alii dementiam videri volunt factum hoc eius, alii te
meritatem : ille interim beatus ac plenus bona consci
entia reddidit sibi testimonium vita excedens laudavit
que aetatis in portu et ad ancoram actae quietem et
dixit, quod vos inviti audistis, quasi vobis quoque faci
endum sit :

Vixi et quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi.

2. De alterius vita, de alterius morte disputatis et ad
nomen magnorum ob aliquam eximiam laudem viro
rum , sicut ad occursum ignotorum hominum minuti
canes, latratis. Expedit enim vobis neminem videri
bonum, quasi aliena virtus exprobratio delictorum
vestrorum sit. Invidi splendida cum sordibus vestris
confertis nec intellegitis, quanto id vestro detrimento
audeatis. Nam si illi, qui virtutem sequuntur, avari,
libidinosi, ambitiosique sunt ; quid vos estis, quibus
ipsum nomen virtutis odio est ? Negatis quemquam
praestare, quae eloquitur, nec ad exemplar orationis
snae vivere. 3. Quid mirum , cum loquantur fortia,
ingentia, omnes humanas tempestates evadentia ? cum
refigere se crucibus conentur, in quas unusquisque
vestrum clavos suos ipse adicit ? ad supplicium tamen
acti stipitibus singulis pendent. Hi, qui in se ipsi ani
mum advertunt, quot cupiditatibus tot crucibus distra
huntur : aut maledici in alienam contumeliam venusti
154 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

sunt. Crederem illis hoc vacare, nisi quidam ex pati.

bulo suos spectatores conspuerent .
XX. Non praestant philosophi quae loquuntur.
Multum tamen praestant quod loquuntur, quod hon
esta mente concipiunt. Nain quidem si et paria dictis
agerent, quid esset illis beatius ? interim non est quod
contemnas bona verba et bonis cogitationibus plena
praecordia. Studiorum salutarium etiam citra effec
tum laudanda tractatio est. Quid mirum , si non escen
dunt in altum ardua adgressil sed si vir es, suspice, et
iam si decidunt, magna conantis. 2. Generosa res est re
spicientem non ad suas, sed ad naturae suae vires cona
ri alta, temptare et mente maiora concipere, quam quae
etiam ingenti animo adornatis effici possunt. Qui sibi
hoc proposuit : Ego mortem eodem voltu audiam quo
videbo : ego laboribus, quanticumque illi erunt, parebo
animo fulciens corpus : ego divitias et praesentes et ab
sentes aeque contemnam nec, si alicubi iacebunt, tris
tior nec, si circa me fulgebunt, animosior. Ego fortu
nam nec venientem sentiam nec recedentem : ego ter
ras omnes tamquam meas videbo, meas tamquam om
nium : ego sic vivam quasi sciam aliis me natum et
naturae rerum hoc nomine gratias agam . 3. Quo
enim melius genere negotium meum agere potuit ?
unum me donavit omnibus, uni mihi omnis : quicquid
habebo, nec sordide custodiam nec prodige spargam :
nihil magis possidere me credam quam bene donata :
non numero nec pondere beneficia nec ulla nisi acci
pientis aestimatione perpendam : numquam id mihi
multum erit, quod dignus accipiet : nihil opinionis
causa, omnia conscientiae faciam : populo spectante
fieri credam quicquid me conscio faciam . 4. Edendi
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP. XXI. 155

mihi erit bibendique finis desideria naturae restingu

ere, non inplere alvum et exinanire : ego amicis iucun
dus, inimicis mitis et facilis exorabor antequam roger :
honestis precibus occurram : patriam meam esse mun
dum sciam et praesides deos : hos supra me circaqne
me stare factorum dictorumque censores : quandoque
aut natura spiritum repetet aut ratio dimittet, testatus
exibo bonam me conscientiain amasse, bona studia,
nullius per me libertatem deminutam, minime meam .
XXI. Qui haec facere proponet, volet, temptabit, ad
deos iter faciet : nae ille, etiam si non tenuerit, magnis
tamen excidit ausis. Vos quidem, quod virtutem cul
emque eius odistis, nihil novi facitis : nam et solem
lumina aegra formidant et aversantur diem splendi
dum nocturna animalia, quae ad primum eius ortum
stupent et latibula sua passim petunt, abduntur in ali
quas rimas timida lucis. Gemite et infelicem linguam
bonorum exercete convicio ; hiscite, conmordete : citius
multo frangetis dentes quam inprimetis. 2. Quare ille
philosophiae studiosus est et tam dives vitam agit ?
quare opes contemnendas dicit et habet ? vitam con
temnendam putat et tamen vivit ? valitudinem con
temnendam et tamen illam diligentissime tuetur at
que optimam mavult ? et exilium vanum nomen pu
tat et ait, quid enim est mali mutare regiones ? et
tamen, si licet, senescit in patria ? et inter longius
tempus et brevius nihil interesse iudicat ; tamen, si ni
hil prohibet, extendit aetatem et in multa senectute
placidus viret ? 3. Ait ista debere contemni ; non, ne
habeat, sed ne sollicitus habeat : non abigit illa a se,
sed abeuntia securus prosequitur. Divitias quidem
ubi tutius fortuna deponet quam ibi, unde sine querela
156 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

reddentis receptura est ? M. Cato cum laudaret Curi

um et Coruncanium et illud seculum , in quo censorium
crimen erat paucae argenti lamellae, possidebat ipse
quadragies sestertium, minus sine dubio quam Crassus,
plus quam Censorius Cato . Maiore spatio, si conparen
tur, proavum vicerat, qnam a Crasso vinceretur. Et, si
maiores illi obvenissent opes, non sprevisset : nec enim
se sapiens indignum ullis muneribus fortuitis putat.
Non amat divitias, sed mavult : non in animum illas,
sed in domum recipit: nec respuit possessas,sed conti
net et maiorem virtuti suae materiain subministrari vult.
XXII. Quid autem dubii est, qnin haec maior mate
ria sapienti viro sit animum explicandi suum in divitiis
quam in paupertate ? cum in hac unum genus virtutis
sit non inclinari nec deprimi, in divitiis et temperantia
et liberalitas et diligentia et dispositio et magnificentia
campum habeat patentem. Non contemnet se sapiens,
etiam si fuerit minimae staturae ; esse tamen se proce
rum volet : et exilis corpore ac amisso oculo valebit ;
malet tamen sibi esse corporis robur. 2. Et hoc ita,
ut sciat esse aliud in se valentius : malam valitudinem
tolerabit, bonam optabit. Quaedam enim, etiam si in
summam rei parva sunt, et subduci sine ruina princi
palis boni possunt, adiciunt tamen aliquid ad perpetu
am laetitiam et ex virtute nascentem . Sic illum adfi.
ciunt divitiae et exhilarant, ut navigantem secundus
et ferens ventus, ut dies bonus et in bruma ac frigore
apricus locus. 3. Quis porro sapientum , nostrorum dico,
quibus unum est bonum virtns, negat etiam haec, quae
indifferentia vocamus, habere in se aliquid pretii et
alia aliis esse potiora ? Quibusdam ex iis tribuitur ali
quid honoris, quibusdam multum . Ne erres itaque,
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP . XXIII . 157

inter potiora divitiae sunt. 4. Quid ergo, inquis, me

derides, cum eumdem apud te locum habeant, quem
apud me ? Vis scire, quam non habeant eumdem lo
cum ? mihi divitiae si effluxerint, nihil auferent nisi
semetipsas : tu stupebis et videberis tibi sine te re
lictus, si illae a te recesserint : apud me divitiae ali
quem locum habent, apud te summum ac postremum :
divitiae meae sunt, tu divitiarum es.
XXIII. Desine ergo philosophis pecunia interdicere :
nemo sapientiam paupertate damnavit. Habebit phi
losophus amplas opes, sed nulli detractas nec alieno san
guine cruentas, sine cuiusquam iniuria partas, sine sor
didis quaestibus, quarum tam honestus sit exitus quam
introitus, quibus nemo ingemiscat nisi malignus. In
quantum vis exaggera illas, honestae sunt : in qnibus
cum multa sint, quae sua quisque dici velit, nihil est,
quod quisquam suum possit dicere. 2. Ille vero fortu
nae benignitatem a se non submovebit et patrimonio
per honesta quaesito nec gloriabitur nec erubescet.
Habebit tamen etiam quo glorietur, si aperta domo et
admissa in res suas civitate poterit dicere : Quod quis
que agnoverit, tollat. O magnum virum , optime divi
tem , si post hanc vocem tantumdem habuerit ! ita dico,
si tuto et securus scrutationem populo praebuerit, si
nihil quisquam apud illum invenerit, quo manus ini
ciat ; audacter et propalam erit dives. 3. Sapiens nul
lum denarium intra limen suum admittet male intran
tem : idem magnas opes, munus fortunae fructumque
virtutis, non repudiabit nec excludet. Quid enim est
quare illis bono loco invideat ? veniant, hospitentur.
Nec iactabit illas nec abscondet : alterum infruniti
animi est, alterum timidi et pusilli velut magnum bo
158 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

num intra sinum continentis : nec, ut dixi, eiciet illas

e domo. Quid enim dicet ? utrumne, Inutiles estis, an ,
Ego nti divitiis nescio ? 4. Quemadmodum etiam pedi
bus suis poterit iter conficere, escendere tamen vehicu
lum malet : sic pauper, si poterit esse dives, volet, et
habebit utique opes, sed tamquam leves et avolaturas :
nec ulli alii nec sibi graves esse patietur. Quid ? Do
nabit : quid erexistis aures ? quid expeditis sinum ?
donabit aut bonis aut eis, quos facere poterit bonos :
donabit cum summo consilio dignissimos eligens, ut
qui meminerit tam expensorum quam acceptorum r'a
tionem esse reddendam : donabit ex recta et probabili
causa : nam inter turpes iacturas malum munus est.
Habebit sinum facilem , non perforatum , ex quo multa
exeant et nihil excidat.
XXIV. Errat, si quis existimat facilem rem esse do
nare . Plurimum ista res habet difficultatis, si modo
consilio tribuitur, non casu et inpetu spargitur. Hunc
promereor, illi reddo : huic succurro, huius misereor :
illum instruo dignum quem non deducat paupertas nec
occupatum teneat: quibusdam non dabo, quamvis de
sit ; quia, etiam si dedero, erit defuturum : quibusdam
offeram , quibusdam etiam inculcabo. Non possum in
hac re esse neglegens: numquam magis nomina facio,
quam cum dono. 2. Quid ? tu, inquis, recepturus do
nas ? Immo non perditurus. Eo loco sit donatio,unde
repeti non debeat, reddi possit. Beneficium conlocetur,
quemadmodum thesaurus alte obrutus; quem non eruas,
nisi fuerit necesse. Quid ? domus ipsa divitis viri quan
tam habet benefaciendi materiam ? Quis enim liberali
tatem tantum ad togatos vocat ? hominibus prudesse
natura iubet : servi liberine sint hi, ingenui an libertini,
 DE VITA BEATA . OAP . XXV . 159

iustae libertatis an inter amicos datae, quid refert ? ubi

cumque homo est, ibi beneficii locus est. 3. Potest ita
que pecuniam etiam intra limen suum diffundere et li
beralitatem exercere; quae non quia liberis debetur,sed
quia a libero animo proficiscitur, ita nominata est. Haec
apud sapientem nec umquam in turpes indignosque in
pingitur nec umquam ita defatigata errat, ut non , quo
tiens dignum invenerit, quasi ex pleno fluat. Non est
ergo, quod perperamn exaudiatis, quae honeste, fortiter,
animose a studiosis sapientiae dicuntur : et hoc primum
adtendite. 4. Aliud est studiosus sapientiae, aliud iam
adeptus sapientiam . Ille tibi dicet ; Optime loquor, sed
adhuc inter mala volutor plurima: non est, quod me ad
formulam meam exigas: cum maxime facio me et for
mo et ad exemplar ingens adtollo : si processero quan
tumcumque proposui, exige ut dictis facta respondeant.
Adsecutus vero humani boni summa aliter tecum aget
et dicet ; Primum non est, quod tibi permittas de meli
oribus ferre sententiam : mihi iam , quod argumentum
est recti, contingit malis displicere. 5. Sed, ut tibi ra
tionem reddam , qua nulli mortalium invideo, andi quid
promittam et quanti quaeque aestimem. Divitias nego
bonum esse : nam si essent, bonos facerent: nunc quon
iam, quod apud malos deprehenditur, dici bonum non
potest, hoc illis nomen nego : ceterum et habendas esse
et utiles et magna commoda vitae adferentis fateor.
XXV. Quid ergo est ? quare illas non in bonis nume
rem et quid praestem in illis aliud quam vos, quoniam
inter utrosque convenit habendas, audite. Pone in opu
lentissima me domo, pone ubi aurum argentumque in
promiscuo usu sit : non suspiciam me ob ista quae, et
iam si apud me extra we, tamen sunt. In sublicium
160 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

pontem me transfer et inter egentes abige: non ideo

tamen me despiciam , quod in illorum numero conse
dero, qui manum ad stipem porrigunt : quid enim ad
rem , an frustum panis desit, cui non deest mori posse ?
Quid ergo est ? domum illam splendidam malo quam
pontem . 2. Pone in instrumentis splendentibus et
delicato adparatu : nihilo me feliciorem credam, quod
mihi molle erit amiculum, quod purpura convivis meis
substernetur. Nihilo miserius ero, si lassa cervix mea
in manipulo foeni adquiescet,si super Circense tomen
tum per sarturas veteris lintei effluens incubabo. Quid
ergo est ? malo, quid mihi animi sit, ostendere praetex
tatüs et chlamydatus quam nudis scapulis aut semitec
tis. 3. Omnes mihi ex voto dies cedant; novae gratu
lationes prioribus subtexantur : non ob hoc mihi place
bo. Muta in contrarium hanc indulgentiam temporis ;
hinc illinc percutiatur animus damno, luctu, incursioni
bus variis, nulla hora sine aliqua querela sit : non ideo
me dicam inter miserrima miserum, non ideo aliqnem
exsecrabor diem : provisum est enim a me, ne quis
mihi ater dies esset. Quid ergo est ? malo gaudia tem
perare, quam dolores conpescere. 4. Hoc tibi ille So
crates dicet ; Fac me victorem universarum gentium :
delicatus ille Liberi currus triumphantem usque ad
Thebas a solis ortu vehat : iura reges Penatium pe
tant : me hominem esse maxime cogitabo, cum deus
undique consalutabor. Huic tam sublimi fastigio con
iunge protinus praecipitem mutationem : in alienum
inponar fericulum exornaturus victoris superbi ac feri
pompam : non humilior sub alieno curru agar quam in
meo steteram. 5. Quid ergo est ? vincere tamen quam
capi malo. Totum fortunae regnum despiciam : sed ex
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP. XXVI. 161

illo, si dabitur electio, meliora sumam. Quicquid ad me

venerit, bonum fiet ; sed malo faciliora ac iucundiora
veniant et minus vexatura tractantem. Non est enim,
quod existimes ullam esse sine labore virtutem : sed quae
dam virtutes stimulis, qnaedam frenis egent. Quem
admodum corpus in proclivi retineri debet, adversus
ardua inpelli ; ita quaedam virtutes in proclivi sunt,
quaedain clivum subeunt. 6. An dubium sit, quin es
cendat, nitatur, obluctetur patientia, fortitudo, perseve
rantia et quaecumque alia duris opposita virtus est et
fortunam subigit ? Quid ergo ? non aeque manifes
tum est per devexum ire liberalitatem , temperantiam ,
mansuetudinem ? In his continemus animum , ne pro
labatur ; in illis exhortamur incitamusque. Acerrimas
ergo paupertati adhibebimus, illas quae pugnare sciunt,
fortiores : divitiis illas diligentiores, quae suspensum
gradum ponunt et pondus suum sustinent.
XXVI. Cum hoc ita divisum sit, malo has in usu
mihi esse, quae exercendae tranquillius sunt, quam eas,
quarum experimentum sanguis et sudor est. Ergo non
ego aliter, inquit sapiens, vivo quam loquor, sed vos
aliter auditis. Sonus tantummodo verborum ad aures
vestras pervenit : quid significet non quaeritis. Quid
ergo inter me stultum et te sapientem interest, si uter
que habere volumus ? Plurimum . Divitiae enim apud
sapientem virum in servitute sunt, apud stultum in im
perio : sapiens divitiis nihil permittit, vobis divitiae
omnia . 2. Vos, tamquam aliquis vobis aeternam pos
sessionem earum promiserit, adsuescitis illis et cohaere
tis ; sapiens tunc maxime paupertatem meditatur, cum
in mediis divitiis constitit. Numquam imperator ita
paci credit, ut non se praeparet bello ; quod etiam si
162 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

non geritur, indictum est. Vos domus formosa, tam

quam nec ardere nec ruere possit, insolentes, vos opes,
tamquam periculum omne transcenderint inaioresque
sint vobis quam quibus consumendis satis virium ha
beat fortuna, obstupefaciunt. 3. Otiosi divitiis luditis
nec providetis illarum periculum ; sicut barbari ple
rumque, inclusi et ignari machinarum, segnes laborem
obsidentium spectant nec quo illa pertineant, quae ex
longinquo struuntur, intellegunt. Idem vobis evenit :
marcetis in vestris rebus nec cogitatis, quot casus undi
que inmineant iam iamque pretiosa spolia laturi. Sapi
enti quisquis abstulerit divitias, omnia illi sua relinquet :
vivit enim praesentibus laetus, futuris securus. 4. Ni.
hil magis, inquit ille Socrates aut aliquis alius, cui idem
ius adversus humana atque eadem potestas est, persuasi
mihi, quam ne ad opiniones vestras actum vitae meae
flecterem . Solita conferte undique verba : non convi
ciari vos putabo, sed vagire velut infantes miserrimos.
Haec dicet ille, cui sapientia contigit, qnem animus viti
orum inmunis increpare alios, non quia odit, sed in re
medium iubet . 5. Adiciet his illa : Existimatio me ves
tra non meo nomine, sed vestro movet, quia calamitates
odisse, et lacessere virtutem bonae spei eiuratio est.
Nullam mihi iniuriam facitis : sed ne dis quidem hi
qui aras evertunt. Sed malum propositum adparet
malumque consilium etiam ibi, ubi nocere non potuit.
6. Sic vestras hallucinationes fero quemadmodum Iu
piter optimus maximus ineptias poetarum ; quorum ali
us illi alas inposuit, alius cornua , alius adulterum illum
induxit et abnoctantem , alius saevum in deos, alius ini
quum in homines, alius raptorum ingenuorum corrupto
rem et cognatorum quidem, alius parricidam et regni
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP. XXVII . 163

alieni paternique expugnatorem : quibus nihil aliud

actum est, quam ut pudor hominibus peccandi demere
tur, si tales deos credidissent. Sed quamquain ista me
nihil laedant, vestra vos moneo causa : 7. Suspicite vir
tutem : credite iis, qui illam diu secuti magnum quid
dain ipsos et quod in dies maius adpareat, sequi cla
mant ; et ipsam ut deos, et professores eius ut antistites
colite : et quotiens mentio sacra literarum intervenerit,
favete linguis. Hoc verbum non, ut plerique existi
mant, a favore trahitur ; sed imperatur silentium, ut
rite peragi possit sacrum nulla voce mala obstrepente.
XXVII. Quod multo magis necessariam est impe
rari vobis, ut quotiens aliquid ex illo proferetur ora
culo, intenti et conpressa voce audiatis. Cum sistrum
aliquis concutiens ex imperio mentitur, cum aliquis se
candi lacertos suos artifex brachia atque humeros sus
pensa manu cruentat, cum aliquis genibus per viam re
pens ululat laurumque linteatus senex et medio lucer
nam die praeferens conclamat iratum aliquem deorum ;
concurritis et auditis et divinnm esse eum , invicem mu
tuum alentes stuporem , adfirmatis. 2. Ecce Socrates
ex illo carcere, quem intrando purgavit omnique ho
nestiorem curia reddidit, proclamat: Quis iste furor ?
quae ista inimica dis hominibusqne natura est infamare
virtutes et malignis sermonibus sancta violare ? Si po
testis, bonos laudate : si minus, transite. Quod si vobis
exercere tetram istam licentiam placet, alter in alterum
incursitate : nam cum in coelum insanitis, non dico sa
crilegium facitis, sed operam perditis. Praebui ego ali
qnando Aristophani materiam iocorum : tota illa comi
corum poetarum manus in me venenatos sales suos effu
dit. 3. Inlustrata est virtus mea per ea ipsa, per quae
164 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

petebatur : produci enim illi et temptari expedit ; nec

ulli magis intellegunt, quanta sit, quam qui vires eius
lacessendo senserunt. Duritia silicis nullis magis quam
ferientibus nota est. Praebeo me non aliter quam ru
pes aliqua in vadoso mari destituta, quam fluctus non
desinunt, undecumque moti sunt verberare : nec ideo
aut loco eam movent aut per tot aetates crebro incursu
suo consumunt. 4. Adsilite, facite inpetum : ferendo
vos vincam. In ea, quae firma et inexsuperabilia sunt,
quicquid incurrit, malo suo vim suam exercet. Pro
inde quaerite mollem cedentemque materiam, in qua
tela vestra figantur. Vobis autem vacat aliena scrutari
mala et sententias ferre de quoquam ? Quare hic philo
sophus laxius habitat, quare hic lautius coenat ! Pa
pulas observatis alienas, obsiti plurimis ulceribus ? 5 .
Hoc tale est quale si quis pulcherrimorum corporum
naevos aut verrucas derideat, quem fera scabies depas
citur. Obicite Platoni, quod petierit pecuniam , Aristo
teli, quod acceperit, Democrito, quod neglexerit, Epi
curo, quod consumpserit : mihi ipsi Alcibiadem et
Phaedrum obiectate . 6. O vos usu maxime felices,
cum primum vobis imitari vitia nostra contigerit !
Quin potius mala vestra circumspicitis, quae vos ab
omni parte confodiunt, alia grassantia extrinsecus, alia
in visceribus ipsis ardentia ? Non eo loco res huma
nae sunt : etiam si staturn vestrum parum nostis, et vo
bis tantum otii supersit, ut in probra meliorum agitare
linguam vacet ?
XXVIII. Hoc vos non intellegitis et alienum fortu
nae vestrae voltum geritis ; sicut plurimi, quibus in cir
co ant theatro desidentibus iam funesta domus est nec
adnuntiatum malum . At ego ex alto prospiciens video,
 DE VITA BEATA . CAP. XXVIII. 165

quae tempestates aut inmineant vobis paulo tardius

rupturae nimbum suum , aut iam vicinae vos ac ves
tra rapturae propius accesserint. Quid porro ? nonne
nunc quoque, etiam si parum sentitis, turbo quidam
animos vestros rotat et involvit, fugientes petentesque
eadem et nunc in sublime adlevatos nunc in infima
adlisos ? * * * * * *

nonta

Palace of the Caesars at Rome.

H
 பரம்பா

WWW .
PREQUELE

The Forum from the Capitol.

 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

AD LUCILIUM

EPISTULAE SELECTAE,
ET

EPIGRAMMATA .
 The teaching of Seneca, which drew all its interest from Greek phi
losophy , was alien from the old Roman sentiments. His doctrines were
essentially cosmopolite. He sought to refer questions of honor and
justice to general and eternal principles, rather than to solve them by
the tests of precedents and political traditions. The educated men of
the later Republic, as well as of the early Empire, had opened their arms
wide to embrace these foreign speculations; and whether they had re
signed themselves to Epicurism, as was the fashion under Julius and
Augustus, or had cultivated Stoicism, which was now more generally in
vogue, they equally abandoned the ground of their unpolished fathers,
which asserted the pre -eminence of patriotism above all the virtues, the
subordination of every claim of right and duty to national interest and
honor. . . . As yet, Stoicism, in the ranks of Roman society, was mere
ly a speculative creed ; and the habit now prevalent there, of speculat
ing on the unity of mankind, the equality of races, the universality of
justice, the subjection of prince and people, of masters and slaves, of
conqueror and conquered, to one rule of Right, tended undoubtedly to
sap the exclusive and selfish spirit of Roman antiquity.
MERIVALE.
 EPISTULAE SELECTAE.

EPISTULA II.
SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM .

Ex his quae mihi scribis, et ex his quae audio, bonam spem

de te concipio. Non discurris nec locorum mutationibus in
quietaris. Aegri animi ista iactatio est. Primum argumen
tum conpositae mentis existimo, posse consistere et secum
morari. Illud autem vide, ne ista lectio auctorum multorum
et omnis generis voluminum habeat aliquid vagum et insta
bile. Certis ingeniis inmorari et innutriri oportet, si velis
aliquid trahere, quod in animo fideliter sedeat. Nusquam est
qui ubique est. 2. Vitam in peregrinatione exigentibus hoc
evenit, ut multa hospitia habeant, nullas amicitias. Idem ac
cidat necesse est his, qui nullius se ingenio familiariter adpli
cant, sed omnia cursim et properantes transmittunt. Non
prodest cibus nec corpori accedit, qui statim sumptus emitti
tur. Nihil aeque sanitatem inpedit quam remediorum crebra
mutatio. Non venit volnus ad cicatricem , in quo medica
menta temptantur : non convalescit planta, quae saepe trans
fertur : nihil tam utile est, ut in transitu prosit : distringit li
brorum multitudo. 3. Itaque cum legere non possis, quantum
habueris, satis est habere, quantum legas. Sed modo, inquis,
hunc librum evolvere volo, modo illum. Fastidientis stomachi
est multa degustare, quae ubi varia sunt et diversa, inquinant,
non alunt. Probatos itaque semper lege, et si quando ad al
ios diverti libuerit, ad priores redi. Aliquid cotidie adversus
paupertatem , aliquid adversus mortem auxilii conpara, nec mi
170 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

nus adversus ceteras pestes: 4. et cum multa percurreris, unum

excerpe, quod illo die concoquas. Hoc ipse quoque facio : ex
pluribus, quae legi, aliquid adprehendo. Hodiernum hoc est,
quod apud Epicurum nanctus sum : (soleo enim et in aliena
castra transire, non tamquam transfuga, sed tamquam explora
tor :) Honesta, inquit, res est laeta paupertas. Illa vero non
est paupertas, si laeta est. Non qui parum habet, sed qui
plus cupit, pauper est. 5. Quid enim refert, quantum illi in
arca , quantum in horreis iaceat, quantum pascat, quantum fe
neret, si alieno inminet, si non adquisita, sed adquirenda con
putat ? Quis sit divitiarum modus, quaeris : primus, habere
quod necesse est, proximus, quod sat est. Vale.

EPISTULA VI.
SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM .

Intellego, Lucili, non emendari me tantum , sed transfigurari.

Nec hoc promitto iam aut spero, nihil in me superesse, quod
mutandum sit. Quidni multa habeam , quae debeant colligi,
quae extenuari, quae attolli ! Et hoc ipsum argumentum est
in melius translati animi, quod vitia sua, quae adhuc ignora
bat, videt. Quibusdam aegris gratulatio fit, cum ipsi aegros
se esse senserunt. 2. Cuperem itaque tecum communicare
tam subitam mutationem mei : tunc amicitiae nostrae certi
orem fiduciam habere coepissem, illius verae, quam non spes,
non timor, non utilitatis suae cura divellit : illius, cum qua
homines moriuntur, pro qua moriuntur. Maltos tibi dabo,
qui non amico, sed amicitia caruerunt. Hoc non potest acci
dere, cum animos in societatem honesta cupiendi par voluntas
trahit. 3. Quidni non possit ? Sciunt enim ipsos omnia ha
bere communia, et quidem magis adversa. Concipere animo
non potes, quantum momenti adferre mihi singulos dies vide
am .
Mitte, inquis, et nobis ista, quae tam efficacia expertus
es. Ego vero omnia in te cupio transfundere, et in hoc ali
 EPISTULAE SELECTAE . 171

quid gaudeo discere, ut doceam : nec me ulla res delectabit,

licet sit eximia et salutaris, quam mihi uni sciturus sum. 4.
Si cum hac exceptione detur sapientia, ut illam inclusam tene
am nec enuntiem, reiciam . Nullius boni sine socio iucunda
possessio est. Mittam itaque ipsos tibi libros : et ne multum
operae inpendas, dum passim profutura sectaris, inponam no
tas, ut ad ipsa protinus, quae probo et miror, accedas. Plus
tamen tibi et viva vox et convictus quam oratio proderit. 5.
In rem praesentem venias oportet : primum , quia homines
amplius oculis quam auribus credunt: deinde, quia longum
iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla. Zeno
nem Cleanthes non expressisset, si tantummodo audisset.
Vitae eius interfuit, secreta perspexit, observavit illum , an ex
formula sua viveret. Platon et Aristoteles et omnis in diver
sum itura sapientium turba plus ex moribus quam ex verbis
Socratis traxit. 6. Metrodorum et Hermarchum et Polyaenum
magnos viros non schola Epicuri, sed contubernium fecit.
Nec in hoc te accerso tantum, ut proficias, sed ut prosis : plu
rimum enim alter alteri conferemus. Interim quoniam di
urnam tibi mercedulam debeo, quid me hodie apud Hecato
nem delectaverit dicam . Quaeris, inquit, quid profecerim ?
amicus esse mihi. Multum proficit: numquam erit solus.
Scito hunc amicum omnibus esse. Vale.

EPISTULA X.
SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM .

Sic est, non muto sententiam : fuge multitudinem , fuge

paucitatem , fuge etiam unum. Non habeo cum quo te com
municatum velim. Et vide, quod iudicium meum habeas :
audeo te tibi credere. Crates, ut aiunt, huius ipsius Stilbonis
auditor, cuius mentionem priori epistula feci, cum vidisset
adulescentulum secreto ambulantem , interrogavit, quid illic
solus faceret ? Mecum , inquit, loquor. Cui Crates : Cave, in
172 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

quit, rogo, et diligenter adtende, ne cum homine malo loquaris.

2. Lugentem timentemque custodire solemus, ne solitudine
male utatur: nemo est ex inprudentibus, qui relinqui sibi de
beat. Tunc mala consilia agitant: tunc aut aliis aut ipsis fu
tura pericula struunt : tunc cupiditates inprobas ordinant: tunc
quicquid aut metu aut pudore celabat, animus exponit : tunc
audaciam acuit, libidinem inritat, iracundiam instigat. De
nique quod unum solitudo habet commodum, nihil ulli com
mittere, non timere indicem, perit stulto : ipse se prodit. 3.
Vide itaque, quid de te sperem, immo quid spondeam mihi
(spes enim incerti boni nomen est) : non invenio cum quo
te malim esse quam tecum. Repeto memoria, quam magno
animo quaedam verba proieceris, quanti roboris plena. Gra
tulatus sum protinus mihi et dixi : non a summis labris ista
venerunt, habent hae voces fundamentum : iste homo non est
unus e populo, ad salutem spectat. 4. Sic loquere, sic vive :
vide ne te ulla res deprimat. Votorum tuorum veterum licet
deis gratiam facias, alia de integro suscipe : roga bonam men
tem, bonam valitudinem animi, deinde corporis. Quidni tu
ista vota saepe facias ? Audacter deum roga : nihil illum de
alieno rogaturus es. Sed ut more meo cum aliquo munusculo
epistulam mittam, verum est, quod apud Athenodorum inveni :
5. Tunc scito esse te omnibus cupiditatibus solutum , cum eo
perveneris, ut nihil deum roges, nisi quod rogare possis palam .
Nunc enim quanta dementia est hominum ! turpissima vota
dis insusurrant : si quis admoverit aurem , conticescent: et
quod scire hominem nolunt, deo narrant. Vide ergo, ne hoc
praecipi salubriter possit : Sic vive cum hominibus, tamquam
deus videat : sic loquere cum deo, tamquam homines audiant.
Vale.
 EPISTULAE SELECTAE . 173

EPISTULA XXIII.
SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM.

Putas me tibi scripturum, quam humane nobiscum hiems

egerit, quae et remissa fuit et brevis, quam malignum ver
sit, quam praeposterum frigus, et alias ineptias verba quae
rentium. Ego vero aliquid, quod et mihi et tibi prodesse
possit, scribam. Quid autem id erit, nisi ut te exhorter ad
bonam mentem ? Huius fundamentum quod sit quaeris ? Ne
gaudeas vanis. Fundamentum hoc esse dixi : culmen est.
Ad summa pervenit, qui scit, quo gaudeat, qui felicitatem
suam in aliena potestate non posuit. 2. Sollicitus est et in
certus sui, quem spes aliqua proritat, licet ad manum sit, licet
non ex difficili petatur, licet numquam illum sperata decepe
rint. Hoc ante omnia fac, mi Lucili : disce gaudere. Existi
mas nunc me detrahere tibi multas voluptates, qui fortuita sub
moveo, qui spes, dulcissima oblectamenta devitanda existimo ?
immo contra nolo tibi umquam deesse laetitiam . Volo illam
tibi domi nasci : nascitur, si domus intra te ipsum sit. 3. Ce
terae hilaritates non inplent pectus : frontem remittunt, leves
sunt : nisi forte tu iudicas eum gaudere qui ridet. Animus
esse debet alacer et fidens et super omnia erectus. Mihi
crede, verum gaudium res severa est. An tu existimas quem
quam soluto volta et, ut isti delicati loquuntur, hilariculo mor
tem contemnere ? paupertati domum aperire ? voluptates te
nere sub freno ? meditari dolorum patientiam ? Haec qui
apud se versat, in magno gaudio est, sed parum blando. 4. In
huius gaudii possessione esse te volo : numquam deficiet, cum
semel unde petatur inveneris. Levium metallorum fructus in
summo est : illa opulentissima sunt, quorum in alto latet vena
adsidue plenius responsura fodienti. Haec, quibus delectatur
volguis, tenuem habent ac perfusoriam voluptatem , et quodcum
que inventicium gaudium est, fundamento caret : hoc, de quo
H 2
174 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

loquor, ad quod te conor perducere, solidum est, et quod plus

pateat introrsus. 5. Fac, oro te, Lucili carissime, quod unum
potest te praestare felicem : disice et conculca ista, quae ex
trinsecus splendent, quae tibi promittuntur ab alio : ad verum
bonum specta et de tuo gaude. Quid est autem hoc de tuo ?
Te ipso et tui optima parte. Corpusculum quoque, etiam si
nihil fieri sine illo potest, magis necessariam rem crede quam
magnam : vanas subgerit voluptates, breves, poenitendas, ac
nisi magna moderatione temperentur, in contrarium abituras.
6. Ita dico : in praecipiti voluptas ad dolorem vergit, nisi mo
dum tenuit : modum autem tenere in eo difficile est, quod bo
num esse credideris. Veri boni aviditas tuta est. Quid sit
istud, interrogas, aut unde subeat ? Dicam : ex bona consci
entia, ex honestis consiliis, ex rectis actionibus, ex contemptu
fortuitorum , ex placido vitae et continuo tenore unam pre
mentis viam . Nam illi, qui ex aliis propositis in alia transsi
liunt aut ne transsiliunt quidem, sed casu quodam trans
mittuntur, quomodo habere quicquam certum mansurumve
possunt suspensi et vagi ! 7. Pauci sunt, qui consilio se sua
que disponant : ceteri eorum more, quae fluminibus innatant,
non eunt, sed feruntur. Ex quibus alia lenior unda detinuit
ac mollius vexit, alia vehementior rapuit, alia proxima ripae
cursu languescente deposuit, alia torrens inpetus in mare eie
cit. Ideo constituendum est, quid velimus, et in eo perseve
randum . Hic est locus solvendi aeris alieni. Possum enim
vocem tibi Epicuri tui reddere et hanc epistulam liberare : 8.
Molestum est semper vitam inchoare : aut si hoc modo magis
sensus potest exprimi: Male vivunt, qui semper vivere incipi
unt. Quare ? inquis. Desiderat enim explanationem ista vox.
Quia semper illis inperfecta vita est. Non potest autem stare
paratus ad mortem , qui modo incipit vivere. Id agendum est,
ut satis vixerimus : nemo hoc putat, qui orditur cum maxime
vitam . Non est quod existimes paucos esse hos : propemo
dum omnes sunt. Quidam vero tunc incipiunt, cum desinen
dum est. Si hoc iudicas mirum, adiciam quod magis admire
ris : quidam ante vivere desierunt quam inciperent. Vale.
 EPISTULAE SELECTAE . 175

EPISTULA XLI.
SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM.
Facis rem optimam et tibi salutarem , si, ut scribis, perseveras
ire ad bonam mentem, quam stultum est optare, cum possis a te
inpetrare. Non sunt ad coelum elevandae manus nec exorandus
aedituus, ut nos ad aurem simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possi
mus, admittat: prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est. Ita
dico, Lucili: sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque
nostrorum observator, et custos : hic prout a nobis tractatus
est, ita nos ipse tractat. 2. Bonus vero vir sine deo nemo est.
An potest aliquis supra fortunam nisi ab illo adiutus exsur
gere ? Ille dat consilia magnifica et erecta. In unoquoque
virorum bonorum

quis deus incertum est, habitat deus.

Si tibi occurrerit vetustis arboribus et solitam altitudinem
egressis frequens lucus et conspectum coeli densitate ramorum
aliorum alios protegentium submovens : illa proceritas silvae
et secretum loci et admiratio umbrae in aperto tam densae at
que continuae fidem tibi numinis facit. 3. Et si quis specus
saxis penitus exesis montem suspenderit, non manu factus, sed
naturalibus causis in tantam laxitatem excavatus, animum
tuum quadam religionis suspicione percutiet. Magnorum
fluminum capita veneramur : subita ex abdito vasti amnis
eruptio aras habet : coluntur aquarum calentium fontes, et
stagna quaedam vel opacitas vel inmensa altitudo sacravit. 4.
Si hominem videris interritum periculis, intactum cupiditati
bus, inter adversa felicem , in mediis tempestatibus placidum ,
ex superiore loco homines videntem , ex aequo deos : non
subibit te eius veneratio ? non dices : Ista res maior est
altiorque quam ut credi similis huic, in quo est, corpusculo
possit ? Vis istuc divina descendit. Animum excellentem ,
176 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

moderatum , omnia tamquam minora transeuntem quicquid

timemus optamusque ridentem, coelestis potentia agitat. 5.
Non potest res tanta sine adminiculo numinis stare : itaque
maiore sui parte illic est, unde descendit. Quemadmodum
radii solis contingunt quidem terram , sed ibi sunt, unde mit
tuntur : sic animus magnus ac sacer et in hoc demissus, ut pro
pius divina nossemus, conversatur quidem nobiscum, sed hae
ret origini suae : illinc pendet, illuc spectat ac nititur, nostris
tamquam melior interest. 6. Quis est ergo hic animus ? qui
nullo bono nisi suo nitet. Quid enim est stultius quam in ho
mine aliena laudare ? quid eo dementius, qui ea miratur, quae
ad alium transferri protinus possunt ? Non faciunt meliorem
equum aurei freni. Aliter leo aurata iuba mittitur, dum con
tractatur et ad patientiam recipiendi ornamenti cogitur fatiga
tus, aliter incultus, integri spiritus. Hic scilicet inpetu acer,
qualem illum natura esse voluit, speciosus ex horrido, cuius hic
decor est, non sine timore adspici, praefertur illi languido et
bracteato. Nemo gloriari nisi suo debet. 7. Vitem laudamus,
si fructu palmites onerat, si ipsa pondera ad terram eorumque
tulit, adminicula deducit. Num quis huic illam praeferret vi
tem , cui aureae uvae, aurea folia dependent ? Propria virtus
est in vite fertilitas : in homine quoque id laudandum est,
quod ipsius est. Familiam formosam habet et domum pul
chram , multum serit, multum fencrat : nihil horum in ipso
est, sed circa ipsum . 8. Lauda in ipso, quod nec eripi potest
nec dari, quod propium hominis est. Quaeris quid sit ? Ani
mus et ratio in animo perfecta. Rationale enim animal est
homo : consummatur itaque eius bonum, si id inplevit, cui
nascitur. Quid est autem , quod ab illo ratio haec exigat ?
Rem facillimam ; secundum naturam suam vivere. Sed hanc
difficilem facit communis insania : in vitia alter alterum tru
dimus : quomodo autem revocari ad salutem possunt, quos
nemo retinet, populus inpellit ? Vale.
 EPISTULAE SELECTAE . 177

EPISTULA LXXXVI.
SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM.
In ipsa Scipionis Africani villa iacens haec tibi scribo ada
ratis manibus eius et arca, quam sepulchrum esse tanti viri
suspicor. Animum quidem eius in coelum, ex quo erat, re
disse persuadeo mihi, non quia magnos exercitus duxit (hos
enim et Cambyses furiosus ac furore feliciter usus habuit), sed
ob egregiam moderationem pietatemque, quam magis in illo
admiror, cum reliquit patriam , quam cum defendit. Aut
Scipio Romae deesse debebat aut Roma in libertate. 2. .Ni
hil, inquit, volo derogare legibus, nihil institutis : aequum
inter omnes cives ius sit : utere sine me beneficio meo, patria :
causa tibi libertatis fui, ero et argumentum . Exeo, si plus
tibi quam expedit, crevi. Quidni ego admirer hanc magnitu
dinem animi, qua in exilium voluntarium secessit et civitatem
exoneravit ? Eo perducta res erat, ut aut libertas Scipioni aut
Scipio libertati faceret iniuriam . Neutrum fas erat : itaque
locum dedit legibus et se Liternum recepit tam suum exilium
reipublicae inputaturus quam Hannibalis. 3. Vidi villam struc
tam lapide quadrato, murum circumdatum silvae, turres quo
que in propugnaculum villae utrimque subrectas, cisternam
aedificiis ac viridibus subditam , quae sufficere in usum vel
exercitus posset, balneolum angustum , tenebricosum ex con
suetudine antiqua (non videbatur maioribus nostris caldum
nisi obscurum ). 4. Magna ergo me voluptas subiit contemplan
tem mores Scipionis ac nostros. In hoc angulo ille Cartha
ginis horror, cui Roma debet, quod tantum semel capta est,
abluebat corpus laboribus rusticis fessum : exercebat enim
opere se terramque, ut mos fuit priscis, ipse subigebat. Sub
hoc ille tecto tam sordido stetit : hoc illum pavimentum tam
vile sustinuit. 5. At nunc quis est, qui sic lavari sustineat ?
pauper sibi videtur ac sordidus, nisi parietes magnis et preti
178 L. ANNAKI SENKOAE

osis orbibus refulserunt, nisi Alexandrina marmora Numidicis

crustis distincta sunt, nisi illis undique operosa et in picturae
modum variata circumlitio praetexitur, nisi vitro absconditur
camera, nisi Thasius lapis, quondam rarum in aliquo spectacu
lum templo, piscinas nostras circumdedit, in quas multa suda
tione corpora exsaniata demittimus, nisi aquam argentea epi
tonia fuderunt. 6. Et adhuc plebeias fistulas loquor : quid,
cum ad balnea libertinorum pervenero ? quantum statuarum ,
quantum columnarum est nihil sustinentium , sed in ornamen
tum positarum inpensae causa ! quantum aquarum per gradus
cum fragore labentium ! Eo deliciarum pervenimus, ut nisi
gemmas calcare nolimus. In hoc balneo Scipionis minimae
sunt rimae magis quam fenestrae muro lapideo exsectae, ut
sine iniuria munimenti lumen admitterent. 7. At nunc blat
taria vocant balnea, si qua non ita aptata sunt, ut totius diei
solem fenestris amplissimis recipiant, nisi et lavantur simul et
colorantur, nisi ex solio agros et maria prospiciunt. Itaque
quae concursum et admirationem habuerant, cum dedicarentur,
in antiquorum numerum reiciuntur, cum aliquid novi luxuria
commenta est, quo ipsa se obrueret. 8. At olim et pauca
erant balnea nec ullo cultu exornata : cur enim ornaretur res
quadrantaria et in usum, non oblectamentum reperta ? Non
subfundebatur aqua nec recens semper velut ex calido fonte
currebat ; nec referre credebant, in quam perlucida sordes de
ponerent. Sed, di boni, quam iuvat illa balnea intrare obscura
et gregali tectorio inducta, quae scires Catonem tibi aedilem
aut Fabium Maximum aut ex Corneliis aliquem manu sua tem
perasse ? 9. Nam hoc quoque nobilissimi aediles fungebantur
officio intrandi ea loca, quae populum receptabant, exigendi
que munditias et utilem ac salubrem temperaturam , non hanc,
quae nuper inventa est similis incendio, adeo quidem , ut con
victum in aliquo scelere servum vivum lavari oporteat. Nihil
mihi videtur iam interesse, ardeat balneum an caleat. Quan
tae nunc aliquis rusticitatis damnat Scipionem, quod non in
caldarium suum latis specularibus diem admiserat ? quod non
in multa luce decoquebatur et exspectabat, ut in balneo con
coqucret. 10. O hominem calamitosum ! nesciit vivese Non
 EPISTULAE SELECTAE . 179

saccata aqua lavabatur, sed saepe turbida et, cum plueret vehe
mentius, paene lutulenta : nec multum eius intererat, an sic la
varetur : veniebat enim ut sudorem illic ablueret, non ut un
guentum . Quas nunc quorumdam futuras voces credis ? Non
invideo Scipioni : vere in exilio vixit, qui sic lavabatur. Immo,
si scias, non cotidie lavabatur. 11. Nam, ut aiunt, qui priscos
mores Urbis tradiderunt, brachia et crura cotidie abluebant,
quae scilicet sordes opere collegerant : ceterum toti nundinis
lavabantur. Hoc loco dicet aliquis : Liquet mihi inmundissi
mos fuisse. Quid putas illos oluisse ? Militiam, laborem , vi
rum . Postquam munda balnea inventa sunt, spurciores sunt.
12. Descripturus infamem et nimiis notabilem deliciis Horatius
Flaccus quid ait ?
Pastillos Rufillus olet.
Dares nunc Rufillum : perinde esset, ac si hircum oleret. Gor
gonii loco esset, quem idem Horatius Rufillo obposuit. Parum
est sumere unguentum , nisi bis die terque renovatur, ne evane
scat in corpore. Quid, quod hoc odore tamquam suo glorian
tur ? 13. Haec si tibi nimium tristia videbuntur, villae inputa
bis, in qua didici ab Aegialo , diligentissimo patrefamiliae (is
enim huius agri nunc possessor est), quamvis vetus arbustum
posse transferri. Hoc nobis senibus discere necessarium est,
quorum nemo non olivetum alteri ponit : quod vidi illum arbo
rum trimum et quadrimum fastidiendi fructus autumno depo
nere . 14. Te quoque proteget illa, quae
Tarda venit, seris factura nepotibus umbram ,
ut ait Vergilius noster, qui non quid verissime, sed quid de
centissime diceretur adspexit nec agricolas docere voluit, sed
legentes delectare. 15. Nam , ut alia omnia transeam , hoc quod
mihi hodie necesse fuit deprehendere, adscribam :
Vere fabis satio est : tunc te quoque, medica ,putres
Accipiunt sulci et milio venit annua cura .
An uno tempore ista ponenda sint et an utriusque verna sit
satio, hinc aestimes licet. Iunius mensis est, quo tibi scribo,
180 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

iam proclivus in Iulium : 16. eodem die vidi fabam metentes,

milium serentes. Ad olivetum revertar, quod vidi duobus
modis dispositum. Magnarum arborum truncos circumcisis
ramis et ad unum redactis pedem cum rapo suo transtulit am
putatis radicibus, relicto tantum capite ipso, ex quo illae pe
penderant. Hoc fimo tinctum in scrobem demisit ; deinde
terram non adgessit tantum , sed calcavit et pressit. 17. Negat
quicquam esse hac, ui ait, spissatione efficacius: videlicet frigus
excludit et ventum : minus praeterea movetur et ob hoc na
scentes radices prodire patitur ac solum adprehendere, quas
necesse est cereas adhuc et precario haerentes, levis quoque re
vellat agitatio : parum autem arboris, antequam obruat, radix.
Ex omni enim materia, quae nudata est, ut ait, radices exeunt
novae. 18. Non plures autem super terram eminere debet
truncus quam tres aut quatuor pedes : statim enim ab imo
vestietur nec magna pars quemadmodum in olivetis vete
ribus arida et retorrida erit. Alter ponendi modus hic
fuit : ramos fortes nec corticis duri, quales esse novellarum
arborum solent, codem genere deposuit. Hi paulo tardius
surgunt ; sed cum tamquam a planta processerint, nihil ha
bent in se horridum aut triste. 19. Illud etiamnunc vidi, vi
tem ex arbusto suo annosam transferri : huius capillamenta
quoque, si fieri potest, colligenda sunt : deinde liberalius ster
nenda vitis, ut etiam ex corpore radicescat. Et vidi non tan
tum mense Februario positas ; sed etiam Martio exacto tenent
et conplexae sunt non suas ulmos. Omnes autem istas arbo
res, quae, ut ita dicam , grandiscapiae sunt, ait aqua adiuvandas
cisternina ; quae si prodest, habemus pluviam in nostra potes
Plurate docere non cogito ne, quemadmodum Aegialus
me sibi adversarium paravit, sic ego parem te mihi. Vale.
 EPISTULAE SELECTAE . 181

EPISTULA CVII.
SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM.

Ubi illa prudentia tua ? ubi in dispiciendis rebus subtilitas ?

ubi magnitudo ? Tam pusilla te res angit ? Servi occupa
tiones tuas occasionem fugae putaverunt. Si amici decipe
rent ? (habeant enim sane nomen, quod illis noster Epicurus
inposuit, et vocentur, quo turpius desint omnibus rebus tuis)
desunt illi, qui et operam tuam conterebant et te aliis mole
stum esse credebant. 2. Nihil horum insolitum, nihil inex
spectatum est. Offendi rebus istis tam ridiculum est quam
queri, quod spargaris in publico aut inquineris in luto. Ea
dem vitae condicio est, quae balnei, turbae, itineris : quaedam
in te mittentur, quaedam incident. Non est delicata res vivere.
Longam viam ingressus es : et labaris oportet et arietes et ca
das et lasseris et exclames : O mors ! id est mentiaris. Alio
loco comitem relinques, alio efferes, alio timebis. Per eius
modi offensas emetiendum est confragosum hoc iter. Mori
vult ? 3. Praeparetur animus contra omnia : sciat se venisse,
ubi tonat fulmen : sciat se venisse ubi

Luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia curae

Pallentesque habitant morbi tristisque senectus.
In hoc contubernio vita degenda est. Effugere ista non po
tes : contemnere potes : contemnes autem , si saepe cogitaveris
et futura praesumpseris. 4. Nemo non fortius ad id, cui se diu
conposuerat, accessit et duris quoque, si praemeditata erant,
obstitit. At contra inparatus etiam levissima expavit. Id
agendum est, ne quid nobis inopinatum sit : et quia omnia
novitate graviora sunt, hoc cogitatio adsidua praestabit, ut
nulli sis malo tiro. 5. Servi me reliquerunt. Alium conpila
verunt, alium accusaverunt, alium occiderunt, alium prodide
runt, alium calcaverunt, alium veneno, alium criminatione pe
182 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

tierunt. Quicquid dixeris, multis accidit. Deinceps, quae

multa et varia sunt in nos diriguntur. Quaedam in nos fixa
sunt, quaedam vibrant et cum maxime veniunt, quaedam in
alios perventura nos stringunt. 6. Nihil miremur eorum , ad
quae nati sumus, quae ideo nulli querenda, quia paria sunt
omnibus. Ita dico, paria sunt : nam etiam quod effugit ali
quis, pati potuit : aequum autem ius est non quo omnes usi
sunt, sed quod omnibus latum est. Imperetur aequitas animo
et sine querela mortalitatis tributa pendamus. Hiems frigora
adducit : algendum est : aestas calores refert : aestuandum
est. 7. Intemperies coeli valitudinem temptat : aegrotandum
est. Et fera nobis aliquo loco occurret et homo perniciosior
feris omnibus. Aliud aqua, aliud ignis eripiet. Hanc rerum
condicionem mutare non possumus : id possumus, magnum
sumere animum et viro bono dignum , quo fortiter fortuita
patiamur et naturae consentiamus. 8. Natura autem hoc, quod
vides, regnum mutationibus temperat. Nubilo serena succe
dunt : turbantur maria, cum quieverunt : flant invicem venti :
noctem dies sequitur: pars coeli consurgit, pars mergitur: con
trariis rerum aeternitas constat. Ad hanc legem animus no
ster aptandus est : hanc sequatur, huic pareat: et quaecumque
fiunt, debuisse fieri putet nec velit obiurgare naturam . 9. Op
timum est pati, quod emendare non possis, et deum, quo auc
tore cuncta proveniunt, sine murmuratione comitari. Malus
miles est, qui imperatorem gemens sequitur. Quare inpigri
atque alacres excipiamus imperia nec deseramus hunc operis
pulcherrimi cursum , cui quicquid patimur, intextum est. 10 .
Et sic adloquamur Iovem , cuius gubernaculo moles ista dirigi
tur, quemadmodum Cleanthes noster versibus disertissimis
adloquitur, quos mihi in nostrum sermonem mutare permitti
tur Ciceronis, disertissimi viri, exemplo. Si placuerint, boni
consules: si displicuerint, scies me in hoc secutum Ciceronis
exemplum .
11. Duc, o parens celsique dominator poli,
Quocumque placuit: nulla parendi mora est.
Adsum inpiger. Fac nolle, comitabor gemens
Malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.
Ducunt volentem fata , nolentem trahunt,
 EPISTULAE SELECTAE. 183

Sic vivamus, sic loquamur : paratos nos inveniat atque inpi

gros fatum . Hic est magnus animus, qui se deo tradidit : at
contra ille pusillus et degener, qui obluctatur et de ordine
mundi male existimat et emendare mavult deos quam se .
Vale.

EPISTULA CXVIII.
SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM.
Exigis a me frequentiores epistulas. Rationes conferamus :
solvendo non eris. Convenerat quidem, ut tua priora essent :
tu scriberes, ego rescriberem . Sed non ero difficilis : bene
credi tibi scio : itaque in antecessum dabo. Nec faciam , quod
Cicero, vir disertissimus, facere Atticum iubet, ut, etiam si rem
nullam habebit, quod in buccam venerit, scribat. 2. Numquam
potest deesse, quod scribam , ut omnia illa, quae Ciceronis in
plent epistulas, transeam : quis candidatus laboret : quis alienis,
quis suis viribus pugnet : quis consulatum fiducia Caesaris,
quis Pompeii, quis arcae petat : quam durus sit fenerator Cae
cilius, a quo minoris centesimis propinqui nummum movere
non possint. Sua satius est mala quam aliena tractare, se ex
cutere et videre, quam multarum rerum candidatus sit, et non
suffragari. 3. Hoc est, mi Lucili, egregium , hoc securum ac
liberum, nihil petere et tota fortunae comitia transire. Quam
putas esse iucundum tribubus vocatis, cum candidati in tem
plis suis pendeant et alius nummos pronuntiet, alius per se
questrem agat, alius eorum manus osculis conterat, quibus
designatus contingendam manum negaturus est, omnes ad
toniti vocem praeconis exspectant, stare otiosum et spectare
illas nundinas nec ementem quicquam nec vendentem ? 4.
Quanto hic maiore gaudio fruitur, qui non praetoria aut con
sularia comitia securus intuetur, sed magna illa, in quibus alii
honores anniversarios petunt, alii perpetuas potestates, alii bel
lorum eventus prosperos triumphosque, alii divitias, alii matri
monia ac liberos, alii salutem suam suorumque! Quanti animi
184 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

res est solum nihil petere, nulli supplicare et dicere : Nihil

mihi tecum , fortuna. Non facio mei tibi copiam : scio apud
te Catones repelli, Vatinios fieri : nihil rogo. Hoc est priva
tam facere fortunam . 5. Licet ergo haec invicem scribere et
hanc integram semper egerere materiam circumspicientibus
tot milia hominum inquieta, qui ut aliquid pestiferi consequan
tur, per mala nituntur in malum petuntque mox fugienda aut
etiam fastidienda. Cui enim adsecuto satis fuit, quod optanti
nimium videbatur ? 6. Non est, ut existimant homines, avida
felicitas, sed pusilla : itaque neminem satiat. Tu ista credis
excelsa, quia longe ab illis iaces : ei vero, qui ad illa pervenit,
humilia sunt. Mentior, nisi adhuc quaerit escendere : istuc,
quod tu summum putas, gradus est. Omnes autem male habet
ignorantia veri. 7. Tamquam ad bona feruntur decepti ru
moribus: deinde mala esse aut inania aut minora quam spera
verint, adepti ac multa passi vident : maiorque pars miratur
ex intervallo fallentia et volgo magna pro bonis sunt. Hoc
ne nobis quoque eveniat, quaeramus, quid sit bonum . Varia
eius interpretatio fuit : alius illud aliter expressit. 8. Quidam
ita finiunt: Bonum est quod invitat animos, quod ad se vocat.
Huic statim obponitur : Quid ? si invitat quidem, sed in per
niciem ? scis quam multa mala blanda sint. Verum et veri
simile inter se differunt. Ita quod bonum est, vero iungitur :
non est enim bonum nisi verum est : at quod invitat ad se et
adlicefacit, verisimile est: subripit, sollicitat, adtrahit. 9. Qui
dam ita finierunt : Bonum est, quod adpetitionem sui movet:
vel, quod inpetum animi tendentis ad se movet. Et huic idem
obponitur : multa enim inpetum animi movent, quae petantur
petentium malo. Melius illi, qui ita finierunt: Bonum est,
quod ad se inpetum animi secundum naturam movet et ita
demum petendum est. Cum coepit esse expetendum , iam et
honestum est : hoc enim est perfecte petendum. 10. Locus
ipse me admonet, ut, quid intersit inter bonum honestumque,
dicam . Aliquid inter se mixtum habent et inseparabile : nec
potest bonum esse, nisi cui aliquid honesti inest, et honestum
utique bonum est. Quid ergo inter duo interest ? Honestum
est perfectum bonum , quo beata vita conpletur, cuius contactu
 EPISTULAE SELECTAE . 185

alia quoque bona fiunt. Quod dico, tale est : sunt quaedam
neque bona neque mala, tamquam militia, legatio, iurisdictio.
11. Haec cum honeste administrata sunt, bona esse incipiunt
et ex dubio in bonum transeunt. Bonum societate honesti fit,
honestum per se bonum est. Bonum ex honesto fluit, honestum
ex se est. Quod bonum est malum esse potuit : quod honestum
est, nisi bonum esse non potuit. Hanc quidam finitionem red
diderunt : Bonum est quod secundum naturam est. Adtende,
quid dicam : quod bonum est secundum naturam est : non pro
tinus quod secundum naturam est etiam bonum est. 12. Mul
ta naturae quidem consentiunt, sed tam pusilla sunt, ut non
conveniat illis boni nomen. Levia enim sunt, contemnenda :
nullum est minimum contemnendum bonum. Nam quamdiu
exiguum est, bonum non est : cum bonum esse coepit, non est
exiguum. Unde adgnoscitur bonum ? si perfecte secundum
naturam est. 13. Fateris, inquis, quod bonum est secundum na
turam esse : haec eius proprietas est : fateris et alia secundum
naturam quidem esse, sed bona non esse. Quomodo ergo illud
bonum est, cum haec non sint ? quomodo ad aliam proprieta
tem pervenit, cum utrique praecipuum illud commune sit,
secundum naturam esse ? Ipsa scilicet magnitudine. 14. Nec
hoc novum est quaedam crescendo mutari. Infans fuit, factus
est pubes : alia eius proprietas fit : ille enim inrationalis est,
hic rationalis. Quaedam incremento non tantum in maius
exeunt, sed in aliud . Non fit, inquit, aliud, quod maius fit :
utrum lagenam an dolium inpleas vino, nihil refert : in utroque
proprietas vini est : et exiguum mellis pondus ex magno sa
pore non differt. Diversa ponis exempla : in istis enim eadem
qualitas est : quamvis augeantur, manent. 15. Quaedam ampli
ficata in suo genere et in sua proprietate perdurant: quaedam
post multa incrementa ultima demum vertit adiectio et novam
illis aliamque quam in qua fuerunt, condicionem inprimit.
Unus lapis facit fornicem , ille, qui latera inclinata cuneavit et
interventu suo vinxit. Summa adiectio quare plurimum facit
vel exigua ? Quia non auget, sed inplet. Quaedam processu
priorem exuunt formam et in novam transeunt. 16. Ubi ali
quid animus diu protulit et magnitudinem eius sequendo lassa
186 L. ANNAEI SENECAE EPISTULAE SELECTAE .

tus est, infinitum coepit vocari : quod longe aliud factum est
quam fuit, cum magnum videretur, sed finitum . Eodem modo
aliquid difficulter secari cogitavimus: novissime crescente hac
difficultate insecabile inventum est. Sic ab eo quod vix et
aegre movebatur processimus ad inmobile. Eadem ratione
aliquid secundum naturam fuit : hoc in aliam proprietatem
magnitudo sua transtulit et bonum fecit. Vale.

EPITAPHIUM SENECAE .
Cura, labor, meritum , sumpti pro munere honores,
Ite, alias post hanc sollicitate animas !
Me procul a vobis deus evocat : illicet actis
Rebus terrenis hospita terra vale !
Corpus avara tamen solemnibus accipe saxis.
Namque animam coelo reddimus, ossa tibi.
 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

EPIGRAMMATA SUPER EXILIO .

I. AD CORSICAM.
Corsica Phocaico tellus habitata colono,
Corsica, quae patrio nomine Cyrnus eras,
Corsica Sardinia brevior, porrectior Ilva,
Corsica piscosis pervia fluminibus,
Corsica terribilis, cum primum incanduit aestas,
Saevior, ostendit cum ferus ora canis,
Parce relegatis, hoc est, iam parce sepultis :
Vivorum cineri sit tua terra levis.

II. DE EADEM.
Barbara praeruptis inclusa est Corsica saxis,
Horrida, desertis undique vasta locis.
Non poma autumnus, segetes non educat aestas,
Canaque Palladio munere bruma caret.
Umbrarum nullo ver est laetabile foetu,
Nullaque in infausto nascitur herba solo .
Non panis, non haustus aquae, non ultimus ignis :
Hic sola haec duo sunt, exsul et exsilium .
III. QUERELA.
Occisi iugulum quisquis scrutaris amici,
Tu miserum necdum me satis esse putas ?
Desere confossum : victori volnus iniquo
Mortiferum inpressit mortua saepe manus.
188 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

IV. ITEM
Quisquis es,-et nomen dicam : dolor omnia cogita
Qui nostrum cinerem nunc, inimice, premis
Et non contentus tantis subitisque ruinis
Stringis in exstinctum tela cruenta caput :
Crede mihi, vires aliquas natura sepulchris
Attribuit : tumulos vindicat umbra suos.
Ipsos crede deos hoc nunc tibi dicere, livor,
Hoc tibi nunc manes dicere crede meos :
Res est sacra , miser. Noli mea tangere fata.
Sacrilegae bustis abstinuere manus.
V. ITEM.
Carmina mortifero tua sunt suffusa veneno,
Et sunt criminibus pectora nigra magis.
Nemo tuos fugiat, non vir, non femina dentes,
Haud puer, haud aetas undique tuta senis,
Utque furens totas immittit saxa per urbes
In populum, sic tu verba maligna iacis.
Sed solet insanos populus compescere sanus,
Et repetunt motum saxa remissa caput.
In te nunc stringit nullus non carmina vates,
Inque tuam rabiem publica Musa furit.
Dum sua conpositus nondum bene concutit arma
Miles, it e nostra lancea torta manu.
Bellus homo, et valide capitalia carmina ludis,
Deque tuis manant atra venena iocis.
Sed tu perque iocum dicis vinumque : quid ad rem
Si plorem , risus si tuus ista facit ?
Quare tolle iocos : non est iocus esse malignum .
Numquam sunt grati, qui nocuere sales.
VI. AD AMICUM.
Crispe, meae vires, lassarumque ancora rerum ,
Crispe, vel antiquo conspiciende foro :
Crispe potens numquam , nisi cum prodesse volebas,
Naufragio littus tutaque terra meo,
 EPIGRAMMATA SUPER EXILIO . 189

Solus honor nobis arx et tutissima nobis

Et nunc afflicto sola quies animo :
Crispe, fides dulcis, placidique acerrima virtus,
Cuius Cecropio pectora melle madent :
Maxima facundo vel avo vel gloria patri,
Quo solo careat si quis, in exsilio est :
An tua, qui iaceo saxis telluris adhaerens,
Mens mecum est, nulla quae cohibetur humo ?
VII. DE QUALITATE TEMPORIS.
Omnia tempus edax depascitur, omnia carpit,
Omnia sede movet, nil sinit esse diu.
Flumina deficiunt, profugum mare littora siccat,
Subsidunt montes et iuga celsa ruunt.
Quid tam parva loquor ? moles pulcherrima coeli
Ardebit flammis tota repente suis.
Omnia mors poscit. Lex est, non poena, perire :
Hic aliquo mundus tempore nullus erit.
VIII. VOTUM.
Sic mihi sit frater maiorque minorque superstes,
Et de me doleat nil nisi morte mea.
Sic illos vincam, sic vincar rursus amando :
Mutuus inter nos sic bene certet amor.
Sic dulci Marcus, qui nunc sermone fritinnit,
Facundo patruos provocet ore duos.
IX . AD CORDUBAM.
Corduba solve comas et tristes indue voltus :
Inlacrimans cineri munera mitte meo.
Nunc longinqua tuum deplora, Corduba, vatem ,
Corduba, non alio tempore moesta magis :
Tempore non illo, quo versi viribus orbis
Incubuit belli tota ruina tibi,
Cum geminis oppressa malis utrimque peribas :
Et tibi Pompeius, Caesar et hostis erat.
I
190 L. ANNAEI SENECAE EPIGRAMMATA SUPER EXILIO .

Tempore non illo, quo ter tibi funera centum

Heu nox una dedit, quae tibi summa fuit.
Non, Lusitanus quateret cum moenia latro,
Figeret et portas lancea torta tuas.
Ille tuns quondam magnus, tua gloria, civis
Infigar scopulo. Corduba solve comas,
Et gratare tibi, quod te natura supremo
Alluit oceano : tardius ista doles.

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Googod
Coin of Agrippina, wife of Claudius, mother of Nero. (It was through her
that Seneca was recalled from exile : Introduction, p . 14.) From the British
Museum .
EPISTULAE SENECAE, NERONIS IMPERATORIS
MAGISTRI, AD PAULUM APOSTOLUM ET
PAULI APOSTOLI AD SENECAM .*

S. HIERONYMUS DE SENECA IN CATALOGO SANCTORUM.

Lucius Annaeus Seneca Cordubensis, Sotionis stoici discipu
lus et patruus Lucani poetae, continentissimae vitae fuit, quem
non ponerem in catalogo sanctorum , nisi me epistulae illae
provocarent, quae leguntur a plurimis, Pauli ad Senecam et
Senecae ad Paulum . In quibus, cum esset Neronis magister
et illius temporis potentissimus, optare se dicit eius esse loci
apud suos, cuius sit Paulus apud Christianos. Hic ante bien
nium quam Petrus et Paulus martyrio coronarentur, a Nerone
interfectus est.

EPISTULA I.
SENECA PAULO SALUTEM .

Credo tibi, Paule, nunciatum esse, quod heri [de te) cum
Lucilio nostro de apocryphis et aliis rebus sermonem habueri
mus. Erant enim quidam disciplinarum tuarum comites me
cum . Nam in hortos Salustianos secesseramus , quo loco occa
sione nostra alio tendentes hi, de quibus dixi, visis nobis ad
iuncti sunt. Certe quod tui praesentiam optavimus, et hoc
scias volo : libello tuo lecto, id est de plurimis aliquas
quas ad aliquam civitatem seu caput provinciae direxisti, mira
exhortatione vitam moralem continentes, usque refecti sumus.
* See Introduction, pp. 34, 36,
192 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

Quos sensus non puto ex te dictos sed per te, certe aliquando
ex te et per te : tanta enim maiestas earum est rerum tanta
que generositate calens, ut vix suffecturas putem aetates honi
num , quibus institui perficique possint. Bene te valere, frater,
cupio..
EPISTULA II.
SENECAE PAULUS SALUTEM .

Litteras tuas hilaris heri accepi, ad quas rescribere statim

potui, si praesentiam iuvenis, quem ad te eram missurus, ha
buissem . Scis enim, quando et per quem et quo tempore et
cui quid dari committique debeat. Rogo ergo, non putes [te]
neglectum , dum personae qualitatem respicio. Sed quod litte
ris meis vos bene acceptos alicubi scribis, felicem me arbitror -
tanti viri iudicio . Neque enim hoc diceres, censor , sophista,
magister tanti principis et iam omnium, nisi quia vere dicis.
Opto te diu bene valere.
EPISTULA III.
SENECA PAULO SALUTEM .
Quaedam volumina ordinavi et divisionibus suis statum eis
dedi. Ea quoque Caesari legere sum destinatus. Si modo
sors prospere annuerit, ut novas afferat aures, eris forsan et tu
praesens : sin, alias reddam tibi diem , ut hoc opus invicem in
spiciamus. Et possem non prius edere ei eam scripturam ,
nisi prius tecum conferam , si modo [ etiam ] impune hoc fieri
potuisset, ut scires non te praeteriri. Vale .
EPISTULA IV .
Paulus SENECAE SALUTEM .
Quotienscunque litteras tuas audio, praesentiam tui cogito
nec aliud existimo quam omni tempore te nobiscum esse.
Cum primum itaque venire coeperis, invicem nos et de proxi
mo videbimus. Bene te valere opto.
 AD PAULUM EPISTULAE . 193

EPISTULA V.
SENECA FAULO SALUTEM.

Nimio tuo secessu angimur. Quid est ? vel quae res te

remo[ra ]tum faciunt ? si indignatio dominae, quod a ritu et
secta veteri recesseris et alios rursum converteris, erit postu
landi locus, ut ratione factum , non levitate hoc existimetur.
EPISTULA VI.
SENECAE ET LUCILIO PAULUS SALUTEM.
De his, quae mihi scripsistis, non licet arundine et atramento
eloqui, quarum altera res notat et designat aliquid, altera evi
denter ostendit, praecipue cum sciam inter vos esse, hoc est
apud vos et in vobis, qui me intelligant. Honor omnibus ha
bendus est et tanto magis, quanto indignandi occasionem cap
tant. Quibus si patientiam demus, omni modo eos ex quaqua
parte vincemus, si modo hi sunt, qui poenitentiam sui gerant.
Bene valete.
EPISTULA VII.
ANNAEUS SENECA PAULO ET THEOPHILO SALUTEM.

Profiteor bene me acceptum lectione litterarum tuarum ,

quas Galatis, Corinthiis, Achaeis misisti, et ita invicem viva
mus, ut etiam cum horrore divino esse exhibes. Spiritus enim
sanctus in te et super te excelsus sublimiores sanctis venerabi
les sensus exprimit. Vellem itaque, cures et cetera, ut maie
stati earum cultus sermonis non desit. Et ne quid tibi, frater,
surripiam aut conscientiae meae debeam , confiteor Augustum
sensibus tuis motum. Cui lecto virtutis in te exordio ista vox
fuit : mirari eum posse, ut qui non legitime imbutus sit, taliter
sentiat. Cui ego respondi, solere deos ore innocentium effari,
haud eorum , qui praevaricare doctrina sua quid possint. Et
dato ei exemplo Vatieni hominis rusticuli, cui viri duo appa
ruissent in agro Reatino, qui postea Castor et Pollux sunt no
minati, satis instructus videtur. Vale.
194 L. ANNAEI SENECAE

EPISTULA VIII.
PAULUS SENECAE SALUTEM .

Licet non ignorem Caesarem nostrarum rerum admirato

rem , si quando deficiet amatorem esse, permittes tamen te non
laedi sed admoneri : puto enim te graviter fecisse, quod ei in
notitiam perferre voluisti id, quod ritui et disciplinae eius sit
contrarium . Cum enim ille gentium deos colat, quid tibi vi
sum sit, ut hoc scire cum velles, non video, nisi nimio amore
meo facere te hoc existimo. Rogo de futuro, ne id agas.
Cavendum est enim, ne dum me diligis, offensum dominae
facias, cuius quidem offensa neque oberit, si perseveraverit, ne
que, si non sit, proderit: si est regina, non indignabitur, si
mulier est, offendetur. Bene vale.

EPISTULA IX .
SENECA PAULO SALUTEM.

Scio te non tam tui causa commotum litteris, quas ad te

de editione epistolarum tuarum Caesari feci, quam natura
[ipsarum ] rerum , quae ita mentes hominum ab omnibus arti
bus et moribus rectis revocat, ut non hodie admirer, quippe
[ut] qui multis documentis hoc iam notissimum habeam . Igi
tur nove agamus, et si quid facile in praeteritum factum est,
veniam irrogabis. Misi tibi librum de verborum copia. Vale
Paule carissime.

EPISTULA X.
SENECAE PAULUS SALUTEM.
Quotienscunque tibi scribo et nomen meum tibi subse
cundo, gravem et sectae meae incongruentem rem facio . De
beo enim, ut saepe professus sum, cum omnibus omnia esse
et id observare in tua persona, quod lex Romana honori se
natus concessit, perlecta epistola ultimum locum eligere, ne
cum aporia et dedecore cupiain [illud) efficere, quod mei ar
 AD PAULUM EPISTULAE . 195

bitrii fuerit. Vale, devotissime magister. Data quinto Calec

darum Iulii Nerone IV et Messala consulibus.

EPISTULA XI.
SENECA PAULO SALUTEM.

Ave mi Paule carissime. Si mihi nominique meo vir tan

tus et dilectus omnibus modis non dico fueris iunctus sed ne
cessario mixtus, optime actum erit de Seneca tuo. Cum sis
igitur vertex et altissimorum omnium montium cacumen, non
ego vis laeter, si ita sim tibi proximus, ut alter similis tui
deputer ? Haud itaque te indignum prima facie epistolarum
nominandum censeas, ne tam temptare me quam ludere vi
dearis, quippe cum scias civem esse te Romanum. [Uti]nam
qui meus, tuus apud te locus, qui tuus, velim ut meus. Vale
mi Paule carissime. Data X. Cal. April. Aproniano et Capi
tone consulibus.

EPISTULA XII.
SENECA PAULO SALUTEM.
Ave mi Paule carissime. Putasne me haud contristari et
non luctuosum esse, quod de innocentia vestra subinde suppli
cium sumatur ? dehinc quod tam duros tamque obnoxios vos
reatui omnis populus iudicet, putans a vobis effici, quidquid
in urbe contrarium fit ? Feramus aequo animo et utamur foro,
quod sors concessit, donec invicta felicitas finem malis im
ponat. Tulit et priscorum aetas Macedonem Philippi filium
et post Darium Dionysium . Nostra quoque Gaium Caesarem ,
quibus quicquid libuit, licuit. Incendium urbs Romana mani
feste saepe unde patiatur, constat. Sed si effari humilitas po
tuisset humana, quid causae sit, et impune in his tenebris
loqui liceret, iam omnes omnia viderent. Christiani et Iudaei
quasi machinatores incendii affecti supplicio uri solent. Gras
sator iste, quisquis est, cui voluptas carnificina est et menda
cium velamentum , tempori suo destinatus est. Ut optimus
quisque unum pro multis donatum est caput, ita et hic devo
196 L. ANNAEI SENECAE EPISTULAE .

tue pro omaibas igni cremabitur. Centum triginta duae do

mus, insulae quatuor (in) sex diebus arsere, septimus pausam
dedit. Bene te valere frater opto. Data quinto Cal. April.
Frugi et Basso consulibus.

EPISTULA XIII.
SENECA PAULO SALUTEM .

[Ave mi Paule carissime. Allegorice et aenigmatice multa

a te usquequaque opera concluduntur et ideo rerum tanta vis
et muneris tibi tributa non ornamento verborum sed cultu
quodam decoranda est. Nec vereare, quod saepius te dixisse
retineo, multos, qui talia affectent, sensus corrumpere, virtutes
rerum evirare. Ceterum mihi concedas velim latinitati morem
gerere, honestis vocibus speciem adhibere, ut generosi muneris
concessio digne a te possit expediri. Bene vale. Data V.
Non. Iul. Leone et Sabino consulibus.

EPISTULA XIV .
PAULUS SENECAE SALUTEM .

Perpendenti tibi ea sunt revelata, quae paucis divinitas con

cessit. Certus igitur ego in agro iam fertili semen fortissi
mum sero, non quidem materiam , quae corrumpi videtur, sed
verbum stabile, dei derivamentum crescentis et manentis in
aeternum . Quod prudentia tua assecuta [ est], indeficiens fore
debebit, ethnicorum Israelitarumque observationes censere vi
tandas. Novum te auctorem feceris Iesu Christi praeconiis
ostendendo rhetoricis irreprehensibilem sophiam , quam pro
pemodum adeptus regi temporali eiusque domesticis atque fidis
amicis insinuabis quibus aspera et incapabilis erit persuasio,
cum plerique illorum minime flectantur insinuationibus tuis.
Quibus vitale commodum scrmo dci instillatus, novum homi
nem sine corruptela perpetuamque animam parit ad deum
istinc properantem . Vale Seneca carissime nobis. Data Cal.
Augusti Leone et Sabino consulibus.
NOTES.

I 2
 ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES.

A. & G., Allen & Greenough's Latin Georg., Georgics.

Grammar. Germ ., Germania .
A. & S., Andrews & Stoddard's Latin
Grammar. H., Harkness's Latin Grammar.
absol., absolute. Hor., Horace.
ad Att. , ad Atticum .
ad Fam. , ad Familiares. i. e., id est, that is.
Ann ., Annales, Annals. impf., imperfect.
Ars Amat., Ars Amatoria. impers ., impersonal.
Ars Poet., Ars Puetica. in M. Anton ., in M. Antonium .
in Verr., in Verrem .
B. & M. , Bullion & Morris's Latin Gram. Iustit. Div. , Institutiones Divinae.
Bell . Gall. , Bellum Gallicum .
Brut., Brutus. Juv ., Juvenal.
Catil., Catiline. Lips., Lipsius.
cf., cou fer, consult.
Cic., Cicero. M. , Madvig's Latin Grammar.
Class. Dict., Classical Dictionary, An- Memor., Memorabilia.
thon's or Smith's .
N. , note.
De Benef., De Beneficiis . Nát. Quaest., Natural Questions.
De Brev. Vit . , De Brevitate Vitae.
De Civ. Dei, De Civitate Dei. Odys., Odyssey.
De Clem. , De Clementia .
De Cousol. ad Helv. , De Consolatione partit., partitive.
ad Helviam . pers., personal.
De Consol. ad Marc., De Consulatione Physiol. Stoic., Physiologia Stoicorum
ad Marciam . Plut., Plutarch.
De Consol.ad Polyb., De Consolatione post-Ang., post-Augustan.
ad Polybium . pred. , predicate.
De Const. Sap., De Constantia Sapi
entis . Quint., Quintilian.
De Fin . , De Finibus.
De Leg ., De Legibus. relat., relative.
De Offic., De Officiis.
De Orat., De Oratore. Sat. , Satire.
De Olio Sp., De Orio Sapientis. Saturn. Conviv., Saturnalia Convivia.
De Prov., De Providentia . subst., substantive.
De Rer. Nat., De Rerum Natura. Suet., Suetonius.
De Senect ., De Senecinte.
De Stoic. repug ., De Stoicorum repug . Tac., Tacitus.
nantiis. Tiber., Tiberius.
De Trang., De Tranqnillitate Animi. Trist., Tristia .
De Vit. Beat., DeVita Beata. Tusc.Disp., Tusculan Disputations.
Dict. Antiq., Dictionary of Antiquities.
dimin ., diminutive. v. I. , varia lectio, various reading.
Diog. Laert., Diogenes Laertius. vid ., vide, see.
Virg ., Virgil.
..., exempli gratia , for example. viz., videlicet, namely.
Epig. , Epigram.
Epit., Epitome. Xenoph. , Xenophon.
Florileg ., Florilegium . Z., Zumpt's Latin Grammar.
 NOTES.

FICKERT gives the title of DIALOGUES to nine of the shorter

philosophical and ethical treatises of Seneca, quoting Quintilian,
De Institutione Oratoria, x. 1 , 129, and Seneca, De Beneficiis, v.
19, 8. Haase, in the Teubner edition of Seneca's Works, adopts
the same title, making the number of dialogues to be twelve.
They are, however, in no usual or proper sense of the word,
dialogues, such as Plato and Cicero wrote, but are rather trea
tises or moral essays addressed to different individuals, and en
livened by occasional questions and answers, somewhat after the
manner of personal discussions.

DE PROVIDENTIA .
ARGUMENTUM . - I. Seneca affirms that there is a providence, i. e. a
ruler and director of the world, and he argues that this must be so from
the movement, order, and constancy of all things. One special point,
however, his friend Lucilius complains of, viz. , “ that evils fall upon
good men .” Seneca, leaving the general topic, devotes bimself to this,
and says that the deity loves good men, and so does not send evils upon
them to punish them, but as a father, to correct and restrain them.
II. Those are not really evils which happen to good men , since evils
cannot fall upon these and overcome them. Evils are to be looked
upon as chastenings and exercise for good men , just as the athletes are
trained for victory in the public gaines. Cato's example is adduced, and
his praise celebrated. III. , IV. He now proceeds to give his reasons
why evils happen to the good. First, it is for their benefit upon whom
they fall, as medicine is given to the sick, and to harden them and render
them fit for the contest with the world. V. Next, he shows that evils
come upon all men ; hence the good being thus treated by the deity is
a proof that the vulgar notion in regard to good and evil things is false.
His third reason is, that good men willingly accept what is sent upon
them , for they offer themselves freely to god and fate. As a fourth
200 NOTES .

reason, he avows that fate exists from eternity, and has fixed all things
by an eternal decree. VI. Finally, he repeats that these are not really
evils ; good men are born and trained for exemplars to others ; and he
brings in the deity, exhorting in a lofty strain , and arousing to strength
and endurance. Stoic-like, Seneca's last words are, If it tries you too
much to bear these ills of life,who holds you back ? The door is open :
go forth .

Cap. 1.-1 . Lucili : Lucilius Junior, procurator of Sicily, was

the friend to whom Seneca addresses, not only this treatise, but
66
also his “ Epistles ” and Natural Questions." He is generally
thought to have been the author of a poem of some note, entitled
" Aetna,” in which an attempt is made to account, on philosoph
ical principles, for the physical phenomena presented by the
volcano. Very little is known of his life and career. Cf. Epist.
79. — ita, si, M. 442 a.-accidere : Lips . and others read accide
rent, the subj. being the mood used in indirect , dependent ques
tions ; H. 529, M. 356. - in contextu operis, in the progress of
( i. e. in another part of) the work. Some critics suppose that a
separate work is here referred to.-cum praeesse . . . nobis
deum : this language implies both a general and special provi
dence , in accordance with the fuller and clearer Christian view .
-contradictionem , post-Aug. , objection , viz., if there is a provi
dence , why do so many evils befall good men ?-manente lite
integra , the primary question remaining untouched , viz. whether
there is a providence ?-agam, I will plead, used in a forensic
sense.

2. non sine aliquo stare : in Epist. 31 reference is made

to the omnipotence of the deity : “ God, the most high and pow
erful, himself upholdeth ( vehit) all things.” Cf. Heb. i. 3, “ Up
holding all things by the word of his power.” — fortuiti inpetus :
in opposition to the Epicurean “fortuitous concurrence ofatoms.”
-et quae casus, etc. The argument is, that in those things
which are the result of chance there is no order, no consistency ;
that, on the other hand, in the mundus (róquos) all things happen
according to law, and consistently ; therefore, they are not the
result of chance, but are directed by an overruling mind and
purpose. — cito arietare = incurrere in se et inpedire, Lips. This
 DE PROVIDENTIA . 1. 2-4. 201

word, arietare, is frequently used by Seneca in the sense of im

peding or hindering ; cf. De Tranq. 1, 7, N.; De Vit. Beata, 8, 5 ;
Epist. 56, 13. The meaning seems to be derived from the man
ner in which rams make their attacks upon each other with
their horns, or from the use of a battering-ram in demolishing
walls in a siege.-- inoffensam , uninterrupted. -- aeternae legis
= fate or providence, according to the Stoic idea . — dispositore :
cf. dispositor ille mundi deus, Nat.Quaest.v. 18,5 ; also, Lactantius,
Instit. Div. iv. 9. The whole passage reminds one of the Psalm
ist's words, “ The heavens declare the glory of God, and the
firmament showeth his handiwork . ” Haase reads, disposito relu
centium . — non esse . . . ordinem . See note above, on fortuiti
inpetus. — ut ... sedeat . . . spectet, etc., result clauses.
nec ullam . sentiant, i. e. on account of evaporation and
absorption ; cf. Eccles. i. 7, “ All the rivers run into the sea ,”
etc.
3. illa, subject of accidunt. - elisorum , poet, expression. -
incendia . . . effusa, cf. Virg. Georg. i. 472. — tumultuosa, tem
pestuous, restless. — alienis, strange, unusual. - miraculo, v. 1. mira
cula . — calentes aquae : cf. Pliny, Nat. Hist. ii. 106, where men
tion is made of hot springs whose waters were esteemed bene
ficial to health . — nova insularum spatia, cf. Nat. Quaest. vi.
21, 1, where is recorded the appearance of an island in the midst
of the Aegean Sea in Seneca's time. f. also Pliny, Nat. Hist. ii.
86, 89 ; iv. 12 : Livy, Historia , xxxix. 56.–4. pelago in se rece
dente, i. e, at ebb-tide; pelago is frequently used in post-Aug.
prose in the sense of mari. — eadem ... operiri, i. e. at flood
tide. - volutatione, post-Aug. in sense of restlessness, disquiet ; cf.
De Brev . Vit. 2, 3. - ad horam ac diem , at a certain hour and
day. - subeunt = fiunt. — lunare sidus, i. e. the moon.-suo
reserventur, i. e. the exposition of those phenomena in nature
which do not take place fortuitously, but are governed by fixed
laws. — ista, difference between iste, ille, hic ? Cf. Ramshorn's
Latin Synonyms, 509. - quaeris : H. C. Michaelis thinks that the
following sentence ( in gratiam , etc.) indicates some ground of
complaint against providence on the part of the person ad
dressed ; hence he prefers the reading quereris, which has some
Ms, authority
202 NOTES .

5. optimos, sc. viros. — immo ... similitudo : in Seneca's

Epistles these ideas are frequently expressed and enlarged upon ;
cf. 41, 1, 2 ; 73, 16 ; etc.- necessitudo,post-Aug., very strong ex
pression. -- aemulator, follower. — vera progenies, cf. Ps. lxxxvi.
6 ; 1 John iv. 3 ; iii. 1, 2 ; truly one would almost affirm , says
Muretus, that this man had handled and tasted of the sacred
Word. See INTROD. to the present vol. p. 26.-6. escendere,
stronger than ascendere ; cf. De Tranq. 15, 17. - vernularum , post
Aug. These were slaves born in the master's house ; they were
considered valuable for this reason, and are termed by Horace
( Sat. ii. 6,66) vernas procaces,saucy, impudent slaves. Cf. Becker's
66
Gallus,” p. 202. - experitur parat: cf. Heb. xii. 6 ; 1 Cor.
iv. 17.

II. - 1 . Nihil ... mali : an emphatic reply to the opening

question of the chapter ; as if he had said, “ adversity,I acknowl
edge, may befall good men, but evil never .” A Stoical paradox,
and affording but small comfort in time of trouble. — tanta ...
fontium , so great abundance of medicinal fountains, i. e. impreg
nated with iron, sulphur, etc.-ne ... quidem : many prefer
nec, as being more usual in later writers, and often found in
Seneca.-in suum colorem trahit : he gives to everything the
coloring of his own character ; i. e. himself a good man, he turns
everything to good account. As the red wine assimilates added
drops of other color, so the good man, etc., Lips.-nec hoc dico,
non sentit illa : insensibility to affliction, Seneca would say, is a
vice, though that has been considered one of the moral principles
of the Stoics. Lips. says that this apathy, or utter indifference
to all external things, belongs to the school of Stilpo, the Mega
rian. Cf.Zeller's “ Socrates and Socratic Schools,” p. 236. Plato
is reported as saying to a person who, nude in the middle of
winter, was embracing a marble column for the sake of exhibit
ing endurance, " if you feel, you act foolishly ; if you do not feel,
you do nothing noble .”
2. modo = dummodo, if only. - fortissimis quibusque: quisque
is often used in a universal or general relation in connection
with the superl., which always precedes it, M. 495.- per quos :
how does per with accus, differ from ab with ablat, M. 254, obs.
 DE PROVIDENTIA . II. 3-8. 203

3. — obiciuntur, i. e. objiciuntur ; cf. § 9, N.-3. licet, with subj,

M. 361.-boni consulant, let them take it in good part, be content
ed with it. — aliter . . . aliter = dissimiliter, rarely used in this
sense . - indulgeant, a peculiarly appropriate word in reference
to love of parents for their children . Cf. Consol. ad Helv. 14, 3 ;
16, 6. —ad studia obeunda : for force of gerundive here, cf. H.
544, notes ; B. & M. 1338. - feriatis diebus : for the holidays.
which were very numerous, cf. feriae, Dict. of Antiq . - sudorem ,
in the gymnastic exercises. - umbra, in opposition to sudorem ;
cf. Cic. Brut. 9.
4. Patrium deus habet . animum : “ like as a father
pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him ,"
Ps. ciii. 13. — illos fortiter et ... inquit, etc.: “ whom the Lord
loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiv
eth , ” Heb. xii. 6 ; vid. other parts of the same chapter. — motu,
v. l. mole . — de genu pugnat, alluding to a combatant who has
been wounded in his lower limbs, and yet continues to fight on
his knees. Cf. Epist. 66, 47.–5. Miraris si, A. & G. 333 b. R.
exerceantur, subj. of purpose, H. 497 ; B. & M. 1212 ; M. 363 a.
- spectant di : some read spectandi. — interritus, cf. Martial,
Epig. xv., xxiii., xxvii. - honestior, cf. Epist. 99, 12 ; Nat. Quaest.
vii . 31 .
6. ista, cf. 1 , 4, N. - puerilia, some read sed before puerilia.
respiciat, subj. after dignum , M. 363 b ; H. 503,2 ; B. & M. 921 ;
A. & G. 320 f.-- operi suo, the universe, the works of the Cre
ator, towards which his attention is always directed . - ecce par
deo dignum, behold a pair of champions worthy the attention of a
god . - conpositus, paired , matched, a common expression with ref
erence to gladiators.—quam ut spectet, subj. is used with com
par. after quam qui, quam ut, when the degree is defined and
modified by a sentence iniplying an innate quality and conse
quence, Z. 560 ; A. & G. 320 c ; H. 49, 62. — Catonem , Cato the
younger, a man of many noble qualities. See Class. Dict. — parti.
bus . . . fractis, alluding to the defeat of Pompey and the re
publicans at Pharsalia, and the final overthrow in Africa.
7. Licet, cf. § 3, N.-inquit, i. e. Cato. His soliloquy extends to
the middle of the next section, quam vitam . — concesserint, cus .
todiantur ... obsideat, subj. after licet, H. 515, III. ; B. & M. 1282.
204 NOTES .

8. Petreius et Iuba : Petreius was a Roman general at the

battle of Thapsus ( B.C. 46), when the Pompeian party suffered
their final defeat. Iuba was son of Hiempsal, the restored king
of Numidia, a supporter of Pompey. When he heard of the
death of Cato, it is said that he turned his sword upon Petreius,
who had been the companion of his flight, and then despatched
himself. Seneca makes his death to have occurred previous to
that of Cato, but other writers give it as above stated . — fati
conventio, a compact between them, super fato, about or in re
gard to their fate, Lips. Cf. De Ira, iii. 26, 4. - nostram , i. e. em
phatically, for meam , referring to Cato's dignity and loftiness of
soul.— mihi, i. e. Seneca . - studia ... tractat: it is said by Plu
tarch that he read the Phaedo of Plato, on the immortality of the
soul. — contaminaretur, cf. § 6, note on respiciat.
9. revocata : in the games and gladiatorial shows and stage
plays, one who had approved himself to the people was frequently
recalled . — difficiliore parte, etc. The gladiator who had ac
quitted himself well before the people was then matched with a
more robust antagonist. – inicitur, i. e. injicitur. The prevailing
spelling now is, in compounds of jaceo, to drop the j after the
preposition ; cf. § 2, obiciuntur. - repetitur, alluding to the cir
cumstances of Cato's death. After having stabbed himself in the
breast, his wounds were dressed by his friends; when, however,
he recovered consciousness, he sought death a second time by
tearing off the bandages, and letting his entrails protrude. — tam
claro ... exitu . The Stoic doctrine of suicide is often extolled
by Seneca ; yet, with a sort of happy inconsistency, he sometimes
shows that he appreciates the value and sacredness of human
life by injunctions hardly compatible with the usual Stoic doc
trine. Cf. Epist. 47, 9, 10, etc. Suicide, it is to be borne in mind,
is at best but a cowardly thing ; and the Stoic's praise of it
shows what a compound of pride and audacity that philosophy
is which teaches that self-murder is a glorious thing, and to be
imitated by all who so choose .

III. - 1. procedente oratione, in the process of my discourse. —

pro ipsis, for the good of those very persons ; cf. Heb. xii. 11.
adiciam , cf. 2, 9, note, inicitur . - persuadebo, etc. This last propo
 DE PROVIDENTIA . III. 2-6 . 205

sition is not taken up at the close of the discourse. Through

some mishap, it seems not to have survived the ravages of time.
2. proici, cf. 2, 9, n.—deduci : Lips. (with whom H. C. Michaelis
agrees) puts a comma after deduci ; this allows liberos to be con
strued with ecferre, and the wise man is thus represented as mani
festing his greatness of mind under the severest trials — poverty
and the loss of wife and children . - ignominia, cf. De Ira, i. 16, 2.
-radi ossa, i. e. with the scalpel. - legi, cf. in capite lecta ossa
(sunt) , De Benef. v. 24, 3. - extrahi venas : a learned writer, in
reference to this passage, says that in certain diseases, as varix or
a dilated vein, the veins were taken out ; but it is probable, as
Lips. holds, that the expression is used, by metonymy, for extrac
tion of blood from the veins. Cf. Celsus, De Medicina, vii. 31.
3. Demetrii : Demetrius of Sunium, a Cynic philosopher, and
pupil of the sophist Rhodius. He became distinguished as a
teacher of this philosophy at Corinth. He lived during the
reigns of the emperors Caligula to Domitian inclusive, and was
banished from Rome because of the freedom with which he re
proved men in power and office. Cf. Tacitus, Ann. 16, 34 ; De
Benef. vii. 8, 2.—Nihil, etc.: a similar saying of Bias, one of the
seven sages, is recorded : čleyev åtuxõ Tòv åtuxiav uni qépovra.
Ut ... fluxerint ... ut,although , etc .; ut takes this meaning
from a suppositional force ,“ even if we suppose the case.” For
subj., cf. A. & G. 266 c ; M. 440 a, Obs. 4 ; H. 515, III. ; B. & M.
1283.—male, unfavorably, or badly. — vinceretur, for sulj., cf. 2, 6,
N. respiciat. - quasi dicat : the words of fortuna extend from quid
ergo to vinci parato. — 4 . quemque, cf. 2, 2, N. quisque.
5. Mucio : C. Mucius Scaevola, who, having been threatened
with burning by king Porsenna during his siege of Rome (B.C.
507) , thrust his right hand into the fire, and let it burn without
flinching. He received the name of Scaevola, or left-handed ,
from this circumstance ; vid. Livy, ii. 12, 13 ; Plutarch's Publicola ;
Epist. 66, 51 , 53. – Fabricio, vid. Plutarch's Pyrrhus, and Class.
Dict.; cf. also $ 9, n. tormenti.--Rutilio : P. Rutilius Rufus, a Ro
man statesman and orator, who was unjustly banished ( B.C. 92)
on a charge of malversation ; vid. Livy, Epit. lib. lxx.; Valerius
Maximus, ii. 10. - regem , i. e. Porsenna.—exusta, sc. manu .
6. quod rus suum .
fodit ? because he cultivated his land
206 NOTES.

while not engaged in public duties ! -- tam . quam , often to be

used in inverted order ; hence here read as if written, tam cum
divitiis quam cum Pyrrho. Cf. De Ira, i. 12, 4. — cum divitiis, cf.
Epist. 120, 6. - triumphalis senex, alluding to his victory over
the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians, B.C. 282 ; cf. Pliny, Nat.
Hist. xviii. 3.-aucupia, i. e. aves captas, by metonymy, abstract
for concrete. — esset, si ... congereret ? In conditional sen
tences when does the impf. subj. refer to past time ? A. & G. 308 a ;
H. 510 note 2. —si ... erigerit, if hehad stimulated the weakness,
etc.; cf. Nat. Quaest. iv. 13, 7. —-pomorum strue . . . feras, etc.
Reference is especially to the boar, which was generally the
chief dish of a grand coena . It was brought whole to the table,
and placed in the centre, with fruits, vegetables, and other dishes
surrounding. The cooking of the boar was an expensive affair.
Cf. Becker's “ Gallus,” p. 133 ; Guhl & Koner's “ The Life of the
Greeks and Romans,” p. 504 ; Hor. Sat. ii. 8, 6–9. - pomorum =
obsoniorum .
7. qui illum damnaverunt. The equestrian order, who were
both the farmers of the revenue and sole judges in criminal cases,
accused and condemned Rutilius, because, while legatus, he had
incurred their hostility by his efforts towards repressing their
extortion in the province ofAsia. — causam ... seculis, i. e. shall
never be acquitted of injustice . - sibi exilium , sc. eripi. He re
fused to return to Rome at the invitation of Sulla .-- solus aliquid,
cf. Epist. 24, 4.-sed longius fugit ? He first retired to Mitylene,
and afterwards to Smyrna. - inquit, i. e. Rutilius, whose answer
to Sulla extends to the end of the section . - felicitas, a play on
the word, from the cognomen Felix, in which Sulla especially
delighted . - Servilianum lacum , a place contiguous to the Ba
silica Julia, near the forum , where many of those proscribed by
Sulla were slain, and their heads exposed . - spoliarium , cf. Epist.
93, 12.-vagantis, i. e. vagantes ; more recent orthography adopts
the termination tis for tes . - multa milia, seven thousand , says
Seneca, De Clem . i. 12, 2. Cf. Plutarch's Sulla. - post fidem , after
a pledge of protection had been given . - per ipsam fidem , he had
induced them, after surrendering, to come without arms.
8. gladio submovetur : Sulla was accompanied, not by the
lictors with their rods, but by a body-guard of soldiers with
 DE PROVIDENTIA . III. 8, 9. 207

their swords. - pretium caedis : two talents for each of the pro
scribed, according to Plutarch. A talent was worth about $1200.
- per quaestorem ... numerat, i. e. he caused the reward to
be paid from the public treasury. The number slaughtered is
not accurately known, but it probably amounted to many thou
sands.- legem Corneliam : the lex de sicariis et veneficis was en
acted B.c. 82. One of its provisions was against a magistratus
or senator who conspired in order that a person might be con
demned in a judicium publicum , etc. The punishment inflicted
by this law upon the convicted offender was, according to some,
interdictio aquae et ignis ; according to others, deportatio in insu
lam et bonorum ademtio. Cf. Dict. Antiq . - tulit: towards the
close of B.C. 81 Sulla was appointed dictator. It was while he
was absolute master of the Roman world that the horrors of the
proscriptio occurred . - clavi, cf. DeTranq. 15, 7. — volneri: writers
of the silver age frequently employ effect for cause, volnus here
being used for clavi volnerantes by metonymy. Tacitus has a
similar expression, volnera dirigebant, i. e. tela volnerantia ( Hist.
ii. 35). Cf. Virgil, Aeneid, x. 140.
9. tormenti : on this story of Regulus, Mommsen remarks :
“ Nothing is known with certainty as to the end of Regulus ;
even his mission to Rome - which is sometimes placed in B.C.
503, sometimes in 513 — is very imperfectly attested. The later
Romans, who sought in the fortunes and misfortunes of their
forefathers mere materials for school themes, made Regulus the
type of heroic misfortune, as they made Fabricius the type of
heroic poverty, and circulated a number of anecdotes, invented
by way of due accompaniment in his name— incongruous embel
lishments, contrasting ill with serious and sober history ” (“ Hist.
ofRome, ” ii. 59).-quam non poeniteat, how far he is from repent
ing. — eamdem sententiam dicet, i. e. that prisoners should not
be exchanged with the Carthaginians, although he was a prison
er himself. — Maecenatem , the minister and friend of Augustus,
the patron of Virgil and Horace, etc.; vid. Class. Dict . — cul :
post-Aug. writers use almost any form of the passive with the
dat. of the agent, instead of the ablat, with ab ; with this differ
ence, however, that the dat., with the present tense, denotes that
the action is done for the interest of the agent; with the perf.
208 NOTES .

and pluperf., that it exists for him as completed. Cf. H. 388, 2,

3 ; B. & M. 845 ; M. 250 a ; A. & S. 127 c.—uxoris : Terentia, the
wife of Maecenas, was said to have been the favorite mistress of
Augustus, and consequently to have caused serious coldness be
tween the emperor and her husband. Notwithstanding her infi
delity and looseness of morals, Maecenas continued deeply enam
oured with her until his death. Her temper was morose, and
frequent quarrels occurred ; but they seldom lasted long, owing
to Maecenas's passionate fondness for her. These numerous
petty quarrels and reconciliations drew from Seneca ( Epist. 114,
6) the remark, that Maecenas married a wife a thousand times,
though he never had but one. - aquarum fragoribus, the noise
(pleasing, of course) of water, admitted, according to Lipsius, by
some device into their very sleeping apartments. Seneca fre
quently refers to ponds and channels of water in the houses of
wealthy and luxurious Romans ; as in Nat. Quaest. iii. 17, 2 :
“fishes swim in the chamber, and under the very table fish are
taken, that are immediately dressed and served.” Cf. Epist. 100,
and De Tranq. 1, 5, N. aquas, etc. - ille, i. e. Regulus.—ad causam
. . respicit, submissively he has respect to the cause of his suffer
ings.
10. Non usque eo, not to 80 great an extent.-- audeat, for subj.,
cf. H. 501 , I.; B. & M. 1218, 1227 ; A. & G. 320 a . — iste, cf. 1 , 4,
N. ista.— taceat,for subj. with licet, cf. 2, 3, N. - paulatim frigore
inducto, i. e. from his extremities upwards; cf. the Phaedo of
Plato at its close.—11 . Quanto . . . est, etc., how much is he to
be envied, etc.- illis, sc. invidendum est. - gemma, vessels and
drinking -cups ornamented with precious stones and gold were
quite frequent. Cf. Becker's “ Gallus,” p. 29 ; Gubl & Koner's
“ The Life of the Greeks and Romans,” p. 451 ; De Benef. vii. 9,
3. - ministratur, impers. In earlier Latin the pers. construction
would be preferred, qui ministrantur . - quibus, dat., cf. De Brev.
Vit. 17, 1 , n . fortunae. - exoletus, said of beautiful, full - grown
youths devoted to that shocking form of prostitution alluded to
by St. Paul, Rom. i. 27. Cf. Martial, Epig. iii. 82, 5, etc. Plautus
uses the term scortum exoletum , a male prostitute. - auro = aureo
poculo by metonymy, a golden cup.-nivem diluit, snow is here said
to be mixed with wine, instead of (as in English ) wine with snow .
 DE PROVIDENTIA . III. 11 - IV . 3. 209

Cf. Epist. 78, 23 : “ O unhappy rich man ! Wherefore ? Because

he mixes not snow with his wine."—vomitu, referring to the dis
gusting practice of eating and drinking to excess, then vomiting,
and then beginning again their gluttony . - Quod ad Catonem
pertinet, as touching Cato ; literally, that which pertains to Cato.
rerum natura, i. e. the deus of the Stoics ; cf. Zeller's “ Stoics,
Epicureans, and Sceptics, " pp. 147-149.-- collideret, subj. of pur
pose, H. 497 ; B. & M. 1212.
12. Inimicitiae, etc. These words, to the end of the section,
are supposed to be uttered by natura, i. e. deus (as above).
Vatinio : P. Vatinius, a leading tool of the triumvirate in the
party strifes of the last days of the republic. Possessed of no
principle, he sold his services to Caesar, when he was tribune of
the people, B.c. 59. Six years later, through the combined influ
ence of the triumvirs, he was chosen praetor instead of Cato. In
personal appearance he was forbidding and repulsive, and Cicero,
alluding to this fact, called him struma civitatis. Cf. Class. Dict.
--sibi manus adferre ? cf. 2, 9, n. on suicide of Cato.--conse
quar ? what shall I (deus) effect by these things ?—quibus, depend
ent on dignum ; cf. H. 421 , III.; B. & M. 919.

IV.-1 . vilia ingenia, mean abilities or loro station , such as are

not worthy of trials, which belong only to the great, according
to Seneca.- calamitates,cf.Virg. Georg. ii. 491 , 2. - morsu animi,
vexation of mind. -- ignorare est, Z. 597.-- rerum . . . partem ,
another part of nature, i. e. the other side of human life, viz, suf
fering. It is intimated that nature consists of diversities — joys,
sorrows, etc.-- 2 . Olympia, the Olympic games, the greatest na
tional festival of the Greeks, celebrated at Olympia in Elis. Vid.
Class. Dict.—sed nemo praeter te, a good illustration of Seneca's
conciseness of style ; cf. 3, 9, refice (tu) illum et mitte, instead of,
si reficias illum et si mittas, etc.-- coronam , the olive wreath, the
prize in the Olympic games. - una, Lips. proposes vivam . — osten .
deret, subj. in relative clause ; cf. 3, 11 , N. collideret.
3. Miserum ... miser : cf. 3, 3, and N. on Demetrius and his
saying.-potueris, sc. facere. - ne tu quidem ipse, sc . scies quid
potueris, you will not even know yourself, etc. Ipse is attached to
the nom. when it is intended to express what the subject itself
210 NOTES.

does, but it is attached to the pers. or reflex pron. when it is in

dicated that the action is exerted upon the subject, and not on
other persons. Cf. M. 489, obs. 2 b ; Arnold's Latin Prose Comp.
368 b .-— ad notitiam : observe the exceptional use of ad with a
noun to express purpose, a usage not allowed in earlier Latin ;
cf. M. 242, obs. 3. - quid quisque didicit, freely, no man has
ever learned his own powers except by trial. - nisi, often joined to
negatives in sense of but or except, M. 442, obs. 2. — virtuti: ob
serve prolepsis in position and construction of this word.
4. Gaudent, etc. Lips. quotes from Stobaeus the words of
Diogenes the Cynic, who, having fallen into certain troubles, ex
claimed , “ Well done, O Fortune! thou hast treated me like a
man,” and he sang and rejoiced. -- inquam . Seneca quite fre
quently introduces this word to give additional force to an asser
tion ; cf. Epist. 90, 27. — milites.bellis triumphant. Haase reads,
milites bellis : Triumphum , connecting the last word with the fol
lowing sentence ; it is then a proper name. - murmillonem
querentem . Lips. gives, from the dissertations on Epictetus, bk. i.,
a statement that there were some among the gladiators of Caesar
who were incensed because they were never matched with foes
equal to them .-- Avida = audax, Lips.--meliori casu , some prefer
causa , but it may be explained clementiore fortuna, to which it is
due that the wounds are not deadly ; cf. Virg . Aeneid, xii. 179,
296.— licet, although , rarely used by good writers as a conjunc.,
but more frequently with its verbal permissive sense ; cf. M. 361,
obs. 1 ; also 2, 3, n.
5. Ipsis . . . consulit, cf. Z. 414. - inquam , cf. n. above, $ 4.
quam , with superl., cf. B. & M. 1003. — ad quam rem , for the ac
complishment of which ; cf. g 3, N. ad notitiam . - si divitiis diffluis ?
This was a nice question for Seneca himself, who was enormously
rich . See INTRODUCTION, P. 21 ; De Vit. Beat, 17, 1, N .; 21 , 3, N.
Unde possum scire, quantum , etc. H. C. Michaelis characterizes
the repetition, possum scire, as unworthy of Seneca's vigor and
elegance of style ; he thinks the repeated words should be omit
ted. Cf. De Benef. iv. 6, 3. -- populare = popularium , associates,
compatriots, etc.--- sequitur,is accustomed to follow. — 6. si ...
vides ? if you always see those whom you have begotten ; cf. Dict.
Antiq. on this subject.- quis, for aliquis ; cf. Z. 708 .-- tranquilli.
 DE PROVIDENTIA . IV. 7-10. 211

tas iners = malacia, a dead calm , in allusion to the detention of

a ship by a calm.
7. inciderit, fut. perf. - grave est, etc. Lips. reads, grave est
tenerae cervici iugum; and Pincian, grave estferre teneris cervicibus
iugum . - venturis malis, evils yet to come. - sua, one's own.--8. di
latus est, is deferred, a reference to the postponement of gladia
torial shows, or the appearance of a particular gladiator, not a
release or dismissal from service . - aut luctu : Fickert omits these
words, which, on the whole, we have thought best, with Haase,
to retain . - qui ... adgrediantur ... explorent ... deiciant,
why subj. ? cf. 3, 11, N. collideret. - deiciant = dejiciant ; cf. 2, 9,
N. inicitur. — quia ... imperantur: some read quare for quia,
making the sentence interrogative. — Male ... meruit, the gen
eral has not treated me ill. - permadescunt, cf. Epist. 20, 11 ; also
Plautus (Mostellaria, i. 2, 63), who uses the same figure in refer
ence to love. — nisi aliquid intervenit quod ... admoneat,un
less something happen to admonish of the human condition, i. e. the
state of human life.
11 ;
9. Quem, relat. to hunc, below . - specularia, cf. Epist. 86,
Juv. Sat. iv. 20. — parietibus circumfusus : a reference to hot-air
pipes encased in the walls, by means of which heat was conveyed
through the houses. In Seneca's time the use of hot-air or vapor
baths was also quite frequent. Cf. Balneae, Dict. Antiq.; also
Epist. 86, where Seneca pours out his indignant contempt upon
the luxury of the times. - excesserunt modum : observe use of
the perf. to denote what is always true. In such cases the action
of the subordinate is generally supposed to be antecedent to that
of the principal sentence ; cf. M. 335 b, obs. 1. — felicitatis in
temperantia, unlimited prosperity.
10. advocata virtute : Lips. and others read, quae advocat ad
virtutem . - Lenior ieiunio mors est : a disputed passage. Lips.
would insert e before ieiunio, and prefers levior to lenior. He
holds that the meaning is, that death is rendered comparatively
easy after long fasting and abstinence, such as Atticus and oth
ers practised. In our text ieiunio is an ablat. of means. - cru
ditate dissiliunt : reference seems to be to the latter part of
the comparison above, infinitis . . . rumpi : dissiliunt, post
Aug., sc.aegri, or dyspeptics. - Numquid, cf. M. 451 b ; H. 351,
212 NOTES .

patres adhortantur, etc. Tertullian ( Ad Martyras, 3) bears wit

ness to this fact even in his day.—ut ... perferant ... perse
verent : on the use of utwith subj., or of the infin ., cf. Z. 615, 616 ;
M. 389.- volnera praebere volneribus, to receive wounds upon
wounds, i. e. to offer for new wounds the already lacerated flesh .
The Spartan boys were taken to the altar of Artemis Orthia to
receive the customary diapaotiywols, or severe flogging, which
was so terrible at times as to draw much blood, and even cause
death ; cf. Cic. Tusc. Disp. ii. 14.
11. patimur : Haase and others read patiamur. – Solidissima
corporis pars, etc. So the proverb of Hippocrates, civnois yap
Kpatúvel, åpyin dè týkel. — Praebendi: on the gerundive with sum ,
cf. M. 420. — faciat, v. 1. faciet. — contemptum , post-Aug.; cf. De
Tranq. 11 , 4.—ad excutienda tela : it is said that the ancient
veterans acquired such skill as to hurl their weapons with a force
and to a distance almost incredible. — quoque : difference be
tween quoque and quoque ? cf. M. 495, 471 ; Z. 355.–12. Ro
mana pax = Roman empire.- Istrum , or the lower part of the
Danube . — gentium , i. e. the nations beyond the rule and limits
of the empire. — Perpetua hiems, etc., a view far from correct as
to the Germans, but nearer the truth in respect to the remote
Scythians ; vid. Tacitus, Germania . - culmo, vid. Lexicon, under
columen.- in alimentum : observe use of in to express purpose.
13. Nulla illis domicilia : the Germans indeed had no fixed
residences or towns ; nevertheless they possessed homes, though
they exchanged lands yearly, as Caesar states concerning the Suevi
( Bell. Gall. iv. 1) ; cf. also Tacitus, Germania .-- in diem, referring
to the Sarmatians, etc.-et hic, used similarly to et is, for more
precise and emphatic definition , M. 484 c. — intecta corpora :
Caesar says that the Germans used skins for clothing, but that
the greater part of the body was naked ; cf. Tac. Germania, 17.—
14. nisi : after a negative proposition, nisi introduces an excep
tion ; cf. M. 442, obs. 3 ; also n. 9 3.

1.-1 . Adice nunc, quod : this is the usual formula of Seneca

when he begins a new argument ; cf. De Const. Sap. 9, 2 ; De Otio
Sap. 32, 17 ; De Vit. Beat.7,1 : adice = adjice,cf. 2, 9, N.- optimum
quemque, all the best. The sing. of quisque with superl. is gener
 DE PROVIDENTIA . V. 1-3. 213

ally used for plur, when the noun is not expressed ; cf. M. 495.
ut ita dicam, so to speak or say. — militare, be soldiers. — edere
operas, do service ; cf. 2,7 ; Epist. 29, 6. Good men perform good
service for others by endurance of affliction. - tribuerit ... in.
rogaverit : these words are in contrast in meaning ; the former
signifies, to bestow some good ; the latter, to impose or inflict
some evil.- Appius : Appius Claudius, surnamed Caecus, because
he became blind in his old age, was censor B.C. 312. The most
enduring monuments of his censorship were the Appian Way to
Capua, and the Appian Aqueduct. By his earnest eloquence he
persuaded the senate to refuse the terms of peace offered by Pyr
rhus ; vid. Livy, ix. 29 ; Cic. De Senec. 6.—Metellus : L. Metellus
Pontifex, twice consul, dictator B.c. 205, and active in the war
with Hannibal. He lost his eyes at the burning of the temple
of Vesta ; cf. De Brev. Vit. 14, 2 ; Pliny, Nat.Hist. vii. 45.
2. Elius, some vile character, of whom there is no mention
elsewhere . -cum in templis consecraverint: Seneca also says,
pecunia in templis sacrata, not as a divinity probably, but as a
votive offering of gold and silver. Images also of gods and god
desses, made of precious metals, were consecrated in temples.
Augustine holds that pecunia was a goddess ( De Civitate Dei, iv.
21,5) . - traducere ,to expose to contempt and ridicule . - At iniquum :
an objector is supposed to complain of the injustice of the pros
perity of evil men and the afflictions of good men.—constringi.
Lips. prefers configi, on the ground that adligari immediately fol
lowing is similar to constringi. — 3. Quid porro ? What then ? –
fortes viros ... volneribus : for severity of Roman military life,
see Dict. Antiq. and 4, 4, N. - praecisos = lascivious. In post-Aug.
writers praecisus usually means castrated ; some read percisos,
which refers to a horrible pollution among the heathen . - nobilis .
simas virgines vestales. — consulitur, is in council. campo =
-

Campus Martius.- in hac magna republica, in this great republic

of humanity, or the world at large.- inpendunt: operam , curas,
ingenium , inpendunt ; so Cic. in Verr. ii. 30, 68.- inpenduntur,
i.e. the good not only devote their all to others, but suffer them
selves, and are even destroyed ; cf. Cons. ad Helv. 16, 17 ; also Ter
tullian, Apol. 44, concerning the slaughter of the Christians under
the sanction of the state.
K
214 NOTES .

4. Hanc . . . vocem , this speech. — Demetrii, probably Deme

trius of Sunium ; cf. 3, 3, N. - totum , i. e. totum corporis. — nullam
moram faciam , etc., I will not delay you at allfrom receiving back
what you have given . - maluissem offerre quam tradere : a clear
intimation of Stoic teaching concerning suicide, following which is
the paradoxical doctrineabout destiny.—opus fuit: with opus est
the thing needed may be an infin ., or an accus. with infin .; H.421,
notes 1 & 2; B. & M.927.-accipere potuistis,i.e.by commanding it.
-retinenti, v. l. renitenti.- dicta lege, by a fixed law , i. e. of fate.
-5. prima nascentium hora disposuit: cf. the sentiment of Ma
nilian, nascentes morimur, finisque ab origine pendet. - veniunt, i.e.
events are not merely the result of chance, but take place in ac
cordance with an immutable decree . — 6 . ad hoc parati sumus,
for this we were destined . Michaelis -suggests parati simus, as
more suitable to the context, and the question, quid itaque ? pa
rati, will then have the ordinary meaning, prepared or ready.-
Quicquid est quod, etc. The following thought contains the
substance of the Stoic paradox, in which the First Cause is repre
sented as subject to secondary causes. Seneca's teaching in other
places quite closely resembles Christian doctrine on this point.
scripsit: in accordance with the fancy that Jupiter dictated his
decrees to the fates for them to record .
7. Non potest . . . materiam : it was a Stoic dogma that the
origin of evils is in matter itself; cf. Lips. in his “ Physiol. Stoic ."
i. Dissert. 14, where he treats of this subject at large; also Zeller's
“ Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics,” p. 181, note. - artifex, i. e. the
Stoic deus or ratio. — haec passa est : cf. on this teaching of the
Stoics, Epist. 65, 2 ; Nat. Quaest. i. ( prolog .) 2, 3 ; Diog. Laert. vii.
134 : haec, Haase reads hoc. — elementis, cf. De Ira, ii. 18, 19. — ut
efficiatur ... dicendus, to produce a man who must be mentioned
with consideration . - fortiore fato opus est : antithetic to the
thought above, languida . . . inertibus, etc. To make the an
tithesis complete, the fortius fatum must be regarded as belong
ing to acrioribus elementis, or as arising from them ; Lips. - eat,
subj. after oportet, without ut ; when used to signify duty, oportet
always has accus. with infin .; M. 373, obs. 1.
8. quae, antecedent ea , understood = talia . — illi, i. e. virtus ;
dat.with gerundive, H.388 ; B. & M. 1310. – Ardua prima via est,
 DE PROVIDENTIA . V. 8, 9. 215

etc. This comparison respecting the difficult course of virtue is

drawn from Ovid, Metamorph. ii. 63, etc. Sol is endeavoring to
dissuade the impetuous Phaëthon from his desire to drive the
chariot of the sun, by depicting the dangers and difficulties of
the undertaking. We give the passage in verse by Dr. Lodge,
of London (translator of Seneca's Works, 1614 ), rather for its
novelty than accuracy or poetic merit:
“The first which with unwearied steeds I clime,
Is such a iourney, that their ceaseless toyle
Can scarcely reach before the morrowes prime ;
The next is highest heau'n, from whence the soyle
And spacious seas, I see with dreadfull eye
And fearefull heart ; the next whereto I hie,
Is steep and prone, and craues a cunning guide ;
And then doth TheTis shake herselfe for dread,
Lest headlong I should fall and downward glide,
And burie in her waues my golden head."

-recentes, fresh, because of rest during the night. – Enituntur,

labor up. — pavida, the effect which formido produces. — mode
ramine certo, steady guidance.— Tethys, put for the sea . She
was the wife of Oceanus and mother of the Oceanides. The sea
seems to receive the sun when setting, and the sun seems to
emerge from it when rising ; hence the poet says, Tethys received
Sol in the evening, and opened the gates for him in the morning.
9. Haec cum ... casuro : these are Seneca's words, not the
poet's ; so, after the next quotation, the interpretation and use
made of the lines are from Seneca . — casuro, concessive, though
about to fall, i. e. though I may or shall fall, I care not, provided
I may go over such a course . — escendo, cf. 1, 6, N. — Utque viam ,
etc.: we quote Dr. Lodge again :
" And that thou mayst continue in the way,
Be carefull lest thy posting Steeds doe stray ;
Yet shalt thon passe by Taurus, who will bend
His hornes to crosse thee, whither thou dost tend ;
Th Aenomian Archer and the Lion fell
Shall stay thy course and fright thee where they dwell .”

-Utque, although. — adversi, opposite. - tauri, a sign of the zodiac.

Ovid generally prefers vacca to taurus. — violenti, so used because
the sun, on entering the constellation Leo, is more violent in its
heat. - humilis et inertis est, etc., it is the part of an ignoble and
weak mind, etc.
216 NOTES .

VI.-1 . Quare tamen, etc.: still, the question comes up again,

why does the deity ? etc. Seneca now takes the ground that there
are no evils but vices ; hence it follows that the virtuous do not
suffer evils, since that name does not properly belong to afflic
tions and the like.—Omnia mala, i. e. evils such as he would call
real, like crimes, wicked thoughts, and others which he proceeds
to enumerate. — avida consilia, cf. De Brev. Vit. 3, 3. Reference
here is undoubtedly to ambition, and other like desires, since
avaritia follows so closely.—ut ... servet ? that he should also
give heed to the burden of good men , i. e. their external condition ,
whether wealth and honors, or troubles, griefs, and cares. Seneca
certainly had not yet fully grasped the Christian idea.-sarcinas,
the baggage which the camp slave, calo, bore. He asks, should
god be made to do the work of a slave ?-Democritus . pro
jecit : the celebrated Eleatic philosopher of Abdera ( flor. B.C.
460) inherited from his father a large property (100 talents, or
more than $100,000) , and assigned it to his brother ; Lips. But
the truth probably is that he expended it in extensive travel and
study, as he died in great poverty.-miraris si, cf. A. & G. 199 c.
2. occidant ? sc. illos, as Brutus, Manlius Torquatus, and oth
ers ; some read , et ipsi occidant. - repetituri, fut. part. expressing
intention, H. 549, 3 ; B. & M. 1355 ; A. & G. 333 r.—cum
adferant ? the Stoic assumption repeated, that a good man may
commit suicide ; cf. 2, 8, n. at the end.-in exemplar: observe
use of in with accus. to denote end or purpose.—3. Quid habetis
quod, etc., what cause have you to complain ? etc.; cf. Z. 562.
possitis, emphatic position . — Isti ... adspicitis, those whom you
admire for their felicity ; some render, those whom you look ирот
as fortunate. — ad similitudinem ... culti, after the similitude
of their own walls adorned on the outside. Compare our Lord's
denunciation of the Pharisees : “ Woe unto you, scribes and Phari
sees, hypocrites ! for ye make clean the outside of the cup and
of the platter, but within they are full of extortion and excess .
“ Ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear
beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and
of all uncleanness ” (Matt. xxiii. 25, 27).— crusta, the inlaid work
on walls, as of variegated marble.
4. ad arbitrium ostendi, i. e. only so much of their real char
 DE PROVIDENTIA. VI. 4-8. 217

acter can be exposed as they will, or they can appear to men as

they themselves will . — alienus splendor absconderit , for subj.,
cf. H. 529, 1. ; B. & M. 1182 ; A. & G. 334.-meliora maioraque :
supply videbuntur, and tanto, correlative of quanto. — Permisi ...
contemnere : later writers and poets, after permitto with the dat.,
also have an infin . Earlier writers always used ut with subj.;
M. 396, obs. 1. - introrsus, opposed to extrinsecus ; cf. De Tranq.
10. — mundus, cf. Ueberweg's “ Hist. of Philosophy,” i. 194 : “ Since
the world ,as a whole, ... is deity,” etc. — exteriora ,ubi vacuum
infinitum ( Lips.), where all is emptiness and void .
5. toleratu, on supine in u, cf. M. 412.—Quia non poteram,
etc. Again the deity is made subject to secondary causes ; cf. 5,
6, N.—deum antecedatis : Lips. charges Seneca with either folly
or presumption ; and, looked at from the Christian standpoint,
such language is the height of arrogance and folly. The usual
Stoic doctrine was that their model wise man “ is king and lord ,
and is inferior in inner worth to no other rational being, not even
to Zeus himself ” (Ueberweg, i. 198). Seneca here, however, seems
plainly to go much farther; cf. De Tranq. 7, 2, N.-solvet, sc. vos
or nos. — finit, i. e. on the supposition that the soul perishes. The
alternative is expressed by transfert. — feriret, subj. of purpose,
M. 355 .
6. patet exitus : the power of death is placed in the hands
of man-an intimation, thought the Stoics, that it was honorable
and praiseworthy to take one's own life, under circumstances of
great trial, rather than submit to dishonor and disgrace. Cato
at Utica was their favorite illustration and exemplar. In this
way was ignored entirely the momentous truth that God alone is
the dispenser of life and death . — Prono . . . loco = a declivity ;
why is prep . omitted before loco ? cf. H. 425, 11. 2 ; M. 273 b . - tra
hitur : Lips. conjectures traditur, as more consistent, since life is
voluntarily surrendered . - libertatem , cf. De Ira, iii. 15, 4.-- in
trantibus, i. e. in lucem , in vitam.
7. quam ... inpingere,i.e. direct against her her own gift,
as when we throw away life . - mortem condiscite, learn death
well, learn how to die at any moment.-- commissura, the joint or
knot . - 8 . in proximo, close at hand, next door. - mori: on this use
of infin ., cf. Z. 597, 598. - quam : the latter term or part of the
218 NOTES .

comparison is omitted ; it may be rendered thus, than is requisite

in order that 80 great swiftness may be perceived . - haustus ignis:
Portia, the wife of Brutus, who joined in killing Julius Caesar, is
said to have destroyed herself by swallowing live coals when she
had learned of her husband's death Philippi. It is quite pos
sible that she inhaled carbonic - acid gas from a charcoal fire, a
favorite and frequent means of self-destruction among the Ro
mans. The allusion in the text may be to this. Cf. Plutarch's
Cato and Brutus.
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI.
ARGUMENTUM . — I. Serenus is represented as addressing a letter to
Seneca, in which he sets forth that he is in an unquiet, morose, and
vacillating condition of mind. He states (somewhat confusedly, as
Lips. thinks) why he is in this trouble of mind : he points out that he
is disquieted and uneasy by being in the midst of luxury and splendor
at the imperial court ; and he avers that he does not know where to
look for repose - whether in the enjoyment of wealth or the practice of
frugality, whether in public life, private retirement, study, or the like.
II. Seneca answers Serenus. He endeavors to persuade him to have con
fidence in himself, to stand firm , and to acquire for himself tranquillity
of mind. Then he promises to point out how it can be reached, the
effect and origin of it being first set forth . III. Against this taedium
( which he considers a disease) he counsels Serenus to bear in mind that
one of the best remedies is activity and taking a share in public affairs,
at least the mingling ease with activity ; if we fall upon more turbulent
times, we must not refuse this duty ; Socrates quoted, as an illustration .
IV. , V. , VI. It is necessary before all things for us, entering upon busi
ness, to know ourselves, then business, then men , for the sake of or
with whom we are to act or labor. Our own strength is to be duly es
timated, what it is, and how far we may go ; then, in business or active
life, we must consider whether we are equal to the work to be done ;
and, further, whether men are worthy our toil and expenditure of time.
VII. , VIII. Moreover, it helps to tranquillity of mind to have faithful
and pleasant friendships; morose, sad-tempered, and fault-finding friends
are to be shunned. Other things, too, hinder our gaining ease ofmind ;
such as our patrimony, which, if moderate, suffices for virtue and quiet
ness of life - if large, hinders both . A moderate fortune is esteemed the
best. IX. True riches are acquired only by frugality and continence ;
therefore luxury is to be resisted, even in useful, profitable matters,
such as a library, books, etc. X. Then, too, trouble is to be put up
with, lest it injure tranquillity ; for every man has his troubles, which
are softened and overcome by labor and custom , as well as by the sight
of another's lot worse than our own . Pleasures are detrimental to
every kind of life, and desires, ever near by and at our very feet, cannot
be banished. XI. Next follows a discussion of equanimity and con
stancy of a wise man . Such a one despises death, or regards it as in
different. Nothing happens or can happen to him unaware ; so death
does not come unexpectedly ; neither does he anticipate the evil or the
good in the future. Examples of illustrious and good men given.
220 NOTES.

XII. , XIII ., XIV. , XV. In superfluous matters we must not toil, nor be
too busy in other people's concerns. One ready to do much must con.
sider the inconstancy of affairs, and avoid levity, etc. , so as to preserve
tranquillity. Hatred of the human race is to be cast aside, and weari
someness avoided. The vanities of men are not to be laughed at or
wept over, but borne with equal mind ; neither are we to be sad at the
loss of our goods. Pretence and anxious watching one's self are not to
be indulged in , and solitude and converse with others are to be pru
dently mingled.

Cap. I.–1 . mihi, i. e. Annaeus Serenus, an intimate and valued

friend of Seneca's. He was praefectus vigilum under Nero, and
died, together with a whole company, from the effects of eating
poisonous fungi. Seneca was much grieved at his death . Cf.
Epist. 63, 14 ; Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 13 ; Pliny, Nat. Hist. xxii. 2, 3.
Seneca : this is the reading now generally approved, though
some bold to Serene. Haase reads retecta (prefixing to cap. I.
the name SERENus in brackets). The earliest ms. is imperfect in
regard to this word, the first two letters only being legible. It
seems most reasonable to regard the author writing as if a letter
had been sent to him by Serenus, in which the latter presents his
complaints, arising out of the position in which he is placed, and
asking for help in the search and striving after ease and content
ment of mind. Probably this treatise was written by Seneca after
his being recalled from exile, through Agrippina's influence, and
his being appointed preceptor to her son Nero.
manu prenderem : a proverbial expression, used of things
definite or plain ; cf. De Benef. vi. 42, 1.—obscuriora et in re
cessu, antithesis to in aperto posita ; a variety of construction not
unusual in Seneca, as also in Livy and Sallust, but more rare in
Tacitus. The words are equivalent to a little more in the back
ground, as in aperto means openly, in the light of day.-vel, even ,
has force of adverb , and enhances the sense of the word modified
by it ; Z. 734.—dixerim, subj. denoting modest affirmation ; M.
350 b.-hostes vagos, i. e. nomadic, as the ancient Numidians and
Scythians, and the modern Arab tribes which roam the desert.
per quos : when a man is the instrument by which anything is
effected, the abl. is rarely used, but generally per with accus.; Z.
455, note. — per quos ... securum , freely, who permit me neither
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. I. 1-3 . 221

to be always on my guard as in war, nor free from apprehension as

in peace : securum , post-Aug. in this sense.— licet, refers to what
is allowed by human laws and usages. It differs from fas, in that
this latter has reference to what is permitted by divine laws and
the higher moral sense. Cf. Doederlein, Lat. Synonyms, p. 43.—
ut, as, in comparisons. - fatear, for subj., cf. H. 484, v .; B. & M.
1180 ; A. & G. 268 ; also, Epist. 53, 8 .--bona fide (sometimes writ
ten exfide bona), honestly, entirely .-- obnoxium , subject or addicted
to the vitia he is speaking of.
2. ut ... ita : in comparisons these words place sentences on
an equality, but this equality is sometimes limited to the result
to which both sentences lead ; so that ut ... ita = although ...
yet ; Z. 726. — Non est, quod dicas, you have no reason to say : for
the subj., cf. H. 503, note 2 ; B. & M. 1229 ; Z. 562, note. — in speci.
em , for appearance' sake ; some prefer the reading in spem . - dico,
I mean = namely, to wit . - quicquid . . . venit, whatever depends
upon the judgment of others. — mora = tempore.— veras vires : as
virtue and all qualities that are sound and noble. -ad placendum,
force of ad with acc. gerund. ? H.544, notes ; B. & M. 1338.-ex.
spectant = require or have need of : donec, until, takes subj. when
a thing is conceived as merely possible, or if purpose is implied ;
when a fact is expressed the indic. is used ; Z. 575 ; H. 519 ; B.
& M. 1238, 1240.- ducat = acquires ; cf. Quintilian, i. 2, 18 ; Hor.
Odes, iii. 27,76.-hoc vitium , i. e. of a wavering and unquiet mind.
3. Tam quam, as well ... as. — amorem induit : some
read moram ; this, however, would destroy the parallelism in
tended between this and the preceding thought. Lips. reads
inducit for induit. Cf. Lucretius, De Rer. Nat. iv. 1283, consue
tudo concinnat amorem . — Haec animi ... ostendere, I cannot
show thee so well at once, as in part, what this infirmity of the
mind is, which vacillates now this way , now that, turning resolutely
neither to the good nor to the bad . - utrumque, plur. in sense, but
when only two per or things are meant rarely put in the
plur.—semel = in full, in detail.- per partes, in part, partly, ad
verbial use, Z. 258, obs. 2 ; cf. Tacitus, Hist. i. 54, 88 ; v. 3 ; Pliny,
Epist. ii. 5. — accidant, an indirect question , H. 529 ; B. & M.
1180. - parsimoniae: when used in plur., ante and post classical.
Here, and in what follows on this subject, Lips. regards Seneca
K 2
222 NOTES .

as speaking concerning himself, and in his own person. He was

a vegetarian in diet, was accustomed to lie on a hard mattress,
and daily went through a course of self -examination . Cf. Epist.
108, 17 ; 98, 13 : De Ira, ii. 36 ; iii. 36. - fateor, followed regularly
by accus. with infin . The indic. tenet shows that the two sen
tences are really distinct declarations : very great love of par
simony possesses me, I confess it. Cf. Virg. Aen. ii. 134.- in ambi.
tionem : in frequently has accus. when it denotes a state of mind
in reference to something, or activity in a certain direction and
with a certain object, as in speciem , above ; M. 230 a . - cubile con
positum , a high couch, spread with colored purple and golden
tapestry, covered with emblems, and resting on golden, ivory,
and silver feet ; cf. Juv. Sat. xi. 94. During the later period of
the republic and the earlier years of the empire, when Asiatic
luxuries were imported into Italy, the richness and magnificence
of the couches of wealthy Romans were almost beyond descrip
tion. The blankets or counterpanes ( vestes stragulae, stragula)
were of very costly material, and generally of purple color, and
embroidered with figures in gold. Cf. Pliny, Nat. Hist. xvi. 43 ;
Cic. in Verr. iv. 12, 26 ; Martial, Epig. ii. 16 ; also, Dict. Antiq.
arcula : this was a chest in which fine clothing and state robes
were kept ; it was also used as a press, Lips. says, to make them
glossy. To this use the words following probably refer, ponderi
bus . expressa.—domestica , sc. vestis. It refers to a garment
worn in the house, of ordinary material, as opposed to forensis
vestis, out-door and official garment of the finest quality. Cf. Cic.
De Fin . ii. 24,77 ; Suetonius, Aug. 73. — sumenda, to be worn .
4. cibus, cf. § 3, N. parsimoniae, etc. — familiae, i. e. the crowds
or numbers of slaves ; cf. 8, 4, N. numerus. — nec spectent, v. I. ex
spectent, which is incompatible with the author's meaning, viz. to
express the eager manner with which servants regard the rich
food served up by them.- nihil habens pretiosive, i. e.
being neither scanty nor costly ; arcessiti denotes that which is
much sought for, viz. because of its scarcity. It often has the
forcefar- fetched, indicating what is unnatural, as opposed to that
which comes of itself, and hence is natural. Cf. Quint. x. 1 , 8 ;
Cic. De Orat. ii . 63. - rediturus : with reference to the disgusting
practice here referred to, cf. De Prov. 3, 11 , N. - intraverit, v. l.
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. I. 4, 5. 223

intraverat : indirect question requires subj. — vernula : cf. De

Prov. 1 , 5, N. - argentum . . . patris, i. e. the silver that his
(Seneca's) father used in the country, viz. at Corduba in Spain,
where he was born ; vid. INTRODUCTION , p. 11.-mensa con

spicua : wealthy and distinguished Romans were very particular

about the material of their tables. The most beautiful and rare
kinds of woods were used, especially the fragrant African citrus.
Pliny relates ( Nat. Hist. xiii. 29) that Cicero bought a table of
this kind for 1,000,000 sesterces (about $ 30,000 ), and that others
were sold for twice and three times as many thousands of dollars.
The legs were made of ivory, and carved to imitate the heads of
various animals, as lions, tigers, etc. Cf. De Benef. vii. 9 ; Hor.
Sat. i. 6,116.—in usum posita, made for my use. — moretur, delays,
i. e. by attracting attention ; hence, captivates.
5. paedagogii: the paedagogus was originally a trustworthy
slave, who attended upon children to and from the gymnasium .
Nero rendered himself obnoxious by training up free boys to
become paedagogi (Sueton. Nero, 8). He and other emperors at
tached large numbers to the court for the sake of state and orna
ment. The modern “ page” has its origin from this source, and
is the fit meaning of the word in this place. The word was also
applied to teachers. The paedagogium denotes the apartments in
the palace occupied by the pages. Cf. Pliny, Epist. 7, 27 ; also,
Class. Dict.-mancipia : these were slaves bought in the market,
as distinguished from those ( vernulae) reared in the house. The
mancipia were very numerous. Horace ( Sat. i. 6, 107) ridicules
the praetor Tullius because he had no more than five slaves to
accompany him from the Tiburtine villa to Rome. Cf. Becker's
“ Gallus. ” — iam : this word,when connecting sentences,frequently
has the force of further ; taken with etiam it may be rendered
moreover ; Z. 286. - domus, etc.: a reference to the splendor of
Nero's palace. “ In the time of Nero the Palatine hill had be
come one vast congeries of imperial piles for the private residence
of the emperors and of the officials of the court, and for some
public purposes. It included palaces, temples, libraries, baths,
and fountains, the gardens of Adonis, and an area for athletic
games. In addition to the complete occupancy of the Palatine
hill, he constructed another palace, the domus transitoria, across
224 NOTES .

the space now occupied by the Coliseum , which ascended the

slope of the Esquiline to the borders of the gardens of Maecenas.
All this pile of palaces was rich beyond description in marbles,
and gilding, and frescoes, and bronzes, and mosaics, and statuary,
and paintings.”—Butler's “ St. Paul in Rome," p. 134. In Nero's
famous “ Golden House ” he had a statue of biinself erected, 120
feet in height. His palace floors were paved with gold, gems, and
precious stones, and the walls were adorned with paintings, raised
figures, etc.; cf. Becker's “ Gallus,” p. 34. — tecta : the ceilings
were also inlaid with ivory and gold ; cf. Becker's “ Gallus,” p.
184 ; Guhl & Koner's “ The Life of the Greeks and Romans,” p.
368, etc. - perlucentis, for perlucentes.-- aquas et circumfluentes,
etc.: a novel feature, that is in some measure approached by the
aquaria frequently seen in American houses; cf. De Prov. 3, 9, N.
- loquar: for subj., cf. A. & G. 268. —scena : a reference to the
magnificence with which the coenatio was fitted up. Suetonius
relates that Nero's coenatio was furnished like a theatre, with
shifting scenes for every course .
6. Circumfudit ... circumsonuit, this extravagant profusion
encompassed me coming from a secluded place, long used to habits of
frugality, and on all sides resounded with its flood of magnificence.
This description may be taken as a fair illustration of the style
of an age abounding in a profusion of ornamental rhetoric. For
an account of the dissolute court of Nero, vid. Butler's “ St. Paul
in Rome.” — frivola, lit. paltry things, wretched furniture, etc.,
mostly post-Aug. in this sense. - numquid : this word can only
be considered as an interrog. particle, in so far as it is a mere sign
of a question, when quid has no meaning at all (except that it
strengthens the simple interrog .) ; but in indirect questions such
as this the accus. quid usually retains its pronominal force; Z.
351 , note . - illa, refers to the splendid appointments of the palace.
-vim praeceptorum , the teachings of my instructors — a refer
ence, probably, to the chief Stoic teachers. Seneca's personal
instructors were Papirius Fabianus, Attalus, and Sotion ; see IN
TRODUCTION, p. 12. - virgis, i. e. the rods of the lictors, which were
borne before the superior magistrates. Seneca was at this time
praetor, and soon after became the chief adviser of Nero.
7. Promptus, v . I. propius. — Zenona : a native of Citium in
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. 1. 7. 225

Cyprus, flourished about B.C. 330. He was the founder of that

system of philosophy called Stoic, from the Stoa Poecile, in
Athens, where in former times poets were accustomed to meet.
For particulars as to his scheme of philosophy, consult the stand
ard work of Zeller, “ The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics ; " also,
Ueberweg's “History of Philosophy, ” Lewes's “ Hist. of Philoso
phy, ” and Class. Dict. — Cleanthen : a native of Assos in Troas,
born about B.C. 300. He succeeded Zeno as head of the Stoic
school. One of his doctrines was that all souls are immortal,
but that the intensity of existence after death would vary ac
cording to the strength or weakness of the particular soul, there
by leaving to the wicked some apprehension of future punish
ment. Some of the Stoics held that only the souls of the wise
and good were to survive death . - Chrysippum : a native of Soli
in Cilicia, born B.C. 280. He studied under Cleanthes at Athens,
and became his successor ; and of him it has been said , “ if
Chrysippus had not lived, the Porch could not have been ” (Diog.
Laërt. vii. 183). He ranked as an authority among the Stoics,
and was the inventor of the logical “ sorites.” Cicero drew
largely from his writings for the Tusculan Disputations. Vid.
Zeller, as above, and Class.Dict.- quorum ... misit,no one of
whom himself entered into public affairs, but each enjoined others to
do so. Chrysippus held that a prudent man avoids business, and
that a statesman must either displease the gods or displease the
people. “ Taken alone, Stoicism could form excellent men, but
hardly excellent statesmen ; and, looking to facts, not one of the
old masters of the school ever had or desired any public office "
(Zeller's “ Stoics,” etc., p. 307, 308 ). — et nemo : if a negative
proposition is followed by an affirmative, in which the same
thought is expressed or continued, et is employed in Latin where
in English we use but ; M. 433, obs. 2. - arietari, used by Seneca
here in the sense, to be harassed, viz. by confusion in public affairs
and wrangling in the forum ; elsewhere the word means to totter
( Epist. 107, 2) ; cf. De Prov. 1 , 2, N.-ex facili, adv. phrase, easily ;
80, in facili, de facili ; cf. De Benef. iii. 8, 2.-res non ... aesti.
mandae, i. e. trivial matters. - magno, cf. B. & M. 803, obs. 5.
convertor : this verb has both pass. and mid. or reflex. meaning;
Z. 146. - domum , adverbially, homeward . - placet, i. e. animo.
226 NOTES .

8. nihil ... redditurus, fut. part. denotes intention,who does

not intend to restore ; cf. M. 425, obs. 5.- quod ad ... spectet =
quod ab alieno iudicio pendeat; deo et sibi placeat : Lips. - ametur :
amare here : = quaerere . - curae,H. 399, 2, 3 ; B. & M. 777. - com
modare . vocem : this refers to the forensic orator in his ca
pacity of pleader in behalf of a client's cause, as commodare ope
ram to the efforts of the advocate in the management of the
details of the cause ; vid. Dict. Antiq., Orator, Advocate, Patro
nus. Seneca, it is to be remembered, was very successful as a
forensic orator, and probably much of his wealth was acquired
in this way. See INTROD. p. 12. — male = immerito. - 9 . In studiis,
etc.: Lips. thinks that there is here a defectiveness and want of
congruity.-verba . . . permittere, to suit the words to the thought.
-ut ... sequatur oratio : the sense seems to be, that the lan
guage without ambiguity may be subject to the thought.- Secu
lis, H. 379, 1 ; B. & M. 950 ; M. 235, obs. 3 ; cf. Epist. 93, 3. — id
agere : custom has established the superfluous use of id ,as pre
liminary to a proposition following ; Z. 748. — non, v. 1. nunc.
funus tacitum , private funeral. There were two kinds of funer
als among the Romans - tacitum or plebeium , and publicum or in
dictivum , because the people were invited to the latter by the
herald ; cf. De Brev. Vit. 20, 4. - 10. sperare : Haase reads spi
rare . -pressioris : angusti. — et ore, supply loquor. — non meo :
cf. Hor. Od. iii. 25, 17 ; Ovid, Fasti, vi. 5. - plus, sc. in me infirmita
tis. — pervideo , v. 1. provideo. — favor = amor sui nimius. - 11 .
quaedam , sc. vitia . - opertis, v. 1. apertis.- quod . . . iudices : cf.
$ 2, N. quod dicas. — adulatione : an ancient writer quoted by Lips.
observes, omnis Romanus adulatione corrumpitur aut corrumpit ;
cf. De Benef. vi. 30 ; Epist. 59, 11.-12. fluctuationem , sc. animi.
-dignum ... debeam : cf. De Prov.2, 6, N. - adferentis, for ad
ferentes.

II.-1 . Quaero iam dudum : the pres. with iam diu or iam
dudum has force of pres.- perf.; H.467,2 ; B. & M. 1083.–Serene :
Seneca, in the first chapter, having stated the points for discus
sion and inquiry, now proceeds to answer at length his supposed
correspondent. - ulli, v. 1. ullius. - interim , sometimes, post.-Aug.
in this sense ; cf. De Ira, i. 16. — cum . . . effugerunt, i. e. after
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. II . 1-6 . 227

they have recovered from the effects of the disease; cf. cum . .
requievit, a few lines below.—2. durioribus, sc. medicinis . - sed
illud, supply opus est; with opus the thing needed is preferred in
the nomin. if it be a neut. pron, or adject.; cf. Arnold's Latin
Prose Compos. 173 ; H. 414, iv. note 4 ; B. & M. 673.-3. non con
cuti, not to be shaken , or agitated violently by passions or otherwise.
-Democriti : Democritus of Abdera, born B.C. 460. He was the
chief advocate of the atomic theory of Leucippus, and being of
a very cheerful temperament, he became known as the “ laugh
ing philosopher.” (Cf. De Ira, ii. 10.) The subject ejdvuia, here
mentioned, was the title of one of his treatises, and was regarded
in his philosophy as the end and ultimate object of our actions.
None of his complete works are extant. — nec enim ... necesse
est, and (with good reason) for it is not necessary.
4. Ergo quaerimus, etc.: cf. with this definition that of De
mocritus (as given in Lipsius's Latin version ), per quam tranquille
et constanter animus agit, nullo metu perturbatus, vel superstitionis,
vel alterius affectus. — propitius sibi, i. e. satisfied with itself and
its lot or state.—gaudium : cf. Cicero's definition , quum ratione
animus moretur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur
( Tusc. Disp. iv. 6, 13).—nec adtollens, etc., allowing neither pros
perity nor adversity to ruffle the calm satisfaction of mind.
publico remedio : the chief Stoic teachers advised participation
in public affairs, though in practice they avoided it ; cf, 1,7, N.
agnoscet, v. ) . cognoscet. — professionem : Lips. refers this either to
false philosopbers, or to magistrates and rulers.-- sub ingenti ti.
tulo, i. e. under the honored title of a wise philosopher, or of an
officer and guardian of public trusts. - simulatione, i. e . of living
peacefully and cheerfully.
5. causa , state or condition, i. e. of unrest. - Adice, i. e. adjice ;
for spelling, cf. De Prov. 2, 9, N. - inveniant : for sulij . , cf. H. 519,
% ; B. & M. 238.- ad novandum pigra, too sluggish for making a
change . — non inconstantiae vitio : Lips. reads, non constantia in
vita . — 6 . ubi, used instead of relat. pron., and may be translated
on account of which.— consequuntur, sc. quod concupiscunt. — in
spem toti prominent, i. e. they live entirely upon baseless hopes ;
said of a class who are always hoping and never realizing :
pendentibus ad vota sua, i. e. to those who are in suspense about
228 NOTES .

the realization of their wishes; votum means an offering solemnly

vowed or dedicated, on condition that one's wish or desire be
granted.-pendent, a tautological repetition of the thought ex
pressed above, pendentibus, etc. Fickert, in a note, gives it as his
impression that Seneca wrote, ad vota sua . Omnia inpendunt,
etc., or, Ad vota sua omnia inpendunt, etc.: almost all mss. join
the words in this way . — cogunt: transitive verbs sometimes have
beside their own proper object an accus. limiting the extent of
their action ; cf. M. 229, 2 ; Virg. Aen . x. 24. - prata, sc. se fecisse.
7. inter destituta vota, in the midst of its disappointed hopes.
- Quae, and these ; cf. B. & M. 701, 1. - secreta studia, private
studies.--pati non potest : cf. Epist. 2, 1 ; primum argumentum
conpositae mentis existimo, posse consistere, et secum morari. — ani.
mus . . . erectus, etc., a mind fixed on the affairs of the wor
etc. - inquietus, Haase reads inquies. -parum , used as a neuter
subst. and as such followed by gen . Z. 432 ; B. & M. 1008. — non
fert, i. e. animus.-8. utique ubi = however it may be at other
times, this is assuredly the case when, etc.—agant : cf. 2. 562.
9. quia, followed by indic. because the author assigns the reason
on his own authority, H. 516, 1. ; B. & M. 1255. It is character
istic of the envious to desire to drag down the objects of their
envy. - aversatione, post-Aug., rarely used . - processuum = good
fortunes, literally, a going forward ; cf. De Consol. ad Polyb. 28.
obirascens, mostly post-Aug., translate as a verb, and so with the
other participles.
10. dixerim , subj. to denote modest affirmation ; cf. 1 , 1, N.
mala : cf. Hor. Ars Poet. 453.-ut, namely, or, as for instance .
versare se, the reflexive pron . sometimes stands in universal as
sertions without a definite reference to a preceding word ; cf.
M. 490, obs. 5.-11 . Homericus Achilles : Iliad, xxiv. 10, 11 ; cf.
Odyss. xx. 24, etc. — varios habitus, various or different postures.
-quod est, and this is a characteristic of a sick man . - aegri :
for gen., cf. H. 399, 3 ; B. & M. 781. - mutationibus ut remediis
uti, to make use of changes as a means of relief. – Nunc Campaniam
petamus : Campania, situate between Latium and Lucania, has
always been celebrated for the fertility of its soil, the beauty of
its scenery, and the salubrity of its climate. Many of the
wealthier citizens of Rome had villas along its hill-sides, and the
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. II. 11 , 12 229

ruins of some of these can be seen to this day. — iam , presently,

said of the immediate future. — inculta, the untilled or woody
country, referring to Bruttium and Lucania . — Bruttios et Luca .
niae saltus: Bruttium was the southernmost district of the
Italian mainland. The inhabitants are said to have originated
from the slaves and shepherds of the Lucanians, who took refuge
in the mountain fastuesses of the south. Diodorus Siculus re
lates that they became an independent nation or people about
B.C. 357. They lived mostly in the interior, the coasts being
chiefly occupied by Greek colonies. In B.c. 274 they were con
quered by the Romans, and made tributary until the invasion of
Hannibal, whose standard they joined. After the departure of
the Carthaginians the Romans took vengeance upon the Bruttii
by subjecting them to complete vassalage. Lucania was divided
from Bruttium by the river Laus. The people were brave, and
gradually acquired possession of the Greek cities on the coast.
They were subdued by the Romans after Pyrrhus had left Italy,
and on Hannibal's appearance joined him against their oppress
ors . The result was that during the second Punic war Lucania
was repeatedly laid waste, and never recovered its former pros
perity. The malaria, which is so fatal there, had doubtless made
itself felt already ; the towns of the interior fell into decay, and
the mountain ranges became one of the wildest regions of Italy.
Large sections were used for grazing, and extensive forests fur
nished supplies of swine for the tables of the Romans, and wild
boars and bears for the amphitheatres. Hence Seneca mentions
these regions, in their rugged wildness, as contrasted with the
loveliness of Campania. - amoeni, refers to pleasure received
through the sense of sight, and hence very properly used here in
connection with oculi. — luxuriosi oculi, our eyesfeasted with lux
urious sights. - releventur, subj. of purpose, B. & M. 1205.
12. Tarentum , the modern Taranto, was one of the most inter
esting cities of ancient times, and was of Lacedaemonian origin.
It was distinguished for its mild climate, beautiful scenery, and
excellent harbor. Its present harbor is sixteen miles in circuit.
By reason of its superior commercial facilities it rose to great
wealth, and became noted for its luxury and refinement. Vid.
Class. Dict. — hiberna = winter ; cf. Virg. Aen . i. 266.— coeli = sky
230 NOTES .

or climate . - regio . . . turbae : the thought is that even in Sen

eca's time the dwellings within the enclosure of the walls were
so numerous, as well as so rich and extensive, as to be able to
hold even its ancient population, notwithstanding the fact that a
considerable portion of the city had been long deserted. Strabo
(vi. p. 278) says : “ The ancient wall comprises a circuit of great
extent, but now the greater part of the space adjoining the isth
mus is deserted ." - plausu . fragore, theatrali . . . Circensi
understood ; Lips. — iuvat, etc. , refers to contests of gladiators
with each other and with wild beasts. - semper fugit: the ad
verb is not in the original, but aptly inserted by Seneca ; cf.
Lucretius, De Rerum Nat. iii. 1081.
13. non effugit ? cf. Hor. Od. ii. 16. - gravissimus, most trouble
some or most dangerous.quod . . . locum, because of frequent
change of purpose ... they had left no opportunity for novelty.
Fastidio esse illis, to be a source of disgust to them ; H. 390 ; B. &
M. 848. - rabidarum deliciarum : Lips. suggests tabidarum , in
the sense of deficientes, languentes : pleasures that have been ex
hausted --that fail to give us any further enjoyment. Compare
Farrar's apposite words in this connection : “ In proportion to
the luxury of the age were its misery and its exhaustion. The
mad pursuit of pleasure was the death and degradation of all
true happiness. Suicide-suicide out of pure ennui and discon
tent at a life overflowing with every possible means of indul
gence - was extraordinarily prevalent. ... The philosophy which
alone professed itself able to heal men's sorrows applauded the
supposed courage of a voluntary death ; and it was of too ab
stract, too fantastic, and too purely theoretical character to fur
nish them with any real or lasting consolation ” (Farrar's “ Seek
ers after God ,” p. 49).— Quousque eadem ? Lips. suggests, as the
meaning here, viz. dormire, surgere, ingerere, egerere, libidinari,
fatiscere, et omnia in orbem ; cf. Epist. 24, 26 ; 89, 18.

III . - 1 . erat = esset ; the extract from Athenodorus extends

to middle of $ 7. – Athenodorus. Several ancient philosophers
bore this name. The one here referred to was probably the cele
brated Stoic surnamed Cordylio. He was born at Tarsus, and
had charge of the library at Pergamus. Cato the Younger, at
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. III. 1-3 . 231

tracted by his fame, made him a visit, brought back the philoso
pher with him to Rome, and lived on terms of entire intimacy
with him during the remainder of his life. While with Cato,
Athenodorus composed a work of some note, which, however,
has been lost - epi otovoñs kai Taidelas. Cf. Epist. 10, 4 ; Diog.
Laërt. vii. 34. - actione ... detinere : on the Stoic views as to
taking part in public affairs, cf. 1 , 7, N .-- actione rerum, in the
transaction of general public duties : actio refers to every civil,
political action, transaction, e. g. de pace, and actions in court; cf.
Ramshorn's Lat. Synonyms.- lacertos .. nutrire : nutrire has
here a zeugmatic force : to exercise the muscles of the arms, and
nurse their strength, to which alone they have dedicated themselves.
propositum habeat = proposuerit : for use of habeo and perf. part.
instead of perf. tense, cf. H. 388, 1 , note ; M. 427 ; B. & M. 1358,
obs. 4 ; for subj., cf. H. 517 ; B. & M. 1250 ; A. & G. 326.
2. Sed quia ... recedendum est : cf. Lord Bolingbroke's re
marks (Letter 212, vol. ii.) : “ When I, who pass a great part, very
much the greatest part, of my life alone, sally forth into the
world , I am very far from expecting to improve myself by the
conversation I find there, and still further from caring one jot
what passes there.” — quia : cf. 2, 9, N. — inquit, i. e. Athenodorus.
-insana . . . ambitione : allusion is here probably made to the
internecine struggles of the great leaders in the contest, Pompey,
Caesar, Antony, etc., and may well be used as pointing to the
dangers surrounding public men also under the empire. — tot ca.
lumniatoribus ... torquentibus, while 80 many detractors are
putting a sinister construction upon virtues and straightforward
conduct. - plus futurum . . . succedat, i. e. there will always be
more hindrances than aids to success.—sed, denotes strong oppo
sition , and interrupts the narration : autem is weaker in this re
spect, yet serves as a connective. - hominum : supply vires coer
centur. - in seducto, in retirement.
3. reipublicae, i. e. before the establishment of the empire
under Augustus. — candidatos extrahit: words which seem ap
plicable to a practice, in the times of the emperors, of partisans
taking their candidates by the hand ; cf. Pliny's Epist. iii. 20 ;
Seneca, Epist. 8, 6,where he remarks,“ to give my friend my hand
and suffrage in the Senate when a candidate for some public
232 NOTES.

office.” — in tanta ... praeceptorum inopia : Seneca often re

fers to the lack of high moral principle in his time. So Butler
fittingly remarks: “ It must have seemed as if all the principles
of morality and honor and mercy, which had hitherto at least
struggled to maintain a place in human affairs, had at length
given way, and resigned the world to the single sway of power
employed as the instrument of luxury, rapacity, lust, cruelty, and
the varied crimes whose evil brotherhood is never broken ” (But
ler's “ St. Paul in Rome," p. 127).- ruentis, i. e. ruentes ; cf. De
Prov. 3, 7, N. vagantis. - nihil aliud, sc. proficit, agit.
4. urbanus praetor : this was the judge who decided cases
between Roman citizens, and was first appointed B.C. 356. As
foreigners resident in Rome increased, a magistrate became nec
essary to determine between them and Roman citizens. This
office was created B.C. 244, and the incumbent was called praetor
perigrinus. Vid. Dict. Antiq . - adeuntibus, sc. in jus, from the
legal phrase adire in jus, to go before a judge, or to go to law.
adsessoris : the assessor was the legal adviser or assistant of the
magistrate. It happened not infrequently that the praetor and
other magistrates were not very well skilled in the law, and hence
arose the necessity of an assistant or adviser. According to Lips.,
he dictated the sentence, though he did not formally pronounce
it himself. The judge then may very properly be said to pro
nounce the words of the assessor. Vid. Dict. Antiq . - qui, sc.
docet, or some word of similar force. - gratuitum , i. e. freely
given, without price or reward, of good-will alone. — officiis : cf.
H. 425, 2. 3 ; B. & M. 855.-non deserueris, i. e. the post of duty.
5. quamvis ... sint : for subj., cf. H. 515, III.; B. & M.1282.
in numerum, etc., i. e. they are enrolled and receive pay equally
with the rest. – 6 . mittit sui signa, etc., i. e. just as the sun or
other luminary sheds its rays of light all around.—aquas .
educere, i. e. to alter the courses of rivers.—consumendum : for
use of gerundive, cf. H. 544, note 2 ; B. & M. 1315.—7 . Alii . .
alii, some of us ... others of us. - inpendimus, sc. tempus. - reli .
quias, i. e. no actually accomplished work remains, as an equiva
lent for the time consumed .—Mihi, i. e. Seneca. He now comments
on Athenodorus's sentiments.-negaverim, subj. in modest asser
tions, M. 350 b, 380. - relato gradu, with a gradual retreat. The
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. III . 7-10 . 233

rirtuous man should retire from a disadvantageous and detri

mental public position, as an army from before the superior
forces of the enemy, orderly and with honor, without the loss of
standards, and with perfect discipline. - fidem , security.
8. fortuna = misfortune. Reference is here probably to the
danger which Seneca incurred as a frequenter of the forum .
Having gained high reputation as an eloquent pleader of causes,
he aroused the jealousy and hatred of Caligula ; this led to his
abandoning the excitement of the forum , and betaking himself
to the quieter walks of philosophy. Vid . Suetonius, Caligula ;
also, Class. Dict. - inferat, v. 1. inserat:-officiis, i. e. muniis publi
cis . - 9 . nos, i. e. the Stoic leaders and teachers. - non unius ur
bis : cf. De Otio, 31. - rostris : the stage from which orators ad
dressed the people assembled in the forum. The name was
derived from the beaks of ships with which the stage was
adorned. Vid. Dict. Antiq. — comitiis : as this word refers to
the action of the people in the time of the republic, its occur
rence here seems somewhat singular. - quantum , as a designa
tion of multitude, for quot, how many.
10. prytanis, for prytanes : the chief magistrate or president
of the Senate (nrpútavis) in some of the Grecian states, as Athens,
Corinth, Miletus, etc., was called prytanis. At Athens it seems
probable that originally the prytanes ranked next to the archons,
acting as judges, and holding courts in the prytaneium (or City
Hall). After the overthrow of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus,
ten, and afterwards thirty prytanes were chosen to administer
the government. Vid. Dict. Antiq.; Grote's “ Hist. of Greece,”
vol. iv. 65. - ceryx (výpux): another example of Latinizing Greek
words, common in Seneca's time. The ceryx , at one period, was
the priest who performed the religious rites of Ceres, according
to Lipsius. He was also a praeco or legatus, an ambassador, the
sense here. — sufes : the chief ruler of the Carthaginians, corre
sponding to the consul of the Romans ; cf. Livy, xxx. 7 ; Anthon's
Class.Dict.(Carthago ).- primam frontem , i.e. among the hastati,
the first line of battle in the Roman army. - triarios : the veteran
division, which occupied the third and last place, while the ha
stati and principes held the first and second. These fought only
when the other troops could no longer resist the enemy. When
234 NOTES :

not in action they rested themselves on the right foot, with the
left advanced, and protected themselves with their broad shields.
--ille in proelio : a reference to Cynaegirus, brother of the poet
Aeschylus, with whom he fought bravely at Marathon. Herodo
tus relates (vi. 114) that he with others pursued the Persians to
their ships, and endeavored to climb up into a vessel, but Cynae
girus's right hand was cut off, and he fell into the water and
perished. The story was afterwards much exaggerated. Cf.
Justin, 2, 9 ; Class. Dict. - prima ... parte, frontrank in public
affairs.
11. auditus eius visusque : others read , auditu enim , visu ,
vultu, nutu, etc. The whole sentence is expressive of the moral
and active aid and support which the good citizen yields to
every effort for the public welfare . - obstinatione tacita : there
are times when silence itself is powerfully eloquent ; e. g. that
noble citizen and philosopher, P. Thrasea, refused to join in the
laudations of Nero in the Senate ; and later, when the murder of
Agrippina by her own son's orders was announced in the Senate
as a piece of good fortune, Thrasea rushed out in indignant scorn
and contempt. He was put to death by Nero, A.D. 66. — citra,
without ; so mostly in post-Aug. prose, especially in Quintilian.
ita virtus, etc., i. e. virtue, however circumscribed or limited ,
leavens everything within the sphere of its influence by the very
force of its inherent, penetrating, and assimilating excellence.
et latens, and that, too, when unperceived . - precarios, uncertain ,
as being dependent on the will of another.
12. Longe itaque : the conclusion to the argument in opposi
tion to the teaching of Athenodorus expressed above, viz. that
for peace of mind, in this world of detractors, we ought to with
draw entirely from participation in public affairs. - prohibetur,
v. 1. prohibebitur. — quam . . . fuit : as the first member of the
comparison is governed by a verb, which does not also belong to
the second member, a new proposition after quam is formed with
a verb ( fuit) of its own ; cf. M. 303 b.- triginta tyranni: Athens
was taken by Lysander B.C. 404, which closed the Peloponnesian
war, after twenty -seven years' struggle. The government of the
city was placed by the conqueror in the hands of a council con
sisting of thirty archons, usually designated in history as the
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. III, 12-14. 235

thirty tyrants. Vid . Class. Dict. and Grote's or Thirlwall's “Hist.

of Greece.” — divellerent, distracted, or disturbed violently.
13. Areos pagos (spelled Areiopagus, or Ariopagos,by others) :
the hill of Ares or Mars, so called from the tradition that Mars
was the first person tried there, on a charge of murdering Halir
rhotius, son of Neptune. The celebrated tribunal which held its
sittings there had existed from very ancient times (Grote's “ Hist.
of Greece,” üi. 72, 3, etc.), and was subsequently modified by So
lon. It was before members of this venerable court that St. Paul
made his defence, as recorded in Acts xvii. 22. A learned writer,
in his commentary, says : “Areiopagus, or Hill of Mars, a rocky
ridge facing the Acropolis, from which the highest court of
Athens took its name. The seats of the judges, hewn in the
solid rock , are still visible. Some have supposed the name in
this case to denote the court itself, before which Paul was now
arraigned, as Socrates had been 450 years before, for the same
offence of introducing strange or foreign gods. The objection
to this supposition is, not that the court had been dissolved or
deprived of its authority, which is uncertain, but that the ensu
ing context is without a vestige of judicial process, and that
Paul, at the close of his address, went out, it would seem, with
out the slightest molestation . He was, no doubt, taken to the
Areiopagus as a convenient and customary place for public speak
ing. It seems to have been very much as if a stranger, preach
ing in the streets of any modern town, should be taken, not be
fore a court, but to a court-house, as a convenient and appropriate
locality in which to answer for himself before the public.” Cf.
Eschenburg's “ Manual of Class. Literature,” 184, § 108 ; Class.
Dict.; also ,Wordsworth's “ Athens and Attica, " ch. xi. - senatu ,
dat., usual form senatui. — Harmodios : Harmodius and Aristogi
ton, Athenians, were two intimate friends, who, on account of a
gross insult to one of them, slew Hipparchus, a son of Pisistratus,
and brother of Hippias, tyrants, B.C. 514. They both lost their
lives. Four years later Hippias was expelled, and the Athenians
ever after looked upon Harmodius and Aristogiton as patriots
and martyrs for liberty. Cf. De Benef. vii. 15, 2.
14. in medio erat : cf. Cic. Ad Atticum, viii. 2, 4. - metuenti
bus : because the rich were especially imperilled under the ty.
236 NOTES .

rants . — cum ... incederet, while, etc. When time only is de

noted, cum rarely takes subj., H. 518, 11. 3. — et qui tuto insulta .
verat ... tulit : not to the thirty tyrants,but to the liberated
Athenians did Socrates owe his death ; vid. Class. Dict.; Plato's
Apology, p. 21. - eius . . . libertas non tulit : cf. De Const. Sap.
2,4 ; De Benef. v. 6, 6.—ut scias : subj. of purpose, depending on
some verb understood, as profero hoc, or the like. - pecuniam :
Lips. suggests petulantiam . - 15. explicabimus nos, etc.: a salu
tary political precept, to accommodate ourselves to the exigen
cies of times and occasions, without violation of truth and virtue ;
Lips. - adliserit, dash in pieces, a figure taken from shipwreck.
absconderit, basely hide himself out of sight ; cf. the character
which Tacitus portrays in his Agricola . — Non est enim servare
se obruere : the readings are various. Erasmus gives, non enim
debet servantem se obruere.
16. Curius Dentatus : thus named, says Pliny, because born
with teeth . He was three times consul, and was renowned for
his victories over the Samnites, Sabines, and Pyrrhus, king of
Epirus. His habits were very simple and frugal, and when the
Samnite ambassadors went to visit him, as Plutarch tells us, they
found him boiling turnips. His answer to them was that a man
who could live as cheaply as he was living had no need of gold.
-vivere, sc. mortuum , i.e. a virtually dead, useless life ; cf. Epist.
82, 3, otium sine litteris mors est et hominis vivi sepultura . - plus,
sc. temporis.

IV.-1 . aut cum quibus, sc. agendum est. — fere . . . nobis,

lit. commonly, to ourselves we seem ; commonly in our own judgment.
-alius patrimonio ... posset = another forced the productive
powers of his estate beyond endurance, that is, to meet his great
expenditures; cf. sola terrae seges imperatur (Tacitus, Germania ,
26).—2. primam frontem : indicating the confident countenance
or resolution which the public man must exhibit, in opposition to
the shamefacedness or bashfulness, denoted by verecundia . — ad au .
lam, in the palace or at court, where obsequiousness usually meets
with better success than sturdiness or stubbornness. - urbanita .
tem , humor or raillery.
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. V. 1 - VI 1. 237

V.-1 . cum rebus . conparandae : to the same effect, cf.

De Ira, iii. 6,7 ; Hor. Ars Poetica, 38, 9. What are the other con
structions after conparare ?-actore, v. 1. vectore, latore.-necesse
est,ut omitted ; cf. H. 502 ; Z. 625 ; M. 373, obs. 1. — ferente : abl.
after comparative. - 2. unde liber regressus non sit : suggestive
of Virgil's well-known lines ( Aen . vi. 126-128 ) :
“ facilis descensus Averno ;
Sed revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras,
Hoc opus, hic labor est. ”

VI.-1 . an perveniat, whether the expenditure of our time

will reach them , i. e. whether our efforts will effect any good in
them . - nobis ... inputant , i. e.some persons actually imagine
that, when they are under obligations to us for our good offices,
we are the parties who are indebted. They charge to our ac
count, without questioning, that with which we ought to be cred
ited. Cf. De Benef. ii . 17, 6, superbi et inputatores ; Suetonius,
Tiber. 53.-Athenodorus , surnamed Cananites, from Cana in Cili
cia, the birthplace of his father, though he himself was a native
of Tarsus. He was a Stoic philosopher, and taught at Apollonia
in Epirus. Here he attracted the attention of Octavius, and was
by him induced to go to Rome, where he became an intimate
friend and adviser of the emperor. He wrote a treatise against
the Categories of Aristotle , and was author of some other works
of note. Vid. Class. Dict.-ne ad coenam sit, that he would
dine with no man who would not in return feel under obligation for
thisfavor.-- coenam : this was the principal meal of the Romans,
and one to which they devoted special attention . The business
of the day having been finished, they gave themselves up to
enjoy the coena, which was often protracted until late in the
evening. For a detailed account of the meals of the Romans, cf.
Dict. Antiq.; Becker's “ Gallus,” p. 451-470 ; Guhl & Koner's
“ The Life of the Greeks and Romans, " p. 501-507. - puto intel .
legis : cf. 3, 1 , n. fateor.- qui cum amicorum faciunt, who
settle with a feast their obligations to the kind offices of theirfriends.
-paria mensa, v. 1. parem mensam , or pares mensas. - fericula :
the various courses of the feast ; literally , the frames on which
the servants brought the different dishes served during the feast;
L
238 NOTES .

hence fericula came to mean the number of courses, and even the
dishes themselves.
2. illis, i. e. conviviis.- Considerandum , etc.: Lipsius suggests
that there is so great lack of unity in this chapter as to give rise
to the impression that a portion of the original has been lost.
natura tua . . . feret: as an element conducive to peace of
mind, Seneca insists upon natural aptitude for any calling. How
much disquietude, as well as ill-success and misfortune, might
be avoided if this rule were always regarded !-feret, v. 1. defert,
or refert. — Isocrates : a distinguished teacher of rhetoric, born
at Athens B.C. 436. He first established a school in the island
of Chios, and afterwards at Athens, where he often had as many
as one hundred students, and, as his terms were high, he acquired
a large fortune. He died at a very advanced age, just after the
battle of Chaeronea, B.C. 338. Thoroughly persuaded of the value
of oratory in public affairs, he devoted himself to releasing it
from sophistry, as far as possible, and basing it on sound moral
principle. His style is rather labored and artificial, and his ora
tions on a great variety of topics give evidence of the most con
scientious care and attention. One of them, the Panegyricus, is
said to have occupied ten or even fifteen years in its preparation.
Vid. Quint. x. 4, 4 ; also, Class. Dict. — Ephorum : a Greek histo
rian, born at Cumae, in Aeolis, about B.C. 405. He was a pupil
of Isocrates, at whose advice he turned his attention especially to
history. Only fragments of his history, in thirty books, of the
early Greeks and Barbarians have survived . On the whole, prob
ably the loss is not very great, as he differed frequently from
standard authorities, as Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon.
Vid. Polybius, xii. 25 ; also, Class. Dict. - Male enim ... labor
est : this, with other apophthegms that are found in Seneca, is
fairly to be compared with the sententiae of the best classical
writers. His apt and forcible epigrammatic sayings are well
worthy of being referred to and quoted.—coacta ingenia : a ref
erence to the proverb, nequid invita Minerva . Lips. is of opinion
that there is something lost between the end of this and the be
ginning of the next chapter.
VII . - 1. aeque • . .
quam , 80 much ... as, only found in
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. VII . 1-4 . 239

Plautus and post-Aug. writers; cf. Pliny, Nat. Hist.ii. 83 ; Tacit.

Ann. xiv. 38 ; Suetonius, August. 64, 89.— amicitia : the praise of
which is fully set forth in Cicero's charming tractate, De Ami
citia . - quantum fieri poterit : the indic. is used in restrictive
phrases with quantum , but the relative requires subj.; cf. Z. 559.
-2. Serpunt enim vitia ... nocent: the sentiment is much
the same with 1 Cor. xv. 33 : “ Be not deceived ; evil communi
cations corrupt good manners ;" cf. De Ira, ii. 8.-pericula tra
hemus, we shall incur danger.sana : supply corpora.-- ubi ..
quaerimus ? i. e. the Stoic's “ wise man,” who exists not, as Mo
rell observes, but in description. So Plutarch ( De Stoic. repugn.
11, 1), “ there is no such one upon earth , nor ever was;" cf. Cic.
Academ . i. 10, 38 ; Diog. Laërt. vii. 117. “ To sum up ” (as Zeller
says, “ The Stoics, ” etc. , p. 254), “ the wise man is absolutely per
fect, absolutely free from passion and want, absolutely happy ; as
the Stoics exclusively assert, he in no way falls short of the hap
piness of Zeus ;" cf. De Prov. 6, 5, N. Yet, with what may be
called a necessary inconsistency, Seneca, and others like him , set
forth this model wise man as worthy of every effort to imitate ;
cf. Matt. v. 48. — istum : cf. Z. 127, 701. - pro optimo . . . malus :
so Epist. 42, 1, 2, where Seneca asserts that such a phoenix (as a
really good man) could scarcely be found in five hundred years,
and that the one of whom his friend Lucilius writes him was a
good man only of the second rank, i. e. only comparatively good,
inasmuch as one wholly good could not be found ; cf. Hor. Sat. i.
3,68 ; De Const. Sap.7, 1 .
3. Platonas et Xenophontas : the accus. plur. of Greek words
is frequently found in as instead of es. - Socratici fetus: the stu
dent may consult here with profit Zeller's able work, “ Socrates
and the Socratic Schools. ” — Catonis : cf. De Prov . 2, 9, n.; also,
Class. Dict. — opus erat ... debuit : observe use of synonyms;
the former expresses a want that is indispensable or requisite for
obtaining some end or object; the latter expresses the moral
obligations resting upon the person (Cato) to satisfy a claim upon
him, quibus se adprobaret, etc.; vid . Döderlein's& Ramshorn's Lat.
Synon . - in quibus, etc., i. e. whose evil power he might either
break down or at least resist ; Lips. — 4. omnia . . . placet, who
sigh at everything, and to whom every circumstancefurnishes ground
240 NOTES .

of complaint. — nulla non : cf. De Bred. Vit. 2, 1, N. numquam non.

licet, although, with tamen following .-- tranquillitati, etc.: Lips.
aptly remarks, a countenance cloudy, and , so to speak , almost
always rainy, disturbs peace or serenity of inind.
VIII. - 1, maximam . . . materiam : cf. 1 Tim . vi. 10, “ The
love of money is the root of all evil.” — quanto levior ... per :
dere : Plato remarked to one who was always pining for wealth,
“ Thou wretch , if thou wouldst be happy, endeavor not to increase
thy store, but to diminish thy desire ;" cf. Stobaeus, Florilegium , x.
-e0 ... quo : cf. M.270, obs. 1.-2. Bion : not the Greek poet,
but the Scythian philosopher, surnamed Borysthenites, who flour
ished about B.C. 300. He studied philosophy at Athens, and at
first attached himself to the Cynic sect under Crates; afterwards
he became a disciple of Theodorus, and finally of Theophrastus
the Peripatetic. He was somewhat brilliant as a wit, but was
notoriously profligate and an unbeliever in the gods. Cic. ( Tusc.
Disp. iii. 26) records one of his witticisms, that “ it is useless to
tear our hair when we are in grief, since sorrow is not cured by
baldness." Vid. Class. Dict. - calvis quam comatis, for comatis
quam calvis ; this figure, hyperbaton, especially in the form
hysteron -proteron, is quite frequent in Seneca ; cf. H. 636, 5.
calvis ... comatis, i. e. the poor ... the rich.— licet, with ut
understood and subj., M. 361.-sine sensu revelli potest : so
Antiphon, the philosopher and orator, wrote of the miserly,
“ When they take and use of their hoarded money, they suffer
no less pain than if they were to lose a piece of their flesh."
respexit, has looked upon with favor ; said of the gods when they
turned a propitious ege upon any project. Thus the Romans
worshipped Fortune, as Fortuna respiciens.
3. Diogenes: the Cynic philosopher, who despised all posses
sions, in imitation of his master Antisthenes. He clad himself in
coarse , shabby garments, lived on what he received in public,
and was not at all abashed at the presence of Alexander the
Great, of whom he asked no favor but to get out of his sunshine.
Vid . Class. Dict. - et effecit ... posset, and so managed that
nothing could be takenfrom him . - paupertatem , inopiam , egesta .
tem : cf. Döderlein's & Ramshorn's Latin Synonyms ; also, Epist.
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. VIII. 3-5 . 241

17, 4, 5. - Aut ego fallor ... possit, either I am deceived, or it is

a mark of kingship, that there is one man who cannot be harmed
among the covetous, defrauders, robbers, etc. - Si quis, etc. : cf.
Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 10. — illis . sint, H. 387. — alieno : in
sense of ignotus, or ignobilis, ignoble, mean , low . The alienus colo
nus was the slave employed to till the land under the ergastula
rius, or keeper of the ergastulum . This was the prison attached
to the Roman farms throughout Italy, and was regarded as nec
essary because of the great number of slaves used to till the land
after the subjugation of Italy ; Lips. Cf. Dict. Antiq.; Plutarch,
Tib. Gracchus. — in foro, i. e. in the bank, as the banks were located
around the forum .
4. respice agedum mundum , just look at the heavens. — deos :
the ancient pagans identified heroes and gods with the heavenly
bodies.—Demetrium, called Pompeianus, because he was a freed
man of Pompey the Great. Plutarch tells an amusing story of
Cato, who, on one occasion, being on a visit to Antioch, and find
ing the people along the road in festal attire and the magistrates
in white robes, took the whole affair as an honor intended es
pecially for himself. Shortly after he ascertained, to his disgust,
that everybody was on the lookout for Demetrius, and the philos
opher exclaimed, “ O wretched city that I am entering !" (Plut.
Pompey and Cato Uticensis). — Numerus illi cotidie, etc.: very
suggestive of the large numbers of slaves among the Romans.
Pliny speaks of one man having five thousand ; Athenaeus states
that some owned as many as ten and twenty thousand. On the
position, occupations, etc., of slaves among the Romans, vid. Guhl
& Koner's “ The Life of the Greeks and Romans," p. 511-519.— :
vicarii, i. e. slaves of slaves, a species of ownership not uncommon
in that day.-cella laxior : slaves being very numerous, most
of them occupied small closets. The best were favored with a
cella laxior. The monks of the Middle Ages called their small
chambers cellae, cells, which word long ago passed into English.
5. At Diogeni servus unicus fugit : cf. § 3, N.; Diog. Laërt.
vi. 55.—immo, nay ; in a reply generally denotes the opposite of
what the question implies to be the opinion of the questioner.
Hence sometimes equivalent to yes, sometimes to no. It also
affirms with emphasis. — vestiarium , i. e. money to buy clothes,
242 NOTES .

or, in general, maintenance; cf. De Benef. iii. 21.- detestantium ,

SC. servorum .- 6 . qui nihil ulli debet, who is under obligations to
no one ; i. e. who has neither a household establishment nor
slaves to provide for. Seneca is not to be understood as favor
ing niggardliness or moroseness in preference to cheerful domes
tic life ; neither does he approve of absolute poverty and mean
ness, but only such frugality as is freed from the cares.of wealth,
troops of dependents, etc. Cf. n . below , optimus pecuniae, etc.
nisi quod, except in so far as, or, except that ; cf. 2. 627 ; M. 442.—
Habiliora sunt corpora, etc., i. e. those are more suitable and
available for warfare, not those who are colossal in size and loose
in build, but who are of moderate stature and compact build.
in bello, v. 1. bella, or pusilla . — contrahi : cf.Virg. Aen . xii. 491.
Optimus pecuniae modus est: cf. Epist. 2, 5, where Seneca says
that the proper amount of wealth is to have first what is neces
sary, and then what is sufficient. Lips. quotes Plato, who, when
asked, “ How much property should a man possess ?” replied,
“ Just enough to keep him from scheming or planning, and place
him beyond the reach of necessity .” Epictetus also holds that
the body is to be the measure of wealth , just as a shoe should be
neither too large nor too small for the foot.

IX . - 1 . sine qua . . non satis patent, without which not

any riches suffice, and also not any riches are attainable that are at
all satisfactory to us.- nec ... non : cf. M. 460, obs. 1.—et usus
... metiri, i.e. to estimate a thing by its power to confer prac
tical benefit, not by its power to embellish . — libido . . . fluat,
let our desires or longings go out after necessary objects. — membris
nostris inniti : wealthy and luxurious citizens were in the habit
of being carried about in a sort of palanquin or litter. The
slaves who supported it were called lecticarii, and the couch
itself lectica. For an interesting chapter on this mode of loco
motion among the ancients, cf. Kitto's Biblical Illustrations (Job
and the Poetical Books), p. 407, Am. ed.
2. gulam temperare : with accus. temperare signifies to con
trol ; cf. Arnold's Latin Prose Comp. 220.—etiam si . . . adhi.
bere : this may be regarded as a parenthetical clause ; then all
the infinitives in the passage will depend upon discamus. - id
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. IX . 2-5. 243

agere, to exert one's self ; cf. Z. 614 b, 748.—a nobis = a nostris

animis. — magna armamenta pandentibus : a beautiful figure
drawn from a ship— “ excessive riches, like huge and unmanage
able rudders, sink rather than direct. ” Lipsius also quotes De
mocrates, an old philosopher, as saying : “ Long garments embar
rass the body ; excessive riches the mind .” — tela, i. e.fortunae.
3. Quidni consulitur, i. e. why is it not made profitable to us
by reflection. — sine populo, i. e. without guests. — sed . . . flec
tendum est : the metae, goals, were turning points at each end of
the Roman circus, around which the horses and chariots had to
turn seven times. Thus the one who had the inner track, and
who turned nearest the metae, would , other things being equal,
finish the course first and win the race .
4. habet, v. 1. habebo ; inpensa, cost, or expense, is here subject of
habet. - quarum dominus vix ... perlegit: many wealthy Ro
mans heaped together large collections of books ; but,in general,
the possession of a large library was no certain index of the lit
erary attainments of its owner - often quite the reverse ; and
frequently it happened that a man never read even the titles
( indices) of all his books. - turba, sc. librorum , a multitude of
books ; cf. Epist. 2, 2, 3, where, among other good advice, Seneca
says, “ Read always the most approved authors, and reserve some
particular sentiment for the day's meditation .” — Quadraginta
milia ... arserunt, v . 1. quadringenta milia . Under Demetrius
Phalereus (expelled from Athens about B.C. 307) the Alexandrian
library increased to 50,000 volumes. Afterwards, according to
some authorities, it reached the number of 700,000 volumes, in
cluding in its vast compass nearly all the best works in Grecian,
Roman, Indian, and Egyptian literature. The largest part was
destroyed during the siege of Alexandria by Julius Caesar. In
A.D. 389 the Serapium (temple of Jupiter Serapis) was burned,
and the 300,000 volumes therein were partly burned and partly
dispersed under the direction of Theophilus, archbishop of Alex
andria. Vid. Gibbon's “ Decline and Fall,” etc.,vol.iii. p. 144 ; v.
228, Am. ed . — Livius : Titus Livy, the historian . This account
is probably given in book 112, now lost.
5. servilium literarum : the common branches of learning, as
reading, writing, etc. , as opposed to liberales literae, the higher
244 NOTES .

and more advanced culture. Some suppose the serviles literae to

refer to the marks or characters branded into the arms of slaves,
as if the ignari of the text were unable to read these.—6. Hones.
tius ... quam ... effuderint: quam is followed by subj.either
with or without ut ; H. 502, 2.—hocce inpensae, i. e. for books ;
another reading is, in hos inpensas ... effuderim . - in Corinthia ,
sc. vasa ; those made at Corinth, of gold, silver, bronze, were
highly prized by the Romans ; cf. De Brev. Vit. 12, 1 , N.-Quid
habes cur ignoscas, what reason have you for pardoning. The
subj. is used after cur, quamobrem , quare, when a phrase, asking
the reason for which, precedes ; M. 363, obs. 3 ; 2.562.-armaria,
cupboards, for the preservation of books. As ancient books con
sisted of rolls, the armaria were used for keeping, not for using
them on the spot. Hence ancient libraries do not seem to have
required as much space as those in our day. Seneca (below, $ 7)
appears to refer to open repositories along the walls, reaching
up to the ceiling, tecto tenus exstructa loculamenta. Cf. Becker's
" Gallus,” p. 234 ; Guhl & Koner's “ The Life of the Greeks and
Romans, ” pp. 466, 529.- citro,v. l. cedro. - corpora : used by later
Latin and Middle-Age writers to mean the works of an author,
similar to our expression “ body of divinity.” Some read, opera .
-cui voluminum ... titulique : the titles and frontispieces of
the books of the time were often richly ornamented. Nor did
the custom die away with the luxury and glory of Rome, but
was sedulously retained by the monks in later centuries in their
copying the Scriptures, missals, and classical writers ; this can
readily be seen at Wolfenbüttel and other libraries on the Con
tinent.
7. cum imaginibus suis, etc. : Pliny ( Nat. Hist. xxiv. 2) relates
that gold, silver, and brazen images of great authors were placed
in libraries, a custom first introduced by Asinius Pollio . The
ceilings of the room were not infrequently fretted with gold and
ornamental glass of different figures. The floor was of Carystic
marble, to aid in strengthening the eyes by its dark color.

X.–1 . onera et inpedimenta crurum ,i.e.chains and shackles

on tiie legs. — facere (vitam) = agere (ritam). — 2. Nullo melius
nomine meruit, for no reason has nature deserved more gratie
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. X. 2 - XI. 1 . 245

tude from us.—Omnes ... copulati sumus : a figure taken from

the custom of fastening a prisoner to his keeper, the right arm
of the former being attached to the left of the latter. St. Peter
was secured to a keeper on each side of him (Acts xii. 6) ; St.
Paul was so fastened to the soldier that kept him (Acts xxviii.
16). Cf. De Ira , iii. 8, 4 . aurea catena : referring to kings,
nobles, rich men, etc., who may rightly be regarded as slaves to
wealth and lank .
3. adligatique ... adligaverunt: cf. Epist. 5, 6 — " as the
same chain binds together both the prisoner and the soldier
(who keeps him), so those things which are wholly unlike march
side by side; fear follows (and goes along with) hope.” — qui.
busdam sua, sc. imperia. The sentiment is twofold : some are
under the domination of their appetites and passions ; others, as
rulers and magistrates, are weighed down by their own authority,
their very dignities becoming, as it were, a burden.—quosdam
sacerdotia : certain priests were prohibited from leaving the
city, such as the priests of Jupiter,Mars, Quirinus ; others could
not leave Italy, lest the sacred rites should be intermitted ; cf.
Livy, ji . 52.
4. Exiguae saepe areae, etc., i. e. a skilful writer will write
much on very small tablets ; exiguae areae = small tablets.
pedem = aream or solum ; others suggest = pedaturam or mensu
ram.:—ferentis, for ferentes ; on present mode of spelling, cf. De
Prov. 3, 7, N.-5. Non sunt ... permittamus : cf. De Ira, iii. 7, 2.
-speique nostrae adludentia, things that give encouragernent to
our hopes . - praerupta, dangerous. — 6. Multi ... sunt, i. e.kings,
princes, etc.; cf. De Clement. i. 8, 2. — suffixos : as Prometheus
was fastened to rock . - humana : some add lege (lex ).- secun
dos : others read sequentes or sequiores, i. e. tristiores.

XI.-1 . nec pedetentim , v. I. et pedetentim . - nec habet ...

timeat: cf. M. 363. — mancipia : cf. 1 , 5, N. — sed . . . quoque :
this is rarely found, and when used denotes merely an addition,
and not a rising to something more important ; M. 461 a. - pre
caria : precarium is that which is given to enjoy at the will of
the donor — a thing committed to our care, but which is likely at
any time to be demanded ; hence the force of reposcentibus. As
L 2
246 NOTES.

in many other of our derived words, precarious is a general term,

taking its rise from a particular thouglit . - vivitque ... reddi.
turus ; cf. Consol. ad Marc. 10 ; De Prov . 5. - commodatus, lent ;
used of things that are themselves in natura to be returned , while
mutuum dure is used of things for which an equivalent is given.
-2. Magna ... mercede, a great expense of time, care, and
labor. - factum , sc. opere et arte, the expression for plate.
3. Adpellaverit, si omitted, as often with fut. perf. In such
instances it is by no means certain that the sentence should not
be a question ; 2. 784. - animum meliorem : a mind improved
by the practice of virtue and acquisition of wisdom . Reverti
unde veneris : the Stoics held that the soul of man was mate
rialistic, describing it sometimes as fire, sometimes as breath, dif
fused through the body, and forming a bond of union for the
body ; cf. Zeller's “ Stoics,” etc., p. 198–201 . They also thought
that after death the soul would return in coelum et astra (the
weltseele of the Germans); Lips. - spiritus in servilia numeran
dus, i. e. our lives must be numbered among the things that do
not belong to us. — servilia, v. 1. servitia . — ait Cicero : cf. pro Mi
lone, 34 ; also, De Ira, i. 2, 3. - prae se ferunt: gladiators usually
manifested the greatest contempt for death, and received the
sword (recipere ferrum ) with much firmness. Their fate, how
ever, rested with the people, who pressed or turned down the
thumb if they wished them to live, or turned the thumb up if
they desired them to die.
4. animose, spiritedly ; cf. Trench, “ Study of Words, ” p. 59,
where he remarks on the English word animosity, as expressive
of enmity and hate, these too often stirring men to a lively and
vigorous activity.-vivo : Lips. conjectures vivus, which is cer
tainly consistent with the thought ; pro homine might then be
rendered worthy of a man , which is the meaning of the words.
5. Quicquid enim fieri potest ... molliet : very similar to a
maxim of Socrates, “ as those who are sailing in a serene and
peaceful sea have in readiness all things that are useful for
safety in a tempest, so those who are wise, in prosperity, make
ready protection against the day of adversity." - Sciebam : cf.
Consol. ad Marc. 9.- conclamatum est, i. e. over the remains of
the dead. — inmaturas . . . praecessit: it was the custom to
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. XI . 5-8. 247

attend funeral processions of children at night with torches and

wax tapers. — capulus : Fickert adopts this as on the whole the
best reading ; others read copulatas.
6. mali ... auctoris, reporter of evil, or of bad news. — Publius :
Syrus, so called from the country of his birth, was a slave manu
mitted by his master, whose name he took , and bence is known
as Publius Syrus. He flourished about B.C. 45, and became cele
brated at Rome as a mimographer. His mimes were early com
mitted to writing, and there is extant a collection of about one
thousand lines, in iambic and trochaic measures, containing prov
erbs, apophthegms, and witty sayings. He exhibits a profound
insight into human nature, and his wit is unsurpassed by writers
of any age. Cf. Dunlop's “ Roman Literature,” vol. i. p. 332, Am.
ed.; also, Class. Dict. - verba ad ... spectantia : the cavea was
the entire portion of the theatre assigned to spectators. The
senators and other dignitaries occupied the lowest part, the
middle classes the next above, and the plebs the highest. Hence
verba here signifies such vulgar commonplaces as suit the lowest
society.-- cothurno . . . sipario , the buskin ... the smaller cur
tain, by metonymy for tragedy and comedy ; cf. Hor. Ars Poet.
278, etc. — et hoc ait : et, but or but also. In a negative proposi
tion, followed by an affirmative, when the same thought is ex
pressed, et is used where we use but ; cf. M. 433, obs. 2. - Cuivis
potest, etc.: Lipsius quotes a similar sentiment from Xenophon ,
πάντα άνθρωπον δεί προσδοκών άπαντα..
7. praetextam et augurale et lora patricia : praetexta , sc.
toga, was the cloak worn by the higher magistrates and the
priests ; augurale, the augur's staff (Lips. prefers auguralem , sc.
togam ) ; lora patricia, the shoes or slippers of red Parthian leath
er, worn in the days of the republic by the three highest magis
trates, the consul, praetor, and curule aedile ; but in later times
used by all the senators, marked with the ivory crescent, or Ro
man c, which stood for centum , as that was the original number
of senators. - exportatio : a reading much disputed ; Lips. con
jectures exsputatio, an expression of supreme contempt.
8. proculcatio : post-Aug.,derived from pro and calx, in refer
ence to the ancient custom of kings putting their foot upon the
necks of the conquered. This practice in time yielded to that
248 NOTES .

of compelling captives to pass under the yoke; hence, to subju

gate.dominus, i. e. tyrannus.- carnifex, the public executioner at
Rome. His office was considered so degrading and odious that
he was not allowed to reside within the city, but lived outside
the porta metia, near the place where slaves were punished. Cf.
Dict. Antiq.-aliena genua : suggestive of the position of cap
tives, kneeling and stretching out their hands to their captors.
numquid : an interrog. particle, quid in this case baving no mean
ing ; Z. 351, note ; M. 451 b ; num expects the answer no.--Pom.
peio, v. 1. Ptolemaeo. This Pompey was, according to Lipsius,
probably a great-grandson of Pompey the Great, and son of that
Sextius Pompey who was consul with Sextus Apuleius during
the last year of the reign of Augustus. Being a relative of Au
gustus, he was of course related to Caligula.—Caius, i. e. Caius
Caesar Caligula, emperor A.D. 37–41, son of Germanicus and
Agrippina, grand-daughter of Augustus, and nephew of Tiberius,
whom he succeeded ; cf. Class. Dict.; also, Merivale, “ History of
the Romans under the Empire,” vol. v. p. 166, etc. The incident
here mentioned , which is in keeping with Caligula's character,
is valuable historically, being recorded only by Seneca . - aperu
isset . . . domum, i. e. he had received Pompey into the palace,
ostensibly conferring a great honor upon him.—tot flumina, etc.:
a reference again to the wealth and extensive domains of some of
the Roman citizens at that time; cf. Epist. 89, 20 ; De Benef. ii. 8.
-heres, i. e. Caligula. - publicum funus : cf. Dict. Antiq. Lips.
expresses wonder that neither Suetonius por Dio Cassius makes
mention of this incident, and exclaims, “ Who can enumerate all
the enormities of that monster !"
9. Seianus : Aelius Sejanus, the corrupt minister of the gloomy
Tiberius, who for eight years held absolute sway over the em
peror. On finding that Sejanus was purposing to dethrone him,
Tiberius gave secret orders to put him to death . The Roman
populace tore his body in pieces, and cast them into the Tiber.
Cf. Class. Dict. — Croesum, the king of Lydia, famed for his
wealth, was conquered by Cyrus the Great, and ordered to be
burned. While on the funeral pile he called out, “ Solon, Solon , "
several times. Cyrus having asked the reason of this, Croesus
stated that Solon had in former years warned him in regard to
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. XI. 9 - XII. 2 . 249
the uncertainty of human felicity. The Persian monarch was
struck with the truth of this sentiment, and so spared the life
of Croesus, and made him his friend and counsellor. Vid. the
story, as told by Herodotus,i. 29-33,86–90. - ad Iugurtham ...
spectavit: Jugurtha was the adopted son of Micipsa, and, in con
junction with Adherbal and Hiempsal, king of Numidia. Lips.
thinks Seneca inaccurate in attributing to one year what it had
taken five to accomplish. It is true the entire war lasted five
years, but Caius Marius was in chief command only during the
last and successful year, B.c. 107–106. Hence Seneca is correct
in embracing the change he mentions within one year. Vid.
Class. Dict.-intra . quam , within that very year.
10. Ptolemaium : king of Mauretania (ab. A.D. 18–40), grand
son of Mark Antony and Cleopatra, and thus a descendant of the
Ptolemies of Egypt. He was summoned to Rome, and soon after
put to death by Caligula, who coveted his great wealth . — Mith
ridates : one of the Arsacidae, and placed upon the throne of
Armenia by Tiberius, A.D. 35. Caligula threw him into prison ;
Claudius released him, and sent him back to Armenia, A.D. 47,
where he reigned till expelled and put to death by his nephew,
Rhadamisthus, A.D. 52. - alter, i. e. Mithridates : alter, Ptolemy.
-ut ... mitteretur, i. e. in good faith, for he was slain on the
road by Caligula's orders, for the reason given above.-11 . ne
aut . . . laboremus, that we neither labor over needless things, nor
spend time in vain .
XII . - 1 . semper ... similes: cf. Epist. 98, 8,where he calls
this class of persons satagios, over-anxious. — formicis : a rather
unfortunate illustration, since the fact is not as here stated ; cf.
Prov. vi. 6 ; xxx. 25 ; also, Hor. Sat. i. 1 , 33.-2. inquietam iner.
tiam : this whole picture of busy idlers is so graphic and true
that it applies as well in the 19th as in any preceding century.
iudicium, sponsalia : Fickert, in a note, gives it as his opinion
that perhaps ad should precede each of these words. Haase in
serts ad.-sponsalia : these were an agreement to marry, made
in such form as to give each party a right of action in case of
non - performance, and the offending party was condemned in such
damages as the judge deemed right. They might be contracted
250 NOTES .

by those not under seven years of age. Cf. Dict. Antiq. (Matri
monium ).— lecticam : the lecticae were of two kinds, for con
venience of the living and for carrying the dead. Some were
of great beauty and costliness. The lectica on which the body
of Augustus was carried to the grave was made of ivory and
gold, and was covered with purple and gold drapery. Cf. Dict.
Antiq.
3. lux orta : it was a Roman custom to pay visits of respect,
etc., at dawn.- nomenculatores : a class of persons at Rome
whose business it was to know the names of all the citizens.
They were frequently employed by candidates for office, in order
that these might be able to greet eyen perfect strangers as old
acquaintances. They were also in the service of the wealthier
people, to stand at the front door and announce to the inmates
of the house the names of those who had left their morning
greetings. — 4. auscultatio, etc.: in other words, a prying curi
osity . - quae ... audiuntur, i. e.matters pertaining to rulers or
princes ; Lips. — Democritum : cf. 2, 3, N. — ita coepisse, etc. :
Democritus begins his work On Peace of Mind (Tepi üdvuias)
with the words quoted.

XIII . - 1 . This short chapter is a continuation of the thought

in the preceding . - negotiatio mihi respondebit, my business will
answer my expectations. — 2. nec illi omnia ut voluit cedunt, nor
do all things turn out as he has wished .

XIV. - 1. Faciles etiam nos facere debemus ... indulge

amus, i. e. we ought to cultivate a complaisant, yielding dis
position, that we may not become too obstinate in holding on to
our established ideas and affairs._transeamusque in ea, etc.:
Lips. quotes from Aristotle a similar sentiment ; also, a fragment
of Aristonymus, who says, “ It is the office of a good pilot to suit
his vessel to the changes of the winds, and of a wise man to the
changes of fortune or circumstances.” — necesse est ... sit : cf.
M. 373, obs. 1 .
2. sibi adplicet, etc. These Stoic requirements only reached
the outer edge of Christianity. We find a beautiful self
repose, but not the Christian self-sacrifice !-naufragio : Zeno's
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI. XIV . 2-6 . 251

ship, with its valuable cargo, was wrecked on the Attic coast,
when he was about thirty years old. Forthwith he applied
himself to the study of philosophy, heard Crates, and subse
quently became the founder of the Stoic school.—Zenon : cf. 1 ,
7, n . - Theodoro : a Cyrenaic philosopher, usually called the
Atheist, because of the profane freedom with which he spoke
against the gods. This caused his banishment from Cyrene, and
also, at a later date (B.C. 307), his exile from Athens. Thence he
went to Alexandria, where he was employed by Ptolemy, king
of Egypt, to go as ambassador to Lysimachus, king of Thrace.
The same free style of speech deeply offended Lysimachus, and
he came near losing his life. The answer recorded by Seneca
saved him from crucifixion. -- tyrannus, i. e. Lysimachus. - et
quidem, sc. eam after et. Is refers to some noun going before,
and if this noun is to receive some additional predicate, quidem
is used , meaning, and that too ; 2. 699. - placeas: for subj., cf. 9,
6, N.-mea interesse : for ablat. of the possessive instead of gen.
of personal, vid .Arnold's Lat. Prose Comp. 203,2.-supra terram ,
i. e. on the cross, as above stated.
3. Canus Iulius : a Stoic philosopher, put to death by Caligu
la, on a charge of being a conspirator with Aemilius Lepidus.
Observe that the nomen and cognomen are transposed, as is often
the case in Tacitus, Pliny, etc. — Phalaris ille, tho well-known
Phalaris of our day, i. e. Caligula. This infamous tyrant is appro
priately named after the cruel and inhuman ruler of Agrigentum
in Sicily (B.c. 570-554).—duci, sc. ad mortem or ad supplicium.
mors beneficium : another of the horrible brood of tyrants ( Tibe
rius) is said to have replied to one begging for death , nondum
tecum in gratiam redii . — 4 . fides : Caligula was not accustomed
to recall or to commute sentence of death .— decem medios, etc.:
by a law of Tiberius ten days intervened between sentence and
execution ; Dio Cass. 57. — verisimile non est = it is hardly
credible.
5. ex morte sua • . habere, to make his oron death a subject
of investigation . - snus: Lips. suggests unus.-Caesari deo nostro :
a sarcastic reference to Caligula's self-deification . - promisitque,
etc. He is said to have fulfilled this promise by appearing in a
vision to one of his friends, named Antiochus.—6. Caianae cla .
252 NOTES.

dis magna portio ! i. e. you alone constitute a great part of the

loss which that tyrant and murderer inflicted upon the world !
XV . - 1 . libidinis lucra damnaque, etc., the advantages and
disadvantages of desire are equally hateful.- Agitur animus in
noctem : this is the result, be teaches, to which the pure mind is
brought by reflection upon the vices, follies, and sins of mankind :
gloom, sadness, avoidance and hatred of men and the world,
without any hope or promise of the dawn of a better day, or of
the coming of any light upon the moral darkness. The image
in Seneca's mind is a man overtaken during a journey by the
darkness of night. The mists obscure his pathway; he becomes
frightened ; and, instead of treading cautiously, he runs in every
direction, and flees from harmless objects (Lips.).—2. Democri.
tum : cf. 2, 3, N. — Heraclitum , born in Ephesus, flourished ab.
B.C. 513. He wrote a work On Nature (nepi púrews), and from
the obscurity of his style he obtained the title of Okotelvós. He is
frequently termed “ the weeping philosopher," in contrast with
Democritus. Cf. Zeller's “ Stoics, ” etc., p. 373-375 ; De Ira, ii,
10, 4 ; Juv. Sat. x. 32. — flebat, ridebat : force of the imperf. ?
3. Adice = adjice. — Bion : cf. 8, 3, N. — initiis, v. 1. mimicis, as
though Seneca had written, negotia hominum sunt ut mimica , to
correspond with the thought above, nihil magnum , etc., or with
the Latin adage, vita mimus ; cf. Epist. 77.-- 4 . quia aliquis
filiam efferat, because some one bears his daughter to the grave.
efferat : subj., since the cause is stated on some other authority
than the writer ; cf. M. 357 ; B. & M. 1255. - spectator : Lipsius
quotes aptly from Martial ( Epig. i.33) :
“ Amissim non flet cum sola est Gellia patrem ,
Si qnis adest, iussae prosiliunt lacrimae .
Non Inget quisquis laudari, Gellia , quaerit,
Ille dolet vere, qui siue teste dolet."

-faciant, sc. hoc. — 5 . Rutilius : cf. De Prov. 3, 5, N. — clientibus,

i. e. Septimius, who had been an officer under Pompey, and Po
pilius,who had been defended by Cicero . - simul de se ... fa
cere : the republic may be said to have perished with Cato, inas
much as he was the last who seemed to embody in himself tho
old republic.
 DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI . XV. 6-15. 253

6. quorum placeat ... desideretur : cf. De Prov. 2, 6 , N.

-Tanto fortior, tanto felicior : a formula of praise and encour
agement; Lips.—non tu dignus ... fortuna posset : freely ren
dered, not that the gods deemed thee worthy of an ill fate, but unde
serving that fortune should have power over thee. — 7 . manus inici.
endae sunt, i. e. either to be whipped or despatched ; Lips.
Regulum : cf. De Prov. 3, 9, N.-8. sub persona viventium : said
of persons who always live under a mask, after the manner of
play-actors.—9. revilescat : post-Aug.-used only once.
10. Illa . . . haec, the former ... the latter , i. e. solitudo, fre
quentia . - Cato, i.e. the younger, according to Plutarch ; but Hor.
( Od. iii. 21, 11) speaks of the elder Cato as given to this habit.
11. ad numeros, i. e. ad modulos. - incessu ipso : cf. Nat. Quaest.
vii. 31, 2 , “ We move on tiptoe ; we do not walk, but we glide or
slip along.” — detrimentum , disgrace, dishonor. — meliores acrio
resque : relaxation is a preparation for labor. The bow , thelyre,
and man are invigorated by rest (Dio Chrysostom, quoted hy
Lips.).—Ut fertilibus ... imperandum , i.e. as we ought not to
force our fertile lands to be productive, or tax them beyond their
strength . - 12. somnus ... mors erit : cf. Plato , De Legib.vii.c.
xiii., where similar sentiments are expressed . — cogerentur = CON
gregarentur.
13. dixi, i. e. didici ; Lips.-Pollionem Asinium : a poet and
historian, as well as orator, of the Augustan age, born about B.C.
76.-decumam (or decimam ), sc. horam . - ne epistulas, etc. : ac
cording to Plutarch, this was the custom of Archias, tyrant of
Thebes. On one occasion while he was banqueting a letter was
brought to him disclosing a conspiracy against him . He refused
to read it, with the words, in crastinum seria . Before morning
he was slain. - interiunxerunt, sc. se a gravioribus laboribus ; cf.
Epist. 83, 6.–14. novam relationem : cf. Dict. Antiq. ( Senatus).
-nox inmunis : those who during the day had been engaged
with the enemy were relieved from the watch at night. — quod
sit : for subj., vid . Z. 558.
15. Liber ... inventor vini, i. e. Bacchus. — vegetat: post
Aug., enliveirs, quickens, etc.—Solonem : Solon, the lawgiver of
Athens, born about B.C. 638, died B.C. 558, at the age of 80.
Arcesilaum : Arcesilaus, or Arcesilas, was founder of the New
254 NOTES.

Academy, and lived at close of 3d century B.C. The scepticism

of this school as to our capacity for obtaining truth is sufficiently
expressed by the formula of Arcesilaus, “ that he knew nothing,
not even his own ignorance.” Vid. Class. Dict.; also, Zeller's
" Stoics, Epicureans,and Sceptics," p. 499–505 . - Catoni: cf. $ 10,
N. — facilius efficiet ... turpem Catonem , whoever shall reproach
him will find it more easy to prove that the crime of drunkenness is
honorable than that Cato was base, because, forsooth, Seneca would
have us believe that Cato's towering virtues overtopped this
vicious personal babit. — aliquando tamen : observe use of ali
quando in connection with the thought of this sentence. The
word approximates in meaning to prope umquam .
16. Graeco poetae, i. e. Anacreon ; cf. Anac. Odes, xxxi., déw,
Ofw uavñval, etc. — Platoni, frustra poeticas, etc.: Lips. refers to
a passage in Plato as the one most probably quoted here ( Phae
drus, xxii. 245 ).– Aristoteli, nullum magnum, etc.; cf. Problem .
§ 30, Quaest. I. ; also, Cicero ( Tusc. Disp. i. 33), “ Aristoteles qui
dem ait, omnes ingeniosos melancholicos esse.
17. quamdiu apud se est, as long as he is sane. — escendere :
cf. Vit.Beat. 23 ; De Prov. 1 , 6, N. - Habes, etc. : here we have what
may be considered the epilogue of the whole book . — quae pos
sint : Z. 558. - nisi . . . circumit, v. l. circumeat. – Lips. calls at
tention to the fact that the promise implied in tueri and restituere
tranquillitatem is not here carried out by the writer, or at best
only in part. Possibly the criticism is too severe, and Seneca
ought not to be tied down to the rules of a formal and set
treatise.
 DE BREVITATE VITAE .
ARGUMENTUM . - I., II. The complaint of all, vulgar and illustrious,
concerning the shortness of life is false, unfounded . Nature acts kindly
towards us while we give ourselves up to neither lusts nor vices, nor
errors hanging over our life. III. , IV. Hence men make no account of
their time, and are never rightly mindful of their mortality. V. , VI.
Examples of illustrious men seeking repose in earnest, as Augustus,
Cicero, Livius Drusus. Some spend their time in light, trivial matters.
VII. , VIII. Few understand the science of living and dying, and com
plaints about occupation and business are vain. IX. Therefore do not
put off till to -morrow what can be done to-day. X. Those occupied
with trifles lead a very short life. XI. , XII. Old men about to die
basely complain of the easy things of life, and say that they have lived
only a little while. The so- called easy and delicate are to be numbered
among the occupati. XIII. , XIV. The delicati do not live more easily
and quietly than they who are busied with useless literary studies.
The follies of grammarians are adduced , and he shows that they alone
are at ease who have leisure for wisdom. XV. , XVI. Praises of wisdom.
Levity and inconstancy of the delicati censured . XVII. , XVIII. The
joys also of these are full of ſear ; from one quarter or another they
tend to escape from us. He exhorts Paulinus to seek repose (otium ) by
fleeing from dangerous public duty. XIX. , XX. He urges him to the
study of wisdom as to a friend indeed. The wretched condition of
those who labor at the beck of others, and the folly of those not seeking
repose and retirement willingly. Turannius an example of the latter.

Cap. 1. -1 . Pauline : Pompeius Paulinus,who commanded in

Germany, A.D. 58, and in connection with L. Antistius completed
the dam to restrain the inundations of the Rhine. He was father
of Pompeia Paulina, wife of Seneca. See INTRODUCTION, P. 13.
The date of the present treatise is not accurately known, but it
was written subsequent to the reign of Caligula, and is probably
one of the later works of Seneca.quod ... decurrant: subj.,
because the thought of another than the author ; cf. H. 516, 1.;
B. & M. 1255 ; A. & G. 341 d . - adfectus : usual force of theword
is, a mental state or disposition ; it means here rather, physical
256 NOTES .

tendency, i. e. to a short life. - maximi medicorum , i. e. Hippo

crates. In some respects he was the most celebrated physician
of ancient or modern times. He is the reputed author of a series
of medical works, numbering sixty volumes, called the “ Hippo
cratic Collection,” which have been commented on by various
writers during more than two thousand years. One of his max
ims is frequently quoted, “ What cannot be cured by medicine is
cured by the knife ; and what cannot be cured by the knife
cured by fire.” Hippocrates was born B.C. 460, and is said to
have lived to be a hundred years old. Vid. Class. Dict. - excla .
matio : cf. Aphorisms of Hippocrates, • Bios Bpaxus ' ŕ dè téxvn
μακρή..
2. Aristotelis : Seneca appears to be wrong in referring to the
great Stagirite here, as Lips. shows, by quoting a contrary state
ment of Aristotle's, viz., “ Man lives a longer time than any other
animal, the elephant alone excepted .” Cicero, also ( Tusc. Disp.
iii. 28), remarks, “ Theophrastus, when dying, is said to have
found fault with Nature, because she had given to stags and
crows so long a life, but to men so short.” — exigentis = expostu
lantis ; v. 1. exigenti. — istam , i. e. Nature . - educerent, sc. vitam ;
Haase reads edurent.
3. Non exiguum , etc.: for similar sentiment, cf. Herod. vii. 46.
-Satis longa vita et, etc. : cf. the well-known passage in Sallust
( Jugurth. 1) : falso queritur de natura sua genus humanum , etc.
si ... conlocaretur : force of impf. subj. in conditional sen
tence ? H. 509 ; B. & M. 1267 ; A. & G. 308. The conclusion data
est in the indic. forms a mixed period, with the condition in
the subj.; H.511, 11. — ultima ... necessitate : a euphemism for
death, abl. absol. with cogente. — quam : antecedent vitam under
stood, subject accus. of transisse. — ire = pergere, labi, etc.—4. ita
aetas . . . patet, even 80 our age, if it be well employed, will prove
very fair and long enough ; Lodge. - disponenti, sc. ei.
II . - 1 . Alium avaritia, etc .: cf. Hor.Od. i. 1 ; Sat. i. 1.
ex alienis ... suspensa, always dependent on the will of others.
-numquam non, at all times ; with non placed before, it means
sometimes ; Z. 755, 17. - alienis periculis, sc. quae inferant. - suis,
i. e. ut ea evitent. - ingratus superiorum cultus, i. e, a devotion
 DE BREVITATE VITAE. II . 1 - III. 1 . 257

to one's superiors that meets with no thanks in return . — 2 . ad .

fectatio alienae fortunae, i. e. a striving to amass a fortune
equal to that of another. — suae odium, sc. fortunae ; they are
Timon-like, misanthropic, dissatisfied with themselves. — mar .
centis oscitantis, for marcentes, oscitantes ; for the termination is
for es, see Z. 68, note . - maximum poetarum : probably the poet
Ennius is meant. The Romans used to call him “ our Ennius, "
by way of distinction, and he was regarded as the father of Latin
poetry. Born at Rudiae, in Calabria, B.C. 239 ; died B.C. 169.
Bouillet, in Lemaire's “ Bibliotheca Classica Latina,” holds that
Menander is the poet here referred to.-verum esse non dubi.
tem : non dubito regularly takes subj., in some writers occasion
ally accus. with infin .; cf. M. 375, obs. 2 ; B. & M. 1234.-omne
spatium , i. e. the whole period of a man's earthly existence.
3. mersos, sc. iis, i. e. vitiis. — recurrere ad se, to recover them
selves. - veluti, etc.: the same figure is used in De Tranq. 2, 1.
quorum : predic. gen .--- in confesso : adverbial phrase, confess
edly.ad . . . concurritur, i. e. to whose happiness everything
conspires.—4. sanguinem educit, i. e. by the rupture of a blood
vessel. — nihil liberi : no time free from business engagements.
populus = multitudo, a frequent post-Aug. force of the word.
Omnis = omnes ; see § 2, N.—Nemo ... vindicat, no one claims
himself as his own. — consumimur, i. e. we are made use of, the
one the advantage and interest of the other; v. l. consumitur.
5. quorum nomina ediscuntur : probably a reference to the
fact that those who wished public preferment kept a nomenclator,
concerning whom see De Tranq. 12, 3, n. Possibly it may refer
to prominent men of the court and distinguished orators. Cf.
Becker's “ Gallus,” p. 212 .-- queruntur, etc.: they complain of
the haughtiness of eminent men, that they have no leisure at
their service when they wish to approach them.-ad latus .
recepit, i. e. tecum ambulando.

III.-1 . inputes : cf. De Tranq. 6 ; also, 2, 2.—quoniam ..

volebas : quoniam takes indic. when the writer gives his own
opinions or assigns a reason on his own authority ; the subj. is
used when he gives the opinions of another. All causal and rela
tive conjunctions take subj. when they introduce a statement or
258 NOTES .

reason given on any other authority than that of the writer.

Cf. H. 576 ; B. & M. 1255 ; Z.544–49. — cum ... faceres : impf.
subj. in narration ; Z. 578 ; H. 521, 11. 2. - Omnia licet ... con
sentiant: concessive subj. According to Michaelis, the author's
zeal for brevity has injured perspicuity, and so he would supply
mirandum after unum . The sense evidently is, though all ... by
common consent signify their wonder at this one thing. — exigua
contentio est de modo= contentio est de exiguo modo. - in vitam
suam incedere, i. e. to encroach upon their life. - eius, sc. vitae.
vitam : supply tamen .
2. simul = simul ac. — Libet ... conprehendere aliquem, i. e.
I will detain any one of the elderly, for the purpose of interro
gating him , as follows, etc. - premitur = agitur.- isto tempore :
iste is called the demonstrative of the second person ; it denotes
what is nearest the hearer, that of yours. Cf. Arnold's Lat. Prose
8. - officiosa
Comp. 377 e ; H. 357, 2 ; B. & M. 1028. - rex, v. 1. reus.
... discursatio, i. e. a running about in an obliging way, for the
purpose of showing the city to your friends : discursatio, post
Aug.; cf. Lactantius, De Opificio Dei, 3.
3. Adice, i.e.adjice.- manu fecimus, i. e.which we have brought
on by our own vices and riotous living. Seneca often uses this
mode of expression.- quod , sc. tempus. - quando: cf. Z. 346.—
quotus quisque, etc. : literally, which in the series every day
passed, etc. ; render, horo many days ? Thus rendered, quotus has
always a disparaging sense, i. e. how fero ! M. 74, obs. 2 ; vid. Cic.
Tusc. Disp. ii. 4.-quando ... voltus, i. e. not deformed by anger,
fear, or other passions and desires. - quantum , sc. vitae tuae.
conversatio, viz. cum amica, above.- quam exiguum . . . relic
tum sit, how little of yours has been left to yourself.
IV.-1 . velut ... perditis, you expend as if from a full and
abundant treasury. - sit: potential subj. after forsitan, fortasse ;
H. 485 ; B. & M. 1177. — timetis, v. 1. tenetis. - A quinquagesimo
anno : there was exemption from military service after the fiftieth
year. - sexagesimus, etc.: an allusion to the law that senators
were not required to serve after the sixtieth year.–2. inde de
0. - quo pauci perduxerunt: supply vitam ; literally, to which
few have drawn out life, i. e. to which few have attained.
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . IV . 3 - V , 4. 259

3. si tuto liceat, if they may do so (descendere) with safety ;

viz. the great, kings, rulers, etc.; cf. De Clement. i. 8, 2, addressed
to the emperor Nero, where Seneca writes, “ It is slavery of the
highest magnitude, not to be able to become less.” — ut ... la
cessat aut quatiat: concessive subj.; before ut supply fac or
sine ; H. 515, II.; B. & M. 1283. — te, v . 1, 8e.

V.-1. non desiit : Augustus, a master in state-craft, several

times gave out that he meant to resign the sovereign power, but
he always took good care never to consummate his abdication .
Immediately after his threefold triumph over the Pannonians,
Dalmatians, Cleopatra and Antony (B.C. 29), he introduced many
needed and useful changes in the Senate and all branches of the
government, and then proposed to lay down his power, but sub
mitted to be placed at the head of affairs for ten years. He sub
sequently repeated this process several times. Vid. Mommsen's
“History of Rome,” vol. iii. pp. 323, 324 ; also, Class. Dict.
2. ut ... perciperem : subj. of result ; H.497. — ex verborum
dulcedine, i. e. since I cannot enjoy the pleasures of actual retire
ment, I derive enjoyment even from a talk about retirement.
Tanta ... otium : Lips. quotes Pliny, writing to Trajan, cum
otium a te, tamquam res optima, et petatur et detur. - illam , sc. rem ,
i. e. otium . — non poterat : supply frui. — 3 . cum civibus, viz. at
the battle of Philippi, in the contest with Brutus and Cassius.
cum collegis : M. Lepidus and M. Antonius, his colleagues in the
second triumvirate . - cum adfinibus : bis final contest was with
Antony, his own brother -in -law ; vid. Class. Dict. — ad externa
bella convertit: after he had become undisputed master of the
Roman world, his foreign military operations were directed
chiefly to maintain intact the boundaries of the empire, espe
cially along the Danube, the Rhine, the Euphrates, and in Gaul
and Asia Minor.
4. inmixtos ... hostes: the passes over the Graian and
Pennine Alps, between Gallia Cisalpina and Helvetia, were held
by a tribe named Salassii. The possession of these passes was
of great importance to the Romans, since they were, so to speak,
in the midst of the empire. The Salassii held out against the
Romans until Augustus sent Ter. Varro Murena to invest the
260 NOTES.

region with a large force. The Salassii were defeated and sold
into slavery . - ultra Rhenum : Augustus appointed his step -son,
Drusus Nero, to conduct operations on the Rhine . — et Euphra
ten : under the leadership of C. Caesar, son of Julia, Augustus's
daughter. - Murenae, Caepionis : Murena, the conqueror of the
Salassii, and F. Caepio, conspired against Augustus, B.C. 22.
They were arrested, tried, and executed.-Lepidi : M. Aemilius
Lepidus, son of the triumvir and Junia, sister of Brutus, formed
a conspiracy, B.C. 30, to assassinate Augustus on his return after
the battle of Actium. Maecenas, having discovered the plot,
seized Lepidus and sent him to Octavianus in the East, who put
him to death. — Egnatiorum : little is known of these here
named . Appian mentions two Egnatii, who were slain in each
other's arms, during the proscription of Antony and Augustus,
after the reconciliation, B.C. 43. - Allia : Julia, only daughter of
Augustus, and wife of Tiberius, was of a very dissolute charac
ter. She was banished by her father to the island of Pandataria,
on the coast of Campania, B.C. 2, and died, in the same year with
Augustus, A.D. 14. She is said to have engaged in a conspiracy,
with the partners of her guilt, against her father's life. While
in exile she was an object of interest to the disaffected . Cf.
Sueton. Aug. 19. - adulterio ... adacti : they were pledged and
bound by their illicit relations, as soldiers are by an oath . — iam
infractam aetatem : Augustus, at the time ofJulia's banishment,
was in his 61st year. He lived to the age of 76.-. plusque et
iterum ... mulier : the woman here named was Julia, Augus
tus's daughter ; the Antony spoken of was Julius Antonius, son
of Mark Antony and Fulvia. He was put to death, B.C. 2. Cf.
Tac. Ann. iv. 44.
5. partes ... rumpebantur, v. 1. parte semper aliqua rumpeba
tur, with Augustus understood as subject of verb . - partim mani.
festos inimicos, i. e. Catiline, the conspirator, and P. Clodius
Pulcher, one of the most profligate and unprincipled men of his
day. The latter became the deadly enemy of Cicero, because of
his testimony against Clodius for violating the mysteries of
Bona Dea, by entering Caesar's house, where they were cele
brated , in company with the ladies of Rome, in the disguise of a
female musician. Clodius, when tribune, obtained a decree of
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . V. 5-VI. 1 . 261

banishment against Cicero, B.c. 58 ; and Fulvia, after Clodius's

death, six years later, married Mark Antony, by whom Cicero
was proscribed, and meanly allowed by Octavianus to be slain.
inimicos : how does inimicus differ from hostis ?—partim dubios
amicos : both Crassus and Pompey proved themselves to be such.
Pompey promised solemnly to defend Cicero against Clodius
and his bitter hatred ; Crassus professed to be the friend of the
great orator and patriot; but both , on flimsy pretexts, refused
their aid when needed.- fluctuatur ... tenet : historic presents,
usage quite frequent with dum ; M.336, obs.2.-dum illam ...
tenet, while he was endeavoring to keep it (the state) from going to
ruin . Lips. quotes Aufidius Bassus, a Roman writer of history,
as saying of Cicero , “ He was a man born to be the saviour of the
state . ” For an able delineation of the life and services of the
greatest of Roman orators, see Forsyth’s “Life of Cicero."—nec
secundis rebus quietus,etc.: in regard to these defects in Cicero's
character, cf. the work just named. It is fairer than Middleton's
Life. It is right here, too, to warn the student against Momm
sen's treatment of Cicero, who, as Freeman says (“Historic Es
says,” 2d series, p. 268), is made, by the historian, “ a mere mark
for contemptuous jeers, for his name is never uttered without
some epithet of scorn .” — adversarum , governed by patiens.
6. Atticum : Q. Caecilius Pomponianus Atticus, a fellow -stu
dent and intimate friend of Cicero's, born B.C. 109. He was sur
named Atticus, probably from his long residence at Athens,
where he became thoroughly versed in Greek literature. His
critical taste was esteemed highly valuable, and Cicero and others
used to send MSS. to him for examination and approval : the De
Senectute was thus submitted to Atticus.—quadam ... epistula :
the quotation is not found in any of the Epistles to Atticus which
have come down to us. — filio, i. e. Sextus Pompey. - libertatis,
descriptive gen. in the predicate, supply est ; so also, sui juris.
VI.-I. Livius Drusus : tribune of the plebs, B.C. 91, uncle of
Cato Uticensis, and great-uncle of Brutus. He was an active,
ambitious, and energetic man, and obtained the passage of sev
eral of the propositions of the Gracchi, such as the distribution
of corn and division of public lands. As, however, he treated
M
262 NOTES.

the Senate rather rudely and contemptuously, and proposed to

double its number from the knights, that body repealed all his
laws. Disgusted with the state of affairs, he wished for a quiet
life, but did not obtain it. Seneca gives the account of his death,
followed by Appian, viz. that being afraid to appear out after
dark, he received his partisans in a dark passage in his house,
and that one evening, when dismissing the crowd present, he
suddenly cried out that he was wounded, and fell to the ground
with a leather -cutter's knife thrust in his groin. Vid. Class.
Dict.leges novas : see note above. He also proposed a law
giving the judicia to the Senate constituted as above noted, and
a law giving citizenship to the foederatae civitates. — mala Grac
chana, i. e. the disturbances and evils resulting from the meas
ures of the Gracchi. — rerum , i. e. the measures which he had
proposed and attempted to carry out, and which he was neither
permitted to accomplish, nor relinquish when begun. - praetex .
tatus: the toga praetexta was laid aside usually at end of 14th
year, when the toga virilis was assumed . — constet, it is known.
rapta = extorta, i.e. judgments were rendered as he wished.
2. Quo . ambitio ? to what end would such immature ambition
not hasten ?-erumperet : potential subj.-- scires, etc.: you could
readily perceive (suppressed condition , if you had the opportunity ) :
what is force of impf. subj. in conditional sentences ?-gravis,
troublesome . - nullo : supply dubitante ; in full, it would read, nullo
dubitante an mors ejus tempestiva esset, i. e. all believing that it was
not untimely .-3. ipsi : cf. De Prov . 4, 3, N. - perosi, v. 1. proden
tes. — adfectus relabuntur, i. e, they relapse into the old
.

state. — adfectus consuetudinem : by enallage for adfectum

solitum , or adfectum consuetudinarium . - nullum non = every ; non
nullum = some; Z. 755 ; cf. 2, 1, N.-hoc spatium , i.e. the allotted
period of life.- quamvis ... currit : the indic. is used with
quamvis in concessive sentences , frequently by post-Aug. writers,
as Tacitus and Seneca . The subj. is found altogether in Cicero,
and most of the earlier writers. With indic. it seems to lose its
etymological force; H. 515 ; B. & M. 1286.- effugiat,ut omitted :
necesse est is frequently followed by subj. instead of accus. with
infin ., especially in later writers. — 4. nec velocissimae, etc.,
Fickert omits nec, which we give, with Haase.
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . VI. 5 - VII, 4. 263

5. Licet ... enumeres, concessive subj.; B. & M. 1282 ; A. &

G. 313 b . -proiectorum , ( of men) given up to, addicted . — Omnia
istorum tempora excute, examine all the details of their lives.
quae . . . officia sunt : perhaps the author alludes to official
banquets and feasting ; or it may be the idea is that, like official
duties, banquets, etc., must be given and attended. Cf. 3, 2 ; dic,
quantum , etc. for similar sentiment.-6. sed omnia ... respuit :
the idea is, that the preoccupied man refuses additional food for
thought, just as a stomach already gorged rejects additional
meat or drink. Cf. De Vit. Beat. 24, 1. - hominis occupati, predic.
genitive.

VII . - 1. aliarum artium , i. e. arts other than the art of liv

ing . - pueri admodum, mere boys ; admodum used as an adjec
tive . - tota vita : ablat. of time how long, in place of accus.;
H. 378, 1 ; B. & M. 950 ; A. & G. 256 b.—Tot maximi viri, i. e.
Democritus, Epicurus, etc.—egerunt, have aimed at. - nedum ut
isti sciant: there is an ellipsis before ut, such as, it is evident, or
probable, or the like ; isti, antithetic to tot maximi viri, and refers
to the common mass of men, in which the writer includes him
self and the person addressed, i. e. such as we are.
2. inde = ex eo, i. e. tempore. — Nihil inde ... iacuit, none of
that time was unemployed , or frittered away in idleness. — quod
permutaret: muto and its compounds are usually followed
by same construction as verbs of selling, but writers both of
prose and poetry sometimes reverse the expression , and put that
which we receive in the accus. and that which we give for it in
ablat., either with or without preposition cum ; Z. 456, note .
permutaret: subj . after dignum ; H. 503, 11. 2. - Itaque satis illi
fuit, i. e. the time allotted to his life was long enough.—3. Nec
est quod : cf. De Tranq. 1 , 1 , N.- omnes illi, etc.: for a like senti
ment, cf. Pliny, Epist. i. 9. — abducunt, sc. te. ad inritandum
. . captantium : to stir up the avarice of legacy-hunters; for
ad with accus. gerundive expressing purpose, vid. H. 544, notes ;
B. & M. 1338.—sed in adparatu habet, i. e. he only values you as
you minister to his love of pomp, by paying court to him and
attending upon him.
4. Dispunge: post-Aug ., compute. - reiculos = rejiculos: v . 1.
264 NOTES .

ridiculos. - fasces, office, especially a high office. The consuls and

praetors were preceded by lictors with the fasces. — Facit ille
ludos : it was the duty of the praetor urbanus ( De Tranq. 3, 4 ,n.)
to conduct the ludi Apollinares. Vid. Dict. Antiq. sortem :
the two praetors determined by lot which functions they should
respectively exercise. — Diripitur, i. e. gratia ac favore: the idea
is that, so great is the number of his clients, there is a strife to
secure his services, and he is dragged this way and that. Cf.
De Ira, iii. 23.–toto foro : ablat. of place without a preposition ;
H.425, 11. 2.— Quando ... res proferentur ? the courts were ad
journed during the dies nefasti. Vid. Dict. Antiq.
5. qui omnes ... ordinat, i.e.who disposes of every day, as
if it were his last ; who cherishes the sentiment in Epist. 15, 12,
“ Behold , this day is my last ; if not,my last is very near.” — fors
fortuna : the goddess of chance or good-luck, and in fact of all
prosperity, worshipped with great devotion by both Greeks and
Romans. Vid. Class. Dict. — huic, sc. vitae. — adici, for adjici : cf.
De Prov. 2, 8, N. — huic adici ... nihil, i. e.the life of such a man
may be broadened and prolonged, but nothing can shorten it ;
for by the useful employment of all time, it would be a complete
life, no matter when it is brought to a close.

VIII . – 1 . Non est itaque quod ... putes : cf. 7, 3, N.— [non
ille . . . sed] : Fickert, in a note, says that he dares not omit
these words, although they are not in the Milan codex.—quid
enim : supply censes or ais. — eos qui rogantur, i. e. those of whom
the time is requested.—2. ipsum, sc. tempus. - neuter : subject
of spectat understood . — Annua congiaria : congiarium means lit
erally a vessel holding a congius, the usual measure of oil or wine
distributed among the people. It was afterwards (Quintil. vi. 3,
52) applied to liberal donations of corn , wine, money, etc., to the
people. Moreover, it was used to denote a present or pension
(as in this instance ) given by a person of high rank to his friends,
in return for which their services were rendered when required.
Cf. Cic. ad Famil. viii. 1 ; Sueton. Vespas. 18 ; Nero, 10. — caris .
sime, v. I. clarissime. - his, sc. congiariis.
3. eosdem aegros vide : cf. Epictetus (Stobaeus, Florileg. cxxi.
30). — paratos, agrees with illos, understood. Supply vide.
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . VIII . 3-IX. 2. 265

inpendere, to expend : governed by paratos ; H. 533, 11.; B. & M.

1122. — Quodsi posset ... trepidarent ... parcerent: cf. 1, 3 .
N.—4. res, i. e. tempus. — sine illorum incremento, i. e. they give
of their precious time without being able to add to that of their
friends to whom they give.
5. nihil admonebit, supply to : subject of verb is aetas under
stood ; for government of velocitatis, vid. H. 409, 1. ; B. & M. 793 ;
A. & G. 219. - sicut missa est ... curret: the figure is taken
from the races in the Circensian games. It is that of a chariot
eer upon the course, sent forth (missus) by the presiding officer
of the Circus Maximus. Vid . Dict. Antiq . - cui ... vacandum ,
for which (death) you must have time, i. e. to which you must at
tend . — velis nolis, for sive velis, sive nolis, whether you wish it or
not ; M. 422, obs. b .

IX . - 1. Potestne : there is an ellipsis of some verb after this

expression ; we may supply morti vacare after quisquam . — dico,
I mean . — operosius : the comparative sometimes serves to denote
a considerable or high degree ; M. 308. Render, operosius
quam ut, too laboriously . to ; or the whole passage, too labori
ously engaged to be able to live better lives . - possint: subj. is used
after comparative, followed by quam qui, or quam ut, in sentences
denoting result ; Z. 560 ; M. 440 a ; 308, obs. 1. - Inpendio vitae,
at the expense of life, i. e. the loss of a true life ; inpendio, ablat.
of price. - exspectatio, quae pendet ex crastino : cf. Epist. 1 , 2,
“ Embrace every hour ; the stronger hold you have on to-day,
the less will be your dependence on to-morrow. Life, however
unimproved , still glides away."—in tua, sc. manu . — omnia quae
ventura sunt, etc., all that is to come is uncertain . - protinus =
statim , iamnunc.
2. ore : Muretus would read, furore. = Optima quaeque, etc.:
Virg. Georg. iii. 66, probably the source of the common saying,
“ Our first days are our best days ;" cf. Epist. 108, 25. - Nisi occu
pas, fugit, sc. dies or tempus :
“ The cnnning fngitive is swift by stealth ,
Too subtle is the moment to be seen ,
Yet soon man's hour is up, and we are gone." - YOUNG.
-Hoc : supply tendit ; hoc refers to the quotation from Virgil.
266 NOTES.

-infinitam cogitationem , i.e. endless thought and planning for

the future, based on the false assumption that man's future is
long on earth . — dicit, i. e. the poet Virgil. — 3 . loquitur, i. e. the
poet.-pueriles adhuc animos : cf. Epist. 22, 14, “Every one de
parts from life as if he had just entered upon it,” a quotation
from Epicurus.
4. Nihil enim provisum , i. e. no provision has been made for
old age. - accedere eam cotidie non sentiebant : cf. Epist. 1 , 2,
“ Where will you find one who sets value upon time? who under
stands that he dies daily ? For herein are we deceived : we look
forward at death, whereas death in a great measure is already
passed. All the lapsed years of life are in the grasp of death . " --
facientis = facientes, sc. 608. — pervenisse, sc. finem itineris ; de
pends upon sciunt.

X.-1 . Fabianus : C. Papirius Fabianus, a Roman rhetorician

and philosopher in the time of Tiberius and Caligula. He wrote
largely, especially on philosophy, and Seneca, in Epist. 100, sets
a high value on his works, placing them next to those of Cicero,
Asinius Pollio, and Livy. Cf. De Tranq. 1 , 6, n.- cathedrariis,
i. e. pedantic, talkative. — antiquis : not ancient, in our sense of the
word (for he lived in Seneca's time, and seems to have been on
terms of intimacy with him), but one of the old stamp, character
ized by the purity and simplicity of the olden time.
2. quod fuit, quod est, quod futurum est, the past, the present,
and thefuture. What is antecedent of quod ?-quod agimus, for
quod est ; so quod acturi sumus for quod futuri sumus, etc.—Hoc,
i. e. quod egimus certum . - ius perdidit: cf. Pliny, Nat. Hist. ii. 7,
ne deum quidem posse omnia ... nullumque habere in praeterita
ius, praeterquam oblivionis ; cf. also, Hor. Od. iii. 29, 45-48.
poenitendae rei recordatio, the recalling of a thing to be repented
of. – retemptare = retentare.- sub censura sua , i. e. under the
censorship of his own onscience, or right reason .
3. necesse est ... timeat : cf. 6, 3, N.— dedicata : given over,
and, as it were, consecrated to memory ; i. e, it is beyond recall,
and in the grasp only of memory. — 4 . Haec ... nec eripi po
test : Lips. quotes Martial, et solum hoc ducas, quod fuit,esse tuum ;
cf, De Vit. Beat, 6, 1 ; De Benef. iii, 4, 1. — velut sub iugo sint:
 DE BREVITATE VITAE. X. 4-XI. 3. 267

comparison from figure of an ox under the yoke, which prevents

his bending his neck and looking back .
5. Abit, v. l. abiit.-in profundum , into obscurity.— licet quan .
tumlibet ingeras, although you accumulate as much as you please :
concessive subj.; cf. 6, 5, N .-- si non subest, sc. tibi. - quassos :
Lips. prefers cassos. - 6 . nullum , sc. tempus. — in cursu , in motion ,
on the wing ; as Heraclitus says, távra pći. — mundus = coelum .
XI . - 1. minores natu , younger, i. e. than they really are.
quam si una fata decipiant : cf. Martial ( Epig. iii. 43),
“Non omnes fallis ; scit te Proserpina canum ;
Persouam capiti detrabet illa tuo."
-non tamquam ... extrahantur ? (as Lodge quaintly renders
it), not as if they did depart, but as if, will they, nill they, they were
pulled out by the eares . - ut non vixerint : subj . of result.
2. quam frustra paraverint . . . ceciderit : indirect ques
tions ; fruerentur : subj. after the relative,with an indef. antece
dent. - At quibus ... agitur : cf. Hor. Epod. 2. – delegatur, is
made over , or assigned, i. e. to another. - inde = ex illa, sc. vita.
nihil ... fortunae traditur : for the wise man trusts to wise
counsels, and judgment rather than chance. — ut ita dicam, 80 to
speak : subj. of purpose. — in reditu est, makes returns : figure
taken from money at interest.
3. basilica, i. e. hall of justice ,court. - quos ... canes eiciunt :
dogs, belonging to janitors, etc., watched public buildings, as
well as private; they were generally loosed at night. The sense
is that some were so zealous and engrossed with their business
at court that they were the last to leave the hall, and the dogs
being let loose were at their heels. Lips. refers to De Ira, iii.
37, 2. — sua turba, i. e. their clients. -aliena, sc. turba.— hasta
praetoris = auction : a spear was erected at auctions, both to an
nounce, by a conventional sign conspicuous at a distance, that a
sale was going on, and to show that it was conducted under the
authority of the magistrate ; hence hasta praetoris. The use of a
hasta for this purpose is said to have been derived from selling
under a spear booty taken in war. Cf. Cic. De Offic. ii. 8. — infami,
infamous, as the price of confiscated goods, which were sold at
these auctions.-lucro : ablat. of price. - suppuraturo, i. e. gains
268 NOTES .

of this nature will become noxious, like a gathering ulcer. A

revolution would render all confiscations null, and hence all
sales would be abrogated, and restitution would be enforced .

XII. – 1. Corinthia , sc. vasa : there was a celebrated alloy of

gold, silver, and copper ( said to have been accidentally discov
ered at the burning of Corinth by Mummius, B.C. 146), which
was very highly prized by the ancients. It was much used in
fashioning various vessels, coins, etc. Cf. De Trang. 9, 6, N.
anxia subtilitate, i. e. to distinguish whether they were genuine
or spurious. - ceromate : ointment made of oil and wax, with
which the wrestlers were anointed ; they were then covered with
dust or soft sand . — vitiis : dat. after laboramus. — sectator puero.
rum rixantium , i. e. the idlers. — aetatium et colorum : governed
by paria , which sometimes in later writers takes gen. to denote
a certain reference (with respect to) to a thing which is otherwise
expressed by the ablat. ; M. 290, obs. 1, g . - vinctorum suorum
greges, i. e. bands of his slaves chained together. He character
izes the wealthy slaveholders as occupati, who employ their time
in thus dividing off their slaves. - athletas: contestants for prizes
( a ) a) in the public games of the Greeks and Romans. Under
the empire athletic exercises became a profession, and only those
trained for the purpose contended in the public games. They
went through a course of exercise and diet, and some of them
are said to have consumed enormous quantities of animal food .
Cf. Dict. Antiq .-- novissimos, v. 1. notissimos.-- quibus : dative of
agent.—dum de singulis ... itur, while he deliberates over each
hair, viz. to determine whether it should be trimmed or not.
deficiens, etc., sc. coma, i. e. beginning to be bald above the fore
head.
2. iuba : elaborately arranged ringlets and locks, perhaps; cf.
Epist. 124, 22, “ Why do you dress your hair with so great dili
gence and art ? " etc. — 3 . canticis =Echansons ; cf. Martial , Epig.
iii. 63, 5. — carmen : object of metientes. — sonant : Lips. prefers
sunt. - tristes, sc. res.
4. posuerim : potential subj. — argentum : the table-service
and plate displayed upon sideboards. Besides the necessary
plate used at meals, wealthy Romans placed costly gold and
 DE BREVITATE VITAE. XII. 4 - XIII. 1 . 269

silver utensils on their tables, called abaci and Delphici. Cf. Cic.
in Verr. iv. 16 ; Pliny, Nat. Hist. xxxvii. 2, 6 ; also, Becker's
“ Gallus,” p . 125. - ordinent ... succingant . suspensi sint :
indirect questions.—exoletorum : cf. De Prov. 3, 11 , N. - tunicas
succingant: cf. Hor. Sat. ii. 8, 70, praecincti recte pueri comptique
ministrent. - quomodo aper a coco exeat : the wild boar was
the chief dish of a grand coena ; cf. De Tranq. 6, 2, N. There
were those who pretended that they could distinguish by the
taste from what part of Italy the boar came ; cf. Hor. Sat. ii. 4,
40. — coco = coquo. - signo dato : by the master, with a nod of
the head usually ; cf. Epist. 95, 24, where Seneca, speaking of the
display of servants and extravagance of an entertainment, ex
claims, di boni, quantum hominum unus venter exercet !-quanta
... scindantur : cf. De Vit. Beat. 17, 2, N.—aves : consisting usu
ally of peacocks, pheasants, doves, ducks, etc.; vid. Becker's
66
Gallus, ” p. 133. - quam .. detergeant: depends on videam ,
above.-Ex his, in consequence of these things.
5. numeraveris : potential subj. The second person is used
of an assumed person representing a single indefinite subject
(some one, one), which is imagined and, so to speak, addressed,
in order to express something indefinite ; M. 370. - illas, sc. gesta
tiones. - alius, i. e. a slave, whose duty it is to remind them when
the regular hour for these various occupations has arrived.
6. Iam sedeo ? Plutarch says of Nicias, the famous Athenian
painter, that while engaged upon his masterpiece, viz. the infer
nal regions as described by Homer, he became so absorbed in the
work as to have to ask his servants, at times, whether he had
bathed or dined. Similar absorption in work is recorded of
Archimedes, Newton, etc. - dixerim , potential subj.: a thing
which easily can or will happen when there is occasion for it is
modestly and cautiously expressed in the subj., most frequently
in the first person, to denote that to which one is inclined ; M.
350 b.— 7 . hominis : gen, after esse understood ; H. 403, 2. What
is the subject of videtur ?--mimos.: cf. De Ira, ii. 4.—Esse ali.
quem : depends on some verb understood ; Lips. gives putas.

XIII. - 1 . inponas, sc. huic : cf. 12, 5, n. numeraveris. - cui:

dat. of possession after est.- latrunculi, draughts, chessmen, by
M 2
270 NOTES .

metonymy for chess. The game is very ancient, and Homer notes
that Penelope's suitors played at it ( Odyss. i. 107). Two sets of
men were used- black and white or red. As they were intend
ed to represent two armies in conflict, they were called various
ly soldiers (Ovid, Trist. ii. 477), foes (hostes), marauders ( latrones);
dimin. latrunculi. Cf. Ovid, Ars Amat.ii. 208 ; iii. 357 ; De Tranq.
14, 4 ; Dict. Antiq. - pila : the game at ball was very ancient and
a great favorite with both Greeks and Romans. It was played by
all ages and ranks ; and the Athenians on one occasion conferred
upon Aristonicus of Carystus the right of citizenship, and erected
a statue to his honor, on account of his skill in this game. Cf.
Athenaeus, i. p. 19 a ; Dict. Antiq . - excoquendi in sole corporis
cura : cf. De Tranq. 3, 1.
2. quae = of whom : refers to the subject of agant. The relat.
sometimes agrees with the predic. noun instead of the antece
dent ; H. 445, 4 ; B. & M. 695. - quem numerum habuisset :
a reference to the vessels and men that king Alcinous furnished
to convey Ulysses to Ithaca . - prior ... Ilias an Odyssea : the
ancient opinion was, as expressed by Longinus, that Homer com
posed the “ Iliad ” in the vigor of his years, and the “ Odyssey "
in old age. This is also the general sentiment in modern times.
For a discussion of the “Homeric Question ," in its several phases,
the student may consult Wolff's Prolegomena, Paley's Preface and
Notes to the “ Iliad,” Müller's “ History of Greek Literature,” etc.
-praeterea an eiusdem ... auctoris : there were, even in an
cient times, critics who held that the “ Iliad ” and “ Odyssey "
were not written by the same poet. They were called xwpisovtec,
or separatists, concerning whom and their views, cf. Grauert
( " Rhein. Mus.” vol. i.) ; Thirlwall's “ Hist. ofGreece," i. 500-516 ;
Edinburgh Review , for April, 1871 ; and Class. Dict. Lips. refers
to a fantastical story of one Phantasia, an Egyptian, daughter of
Nicarchus of Memphis. She is said to have written an account
of the Trojan war and the wanderings of Ulysses, and deposited
it in the temple of Vulcan at Memphis. Homer, the story goes
on to say, procured a copy from one of the sacred scribes, and
thus stole the materials for immortality. - alia deinceps huius
notae, and so on, other questions of this kind ; alia, object of
quaerere, understood . — quae sive contineas, sc. in tua mente.
 DE BREVITATE VITAE. XIII. 2-6 . 271

non doctior videaris : Lips. quotes Aristippus — as not those who

consume the most, but those who use the necessary articles of
food are the stronger, so those who have read useful, not the
most books, must be considered learned.
3. Romanos : Suetonius (70) names Tiberius among these.
Duillius : C. Duillius, consul, B.C. 260. He gained the first Roman
naval victory over the Carthaginians, off the coast. A column was
erected in the forum in memory of this, and it was adorned with
the beaks of the conquered ships. Cf. Pliny, Nat. Hist. xxiv. 5.
-Curius Dentatus : cf. De Tranq. 3, 16, N.-4. Claudius : Appius
Claudius, surnamed Caudex, from his connection with naval af
fairs, was consul B.C. 264. He commanded the forces sent to aid
the Mamertini, and, after landing in Sicily at night, defeated Hiero
and the Carthaginians. Vid. Class. Dict. - quia plurium tabula.
rum , etc. : Lips. quotes Varro (ap. Nonium), quod antiqui plures
tabulas conjunctas, codices dicebant : a quo in Tiberi naves codicarias
appellamus.
5. Sane et hoc . . . quod, this certainly may also be pertinent
to the matter in hand, that, etc. — Valerius Corvinus : consul, B.C.
263, second year of first Punic war. His operations were chiefly
directed against the Carthaginians in Sicily. He relieved Mes
sana from blockade, and received in consequence the cognomen
Messalu. - primus L. Sulla, etc.: Sulla, when praetor, B.c. 93,
gratified the Romans with an exhibition of one hundred African
lions, which were slain by archers sent for the purpose by Boc
chus, king of Mauretania. It was this king who betrayed Jugur
tha to Sulla.—cum alioquin adligati darentur, while in general
they were presented bound, i. e. to the archers . — darentur : cum
usually has the subj. when it expresses a kind of comparison,
and especially a contrast, between the contents of the leading
proposition and the subordinate ; M. 358, obs. 3.
6. Pompeium , etc. During his second consulship Pompey
opened the theatre in the Campus Martius ( capable of holding
forty thousand spectators) with games of unparalleled magnifi
cence. Five hundred African lions were slain, and eighteen ele
phants were attacked. Some of these were killed, Pliny says ( Nat.
Hist. viii . 20), by Gaetulian huntsmen ; but Seneca represents the
contest as between the elephants and criminals (noxiis hominibus)
272 NOTES.

who had been exposed to them . — bonitatis eximiae, sc. princeps.

Concerning Pompey, see the full and carefully prepared article
Pompeius, in Dr. Smith's “ Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Biog. ; " also,
Mommsen's severe and hard judgment, “ Hist. of Rome, ” vol. iv.
pp. 508, 509. - exterantur, let them be crushed . - Satius erat ista,
etc., it were better that such things as these be forgotten , lest, etc.;
satius erat, the apodosis, the protasis omitted. The impf. iudic.
is often used when it is declared, without a condition, what might
or ought to happen, but does not happen. The impf. of sum is
then accompanied by such neuters as satius, melius, etc.; M. 348 C,
obs.; B. & M. 1275.-minime humanae = inhuman .

XIV.-1 . Ille, i. e. Pompey the Great. — obiceret : on spelling

of compounds of iaceo, cf. De Prov. 2, 9, N.-plus, sc. sanguinis :
object of fundere. Soon after the games above mentioned (13,
6, n.) Pompey became sole consul, with dictatorial powers (B.C.
52) ; then followed the events which led to the inevitable and
bloody struggle with Caesar, and its results.-idem, also ; H.
451, 3. — Alexandrina perfidia deceptus: Pompey had been a
friend to Ptolemy, brother of Cleopatra ; but nevertheless he was
slain through the treachery of the young king's advisers, Pothi
nus, Theodotus, and Achillas. - ultimo, at last; adv. - mancipio :
dat. of agent; H. 388 ; B. & M. 1310. Pompey was stabbed first
by L. Septimius, who had served under him as a centurion during
Pompey's brilliant campaign against the pirates in the Mediter
ranean , He was aided in this murder by Achillas, to whom
Bouillet applies the term mancipio.-- cognominis sui, i, e. Magnus,
or the Great.
2. Sed ut . . . revertar, but to return ; subj. of purpose.
idem , he likewise, i. e. quemdam , 13, 3. — Metellum : consul, B.C.
251. He was the first of his family who rose to eminence. He
defeated Hasdrubal in Sicily during the first Punic war, and es
tablished the supremacy of Rome in that island. All the ele
phants of the enemy fell into his hands, and he was the first
who exhibited these animals in a triumph.— victis Poenis :
ablat. absol . – Sullam ultimum , etc. This statement is regarded
as doubtful. The poemerium was extended as the city increased
in size, but it was done, according to ancient usage, by such men
 DE BREVITATE VITAE. XIV . 2-6. 273

as had by their victories over foreign nations enlarged the boun

daries of the empire (Tac. Ann. xii. 23). After Sulla, it is claimed
that Julius Caesar, Augustus, Claudius, and Aurelian extended
the poemerium (Cic. ad Attic. xiii. 20). Aurelian was the last. —
agro adquisito : ablat. absol.
3. ille, i. e. quemdam , 13, 3.- quod plebs eo secessisset: the
plebs revolted and withdrew to the Aventine hill, B.C. 450, and
also on other occasions. The Aventine was not included in the
poemerium until the time of Claudius. — ut concedas ... scri.
bant, although you grant ; concessive subj.; B. & M.1283. - ut ad
praestationem scribant, although they pledge themselves for the
truth of what they write. — 4 . Fabianus : cf. 10, 1 , N.—omnium :
partit. gen. after soli. — nec ..tantum : the rising to something
more important is introduced rarely by non tantum , except when
the subject or predicate is common to both clauses ; non solum
and non modo are more frequent; M. 461, obs. - vitam : Lips. sug
gests viam .
5. nullo ... interdictum est, no age is prohibited us ; seculo,
ablat. of separation. The verb interdicere, with its own case, is
more frequently followed also by ablat. of separation than by
accus. ; Z. 469. Cf. Caesar, Bell. Gall. i. 46 ; Quintil. vi. 3,79.
Disputare cum Socrate licet, sc. nobis, we may dispute with
Socrates. - Carneade : Carneades, a famous philosopher, founder
of the New Academy, born in Cyrene, Africa, B.C. 213. He was
a pupil of Diogenes at Athens for a time, then adopted the scep
ticism of the Academics, and strongly opposed the Stoics on the
question of the criterion of the truth of our knowledge. Cf.
Zeller's "Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics," p. 508-535 ; also,
Lewes's “ Hist. ofAncient Philosophy.”—Epicuro quiescere : the
great aim of Epicurus was to free men from all apprehensions,
pains, etc., and to live in tranquil security ; cf. Zeller, as above,
p. 382, etc.-- Stoicis : their aim was to subdue every passion and
to live according to nature, as they phrased it ; cf. Zeller, Lewes,
Class. Dict., etc.—Cynicis : cf. De Tranq. 8, 3, n. Diogenes. — cum
.. patiatur : causal.
6. Quidni ... demus : subj. of deliberation is used in ques
tions as to what may, is to be, or should be done, generally with
a negative force, implying that it has not been or will not be
274 NOTES .

done ; H. 484, v.; M. 353. — per oficia , for the sake of paying
court. - meritoriam , that expects a reward = mercenary. — illos, i. e.
isti, above. — 7 . cum din torserint, i. e. by keeping them wait
ing . - simulata ... transcurrant, i. e. they pass them by with
a brief notice, through pretence of being hurried . — clientibus :
after refertum ; H. 421 , 11. - quasi . . . sit : H. 509, 513, 11.-in.
susurratum , sc . nomenclatoribus.
8. licet dicamus : 2. 624. — Zenonem : cf. De Tranq. 1, 7, N.
Pythagoram : native of Samos, the celebrated Greek philoso
pher, flourished B.C. 540–510 ; vid. Class. Dict. — Democritum :
cf. De Tranq. 2, 3, N. – Aristotelem : the pupil of Plato, founder
of the Peripatetic school, and second only to his master in the
influence he has exercised and still continues to exercise on phi
losophy ; cf. Zeller's “ Socrates and the Socratic Schools ; " Ueber
weg's “ Hist. of Philosophy ,” vol. i. p. 137, etc.— Theophrastum :
a Greek philosopher, born in Eresus, Lesbos, about B.C. 375, died
B.C. 287. He became a favorite pupil of Aristotle, who, on his
leaving Athens for Chalcis, designated Theophrastus for the
presidency of the Lyceum, and in his will left him his library
and the originals of his writings. Vid . Class. Dict.
9. Horum te ... coget : perhaps Seneca was even now an
ticipating his own compulsory death at the hands of Nero ; cf.
INTRODUCTION to the present vol., p. 18. — conterit, contribuit,
v. 1. conteret, contribuet ; conterit = perdit. - nullius amicitia capi.
talis : a reference to the condition of things under the emperors
of Seneca's day, when strong private friendships were looked
upon with suspicion, and regarded as almost treasonable. - nul.
lius sumptuosa observatio : perhaps a reference to the practice
of giving costly presents to the emperor, to appease bis wrath or
court his favor, through fear of his avarice ; cf. Juvenal, Sat. iii.
184, etc.

XV.-1 . per illos non stabit, it will not be owing to them ; cf.
Arnold's Lat. Prose Comp. p. 203. — quo minus ... haurias, that
you do not take in the utmost that you shall have capacity to re
ceive ; quo minus = ut non ; H. 497, 2.- plurimum quantum : to ex
press the highest degree possible, quantum is often used instead
of quam with the superlat.; M. 309, obs. 3 ; Z. 689.—deliberet
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . XV . 1-XVI . 5. 275

consulat ... audiat ... laudetur . . . effingat: for subj.,

cf. Z. 558 .-- laudetur, sc. aquibus. — Solemus dicere : for similar
thought, cf. Consol. ad Marc. 18, 6. - sortiremur : an indirect ques
tion ; H. 529. — forte nobis datos : Lips. objects to these words
as superfluous, since the idea offorte is implied in sortiremur.
nobis ... nasci licet, i. e.the mind at least can choose its intel
lectual, moral, and spiritual parents.
2. familiae : Lips. quotes from Cicero ( De Or. iii. 16), a Socrate
proseminatae sunt quasi familiae, dissentientes inter se et multum
disiunctae ; also ( De Divin . ii. 1 , 3), Peripateticorum familia.
maligne = invidiose et parce.-- diviseris = distribueris. - deicitur
= dejicitur, v. 1. ejiciet. — haec una ratio est, etc. , this is the only
way, etc.-decretis ambitio iussit : whatever the ambition of
another has imposed upon us ; Lips.-vetustas tempus. — 3 . iis :
-

governed by noceri. — sequens ... ulterior : the near and the

far -off future. - in vicino, near at hand. Lips. quotes from Vel
leius Paterculus (ii. 92), praesentia invidia , praeterita veneratione
prosequimur ; et his nos obrui, illis instrui credimus.-- idem
qui, the same ... as. — legibus : ablat. of separation.—4. Transit,
v.l. transiit . - hoc praecipit, i. e. praesumit, anticipat. - dum
agunt: M. 369, obs. 3.

XVI. – 1. Nec est, quod ... putes : cf. De Tranq. 2, 2, N.

hoc argumento = quia interdum , etc.— dum veniat: H. 519.
condictum = statutum . - id = otium . 2. muneris gladiatorii :
the gladiatorial show is said to have had its origin from the cus
tom among the Etruscans of killing slaves and captives at the
funeral pyres of the deceased. Gladiators were first exhibited at
Rome, B.C. 264, by M. and D. Brutus, at the funeral of their father
(Livy, Epit. 16). Vid. Dict. Antiq.- constitutum , sc. tempus.
medios dies : shows were held in the afternoon .-- ad illud tem .
pus, compared with that time. — suo vitio, through their own fault.
3. Quid aliud ... quam auctores illis inscribere ; M. 444 b ,
obs. 1. — morbo = vitio, adfectui. --exemplo divinitatis excusa
tam : cf. De Vit. Beat. 26.—4. lucis metu, i. e. through fear that
the light will soon dawn upon them .-- exsultantis = exsultantes ; 1

on use of is for es in acc. plur. , cf. Z. 68, note ; exsultantis, sc. 208.—
5. Cum . porrigeret = comprehenderet. — mensuram : Herod
276 NOTES .

otus ( vii. 184–187) gives the story in full as to the mode adopted
for numbering the vast army and followers of the Persian king.
The total of over five millions in all is generally discredited in
modern times. Cf. Grote, “Hist. of Greece," vol. iv. p. 380-385 ;
Rawlinson's “ Herodotus," vol. iv. pp. 128, 129. – Persarum rex,
i, e. Xerxes.

XVII. - 1. Quid, quod : elliptical expression, what shall we say

to this, that, or, how is it, that ; M. 479 d, obs. 1. – Maxima quae
que : cf. De Prov. 2, 2, N.-nec ulli fortunae ... creditur : cf.
Livy, xxx. 30, Maximae cuique fortunae minimae credendum est ,
“ The highest fortune is always least to be trusted ;" fortunae,
dat. after creditur. Various intransitive verbs that take dat. in
active retain that case in passive; such verbs must then be used
impersonally ; M. 244 b.
2. opportunius, more inclined or liable . — casura, things that will
soon fall away, perish ; in this instance, high states of felicity.
maiore, sc. labore.— Nulla . . . ratio est, meanwhile there is no
care of time, that will never more return . - 3 . materia, sc. miseri
arum . - plus ... auferunt, i. e. in enhancing the honors of oth
ers ; alieni, sc. honores. — desimus = desivimus. — Accusandi: acti
tandi ; Lips.-Marium caliga dimisit ? Marius received leave
of absence from the war against Jugurtha, and, repairing to Rome,
was chosen consul, B.C. 107. — caliga = military life, or service in
an inferior grade.
4. Quintius, i. e. Cincinnatus, who was made dictator a second
time at the age of 80 ; cf. Cic. De Senect. 16 ; Livy, ix. 13–15.
praevadere, v. 1. pervadere. - Scipio : P. Corn. Scipio Africanus
Major, was appointed to the command of the army in Spain,
operating against the Carthaginians, B.c. 210. At the age of 24
he conquered Hannibal at Zama, and took Carthage, B.c. 202.
In order to secure the province of Greece to his brother, he
promised to act as his lieutenant (legatus) in the war against
Antiochus the Great, king of Syria, and thus he became, as it
were, sponsor for the success of his brother's consulship. He
conquered Antiochus in a decisive battle at Mount Sipylus, in
Asia Minor. Through envious spite and jealousy he was charged
with being bribed so as to allow Antiochus too easy terms; hence,
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . XVII . 4 - XVIII . 4 . 277

in disgust at the ingratitude of the Romans, he left the city and

retired to his country-seat at Linternum. Here he spent the re
mainder of his days in the cultivation of his estate. Cf. Epist.
86, 1–5 ; Livy, xxxviii, 50–60. - fraterni, sc. consulatus. - repone
tur, v. 1. reponeretur.

XVIII. -1 , non pro aetatis spatio iactatus, i. e. tossed about

in public affairs out of proportion to the length of his life. It
would seem from what follows (maior pars, etc.) that he had en
tered upon his office while still youthful. - publicas in te con
verteris. It is not known to what disturbances the author re
fers. He seems to praise the fidelity and patriotism of Paulinus
in taking upon himself the odium of some troubles for the sake
of the public good . - faciat, sc. virtus.
2. Tu ... administras: an exaggerated statement. He was
not minister of the finances, but simply praefectus annonae, a per
manent office under the emperors, who had jurisdiction over all
matters pertaining to the corn-market, and, like the praefectus
vigilum , was chosen from the equites. — odium vitare difficile est :
because it is difficult to satisfy so many thousands of people.
3. ministerio honorifico : under the republic men of consu
lar rank superintended the distribution of corn. Pompey was
charged with this duty for five years, and Augustus took upon
himself the office until he appointed the praefectus annonae as a
permanency . Lips. quotes from Boethius, 8oquis quondam populi
curasset annonam, magnus habebatur ; nunc ea Praefectura quid
abjectius ?-cogita non id egisse te, reflect that you did not make
this the object of your action . - id, viz. ut committerentur. - milia, sc.
modiorum . — Non deerunt, etc., i. e, men suitable will not be want
ing to fill the place you vacate.-obicere = objicere : on spelling
of compounds of iaceo or iacio, cf. De Prov. 2, 8, N. - cum ventre
negotium est, you have to do with the human appetite ; cf.
Homer, Odyss. xvii. 286.
4. C. Caesar, i. e. Caligula.-hoc, viz. quod decedebat populo
Romano superstite. - superesse : this is the reading of the mss.,
but Lips. is probably correct in the suggestion that it should read
supererant, or superfuere. — dum ... ludit : that he might be able
to boast of having marched over the sea as on dry land, he con
278 NOTES .

structed across the channel between Baiae and Puteoli (a distance

of three Roman miles and six hundred paces) a bridge with boats
that ought to have been used in conveying corn for the fainish
ing people. He squandered all that Tiberius left in the treasury
(720,000,000 sesterces ), and spent continually more than the rev
enues of the state. - imperi: gen. for imperii ; Z. 49, note 1.
5. Exitio . fame ... ruina : ablat. of price ; H. 422 ; B.
& M. 884 ; Z. 444.— superbi regis, i. e. Xerxes. — saxa, ferrum ,
ignes, Caium excepturi: the idea is that they would meet these
things if they did not conceal the knowledge of the scarcity of
provisions. Observe the climax, Caium being placed last, as if
the sight of Caligula were the worst penalty. Cf. De Ira, iii. 19,
1, where Seneca, in enumerating this tyrant's cruelties, says that
he tortured with rope, rack, fire, and his own countenance.
inter viscera, sc. urbis . — tegebant: object, tantum . . . mali.

XIX.–1. esse : its subject-accus. is what ? - cures ac .

cedas : indirect questions. — horrea : granaries were built in va

rious parts of the city, in which the public stores were placed.
an ad haec, etc.: these were some of the questions much dis
cussed among the Stoics ; cf. Zeller, Ueberweg, Lewes, before re
ferred to, 14, 5, N.; also, Epist. 113, where Seneca has a curious
and rather amusing discussion of certain Stoic questions.-scitu
rus : expresses purpose. — ubi nos ... natura conponat : cf.
Epist. 64, where Seneca, writing of the death of his friend Sere
nus, says, “ And perchance (if the opinion of wise men be true,
and any place receive us) he, who we suppose has perished ,
has only been sent before .” — gravissima quaeque : cf. De Prov.
2, 2, N. - supra : adverb . — summum ignem , i. e. aetherem . - vici .
bus, v. 1. cursibus.- cetera : object of sciturus.
2. solo = terra. — vigentibus, sc. nobis : dat. after gerundive ;
neuter of gerundive of intransitive verbs is used with esse, to
signify that the action must be done. The subject which has to
do something is then put in the dative, as with ordinary gerund
ive ; M. 421.-in hoc genere vitae, i. e. in a life devoted to the
investigation of such questions as the above . — hoc = tali . - bona .
rum artium = philosophiae. — alta rerum quies, a profound rest
from worldly affairs.-- amare et odisse, sc, ad alienum amorem ,
 DE BREVITATE VITAE . XIX. 2 - XX . 4. 279

et alienum odium . - res : in apposition with the several words,

somnum , etc.; cf. Pliny, Panegyricus, 85, 3.
3. Cum videris ... sumptam, i, e . when you shall see the
magistracy assumed a second or third time, or even more.-ut
unus . . . annus : in other words, to attain the consulship.
Under the republic the year received its name from the consuls,
and in all public documents their names marked the year. Un
der the empire, when there were many consuls during the year,
at the will or caprice of the emperor, the year was designated
from those only who entered upon their office at the beginning
of the year, and were called consules ordinarii. - antequam
eniterentur: the subj. is used with antequam if purpose is im
plied and the action does not take place. In this case the at
ainment of ambition is prevented by death. Cf. M. 360, etc. —
luctantis = luctantes. — aetas reliquit = vita reliquit. — titulum
sepulcri: for the sole reward that honors might be inscribed
upon their sepulchres.

XX.-1 . spiritus liquit : cf. aetas reliquit, 19, 3, N.-quem ac

cipiendis inmorientem rationibus, i. e. dying while he is in the
very act of making and receiving his worldly gains ; rationibus,
dat. after in in composition.—diu tractus, long put off, i. e. by the
long life of the one whose heir he is.—2. Turannius : he was ap
pointed to the office ofpraefectus annonae by Augustus just before
his death, and was the first incumbent after that position was
made permanent.-vacationem, i. e. dismissal ; Tacit. Ann. i. 7 ;
xi. 31 ; Sueton. August. 37. — conponi se, viz. ut moribundum.
iuvat, sc. alicui. — nullo alio nomine, on no other account.—3. a
quinquagesimo anno : cf. 4,1, N. — in conspicuo, before the eyes. -
nemo non , every one ; Z. 755.
4. Quidam ... disponunt : persons generally left a sum of
money with which to build their tombs, but frequently they were
built during the lifetime of their intended occupants. Augustus,
in his sixth consulship, built the mausoleum between the Via
Flaminia and the Tiber, and planted around it woods and laid
out walks for public use. On the Via Appia and other roads
tombs were erected extending for miles. Cf. Guhl & Koner's
“ The Life of the Greeks and Romans,” p. 375–386.-munera :
280 NOTES .

gladiators, called bustuarii, were often hired to fight around the

burning funeral pile ; cf. Hor. Sat. ii. 3, 85. — exsequias : this term
was usually applied to the funeral procession ( pompa funebris).
The order of the procession was regulated by the designator fune
ris, who was attended by lictors dressed in black (Cic. De Legib.
ii. 24). It was headed by musicians, and accompanied by hired
mourners, players, buffoons, etc. The freedmen of the deceased
followed, wearing the cap of liberty. For a full account of fu
nerals among the Romans, cf. Dict. Antiq., article “ Funus ; ” also,
Guhl & Koner's work , referred to above. — ad faces et cereos
ducenda sunt : the funerals of children and of those who died
very early in life were, for the most part, celebrated at night ; cf.
De Tranq. 11 , 5, N.; Epist. 122, 10 .
 DE VITA BEATA .
ARGUMENTUM . — I. A happy life is sought for by all, but what it is, or
how it can be attained , there is general ignorance. II. , III. Concerning
good and happy life we must not think with the vulgar, but with the
best and noblest. Happy life, according to Stoic teaching. IV. , V. Full
er description of the highest good. Happy life rests on reason and
virtue, not on pleasure. VI. Virtue cannot be copulated with pleasure.
Criticism on some sayings of Epicurus's followers. VII. , VIII. Virtue
cannot be joined to an evil life, to which voluptas leads. To live hap
pily, and according to nature, is the same thing, reason alone being
mistress. IX.-XI. Virtue is sought for its own sake. He proceeds to
discriminate by showing what separates Epicureans and Stoics concern
ing the highest good. XII. , XIII. They do not truly follow Epicurus
who seek pleasure alone, for he enjoined good and right things. XIV. ,
XV. Pleasure must obey the rule of reason and virtue. He repeats
that virtue and pleasure cannot be forced into union. XVI. - XVIII.
Virtue alone suffices for living happily ; why, then , is more required ?
Answer : Not a philosopher's life merely, but his precepts to be accept
ed and followed . XIX. , XX. Objections against philosophers frivolous.
They persuade to noble deeds, though they may not act equal to what
they say. XXI. -XXIII. Repels calumnies, many of which were prob
ably directed against Seneca himself. A wise man does not despise
riches, which , although held by the Stoics to be among indifferent
things, afford material and field for practice of virtue. XXIV. -XXVI.
On use of wealth for divers good purposes. A wise man holds riches to
be useful, but not necessarily a good. Difference between a foolish rich
man and a wise rich man . XXVII. , XXVIII. Earnest and forceful words
of Socrates against slanderers of truth and virtue.

Cap . I. - 1 . Gallio : L. Junius, the elder brother of Seneca.

His name originally was M. Annaeus Novatus, but after his
adoption by the rhetorician, Junius Gallio, he was named after
his adopted father. He is said to have committed suicide, A.D.
65. The present treatise addressed to him was written probably
by Seneca in the latter part of his life, when he had become an
object of calumny to many on account of his wealth. It may not
improperly be considered as in some sort a defence of his own
282 NOTES .

life as well as an apology for his great wealth . — eo . . quo :

M. 270, obs. 1.-si via lapsus est, if he has slipped from , i. e. lost
the way . — itaque: expresses relation of cause in facts (Z. 344,
note) : since men are blind to perceive, etc., therefore. — illo : ad
verb ; literally, to that place = thereto . - intellecturi: fut. part. de
noting design ; H. 549, 3 ; B. & M. 1355. - profligetur, v. 1. pro
ficiamus, because of the unusual signification in which profligare
is here used. Lips. quotes from Livy, ita fortasse decuit, deos ipsos
committere ac profligare bellum , nos autem commissum ac profliga
tum conficere. He also refers to Tacitus and other writers as using
the word in the same sense, and remarks that profligare is to en
ter upon and carry forward an action to a considerable extent,
although not quite to completion.- quantoque ... simus, and
how much nearer we are to that ; ab belongs to simus, separated
by tmesis.
2. laboremus : concessive subj.- cui: dat. of agent ; H. 515 ;
B. & M. 1281 ; A. & G. 266 C. 1. - hic : adverb=in this case. —
In illis ... at hic : antithetical. — conprensus . interrogati :
conditional participles. — limes, i. e. via agrestis angustaque. - tri
tissima quaeque ... celeberrima, all the best beaten and most
frequented paths ; vid. Arnold's Lat. Prose Comp., quaeque with
superlat.; also, De Prov. 2, 2, N.-3. pecorum ritu : a very ap
propriate figure, which, according to Plutarch, Cato the Elder
once used in regard to the Roman people : “ You, he said, are
like a flock of sheep. You do not severally obey different ones,
but as a whole you follow after any one who will be your lead
er.”—sed quo itur, but where the mass are accustomed to go. Ob
serve that itur expresses customary action . — conponimur = we
connect ourselves with every rumor ; verb used in a middle
sense. — ad similitudinem , according to the example or manner of
men .— aliorum super alios, one upon one, and another upon anoth
er, or, one upon the other.
4. ipse : when does this agree with the subject rather than the
object ? M. 487 b.-premit, press hard or crowd . - nemo er
rat: suggestive of St. Paul's words, Rom. xiv. 7, “ For none of us
liveth to himself,” etc., though used in a different connection.
hoc : antecedent to quod, above . - videas licet : cf. M. 361 ; Z.
574. -et causa et auctor, the cause as well as the occasion ; 2, 338.
 DE VITA BEATA . 1. 4 - II . 1 . 283
-adplicari: subject-infin. of nocet. - versat, i.e. sollicitat, turbat ;
subject, error . — traditus per manus, handed or delivered doron
from hand to hand, i. e. from father to son.—5. comitiis : on the
Roman comitia, cf. Dict. Antiq.-mobilis = fickle, inconstant ; ap
plied to any thing readily moved about by force of the winds, as
a weathercock, etc.; cf. Cicero, Pro Murena, 17 ; Hor. Od. i. 1, 7,
8.—se . . . circumegit, has whirled itself about.—in quo secun
dum plures datur, in which judgment is given by the majority, i. e.
in which the majority rule.

II.-1. non est quod ... respondeas, there is no occasion for

your answering ; cf. De Tranq. 1 , 2, N.; respondeas, subj . in an in
defin. relative sentence ; Z. 561 b, 562 ; H. 503, note 2 ; M. 372,
obs. 6.—discessionum : there were three ways in which the vote
was taken in the Senate-1, by voice, when each senator re
sponded to the question of the consul, assentio ; 2, when difference
of opinions existed, the leaders took their positions on separate
seats, and their several supporters ranged themselves by their
side ; this was called pedibus sententiam ire, or the decision per
discessionem ; 3, remaining in their seats, they signified assent
with uplifted hands ; Lips.—Haec pars videtur : the usual
formula of declaring the vote, similar to our “ the ayes, or noes,
seem to have it.” — peior est : cf. Epist. 29, 10, quid . philo
sophia praestabit ? etc.—Non tam .. agitur, it does not go 80
well with human affairs. — volgo : dat. of agent, by what rule ? H.
388, 1 ; B. & M. 844 ; A. & G. 232 b.— tam chlamydatos quam
coronatos, for tam coronatos quam chlamydatos, a kind of hystero
logia frequent in Seneca ; literally, as well those wreathed with a
crown as those who wear the chlamys. This was a Grecian scarf,
originally military, but afterwards worn by actors, women and
children, and also by common soldiers. The youths wore it
until the age of twenty. The coronati were the victors, either
soldiers, poets, pugilists, etc., who received a crown of garlands;
vid. Dict. Antiq. The words indicate figuratively two classes of
mankind, high and low, noble and ignoble, etc. Lips. conject
ures, candidatos quam coloratos, i. e. as well those clothed in white
as those attired in colored clothes, on the ground that the more
respectable were clothed in white, and thus distinguished from
284 NOTES .

the rabble, the colorati. He urges this as being more consistent

with the context, Non enim colorem vestium , etc.
2. oculis ... non credo : since with the eyes the real life
cannot be seen ; credo, with dat., I trust. – diiudicem : subj. of re .
sult ; H. 503, not 2 ; B. & M. 1218. — tortus a se, tested or tried by
itself, i. e. after self -examination . - in multis rideo, v. 1. mutis in.
video . — quanto : adverb . - levius, v. 1. melius.—3. si modo ..
gratia est : a modification of the main statement. Lips. quotes
Sallust, inter bonos amicitia, inter malos factio est. — ut me
educerem , to withdraw myself from . — aliqua dote = by some par
ticular gift or talent, or, perhaps, by some marked action ; a fre
quent post-Aug. meaning.-quid aliud quam ... opposui, what
else did I do but oppose myself to the weapons. A tense of facere is
omitted in short propositions containing an opinion on a person's
action ; this is so in various phrases. Cf. Z. 771. - aut, quod in
aequo est, or , what is to the same purpose.- esse : supply hostes.
populus, throng, or multitude ; post-Aug. signification.

III.-1 . Quin ( from qui-ne, non ): primarily means, hor not,

why not ; cf. M. 375, obs. 5.—usu, in respect to profit. quod sen
tiam, which I experience, i. e. in animo, like the French sentir.–
sentiam .. ostendam : subj. after relat. with indefinite antece
dent. - ostendam , in apparatu et pompa ; Lips. — ad quae con
sistitur, sc. populis, near which people delay . — foris, i. e. extrinse
cus, on the outside, outwardly ; opposed to introrsus, on the in
side, inwardly ; cf. De Prov. 6, 4, N-in speciem ( for ablat. specie),
for appearance' sake. — a secretiore parte = in that which is less
visible to the eye.-Hoc, i. e. a secretiore parte. - eruamus = inve
niamus.
2. circumitus: post-Aug., circumlocutions. - et ... et, as well
.. as. — coarguere, i. e. confutare. — non adligo me, etc: : cf.
Epist. 45, 4, to the same purpose. - proceribus, i. e. Zeno, Chry
sippus, Cleanthes.-censendi ius, the right of expressing opinion ,
or of voting. This and the following sentences, to Hoc amplius
censeo inclusive, embody the phraseology of the Senate in legisla
tion.-sententiam dividere, i. e. to divide a proposition contain
ing several parts, so that the question might be taken on each
separately. The call was made, divide ( imperative).— citatus :
 DE VITA BEATA . III. 2-IV. 4. 285

each senator was called upon in the order of his rank . – rerum
naturae, nature, the deus of the Stoics.
3. Beata est . . . suae : in this the Stoics placed the highest
good of man. Lips. quotes Chrysippus, tò télos kivai áco cúbws
rõ qúoel Zñv.-conveniens, harmonious with .- quae et haec, i. e.
vita. — patiens : cf. De Constant. Sap. 14, 2. — sine admiratione :
cf. Horace's well-known nil admirari, etc. , Epist. i . 6, 1.-usura
servitura : fut. part. denoting inclination, inclined to use,
inclined to be in servitude. — 4 . perpetuam ... libertatem : cf.
Epist. 92, 3, quid est beata vita ? etc.- in ipsis flagitiis noxia, i. e.
in the case of acts done in the heat of passion, hurtful. — omnis
. . . feritas : cf. De Ira, i. 16, 27.

IV . - 1 . eadem sententia, sc. potest.- non : modifies iisdem , not

the same = different (aliis).-sinuata media parte : ablat. absol.,
the middle swelling outward like a crescent. — illi: dat. of posses
sion ; H. 387 ; B. & M. 821 ; A. & G. 231. - standi : limits volun
tas, desire of making a stand. — ita : answer to quemadmodum ,
above. — finitio, v. 1. definitio. - exporrigi: post-Aug., used by
Pliny, Persius, etc.—colligi, compressed, i. e. comprised in a few
words.—2. conversantium cura, regard for those much in one's
company, those with whom one associates much ; conversor is
post-Aug., much used by Seneca ; cf. De Clement. i. 3, 2. - finire
-
= definire, to define. - extollant ... frangant ... noverit : con
secutive subjunctives.
3. si evagari velis, if you wish to amplify. — aliam ... faciem ,
one and another (i. e. different) aspect. The thought is, you may
view the same idea in different aspects, provided its force remain
unimpaired. - potestate, i. e. significatione — prohibet : usually
followed as a verb of hindering by quominus or ne, with subj .,
but sometimes, as in this instance, by accus. with infin .; Z. 544,
note. - interritum , undismayed by fear ; cf. Cic. Tusc. Disp. v. 14,
volumus eum , qui beatus sit, tutum esse, inexpugnabilem , septum
atque munitum ; non ut parvo metu praeditus sit, sed ut nullo.
4. velit nolit : familiar expression for sive velit, sive nolit, sup
pose he were willing, suppose he were unwilling, i. e. whether he
were willing or not ; M. 442 b, obs. - sequatur ; consecutive subj.,
ut being omitted after necesse est ; M. 373, obs. 1 ; Z. 625.—ex alto,
N
286 NOTES .

from the depths of the heart. - ut quae = cum ea . The force of

qui in causal sentences is increased by ut ; H. 517 ; B. & M. 1253,
obs. 2 .-- corpusculi : diminutive used as an expression of con
tempt. - et = etiam.- quo die, etc. , on the day he shall become the
slave of pleasure he will become the subject ofpain.

1.-1 . servitutem : after serviturus sit, accus. of kindred sig.

nification ; H. 371 , 1 , 3 ; B. & M. 713 ; A. & G. 238.-dominia=
domini. - alternis, sc. vicibus, by turns, alternately . - exeundum
est, sc. nobis, we must rise into liberty .-- in tuto conlocata ,
securely established . - diffusio animi = laetitia , serenitas. — ex bono
suo ortis, those things that arise from his own goodness, i. e. the
fruit of good inhering in him.
2. Quoniam . . . rationis, ince I have begun to treat this mat
ter largely, or liberally, I may add that he can be called blessed who,
by the aid of reason, neither desires nor fears anything. - cupit nec
timet, sc . quidquam.- Quoniam et : the ellipsis in the thought
may be supplied thus, “ I mention reason because," etc. ; quo
niam assigns a motive rather than a conclusive reason ; Z. 346.—
dixerit : perf. subj. used as softened indic., not essentially differ
ent from fut., any one will not call them happy, etc.
3. illis, i. e. pecoribus et animalibus. - extra veritatem pro
iectus, one who has taken himself outside the pale of truthfulness.
lacerationes, vellicationes : the former refer to the body, the
latter to the mind ; cf. De Ira, iii. 43, 5. — statura semper ubi
constitit, proposing, i. e. resolving to stand where she has taken her
stand .- ac ... vindicatura, and determined to maintain her posi
tion even against an irate and hostilefortune. Observe use of fut.
parts. - 4. Nam quod ... pertinet, for in regard to pleasure.
omnes vias, all avenues of the senses. — aliaque ex aliis admoveat,
and though she applies one means after another ; admoveat : concess.
subj. ; H. 515 ; B. & M. 1282.-velit : deliberative subj. ; H. 484,
V.; B. & M.1780. - deserto animo ... dare, to attend to thebody
at the expense of the mind ; deserto animo : abl. absol.

VI.–1 , inquit, says he, i . e. the Epicurean, the man who finds
happiness in pleasure, and who confounds the pleasures of the
body with those of the mind. - arbiter : in apposition with
 DE VITA BEATA . VI. 1 - VII. 2 . 287

what ? --- praeterita respiciat, etc.: a dogma of Epicurus, that

the wise rnan enjoys present, recalls past, and anticipates future
pleasures ; cf. Cic. De Fin . ii.; Lips.- inmineat,let him reach out
or grasp after, like a miser, as it were.—- sagina,fatness, produced
by much eating ; post-Aug.- legere, to choose.
2. cui : dat. of agent. — Beatus ergo, etc. Compare these with
the beatitudes of the Divine Master, and although granting that
they embody great moral truths, to which Seneca had attained,
yet we cannot but perceive how far short they are of those cheer
ing and heart-searching truths contained in the Sermon on the
Mount. - iudicii rectus : cf. 5, 3.- omnem suarum, every
disposition of his affairs , habitum : mostly post-Aug. in this sig
nification . - Videt et in illis, v. l. vident illi. — et = etiam. — in
illis in voluptatibus; sc. esse.— Videt et ... quam turpi illud
loco, i. e. a man of correct judgment sees also in how ignoble
a position, etc. — Itaque negant, etc., and so they deny that pleas
ure can be separated from virtue.-quemquam vivere, sc. ita, fol
lowed by ut with consec. subj.
3. ista tam diversa, these things differing so widely, viz. the life
of pleasure and the life of virtue ; tam is rejected in some edi
tions. - videlicet quia : the answer to the preceding question,
rendered by the advocate of the compatibility of virtue and
pleasure, to whom the question is supposed to be addressed.—
huius, i. e. virtutis.si . essent videremus : note force
of impf. subj. in hypothetical period ; H. 510 ; B. & M. 1267 ; A.
& G. 308. - indiscreta, not distinguishable, inseparable. - sed
honesta, v. l. sed non honesta . - exigenda, to be attained .

VII.-1 . Adice = adjice.-- quod, that.-et, even , i. e. some are

unhappy, even with pleasure. - qua virtus ... indiget, which
(pleasure) virtue often lacks, but never needs. -immo diversa , nay
more, whose tendencies are in opposite directions. — Altum quiddam
est virtus . . . voluptas humile : antithetical clauses. — cuius
statio, whose sphere.
2. coloratam , flushed with heat ; cf. De Const. Sap. 13, 2. - bali .
nea : balineum or balneum (Balaveĩov) primarily signifies a bath or
bathing -vessel; hence also applied to the chamber containing the
bath. In early times one room sufficed, but afterwards, as wealth
288 NOTES.

increased, a number of rooms, even in private houses, were desig

nated by the word balnea. Vid. Dict. Antiq., under this title.
sudatoria : for the use of the sudatorium , or central space in the
thermal chamber, vid. as above, Dict. Antiq.; cf. also, Juv. Sat.
vi. 420.-loca aedilem metuentia : the aediles were, as has been
remarked, the moral police of old Rome. They superintended
buildings, public and private ; took care of the streets and pave
ments, and cleaning and draining the city ; kept an oversight of
the markets and sales there, and watched the weights and meas
ures in use. They were charged also with the duty of preserving
decency and order in public baths and houses of entertainment ;
they too looked after prostitutes and houses of ill-fame. Vid .
Dict. Antiq. - medicamentis = cosmetics, paints. — pollinctam ,
washed, as corpses are washed for funerals; v. l. pollutam .
3. nescit exire, i. e. it cannot perish . - optima, being itself the
best, qualifies the subject ofmutavit,i. e. illa = recta mens, above ;
observe its position as the emphatic word.-non multum loci
habet, it does not occupy much room . The idea is that pleasure is
short- lived and transitory in its operations and experiences, and
hence, in comparison with virtue, which has the contrary quali
ties, its operations are contracted within narrow limits.—in ipso
periturum , having a tendency to perish in its very use.—et
dum ... finem , and even at its beginning is near its end .

VIII. – 1 . Quid, quod = quid dicam de eo, quod ; nay, even , or

moreover" ; cf. De Brev. Vit. 17, 1 , N.; also, H. 454, 2 ; M. 479 d, obs.
1 ; Z. 769. — comes, follower. — 2 . Hoc secundum naturam vivere.
-si .... conservabimus . . . subierimus ... possederint ...
fuerint: the several conditions of the protasis ; the apodosis to
be supplied, secundum naturam vivemus. The sentiment is that
he can live according to nature who employs the gifts (dotes) of
the body as nature demands ; who does not subject himself to
the slavish influences of the goods of this life, but uses them and
makes them subserve proper ends ; who does not allow covetous
ness or desire for another's goods (aliena) to possess him ; and
who does not glut himself with superfluities ( adventicia ), but uses
them as aids (auxilia) when necessity demands.—in utrumque,
against or for either event = mori aut vivere. — artifex vitae ; in
 DE VITA BEATA . VIII. 2-IX. 1 . 289

the sense of the old proverb, “Every man is the artificer of his
own fortune.”—Fiducia eius = fiducia sui, self -confidence. — illi :
dat. after placita ; H. 391 ; B. & M. 860.- litura, alteration or cor
rection . The idea is, let him not determine any thing that will
give occasion for repentance.
3. Intellegitur, it is plain . — in iis quae ... magnificum , i. e.
in entertainments, generous. - ratio sensibus insita : the idea
appears to be, not that the reason inheres in or is entirely under
the lead of the senses, but that it acts through them . — unde
a quo. — in se revertatur : supply et to connect with preceding
clause. - mundum (v. 1. mundus) : the Stoic mundus is simply the
matter or substance of their deus. They “ teach that whatever
is real is material. Matter and force are the two ultimate prin
ciples. ... The working force in the universe is god. . . . At
the end of a certain cosmical period all things are reabsorbed
into the deity, the whole universe being resolved into fire in a
general conflagration. The evolution of the world then begins
anew,‫ לי‬and so on without end ” (Ueberweg's “ Hist. of Philoso
phy, ” i. 194).-deus : “ there are two elements in nature ; the first
is öln tpúrn, or primordial matter, the impassive element from
which things are formed ; the second is the active element,
which forms things out of matter - reason, destiny (eipapuévn ),
god. The divine reason operating on matter bestows upon it
the laws which govern it, laws which the Stoics called lóyou
ottepuatikoi, or productive causes. God is the reason of the
world " (Lewes's “ Hist. of Ancient Philosophy, ” vol . i. p. 290 ).
Cf. Ueberweg, as above ; also, Zeller's “ Stoics, ” etc., p. 192.
4. persuasione, conviction, usual post-Aug. meaning.- Quae ...
tetigit, i. e. when all the parts of the mind under the guidance
of reason work harmoniously, each performing its own proper
functions, then has the mind attained the highest good, i. e.
peace of mind . - ut ita dicam, so to speak . - 5 . arietet, it stumbles ;
frequent in Seneca ; cf. De Prov. 1, 2, N., arietet, in pravo ; labet, in
lubrico ; Lips.-pugnam, a conflict, i. e. a want of harmony in the
mind . — dissident vitia, vices are always at variance with each other.
IX. - 1 . herbulae, i. e. the flower. — 2. placet : denotes the
cause ; delectat, the effect. — Summum bonum in ipso iudicio :
290 NOTES .

in other words, the highest good is dependent on the exercise

of human reason—a sentiment not in accord with revelation or
experience. - habitu optimae mentis. Zeno (quoted by Cicero)
used to say that not only the practice of virtue, but the posses
sion of a virtuous mind was excellent and praiseworthy, yet no
one ever possessed virtue who did not practise it. — quae = et ea
= mens ; B. & M. 701. — Nihil enim extra totum est, i. e. a vir
tuous mind has all good within itself. — 3 . ipsa pretium sui :
virtue is its own reward . - subtilitas : Lips. conjectures sublimi
tas.- laxior, more disordered .

X.-1 . Dissimulas, you profess ignorance of. - iucunde vivere,

nisi ... vivit : the sentiment of Enicurus, in his letter to Menoe
ceus (given in Diog. Laert. x. 132), “ One cannot live pleasantly
who does not also live discreetly and honestly ;" and he then
adds, “ Nor rightly unless pleasantly, for kindred virtues belong
to a pleasant life, and cannot be separated from it. ” — quod =
honeste vivere. — inquit, v. 1. inquam . - vitam , quam, etc., i. e. true
pleasure is inseparably connected with a life of virtue. - Atqui:
admits that which precedes, but opposes something else to it ;
Z. 349. - voluptatibus vestris : sensual pleasures merely, as op
posed to pleasures of the mind . - stultissimos quosque : cf. M.
485, on force of quisque with superlat.
2. fluentis = fluentes. - segnis animi indormientis sibi, i. e. a
mind that is so absorbed in itself as to be negligent of all duties
external to itself . — 3 . aurem pervellit : proverb, to pull by the
ears, i. e. admonishes or incites to serious reflection.— temperan
tia autem ... minuat, summi . . . est : adversative and anti
thetical, embodying the Epicurean idea of moderation in pleas
ures, as opposed to temperantia laeta est, the restraint of which is
obnoxious to the Epicureans, who placed all good in pleasure.
Tu, i. e. the follower of Epicurus whose views he is controvert
ing. — ego utor. St. Augustine says, “ We enjoy God , but use
everything else .” Florus also (bk . ii.) remarks of Hannibal , after
the battle of Cannae, that “ although he could have used his
victory, he preferred to enjoy it ; and, leaving Rome behind,
passed into Campania and Tarentum .” — de illo loquor, i. e. I
do not assert this of myself, who have not yet arrived to that
 DE VITA BEATA. X. 3 - XI. 3. 291

excellence, but of that ideal wise man, who has reached the
highest good .

XI. - 1 . nedum voluptas, i. e. much less would I call him

happy who is a slave to voluptuousness ; M. 461 , obs. 3.-mundi
fragores = earthquakes, thunder-storms, etc. — adversario, i. e.
voluptas. — suasura sit : fut. part. denotes purpose and tendency,
likely to persuade; H. 549, 3 ; B. & M. 1355.-cui : dative of pos
session.
2. Virtus autem : for similar line of argument against a dogma
of Aristotle, cf. De Ira, i. 9, 2.—cum .. sit : causal subj. ; H.
517 ; B. & M. 1250. — parentis imperantis : gen. of duty or
custom ; M. 282.-a tergo ... imperat ? do you place the leader
behind ?-praegustare : to perform , as it were, the office of a prae
gustator to pleasure, as to a mistress. The passage is similar to
one in Cicero ( De Fin. ii. 21 , 69), where Cleanthes is represented
as drawing the picture of the goddess Voluptas, arrayed in regal
attire and sitting on a throne. The Virtues stand near as attend
ants, both to minister to her wishes and aid her with counsel,
that she may do nothing imprudent, which might result in pain.
-apud quos = a quibus. — si loco cessit, if she has yielded her
proper place, i. e. the first and highest.—de quo agitur, concerning
the matter in question . – fatearis : subj. dependent upon necesse est,
which also may take accus. with infin ., ut omitted ; H. 502 ; B.
& M. 1222.
3. Nomentanum : a noted spendthrift and epicure. Horace
frequently refers to him as an example of extreme dissoluteness.
Cf. Sat. i. 1. 102, 8. 11 ; ii. 1. 22, 3. 175, etc.—Apicium : M. Gabius
Apicius, the most renowned of a trio of that name, who gained
celebrity by their gluttony, flourished under Tiberius. After
finding that he had spent some $3,000,000 in riotous indulgence,
and had only about $300,000 left, he put an end to his career by
poison , as it would be impossible for him, he thought, to live on
such a pittance. Schools in the culinary art were named from
him . Cf. Consol.ad Helv. 10, 2 ; Epist. 94 ,43 ; 120, 20 ; also, Class.
Dict.-- conquirentis, recognoscentis = conquirentes, recognoscentes ;
cf. Z. 68, note.—omnium gentium animalia : birds and fish were
sought from all parts of the world ; cf. Consol, ad Helv. 9, 9,
292 NOTES .

e suggestu rosae,from the bed of roses ; a reference, probably, to

the richness of the couches on which they reclined at dinner, or
perhaps to the wearing of chaplets or garlands of roses at meals.
Roses were distributed at the mensa secunda, and were supposed
to exercise beneficial influence. The suggestus is supposed to be
the couch in the semicircular shape called sigma, from its resem
blance to that letter, which replaced the more ancient triclinium ,
after round tables came into general use. Cf. Becker's " Gallus,”
p. 261 ; Guhl & Koner's “ The Life of the Greeks and Romans,”
pp. 444, 445. - spectantis = spectantes.- aures ... oculos : the
wealthy Romans enlivened their dinners with music, histrionic
performances, delicious odors, etc. — fomentis : according to Lips.,
reference is here intended to the rubbing by slaves of their mas
ters' limbs at bathing and other times. Bouillet makes the word
equivalent to pulvillis, small cushions. — cessent, i. e. a voluptate.
parentatur : impers. governs dat., appropriately used, as if they
were feasting at their own funerals; cf. Epist. 122, 3 ; 12, 8. The
latter furnishes a striking illustration of the reckless indecency
of a noted debauchee, Pacuvius.—nec tamen . . . gaudent, and
yet it will not go pleasantly with them (i. e. they will not be happy ),
because they take no pleasure in goodness.

XII . – 1. inquit, i. e. the advocate of pleasure, the epicure.

quod = et id : accus. subject of infin . — inaequales = inconstantes :
at one time elated with joy, at another depressed with sadness.
-sub ictu poenitentiae: literally, under the blow of penitence, i.e.
in the power of penitence, since sorrow and shame are apt to
follow close upon the heels of folly . - hilarem insaniam insa
nire, they are mad with a jovial madness ; insaniam , cognate
accus.; H. 371, 1. 2, 1 ; B. & M. 713 ; cf. Hor. Sat. ii. 3, 302.
2. remissae, mild or cheerful. - vix notabiles, scarcely obsero
able.-- ut quae ... veniant, since they come unsought ; causal
sentence—ut merely strengthens the causal relative sentence ;
H. 517 ; B. & M. 1253. - accersitae = arcessitae.- quamvis .
accesserint: concessive subj.; quamvis properly signifies, however
much you will, and the subj . by itself expresses the concession.
per quod vitium, i. e. per quam societatem (viz. virtuti voluptatem
implicare).- pessimis quibusque adulantur, they pay court to all
 DE VITA BEATA. XII. 2 - XIII. 2 . 293

the most corrupt ; adulare is properly used of dogs, and signifies

primarily to creep or sneak up to a person, and in that sense al
ways takes accus. In its figurative sense of servile flattery it is
also used with accus., but more commonly with dat.; Z. 389,
note 3 ; quisque : cf. 10, 1 , N.
3. Ille, that one, by way of example, one of the class character
ized by pessimus. — ructabundus: Lips. prefers this to reptabundus
of Pincian and others, on the ground that it is more consonant
with ebrius. — vitiis ... inscribit : led on by the example of
those affirming the compatibility and identity of pleasure and
virtue, the vilest openly flaunt their excesses, and take refuge
under the banner of Epicurus, whose wisdom they claim to pos
sess. - profitetur : he boasts of his vices as worthy of praise.
The vicious may (and do) say, We follow a life of pleasure.
Why not ? Epicurus says it is the highest good.
4. illa : used with reference to what is well knoon . The idea
is, he who wishes for an excuse for his vices does not consider
how moderate was the pleasure advocated by Epicurus, who is
rarely credited with his real views. - peccandi verecundiam : in
apposition with bonum . — ideoque, etc. : no chance for youth to
recover from vicious follies when once deceived by the fallacies
of Epicureanism.

XIII. – 1. quod corrumpit adparet: the very name and praise

of pleasure are corrupting, because they afford an occasion and a
means to the vicious of cloaking their vices, and of perverting
that which has some good in it.— (invitis hoc ... dicam ), I will
say this, though the men of our (the Stoic) school dissent ; popularis :
used of one belonging to a party, sect, faction, etc. Sallust ( Catil.
24) uses it of the accomplices of Catiline. - sancta Epicurum : cf.
Epist. 33, 1-3. — tristia, severe, exacting. — virtuti legem, i. e. ad
naturam vivere ; cf. 3, 3, N.; also, Epist. 4, 8.
2. parere naturae : cf. Epist. 4 , just quoted, for what is meant
by obedience to nature, viz. to be free from hunger, thirst, cold,
etc.—Quid ergo : what, then , is the objection against praise of
pleasure – bonum ... auctorem , i. e. he seeks some honorable,
philosophical authority for a bad thing.-illo : adv. thither, viz.
bonum auctorem . - blando nomine inductus : under cover of a fair
N2
294 NOTES .

name. - audit = discit a philosophis._inde, from that time. — aper .

to capite : ablat. abs. = in the sight of all men ; v. l. operto. - male
audit, it has a bad reputation, i. e. it hears itself disparagingly
mentioned.
3. interius admissus : one who has been admitted to an inti
mate knowledge of the teachings of the Epicurean sect. - Frons
eius ipsa, etc. Its very approaches give occasion for conjectures
of something vicious within, or for gross misrepresentation. Epi
curus had his Garden, as Plato his Academy, Zeno his Stoa or
Porch, and Aristotle his Lyceum. At the entrance of the Gar
den was placed this inscription : " The hospitable keeper of this
mansion, where you will find pleasure the highest good, will present
you liberally with barley cakes and water fresh from the spring.
The gardens will not provoke your appetite by artificial dainties,
but satisfy it with natural supplies. Will you not be well enter
tained ? " Cf. Lewes, Ueberweg, and Zeller, already referred to.
stolam , v. l. stola : a woman's loose, flowing robe ; also, the dress
of a voluptuary; cf. Hor. Sat. i. 2, 99. Government of? H. 377 ;
B. & M. 733. — tibi : ethical dat. ; cf. H. 389 ; B. & M. 838.—veri.
tas, v. I. virilitas. - patientiae : endurance of unnatural lust or
passion ; cf. De Prov. 3, 11 ; Cic. in Verr. ii. 5, 13.-tympanum : a
mark of lasciviousness, since it was used by the Corybantes in
their orgies in the worship of Cybele.—cum = simul ac, as soon as.
4. generosae indolis spem , hope of noble qualities. - perventu
rus : fut. part. ; cf. 11 , 1, N. - ex eis = eorum . - Agedum , well then ;
used in transitions in discourse. - in ipsa est modus. The idea
that there can be no excess in virtue, and that in one all are
comprehended , seems almost general among the ancient philoso
phers. The idea here is that a virtue can be neither more nor
less a virtue; there is no golden mean. Lips. (in his “ Manuduc
tio ,” iii. Diss. 4) quotes Menedemus and Ariston (3d century B.C.)
as saying, “ There is but one virtue, though set off under various
titles.” See also Cic. De Fin . v. 23 (67) ; cf. “ Epistles of L. A.
Seneca, with large Annotations,” by Thomas Morell, D.D., vol. i. ‫ܕ‬

p. 259, on Epist. 67.-quod magnitudine laborat sua : cf. these

words of Livy in the Preface to his History.

XIV . - 1. Rationabilem : post-Aug. - porro: marks the prog

 DE VITA BEATA . XIV . 1.-XV. 2. 295

ress of ideas developed in the last chapter, especially the thought

above, agedum , etc. - sortitis naturam , to those who have received
a reasonable nature. — [si hoc placet ... comitatu ] : Fickert
brackets this sentence as an interpolation on the part of some
one desirous of explaining the words, si placet ista iunctura.
excelsissimam , v. 1. excellentissimam . — voluptati ... ancillam ,
etc.: cf. 12, 2, N. on praegustare. - capientis concipientis : pred.
gen . - temperatores = moderatores . - nihil coget, sc. sed.
2. ei = ii, v. 1. hi ; this orthography of the plur. is very rare ; cf.
M. 83, obs. 1.-principia = precedence, the first place, a metaphor
drawn from military life ; cf. Pliny, Nat. Hist. ix. 35, 54. - mari:
why ablat. without preposition ? H. 425, 11. 2 ; B. & M. 937, 2.
Syrtico : the Syrtes, Greater and Lesser, on the eastern half of
the northern coast of Africa ; cf. Class. Dict. — 3. caecae, v. 1.
caeco. - habentes = ii qui habent.-- quo . eo : ablatives of ex
cess and deficiency ; H. 423 ; B. & M. 929, 30.
4. Permanere libet ... imagine = I am disposed to continue
still further the comparison which I have just now employed . —
bestiarum ... feras : bestia, an animal without reason , in con
tradistinction to man ; fera, a wild animal living on land, in
contradistinction to domestic animals ; cf. Ramshorn's Latin
Synonyms, p. 96. — laqueo captare, etc. : quoted from Virgil,
Georg. i, 139, 40. — latos, v. 1. magnos. — officiis : ablat. of separa
tion ; cf. M. 262.-pro ventre dependit, sc. se, he gives himself
over for the sake of his belly, as Apicius, Nomentanus, etc., 11 , 3.
XV.-1 . confundi = coniungi : in a good sense . - summum bo
num = virtus. — Quia pars, etc., i. e. no part ofthe honorable can
be dishonorable ; and the argument is, if pleasure as an end is
dishonorable, it hence cannot be part of or one with virtue, the
chief good. The expression is very concise, a good instance of
multum in parvo. — gaudium : according to the Stoics, gaudium
is suited to the wise man alone, voluptas never. The former in
dicates the emotion which is caused by delight at some real or
imagined good ; the latter the pleasurable sensation created by
a high degree of pleasure through the senses-voluptuousness.
Cf. Ramshorn's Latin Synonyms.
2. consequentia ... non consummantia, i. e.they do not con
296 NOTES.

stitute a part of the chief good. — ita demum, etc.: the invinci
bility of virtue is conditioned only by the law that nothing is
preferred before or estimated higher than herself. — sequitur
vita anxia : the man who takes pleasure as his guiding prin
ciple becomes a slave to the caprices of fortune, and cannot en
dure the ills of body and vicissitudes of life with the same equa
nimity which he displays who makes virtue his aim.
3. benignus interpres .: one who puts the most favorable con
struction on the ills that befall him , and regards them as a dis
cipline to a good end. The spirit of the passage ( quomodo hic,
etc.) reminds one of the words of St. Paul (Rom . viii. 18), “ I
reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to
be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us."
patriae . . . propugnator : cf. Hor. Od. iv. 9, 51 .
4. frangendus : the height is to be diminished by the as
cent ; when once the steep is scaled, it ceases to exist as a diffi
culty to be overcome. Hence the peculiar force of frangendus.
legem esse naturae, i. e. he will know that the deity or fate has
sent upon him all the difficulties of times and occasions ; Lips.
5. illud ... vetus praeceptum , deum sequere: Lips. quotes
Boethius ( De Consol. Phil. i. 4) as ascribing this precept to Py
thagoras, and Cicero ( De Fin. iii. 22, 73) as attributing it to one
of the Seven Wise Men. The Stoics even sometimes formulated
this as the highest good or chief end of man. Lips. also refers
to Philo Judaeus (1st century A.D.) as saying ( De Migrat. Abrah .
p. 462 ), “ The end, according to Moses, the holy one, is to follow
God ."
6. ex transverso, unexpectedly, though sent by deity or fate.
-Quicquid . . . patiendum est : an allusion to the doctrine of
fate and secondary causation. All things were connected to
gether in a series by a universal nexus.-- usurpetur: a conjectural
reading of Fickert's ; Haase gives suscipiatur. The mss. vary
much in respect to this passage ; some have, magno visu (or nisu)
eripiatur ; Lips. suggests, magno nobis excipiatur. - sacramentum :
for jusjurandum , a military figure. As the soldiers are compelled
by oath to follow the standard and obey the general, so are we
forced to endure the casualties common to men ; hence the infer
ence, let us endure them courageously (magno animo ). Cf. Epist.
 DE VITA BEATA . XV. 6-XVII. 1. 297

95, 35.- In regno , i. e. fortunae an verius fati ; Lips. Lodge

translates, “ We are born under a royal domination. It is liberty
to obey God .” — deo parere : Lips. calls this a golden saying, and
quotes Philo, the Jewish writer, “ To obey God is not only better
than liberty, but better far than ruling.” See Parallels or Re
semblances to Scripture, at end of Introduction, p. 43.

XVI.-1 . qua fas est, as far as it is the divine will . - deum

effingas. This is language worthy of a Christian, when uttered
from a Christian standpoint — that one should portray by his life
the divine attributes in such wise as to exemplify by imitation
the divine being, as far as it is possible for man so to do. We
might almost believe that Seneca had heard of the apostle's
words, “Partakers of the divine nature” (2 Pet. i. 4). Cf. De
Const. Sap. 8, 2.-pro hac expeditionerin return for this ener
getic bearing.-et, even .-- cogeris : fut. pass. 2d sing. How does
it differ from pres. pass. ! --ex sententia, according to your wish.
2. sufficiat ... superfluat: why subj. ? H.485 ; B. & M. 1180.
-immo superfluat : immo gives an additional emphasis, or makes
a correction, to what precedes ; translate, nay, I should rather ask,
why is it ( virtus or illa perfecta, etc.) not more than sufficient, ad
beate vivendum ? - extrinsecus : used adjectively ; cf. De Tranq.
10, 5.—opus : predicate; H. 414, iv . note 4 ; B. & M. 673, obs. 4.
-qui ... tendit : the wise inan only has fully attained ; others
who are striving are merely on the road, but still are in the right
course. — luctanti : agrees with ei. - quod, that. — adligati ...
adstricti . . . destricti : observe distinction in these words.
See Lexicon.

XVII. - 1 . Quare ... vivis ? wherefore do you talkmore strictly

live ? The argumentum ad hominem , here and following,
than you
is one which Seneca has often had made against him. A writer
in the Westminster Review (July, 1867) says, “ Seneca's position
was equivocal. He was immensely rich, and he professed to ad
mire poverty. .... In his frequent eulogiums on poverty we do
not think he was wholly insincere, though we regret that he did
not recommend his theory by his practice. . . . After all abate
ments, we allow that Seneca was inconsistently and ungracefully
298 NOTES.

rich.” Cf. also Merivale's “History of the Romans under the

Empire, ” vol. vi. pp. 43, 186. - verba submittis, why do you ten
der deceitful expressions ? hence, why do you flatter ?
2. cultius rus, a more ornamented country-seat. - naturalis usus :
a reference to the Stoic dogma, which the objector intimates
Seneca does not keep . - cur ... coenas : cf. De Tranq. 1, 3, N.
nitidior : a reference, probably, to the magnificent citron tables
of Seneca ; cf. De Tranq. 1 , 4, N.-apud te, at your house. Seneca
himself was very temperate, but he seems to have conformed
freely to the convivial customs of his day in respect to entertain
ments.—vinum aetate tua vetustius : probably the celebrated
wine known as the Vinum Opimianum . The vintage of the year
when L. Opimius was consul, B.C. 121 , was of unprecedented
quality, owing to the extraordinary heat of the autumn. A large
quantity was stored and preserved for many years. Cicero, in
his Brutus (83), some eighty- five years afterwards, mentions its
existence ; and Pliny ( Nat. Hist. xiv. 4, 5) mentions, A.D. 77, that
even then some of this wine still remained. It was so strong
and so much like rough honey, he tells us, that it could not be
drunk unless largely diluted with water.—cur annuum dispo
nitur ? Another troublesome passage. The readings of Mss.
vary : Haase gives arvum for annuum ; Pincian conjectures, cur
laute domus ; Michaelis, argentum ; and Lipsius reads, cur autem
disponitur ? — arbores ... daturae : the wealthy Romans had
extensive groves of laurel, cypress, and plane trees.—uxor tua,
i. e. Pompeia Paulina ; cf. De Brev. Vit. 1 , 1, N.- locupletis .
auribus gerit. The Roman ladies wore very costly gems on
their fingers and in their ears. Pliny tells of a pearl valued at
60,000,000 sesterces about $2,000,000. Seneca also speaks of
“ hanging from each ear the worth of two or three men's patri
monies ” (De Benef. vii. 9, 4).-paedagogium : cf. De Tranq. 1,5, N.
-pretiosa veste : a tunic embroidered with gold . — temere et
ut libet, without regard to order, and at each one's pleasure. -scin
dendi obsonii magister, a master in carving. The carver is called
also structor and carptor. His art consisted not only in carving
in a skilful manner, but also in dancing, and keeping regular
time in his movements ; cf. Becker's “ Gallus,” p . 121, Juvenal
makes use of the term chironomonta (Sat, v. 120).
 DE VITA BEATA . XVII. 3-XIX. 3. 299

3. trans mare : in Britain and elsewhere.-. cur plura, sc . pos

sides ; plura may include both servants and lands. — plures, sc.
servos. - quorum notitiae memoria sufficiat: Fickert thinks Sen
eca may have written, quorum memoriae sufficias. — Adiuvabo : the
reply to the objector's criticisms begins here. — Non sum sapiens :
though the Stoic held that there was such a thing as a wise man ,
yet he never hoped or expected to become one wholly himself.—
4. obiurgare, to correct, i. e. by words and writings, and hence to
repress ; Lips.- sanitatem = sapientiam Stoicam .
XVIII . - 1 . ego enim, etc. The author modestly disclaims
any excellence, so that he may not be a stumbling-block to oth
ers . He speaks rather for those who have made some progress
(aliquid acti).- Aliter ... aliter = alio ... i, e. , in coin
mon phrase, “ You say one thing and do another.”—capita ( = ca
pitulum, post-Aug. ; Lips.) : in apposition with hoc. — dicebant,
were accustomed to say . — cum = simul ac, as soon as . — vivam quo .
modo oportet, I will live as I ought.
2. vos : accus. object of necatis ; malevolence drinks its own
poison, and becomes its own victim.-quo minus : after verbs of
hindering ; Z. 543. - et : has force of etsi, even if . — 3 . Rutilius :
cf. De Prov. 3, 5, N.-quibus : dat. of interest := in whose opinion.
Demetrius Cynicus : cf. De Prov. 3, 3, N. — Cynicos : cf. Ueberweg's
“ Hist. of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 92–94 ; Zeller's “ Stoics,” etc., p.
286–290.-Vides enim ? ironical.

XIX . - 1 . Diodorum , Epicureum : little or nothing is known

of this Diodorus.-negant ex decreto, etc., they deny that he act
ed in accordance with the teaching of Epicurus. — conscientiae :
governed by plenus ; H. 399, 3 ; B. & M. 776. — aetatis ... actae:
the figure is that of a ship lying at anchor in a quiet harbor.
He is represented as passing a peaceful and quiet life, apart from
the sea of turmoil and strife belonging to a public career. — vobis :
dat. of agent. — Vixi, etc.: Virg. Aen. iv. 653. — 2. audeatis : a
nominal question . — Negatis quemquam : cf. 18, 1, n. aliter.
3. loquantur . . . conentur : causal subj.; H. 518 ; B. & M.
1250.-omnis = omnes. - refigere : to release themselves from the
crosses which natural lusts and desires have erected for each
300 NOTES .

one. Every man by every act of vice and by inordinate desire

drives a nail into his own cross, on which he must pay the pen
alty.-- ad supplicium .. ..pendent: yet when brought to pun
ishment they hang suspended on a single beam ; i. e. those who
are in pursuit of wisdom are not distracted by as many desires
as you are.—in se ipsi : Lips. reads, in se ipsos, and makes it refer
to the subject of pendent, i. e. those in the pursuit of wisdom.
aut maledici, etc., i. e. the slanderers are charmed over the dis
grace of another.

XX. - 1 . non est quod : cf. De Tranq. 2, 2, n . — Studiorum

salutarium , etc.: a motto well worth remembering.-citra ef
fectum : cf. Apuleius (quoted by Lipsius), omnibus bonis in rebus
conatus laude, effectus in casu est.-- conantis = conantes. — 2 . ador
natis, sc. iis : dat. of agent. — Qui, such an one.— audiam quo vi.
debo : by hyperbaton for videbo quo audiam ; this figure is quite
frequent in Seneca. The sentiment is that the approach of my
own death will not move me more than the news of another's
death . — Ego ... sentiam , i. e. I will look with indifference
upon fortune, whether she comes or goes.--hoc nomine, on this
account.
3. Quo enim : the idea is, for what better purpose could nat
ure use me than for others ?-omnis = omnes.
:-quod dignus ac
cipiet, which a worthy man shall receive at my hands. - nihil opini.
onis causa : cf. De Ira, iii. 41, conscientiae satisfiat ; nihil in famam
laboremus. — populo . credam . . . faciam , I will believe that
whatever I do, when I am the only witness, is done in the sight of the
whole world . Similar noteworthy sentiments occur in other parts
of Seneca's writings. — 4 . erit : what is the subject ?-hos supra,
etc. : cf. De Prov. 6, 3. - natura, i. e. dii. - ratio dimittet, in ref
erence to the Stoic teaching on suicide ; cf. De Prov. 6, 6, N.
XXI.-1 . tenuerit, i. e. iter, cursumm.. –magnis tamen excidit
ausis : cf. Ovid , Metam . ii . 328. - nihil novi facitis, you do nothing
new , that is, because you dare nothing noble and great. The
thought is antithetical to the first : novi, partit. gen . - hiscite, etc.
Those who abuse the virtuous are addressed under the figure of
à dog.–2. Quare ille philosophiae, etc. : probably an allusion
 DE VITA BEATA . XXI. 2 - XXII , 2. 301

to some attack on Seneca himself, who was very wealthy ; cf.

17, 1 , N.
3, non, sc. ait ista debere contemni. - non abigit illa : Lipsius
quotes the elder Seneca as saying, “ Who will reject the gifts of
inflowing fortune ?” — abigit ... prosequitur, v. I. abiget .
prosequetur. - ubi tutius fortuna deponet . . . est ? where indeed
shallfortune more safely deposit her treasures than in a place whence
she will recover them without complaint of the restorer ?–M. Cato,
i. e. Cato Uticensis, or the Younger ; vid. Class. Dict. - Curium : *
M. Curius Dentatus, the conqueror of Pyrrhus and the Samnites ;
cf. De Tranq. 3, 16, N. — Coruncanium : Tiberius Coruncanius, con
sul B.C. 280, a friend of Dentatus, was the first plebeian who be
came pontifex maximus. He was eminent as a statesman, and
possessed a profound knowledge of pontifical and civil law. Cf.
Class. Dict. — censorium crimen : a crime to be noted by the
censor. In B.C. 275 Corn . Rufinus, proconsul and ex-dictator,
was expelled from the Senate by the censors, C. Fabricius and
Q. Aemil. Papus, because he possessed ten pounds of silver plate.
Cf. Livy, Epit. xiv.-lamellae : dat. of possession ; cf. De Brev.Vit.
12, 1. - quadragies sestertium = quadragies centena millia sester
tiorum , 4,000,000 sesterces, about $150,000 ; cf. Z. 873. Lips. con
jectures, quadringenties sestertium = about $ 1,600,000.- Crassus:
M. Crassus, noted for his wealth , was said to have possessed es
tates outside of Rome valued at 200,000,000 sesterces. — Censo
rius Cato : the great-grandfather of Cato of Utica.—Non amat
divitias .. vult: on the whole,the best excuse which Seneca
could offer for being very rich, and using his riches in personal
and social enjoyment, while preaching the opposite ; cf. 17, 1, N .;
also, INTRODUCTION, pp. 21, 22.

XXII.-1 . maior materia sapienti viro, etc.: the wise man

alone knows how to use riches aright ; the foolish abuse them.
sit : consecutive subj. with quin after quid . . . dubii ; H. 496, 3 ;
B. & M. 1232. - cum ... sit ... habeat : causal subj. What
is subject of sit ?-campum patentem , i.e. an unobstructed
.

field of action. — staturae : descriptive gen., limits subject of

fuerit.
2. hoc, sc. malit ; Lips. reads haec. - Quaedam : such, accord
302 NOTES .

ing to the maxims of Zeno, were riches, health, physical strength,

etc. - in summam rei, in respect to the chief matter . — adiciunt =
adjiciunt. - ex virtute nascentem : the offspring of virtue were
joy and serenity of mind, as the Stoics held . — ferens ventus : cf.
Virg. Aen . iv. 430, expectet facilemque fugam , ventosque ferentes.
bruma: properly, the winter solstice, used for the period near
the solstice, almost always stormy. - apricus, exposed to the sun .
3. alia aliis : good, bad, and indifferent comprised the Stoic
category. Virtue only was good, vice only bad ; all other things
were indifferentia — utility alone determined their relative valua
tion. Of these, some were producta , preferable things ; others,
abducta . The producta were of three kinds—those of the mind,
of the body, and externa . Of the mind were ingenium , ars, scien
tia ; of the body were sanitas, vires ; externa were opes, gloria ,
nobilitas. Of these some are preferable to others—as those of the
mind to those of the body ; those of the body to those external ;
Lips.—4. cum ... habeant : cf. § 1, habeat. — quem , as; object
of habeant understood.-divitiae, etc.: riches belong to me, you
belong to riches ; in other words, riches are my slaves, you are a
slave to your riches.

XXIII.–1 . pecunia : ablat. of separation ; interdicere is some

times used with dat. of person and ablat. of thing ; A. & S. 251,
R. 2. - paupertate : ablat. of punishment. Verbs of condemning,
instead of gen. of the crime, sometimes take ablat. of the punish
ment ; H. 410, III. 5 ; B. & M.795, obs. 3.—Habebit philosophus,
etc.: a plea in his own defence. — nec alieno ... partas, i.e, not
acquired as the spoil or confiscated property of a proscribed and
slain enemy.-sine sordidis quaestibus, i. e. gained without des
picable means. — In quantum vis, as much as you please. — cum
sint : concessive subj., although, etc. — 2. per honesta, by
honest means, honestly.- Quod ... tollat, let each one take what
he has recognized as his own.-0 magnum : M. 536. — optime: adv.
-iniciat = injiciat.
3. denarium : a silver coin = about 18 cents.- loco : besides
the dat., invidere frequently has the ablat. with or without in;
as, invidere igne rogi miseris; Lucan's Pharsalia, vii. 798.-hospi.
tentur : post-Aug., let them enjoy his hospitality . - infruniti, silly,
 DE VITA BEATA . XXIII. 3-XXIV. 4. 303

or senseless. — utrumne, whether ; never used in single questions.

4. escendere : cf. De Prov . 1, 6, N.; De Trang. 15, 17.—habebit,
i. e. he will esteem riches, yet as fleeting and transitory. - quid
expeditis sinum ? for the purpose of receiving a gift, forsooth.
rationem esse reddendam , that an account must be rendered for
stewardship . - nam inter turpes iacturas, etc. , i. e. a gift unwor
thily bestowed is thrown away. - exeant, i. e. consilio. - excidat,
i. e. casu aut levitate.

XXIV.-1 . Hunc promereor, I win thefavor of this one by my

gifts ; usually construed with de and ablat.-illum instruo, i. e.
I furnish him with ampler and more liberal means.—deducat,
etc.: one who deserves not to be taken away from higher pur
suits, by the necessity of daily labor, on account of poverty ; Lips.
reads diducat, subj. of result after dignus ; H. 501 , III.; B. & M.
1226.—inculcabo, i. e. upon the modest and unexacting.-nomi.
na facio : nomen facere means, to write items of debts in an account
book ; hence, here, I never put money at interest so well as when, etc.
2. recepturus : expresses purpose, to receive again . - perditu .
rus : to squander as prodigals, really the antithesis of the thought
in the preceding question. - Eo loco = tali loco, a praiseworthy
sentiment. — domus: the household and slaves. — togatos : Roman
citizens, as opposed to foreigners, or Roman soldiers.- liberi ...
libertini: cf. Ramshorn's Latin Synonyms. - ingenui, free-born.
iustae libertatis : complete and legal liberty. This was obtained
by slaves through the process of manumission in one of three
ways, viz. vindicta, censu , testamento. On this subject, cf. Dict.
Antiq . - inter amicos datae, sc. libertatis. This was not really a
legal manumission, but might be revoked by the master. Cf.
Dict. Antiq .
3. quae = et ea . - libero animo : a mind that acts voluntarily
and is not constrained . - apud sapientem = a sapiente.- Non est
ergo, quod : cf. 2, 1, N.; for the subj. exaudiatis, De Tranq. 1,
2, N.-4. Aliud . . . aliud , one thing . . . and another.— Ille : re
fers to which, the nearer or more remote subject ? cf. Lat. Prose
Comp . 377.—inter mala volutor plurima : in other words, I am
involved in the weaknesses and imperfections of human nature.
-ad formulam meam : according to a rule or law which I have
304 NOTES.

laid down for myself to follow . - Adsecutus vero, etc., but he who
has attained the height of human wisdom (i. e. virtue).- Primum
... sententiam , first,you are not to pass judgment on your betters.
5. promittam . aestimem : indirect questions ; M. 356.—
si essent, bonos facerent: for the Stoics held that it was a char
acteristic of good always to confer good ; hence, that which could
be used both for good and evil purposes was not good-a not
very cogent conclusion . - adferentis = adferentes.

XXV. - 1. quid praestem , etc., what I value in them differently

from you ; an indirect question ; M. 356.—aliud quam : aliud in
the older writers stands with quam in negative propositions, or
in interrogatives with a negative sense . In writers later than
Livy this distinction is not observed ; M. 444, obs. 1. - suspiciam ,
honor or respect. In sublicium pontem : where mendicants were
accustomed to gather, because of the numbers who passed by ;
cf. Juv.Sat. iv. 115 ; xiv. 132 ; Martial, Epigram . x. 5.-quid enim
ad rem, sc. est., for what is it to the case whether, etc. Again we
have the Stoic doctrine of suicide, his only resource under certain
trials and calamities. Cf. De Prov. 6, 6, n . - deest : what is its
subject ? B. & M. 1147 ; H. 549.
2. instrumentis splendentibus : such as golden and purple
couches, richly carved tables, etc.; cf. De Tranq. 1, 3, N.; v. 1.
stramentis. — molle ... amiculum : a luxurious purple cloak
made of the finest wool . It was worn at supper and at ban
quets.-purpura : purple couches and carpets ; cf. Cicero, in M.
Anton. ( Philippica ), ii. 27, 67 ; Virg. Aen . i. 700. - cervix = caput.
-Circense tomentum : a cushion made of cheap wool and stuffed
with feathers, or more frequently with chaff and broken straw ;
called Circense, says Lips. , because they were to be purchased at
the Circus, or because the poor were accustomed to lie upon
them at that place ; cf. Martial, Epig. xiv. 159. — praetextatus,
i. e. clad in the robes of office. Lips. prefers the reading, pexatus.
-chlamydatus. The manuscripts vary much here. Haase reads
gausapatus ; other readings are, candidatus, causatus, camisatus,
canusinatus. - 3 . cedant ... subtexantur : concessive subjs., the
particle licet being omitted.— non ob, etc., sc. tamen . - hinç il .
linc, from every quarter.-- ater = infelix, infaustus,
 DE VITA BEATA. XXV . 4 - XXVI. 5. 305

4. ille, i. e. celeberrimus. - delicatus ... currus : the triumphal

chariot of Liber or Bacchus, enriched with gold and gems, and
wreathed with ivy and the grape.—ad Thebas : Thebes, said to
be the birthplace of Bacchus, and to which he returned in tri
umph from India, which country he had subjugated . - Penatium :
Fickert suggests whether iura Penatium may not signify ius vitae
or veniam vivendi, and quotes Macrobius, Saturn . Conviv. iii. 4, in
iïustration. Lips. approves the reading Persarum , because the
Persians were the most powerful nation in the Orient. — fericu
lum = ferculum : in order that they might be more readily seen,
the most illustrious captives were borne on theferculum on occa
sion of a conqueror's triumph . — non humilior, etc., i. e. I will bear
the same mind as I would were I the triumphing general.
5. veniant : malo sometimes is followed by the subj. with or
without ut, instead of the accus. with the infin .; Z. 624. - stimu
lis : as, for instance, in adversity. — frenis : as in prosperity.
6. per devexum, down a declivity, i. e. without difficulty. — Acer
rimas, sc. virtutes. — quae suspensum gradum , i. e. which ad
vance with leisure step.

XXVI . - 1. Cum hoc ita divisum sit, since this distinction has
been made, viz ., in respect to the virtues above mentioned . — vos
aliter auditis, sc. quam loquor . - habere volumus ? sc. divitias.
Divitiae enim, etc. : cf. 22, 1, 4, N.-2. indictum est : an allusion
to the customary and formal declaration of war by the fetiales;
vid. Livy, i. 32,5, etc. — tamquam ... possit ... transcenderint
sint: tamquam is a particle of comparison, introducing a
condition of which the conclusion is omitted or implied, and is
usually followed by the present or perf. subj. ; H. 503 ; A. & G.
312.
3. quo illa pertineant, what end these ( engines) would serve ;
cf. Caesar, Bell.Gall. ii. 30 ; Tac. Ann. xii. 45. - Sapienti ... re
linquet : cf. words of Bias of Priene (about B.C. 550 ), who, al
though he had lost house, wealth, and everything, exclaimed,
“ I carry all my property with me; " cf. De Prov. 3, 3, n.-4. ille :
cf. 25, 4, N. — actum vitae, course of life. — vitiorum : governed in
gen. by inmunis.
5. Existimatio ... vestra, your good name. — bonae spei eiura .
306 NOTES.

tio : the thought is that men who assail virtue are to be despaired
of; there is no hope of moral recovery for them, since they for
swear virtue.—sed ne dis ... evertunt: cf. De Constant. Sap.4,
2, “ Even as celestial things are not subject to human hands, and
they that overturn temples and melt images can in no way hurt
god, so whatever is maliciously attempted against a wise man is
attempted in vain ; " cf. also , De Benef. vii.7, 3.
6. alas inposuit : an allusion to Jupiter's visit, in the form of
a swan, to Leda, by whom he became father to Castor, Pollux,
and Helen . — alius cornua : he assumed the form of a bull, when
he ravished Europa.-saevum in deos : Jupiter dethroned Saturn,
hurled Vulcan headlong to the earth, suspended Juno out of
heaven by her feet, etc. — raptorum , etc. : probably an allusion
to the seizure and abduction of Ganymede, whom Jupiter made
his cup-bearer ; cf. Class. Dict. for ancient mythology.- quibus
... actum est, etc., by which nothing else was aimed at, etc. In
this we have Seneca's estimate of the noxious tendency of pagan
mythology. We can judge, also, how little faith cultivated men
of his day put in the popular system of pagan religion then pre
vailing. – hominibus : ablat. of separation.
7. favete linguis, i. e. keep silence. When the sacred name of
virtue has been mentioned, maintain silence if you can say noth
ing in her praise, or in praise of those in pursuit of her. At the
celebration of ancient religious rites silence was enjoined, in
order that there might not be any disturbing influence. — Hoc
verbum ... obstrepente : these words are regarded by some as
an interpolation, but they are found in all the books, and have
reference to the beginning of the next chapter.
XXVII . - 1 . oraculo, i. e. of virtue or a virtuous man. - sis
trum : a bronze rattle, according to Apuleius, used by the an
cient Egyptians in their religious ceremonies, especially in the
worship of Isis. (Cf. Dict. Antiq.) The Romans became familiar
with its use by the introduction of Isis -worship into Italy, shortly
before the Christian era. The sistrum is still used in Nubia and
Abyssinia . - secandi . . . artifex, i. e. a priest of Bellona or Cy
bele.—suspensa manu, with sparing hand.- laurum : a symbol of
inspiration, worn by the priests of Apollo, used here in connection
 DE VITA BEATA . XXVII. 1-6 . 307

with ululat, to denote a claim to prophetic powers.-- linteatus :

after the manner of the Egyptian priests. — divinum , divinely in
spired.
2. transite, i. e. in silence ; cf. favete linguis, 26, 7, N. – Aristo
phani : the famous comic poet, contemporary with Socrates, etc.;
cf. Class. Dict. — materiam iocorum , i. e. in his comedy called
“ The Clouds,” in which Socrates is sharply satirized as the head
of the tribe of sophists, and the corrupter of the moral principles
of the youth . — manus, band or company, referring to other comic
poets of the day, as Eupolis, Cratinus, etc.
3. produci, etc., to be draggedforth and put to the test, as gladi
ators and athletes.-illi, i. e. virtue. - in vadoso mari, placed in
the midst of a restless sea ; v. 1. undoso ; Lips. — 4 . malo suo : dat. ,
to its own harm . — Papulas observatis, etc. The philosopher is
represented as turning upon his accusers. Cf. St. Matt. vii. 3-5 ;
St. Luke vi. 41 , 42.
5. Obicite = objicite.- petierit pecuniam : when he voyaged to
Sicily to meet Dionysius and Dion. — quod acceperit, sc. pecu
niam ; from Alexander, who was his pupil , and who, on one oc
casion , presented him with 800 talents. — Democrito : cf. De Prov.
6,1, N.- quod consumpserit : it was charged that Epicurus ex
pended one mina per day for articles of food . — mihi ipsi, i. e.
Socrates, in whose mouth is put this address to the detractors
of the wise man. Some would refer this and the following to
Seneca, on account of chronological difficulties in making Soc
rates speak of Aristotle ana Epicurus, who were not born till
after Socrates's death ; but there is so little propriety in consid
ering the words as coming from Seneca that it seems better to
regard them here as a sort of poetic license or anticipation.
Alcibiadem : a man of fine abilities, but utterly lacking in moral
principle, although he had been a pupil and admirer of Socrates.
Alcibiades is the young man who is represented by Aristophanes,
in “ The Clouds,” as corrupted by the sophistries of Socrates.
Cf. § 2, N. - Phaedrum : a friend of Plato's, and also one of Soc
rates's pupils. Very little is known of him. Plato gives the
name Phaedrus to one of his Dialogues.
6. O vos usu maxime, etc. , i. e. happy would you be if in your
daily experience you would endeavor to follow the lives of wise
308 NOTES .

men, since in that event you would acquire the name of seekers,
even if you could not become the possessors of wisdom ; Micha
elis. — Vos : accus. of exclamation. eo loco = tali loco, i. e. all
men are not in such condition as you.

XXVIII . - vos, etc. Socrates continues to speak . — fortunae :

dat. governed by alienum . - quibus : dat. of interest. - inmineant
accesserint : indirect questions.—Quid porro ? sc. dicam.
******
etiam si parum sentitis, even if you scarcely discern it.
The close of this treatise is lost. Some critics are in favor of
joining the imperfect treatise, De Otio aut Secessu Sapientis, to the
present, but with no good or sufficient reason , since its contents
and treatment are quite diverse from the De Vita Beata.

THE END,
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Article
Stoic Theology: Revealing or Redundant?
Kai Whiting 1, * and Leonidas Konstantakos 2
1 MARETEC—LARSyS, Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, Avenida Rovisco Pais 1,
1049-001 Lisboa, Portugal
2 School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University, 11200 SW 8th St, Miami,
FL 33199, USA; lkons001@fiu.edu
* Correspondence: kaiwhiting@tecnico.ulisboa.pt or whitingke@yahoo.co.uk;
Tel.: +351-21-841-73-66 (ext. 1366)




Received: 12 February 2019; Accepted: 8 March 2019; Published: 14 March 2019


Abstract: With the notion of advancing a modern Stoic environmental ethical framework, we explore
the philosophy’s call to “living according to Nature”, as derived from ancient Stoic theology. We do
this by evaluating the orthodox (ancient) viewpoint and the contemporary criticisms levelled against
it. We reflect on the atheistic interpretations of Stoicism and their associated call to “live according to
the facts”. We consider the limitations that this call has when applied to societal, and particularly
non-human matters. We do not undertake this research with the aim of determining which view
of Stoic theology is right or wrong. However, we contest one of the assumptions of the heterodox
approach, namely that the Stoic worldview is incompatible with modern scientific thinking. Indeed,
we demonstrate how Stoic theology, far from being outdated or irrelevant, is actually refreshingly
contemporary in that it provides the tools, scope and urgency with which to deliver a far more
considerate ethical framework for the 21st century. Finally, we suggest where Stoic theology can help
practitioners to reframe and respond to environmental challenges, which we argue forms part of their
cosmopolitan obligation to take care of themselves, others and the Earth as a whole.

Keywords: environmental ethics; climate change; nature; orthodox theology; pantheism; Stoicism;
sustainable development; virtue ethics

1. Introduction
Stoicism is a Greco-Roman philosophy. Originally established by Zeno, out of Cynicism, and
heavily influenced by Socrates and Plato, it was then further developed by Roman practitioners, most
notably Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (Sellars 2014). Its ideas also influenced many key
(non-Stoic) figures of the Enlightenment including Adam Smith and Francis Hutcheson. It continues to
be of interest to modern scholars, most notably Julia Annas, Martha Nussbaum, A.A Long, Christopher
Gill and Massimo Pigliucci.
More importantly, at least in the context of this present paper, is the continual development
and re-interpretation of ancient Stoic principles within the Modern Stoicism movement. The latter,
which emerged during the late 20th century, represents a growing community of lay members (and
academics) committed to pursuing a “life worth living”, through the day-to-day practice of the four
Stoic virtues of courage, justice, self-control and wisdom (Gill 2014b; LeBon 2018). Indeed, in the
last five years or so, there has been a proliferation of academic articles, blogs, trade and scholarly
books, newspaper articles, conference attendees and informal affiliations to Stoic fellowships and social
media groups. Those that practice Stoicism, or at least express an interest in it, come from diverse
backgrounds. As of November 2018, there were 56 registered Stoic fellowship groups from all over the
world, including Canada, France, Guatemala, Holland, Portugal, the UK and the US (Lopez 2018).

Religions 2019, 10, 193; doi:10.3390/rel10030193 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions

Religions 2019, 10, 193 2 of 18

Stoic Philosophy and Religious Belief

The modern Stoic movement incorporates a wide range of religious and spiritual inclinations.
Among its contemporary practitioners, there are many that lean towards more atheistic or agnostic
interpretations. There are pantheists and theists. The ancient Stoic texts also exhibit a range of attitudes
to divinity. Marcus Aurelius sometimes seems to treat his ethical commitments as compatible with
either “providence or atoms”. We can look to Epictetus for more personified descriptions of the divine.
The Stoic tradition in general “was a complex amalgam of pantheism and theism” (Long 2002, p. 147).
All of them converged on one point: the logos.
In Stoicism, the logos is understood to be the perfectly rational benevolent Nature of the universe that
connects everything in its causal nexus. The universe is considered the highest expression of rationality
because of its order, structure and wholeness. It is paradigmatic in its benevolent/providential care for all
component parts of the universe: the sea, air, rocks, plants and animals, including humans (Cicero, On
the Nature of the Gods 2.83, 100–1, 122–30, Long and Sedley 1987, 54J).
The logos was, according to Diogenes Laertius, equally referred to by the Stoics as “god”, “Zeus”,
“intellect” and “Fate”. Other nouns ascribed to the term included “providence” and “Natural Law”.
It is important, so as to avoid confusion, to distinguish between the Stoic conception of natural law,
which was itself Divine and the natural law as Thomas Aquinas understood it, where it was the
creation of the Divine. Regardless of the exact word used, there was, among the ancient Stoics, an
overarching agreement that the essence of the universe was a natural presence (a material soul, so to
speak) actively permeating the whole and sustaining it:

[The Stoics say] that god is the mind of the world, and that the world is the body of god. (Lactantius,
Divine Institutes VII.3 = SVF II. 1041)

A modern articulation of this worldview is expressed by renowned De Waal (2010) in his book
The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society:

The way our bodies are influenced by surrounding bodies is one of the mysteries of human existence,
but one that provides the glue that holds entire societies together. We occupy nodes within a tight
network that connects all of us in both body and mind.

The logos pervades all elements of life. It is the essence of the universe which provides the
foundation of humankind’s rational nature and mandates what “excellent” behaviour consists of.
It is, consequently, the literal reason everything exists and operates the way it does. The logos thus
grounds ancient Stoic ethics into a framework that not only provides meaning but is “meaning”.
This understanding is exemplified by Cleanthes in Hymn to Zeus when he refers to the logos as the
“common law of god” and the “one eternal rational principle” which, if rationally obeyed, leads to the
“good life”.
Incidentally, this is why the modern Becker (2017, p. xiii) wrote that Stoicism’s logocentric
foundation is not something that we should abandon casually. We, the authors, agree with Becker’s
sentiments. Indeed, before dismissing a core tenet in Stoic philosophy, one would be wise to first
question whether hastily removing it, or underplaying its significance, might serve to hinder progress
towards virtue. This remains the case even if prominent Stoic scholars such as Becker (2017); Irvine
(2008); LeBon (2014) and Pigliucci (2018, 2017b) argue that maintaining Stoic theology is untenable or
unpalatable to modern sensibilities.
This paper does not pretend to be a comprehensive survey of all the ideas in the history of
philosophy that might support sustainable action but instead a study of how Stoicism does so. At the
same time, it is an in depth look at the way in which an updated Stoic theology based on the ancient
cosmological framework might support a modern Stoic ethics. Consequently, in this paper, we explore
the value of maintaining the logocentric framework in Stoicism, particularly in light of Whiting and
Konstantakos (2018) and Long (2018). We also consider the implications that its removal might have.
We do this by analysing the orthodox (logocentric) viewpoint, taking into account the criticisms
Religions 2019, 10, 193 3 of 18

levelled against it, and also the response that can be given to these criticisms. We also reflect on the
limitations of the heterodox position (modern atheistic interpretations of Stoicism) and suggest where
an integrated framework/perspective can advance Stoic environmental ethics. We do not do this with
the aim of determining which view of Stoic theology is right or wrong. Rather, we aim to challenge
one of the assumptions of the heterodox approach, namely that the Stoic worldview is incompatible
with modern scientific thinking. Lastly, we discuss the implications of this view for the Modern Stoic
movement at large, especially with regard to environmental concerns.

2. Environmental Ethics in Stoicism

Following the popularisation of the term “Anthropocene”, in the 21st century, to refer to the
geological period when humankind is a significant driver of global climatic and geological change,
there is an increasing consensus that the current socioeconomic system is disrupting the Earth’s delicate
balance and reducing biodiversity (Haberl et al. 2007; Lewis and Maslin 2015; Rockström et al. 2009;
Steffen et al. 2015, 2007; Swartz et al. 2010).
The extent of humankind’s reach can be expressed by the traces we leave behind. The ancient
Stoics show some awareness of this fact. This is so even though the scale of the damage done by
human beings to the natural environment was far less than it is now. Seneca, for instance, shows that
Stoicism can be applied to such issues when he explores the link between greed (a Stoic vice) and
environmental deterioration:

“Now I turn to address you people whose self-indulgence extends as widely as those other people’s
greed. I ask you: how long will this go on? Every lake is overhung with your roofs! Every river is
bordered by your buildings! Wherever one finds gushing streams of hot water, new pleasure houses
will be started. Wherever a shore curves into a bay, you will instantly lay down foundations. Not
satisfied with any ground that you have not altered, you will bring the sea into it! Your houses gleam
everywhere, sometimes situated on mountains to give a great view of land and sea, sometimes built on
flat land to the height of mountains. Yet when you have done so much enormous building, you still
have only one body apiece, and that a puny one. What good are numerous bedrooms? You can only
lie in one of them. Any place you do not occupy is not really yours.—Seneca’s Letters on Ethics to
Lucilius, Letter 89.20. (translated by Graver and Long 2015)

In the 21st century the problem highlighted by Seneca has increased massively. The total volume
of concrete ever produced is enough to cover the entire Earth’s surface with a layer two millimetres
thick (Lewis and Maslin 2018). In 2010 alone, there was an estimated 75 million tonnes of plastic waste
generated with 4.8 to 12.7 million tonnes entering the ocean (Jambeck et al. 2015). Cumulatively, and
taking into account all possible sizes of plastic particles, there are an estimated five trillion plastic
pieces weighing over 250,000 tonnes floating in the sea (Eriksen et al. 2014). In addition to choking
our oceans, we acidify and heat them, which in turns lead to coral bleaching and the devastation of
fish nurseries. In 1974, 10 percent of fish populations were overfished compared to 66.9 percent in
2015, despite global sustainability targets set to reverse this decline (FAO 2018; UN 2015). In 2016,
approximately 80 million tonnes of fish were removed from the sea and in just 40 years, there has been
a 60 percent decline in terrestrial and marine vertebrate populations (FAO 2018; WWF 2018).
Factories and farming remove the same quantity of nitrogen as all of Earth’s natural processes
and humans annually move more sediment, soil and rock than that which is carried off in the same
year by all natural processes combined. Since the Industrial Revolution, our activities have released 2.2
trillion tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere, which has increased the total amount in the atmosphere by
44 percent (Lewis and Maslin 2018). The trees needed to combat this phenomenon, and the associated
global temperature rise, have been cut to make way for our expansion. Since the dawn of agriculture,
the global forest area has almost halved and the tropical forests able to provide the greatest removal
of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere are increasingly under the threat of agricultural and mining
activity (FAO 2016).
Religions 2019, 10, 193 4 of 18

The unprecedented material wealth accumulation, far beyond the imaginations of the historic
elite, has led to increasing inequality in the 21st century. Furthermore, given the existing policies
and practices that advance rather than overcome economic polarity, for the poor to be bought
out of poverty it will be Earth and not corporate profit margins that will need to be the most
accommodating (O’Neill et al. 2018; Raworth 2017). In short, we need to urgently re-evaluate our role
on and relationship with Earth, living beings and planetary processes. Failure to do so will mean that
humankind risks pushing the natural environment beyond the point where it can sustain life and
facilitate flourishing for human and other forms of life. In this respect:
The Anthropocene is a reminder that the Holocene, during which complex human societies have
developed, has been a stable, accommodating environment and is the only state of the Earth System
that we know for sure can support contemporary society —Steffen et al. (2011)
The above statement, while evidently modern, is in line with ancient Stoic thought, according
to which the recognition of the validity and rationality of the natural universe go hand in hand with
achieving human excellence and happiness. This understanding is consistent with the Stoic idea that
the goal of life is “to live according to Nature”, an idea which is linked, in turn, with their pantheistic
worldview. Pantheism, as a metaphysical and religious stance, can be broadly defined as a belief that
“god is everything and everything is god or that the world is either identical with god or, in some way,
a self-expression of his nature” (Owen 1971, p. 8).
The idea of pantheism gives us scope for exploring the implications of Stoic theology for
environmental ethics, and thus for extending the limited amount of work done by modern Stoics on
this topic (e.g., Gill 2014a; Konstantakos 2014; Whiting et al. 2018a, 2018b). This is because pantheist
ethical frameworks generally are metaphysically founded on the unity of the divine, and the idea that this
divinity is present within all its component parts. This understanding then forms the basis of extending
one’s notion of the moral community to non-human beings and non-living things, such as rocks (Levine
1994). Whiting et al. (2018a) expansion of the Stoic circles of concern to include the “environment”, reflects
this worldview, and the fact that the preceding circles (ranging from the “self” to “humanity”) could not
exist without the sustenance and support provided by Earth (Cf. Epictetus 1.14).
The moral obligation that comes with including the environment in the circles of concern is
captured by Aldo Leopold’s assertion that “a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold 2014).
It also echoes the view of Stoic biologist Steve Karafit that one cannot claim to be progressing towards
the goal of Stoic virtues at the cost of environmental sustainability (Karafit 2018). The rationale behind
a Stoic ethics that integrates both Leopold’s and Karafit’s statements is that a Stoic’s virtue, in order to
be considered as such, must necessarily manifest itself in interactions with other living beings and the
environment. This is because Nature is the ultimate reference of all evaluation and produces both facts
and values. It thus states both what is the case and what ought to be the case (Long 1996b). In other
words, Stoic morality is necessarily grounded in Nature. What is reasonable is not merely an action
that is logical, but that which is consistent with humankind’s rational and social nature.
That said, and in order to reduce any potential for misunderstanding, it is important to distinguish
the Stoic sense of anthropocentric/logocentric moral obligations and that held by practitioners of Deep
Ecology (see Naess 1973) or Leopold’s Land Ethic (see Lenart (2010) as evaluated by Protopapadakis
(2012). Here it is sufficient to say that both these approaches attempt to operate out of a biocentric
(Earth-centred) model, and argue strongly against any thoughts or actions that favour humankind
over any other living community. This stance is incompatible with Stoicism for various reasons. Firstly,
biocentricism is rooted in a non-hierarchical reality of the universe and an ethical framework that
operates according to the belief that humans are not inherently superior to any other species or the
living organism that Earth constitutes (Gadotti 2008a, 2008b; Gadotti and Torres 2009; Taylor 2011).
This clearly contradicts the Stoic position that humankind’s rationality affords them a special place in
the natural order and that Nature’s providence applies in a special way to them. Secondly, the Stoic
god, although traditionally considered to be a biological animal, does not share the characteristics of
Religions 2019, 10, 193 5 of 18

James Lovelock’s Gaia, which maintains a self-regulating homeostasis but does not do so purposefully
or with any sense of foresight or telos (Lovelock 1990). Thirdly, while the logos has intrinsic value,
Earth as a planet, humankind, and any animal or plant, although warranting of moral consideration,
do not. Lastly, a biocentric position is built on the premise that a person can see our shared planetary
kinship through the “planet’s eyes” and that we ought to approach norms and values from the Earth’s,
or at least an animal’s or plant’s, perspective. There is no attempt in Stoic thought to attempt to see the
universe from such a perspective, since Stoics think that being human (as distinct from a non-human
animal) gives us a favourable position for making sense of the universe. Although human beings are
encouraged to take up “the cosmic perspective” (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 5.24, 12.24, 9.32), this is
one that human beings, as rational animals, are distinctively capable of adopting (Cicero, On the Nature
of the Gods 2.37). In short, the Stoic position is, by definition, equally anthropocentric and logocentric.
This is possible because we are both human and distinctively able to understand, through the logos,
the rationality built into the universe because of our own rationality.
This difference between Stoicism and the modern biocentric view does not mean that there are no
points of similarity. Good examples of certain shared beliefs is provided by Naess (1995, p. 14), when
he asserts that we are all in, of and for Nature from the very beginning, and by Vaughan, who emphasises
that pantheism “recognises both our biological and psychological dependence on the environment
[and the fact that] we are actually interdependent and interconnected with the whole fabric of reality”
(Devall 1995, p. 103).
This assertion aligns with Posidonius’ view that the status of each limb depends on the body’s
overall condition, and that it is not possible for the component parts to prosper if the whole suffers
(Protopapadakis 2012). Accepting the Stoic logocentric model means that looking after the planet is
the manifestation of an appropriate action (kathekon), which is beneficial for its own sake, our sake
and for the sake of the Universal community (Stephens 1994). In which case, modern Stoics ought to
call for environmental action because to align oneself with “the will of god” (the in-built order and
rationality of the universe) is good and because god commands it.
Consequently, the Stoic call to live in agreement with Nature is essential to achieving eudaimonia
(human flourishing). To live in harmony with Nature is to maximise one’s happiness because it is the
only path that leads human beings to flourish. If we then accept that the universe is good, then living
according to “the will” of the rational universe has intrinsic value. This does not mean that a person
following this “will” becomes subject to the whims of a capricious being that shows favouritism to a
specific tribe (or “chosen people”) and who becomes pleased or angered by a person’s (in)ability to
live according to an ascribed set of cultural norms and mores. Nor does such a “will” disregard others
out of the need for acts of arbitrary obedience and unquestioned loyalty. In fact, such prescriptions
go against cosmopolitan principles and the circles of concern. Instead, living according to the Stoic
god’s will is expressed through the benefit that comes by harmonising one’s own rational nature with
the universal active principle that has made Earth conducive to the generation and maintenance of
life. This remains true even if, like Marcus Aurelius, one’s personal role involves leading an army
into battle (e.g., Meditations, 2.5). Indeed, one’s local job functions do not absolve a person from the
responsibility and obligation of acting out one’s civic duty, as a citizen of the universe (cf. Stephens
2011, pp. 36–39).
Human beings are not the pinnacle of existence (the logos is) but they are exceptional among all
animals in that they have been bestowed with the property of rationality—a characteristic they share
with god. Incidentally, it is Nature’s providential care and generous provision of life that implants the
instinctive desire that humans and other living beings feel when it comes to the need to preserve and
take care of themselves (their nature or “constitution”) and also to procreate and look after offspring
and others of their kind (see Long and Sedley 1987, 57, esp. A, F(1)). In this sense, a person that follows
“god’s will” is simply conforming their mind and volition to the natural law that determines right
thoughts and actions for them, as a member of a community uniquely equipped to understand the
universe’s causal structure and its beneficence to their very existence (Cf. Epictetus 1.14). The key
Religions 2019, 10, 193 6 of 18

question then becomes, if we reject Stoic teleology and “live according to facts”, can we still come to
the same conclusion? Or do we lose something in the process?

3. Stoic Theology: A Modern Debate

This has already been a great deal of specialist theological discussion on the ancient Stoic
worldview. This section explores the extent of which modern Stoics can incorporate the Stoic worldview
in a coherent ethical framework that aligns with the 21st century understanding of how the world
works. We clarify the main two approaches to theology held within modern Stoicism and untangle
some of the thornier issues in order to better understand the ethical claims being made.

3.1. The Orthodox View

Various modern Stoic scholars, most notably A.A Long, Christoph Jedan, Gisela Striker and
Marcelo Boeri contend that the orthodox Stoic view is not a mere historical detail but essential to
the coherence of the philosophy. Jedan (2009) argues that Stoic theology provides the rationality of
apparently paradoxical claims regarding the sufficiency and “all or nothing” status of virtue. Boeri
(2009) puts forward the case that ancient Stoic cosmology provides meaning to Stoic principles and
points to the sheer number of texts where the origin of Stoic tenets can be explicitly traced back to the
logos. Likewise, Long (1996a) asserts that the Stoic conviction regarding a human being’s purpose and
the attainment of eudaimonia “is principally grounded in their beliefs about the relation in which human
beings stand to a determinate and providentially governed world” (Long 1968). Similar sentiments are
found in Striker (1996).
Part of the unease that moderns have with the orthodox view is that this approach uses the term
“theology”, which in turn, invokes an association with “religion”, “the nature of god” and “spirituality”.
It is, therefore, important that we dispel any common (and fully understandable) misconceptions
moderns may have when interpreting ancient Stoic texts and their theological framework. In doing
so, we hope that those readers of a more agnostic/atheistic inclination do not come to reject Stoic
ideas and their applicability to environmental ethics, before they have had the time to (re)read and
(re)consider them. This is particularly important because there are many modern Stoics who were
originally attracted to the philosophy and its fellowships precisely because of an aversion to, or a loss
of, a contemporary religious belief.
It is essential that moderns understand that the ancient Stoics would not have recognised the
modern distinction between religious thought and scientific inquiry. This is why the Stoic god, as
perfect rationality, has a clear philosophical basis, which necessarily must be arrived at and defended
via rational argument and not faith or dogma (Clark n.d.). Furthermore, while there were certainly
religious aspects, ancient Stoicism was not a religion. There was no leadership hierarchy nor was there
an appointed authority, places of worship or sacred books. It was not heretical to question or reject
earlier Stoic ideas on the basis of reasoned argument. Furthermore, no Stoic practitioner was seen
as an apostate and ex-communicated for involving themselves in the Roman rituals and traditions
(Sadler 2018). That said, the ancient Stoics, especially Chrysippus and Cornutus, did re-interpret some
pre-existing and traditional Greco-Roman religious ideas in order to bring them into their logocentric
worldview. The latter, which we have already briefly discussed, was a naturalistic rational framework
that formed the basis of Stoic virtue ethics and provided practitioners with the rationale to study the
natural world and the wider cosmos, including the celestial bodies (which were often referred to as
gods). This is, in effect, what Cicero explains in On Ends (De Finibus III, 73):

Nor can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature
and even of the life of the gods.

We want to make it clear that while it is true that under the modern Stoic umbrella people can
refer to themselves as a Christian Stoic, a Muslim Stoic, a Hindu Stoic, a Buddhist Stoic or an atheist
Stoic—as long as they accept that the four Stoic virtues are sufficient and necessary for an adult human
Religions 2019, 10, 193 7 of 18

being to flourish—the orthodox Stoic position is grounded in a pantheistic vision of the universe
(Levine 1994; Sellars 2006). Furthermore, the immanent nature of the Stoic god will certainly conflict
with the transcendental aspects of the aforementioned religious traditions, leading to, at the very least,
unusual interpretations of key aspects of Christian, Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist beliefs—especially
those associated with “miracles” and other supernatural events. This is because nothing outside
Nature forms any part of what Stoics believe to exist. In other words, the orthodox Stoic understanding
of the universe, including god, is entirely grounded in natural phenomena.
Stoic reverence for Nature or “god” does not come through any profession of faith, i.e., an
affirmation dependent on the holding of a belief, such as in existence of heaven, hell, angels and other
miraculous signs, even in the absence of, or contrary to, available evidence. This is clear from the
Chrysippean “proofs” for the Stoic god, which are all based on reasoned argument about the nature of
the universe as understood by the Stoics (Dragona-Monachou 1976, pp. 112–20). In other words, the
ancient Stoics recognised, through their theology and not despite it, that progress towards virtue relied not
on divine revelations from a supernatural being but on living in accordance with Nature and by the
facts Nature provides.
The Stoic pantheistic vision has some unique features that distinguish it from Spinoza’s god
(see Long 2003) and the entity created by Arne Naess (1973). However, it also shares many
aspects with modern-day movements and belief systems that emphasise the importance of leading
an environmentally sensitive/sympathetic way of life. In Stoicism, this response is simply an
acknowledgement that the Earth’s natural system, as the giver and sustainer of life (words typically
used to describe a god), is worthy of care and consideration, for its sake and our own.
The Stoic god is the universal pervasiveness of the universe’s mind—its commanding faculty—and
thus the force of fate and the necessity of future events (Long and Sedley 1987, 54A, 54B). It is the
creator of the whole, immortal, perfectly rational, perfectly happy and perfectly benevolent—in that
the universe generously provides all that is required to support life and allow that life to flourish. The
Stoic god is provident toward the world and its occupants and does not create or admit the existence
of evil. It is not anthropomorphic, but it does exercise an anthropocentric divine providence, which is
best understood by humankind through carefully and methodically observing Nature, which reveals
its divinity (perfect rationality) in physical processes, i.e., scientific facts (Baltzly 2003). God’s body is
finite, insofar as the cosmos is finite (Aetius I, 6 = SVF 2.528) and made of a physical creative fire or
physical breath. Furthermore, like the rest of creation, the Stoic god is a soul-body composite made up
of a passive principle (“matter” or “substance without quality”) and an active principle (logos, which
was likewise corporeal).
The Stoic god’s acts and intentions are not specific to an individual, or a group of individuals.
Instead, they operate in line with natural causality and reflect the providentially and fatally ordered
sequence of causes and effects in the cosmos—an inescapable and inevitable law of what exists (Inwood
and Gerson 1997). There are no divine interventions, so no favouritism and no miracles (Algra 2003).
Other than thinking and acting rationality in accordance with Nature, so that one can progress towards
a eudaimonic state, there are no prescribed acts or words of “worship”. There is no way to “please” or
“anger” the Stoic god. There is no divine judgement and god does not send souls to a “heaven” or
“hell”. In fact, other than certain speculations regarding the wisest of humans (the sages), the soul, as a
physical component of the body, does not survive death (Jedan 2009; Lagrée 2016).
This is what orthodox modern Stoic Chris Fisher (2016) explains, when reflecting on Seneca’s On
Providence, 2.4:

Stoics viewed Nature as benevolent—conducive to human life. Death, disease, and natural disasters
are not punishments from an angry God; they are simply the natural unfolding of events within a web
of causes, often outside of our control. Stoics accept that the cosmos is as it should be and they face
challenging events as opportunities for growth rather than considering them harmful. This is neither
resignation nor retreat from the realities of human existence. Stoics strive to do all we can to save
lives, cure disease, and understand and mitigate natural and man-made disasters.
Religions 2019, 10, 193 8 of 18

It is within this frame of reference, that ancient and orthodox modern Stoics agree that there are
objective moral facts, i.e., that some kinds of actions are right and others wrong, independent of what
a human being thinks or decides. If this were not so, Stoics could not explain how it is possible that
an individual who has perfected their moral reason (referred to as a sage) is said to be incapable of a
moral mistake.
The Stoic teleological worldview is evidently and explicitly associated with Chrysippus’ dictum
that living in agreement with Nature means engaging in no activity which the common law (god)
forbids. Furthermore, the excellent character (arete) of a flourishing agent (eudaimon) consists in being
in concordance with “the will of the universe”. In which case, as Long (1996b) points out, the theocratic
postulate is integral to the Stoic conception of virtue, and in understanding how virtue is sufficient and
necessary for eudaimonia. In a Stoic framework, this requires knowledge of Nature (which is accessed
via “physics” and theology) and those morally correct actions (katorthomata) that necessarily cohere
with Nature. It follows that those modern Stoics who promote a theological approach to morality do
so because they believe that the logocentric worldview roots facts in a unified cosmic framework and
is thus the reason behind the Stoic call to live according to Nature. In turn, they maintain that Nature
provides the facts and the corresponding values for normative decision making. Indeed, even if an
atheistic-leaning Stoic does show that there is a mechanistic non-rational ordering of the universe that
does not mean we should value it, as we will explore in more detail in Section 4.
In short, the orthodox Stoic position holds that facts are not the end but rather the means with
which to seek harmony with the universe and reason, because the logos is an intrinsic good. They also
point to Nature’s providential care as the basis for the Stoic cosmopolitan ethical framework and the
Stoic metaphor of the circles of concern, which conceptualise the appropriateness of looking after the
self, other members of the universal human tribe and the environment.

3.2. The Heterodox View

Breaking away from certain aspects of Stoic theology/cosmology is not something that is restricted
to modern philosophers. The ancient Stoic Panaetius, for example, rejected some aspects of Stoic
theology, namely divination and the conflagration (cataclysmic end of the cosmos when all becomes
fire), while retaining the Stoic position overall (Testimonia 130–140). Likewise, neo-Stoics such as Justus
Lipsius and Francis Hutcheson rejected elements of Stoic cosmology in favour of Christian doctrine
(Maurer 2016). Lipsius, for example, argues among other things, that the Stoics are wrong to claim that
the sage is superior to god, a position justified by their belief that a Stoic practitioner relies on their
own efforts, whereas god is virtuous by nature (Man. 3.14, as paraphrased by Lagrée 2016). In our
opinion, while there is nothing wrong with rejecting certain elements of Stoic theology as untenable, one
must be careful to ensure that if some Stoics reject the philosophy’s theological premise in its entirety
that their reasons are valid. It also means that whatever replaces it must be consistent and coherent
with the uniquely Stoic idea that virtue is the one true “good” and the only thing that is both necessary
and sufficient for human happiness.
The heterodox modern Stoic view is an atheistic-agnostic ethical framework. It attempts to
provide normative values without reference to Stoic theology. Modern Stoics that hold to this position
do so for various reasons. One of them is linked to the issue that moderns have with the Western
perception of god (not just the Stoic one) and the concept’s relevance or role in explaining phenomena
in the natural world (Cf., LeBon 2014). As we have already discussed, this discomfort is derived
from a cultural understanding of “god” which is dominated by monotheistic interpretations and the
superstitious and supernatural baggage that such beliefs imply. The Stoic god most definitely does not
coincide with Abrahamic creation myths, nor its descriptions of god’s anthropomorphic character (i.e.,
angry or jealous) that leads to his capricious actions and an arbitrary or punitive Will. We have also
shown that Stoic theology is more like (modern) science than other theological perspectives because
the material Stoic god is more aligned with what atheists or agnostics might refer to as the “scientific
worldview”.
Religions 2019, 10, 193 9 of 18

This brings us to a second, and much more difficult and nuanced, topic to address, which is
whether moderns can accept the Stoic’s naturalist theological framework, as a credible scientific
account of the natural world. Many leading modern Stoic scholars, such as Lawrence Becker (Becker
2017, p. 6) and Massimo Pigliucci (Pigliucci 2017a) argue that we cannot. They contend that, if the
integrity of modern Stoicism is to remain intact, we must necessarily make the case that Stoic ethics
can be upheld without the need for cosmic teleology. This is in essence why Annas (2007, 1995) and
Inwood (2003) argue that recovering the Stoic theological framework in a modern context would
ultimately be a mistake.
Becker (2017, 1998) tries to flesh out the practice of Stoic ethics in the modern world. He adopts
an atheistic approach in which he replaces the cosmological foundations of the call to “live according
to Nature” with an ethical framework built on a call to “live according to the facts”. He states that:

Following nature means following the facts. It means getting the facts about the physical and social
world we inhabit, and the facts about our situation in it—our own powers, relationships, limitations,
possibilities, motives, intentions, and endeavours—before we deliberate about normative matters. It
means facing those facts—accepting them for exactly what they are, no more and no less—before we
draw normative conclusions from them. It means doing ethics from the facts—constructing normative
propositions a posteriori. It means adjusting those normative propositions to fit changes in the facts.
(Becker 2017, p. 46)

In rejecting the Stoic linkage between Stoic ethics and cosmology, Becker assumes that Stoic
theology, in the ancient world, did not aim to “face the facts”. However, this is mistaken. Stoic theology,
and ethics, were supposed by ancient Stoics to be consistent with ‘the facts’, as they understood them,
that is the facts about the nature of the universe and the place of human beings and other animals
within the universe. Therefore, the position Becker adopts—while presented as being a radical revision
of the Stoic view—is actually in line with it. Furthermore, Stoic principles stipulate that practitioners
have an obligation to address discrepancies where ancient beliefs contradict modern discoveries or are
challenged by scientific pursuits. In other words, Stoic theology is not opposed to the scientific view,
but depends on it.
Having identified this source of confusion, it is worth clarifying what exactly is being argued in
the modern heterodox call to “follow the facts”. The crux of the issue does not boil down to whether
Stoics should follow facts (they evidently should) but whether the orthodox Stoic worldview is an
accurate depiction of the facts, as these are understood in the modern world. The question at hand
is whether or not it is acceptable for moderns to operate out of the orthodox understanding that the
universe acts with benevolent providence, that the logos is an intrinsic “good” and that it dictates
what is virtuous, vicious or neither.
For many prominent modern Stoics, including Lawrence Becker, Massimo Pigliucci, Greg Lopez
and Piotr Stankiewicz (see Stankiewicz 2017, for example), the heterodox worldview is compatible with
modern science precisely because, unlike the orthodox position, it does not claim that the universe is good
or that it provides objective meaning. For such Stoics, the universe is understood as being mechanistic
(quantistic-relativistic). It is most definitely not benevolent and certainly does not work for the benefit of
humankind (Pigliucci 2017a). Consequently, the logos is re-envisioned, or re-defined, as “the (factual)
observation that the universe is indeed structured in a rational manner” (Pigliucci 2017c).
For heterodox Stoics, given that meaning does not exist objectively, it is simply something that
humans construct as social and intelligent beings. It follows that what an individual neurotypical
human being ought to do can be derived from facts about human values, preferences, historical
events, cultural norms and social conventions (Becker 2017). These facts are not derived from what
an orthodox Stoic refers to when they speak of “living according to Nature”, but instead from our
collective accounts of human psychology, history, sociology and biology. Contrary to the orthodox
position, there is no absolute moral truth (orthodox Stoics would contend that it is the goodness
inherent in the immanent law of Nature) and no objective good outside of human perception. In other
Religions 2019, 10, 193 10 of 18

words, “virtue” is not an objective intrinsic property of Nature but depends solely on human thought
and action. This is effectively what Pigliucci (2017a) implies:

The idea of mind independent moral truths is rejected as incoherent since ethics is the study of human
prescriptive actions. Conversely, relativism is also a no starter because there are objective facts about
human nature and the human condition that constrain our ethical choices.

Massimo Pigliucci is certainly right (and in line with ancient Stoicism) in arguing that we should
aim to make decisions based on an objective understanding of human nature. After all, we are
compelled by certain facts and lack the absolute freedom to choose which facts are valuable to us (e.g.,
pain, hunger or thirst). Likewise, our capacity for rationality causes us to become aware of other types
of facts, such as climate change. Once we are aware of climate change, we are then consciously and
rationally compelled to understand this fact for the sake of our own good (Butman 2019). The problem
with Pigliucci’s (2017a) statement and Becker’s (1998, 2017) view on ‘facing the facts’ is that while
there may be some connections between facts and norms, for many moderns, including those in the
heterodox camp, it is a fallacy to believe that one can derive values from them (Hume 2006; Moore
1959). It is also important to recognise that the ancient Stoics did not reduce Physics to “fact hunting”
because they were aware that what they might consider a fact might not be. This is the reason why
Stoics say that when facts are unclear, but the impression is such that it is reasonable to believe them,
then we should only assent to the impression that it is reasonable to believe, and not assert that
such and such is the case. In other words, we should assent with reservation as Sphaerus did with
the pomegranate (as explained by Diogenes Laertius in the Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Book 7,
177). Furthermore, if we see the world only through the lens of facts, we tend to see things from a
reductionist perspective. The latter can have and has had grave consequences for the natural world,
which is far more complex than we can understand and does not thrive when reduced to its component
parts (Long 2018).
Ethics are not only concerned with human actions towards other humans, but also with how
the world and non-humans operate. Our freedom to imbue facts with meaning is conditioned by the
fact that we live in the world, which is not only dependent on human nature but Nature generally.
Together, they both determine the attitude a person ought to have and what action they ought to take.
This is why orthodox Stoics maintain that it is in aligning one’s behaviour with how the world works
which is conducive to human happiness.
Another major difficulty that surfaces when appealing to the objectivity of facts is that while they
can help an individual decide what to think or how to act, they have no bearing, in and of themselves,
on whether that thought or act is virtuous or not. To infer virtue or vice from scientific facts requires
a proxy ideal for virtue in the objective sense. One way to interpret the heterodox view of virtue is
through “harmony”, which is a particularly appropriate Stoic proxy for wellbeing. This is because it
incorporates both societal structures and the natural world. Striving for a personal sense of harmony
provides meaning for an individual looking to navigate an indifferent universe. In this respect, it
would not matter if a person is aligned with the nature of the universe, as it is that person’s sense
of harmony or discord that determines their progress towards eudaimonia. In other words, one can
make the case that a Stoic could determine the virtuousness of their thoughts, acts or mental state by
gauging how much harmony was created or destroyed either in themselves or within, or between, any
of the other relationships represented by the concentric circles of concern. If this is true, Annas (1995)
is correct to assert:

If I am convinced that virtue is sufficient for happiness, then when I acquire the cosmic perspective I
acquire the thought that this is not just an ethical thesis, but one underwritten by the nature of the
universe. But what actual difference can this make? It cannot alter the content of the thought that
virtue suffices for happiness, for I understood that before if I understood the ethical theory. Nor is it
easy to see how the cosmic perspective can give me any new motive to be virtuous; if I understood
and lived by the ethical theory, I already had sufficient motive to be virtuous, and if awareness of the
Religions 2019, 10, 193 11 of 18

cosmic perspective adds any motivation then I did not already have a properly ethical perspective
before. —(Annas 1995, p. 166)

Arguably, the biggest challenge to the heterodox position is revealed when attempting to apply
harmony as a proxy for societal/planetary wellbeing. For societal issues, this would entail the use
of social cohesion as an indicator of the appropriateness of a given thought or action. However,
when we equate social harmony with virtue as derived from facts about human values, preferences,
historical events, cultural norms and social conventions, we need to recognise that these facts (unlike
the essence of Nature) change. Indeed, one of the biggest factors that separate humans from other
animals is cumulative culture. The latter describes our unique ability to take advantage of the scientific
knowledge and philosophical ideas that are only made possible by our ability to understand and make
use of the imparted knowledge and artefacts of others (Caldwell and Millen 2008; Whiting et al. 2018c).
It explains why social structures and values evolve for humankind while for other animals they do not.
A good example of the problem of relying on societal values to determine virtue is the concept
of slavery. The latter was commonplace in the ancient world. Incidentally, two powerful Roman
Stoics, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius were well placed to modify this practice. They chose not to.
Furthermore, their respective writings that now form the Stoic “canon” show that they accepted
slavery as an indifferent circumstance (though not one that was preferable) , and believed that it was
in the treatment of the slave that virtue could be found. Seneca for example, remarks to Lucilius that:

I do not wish to involve myself in too large a question, and to discuss the treatment of slaves, towards
whom we Romans are excessively haughty, cruel, and insulting. But this is the kernel of my advice:
Treat your inferiors as you would be treated by your betters. In addition, as often as you reflect how
much power you have over a slave, remember that your master has just as much power over you.
—Seneca, Moral letters to Lucilius, Letter 47, Chapter 4

Evidently for these Roman Stoics, justice and self-control consisted of treating a slave with
kindness, not using them sexually, allowing them to eat at the dinner table and remembering their
humanity. It would be very difficult to maintain this position now. This means that either enslaving
others was always vicious - even if the Romans did not realise it or could do nothing about it - or that,
given the social norms and preferences of Ancient Rome, slavery was acceptable for ancient Roman
Stoics but is wrong for modern ones (for a more detailed discussion on the ancient Stoic position on
slavery (see Robertson 2017).
An orthodox modern Stoic can claim that slavery is objectively unjust regardless of spatiotemporal
circumstances. That is, if Roman society required forced labour to function then that structure was
not formed in accordance with Nature and those Romans were therefore vicious, regardless of any
particular opinion or set of opinions. On the contrary, this is where heterodox Stoics reach an impasse.
For if virtue is derived through human social mechanisms, and societal harmony is the litmus test
for virtue, then banning slavery would have been unjust because it would have resulted in social
breakdown, if not chaos. Additionally, and problematically for anyone looking to “live according to
the facts”, there are no facts that state that slavery is bad from a Stoic perspective. One might infer
that it is vicious because pain or harm is being caused, but this would be a Utilitarian argument and
not a Stoic one given that Stoic principles hold that pain and harm do not prevent a person from
flourishing, and therefore do make the moral difference (although the reasons for inflicting pain do
make a moral difference).
In this respect, the orthodox framework is far from redundant because it stipulates an objective
universal reference point that dictates how we all should live, regardless of how human beings think
and act. In which case, Stoic theology can inform us on what we, as a society, ought to do.
Religions 2019, 10, 193 12 of 18

4. Stoic Theology: Implications for Environmental Ethics

The call to “live according to Nature” is a fundamental principle of Stoic philosophy. It is not
restricted to moral duties (which would be a deontological position) but extends to one’s thoughts
and mental states. In other words, flourishing is not the mere performance of appropriate actions
(kathekonta), since these can be accomplished without a virtuous character. Hence why Stoics stipulate
that the wise person is happy because he or she does the right action for the right reason and this
right reason stems from a virtuous disposition, which is necessarily aligned with the universal causal
principle (god).
Nature is the sine qua non for the evaluation of reason and no reasonable proposition can exist
or be understood outside of it. Nature is also the cause of knowledge and truth. It is the basis for
everyone’s (and everything’s) being and reality. Even moral truths, which are not founded on scientific
fact, but rely on coherence or intuition, are grounded in the subjective experience of our own nature
and the objectivity of the natural world generally. This reality helps us understand that we are all
part of Nature, as an interconnected and interdependent web of connections that we cannot separate
ourselves from. Instead, what sets humans apart is a rationality that enables us to glean divine wisdom,
and absolute truth, in the form of natural laws. In contrast, all other members of the Whole have no
choice but to live in harmony with the logos. In other words, our uniqueness as a species comes in our
capacity to choose not to live accordance with Nature (Butman 2019).
Many moderns have used our species’ innate characteristics to construct and transmit rationalising
narratives that have caused many of us to give assent to the false impression that we have tamed
Nature. Such stories have also led to the fallacious declaration that through our technology and
ingenuity we have “risen above” the physical limits that were imposed on us, and have successfully
distanced, or removed ourselves from “god’s” grasp (Illich 1983; Whiting et al. 2018a). However,
all we have done in reality is encroach upon those spaces previously occupied by non-Westernised
communities, animals, plants and geological formations until we have undermined or negated their
capacity to exist—to our great shame and loss (as we saw in Section 2).
The wanton environmental devastation that has become a feature (read collateral damage) of
the human values, preferences and commitment to the present socioeconomic system underlines
why greed and injustice are considered Stoic vices (made manifest in the absence of self-control
and/or justice). It also gives credence to the idea that there is value in operating under the Stoic
theological premise. The latter, as with all theological perspectives, provides humankind with an
objective yardstick with which to frame and measure our morality. Despite what some moderns may
claim, ethics is not just a matter of how we behave towards other human beings, but also necessarily
involves the environment of which we are all part. In this respect, the call to “live according to
Nature”, far from being outdated or archaic, as many heterodox leaning Stoics claim, is actually
refreshingly contemporary. It provides the tools, scope and urgency with which to deliver a far
more considerate and dynamic ethical framework for the 21st century. It is exactly what we need to
(re)consider and (re)contextualise the preferences, practices, policies, historical events, cultural norms,
social conventions and human values that have caused the West to disregard planetary wellbeing,
cause carbon emissions to climb and led to socioenvironmental inequality (as highlighted by IPCC
2018; Lent 2017; Raworth 2017; Steffen et al. 2015).
There is nothing wrong with global warming or environmental damage according to “the facts”.
In addition, these, in and of themselves, simply constitute a non-normative truth. That said, facts are
integral to Stoic environmental ethics because they unequivocally demonstrate that carbon emissions
have risen sharply since the Industrial Revolution and that, among other things, Earth is experiencing
huge biodiversity loss. They indicate that the current socioeconomic system and its technologies have
brought millions of people out of poverty and allowed them to rise above the drudgery of subsistence
farming and some of the most arduous of domestic chores. They also tell us that one half of the world’s
energy is used by one-seventh of its population (Rosling 2010). In other words, isolated facts state that
environmental damage has occurred or that animals have died. They show that a small minority of
Religions 2019, 10, 193 13 of 18

people use most of the world’s resources and that the ability to substitute muscle power with fossil
fuels has freed those same people to live without fear of local weather anomalies and do more than
housework. However, no fact can tell us what we ought to do when two sets of facts are juxtaposed,
such as the carbon emission rises associated with the increased use of home appliances and the poverty
that people are almost always guaranteed without them. The facts cannot tell us whether a British
CEO should reduce their reliance on electronic gadgets (at the expense of comfort and convenience) or
whether a rural South American villager should instead be denied the opportunity to progress. Indeed,
one can even use isolated facts (in a Utilitarian fashion) to surmise that this British CEO should be
absolved from personal responsibility because he or she will make more of a net positive impact to
planetary wellbeing than a village of South American farmers who suddenly do not have to wash their
clothes by hand.
Even when collective decisions align with some (or even all) of humanity’s current values and
preferences, this does not mean that these align with courage, justice, temperance or wisdom, as is
objectively understood when viewing the world through the dual anthropocentric/logocentric lens.
Operating with the mind’s eye fixed on the objective yardstick that orthodox theology provides, gives
us an ethical imperative to express our values and virtues not just relative to each other but in respect
to the Whole. It is this understanding that underpins many of our cosmopolitan ideas. The latter allow
us to recognise our obligations towards indigenous and vulnerable communities that either do not
ascribe to, or do not benefit from, Western ideals and systems. This is especially true if we accept
that the “environment” forms the last concentric ring of the modern set of Stoic circles of concern.
The addition of the “environment” then highlights the need for an ethical framework that considers
planetary processes beyond any reductionist commitment to a set of facts.
Under a cosmopolitan ideal, we can understand that what makes global warming wrong is our
rational desire to make the planet more hospitable to ourselves and future generations (including those
born today). We can point to the virtue of resisting engagement with those activities that increase our
personal carbon or water footprint. We can support the school climate strikes because the children
(and parents) undertaking them are challenging the ignorance of climate denial and those policies
that exacerbate climate breakdown, despite various warnings from both Nature and the scientific
community (Thunberg 2018). We can see why we should collectively challenge certain pursuits that
put profit before socioenvironmental justice or wise decision-making (Lane 2012). In other words, once
we understand the call to live according to Nature, we can question the virtue-signalling of politicians
condemning climate strike truancy rather than addressing the real environmental issues at stake.
In short, the orthodox Stoic position promotes an understanding that facts are not the end but
rather the means with which to seek harmony with the universe and reason, which is encompassed by
the logos, as an intrinsic good. Arguably, this reality becomes clearer once modern Stoics understand
the relevance of Stoicism as a political philosophy and not just a personal one limited to dealing with
one’s emotions and the dichotomy of control. In this regard, Stoic theology is revealing, because it can
guide modern Stoics dealing with the socioenvironmental challenges of the 21st century and in the
building of the coherent ethical framework that this entails (Figure 1).
rather the means with which to seek harmony with the universe and reason, which is encompassed
by the logos, as an intrinsic good. Arguably, this reality becomes clearer once modern Stoics
understand the relevance of Stoicism as a political philosophy and not just a personal one limited to
dealing with one’s emotions and the dichotomy of control. In this regard, Stoic theology is revealing,
because it can
Religions 2019, guide modern Stoics dealing with the socioenvironmental challenges of the1421st
10, 193 of 18
century and in the building of the coherent ethical framework that this entails (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Stoic orthodox theology applied to environmental ethics.

Figure 1. Stoic orthodox theology applied to environmental ethics.

5.5.Final
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universe. a heterodox
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must concede that rational humans, if programmed to look for, and operate under, patterns, flourish
when they live according to what they perceive to be a rationally ordered universe. This is regardless
of whether that universe is rational or not, or if they are mistaken about the nature of the pattern.
It follows then that to live according to this fact is tantamount to human happiness (eιιdaimonia), as
is recognising the interconnectedness of Nature. In other words, our flourishing is dependent on
our capacity to bring ourselves in line with Nature as a whole and our own particular nature as an
idiosyncratic human being (Diogenes Laertius 7.85-6 = LS 63 C). Where Lawrence Becker succeeds is
in clarifying the value of the scientific method and the pursuit of facts in the modern context, which
might be overlooked in a call to “live according to Nature”:

[We should] get the facts about the physical and social world we inhabit, and the facts about our
situation in it—our own powers, relationships, limitations, possibilities, motives, intentions, and
endeavours—before we deliberate about normative matters. —Becker (2017, p. 46)

The Stoic idea of god, for the reasons stated above, does not, for the most part, contradict scientific
pursuits. Rather, it serves to correct misapplications of these endeavours. In addition, Stoic principles
dictate that when ancient Stoic beliefs (e.g., animals solely exist for humankind’s benefit) contradict
modern discoveries we have an obligation to address such discrepancies. This does not negate the
value of cosmic sympathy as derived by Stoic teleology. Rather it allows a practitioner to not give
assent to false impressions and brings the philosophy and its practitioners in line with the rational will
of a benevolent universe. It does this by providing meaning to our pursuits, which includes directing
science (and the humanities) towards research that benefits the Whole.
Part of the issue that moderns have with the Stoic god is derived from the West’s cultural
understanding of monotheism, which as we have made clear in this paper does not form the basis of
Religions 2019, 10, 193 15 of 18

the Stoic god. Conversely, it explains why a religious Stoic must give up the alleged transcendental
god for an immanent one. While such terminology may make moderns uncomfortable, this is not the
first time that Stoic ideas, such as women being educated or Zeno’s view that both heterosexual and
homosexual relationships are acceptable, have clashed with popular sensitivities. These perspectives
have since been vindicated in the West and are foundational to the cosmopolitan principles of the
philosophy. The historical removal of these ideas on the grounds that some people felt uncomfortable
would have compromised the integrity of Stoic philosophy and the coherence of Stoic axiology.
The same can be said for the modern claim that the Stoic orthodox position is untenable or unpalatable.
In which case, the removal of Stoicism’s theological component to protect academic sensibilities and
suit a modern practitioner’s palate is not just unjustified but troubling. It also, as we have shown,
prevents Stoics from connecting with environmental ethics on their philosophy’s own terms. Stoic
rationalism implies living according to Nature, so if we are ruining the planet, we are not acting
rationally, and thus not operating virtuously. Finally, whether or not Stoic theology provides the most
accurate description of the universe, it still forces a different view from that propagated by those that
put profits before people and the planet. It offers an underlying ethos and ethical framework that
could play a critical role in how Stoics go about reversing the climate breakdown and environmental
damage that the current geopolitical worldview and socioeconomic system are all but ignoring, if
not accelerating.

Author Contributions: K.W. conceived this paper, led the narrative framing and coordinated its writing. L.K.
provided extensive feedback and support on the Stoic sections.
Funding: K.W. acknowledges the financial support of the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) and MIT
Portugal Program through the grant PD/BP/113742/2015.
Acknowledgments: We thank Chris Gill and A.A Long for their helpful comments, suggestions and advice. We
also appreciate the time taken by Jeremy Butman to comment on this paper. Lastly, we acknowledge the lifetime
work of Lawrence Becker, especially, in establishing a form of Stoicism for the 20th and 21st centuries. Without his
efforts this would not have been possible.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Stoicism, a Philosophical Basis for Ecology?
Koffi Alladakan
University of Abomey-Calavi, Cotonou, Benin
How to cite this paper: Alladakan, K.
(2021) Stoicism, a Philosophical Basis for
Ecology? Open Access Library Journal, 8:
e7237
https://doi.org/10.4236/oalib.1107237
Received: February 10, 2021
Accepted: April 26, 2021
Published: April 29, 2021
Copyright © 2021 by author(s) and Open
Access Library Inc.
This work is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution International
License (CC BY 4.0).
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Open Access
1. Introduction
In Greco-Roman antiquity, if the whole philosophical tradition has given, in
DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1107237 Apr. 29, 2021
Open Access Library Journal
2021, Volume 8, e7237
ISSN Online: 2333-9721
ISSN Print: 2333-9705
Abstract
Through its ideal of “living in harmony with nature”, the Portico appears to
be a philosophy that invites men to take the relationship with the world se-
riously. In order to achieve wisdom, the essential mark of which is sobriety, it
has established principles, some of which seems to have an ecological value.
While considering nature as an organic and spiritual entity which parts to-
gether form a whole, stoicism posits that it constitutes the destiny whose laws
are inescapable and instructs men never to rebel against the already estab-
lished order but always to seek the best way to collaborate with it so as not to
suffer the evils of their action. With the principle of “universal sympathy”, he
adds that everything is interwined and interdependent so that one cannot
touch other elements of the cosmos without acting on the whole. Through the
principle of oikeiôsis, i.e. the appropriation of oneself, a familiarity with what
is close, extending from the human species to other natural beings, to the
whole earth, develops. Apart from all these doctrinal considerations, we dis-
cover paradoxically that Seneca’s work conceals several clues relating to the
environmental problems. In this sense, it would be difficult to deny that the
philosophy of the Portico has nothing to do with the foundation of ecology.
Rather, its interest would lie, in terms of effectiveness, in the education of
virtue, consisting of a habitus animi, a disposition of the soul in a certain way,
which naturally implies ecological behaviour.
Subject Areas
Philosophy
Keywords
Stoicism, Universal Sympathy, Oikeiôsis, Virtue, Ecology
1 Open Access Library Journal
 K. Alladakan

general, an importance to nature, it is stoicism which has considered, particular-

ly, nature as a living organism. According to this doctrine, nature cannot be the
result of chance, because its observation shows that there is a universal order
which is the result of divine, providential and rational actions, whose knowledge
is a determining factor for good behaviour. This follows from the Stoic ideal: “to
live in harmony with nature” whose application could naturally imply a rela-
tionship of harmony and balance between men and nature and have a positive
impact on the latter in terms of reducing the exploitation of resources, brief in
terms of protection and protection of nature. In this sense, one might ask
whether there is a link between Stoics and ecologists. Clearly, would the latter
not have been inspired by Stoic philosophy to elaborate their thought that is
ecology? In a clear way, would they not have taken inspiration from the Stoic
philosophy to elaborate their thought that is environmentalism? In other words,
would stoicism not be the distant source from which the idea of the need to
maintain a harmonious relationship between man and nature arose? In other
words, can we argue that the Stoics were the precursors of the ecologists? The
objective of this research is to show that Stoicism would be the philosophy that
would have served as the basis of ecology.
The study we have undertaken will first attempt to establish a relationship
between Stoicism and Ecologism. The two doctrines seem to have almost the
same language as regards the relationship that man must maintain with nature.
Then we will present Stoic principles that have ecological value. It is the unity
and order of nature that must be respected, the universal sympathy that ex-
presses the link between the elements of nature and the familiarity that man de-
velops towards it. Finally, we will highlight the evidences of Stoic thought con-
cerning the environmental problems. Above all, it will be a question of showing
that a virtuous life has a positive impact on nature.

2. Link between Stoicism and Ecologism

Despite the great gap that separates the Stoics and the ecologists in terms of
time, it is curious to discover that they hold almost the same discourse on na-
ture, inviting to maintain a relationship of harmony and balance between men
and the cosmos.
The Stoic school, The Portico, was founded founded by Zeno of Kitium at the
end of the 4th century B.C. in Athens, Greece. In Greek, this place was called the
Stoa poikilè, which means painted Portico, from which comes the name Stoicism
which is still called to the philosophy of the Portico. Over about six centuries,
Stoicism has survived from Athens to Rome via Rhodes and its last representa-
tive is Marcus Aurelius who died in 180 AD. J.-C. The Stoic school based its
philosophy on ancient naturalism, postulating that one must “live in harmony
with nature”, that is to say to know the laws of nature to live well. His teaching
consists of three parts: physics, logic and ethics. Seneca was one of its great rep-
resentatives in Rome during the imperial era, whose work came almost entirely

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 K. Alladakan

to us and which deals essentially with the study of nature and ethics. But this one
appears to have contributed the most to the influence and good reputation of the
Portico. For ethics teaches men to live in harmony with himself, others and na-
ture. And it seems that it is precisely at this level that one finds all the interest
that one can have today for stoicism. More precisely the idea of environmental-
ism, the need to maintain a harmonious relationship between men and nature,
would be an emanation of this philosophy; what is important to investigate.
Through its ideal of “living in harmony with nature”, the Portico appears to
be a philosophy that invites men to take their relationship with the world se-
riously. It demands harmony between men who must be in perfect harmony
with nature. Nature has laws that mankind must observe in order to know hap-
piness. Through this, the idea of ecology undoubtedly emerges. Because, to a
certain extent, it is a question of men’s relationship with nature. And when we
draw a parallel between the Stoics’ discourse on nature and that of the ecologists,
we can affirm that Stoicism would constitute a philosophical foundation of
ecology. If it is possible to arrive at one of the evidences of Stoic thought such as
ecologism in the present case, which seems acceptable according to Duhot, he
does not intend to say that the Stoics are the precursors of this ideology:

“The Stoic gaze considers continuity and systems, situates men in the total-
ity of the universe and does not want to isolate anything from the whole.
Everything is interdependent and is inscribed in an ordered scale of beings.
However, it would be quite naive to attribute this new convergence to an
anticipatory vision of the Stoics and to consider them as precursors of any
modern ideology. …] The Stoics are precursors neither of systematic
thought nor of ecology, any more than the atom of Democritus or Epicurus
was of physicists. It is we who, by reconstructing our rationality, rehabilitate
the possibility of conceiving things other than by reducing them to simple
units [1].”

Neither the Epicureans nor the Stoics are respectively precursors of physicists
and ecologists. The relevance and truthfulness of this statement is fully revealed
in the sense that the Ancients and the moderns never lived together at the same
time to think about the same problems. The difference between them is very
large and although the term sometimes seems identical, it should be noted that
their meanings differ. But as far as the case of the Stoics is concerned, it seems
that it is possible to bring some nuance because what makes their thought spe-
cific and permanent, and thus their strength, is exactly their ethics, which makes
them always seem to be ahead of their time; which even gives the impression of
an anachronism about them. It is true that they have never directly posed the
problem of the environment; for the preservation and safeguarding of the envi-
ronment was not their main concern, and it only began recently in the 1970s.
But since the ecological crisis is in fact an ethical problem, it is possible that Stoic
thought has implicitly addressed it in its moral concerns in general. Thus, for
example, Seneca (1993: 123, 3) thought of moral progress when he said that “it is

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 K. Alladakan

indispensable to get used to living a short life”; this could make sense today on
the ecological level. More precisely, an in-depth study has confirmed that the
problem of the environment was not unknown to the Ancients, especially among
the Romans, whose zeal for the organization and transformation of the world
was no different from that which engendered the industrial revolution. To be
convinced of this, we can refer to Fideli Paolo (2005, p. 7):

“[...] it is true that the concept of ecology has taken on primary importance
in the modern world because of the dramatic consequences of the some-
times irrational use of industrial resources and the sometimes insufficient
control of products harmful to man; however, this does not mean that—for
other reasons and at another level—the question did not also arise for the
Greeks and Romans, who lived in a world untouched by pollution [2].”

But the difference is that the scale of the environmental crisis in antiquity was
absolutely less than that of the contemporary world. One could also add that if
the problem had arisen, it was not the subject of any particular study; it was ad-
dressed through the moral and ethical concerns of the Ancients. On the basis of
all this, it would be excluded that ecological thought was born ex nihilo without
being inspired by ancient wisdom in general and stoicism in particular. Luc Fer-
ry (2006, pp. 46-47) asserts this idea with this precision:

“However, if you want to compare this conception of [Stoic] morality to

something you know and that still exists today in our societies, think of
ecology. For ecologists, in fact, and in this they take up, although often
without knowing it, themes from Greek Antiquity nature forms a harmo-
nious whole that humans would be well advised to respect and even, in
many cases, to imitate. It is in this sense that they speak, for example, not of
the cosmos, but it comes down to the same thing, of ‘biosphere’ or ‘ecosys-
tems’. As the German philosopher who was a great theorist of contempo-
rary ecology, Hans Jonas, said, ‘the ends of man are domiciled in nature’,
which means: the objectives that human beings should ethically propose to
themselves are inscribed, as the Stoics thought, in the very order of the
world, so that the ‘devoir-be’—that is, what one must do morally—is not
cut off from being, from nature as it is [3].”

The connection between Stoicism and ecology seems to be quickly made, and
it would not be at all exaggerated to see that most of the Stoic principles seem to
express an ecological value, since their application naturally implies a relation-
ship of harmony and balance between man and nature. It is the unity and order
of nature that must be respected, the universal sympathy that expresses the link
between the elements of nature and the familiarity that man develops towards it.
In addition to all this, there is naturally the impact of the virtuous life which
would be less on nature. In any case, it would be well possible to invite the read-
er to reread the Stoics, in this case Seneca, to be inspired by his ethics for a good
management and protection of nature in general:

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 K. Alladakan

“Seneca’s ecological concerns boil down to the condemnation of the glut-

tony of the human species, which leads men to misuse natural phenomena.
While it is quite clear that it is not a blind anachronism to speak of ecologi-
cal concerns in an author who lived more than twenty centuries ago, it is
important not to misunderstand the texts that condemn the philosopher’s
disrespect for nature and its goods. The ecological concerns in question are
in reality only the result of the condemnation of moral depravity. Ecology,
as protection of the environment, was of no more concern to him than the
ruin of justice, friendship, benevolence and recognition, etc. Ecology
represents only a rotten link in the long rotten chain of acts and representa-
tions of the human species [4] (P. Hounsounon-Tolin, 2011, pp.111-112).”

3. Stoic Principles with Ecological Value

Stoic principles of ecological value are concerned with the unity and order of
nature that must be respected, the universal sympathy that expresses the link
between the elements of nature and the familiarity that men develops towards it.

3.1. Unity and Order of Nature

We must begin by mentioning that the Portico is not a philosophy that can be
reduced exclusively to ethics, wisdom or an art of living, but is above all a reflec-
tion on nature. And in this sense, it is undoubtedly the philosophy of Gre-
co-Latin antiquity whose message most invites man to think about his relation-
ship to the world. By developing the ancient ideal of “living in harmony with
nature” as the supreme end of the search for happiness, he considered nature as
a harmoniously ordered living organism. The Stoic cosmos, unlike that of the
Epicureans, which is empty and subject to chance, is hierarchically constituted of
beings of which man is at the top because he has the privilege of being rational
in the same way as God, the creator, who governs the whole universe. It is cha-
racterized by unity, because we remember that Seneca (1993, 95, 51) affirmed
that “men constitute the members of a great body which is the world and which
is one” [5]. The organization of nature, which is characterized by the order and
regularity of the phenomena that take place in it, is the result of a perfect law
that lies at its origin, and which is nothing other than the law of destiny, which is
irreversible. It requires of all its subjects obedience and submission for the sake
of a good cooperations which bring happiness, true freedom. Among all natural
beings, man is the only one capable of understanding such an organization of
the world, and it is precisely with the aim of participating in it voluntarily in or-
der to preserve himself from the inconveniences that would result from his re-
sistance. Since, his misfortune lies in his refusal to harmonize with the order of
the cosmos, which is inescapable and can only be detrimental to him in case of
disagreement. When he seeks to oppose or change the normal course of events
instead of turning away from his ideas, he exposes himself to danger. They are at
great risk because they cannot reverse or avoid the trend. One could, by inter-

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 K. Alladakan

pretation and in a general way, situate the source of man’s misfortunes, such as
the environmental problem, in his rebellion that puts him at odds with the order
of nature. This order being already established, the only possible solution is to
adhere to it, not in the sense of resignation but rather of consent, of joyful ac-
ceptance. While obeying nature, man is not forbidden to take advantage of all
the opportunities available to him to achieve what is possible. For example, ac-
cording to an African proverb, “the waters of the river do not flow backwards”,
that is, naturally, “the water of the river does not return to its source”; just as it is
not possible to block its way and oppose its passage; to do so is to go against the
cosmic order. However, one can dredge a river in order to channel it, prevent its
overflow and narrow its bed. One can also exploit its falls from the erection of
dams to produce electrical energy. Most of the time, it is at the antipodes of the
order of nature that men act out of ignorance and especially out of pleasure,
which can lead to problems such as environmental problems. Seneca (1993, 122,
8-9) witnessed this and wrote the following:

“Don’t they come in the opposite direction of nature, these passionate

amateurs of the winter rose, who by affusions of hot water, by skillful trans-
plantations tear off a spring flower from the ground in the middle of the
winter solstice? In the reverse of nature, those who plant an orchard at the
top of the towers of their villa and who are on the roof and ridge of their
home a forest that undulates in the wind and takes root at a height where it
would hardly have raised the tops of its trees? Against nature those who
throw the foundations of their thermal baths into the sea and do not believe
they can swim voluptuously enough unless their warm water basins are
beaten by the stream and the storm? Having made it a rule to accept only
what goes against nature (…), they end up in a complete divorce from it.”
Here, the philosopher denounces and condemns unnatural actions, con-
sisting of “moving the land, closing the seas, throwing the rivers into the
abyss, suspending the woods” [5], which would not be without damage to
nature and to the man who is the author. The consequence is that the latter
creates disorder in the natural environment by degrading it. It should be
noted that even if it is painful to respect the order of the cosmos, it must be
recognized that it is not without interest. Isn’t this why, according to the
Stoics, in order to live better, it is absolutely necessary to know nature?

3.2. Universal Sympathy as the “Holistic Dimension of Nature”

The human being is endowed with reason that is at work in the universe, which
allows him to apprehend the functioning of the universe and to live in accor-
dance with it. As such, he has a special status obliging him to respect the cosmic
order so that harmony reigns. He discovers through the study of nature that all
the elements are united and connected; nothing is isolated and everything is in-
terdependent. A. Bridoux (1966, p. 90) confirms this well when he writes that
“everything is linked to everything in space as well as in time; the general cha-

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 K. Alladakan

racter of the universe in which everything depends on everything” [6]. Nature

constitutes a “Whole” formed by all its parts that are related to each other. Se-
neca says, to this effect, that “everything is in everything” and we will speak in
Stoic language of universal sympathy:

“The sympathy of the elements of the cosmos shows and imposes that the
cosmos is unified, that is to say continuous, a whole without emptiness,
where all the parts are necessarily linked. ...] when a finger is cut off, says
Sextus, it is the whole body that suffers, an example that must be unders-
tood in the definition of a body as a system, in which all parts are interde-
pendent and linked. The world is thus this unified whole, composed how-
ever of sufficiently heterogeneous parts to admit notable transformations
[...] without nevertheless compromising its unity. Without compromising
its unity [7].”

Starting from the notion of sympathy—“sympatheia is a co-affection of the

parts, affected by the other parts taken as a whole”—expressing the bond of re-
ciprocal dependence up to the universal scale that exists between the parts of the
whole that is the world, one is tempted to affirm that the idea of “the holistic
dimension of nature” [8], according to Daniel Desroches (2014, p. 283), so dear
to ecologists, would be inspired by the stoicism that indicates that each being or
part has an influence on the totality that is nature that must be taken into ac-
count before acting. From stoic holism we can retain that the world is conti-
nuous and when we touch one element it affects all the others. And by this, it is
important to make it known that the harmony and balance of the world depends
on the quality of this interaction; which engages the total responsibility of the
human being who must know in his soul and conscience that the slightest ges-
ture has consequences on the whole of nature. The most eloquent illustration of
universal sympathy comes from Chrysippe when he says that a drop of wine
thrown into the sea scatters and mixes with the whole world:

“A cup or even a single drop of wine that falls into the Aegean Sea or the
Sea of Crete, will reach the ocean and the Atlantic Sea not by touching them
superficially, but by spreading out in all dimensions, in depth, in width, and
in length. This is what Chrysippe admits in the first book of “Physical Re-
search”: “Nothing prevents a drop of wine from mixing with the sea”; and
so that we are not surprised, he says that “thanks to the mixture, the drop
will spread to the whole world [9].”

Whatever its magnitude, any action taken has a direct impact on the entire
cosmos. The smoke from incense is capable of reaching all parts of the cosmos.
Seneca’s example, relating to atmospheric phenomena, also illustrates the notion
of universal sympathy, and can serve to make man aware of his relationship with
nature. The philosopher, who through his reflections appears to be a thinker of
all times, identified air with the divine breath in Natural Questions and showed
that it is a vital source for all living beings. According to Seneca, this breath plays

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 K. Alladakan

the role of a vehicle that feeds the stars and earthly beings through its connection
between heaven and earth:

“Thus, the air is a part of the world, and certainly necessary. It is what binds
heaven and earth together, what thus separates the highest regions from the
lowest, so that yet it unites them. It separates them, because it interposes it-
self between them; it unites them because through it each of them is in
sympathy with the other; it gives above it all that it receives from the earth,
and conversely it transfers the energy of the stars to earthly things [10] (Se-
neca, 1961, II, IV, 1).”

In commenting on this passage, Valéry Laurand indicated that air must be

considered as a true agent of universal sympathy. The description of the function
of air, which shows the importance that should be given to it, could lead one to
consider the extent of the damage that could result from air pollution, which
presents itself as an invigorating agent for the whole world. On the other hand,
the Stoic philosopher further showed how all parts of the universe are equivalent
and each contributes in its own way to giving meaning to the whole that is the
cosmos. After sea water and air, which serve as a vehicle of communication
throughout the world, there are the flora, fauna and land, which are also parts of
nature and which sympathize both with each other and with the rest of nature.
Each one of them plays a specific role and without them the universe would not
exist:

“What I call quasi-parts of the world are, for example, animals, trees. For
the kind of animals and the trees are part of the universe, since they con-
tribute to the completion of the whole and the universe does not exist
without that. But a single animal, a single tree is only a quasi part […] it is
that indeed the universe would not exist more without one than without the
other. But the earth is also matter of the universe, because it contains all the
substances from which the food that all animals, plants and stars share
comes from. It is from it that all individuals draw their strength, and the
world from which to satisfy its innumerable needs; it is from it that nou-
rishes, night and day, these so many active, so greedy stars, which need food
in proportion to their activity. This is where nature draws as much as its
maintenance requires [11].”

We understand more than that any element that constitutes a whole, a whole
like the world, is not to be neglected if it has a vocation to exist. But the ecologi-
cal consequence, which is moreover implied, is that Seneca condemns with the
utmost rigor any idea of anthropocentrism, which relates everything to the hu-
man species and consecrates its supremacy over everything else. On the con-
trary, if this one finds itself at the top of the hierarchy of the beings because of its
rationality, it is to assume a responsibility, that to take care of the maintenance
of the balance and the order having to reign in the universe. In that, the study of
nature proves to be necessary because, it has no other objective than to appro-

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 K. Alladakan

priate ethical tools which will make it possible not to break the harmony and the
balance with all the natural beings, and, by there all the universe. Stoicism af-
firms the unity of the world in which everything is intertwined and holds to-
gether. It is the internal solidarity of the cosmos. This is what Marcus Aurelius
repeats (1953, VII, 9):

“All things are interwined with one another; their sequences are holy, and
almost none is alien to the other, for they have been ordered together and
contribute to the ordering of the same world. For there is but one world
which embraces all, […] but one substance, one law […] [12]”.

3.3. From Social to Ecological Oikeiosis

An awareness is imposed to man from the knowledge he has of nature and
which obliges him on the one hand, not to isolate himself and on the other hand,
to act in synergy with all other beings and in a way to have less negative impacts
on the world. Its happiness depends on it; because it will contribute to its own
destruction if it only degrades nature. His weapon is his reason within himself,
the guiding part, the use of which will enable him to desire that which cannot
disturb his soul, and which would be at the same time that which requires a less-
er exploitation of nature. In this sense, the preservation and safeguarding of na-
ture is nothing other than the direct consequence of self-realization, which is
synonymous with the tranquility of the soul and happiness. But before tackling
this aspect, it would be good to return to the notion of oikeiôsis, a Stoic prin-
ciple, whose value is no less ecological.
It is the principle of oikeiôsis whose development cannot be exhausted; it
served Stoic philosophy as the foundation of anthropology. It is also this prin-
ciple that allowed Seneca to found his theory of education by indicating that
there is both rupture and continuity between instinctive life and rational life
from the age of reason, which corresponds to seven years. According to him, he
who has not received philosophical education is governed by his primary im-
pulse, instinct. The argument that the Stoics used to question the Epicurean
doctrine of happiness, and which seems convincing, comes from the oikeiôsis,
when they showed that the appropriation of oneself, that is to say the develop-
ment and conservation of the being, is not only what is specific to man but in-
herent to all living beings. By the way, Grimal (1991, p. 369) tells us: “[…] the
notion of oikeiôsis which the Romans, since Cicero, at least translate by concilia-
tio, and which is defined as the tendency [the impulse] possessed by each living
being, from the plant to the human being, to ensure the duration of its being”
[13]. Consequently, human happiness can only be based on what distinguishes
it, namely reason. Apart from plants whose care is provided by nature itself, the
self-preservation of animals, including man, is taken care of by themselves. Like
all animals, man seeks what is pleasing to him and rejects its opposite. He takes
care of himself thanks to the love he has for himself from birth. However, when
he grows and procreates, he takes care of his children and they feel a sense of af-

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 K. Alladakan

fection towards him. This bond of attachment and familiarity extends to every-
thing from the nuclear cell to the universal family. Hence the idea of cosmopoli-
tanism when the Stoics speak of the citizen of the world. The notion of the prin-
ciple of oikeiôsis, as we have seen, already appears at three different levels.
Firstly, it characterizes the primary impulse that pushes every living being to act
to ensure its survival, which can be described as instinctive oikeiôsis; secondly,
with the constitution of reason which makes man’s particularity, judgment in-
tervenes so that there is harmony, concord in itself and in conduct, this is ra-
tional oikeiôsis. Finally, the feeling of sympathy that binds one to another up to
the universal scale is social oikeiôsis. And in an analogous way to this, we can
speak of ecological oikeiôsis, which is nothing other than this feeling of familiar-
ity that extends from the human race to all natural beings, the earth and the
whole universe. It is in this sense that we are attached to this landscape, this an-
imal, this place or this watercourse. All in all, we discover that this principle
plays an eminently important function in man's environment. This idea is found
in Carlos Levy (1997, p. 165) when he says that:

“The oikeiosis is in the same relation to oneself and to the world. To con-
tinue to live, to realize his nature, the living being must seek certain things
and avoid others. Already at the stage of the instinct is perceived the diffe-
rentiated character of the environment […] [14].”

And nature is the common feature of all beings because it is present in each of
them for having created them. In this sense, everything is called to tend towards
the universal. The synthesis of the principle of oikeiôsis seems well done through
this fragment of Rodis-Lewis Geneviève (1970, p. 128):

“By his creative intelligence and his work, man arranges his ‘habitat’, ex-
tending his living environment. This ‘famous oikeiôsis’ of the Stoics, the
principle of the animal’s natural adaptation, is taken over by reason, which
grasps and understands everything in its relationship with the Whole, and
thus transforms experience, a succession of individual situations, into uni-
versal organization [15].”

4. Seneca and the Question of the Environment

Above all, it will be a question of showing that a virtuous life has a positive im-
pact on nature. In addition, a brief presentation will be given on the evidences of
Stoic thought on environmental issues.

4.1. Education in Virtue as the Basis of the Principle of

Moderation
Reason being what defines man, it needs to be well developed, in order to allow
us to know the laws and the way nature works. This knowledge aims to make use
of reason, which is absolutely essential to maintain the harmony and balance of
the cosmos. And this would only be the fruit of a virtuous soul, which is in har-

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 K. Alladakan

mony with itself. Stoic happiness is synonymous with the tranquility of the soul,
which cannot be the accumulation of material goods but only the practice of
virtue which is the expression of self-limitation of desires to be satisfied with the
little; which does not mean poverty. It emerges that the satisfaction of needs is
not condemned, but only excess; for Seneca affirmed that “vice exists as soon as
there is excess.” In other words, abuse in all things is harmful and virtue is the
expression of measure, moderation. Hence the rule of wisdom, which is abso-
lutely salutary:

“Hold therefore this rule of existence, rational and salutary, to grant your
body only just what is necessary to be well. …] Eat only to quench hunger;
drink only to quench thirst; your clothes only as a safeguard against the
cold; your houses only as a defense against the weather. Is the building
made of grass or foreign marble of various shades, it does not matter. Know
that man is as well under thatch as under a golden roof. Disdain everything
that arranges for ornament and decoration a superfluous art. Consider that
nothing is admirable, except a soul, which finds nothing great if it is tall [5]
(Seneca, 1993, 8.5).”

Man cannot live without acting on nature, but the problem arises in terms of
use. All the interest of the modern reader in stoicism could be situated at this
level. To refuse excess is to refuse vice, and this is what brings concord and
tranquility of soul, and at the same time participates in the safeguarding of na-
ture. The sage of the Portico, in his concern to maintain the health of the soul by
avoiding all that can disturb it, seeks only to satisfy its necessary needs. He con-
fines himself to the essential, avoiding excess, luxury, superfluity, abuse and
therefore all waste, in order to devote himself resolutely to what is sufficient.
This means that from the outset he is a proponent of moderate consumption, the
consequence of which would undoubtedly have a minimal impact on the envi-
ronment. It is a life of sobriety that could be the subject of an invitation or rec-
ommendation to the human race to lessen the effects of pollution and the de-
gradation of nature. But the most important appears to be the educational
project elaborated by Seneca, which emphasizes the habitus animi, a virtuous
disposition of the soul, which implies a life of simplicity, which naturally trans-
lates into ecological behavior, thus a means par excellence to preserve the envi-
ronment. This could be seen as an incredibly modern solution to the thorny
problem of how to reconcile the necessary pursuit of progress with the protec-
tion of the natural heritage. If global warming is today a source of fear, accord-
ing to Seneca, the only way to combat it is to limit desires. And this should be a
matter of great concern in order to appeal to the awareness that the unlimited
satisfaction of the infinity of desires contrasts dangerously with the scarcity and
depletion of natural resources. This could require a reversal of values, and de-
mand consumption in moderation, a habit that one automatically acquires
through a virtuous soul, if one is convinced that the total satisfaction of desires
would be the cause of environmental problems.

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 K. Alladakan

Apart from these interpretations, which take the place of evidence arising
from stoicism regarding ecology, it is time to recognize the relevance of Paolo
Fedeli’s words, which showed that the environmental problem began in ancient
times, and more precisely in Rome, because of the development of economic ac-
tivities, but which had an extremely minor impact or no impact at all on nature.
This means that the observation has been made at least, and Seneca seems to
have lived through the situation and borne witness because in his work, certain
passages reflect his ecological concerns that have already been investigated by P.
Hounsounon-Tolin in his book entitled Rendez-vous chez Sénèque. About eth-
ics.

4.2. Moral Considerations as an Environmental Issue

Above all, Seneca rebelled against various forms of pollution and exploitation of
nature, especially human activities and techniques used to increase productivity.
Thus, he spoke of agriculture, which must necessitate deforestation, the practice
of shifting cultivation and then the use of ploughs and fertilizers [5], (1993, 90,
21). With regard to hunting, allusion is made to poachers who use various tech-
niques to harvest wildlife [5], (1993, 90, 11); and with regard to fishing, it is the
over-exploitation of bodies of water that is put on the blacklist [11], (1940, p.
189). Questions have been raised about deforestation and the slaughter of animal
species [16], (1923, X, 5-6); the exploitation of mining resources has been se-
verely denounced because of their misuse and soil degradation [17], (1972, VII,
10, 2; 4). Finally, what removes any uncertainty about the environmental prob-
lem in antiquity and particularly in Rome during the imperial period is the tes-
timony that Seneca gave with regard to air pollution in various forms. It is the
pollution of the air by excessive noise that hinders all good meditation for the
tranquility of the soul [5], (1993, 56, 1-6). But what the Roman philosopher
could not bear was exactly the air pollution by smoke that made him ill and
forced him to travel to recover his health:

“You can know what I gained by deciding to leave? No sooner had I left the
bad air of Rome and the smell of the smoking stoves which, once in full
work, vomit, mixed with dust, all that they have just engulfed with stinking
vapors, I immediately noticed a change in my state; you cannot believe how
much my vigor increased when I set foot in my vineyard. I let go to the
pasture and gave myself to it all I had to drink. I found myself again; this
suspicious languor that didn’t tell me anything worthwhile disappeared, I
started working again with all my soul [5].”

5. Conclusion
This study allowed us to show that stoicism could be considered the philosophy
that inspired environmentalists. For there is indeed a relationship between them
and the Stoics whose principles (unity and order of the world, universal sympa-
thy, principle of oikeiosis and virtue as moderation) develop the idea of the need

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 K. Alladakan

to maintain a harmonious relationship between man and nature. Indeed, the

philosophy of the Portico has proclaimed the sufficiency of virtue to lead man to
happiness. The health of the soul is what should be of primary concern; it is rea-
lized when the soul is free from the passions of desire and fear, which are born
when one rebels against the order of nature. When man disassociates himself
from nature, he runs to his ruin. Nature is the expression of the principle of
cause and effect; this should make men aware of the consequences of their ac-
tions on it and oblige him to be in connection with all natural beings. The Stoic
happiness which consists in “living in harmony with nature” is realized by vir-
tue, judgment and not by the total satisfaction of desires which, in reality, only
engenders fears that make the majority of men unhappy. Taking advantage of
nature through the satisfaction of his needs, it is his duty to treat it with respect
and to protect it by limiting his desires, to be satisfied with little, that is to say
what is enough.
As can be seen, Stoicism is more topical than ever in that it can effectively
contribute to the preservation and preservation of nature. But will the contem-
porary world be able to adopt such a philosophy?

Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this pa-
per.

References
[1] Duhot, J.-J. (2003) Epictetus and Stoic Wisdom. Albin Michel, Paris.
[2] Fedeli, P. (2005) Ecologie Antique, Translated by Isabelle Cogitore. Infolio, Paris.
[3] Ferry, L. (2006) Learning to Live. Plon, Paris.
[4] Hounsounon-Tolin, P. (2011) Rendez-vous chez Sénèque. L’Harmattan, Paris.
[5] Seneca (1993) Entretiens. Letters to Lucilius. R. Laffont, Paris.
[6] Bridoux, A. (1966) Le stoïcisme et son influence. Vrin, Paris.
[7] Laurand, V. (2005) La sympathie universelle: Union et separation. Revue de Méta-
physique et de Morale, 4, 517-535. https://doi.org/10.3917/rmm.054.0517
[8] Desroches, D. (2014) La Philosophie comme mode de vie. Presses de l’Université de
Laval, Québec.
[9] Pseudo-Plutarque (1993) Opinions des philosophes, Translated by Lachenaud G.
Les Belles Lettres, Paris.
[10] Seneca (1961) Questions naturelles, tome I, traduit par Paul Oltramare. Les Belles
Lettres, Paris.
[11] Seneca (1940) Questions Naturelles, Translated by François and Pierre. Richard.
Garnier et Frères, Paris.
[12] Marc, A. (1953) Pensées, Text Established and Translated by A.I. Trannoy. Les
Belles Lettres, Paris.
[13] Grimal, P. (1991) Sénèque ou conscience de l’empire. Fayard, Paris.
[14] Levy, C. (1997) Les philosophies hellénistiques. Le livre de Poche, Paris.
[15] Rodis-Lewis, G. (1970) La morale stoïcienn. PUF, Paris.

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[16] Seneca (1923) Consolations à ma mère, Translated by René Waltz. Les Belles Let-
tres, Paris.
[17] Sneca (1972) Des Bienfaits, tome II, Translated by François Prechac. Les Belles Let-
tres, Paris.

DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1107237 14 Open Access Library Journal

Ashdin Publishing
Journal of Evolutionary Medicine
Vol. 6 (2018), Article ID 236037, 7 pages
doi:10.4303/jem/236037
Research Article
Female Choice and Male Stoicism
Susan G. Brown, Susan Shirachi, and Danielle Zandbergen
Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii, 200 W Kawili St., Hilo, HI 96720, USA
Address correspondence to Susan G. Brown, susanb@hawaii.edu
Received 1 July 2017; Revised 7 March 2018; Accepted 21 March 2018
Copyright © 2018 Susan G. Brown et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract Men consistently report that they are healthier than women
but have higher mortality rates. We hypothesized that men were
sexually selected to present themselves as healthy to possible mates,
according to predictions from health selection theory. The present
study tested this theory by contrasting known influences of female
mate choice with male’s reactions to a health problem (flu symptoms,
reaction to vog (air pollution associated with volcanic emissions in
the Hawaiian islands) or a headache). Participants viewed three sets
of slides contrasting male facial symmetry, physique, and status with
stoicism (defined as ignoring a health problem) and were asked to
choose which male they preferred as a long-term or a short-term mate.
Participants preferred stoic men who worked even though they were
experiencing health problems as long-term mates, disregarding the
male’s facial symmetry and physique. Status also significantly affected
long-term mate choice. In short-term mate choice, participants shifted
their preferences to symmetrical faces and mesomorphic bodies,
signals of attractiveness, disregarding stoicism. In conclusion, our data
provide support for health selection theory. Additionally, preventive
health measures directed at men should recognize their reluctance to
recognize minor health problems and focus on techniques that enhance
men’s perception of their health symptoms.
Keywords evolutionary medicine; stoicism; symmetry; physique;
prestige; health selection theory
1. Introduction
It might well be axiomatic that “women get sick, and men
die” [1]. While it is true that men have higher mortality
rates at most, if not all, ages than women [2, 3], this is not
the only gender difference in health. Men self report better
health [4, 5] and higher quality of life than women [6, 7],
regardless of their increased mortality rates. Consequently,
despite the fact that men die at younger ages than women,
men are not correspondingly reporting poorer health. In
fact, they are doing quite the opposite; men appear to
disregard their health problems to their overall detriment.
For example, more men died in the H1N1 epidemic in New
Mexico despite the fact that similar number of males and
females were admitted to the hospital [8], of trauma-related
shock [9] and of cardiovascular disease [10].
Brown et al. [11] in health selection theory hypothesized
that the perceived good health and quality of life in men
resulted partly from women’s intersexual selection of male
ASHDIN
publishing
partners. It was theorized that women preferred stoic men
who presented themselves as healthy mates. Stoic men also
have traits that aid them in male competitive interactions
such as risk taking because stoicism is the ability to endure
hardship without complaint. Brown et al. [11] argued that
women who selected mates who worked and hunted despite
fatigue and illness produced more surviving offspring than
women who did not select such stoic mates. This selection
process ultimately resulted in men, consciously or uncon-
sciously, disregarding some signs of illness and led to men
dying at younger ages than women. To test the theory, we
designed an experiment that contrasted known female pref-
erences in mates with stoicism.
Factors affecting human mate choice include char-
acteristics of the chooser as well as the potential mate.
For example, men show a greater preference for physical
attractiveness than women [12, 13, 14, 15] while women’s
mate choice preferences vary across the menstrual cycle [16,
17, 18, 19, 20]. Because the costs of reproduction in women
are high including oogamy, gestation, parturition, and child
care, women should be choosy about their mates. As such,
female mate choice is influenced by whether the potential
mate is likely (long-term (LT) mate) or unlikely (short-term
(ST) mate) to invest in the woman and her offspring. For
ST mates, women preferred moderate risk-takers [21],
more attractive men [22], and men with mesomorphic
bodies [23, 24, 25]. Dixson et al. [23] found that women’s
preferred waist to shoulder ratio (WSR) was .6. Likewise,
Hughes and Gallup [25] found that a male’s shoulder to
hip ratio (SHR) was positively correlated with the number
of sex partners and the number of extra-pair copulations
he reported. Consequently, for ST partners, women show
a distinct preference for physically attractive men [26].
However, the traits women prefer in ST mates who will not
be investing in the women and their potential offspring are
theoretically different from the traits women prefer in LT
mates and some would argue that over evolutionary time
females did not invest as much in ST as compared to LT
2 Journal of Evolutionary Medicine
mate choice. A woman’s overall reproductive success would
decrease if her LT partner abandoned her for someone else
or if her LT partner was consistently unhealthy requiring her
to take care of him in addition to her offspring, a prediction
of health selection theory [11].
Other variables in women’s mate choice are male
status and socioeconomic prospects [13, 27, 28]. Huber
et al. [29] reported that women’s probability of being
childless decreased as her husband’s income increased.
Similarly, the number of children the partners conceived
was positively correlated to the husband’s income. The
relationship between status and reproductive fitness is not
necessarily linear. Women seem to be weighing the costs
and likelihood of raising healthy children rather than simply
increasing offspring number [30]. Therefore, as the average
individual wealth of a country increases, the fertility rate
drops as Fieder et al. [31] found in the Americas and
part of Africa. One heuristic that Western women can use to
distinguish high status is through a man’s choice of clothing.
For example, Cunningham et al. [32] reported that women
were more attracted to men wearing high status clothing
compared to T-shirts. Other factors that women consider
when making LT, rather than ST, mate choices are the traits
of industriousness and ambition [13]; older age [13]; warmth
and trustworthiness [28]; open intellect [33]; kindness,
consideration, and warmth [16, 27]; intelligence [26];
fondness for children as well as the potential to be a good
father [16, 27]; and adaptable behavior [27].
In the current research, we contrasted known influences
of LT and ST mate choices with a man’s stoicism about
minor health problems. We predicted that women consider
stoicism in their LT mate choices but not their ST mate
choices. Hrdy [34] elegantly argued that humans evolved
as cooperative breeders within hunter-gatherer societies.
Women needed help in raising their offspring and this help
came from several sources including maternal relatives,
older children, and LT male partners. Male partners helped
with actual child care, as demonstrated by their carrying and
playing with children, and subsidized the energy needs of
women and children through hunting and foraging. Men in
modern foraging societies (Ache, Hiwi, and Hadza) begin
producing more energy than they consume at around 17 to
18 years and peak in energy production between 25 and 50,
a time when women and children require more energy than
they can produce [35].
We hypothesized that stoic men were more attractive
as LT partners. These men would not only be more likely
to provide the woman and their offspring with their energy
needs but also would not place an additional burden on their
mates through malingering. However, stoic men would not
necessarily be attractive as ST mates because they would not
be expected to provide for a woman and any offspring result-
ing from the ST mating opportunity. Therefore, we predicted
for ST mate choice that women would ignore the charac-
teristic of stoicism but attend to other variables, like facial
symmetry and mesomorphic body shape as reflections of
attractiveness.
We tested three predictions in the current research. First,
women prefer stoic men rather than men with symmetrical
facial characteristics or mesomorphic physiques as LT
mates based on health selection theory. Second, women
reverse the above choices when choosing an ST mate,
exhibiting a preference for symmetrical facial characteristics
and mesomorphic physiques. The reversal was predicted
because ST mates would not be involved in cooperative
breeding. Finally, we predicted that women would prefer
both stoicism and status, in terms of attire, in LT mate
choice because both traits are favored in a cooperative
breeder.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
All of the research was approved by the University of
Hawaii Committee on Human Studies. Participants were
recruited from a gender-normative population. Of the 109
participants recruited for the study, 86 were women and 23
were men from two colleges in Hilo, Hawaii: the University
of Hawaii at Hilo (UHH) and Hawaii Community College
(HawCC). Both institutions have a mixture of traditional and
nontraditional students and are ethnically diverse. Partici-
pants were recruited from Survey of Psychology (PSY 100)
courses at UHH, two upper division psychology courses
at UHH, biology at HawCC, and chemistry lab sections at
UHH. In the latter courses, participants were given extra
credit for participation and in the PSY100 courses students
received credit for a course requirement to participate in
a research study. We tested whether the students from
the upper division psychology courses skewed the results
because they had a better understanding of sexual selection
theory than students in the other courses. Their answers dif-
fered from the students in the other courses in two categories
(LT symmetry and LT status) but they were less influenced
by these variables than the other students. We performed
the major analyses excluding participants recruited from
the upper division psychology courses and the results were
more extreme than when we examined all participants. We
report results from the entire participant pool.
2.2. Visual stimuli
We created three separate sets of slideshows, each of
men from the following ethnic groups: Caucasian, Asian,
and Pacific Islander (PI) men. Participants were shown
the slideshows of the ethnicity that they reported upon
recruitment; this did not always correspond to the ethnicity
they later reported in the Demographic Questionnaire.
Each slideshow consisted of nine slides: two for symmetry
Journal of Evolutionary Medicine 3

Table 1: An example of a PI slideshow; because images were randomized in the presentations no two participants viewed
the same slideshow. The names are common for PI men living in Hawaii. Codes indicate ethnicity, name, major, sport, and
illness.
1st slide: the participant views and reads for 30 s A PI male with a symmetrical face is pictured.
Vignette: Kawika is a college student at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. He is a
pre-pharm major and was just accepted into Pharmacy School. During his time at UHH
he has frequently been on the Dean’s Honor Roll. He is also on the volleyball team and
spends a lot of time working out. He candidly admits that he catches almost every cold
and flu that visits Hawaii during the flu season.
(SYM; ILL) Code: 3,1,3,1,2.
2nd slide: the participant views and reads for 30 s A PI male with an asymmetrical face is pictured.
Vignette: Kaleo is a college student at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. He is a
pre-engineering major and was just accepted into an aeronautical engineering program.
During his time at UHH he has frequently been on the Dean’s Honor Roll. He is also on
the soccer team and spends a lot of time working out. He admits to getting the sniffles
and feeling a bit off occasionally but never catches a cold or flu.
(UNSYM; STOIC) Code: 3,2,4,2,1.
3rd slide: blank for 10 s; the participant indicates which male she would prefer as an LT and as an ST mate.
She is informed that the same male can be selected for both but she must make a selection.
4th slide: the participant views and reads for 30 s A PI male dressed in a suit is pictured.
Vignette: Mano is a college student at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. He is a business
major and was just accepted into MBA program. During his time at UHH he has
frequently been on the Dean’s Honor Roll. He is also on the swimming team and spends
a lot of time working out. He admits that he often wakes up with headaches that are so
bad that he must remain in bed for the day.
(HIGH STATUS; ILL) Code: 3,5,5,3,4.
5th slide: the participant views and reads for 30 s A PI male dressed casually is pictured.
Vignette: Mika is a college student at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. He is an
accounting major and was just accepted into an international banking program. During
his time at UHH he has frequently been on the Dean’s Honor Roll. He is also on the
track team and spends a lot of time working out. Even when he wakes up with a
headache, he ignores it and goes to school and practice.
(LOW STATUS; STOIC) Code: 3,6,6,4,3.
6th slide: blank for 10 s; the participant indicates which male she would prefer as an LT and as an ST mate.
She is informed that the same male can be selected for both but she must make a selection.
7th slide: the participant views and reads for 30 s A PI male with medium mesomorphic torso (WSR = .8) is pictured.
Vignette: Lono is a college student at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. He is a pre-law
major and was just accepted into Law School. During his time at UHH he has
frequently been on the Dean’s Honor Roll. He is also a member of the surfing club and
spends a lot of time working out. When the vog is bad, he might sneeze a bit but he’s
found that if he ignores it he can still attend practice.
(LOW PHY; STOIC) Code: 3,4,1,5,5.
8th slide: the participant views and reads for 30 s A PI male with a high mesomorphic torso (WSR = 6) is pictured.
Vignette: Liko is a college student at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. He is a pre-med
major and was just accepted into Medical School. During his time at UHH he has
frequently been on the Dean’s Honor Roll. He is also a member of the paddle-boarding
club and spends a lot of time working out. Sometimes when the vog is bad, he is laid up
with asthma and respiratory problems for a day or two.
(HIGH PHY; ILL) Code: 3,3,2,6,6.
9th slide: blank for 10 s; the participant indicates which male she would prefer as an LT and as an ST mate.
She is informed that the same male can be selected for both but she must make a selection.

(SYM), a facially symmetrical versus asymmetrical man
followed by a blank slide; two for physique (PHY), a
mesomorph (waist to shoulder ratio (WSR) = .6) versus a
less mesomorphic (WSR = .8) man followed by a blank
slide; and two for status (STATUS), a man in a tie versus
a man in a casual shirt followed by a blank slide (Table 1).
The stimulus slides which contained both a picture and a
vignette (see below) were shown for 30 s and were followed
by a blank slide shown for 10 s. All photographs were
obtained using Google Image Search and were converted
to black and white to control for color. Symmetry was
assessed by six left and right measurements: eye to ear;
4 Journal of Evolutionary Medicine

Table 2: Experimental protocol, randomization and counterbalancing.

Protocol
All participants viewed the three stimulus
pairs (SYM, PHY, STATUS)
Most participants viewed a slideshow of
their reported ethnicity
No two participants viewed the same
slideshow
Randomization
The six possible orders of stimulus pairs
(SYM, PHY, STATUS)
The six possible orders of illness
(cold/flu, headache, vog)
The six possible counterbalanced orders
of ignoring (I) versus succumbing (S) to
an illness (ISS, ISI, IIS, SII, SIS, SSI)
Counterbalancing
Presentations within a pair (asymmetrical versus
symmetrical; high mesomorph versus medium
mesomorph; tie versus casual wear)
Presentation of ignoring (stoicism) versus
succumbing to an illness

mid-upper lip to each corner of the mouth; tip of nose
to the extension of each nostril; facial jaw proportions;
top of eye to hairline; pupil of eye to eyebrow. The six
proportions were averaged to provide a symmetry index.
The difference (asymmetrical to symmetrical) was .93 to
.98 for the Caucasians, .90 to .96 for the Asians, and .89
to .91 for the Pacific Islander (PI). Orders of the stimuli
were randomized and/or counterbalanced where all possible
orders of a variable’s levels were presented (see Table 2).
2.3. Vignettes
Each stimulus slide was accompanied by a vignette which
described the man in the photo (Table 1). All men were
described as college students at the UHH who were on
the Dean’s Honor Roll, were accepted into a graduate
program (law, medical, pharmacy, engineering, MBA or
International Banking), and participated in a sport. Because
each participant was going to see all six combinations of
variables, we created six majors and six sports. Within a
slide pair (SYM, PHY, STATUS), a pre-law major was
always paired with a pre-med major, pre-pharmacy was
always paired with pre-engineering, and business was
always paired with an accounting major. All men were also
described as athletic men who frequently exercised. Like
the majors, we always paired similar sports: volleyball with
soccer (team sports), swimming with track (team/individual
sports), and surfing with paddle boarding (individual ocean
sports popular in Hawaii).
We varied three different illnesses: cold, headache,
and vog induced respiratory problems (vog is air pollution
associated with volcanic emissions in the Hawaiian islands).
The vignette stated that the man either ignored and worked
through his illness (he admits to getting the sniffles and
feeling a bit off occasionally but never actually catches a
cold or flu; even when he wakes up with a headache, he
ignores it and goes to school and practice; when the vog is
bad, he might sneeze a bit but he’s found that if he ignores
it he can still attend practice) or admitted that he suffered
from the illness (he candidly admits that he catches almost
every cold and flu that visits Hawaii during the flu season;
he often wakes up with headaches that are so bad and he
must remain in bed for the day; sometimes when the vog is
bad, he is laid up with asthma and respiratory problems for
a day or two).
2.4. Procedure
Each participant signed and dated the provided informed
consent form and filled out a short demographic question-
naire. The demographic questionnaire obtained information
on the participants’ age, gender, use of hormonal birth con-
trol, start date of their last menses for women, which ethnic-
ity they identified with, as well as their family’s ethnicity.
Estimated phase of the menstrual cycle was determined by
a forward count method for each woman who was not using
hormonal birth control and who provided the start date of
their last menses (43/53). Menstrual phase was defined as
Days 1–5, follicular phase as 6–10, ovulatory phase as 11–
15, luteal phase as 16–22, and premenstrual phase as greater
than Day 23. Analyses combined data from women in their
follicular and ovulatory phases (potential fertile days) and
women in their menstrual, luteal, and premenstrual phases
(potential unfertile days). Participants were instructed that
they were going to view a brief slideshow showing a variety
of photographs and vignettes. Each female participant was
shown a pair of slides/vignettes and then asked to choose
which man would be more preferable, LT or ST partner,
based on the information provided. Participants were told
that they could choose the same man or a different man as an
LT and an ST partner. Participants then saw two more pairs
of slides. The three pairs of slides differed in whether SYM,
PHY or STATUS was manipulated along with stoicism (for
an example of a slideshow see Table 1). Male participants
were asked to indicate which man they felt a woman would
prefer as an LT or ST partner. Men should also prefer sto-
icism in LT mates for their female relatives. Stoic mates
should increase a female’s fitness resulting in an increase
in the male relatives’ inclusive fitness. Additionally, having
a stoic brother-in-law would potentially provide a man with
a reliable hunting partner. As a manipulation check, after
participants recorded their preferences, they were asked to
list the variables that they thought were being examined in
the experiment. This question was on the reverse of their
answer sheets to avoid influencing responses. The data were
analyzed using Fisher Exact Tests, chi-square, and step-wise
multiple regression.
Journal of Evolutionary Medicine 5

3. Results Table 3: Demographics of the participants. Under iden-

3.1. Demographics and controls tified ethnicity, Asian included individuals who identified
as Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Filipino;
The women (Mage = 21 (SD = 4.8)) were significantly
Pacific Islander individuals who identified as Portuguese,
younger than the men (Mage = 25 (SD = 9.9); F(1, 106) =
Hawaiian, Samoan, and Local; and other individuals who
6.68; P = .01). None of the participants was younger than
identified as Hispanic, Black, and mixed.
18. Slightly over 50% of the participants were currently in
Gender Women (n = 86) Men (n = 23)
romantic relationships that had lasted, on average, about
Currently in romantic 58% (50/86) 48% (11/23)
three years. Approximately one third of the women were relationship (RR)
using hormonal forms of birth control. Forty percent of Ave # of months in RR 35.5 (34.1) 41 (38.1)
the participants were tested using the Asian slideshow; Hormonal birth control 38% (33/86) NA
however, this differed from the 44% of participants who Phase of menstrual cycle
identified themselves as Asian. Some of the latter, especially Menstrual (Days 1–5) N =8 NA
the Filipino women, initially said they were “local” and so Follicular (Days 6–10) N =8 NA
were tested with the PI slideshow. PI also contained many Ovulatory (Days 11–15) N =8 NA
participants who identified themselves to be of mixed Luteal (Days 16–22) N =8 NA
ancestry as did some of the Caucasians (see Table 3 for Premenstrual (> 23 days) N = 11 NA
demographic results). Tested under ethnic stimuli
Due to the intricacy of the slideshow, we first tested Caucasian 30% (26/86) 30% (7/23)
potential confounding effects. All of the P values reported Asian 43% (37/86) 30% (7/23)
Pacific islander (local) 27% (23/86) 39% (9/23)
were computed with Fisher Exact tests. We attempted to
Identified ethnicity
control for the majority of potential confounds through
Caucasian 19% (16/86) 26% (6/23)
counterbalancing and randomization (Table 2). For each Asian 50% (43/86) 22% (5/23)
independent variable, there were six tests (LT vs. ST Pacific islander (local) 17% (15/86) 26% (6/23)
symmetry; LT vs. ST physiques; LT vs. ST status). Women Other 14% (12/86) 26% (6/23)
and men did not differ in their preferences for stoic men (six
P values ≥ .48), being in an LT relationship did not influ-
ence preference (six P values ≥ .52), use of hormonal birth to the predictive power of illness in LT mate choice. Illness
control did not influence preferences (six P values ≥ .26), alone accounted for 14% of the variance in LT mate choice
participants who thought illness was a variable of interest while illness and prestige accounted for 16% of the variance.
did not differ from those who did not (six P values ≥ .25), Participants’ variance in ST mate choice was predicted
and participants who viewed Caucasian, Asian or PI men did by men with symmetrical faces and mesomorphic body
not differ in their preferences (six P values ≥ .29). Phase shapes (Table 5). In the physique analyses, participants’
of menstrual cycle was related to women’s preferences for responses were also predicted by illness but in the opposite
stoic men as ST mates. In their choices of ST mates in the direction of LT mate choice. A preference was observed
physique (P = .007) and status (P = .02) conditions, they for men who succumbed to rather than ignored their health
preferred stoic men. We also tested whether our descriptions problems. In the model which contained only illness 6% of
of men in varying majors (law versus medicine; pharmacy the variance in ST choice was accounted for while illness
versus engineering; business versus finance) or sports and physique accounted for 11% of the variance. When
(volleyball versus soccer; swimming versus track; surfing prestige was examined for ST mate choice, the R was not
versus paddleboard) influenced women’s mate choice. None significant (adj R2 = .001; P = .39).
of these variables was statistically significant (all P s > .10
and modal P = 1.00). 4. Discussion
As predicted by health selection theory, the participants
3.2. Stoicism preferred stoic men as LT mates. Health selection theory
Step-wise multiple regression using illness, major, sport and was derived from data which showed that men perceived
either SYM, PHY or STATUS were used to predict LT and themselves as having superior health but also experienced
ST mate choices. We found that women preferred men who greater mortality than women at all adult ages. Additionally,
ignored their health problems for LT mates over those who the theory stems from the premise that humans are
had symmetrical faces or mesomorphic bodies. The only cooperative breeders [34] and as such women require
significant predictor in the models which contrasted illness help in raising their offspring. The theory hypothesizes that
with symmetry or physique was illness (Table 4). Neither men ignore or are unaware of their minor health symptoms
symmetry nor physique added any predictive power to the because women historically chose mates who ignored minor
participants’ choices of LT mates. In contrast, status did add health problems rather than succumbed to them [11]. Our
6 Journal of Evolutionary Medicine

Table 4: Step-wise multiple regression for LT partner choice.

Symmetry (SYM) choice Physique (PHY) choice Status (STATUS) choice
Variable B SE B beta B SE B beta B SE B Beta
Ill∗ −.40 .09 −.44 −.42 .06 −.46 −.38 .06 −.38
SYM −.021
PHY .06
STATUS −.16 .06 −.16
Major −.008 −.013 −.008
Sport −.006 .010 .021
R2 .19 .21 .16
F 51.98∗∗ 56.67∗∗ 21.32∗∗
∗ Illness was coded so that a negative number indicates a preference for stoicism.
∗∗ P < .0001.

Table 5: Step-wise multiple regression for ST partner also showed a preference for men who succumbed to minor
choice. illness. These results provide support for Gangestad and
Symmetry (SYM) choice Physique (PHY) choice Simpson’s [37] sexual pluralism theory that women prefer
Variable B SE B beta B SE B beta men as ST partners with attractive facial and physical
Ill∗ .04 .22 .06 .24 traits, traits that might be adaptive for offspring, while
SYM −.36 .06 −.36 contradicting sexual strategies theory [38] which predicts
PHY −.24 .06 −.24 that women should exhibit similar preferences in their
Major −.025 −.014 choices of LT and ST mates. Preferences in ST mates
Sport −.005 −.007
were also influenced by phases of the women’s menstrual
R2 .12 .11
cycle in the tests against physique and status. Women
F 31.72∗∗ 14.88∗∗
∗ Illness was coded so that a negative number indicates a preference
in the follicular and ovulatory phases of the menstrual
for stoicism. cycle returned to the LT preference for stoic men in these
∗∗ P < .0001. conditions. Our sample sizes were small for this part of the
study, and we used an indirect measure of menstrual cycle
experiment lends support to health selection theory but, phase which decreases the reliability of the results [39] so
more importantly, implies that health services for men and this aspect of the study deserves further research.
women should differ. If men have been selected to ignore Limitations of the present research include the fact that
or are not conscious of their health problems, then their preferences were determined based on a vignette and a
health services should emphasize how to increase men’s picture of a potential partner. Additionally, women might
perceptions of their potential health problems so that they prefer stoic mates because stoicism is directly related to
are more like to engage in preventive health care [36]. immune function in males but has a trade off in a shorter
Women also showed a preference for high status men as lifespan. Further exploration of the relationship between
LT mates. In fact, women’s first preference was for high sta- stoicism and immune function in males is warranted.
tus and stoic men, which shows support for our third hypoth- Human LT mate choices are much more complex and
esis. In this study, we controlled for mental and physical involve a period of courtship in which potential partners
skills in that all men were described as being on the honor become acquainted with each other. Perhaps a more accurate
roll, being accepted into graduate training, participating in a test of health selection theory would be to ask women
sport, and keeping fit. Status was manipulated through attire. about the characteristics that they like and dislike about
We assumed that participants either consciously or uncon- their current partners including stoicism and malingering
sciously perceived the clothing cue as a symbol of status. behavior. Additionally, this was a first test of the theory
Given that all the potential partners were successful, higher and it would be interesting to replicate the results using
status would predict even greater resources for a woman and economic principles such as the design used by Li and
her offspring. Kendrick [26].
We found that women switched their preferences
away from status to physically attractive men, in terms Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
of facial symmetry and increased mesomorphism when
making ST mate choices, replicating previous findings [26]. Acknowledgments We were helped in data collection by Beth
Interestingly, for the physique manipulation, the participants Askren, Daniel Reed Lucas III, and Kelly Broussard.
Journal of Evolutionary Medicine
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[32] M. R. Cunningham, A. P. Barbee, and C. L. Pike, What do
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Psychol, 59 (1990), 61–72.
[33] M. D. Botwin, D. M. Buss, and T. K. Shackelford, Personality
and mate preferences: five factors in mate selection and marital
satisfaction, J Pers, 65 (1997), 107–136.
[34] S. B. Hrdy, Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of
Mutual Understanding, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 2009.
[35] H. Kaplan, K. Hill, J. Lancaster, and A. M. Hurtado, A theory
of human life history evolution: diet, intelligence, and longevity,
Evol Anthropol, 9 (2000), 156–185.
[36] K. W. Springer and D. M. Mouzon, “Macho men” and preventive
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[37] S. W. Gangestad and J. A. Simpson, The evolution of human
mating: Trade-offs and strategic pluralism, Behav Brain Sci, 23
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24 Stoic Spiritual Exercises
compiled by Massimo Pigliucci and Greg Lopez
Stoic Spiritual Exercises
compiled by Massimo Pigliucci and Greg Lopez
for the howtobeastoic.org blog

Cover: Epictetus (left) and Marcus Aurelius (right)

Cartoons: from actionphilosophers.com
Back cover: Roman Forum, photo by Massimo Pigliucci

Published by HowToBeAStoic.org, New York, NY

Copyright Massimo Pigliucci, 2016
Font: Optima regular
Licensed under a Creative Commons license
Introduction

Stoicism is a practical philosophy of life, and while I enjoy writing about its history and
theory, it is the practice that has so far had a significant impact in my life. I assume it is the
same for most readers too.

That’s why in this booklet I collect a number of passages from the ancient Stoics where
they explicitly advise certain practices or exercises. (Thanks to my friend Greg Lopez for
helping curating the collection, on the occasion of Stoic Camp). The first list is distilled
from Epictetus’ Enchiridion (the aptly titled “Manual”), while the second list is derived
from Marcus’ Meditations (again aptly, a diary that the emperor wrote for his own personal
use).

The idea here is to step back for a moment from decidedly more modern “Stoic” exercises,
which are actually derived from recent developments in psychology, such as Victor Frankl’s
logo-therapy, or cognitive behavioral therapy (see, for instance, Don Robertson’s book).
There is, of course, nothing wrong with attempting to update both Stoic theory (as I’ve
began doing here and here) and practice. But it is also, I think, good to keep in mind what
the ancients actually said and not mix it so thoroughly with modern perspectives that the
two become indistinguishable.

Specifically, as we shall see, ancient Stoic techniques were decidedly leaning on the
cognitive/verbal side of things, not so much on the visualization approach promoted by
modern CBT. This isn’t intrinsically bad or good. It just is, and some people will likely
respond better to cognitive approaches (myself included, it seems), while others will do
well with visualization exercises. Nothing crucial hinges on this, except, again, the need
to have present in one’s mind what counts as an ancient Stoic vs a modern Stoic exercise,
for the sake of historical clarity, if nothing else.

The way I decided to organize the entries below is simply in order of appearance in the
Enchiridion or the Meditations, though the same “exercise” may be referred to more than
once by either author, which I will point out when appropriate. For each entry I give a
brief description or comment, followed by the original passage.

I hope this modest effort will be both enjoyable and especially useful.

Massimo Pigliucci
K.D. Irani Professor of Philosophy
the City College of New York
New York City, February 2016
 Epictetus, from the Enchiridion

Examine your impressions. Here Epictetus

exhorts us to practice what is arguably the
most fundamental of his doctrines:
constantly examine our “impressions,” that
is our initial reactions to events, people, and
what we are being told, step back to make
room for rational deliberation, avoid rash
emotional reactions, and ask
whether whatever is being thrown at us is
under our control (in which case we should
act on it), or it isn’t (in which case we
should regard it as not of our concern).

So make a practice at once of saying to

every strong impression: ‘An impression is all you are, not the source of the impression.’
Then test and assess it with your criteria, but one primarily: ask, ‘Is this something that is,
or is not, in my control?’ And if it’s not one of the things that you control, be ready with
the reaction, ‘Then it’s none of my concern.’ (Enchiridion I.5)

Remind yourself of the impermanence of things. Yes, yes, this is one of the (superficially)
harshest passages in Epictetus. Not the part about the china, but the one about the wife or
child. But I think Anthony Long (among others) is right about how this (in)famous quote
ought to be interpreted. First off, remind yourself of the historical context: Epictetus was
writing at a time when even emperors (like Marcus himself) lost most of their children and
other loved ones at what we would consider a tender or premature age, to disease, or war.
While most of us in the West are currently lucky in that respect, the point remains: life is
ephemeral, and people we deeply care abut may be snatched from us suddenly and
without warning. Moreover, what Epictetus is counseling here is not an inhuman
indifference toward our beloved ones, but quite the opposite: to constantly remind
ourselves of just how precious they are precisely because they may soon be gone. Anyone
who has lost a person close to them ought to know exactly what this means. We should go
through life just like the Roman generals went through their official celebratory triumphs
in the eternal city: with somebody (in their case, a slave) who constantly whispers in our
ears “memento homo” (remember, you are (only) a man).

In the case of particular things that delight you, or benefit you, or to which you have
grown attached, remind yourself of what they are. Start with things of little value. If it is
china you like, for instance, say, ‘I am fond of a piece of china.’ When it breaks, then you
won’t be as disconcerted. When giving your wife or child a kiss, repeat to yourself, ‘I am
kissing a mortal.’ Then you won’t be so distraught if they are taken from you. (Enchiridion
III)
Reserve clause. Since the only thing truly under our control are our intentions and
behaviors, the outcome of anything we try to do depends at the least in part on external
circumstances. Which means we should approach doing anything with the Stoic
reserve clause, fate permitting.

Whenever planning an action, mentally rehearse what the plan entails. If you are heading
out to bathe, picture to yourself the typical scene at the bathhouse – people splashing,
pushing, yelling and pinching your clothes. You will complete the act with more
composure if you say at the outset, ‘I want a bath, but at the same time I want to keep my
will aligned with nature.’ Do it with every act. That way if something occurs to spoil your
bath, you will have ready the thought, ‘Well, this was not my only intention, I also meant
to keep my will in line with nature – which is impossible if I go all to pieces whenever
anything bad happens.’ (Enchiridion IV)

How can I use virtue here and now? The passage below is one of the most empowering of
Stoic writings. Epictetus, the former slave, lame because of a once broken leg, tells us to
use every occasion, every challenge, as a way to exercise our virtue, to become a better
human being by constant practice.

For every challenge, remember the resources you have within you to cope with it.
Provoked by the sight of a handsome man or a beautiful woman, you will discover within
you the contrary power of self-restraint. Faced with pain, you will discover the power of
endurance. If you are insulted, you will discover patience. In time, you will grow to be
confident that there is not a single impression that you will not have the moral means to
tolerate. (Enchiridion X)

Pause and take a deep breadth. Here is the crucial step that allows us to more rationally
examine our impressions: we need to resist the impulse to react immediately, instinctively,
to situations. Instead, pause, take a deep breadth, and then consider the issue as
dispassionately (in the sense of equanimity, not lack of care) as possible.

Remember, it is not enough to be hit or insulted to be harmed, you must believe that you
are being harmed. If someone succeeds in provoking you, realize that your mind is
complicit in the provocation. Which is why it is essential that we not respond impulsively
to impressions; take a moment before reacting, and you will find it is easier to maintain
control. (Enchiridion XX)

Other-ize. This is a fascinating one, as we are reminded of just how differently we regard

the same event if it concerns us or other people. Naturally, it is far easier to maintain
equanimity (which, again, is not to be confused with emotional impassivity!) when little
inconveniences, or even disasters, happen to others than to ourselves. But why, really?

We can familiarize ourselves with the will of nature by calling to mind our common
experiences. When a friend breaks a glass, we are quick to say, ‘Oh, bad luck.’ It’s only
reasonable, then, that when a glass of your own breaks, you accept it in the same patient
spirit. Moving on to graver things: when somebody’s wife or child dies, to a man we all
routinely say, ‘Well, that’s part of life.’ But if one of our own family is involved, then right
away it’s ‘Poor, poor me!’ We would do better to remember how we react when a similar
loss afflicts others. (Enchiridion XXVI)

Speak little and well. I must admit that this is a hard one for me to practice, probably due
to my ego and the professional habits of a teacher who is far too often in professorial
mode. Still, I’ve tried to remember this counsel and take it to heart, and it is serving me
increasingly well.

Let silence be your goal for the most part; say only what is necessary, and be brief about it.
On the rare occasions when you’re called upon to speak, then speak, but never about
banalities like gladiators, horses, sports, food and drink – common-place stuff. Above all
don’t gossip about people, praising, blaming or comparing them. (Enchiridion XXXIII.2)

Choose your company well. I laugh every time I read this. To modern ears it sounds
insufferably elitist, but it really isn’t (remember, it comes from an ex-slave who was making
a living teaching in the open air). Also, keep in mind that “philosophers” here doesn’t
mean professionals, but rather people who are interested in following virtue. More
generally, this is simply the sound advice that our life is short, and temptation and waste
are always lurking, so we need to pay attention to whom we spend our time with and
doing what.

Avoid fraternizing with non-philosophers. If you must, though, be careful not to sink to
their level; because, you know, if a companion is dirty, his friends cannot help but get a
little dirty too, no matter how clean they started out. (Enchiridion XXXIII.6)

Respond to insults with humor. This is a lovely example of profound wisdom

accompanied by Epictetus’ distinctive brand of humor: instead of getting offended by
someone’s insults (remember, they are not “up to you”) respond with self deprecation. You
will feel better, and your vilifier will be embarrassed.

If you learn that someone is speaking ill of you, don’t try to defend yourself against the
rumours; respond instead with, ‘Yes, and he doesn’t know the half of it, because he could
have said more.’ (Enchiridion XXXIII.9)

Don’t speak too much about yourself. I must admit to failing at this often enough (see
“ego” and “professorial mode” above), but I’m trying. And boy, does that make for a much
better social experience!

In your conversation, don’t dwell at excessive length on your own deeds or adventures.
Just because you enjoy recounting your exploits doesn’t mean that others derive the same
pleasure from hearing about them. (Enchiridion XXXIII.14)

Speak without judging. Still working on this one too, but, again, this is so true, and so
typically Stoic. The idea is to distinguish between matters of fact — to which we can
assent, if we find them justified by observation — and judgments — from which we
generally speaking ought to abstain, since we usually don’t have sufficient information.
Just imagine how much better the world would be if we all refrained from hasty judgments
and looked at human affairs more matter of factly.

Someone bathes in haste; don’t say he bathes badly, but in haste. Someone drinks a lot of
wine; don’t say he drinks badly, but a lot. Until you know their reasons, how do you know
that their actions are vicious? This will save you from perceiving one thing clearly, but then
assenting to something different. (Enchiridion XLV)
 Marcus Aurelius, from the Meditations

Morning meditation on others. This is a

famous passage, displaying Marcus’
somewhat pessimistic view of humanity
right up front. Nonetheless, the message is
powerful, and can be adopted also by
people with a more cheerful disposition
(or at the least a sense of humor about the
reality of things).

Begin the morning by saying to yourself, I

shall meet with the busybody, the
ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious,
unsocial. All these things happen to them
by reason of their ignorance of what is
good and evil. But I, who have seen the
nature of the good that it is beautiful, and
of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of
him who does wrong, that it is akin to me,
not only of the same blood or seed, but that it participates in the same intelligence and the
same portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on
me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For we are made for
cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth.
To act against one another then is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another
to be vexed and to turn. (Meditations II.1, see also X.13)
 
Keep at-hand principles. Here is advice to do precisely what I am attempting to do with
this collection: create an easily accessible tool that reminds me, whenever needed, of
what is really important and how to think about it. (Below, keep in mind that “divine” can
just as well be interpreted as “natural” in Stoic parlance.)

As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases that suddenly
require their skill, so do you have principles ready for the understanding of things divine
and human, and for doing everything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond
that unites the divine and human to each other. (Meditations III.13, see also end of IV.3, V.
16 and VII.2)

Why am I doing this? We are purposeful animals, and yet much of what we do seems to
be not particularly well thought out. The Stoic advice is to consider carefully what we are
doing and why. Life is short, make the best (i.e., the most virtuous) of it.

Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than according to the perfect
principles of art. (Meditations IV.2, see also VIII.2)
Renunciation. Marcus here is talking about “indifferents,” that is things that may be
preferred or dispreferred, but are not an intrinsic component of virtue — like wealth,
material possessions, reputation, and the like. The suggestion is to train oneself to do
without them, at the least from time to time, to both remind us that they are not crucial for
eudaimonia, as well as to better appreciate them when we do have them.

The more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other things like them, or even
when he is deprived of any of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the
same degree he is a better man. (Meditations V.15)

Decomposition exercise. The one below is another famous excerpt from Marcus, where
he prods himself to look at the basic constituents of things and actions, appreciating anew
that they are material things to which all too often we attribute more importance than they
do in fact have. To put things in context, the bit about sexual intercourse probably should
not be interpreted as prudish (Marcus did, after all, have 13 children!), but rather as a
check against lust for lust’s sake.

When we have meat before us and such eatables, we receive the impression that this is the
dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this
Falernian is only a little grape juice, and this purple robe some sheep’s wool dyed with the
blood of a shellfish; or, in the matter of sexual intercourse, that it is merely an internal
attrition and the spasmodic expulsion of semen: such then are these impressions, and they
reach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see the things as they truly are.
Just in the same way ought we to act all through life, and where there are things that
appear most worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their
worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward show
is a wonderful perverter of reason, and when you are most sure that you are employed
about things worth your pains, it is then that it cheats you most. (Meditations VI.13, see
also III.11, VIII.11, XI.2, XI.16 and XII.10)

Acknowledging others’ virtues. This is one version of the common Stoic idea of reminding
oneself of role models, because virtue cannot be learned just by way of theory, it requires
examples and practice.

When you wish to delight yourself, think of the virtues of those who live with you; for
instance, the activity of one, the modesty of another, the liberality of a third, and some
other good quality of a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of the virtues
when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with us and present themselves in
abundance, as far as is possible. Hence we must keep them before us. (Meditations VI.48,
though also see all of book I)

Take another’s perspective. A wonderful exercise in humility, reminding us to step in

another person’s shoes to at the least attempt to see things from their perspective, before
passing judgment.
When a man has done you wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about good or
evil he has done wrong. For when you have seen this, you will pity him, and will neither
wonder nor be angry. For either you yourself think the same thing to be good that he does
or another thing of the same kind. It is your duty then to pardon him. But if you do not
think such things to be good or evil, you will more readily be well disposed to him who is
in error. (Meditations VII.26, see also IX.34)

View from above. A classic Stoic exercise: seeing things from a distance helps us put them
in the proper (cosmic) perspective.

You can rid yourself of many useless things among those that disturb you, for they lie
entirely in your imagination; and you will then gain for yourself ample space by
comprehending the whole universe in your mind, and by contemplating the eternity of
time, and observing the rapid change of every part of everything, how short is the time
from birth to dissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as well as the
equally boundless time after dissolution. (Meditations IX.32, see also VII.48 and XII.24
— third exercise)

How did they (not) sin? Short, profound, and rather self-explanatory.

If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But perhaps he has not done wrong.
(Meditations IX.38)

Keep change and death in mind. Change and death are inevitable, that is why we need to
focus on what we do here and now, hic et nunc.

Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into one another, and
constantly attend to it, and exercise yourself about this part of philosophy. For nothing is so
much adapted to produce magnanimity. … Consider in what condition both in body and
soul a man should be when he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life,
the boundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter. (Meditations X.11
and XII.7, see also X.18, X.19 and X.29)

When offended… A handy reminder of how silly it is to get offended at someone else’s
behavior or words.

When you are offended at any man’s fault, immediately turn to yourself and reflect in what
manner you yourself have erred: for example, in thinking that money is a good thing or
pleasure, or a bit of reputation, and the like. (Meditations X.30, see also IX.42)

Rebutting thoughts. Stoicism is often acknowledged as the forerunner of some of the most

efficacious modern therapies, such as Victor Frankl’s logotherapy and Albert Ellis’ rational
emotive behavior therapy. This passage could easily have been written by a modern
counselor, inviting you to challenge your own thoughts, to argue with yourself, until you
see things more clearly and begin to act accordingly.
There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty against which you should be
constantly on your guard, and when you have detected them, you should wipe them out
and say on each occasion thus: this thought is not necessary; this tends to destroy social
union; this which you are going to say comes not from the real thoughts — for you should
consider it among the most absurd of things for a man not to speak from his real thoughts.
But the fourth is when you shall reproach yourself for anything, for this is an evidence of
the diviner part within you being overpowered and yielding to the less honorable and to
the perishable part, the body, and to its gross pleasures. (Meditations XI.19)

Morning meditation on the cosmos. Lastly, an exercise that is a combination of physical

and spiritual: at the least from time to time, get your butt off the bed before dawn, head
out to a spot where you can see the Sun rise, and think about your place in the universe.

The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we may be reminded of
those bodies that continually do the same things and in the same manner perform their
work, and also be reminded of their purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.
(Meditations XI.27)
Stoicism is a practical philosophy of life, and while I enjoy writing about its history and
theory, it is the practice that has so far had a significant impact in my life. I assume it is
the same for most readers too.

That’s why in this booklet I collect a number of passages from the ancient Stoics where
they explicitly advise certain practices or exercises. (Thanks to my friend Greg Lopez for
helping curating the collection, on the occasion of Stoic Camp). The first list is distilled
from Epictetus’ Enchiridion (the aptly titled “Manual”), while the second list is derived
from Marcus’ Meditations (again aptly, a diary that the emperor wrote for his own
personal use).

The idea here is to step back for a moment from decidedly more modern “Stoic”
exercises, which are actually derived from recent developments in psychology, such as
Victor Frankl’s logo-therapy, or cognitive behavioral therapy (see, for instance, Don
Robertson’s book).
There is, of course, nothing wrong with attempting to update both Stoic theory (as I’ve
began doing here and here) and practice. But it is also, I think, good to keep in mind
what the ancients actually said and not mix it so thoroughly with modern perspectives
that the two become indistinguishable.

~Massimo Pigliucci
 apeiron 2020; 53(4): 463–486

Aiste Celkyte*
The Soul and Personal Identity in Early
Stoicism: Two Theories?
https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2017-0038

Abstract: This paper is dedicated to exploring the alleged difference between

Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ accounts of the post-mortal survival of the souls and
the conceptions of personal identity that these accounts underpin. I argue that
while Cleanthes conceptualised the personal identity as grounded in the rational
soul, Chrysippus conceptualised it as the being an embodied rational soul. I also
suggest that this difference between the two early Stoics might have been due to
his metaphysical commitments arising from his response to the Growing
Argument put forth by the Academics rather than the critique of his teacher.

Keywords: stoicism, soul, identity, immortality

One of the fundamental claims of Stoic metaphysics is the corporeality of every-

thing that exists in this world, including the rational soul of human beings. The
principles of Stoic materialism are quite complex, however.1 The peculiarity of
the Stoic position becomes especially clear in the case of their views regarding
the post-mortal survival of the soul. At the beginning of the Tusculan
Disputations, there is the following classification of philosophical accounts
concerning this issue: (i) death is the perishing of both body and soul; (ii)
death is the separation of the body and the soul. The latter can be further
divided into the following subcategories: (ii. a) the soul dissolves immediately
after the separation; (ii. b) the soul continues to exist for some time; (ii. c) the
soul exists for eternity.2 The Stoic account belongs to the category (ii. b).3 This
view is noted for its oddity. The Stoics are said to admit the difficult point that
the human soul has an independent existence from the body, only to reject the

1 For a study of Stoic materialism and its implications, see Vogt (2009). Cf. Gourinat (2009) for
an argument that very notion of materialism might not be very useful when trying to under-
stand the Stoic stance because Stoic philosophy has traits of both materialism and dualism.
2 Cic. Tusc. 1.9.
3 Epictetus might have been an exception; see D 3.13.14-15.

*Corresponding author: Aiste Celkyte, Philosophy and Religious Studies, Janskerkhof 13, 3512
BL Utrecht, Netherlands, E-mail: aiste.celkyte@gmail.com

Open Access. © 2021 Aiste Celkyte, published by De Gruyter. This work is

licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
464 Aiste Celkyte

very simple claim – which also seems to be a natural consequence of their first
point – that the soul most likely exists for eternity.4
The claim that souls survive death but last only for a certain period of time
is highly unusual. The number of supporting fragments is not very high but
substantial enough to show that the view must have been a well-known part of
the Stoic doctrine. There are two kinds of questions that can be asked about this
material. The first and most obvious one concerns the Stoic account of the post-
mortal survival of the soul. Why does the soul survive at all? Why does it survive
only for a little bit as opposed to for eternity? The post-mortal survival of the
soul is not necessarily impossible in a materialist framework; after all, if the soul
is material, its matter obviously does not simply disappear once it is dead. Yet,
true materialists are typically committed to the view that identity does end with
death, even if the substratum continues to exist. What is especially interesting in
the Stoic case, therefore, is the question of whether the claim that souls survive
post mortem means that ‘we’ survive our death. What kind of a view on personal
identity does, then, the Stoic account of the post-mortal existence of the soul
imply? This is the second kind of question concerning this material that ought to
be raised. In a sense, the issue at stake is the persistence of identity because the
fundamental question here is whether death is the kind of change through
which identity is capable of persisting.

Sources: Chrysippus vs. Cleanthes

The evidence for settling these questions is, as it is so often the case with early
Stoic material, not only fragmentary but also problematic. Most texts ascribe the
account of the post-mortal survival of the soul as described in Tusculan
Disputations to ‘the Stoics’ in general. Diogenes Laertius, however, claims that
there were, in fact, two fairly different views as follows:

Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν πάσας ἐπιδιαμένειν μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν
μόνον.

Cleanthes indeed holds that all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration; but
Chrysippus says that only the souls of the wise do so.5

According Diogenes Laertius, then, there is a fairly significant difference

between the views held by Cleanthes and Chrysippus. The former allowed that

4 Cic. Tusc. 1.32.

5 Diog. Laert. 7.157 = SVF 2.811, tr. Hicks.
 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 465

all souls survive until the end of the world cycle, while Chrysippus claimed that
only the souls of the wise survive for such a long time.6 For the sake of
precision, the first issue that ought to be clarified here is what it means to
cease to exist in this context. The matter out of which both bodies and souls are
made does not, of course, cease to exist. Ceasing to exist must be the transfor-
mation of a soul in such a way that it cannot be identified as a ‘soul’ anymore.
The conflagration is the point at which all qualified individuals cease to exist.7 It
is possible that Cleanthes claimed that the conflagration is the cut-off point for
the existence of souls for this reason. The view attributed to Chrysippus, mean-
while, is more idiosyncratic. He suggests that the majority of souls disintegrate
much earlier, although, in exceptional cases, some souls last until the end of the
world cycle.8 It is notable that no other source mentions such a disagreement
and generally the extant fragments attribute a single view to ‘the Stoics.’ Are
there reasonable grounds for trusting Diogenes Laertius’ report that there was a
disagreement between Cleanthes and Chrysippus regarding the post-mortal
survival of the soul?9
I would argue that Diogenes Laertius’ testimonial ought not to be dismissed
without consideration, because the extant suggests that Chrysippus and Cleanthes
had disagreed on a number of issues, some of them concerning the nature and the
activities of the soul. Seneca, for instance, argues that it is not always necessary to
follow Stoic orthodoxy because even the early Stoics disagreed. According to him,
Cleanthes and Chrysippus did not agree on what walking was, because ‘Cleanthes
said it was breath extending from the commanding-faculty to the feet, Chrysippus
that it was the commanding faculty itself.’10 In Diogenes Laertius, moreover,
Cleanthes is said to maintain that virtue cannot be lost once it is acquired,
while Chrysippus argued that virtue can be lost in the case of intoxication or
depression.11 Calcidius records the disagreement regarding the theorisation of fate

6 See Hoven (1971, 47) for the argument that Chrysippus’ claim ought to be interpreted with
reference to the conflagration here as well.
7 See Alexander of Aphrodisias in An. Pr. 180,33-36, 181,25-31; Cooper (2009, 104). Interestingly,
Cleanthes and Chrysippus have slightly different accounts of conflagration, see Salles (2009) for
an in-depth discussion.
8 The wise men are, after all, extremely rare. Alexander of Aphrodisias (Fat. 199.14-22 = SVF
3.658 = LS 61N) claimed that the Stoic wise man is rarer than a phoenix.
9 This apparent disagreement is fairly rarely discussed in the scholarship on this topic. A. E. Ju
mentions the disagreement between Cleanthes and Chrysippus (2009, 115), but it does not play
an important role in her interpretation.
10 Seneca Ep. 113.23 = SVF 2.836 = LS 53L, tr. Long and Sedley (Cleanthes ait spiritum esse a
principali usque in pedes permissum, Chrysippus ipsum principale). See Inwood (2014, 69–74).
11 Diog. Laert. 7.127 = LS 61I.
466 Aiste Celkyte

and providence as follows: according to Chrysippus, everything in accordance

with fate is also due to providence and vice versa; according to Cleanthes, not all
things that come about by fate are products of providence.12 Cleanthes and
Chrysippus also seem to have held different views regarding the nature of impres-
sions (the former called them imprints, the latter claimed that they were altera-
tions in the soul)13 as well as the question of whether all the virtues refer back to
the same state of mind (as Cleanthes states) or are separate branches of knowl-
edge (as Chrysippus argues).14
The nature of the disagreements between Cleanthes and Chrysippus has
been discussed in the scholarship as well. Malcolm Schofield, for example,
shows that, in the case of the Stoic theory of cardinal virtues: ‘Chrysippus
seems to have agreed with Cleanthes about the structure appropriate for a theory
of cardinal virtues, while radically disagreeing with him about the substantive
content of the theory.’15 It has also been suggested by David Sedley that the
source of the disagreement between Cleanthes and Chrysippus, apart from the
general issue of which account would be the best philosophically, was the best
interpretation of Zeno’s position.16
There is, therefore, a sufficiently good reason not to dismiss Diogenes
Laertius’ claim that Cleanthes and Chrysippus had different views regarding
the post-mortal survival of the soul and to investigate how substantial this
difference is. In addition to this, it is necessary to ask whether this seemingly
slight difference in the early Stoics’ account of the soul led to different con-
ceptualisations of personal identity and the scope of its persistence.

Sources: Eusebius, Ps. Plutarch and Others

There are quite a few extant fragments on the Stoic views of the post-mortal
survival of the soul but possibly the most explicit and lengthiest record is found
in Eusebius.17 In Book 15 of his Preparation for the Gospel, Eusebius describes

12 Calcidius 144 = SVF 2.933 = LS 54U. See Bobzien (1998, 46–47).

13 Sextus Empiricus M 7. 227–241.
14 Plut. Mor. 441A-C and 1034C-E. Schofield (2013) is very useful for untangling the argument
here. Cf. Gourinat (2007, 217–241).
15 Schofield (2013, 22).
16 Sedley (2003, 15–16). On the difference between Zeno and the rest of the early Stoics
regarding ethics, see Rist (1977).
17 The fragments not discussed in this section will be referred to later when they are relevant to
the discussion.
 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 467

the views held by various Greek philosophers. When he reaches Stoicism, he

provides the following account:

Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γενητήν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν· οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν
φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ’ ἑαυτήν, τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς
εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσούς τινας χρόνους. τὸ δὲ
διαμένειν τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτως λέγουσιν, ὅτι διαμένομεν ἡμεῖς ψυχαὶ γενόμενοι τοῦ σώματος
χωρισθέντες καὶ εἰς ἐλάττω μεταβαλόντες οὐσίαν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς. τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ
ἀλόγων ζῴων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασι.

They [the Stoics] say that the soul is subject to generation and destruction. When
separated from the body, however, it does not perish at once but survives on its own
for certain times, the soul of the virtuous up to the dissolution of everything into fire, that
of fools only for certain definite times. By the survival of souls they mean that we
ourselves survive having become souls separated from bodies and changed into the
lesser substance of the soul, while the souls of non-rational animals perish along with
their bodies.18

Assuming that Diogenes Laertius’ report regarding the disagreement between

Cleanthes and Chrysippus is true, Eusebius’ passage describes the view held by
Chrysippus. Two points indicate this: first, the distinction between ordinary and
wise souls and, second, the claim that the latter last until the conflagration,
while the former disintegrate sometime after death. A short passage from Pseudo
Plutarch records the same view but with some enlightening details. He states the
following:

οἱ Στωικοὶ ἐξιοῦσαν ἐκ τῶν σωμάτων οὔπω φθείρεσθαι. < καὶ > τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν
ἀμαυρὸν σύγκριμα γίνεσθαι (ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι < τὴν > τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων). τὴν δὲ ἰσχυροτέραν
(οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τοὺς σοφούς) ζῆν μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως.

When (the souls) leave the bodies, the Stoics say they do not immediately perish. The weak
ones become dark compounds (these are the souls of the ignorant). The strong ones,
however, (such as the souls of the wise men) live until the conflagration.19

The central claim here is the same as the one found in Eusebius and Diogenes
Laertius, that is, wisdom determines how long human souls will survive after
death. The wise souls last until the conflagration, while the ordinary ones cease

18 Eusebius Praep. Evang. 15.20.6 = SVF 2.809 = LS 53W, tr. Long and Sedley, slightly amended
(‘having become souls’ instead of ‘as souls’ in the second line from the bottom). Eusebius
claims that his source for the views he records in Book 15 is Arius Didymus. See Chiesara (2001,
77) for a suggestion that Arius Didymus’ source might have been Posidonius.
19 Ps. Plut. Plac. 4.7, 3 = SVF 2.810, translation is mine. This passage is not found in Stobaeus,
another source for the epitome of Aetius. Despite the fact that there seems to be a certain
similarity between this passage and the one preserved by Eusebius, no connection can be
established with certainty between Arius Didymus and Aetius, see Mansfeld (2016, 164–168).
468 Aiste Celkyte

to exist earlier. This short passage, however, also states that ordinary souls
disintegrate into other, ‘dark’, compounds and that the souls of the wise are
strong. Strength, I argue below, is of crucial importance when explaining the
longevity of the wise souls.
Eusebius and Ps Plutarch are arguably the best sources for the Stoic views
on the post-mortal survival of the souls as they are the longest and provide the
most details.20 Yet, if it is accepted that Diogenes Laertius’ report is accurate
regarding the difference between Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ views, then the
account found in Eusebius and Ps Plutarch is Chrysippean. Before delving into
its analysis, however, it is necessary to clarify Cleanthes’ theorisation of the
human soul and personal identity.

Cleanthes’ View: On Being ‘Soul Alone.’

Cleanthes, according to Diogenes Laertius, maintained that all souls survive
until conflagration. Arguably, this claim implies that personal identity is
grounded in the existence of the soul. Such an interpretation of the Stoic
theorisation of the soul and, to some extent, identity is discussed by A.A.
Long in his article ‘Soul and Body in Stoicism.’ The article contains the argument
that the Stoics thought of the body and the soul as two distinct substances and,
generally, were leaning towards Platonic dualism rather than the view that the
psychic existence emerged from the functions of bodily organs.21 The post-
mortal survival of the soul is contingent on the development of souls as distinct
independent entities co-existing with bodies.22 This account of the relationship

20 For example, Cic. Tusc. 1.77 = SVF 2.822 (Stoici autem usuram nobis largiuntur tamquam
cornicibus: diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant) briefly describes the same view. One
notable difference is the lack of distinction between the ordinary and the wise souls. This
omission could be a matter of a simple truncation. The wise souls are extremely rare, and,
consequently, the issue of the post-mortal survival of the souls primarily concerns the ordinary
souls. Another source, Lactantius Div. Inst. 7.20 = SVF 2.813, presents a Christian interpretation
of this Stoic view, in which many details must have been supplied by Lactantius himself.
21 The reason for this is the Stoic supposition ‘that an animal needs a body which is completely
equipped with all the organs and functions of a flesh and bones body before its soul can come
into existence, as the principle of specifically animal life for that flesh and bones body. The soul
cannot be an organ of the flesh and bones body because all bodily organs exist before the soul
comes into being’ (Long 1982, 43).
22 A part of A.E. Ju’s article, ‘Stoic and Posidonian Thought on the Immortality of Soul’, is
dedicated to making sense of the complicated evidence on the early Stoic views of the
continuing existence of the soul after death. Like A.A. Long, she argues that the soul is an
 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 469

of the body and the soul has some significant consequences for the way in
which the Stoics conceptualise personal identity, namely, the idea that personal
identity is rooted solely in the rational soul. Long’s explanation of this issue is
lengthy and multi-faceted, but some of the most pertinent points for the current
paper are as follows. The Stoic distinction between pneuma as physis and as
psyche not only unburdens the soul from being responsible for growth and
nutrition,23 but also helps to explain why the Stoics maintain that ‘no causal
necessity links bodily changes and all of the soul’s reactions to them … So, while
Stoics would no doubt admit that the soul cannot fail to be aware of an empty
stomach, they would deny that that awareness automatically triggers a desire to
eat. The hunger sensation and the desire to eat are separate states of the soul.
The former is an unavoidable psychic reaction to the body; but the latter
depends on the soul and the judgement that the soul makes … The attitude of
emotional indifference to bodily pains and pleasures highlights the supposed
independence and value of the soul. It explains the tendency to regard the
humanity of a man, his real self, as identical to his hegemonikon.’24 A short
fragment that records Cleanthes’ view that humans are ‘soul alone’ further
supports this interpretation.25
A.A. Long analyses all the Stoic evidence together, but if Diogenes Laertius
is correct and there was a difference between Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ views,
then this interpretation applies more to Cleanthes than to Chrysippus.26 It
convincingly accounts for what could motivate a Stoic to tie personal identity
with the soul, how a Stoic could explain the survival of all rational human souls
until the end of the world cycle and, finally, why a Stoic would call human
beings ‘souls alone.’ If Diogenes Laertius’ report is accurate, however, this Stoic
can only be Cleanthes.

independently existing substance according to the Stoics. She also suggests that they might
have inherited this view from Plato (Ju 2009, 116, 119).
23 Long (1982, 45).
24 Long (1982, 52).
25 Epiphanius adv. Haeres. 3.2,9 (3.37) = SVF 1.538.
26 Although I am arguing that these concerns motivated Cleanthes to tie identity to the soul, I
would not, of course, deny that Chrysippus was not committed to the standard Stoic psycho-
logical account that distinguishes between an impression to do something and an assent to do
it. I will argue below, however, that Chrysippus was motivated by other concerns, especially the
problem presented by the Growing Argument. While tying personal identity to the soul is a way
of highlighting the independence of hegemonikon and the judgements it makes, it is not
necessary to separate, in the metaphysical sense, hegemonikon from the rest of the activity of
psychic pneuma (cf., for example, Graver (2007, 32–34)). Chrysippus, therefore, could have been
coherently committed to the standard Stoic psychological model and the claim that personal
identity is an embodied soul.
470 Aiste Celkyte

Chrysippus’ View: The Donkey Problem

Chrysippus’ view, that is, the view preserved in the fragments of Eusebius and
Pseudo Plutarch, appears to be more complex and idiosyncratic. The fact that
Chrysippus distinguished between different types of souls and claimed that the
ordinary ones end up disintegrating before the end of the world cycle suggests
that his account of the soul as well as identity might have differed from that of
Cleanthes. Ultimately, the question is what exactly Chrysippus’ view implies
about personal identity. If it implies that identity persists after death, then it is
more or less the same view as that of Cleanthes. If, however, it implies that
identity does not properly persist after death, then it is a rather different view.
In his Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions, Plutarch records a peculiar
philosophical puzzle and an even more peculiar Stoic answer that is a good
starting place for determining Chrysippean understanding of personal identity. It
is worth noting from the start that this fragment is not explicitly ascribed to
Chrysippus. From the beginning of this treatise, however, Chrysippus seems to
be treated as representing all Stoicism.27 The other Stoics are hardly mentioned
at all, while Chrysippus’ names shows up multiple times, including right before
the passage below. It is not impossible that there is a connection between
Chrysippus and this fragment, yet it cannot be established with certainty. The
substance of my interpretation will rely on the fragments discussed below that
are securely ascribed to Chrysippus. The fragment that contains the donkey
problem, however, problematises personal identity in a revealing way and
therefore it is a good starting point.
The fragment in question describes the Stoic take on the case of body
switching. It is, therefore, very illuminating as it implicitly states where identity
lies and under what conditions it ceases to exist. In this passage, Plutarch
accuses the Stoics of hypocrisy or at least a contradiction. They claim that the
attractiveness and the health of a body do not make one more likely to attain
happiness, yet they also make health preferable to wisdom in the following way:

καὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτῳ φασὶ καὶ Φερεκύδῃ καθήκειν ἄν, εἴπερ ἠδύναντο, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀφεῖναι
καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν, ὥστε παύσασθαι φθειριῶντας καὶ ὑδρωπιῶντας: καὶ τῆς Κίρκης
ἐγχεούσης δύο φάρμακα, τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν ἄφρονας ἐκ φρονίμων τὸ δ᾽ ὅνους φρονίμους ἑξ
ἀφρόνων ἀνθρὡπων, οὐκ τὸν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πιεῖν τὸ τῆς ἀφροσύνης μᾶλλον ἢ μεταβαλεῖν
εἰς θηρίου μορφὴν τὸ εἶδος, ἔχοντα τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ μετὰ τῆς φρονήσεως δηλονότι τὴν

27 This is especially clear in Plut. Mor. 1059E, where the idiosyncrasy of Chrysippus’ logic (it is
compared to an octopus that supposedly gnaws its own tentacles) leads to the claim that the
Stoics contradict common notions. Chrysippus is also treated as representing Stoicism in
general earlier, in 1059B.
 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 471

εὐδαιμονίαν; καὶ ταῦτά φασιν αὐτὴν ὑφηγεῖσθαι καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι τὴν φρόνησιν ‘ἄφες
με καὶ καταφρόνησον ἀπολλυμένης ἐμοῦ καὶ διαφθειρομένης εἰς ὄνου πρόσωπον.

And they [the Stoics] say that it would have been fitting for Heraclitus and Pherecydes, if
they could have done so, to give up their virtue and prudence in order to get rid of their
pediculosis and dropsy; and that, if the potions poured by Circe were two, one making
prudent men into fools and the other making foolish men into prudent donkeys, (it would
be right) for Odysseus to have drunk the potion of folly rather than to have changed his
form to the shape of a beast though thereby keeping his prudence — and with his prudence
obviously his happiness; and this, they say, is the precept and prescription of prudence
herself: ‘Let me go and regard me not, for I am being undone and perverted into an
donkey’s head.’28

The passage describes the Stoic answer to a simple dilemma that makes one
choose between two evils. Is it better to be wise in a donkey body or to be foolish
but retain one’s human shape? The dilemma is interesting, because it forces the
chooser to prioritise either a bodily shape or a cognitive capacity. The Stoics,
according to this passage, choose the latter.
This very striking answer appears to run counter to all the standard Stoic
tenets, as Plutarch rightly notes. How is it possible that wisdom, the only good,
is less preferable than a bodily form? The answer lies in the Stoic understanding
of what it would mean to be wise in a donkey’s body. In order to make sense of
the Stoic choice, perhaps the puzzle could be re-phrased as follows: if one chose
the second drink, would one turn into a wise person in a donkey’s body or just a
wise donkey? The Stoics’ choice may have been informed by the assumption that
this person would simply become a wise donkey.29 Once Odysseus’ form is
changed into that of a donkey, his wisdom becomes the wisdom of a donkey
rather than a human man. The commanding faculty is the most important part of
human beings, according to the Stoics; it is the aspect that makes human beings
different from all other living livings.30 Numerous fragments in the Stoic corpus
emphasise that humans have a privileged access to rationality which they share
with the active principle,31 and animals do not possess such a faculty.32 A wise
donkey, therefore, would be an oxymoron to the Stoics. Most importantly, the
Stoic answer indicates that the nature of human wisdom is such that it cannot be
transferred to a different body. The only way in which that wisdom would not be
transferrable to a member of another species would be if personal identity was

28 Plut. Mor. 1063F-1064B, tr. Cherniss, amended.

29 Cf. Lact. Div. Inst. 3.19.
30 For example, Origen Princ. 3.1.2-3 = SVF 2.988 = LS 53A.
31 See Plut. Mor. 1076A = SVF 3.246 = LS 61J, where this view is attributed to Chrysippus.
32 Diog. Laert. 7.86.
472 Aiste Celkyte

dependent on the combination of the body and the soul. Personal identity is, in
that case, grounded in being an embodied rational soul.33

Chrysippus’ View: An Embodied Soul

There is some additional evidence to support the interpretation that Chrysippus
theorised personal identity as being an embodied soul. The Chrysippean
notion34 of blending (κρᾶσις) is quite pertinent here. The blending is described
in the Stoic theory of mixtures. The theory distinguishes three types of mixtures:
juxtaposition, fusion and blending. It seem that this particular type of mixture
was a matter of great contention in antiquity.35 In his work On Mixture,
Alexander of Aphrodisias also mostly concentrates on discussing the blending,
especially how this mixture accounts for the soul’s interaction with the body.
Alexander of Aphrodisias’s description of this mixture is as follows:

ἔστι δὲ ἡ Χρυσίππου δόξα περὶ κράσεως ἥδε· ἡνῶσθαι μὲν ὑποτίθεται τὴν σύμπασαν
οὐσίαν, πνεύματός τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὑφ’ οὗ συνέχεταί τε καὶ συμμένει
καὶ σύμπαθές ἐστιν αὑτῷ τὸ πᾶν· … τὰς δέ τινας γίνεσθαι μίξεις λέγει δι’ ὅλων τινῶν οὐσιῶν
τε καὶ τῶν τούτων ποιοτήτων ἀντιπαρεκτεινομένων ἀλλήλαις μετὰ τοῦ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐσίας
τε καὶ ποιότητας σώζειν ἐν τῇ μίξει τῇ τοιᾷδε, ἥντινα τῶν μίξεων κρᾶσιν ἰδίως εἶναι λέγει …
εἶναι γὰρ ἴδιον τῶν κεκραμένων τὸ δύνασθαι χωρίζεσθαι πάλιν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, ὃ μόνως
γίνεται τῷ σώζειν ἐν τῇ μίξει τὰ κεκραμένα τὰς αὑτῶν φύσεις … τοῦ δὲ τοῦθ’ οὕτως
ἔχειν ὡς ἐναργέσι χρῶνται μαρτυρίοις τῷ τε τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσαν, ὥσπερ
καὶ τὸ δεχόμενον αὐτὴν σῶμα, δι’ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος διήκειν ἐν τῇ μίξει τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ
σώζουσαν τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ψυχῆς ἄμοιρον τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντος σώματος),
ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχειν καὶ τὴν τῶν φυτῶν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἐν τοῖς συνεχομένοις
ὑπὸ < τῆς > ἕξεως.

33 I adopt the term used by C. Gill in his discussion of Stoic phychophysical holism, see Gill
(2006a: especially pp. 29–46 for the analysis of Stoic conceptualisation of the relationship of
body and soul) and Gill (2006b, 213–217). Although Gill discusses the notion of the embodied
soul in the context of psychology, it is also useful for discussing the metaphysics of personal
identity as it informatively captures the condition that grounds personal identity; and, of
course, the Stoic psychology and metaphysics of personhood are not unrelated topics.
34 Long and Sedley (1987, 293) suggest that the notion of blending most likely preceded
Chrysippus, but the connection between blending and the cosmic breath was most likely
Chrysippean.
35 See Plut. Mor. 1078 B-D = SVF 2.465 = LS 48E. It has also been called somewhat problematic
in older scholarship but see Nolan 2006, 169–177) for an argument that Chrysippean blending is
not only consistent with other Chrysippus’ other physical tenets but also quite a coherent
theory.
 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 473

Chrysippus has the following theory of blending: he first assumes that the whole of
substance is unified by a breath which pervades it all, and by which the universe is
sustained and stabilized and made interactive with itself … Other mixtures occur, he
argues, when certain substances and their qualities are mutually coextended through
and through, with the original substances and their qualities being preserved in such a
mixture; this kind of mixture he calls specifically ‘blending’ … for the capacity to be
separated again from one another is a peculiarity of blended substances, and this only
occurs if they preserve their own natures in the mixture … As clear evidence of this being
so they make use of the fact that the soul, which has its own individual existence, just like
the body which receives it, pervades the whole of the body while preserving its own
substance in the mixture with it. For none of the soul lacks a share in the body which
possesses the soul. It is just the same too with the physique of plants, and also with the
tenor of things which are sustained by tenor.36

When two bodies blend, they co-extend throughout each other without losing
their own specific properties and substances. The two bodies, then, are com-
pletely combined, yet they preserve their own characteristics so that when the
compound is dissolved, the two bodies maintain their substances. Unlike in the
case of juxtaposition, the blended bodies are not just piled together but genu-
inely co-extend through each other. A famous claim about blending reported by
a number of sources states that, according to Chrysippus, a drop of wine blends
throughout the entire sea.37 At the same time, the individual substances and
properties are not destroyed, and38 the compound made by means of blending
can be separated back into its constituents, just as an oiled sponge, when
dipped into wine mixed with water, will separate the two liquids by absorbing
water.39
The notion of blending is important for understanding the way in which
Chrysippus theorised personal identity because it shows that he might have
thought of living humans, in terms of identity, as blended entities, that is
embodied souls. The idea that identity depends on being an embodied soul
means in order to understand what humans are, we have to think of them as
souls present in bodies. Of course, the soul is the active and, more importantly,
the best part of a human being, according to the Stoics.40 However, in terms of

36 Alexander of Aphrodisias Mix. 216,14-218,6 = SVF 2.473 = LS 48C, tr. Long and Sedley.
37 See Diog. Laert. 7.151 = SVF 2.479 = LS 48A, Plut. Mor. 1078E = SVF 2.480 = LS 48B.
38 Lewis (1988, 86–90) argues that blending does in fact involve the destruction of the
constituents while they are in the mixture. This paper does not address the question of the
soul and, as a result, it is not immediately clear how such an interpretation would account for
the mixture of the body and the soul.
39 Stob. 1.155,5-11 W = SVF 2.471 = LS 48D.
40 See Seneca Ep. 76.9-10 = SVF 3.200a = 63D.
474 Aiste Celkyte

personal identity, or to use the Stoic term, peculiarly qualified individuals, to be

a particular human being is to be a rational soul blended with a human body.
The Chrysippean fragments containing the claims that the soul is engen-
dered after the body also suggest that personal identity is grounded in the
interaction between the body and the soul. The extant evidence is not elaborate
but it clearly states that, according to Chrysippus, the soul is engendered after
the body because children resemble their parents in character.41 It is fairly
obvious that children bear physical resemblance to their parents, which indi-
cates that children’s bodies are causally linked to their parents’ bodies.
Arguably, the aim of Chrysippus’ argument is to show that the same applies to
the properties of souls. They come into being after bodies do and, thus, they do
not exist prior to conception.42 What is especially interesting for the purposes of
this paper, however, is that this claim indicates that an individual is a result of
the combination of the properties of the body and the soul. The particular nature
of the particular soul, such as the temperament and the character of a person,
depends on the body in which it resides. Personal identity, or to use a Stoic
term, being a peculiarly qualified individual, is grounded in being a compound
of a body and a soul.
The very same idea can be also found in Galen, although the context of this
fragment is a rather different, physical, discussion. Galen reports the
Chrysippean claim that on a more physical, elemental level, the soul is made
out of air and fire43 but it also acquires more moisture from the bodies in which
it dwells.44 The body and the soul, thus, have a mutual effect on each other.
Personal identity is a result of this interaction and depends on this compound.
Consequently, the destruction of personal identity must be the separation of
the body and the soul, that is, death, despite the fact that the soul still exists
after this separation. A number of testimonia recording Chrysippus’ definition of
death survives.45 According to Nemesius, Chrysippus defined death as the

41 Plut. Mor. 1053D = SVF 2.806 = LS 53C (ἀποδείξει δὲ χρῆται ‘τοῦ γεγονέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ
μεταγενεστέραν εἶναι μάλιστα τῷ καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐξομοιοῦσθαι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς
γονεῦσι). Chrysippus might have been not the author, however. The same is maintained by
Cleanthes, according to Tertulian On the Soul, chapter 5 = SVF 1.518 and Nemesius de Nat. Hum.
2. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.79, where this argument is attributed to Panaetius.
42 See, for example, Long and Sedley (1987 (vol.2):312).
43 It is worth noting that pneuma might be not a mixture of the two but, rather, constituted of
each of these elements, as Sorabji argues (1988, 85–89).
44 Galen PHP 5.3.8 = SVF 2.841 = LS 47H. Cf. Cicero Tusc. 1.18, for the claim that an earthy body
is warmed up by the heat of the soul.
45 See Plutarch Mor. 1052D, where Zeus is said not to die, because no separation of body and
soul occurs. Cf. Salles (2009, 130–131) on this passage.
 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 475

separation of the soul and body in the argument designed to prove the corpore-
ality of the soul as follows: ‘Chrysippus says that death is the separation of soul
from body. Now nothing incorporeal is separated from a body. For an incorpor-
eal does not even make a contact with a body. But the soul both makes contact
with and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is a body.’46 The ‘soul’
in these cases refers specifically to the commanding faculty.47
A short record of the Stoic definition of the qualified individual found in
Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul shows that the separation of
the body and the soul is also the cessation of personal identity. While introdu-
cing the issue of how souls are individuated, Simplicius inserts the Stoic con-
tribution48 on this topic as follows:

… εἴ γε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συνθέτων τὸ ἀτομωηὲν ὑπάρχει εἶδος, καθ’ ὃ ἰδίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς
Στοᾶς λέγεται ποιόν, ὃ καὶ ἀθρόως ἐπιγίνεται καὶ αὖ ἀπογίνεται καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν παντὶ τῷ τοῦ
συνθέτου βίῳ διαμένει, καίτοι τῶν μορίων ἄλλων ἄλλοτε γινομένων τε καὶ φθειρομένων.

… if in the case of compound entities there exists individual form- with reference to which
the Stoics speak of something peculiarly qualified, which both is gained, and lost again, all
together, and remains the same throughout the compound entity’s life even though its
constituent parts come to be and are destroyed at different times.49

The claim about the persistence of identity in spite of material changes refers to
the Chrysippean solution to the Growing Argument. The Growing Argument, also
known as the Theseus Ship Paradox, is a paradox about the persistence of
identity through change. Although it is typically attributed to Epicharmus, it
was also adopted by the Academics to challenge the Stoics.50 The puzzle arises
from the premise that material change leads to identity change, and so any
material change could lead to identity change, and Socrates who goes into a
barbershop at one o’clock is a different person from Socrates at two o’clock who
has just had a haircut. Chrysippus’ solution to this paradox consists in denying
the problematic premise and showing that identity is a kind of property that
does not depend on small material changes.51 This passage does, however, tell
us about the scope of identity. It clearly states that peculiarly qualified

46 Nemesius 81,6-10 = SVF 2.790 = LS 45D, tr. Long and Sedley. This might have been inherited
from Zeno, see Tertulian De Anima 5.
47 Sextus Empiricus M 7.234 = LS 53F, tr. Long and Sedley.
48 Most of the more sophisticated Stoic contributions to metaphysics were made by
Chrysippus. He is responsible, for instance, for the Stoic theory of genera, see Menn (1999,
227) as well as Long and Sedley (1987, 165–166; 173).
49 Simplicius in DA 217,36-218,2 = SVF 2.395 = LS 28I, tr. Long and Sedley.
50 On the Academics’ adaptation of Epicharmus’ puzzle, see Sedley (1982, 256–258).
51 For analysis of Chrysippus’ solution, see Sedley (1982) and Bowin (2003). Cf. Lewis (1995).
476 Aiste Celkyte

individuals, while they persist throughout the existence of the compound, cease
to exist once a compound is separated. The end of the peculiarly qualified
individual, then, is not a loss or an acquisition of matter, but the separation of
the compound. In the case of personal identity, this is the separation of body
and soul.
Chrysippus very likely thought of identity as grounded in being an embo-
died rational soul. The significance difference from Cleanthes’ account is that
personal identity does not survive death despite the fact that the soul does
survive it.52 This view is quite reasonable for a philosopher who is committed
to the view that everything in this world, including human souls, is material.
After all, the body does not immediately disintegrate either, yet the corpse is not
a person. In the same way, the surviving soul is not a person.

Chrysippus’ view: ‘The Smaller Substances’

One of the most puzzling claims in the extant evidence on Chrysippean views on
the post-mortal survival of the souls is the claim that the souls survive having
turned into smaller substances (εἰς ἐλάττω μεταβαλόντες οὐσίαν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς)
after death. An even more bewildering aspect of the post-mortal survival of the
ordinary souls is the temporal aspect of the whole process. In this section,
therefore, I am going to explore Chrysippus’ account of the soul and determine
why the souls survive ‘for a little while’ and what determines how long they do
survive. In accordance with the conclusions reached above, the issue at stake
here is not a person Socrates – the personal identity ceases at the point of
death – but the remaining soul of Socrates. The question of what happens to the
soul of Socrates after death is thus comparable to the question of what happens
to the body of Socrates after death, in the sense that the discussion no longer
concerns Socrates per se.
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to start with the question of
what the smaller substances are, or what is left of the soul once it departs from
the body.53 Arguably, a fairly natural way of interpreting the term ‘a smaller
substance’ would be to read it as referring to the elemental theory. A human
being is a compound in several ways. On the one hand, a person is a compound
of the body and the soul, and death marks the dissipation of this compound. On

52 This is contra Lewis (1995, 97–99).

53 Cf. Scholia in Hom. Illiad 65 = SVF 2.815 for the claim that, according to Chrysippus, the soul
becomes round after the separation.
 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 477

the other hand, a person is also a compound of the four elements, like all other
living creatures.54 The composition and dissipation of the compounds made of
elements is extensively described in Stoic elemental theory.
The evidence for Chrysippus’ elemental theory is fairly abundant.55 Possibly
the most elaborate account is preserved in Stobaeus. It states not only that,
according to Chrysippus, terrestrial beings ultimately resolve into the four ele-
ments, but also that the very term ‘element’ can have three meanings. First, it
can refer to fire, because it is the element sui generis; second, it can refer to the
four elements; and, finally, it can refer to anything that causes generations from
itself into some end which subsequently resolves back into the original form.56
The very concept of an element involves both creation from and resolution into
the original elemental state. Following the dissolution of the compound of the
body and the soul, the dissolution of the elemental compound ought to take
place.
A living person is made out of fire, air, water and earth, and while the way
in which the elements interact when they make up a person is complex,57
several fragments suggest that both the body and the soul have dominant
elements. The soul is commonly described as consisting of fire and air, while
the body is described as ‘damp’ and so, implicitly, consisting of earth and
water.58 If a human being consists of four elements, then the elemental disen-
tanglement at death would quite naturally mean that the surviving soul is a
smaller substance as it contains two rather than four elements. In the passage of
Galen cited above, the soul is said to gain dampness from the body, but
presumably this kind of property would be lost once the soul is not in contact
with the body.
The most puzzling aspect of the survival of the souls is the temporality of
this phenomenon. What could possibly motivate Chrysippus’ claim that the
ordinary souls survive for some time only? I would argue that elemental theory
might have played a role here. The elemental changes take place due to two
kinds of processes: condensation and rarefication. These two processes are
foundational for explaining the world cycle.59 Condensation and rarefication
also play a role in the formation of the soul and, therefore, they are often

54 Chrysippus’ elemental theory is outlined in Stob. 1.129,2-130,13 W = SVF 2.413 = LS 47A.

55 It is not unproblematic, however. See White (2003, 133–136).
56 Stob. 1.129,2-130,13 W = SVF 2.413 = LS 47A. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.136-7.
57 Most of material things have all four elements in their constitution, see Cooper (2009, 115).
58 Galen PHP 5.3.8 = SVF 2.841 = LS 47H; Alexander of Aphrodisias Mix. 224,14-17,23-6 = SVF
2.442 = LS 47I.
59 Diog. Laert. 7.142; Galen Nat. fac. 106,13-17 = SVF 2.406 = LS 47E.
478 Aiste Celkyte

mentioned in connection to Stoic embryology. Although there is no extant

evidence that explicitly addresses the question of how the soul dissipates, the
Chrysippean account of the embryo formation provides less direct, but still
relevant, information. The account of embryo formation involves not only a
fairly detailed account of the physiological process leading to the formation of
the rational soul but also describes the identity-forming change, that is, the
conditions that are necessary for pneuma to attain the state of the soul. From
this, it is possible to infer the conditions under which the pneuma is no longer in
a state to be a human soul. The Chrysippean embryological account, thus, might
shed light on his account of the post-mortal survival of the soul.60
Plutarch’s critique61 of Chrysippus’ views62 is one of the main sources for
Stoic embryology. In an attempt to show that Chrysippus’ views on the effects of
cooling and heating on the soul are contradictory, Plutarch cites his account of
embryo-formation. According to Chrysippus, an embryo is like a plant while it is
in the womb but when it is born, it is cooled and hardened by the air and, as a
result, turns into an animal.63 It is noteworthy that the soul is only properly
formed at the time of birth, when an embryo is cooled and hardened by the air.
As T. Tieleman argues,64 this account of the birth of the soul is rather well
constructed: ‘that the soul should come into being as soon as the physiological

60 See Tieleman (1991, 123).

61 Plutarch claims that Chrysippus’ view is contradictory because it suggests that the soul fully
develops (and, implicitly, becomes fine) by condensing at birth, yet it is seems impossible that
condensation makes something finer rather than thicker. Plutarch, however, appears to mis-
represent the Stoic view here. Nothing in Chrysippus’ quotes suggests that the exposure to the
air rarefies the soul. In fact, in Hierocles’ fragment on Stoic embryology, pneuma is said to
become finer gradually during gestation (Hierocles 1.5-33 = LS 53B, see n. 68), so birth does not
make the pneuma finer, because it has already been made such during the gestation. The
condensation serves a different purpose. Stoic sources and medical tradition describe physical
pneuma in embryo as hot (Diog. Laert. 7.157; cf. Graver (2007, 21) on the use of this in pre-Stoic
medical tradition, see Tieleman (1991, n.36). Embryo’s exposure to cold air, then, tempers the
heat of pneuma, so that a newborn can process air (a naturally cold element) and support itself
by breathing (cf. n.64).
62 Zeno had a rather different account. According to the reports of Eusebius and Galen (Praep.
Evang. 15.20,1 and Hist. Phil. 108 = SVF 1.128), he maintained that embryo does have a soul that
is a small part of the parental soul.
63 Plut. Mor. 1052F = SVF 2.806 (τὸ βρέφος ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ φύσει τρέφεσθαι νομίζει καθάπερ
φυτόν: ὅταν δὲ τεχθῇ, ψυχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ στομούμενον τὸ πνεῦμα μεταβάλλειν καὶ
γίγνεσθαι ζῷον). Cf. Hierocles 1.5-33, 4.38-53 = LS 53B.
64 This comment is in reference to a fragment from Ps. Plutarch. While Ps. Plutarch was most
likely referring to a work of Diogenes of Babylon’s, Tieleman also argues that this account can
also be attributed to Chrysippus and Cleanthes (1991, 124).
 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 479

mechanism by which it sustains and nourishes itself begins, is a neat and

economical theoretical construct.’65
While the crucial part for the formation of the soul is birth and the exposure
to the air,66 an embryo undergoes important gradual change during gestation.
This piece of information is found in another fragment that is somewhat more
detailed than Plutarch, yet records the very same account. In this fragment, the
Stoics are said to consider an embryo to be not an animal but a part of mother’s
womb. Just like a fruit is a part of a tree until it ripens, falls and becomes a
distinct entity in its own right, an embryo is a part of its maternal womb until it
is born and becomes an animal.67 The comparison with a piece of fruit shows
that the development of an embryo is a gradual process during which it under-
goes a slow but radical change. A similar claim is found in Hierocles. He
maintains that while the decisive moment for the formation of the soul – that
is, birth – is quite sudden, the actual process of an embryo’s growth is gradual,
as follows: ‘In the early stages, the physique is breath of a rather dense kind and
considerably distant from soul; but later, when it is close to birth, it becomes
finer … ’68
The disintegration of the soul, I would argue, is this process in reverse.
While during gestation the soul undergoes rarefication,69 post mortem it starts
condensing and, as the passage from Ps. Plutarch suggests, eventually turns
into dark compounds (ἀμαυρὸν σύγκριμα γίνεσθαι). This explains why souls do
not cease to be immediately.70 Souls last for a while because disintegrating, just

65 Tieleman (1991, 122).

66 This part might seem like a counter-case for the interpretation proposed in this paper so far,
as the proper coming-into-being of the soul coincides with the coming-into-being of a person in
a proper sense. There is, however, no inconsistency between theorising human identity as an
embodied soul and making soul-formation and identity-formation simultaneous. Being an
embodied soul requires both a body and a soul, and it cannot come into existence until both
of its components are properly in existence. It is only when the soul, due to the cooling of the
matter, comes into being that the compound of the body and the soul is formed.
67 Ps. Plut. Plac. 5.15 (Πλάτων ζῷον τὸ ἔμβρυον καὶ γὰρ κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ καὶ τρέφεσθαι
καὶ αὔξεσθαι. οἱ Στωικοὶ μέρος εἶναι αὐτὸ τῆς γαστρί οὐ ζῷον: ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς καρποὺς μέρη
τῶν φυτῶν ὄντας πεπαινομένους ἀπορρεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἔμβρυον).
68 Hierocles 1.5-33 = LS 53B, tr. Long and Sedley.
69 Birth itself might be a condensing event, possibly the type of event that stops the rarefica-
tion of the soul at the necessary point for it not to become too fine.
70 Cf. Ju (2009, 115–120). In regards to Chrysippus’ view that the wise souls last until the
conflagration while the ordinary ones do not, Ju argues that there are two different types of
dissipation that souls can be subjected to: mere resolution and the conflagration. Only the wise
souls undergo conflagration, while the ordinary people undergo mere resolution, which is a
process by means of which a compound dissolves into components.
480 Aiste Celkyte

like forming, takes a certain amount of time. Another parallel here could be a
body. It takes a while for a body to disintegrate post mortem, and the soul, being
a corporeal entity as well, would also take some time to cease to exist.
It is noteworthy that this reading of how humans come into being and cease
to exist is consistent with the definition of the peculiarly qualified individual
preserved by Simplicius. Peculiarly qualified individuals come into existence
and cease to exist immediately. The point of birth, when the soul solidifies, and
the moment of death, when the compound separates, would be such moments in
this case. Identity, furthermore, persists throughout the life of a compound
despite the increase or the decrease of the matter in the compound. Once the
compound is separated, however, personal identity ceases to exist and the
remaining components of the previous compound, that is, the body and the
soul, disintegrate over a long period of time. The claim that humans survive as
smaller substances for some time, then, is quite consistent with other views
attributable to Chrysippus, and overall, it fits coherently into Chrysippean
metaphysics.

Chrysippus’ view: The Wise Souls

Given everything that has been argued, Chrysippus’ claim that the souls of the
wise men survive until conflagration appears to present a strange exception.
What could possibly motivate Chrysippus to claim that these souls last until the
end of the world cycle?
The claim that the souls survive death appears to show a Platonic influence.
Chris Gill shows, however, that it also follows rather naturally from Stoic
commitments, as follows: ‘What it represents is a logical consequence of the
thought that pneuma has a physical existence and that there are varying degrees
of pneumatic tension, which are more or less cohesive and enduring. Hence, the
wise, whose stable and virtuous character (diathesis) constitutes the highest
possible state of pneumatic tension, will survive longest beyond the dissolution
of the rest of the body.’71 Thus, the longevity of the wise souls can be explained
by using Stoics’ own physical framework. The claim was most likely motivated
by the pneumatic theory and the idea that this longevity is a by-product of high-
level tension found in those souls that possess virtue.72

71 Gill (2006a, 81). Cf. Bénatouïl (2005).

72 This is a fairly common suggestion in the scholarship on this topic, see, for example, Algra’s
(2009, 371) analysis for a very similar conclusion.
 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 481

In fact, strength plays a rather important role in the Stoic conceptualisation of

virtue, a distinguishing property of the wise man, even if this notion is not of Stoic
origin. The idea that virtue is a kind of strength is, as Malcolm Schofield shows,
Socratic, and especially prominent in Xenophon’s depictions of Socrates.73 It is
adopted by Cleanthes, who says virtue as a tension is a ‘stroke of fire’ (πληγὴ
πυρὸς) and suggests that when the soul acquires the level of tension needed for
understanding what behaviour one ought to pursue, this tension ‘is called
strength and might’ (ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος).74 Cleanthes, thus, conceptualises
virtue not only as wisdom but also as a kind of strength.75 Although Chrysippus
makes strength the secondary virtue,76 it is noteworthy that the later tradition
appears to merge Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ theories and ‘it may be that
Chrysippus himself has already downgraded the status of tension as virtue.’77
This reading can be further supported by rather extensive evidence on Stoic
views regarding the corrosive effect of pleasure on the soul. The love of pleasure
is explicitly said to be a parallel to a bodily disease in a fragment found in
Diogenes Laertius.78 Galen, citing from Chrysippus’ On Emotions, records the
view that there is a parallel between good tension in the body and the soul and
that both of them constitute health in their respective areas.79 The same idea is
also found in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations.80 The wise souls, then, last for a
very long time, because they contain very high levels of pneumatic tension, and
they are ‘healthy’, that is, not corroded by wrong beliefs and pursuits of
pleasure.
In terms of personal identity, the wise man is no different from an ordinary
person in the sense that both personal identities would cease at the time of
death. Thus Socrates’ soul survives, but Socrates does not. The wise men are
special only in terms of the longevity of their souls. Whereas the ordinary souls
start condensing after separation from the bodies, the wise souls do not undergo
such a change until the conflagration due to their high pneumatic tension.

73 Schofield (2013, 18–19).

74 Plut. Mor. 1034 D-E.
75 Schofield (2013, 20).
76 He had good reason to do so, because, as Schofield shows, Cleanthes’ promotion of
enkrateia among the virtues diminished the importance of rational thinking when making
hard ethical decisions, see Schofield (2013, 26).
77 Schofield (2013, 28). Cf. Bénatouïl (2005, 12).
78 Diog. Laert. 7.115.
79 Galen PHP 5.2.22-24, 26-27 = SVF 3.471, 471a. For the physiological effects of emotions on the
soul, see Rapp (2006, 196–197).
80 Cic. Tusc. 4.30-1. Cf. Graver (2002, 205) for an argument that these parallels are typically
Chrysippean.
482 Aiste Celkyte

Presumably, the motion and heat of high pneumatic tension keep these souls
from cooling, hardening and condensing.

Demons
The Stoics were in unanimous agreement that souls do persist through death but
the details of their accounts, as I have argued in this paper, can be quite
different. There is a small set of evidence that explains the survival of the
souls with a reference to demonology, a rarely-discussed area of Stoic thought.
The main piece of evidence here is a passage from Sextus Empiricus cited below,
and this fragment is often discussed together with the other fragments on the
post mortal survival of the soul, although, typically, little emphasis is put on the
claim that the souls survive as demons. In this section, I will argue that the
connection between the demonology fragments and the other evidence regard-
ing the Stoics accounts of the post-mortal survival of the soul is tenuous. The
evidence on the Stoic demonology, therefore, is worth noting as a part of the
Stoic philosophical framework, although it does not change the interpretation of
the Cleanthean and Chrysippean accounts of the post-mortal survival of the soul
and personal identity presented above.
The central piece of evidence on the survival of the souls as demons is a
fragment found in Sextus Empiricus’ discussion of the arguments regarding the
divine existence. Sextus presents the Stoic critique of the Epicurean account of
what happens to the soul after death and, in the process of explaining Stoic
counter-arguments, records the claim that souls persist after death in the follow-
ing manner:

ἔκσκηνοι γοῦν ἡλίου γενόμεναι τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην οἰκοῦσι τόπον, ἐνθάδε τε διὰ τὴν
εἰλικρίνειαν τοῦ ἀέρος πλείονα πρὸς διαμονὴν λαμβάνουσι χρόνον, τροφῇ τε χρῶνται
οἰκείᾳ τῇ ἀπὸ γῆς ἀναθυμιάσει ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα, τὸ διαλῦσόν τε αὐτὰς ἐν ἐκείνοις
τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἔχουσιν. εἰ οὖν διαμένουσιν αἱ ψυχαί, δαίμοσιν αἱ αὐταὶ γίγνονται. εἰ δὲ
δαίμονές εἰσι ῥητέον καὶ θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν.

At any rate, after becoming disembodied they reside in the region below the moon, and
there, because of the purity of the air, they get to keep going for a longer time, and they
find a congenial food in the exhalation that rises from the earth (as the rest of the stars do
as well), and in those regions they do not have anything that will dissolve them. So, if
souls keep going, they are the same as spirits [daimones]; and if there are spirits, it must be
said that gods too are real … 81

81 Sextus Empiricus M 9.73-4 = SVF 2.812, tr. Bett.

 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 483

This account of the post-mortal survival of the souls is rather different from the
accounts preserved by Eusebius, Ps. Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius. The first
question to ask, then, is how compatible the view recorded here is with the
views preserved in other places and whose view this is likely to be. The text
unfortunately does not mention either the conflagration or the distinction
between the ordinary and the wise souls, and, therefore, it is not clear whether
the scenario described here applies to all or just the wise souls.
The lack of distinction could be an indication that this is Cleanthes’ view.
The context in which this account is found, however, points towards Chrysippus
because it was Chrysippus and Posidonius who engaged in the arguments with
the Epicureans the most.82 Attributing the view to the third head of the Stoa is
also not unproblematic, however. Chrysippus’ account contains a significant
distinction between the ordinary and the wise souls. If the souls dwelling in
the region below the moon are wise,83 then the explanation for their longevity
lies in their environment rather than internal properties, which would be out of
sync with Chrysippean ethics. These two explanations do not necessarily contra-
dict each other (and it is possible to maintain that strong souls are further
supported by their environment), yet it would be strange to build up an elabo-
rate theory about the physical strength and the health of the wise soul only to
claim that it survives due to environmental factors. If the souls that dwell below
the moon and become demons are ordinary, then the fact that they are supposed
to dissipate after some time presents a problem.84
There is another possible source for the account preserved by Sextus
Empiricus. As mentioned above, it is not only Chrysippus but also Posidonius
who engaged in the debates with the Epicureans. Diogenes Laertius records a
citation from Posidonius’ Physics about the nutriment of the heavenly bodies
that presents a very similar cosmological picture to the one found in Sextus’
passage,85 although this cosmology is not exclusively Posidonian.86 Posidonius
did, however, write a treatise on demonology entitled On Heroes and Demons,87

82 For Chrysippus, see Plut. Mor. 1054B = SVF 2.539; Eusebius Praep. Evang. 261A = SVF 2.978.
For Posidonius, see Cic. Nat. D. 1.123 = fr. 22a EK. Cf. Algra (2009, n.34).
83 See Diog. Laert. 7.151 for the claim attributed to the Stoics in general that the surviving souls
of the souls of the good are heroes. Cf. Algra’s (2009, 373) discussion of this passage.
84 Cf. Algra (2009, 386).
85 Diog. Laert. 7.145, tr. Hicks (Γεωδεστέραν δὲ τὴν σελήνην, ἅτε καὶ προσγειοτέραν οὖσαν.
τρέφεσθαι δὲ τὰ ἔμπυρα ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἐκ τῆς μεγάλης θαλάττης
νοερὸν ὄντα ἄναμμα: τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐκ ποτίμων ὑδάτων, ἀερομιγῆ τυγχάνουσαν καὶ πρόσγειον
οὖσαν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου: τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς).
86 See Stob. 1.219,24 W = SVF 2.677 for a similar view attributed to Chrysippus.
87 Posidonius fr. 24 EK.
484 Aiste Celkyte

and view of the soul is in sync with account preserved by Sextus.88 Attributing
this view to Posidonius does not, of course, rule out the possibility that
Chrysippus also held this view. As far as the extant fragments are concerned,
it is easier to attribute this view to Posidonius rather than to Chrysippus.
Chrysippus certainly wrote about demons89 but whether the kind of theory
that is found in Sextus Empiricus would also be advocated by Chrysippus and
included in his account of the post-mortal survival of the souls is inconclusive.
As a result, it is not clear whether demonology plays a significant explanatory
role in the early Stoic accounts of the post-mortal survival of the soul.

Agree to Disagree: Concluding Remarks

I have argued that if Diogenes Laertius’ record of the disagreement between
Cleanthes and Chrysippus is taken to be a reliable piece of information – and
there are several reasons to do so – then it follows that there was a subtle yet
important difference between these two early Stoics regarding their views about
not only the soul but also personal identity. Cleanthes subscribed to the view
that personal identity is grounded in the soul alone. Chrysippus, meanwhile,
had a more complex view. According to him, personal identity is grounded in
being an embodied rational soul. After death, the tenors of ordinary souls
dissipate after a while, just like the tenors of all human bodies dissipate,
while the souls of the wise, being stronger and healthier, last until the end of
the world cycle. It is noteworthy, however, that the fact that Chrysippus and
Cleanthes held different views does not necessarily mean that Chrysippus’
account ought to be construed as explicitly criticising the view of his teacher.
Possibly the pertinent background here is, again, the Growing Argument.
Chrysippus’ solution to this paradox primarily consists in denying that identity
is grounded in matter, and this move has some important consequences for the
scope of personal identity. It commits Chrysippus to the view that identity does
not depend on material parts and it does not ‘go’ where material parts ‘go.’
Chrysippus’ account shows that Socrates walking out of a barber shop is the
same person who walked into the barber shop an hour ago, despite the fact that
a part of Socrates, his hair, is left behind. Consequently, assigning post-mortal

88 Ju (2009, 113–114) uses Sextus’ passage for her discussion of Posidonius’ conception of the
soul.
89 Suda = SVF 2.1205 and Cic. Div. 2.70, 144. There is also some evidence in Plut. Mor.
1051C = SVF 2.1178, but see Algra (2009, 379–384).
 The Soul and Personal Identity in Early Stoicism 485

identity to a part of the body-soul compound would be not quite coherent. It is

more natural for Chrysippus to maintain that identity ceases to exist at the time
of the separation of the compound, and it does not persist even though the parts
of the compound keep on persisting. If this is the case, then it is not quite
accurate to interpret Chrysippus’ view as a critique of Cleanthes’ views. The
target of Chrysippus’ critique is the Academics90 and the implications of the
Growing Argument. The fact that his account ended up contradicting Cleanthes’
view might have been, after all, only a by-product of his critique of the Stoics’
opponents and, therefore, somewhat accidental.

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The Roman Stoics: Seneca and Epictetus 1

Stoicism: Early, Middle, Late, and New

1. Central Proponents

(1) Early Stoicism: 3rd century BC Athens; Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus. Meetings
in the painted colonnade: en tē poikilē stoa. Influenced by Socrates and the Cynic
Crates. Limited primary sources, mostly critical secondary sources.
(2) Middle Stoicism: 2nd century: Panaetius, Posidonius (Cicero visits: De
Officiis). Innovations in many areas of Stoic theory. Some Platonic influences.
(3) Late Stoicism = Roman Stoics, Stoicism of the Roman Imperial Period (c.
30BC–300CE). Focus on practical ethics, but some innovation even without
institutional school and central authorities (e.g., indifferents, katorthōmata = right
actions, passions; topics such as desire/aversion, impulse/rejection, coherent beliefs
and choices; see Ep. 89, Diss. 3.2, Handbook 1); semi-public intellectuals: advising
emperors, counselling wealthy citizens, plus teaching.1 Key figures are:
(a) Seneca (1BC–65CE), born in Cordoba (see map); learns philosophy from
Attalus (Stoic) and Sotion (Pythagorean); rises to wealth and fame in Rome as a
senator (consul in 56) and tutor to Nero (arranged by Agrippina), becomes a high-
ranking adviser, but ultimately forced into suicide (alleged involvment in an
attempt to assassinate Nero); writes letters (composed 62-4), plays, essays (On anger
etc.). For a long time the only window to ancient Stoicism.2 Main theme:
philosophy is the practice of crafting a life (that is worth living).
(b) Gaius Musonius Rufus (c. 20–90), born into noble Etruscan family; aka ‘Roman
Socrates’; teaches Stoicism in Rome; exiled in 65, returns on Nero’s death (69),
exiled again by Vespasian (c. 75–9); 21 discourses and fragments survive.3
(c) Epictetus (c. 50–135), name means ‘further acquired’ (epiktētos; from ktaomai, to
procure or gain for oneself), born in Hieropolis; in Rome as slave to Epaphroditus
(secretary to Nero); allowed to study with Musionius Rufus; begins teaching on
being freed; like all philosophers evicted from Italy by Domitian (95); settles in
Nicopolis; is visited by prominent people (e.g., Hadrian); adopts a child in old age
and ‘marries’; Lucius Flavius Arrianus (= Arrian) ghostwrites the Discourses (4/8
survive) and the Handbook; the 10th-century Bodleian ms says diatribai, which means
‘informal talks’ or ‘conversations’, and Encheiridion, which roughly means ‘the little
thing in hand’ and summarises the Discourses.
(d) Marcus Aurelius (121–180 CE), born in Rome, emperor from 161 to 180; dies
near Vienna from illness (watch ‘Gladiator’); writes the Meditations (actually, Ta eis
heauton, roughly, ‘those to oneself’) while on campain; restores philosophy to Athens
by founding four chairs for the main schools.
(4) New or Modern Stoics: see modernstoicism.com.

1 Gill, C. (2003). The School in the Roman Imperial Period. In B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to the Stoics (pp. 33–58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2 See Vogt, K. (2015). Seneca. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. plato.stanford.edu/entries/seneca/
3 Lutz, C. E. (1947). Musonius Rufus ‘The Roman Socrates’. Yale Classical Studies, 10, 3–150.

OUDCE Michaelmas Term 2019 | Peter Wyss

2. The Resources

– course website: https://open.conted.ox.ac.uk/series/roman-stoics

– Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/seneca/
and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/
– Rewley House library: copies of the key texts (e.g., Seneca’s Letters on Ethics),
collections (e.g. Inwood and Gerson’s The Stoics Reader), and secondary
literature, such as guides and companions
– ask me for more specialist literature (e.g., journal articles)4

4 Doppelherme des Sokrates und Seneca, Antikensammlung, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin.

This work is licensed by the University of Oxford under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 UK: England & Wales Licence
Philosophers’

Imprint volume 20, no. 18

june 2020 D iogenes of Sinope held little hope that there are any truly virtu-
ous people. He is said to have searched the streets of Athens,
carrying a lamp in broad daylight, claiming he was looking for an hon-
est man. Diogenes claimed that much of what dominated an Athenian
life – social status and material wealth – were hindrances to virtue,
and thus that truly honest or virtuous people were exceedingly rare.1

STOIC VIRTUE: A
Surely though, Diogenes was far too cynical. We know many honest
people – honest parents, honest bankers, and honest friends – even
though there are social pressures that undermine the virtues. Part of
Diogenes’s error seems to be that he thought a person could not be hon-

CONTEMPORARY est without being completely honest. Even if Diogenes was right about
the obstacles to virtue in daily life, was he not wrong to think that a
person could not be honest without shedding all such attachments? I

INTERPRETATION
Robert Weston Siscoe
University of Arizona
© 2020, Robert Weston Siscoe
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License
<www.philosophersimprint.org/020018/>
will be arguing that there is a way of understanding Diogenes that can
make sense of his seemingly outlandish claim, a way of interpreting
virtue terms on which there is no one honest or virtuous unless there
is someone who is perfectly so.
The claim that virtue requires perfection, an infamous Stoic doc-
trine, is thought to be implausible for a myriad of reasons. To begin
with, our ordinary virtue ascriptions far outpace those of the Stoic.
According to Stoicism, only the perfectly virtuous sage is actually vir-
tuous – everyone else is vicious. As already mentioned though, our
applications of virtue terms are hardly limited to those who are com-
pletely virtuous. We often describe those with small moral foibles as
virtuous, making the Stoic position seem almost absurd. Furthermore,
it is difficult to understand how the Stoic view can make sense of moral
progress and virtue comparisons, further components of our common-
sense moral lives. These three pressing worries for the Stoic conception
1. See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 6.41. The more accurate
translation of what Diogenes inquires as he is traveling through the streets
is that “he is looking for a man.” The reason that he cannot find one is that
he takes man to be essentially rational. By living apart from virtue, however,
the citizens of Athens are also not living completely rational lives, hence Dio-
genes’s criticism that he cannot find a man as he cannot find anyone completely
virtuous and thus rational.
 robert weston siscoe
of virtue – ordinary virtue ascriptions, virtue comparisons, and moral
progress – are all outlined in detail in Section 1. How, then, can anyone
maintain that virtue requires perfection?
In this paper, I will be arguing that it is possible to maintain that
virtue requires perfection by holding that virtue-theoretic terms are ab-
solute gradable adjectives. Recent work in linguistics has revealed a dis-
tinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives, categories
that, with a few notable exceptions, were previously conflated. Posit-
ing this divergence explains a wide range of linguistic phenomena, ce-
menting the relative/absolute distinction as orthodoxy on gradable ad-
jectives.2 Unsurprisingly, the contrast between absolute and gradable
adjectives has been ignored within philosophy as well – a blind spot in
need of remedy. In Section 2, I detail the relative/absolute distinction,
outlining the characteristics that separate relative from absolute grad-
able adjectives, setting the stage for arguing that virtue-theoretic terms
resemble absolute gradable adjectives.
One crucial difference between relative and absolute gradable ad-
jectives is how their truth-conditions are determined. The denotations
of relative gradable adjectives, including ‘tall’ and ‘expensive’, shift
across context, allowing that a child who is not considered tall amongst
adults can still be considered tall for their age and that a handbag that
is not expensive to the cultural elite is nonetheless expensive for those
in the middle class. When terms like ‘virtuous’ and ‘honest’ are taken
to be relative gradable adjectives, the natural result are accounts on
which their truth conditions differ along with the context. This is prob-
lematic for the Stoics, however, because applications of ‘virtuous’ and
‘honest’ then only require meeting the contextually relevant standards.
On the other hand, unlike relative gradable adjectives, the denotation
of absolute gradable adjectives remains fixed on the maximal element
in the underlying scale regardless of the context. Absolute gradable
2. See Kennedy (2007). The other notable exceptions to the widespread neglect
of this distinction are Kennedy and McNally (2005), Rusiecki (1985), and Unger
(1975).
philosophers’ imprint
Stoic Virtue
adjectives are thus not context-sensitive and always pick out objects
that satisfy the top of their scales. Interpreting virtue terms as absolute
gradable adjectives, a task that I attempt in Section 3, thus makes it
possible to defend the Stoic view that virtue requires perfection.
Taking virtue-theoretic adjectives to be absolute gradable adjectives
not only helps capture the Stoic view that being virtuous requires be-
ing fully virtuous, as I will in Section 4, it also provides a response to
the three primary objections to Stoic virtue. Absolute gradable adjec-
tives still permit distinctions below the maximum of their underlying
scales, thus providing a route to understanding virtue comparisons
and moral progress. Furthermore, imprecise attributions of absolute
gradable adjectives are often made, but such attributions are literally
false, not true in any context. If virtue terms are absolute gradable
adjectives, then many of our ordinary uses of virtue terms are also
imprecise uses, allowing the Stoics to make sense of ordinary virtue
attributions.
The primary goal of this paper then is to argue that, by interpreting
virtue terms as absolute gradable adjectives, there is a route to defend-
ing the Stoic account of virtue. In Section 1, I will lay out the Stoic view,
outlining both the Stoic commitments on virtue as well as some of the
most common objections leveled against it. In Section 2, I will then de-
scribe the distinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives,
noting the tests that are often used to distinguish them along with the
differences in their truth conditions. I will then argue in Section 3 that
it is not implausible to develop the Stoic position by interpreting virtue-
theoretic adjectives as absolute gradable adjectives. To begin with, the
Stoics interpret virtue terms on the linguistic model of ‘straight,’ an
absolute gradable adjective. Furthermore, virtue terms pass many of
the tests attributed with absolute gradable adjectives, providing a case
that ‘straight’ and ‘virtuous’ are of the same semantic kind. I then use
this observation in Section 4 to respond to the critiques of Stoic virtue,
arguing that the work on absolute gradable adjectives provides a route
to defending the Stoic view. In the conclusion, I will consider some
of the consequences for virtue ethics if we not only accept that taking
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 robert weston siscoe
virtue terms to be absolute gradable adjectives is a promising route to
defend Stoicism, but that virtue-theoretic adjectives in fact are absolute
gradable adjectives. On this understanding of virtue terms, Diogenes
is not mistaken about the truth-conditions of virtue terms; he simply
refuses to use ‘honest’ imprecisely.
1. Stoic Virtue
Before we get started, it will be helpful to get clear on a few issues. To
begin with, I do not intend to be offering an historical interpretation
of the Stoics. My goal, rather, is to show how some problems pressed
against Stoics can be met by considering contemporary work in lin-
guistics. As the Stoics were obviously not privy to such developments,
this aim prevents me from offering a strict historical interpretation of
the Stoics. What I will be offering instead is an attempt to make consis-
tent a package of Stoic commitments that the majority of Stoic scholars
have found contradictory. In that sense, this project is an interpretation
of the Stoics. However, since the solution will be framed in terms of a
distinction in contemporary linguistics between relative and absolute
gradable adjectives, the understanding of the Stoics offered in this pa-
per is a contemporary interpretation. To the extent that I make use of
Stoic writings, then, I only take myself to be showing that such moves
are consonant with certain aspects of Stoic thought, not that the Stoics
would completely endorse my solution. Just as I do not intend to offer
an exact historical interpretation of the Stoics, I also do not provide a
complete defense of the Stoic view of virtue. My goal in this paper is
just to show that certain Stoic commitments can be made consistent,
not to argue against competing theories of virtue. In the conclusion, I
do explore some of the upshots of my interpretation of the Stoic ac-
count of virtue, but a full defense of the view that the virtues are in
fact in accord with Stoic doctrine will have to be left to further work.3
Another point worth keeping in mind is that there is no one such
3. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for helping me to get clear about the
scope of this paper’s argument.
philosophers’ imprint
Stoic Virtue
thing as the Stoic account of virtue – there are instead many individual
Stoics with divergent accounts of the virtuous life. Because there is no
one thing that is the Stoic understanding of virtue, it is not possible
to defend the Stoic view on virtue. For this reason, I will be focusing
on aspects of Stoic theorizing about virtue that have significant overlap
across a diverse set of Stoics. In laying out the Stoic view, then, we will
be looking for areas of widespread consensus in Stoic thought. Once
these have been established, I’ll then proceed to develop a route to
embracing these elements of the Stoic account of virtue.
Finally, even though I intend to argue for a detailed Stoic account
of virtue, due to limitations of space, there will be parts of the over-
lapping Stoic consensus that I will not be able to defend. This paper
unfortunately cannot encompass all of Stoic theorizing – that virtue
is the only good or that virtue is completely an internal affair – but
nevertheless aims to argue for a set of Stoic claims that are especially
contentious. In order to avoid confusion, in this section, I will outline
the elements of Stoic virtue that will be pertinent for this paper, later
offering a single solution that can be used to secure all of these claims.
Our first task, then, is to lay out aspects of Stoic virtue for which I will
offer a strategy for defending.
1.1 Virtue and Vice
The first element of Stoic virtue that this paper will focus on is the
thought that virtue requires moral perfection. On the Stoic view, only
the perfectly virtuous sage can truly be described as virtuous. Virtue
is so lofty that a person who attains it is on par with the gods. Cicero
contends that, on the Stoic view, “virtue in man and God is the same...
For virtue is nothing else than nature perfect and brought to a summit:
it is, therefore, a point of similarity between man and God”,4 while of
the sage Dion, Plutarch says, “Zeus does not exceed Dion in virtue”.5
4. See De legibus 1.25 (SVF 1.564). Where possible, the location of these ex-
cerpts has been given both in H. von Arnim’s Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (SVF)
and A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley’s The Hellenistic Philosophers (LS).
5. See De communibus notitiis 1076A (SVF 3.246, LS 61J).
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 robert weston siscoe
For this reason, ancient commentators describe the virtuous person as
being “rarer than the Ethiopian phoenix”.6 Cicero goes so far as to say
that “it happens more often that a mule begets than that a sage comes
into existence”.7 Modern commentators have upheld this reading of
the Stoics, taking ‘virtuous’ to truly apply only to the perfectly virtu-
ous.8 There is thus a wide consensus that the Stoics endorsed Perfect
Virtue:
(1) Perfect Virtue – Only the perfectly virtuous are truly virtu-
ous.
For the Stoics, the perfectly virtuous person is identified with the sage,
of which there have been very few in history. The average person falls
below moral perfection, and thus cannot be truly described as virtuous.
Thus, the Stoics take a quite contentious stance with Perfect Virtue,
contending very few people have ever been actually virtuous.
The difficulty of the Stoic position does not stop, however, with
arguing that only the perfectly virtuous are considered virtuous. The
challenge only deepens with the Stoics drawing a strict line between
virtue and vice. According to the Stoics, “nothing is between virtue and
vice”,9 a point they drive home with a number of metaphors. One com-
mon analogy is to describe the vicious person as drowning, something
that can happen whether they are close to the surface or far below the
waves, making it irrelevant how close they are to being virtuous: The
Stoics say,
But just as in the sea the man an arm’s length from the surface
is drowning no less than the one who has sunk five hundred
fathoms, so even those who are getting close to virtue are no
6. See Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 199.16–sa18 (SVF 3.568, LS 61N).
7. See De divinatione 2.61.
8. See Becker (1998), pp. 119–126; Brouwer (2014), ch. 3; Jedan (2011), ch. 4;
Long (1986), pp. 204–205; Sandbach (1975), p. 28; and Zeller (1880), pp. 266-
270.
9. See Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 7.127 (SVF 3.40, LS 61I).
philosophers’ imprint
Stoic Virtue
less in a state of vice than those who are far from it.10
Cicero compares being in a state of vice to being blind, saying that just
as “a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one
just born”, likewise the person about to attain virtue remains vicious.11
Similarly, Chrysippus argues that those who are closer to virtue are
nevertheless vicious, as the traveler who “is a hundred furlongs from
Canopus, and the man who is only one, are both equally not in Cano-
pus.”12 It is thus generally agreed that, in addition to Perfect Virtue,
the Stoics endorsed Bivalence:13
(2) Bivalence – Everyone is either virtuous or vicious.
With Bivalence, the Stoics held that there is no one that is not either
virtuous or vicious. There are no vague cases – anyone who is not
virtuous is vicious. When we combine Bivalence with Perfect Virtue
though, it follows that everyone who is not perfectly virtuous is vicious.
If it was counterintuitive to accept Perfect Virtue, then even more so
the combination of the two. Not only are the Stoics committed to the
rarity of the sage, but they are also committed to thinking that almost
everyone who has ever lived is vicious.
1.2 Concerns about Stoic Virtue
The combination of Perfect Virtue and Bivalence might seem to make
the Stoic position on virtue practically a non-starter.14 Should we really
think that almost everyone is vicious? Critics of the Stoic account of
virtue have pressed a number of objections that are thought to conclu-
sively show that the Stoic rhetoric about virtue was just that, rhetoric.
10. See Plutarch, De communibus notitiis 1063A–B (SVF 3.539, LS 61T).
11. See De Finibus 3.48 (SVF 3.530).
12. See Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 7.120 (SVF 3.527).
13. Contemporary commentators who attribute Bivalence to the Stoics include
Becker (1998), p. 119; Brouwer (2014), ch. 3; Sandbach (1975), p. 28; Sellars
(2003), p. 61; and Sharples (2014), p. 106.
14. Geert Roskam (2005) says rhetorically, “No doubt this view should not be
taken seriously” (p. 15.).
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 robert weston siscoe
The first of these considerations is that the Stoic account of virtue is
too demanding. Must a person really be perfectly virtuous in order to
be virtuous at all? Such a requirement seems quite unrealistic. After
all, most of us know several people we would call virtuous – virtuous
parents, virtuous mentors, and virtuous friends – and thus it appears
that the Stoic view cannot make sense of many of our applications of
‘virtuous’. Even though these people are not perfectly virtuous, it nev-
ertheless seems fitting to call them virtuous. The first problem, then,
with the Stoic view is that it does not seem to permit that ordinary
people are virtuous even though it seems completely appropriate to
describe them as such, a fact captured by Ordinary Virtue:
(3) Ordinary Virtue – It is appropriate to describe ordinary peo-
ple who are not completely virtuous as virtuous.
The Stoic view appears to be clearly out of step with Ordinary Virtue.
If hardly anyone is actually virtuous, then why would it be appropriate
to call our friends and neighbors virtuous? The Stoic account seems
clearly lacking in that it fails to capture this fact about our virtue talk.
One way to make sense of Ordinary Virtue is to argue that being
truly virtuous does not demand being perfectly virtuous. Contra the
Stoics, being virtuous could instead require something like being vir-
tuous enough. Christine Swanton provides just such an account, giving
the following analysis of virtue: “A virtue is a good quality of char-
acter, more specifically a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge,
items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way.”15
According to Swanton, whether or not the Athenian is virtuous de-
pends not on whether they are fully in accord with virtue, but whether
they are doing good enough given their situation. Dan Russell agrees,
contending that being virtuous enough is sufficient for being virtuous:
“It seems undeniable that being virtuous enough is a sufficient condi-
tion for being virtuous “tout court” – not perfectly virtuous or even
virtuous without qualification, but nonetheless virtuous in a genuine,
15. Swanton (2003), p. 19.
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“bona fide” sense.”16 On Dan Russell’s account, being virtuous enough
in a given situation is sufficient to be considered virtuous full stop – it
is not required that a person be perfectly virtuous to be called virtu-
ous. Thus, on Swanton’s and Russell’s accounts, even if perfect virtue
is unattainable, we can still make sense of why Ordinary Virtue is
true – we call our parents and friends virtuous because they are in fact
virtuous.
Another criticism of the Stoic conception of virtue is that it can-
not account for degrees of virtue. It is obvious that one person can be
more virtuous than another even if neither are perfectly virtuous, but
the strict Stoic doctrine that only the completely virtuous are virtuous
while the rest are vicious is too coarse-grained to capture this distinc-
tion, or so the charge goes. Julia Annas formulates this objection to the
Stoic view of virtue as follows:
[Being less than fully virtuous] would be troubling if we insisted
on a rigorist approach, such that a person either is virtuous or is
not virtuous at all. This would have the result that only the fully
virtuous person is virtuous, while none of us are virtuous at all.
This is in fact the Stoic position, but it is a very awkward one,
since it strictly allows for no difference between the mediocre
non-virtuous and the horrendously vicious non-virtuous.17
On Annas’s interpretation, Stoics cannot distinguish between the mod-
erately and the extremely vicious. Anything that falls short of perfect
virtue is vice, making the Stoic view incapable of making finer-grained
judgments about the level of virtue and vice in each person. For this
reason, Stoics are saddled with judging that the occasionally dishon-
est are just as bad as pathological liars, labeling both simply as falling
short of the virtue of honesty. This view, Annas says, “allows for no
difference between the mediocre non-virtuous and the horrendously
vicious non-virtuous,” making the Stoic opinion quite out of keeping
16. Russell (2009), p. 112.
17. Annas (2011), p. 65.
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with commonsense notions of virtue.
Lawrence Becker takes the same perspective, arguing that the Stoic
take on virtue is powerless to say that anyone who falls short of virtue
is more virtuous than another. On Becker’s understanding, because
Stoic virtue is so binary, ordinary citizens are just as vicious as serial
killers:
Virtue is the only good, and it is an all-or-nothing affair. No
one who falls short of being a sage has any trait that can be
called good at all, nor can one such person be any better or
more virtuous than another. There are sages, and then there are
the rest of us. Sages are equally virtuous; the rest of us (serial
killers and mild-mannered reporters, mass murderers and their
innocent victims) are all equally vicious.18
Becker argues that, because the Stoics endorse a strict reading of virtue
that labels only the sage as virtuous, it is not possible to draw any
distinctions between non-sages. If this is right though, then surely the
Stoics were mistaken about virtue. Everyday people are more virtuous
than mass murderers, so much the worse for any theory of virtue that
says otherwise. Let’s call this fact about virtue that Stoicism fails to
capture Comparative Virtue:
(4) Comparative Virtue – For two persons that both fall short of
perfect virtue, it is possible for one of them to be more virtuous
than the other.
Like with Annas’s criticism, Comparative Virtue is an indictment of
Stoic virtue for failing to capture the range of virtue ascriptions that
we make. We can and do say that there are ordinary folks who are
more or less virtuous, and insofar as the Stoic doctrine cannot make
sense of this, it fails to capture our standard concept of virtue.
The final criticism of Stoic virtue that we will look at is that it
cannot account for moral progress. By the Stoic’s own lights, moral
18. Becker (1998), p. 118.
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progress is possible. Plutarch and Stobaeus both attest to the Stoic en-
dorsement of the man who makes moral progress, the prokoptôn.19 Ac-
cording to Cicero, Cato the Younger characterizes the prokoptôn as ad-
vancing through five distinct moral stages, the final step being the one
that takes the prokoptôn from vice to virtue.20 The Stoics, then, believe
in the potential of Moral Progress, even when a particular prokoptôn
has not yet become morally perfect:
(5) Moral Progress – It is possible to make moral progress with-
out becoming perfectly virtuous.
The difficulty with Moral Progress, however, is how to conceptually
locate its possibility within the Stoic framework. If all non-sages are
vicious, how can we describe the movement towards virtue?
Many commentators maintain that the prokoptôn endorsed by the
Stoics is ultimately paradoxical. Dirk Baltzly, for instance, says that the
Stoics cannot be literally interpreted as endorsing Moral Progress:
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as moral progress for the
Stoics (if that means progress within morality), and they give the
charming illustration of drowning to make their point: a person
an arm’s length from the surface is drowning every bit as surely
as one who is five hundred fathoms down.21
On Baltzly’s reading, the Stoics should not be thought of as arguing
for progress in virtue since there is no such thing – anyone who is not
virtuous is vicious. F.H. Sandbach agrees, concluding that the Stoics
could not seriously have endorsed Moral Progress since it creates a
paradox with their other views:
Although the Stoics defended the paradox, it may be doubted
whether they took it very seriously. Perhaps a more effective en-
19. See Plutarch, De Profectibus in Virtute 75C (SVF 3.539, LS 61S) and Stobaeus,
Florilegium 4.22 (SVF 3.510).
20. See De Finibus 3.20 (SVF 3.188, LS 59D).
21. See Baltzly (2018).
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couragement to effort was provided by the figure of the man
‘making an advance’ (prokoptôn), still involved in the waters of
wickedness, but making his way towards the surface. Critics
claimed that he was inconsistent with the paradox, and to com-
mon sense he is.22
Sandbach’s understanding is that taking someone to grow in virtue,
moving his way towards the water’s surface, was not conceivable on
the Stoic view. Using such language may have helped the cause of
virtue, since it might have encouraged people to make moral progress,
but Sandbach doubts that this can be made compatible with the other
Stoic commitments.
2. Gradable Adjectives: Relative and Absolute
We can now see the burden of proof that is on the defender of Stoic
virtue. The advocate of the Stoic account of virtue must find a way to
capture (1)–(5). One way to make sense of (1)–(5) would be to say that
only some of these claims are true and offer an error theory for the
remainder. Such an account might endorse Perfect Virtue, Bivalence,
and Moral Progress, for instance, and explain why we mistakenly be-
lieve Ordinary Virtue and Comparative Virtue. An even stronger re-
sponse, however, would be to propose a strategy that vindicates all of
(1)–(5), showing that Stoic virtue has nothing to fear from the stock
objections offered by Stoic critics. This latter response is what I will
aim for in this paper. I will argue that understanding virtue terms as
absolute gradable adjectives allows the Stoic interpreter to accept (1)–
(5) as true, making Stoic virtue capable of answering its most pressing
objections. However, before I make the case that virtue-theoretic adjec-
tives are plausibly thought to be absolute gradable adjectives, I must
first introduce the distinction between relative and absolute gradable
adjectives.
22. See Sandbach (1975), p. 45. Other commentators that take issue with Moral
Progress include Roskam (2005), pp. 23–25.
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2.1 Relative Gradable Adjectives
The orthodox view of gradable adjectives is that they come in two va-
rieties, relative gradable adjectives and absolute gradable adjectives,
henceforth RAs and AAs.23 Relative gradable adjectives, such as ‘tall’,
‘large’, ‘long’, and ‘expensive’, are characterized by an underlying de-
gree scale on which objects in the domain fall.24 Because this scale
imposes an ordering, uses of comparative constructions are then true
and false depending on whether they mirror this underlying structure.
For example, (6) is true just in case John has a greater degree of height
than Harry:
(6) John is taller than Harry.
This ordering, however, is not all that goes into determining whether
(7) is true:
(7) John is tall.
The truth of (7) also depends on a threshold on the underlying scale. If
the degree of John’s height is clearly greater than the threshold, then
(7) is true, and if the degree of his height is clearly lower, then (7) is
false.25 As previously mentioned, the threshold in question is contex-
23. This distinction is due to Kennedy (2007), Kennedy and McNally (2005),
Rusiecki (1985), and Unger (1975). The characteristics of absolute gradable ad-
jectives have also been studied by Rotstein and Winter (2004), though their
focus was on the distinction between partial and total gradable adjectives.
24. Though the scale approach of Cresswell (1977), Heim (2000), Kennedy
(2007), and von Stechow (1984) has been the most influential, the primary com-
petitor is a view on which the extension of a gradable adjective displays con-
textual shifts with the basis for comparatives being quantifications over pos-
sible precisifications of the adjective’s extension, a view whose development
runs through Fine (1975), Kamp (1975), Klein (1980), Larson (1988), and Pinkal
(1995). The scale view holds a distinct advantage though in explaining the dis-
tinction between relative and absolute adjectives (Kennedy, 2007).
25. With talk of degrees that are clearly lower or higher than the relevant thresh-
old, I am following Rotstein and Winter (2004), Kennedy (2007), and Kennedy
and McNally (2005) in holding that the extension of a relative gradable adjec-
tive includes those items that “stand out” relative to the contextual threshold
in order to accommodate the possibility of borderline cases. The view that
relative gradable adjectives have a contextual threshold, however, has a much
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tually determined. The degree of height which a primary school child
must possess to be considered tall is much lower than the degree that
a basketball player must possess.
The contextual thresholds of RAs can be adjusted to differentiate
between most individuals that differ to some degree on the underlying
scale.26 In a selection task with two heaps of sand, (8) is felicitous even
if the piles of sand are not particularly tall, so long as one is taller than
the other:
(8) Point to the tall one.
RAs thus have an accommodating contextual threshold in that it can
be adjusted to differentiate between most points on the underlying
degree scale. Relative gradable adjectives lose this feature, however,
at the extreme ends of the scale. If I am at a professional basketball
game looking at two players well above seven feet, or at a national
park admiring two very tall redwoods, (8) is infelicitous. This infelicity
demonstrates that, though RAs can be used to distinguish between
objects that fall in the middle of their degree scales, their contextual
thresholds cannot always be adjusted to differentiate between objects
that fall on the extreme ends of the degree scale.
Another feature of relative gradable adjectives is that they always
give rise to Sorites paradoxes. With ‘tall’, the paradox gets going with
(9):
(9) For whatever height you are, one inch of height does not
change whether you are tall or not.
The trouble of course is created by the fact that (9) seems true. This can
be explained by the fact that RAs cannot be used to pick out a max-
imally specific degree on the underlying scale. As previously noted,
longer history. See Barker (2002), Bartsch and Vennemann (1972), Bierwisch
(1989), Cresswell (1977), Fine (1975), Kamp (1975), Klein (1980), Lewis (1970),
Pinkal (1995), Sapir (1944), von Stechow (1984), and Wheeler (1972).
26. See Kennedy (2007), Kyburg and Morreau (2000), Sedivy et al. (1999), and
Syrett et al. (2006 and 2010).
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an object falls with the extension of an RA like ‘tall’ if it possesses a
degree of height that is clearly greater than the relevant threshold, a
description meant to accommodate for borderline cases. Even though
there are basketball players who are obviously tall and others who are
not, there are others that it is unclear whether they should be classified
as tall or short, and it may even seem right to say that they are neither.
This vagueness makes it such that (9) is intuitively correct, leading to
the Sorites.27
2.2 Absolute Gradable Adjectives: Total and Partial
Absolute gradable adjectives include ‘dry’, ‘straight’, ‘pure’, and
‘empty’. Like relative gradable adjectives, absolute gradable adjectives
can be used in comparatives. Every eligible object in the domain is as-
signed a certain degree on the underlying scale, making (10) true so
long as the mug is filled to a greater degree than the cup:
(10) The cup is emptier than the mug.
Furthermore, just as with RAs, this degree scale is not all that goes into
determining whether (11) is true:
(11) The cup is empty.
The accuracy of (11) depends on whether the fullness of the cup falls
within a certain range. Unlike with RAs, however, this range cannot
be characterized as a contextual threshold that can be adjusted simply
by distinguishing between two points on the degree scale. Supposing
that the mug is three quarters full and the cup only halfway, (10) is still
true, but the following command is infelicitious:
(12) #Point to the empty one.
AAs thus do not have thresholds that are contextually accommodating
27. For evaluations of what types of semantic accounts of gradable adjectives
can diagnose the existence of borderline cases and the Sorites paradox, see
Graff Fara (2000), Kennedy (2007), Pinkal (1995), and Rusiecki (1985).
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as do RAs.28
The infelicity of (12) in the above case may seem analogous to the
case of the tall basketball players or the tall redwoods. Why not say
that, just like with RAs, there are parts of the scale that a contextual
threshold cannot distinguish between? What separates the infelicity of
(8) from the infelicity of (12) is that, in the former case, the infelicity oc-
curs with two objects that are at the scale’s extreme, while in the latter
case, the infelicity occurs with objects in the middle of the scale. The
cups are three quarters and half full, whereas both basketball players,
and both trees, are very tall. This asymmetry is reinforced by the fact
that, while RAs cannot be used to differentiate between objects on the
extreme end of a scale, AAs can. Consider, for instance, a cup that is
completely empty and a mug that has a swallow of liquid left. In such
a case, both (10) and (12) are felicitous. RAs and AAs thus differ in
the following way: RAs can be used to distinguish between objects in
the middle of a scale but not at the scale’s extreme, while uses of AAs
cannot distinguish between objects in the middle of the scale, but can
at the end of the scale.
Because absolute gradable adjectives do not possess a threshold
that is contextually flexible in the same way as relative gradable adjec-
tives, there are cases in which they do not give rise to Sorites paradoxes.
If the cup has exactly one ounce of liquid in it and is for that reason
not empty, there is no temptation to accept a sentence like (13), which
is essential for the paradox to get started:
(13) For however full a container is, one ounce of liquid does not
change whether it is empty or not.
If the cup has exactly one ounce of liquid in it, taking away that ounce
of water makes it true that the cup is empty, making (13), the first step
along the route to the paradoxical result, clearly false. This is because
there is a clear cutoff point for the distinction between empty and not
28. See Kennedy (2007), Kyburg and Morreau (2000), Sedivy et al. (1999), and
Syrett et al. (2006 and 2010).
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empty. With ‘tall’, it is not clear at what point adding one inch of height
will take someone from not being tall to being tall, but in the case of
the empty glass, it is clear when taking away another ounce of liquid
will make it empty.29
Absolute gradable adjectives come in two forms: total and partial.
Total AAs require the absence of a particular property. A dry table
is not wet to any degree, a straight line is not at all bent, and pure
gold does not contain any impurities. The truth of partial AAs, on
the other hand, requires only that objects possess a minimal degree
of the property described. A table is wet if it has even a small degree
of wetness, a line is bent if it is just under one hundred and eighty
degrees, and gold is impure if it contains some amount of impurity.30
AAs often come in pairs – wet and dry, bent and straight, impure and
pure, open and closed – with one of the pairs behaving as a total AA
and the other a partial AA. This is the case so long as the AAs in
question are contradictories. ‘Wet’, for instance, is synonymous with
‘not dry’, and ‘dry’ with ‘not wet’, yielding the result that ‘wet’ and
‘dry’ are a total/partial pair. ‘Empty’ and ‘full’, on the other hand, are
not contradictories in that ‘empty’ does not simply mean ‘not full’, so
‘empty’ and ‘full’ do not form a total/partial pair. ‘Empty’ and ‘full’
are, in fact, both total AAs, as both can create failures in the “point to”
selection test.
Even though many uses of total AAs require the absence of a partic-
ular property, it is possible to create a context in which approximations
are also considered to satisfy sentences attributing total AAs. It can be
acceptable to say that a table is dry even if is slightly damp when the
purpose is to cover the table with a tablecloth that you do not want to
get soaking wet. Similarly, it can be acceptable to say that a glass is full
29. The fact that Sorites-paradoxical results disappear in some cases with AAs
has been noted by Burnett (2014), Kennedy (2007), and Pinkal (1995).
30. For more on the distinction between total and partial absolute adjectives,
see Burnett (2014), Cruse (1986), Kennedy (2007), Rotstein and Winter (2004),
and Yoon (1996). Kamp and Rossdeutscher (1994) entertain the distinction as
well, but under the description of a distinction between universal and existen-
tial adjectives.
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even if it could be slightly more full than it is. Total AAs can thus give
rise to Sorites paradoxes in such contexts. Does adding one more drop
of water change whether the table is dry or not? Does taking away a
drop of water prevent the cup from being full? Negations of partial
AAs exhibit the same characteristic, as ‘not bent’, ‘not wet’, and ‘not
impure’ behave like total AAs. Absolute gradable adjectives that do
not give rise to the Sorites in any context are partial AAs and the nega-
tions of total AAs. Because partial AAs require that an object possess a
minimal degree of the property in question, objects that possess none
of the property will then falsify the crucial premise of the Sorites:
(14) For however wet a table is, taking away one drop of water
will not make it dry.
If there is only a single drop of water on the table, then (14) will be false
of that table. Likewise, since negations of total AAs are synonymous
with partial AAs, negations of total AAs also do not give rise to Sorites
paradoxes.31 The lack of Sorites-paradoxical results for partial AAs and
negations of total AAs is associated with the presence of a top-closed or
bottom-closed scale. A table can be maximally dry, and thus ‘wet’ does
not give rise to a Sorites, whereas, for the RA ‘tall’, it is not possible
to be maximally tall. For however tall you are, it is always possible to
possess a degree more height. Because ‘tall’ has an open scale, ‘not tall’
gives way to the Sorites just as easily as ‘tall’ does.
2.3 Vagueness and Imprecision
How should we characterize the contextual variation allowed by AAs?
Why under some circumstances can the use of an AA still lead to a
Sorites paradox? The difference between the contextual variation in
RAs and AAs is best understood as the distinction between vagueness
and imprecision.32 The guiding thought with imprecision is that a par-
31. For more on the Sorites and absolute gradable adjectives, see Burnett (2014)
and Kennedy (2007).
32. For more on the distinction generally, see Krifka (2002 and 2007), Lakoff
(1973), Sadock (1977), and Sauerland and Stateva (2007). For the distinction as
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ticular point plays a central role in the meaning of the term used. For
instance, if it is said that Mary arrived at three o’clock, the precise time
three o’clock plays a crucial role in the meaning of the sentence. Such
a statement could be made imprecisely, if Mary arrived at 2:58 or 3:02,
for instance, but this does not undermine the thought that precisely
3:00 constrains the meaning of the assertion. With gradable adjectives,
the maximal or minimal points on the scale play a central role in the
meaning of AAs. A glass that is completely full counts as full in any
context, but when the standards of ‘full’ are relaxed, this is not due to a
contextually determined threshold, as with RAs, but merely imprecise
uses of ‘full’, a term which depends for its meaning on maximal full-
ness. When the standards are thus relaxed and a degree or so below
complete fullness counts as full, then it is unclear at what lesser degree
of fullness a glass stops counting as full due to the imprecision.
A test to distinguish between vague and imprecise predicates is
whether the gradable adjective in question allows for natural precisi-
fication. The meanings of vague terms can only be precisified by in-
troducing stipulative definitions, whereas with imprecise terms, natu-
ral language contexts can independently precisify the term. With im-
precise AAs, contexts can be established in which only the maximal
degree satisfies the standards. Even though a sports stadium can be
described as empty on a day of low attendance, nothing but complete
emptiness will be under consideration when a construction boss over-
seeing the demolition of the stadium inquires whether it is empty. It is
also possible to eliminate borderline cases from consideration. Twenty-
two karat gold only permits impurities to eight percent, but a jeweler
may establish a higher standard for ‘pure’ with a use of (15):
(15) The gold for the rings needs to be pure, but this gold is
twenty-two karat, so it will not do.
Similarly, if a surface is being used for an experiment and needs to be
so dry that it has no water molecules on it at all, a scientist can use
it relates to absolute gradable adjectives, see Pinkal (1995) and Kennedy (2007).
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‘dry’ to pick out this property:
(16) The table needs to be dry, but the surface still has a few
stray water molecules, so it will not do.
Vague RAs, however, allow no such precifications. Not only do RAs not
have closed scales, thus not allowing for precisification to a maximal or
minimal degree, but strict cutoffs cannot be created either. The world
record height for a redwood tree is 380 feet. A forester that is looking
for tall trees cannot create a cutoff for ‘tall’ by a use of (17):
(17) #I’m looking for tall redwoods, but this one is 375 feet tall
so it will not do.
Thus, RAs cannot be naturally precisified, while AAs can, securing that
uses of RAs can be vague while uses of AAs can be imprecise.
The fact that AAs accept natural precisification and RAs do not can
also be demonstrated by answers to queries. If before the demolition of
the stadium, the construction foreman asks the owner of the stadium
whether it is empty, the owner is untruthful if they say (18) when there
is only one person left in the stadium:
(18) The stadium is empty.
For the purposes of demolition, only a completely empty stadium will
do, and therefore ‘empty’ is precisified to mean no people whatsoever.
The same cannot, however, occur with an RA like ‘tall’. Suppose that
a record-hunter heads to the national park looking for a record-setting
redwood. Even though the park does not have any trees over 380 feet,
the forester cannot for this reason truthfully say (19):
(19) The park does not have any tall redwoods.
Even though the purpose of the conversation is finding a record-setting
redwood, this does not precisify the meaning of ‘tall’ up to any red-
woods that are record-setting. The key difference then between vague
and imprecise adjectives is that imprecise adjectives can be made more
precise, possibly even establishing strict cutoffs, while vague adjectives
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cannot.
Assaf Toledo and Galit Sassoon argue that the orthodox view is
wrong to think that absolute gradable adjectives are used imprecisely.
They present contrasts of total AAs that they claim tell against the
standard account:
(20) This kitchen knife is clean.
(21) This surgical instrument is clean.
(22) This child’s shirt is dirty.
(23) This tuxedo is dirty.
If total AAs are used to picked out the maximal element on the un-
derlying scale, then why are uses of (20) and (22) acceptable in cases
of cleanliness and dirtiness that are less stringent than is required for
uses of (21) and (23)? This extends to other examples as well – why
do we not hesitate, for instance, to say wine glasses are full when they
are only filled halfway?33 According to Toledo and Sassoon, such cases
show that the interpretation of AAs cannot just depend on the maxi-
mal element in the scale. Rather, other factors must be considered as
well, like the type of object of which they are being ascribed, gener-
ating shifting standards when applied to kitchen knives and surgical
instruments.
Despite the contentions of Toledo and Sassoon, these examples do
not show that the standard view is inadequate. All of their examples
can be predicted by the orthodox account as acceptable imprecise uses.
Imprecise uses are acceptable whenever the property they pick out is
good enough for the practical purposes at hand. In the case of kitchen
knives and surgical instruments, the characteristic use of the latter
requires much more so far as cleanliness is concerned, so the stan-
dards for uses of (21) are more demanding than uses of (20). Likewise,
tuxedo’s are worn in circumstances where being spotlessly clean is the
norm, so acceptable uses of (23) require less dirt than those of (22).
33. See Toledo and Sassoon (2011). They borrow the wine glass example from
McNally (2011).
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What about wine glasses? The standard view predicts that if it is per-
missible to ascribe fullness to a wine glass when it is not maximally
full, this is because there is some practical goal that can be satisfied
by wine glasses that are less than completely full. This prediction is
confirmed – amongst wine connoiseurs it is common knowledge that
a wine glass is only filled halfway in order to allow the wine to be
properly aerated, the same purpose for which wine decanters are used.
Having room to swirl the glass allows the aroma of the wine to be re-
leased.34 Thus, there is a practical purpose at play when half-full wine
glasses are described as full, allowing such data to be captured by the
orthodox account.
3. The Stoics and Absolute Gradable Adjectives
The distinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives can
help us make headway on how to understand the Stoic claims about
virtue. In particular, by taking virtue-theoretic terms to be absolute
gradable adjectives, we can offer a perspective that secures the truth
of (1)–(5). This is not to say that this is how any particular Stoic au-
thor would have responded to these issues – as previously stated, this
paper is not meant to be a historical reconstruction of the Stoic posi-
tion. Rather, my aim will be to show that understanding virtue terms
as AAs is consonant with many Stoic commitments and that it can
respond to some of Stoicism’s most serious criticisms.
3.1 Simplicius on Tenors and Characters
The first connection that suggests virtue terms should be interpreted as
absolute gradable adjectives is the Stoic claim that the virtues ought to
be thought of as “characters” (diathesis) rather than “tenors” (hexis).35
34. See Fox (2011) and McCarthy and Mulligan (2015).
35. Long and Sedley translate diathesis as ‘character’ and hexis as ‘tenor’,
whereas Barry Fleet’s (2002) translation of Simplicius renders diathesis as ‘con-
dition’ and hexis as ‘state’. Because the Long and Sedley translation is used
most often, I will stick with the language of tenors and characters.
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Aristotle took the virtues to be tenors,36 but the consensus is that Stoics
chose instead to conceptualize the virtues differently, equating them
with characters. This is the terminology that both Plutarch and Dio-
genes use in characterizing the Stoic position:
Plutarch – All these [Stoics, Menedemus of Eretria, Aristo of
Chios, Zeno of Citium, and Chrysippus] agree in taking virtue
to be a certain character (diathesis) and power of the soul’s
commanding-faculty37
Diogenes Laertius – Virtue is a consistent character (diathesis),
choiceworthy for its own sake and not from fear or hope or any-
thing external38
Not only do both Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius summarize the Stoic
position by saying that virtues are a sort of character (diathesis), but
Simplicius argues that this choice was motivated by the Stoic account
of virtue. In his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, Simplicius distin-
guishes between tenors (hexis) and characters (diathesis), arguing that
the Stoics understood the virtues as characters due to their lack of
gradability:
[The Stoics] say that tenors (hexis) can be intensified and relaxed,
but characters (diathesis) are not susceptible to intensification or
relaxation. So they call the straightness of a stick a character,
even though it is easily alterable since it can be bent. For the
straightness could not be relaxed or intensified, nor does it ad-
mit of more or less, and so it is a character. For the same reason
the virtues are characters, not because of their stable feature but
because they are not susceptible to intensification or increase.39
36. See Nicomachean Ethics 1105b25–26.
37. See De Virtute Morali 440E–441D (LS 61B).
38. See Vitae Philosophorum 7.89 (SVF 3.39, LS 61A).
39. See Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 237.25-238.20 (SVF 2.393, LS 47S).
For more on the Stoic choice to take virtues as tenors (diathesis), see Jedan
(2011), pp. 59-60, and Rist (1977), p. 3.
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 robert weston siscoe
For the Stoics, characters are states that are non-scalar; either a char-
acter can be attributed to an object or it cannot. The model is that of
straightness – a rod is either straight or bent, there is no in between.
Diogenes Laertius also attributes the model of straightness to the Sto-
ics: “For as [the Stoics] say, a stick must be either straight or crooked,
so a man must be either just or unjust, but not either more just or more
unjust, and likewise with the other virtues.”40 The virtues then are also
characters.41 Just like a stick is either straight or bent, a person is either
virtuous or vicious. The Stoics thus rejected the Aristotelian view that
the virtues are tenors, classifying them instead as characters.42
3.2 Virtues as Absolute Gradable Adjectives
For our purposes, Simplicius and Diogenes Laertius picked an apt com-
parison – we have already seen that ‘straight’ is an absolute gradable
adjective, and so it makes sense to use this example to distinguish
between hexis and diathesis. As it turns out, the distinction between
40. See Vitae Philosophorum, 7.127 (SVF 3.40, LS 61I).
41. The Stoic rejection of the virtues as hexis also might have been due to a
slightly different understanding of these terms than Aristotle. Simplicius (238.2-
238.32) notes that the Stoics applied hexis to a number of concepts that Aristotle
would have characterized as diathesis, introducing the possibility that Aristotle
and the Stoics diverged on the precise meanings of these terms. What is impor-
tant for the current interpretation of the Stoics though is how they understood
the contrast between hexis and diathesis, even if this is not a view shared by
Aristotle.
42. One potential difficulty with this understanding of the Stoics is Stobaeus’s
position that the virtues are tenors (hexis), a view he articulates both explicitly
(SVF 3.104, LS 60L) and by arguing that virtue can be characterized as episteme
(SVF 3.280, LS 61D) combined with taking episteme to be a hexis (SVF 3.112,
LS 41H). Long and Sedley recognize this difficulty, arguing that general tenors
must be differentiated from mere tenors. The former is just any kind of state, a
genus of which characters is a species. On this general understanding of tenor,
character is a type of tenor but one that does not admit of degrees. The latter
classification, mere tenors, applies to states that do admit of degrees (Long
and Sedley, 1987, p. 376). As applied to the challenge in interpreting Stobaeus,
both virtue and episteme can be general tenors without contradicting the view
that the virtues are also characters, but the virtues are not mere tenors. Thank
you to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to address these textual
difficulties in Stobaeus.
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tenors and characters maps onto the distinction between RAs and AAs.
In both cases, the difference is that the latter possesses an importantly
non-scalar component.43 The Stoics chosen linguistic model for virtues,
‘straight’, is clearly an AA. Given the similarity between characters and
properties picked out by AAs, is it possible to also interpret virtue
terms as absolute gradable adjectives? We can begin by observing that
virtue-theoretic adjectives, including the generic ‘virtuous’ along with
the more specific ‘honest’ and ‘courageous’, are clearly gradable. They
function felicitously both in comparatives and with degree modifiers:
(24) Mary is more virtuous/honest/courageous than John.
(25) Mary is very virtuous/honest/courageous, the most virtu-
ous/honest/courageous person I know.
Virtue terms are obviously gradable adjectives, but a gradable adjec-
tives of what stripe? Absolute or relative? Total or partial? Can virtue
terms be modeled on an absolute gradable adjective like ‘straight’, or
is their behavior rather more similar to a relative gradable adjective
like ‘tall’?
It is helpful here to note that virtue-theoretic adjectives modify a
wide range of object types. Our discussion will focus on persons and
actions, the relevant objects of appraisal within ethics. In both cases,
virtue-theoretic adjectives function like total AAs in “point to” tests,
both in the middle of and at the extremes of the underlying scales.
Tests with objects in the middle of the underlying scale do not allow
differentiation. If John has lied three times today and Mary only two,
even though an honesty comparative like (24) is acceptable, the follow-
ing command is infelicitous:
(26) #Point to the honest/virtuous person.
Tests at the extreme end of the scale, however, do allow such distinc-
tions. Consider if Mary has told no lies and John one. Not only is the
43. Just as AAs are a species of gradable adjectives, Long and Sedley (1987)
classify tenors as a species of enduring state (p. 376).
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 robert weston siscoe Stoic Virtue

honesty comparative (24) felicitous in such a scenario, but the com- (30) For however dishonest a person is, the disposition to tell
mand (26) is as well. The same holds true for assessments of actions. one less lie will not make them honest.
If John hid in his foxhole but Mary managed to will herself out of the
With (30), we are not simply altering the manifestations of the person’s
trench, a use of (27) is true. However, if Mary subsequently cowers
dispositions, but whether they have the disposition altogether. Chang-
at the gate of the enemy stronghold, despite the fact that she is more
ing a person from being disposed to tell a lie in a particular scenario to
courageous, (28) is infelicitous:
no longer being so disposed can thus change whether or not they are
(27) Mary’s action was more courageous than John’s. honest.
(28) #Point to the person whose war effort was courageous. Further confirming that virtue terms are total AAs is the fact that
virtue talk is subject to natural precisification. Virtue terms are some-
Had Mary stormed the gates though, not only would (27) have been
times used to rule out those that are quite vicious. If a job candidate
true, but (28) would have been an acceptable request as well. Virtue-
lies on an application, a manager could refuse to consider them with a
theoretic terms thus display the same asymmetry that total AAs do
use of (31):
with RAs in that they cannot be used to distinguish objects in the mid-
dle of the scale but can be used to do so at the scale’s extreme. (31) We need someone who is honest.
Because the scale of virtue has a maximal element, uses of virtue-
On other occasions though, virtue language can be used to rule out
theoretic adjectives also do not always create Sorites marches. For ex-
those that are vicious even to a small degree. Suppose that an intelli-
ample, (29) is clearly false when considering the difference between
gence agency is hiring a spy and, in the course of their interview, even
telling one lie or none at all:
though they do not lie, they nevertheless fail to divulge one of their
(29) For however dishonest a person is, telling one less lie will previous marriages. Intelligence staff may move on from the candidate
not make them honest. with a use of (31) even though the candidate is very honest, a much
stronger standard than someone who outright lies on their application.
It is possible that, for a person who has told one lie, having told one
The case for virtue terms being total absolute gradable adjectives
less lie will make them honest. An important issue to note is that being
is thus fairly strong. One way to develop the Stoic account of virtue
an honest person, and a virtuous person more generally, is not just
then is by taking virtue-theoretic adjectives to be AAs, uniting the
grounded in particular actions. Virtues are dispositions, and as such,
Stoic model of ‘straight’ and virtue terms under one semantic kind.
they can fail to manifest due to the absence of triggering conditions
Another reason to think that this reading does not do too much vio-
or be masked when such conditions obtain. A dishonest person can
lence to the Stoic view is their treatment of the virtues and vagueness.
therefore have told no lies at all due to their unmanifested disposition
Even though the Stoics were one of the earliest sources to consider the
to be dishonest. On this understanding, it is no surprise that (29) comes
Sorites paradox, they never entertained the thought that virtue terms
out false. In this case, it is not false because virtue terms do not always
could give rise to a Sorites. Instead, there is an obvious cutoff in cases
lead to the Sorites, but because a dishonest person is not made honest
of virtue. In considering Chrysippus’s exploration of Sorites-type argu-
by having told one less lie. To account for this, we can alter (29) as
ments, Susanne Bobzien points out that virtue was not something that
follows:
Chrysippus took to create a Sorites march:

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 robert weston siscoe
“In the case of Stoic virtue, there is no such pattern. Rather,
virtue is a limit. Once something is a heap, it can still grow from
a small heap to a bigger heap; once something counts as many,
it can grow from just many to very many, etc. But once some-
one has become virtuous, they have become fully, maximally,
perfectly, and most virtuous at that very time.”44
Thus, another point of agreement between the Stoic account of virtue
and understanding virtue terms to be AAs is that virtue terms do not
give rise to the Sorites.45
Because there are good arguments to think that virtue terms are nei-
ther contextually variable nor give rise to Sorites paradoxes, it is plausi-
ble that virtue terms are total AAs. This is not to deny that it is possible
to create a Sorites context with imprecise uses of ‘virtuous’. ‘Virtuous’
and ‘vicious’ are contradictories, and thus the total AA should be ca-
pable of generating the Sorites when used imprecisely. ‘Vicious’ is a
partial AA, as a set of actions that embody vice to even a small degree
are vicious, and ‘virtuous’ is total, for it is true of sets of actions that
possess virtue to a maximal degree. Sure enough, ‘virtuous’ does give
rise to Sorites-paradoxical results when used imprecisely. Consider a
case where a bank teller is described as virtuous even though he has
44. See Bobzien (2002), p. 227.
45. Due to the close connection between virtue and episteme outlined in Foot-
note 42, we might also expect that many epistemic traits are expressible
using absolute gradable adjectives. An interesting case study in this regard
is rationality. ‘Rational’ cannot be used with a contextually accommodating
threshold in the middle of its scale. Suppose that, upon looking out the
window and seeing no rain outside, Mary forms the belief that it is lightly
raining. John, on the other hand, forms the belief that it is not only cloudy
and raining, but also hailing. In such a case, even though Mary’s belief is
less irrational than John’s, the following is an infelicitous request:
#Point to the one who believed rationally.
Therefore, the unmarked form of ‘rational’ cannot be used to distinguish be-
tween beliefs in the middle of the underlying scale of rationality. It could well
be then that the Stoic view that virtue-theoretic adjectives are AAs also has ap-
plications within epistemology. For more on ‘rational’ as an AA, see my “Belief,
Rational and Justified,” (Forthcoming).
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Stoic Virtue
forged one check. Will adding one more forged check to his resume
make him vicious? Because it is not clear that one more illegal money
order would make him vicious, the crucial premise of the Sorites takes
hold. The partial AA, on the other hand, does not yield this result be-
cause it is associated with a strict cutoff. This is true of ‘vicious’, as a
believer who does not possess any degree of vice cannot be described
as vicious in any context.
4. Defending Stoic Virtue
In the last section, I made the case that taking virtue adjectives to be
absolute gradable adjectives is a promising development of the Stoic
account of virtue, uniting a number of Stoic commitments. In this sec-
tion, I will show that understanding virtue terms as AAs can also make
sense of (1)–(5). If virtue terms are absolute gradable adjectives, this
means that they track an underlying top-closed scale as represented in
Figure 1. To be virtuous is to reach the maximum point in the scale.
This makes sense of Perfect Virtue – just like with fullness, only those
who are at the top of the scale of can truly be called full or virtuous.
The scalar representation also helps make sense of Bivalence. Just like
every stick that is not straight is bent, everyone that is not virtuous falls
below the top degree in the scale, below the waves of the sea, and is for
that reason vicious. Taking virtue-theoretic terms as absolute gradable
adjectives can thus make sense of the basic Stoic picture of virtue.
Interpreting virtue adjectives as AAs also provides avenues of re-
sponse to the critics of Stoic virtue. Take Ordinary Virtue, for example.
As we have seen, AAs can be used imprecisely. When we say that a sta-
dium is empty on game day, we are not being as precise as when we
say that the stadium is empty for a demolition. The former application
of ‘empty’ is strictly false, but it is good enough for the practical inter-
ests at play. The stadium does not need to be entirely empty on game
day as it does when a deconstruction project is in the offing. This point
holds for the virtues as well. It is true to say that a person is honest
or courageous only if they are completely so. However, imprecise uses
of virtue-theoretic adjectives still have their place – such uses can have
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 robert weston siscoe
Figure 1: Absolute Virtue
practical value, like when making hiring decisions that do not require
someone who is completely honest. This allows the Stoics to make
sense of Ordinary Virtue, that we often describe those who are not
completely virtuous as virtuous. Even though such descriptions are
literally false, it is appropriate to describe them in this way because
we are often not concerned with perfect virtue on a day-to-day basis.
Nevertheless, a theory of virtue does not have to answer to merely im-
precise applications of a concept. The Stoics can maintain that only the
fully virtuous are truly virtuous even though we often use virtue terms
imprecisely.
What about Comparative Virtue? Even though total AAs only per-
mit application of the unmarked form at the top of the scale, they nev-
ertheless allow comparisons in the middle of the scale. With ‘straight’,
even though it is only true that a perfectly straight line is straight, it is
possible to make true comparative claims, like that rod A is straighter
than rod B. Likewise, with virtue terms, we have seen that it is pos-
sible to compare two individuals on the underlying scale associated
with the virtues. As we have seen, it is permissible to use virtue terms
in comparatives and with degree modifiers:
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Stoic Virtue
(32) Mary is more virtuous/honest/courageous than John.
(33) Mary is very virtuous/honest/courageous, the most virtu-
ous/honest/courageous person I know.
Even though neither Mary nor John are perfectly virtuous, (32) and
(33) are felicitous due to comparisons on the underlying scale. Thus,
despite the fact that neither Mary nor John can be truly described
using the unmarked form, comparing where individuals fall on the
underlying scale can make sense of Comparative Virtue.
Similarly, this underlying scale is what makes Moral Progress pos-
sible. Even though the prokoptôn only becomes virtuous after traversing
the final step on the scale, they were nevertheless making progress be-
fore they reached this final stage. These improvements did not change
their overall moral evaluation, they still remained vicious at each step,
but they nevertheless could satisfy Moral Progress before the last stage
in their moral development. Annas defends the Stoics on this point,
saying that, instead of talking about degrees of virtue, we can instead
speak in terms of degrees of moral progress:
The idea that there are no degrees of virtue does not mean that
there cannot be degrees of progress towards virtue. And the
Stoics do believe this, since they talk about the person who is
making progress in living better, the prokoptôn or ‘progressor’.
When you reorder your priorities and try to live up to your new
commitments, you are progressing towards virtue, and there can
certainly be degrees of that.46
According to Annas, if we understand the Stoics as advocating
progress towards virtue rather than progress within virtue, then it is
not inconsistent for them to hold Moral Progress along with their other
commitments. This progress, then, can proceed along the underlying
scale even though the change from vicious to virtuous only happens
at the final stage.
46. See Annas (2016).
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Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to give a contemporary interpretation capa-
ble of defending the Stoic account of virtue. By understanding virtue
terms as absolute gradable adjectives, Stoics can maintain that (1)–(5)
are all true, offering an updated defense of a view that is often thought
to be beyond the pale. This modest stance, that taking virtue terms as
AAs can help the Stoics respond to certain sorts of criticisms, is not to
say that the view offered in this paper is correct. My purpose in this
paper has been to show that, if we understand virtue terms as AAs,
there’s a contemporary interpretation of the Stoics that can offer re-
sponses to some of its most pressing criticisms. If we go a step further,
however, and agree that virtue terms are absolute gradable adjectives,
then this has a significant number of consequences for theorizing about
virtue.
If it is right to think of ‘virtuous’ as a total AA, then several philoso-
phers have missed the mark when theorizing about virtue. Take Ros-
alind Hursthouse, for example. Hursthouse holds that whether or not
a person is virtuous comes in degrees: “As I noted...whether or not
an adult definitely has a particular virtue is a matter of degree."47 On
Hursthouse’s view, whether or not a person possesses a certain virtue
comes in degrees. If the development of the Stoic view that is advanced
in this paper is correct, however, then Hursthouse is mistaken. Ob-
taining a particular virtue requires perfection, and those who do not
achieve this perfection do not properly possess the given virtue. Like-
wise, the contextual accounts of virtue offered by Swanton and Russell
are incompatible with a perfectionist understanding of virtue. If the
Stoics are correct, being virtuous is not simply a matter of being virtu-
ous enough, but being completely virtuous.48 Hursthouse’s, Swanton’s,
47. See Hursthouse (1999), p. 145.
48. Russell (2009) is an interesting case, as he anticipates several of the insights
offered in this paper. He notes that “thinking of virtue in terms of ideals is
required on account of the very sort of satis concept that virtue is” (p. 112).
Russell also notes that virtue-theoretic adjectives as well as adjectives like ‘full’
have thresholds that are fixed by practical purposes (p. 118), anticipating what
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Stoic Virtue
and Russell’s views are mistaken. A person cannot be virtuous if they
only respond to the circumstancess of life in a way that is good or vir-
tuous enough. If a person’s actions are only good enough or virtuous
to a high degree, then at best that person can satisfy a virtue predicate
that is used imprecisely.
Furthermore, if virtue-theoretic adjectives are AAs, then Diogenes
was right to have a pessimistic view on the prospect of virtuous Athe-
nians. The majority of the citizens of Athens harbored some degree
of vice, making most of them, if not all, vicious. Instead of taking
Diogenes to be unrealistic, however, and expecting too much of the
Athenians, we can see that his high standards captured the semantics
of virtue terms. Diogenes refused to go along with imprecise applica-
tions of virtue terms, instead insisting that they be used in accord with
their actual truth conditions. Far from being a madman, Diogenes saw
what only the Stoics have had the courage to maintain – virtue requires
moral perfection.4950
can be seen by identifying virtue-theoretic adjectives as absolute gradable ad-
jectives.
49. For applications of these ideas to positions within contemporary virtue
ethics, see my “The Demandingness of Virtue,” (Forthcoming).
50. For helpful discussion and input on this project, I am indebted to Maria
Altepeter, Julia Annas, Stew Cohen, Juan Comesana, Christopher Kennedy,
Daniel Nolan, Nathan Oakes, Jeremy Reid, Tristan Rogers, Jackie Sideris,
Joshua Stuchlik, Bjorn Wastvedt, Jonathan Weinberg, Sean Whitton, and two
anonymous reviewers from this journal.
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 robert weston siscoe
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451179
2012
HEA17210.1177/1363459312451179Moore et al.Health

Article

Health
17(2) 159­–173
Troubling stoicism: © The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission:
Sociocultural influences and sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1363459312451179
applications to health and hea.sagepub.com

illness behaviour

Andrew Moore, Janet Grime, Paul Campbell

and Jane Richardson
Keele University, UK

Abstract
In light of the ambiguity of meanings attributed to the concept of stoicism we
critically explore its use as a label to explain and describe health and illness behaviour,
juxtaposing the often negative portrayals of contemporary stoicism against its classical
and philosophical origins. By reflecting critically on the term ‘stoicism’, its application
and dimensionality, we show how the term has evolved from classical to contemporary
times in relation to changing context, and explore different understandings of the term
across medical and health literature. We attend to sociocultural factors that are seen
to influence the conceptualization of stoicism such as generational influences, gender
and geographies. We make the assertion that by applying the label of ‘stoicism’ as it is
known today, there is a danger of too readily accepting a term that masks particular
health behaviours while missing an array of sociological factors that are important to
how people deal with adversity arising from chronic health problems. We therefore
encourage further questioning of this term.

Keywords
ageing and life course, chronic pain, health, illness behaviour, sociocultural influences,
stoicism

Introduction
The word ‘stoicism’ is common in lay and academic parlance. In health literature it is used
to describe illness behaviour characterized by silent endurance and lack of emotion – often

Corresponding author:
Andrew Moore, Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre, Primary Care Sciences, Keele University,
Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, UK
Email: a.j.moore@cphc.keele.ac.uk
160 Health 17(2)

described as a ‘stiff upper lip’. The conceptualization of stoicism has been largely over-
looked in the sociology of health and illness, receiving most attention from behavioural
psychology researchers. Murray et al. (2008) and Pinnock et al. (1998) note this to be an
oversight, particularly in relation to its potential explanatory power in health, for exam-
ple, having a stoic attitude has been reported as one way in which older people cope with
the effects of chronic pain (Cairncross et al., 2007; Helme and Gibson, 1999). Such stoic
attitudes are seemingly defined by a reluctance to label symptoms as painful to others
and are commonly related to under-reporting of mild or weak pain. However, Helme and
Gibson (1999) suggest there is little to substantiate this view and assert that it is difficult
to estimate the extent to which stoicism, and other factors such as cautiousness and
misattribution may influence pain reporting in older people. The literature on how older
people cope with chronic pain provides relevant material for analysing the meaning and
use of the term stoicism and will be drawn upon extensively in this article.
In studies of pain perception, Helme and Gibson (1999) suggest that stoicism is more
prevalent at lower intensities of pain, resulting in the under-reporting of weak or mild
pain but less likely to affect reporting of moderate to severe pain. This implies that what-
ever it is that the authors call stoicism has its limits and that if the pain were more intense
then stoicism would not be evident. This may be so if the defining element of stoicism
were simply silence. Helme and Gibson (1999: 109, emphasis added) also refer to ‘stoi-
cism or alternatively a decreased willingness to label a sensation as painful’, which sug-
gests that ‘stoicism’ might not be the best descriptor of what they are observing.
Wagstaff and Rowledge (1995: 181) – who formulated the Liverpool Stoicism Scale –
defined the ‘modern concept of stoicism’ as a lack of emotional involvement and expres-
sion, and exercising emotional control or endurance. Their findings suggest there is some
support for the stereotypical view that men are more stoical than women and that stoical
people have a weaker emotional reaction to emotive stories and an unsympathetic atti-
tude towards other’s misfortune. The scale was not used again until Murray et al. (2008)
further investigated its validity, acknowledging that the scale uses a unidimensional or
reduced form of stoicism. Although the scale proved to be reliable, its unidimensionality
weakened the study.
Apart from the lack of evidence to support stoicism, there is also conflict over whether
it is a positive or negative trait (Murray et al., 2008; Spiers, 2006). This confounds the
problem of defining what stoicism has come to mean. For example, an undefined label
of ‘stoicism’ may be seen to mirror other kinds of coping methods (silence, distraction,
endurance, acceptance) which may be explained by social construct forces that have little
to do with stoicism. While there is evidence in the social, biomedical and health literature
to suggest that there are psychosocial, gender, geographical, economic and cultural dif-
ferences between people who display ‘stoicism’ and those who do not, the term is never
well defined which arguably leads to its misapplication (Bendelow, 1993; Bendelow and
Williams, 1995; Cairncross et al., 2007; Charmaz, 1983; Helme and Gibson, 1999;
Richardson, 2005; Sanders et al., 2002; Spiers, 2006).
In this article, we seek to reassess the sociological and psychological landscapes of
stoicism exploring how the term has been used in different ways at different times, par-
ticularly in relation to chronic persistent pain, such as pain associated with a long term
condition.
Moore et al. 161

The most common type of chronic pain is musculoskeletal pain, such as that associ-
ated with rheumatoid and osteoarthritis, and is the main cause of disability in later life
(World Health Organization, 2003). The treatments for chronic pain are complex (Blyth
et al., 2007; Gatchel et al., 2007). Because of the individual variations in the experience
of pain, a significant amount of attention has been given to psychological factors, most
notably the way in which individuals differ in ‘coping’ (Linton, 2000; Turk and Okifuji,
2002). However, a careful consideration of both psychological and sociological
approaches to health and illness are required to achieve a deeper understanding of illness
behaviour in relation to both chronic pain and illness in general. Illness behaviour is
defined here as ‘the ways in which people respond to bodily indications and the condi-
tions under which they come to view them as abnormal’ (Mechanic, 1986: 1).
Recently McCracken (2010: 420) discussed developments in psychological
approaches to pain and the adoption of more theoretically based and ‘contextually sensi-
tive’ methods. Being contextually sensitive requires a sociological approach to chronic
pain, that takes into account the historical context from which the construct emerged.
The origins of stoicism are important to our understanding of how its meaning has
changed over time.

The origins of stoicism

Stoicism originated in Greece. It was one of the most influential philosophical schools of
the Hellenistic period. Its founder Zeno, ‘the philosopher of Citium’, was born in the late
330s BC. He taught in the colonnade in Athens known as the Stoa Poikile or ‘Painted
Stoa’ from which the term derives (Erskine, 2000). Little contemporary evidence of
Zeno’s writings remains. While the main tenets of stoicism are well known today, it is not
possible to know whether these same tenets were also held by Zeno, and if so, how he
argued for them (Erskine, 2000). Despite this, it is taken that the two most important ele-
ments of Stoic philosophy were Reason (logos) and Nature (physis), evident in the Stoic
emphasis on emotional constraint and acting in harmony with nature.
Evans (2008) describes stoicism as a product of the era in which it developed. The
Greek city-states experienced tremendous upheaval as the Roman Empire sought to con-
quer them, and war and bloodshed made everyday life uncertain and brutal. Roman dic-
tators imposed their will on the people:

If the city-state fell, the true philosopher could maintain his equanimity, because he was not just
a citizen of Athens or Sparta, but a citizen of the universe, a Cosmopolitan. The universe, Stoics
believe, is governed by a universal law, which they called the Logos. When we cultivate
acceptance of change and indifference to externals, then we live in harmony with this divine
law. (Evans, 2008)

One of the core foundations of stoicism was to be free of the passions, which in ancient
times translated as anguish or suffering (Seddon, 2005) and today might be termed ‘emo-
tions in excess’. Thus, if the reason for silence is fear, anxiety, embarrassment or indig-
nity (emotions in excess) then stoicism is not the reason for silence, though silence may
be the face of how these emotions are presented outwardly. Seddon (2005) distinguishes
162 Health 17(2)

between these excess emotions or pathe (anguish and suffering), and the instinctive
physical reactions that accompany them (trembling or turning pale in the face of danger),
and the eupatheiai – literally the ‘good feelings’ – which are felt by the stoic sage:

Where the non-stoic experiences fear, pleasure and desire, the stoic experiences caution, joy
and wish. In this way, the stoic sage therefore enjoys apatheia, literally ‘freedom from passion’
or ‘freedom of spirit over the nervous excitability produced by the passions: steadiness and
imperturbability won through their mastery. (Emmet, 1966: 41)

We argue that it is this sense of mastery in conjunction with core principles, such as
mindfulness, and emotional control, which have been lost over time as the meaning of
stoicism has evolved.

Stoicism and the emotions

While contemporary definitions of stoicism suggest that it is wise to remain indifferent
to changes in fortune and to pleasure or pain, Edelstein (1966: 5) asserts that, ‘The Stoa
at no time endorsed a theory of indifferentism’ as there is a distinction between a thing
that is ‘good’ (virtue) and other things that are preferred or rejected. This distinction,
Edelstein asserts, is the very essence of stoicism; if things were without ‘value’ (a word
the Stoics invented) morality itself would be destroyed. Stoicism, defined as a lack of
emotional involvement and expression or the exercising of emotional control and endur-
ance (Wagstaff and Rowledge, 1995), acknowledges its deeper roots as a more devel-
oped philosophy based on rationality, reason and natural order. However, within
contemporary health literature, there seems to be a tendency to ascribe stoicism in a
rather limited and unidimensional manner to explain the element of silence and lack of
emotional response, without questioning the reason behind this behaviour. The philoso-
phy of stoicism incorporates much more than an apparent silent indifference. It is the
reason for silence that is the key.
As time has passed, the meaning of what it is to be stoical has changed. The label is
applied uncritically to those who do not complain, but can we really call this stoicism?
Before answering this question it is necessary to examine critically the psychosocial fac-
tors that have been linked to contemporary stoicism and health behaviour.

Age and generation

There is little acknowledgement of the sociocultural factors that play a role in the devel-
opment of ‘stoic attitudes’ and behaviour. Stoicism has been attributed to cohort effects,
where certain generations necessarily developed attitudes and practices in response to
the cultural, political and social economies of the time, in order to survive (Hofland,
1992; Kunkel and Williams, 1991; Murray et al., 2008). While stoicism is commonly
associated with older people (Yong et al., 2001), we suggest that because of this some
health behaviours are mistakenly or uncritically attributed to stoicism. There are a range
of sociocultural factors that influence this association.
Moore et al. 163

Older people may have grown up in a culture that more strongly valued attitudes of
stoicism, in relation to pain for example, such as the ‘war generations’ – the ‘Old
Americans’ – third-generation and American World War II veterans, who were shown by
Garro (1990) to have a tendency to hide their pain in the belief it was a sign of weakness.
Zborowski (1952) shows that cultural influences are evident in different ethnic American
populations, such as the Protestant ‘Old Americans’ who encouraged their children not
to complain and to expect pain in sports and games. This was in contrast to the Italian and
Jewish Americans who were more protective of their children. Such attitudes may be
termed ‘stoical’ in hindsight, but as Helman (2000: 135) suggests many of Zborowski’s
findings are ‘no longer relevant to patient populations in the USA from any of these cul-
tural or religious backgrounds’. While this suggests that cultural responses to chronic
pain may be characteristic of generations, Helman notes Kleinman et al.’s (1992) warn-
ing against using ethnic stereotypes, emphasizing the acknowledgement of an individu-
al’s personal story, their community, historical time and their own beliefs and outlook.
The thrust of this argument is that we should be cautious about assigning labels of stoi-
cism to particular pain behaviour based on the assumed characteristics of individuals
who belong to a certain generation, religion or ethnicity.
Similarly, in the UK, Cornwell (1984) finds that residents from a deprived area of
East London showed generational differences in attitudes towards health and illness,
including chronic health conditions, reflecting an ‘individualistic’ ideology that encour-
aged independence. ‘Having the right attitude’ was particularly valued by older people
who had lived in the slums and knew financial hardship that was not alleviated by the
NHS or wider welfare system. The ‘self-reliance’ that older generations were seen to
most value was taught to them by their parents prior to the existence of a welfare system.
Like Kleinman et al. (1992), Cornwell (1984) warns against making any generalizations
about ‘working class’ concepts of health and illness, suggesting that because they appear
to stem mainly from public accounts, it makes it difficult to know whether they should
be taken as evidence of similarities across different social groups and sub-cultures, or as
evidence that they share the same common sense theories about health and illness.
While such examples are common, and despite warnings against making generational
assumptions, ‘stoical attitudes’ to pain are still seen as common in older age groups,
perhaps as a result of adverse events, for example, World Wars, the Great Depression
(Yong et al., 2001). Based on such adverse event criteria, one would expect a stoical
attitude to be prevalent in the present younger X and Y generations who are living
through turbulent times, hindered by unemployment, unattainable housing prices and the
current financial debt crisis. However, if we look towards the development of the NHS
and current health care availability, today’s generation enjoys a greater access, equity
and quality of service than older generations would have done. Developments in sick pay
policy and health insurance mean that people no longer have to work through illness. In
addition, better pain medication is now widely available. Perhaps as a result of this they
are less ‘stoical’ than older generations because there is less requirement to be so, despite
grievances as to how the welfare state is managed (Cornwell, 1984). We can infer that
previous generations had to be stoical because of the lack of availability and access to
services and welfare, and they had less of a personal choice whether or not to be ‘stoic’.
However, the flipside of this argument is that it assumes absolute adversity as opposed to
164 Health 17(2)

relative adversity. Townsend (1979) argues that the level of adversity that one feels is
experienced in relative comparison to what others in the same generation experience,
rather than in relation to how much better off they are in comparison to the previous
generation. This essentially weakens the generational hypothesis of stoicism.
The commonality of examples suggests that stoicism is partially a ‘generational’ phe-
nomenon, challenging ideas that it is a psychological trait inherent in some individuals.
Indications are that it might also be a question of social context, where certain attitudes
are seen to be valuable in effectively dealing with pain and adversity. However, there is
little evidence that health behaviours in older generations are governed by attitudes that
can be attributed to stoicism.

Culture and geographies of stoicism

We cannot assume stoicism is solely a generational phenomenon if we are classing it
simply as ‘a decreased willingness’ to complain about pain. Cornwell (1984) noted a
deep unwillingness among her sample of East Londoners to discuss health, illness or to
acknowledge pain. Such examples are found in industrial, outback, rural and lower soci-
oeconomic communities, and seem to be characteristic of what Cornwell (1984) describes
as ‘hard earned lives’. We suggest that stoicism is not simply generational, but also a
sociocultural phenomenon influenced by environment (place), employment type and
community, and that, therefore, there may be particular ‘geographies of stoicism’. The
vagueness of the contemporary use of the term however makes this hard to appreciate.
Differences in attendance at health services between rural and urban populations may be
attributed to an assumed ‘stoicism’ among rural residents, yet their lack of attendance is
more accurately attributed to factors such as travel distance, stigma, cultures of self-
reliance and the lack of anonymity (Deaville, 2001). Clark et al. (2004) found that in
comparisons between rural and urban nursing homes, rural nursing home staff, ‘more so
than their urban counterparts, emphasized stoicism as an attitudinal barrier on the part of
residents that interfered with pain assessment’ (Clark et al., 2004: 745). This stoicism
seemed to be attributed by the nursing staff to both generational and geographical influ-
ences. They suggested that, because of their age, residents expected pain, stating, ‘It’s
how they age here’ (Clark et al., 2004: 745). Whether or not this can be called stoicism it
remains impossible to say in this case, but certainly there are notions that rural and urban
generations and the staff who care for them differ in their attitudes towards pain. The
question is to what do we attribute those attitudes?
Farmer et al. (2006) note the neglect of sociocultural factors in the differences between
health seeking behaviour in rural and urban populations, suggesting that while there is
some evidence for ‘stoicism’ it remains a poorly defined concept. In a more detailed
analysis of the differences in consultation decision making between rural and urban pop-
ulations a range of factors were found to be responsible. These included established
doctor–patient relationships, access to services, consumerist attitudes and habits, and
knowledge and perceptions of services (Farmer et al., 2006), thus showing that besides
possibilities of ‘stoicism’ there are multiple sociocultural factors which must be accounted
for before considering the label of ‘stoicism’.
Moore et al. 165

In exploring the spatialities of caring and mental health in the remote Scottish
Highlands, Parr and Philo (2003) show how ‘visible’ social relations between patients
with mental health problems and community practice nurses are seen as ‘risky’ where
‘cultural norms include stoicism and non-disclosure about health and emotional prob-
lems’ (Parr and Philo, 2003: 477). Par and Philo do not define ‘stoicism’, but its close
association with non-disclosure, ‘gossip’ and ‘fear of difference’ (Parr and Philo, 2003:
480) suggests a contemporary meaning more aligned with a fear of consequences, mir-
roring the same contemporary stoicism found in remote and rural communities in other
parts of the world, such as Australia (Fuller et al., 2000).
International research points to the fact that the term ‘stoicism’ is used invariably to
describe a range of behaviours which centre around the theme of not complaining about
pain, chronic or otherwise. Pang (1995), for example, states that stoicism is an important
part of the Korean culture where people are encouraged to be silent about their feelings
and to suffer in silence, privately. Filipino nurses are noted to under-medicate patients
who are in pain, because of the lack of pain medication available, fear of addiction and
because ‘stoicism is highly valued and, for Catholic Filipinos, suffering is an opportunity
to demonstrate virtue’ (Galanti, 2000: 278). Clark and Clark (1980) show that Nepalese
porters have higher criteria (‘stoical’) for reporting pain than occidentals. In a review of
the literature on affective responses to pain Davidhizar and Giger (2004) suggest that
diverse cultural responses to pain usually fall into two categories: emotive or stoical,
where Amish communities were shown to be stoical, as were the Irish, while Jewish and
Italian communities were found to be more emotive. Narayan (2010) reiterates common
beliefs that are interpreted as stoical, such as being a ‘good patient’ means not complain-
ing about pain. There are also certain cultural groups and subcultures in which the notion
of stoicism in the face of pain is valued. These may be termed occupational cultures of
stoicism, such as those found among male and female athletes (Howe, 2001; Roderick,
2006; Turner and Wainwright, 2003). In the majority of these studies stoicism is seen
simply as not complaining.
There may be environmental factors which determine that in order to live as best as
one can then being stoical would be advantageous and there would certainly be geogra-
phies of stoicism. However, if stoicism is taken to be simply not complaining then the
reasons for this may be as varied and contextual as the locality, culture, sub-group and
occupation. In determining whether geographies of stoicism really exist one must heed
Kleinman et al.’s (1992) argument against using ethnic stereotypes.

Stoicism as a male trait

The difference between the Stoics and other philosophers, Seneca says, is the difference
between men and women; those who have chosen the Stoa have chosen the manly, the heroic
cause. (Edelstein, 1966: 10)

Contemporary stoicism seems at first glance to be stereotypically a masculine trait. In the

times of Greek antiquity philosophy and education were almost exclusively the pursuits
of the free man. Women in Ancient Greece had a different status than most contemporary
western women – they were seen as the property of men and mostly confined to the
166 Health 17(2)

home, receiving no formal education and were thought to be irrational, given to exces-
sive emotions, physical abuse and melancholy. Philosophers, with the exception of Plato,
thought that women had less capacity for reason than men and were morally inferior
(Boardman et al., 2001). It is interesting to consider that they could be perceived as stoi-
cal in contemporary terms however, as evidence from the Greek plays implies that they
would have suffered any misfortune in silence (Boardman et al., 2001).
Using modern psychological measures of stoicism Murray et al. (2008) found that
males displayed ‘higher levels of stoicism’ than women, based on a unidimensional
measurement using the Liverpool Stoicism Scale (LSS). However, they found that
although levels of stoicism appear to be higher in males, it is not isolated to males, hav-
ing a core that has ‘similar implications for both genders’ (Murray et al., 2008: 1379). If
stoicism is seen as a male trait there is a danger of circularity as behaviour in women is
less likely, therefore, to be expected, recognized and labelled as stoical. Murray et al.’s
(2008) findings point to stoicism as potentially ‘maladaptive’ and related to negative
attitudes to seeking psychological help.
Bendelow (1993: 290) suggests that the ontological security of women is less threat-
ened by the admission of pain than it is in men for whom ‘the psychological structure of
masculinity is predisposed to inhibit the admission of vulnerability’. Pinnock et al.
(1998) attribute delays in and refusals to seek help among Australian men with urologi-
cal problems to a stoical attitude, where stoicism defined illness as ‘weakness’. We feel
that this may be a part of the problem in the gendering of stoicism. Seeing illness as a
weakness may be more a function of machismo (Sobralske, 2006), and attributed to fear
or phobos, embarrassment and appearing as ‘less of a man’, than to any stoic attitude of
accepting illness as nature’s course and seeking whatever help may be needed, and deal-
ing with it in a more appropriate and rationally dispassionate way. As noted earlier, clas-
sical stoicism asserts that fear and embarrassment are emotions in excess that encourage
irrational action, and that one should rise above in order to act appropriately and to
remain in control (of one’s health). Also, it is the ‘appearance’, the choice to display
weakness, pain or strength to others which is key here to how stoicism and gender are
constructed. Men avoid help seeking behaviour and hide apparent weakness and pain to
maintain their dominance and social position. However athletes, men and women, per-
form despite injuries, breaking pain barriers, to display the attributes they are applauded
for – strength, toughness, endurance, commitment and heart (Addis and Mahalik, 2003;
Roderick, 2006; Turner and Wainwright, 2003; White et al., 1995). So, from a social
constructionist perspective, gender is something that is performed in different contexts
rather than a property of the individual (Addis and Mahalik, 2003). Health seeking
behaviour is then dependent on the context in which one finds oneself. It is not a stable
property of the individual, and depends largely on how a problem is perceived within a
certain context. It is to the importance of context that we now turn.

The importance of context

Pinnock et al. (1998) state that ‘tales of stoicism’, as told by their respondents, spoke of
‘suffering’, ‘failing’, ‘making do’ and ultimately ‘dying’ without seeking help. Reasons
such as having to take time off work, fear that something might be wrong or fear of being
Moore et al. 167

seen as a hypochondriac can be attributed to external factors that influence their actions.
This leads to what classical stoicism might see as an irrational course of action, based on
emotional investment and a fear of consequential damage to one’s self-image/esteem.
Participants spoke of ‘embarrassment’, ‘pride’ and ‘ignorance’ as reasons for not dis-
cussing their health, or normalization of not talking about health as a ‘male thing’. This
kind of ‘stoicism’ has the potential for negative connotations as the consequences of
non-disclosure may lead to a worsening of the condition and related problems. Similarly,
Cornwell noted that within the hard-earned lives of men and women in East London talk-
ing about one’s health was perceived negatively: ‘Stan Flowers looked appalled when I
asked if he ever discussed his health or anything to do with health with his friends at the
local working-men’s club, and said that men who did so were ostracized for being mor-
bid’ (Cornwell, 1984: 129).
While talk about health among friends and family may be negatively perceived, stoi-
cism has also been strongly related to negative attitudes towards health seeking behav-
iour (Hinton, 1994; Murray et al., 2008; Pinnnock et al., 1998). This is different from the
philosophy of the ancient Greek stoics, such as Marcus Aurelias. In his Meditations,
Marcus Aurelias (2004: 11) wrote of the lessons he had learned from his adoptive father:

His willingness to take adequate care of himself. Not a hypochondriac or obsessed with his
appearance, but not ignoring things either. With the result that he hardly ever needed medical
attention, or drugs or any sort of salve or ointment.

That Aurelias’ adoptive father took adequate care of himself and did not ignore condi-
tions, implies that silence about illness was not a classical stoical way – at least not
silence to a medical professional. It is evident that he did not ignore his need for, and
received, medical attention as and when needed, but did not obsess about it either. There
is no evidence that Aurelias’ father remained silent about his condition to health profes-
sionals or that he avoided seeking help, with the result that it was ‘hardly ever needed’.
There is an obvious difference between avoiding emotional entanglement in the context
of a philosophy which incorporated the pursuit of a rational and harmonic way to finding
health, and the modern situation of avoiding admitting problems, for fear of the conse-
quences, by remaining silent. In the UK before the introduction of the NHS, medical
attention was expensive or not widely available for most of the population, had few
effective treatments or was mistrusted, so that not seeking help was rational. In hind-
sight, using a modern setting, it has been mooted as ‘stoical’ and virtuous behaviour.
Pinnock et al. (1998) in their study of older men’s concerns about their urological
health suggest that stoicism was evident in those who did not seek help from their doctor
because they feared uncovering something that was wrong, such as prostate cancer, or
because they would have to take time off work and, therefore, let others down. The
authors noted that the men particularly feared prostate cancer because of the additional
threat to sexual function. Not seeking help for fear of uncovering something wrong might
be seen as irrational from a classical stoic viewpoint because it is based on emotion – fear
of the unknown, such as, a threat to sexual function which in turn could challenge self-
perceptions of masculinity. However, impotence, as a side-effect of treatment for pros-
tate cancer, is a real possibility. The individual faces the dilemma as to which is perceived
168 Health 17(2)

to be the more calamitous outcome – having a condition going undiagnosed or the poten-
tial side-effects of a treatment if the condition is diagnosed. Arguably, avoiding exposure
to the dilemma is a rational response.
Not acknowledging pain in non-self-limiting conditions, such as cancer, can lead to
negative outcomes and poor pain management and treatment (Hillier, 1990).
Contemporary stoicism is often therefore seen to be ‘maladaptive’ in this context (Spiers,
2006). However, there are differences of opinion about whether stoicism is adaptive or
maladaptive. In a study of home-care nursing in Western USA (Spiers, 2006), patients
were treated for a number of health conditions, including chronic pain. Spiers (2006:
296) describes a mutual expectation of stoicism between patients and nurses, where ‘sto-
icism did not imply enduring excessive pain but, rather, the ability to know where one’s
pain boundaries lay and to take appropriate measures to keep pain within those bounda-
ries’. By various communicative means the nurses facilitated this kind of effective stoi-
cism. However, Spiers (2006: 296) noted an inappropriate stoicism where patients’
stoical attitudes ‘limited or obstructed nurses’ attempts to intervene in situations of inad-
equately managed pain’, where patients’ self-reports were incongruent with their verbal
and non-verbal behaviour (wincing, moaning, screams, agonized facial expressions).
This kind of stoicism was criticized by the nurses as leading to inappropriate suffering.
Spiers’ study seems to suggest that there are both positive and negative strands of stoi-
cism. However, their explanation also appears to imply that the nurses’ view of what is
effective (positive) stoicism is privileged over a patient’s view, implying that the nurse
is rational and the patient is irrational. The question then arises as to who decides what is
rational or irrational? Whose view is privileged? Rather than making judgements about
rationality and attributing behaviour to being stoical, would it not be better to question
the reasons for silence if silence is obvious?
The lack of clear definition of what stoicism constitutes and implies, and whether it is
to positive or negative ends is aptly summarized by the findings of Murray et al. (2008:
1371):

Consistent with the assumption that stoicism confers resilience, a positive association has been
reported between stoicism and quality of life amongst muscular dystrophy patients (Ahlstroem
& Sjoeden, 1996). Likewise, evidence that cognitive therapies are efficacious treatments for
distress disorders (Nathan & Gorman, 2002) suggests that stoicism may be an adaptive
orientation. On the other hand, stoicism has been found to generate harmful inertia in the face
of some medical symptoms (Hinton, 1994; Pinnock et al., 1998). More broadly, it could be
proposed that stoic minimization of difficulties and consequent negative attitudes to seeking
professional help may generate detrimental consequences for mental health and wellbeing.

What we think Murray et al. have not determined here is that stoicism in each of these
cases may have been construed in different ways as it is not explicitly defined within any
of these studies. Murray’s assertion that ‘positive’ stoicism confers resilience is in
accordance with Gattuso’s (2003) concept of resilience as the ability to maintain a sense
of identity and self over time and in the face of adversity. Links have been made between
cognitive therapies and classical stoicism (Evans, 2008; Still and Dryden, 1999) and
there also seem to be similarities which suggest that the construct of resilience has much
Moore et al. 169

in common with classical stoicism, whereas stoicism that is seen to be maladaptive

focuses on silence, non-admission and non-help seeking behaviours.

Discussion
A rather mixed evidence base seems to suggest that there are generational influences on
stoic behaviour, though this should not be overstated as hardship and adversity are expe-
rienced relatively in comparison to one’s peers rather than to previous generations
(Townsend, 1979). People’s personal geography (one’s social and physical environ-
ments) may also have some influence (Clarke et al., 2011; Cornwell, 1984; Deaville,
2001; Farmer et al., 2006) though the lack of definition and assumptions about perceived
stoicism makes this difficult to establish. Poor consideration of sociocultural factors in
establishing differences in health behaviour and attitudes to health and illness, such as
chronic painful conditions, between urban and rural populations makes the attribution of
‘stoicism’ tempting but perhaps inappropriate.
Additionally, there seems to be a wider unwillingness to acknowledge that psychologi-
cal constructs such as stoicism do not exist independently of social structure, policies,
institutions, economics, social identities and many other factors that impact on the context
under which individuals develop such philosophies. A sociological approach to a study of
stoicism takes such factors into account. The literature on chronic pain provides a perti-
nent and productive focus in carrying out a sociological analysis of stoicism.
In trying to disentangle the various influences and meanings attributed to the term, we
have attempted a partial delineation of the conceptualization of stoicism. While we have
addressed some of the major themes in classical stoic thought such as rational thinking
and disentanglement from the passions, and the differentiation of good from bad stoi-
cism a more detailed account is beyond the scope of this article and we are left at this
point with the question of who ultimately decides what is good and bad? If health is to
be seen as more than the absence of disease, and to include for example older people
seeing health as maintaining functional ability and independence (Blaxter and Paterson,
1982), then not seeking help from health care practitioners or family for fear of compro-
mising that independence makes sense. They may fear they will be treated as an invalid,
or pressured into entering a care home. While health care practitioners and family may
see this as ineffective stoicism, for their part the older person may already have experi-
ence of being treated as an invalid and so do what they think they need to do to reassert
their independence (Yardley et al., 2006), a consequence of which might be not admitting
to pain in order to preserve that independence.
Also the questions remain; to whom do we attribute such behaviours, and who claims
them? Stoic behaviour may be attributed in hindsight to someone who displays certain
‘stoic’ characteristics and understandings of the world in response to pain or adversity, or
it may be consciously developed as a life philosophy, deliberately utilized in order to deal
effectively with pain and adversity (Sherman, 2005). Regardless of whether it is con-
sciously developed or not, classical stoic behaviour might be seen as potentially confer-
ring psychological benefits in the contemporary world. Indeed, connections between
classical stoicism and cognitive behaviour therapy have been made (Evans, 2008).
170 Health 17(2)

Conclusion
While it is evident that the philosophy of stoicism has evolved over time and in relation
to changing contexts, there has been little exploration of stoicism in the sociology of
chronic illness. Multiple contextual factors including age, generation, gender, culture
and geography, have been shown to impact on notions of what constitutes contemporary
stoicism. The contemporary term has become largely associated with silence, non-
admission and endurance of adversity, such as pain, without complaint (or help seeking).
There is a danger that applying a label of stoicism may in fact only serve to hinder the
questioning of illness behaviours which might otherwise benefit from further explora-
tion. We would suggest that a more considered exploration of the context in which the
term stoicism is used is important to furthering an understanding of how people cope
with and manage chronic illness, particularly painful health conditions. Silence in the
face of ill health and pain is not necessarily a marker of stoicism, and the basis and reason
for an individual’s silence should warrant closer scrutiny.

Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre at Keele University
under the Arthritis Research UK centre initiative grant [number 18139].

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Author biographies
Andrew Moore is a research associate at Keele University’s Arthritis UK Primary Care Centre. His
background is in palliative care research and geographies of the life-world. His research interests
Moore et al. 173

include older people’s experiences of living with chronic pain and self-management, and commu-
nication and language in clinical consultations.

Janet Grime’s first degree was in psychology but following two years as VSO in Malawi she under-
took a postgraduate degree in community health care, when she was introduced to medical sociol-
ogy. Janet has worked as research fellow at Keele for a number of years. Her research interests
have included patient experience of health care, the role and value of health information in manag-
ing illness/chronic conditions and what makes for wellness and resilience among older people with
osteoarthritis.

Paul Campbell is a research associate at the Arthritis UK Primary Care Centre. Paul has a psychol-
ogy background and his research interests are on the influence of psychosocial factors on those
with chronic pain conditions. Specific topics include: the influence of relationship quality on
those with long term back pain; the role of social support for those with chronic spinal pain; and
the pathways that lead to depressive symptoms in those with chronic pain.

Jane Richardson is a Senior Lecturer in the Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre at Keele
University. Her research interests are in people’s experience of living with chronic painful condi-
tions. Her current research (funded by ESRC and NIHR Research for Patient Benefit) is in the area
of how people manage to live well with chronic pain, including in later life.
 4 (6) 2018

DOI: 10.26319/6921 Matthew Sharpe

Faculty of Arts and Education
Deakin University

Into the Heart of Darkness

Or: Alt-Stoicism? Actually, No…

In several conversations over the last months, people have independently raised a troubling sign of the times.
Since the mid-2010s, it seems, “Alt-Right” bloggers have begun to populate Facebook and other online venues
of the “Modern Stoicism” movement, claiming that the ancient philosophy vindicates their misogynistic and
nativist views, complete with sometimes-erroneous “quotations” from Marcus Aurelius.
Donna Zuckerberg, in several articles and in her recent book, Not All Dead White Men: Classics and
Misogyny in the Digital Age, has done a courageous service to us all by examining and documenting this
phenomenon. As she writes:

The Red Pill emphasizes Stoicism practicality in nearly every article about the philosophy…
Illimitable Men, a blog that uses a more literary and philosophical approach than most manosphere
sites, lists Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations second in the top ten “books for men,” describing it
as “helpful as a spiritual guide to dealing with, and perceiving life.” Meditations also appears
on a list of “Comprehensive Red Pill Books” on the Red Pill subreddit, where it is described as
“a very simple pathway to practical philosophy.” In a review of Epictetus’s Enchiridion on Return
of Kings, Valizadeh praises Stoicism and claims that “Stoicism will give you more practical tools on

1) Donna Zuckerberg, “How to Be a Good Classicist Under a Bad Emperor,” Eidolon, November 22, 2016, https://eidolon.pub/how-
to-be-a-good-classicist-under-a-bad-emperor-6b848df6e54a; Donna Zuckerberg, “So I Wrote a Thing,” Eidolon, October 8, 2018,
https://eidolon.pub/so-i-wrote-a-thing-6726d9449a2b.
2) Donna Zuckerberg, Not All Dead White Men: Classics and Misogyny in the Digital Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2018).

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 Matthew Sharpe, Into the Heart of Darkness or: Alt-Stoicism? Actually, No…

approaching life and dealing with its inevitable problems.” Valizadeh also wrote a 2016 review of
Meditations with the effusive title “Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations Is the Best Manual We Have on
How to Live.” An article in the online alt-right journal Radix, “Viewing Stoicism from the Right,”
admits that “Stoicism gives you practical directions to follow” …

Zuckerberg’s stance on this “Alt-Stoicism”, as it might be called, is two-sided. On the one hand, Zuckerberg
observes that because of Stoicism’s putative ethicopolitical commitments (on which more in due course), it is
at least “paradoxical” (if not an “irreconcilable contradiction”) that the Alt-Righters have tried to mount the
steps of the porch, in their bid for cultural hegemony in the Age of Messrs Putin, Trump and company.
On the other hand, Zuckerberg issues an urgent call to those involved in, or sympathetic to the modern
Stoicism phenomenon to directly engage with Alt-Stoicism’s proponents and arguments, rather than dismissing
them as so many distasteful interlopers, without any basis or warrant. For her, “a closer reading” of the Stoic
texts reveals more complex and ambivalent attitudes towards gender in particular, so that “Red Pill” versions of
Stoicism are not wholly misreadings: “they may be responding to and drawing on parts of Stoicism that advo-
cates of the philosophy would prefer to ignore.”
Jules Evans has gone some way to answering Zuckerberg’s call for a Modern Stoic response to “Alt-Stoicism”
in a November 2016 article: “How the Alt-Right Emerged from Men’s Self-Help.” Massimo Pigliucci, whom
Zuckerberg cites, has also offered such a reply in the more recent: “Stoicism and Politics: between the Scylla
of the New Left and the Charybdis of the Alt-Right”. So, I do not want either to reinvent the wheel, or steal
anybody else’s thunder here. But I do think it is worth venturing a few new considerations in response to Not
All Dead White Men’s challenge to non-Alt-Right friends of Modern Stoicism. Classicists and lovers of the clas-
sics should, I agree with Zuckerberg:

focus on the parts of antiquity that aren’t elite white men. Read and cite the work of scholars who
write about race, gender, and class in the ancient world. Be open about the marginalization and
bias that exists within our discipline.

There is also a work to be done to push back directly against what she acknowledges in the same piece as the
“shallow, poorly contextualized, and unnuanced” reading of the ancient sources themselves that the Alt-Righters
are proselytizing.10
To do a little more of that work here, and as such to contest Zuckerberg’s stronger claim that an “Alt-Stoicism”
is more than an exercise in polemical cherry-picking, I will begin in the heart of darkness, looking at why the
Nazi classicists all abhorred Stoicism. This analysis will allow us next to pinpoint what the attempt to forge an

3) Ibid., 41
4) Ibid., 33.
5) Ibid.
6) Ibid.
7) Jules Evans, “How the Alt-Right Emerged from Men’s Self-Help,” Philosophy for Life, and Other Dangerous Situations, November
16, 2018, http://www.philosophyforlife.org/how-the-alt-right-emerged-from-mens-self-help/.
8) Massimo Pigliucci, “Stoicism and Politics: Between the Scylla of the New Left and the Charybdis of the Alt-Right,” How to be
a Stoic, August 7, 2017, https://howtobeastoic.wordpress.com/2017/08/07/stoicism-and-politics-between-the-scylla-of-the-new-left-
and-the-charybdis-of-the-alt-right/.
9) Zuckerberg, “How to Be a Good Classicist Under a Bad Emperor.”
10) Ibid.

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 Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 4 (6) 2018

“Alt-Stoicism” today must deny or ignore: namely, Stoicism’s cosmopolitanism, as well as its egalitarian assess-
ment of the capacities of women. Our concluding remarks will then reflect on the complex question of the rela-
tionship between Stoicism and politics, querying whether Stoicism prescribes any single political stance today,
but insisting that it nevertheless strongly proscribes all forms of nativism or white supremacism.

Why the Nazi Classicists Hated Stoicism

Zuckerberg rightly associates “Alt-Right classicism” today with the disturbing efflorescence of National Socialist
classicisms in Germany after January 30, 1933.11 As Johann Chapoutot’s remarkable study Le nazisme et l’Antiquité
has documented, Hitler’s ascent to power led to a wave of German classicists coming forwards with attempts to
legitimize the Nazis’ worldview through revisionist readings of Greek and Roman antiquity.12
The problem, then as now, is that some parts of antiquity fitted this kind of Far-Right agenda better than
others: eugenic, militaristic, agrarian Sparta, as against democratic, sea-trading, dynamic Athens; the more
“primordial” or “Aryan” Greeks, as against the immigrant-inclusive and religiously-tolerant Rome,13 the Roman
Imperium versus the Republic … not to mention the Plato of the political dialogues (with their own eugenic
moments), versus the ugly, plebeian Socrates, who spoke to all comers.14
Le nazisme et l’Antiquité in this light contains a section on the Nazis and Stoicism which the Alt-Righters
today would do very well to read.15 For the first thing that leaps out here is that the leading proponents of Stoicism
were not dead white men at all, a fact that was far from lost on the race-obsessed Nazis. Nearly all of the leading
Stoics of the Hellenistic era came from the Near East. As Fritz Schachermeyr lamented:

Amongst the scholarchs which succeeded [Zeno] up until Panaetius, not one of them came from
a town with mostly Greek blood … The others came from Cilicia, from Cyprus and from Babylon.
Zeno, the founder, came from the Semitic town of Kition [sic.!], on the island of Cyprus.16

As we might say today, the rise of the Porch in Athens, and then more widely, was already a multicultural story.
Stoicism was one product of what the National Socialist philosopher Martin Heidegger, in his infamous Black
Notebooks, decries as the “Hellenistic-Jewish ‘world’”, whose philosophies he (not by chance) never deigns to
consider.17 But compare Schachermeyr again:

Hellenism shows us the Greek people in full dissolution into cosmopolitanism, thus into complete
de-Nordification. The most remarkable product of Hellenism, the Stoa, will very much go in the
same direction. It was elaborated by Semites and bastards, in order to become a pseudo-ideal

11) Ibid.
12) Johann Chapoutot, Le nazisme et l’Antiquité (Paris: Broché, 2012).
13) Cf. Ursula Rothe, “What the Romans can Teach us on Immigration and Integration,” The Conversation, February 18, 2015,
https://theconversation.com/what-the-romans-can-teach-us-on-immigration-and-integration-36391.
14) Chapoutot, Le nazisme et l’Antiquité, 284–300.
15) Ibid., 306–312.
16) Ibid., 307.
17) Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen VII–XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938/39), ed. Peter Trawny (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann
[GA 95]), 339.

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 Matthew Sharpe, Into the Heart of Darkness or: Alt-Stoicism? Actually, No…

expressly shaped to give arguments to people without fatherlands (apatrides) and to the racial
enemies of future epochs.18

In the Nazis’ “raciological” imaginings, the mixing of races in the Hellenistic period (fourth century- first century
BCE) necessarily effected profound cultural changes – and for the worst. The “healthy” tribal, closed, hierarchical
values of the Greek poleis (at least suitably downplaying the widespread movement towards democracy after
the mid-sixth century) gave way to more open, cosmopolitan and egalitarian worldviews. Ludwig Schermann
hence could edifyingly describe Stoicism, which was central to this cultural opening, as a “Semitic poison”,19 as
well as a symptom of the Greek world’s increasing emasculation and decadence after the Peloponnesian war.
Even a Stoic scholar as eminent as Max Pohlenz, in this climate, would feel it meaningful to designate
Zeno as “a Phoenician of pure blood” and claim in 1942 that we can understand “very many traits” of Stoicism
when “we recall that its founders were not Greek.”20
Arguably the leading Nazi classicist-come-ideologue, the “race pope” Hans Guenther likewise decried Stoicism
as “one of the racially destructive forces of Roman history.”21 Stoicism was for him as for his lesser fellows a fifth,
Semitic column that introduced foreign, egalitarian ideals into Nordic, hierarchical Rome. These ideals pushed
the Imperium towards a vapid “individualism” which was the flipside of an equally rootless cosmopolitanism22
– one “which recognized no other tie [between peoples] than that of reason,” as Fritz Geyer concurred.23
It was Schachermeyr who would draw the long-term historical conclusions. Stoicism’s “Semitic” commit-
ment to the equality of all human beings, he counselled, must be seen clearly by Germans for what it is: the deep
antecedent of the modern liberal “ideas of 1789” that underlay both the permissive Weimar constitution and
the punitive Treaty of Versailles. “The consequence of this fundamental equality of men has been the concep-
tions of the dignity of humanity, the rights of man, [and] the demand for tolerance,” he protested.24 From a Nazi
perspective, case closed.
As Chapoutot shows, Stoicism was accordingly embraced by exactly no leading Nazi ideologues, even as
they thumbed the pages of the ancients for anything and everything that could be mobilized. From the perspec-
tive of a Far Right at that time far better informed than our postmodern “Alt-ernative”, that is to say, Stoicism
was nothing short of a “diabolical” philosophy, deeply threatening to all those set upon Making Germany
Great Again.25

What the Alt-Righters Must Deny, Ignore or Forget About Stoicism

There is an old saying that whoever appeals to the Nazis in any argument has lost. So, I hope the reader will
accept my apologies for citing this lurid, albeit newly relevant historical material. The point is that the Nazi
classicists, with polemical venom, honed in upon and railed against the universalistic, cosmopolitan dimen-
sions of Stoic thought. Recalling their readings of the Stoics hence allows us very quickly to put our finger on

18) Chapoutot, Le nazisme et l’Antiquité, 307.

19) Ibid., 308.
20) Ibid.
21) Ibid., 309.
22) Ibid.
23) Ibid., 311.
24) Ibid., 310.
25) Ibid.

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 Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 4 (6) 2018

the key dimensions of Stoic thought that the Alt-Righters today cannot accommodate into their worldview, and
so must deny, ignore, fudge or forget.
I realize as I write this that I am pushing against a partly-open door, since Donna Zuckerberg has already
stressed this point in Not All Dead White Males. As she writes:

Stoicism is a cosmopolitan philosophy. Epictetus advised, following Socrates: “When someone

asks you to what country you belong ... say rather that you are a citizen of the world [kosmos]”
(Epictetus, Discourses 1.9). Epictetus’s “citizen of the world” concept is shared by all ancient Stoics.
Musonius argument that exile is an evil depends on the idea that “the world is the common father-
land of all human beings,” and Marcus Aurelius writes, “As Antoninus, my city and fatherland are
Rome. But as a human, they are the world. So what is good for me must also be good for both of
these” (Musonius, Lectures 9.2; Aurelius, Meditations 6.44). Many of the factions within the Red
Pill, particularly the white nationalists of the Alt-Right, would call any attention to the interests
of other nations a sign of being a cuck. Multiculturalism is the avowed enemy.26

And the same of course holds for Red Pill “thought leaders” attempts to use Stoicism to argue for innate mascu-
line superiority over women. To make such a case, as Pigliucci notes, would-be “Alt-Stoics” must simply ignore
passages wherein such superiority is explicitly raised and denied by the Roman Stoics.27 “Women have received
from the gods the same reasoning power as men,” says Musonius Rufus (Lectures 3.1): “the power which we
employ with each other and according to which we consider whether each action is good or bad, and honour-
able or shameful.”28 Seneca, consoling a grieving aristocratic woman, likewise exhorts her by protesting: “who
would say that nature has dealt grudgingly with the minds of women, and stunted their virtues? Believe me,
they have the same intellectual power as men, and the same capacity for honorable and generous action.”29
Of course, Zuckerberg (alongside Martha Nussbaum or Lisa Hill, whom she cites) is right to highlight
that, with this said, much of Stoic rhetoric, with its stress upon self-reliance, most certainly reflects the patri-
archal standards and values of the ancient world.30 There are also Stoic texts, which Zuckerberg cites, in which
Stoics clearly assume that women are naturally more emotional than men, which is not from their perspec-
tive a positive trait. Moderns must always remember that, whatever the ancient Greeks’ merits, their treatment
of women was especially repressive, even in contrast to the Romans – to say nothing of the slave trade which
neither society opposed.
With this much said, these ancient prejudices, real as they are, are not what is surprising and distinct in
the Stoics’ thought. It is indeed arguable that we should in no way be surprised that the Stoics shared the values
of their time, retrograde in matters of gender, if not of race. This much can be granted even by non-historicists
to historicism. We should criticize those values and call attention to them, especially when it is a matter, as
in Modern Stoicism, of trying to reanimate ideas and traditions from the ancient pagan world. But what is

26) Zuckerberg, Not All Dead White Men, 43.

27) Pigliucci, “Stoicism and Politics.”
28) Musonius Rufus, “Lecture III: That Woman Too Should Study Philosophy,” in Musonius Rufus, the Roman Socrates: Lectures and
Fragments, introduction and trans. Cora E. Lutz, Volume X of the Yale Classical Studies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1947),
https://sites.google.com/site/thestoiclife/the_teachers/musonius-rufus/lectures/03.
29) Lucius Annaeus Seneca, “Of Consolation: to Marcia,” in Minor Dialogs Together with the Dialog “On Clemency,” trans. Aubrey
Stewart (London: George Bell and Sons, 1900), xvi, www-site: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Of_Consolation:_To_Marcia#XVI.
30) Zuckerberg, Not All Dead White Men, 46–50.

110
 Matthew Sharpe, Into the Heart of Darkness or: Alt-Stoicism? Actually, No…

surprising and distinctly Stoic – as against conventionally “ancient” – is that, in slave-holding societies in which
the place of all women who were not in the world’s oldest trade was very much in the home, the Stoic philoso-
phers nevertheless expounded philosophical ideas which allowed these customs, in principle, to be challenged
and called into question.
So, still today, we can combat the Alt-Right’s nativism by evoking the Stoic Hierocles’ famous notion of
the widening circles of proper human concern, which reaches out to embrace all peoples, independent of race,
religion, or nationality.31 Still today, we can point to the contradiction between the Stoics’ theoretical commit-
ment to the equal capacities of men and women to decry their sexist assumptions elsewhere as fundamentally
unjust or contra naturam. And still today, Stoic cosmopolitanism can be appealed to in order to criticize the
partiality of anyone interested in the “spiritual exercises” Stoicism prescribes to meet and overcome adversity,
without taking account of the wider physical or metaethical understandings in which these exercises were
grounded. As Pierre Hadot amongst others has stressed, one entire discipline of Stoic exercises is based in Stoic
physics, so they simply do not make sense when abstracted from the Stoics’ conception of the larger whole of
which each human being forms a small, rational part.32
However, just such a cherry picking of certain exercises and virtues from the larger Stoic whole is what
the “Red-Pillers” have been undertaking, in part taking their lead from some of the more theory-lite advocates
of Stoicism led by Ryan Halliday.33

Closing Caveats: on the Porch and Politics

I hope readers can see that it is not a matter here of another version of the following syllogism, which is very
often parsed in different contexts by different authors, whether consciously or not:
1. The author admires Stoicism [or some philosopher or philosophy];
2. The author is a cosmopolitan, culturally more or less liberal, democratic socialist …; hence:
3. Stoicism [or the other philosophy at issue] must, like the author, have been more or less cosmo-
politan, in spite of any countervailing evidence that might emerge.34
It is not that these premises do not happen to be true. So, I believe, is the conclusion (3), minus the unsci-
entific caveat. Yet the operative premises for the conclusion that Stoicism was an ancient form of cosmopoli-
tanism do not come from the author’s own, later modern value preferences. As the Nazi classicists lamented,
they hail from the ancient sources themselves: Stoicism itself was an ancient form of cosmopolitanism, what-
ever we might today wish or lament.
Can we therefore infer anything prescriptive about what politics a “modern Stoic” or “modern Stoicism”
should have, on this basis? Should we say that the Stoics were proto-feminists, or proto-social democrats, or
proto-liberals …, and that all would-be modern Stoics therefore need to be any one of these things?

31) Hierocles, Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments, and Excerpts, trans. David Konstan (Atlanta: Society of Biblical
Literature, 2009); Brad Inwood, “Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century AD,” The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
Newsletter 115 (1983): 17–19.
32) Pierre Hadot, “La Physique comme exercise spirituel ou pessimisme et optimisme chez Marc Aurèle,” Revue de théologie et de
philosophie, 22 (1973): 225–239; Pierre Hadot, The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
33) Zuckerberg, Not All Dead White Men, 43–46. The complete justice of Zuckerberg’s treatment of Halliday could be disputed, since
the would-be Alt-Stoics also arguably read his work somewhat selectively.
34) We can see the potential force of this argument in pushing people to deny new, “illiberal” evidences when we look at the history
of “the Heidegger case”, as it is called in the Anglosphere.

111
 Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 4 (6) 2018

These are very complex questions. From an historiological perspective, evaluating ancient sources in the
light of our later modern political struggles is something about which great caution should be exercised. To read
ancient texts intelligently does not require that we uncritically accept all of the value orientations of ancient
thinkers as beyond reproach, subordinating ourselves to their “greatness”: a criticism that is made of Straussian
readings of the ancients.35 But we do need to understand that the ancient philosophers were thinkers working
within historical and cultural contexts that necessarily exerted influences upon them, as our contemporary
milieu exerts influences upon us. We cannot feasibly expect the Stoics, or any other ancients, to wholly agree
with us, or even to have raised as issues and problems many of the issues and problems that we presently face.
Future generations can be expected to find many of our unexamined presumptions equally contestable.
Moreover, from a philosophical perspective, it has to be said that, if a necessary condition for having what
we can call a “political philosophy” is having a developed theoretical account of the different kinds of regimes
and institutions, of the effects of various extrinsic (geographical, cultural, educational, linguistic…) factors of
political life, and even of the best and second best regimes, then the Stoics did not have a political philosophy
in the way that Plato or Aristotle did.
Seneca addressed several texts, notably De Clementia, to leading Roman political figures – and the
Lucilius of the Moral Letters himself was a political figure. But these texts, or a text like De Otio, concern the
personal and social ethics that these figures ought to adopt, and which virtues they should admire and culti-
vate. Zeno’s Politeia (Republic) battled a reputation of being a highly Cynical production, written “on the tail
of a dog,” rather than a positive contribution to political thought.36 Concerning what survives of this text, it is
even harder to say than it is with Plato’s Republic just how literally we should take the apparently scandalous
political prescriptions it makes concerning sexuality, marriage, and social and religious life, or whether the
whole is meant as an edifying provocation.
When we move from theory to practice and look at the historical record of how the ancient Stoics equipped
themselves politically, there is once more no single “Stoic” political stance that can be unequivocally identified.
Most famously, some Stoics, associated with the philosopher Gaius Blossius, sided with the Gracchi brothers
in their attempts to implement the second century land reforms: redistributive reforms which, with the benefit
of hindsight, might perhaps have saved the Roman Republic. Others, followers of the middle Stoic Panaetius,
opposed the measures – not to mention Cicero, who would fulminate against them from the rostrum and
denounce them in his philosophical dialogues.37
During the Principate, again, some Stoics served as household advisers and what we might call “life
coaches” to leading Roman politicians. Yet, many others suffered exile for involvement (whether real or suspected)
in resistance against the Emperors, including Epictetus and Seneca. The latter paid the ultimate price for being
suspected of conspiring against his former pupil, the Emperor Nero.
So, there are real limits that confront the attempt to make any too prescriptive, positive assertions
concerning the politics of the Porch, in antiquity or today. It is uninformative, if not nugatory, to try to name
Seneca an honorary Democrat or Republican, a feminist or a conservative. Nevertheless, with that many caveats
presented, the Stoics’ ethical system surely prescribes moral limits as to what political actions and movements
a Stoic could conceivably support. And no matter what fudging anyone might attempt, a “Stoic” cannot be

35) See Miles Burnyeat, “Sphinx without a Secret,” New York Review of Books, May 30, 1985, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/
1985/05/30/sphinx-without-a-secret/.
36) Cf. Andrew Erskine, The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1990), 9–42.
37) Erskine, The Hellenistics Stoa, 150 –180; Marcus Tullius Cicero, “Of Friendship [De Amicitia],” in Cicero, On Old Age. On Friendship:
On Divination, trans. Walter Miller, Loeb Classical Library 154 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923), 11–13.

112
 Matthew Sharpe, Into the Heart of Darkness or: Alt-Stoicism? Actually, No…

a nativist or a white supremacist and remain a Stoic. Such convictions violate the Stoics’ basic cosmopolitan
commitments, and their arguments that all human beings, of all races and genders, are equally capable of
reason and virtue, the only true good.
Justice towards others, as well as moderation and courage for oneself, remained for the Stoics a cardinal
virtue – as it was the first of the virtues for Cicero.38 And the cultivation of self-mastery was always figured as
a precondition for acting justly towards others – in Hierocles’ image of the concentric circles of proper human
concern, whereby we are enjoined to ultimately bring even the outer circle encompassing the whole human race
into the inner circles of our care. By contrast, anger, fear and hatred, even or especially when they are decked
out in highly-selective appeals to august cultural authorities, as in the Red Pill “manosphere”,39 are vices to be
countered and opposed, not exalted and stoked.
Ultimately, the very idea of an Alt-Stoicism is a contradictio in adjecto.

38) Marcus Tullius Cicero, Of Duties[De Officiis], trans. W. A. Falconer, Loeb Classical Library 30 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University
Press, 1923), 43–44.
39) Cf. Zuckerberg, Not All Dead White Men, 50–54.

113
 About  For Authors  Archive Contact Search... 

Into the Heart of Darkness Or: Alt-Stoicism?

Actually, No…
 28/12/2018 /  MATTHEW SHARPE

DOI: 10.26319/6921

Preview:
In several conversations over the last months, people have independently raised a troubling sign of the
times. Since the mid-2010s, it seems, “Alt-Right” bloggers have begun to populate Facebook and other
online venues of the “Modern Stoicism” movement, claiming that the ancient philosophy vindicates their
misogynistic and nativist views, complete with sometimes-erroneous “quotations” from Marcus Aurelius.

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How to cite:
Sharpe, Matthew. “Into the Heart of Darkness Or: Alt-Stoicism? Actually, No…” Eidos. A Journal for
Philosophy of Culture 2, no. 4(6) (2018): 106-113. https://doi.org/10.26319/6921.

Author:
Matthew Sharpe
Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University
 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria 3125 
matthew.sharpe@deakin.edu.au

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ISSN 2544-302X / DOI 10.14394/eidos.jpc

© 2022 Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture / All Rights Reserved
 Open Access
To cite: Pathak EB, Wieten SE,
Wheldon CW. Stoic beliefs
and health: development
and preliminary validation of
the Pathak-Wieten Stoicism
Ideology Scale. BMJ Open
2017;7:e015137. doi:10.1136/
bmjopen-2016-015137
►► Prepublication history and
additional material for this
paper are available online. To
view these files, please visit the
journal (http://​dx.d​ oi.​org/1​ 0.​
1136/b​ mjopen-​2016-0​ 15137).
Received 10 November 2016
Revised 15 August 2017
Accepted 22 August 2017
1
Department of Internal
Medicine, Morsani College of
Medicine, University of South
Florida, Tampa, Florida, USA
2
Departments of Philosophy and
Internal Medicine, University of
South Florida, Tampa, Florida,
USA
3
Department of Community and
Family Health, College of Public
Health, University of South
Florida, Tampa, Florida, USA
Correspondence to
Dr Elizabeth B Pathak;
​dr.​elizabeth.p​ athak@​gmail.c​ om
Stoic beliefs and health: development
and preliminary validation of the
Pathak-Wieten Stoicism Ideology Scale
Elizabeth B Pathak,1 Sarah E Wieten,2 Christopher W Wheldon3
Abstract
Introduction  We developed and validated a new
parsimonious scale to measure stoic beliefs. Key domains of
stoicism are imperviousness to strong emotions, indifference
to death, taciturnity and self-sufficiency. In the context of
illness and disease, a personal ideology of stoicism may
create an internal resistance to objective needs, which can
lead to negative consequences. Stoicism has been linked to
help-seeking delays, inadequate pain treatment, caregiver
strain and suicide after economic stress.
Methods  During 2013–2014, 390 adults aged 18+
years completed a brief anonymous paper questionnaire
containing the preliminary 24-item Pathak-Wieten Stoicism
Ideology Scale (PW-SIS). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
was used to test an a priori multidomain theoretical model.
Content validity and response distributions were examined.
Sociodemographic predictors of strong endorsement of
stoicism were explored with logistic regression.
Results  The final PW-SIS contains four conceptual domains
and 12 items. CFA showed very good model fit: root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA)=0.05 (95% CI 0.04
to 0.07), goodness-of-fit index=0.96 and Tucker-Lewis
Index=0.93. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.78 and ranged from
0.64 to 0.71 for the subscales. Content validity analysis
showed a statistically significant trend, with respondents who
reported trying to be a stoic ‘all of the time’ having the highest
PW-SIS scores. Men were over two times as likely as women
to fall into the top quartile of responses (OR=2.30, 95% CI
1.44 to 3.68, P<0.001). ORs showing stronger endorsement
of stoicism by Hispanics, Blacks and biracial persons were not
statistically significant.
Discussion  The PW-SIS is a valid and theoretically coherent
scale which is brief and practical for integration into a wide
range of health behaviour and outcomes research studies.
Introduction
Stoicism is a school of philosophy which orig-
inated in ancient Greece.1–3 Core elements
in the classical definition of stoicism were
an idealisation of imperviousness to strong
emotions, and an indifference to death.3
Major Asian philosophical systems of thought,
such as Buddhism and Confucianism, also
endorsed stoic principles and teachings.4 5
Beginning in the 19th century, academic and
popular philosophers in Europe and the
Americas were exposed to and influenced by
Pathak EB, et al. BMJ Open 2017;7:e015137. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015137
Research
BMJ Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015137 on 14 November 2017. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on January 30, 2022 by guest. Protected by copyright.
Strengths and limitations of this study
►► The Pathak-Wieten Stoicism Ideology Scale (PW-SIS)
is a new, theoretically coherent, multidimensional
scale which measures stoic beliefs and sense of self
along four domains: stoic taciturnity, stoic endurance,
stoic serenity and stoic death indifference.
►► The PW-SIS contains 12 items and demonstrates
good psychometric properties and content validity in
a large sample (n=390) of educated adults.
►► Mean stoicism ideology scores were higher for men
than women, but for both genders the most frequent
scores were neutral on stoic ideology, and the
response distributions by gender overlapped almost
completely.
►► Further validation of the PW-SIS in demographically
and socioeconomically diverse populations will
improve its generalisability.
Asian philosophy and religion. Therefore,
it may not always be possible to distinguish
whether particular strands of contemporary
thought associated with stoicism originated in
ancient Greece, ancient India or elsewhere.
For example, using very different language
and symbolism, both the Greek Stoics and the
Buddha exhorted the student to live fully and
completely in the present, while minimising
concern about the future.
Contemporary meanings and connota-
tions of stoicism have expanded beyond their
ancient origins, to include ideals of taciturnity
and self-sufficiency.6–8 Today, the philosophical
principles of stoicism can be seen to closely
align with some personal ideologies, values
and behaviours which are commonplace
across many industrial nations, and are evident
in many non-Western cultures as well.9–12 For
example, in the USA, the armed forces have
explicitly embraced stoic ideology as a tool for
mitigating combat stress.13 14
Previous research on stoicism and health
Much of the previous health-related research
which mentions stoicism has invoked the term
as a descriptor of particular patient groups
1
Open Access

or behaviours, without an explicit theoretical context.8
Stoicism is mentioned most frequently in studies related
to pain (particularly cancer pain) and coping strategies;
indeed stoicism has been labelled a ‘coping strategy’
in more than one study.6–8 15 16 Stoicism has also been
invoked as a defining characteristic of masculinity and as
a key explanatory factor for certain health behaviours and
outcomes among men. There are several psychometric
instruments that measure endorsement or adherence to
social norms of masculinity, but these scales include only
a few items which explicitly assess stoicism.17–19
Direct measurement of stoicism in previous health-re-
lated measures has implicitly defined stoicism as a pattern
of behaviours, not as an ideology. The pain attitudes ques-
tionnaire (PAQ), published in 2001, has a brief subset of
questions focused on stoic responses to physical pain.20–22
The stoicism items in this scale were designed to capture
pain coping strategies of chronically ill or injured patients.
Of the 29 items in the PAQ, most measured past actions
(ie, pattern of behaviour) and only 2 were explicitly
focused on ideology: #2 ‘When I am in pain I should keep
it to myself,’ and #24 ‘Pain is something that should be
ignored.’ The 20-item Liverpool Stoicism Scale (LSS) was
first developed in 19923 and has not been widely used.24–27
The LSS predominantly (16 of 20 items) assesses a single
theoretical domain (stoic taciturnity) of the four validated
BMJ Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015137 on 14 November 2017. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on January 30, 2022 by guest. Protected by copyright.
theoretical domains included in the final Pathak-Wieten
Stoicism Ideology Scale (PW-SIS) (table 1).
Furthermore, the majority of items in the LSS focus on
behaviour or conduct, for example, ‘I tend not to express
my emotions.’ However, there are three items that are
ideological, for example, “One should keep a ‘stiff upper
lip’.” Both the LSS and the PAQ contain statements that
are aphorisms (ie, ‘Pain is something that should be
ignored’) or proverbs (ie, ‘A problem shared is a problem
halved’). We consider these formats problematic, because
these statements do not refer explicitly to the respon-
dent. Consequently, agreement cannot be interpreted as
a reflection of self-identity. Furthermore, aphorisms and
proverbs may invite endorsement to a great extent simply
because of familiarity. In fact, Yong et al found that item
#24, ‘Pain is something that should be ignored,’ on the
PAQ had a low alpha and reduced the internal consis-
tency of their scale.21
Theoretical context
In 1983, Kathy Charmaz published a very influential
sociological study on the ‘loss of self’ suffered by people
with chronic illnesses.28 Although stoicism per se was
mentioned only briefly, the idea that the suffering caused
by disease emerges as much (or more) from threats to a
person’s identity and sense of self as from purely bodily

Table 1  Liverpool Stoicism Scale items and correspondence to Pathak-Wieten Stoicism Ideology Scale conceptual domains
Closest domain from the
Item Pathak-Wieten Stoicism
number Liverpool Stoicism Scale item* Ideology Scale
1 I tend to cry at sad films. Stoic taciturnity
2 I sometimes cry in public. Stoic taciturnity
3 I do not let my problems interfere with my everyday life. Stoic taciturnity
4 I tend not to express my emotions. Stoic taciturnity
5 I like someone to hold me when I am upset. Stoic taciturnity
6 I do not get emotionally involved when I see suffering on television. Stoic serenity
7 I would consider going to a counsellor if I had a problem. Stoic taciturnity
8 I tend to keep my feelings to myself. Stoic taciturnity
9 I would not mind sharing my problems with a male friend. Stoic taciturnity
10 It makes me uncomfortable when people express their emotions in front of me. None
11 I don’t really like people to know what I am feeling. Stoic taciturnity
12 I rely heavily on my friends for emotional support. Stoic taciturnity
13 I always take time out to discuss my problems with my family. Stoic taciturnity
14 One should keep a ‘stiff upper lip’. Stoic serenity
15 I believe that it is healthy to express one’s emotions. Stoic taciturnity
16 Getting upset over the death of a loved one does not help. Stoic death indifference
17 I would not mind sharing my problems with a female friend. Stoic taciturnity
18 A problem shared is a problem halved. Stoic taciturnity
19 I would not cry at the funeral of a close friend or relative. Stoic taciturnity
20 Expressing one’s emotions is a sign of weakness. Stoic taciturnity
*The Liverpool Stoicism Scale is reprinted with permission from Gaitniece-Putāne.24 © Department of Psychology, University of Latvia, 2005.
All rights reserved.

2 Pathak EB, et al. BMJ Open 2017;7:e015137. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015137

 Open Access

BMJ Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015137 on 14 November 2017. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on January 30, 2022 by guest. Protected by copyright.
experiences of pathophysiology is one of the theoretical Stoic serenity is the belief that one should refrain from
underpinnings of our work. experiencing strong emotions.
In this report, we attempt to articulate an explicit Stoic death indifference is the belief that one should not
theory of stoicism and its potential impact on health. We fear or avoid death.
theorise that stoicism is a system for self-regulation rather Each item in our scale was carefully worded to capture
than a behaviour or personality trait. As a guide to ideal the respondents’ ideology, not their past behaviour,
self-conduct, it requires self-conscious implementation using a 5-point Likert response scale with the following
and regular enforcement; in other words, stoicism is an responses: ‘disagree’, ‘somewhat disagree’, ‘not sure’,
ideology (eg, a belief system which informs one’s atti- ‘somewhat agree’ and ‘agree’. Nine of the original 24
tudes and actions with the inherent potential for internal items were ‘reverse’ items that specified antistoic beliefs,
resistance and conflict). Personal ideologies create expec- that is, ‘I believe I should experience strong emotions.’
tations for people about who they are, as well as how they The participant version of the scale (pen-and-paper ques-
should and should not behave. For example, we theorise tionnaire) listed response codes of 0 (disagree) through
that people who strongly endorse a personal ideology 4 (agree). These responses were recoded during analysis
of stoicism may be more likely to avoid or delay seeking to range from −2 (disagree) to +2 (agree). Consequently,
professional medical intervention for serious signs and an average score of 0 corresponds to a neutral stance—
symptoms of disease. This personal ideology of self will neither endorsement nor rejection of stoicism. Positive
not mandate behaviour in a deterministic fashion; rather, scores indicate endorsement of a stoic ideology, while
stoicism will create expectations of ideal behaviour (which negative scores indicate rejection of a stoic ideology.
may not always be met). In order to test these theoretical
propositions in future research, a validated measure of Data collection
an individual’s endorsement of stoic ideologies is needed. Data were collected over a period of 10 months during
The purpose of our study was to develop a theoretically 2013–2014. All participants were university employees
coherent multidimensional scale to assess endorsement of or students. Written consent forms were waived by the
a personal ideology of stoicism, and to empirically validate IRB to ensure respondent anonymity but all partici-
this scale in a multiethnic sample of healthy communi- pants provided verbal informed consent. Each partici-
ty-dwelling adults. We present the results of confirmatory pant completed a brief paper-and-pencil questionnaire
factor analysis (CFA) of the multidomain PW-SIS, and consisting of the 24-item preliminary PW-SIS, sociodemo-
discuss the potential usefulness of this tool for predicting graphic questions and a final single item ‘I try to be a
constraints in health-related help-seeking behaviours. stoic’ with a 7-item response scale ranging from ‘never’
The PW-SIS is a generalised scale which assesses stoic to ‘all the time’. The study population consisted of a
beliefs and sense of self but does not explicitly measure convenience sample of 390 adults aged 18 years and older
health behaviours or health outcomes. Therefore, the who were recruited in person by the authors in public
PW-SIS can be used in a wide range of empirical research common areas of university facilities (eg, cafeterias) using
studies. walk-up tables. Monetary incentives were not provided to
In addition, in this report we conducted an exploratory
assessment of the association between high endorsement
of stoicism and participant age, gender, and race and Table 2  Characteristics of the study population (n=390)
ethnicity. We expect stoic ideologies to be embedded in a
N %
larger system of cultural beliefs that may be related to age,
gender, race and ethnicity, and other social characteristics. Age (year)
 18–24 303 77.7
 25+ 87 22.3
Methods Gender
Conceptual development of the stoicism ideology scale
 Female 221 56.7
Drawing on multiple scholarly and popular
sources,1–3 6 15 29–31 we developed the preliminary 24-item  Male 169 43.3
Stoicism Ideology Scale (PW-SIS) to capture endorsement Race and ethnicity
of five dimensions of stoicism (see online supplementary  White 215 55.1
table 1 in the Technical Supplement). Based on our liter-  Black 55 14.1
ature review and expert knowledge of philosophy, we
 Hispanic 59 15.1
defined each domain as follows:
Stoic taciturnity is the belief that one should conceal  Asian 36 9.2
one’s problems and emotions from others.  Biracial/other 25 6.4
Stoic endurance is the belief that one should endure Nativity
physical suffering without complaining.  USA (including Puerto Rico) 315 80.8
Stoic composure is the belief that one should control
 Other 75 19.2
one’s emotions and behaviour under stress.

Pathak EB, et al. BMJ Open 2017;7:e015137. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015137 3

Open Access

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Table 3  Pathak-Wieten Stoicism Ideology Scale
Original item
Item Domain number*
1. I expect myself to hide my aches and pains from others. Stoic endurance Q2
2. I don’t believe in talking about my personal problems. Stoic taciturnity Q3
3. I expect myself to manage my physical discomfort without complaining. Stoic endurance Q5
4. I believe I should experience strong emotions. [reverse code] Stoic serenity Q8
5. When the time for my death comes, I believe I should accept it without fear. Stoic death indifference Q12
6. I expect myself to hide my strong emotions from others. Stoic taciturnity Q13
7. I would prefer to be unemotional. Stoic serenity Q14
8. I expect myself to manage my own problems without help from anyone. Stoic taciturnity Q15
9. I believe my physical pain is best handled by just keeping quiet about it. Stoic endurance Q17
10. I would be very upset if I knew my death was coming soon. [reverse code] Stoic death indifference Q18
11. I expect myself to avoid feeling intense emotions. Stoic serenity Q20
12. I would not allow myself to be bothered by the fear of death. Stoic death indifference Q24
Authors were asked to rate Items on a 5-point scale: Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Not sure, Somewhat agree or Agree. See Methods
section for scoring instructions.
*See online supplementary table 1: Technical Supplement.

participants. A study response rate could not be calcu- quartile of the overall distribution of responses to repre-
lated due to the data collection methods. sent strong endorsement of stoicism.

Data analyses
Data analysis proceeded in five steps. During step 1, we
examined univariate response distributions for each of
the 24-scale items. A simple correlation matrix was exam-
ined to identify redundant items. Finally, we assessed
content validity based on agreement with the statement
‘I try to be a stoic.’ As a result of step 1 analyses, six
items were dropped from further analyses—including
the entire stoic composure domain. Further details of
this scale reduction step are included in the Technical
Supplement (online supplementary table 2).
During step 2, we conducted a CFA of the reduced
18-item PW-SIS. CFA is the appropriate analytic choice
to test scales that have an a priori, theoretically explicit
subdomain structure.32–36 We used proc calis in SAS V.9.4
for the CFA. Based on the results of the first CFA, we elim-
inated two items with poor factor loadings (see online
supplementary file 1, Technical Supplement, for details).
During step 3, we repeated the CFA on the reduced
16-item PW-SIS. Finally, for the purpose of parsimony
we further reduced the total number of scale items to 12
(3 items in each of 4 domains) and conducted a CFA on
the final 12-item version of the PW-SIS (step 4; see online
supplementary table 3). Additional details and rationale
for analytic steps 1–4 are included in online supplemen-
tary tables 1–3: Technical Supplement.
Step 5 of our analysis consisted of preliminary content
validation, examination of response distributions for
the overall and domain scores, and exploratory logistic
regression modelling of sociodemographic predictors of
strong endorsement of stoicism. For the logistic regres-
sion analysis, we categorised the outcome using the top
Results
The size of our study population (n=390) provided more
than 15 respondents for each question in the preliminary
scale, which exceeds the widely accepted norm of at least
10 respondents per question.37 Although skewed towards
younger adults (78% of respondents were <25  years
old), the study population was in other respects diverse
(table 2). A majority self-identified as female (57%) and
white (55%). Hispanics (15%) and Blacks (14%) were the
second and third largest racial/ethnic groups, followed
by Asians (9%) and biracial or other ethnicity (6%). A
substantial minority of respondents (19%) were born
outside the USA or Puerto Rico.
The final four-domain, 12-item PW-SIS is shown in
table 3. CFA of the final scale showed very good model
fit with individual item factor loadings ranging from
0.48 to 0.76, root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) =0.05 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.07), goodness-of-fit
index=0.96 and Tucker-Lewis Index=0.93.
Relationships among the PW-SIS and its four concep-
tual domains are shown in table 4. Cronbach’s alpha
ranged from 0.64 to 0.71 for the subscales and was 0.78
for the 12-item PW-SIS. Scores for stoic taciturnity were
strongly correlated with scores for both stoic endurance
and stoic serenity, but stoic endurance and stoic serenity
were not highly correlated with each other. Stoic death
indifference had the highest (most stoic) mean scores
among the four domains, and it was least correlated with
the other three domains.
Figure 1 depicts mean PW-SIS scores by response to the
statement ‘I try to be a stoic.’ There was a clear monotonic

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and statistically significant trend, with respondents who
reported trying to be a stoic ‘all of the time’ having the

Cronbach’s Correlation with Correlation with Correlation with Correlation with

highest stoicism scores, and respondents who reported
trying to be a stoic ‘never’ having the lowest stoicism

SDI score

P=0.0729

P=0.0005

P=0.0031

P<0.0001
scores. Most respondents chose one of the three interme-
diate categories. Respondents who chose ‘I don’t know’
0.09

0.18

0.15

1.00

0.53
as their response had stoicism scores similar to those who
said they ‘sometimes’ tried to be a stoic.
The distributions of mean scores for the four concep-
tual domain subscales are shown in figure 2. Domain
P<0.0001

P<0.0001

P=0.0031

P<0.0001
SS score

scores comprised the mean score for the three questions

in the domain. In this study population, respondents
0.53

0.35

1.00

0.15

0.72
were least likely to endorse stoic serenity and most likely
to endorse stoic death indifference.
The full distribution of respondent scores is shown
separately for women and men in figure 3. The distribu-
tions overlapped almost completely, but there were no
P<0.0001

P<0.0001

P=0.0005

P<0.0001
SE score

men with the least stoic scores, and no women with the
0.59

1.00

0.35

0.18

0.74

most stoic scores. Response distributions were skewed to

the left for women (less stoic) and to the right for men
(more stoic), consistent with a statistically significant
difference in the mean scores for women (−0.31, 95% CI
−0.40 to −0.22) and men (+0.04, 95% CI −0.05 to +0.14).
P<0.0001

P<0.0001

P=0.0729

P<0.0001
ST score

Results of an exploratory analysis of sociodemographic

1.00

0.59

0.53

0.09

0.79

predictors of high endorsement of stoicism are shown

in table 5. There is no a priori cut point designated as
‘highly stoic’ in the PW-SIS; in this analysis, the cut point
used was a mean score greater than the 75th percentile
of the overall response distribution. The top quartile of
Mean score (95% CI) alpha
Table 4  Conceptual domains of the Pathak-Wieten Stoicism Ideology Scale (PW-SIS)

−0.08 (−0.18 to +0.02) 0.71

+0.04 (−0.06 to +0.13) 0.65

−0.66 (−0.75 to −0.56) 0.64

Stoic death indifference (SDI): the belief that one should +0.08 (−0.03 to +0.18) 0.69

−0.16 (−0.22 to −0.09) 0.78

the distribution of all respondents (n=390) ranged from

+0.33 to +1.67. Among women, 18.9% strongly endorsed
stoicism, compared with 32.8% of men. After multivariate
adjustment, men were over two times as likely as women
to fall into the top quartile of responses (OR=2.30, 95% CI
1.44 to 3.68, P<0.001). Adults born in the USA or Puerto
Rico were also twice as likely as adults born elsewhere to
strongly endorse stoicism (OR=1.97, 95% CI 1.01 to 3.84,
P=0.048). ORs showing stronger endorsement of stoicism
by Hispanics, Blacks, biracial persons and adults 25 years
Stoic taciturnity (ST): the belief that one should conceal

Stoic endurance (SE): the belief that one should endure

and older were not statistically significant.

Stoic serenity (SS): the belief that one should refrain
one’s problems and emotions from others (modern)

physical suffering without complaining (modern)

Discussion
from experiencing strong emotions (classical)

The PW-SIS is a theoretically coherent, multidimensional

scale which demonstrates good psychometric proper-
ties and content validity based on initial validation in
a large sample of educated adults. The PW-SIS is also
Stoicism ideology scale (PW-SIS)
not fear or avoid death (classical)

brief and practical for integration into a wide range of

empirical research studies. In our study population of
mostly younger adults, endorsement of stoicism varied
by conceptual domain, with the weakest endorsement
of the classical domain stoic serenity (aversion to strong
emotions). Exploratory logistic regression analysis identi-
fied male gender and US birth as significant predictors of
strong endorsement of stoicism. Finally, point estimates
Domain

suggested higher endorsement of stoicism for Blacks,

Hispanics and biracial persons compared with Whites,
but these results were not statistically significant.

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Figure 1  Content validity of the Pathak-Wieten Stoicism Ideology Scale: mean scores by response to the statement ‘I try to be
a stoic.’

Integration of our theory of a stoic ideology of the
self into existing health behaviour models could help
explain the formation of beliefs and attitudes towards
criterion-specific help-seeking behaviours. Reasoned
action approaches—such as the integrative model
of behaviour prediction—poorly define background
factors that underlie belief formation.38 Measurement
of self-concepts, such as stoicism ideologies, may help
explain this population variability. Expanding health
behaviour theory to include aspects of the self could also
help inform health education messaging and risk-based
communication.
Ironically, a personal ideology of stoicism almost guaran-
tees failure to live up to one’s personal ideal. Experiences
of illness and disease often involve transient weakness and
functional limitations. With ageing, these experiences
will increase in frequency, duration and severity for most
people. Simply put, experiences of illness and disease
tend to require aid—whether from health professionals
in a formal context, or from family members or friends
in an informal context. An ideology of stoicism creates an
internal resistance to external objective needs, which can
lead to negative consequences.8–12

Figure 2  Pathak-Wieten Stoicism Ideology Scale: distribution of domain scores.

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Figure 3  Pathak-Wieten Stoicism Ideology Scale: distribution of overall scores by gender.

Gender and stoicism women and men overlapped almost completely. Despite
Stoicism is widely viewed as a defining attribute of the fact that men were twice as likely as women to
masculinity. Instruments designed to assess endorse- strongly endorse stoic ideology, our results suggest that
ment of hegemonic masculine ideologies have included gendered stereotypes about stoicism (‘stoic men’ and
specific questions that touch on stoicism. However, the ‘emotional women’) are overblown. Because the PW-SIS
conceptual and measurement overlap between these is agnostic to respondents’ genders, it is ideally suited
instruments and the four-domain PW-SIS is minor.17 For to investigate the empirical reality of stoicism among
example, in the widely used Personal Attributes Ques- both women and men. Furthermore, our finding that a
tionnaire, only 2 of 24 items relate to a single domain of minority of women strongly endorsed stoic ideology may
the PW-SIS. The Conformance to Masculine Norms scale be particularly important. For example, a study of major
assesses 11 distinct domains of masculinity, of which only strain among family caretakers of elderly patients with
2 (emotional control and self-reliance) partially overlap dementia found that those who used stoicism as a coping
with domains of the PW-SIS.18 19 In our study, the results strategy suffered burnout, while those who sought social
are notable because for both genders the most frequent support did not.39
scores were in the middle of the distribution (neutral
on stoic ideology), and the response distributions for Study limitations
In any questionnaire-based scale, validity of the individual
Table 5  Sociodemographic predictors of a mean Pathak- items and the total scale against the concept of interest is
Wieten Stoicism Ideology Scale score in the top quartile of paramount concern. Unlike many psychometric instru-
(>0.167) ments, the PW-SIS does not purport to measure a latent,
OR (95% CI) P value inherent trait such as personality, or a clinically definable
disorder such as depression or anxiety. Rather, we attempt
Age 18–24 years 1.00 (referent) to measure an explicit set of beliefs, which by definition
Age 25–73 years 1.34 (0.76 to 2.35) ns are neither inborn nor immutable. Therefore, a robust
Men 2.30 (1.44 to 3.68) <0.001 assessment of the content validity of our scale items
Women 1.00 (referent) must come after publication and evaluation by multiple
experts and researchers. We included a single question-
Asian 0.93 (0.38 to 2.25) ns
naire item ‘I try to be a stoic’ to assess content validity, but
Black 1.55 (0.78 to 3.09) ns
future validation and outcome studies could expand on
Biracial/other 1.70 (0.66 to 4.34) ns this approach or include a qualitative component.
Hispanic 1.88 (0.99 to 3.56) ns  A related question pertains to the predictive validity of
Whites 1.00 (referent) the PW-SIS. In other words, to what extent does strong
Born in the USA 1.97 (1.01 to 3.84) 0.048
endorsement of stoic ideology predict actual stoic
behaviours? Predictive validity can only be rigorously
Born elsewhere 1.00 (referent)
addressed through prospective study designs.

Pathak EB, et al. BMJ Open 2017;7:e015137. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015137 7

Open Access
Our study population, similar to many scale valida-
tion studies, was university based. Therefore, validity and
generalisability to very different populations should not
be assumed, but instead tested in future studies. In partic-
ular, validation of the PW-SIS among the elderly and
persons of lower educational attainment would be valu-
able for health-related research.
Strengths of the PW-SIS
Our scale has several strengths. First, all items refer
explicitly to the respondent; there are no aphorisms or
proverbs. Second, each item refers to an expectation or
belief about ideal self-conduct, rather than to a simple
description of past behaviour. So, for example, Q5 states ‘I
expect myself to manage my physical discomfort without
complaining’ rather than ‘I always manage my physical
discomfort without complaining.’ This distinction is crit-
ical to the theoretical underpinnings of the scale. Third,
we deliberately chose not to mention disease or illness
in the scale items, so that the scale would be appropriate
for a wide range of study populations, including currently
healthy individuals. (Although some items do explicitly
mention ‘physical pain’ and ‘everyday aches and pains’.)
Our intention was to capture the respondents’ global
endorsement of stoicism as a code of ideal conduct. Finally,
the PW-SIS does not reference gender norms, so it can
serve as a tool to empirically investigate gender differ-
ences in stoic ideology.
Directions for future research
The PW-SIS should be validated in multiple study popu-
lations with a range of socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics. Our theory that ideologies of stoicism will
result in constraints on health-related behaviours needs
to be empirically tested, ideally in rigorously designed
prospective studies. Given the rise of patient-centred
healthcare,40 41 understanding patients’ motivations and
perspectives has never been more important. The current
health education paradigm holds that improving patients’
knowledge of symptoms and signs will result in more
timely help-seeking behaviour.38 42–44 Each year, thousands
of individuals suffer needlessly and many die because of
extended delays in seeking professional aid for acute
medical conditions (eg, myocardial infarctions, strokes,
diabetic emergencies, cancer complications and pain,
and acute exacerbations of congestive heart failure).45–52
Numerous studies have been conducted to attempt to
elucidate the reasons behind patient delays,46–51 53 with
the ultimate goal of designing education programmes
and interventions that will result in timely help-seeking.
Significant risk factors for help-seeking reluctance have
been identified (eg, Black race52 54 55) but much of
the variation remains unexplained and we still lack a
complete understanding of why certain patients and not
others delay seeking aid.
A distinction of our theory is movement of the focus
of inquiry away from the disease and the patient’s rela-
tionship to the disease (eg, health knowledge, symptom
8 Pathak EB, et al. BMJ Open 2017;7:e015137. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015137
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awareness, ability to comply with self-care regimens)
and onto patients’ sense of self—their self-concepts and
self-identity.56 We hypothesise that illness behaviours may
become ‘noncompliant’ or ‘irrational’ or ‘self-harming’
when specific courses of action would create an internal
conflict with patients’ ideas of who they are. Specifically,
we posit that people who strongly believe that they
should manage their problems on their own, not show
emotions, and not complain about physical discomfort
will experience an internal cognitive conflict when faced
with a situation that could require help from others.
This internal conflict will lead to delays in or avoidance
of help seeking, with potentially life-threatening conse-
quences. For example, empirical studies of increasing
rates of male suicide in rural Australia have identified
hegemonic masculine norms of stoicism as an important
causal factor in the context of severe economic stress.57 58
Understanding the influences of race, ethnicity, socioeco-
nomic status, religion and other cultural factors on stoic
ideologies may help explain past research findings on
delays in help seeking. Finally, there may also be positive
health consequences of stoic ideologies for individuals,15
which careful prospective research could confirm.
Acknowledgements  The authors are grateful to the respondents for their
voluntary participation in this study. We would particularly like to thank the four
peer reviewers of this manuscript, whose detailed and thoughtful readings resulted
in a substantially improved final paper.
Contributors  EBP conceived the study. EBP and SW developed the preliminary
PW-SIS. All authors enrolled participants and collected questionnaire data. CWW
contributed statistical expertise to the confirmatory factor analysis. EBP analysed
the data. All authors interpreted the results and outlined the paper. EBP drafted the
manuscript. All authors contributed to literature review and substantive revisions of
the paper.
Competing interests  None declared.
Patient consent  Obtained.
Ethics approval  Institutional Review Board of the University of South Florida.
Provenance and peer review  Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Data sharing statement  No additional data are available.
Open Access This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the
Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 4.0) license, which
permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially,
and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is
properly cited and the use is non-commercial. See: http://​creativecommons.​org/​
licenses/​by-​nc/​4.​0/
© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the
article) 2017. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise
expressly granted.
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874625
research-article2019
GCH0010.1177/2059436419874625Global Media and ChinaSteenberg

Special Issue Article

Global Media and China

Bruce Lee as gladiator:

2019, Vol. 4(3) 348–361
© The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
Celebrity, vernacular stoicism sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/2059436419874625
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Lindsay Steenberg
Oxford Brookes University, UK

Abstract
This article situates Bruce Lee’s films and star persona in the context of wider patterns in global
genre cinema of the 1960s and 1970s. I argue for a connection between the Western reception
of Lee’s films and those of the mid-century Italian sword and sandal films, beginning with the
Colosseum fight between Bruce Lee and Chuck Norris that concludes Way of the Dragon (1972).
From the dojo fights of Fist of Fury (1972), through the tournament structure in Enter the Dragon
(1973), to his statistically led re-animation in the EA Sports UFC 3 (2018) videogame, Bruce Lee
can be usefully considered as a gladiator. Bruce Lee, as fighter, performer and star persona,
contributes to the enduring gladiatorial archetype that is an embedded feature in the Western
visual imaginary. Furthermore, I argue that the gladiator archetype itself shifted because of Lee’s
onscreen roles and the discourse that surrounds his star persona. In order to map these shifts
and patterns of confluence, I chart three main points of impact that Lee has had on the gladiatorial
archetype using his Western-facing roles on film and television, namely the television series
Longstreet (1971–1972) and Enter the Dragon (1973). First, I consider the inclusion of martial arts
and, second, the opening up of the field of representation to different models of masculinity,
including a leaner body type and a non-White – in this case, ethnically Chinese – gladiator.
The third point is the emphasis on a popular, or vernacular, stoicism. Ultimately, I elucidate
the relationship between the gladiator, Bruce Lee, and philosophy, arguing that Lee embodies a
vernacular stoicism that has become one of the defining features of the post-millennial gladiator
and notions of heroic masculinity in popular culture more widely.

Keywords
Colosseum, gladiator, martial arts, stoicism, violence

Corresponding author:
Lindsay Steenberg, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford OX3 0BP, UK.
Email: lsteenberg@brookes.ac.uk

Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)
which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original
work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
Steenberg 349

The Colosseum
In The Way of the Dragon (1972), Bruce Lee fought Chuck Norris in the Roman Colosseum. The
stands were empty of the bloodthirsty crowds of antiquity, although by all accounts the cinema
crowds were plentiful. The amphitheatre itself is pictured not in the digitally augmented whole-
ness of Ridley Scott’s turn of the millennium blockbuster Gladiator (2000) but as the ‘noble
wreck in ruinous perfection’ immortalised in Lord Byron’s romantic poetry. ‘Once more’, reads
a publicity card for the film, ‘the Colosseum echoes the sound of a fight to the death!’ This
sequence is compellingly gladiatorial – in its location, in its celebrity combatants with their dis-
tinct systems of fighting (Chinese boxing vs Japanese-American Karate) and in its celebration of
classically informed ideals of masculine warrior physicality. Furthermore, as a modestly budg-
eted genre film partially filmed in Italy, it recalls the cycle of so-called ‘gladiator movies’ that
experienced a golden age in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Western audiences watching Lee and
Norris in the Colosseum could not have failed to connect other spectacular genre fights staged
by the near-exhausted Italian genre.
I argue that the gladiatorial evocations of this fight sequence are not exceptional within Lee’s
oeuvre, nor in the paratextual legacies of his celebrity. From the dojo fights of Fist of Fury (1972),
through the tournament structure in Enter the Dragon (1973), to his statistically led re-animation
in the EA Sports UFC 3 (2018) videogame, Bruce Lee can be usefully considered as a gladiator. To
offer an initial broad definition, the gladiator is a professional fighter who combines showmanship,
professionalism, and violent skill. Paradoxically, the gladiator has come to signal both the corrupt
decadences of an empire’s spectacle-based culture and the ideals of its stoic masculine virtue. In
his Western reception, Bruce Lee belongs to an established pattern of gladiatorial visual imagery
(and narrative scenarios) linking the suffering body of the celebrity fighter with virtue, nostalgia,
and iconic philosophical principles.

Methodology
Because of this gladiatorial connection, quite differently from many other approaches to Bruce
Lee, this article analyses the Western reception of Lee’s films. It focuses more on those roles that
were visible in the West, notably Enter the Dragon and Lee’s earlier television appearances in
Longstreet (1971–1972). These two texts are centralised because they were designed with Western
audiences in mind and thus aim to present a version of Bruce Lee’s persona that the filmmakers and
showrunners considered most suited to Western media culture in the 1970s. In addition to these
textual representations, this article is focused on the Western reception and invention of Lee’s star
persona, particularly since his death. This attention to Lee’s position in the Western imaginary is
chosen because the gladiator as an archetype is rooted in Western culture and this Western gladiato-
rial dimension has remained underdeveloped in all treatments of Bruce Lee, whether they have
been Western or Eastern in focus.
Bruce Lee, as fighter, performer and star persona, contributes to the enduring gladiatorial arche-
type that is an embedded feature in the Western visual imaginary. Furthermore, I argue that the
gladiator archetype itself actually shifted because of Lee’s onscreen roles and the discourse that
surrounds his star persona. In order to map these shifts and patterns of confluence, this article will
first offer a critical definition of the gladiatorial, particularly in cinema. It will establish the fluid
relationship between the gladiator and genre before focusing on Bruce Lee as a gladiator. I chart
three main points of impact that Bruce Lee has had on the gladiatorial archetype. First, the inclusion
350 Global Media and China 4(3)

of martial arts and, second, the opening up of the field of representation to different models of mas-
culinity, including a leaner body type and a non-White – in this case, ethnically Chinese – gladiator.
The third point is an investigation of the emphasis on a popular, or vernacular, stoicism. Ultimately,
I elucidate the relationship between the gladiator, Bruce Lee, and philosophy, arguing that Lee
embodies a vernacular stoicism that has become one of the defining features of the post-millennial
gladiator and notions of heroic masculinity in Western popular culture more widely.

Towards a critical definition of the gladiatorial

The gladiator is a ubiquitous and infinitely adaptable archetype in Western culture.1 He is notable
for his striking physicality, for his martial skill and for being simultaneously celebrated and mar-
ginalised. From his first appearance in Roman funeral games in 264 BC, the gladiator has always
had a ritual or spiritual significance. His violence has always been more than spectacle. Nevertheless,
during their imperial heyday, the gladiatorial games (or munera) represented the apex of Roman
spectacular entertainment. The several hundred ruined amphitheatres discovered around the
Mediterranean are lasting visible evidence of Roman imperial expansion and the driving impor-
tance of celebrity fighters to their politics and culture.2 Gladiators did not disappear when they
were banned by Western Emperor Honorius in AD 404. It is through his vivid fictionalised afterlife
that the gladiator is upgraded from celebrity to archetype via pathways of neo-classicism (such as
Jean-Léon Gérôme’s painting in Figure 1), romantic poetry (such as Byron’s (1812–1818, 1816–
1817) Manfred and Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage) and genre fiction (such as Howard Fast’s (1951)
Spartacus and Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s (1834) The Last Days of Pompeii). It is in the cinema,
however, the gladiator finds his most resonant post-Roman expression through a compelling com-
bination of aesthetics and narration.
As I argue in a forthcoming monograph, in which I trace gladiatorial imagery in visual culture,
the gladiator archetype is perfectly suited to the medium of film, where he has found a successful
home in notable cycles such as the Italian peplum, which featured gladiators played by American
(or Americanised) bodybuilders. The genre is more commonly known by the label ‘sword and
sandal’ film or, more significantly, ‘gladiator movie’. The gladiator has most recently found
renewed popularity in the reboot of the genre begun by the 2000 release of Ridley Scott’s Gladiator,
where the character is haunted by post-millennial sadness and nostalgia.

Figure 1.  Jean-Léon Gérôme’s meticulously researched neo-classical painting provided inspiration for the
film Gladiator.
Steenberg 351

Mapping gladiator characters across approximately 400 feature films, television programmes
and, to a limited extent, videogames, I define the fictional gladiator as a man (occasionally a woman)
forced to fight (by circumstances or enslavement) for the entertainment of a capricious crowd. This
archetypal character is not limited to his Roman origins or to his associations with the sword and
sandal genre. Indeed, from the Colosseum to the Thunderdome and the most recent instalment of the
Thor franchise, the gladiatorial scenario plays out in resonant and strikingly conventional ways.
Examples of cinematic gladiators include men who fought in the amphitheatres of the ancient world,
such as Maximus (Russell Crowe) in Gladiator, Roccia (Dan Vadis) in Triumph of the Ten Gladiators
(1964), the eponymous hero (played by Arnold Schwarzenegger) in Conan the Barbarian (1982),
Milo (Kit Harrington) in Pompeii (Anderson, 2014) and the many Spartacii (Kirk Douglas, John
Heston, Kirk Douglas, Goran Visnjic, Andy Whitfield, and Liam McIntyre). I argue that the arche-
type also includes Tyler Durden (Brad Pitt) from Fight Club (1999), mind-controlled videogame
avatar John Tillman (Gerard Butler) in Gamer (2009), Katniss Everdeen (Jennifer Lawrence) from
The Hunger Games (2012) and the performer, fighter, and celebrity Bruce Lee.

Bruce Lee as gladiator

It is at the crossroads of the gladiator genre and archetype that I position Bruce Lee. He is the centre
around which a complex feedback loop crystallises between redemptive violence, philosophy, nostal-
gia, and transnational genre cinema. Lee fits all the features of the gladiator as I have outlined them
above. Fighting is never his characters’ first choice, as they are required to do so for a larger and
worthy purpose. The audiences that witness his performances in the cinema are frequently doubled
diegetically, as in the bouts in Enter the Dragon, the dojo fight in Fist of Fury or when Lee/Cheng
takes on a large group of thugs singlehandedly in The Big Boss (1971). Like the gladiators before
him, he is physically striking – iconic even. The much-reproduced image of a shirtless Lee from
Enter the Dragon with three scratches on his chest has become a metonym of Lee’s celebrity and,
arguably, of kung fu cinema in general. This iconic physicality parallels the role of the strongman in
the peplum genre and there are visible similarities in the way those gladiatorial bodies are positioned
in publicity posters and lobby cards advertising the films in which they appear (e.g. Figure 2).
If we take gladiatorial masculinity as a barometer for measuring shifts in cultural mythologies
(and I do), then the wildfire of Lee’s celebrity – and its ongoing paratextual and digitally augmented
legacies – represents a measurable shift in Western fantasies of ideal manhood. Such established
Western masculine ideals have been built on classicist or nostalgic reinterpretations of key Roman
concepts such as stoicism and virtus (a public-facing characteristic very loosely translated as mascu-
line martial valour and virtue).3 I would suggest that Lee’s appearance in Enter the Dragon is a key
stepping stone for bringing the gladiator archetype out of the Colosseum and into the present day. To
return to my opening imagery, Lee is able to step back into the Colosseum as a ruin and retrofit its
function as an enduring monument to past articulations of the warrior. Here the ruined Colosseum
belongs not to the Roman gladiator but the gladiator archetype as a larger, globalised icon.

Gladiator as teacher
The gladiator has always been a martial artist. The Roman gladiator was trained in a school (ludus)
in a particular style or armature (e.g. the net and trident of the retiarius) through a highly hierarchi-
cal and disciplined system. The contemporary sport martial artist is sometimes seen as a kind of
continuation of the professional gladiator. This connection is particularly resonant in the discourse
352 Global Media and China 4(3)

Figure 2.  The publicity posters above are built around the centrality of the gladiator characters, posing
here shirtless with their iconic weaponry.

surrounding the rise of Mixed Martial Arts where it is, paradoxically, used both as a marketing tool
for the Ultimate Fighting Championship and as an insult to condemn the brutality of the sport.4
However, the moment when the Western gladiator learned Asian martial arts is attributable to the
popularity and legacies of Bruce Lee’s stardom, beginning in the West with The Green Hornet
(1966–1967) and solidified with Enter the Dragon. The spectre of these lessons is visible in the
stylised gladiatorial violence of 2014’s Pompeii and the Starz series Spartacus (2010–2013).
Although Enter the Dragon remains absolutely crucial here, I would like to privilege one of Lee’s
television roles as primary to the process by which the gladiator learned kung fu or, to be more
precise, Jeet Kune Do. In the short-lived crime show Longstreet, an Adidas-clad, Reebok-wearing
Bruce Lee plays antiques dealer Li Tsung. Li is an advocate and practitioner of Jeet Kune Do who
becomes the martial arts/self-defence instructor to the titular character, tragically blinded insurance
investigator Mike Longstreet (James Franciscus). In typically orientalist fashion, Li becomes both
teacher and sidekick to the White male hero, embedded in the idealised multicultural ‘work-family’
group that gathers around Mike.
Li appears early in the first episode of the series (following the original 90-minute Pilot), enti-
tled ‘The Way of the Intercepting Fist’. His character and his Jeet Kune Do are clearly informed by
Lee’s star persona. Many of Lee’s most quoted aphorisms are articulated by this character, includ-
ing his advice:

If you try to remember you will lose. Empty your mind. Be formless; shapeless; like water. Now you put
water into a cup, it becomes the cup. Put it into the teapot, it becomes the teapot. Now water can flow and
creep or drip or crash. Be water, my friend.

It is important to acknowledge and analyse Li as an embodiment of Lee’s Jeet Kune Do and his
star persona; I would argue that none of his other screen characters embody Lee as directly as Li
Steenberg 353

Tsung. However, I would like to reconsider Lee’s role on Longstreet in the wider context of crime
television. Longstreet is a crime television programme that was broadcast on ABC, the network
that also screened Batman (1966–1968), the aforementioned The Green Hornet, and even earlier,
the similarly New Orleans-set procedural Bourbon Street Beat (1959–1960). The crime genre has
an established tradition of drawing on exciting urban locales and subcultures to flavour and dif-
ferentiate its generic content. Lee’s Jeet Kune Do should be read in the context of such American
‘flavouring’ tactics. Although Longstreet has a somewhat special status as a stage for Bruce Lee, it
needs to be stressed that it was first and foremost a crime series whose unique selling points were
its disabled investigator and the many exotic background details of New Orleans, of which antiques
dealer Li’s pragmatic martial arts was merely one recurring fixture. Li’s Jeet Kune Do is distilled
into a concentrated and digestible form, conventional to the genre and medium. In order to do so,
the show uses orientalist shorthand to frame Lee/Li as mysterious teacher–sidekick and places the
spectator in Mike’s position as student. The programme further fuses Li with the urban background
of an exoticised New Orleans invigorated by the youthful subcultures of the late 1960s.
I would argue that Longstreet’s importance to the industry and celebrity of Bruce Lee, as to the
archetype of gladiatorial masculinity, is to reinforce and naturalise the notion of the gladiator-
warrior as teacher. Meaghan Morris (2001) and Paul Bowman (2010, 2013) emphasise Lee’s
importance as an iconic teacher, particularly to Western audiences. Robert A. Rushing makes the
same point regarding the strongman characters of mid-Century Italian peplum films, arguing that,
‘from its beginning . . . the mid-century peplum presented the strongman as a teacher and a role
model’ (Rushing, 2016, p. 70). Rushing’s take is much more psychoanalytically focused, looking
to the strongman and gladiator as a teacher for young men (in the diegetic and cinema audiences)
and focusing on lessons about manhood and heterosexuality. He adds the caveat that ‘heterosexu-
ality must be gotten to, and it will require a Herculean labor to get there’ (Rushing, 2016, p. 70).
The screen image and persona of Bruce Lee, like the strongman, is an object of deep libidinal
investment for his audience. Like the Western gladiator characters before him, he gathers a crowd
of devoted young followers about him keen to learn from his strength and mastery. To this potent
pedagogical cocktail, Lee fused the traditions of martial arts pedagogy with its own long-standing
conventions. Despite the fact that Lee vocally insisted that his take on martial arts was a radical
departure from traditional martial arts teaching forms, in Longstreet, as elsewhere, he is able to
signal both this radical rupture with tradition and unspecified traditions of Asian spiritual martial
arts teaching styles. Lee/Li teaches Mike martial arts framed by generic conventions (both tele-
visual and martial), in ways that emphasise ritual repetition, pan-Asian mysticism, and personal
betterment.
The moment when the gladiatorial archetype incorporated conventions of Asian martial arts into
his fighting arsenal further represents a moment that opened up the field of representation for a
different kind of embodied martial masculinity. First and foremost, Lee subverts the persistent
whiteness of the gladiator character – a quality noted and influentially analysed by Richard Dyer
(1997). As Dyer establishes, by the turn of the 20th century, ‘the Caucasian whiteness of the clas-
sical world was taken for granted, down to the pleasures taken in the literal (hue) whiteness that its
statues now have’ (Dyer, 1997, p. 148). Like Lee’s character in Longstreet, non-White (generally
Afro-Caribbean) actors played roles as sidekicks to gladiators in sword and sandal films, for exam-
ple, Woody Strode’s memorable performance as Draba in Spartacus (1960). In films, and via the
celebrity industry that persisted after his death, Bruce Lee was not a sidekick but a central protago-
nist whose warrior identity and gladiatorial qualities had a profound impact on global audiences
fresh from seeing the monochromatic classicism of peplum genre cinema.5
354 Global Media and China 4(3)

The body of the gladiator

The body of Lee as gladiator moves away from the bulk of stars such as Dan Vadis, Mark Forest,
or Kirk Douglas to a toned and leaner body type defined by a tense kinetic energy. This would
inform, and arguably pave the way, for the physiques of later action stars such as Brad Pitt, Kit
Harrington, and Jason Statham, all of whom play gladiator characters. Lee’s celebrity hinges on his
abilities as a martial artist, bringing a hard edge of authenticity to the gladiator’s battles that had
before this been implied through the impressive physical size and lifting strength of the body-
builder. Gordon Mitchell (as Marcus) in Gladiator of Rome/Il gladiator di Roma (1962), for exam-
ple, signals his worthiness to fight by lifting boulders at a slave mine. Where Mark Forest or Dan
Vadis’ bodies are defined by posing in a manner recalling classic statuary (Dyer, 1997; Wyke,
1997), Lee’s onscreen physicality is rooted in rapid movement as much as static posing. Where the
strongman visibly strains or lifts, Lee’s gladiators explode into quick action. A notable example of
this association of Lee’s onscreen body with movement occurs in a much-circulated screen test in
which the 24-year-old Lee explains and demonstrates kung fu. After posing for the camera, Lee
demonstrates some movements against a volunteer, who visibly flinches at Lee’s speed (‘These are
just natural reactions’, explains the man). The crew can be heard laughing with admiration and
surprise at Lee’s quickness and his volunteer’s reactions. This association is further mythologised
in the celebrated ‘one-inch punch’ associated with Lee (and, like the screen test, widely circulated
online) and in the rumours that Lee’s punching speed was so fast on the set of Enter the Dragon
that they had to slow the cameras to capture his movement.
In addition to this sense of weaponised speed, the narration and fight choreography of many of
Lee’s film appearances also provide moments of sculptural intensity that recall the classicism of
ancient world statuary in a manner similar to the posing of the gladiator bodybuilder. This is exem-
plified in the Colosseum sequence in The Way of the Dragon, which sets up relatively static long
shots showcasing the combatants’ bodies as they slowly and with intention take off their shirts.
This is intercut with moments of fast blows and more mobile camerawork, including zooms. Nor
is this pattern limited to fight sequences, as The Way of the Dragon also features other moments in
which Lee/Tang Lung poses, for example, while warming up shirtless on a balcony.
David Bordwell has influentially identified the ‘pause/burst/pause’ pattern used to such pow-
erful effect in Hong Kong cinema, even using a sequence from The Way of the Dragon in particu-
lar to illustrate his point (Bordwell, 2000, pp. 221–224). Such a pattern reveals the importance
of combining stillness with movement to produce a compelling rhythmic structure to action. I
would suggest that while Western cinema, as Bordwell argues, does not take the best advantage
of this kind of rhythmic narration, the arena fights of Italian genre cinema and their big budget
Hollywood epic counterparts (e.g. Demetrius and the Gladiators (1954) and Spartacus) rely on
a similarly powerful combination of posed moments (and interchanges of gazes) with explosions
of violent action. In its Western cinematic setting, Bordwell’s paradigm can be amended to
describe gladiatorial combat not as pause/burst/pause but as pose/burst/pose. Because the per-
forming fighter must always keep his audience in mind, even in the heat of combat, posing is an
absolute necessity.
The pattern of interchangeability between gladiatorial posing and martial kinetic action, brought
together in Lee’s onscreen life, continues in the post-millennial sword and sandal film, which
Rushing observes is marked by the use of high-speed cameras that make possible a technique of
rhythmic ramping, an effect that permits movement between speeds in the same shot. The most
notable example of this technique is in Zach Snyder’s 300 (2006), which makes heavy use of this
Steenberg 355

practice to dramatise and aestheticise the struggle of the hyper-masculine Spartans. The effect,
according to Rushing, is that

Time is slowed, allowing the viewer to gaze in rapt admiration at the beautifully muscled body poised to
strike, and then smoothly ramps up to nearly normal speed so the viewer can admire the kineticism of the
movement as it uncoils. (Rushing, 2016, p. 56)

Starz’s Spartacus, in obvious homage to 300’s aesthetic, makes liberal use of rhythmic ramping
and moments of extreme slow motion in its presentation of gladiators. There is a genealogical
relationship here between the digital ramping of Spartacus and the zooms used to punctuate Lee’s
1972 Colosseum fight. Both represent moments when speed and focus change dramatically within
the shot and permit posing and speed to exist almost simultaneously. For Bordwell, the Hong Kong
pause/burst/pause pattern links stillness and speed in formal mastery that adds emotional impact
(‘motion emotion’) to the fight sequence, while, for Rushing, this combination (realised through
high-speed ramping and made famous in 300) is proof of the way sword and sandal films imagine
time as fundamentally entwined with the doomed nature of the gladiator character.

‘We who are about to die’

Enter the Dragon was released on Western screens shortly after Bruce Lee’s death in July 1973,
and its reception is framed by a hyper-awareness that what was supposed to be the Hollywood
breakout of a physically expressive star was an uncanny freeze frame of the cinematic moment just
before his premature death.6 This is compounded by the posthumous cobbling and recobbling
together of his unfinished film, The Game of Death (released in 1978 as Game of Death) and the
many faux sequels and ‘Bruceploitation’ efforts such as Goodbye Bruce Lee: His Last Game of
Death (1976) and Enter the Game of Death (1981). Like James Dean or Marilyn Monroe, Lee
belongs to a pantheon of Hollywood stars whose youthful qualities (of rebelliousness or sexuality,
for example) are frozen and heightened by their early deaths. Leon Hunt and Paul Bowman insist
that Lee’s Western stardom is built on the ‘paradox of an impossibly athletic and charismatic star
who seemed to have burned out on first contact. In this context, Lee’s death was always part of his
“aura”’ (Hunt, 2003, p. 97, cited in Bowman, 2010, p. 18). Furthermore, the tragic circumstances
surrounding the death of Lee’s son Brandon layer a deeper sense of tragedy to Lee’s stardom.
Inevitably, dying young is a fundamental feature of the cinematic gladiator; they are the morituri,
or ‘those about to die’. The cinematically ubiquitous if not historically accurate gladiatorial salute
nos morituri te salutamus/‘we who are about the die salute you!’ – underpins the mythological
appeal and melodramatic impact of the gladiator. As a boxer touches gloves or a martial artist
bows before their fight, so the mythic gladiator salutes his opponent, his emperor and his audience
before fighting. Such gestures are significant as they call attention to the ritual and narrative
importance of the gladiator’s violent performance, whether that happens in the amphitheatre or
the dojo. In his comprehensive study of the sword and sandal film, Rushing argues that the ‘about
to die’ of the gladiator is a key factor in the way the peplum genre imagines cinematic time as
slowed down or stopped; as he contends, ‘the time of the peplum is the time of the morituri, liter-
ally Barthes’ “going to die” of still photography, a future without a future’ (Rushing, 2016, p. 57).
I argue that this also describes the impact that Bruce Lee’s death has had on the Western reception/
understanding of Enter the Dragon and Game of Death, as well as, retrospectively, all of Lee’s
roles, filmed appearances (e.g. the screen test) and photographs (e.g. the one-inch punch). These
356 Global Media and China 4(3)

are recirculated, remediated, and recreated across digital culture; Lee’s ever-evolving star image
carries with it the sense that he, like the gladiator, is always ‘about to die’, frozen in his last skilful
movement as in the last shot of Fist of Fury. Gladiators are always about to die, even at the height
of their martial skill, physical fitness, and youthful beauty.
The rapid changes in time and speed coupled with the ‘about to die’ of the gladiator character
further frames the nostalgic register of the gladiator as a man who is always out of time (in both
senses of the phrase). This ‘about to die’ aura fuels the afterburn of Lee’s celebrity and cements an
elegiac structure of feeling that now belongs to the gladiator archetype, particularly since the turn
of the millennium with Gladiator. The gladiator has always been a man out of step with time. This
plays out in the ongoing negotiations around Lee’s celebrity discourse, which has become entan-
gled with the archetypal features of the mournfully sincere gladiator as well as the philosophical
wisdom of the cinematic kung fu fighter.

Philosophers and gladiators

The last and perhaps most significant way that Bruce Lee affected a change to the gladiatorial
archetype and connected the gladiators of the past with those of the cinematic present and future is
through his association with philosophy. In a now widely circulated interview (resonantly entitled
‘The Lost Interview’), Canadian author and historian Pierre Berton connects Lee’s superstar mar-
tial artist persona with philosophy and, significantly here, with the Greco-Roman world:

We don’t, in our world [by which he means the West], and haven’t since the days of the Greeks who did,
combine philosophy and art with sport. But quite clearly the oriental attitude is that the three are facets of
the same things.

Here, Berton connects the Western classical past with a (generic/orientalist) East Asian present,
suggesting that Lee’s articulation of violence belongs, in some way, to Western classicist ideals. It
is this triangulation between Western classicism, Eastern mysticism and Bruce Lee that I want to
examine through a popular, perhaps even populist, articulation of the philosophy of stoicism.7
Gladiators, well known as fighting performers like Lee, likewise have an established relation-
ship to philosophy and philosophers. Ancient Roman thinkers showed significant interest in the
figure of the gladiator, notably stoic celebrities such as orator and lawyer Cicero, statesman and
stoic philosopher Seneca, and gladiator physician and stoic critic Galen. Historically, stoic writers
have provided some important literary insights on Roman gladiators.8 Like the Christian writers
who would follow them (such as St. Augustine and Tertullian), they used gladiators as resonant
examples for their teachings on ethics and morality – as cautionary tales and, sometimes, as virtu-
ous ideals. Unlike later Christian thinkers, the Roman stoics sometimes employed the gladiator as
an illustrative example of ideal masculine virtus, acting in harmony with the nature of the universe
and as examples to emulate. Seneca likens the gladiator to a stoic wise man. Cicero points to the
gladiator’s discipline and ability to withstand pain. It is particularly as a pedagogical tool that the
gladiator is of the most concern to Roman stoic philosophy, in a manner that parallels the teaching
aspects of Bruce Lee’s public image. To be somewhat whimsical, it is tempting to make at least a
superficial connection between the Roman stoic statesman Cato the Younger and the martial artist/
chauffeur Kato played memorably by Bruce Lee in The Green Hornet series.
Where the gladiators of Rome and their cinematic realisations were generally used as illustra-
tive examples for philosophy, Lee changed the gladiatorial archetype in the wake of the post-war
Steenberg 357

sword and sandal film, adding a philosophic intellectualism that was not a part of this type of
masculinity before – from the silent character of Ursus in Quo Vadis (LeRoy, 1951) to Steve
Reeves’ grinning heroics. The gladiator went from being the body on which the philosopher might
meditate, to the body that fights and philosophises or philosophises through fighting. However, the
type of stoicism associated with Bruce Lee and with gladiatorial characters such as Maximus in
Gladiator would be almost unrecognisable to Seneca or Cicero.

Vernacular stoicism
The philosophical gladiators emerging in the wake of Bruce Lee’s popularity exhibit a kind of
popular stoicism which draws from neo-classicist nostalgic iterations of Greek and Roman stoi-
cism. This is part of a larger pattern of vernacular stoicism circulating in popular culture with
renewed vigour in the 21st Century. It is manifest in the popularity of philosophically flavoured
self-help books such as The Daily Stoic (Holiday & Hanselman, 2016), How to be a Stoic (Pigliucci,
2017) and social media sites such as The Art of Manliness. Nancy Sherman argues that stoicism is
a fundamental part of military identity, and she defines the vernacular sense of stoicism as associ-
ated with ‘control, discipline, endurance’ (Sherman, 2007, p. 2). This expression of stoicism is tied
to a masculinity that is unemotional, aloof and taciturn. However, I would argue for the centrality
of the martial undercurrents of vernacular stoicism and a powerful subtext of (just barely) con-
tained violence.
Bruce Lee is consistently associated with philosophy, as the Berton interview illustrates, and he
is also often described using the label and attributes of the vernacular stoicism I have just described.
For example, Kyle Barrowman’s analysis of an early comedic sequence in The Way of the Dragon
describes Bruce Lee’s performance as marked by a ‘Keatonesque stoicism’ (Barrowman, 2012).
Another example is a blog entry on The Daily Stoic connecting martial arts with stoicism, and
using Lee as an example of stoic patience (it cites his aphorism ‘I fear not the man who has prac-
tised 10,000 kicks once, but I fear the man who has practised one kick 10,000 times’). To push this
association further, I would suggest that Lee’s (1975) Tao of Jeet Kune Do has taken on a talis-
manic status similar to Marcus Aurelius’ Mediations as a popularised and recirculated ‘how-to’ of
warrior-philosophy. Certainly, many of the concepts outlined have stoic resonance. To wit,

The great mistake is to anticipate the outcome of the engagement; you ought not to be thinking of whether
it ends in victory or in defeat. Let nature take its course, and your tools will strike at the right moment.
(Lee, 1975, p. 12)

In this vein, but with reference to the digitally reanimated Lee featured in a Whisky commer-
cial, a New York Times review of The Bruce Lee Legacy Collection (Kehr, 2013) ends its summary
by associating Lee’s digital re-animation with stoicism: ‘Looming out of the shadowy back-
ground, CGI Lee expounds his stoic philosophy (“Walk on”) on behalf of Johnnie Walker Blue
Label whiskey. “Dragons never die”, says Digital Bruce – or is it that their managers won’t let
them?’ Here, the author aptly makes the connection between vernacular stoicism and the com-
mercialisation of Bruce Lee’s star image. In this way, the stoicism of Lee’s digital re-animation is
another lucrative element in the ‘Bruceploitation’ industry, which has been discussed at length by
Brian Hu (2008). Hu argues that the wave of Bruce Lee imitators (or ‘conjectural Bruce Lees’)
that appeared following the star’s death added to the star persona of ‘Bruce Lee’: ‘After his death
the Bruce Lee star persona functioned by becoming flexible and sticky, providing Bruce with new
358 Global Media and China 4(3)

Figure 3.  Sentiment visualisation from 9 August to 13 August 2019 for #brucelee.

narrative scenarios’ (Hu, 2008, p. 126). This process continues and Lee’s association with, and
embodiment of, a gladiatorial stoicism is part of a new narrative that has been layered on his exist-
ing persona, at least since the Pierre Berton interview and with more intensity in his posthumous
re-animations.

Social media sentiment visualisation

It is via social media, on sites such as The Daily Stoic and more generally on Twitter and Instagram,
that there is evidence of a particular bias towards reading Lee as a stoic warrior ideal. Here, I have
borrowed from the toolkit of the digital humanities and used the hashtag ‘#brucelee’ as a fruitful
cross section for analysing Lee’s digital legacy, as well as illustrating how he is now associated
with a stoic martial masculinity.
In 2019, between 9 and 13 August, there were 307 posts on Twitter using the #brucelee hashtag.
Sentiment visualisation software (Figure 3) demonstrates that Bruce Lee inspires Tweets on an
emotional register that is largely pleasant, falling under the labels like ‘calm’ and ‘serene’ but
within the active field.9 This fits nicely with popular notions of the stoic as simultaneously emo-
tionally controlled but physically active. In popular conceptualisations, the stoic is a man of action
rather than of emotions or words. Thus, the ‘emotional content’ of Lee’s persona has, in its digital
afterlife, moved away from the comic irreverence of the opening of The Way of the Dragon, the
undigested rage of Fist of Fury, or even the emotional expressiveness of Lee’s interview with
Berton. The vernacular stoicism of the persona ‘Bruce Lee’ exhibits an active serenity embodied
by his Western-facing characters, such as Lee in Enter the Dragon, and explicitly taught through
his teacher characters, such as Li in Longstreet. This stoic element has become more important
since Lee’s death.
Just as Lee’s digital re-animation represents an aspect of an established phenomenon of
Bruceploitation, his association with stoicism is a singular example of a wider pattern of analysis
that connects Lee with philosophy. This entanglement between man, martial artist, star performer,
and a generalised sense of Eastern philosophy continues to be a source of a good deal of discussion
Steenberg 359

and debate. Paul Bowman suggests that most analyses in popular accounts ‘either collapse into
odes of straightforward hagiography or celebrations of a rather saccharine self-help ideology’
(Bowman, 2010, p. 169). Such considerations are built on assigning Lee the status of authorial
genius or visionary iconoclast. This tendency notably continues in, and is compounded by, many
of the popular publications on stoicism.
While Lee famously opposed what he read as the rigidity of classicism, particularly in the teach-
ing of martial arts (cf. Lee, 1971, 1975), in his stoic associations he has become a model for a kind
of classicism that is a hybrid expression of Eastern and Western pasts, philosophies and fighting
systems. Rather than the bricolage of postmodernism that implies composites, pastiche or hybridi-
sation, the post-digital stardom of Lee belongs to a gladiatorial network. Furthermore, Lee’s star-
dom has shifted this network to imagine a gladiator-as-philosopher via layered pathways of
associations, the most salient of which is a stoicism that is vernacular in its use and hybridised in
its references from Eastern and Western sources.

Conclusion
To conclude, I would like to journey back to the Colosseum to reinforce the assertion that Bruce
Lee should be considered in the context of wider patterns of gladiatorial masculinity. His fight with
Chuck Norris is the apex of his creative expression as a filmmaker and martial performer, as
nowhere else did he have as much control over the cinematic product as with The Way of the
Dragon. It is significant that Lee chose the Colosseum as the stage for this fight because it explic-
itly connects Lee as a fighting performer to the Roman gladiators who fought in that amphitheatre.
Bordwell (2000) describes this memorable moment as when Lee ‘turns the West’s emblem of
combat, the Coliseum, into an arena for Eastern gladiators’ (p. 51). This off-hand summary has
profound resonance. This moment, and the Western fame that was to follow Lee’s death and the
release of Enter the Dragon, solidified Lee’s persona as gladiator-performer-philosopher.
Lee’s star image continues to feed into and out of the fluid archetype of the gladiator. Despite
the resolute whiteness of the character, Lee’s enduring but evolving star discourse has opened up
the archetype to different types of physical expression and embodiment. Like other gladiators,
Lee’s screen characters belong to the ranks of the morituri, those about to die, frozen in youthful
physicality at the active moment just before death. As a philosopher-gladiator, Lee has come to
embody a hybrid vernacular stoicism that can nostalgically recall the traditions of the past while
retrofitting them in ways that are easily digestible and feel both mysteriously ancient and urgently
modern.

Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article: The author is grateful for the support of Oxford Brookes University, which awarded her a
Research Excellence Fellowship that contributed to the completion of this article.

ORCID iD
Lindsay Steenberg https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3576-1593

Notes
1. As the gladiator is largely, though not exclusively, a male archetype, I will be using masculine pronouns
throughout the article. For a more nuanced discussion of the gender politics of the gladiator archetype,
360 Global Media and China 4(3)

please see Steenberg (2014, in press). I will also be using the term ‘gladiator’ to describe the archetypal/
mythic character as well as the Roman professional fighter. When discussing the Roman gladiator, I
will indicate his historical specificity, otherwise I will refer to the archetype (onscreen and beyond) as
‘gladiator’.
2. For a more detailed history of Roman gladiatorial competition between 264 BC and AD 404, please see
Hopkins (1983), Edwards (2007), Fagan (2011) and Golvin (2012). Accessible but useful popular histo-
ries of the gladiator include Meijer (2004), Hopkins and Beard (2005) and Bishop (2017).
3. For a detailed etymological study of the term virtus during the republican period, see McDonnell (2006).
4. For a more detailed discussion on the triangular relationship between the Ultimate Fighting Championship
(UFC), gladiatorial imagery, gladiator films and martial arts cinema see Bolelli (2014).
5. There is not space in this article to fully unpack notions of whiteness, classicism and Bruce Lee. I flag
this up as significant here but remain focused on the gladiatorial archetype and the key changes brought
about by Lee’s films and star image.
6. Lee died on 20 July 1973. Enter the Dragon was released in Hong Kong on 26 July 1973, in New York
on 17 August 1973 and the rest of the United States on 19 August 1973, and in London on 10 January
1974.
7. This study of Bruce Lee remains focused on his associations with Western philosophy, particularly stoi-
cism. I limit this study to Western philosophy in order to interrogate Lee’s role within the gladiatorial
archetype. However, I briefly acknowledge and explore the way Lee’s star persona in the West built
itself around his ability to project a pan-Asian mysticism, rather than any specific philosophic tradition
or school of thought.
8. For example, see Cagniart (2000).
9. This time range was dictated by the parameters of the software and the tweets from this time are repre-
sentative of those that are routinely posted under #brucelee, as several other representative time periods
were also surveyed in the past (e.g. the period between 6 July and 11 July 2018 saw 264 tweets that fell
in a similar pattern).

References
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McDonnell, M. (2006). Roman manliness: Virtus and the Roman republic. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
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Author biography
Lindsay Steenberg is Senior Lecturer in Film Studies at Oxford Brookes University where she co-ordinates
their graduate programme in Popular Cinema. Her research focuses on violence and gender in postmodern and
postfeminist media culture. She has published numerous articles and chapters on the crime and action genres.
She is the author of Forensic Science in Contemporary American Popular Culture: Gender, Crime, and
Science and is currently working on a monograph entitled Breaking the First Rule of Fight Club: Tracing the
Gladiatorial Impulse in Visual Culture, for which she has been awarded a Research Excellence Fellowship
from Oxford Brookes.
 philosophies

Article
Political Correctness between Wise Stoicism and
Violent Hypocrisy
Lorenzo Magnani
Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section and Computational Philosophy Laboratory,
University of Pavia, 27100 Pavia, Italy; lmagnani@unipv.it

Academic Editors: Jean-Yves Beziau and Thalia Magioglou

Received: 23 September 2016; Accepted: 30 November 2016; Published: 8 December 2016

Abstract: This article aims at commenting in a novel way on the concept of political correctness,
by showing that, even if adopting a politically-correct behavior aims at promoting a precise moral
outcome, violence can be still perpetrated, despite good intentions. To afford in a novel way the
problem of political correctness, I will adopt a theoretical strategy that adheres to moral stoicism,
the problem of “silence”, the “fascist state of the mind” and the concept of “overmorality”, which I
have introduced in my book Understanding Violence. The Intertwining of Morality, Religion, and
Violence: A Philosophical Stance (Springer: Heidelberg/Berlin, Germany, 2011). I will demonstrate
that political correctness certainly obeys the stoic moral rule, which teaches us that we have to
diminish conflicts and, so, the potential for derived violence, by avoiding to pronounce words
and expressions that can be offensive and so conflict making. Unfortunately, political correctness
often increases the so-called already widespread overmorality, typical of our era, and postulates
too many minor moral values (or rights) to be attributed to individuals and groups, which must
be respected. Therefore, engaging in political correctness obscures more serious issues regarding
social, political and economic life, committing a sin of abstractness and idealization. At the same
time, by discouraging the use of words and expressions, the intrinsic overmoralization at work
creates potential new conflicts and potential derived violence.

Keywords: political correctness; stoicism; hypocrisy

1. “The Trio of Chubby Girls Nearly Olympic Miracle”

Simply following Wikipedia, we can find an acceptable definition of political correctness: it refers
to language, policies or measures that are intended not to offend or disadvantage any particular
group of people or minorities in society (cf. also [1–3]).1 Recently, in Western society (especially
in the U.S., but now also, insistently, in the EU) politics, mass media and some academic circles, a
kind of obsessive and prudish reference to the need of a politically-correct behavior grew beyond any
expectation, referring for example to a kind of multiculturalist cult, feminism, equality of cultures,
affirmative action, etc., and favoring self-victimization, always seen as related to fundamental moral
values to be implemented to the aim of the progress of civilization and freedom. Usually, political
correctness is proposed by some, sometimes aggressive, elitist small groups formed by important
politicians, journalists, rich and famous actors and major protagonists of mass-media, and it is
occasionally adopted, reproduced and sometimes magnified in social networks (obsessively) and in
academia and higher education (pedantically).

1 In the media, the term can be used as a pejorative, implying that these policies are always excessive. It is well known that
in October 1990, the New York Times article by Richard Bernstein promoted a strong popularization of the term.

Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274; doi:10.3390/philosophies1030261 www.mdpi.com/journal/philosophies

Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 262

Indeed, today, political correctness undoubtedly embeds a controversial connotation because

some imprecise and inconsistent norms have been extensively applied in educational settings,
especially in the academic environment. Since the 1990s, this caused the reaction of several authors,
who discussed the radical (sometimes blind) enforcement of politically-correct measures in high
schools and colleges of the United States and Canada (cf. [4–6]). Derived moral agendas are often
considered by a large part of public opinion arbitrary, abstract, hypocritical and unjustified challenges
to the standard semantics of natural languages of various groups.
Here is a simple sad example of the excessive use of political correctness aiming at protecting
the dignity of women: in August 2016, a sport journalist of an Italian national newspaper has
been (unbelievably) fired because of his article “Il Trio delle cicciottelle sfiora il miracolo olimpico”
(“The trio of chubby girls nearly an Olympic miracle”), which was considered offensive
against women.
I am convinced that to increase knowledge about the problem of political correctness, it
is important to exploit three central topics I also discussed in my book Understanding Violence.
The Intertwining of Morality, Religion, and Violence: A Philosophical Stance [7]:

(1) the relationship between morality and violence, also linked to the so-called “fascist state of the mind”;
(2) the concept of overmorality;
(3) the stoic doctrine of indifference.

2. Political Correctness between Morality and Violence

I have said that political correctness refers to language, policies or measures that are intended
not to offend or disadvantage any particular group of people in society. As already highlighted
by [8], political correctness is a “process of making judgments from the vantage point of a particular
ideology”, and it usually represents a strong moral commitment that also carries a halo of special
modernity and a high level of civilization. Let us see the problem of political correctness in light of
some aspects of stoic moral philosophy.
In light of the stoic tradition, we can say that there are preferable moralities (for example, for me
and for other intellectual people). Just to make an example, I prefer life imprisonment to the death
penalty, because I see a weaker violence in it: yet, it is clear that the success of such a preference
depends on the struggle in the objective life of groups and their cultures and on the fact that the
option I endorse is the established one in my legal framework (sadly, I often notice that the established
habit is the most violent one). I am almost sure that many people here in Northern Italy, who actively
militate in the “Lega Nord” (Northern League), basically embedded in a xenophobic state of mind,
consider the death penalty to be less violent than life imprisonment (because, I guess, from their own
inner “moral” perspective, they think that killing a killer diminishes the global violence of a society
and that it is the “just” punishment).
Is perceiving injustice “natural”? Obviously, I do not think so. Perceiving injustice is very
variable: do you not see how different the feeling of injustice is in different people? I like capitalistic
social-democracies, and I am very surprised to see how many people do not perceive at all the
global injustice of this horrible (at least for me) neo-con/neoliberal capitalism. Therefore, perceiving
injustices consists of a practice heavily affected by cultural and axiological factors: here in Italy, there
are people who lost their jobs or their private enterprise/business, and who became poor (or poorer),
because of neoliberal policies, but they still morally think neoliberalism is the best and do not perceive
its atrocious outcomes like I do. I think they are incoherent and ignorant, but many of them surely
think I am a stupid dreamer and/or a horrible and verbally violent member of a presumptuous
intellectual elite oriented towards social democracies! I like equality, but I do not have any reason to
think that equality is something special. I am aware that, if we want to impose and establish equality,
we have to perform what Walter Benjamin calls a law-making violent act (consider for example, the
French revolution). Indeed, many people and groups do not like equality and do not think equality is
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 263

a positive aspect of a strong morality, even now in the 21st Century: they consequently feel constantly
violated by the modern civil idea of “égalité”. Therefore, why think that equality is void of any
relationship with violence? The egalitarian groups usually hate non-egalitarians and vice versa,
as I think they are both convinced they are dealing with a “pure/good morality” (which justifies
any related violence, thanks to the moral bubble they are in).2
I always endorsed political correctness as a very progressive moral commitment: this conviction
does not have to obliterate the fact that it can be a carrier of violence under many perspectives,
as I will try to illustrate in the following parts of this article. As a philosopher, adopting a
naturalistic perspective, what I want to avoid is establishing a final and stable truth about political
correctness, that is a dogmatic and “locked” moral-philosophical perspective about “what is political
correctness?” Of course, I also want to avoid answering questions like “how can we properly apply
political correctness”. Answering these questions inside philosophy seems to me the perpetration
of a high degree of intellectual violence, disrespecting the banality and, so to say, moral dignity of
trivial simple human behaviors. These behaviors, when related to the respect of “correctness”, might
perpetrate a violence that can be clearly empirically seen: a violence that can consists in abstractly,
without a serious reason, negating diversity or even unaware of harming people in various ways.3
However, the reader must not misunderstand me! When I say I want to provide a “moral
dignity” to human behavior, I am referring to the fact that we have to respect it, as a human behavior
that cannot be neutralized with an abstract, narcissistic, emancipating, conceptual philosophical
theory (too “low cost”, from both the intellectual and emotional point of view). This would be
a kind of violence, a merely abstract terminator machine, “written in more or less complicated
books and articles”, which just fakes a perverse atmosphere of an almost empty moral “militancy”.
In short, I cannot compose a list in which I distinguish between good and bad politically-correct
behaviors. In this article, I would simply like to increase philosophical and cognitive knowledge
on political correctness’ multiple aspects, to show how it is de facto intertwined with violence
and how much violence is hidden, and invisibly or unintentionally performed, when derived from
that supposed-to-be-always-noble moral commitment. In a few words, I already remarked along
almost all of the pages of my book that I have quoted above that I think it is mandatory, in our times,
to stress the other face of (presupposed) good things and beliefs. Gogol, for example, was perfectly
aware of the fact that knowledge, inclination and sensitivity to good is always inextricably bound to
knowledge, inclination and sensitivity to evil.
As an individual, I have of course my own (evolving) morality, but, as I already said, I keep
it as something very particular that I do not intend to “teach” to anyone. Here are some elements
of what I consider to be my morality: (1) I do not like the overmorality (cf. Section 4 below) that I
witness everywhere; (2) in my behavior, I always try to “lower emotions”, to avoid a priori conflicting
situations where morally-dependent conflicts (and conflicts of other cultural perspectives) can arise;
(3) I try to treat people according to their “nature”, like Zeno of Citium says: “The goal of life is living
in agreement with nature”; (4) I do not like revenge, but I try to transform it, when it is possible of

2 Being constitutively and easily unaware of our errors is very often intertwined with the self-conviction that we are not at
all violent and aggressive, but just moral, in the argumentation we perform (and in our eventual related actions). A moral
bubble, in which an agent is “trapped”, refers to the fact that we only see the moral side of our actions and not the possible
violent effects. I have introduced and explained this concept in [7], Chapter Three.
3 For example, political correctness could lead to a patronization of people’s behavior from a philosophical point of view,
which reflects the same effect of the blind enforcement of political correctness norms that, as already pointed out by Žižek,
are “all the more humiliating inasmuch as they are masked as benevolence” [9]. Indeed, several studies pointed out how
blind politically-correct measures provided much distress in some closed communities (such as universities, high schools,
workplaces) than the previous enactment of less strict norms of behavior. Just to mention two cases, [10] testified how, in
his clinical work as a family systems therapist, he had repeatedly encountered experiences of social distress in clients who
attempted to deal with strong political correctness measures, and a study conducted by [11] reported how the pressure to
appear politically correct in educational settings can create discrepancies between public behavior and private attitudes,
generating phenomena of hypocritical acceptance of norms rather than multicultural comprehension.
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 264

course (better to avoid revenge if it involves too violent outcomes) into a moderate, non-retaliatory,
didactic reaction (if this is not possible or feasible, I simply give up). As you can easily see, this is not
a morality in the common sense of the term (like my inner Catholic morality, which I learned when
I was a child and, that anyway, I still love and try to follow); it is something more personal and also
characterized by meta-moral aspects (individual, customized to me and through my history), related
to a possible good construction of myself.
As a researcher in moral philosophy, I am convinced that there is a spontaneous generation of
violence through morality. As an example, imagine that you are a good stoic (as I would like to be),
and you are morally intelligent because you prefer to prevent violence. Other people that entertain
relationships with you, and that instead prefer and like the behavior you perceive as “violent”, can
perceive “you” as violent because you prefer to violently repress your passions and emotions like
stoicism requires! Moreover, we must not forget that people often “like” violence (emotionally
or, more rationally, because they are morally convinced of its “moral” function: punishment,
purification, revenge, edification, etc.), and it is difficult to dissuade them. When we approach violent
people to persuade them about the badness of their behavior, we are in turn very often considered as
non-violently violent!4
Indeed, the violent dimension of morality is embedded in the extent that is self-blind or, as I
already mentioned in previous works, auto-immune [12,13]. The more self-righteous a moral norm
is felt by the individuals who apply it, the less they will notice its intrinsic violence. For strict
politically-correct measures, the danger of self-blindness is doubled. On the one hand, people who
enact these measures may not be aware of the strong moral position they are enforcing (and so, of
its violent dimension). On the other hand, as [9] pointed out, they may hardly be aware of the fact
that using new forms of labels in order to substitute blunt and cruel forms, they could still highlight
the same difference they are trying to avoid noticing (as replacing the word “fat” or “stupid” with
“weight challenged” and “mentally challenged” strongly focus the attention on the lacks/problems
that people try to ignore), becoming even more humiliating and aggressive in the eyes of the victims.
I have said above that the dimension of wisdom (stoics, etc.) is a good morality; I can now
clearly add that it is always related to an aristocratic attitude. From the moral point of view, political
correctness is stoic because it aims at weakening risky conflicts, violence, oppression, etc., which
derive for instance from some verbal expressions. For example, some expressions originate in those
cases in which humans perform an act of elimination of proper names (“kikes” for Jews, “gooks” for
Vietnamese; for two decades, the former Italian prime minister has made an annoying, but efficacious
and aggressive use of the word “communist” to indicate simply democratic or Christian-democratic
people, and in turn, he has been nicknamed by his adversaries as “the dwarf” for his short size, in a
bitter escalation of calling each other names). Thus, comprehending the limitation of the enforcement
of blind political correctness, I agree with [14] when he declares that “politically correct solutions
can likely be imprecise, inconsistent, pragmatic, logically indefensible. That does not make them less
ethical”. Therefore, in the following section, I will analyze the so-called “fascist state of the mind”,
showing those behaviors (mainly verbal) that surely political correctness can beneficially contrast.

3. Extreme Absence of Political Correctness: Intellectual Genocide

In that psychological state, the psychoanalyst Bollas [15] called the “fascist state of the mind”5
verbal attack very often creates a more or less unconscious “sense of murdering”. In the worst cases,
various kinds of so-called fallacious arguments are used, also to provide those symptoms I personally
consider real “alarms” through which it is possible to abduce the emergence of the fascist state of

4 On this interplay of violent/non-violent, cf. also [7], Chapter Four, Section “Nonviolent Moral Axiologies, Pacifism,
and Violence”.
5 For a treatment of this subject in the perspective of the relationship between morality and violence, see my [7], Chapter 5.
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 265

mind: Bollas lists some of the main efficacious cases, which he eloquently considers as the tools for a
possible intellectual genocide, which is considered as a real, new and important “category of crime”.
A subset of these is the group of rhetorical methods that substantiate what he calls the committive
genocide:6

(1) distortion of the opponent’s image, for example using a massive quantity of ad hominem;
(2) decontextualization of the opposing view: this phenomenon is in turn linked to the scapegoat
mechanism (which often relies on gossiping dynamics) that I have already illustrated in [7].
Bollas also adds that “The extreme of this act is the removal of a victim from his tribe, home
(i.e., context), isolated for purposes of persecution” [18] (p. 208);
(3) denigration, depicting the opponent’s position as ridiculous;
(4) caricature, which helps delineate and identify the group or the ideas that have to be considered
undesirable and so “killed”;
(5) change of name: I just illustrated above speaking of Jews and Vietnamese people as an act
of the elimination of proper names (“kikes” for Jews, “gooks” for Vietnamese people and of
Berlusconi). It is pretty obvious that this elimination reverberates the subsequent potential
elimination of the people/ideas from the socio-political scene and in the worst case from the
very “community of living people”.7
(6) categorization as aggregation, when the individual is transferred to a general category, usually
with a bad connotation, in which he/she loses his/her identity and qualities: “he/she is a
psychopath”, “he/she is an immigrant”, “he/she is a former alcoholic”.

To be simple and clear from the perspective of the philosophy of violence: here, I am not referring
to the more or less legitimate desire of the fascist (and of all human beings) to win against others, to
become richer or to acquire power and command, but to the extremely violent and harmful tools
he/she uses that, because of their radical character, always surpass in cruelty the tools used by the
opponents, which are less violent and so “constitutively” weaker if compared with those used by
the fascist.
This consideration also clearly explains the rapid implementation of a “virtuous” circle of evil.
All opposition, that the germinal fascist state of the mind depicts as weak and with the stigmas
of doubt and complexity, quickly actually becomes weak, doubtful and vulnerable to everyone
embedded in that very opposition and so perceived as weak by the collectivity dominated by the
fascist state of the mind. It is just this cluster of violent effects, so paradigmatic in the case of the fascist
state of the mind, that political correctness aims at contrasting: the “oppositions” here are instead
simple groups, genders, sexual minorities, etc., affected by verbal and written abuses of politically
“uncorrect”, not necessarily fascist, people. Indeed, political correctness also refers to less violent
abuses, with respect to the ones perpetrated by the fascist state of the mind, though still serious and
worth being contrasted.
Certainly related to this fascistic aspect (and to other less violent aspects, which live undisturbed
in our mass media marketing, newspapers, social networks and books) is the general aggressive
component of so-called “conversational dominance”, which asymmetrically establishes an unequal

6 Salmi [16] usefully lists the various effects of genocide under the category of alienating violence, when a person is deprived
of her/his rights to emotional, cultural and intellectual growth, by means of racism, social ostracism and ethnocide. This
has to be distinguished from repressive violence, which resorts to a mere deprivation of basic rights other than the right to
survival and protection from injury, including civil, political and social rights [17] (p. 320).
7 Other processes of methodical “substitution” (especially active in the case of Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeitepartei)
were related to: (1) the substitution of religion by the instrumentalization of art; (2) the substitution of art by propaganda;
(3) the substitution of propaganda by indoctrination; (4) the substitution of culture by monumentalism; (5) the substitution
of politics by esthetics; (6) the substitution of esthetics by terror (masses, already transformed into a homogenous
conglomeration where the elbow room that would enable any political or cultural relation is missing, are further weakened
through the erasure of the very faces, metaphorically, aiming toward a total anonymization, and any sense of individual
responsibility) [19].
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 266

distribution of entitlements and rights, such as the opportunity to introduce new topics, and
verbally victimizes some participants.8 Furthermore, this level political correctness can produce a
positive role.
The emphasis on the role of fallacious argumentation in the formation of the fascist state of
the mind can easily explain how abusive “manipulations” in discourse interaction at the social
level (through written text, speech and visual messages) are important in totalitarian states and
collectivities, but also in standard professional settings, institutions, families, etc. They are violent
tools used by dominants to establish inequalities of various types and possibly to perform intellectual
genocide, when they achieve their absolute target of annihilating opponents. I have to say that
political correctness is not in general applied to many demagogical manipulations typical of
politicians, mass media and financial authorities of our times, which I consider deeper cases of abuse
and violence, even if, maybe, it should be. It easily vaporizes, when in contact with, so to say,
strong powers, for example political or economical, because trying to “correct” weak and vulnerable
people is easier, since political correctness is related to the use of that simple weapon consisting of
natural language. Van Dijk lists the major argumentative and structural tools that are involved in
manipulation processes, which are almost always devoted to focusing on those cognitive and social
characteristics of the recipient that make them more vulnerable and less resistant:

(a) Incomplete or lack of relevant knowledge—so that no counter-arguments can be

formulated against false, incomplete or biased assertions; (b) Fundamental norms, values
and ideologies that cannot be denied or ignored; (c) Strong emotions, traumas, etc.
that make people vulnerable; (d) Social positions, professions, status, etc. that induce
people into tending to accept the discourses, arguments, etc. of elite persons, groups or
organizations. These are typical conditions of the cognitive, emotional or social situation
of the communicative event, and also part of the context models of the participants,
i.e., controlling their interactions and discourses. [. . . ] [Moreover, discourse structures
materialize suitable constraints which favor manipulations:] (a) Emphasize the position,
power, authority or moral superiority of the speaker(s) or their sources—and, where
relevant, the inferior position, lack of knowledge, etc. of the recipients; (b) Focus on the
(new) beliefs that the manipulator wants the recipients to accept as knowledge, as well
as on the arguments, proofs, etc. that make such beliefs more acceptable; (c) Discredit
alternative (dissident, etc.) sources and beliefs; (d) Appeal to the relevant ideologies,
attitudes and emotions of the recipients [21] (pp. 375–376).

At this point, we can say that the exercise of political correctness implements a moral attitude that
is capable of annihilating some of the violent results I have described in this section: consequently,
we can easily conclude that, surely, politically correctness is good.

4. Overmorality: When Humans Are Too Politically Correct

Typical of the fascist state of the mind I illustrated in the previous section are also the so-called
cases of omittive genocide, which resort to the absence of reference when the life, work or culture
of an individual or group is intentionally not referred to. Of course, this is an ordinary tool that,
when performed systematically and constantly against well-chosen targets, can be both at the basis
of the fascist state of the mind and a simple tool in the subtle violent dynamics of everyday life, á la
“Desperate Housewives”.
It is at this level that we can envisage the first bad effects of political correctness. To be politically
correct is often, too often, especially now, related to two main aspects, linked to “omittive” behaviors:

8 [20], Chapter 8: “Dispute and aggression” also studies the role of insults as a precursor to physical aggression in their
intertwining with arguments that can be used to establish sociability.
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 267

(1) hypocrisy; we just condemn almost innocent verbal intemperances and easily employ all our
indignation (and all our moral energies) against the expression “The Trio of Chubby Girls
nearly an Olympic Miracle”, forgetting that in Western society, women are killed and abused
in more serious ways: when concretely faced with this problem, we have already spent all
our moral energies in being politically correct, in punishing the uncorrect verbal abuser and,
so, in feeling so morally proud, and also, pathetically, I have to say, in feeling ourselves
exonerated from further commitment to defend the female gender. Political correctness is
in this case a violent way of omitting to speak or to treat more urgent problems of violence
and abuses, reaching a hypocritical pacifying state, as bluntly reported in a popular article
entitled “Do we want to be politically correct or do we want to reduce partner violence
in our community?” [22].9 Moreover, the pressure to appear politically correct can lead to
the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, as reported by [11]. Pluralistic ignorance is the
overestimation of a group endorsement of an attitude or a norm when, in fact, it enjoys little
support among group members. Van Boven explains that the desire to appear politically correct
in order to be deemed as ethically sensitive can indeed lead people to support affirmative
action despite privately held doubt, increasing the erroneous perception that a particular norm
is widely accepted in a group. This obviously also leads to the hypocritical acceptance and
diffusion of controversial norms for politically-correct behavior;
(2) abstractness and idealization: often, political correctness is related to too controversial new
moral values, which do not necessarily represent an increase of dignity of the people involved.
Indeed, it may cause episodes of “sweeter discrimination”, which is perceived less verbally
aggressive, for the lexicon used, by the perpetrators, but it is still felt as absolutely discriminatory
by the victims. In this perspective, politically-correct behaviors aim at favoring (and at the same
time derive from) abstract and ideal discussions and debates about some minor “rights” to be
preserved and defended, diverting attention from more serious moral issues of social, political
and economic life.10

4.1. Overmorality
The first aspect I have just introduced a few lines above is related to the problem I called ([7],
Chapter 6) overmorality. I maintain that overmorality (that is, the presence of too many moral
values attributed to too many human features, things, event and entities) is dangerous, because
it furnishes too many opportunities to trigger more violence by promoting plenty of unresolvable
conflicts. I recently realized that overmoralization is analogous to the problem of overcriminalization,
when I found the book by Husak [23]: overcriminalization presents similar discontent with respect
to overmoralization. For example, Husak contends that the state lacks a good reason to punish drug
users and that, thanks to overcriminalization, injustice (consequently) increases, and it is pervasive
throughout the criminal domain: the results of criminal justice in the presence of overcriminalization
are often perverse and “unjust”, with the consequence of an exceptional and expensive quantity

9 A paradoxical event that concerned political correctness has been the cancellation of the television program Politically
Incorrect, a political talk show hosted by Bill Maher that aired from 1993 to 2002. Six days after the 11 September 2001
attacks, Dinesh D’Souza appeared on the program. He commented on the event by criticizing people who suggested
terrorists were cowards by saying, “Look at what they did. You have a whole bunch of guys who were willing to give their
life; none of them backed out. All of them slammed themselves into pieces of concrete. These are warriors”. Maher agreed
with D’Souza’s comments and said, “We have been the cowards. Lobbing cruise missiles from two thousand miles away”.
Maher’s comments ultimately led to advertisers ending their support and his show being canceled. This is a funny
paradoxical story in which we can see both the moral and violent character of political correctness at work: there were
subsequently comments in various media on the irony that a show called Politically Incorrect was canceled because its host
had made a supposedly politically-incorrect comment (cf. Wikipedia, entries Politically Incorrect and Dinesh D’Souza.)
10 We have to say that, for example mass media, which are strong sustainers and promoters of political correctness, are
instead, on multiple occasions, far from being politically correct, so promoting, for example, hate speech, unaware of the
politically-incorrect use of language, images or cartoons that irritate or provoke religious groups and devotion to horrible
politicians who, so to say, “cannot be criticized”.
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 268

of people in prison. Provocatively, Husak contends that a right not to be punished should be
implemented, given the fact that, like Jeremy Bentham already contended, any punishment is a
violence. Why would this right deserve less protection than free speech, freedom of association or
liberty of conscience? Too many people are more or less violently legally punished because of the
infringement of mere mala prohibita and not because they also did mala in se. Thus, often, those
punishments are not deserved, not even as mere didactic examples to be presented to other humans.
A description of the main assumptions indicated by Husak is simply given by Donoso [24]:

Husak exposes with clarity how a system characterized by overcriminalization puts at

stake basic principles of the rule of law by making people unaware of what types of
conduct are criminally proscribed; precluding them from having adequate notice of some
of their legal obligations; and, ultimately, by undermining one of the main goals of the
system of law, namely, to guide people’s behavior (p. 11). Overcriminalization also breaks
principles of legality by making the criminal law outsource from non-criminal branches
of the law (p. 13), which runs the serious risk of making the criminal law even less
intelligible for the layperson and making its limits dependent on the limits of spheres
of law that are beyond its proper domain. Despite these and other reasons to be worried
about overcriminalization, Husak emphasizes—guided by “the peculiar American penal
context” (p. 14)—that the principal reason to be troubled by having too much criminal law
is that it produces too much punishment. That is the most urgent source of injustice on
which the book focuses.

Analogously, I think that an excess of morality coincides with an excess of punishment and
conflict, and this explains my sympathy for Husak’s ideas. Political correctness, today, tends to project
moral worth to too many aspects of life, also extremely marginal: our example of “Chubby Girls” is
eloquent. It is nice to see people (and especially males) so worried about the fact that Olympic girls
can be so easily offended, but attributing such a value to the female body, so that you are forbidden to
say it is “chubby” without being severely punished, is too much. Indeed, this moral attitude trivially
conflicts, for example, with my traditional moral frameworks (and of many people like me) that are
more worried about violence against women through rape and murder or through much more violent
abusive verbal vulgarity. Moreover, we do not have to forget that an excess of too disputable political
correctness creates in some people and groups an unwelcome climate of repression.
Indeed, I think that our era is characterized by a huge quantity of fragmentary, often
contradictory, moral values and allegiances that affect human behavior in confusing and conflicting
ways: the excess of new values related to a sophisticated and controversial exercise of political
correctness forms an important part of this set. This complexity often makes people simply ignorant
of basic moral rules, which would be instead useful for their practical life in a community, to avoid
potential violent conflicts. Indeed, it can be contended that fragmented pieces of morality can corrupt
and transform more basic and fruitful tenets. The stoics always emphasized the need to limit the
over-expansion of morality. They contended that humans could recognize that many of the values
they attribute to events, behaviors, artifacts, and so on, should be considered indifferent. On closer
analysis, many things are indifferent (as in the case of some of the excessively questionable moral
values invented by political correctness), and to take excessive moral care of them is wrong and
pernicious. The stoics are very severe against overmorality:

Since such things as health, wealth or reputation could not affect virtue, it made no
difference to the wise man whether he had them or not, and he could not consider them
good or evil. Zeno termed them all “indifferents”, but he called such things as health
and wealth “according to nature” and the opposite of these “contrary to nature”. [. . . ] But
even if the virtue of the wise man was not affected by the loss of property, it was necessary
for him to earn his own living and to support his family. Zeno called actions of this kind
“duties”, “acts of which a reasonable account can be given”. A man could be virtuous in
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 269

sickness or poverty but from the practical point of view he had to pay enough attention to
health to be a good soldier in the defense of his country and enough attention to money
to earn his own living [25] (pp. 152–153).

Duties of this kind are of low or no moral value, seen in proportion to how they aid the natural
instinct for self-preservation. Hence, it seems clear that:

(1) if we deprive “things” of their excessive moral value and reduce them to “preferable” or “not
preferable” targets, which are related to merely “practical” duties, it is less likely they can
trigger deep passion and unmanageable intra-personal and interpersonal conflicts, and we
will certainly be less inclined to use them as a way of punishing ourselves and other human
beings for not respecting our too many unquestionable moral commitments; less wrongdoing
would help us, like Coeckelbergh [26] (p. 243) says, “[. . . ] to set up institutions that prevent
‘interminable generations of prisoners’ and pay more attention to those who do good in spite of,
and in response to, the tragic character of human action and human life”;
(2) unfortunately, to espouse the doctrine of the indifferents is still a strong “moral option”, which
can generate conflict with people who think those things you do not consider to be valuable
are instead worthy of being endowed with some positive moral values and certainly not to be
neglected from this point of view.

In Section 2, I have said that, from the moral point of view, political correctness represents an
example of stoic moral behavior because it aims at weakening risky conflicts, violence, oppression,
etc., deriving for instance from some verbal expressions that originate in those cases in which humans
perform an act of verbal or written abuse. From another, still stoic, perspective, we have just seen that
political correctness is also responsible for an increase of that overmorality already present in our
Western societies, prone to create new conflicts and consequently new potential violence.

4.2. Is Silence Politically Correct?

We still have to work on the second aspect illustrated above at the beginning of Section 4,
regarding the fact that abstractness and idealization often affect political correctness. We said political
correctness is related to too controversial values, which do not necessarily represent an increase of
the dignity of the people at stake, and favors (and at the same time derives from) abstract and ideal
discussions and debates about some minor “rights” to be preserved and defended, still diverting
attention from more serious moral issues of social, political and economic life.
In a few words, political correctness often creates a kind of indirect silence about important
concrete and important moral situations because of an excess of idealization and abstraction
regarding minor issues, which play a strong distracting role. This is for example typical of politicians,
journalists and in general of mass media. To better illustrate this aspect, we have to examine the
general moral problem of silence. Silence can be seen as a way to morally and stoically disregard a
situation (basically, we do not express our moral opinion or judgment) in order to avoid the possible
rise of conflicts. It is something also implied in the behavior of politically-correct people who avoid
expressing even true propositions in case they might offend the receiver. Regrettably, often silence
can also favor violence: Zerubavel [27] (p. 16) observes that conspiracies of silence pose serious
problems, and we therefore also need to examine their negative effects on social life.11 For example
taboos, euphemisms and tact are certainly related to the act of weakening our, so to speak, excessive
“expressions of morality” (a kind of overmorality), but:

11 The same consideration has been exposed by several authors of the so-called epistemology of ignorance [28–30]. Indeed,
on several occasions, it is highlighted how feminist and anti-racist issues should be directly addressed without reserve and
modesty in order to overcome the walls of silence that various cultural environments try to perpetuate with euphemistic
labels, indirect comments or implicit references.
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 270

Aside from the pressure to see and hear no evil, there is also a strong social pressure not
to acknowledge the fact that we sometimes do indeed see or hear it. Not only are we
expected to refrain from asking potentially embarrassing questions, we are also expected
to pretend not to have heard potentially embarrassing “answers” even when we actually
have. By not acknowledging what we have in fact seen or heard, we can “tactfully”
pretend not to have noticed it [27] (p. 30).

The relationship of this consideration with politically-correct behavior is extremely clear.

Moreover, from this point of view, not breaking the silence is a way of controlling violence and
diminishing it. We have said that often silence triggers violence. Politics of denial and sex repression
are clear examples: repression is often operated as an injunction to silence, an admission that there
was (and is) nothing to say about such things, nothing to see and nothing to know, as has already been
clearly analyzed by Foucault [31,32]. Additionally, we know perfectly well that, unfortunately, silence
breakers are often ridiculed, vilified and even mobbed/ostracized, thus becoming victims of other
kinds of violence. A similar destiny is now reserved for people who refuse to obey politically-correct
behaviors they consider stupid and marginal.
Furthermore, various groups consider silence breakers as threats to their existence and safety.
Similarly, various groups of the followers of hyper-inspective politically-correct policies consider
breakers of political correctness as threats to their dignity and not only to the rights and dignity
of the target people. In general moral cases, we also face a paradoxical effect when, in an effort to
preserve group cohesion, conspiracies of silence can undermine that cohesion by jeopardizing the
development of trusting relations presupposed by overt communication (anyway, is it not, maybe,
the case that an excess of silence due to political correctness behaviors inside a group is a menace to
communications and group cohesion and to the “development of trusting relations presupposed by
overt communication”?).
Silence is also embedded in conflicting moral situations. With the “moral” scope of “protecting”
her family, a woman who suspects that her husband is molesting their daughter may thus pretend
not to notice it. In such a way, she perpetuates the inflicted violence, but by breaking the silence, she
would attack the integrity of the family as a whole, which is always seen as a value. Conspiracies of
silence may also trigger feelings of loneliness.
On the other hand, the moral non-violent function of silence has to be emphasized and, so,
its counterpart in the case of political correctness: “[. . . ] denial also helps protect others besides
oneself. Being unaware that the person with whom I am talking is constantly yawning may indeed
be self-protective, yet pretending not to notice it so as not to embarrass him is clearly motivated by
altruistic concerns” [27] (p. 75) . Being tactfully inattentive and discreet helps save the public image of
our neighbors and avoids conflicting with them and hurting their feelings. Of course, the conspiracy
of silence does not protect only individuals, but also the group collective image and safety.
Finally it is worth mentioning an issue that an anonymous reviewer submitted to my attention,
related to a specific relationship between silence and political correctness. Sometimes, political
correctness produces what the reviewer calls injurious “silence”, which seems akin to voluntary,
but unjustifiable, “blindness” regarding instances of injustice. For example, in current universities,
the administrations refuse to use ethnic or racial descriptions regarding perpetrators of crimes or
misdemeanors. Gender identification appears unobjectionable in crime reportage, but otherwise
descriptions of, say, assailants tend to be of such generality as to be quite useless as a guide for
police or anxious students. Further, it appears that also broader issues, like the details of possible
connections between violence and ethnic groups, tend to be exaggeratedly precluded by political
correctness as areas for scientific investigation.
Other aspects of silence less related to the problem of politically-correct behavior are very
interesting and have to be reported. Silence is also used to help people in crossing the line into
committing violence: they are kept in ignorance of what they are doing for as long as possible.
Keeping people in the dark is often performed by manipulating ambiguity and misunderstanding
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 271

in order to promote wrongdoing [33]. Other related ways of encouraging violent behavior, which in
multiple ways comply with the lack of information and/or silence, are related to:

(1) diffusion of responsibility (the larger the group, the less responsible and informed any
individual member feels);
(2) division of labor (which helps conceal responsibility and even the possibility of tracking and
individuating the single responsibility as regards harm perpetrated);
(3) exploitation of trust and loyalty (when, for example, people at the bottom trust the
decision-makers at the top to do the right thing and unaware, become evildoers);
(4) suppression of private doubts and inhibitions thanks to the immersion in groups (whatever
their peaceful private feelings, people tend to express only the “correct” view imposed by a
group they belong to, for example of strong hatred against an enemy).12

Furthermore, the so-called “ostrich effect” is related to the problem of silence.13 Basically, the
ostrich effect is the tendency to ignore unpleasant information by means of avoidance and/or
denial. The result is to keep silent on certain matters, thus blocking the possibility that a certain
piece of information is made publicly available or acknowledged. This is also described, still in
metaphorical terms, by the English expression “the elephant in the room”, to refer to an object
that everybody is indeed aware of, yet no one wants to publicly acknowledge [27]. After all,
when adopted, political correctness can obliterate the actual moral thoughts of people, so favoring
deception or miscommunication.
There are a number of reasons why people prefer not to publicly acknowledge that they have
certain problems. Consider, for instance, the case of some holocaust survivors who refused to recount
their violent experiences passing on the same attitude to their children and grandchildren. What they
experienced in the concentration camps was so violent and horrific that they decided not to disclose it
even to their closest relatives. Additionally, even when asked to explicitly mention some experience
from that time, they still resisted by resorting to the use of euphemisms, for example, in the case
of holocaust, “unmentionable years” or “the war”. Paradoxically, the recourse to euphemisms (that
basically change the names of certain events) allows victims to refer to brutal experiences without
actually mentioning them. Holocaust survivors are “silent witnesses”, who prefer not to share their
experiences because it would be extremely painful and traumatic to disclose them.14 These cases can
be also considered as related to the behaviors, so to speak, of self-political correctness, to hide those
memories that can harm again those victims.
Conversely, one may opt not to talk about certain events not because of a trauma, but because
it might involve fear or lack of confidence, or because of political correctness. An example similar to
the one related to domestic sexual abuse is the following: in a family, other members may decide to
keep silent about a member’s drinking problem just because they are afraid of the consequences
and conflicts or because they are afraid of not being able to address the problem or tackle it.
Active avoidance is meant as a survival strategy, when, for instance, people lack the resources to
cope with a problem.
On some other occasions, denial is just a matter of tact. We purposefully avoid noticing a certain
detail in our friend just because we are supposed to ignore it. This may regard more or less trivial
things like, for instance, bad breath, weight gain or hair loss. Contrary to the examples of the bad
application of political correctness, in these and similar cases, even if the values at stake are trivial
and simple, silence is still good because it is able to protect individual local affective relationships.
Furthermore, disclosing and communicating certain information may irritate people or make them

12 These cases are typical of what is called structural violence, which I have described in [7], Chapter 1, and reiterated with
some aspects of the kinds of disengagement of morality described in the Chapter 5 of the same book.
13 Cf. [34,35].
14 Aspects of violence pertaining to the Holocaust in the perspective of Hannah Arendt and feminism are dealt with in [36].
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 272

feel embarrassed. We would rather prefer not to make people lose face. This might also be related to
privacy and its ethical underpinnings. For instance, we may omit to say that our colleague’s husband
cheated on her, thereby causing depression, when the boss is going to assign a new and important
task, because that could influence his/her decision. Here, what is implicit is that the communication
of certain information is not ethically neutral, as it can promote malicious gossiping or, even worse,
discrimination or mobbing. More generally, even in the absence of a legal duty to privacy, silence can
be a protective measure related to the respect of people’s ability to develop and realize their goals.15
The ostrich effect can also be interpreted as a particular case of self-deception. More precisely,
it stresses the relationship between language and self-deception. Indeed, silence is not an inattentive
attitude, according to which we simply do not pay attention to something; it is an active way of
diverting attention, such as we have illustrated above in the case of the side effects of some cases of
political correctness. Paying attention to these aspects relates to the problem of the violent dimension
of language. Silence and denial can be explicit responses to this. Language, which is indeed the
product of massive cognitive processes made possible and reinforced also thanks to the docility of
humans in communicating and in accepting information that arrives from other people, is a carrier of
morality, but can turn out to be like a weapon able to harm people when adopted and constrained in
politically-correct human environments.
In these final remarks, having seen the problem of political correctness in light of silence and the
ostrich effect, we have tried to demonstrate how these aspects still point to the double face of political
correctness: it can perform moral, violent and both moral and violent roles, depending on the time
and contexts of its application.

5. Conclusions
In this article, I have tried to show that political correctness is not always a good policy and can
very easily promote violence of various kinds. Political correctness obviously aims at moderating
conflicts and, so, possible related violence, but at the same time, often establishes too many new
moral values, supposed to be respected, which are sometimes easily considered of minor moral
worth. Therefore, engaging in political correctness often reinforces that “overmorality” that grips
current Western societies. Too many new disputable moral worths are at the same time sources of
new conflicts and possible new violent outcomes: political correctness, exaggerated in abstractness
and idealization, can easily be accused of disregarding more serious issues concerning social, political
and economic life. Natural language, the main human tool to be controlled when adopting political
correctness, turns out to be like a weapon able to harm people, because silencing or disregarding,
superficially, some parts of language that carry traditional moral values can originate offense and
violence. I have tried to demonstrate how this fact is related to the double face of political correctness,
and I concluded that it can play both moral and violent roles, depending on the time and contexts of
its application. My analysis adopted a theoretical strategy involving moral stoicism, the problem
of “silence”, the “fascist state of the mind” and the concept of “overmorality”, which I consider
fundamental in the current debate about the relationship between morality and violence.

Acknowledgments: Parts of this article are excerpted from the book Understanding Violence. The Intertwining
of Morality, Religion, and Violence: A Philosophical Stance, Springer, Heidelberg, 2011, Chapter 6, Copyright
(2011). For her suggestions regarding the problem of ignorance and Žižek considerations, I am indebted to my
collaborator Selene Arfini.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

15 More details concerning the general ethical and violent role of silence and the ostrich effect are illustrated in [7], Chapter 3.
Philosophies 2016, 1, 261–274 273

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1. Friedman, M.; Narveson, J. Political Correctness: For and Against; Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, MD,
USA, 1995.
2. Schwartz, S. The Revolt of the Primitive: An Inquiry into the Roots of Political Correctness; Transaction
Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ, USA, 2003.
3. Geoffrey, H. Political Correctness: A History of Semantics and Culture; John Wiley & Sons: Malden, MA,
USA, 2010.
4. Herbert, K. The Politically Correct bypass: Multiculturalism and the Public Schools. Soc. Policy 1991, 22,
33–40.
5. Anderson, C.B. Political correctness on college campuses: Freedom of speech v. doing the politically
correct thing. SMUL Rev. 1993, 46, 171.
6. Poole, D.L. Politically correct or culturally competent? Health Soc. Work 1998, 23, 163–166.
7. Magnani, L. Understanding Violence. The Intertwining of Morality, Religion, and Violence: A Philosophical Stance;
Springer: Heidelberg/Berlin, Germany, 2011.
8. Kelly, R.J.; Rubal-Lopez, A. Political correctness and multiculturalism: Who support PC? J. Soc.
Distress Homeless 1996, 5, 111–137.
9. Žižek, S. The Ticklish Subject; Verso: New York, NY, USA, 1999.
10. Chabot, D.R. Political correctness: Contributing to social distress? J. Soc. Distress Homeless 1996, 5, 143–147.
11. Van Boven, L. Pluralistic ignorance and political correctness: The case of Affirmative action. Int. Soc.
Political Psychol. 2000, 21, 267–276.
12. Magnani, L.; Bertolotti, T. Cognitive bubbles and firewalls: Epistemic immunizations in human reasoning.
In CogSci 2011, XXXIII Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society; Carlson, L., Hölscher, C.,
Shipley, T., Eds.; Cognitive Science Society: Boston, MA, USA, 2011.
13. Arfini, S.; Magnani, L. An eco-cognitive model of ignorance immunization. In Philosophy and Cognitive
Science II. Western & Eastern Studies; Magnani, L., Li, P., Park, W., Eds.; Springer: Heidelberg, Germany,
2015; Volume 20, pp. 59–75.
14. Peterson, P.E. Classifying by Race; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2014.
15. Bollas, C. Cracking Up: The Work of Unconscious Experience; Routledge: London, UK, 1995.
16. Salmi, J. The different categories of violence. In Violence: A Philosophical Anthology; Bufacchi, V., Ed.;
Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills/Basingstoke, UK; New York, NY, USA, 2009; pp. 311–319.
17. Bufacchi, V. (Ed.) Violence: A Philosophical Anthology; Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills/Basingstoke, UK;
New York, NY, USA, 2009.
18. Bollas, C. Being a Character: Psychoanalysis and Self Experience; Routledge: London, UK, 1993 [1992].
19. Mandoki, K. Terror and aethestics: Nazi strategies for mass organization. Renaiss. Mod. Stud. 1999, 42, 4–81.
20. McKinlay, A.; McVittie, C. Social Psychology and Discourse; John Wiley & Sons: Chichester, UK, 2008.
21. Van Dijk, T.A. Discourse and manipulation. Discourse Soc. 2006, 17, 259–383.
22. Hamel, J. Do We want to be politically correct, or do we want to reduce partner violence in our
communities? Partner Abuse 2010, 1, 82–91.
23. Husak, D. Overcriminalization. The Limits of the Criminal Law; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2008.
24. Donoso, A.M. Review of Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization. The Limits of the Criminal Law.
Crim. Law Philos. 2010, 4, 99–104.
25. Reesor, M.E. The “indifferents” in the old and middle Stoa. Trans. Proc. Am. Philol. Assoc. 1951, 82, 102–110.
26. Coeckelbergh, M. Criminal or patients? Towards a tragic conception of moral and legal responsibility.
Crim. Law Philos. 2010, 4, 233–244.
27. Zerubavel, E. The Elephant in the Room. Silence and Denial in Everyday Life; Oxford University Press: Oxford,
UK, 2006.
28. Proctor, R.N.; Schiebinger, L. (Eds.) Agnotology. The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance; Stanford University
Press: Stanford, CA, USA, 2008.
29. Tuana, N. The speculum of ignorance: The women’s health movement and epistemologies of ignorance.
Hypatia 2013, 21, 1–19.
30. Sullivan, S.; Tuana, N. Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance; SUNY Press: New York, NY, USA, 2007.
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31. Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison; Sheridan, A., Translated; Vintage Books:
New York, NY, USA, 1979 [1975].
32. Foucault, M. (Ed.) Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984); New Press:
New York, NY, USA, 2006.
33. Baumeister, R. Evil. Inside Human Violence and Cruelty; Freeman/Holt Paperbacks: New York, NY,
USA, 1997.
34. Karlsson, N.; Loewenstein, G.; Seppi, D. The ostrich effect: Selective attention to information.
J. Risk Uncertain. 2009, 38, 95–115.
35. Brown, A.L.; Kagel, J.K. Behavior in a simplified stock market: The status quo bias, the disposition effect
and the ostrich effect. Ann. Financ. 2009, 5, 1–14.
36. Bar On, B.A. The Subject of Violence: Arendtean Exercises in Understanding; Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham,
MD, USA, 2002.

c 2016 by the author; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC-BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Editorial

For reprint orders, please contact: reprints@futuremedicine.com

Back to the future: Stoic wisdom and

psychotherapy for neuropsychiatric
conditions
Andrea E Cavanna*,1,2,3
1
Department of Neuropsychiatry, BSMHFT & University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
2
School of Life & Health Sciences, Aston Brain Centre, Aston University, Birmingham, UK
3
Sobell Department of Motor Neuroscience & Movement Disorders, Institute of Neurology & University College London, London,
UK
*Author for correspondence: Tel.: +44 121 3012317; Fax: +44 121 3012291; a.e.cavanna@bham.ac.uk

First draft submitted: 18 December 2018; Accepted for publication: 19 December 2018; Published
online: 15 January 2019

Keywords: cognitive-behavioral therapy • neurology • neuropsychiatry • psychotherapy • quality of life • Stoicism

It has long been acknowledged that most neurological disorders are chronic in nature and available treatment inter-
ventions are rarely curative. A relatively more recent acquisition is the clinical observation that most neurological
disorders resulting from central nervous system pathologies are associated with significant psychiatric and behavioral
disturbances and should be considered neuropsychiatric conditions tout court [1]. This is true, for example, for basal
ganglia disorders, whether they are currently classed as neurodevelopmental or neurodegenerative movement disor-
ders. Both Tourette syndrome (hyperkinetic movement disorder with neurodevelopmental etiopathogenesis) and
Parkinson disease (hypokinetic movement disorder with neurodegenerative etiopathogenesis) clinically present with
a combination of motor and nonmotor features sharing a chronic course [1]. Specifically, Tourette syndrome, with
its combination of tics and obsessive-compulsive symptoms and/or attention-deficit and hyperactivity symptoms,
has recently been referred to as ‘paradigmatic neuropsychiatric disorder’ [2]. Parkinson disease, with its association
with rigid-hypokinetic (or tremor) features and anxiety/affective symptoms (or iatrogenic impulse dysregulation
and psychosis), has been regarded as ‘the quintessential neuropsychiatric disorder’ [3]. The most effective treatment
interventions currently available consist in pharmacotherapy targeting dopaminergic pathways. Antidopaminergic
agents can decrease tic frequency and severity in patients with Tourette syndrome, whereas dopamine replacement
therapy can improve rigidity, bradykinesia, and, to a lesser extent, tremor, in patients with Parkinson disease.
Unfortunately, neither pharmacological interventions nor more invasive approaches such as deep brain stimulation
surgery are known to be curative per se. Moreover, it is well recognized that both antidopaminergic and dopaminergic
agents can result in psychiatric/behavioral adverse effects (e.g. on vigilance/affect and impulsivity/reward-seeking
behaviors, respectively) [1]. It is therefore hardly surprising that the focus of clinical practice and research has pro-
gressively shifted from objective neurological outcome measures to patient-reported health-related quality of life. To
stick to the example of movement disorders, it has consistently been shown that nonmotor manifestations such as
affective symptoms can bear a more significant impact on health-related quality of life than motor impairment [4,5].
Psychological therapies, especially cognitive-behavioral approaches, have been shown to be highly effective first-line
treatment interventions for patients with affective and anxiety disorders, i.e. the main determinants of health-related
quality of life across neuropsychiatric conditions. Based on the available evidence, in the UK, the National Institute
for Health and Clinical Excellence has made recommendations for the use of cognitive-behavioral therapy in the
treatment pathways of adult patients with depression in the context of a chronic physical health problem [6], with
relevant implications to a wide range of neuropsychiatric conditions.
It has been suggested that there have been three successive ‘waves’ in terms of modern psychotherapy interventions
throughout the second half of the XX century and the beginning of the XXI century [7]. The first wave (behavior
therapy) originated from Burrhus F Skinner’s popular doctrine of behaviorism, at least in part as a reaction
to Freudian models of the mind and psychodynamic therapy. The transition between the first and the second

10.2217/fnl-2018-0046 
C 2019 Andrea E Cavanna Future Neurol. (2019) 14(1), FNL2 eISSN 1748-6971
Editorial Cavanna

wave marked the birth of cognitive-behavioral therapy approaches: this passage has often been described as the
clinical equivalent of the cognitive revolution that took place in the field of scientific psychology thanks to
the work of Noam Chomsky and other pioneers of cognitive sciences. The revolution of the ‘second wave’ of
psychotherapy consisted in expanding the previous model of environmental triggers and behavioral responses by
interposing a cognitive mediator that had been absent in the ‘first wave’ of behavioral approaches [8]. Albert Ellis’
rational emotive behavior therapy and Aaron Beck’s cognitive therapy championed the ‘second wave’ by developing
popular clinical counterparts to the cognitive revolution in the late 1950s and 1960s. It was Albert Ellis who
first acknowledged ancient philosophers as the source of the therapeutic value of rationality as cognitive mediator
between environmental challenges and emotional reactions. Interestingly, it has been noted that both Ellis’ and
Beck’s early writings gave credit to the Stoics as the ancient progenitors of modern cognitive-behavioral therapy,
as their approach was anticipated by the fundamental Stoic belief that emotions arise from an interaction between
human reason and the environment [9]. Stoicism is a Hellenistic school of philosophy founded by Zeno of Citium
at the beginning of the III century BC inspired by Socrates’ teaching. Most of the surviving Stoic texts were written
by or about the Roman Stoics (Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius), that is, toward the end of the 600-year period
during which the classical phase of this philosophical tradition flourished. Although the fact that clinical psychology
grew out of the discipline of ancient philosophy is often overlooked by modern psychotherapists, recent studies
have convincingly shown that modern cognitive therapy owes much to the writings and ideas of the Stoics of
Rome [9,10]. Specifically, the philosophy of Epictetus is cited by both Ellis and Beck as a forerunner of modern
cognitive therapy [11]. Epictetus’ most quoted passage from the ‘Enchiridion’ (‘Handbook’) clearly illustrates the
close link between Stoicism and cognitive-behavioral therapy: “Men are disturbed not by things but by the views
which they take of them [. . . ] when, therefore, we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame anyone
but ourselves: that is, our own judgments.” The cognitive-behavioral therapist also assumes that the individual’s
primary problem has to do with his construction of reality, rather than with reality itself. Ellis himself referred
to Epictetus as “a remarkably wise Stoic [who] pointed out some of two thousand years ago that you choose to
overreact to the obnoxious behavior of others while you could more wisely choose to react in a very different
manner” [12].
The Stoic and cognitive theories about the operation of reason upon emotion and behavior have striking
parallelisms. Several analogies draw on the meaning of the ancient Greek term ‘arete’, which is often mistranslated
as ‘virtue’, whereas it simply referred to ‘excellence’ (devoid of moral value). In this sense, ‘arete’ could be attributed
to nonliving things: for example, the ‘arete’ of a knife would be its sharpness. Likewise, the ‘arete’ of human
beings is rationality, that is, excellence in the feature (reason) which characterizes human nature. According to the
Stoic doctrine, emotional reactions, far from being irrational and impossible to analyze, are judgments based on
reason – and therefore amenable to control and manipulation. In fact, Epictetus himself compared the role of the
philosopher to that of a physician, consistently with the tradition of ancient philosophy as medicine of the soul or
‘psychotherapy’ [13]. The Stoic philosopher as psychotherapist used to help others to achieve ‘reasoned emotions’.
Cultivating ‘arete’ through daily practice was seen as the way to achieve the good life (‘eudaimonia’), free of irrational
anxieties and sorrows. In a similar fashion, modern cognitive-behavioral therapists place emphasis upon the rational
approach to alter dysfunctional emotions and therefore treat anxiety and affective disorders.
The ‘third wave’ of psychotherapy was heralded in a 2004 article by Steven Hayes as a group of therapies
encompassing mindfulness-based cognitive therapy and acceptance and commitment therapy, among others [7]. In
2011, the same author and his colleagues proposed ‘contextual cognitive behavioral therapy’ as a new designation
for the ‘third wave’ group of psychotherapy [14,15]. It is worth noting that the practice of mindfulness is not
new to the western tradition, as it can be traced back to the primarily Stoic exercise of attention (‘prosoche’, or
‘concentration on the present moment’). Thanks to this attitude, the philosopher is fully aware of what he does
at each instant, and he wills his actions fully, thereby freeing himself from unhealthy emotions, which are rooted
in the past (depression) or in the future (anxiety). The late French scholar Pierre Hadot argued that for the Stoics
the exercise of attention to the present moment is, in a sense, the key to a wider range of spiritual exercises [16].
As part of their cognitive-behavioral treatment intervention, patients may be asked to keep a diary (journal) or
write down their thoughts and behavior patterns. Again, the practice of recording own thoughts and feelings can
be traced back to Marcus Aurelius’ ‘Meditations’, a book that was not intended for publication and is sometimes
titled ‘To himself’, reflecting its original purpose – an exercise of reflective practice of Stoic discipline [17]. Modern
versions of the Stoic spiritual exercises have recently been presented in ‘The Daily Stoic Journal’ [18] (that builds on
Ryan Holiday’s 2016 book ‘The Daily Stoic’ [19]) and are due to feature in the forthcoming ‘Live like a Stoic’ [20]

Future Neurol. (2019) 14(1) future science group

 Back to the future: Stoic wisdom & psychotherapy for neuropsychiatric conditions Editorial

by Massimo Pigliucci, author of the 2017 best seller ‘How to be a Stoic’, an imaginary dialogue with Epictetus [21].
Finally, an original study by Donald Robertson weaving the life and philosophy of Marcus Aurelius with insights
from modern psychology is due to appear in 2019 [22]: at the dawn of the new millennium Stoicism seems to be
alive and at the heart of modern psychotherapy. Back to the future?

Financial & competing interests disclosure

The author has no relevant affiliations or financial involvement with any organization or entity with a financial interest in or financial
conflict with the subject matter or materials discussed in the manuscript. This includes employment, consultancies, honoraria, stock
ownership or options, expert testimony, grants or patents received or pending, or royalties.
No writing assistance was utilized in the production of this manuscript.

Open access
This work is licensed under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license,
visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

References
1. Cavanna AE. Motion and Emotion. Springer, NY, USA (2018).
2. Cavanna AE. Gilles de la Tourette syndrome as a paradigmatic neuropsychiatric disorder. CNS Spectr. 23(3), 213–218 (2018).
3. Weintraub D, Burn DJ. Parkinson’s disease: the quintessential neuropsychiatric disorder. Mov. Disord. 26(6), 1022–1031 (2011).
4. Evans J, Seri S, Cavanna AE. The effects of Gilles de la Tourette syndrome and other chronic tic disorders on quality of life across the
lifespan: a systematic review. Eur. Child. Adolesc. Psychiatry 25(9), 939–948 (2016).
5. Balestrino R, Martinez-Martin P. Neuropsychiatric symptoms, behavioural disorders, and quality of life in Parkinson’s disease. J. Neurol.
Sci. 373, 173–178 (2017).
6. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. Depression in adults with a chronic physical health problem: treatment and
management (Clinical Guideline 91) (2009). www.nice.org.uk/CG91
7. Hayes SC. Acceptance and commitment therapy, relational frame theory, and the third wave of behavior therapy. Behav. Ther. 35,
639–665 (2004).
8. Ruggiero GM, Spada MM, Caselli G, Sassaroli S. A historical and theoretical review of cognitive behavioral therapies: from structural
self-knowledge to functional processes. J. Ration. Emot. Cogn. Behav. Ther. 36, 378–403 (2018).
9. Robertson D. The philosophy of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT): Stoic philosophy as rational and cognitive psychotherapy.
Karnac, London, UK (2010).
10. Robertson D. The Stoic influence on modern psychotherapy. In: The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition. Sellars J (Ed.).
Routledge, London, UK, 374–388 (2016).
11. Still A, Dryden W. The Historical and Philosophical Context of Rational Psychotherapy: the Legacy of Epictetus. Karnac, London, UK (2012).
12. Montgomery RW. The ancient origins of cognitive therapy: the reemergence of Stoicism. J. Cogn. Psychother. 7(1), 5–19 (1993).
13. Xenakis I. Epictetus: Philosopher-Therapist. Martinus Jijhoff, The Hague, The Netherlands (1969).
14. Hayes SC, Villatte M, Levin ME, Hildebrandt M. Open, aware, and active: contextual approaches as an emerging trend in the behavioral
and cognitive therapies. Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol. 7, 141–168 (2011).
15. Dimidjian S, Arch JJ, Schneider RL, Desormeau P, Felder JN, Segal ZV. Considering meta-analysis, meaning, and metaphor: a
systematic review and critical examination of ‘third wave’ cognitive and behavioral therapies. Behav. Ther. 47(6), 886–905 (2016).
16. Hadot P. Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault. Oxford: Blackwell, Oxford, UK (1995).
17. Hadot P. The Inner Citadel: the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Harvard University Press, MA, USA (1998).
18. Holiday R, Hanselman S. The Daily Stoic Journal: 366 Days of Writing and Reflection on the Art of Living. Portfolio, NY, USA (2017).
19. Holiday R. The Daily Stoic: 366 Meditations on Wisdom, Perseverance, and the Art of Living. Portfolio, NY, USA (2016).
20. Pigliucci M, Lopez G. Live Like a Stoic. Rider, London, UK (2019).
21. Pigliucci M. How to be a Stoic. Rider, London, UK (2017).
22. Robertson D. How to Think Like a Roman Emperor: the Stoic Philosophy of Marcus Aurelius. St Martin’s Press, NY, USA (2019).

future science group www.futuremedicine.com

Future Medicine Ltd

Future NeurologyVolume 14, Issue 1, February 2019

https://doi.org/10.2217/fnl-2018-0046

Open Access/Creative Commons Attribution

Editorial

Back to the future: Stoic wisdom and psychotherapy for neuropsychiatric conditions

Andrea E Cavanna,1,,2,,3

,1 1Department of Neuropsychiatry, BSMHFT & University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

,2 2School of Life & Health Sciences, Aston Brain Centre, Aston University, Birmingham, UK

,3 3Sobell Department of Motor Neuroscience & Movement Disorders, Institute of Neurology &
University College London, London, UK

*Author for correspondence: Tel.: +44 121 3012317; Fax: +44 121 3012291; a.e.cavanna@bham.ac.uk

First draft submitted: 18 December 2018; Accepted for publication: 19 December 2018; Published
online: 15 January 2019.

Keywords: cognitive-behavioral therapy • neurology • neuropsychiatry • psychotherapy • quality of life

• Stoicism

It has long been acknowledged that most neurological disorders are chronic in nature and available
treatment interventions are rarely curative. A relatively more recent acquisition is the clinical
observation that most neurological disorders resulting from central nervous system pathologies are
associated with significant psychiatric and behavioral disturbances and should be considered
neuropsychiatric conditions tout court [1]. This is true, for example, for basal ganglia disorders, whether
they are currently classed as neurodevelopmental or neurodegenerative movement disorders. Both
Tourette syndrome (hyperkinetic movement disorder with neurodevelopmental etiopathogenesis) and
Parkinson disease (hypokinetic movement disorder with neurodegenerative etiopathogenesis) clinically
present with a combination of motor and nonmotor features sharing a chronic course [1]. Specifically,
Tourette syndrome, with its combination of tics and obsessive-compulsive symptoms and/or attention-
deficit and hyperactivity symptoms, has recently been referred to as ‘paradigmatic neuropsychiatric
disorder’ [2]. Parkinson disease, with its association with rigid-hypokinetic (or tremor) features and
anxiety/affective symptoms (or iatrogenic impulse dysregulation and psychosis), has been regarded as
‘the quintessential neuropsychiatric disorder’ [3]. The most effective treatment interventions currently
available consist in pharmacotherapy targeting dopaminergic pathways. Antidopaminergic agents can
decrease tic frequency and severity in patients with Tourette syndrome, whereas dopamine
replacement therapy can improve rigidity, bradykinesia, and, to a lesser extent, tremor, in patients with
Parkinson disease. Unfortunately, neither pharmacological interventions nor more invasive approaches
such as deep brain stimulation surgery are known to be curative per se. Moreover, it is well recognized
that both antidopaminergic and dopaminergic agents can result in psychiatric/behavioral adverse effects
(e.g. on vigilance/affect and impulsivity/reward-seeking behaviors, respectively) [1]. It is therefore
hardly surprising that the focus of clinical practice and research has progressively shifted from objective
neurological outcome measures to patient-reported health-related quality of life. To stick to the
example of movement disorders, it has consistently been shown that nonmotor manifestations such as
affective symptoms can bear a more significant impact on health-related quality of life than motor
impairment [4,5]. Psychological therapies, especially cognitive-behavioral approaches, have been shown
to be highly effective first-line treatment interventions for patients with affective and anxiety disorders,
i.e. the main determinants of health-related quality of life across neuropsychiatric conditions. Based on
the available evidence, in the UK, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence has made
recommendations for the use of cognitive-behavioral therapy in the treatment pathways of adult
patients with depression in the context of a chronic physical health problem [6], with relevant
implications to a wide range of neuropsychiatric conditions.

It has been suggested that there have been three successive ‘waves’ in terms of modern psychotherapy
interventions throughout the second half of the XX century and the beginning of the XXI century [7]. The
first wave (behavior therapy) originated from Burrhus F Skinner's popular doctrine of behaviorism, at
least in part as a reaction to Freudian models of the mind and psychodynamic therapy. The transition
between the first and the second wave marked the birth of cognitive-behavioral therapy approaches:
this passage has often been described as the clinical equivalent of the cognitive revolution that took
place in the field of scientific psychology thanks to the work of Noam Chomsky and other pioneers of
cognitive sciences. The revolution of the ‘second wave’ of psychotherapy consisted in expanding the
previous model of environmental triggers and behavioral responses by interposing a cognitive mediator
that had been absent in the ‘first wave’ of behavioral approaches [8]. Albert Ellis’ rational emotive
behavior therapy and Aaron Beck's cognitive therapy championed the ‘second wave’ by developing
popular clinical counterparts to the cognitive revolution in the late 1950s and 1960s. It was Albert Ellis
who first acknowledged ancient philosophers as the source of the therapeutic value of rationality as
cognitive mediator between environmental challenges and emotional reactions. Interestingly, it has
been noted that both Ellis’ and Beck's early writings gave credit to the Stoics as the ancient progenitors
of modern cognitive-behavioral therapy, as their approach was anticipated by the fundamental Stoic
belief that emotions arise from an interaction between human reason and the environment [9]. Stoicism
is a Hellenistic school of philosophy founded by Zeno of Citium at the beginning of the III century BC
inspired by Socrates’ teaching. Most of the surviving Stoic texts were written by or about the Roman
Stoics (Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius), that is, toward the end of the 600-year period during which
the classical phase of this philosophical tradition flourished. Although the fact that clinical psychology
grew out of the discipline of ancient philosophy is often overlooked by modern psychotherapists, recent
studies have convincingly shown that modern cognitive therapy owes much to the writings and ideas of
the Stoics of Rome [9,10]. Specifically, the philosophy of Epictetus is cited by both Ellis and Beck as a
forerunner of modern cognitive therapy [11]. Epictetus’ most quoted passage from the ‘Enchiridion’
(‘Handbook’) clearly illustrates the close link between Stoicism and cognitive-behavioral therapy: “Men
are disturbed not by things but by the views which they take of them […] when, therefore, we are
hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame anyone but ourselves: that is, our own
judgments.” The cognitive-behavioral therapist also assumes that the individual's primary problem has
to do with his construction of reality, rather than with reality itself. Ellis himself referred to Epictetus as
“a remarkably wise Stoic [who] pointed out some of two thousand years ago that you choose to
overreact to the obnoxious behavior of others while you could more wisely choose to react in a very
different manner” [12].

The Stoic and cognitive theories about the operation of reason upon emotion and behavior have striking
parallelisms. Several analogies draw on the meaning of the ancient Greek term ‘arete’, which is often
mistranslated as ‘virtue’, whereas it simply referred to ‘excellence’ (devoid of moral value). In this sense,
‘arete’ could be attributed to nonliving things: for example, the ‘arete’ of a knife would be its sharpness.
Likewise, the ‘arete’ of human beings is rationality, that is, excellence in the feature (reason) which
characterizes human nature. According to the Stoic doctrine, emotional reactions, far from being
irrational and impossible to analyze, are judgments based on reason – and therefore amenable to
control and manipulation. In fact, Epictetus himself compared the role of the philosopher to that of a
physician, consistently with the tradition of ancient philosophy as medicine of the soul or
‘psychotherapy’ [13]. The Stoic philosopher as psychotherapist used to help others to achieve ‘reasoned
emotions’. Cultivating ‘arete’ through daily practice was seen as the way to achieve the good life
(‘eudaimonia’), free of irrational anxieties and sorrows. In a similar fashion, modern cognitive-behavioral
therapists place emphasis upon the rational approach to alter dysfunctional emotions and therefore
treat anxiety and affective disorders.

The ‘third wave’ of psychotherapy was heralded in a 2004 article by Steven Hayes as a group of
therapies encompassing mindfulness-based cognitive therapy and acceptance and commitment therapy,
among others [7]. In 2011, the same author and his colleagues proposed ‘contextual cognitive
behavioral therapy’ as a new designation for the ‘third wave’ group of psychotherapy [14,15]. It is worth
noting that the practice of mindfulness is not new to the western tradition, as it can be traced back to
the primarily Stoic exercise of attention (‘prosoche’, or ‘concentration on the present moment’). Thanks
to this attitude, the philosopher is fully aware of what he does at each instant, and he wills his actions
fully, thereby freeing himself from unhealthy emotions, which are rooted in the past (depression) or in
the future (anxiety). The late French scholar Pierre Hadot argued that for the Stoics the exercise of
attention to the present moment is, in a sense, the key to a wider range of spiritual exercises [16]. As
part of their cognitive-behavioral treatment intervention, patients may be asked to keep a diary
(journal) or write down their thoughts and behavior patterns. Again, the practice of recording own
thoughts and feelings can be traced back to Marcus Aurelius’ ‘Meditations’, a book that was not
intended for publication and is sometimes titled ‘To himself’, reflecting its original purpose – an exercise
of reflective practice of Stoic discipline [17]. Modern versions of the Stoic spiritual exercises have
recently been presented in ‘The Daily Stoic Journal’ [18] (that builds on Ryan Holiday's 2016 book ‘The
Daily Stoic’ [19]) and are due to feature in the forthcoming ‘Live like a Stoic’ [20] by Massimo Pigliucci,
author of the 2017 best seller ‘How to be a Stoic’, an imaginary dialogue with Epictetus [21]. Finally, an
original study by Donald Robertson weaving the life and philosophy of Marcus Aurelius with insights
from modern psychology is due to appear in 2019 [22]: at the dawn of the new millennium Stoicism
seems to be alive and at the heart of modern psychotherapy. Back to the future?

Financial & competing interests disclosure

The author has no relevant affiliations or financial involvement with any organization or entity with a
financial interest in or financial conflict with the subject matter or materials discussed in the manuscript.
This includes employment, consultancies, honoraria, stock ownership or options, expert testimony,
grants or patents received or pending, or royalties.

No writing assistance was utilized in the production of this manuscript.

Open access

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0

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Stoicism
Stoicism is a school of Hellenistic philosophy founded by Zeno of
Citium in Athens in the early 3rd century BC. It is a philosophy of
personal eudemonic virtue ethics informed by its system of logic
and its views on the natural world, asserting that the practice of
virtue is both necessary and sufficient to achieve eudaimonia –
flourishing, by means of living an ethical life. The Stoics identified
the path to eudaimonia with a life spent practicing the cardinal
virtues and living in accordance with nature.

The Stoics are especially known for teaching that "virtue is the only
good" for human beings, and those external things—such as health,
wealth, and pleasure—are not good or bad in themselves
(adiaphora), but have value as "material for virtue to act upon".
Alongside Aristotelian ethics, the Stoic tradition forms one of the
major founding approaches to virtue ethics.[1] The Stoics also held
that certain destructive emotions resulted from errors of judgment,
and they believed people should aim to maintain a will (called
prohairesis) that is "in accordance with nature". Because of this, the
Zeno of Citium, the founder of
Stoics thought the best indication of an individual's philosophy was
Stoicism, in the Farnese collection,
not what a person said but how a person behaved.[2] To live a good
Naples – Photo by Paolo Monti, 1969
life, one had to understand the rules of the natural order since they
thought everything was rooted in nature.

Many Stoics—such as Seneca and Epictetus—emphasised that because "virtue is sufficient for happiness",
a sage would be emotionally resilient to misfortune. This belief is similar to the meaning of the phrase "stoic
calm", though the phrase does not include the traditional Stoic views that only a sage can be considered
truly free and that all moral corruptions are equally vicious.[3]

Stoicism flourished throughout the Roman and Greek world until the 3rd century AD, and among its
adherents was Emperor Marcus Aurelius. It experienced a decline after Christianity became the state
religion in the 4th century AD. Since then it has seen revivals, notably in the Renaissance (Neostoicism)
and in the contemporary era (modern Stoicism).[4]

Contents
Name
Origins
Modern usage
Basic tenets
History
Logic
Propositional logic
Categories
 Epistemology
Physics
Ethics
The doctrine of "things indifferent"
Spiritual exercise
Love and sexuality
Social philosophy
Influence on Christianity
Stoic philosophers
See also
References
Further reading
Primary sources
Studies
External links

Name

Origins

Stoicism was originally known as "Zenonism", after the founder Zeno of Citium. However, this name was
soon dropped, likely because the Stoics did not consider their founders to be perfectly wise, and to avoid
the risk of the philosophy becoming a cult of personality.[5]

The name "Stoicism" derives from the Stoa Poikile (Ancient Greek: ἡ ποικίλη στοά), or "painted porch", a
colonnade decorated with mythic and historical battle scenes, on the north side of the Agora in Athens,
where Zeno and his followers gathered to discuss their ideas.[6][7]

Sometimes Stoicism is therefore referred to as "The Stoa", or the philosophy of "The Porch".[5]

Modern usage

The word "stoic" commonly refers to someone who is indifferent to pain, pleasure, grief, or joy.[8] The
modern usage as a "person who represses feelings or endures patiently" was first cited in 1579 as a noun
and in 1596 as an adjective.[9] In contrast to the term "Epicurean", the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy's entry on Stoicism notes, "the sense of the English adjective 'stoical' is not utterly misleading
with regard to its philosophical origins."[10]

Basic tenets

Philosophy does not promise to secure anything external for man, otherwise it would be
admitting something that lies beyond its proper subject-matter. For as the material of the
carpenter is wood, and that of statuary bronze, so the subject-matter of the art of living is each
 person's own life.

— Epictetus, Discourses 1.15.2, Robin Hard revised translation

The Stoics provided a unified account of the world, constructed from ideals of logic, monistic physics and
naturalistic ethics. Of these, they emphasized ethics as the main focus of human knowledge, though their
logical theories were of more interest for later philosophers.

Stoicism teaches the development of self-control and fortitude as a means of overcoming destructive
emotions; the philosophy holds that becoming a clear and unbiased thinker allows one to understand the
universal reason (logos). Stoicism's primary aspect involves improving the individual's ethical and moral
well-being: "Virtue consists in a will that is in agreement with Nature."[11] This principle also applies to the
realm of interpersonal relationships; "to be free from anger, envy, and jealousy",[12] and to accept even
slaves as "equals of other men, because all men alike are products of nature".[13]

The Stoic ethic espouses a deterministic perspective; in regard to those who lack Stoic virtue, Cleanthes
once opined that the wicked man is "like a dog tied to a cart, and compelled to go wherever it goes".[11] A
Stoic of virtue, by contrast, would amend his will to suit the world and remain, in the words of Epictetus,
"sick and yet happy, in peril and yet happy, dying and yet happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and
happy",[12] thus positing a "completely autonomous" individual will, and at the same time a universe that is
"a rigidly deterministic single whole". This viewpoint was later described as "Classical Pantheism" (and
was adopted by Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza).[14]

History

Beginning around 301 BC, Zeno taught philosophy at the Stoa Poikile ("Painted Porch"), from which his
philosophy got its name.[15] Unlike the other schools of philosophy, such as the Epicureans, Zeno chose to
teach his philosophy in a public space, which was a colonnade overlooking the central gathering place of
Athens, the Agora.

Zeno's ideas developed from those of the Cynics, whose founding father, Antisthenes, had been a disciple
of Socrates. Zeno's most influential follower was Chrysippus, who was responsible for molding what is
now called Stoicism. Later Roman Stoics focused on promoting a life in harmony within the universe, over
which one has no direct control.

Scholars usually divide the history of Stoicism into three phases:

Early Stoa, from Zeno's founding to Antipater.

 Middle Stoa, including Panaetius and Posidonius.
Late Stoa, including Musonius Rufus, Seneca, Epictetus,
and Marcus Aurelius.

No complete works survive from the first two phases of Stoicism.

Only Roman texts from the Late Stoa survive.[16]

Stoicism became the foremost popular philosophy among the

educated elite in the Hellenistic world and the Roman Empire,[17]
to the point where, in the words of Gilbert Murray "nearly all the
successors of Alexander [...] professed themselves Stoics."[18]

Logic

Propositional logic Antisthenes, founder of the Cynic

school of philosophy
Diodorus Cronus, who was one of Zeno's teachers, is considered
the philosopher who first introduced and developed an approach to
logic now known as propositional logic, which is based on
statements or propositions, rather than terms, differing greatly from
Aristotle's term logic. Later, Chrysippus developed a system that
became known as Stoic logic and included a deductive system,
Stoic Syllogistic, which was considered a rival to Aristotle's
Syllogistic (see Syllogism). New interest in Stoic logic came in the
20th century, when important developments in logic were based on
propositional logic. Susanne Bobzien wrote, "The many close
similarities between Chrysippus's philosophical logic and that of
Gottlob Frege are especially striking."[19]

Bobzien also notes that "Chrysippus wrote over 300 books on

logic, on virtually any topic logic today concerns itself with,
including speech act theory, sentence analysis, singular and plural
expressions, types of predicates, indexicals, existential propositions,
Bust of Seneca
sentential connectives, negations, disjunctions, conditionals, logical
consequence, valid argument forms, theory of deduction,
propositional logic, modal logic, tense logic, epistemic logic, logic
of suppositions, logic of imperatives, ambiguity and logical paradoxes."[19]

Categories

The Stoics held that all beings (ὄντα)—though not all things (τινά)—are material.[20] Besides the existing
beings they admitted four incorporeals (asomata): time, place, void, and sayable.[21] They were held to be
just 'subsisting' while such a status was denied to universals.[22] Thus, they accepted Anaxagoras's idea (as
did Aristotle) that if an object is hot, it is because some part of a universal heat body had entered the object.
But, unlike Aristotle, they extended the idea to cover all accidents. Thus if an object is red, it would be
because some part of a universal red body had entered the object.

They held that there were four categories.

 substance (ὑποκείμενον)

The primary matter, formless substance, (ousia) that things are made of

quality (ποιόν)

The way matter is organized to form an individual object; in Stoic physics, a physical
ingredient (pneuma: air or breath), which informs the matter

somehow disposed (πως ἔχον)

Particular characteristics, not present within the object, such as size, shape, action,
and posture

Somehow disposed in relation to something (πρός τί πως ἔχον)

Characteristics related to other phenomena, such as the position of an object within

time and space relative to other objects

Make for yourself a definition or description of the thing which is presented to you, so as to
see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety,
and tell yourself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has been
compounded, and into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so productive of elevation of
mind as to be able to examine methodically and truly every object that is presented to you in
life, and always to look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe this is, and
what kind of use everything performs in it, and what value everything has with reference to the
whole.

— Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, iii. 11

Stoics outlined what we have control over categories of our own action, thoughts and reaction. The
opening paragraph of The Enchiridion states the categories as: "Things in our control are opinion, pursuit,
desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body,
property, reputation, command, and, in a word, whatever are not our own actions." These suggest a space
that is within our own control.

Epistemology

The Stoics propounded that knowledge can be attained through the use of reason. Truth can be
distinguished from fallacy—even if, in practice, only an approximation can be made. According to the
Stoics, the senses constantly receive sensations: pulsations that pass from objects through the senses to the
mind, where they leave an impression in the imagination (phantasiai) (an impression arising from the mind
was called a phantasma).[23]

The mind has the ability to judge (συγκατάθεσις, synkatathesis)—approve or reject—an impression,
enabling it to distinguish a true representation of reality from one that is false. Some impressions can be
assented to immediately, but others can achieve only varying degrees of hesitant approval, which can be
labeled belief or opinion (doxa). It is only through reason that we gain clear comprehension and conviction
(katalepsis). Certain and true knowledge (episteme), achievable by the Stoic sage, can be attained only by
verifying the conviction with the expertise of one's peers and the collective judgment of humankind.
Physics
According to the Stoics, the Universe is a material reasoning substance (logos),[24] known as God or
Nature, which was divided into two classes: the active and the passive.[25] The passive substance is matter,
which "lies sluggish, a substance ready for any use, but sure to remain unemployed if no one sets it in
motion".[26] The active substance, which can be called Fate or Universal Reason (logos),[24] is an
intelligent aether or primordial fire, which acts on the passive matter:

The universe itself is God and the universal outpouring of its soul; it is this same world's
guiding principle, operating in mind and reason, together with the common nature of things
and the totality that embraces all existence; then the foreordained might and necessity of the
future; then fire and the principle of aether; then those elements whose natural state is one of
flux and transition, such as water, earth, and air; then the sun, the moon, the stars; and the
universal existence in which all things are contained.

— Chrysippus, in Cicero, De Natura Deorum, i. 39

Everything is subject to the laws of Fate, for the Universe acts according to its own nature, and the nature
of the passive matter it governs. The souls of humans and animals are emanations from this primordial Fire,
and are, likewise, subject to Fate:

Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one substance and one soul; and
observe how all things have reference to one perception, the perception of this one living
being; and how all things act with one movement; and how all things are the cooperating
causes of all things that exist; observe too the continuous spinning of the thread and the
structure of the web.

— Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, iv. 40

Individual souls are perishable by nature, and can be "transmuted and diffused, assuming a fiery nature by
being received into the seminal reason ("logos spermatikos") of the Universe".[27] Since right Reason is the
foundation of both humanity and the universe, it follows that the goal of life is to live according to Reason,
that is, to live a life according to Nature.

Stoic theology is a fatalistic and naturalistic pantheism: God is never fully transcendent but always
immanent, and identified with Nature. Abrahamic religions personalize God as a world-creating entity, but
Stoicism equates God with the totality of the universe; according to Stoic cosmology, which is very similar
to the Hindu conception of existence, there is no absolute start to time, as it is considered infinite and cyclic.
Similarly, the space and Universe have neither start nor end, rather they are cyclical. The current Universe
is a phase in the present cycle, preceded by an infinite number of Universes, doomed to be destroyed
("ekpyrōsis", conflagration) and re-created again,[28] and to be followed by another infinite number of
Universes. Stoicism considers all existence as cyclical, the cosmos as eternally self-creating and self-
destroying (see also Eternal return).

Stoicism, just like Indian religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, does not posit a beginning or
end to the Universe.[29] According to the Stoics, the logos was the active reason[24] or anima mundi
pervading and animating the entire Universe. It was conceived as material and is usually identified with
God or Nature. The Stoics also referred to the seminal reason ("logos spermatikos"), or the law of
generation in the Universe, which was the principle of the active
reason working in inanimate matter. Humans, too, each possess a
portion of the divine logos, which is the primordial Fire and reason
that controls and sustains the Universe.[30]

The first philosophers to explicitly describe nominalist arguments

were the Stoics, especially Chrysippus.[31][32]

Ethics
Ancient Stoics are often misunderstood because the terms they used
pertained to different concepts than today. The word "stoic" has
since come to mean "unemotional" or indifferent to pain because
Stoic ethics taught freedom from "passion" by following "reason".
The Stoics did not seek to extinguish emotions; rather, they sought Chrysippus
to transform them by a resolute "askēsis", that enables a person to
develop clear judgment and inner calm.[33] Logic, reflection, and
focus were the methods of such self-discipline, temperance is split into self-control, discipline, and modesty.

Borrowing from the Cynics, the foundation of Stoic ethics is that good lies in the state of the soul itself; in
wisdom and self-control. Stoic ethics stressed the rule: "Follow where reason leads". One must therefore
strive to be free of the passions, bearing in mind that the ancient meaning of pathos (plural pathe) translated
here as passion was "anguish" or "suffering",[34] that is, "passively" reacting to external events, which is
somewhat different from the modern use of the word. Terms used in Stocism related to pathos include
propathos or instinctive reaction (e.g., turning pale and trembling when confronted by physical danger) and
eupathos, which is the mark of the Stoic sage (sophos). The eupatheia are feelings that result from the
correct judgment in the same way that passions result from incorrect judgment. The idea was to be free of
suffering through apatheia (Greek: ἀπάθεια; literally, "without passion") or peace of mind,[35] where peace
of mind was understood in the ancient sense—being objective or having "clear judgment" and the
maintenance of equanimity in the face of life's highs and lows.

For the Stoics, reason meant using logic and understanding the processes of nature—the logos or universal
reason, inherent in all things. According to reason and virtue, living according to reason and virtue is to live
in harmony with the divine order of the universe, in recognition of the common reason and essential value
of all people.

The four cardinal virtues (aretai) of Stoic philosophy is a classification derived from the teachings of Plato
(Republic IV. 426–35):

Wisdom (Greek: φρόνησις "phronesis" or σοφία "sophia", Latin: prudentia or sapientia)

Courage (Greek: ανδρεία "andreia", Latin: fortitudo)
Justice (Greek: δικαιοσύνη "dikaiosyne", Latin: iustitia)
Temperance (Greek: σωφροσύνη "sophrosyne", Latin: temperantia)

Following Socrates, the Stoics held that unhappiness and evil are the results of human ignorance of the
reason in nature. If someone is unkind, it is because they are unaware of their own universal reason, which
leads to the conclusion of unkindness. The solution to evil and unhappiness then is the practice of Stoic
philosophy: to examine one's own judgments and behavior and determine where they diverge from the
universal reason of nature.
The Stoics accepted that suicide was permissible for the wise person in circumstances that might prevent
them from living a virtuous life.[36] Plutarch held that accepting life under tyranny would have
compromised Cato's self-consistency (constantia) as a Stoic and impaired his freedom to make the
honorable moral choices.[37] Suicide could be justified if one fell victim to severe pain or disease,[36] but
otherwise suicide would usually be seen as a rejection of one's social duty.[38]

The doctrine of "things indifferent"

In philosophical terms, things that are indifferent are outside the application of moral law—that is without
tendency to either promote or obstruct moral ends. Actions neither required nor forbidden by the moral law,
or that do not affect morality, are called morally indifferent. The doctrine of things indifferent (ἀδιάφορα,
adiaphora) arose in the Stoic school as a corollary of its diametric opposition of virtue and vice (καθήκοντα
kathekonta, "convenient actions", or actions in accordance with nature; and ἁμαρτήματα hamartemata,
mistakes). As a result of this dichotomy, a large class of objects were left unassigned and thus regarded as
indifferent.

Eventually three sub-classes of "things indifferent" developed: things to prefer because they assist life
according to nature; things to avoid because they hinder it; and things indifferent in the narrower sense. The
principle of adiaphora was also common to the Cynics. Philipp Melanchthon revived the doctrine of things
indifferent during the Renaissance.

Spiritual exercise

Philosophy for a Stoic is not just a set of beliefs or ethical claims; it

is a way of life involving constant practice and training (or
"askēsis"). Stoic philosophical and spiritual practices included
logic, Socratic dialogue and self-dialogue, contemplation of death,
mortality salience, training attention to remain in the present
moment (similar to mindfulness and some forms of Buddhist
meditation), and daily reflection on everyday problems and possible
solutions e.g. with journaling. Philosophy for a Stoic is an active
process of constant practice and self-reminder.

In his Meditations, Marcus Aurelius defines several such practices.

For example, in Book II.I:

Say to yourself in the early morning: I shall meet today

ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, uncharitable
men. All of the ignorance of real good and ill ... I can
neither be harmed by any of them, for no man will
Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic Roman
involve me in wrong, nor can I be angry with my
emperor
kinsman or hate him; for we have come into the world
to work together ...

Prior to Aurelius, Epictetus in his Discourses, distinguished between three types of act: judgment, desire,
and inclination.[39] According to philosopher Pierre Hadot, Epictetus identifies these three acts with logic,
physics and ethics respectively.[40] Hadot writes that in the Meditations, "Each maxim develops either one
of these very characteristic topoi [i.e., acts], or two of them or three of them."[41]
Seamus Mac Suibhne has described the practices of spiritual exercises as influencing those of reflective
practice.[42] Many parallels between Stoic spiritual exercises and modern cognitive behavioral therapy have
been identified.[43]

Stoics were also known for consolatory orations, which were part of the consolatio literary tradition. Three
such consolations by Seneca have survived.

Stoics commonly employ ‘The View from Above’, reflecting on society and otherness in guided
visualization, aiming to gain a "bigger picture", to see ourselves in context relevant to others, to see others
in the context of the world, to see ourselves in the context of the world to help determine our role and the
importance of happenings.

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, in Book 7.48 it is stated;

A fine reflection from Plato. One who would converse about human beings should look on all
things earthly as though from some point far above, upon herds, armies, and agriculture,
marriages and divorces, births and deaths, the clamour of law courts, deserted wastes, alien
peoples of every kind, festivals, lamentations, and markets, this intermixture of everything and
ordered combination of opposites.

Love and sexuality

Stoics considered sexuality an element within the law of nature that was not to be good or bad by itself, but
condemned passionate desire as something to be avoided.[44][45][46] Early exponents differed significantly
from late stoics in their view of romantic love and sexual relationships.[44][45]

Zeno advocated for a republic ruled by love and not by law, where marriage would be abolished, wives
would be held in common, and eroticism would be practiced with both boys and girls with educative
purposes, to develop virtue in the loved ones.[44][46] However, he didn't condemn marriage per se,
considering it equally a natural occurrence.[44][45] He regarded same sex relationships positively, and
maintained that wise men should "have carnal knowledge no less and no more of a favorite than of a non-
favorite, nor of a female than of a male."[46][47] Zeno favored love over desire, clarifying that the ultimate
goal of sexuality should be virtue and friendship.[45][46]

Among later stoics, Epictetus maintained homosexual and heterosexual sex as equivalent in this field,[47]
and condemned only the kind of desire that led one to act against judgement.[45] However,
contemporaneous positions generally advanced towards equating sexuality with passion, and although they
were still not hostile to sexual relationships by themselves, they nonetheless believed those should be
limited in order to retain self-control.[44][47] Musonius spoused the only natural kind of sex was that meant
for procreation, defending a companionate form of marriage between man and woman,[44] and considered
relationships solely undergone for pleasure or affection as unnatural.[45][47] This view was ultimately
influential in other currents of thought.[45]

Social philosophy
A distinctive feature of Stoicism is its cosmopolitanism; according to the Stoics, all people are
manifestations of the one universal spirit and should live in brotherly love and readily help one another. In
the Discourses, Epictetus comments on man's relationship with the world: "Each human being is primarily
a citizen of his own commonwealth; but he is also a member of the great city of gods and men, whereof the
city political is only a copy."[48] This sentiment echoes that of Diogenes of Sinope, who said, "I am not an
Athenian or a Corinthian, but a citizen of the world."[49]

They held that external differences, such as rank and wealth, are of no importance in social relationships.
Instead, they advocated the brotherhood of humanity and the natural equality of all human beings. Stoicism
became the most influential school of the Greco-Roman world, and produced a number of remarkable
writers and personalities, such as Cato the Younger and Epictetus.

In particular, they were noted for their urging of clemency toward slaves. Seneca exhorted, "Kindly
remember that he whom you call your slave sprang from the same stock, is smiled upon by the same skies,
and on equal terms with yourself breathes, lives, and dies."[50]

Influence on Christianity
In St. Ambrose of Milan's Duties, "The voice is the voice of a
Christian bishop, but the precepts are those of Zeno."[51][52]
Regarding what he called "the Divine Spirit", Maxwell Staniforth
wrote:

Cleanthes, wishing to give more explicit meaning to

Zeno's 'creative fire', had been the first to hit upon the
term pneuma, or 'spirit', to describe it. Like fire, this
intelligent 'spirit' was imagined as a tenuous substance
akin to a current of air or breath, but essentially
possessing the quality of warmth; it was immanent in
the universe as God, and in man as the soul and life-
giving principle. Clearly, it is not a long step from this
to the 'Holy Spirit' of Christian theology, the 'Lord and
Giver of life', visibly manifested as tongues of fire at
Pentecost and ever since associated—in the Christian
as in the Stoic mind—with the ideas of vital fire and Justus Lipsius, founder of
beneficient warmth.[53] Neostoicism

Regarding the Trinity, Staniforth wrote:

Again in the doctrine of the Trinity, the ecclesiastical conception of Father, Word, and Spirit
finds its germ in the different Stoic names of the Divine Unity. Thus Seneca, writing of the
supreme Power which shapes the universe, states, 'This Power we sometimes call the All-
ruling God, sometimes the incorporeal Wisdom, sometimes the Holy Spirit, sometimes
Destiny.' The Church had only to reject the last of these terms to arrive at its own acceptable
definition of the Divine Nature; while the further assertion 'these three are One', which the
modern mind finds paradoxical, was no more than commonplace to those familiar with Stoic
notions.[53]

The apostle Paul met with Stoics during his stay in Athens, reported in Acts 17:16–18 (https://www.biblega
teway.com/passage/?search=Acts+17:16–18&version=nkjv). In his letters, Paul reflected heavily from his
knowledge of Stoic philosophy, using Stoic terms and metaphors to assist his new Gentile converts in their
understanding of Christianity.[54] Stoic influence can also be seen in the works of St. Ambrose, Marcus
Minucius Felix, and Tertullian.[55]

The Fathers of the Church regarded Stoicism as a "pagan philosophy";[56][57] nonetheless, early Christian
writers employed some of the central philosophical concepts of Stoicism. Examples include the terms
"logos", "virtue", "Spirit", and "conscience".[29] But the parallels go well beyond the sharing and
borrowing of terminology. Both Stoicism and Christianity assert an inner freedom in the face of the external
world, a belief in human kinship with Nature or God, a sense of the innate depravity—or "persistent
evil"—of humankind,[29] and the futility and temporary nature of worldly possessions and attachments.
Both encourage Ascesis with respect to the passions and inferior emotions, such as lust, and envy, so that
the higher possibilities of one's humanity can be awakened and developed.

Stoic writings such as Meditations by Marcus Aurelius have been highly regarded by many Christians
throughout the centuries. The Eastern Orthodox Church and Oriental Orthodox Church accept the Stoic
ideal of dispassion to this day.

Middle and Roman Stoics taught that sex is just within marriage, for unitive and procreative purposes
only.[58][59] This teaching is accepted by the Catholic Church to this day.[60]

Saint Ambrose of Milan was known for applying Stoic philosophy to his theology.

Stoic philosophers
Zeno of Citium (332–262 BC), founder of Stoicism and the Stoic Academy (Stoa) in Athens
Aristo of Chios (fl. 260 BC), pupil of Zeno;
Herillus of Carthage (fl. 3rd century BC)
Cleanthes (of Assos) (330–232 BC), second head of Stoic Academy
Chrysippus (280–204 BC), third head of the academy
Diogenes of Babylon (230–150 BC)
Antipater of Tarsus (210–129 BC)
Panaetius of Rhodes (185–109 BC)
Posidonius of Apameia (c. 135–51 BC)
Diodotus (c. 120–59 BC), teacher of Cicero
Cato the Younger (94–46 BC)
Seneca (4 BC – 65 AD)
Gaius Musonius Rufus (1st century AD)
Rubellius Plautus (33–62 AD)
Publius Clodius Thrasea Paetus (1st century AD)
Lucius Annaeus Cornutus (1st century AD)
Epictetus (55–135 AD)
Hierocles (2nd century AD)
Marcus Aurelius (121–180 AD)

See also
4 Maccabees
Ecclesiastes
Dehellenization
 Deixis
Glossary of Stoic terms
Ekpyrosis, palingenesis, apocatastasis
Ekpyrotic universe (cosmological theory)
Megarian school
Oikeiôsis
Stoic passions
Paradoxa Stoicorum
Plank of Carneades
Sage (philosophy)
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
"Stoic Opposition"
Tirukkural

References
1. Sharpe, Matthew. "Stoic Virtue Ethics (http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30059463/sharpe-s
toicvirtue-2013.pdf)." Handbook of Virtue Ethics, 2013, 28–41.
2. John Sellars. Stoicism, 2006, p. 32.
3. Stoicism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
4. Becker, Lawrence C. (2001). A New Stoicism (https://books.google.com/books?id=NbqFt3R
PsuQC). Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1400822447.
5. Robertson, Donald (2018). Stoicism and the Art of Happiness. Great Britain: John Murray.
6. "Definition of STOIC" (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stoic).
7. Williamson, D. (1 April 2015). Kant's Theory of Emotion: Emotional Universalism (https://boo
ks.google.com/books?id=62WCDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA17). Palgrave Macmillan US. p. 17.
ISBN 978-1137498106.
8. "Modern Stoicism | Build The Fire" (http://buildthefire.com/modern-stoicism/). Build The Fire.
9 February 2016. Retrieved 22 June 2016.
9. Harper, Douglas (November 2001). "Online Etymology Dictionary – Stoic" (http://www.etymo
nline.com/index.php?term=stoic). Retrieved 2 September 2006.
10. Baltzly, Dirk (13 December 2004). "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – Stoicism" (http://p
lato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/). Retrieved 2 September 2006.
11. Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy, p. 254
12. Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy, p. 264
13. Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy, p. 253.
14. Charles Hartshorne and William Reese, "Philosophers Speak of God," Humanity Books,
1953 ch 4
15. Becker, Lawrence (2003). A History of Western Ethics. New York: Routledge. p. 27.
ISBN 978-0415968256.
16. A.A.Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 115.
17. Amos, H. (1982). These Were the Greeks. Chester Springs: Dufour Editions. ISBN 978-
0802312754. OCLC 9048254 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9048254).
18. Gilbert Murray, The Stoic Philosophy (1915), p. 25. In Bertrand Russell, A History of Western
Philosophy (1946).
19. Ancient Logic (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ancient/) by Susanne Bobzien. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
20. Jacques Brunschwig, Stoic Metaphysics in The Cambridge Companion to Stoics, ed. B.
Inwood, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 206–32
21. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 10.218. (chronos, topos, kenon, lekton)
22. Marcelo D. Boeri, The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.
54, No. 4 (Jun., 2001), pp. 723–52
23. Diogenes Laërtius (2000). Lives of eminent philosophers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press. VII.49
24. Brenk, Frederick (January 2016). "Pagan Monotheism and Pagan Cult" (https://classicalstud
ies.org/annual-meeting/147/abstract/pagan-monotheism-and-pagan-cult). "Theism" and
Related Categories in the Study of Ancient Religions. SCS/AIA Annual Meeting (https://samr
eligions.org/2014/12/30/theism-and-related-categories-in-the-study-of-ancient-religions/).
Vol. 75. Philadelphia: Society for Classical Studies (University of Pennsylvania). Archived (h
ttps://web.archive.org/web/20170506035740/https://classicalstudies.org/annual-meeting/14
7/abstract/pagan-monotheism-and-pagan-cult) from the original on 6 May 2017. Retrieved
14 October 2020. "Historical authors generally refer to “the divine” (to theion) or “the
supernatural” (to daimonion) rather than simply “God.” [...] The Stoics, believed in a God
identifiable with the logos or hegemonikon (reason or leading principle) of the universe and
downgraded the traditional gods, who even disappear during the conflagration (ekpyrosis).
Yet, the Stoics apparently did not practice a cult to this God. Middle and Later Platonists,
who spoke of a supreme God, in philosophical discourse, generally speak of this God, not
the gods, as responsible for the creation and providence of the universe. They, too, however,
do not seem to have directly practiced a religious cult to their God." {{cite book}}:
External link in |series= (help)
25. Karamanolis, George E. (2013). "Free will and divine providence" (https://books.google.com/
books?id=ZVdsBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA151). The Philosophy of Early Christianity. Ancient
Philosophies (1st ed.). New York and London: Routledge. p. 151. ISBN 978-1844655670.
26. Seneca, Epistles, lxv. 2.
27. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, iv. 21.
28. Michael Lapidge, Stoic Cosmology, in: John M. Rist, The Stoics, Cambridge University
Press, 1978, pp. 182–83.
29. Ferguson, Everett. Backgrounds of Early Christianity. 2003, p. 368.
30. Tripolitis, A., Religions of the Hellenistic-Roman Age, pp. 37–38. Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing.
31. John Sellars, Stoicism, Routledge, 2014, pp. 84–85: "[Stoics] have often been presented as
the first nominalists, rejecting the existence of universal concepts altogether. ... For
Chrysippus there are no universal entities, whether they be conceived as substantial
Platonic Forms or in some other manner.".
32. "Chrysippus | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy" (https://iep.utm.edu/chrysipp/).
33. Graver, Margaret (2009). Stoicism and Emotion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
ISBN 978-0226305585. OCLC 430497127 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/430497127).
34. "Passion" (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/passion). Merriam-Webster.
Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 29 January 2011.
35. Seddon, Keith (2005). Epictetus' Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes. New York: Routledge.
p. 217. ISBN 978-0415324519. OCLC 469313282 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/46931328
2).
36. Don E. Marietta, (1998), Introduction to ancient philosophy, pp. 153–54. Sharpe
37. Zadorojnyi, Alexei V. (2007). "Cato's suicide in Plutarch AV Zadorojnyi". The Classical
Quarterly. 57 (1): 216–30. doi:10.1017/S0009838807000195 (https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS0
009838807000195). S2CID 170834913 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:1708349
13).
38. William Braxton Irvine, (2009), A guide to the good life: the ancient art of Stoic joy, p. 200.
Oxford University Press
39. Davidson, A.I. (1995) Pierre Hadot and the Spiritual Phenomenon of Ancient Philosophy, in
Philosophy as a Way of Life, Hadot, P. Oxford Blackwells, pp. 9–10
40. Hadot, P. (1992) La Citadelle intérieure. Introduction aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle. Paris,
Fayard, pp. 106–15
41. Hadot, P. (1987) Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique. Paris, 2nd ed., p. 135.
42. Mac Suibhne, S. (2009). " 'Wrestle to be the man philosophy wished to make you': Marcus
Aurelius, reflective practitioner". Reflective Practice. 10 (4): 429–36.
doi:10.1080/14623940903138266 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F14623940903138266).
S2CID 219711815 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:219711815).
43. Robertson, D (2010). The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy: Stoicism as
Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy (https://books.google.com/books?id=XsOFyJaR5vE
C). London: Karnac. ISBN 978-1855757561.
44. Hubbard, Thomas K. (2013). A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities. John Wiley &
Sons. ISBN 978-1118610688.
45. Ellis, J. Edward (2007). Paul and Ancient Views of Sexual Desire: Paul's Sexual Ethics in 1
Thessalonians 4, 1 Corinthians 7 and Romans 1. Bloomsbury. pp. 106–19. ISBN 978-
0567446213.
46. Crompton, Louis (2009). Homosexuality and Civilization. Harvard University Press. pp. 66–
67. ISBN 978-0674030060.
47. Neill, James (2011). The Origins and Role of Same-Sex Relations in Human Societies.
McFarland. pp. 210–13. ISBN 978-0786469260.
48. Epictetus, Discourses, ii. 5. 26
49. Epictetus, Discourses, i. 9. 1
50. Seneca, Moral letters to Lucilius, Letter 47: On master and slave, 10, circa AD 65.
51. "On the Duties of the Clergy" (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3401.htm).
www.newadvent.org. Retrieved 1 March 2017.
52. Aurelius, Marcus (1964). Meditations (https://archive.org/details/meditations0000marc_m9z
0). London: Penguin Books. p. 26 (https://archive.org/details/meditations0000marc_m9z0/pa
ge/26). ISBN 978-0140441406.
53. Marcus Aurelius (1964). Meditations
(https://archive.org/details/meditations0000marc_m9z0). London: Penguin Books. p. 25 (http
s://archive.org/details/meditations0000marc_m9z0/page/25). ISBN 978-0140441406.
54. Kee, Howard and Franklin W. Young, Understanding The New Testament, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey, Prentice Hall, Inc. 1958, p. 208. ISBN 978-0139365911
55. "Stoicism | Definition, History, & Influence | Britannica" (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Stoi
cism). www.britannica.com.
56. Agathias. Histories, 2.31.
57. David, Sedley. "Ancient philosophy" (http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/A130). In E. Craig
(ed.). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2008.
58. Musonius Rufus. "Lecture XII "On Sexual Indulgence" (https://sites.google.com/site/thestoicli
fe/the_teachers/musonius-rufus/lectures/12)." Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates
(Lectures and Fragments), Introduction and Translation by Cora E. Lutz, From Volume X of
the Yale Classical Studies, Yale University Press, 1947
59. The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early
Christianity. (https://books.google.com/books?id=oD55Um42RowC&printsec=frontcover&hl
=en&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q=Origen%20Stoicism&f=false) From University of
California Press, 2003
60. Catechism of the Catholic Church (2nd ed.). Libreria Editrice Vaticana. 2019. Paragraph
2366 (https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P86.HTM#:~:text=2366%20).

Further reading

Primary sources
A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987.
Inwood, Brad & Gerson Lloyd P. (eds.) The Stoics Reader: Selected Writings and
Testimonia Indianapolis: Hackett 2008.
Long, George Enchiridion by Epictetus, Prometheus Books, Reprint Edition, January 1955.
Gill C. Epictetus, The Discourses, Everyman 1995.
Irvine, William, A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008) ISBN 978-0195374612
Hadas, Moses (ed.), Essential Works of Stoicism, Bantam Books 1961.
Harvard University Press Epictetus Discourses Books 1 and 2, Loeb Classical Library Nr.
131, June 1925.
Harvard University Press Epictetus Discourses Books 3 and 4, Loeb Classical Library Nr.
218, June 1928.
Long, George, Discourses of Epictetus, Kessinger Publishing, January 2004.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca the Younger (transl. Robin Campbell), Letters from a Stoic:
Epistulae Morales Ad Lucilium (1969, reprint 2004) ISBN 0140442103
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, translated by Maxwell Staniforth; ISBN 0140441409, or
translated by Gregory Hays; ISBN 0679642609. Also Available on wikisource translated by
various translators
Oates, Whitney Jennings, The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers, The Complete Extant
Writings of Epicurus, Epictetus, Lucretius and Marcus Aurelius, Random House, 9th printing
1940.

Studies
Bakalis, Nikolaos, Handbook of Greek Philosophy: From Thales to the Stoics. Analysis and
Fragments, Trafford Publishing, 2005, ISBN 1412048435
Becker, Lawrence C., A New Stoicism (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998)
ISBN 0691016607
Brennan, Tad, The Stoic Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; paperback 2006)
Brooke, Christopher. Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to
Rousseau (Princeton UP, 2012) excerpts (http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9737.html)
 Hall, Ron, Secundum Naturam (According to Nature) (http://books.google.com/books/about?
id=h6AREAAAQBAJ). Stoic Therapy, LLC, 2021.
Inwood, Brad (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to The Stoics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003)
Lachs, John, Stoic Pragmatism (Indiana University Press, 2012) ISBN 0253223768
Long, A. A., Stoic Studies (Cambridge University Press, 1996; repr. University of California
Press, 2001) ISBN 0520229746
Robertson, Donald, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy: Stoicism as Rational
and Cognitive Psychotherapy (London: Karnac, 2010) ISBN 978-1855757561
Robertson, Donald, How to Think Like a Roman Emperor: The Stoic Philosophy of Marcus
Aurelius (https://books.google.gr/books?id=xGBbDwAAQBAJ). 'New York: St. Martin's
Press, 2019.
Sellars, John, Stoicism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006) ISBN 1844650537
Stephens, William O., Stoic Ethics: Epictetus and Happiness as Freedom (London:
Continuum, 2007) ISBN 0826496083
Strange, Steven (ed.), Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2004) ISBN 0521827094
Zeller, Eduard; Reichel, Oswald J., The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, Longmans, Green,
and Co., 1892

External links
Baltzly, Dirk. "Stoicism" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/). In Zalta, Edward N.
(ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Stoicism" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/stoicism.htm). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Stoic Ethics" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/stoiceth.htm). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Stoic Philosophy of Mind" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/stoicmind.htm). Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy.
Hicks, Robert Drew (1911). "Stoics"  (https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A
6dia_Britannica/Stoics). Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.).
The Stoic Therapy eLibrary (https://www.stoictherapy.com/elibrary)
The Stoic Library (http://www.ibiblio.org/stoicism/)
Stoic Logic: The Dialectic from Zeno to Chrysippus (http://www.historyoflogic.com/logic-stoic
s.htm)
Annotated Bibliography on Ancient Stoic Dialectic (http://www.historyoflogic.com/biblio/logic
-stoics-biblio-one.htm)
"A bibliography on Stoicism by the Stoic Foundation" (http://stoicfoundation.host-ed.me/bibli
ography.htm). Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/6At6hE72Q?url=http://stoicfoundation.h
ost-ed.me/bibliography.htm) from the original on 23 September 2012. Retrieved
14 September 2012.
BBC Radio 4's In Our Time programme on Stoicism (http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/ino
urtime/inourtime_20050303.shtml) (requires Flash)
An introduction to Stoic Philosophy (http://users.hartwick.edu/burringtond/stoics/intro.html)
The Stoic Registry (formerly New Stoa) :Online Stoic Community (http://thestoicregistry.org)
Modern Stoicism (Stoic Week and Stoicon) (https://modernstoicism.com)
The Four Stoic Virtues (https://www.orionphilosophy.com/stoic-blog/4-stoic-virtues/)

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Seneca the Younger
Lucius Annaeus Seneca the Younger (/ˈsɛnɪkə/; c. 4 BC –
Seneca the Younger
AD  65),[1] usually known as Seneca, was a Roman Stoic
philosopher, statesman, dramatist, and, in one work, satirist, from
the post-Augustan age of Latin literature.

Seneca was born in Cordoba in Hispania, and raised in Rome,

where he was trained in rhetoric and philosophy. His father was
Seneca the Elder, his elder brother was Lucius Junius Gallio
Annaeanus, and his nephew was the poet Lucan. In AD 41,
Seneca was exiled to the island of Corsica under emperor
Claudius,[2] but was allowed to return in 49 to become a tutor to
Nero. When Nero became emperor in 54, Seneca became his
advisor and the praetorian prefect Sextus Afranius Burrus,
provided competent government for the first five years of Nero's
reign. Seneca's influence over Nero declined with time, and in 65
Seneca was forced to take his own life for alleged complicity in the
Pisonian conspiracy to assassinate Nero, in which he was likely to Ancient bust of Seneca, part of the
have been innocent.[3] His stoic and calm suicide has become the Double Herm of Socrates and
subject of numerous paintings. Seneca

As a writer Seneca is known for his philosophical works, and for Born c. 4 BC
his plays, which are all tragedies. His prose works include a dozen Corduba, Hispania
essays and one hundred twenty-four letters dealing with moral Baetica (present-
issues. These writings constitute one of the most important bodies day Spain)
of primary material for ancient Stoicism. As a tragedian, he is best Died AD 65 (aged 68–
known for plays such as his Medea, Thyestes, and Phaedra. 69)
Seneca's influence on later generations is immense—during the
Rome
Renaissance he was "a sage admired and venerated as an oracle of
moral, even of Christian edification; a master of literary style and a Nationality Roman
model [for] dramatic art."[4] Other names Seneca the
Younger, Seneca
Notable work Epistulae Morales
Contents ad Lucilium

Life Era Hellenistic

Early life, family and adulthood philosophy
Politics and exile Region Western philosophy
Imperial advisor
School Stoicism
Retirement
Main Ethics
Death
interests
Philosophy Notable Problem of evil
Drama ideas

Works Influences
 Seneca's tragedies Plato, Epicurus, Zeno of Citium,
Essays and letters Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Publilius
Essays Syrus, Attalus, Sotion
Other essays Influenced
Letters
Marcus Aurelius, Michel de
Other
Montaigne, Dante Alighieri,
Spurious Augustine of Hippo, Albertino
"Pseudo-Seneca" Mussato, Cardinal Giovanni
Editions Colonna, Tertullian, Martin of Braga,
Legacy Medieval philosophy, Baruch
As a proto-Christian saint Spinoza, Edmund Burke, Joseph
An improving reputation De Maistre
Notable fictional portrayals
See also
Notes
References
Further reading
External links

Life

Early life, family and adulthood

Seneca was born in Córdoba in the Roman province of Baetica in Hispania.[5] His father was Lucius
Annaeus Seneca the elder, a Spanish-born Roman knight who had gained fame as a writer and teacher of
rhetoric in Rome.[6] Seneca's mother, Helvia, was from a prominent Baetician family.[7] Seneca was the
second of three brothers; the others were Lucius Annaeus Novatus (later known as Junius Gallio), and
Annaeus Mela, the father of the poet Lucan.[8] Miriam Griffin says in her biography of Seneca that "the
evidence for Seneca's life before his exile in 41 is so slight, and the potential interest of these years, for
social history as well as for biography, is so great that few writers on Seneca have resisted the temptation to
eke out knowledge with imagination."[9] Griffin also infers from the ancient sources that Seneca was born
in either 8, 4, or 1 BC. She thinks he was born between 4 and 1 BC and was resident in Rome by AD 5.[9]

Seneca tells us that he was taken to Rome in the "arms" of his aunt (his mother's stepsister) at a young age,
probably when he was about five years old.[10] His father resided for much of his life in the city.[11] Seneca
was taught the usual subjects of literature, grammar, and rhetoric, as part of the standard education of high-
born Romans.[12] While still young he received philosophical training from Attalus the Stoic, and from
Sotion and Papirius Fabianus, both of whom belonged to the short-lived School of the Sextii, which
combined Stoicism with Pythagoreanism.[8] Sotion persuaded Seneca when he was a young man (in his
early twenties) to become a vegetarian, which he practised for around a year before his father urged him to
desist because the practice was associated with "some foreign rites".[13] Seneca often had breathing
difficulties throughout his life, probably asthma,[14] and at some point in his mid-twenties (c. 20 AD) he
appears to have been struck down with tuberculosis.[15] He was sent to Egypt to live with his aunt (the
same aunt who had brought him to Rome), whose husband Gaius Galerius had become Prefect of Egypt.[7]
She nursed him through a period of ill-health that lasted up to ten years.[16] In 31 AD he returned to Rome
with his aunt, his uncle dying en route in a shipwreck.[16] His
aunt's influence helped Seneca be elected quaestor (probably after
37 AD[12]), which also earned him the right to sit in the Roman
Senate.[16]

Politics and exile

Seneca's early career as a senator seems to have been successful

and he was praised for his oratory.[17] Cassius Dio relates a story
that Caligula was so offended by Seneca's oratorical success in the
Senate that he ordered him to commit suicide.[17] Seneca only
survived because he was seriously ill and Caligula was told that he
would soon die anyway.[17] In his writings Seneca has nothing
good to say about Caligula and frequently depicts him as a
monster.[18] Seneca explains his own survival as down to his
patience and his devotion to his friends: "I wanted to avoid the Modern statue of Seneca in Córdoba
impression that all I could do for loyalty was die."[19]

In 41 AD, Claudius became emperor, and Seneca was accused by the new empress Messalina of adultery
with Julia Livilla, sister to Caligula and Agrippina.[20] The affair has been doubted by some historians,
since Messalina had clear political motives for getting rid of Julia Livilla and her supporters.[11][21] The
Senate pronounced a death sentence on Seneca, which Claudius commuted to exile, and Seneca spent the
next eight years on the island of Corsica.[22] Two of Seneca's earliest surviving works date from the period
of his exile—both consolations.[20] In his Consolation to Helvia, his mother, Seneca comforts her as a
bereaved mother for losing her son to exile.[22] Seneca incidentally mentions the death of his only son, a
few weeks before his exile.[22] Later in life Seneca was married to a woman younger than himself,
Pompeia Paulina.[8] It has been thought that the infant son may have been from an earlier marriage,[22] but
the evidence is "tenuous".[8] Seneca's other work of this period, his Consolation to Polybius, one of
Claudius' freedmen, focused on consoling Polybius on the death of his brother. It is noted for its flattery of
Claudius, and Seneca expresses his hope that the emperor will recall him from exile.[22] In 49 AD
Agrippina married her uncle Claudius, and through her influence Seneca was recalled to Rome.[20]
Agrippina gained the praetorship for Seneca and appointed him tutor to her son, the future emperor
Nero.[23]

Imperial advisor

From AD 54 to 62, Seneca acted as Nero's advisor, together with

the praetorian prefect Sextus Afranius Burrus. One by-product of
his new position was that Seneca was appointed suffect consul in
56.[24] Seneca's influence was said to have been especially strong
in the first year.[25] Seneca composed Nero's accession speeches in
which he promised to restore proper legal procedure and authority
to the Senate.[23] He also composed the eulogy for Claudius that
Nero delivered at the funeral.[23] Seneca's satirical skit
Apocolocyntosis, which lampoons the deification of Claudius and
praises Nero dates from the earliest period of Nero's reign.[23] In 55
Nero and Seneca, by Eduardo Barrón
AD, Seneca wrote On Clemency following Nero's murder of (1904). Museo del Prado
Britannicus, perhaps to assure the citizenry that the murder was the
end, not the beginning of bloodshed.[26] On Clemency is a work
which, although it flatters Nero, was intended to show the correct (Stoic) path of virtue for a ruler.[23]
Tacitus and Dio suggest that Nero's early rule, during which he listened to Seneca and Burrus, was quite
competent. However, the ancient sources suggest that, over time, Seneca and Burrus lost their influence
over the emperor. In 59 they had reluctantly agreed to Agrippina's murder, and afterward Tacitus reports
that Seneca had to write a letter justifying the murder to the Senate.[26]

In 58 AD the senator Publius Suillius Rufus made a series of public attacks on Seneca.[27] These attacks,
reported by Tacitus and Cassius Dio,[28] included charges that, in a mere four years of service to Nero,
Seneca had acquired a vast personal fortune of three hundred million sestertii by charging high interest on
loans throughout Italy and the provinces.[29] Suillius' attacks included claims of sexual corruption, with a
suggestion that Seneca had slept with Agrippina.[30] Tacitus, though, reports that Suillius was highly
prejudiced: he had been a favourite of Claudius,[27] and had been an embezzler and informant.[29] In
response, Seneca brought a series of prosecutions for corruption against Suillius: half of his estate was
confiscated and he was sent into exile.[31] However, the attacks reflect a criticism of Seneca that was made
at the time and continued through later ages.[27] Seneca was undoubtedly extremely rich: he had properties
at Baiae and Nomentum, an Alban villa, and Egyptian estates.[27] Cassius Dio even reports that the
Boudica uprising in Britannia was caused by Seneca forcing large loans on the indigenous British
aristocracy in the aftermath of Claudius's conquest of Britain, and then calling them in suddenly and
aggressively.[27] Seneca was sensitive to such accusations: his De Vita Beata ("On the Happy Life") dates
from around this time and includes a defence of wealth along Stoic lines, arguing that properly gaining and
spending wealth is appropriate behaviour for a philosopher.[29]

Retirement

After Burrus' death in 62, Seneca's influence declined rapidly; as Tacitus puts it (Ann. 14.52.1), mors Burri
infregit Senecae potentiam ("the death of Burrus broke Seneca's power").[32] Tacitus reports that Seneca
tried to retire twice, in 62 and 64 AD, but Nero refused him on both occasions.[29] Nevertheless, Seneca
was increasingly absent from the court.[29] He adopted a quiet lifestyle on his country estates, concentrating
on his studies and seldom visiting Rome. It was during these final few years that he composed two of his
greatest works: Naturales quaestiones—an encyclopedia of the natural world; and his Letters to Lucilius—
which document his philosophical thoughts.[33]

Death

In AD 65, Seneca was caught up in the aftermath of the

Pisonian conspiracy, a plot to kill Nero. Although it is
unlikely that Seneca was part of the conspiracy, Nero
ordered him to kill himself.[29] Seneca followed
tradition by severing several veins in order to bleed to
death, and his wife Pompeia Paulina attempted to share
his fate. Cassius Dio, who wished to emphasize the
relentlessness of Nero, focused on how Seneca had
attended to his last-minute letters, and how his death
was hastened by soldiers.[34] A generation after the Manuel Domínguez Sánchez, The suicide of
Julio-Claudian emperors, Tacitus wrote an account of Seneca (1871), Museo del Prado
the suicide, which, in view of his Republican
sympathies, is perhaps somewhat romanticized.[35]
According to this account, Nero ordered Seneca's wife saved. Her wounds were bound up and she made
no further attempt to kill herself. As for Seneca himself, his age and diet were blamed for slow loss of blood
and extended pain rather than a quick death. He also took poison,
which was, however, not fatal. After dictating his last words to a
scribe, and with a circle of friends attending him in his home, he
immersed himself in a warm bath, which he expected would speed
blood flow and ease his pain. Tacitus wrote, "He was then carried
into a bath, with the steam of which he was suffocated, and he was
burnt without any of the usual funeral rites. So he had directed in a
codicil of his will, even when in the height of his wealth and power
he was thinking of life's close."[35] This may give the impression of
a favourable portrait of Seneca, but Tacitus' treatment of him is at
best ambivalent. Alongside Seneca's apparent fortitude in the face
of death, for example, one can also view his actions as rather
histrionic and performative; and when Tacitus tells us that he left
his family an imago suae vitae (Annales 15.62), "an image of his
life", he is possibly being ambiguous: in Roman culture, the imago
was a kind of mask that commemorated the great ancestors of noble
families, but at the same time, it may also suggest duplicity,
superficiality, and pretence.[36]
Lodovico Lana, Death of Seneca,
Philosophy National Gallery of Art

As "a major philosophical figure of the Roman Imperial

Period",[37] Seneca's lasting contribution to philosophy has been to
the school of Stoicism.  His writing is highly accessible[38][39] and
was the subject of attention from the Renaissance onwards by
writers such as Michel de Montaigne.[40] He has been described as
“a towering and controversial figure of antiquity”[41] and “the
world’s most interesting Stoic”.[42]

Seneca wrote a number of books on Stoicism, mostly on ethics,

with one work (Naturales Quaestiones) on the physical world.[43]
Seneca built on the writings of many of the earlier Stoics: he often
mentions Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus;[44] and frequently cites
Posidonius, with whom Seneca shared an interest in natural
phenomena.[45] He frequently quotes Epicurus, especially in his
Letters.[46] His interest in Epicurus is mainly limited to using him
as a source of ethical maxims.[47] Likewise Seneca shows some
interest in Platonist metaphysics, but never with any clear
First page of the Naturales
commitment.[48] His moral essays are based on Stoic doctrines.[39]
Quaestiones, made for the Catalan-
Stoicism was a popular philosophy in this period, and many upper-
Aragonese court
class Romans found in it a guiding ethical framework for political
involvement.[43] It was once popular to regard Seneca as being
very eclectic in his Stoicism,[49] but modern scholarship views him as a fairly orthodox Stoic, albeit a free-
minded one.[50]

His works discuss both ethical theory and practical advice, and Seneca stresses that both parts are distinct
but interdependent.[51] His Letters to Lucilius showcase Seneca's search for ethical perfection[51] and
“represent a sort of philosophical testament for posterity”.[41] Seneca regards philosophy as a balm for the
wounds of life.[52] The destructive passions, especially anger and grief, must be uprooted,[53] or moderated
according to reason.[54] He discusses the relative merits of the contemplative life and the active life,[52] and
he considers it important to confront one's own mortality and be able to face death.[53][54] One must be
willing to practice poverty and use wealth properly,[55] and he writes about favours, clemency, the
importance of friendship, and the need to benefit others.[55][52][56] The universe is governed for the best by
a rational providence,[55] and this must be reconciled with acceptance of adversity.[53]

Drama
Ten plays are attributed to Seneca, of which most likely eight were
written by him.[57] The plays stand in stark contrast to his
philosophical works. With their intense emotions, and grim overall
tone, the plays seem to represent the antithesis of Seneca's Stoic
beliefs.[58] Up to the 16th century it was normal to distinguish
between Seneca the moral philosopher and Seneca the dramatist as
two separate people.[59] Scholars have tried to spot certain Stoic
themes: it is the uncontrolled passions that generate madness,
ruination, and self-destruction.[60] This has a cosmic as well as an
ethical aspect, and fate is a powerful, albeit rather oppressive, Woodcut illustration of the suicide of
force.[60] Seneca and the attempted suicide of
his wife Pompeia Paulina
Many scholars have thought, following the ideas of the 19th-
century German scholar Friedrich Leo, that Seneca's tragedies were
written for recitation only.[61] Other scholars think that they were written for performance and that it is
possible that actual performance took place in Seneca's lifetime.[62] Ultimately, this issue cannot be
resolved on the basis of our existing knowledge.[57] The tragedies of Seneca have been successfully staged
in modern times.

The dating of the tragedies is highly problematic in the absence of any ancient references.[63] A parody of a
lament from Hercules Furens appears in the Apocolocyntosis, which implies a date before 54 AD for that
play.[63] A relative chronology has been proposed on metrical grounds.[64] The plays are not all based on
the Greek pattern; they have a five-act form and differ in many respects from extant Attic drama, and while
the influence of Euripides on some of these works is considerable, so is the influence of Virgil and
Ovid.[63]

Seneca's plays were widely read in medieval and Renaissance European universities and strongly
influenced tragic drama in that time, such as Elizabethan England (William Shakespeare and other
playwrights), France (Corneille and Racine), and the Netherlands (Joost van den Vondel).[65] English
translations of Seneca's tragedies appeared in print in the mid-16th century, with all ten published
collectively in 1581.[66] He is regarded as the source and inspiration for what is known as "Revenge
Tragedy", starting with Thomas Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy and continuing well into the Jacobean era.[67]
Thyestes is considered Seneca's masterpiece,[68] and has been described by scholar Dana Gioia as "one of
the most influential plays ever written".[69] Medea is also highly regarded,[70][71] and was praised along
with Phaedra by T. S. Eliot.[69]

Works
Works attributed to Seneca include a dozen philosophical essays, one hundred and twenty-four letters
dealing with moral issues, nine tragedies, and a satire, the attribution of which is disputed.[72] His
authorship of Hercules on Oeta has also been questioned.
Seneca's tragedies

Fabulae crepidatae (tragedies with Greek subjects):

Hercules or Hercules furens (The Madness of Hercules)

Troades (The Trojan Women)
Phoenissae (The Phoenician Women)
Medea
Phaedra
Oedipus
Agamemnon
Thyestes
Hercules Oetaeus (Hercules on Oeta): generally considered not written by Seneca. First
rejected by Daniël Heinsius.

Fabula praetexta (tragedy in Roman setting):

Octavia: almost certainly not written by Seneca (at least in its final form) since it contains
accurate prophecies of both his and Nero's deaths.[73] This play closely resembles Seneca's
plays in style, but was probably written some time after Seneca's death (perhaps under
Vespasian) by someone influenced by Seneca and aware of the events of his lifetime.[74]
Though attributed textually to Seneca, the attribution was early questioned by Petrarch,[75]
and rejected by Justus Lipsius.

Essays and letters

Essays

Traditionally given in the following order:

1. (64) De Providentia (On providence) – addressed to Lucilius

2. (55) De Constantia Sapientis (On the Firmness of the Wise Person) – addressed to Serenus
3. (41) De Ira (On anger) – A study on the consequences and the control of anger – addressed
to his brother Novatus
4. (book 2 of the De Ira)
5. (book 3 of the De Ira)
6. (40) Ad Marciam, De consolatione (To Marcia, On Consolation) – Consoles her on the death
of her son
7. (58) De Vita Beata (On the Happy Life) – addressed to Gallio
8. (62) De Otio (On Leisure) – addressed to Serenus
9. (63) De Tranquillitate Animi (On the tranquillity of mind) – addressed to Serenus
10. (49) De Brevitate Vitæ (On the shortness of life) – Essay expounding that any length of life is
sufficient if lived wisely – addressed to Paulinus
11. (44) De Consolatione ad Polybium (To Polybius, On consolation) – Consoling him on the
death of his brother.
12. (42) Ad Helviam matrem, De consolatione (To mother Helvia, On consolation) – Letter to his
mother consoling her on his absence during exile.
Other essays
(56) De Clementia (On Clemency) – written to Nero on the need for clemency as a virtue in
an emperor.[76]
(63) De Beneficiis (On Benefits) [seven books]
(–) De Superstitione (On Superstition) – lost, but quoted from in Saint Augustine's City of
God 6.10–6.11.

Letters

(64) Epistulae morales ad Lucilium – collection of 124 letters, sometimes divided into 20
books, dealing with moral issues written to Lucilius Junior. This work has possibly come
down to us incomplete; the miscellanist Aulus Gellius refers, in his Noctes Atticae (12.2), to
a 'book 22'.

Other
(54) Apocolocyntosis divi Claudii (The Gourdification of the Divine Claudius), a satirical
work.
(63) Naturales quaestiones [seven books] an insight into ancient theories of cosmology,
meteorology, and similar subjects.

Spurious
(58–62/370?) Cujus etiam ad Paulum apostolum leguntur epistolae: These letters, allegedly
between Seneca and St Paul, were revered by early authorities, but modern scholarship
rejects their authenticity.[77][78]

"Pseudo-Seneca"

Various antique and medieval texts purport to be by Seneca, e.g., De remediis fortuitorum. Their unknown
authors are collectively called "Pseudo-Seneca."[79] At least some of these seem to preserve and adapt
genuine Senecan content, for example, Saint Martin of Braga's (d. c. 580) Formula vitae honestae, or De
differentiis quatuor virtutumvitae honestae ("Rules for an Honest Life", or "On the Four Cardinal Virtues").
Early manuscripts preserve Martin's preface, where he makes it clear that this was his adaptation, but in
later copies this was omitted, and the work was later thought fully Seneca's work.[80] Seneca is also often
quoted as having stated that "Religion is regarded by the common people as true, by the wise as false, and
by the rulers as useful";[81] this is based on a translation by Edward Gibbon, but is disputed (https://en.wiki
quote.org/wiki/Seneca_the_Younger#Disputed).

Editions
Naturales quaestiones (https://gutenberg.beic.it/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=4698971)
(in Latin). Venezia: eredi Aldo Manuzio (1.) & Andrea Torresano (1.). 1522.

Legacy

As a proto-Christian saint
 Seneca's writings were well known in the later Roman period, and
Quintilian, writing thirty years after Seneca's death, remarked on the
popularity of his works amongst the youth.[82] While he found much to
admire, Quintillian criticised Seneca for what he regarded as a degenerate
literary style—a criticism echoed by Aulus Gellius in the middle of the 2nd
century.[82]

Plato, Seneca, and Aristotle
in a medieval manuscript
illustration (c. 1325–35)
unknown.[86]
The early Christian Church was very favourably disposed towards Seneca
and his writings, and the church leader Tertullian possessively referred to
him as "our Seneca".[83] By the 4th century an apocryphal correspondence
with Paul the Apostle had been created linking Seneca into the Christian
tradition.[84] The letters are mentioned by Jerome who also included
Seneca among a list of Christian writers, and Seneca is similarly mentioned
by Augustine.[84] In the 6th century Martin of Braga synthesised Seneca's
thought into a couple of treatises that became popular in their own right.[85]
Otherwise, Seneca was mainly known through a large number of quotes
and extracts in the florilegia, which were popular throughout the medieval
period.[85] When his writings were read in the later Middle Ages, it was
mostly his Letters to Lucilius—the longer essays and plays being relatively

Medieval writers and works continued to link him to Christianity because of his alleged association with
Paul.[87] The Golden Legend, a 13th-century hagiographical account of famous saints that was widely
read, included an account of Seneca's death scene, and erroneously presented Nero as a witness to Seneca's
suicide.[87] Dante placed Seneca (alongside Cicero) among the "great spirits" in the First Circle of Hell, or
Limbo.[88] Boccaccio, who in 1370 came across the works of Tacitus whilst browsing the library at
Montecassino, wrote an account of Seneca's suicide hinting that it was a kind of disguised baptism, or a de
facto baptism in spirit.[89] Some, such as Albertino Mussato and Giovanni Colonna, went even further and
concluded that Seneca must have been a Christian convert.[90]

An improving reputation

Seneca remains one of the few popular Roman philosophers from the
period. He appears not only in Dante, but also in Chaucer and to a large
degree in Petrarch, who adopted his style in his own essays and who
quotes him more than any other authority except Virgil. In the Renaissance,
printed editions and translations of his works became common, including
an edition by Erasmus and a commentary by John Calvin.[91] John of
Salisbury, Erasmus and others celebrated his works. French essayist
Montaigne, who gave a spirited defense of Seneca and Plutarch in his
Essays, was himself considered by Pasquier a "French Seneca".[92]
The "Pseudo-Seneca", a
Similarly, Thomas Fuller praised Joseph Hall as "our English Seneca".
Roman bust found at
Many who considered his ideas not particularly original, still argued that he Herculaneum, one of a
was important in making the Greek philosophers presentable and series of similar sculptures
intelligible.[93] His suicide has also been a popular subject in art, from known since the
Jacques-Louis David's 1773 painting The Death of Seneca to the 1951 film Renaissance, once
Quo Vadis. identified as Seneca. Now
commonly identified as
Even with the admiration of an earlier group of intellectual stalwarts, Hesiod
Seneca has never been without his detractors. In his own time, he was
accused of hypocrisy or, at least, a less than "Stoic" lifestyle. While
banished to Corsica, he wrote a plea for restoration rather incompatible with his advocacy of a simple life
and the acceptance of fate. In his Apocolocyntosis he ridiculed the behaviours and policies of Claudius, and
flattered Nero—such as proclaiming that Nero would live longer and be wiser than the legendary Nestor.
The claims of Publius Suillius Rufus that Seneca acquired some "three hundred million sesterces" through
Nero's favour, are highly partisan, but they reflect the reality that Seneca was both powerful and
wealthy.[94] Robin Campbell, a translator of Seneca's letters, writes that the "stock criticism of Seneca right
down the centuries [has been]...the apparent contrast between his philosophical teachings and his
practice."[94]

In 1562 Gerolamo Cardano wrote an apology praising Nero in his Encomium Neronis, printed in Basel.[95]
This was likely intended as a mock encomium, inverting the portrayal of Nero and Seneca that appears in
Tacitus.[96] In this work Cardano portrayed Seneca as a crook of the worst kind, an empty rhetorician who
was only thinking to grab money and power, after having poisoned the mind of the young emperor.
Cardano stated that Seneca well deserved death.

Among the historians who have sought to reappraise Seneca is the

scholar Anna Lydia Motto who in 1966 argued that the negative
image has been based almost entirely on Suillius' account, while
many others who might have lauded him have been lost.[97]

"We are therefore left with no contemporary record of

"Seneca", ancient hero of the
modern Córdoba; this architectural
roundel in Seville is based on the
"Pseudo-Seneca" (illustration above)
Seneca's life, save for the desperate opinion of Publius
Suillius. Think of the barren image we should have of
Socrates, had the works of Plato and Xenophon not
come down to us and were we wholly dependent upon
Aristophanes' description of this Athenian philosopher.
To be sure, we should have a highly distorted,
misconstrued view. Such is the view left to us of
Seneca, if we were to rely upon Suillius alone."[98]

More recent work is changing the dominant perception of Seneca

as a mere conduit for pre-existing ideas showing originality in Seneca's contribution to the history of ideas.
Examination of Seneca's life and thought in relation to contemporary education and to the psychology of
emotions is revealing the relevance of his thought. For example, Martha Nussbaum in her discussion of
desire and emotion includes Seneca among the Stoics who offered important insights and perspectives on
emotions and their role in our lives.[99] Specifically devoting a chapter to his treatment of anger and its
management, she shows Seneca's appreciation of the damaging role of uncontrolled anger, and its
pathological connections. Nussbaum later extended her examination to Seneca's contribution to political
philosophy[100] showing considerable subtlety and richness in his thoughts about politics, education, and
notions of global citizenship—and finding a basis for reform-minded education in Seneca's ideas she used
to propose a mode of modern education that avoids both narrow traditionalism and total rejection of
tradition. Elsewhere Seneca has been noted as the first great Western thinker on the complex nature and
role of gratitude in human relationships.[101]

Notable fictional portrayals

Seneca is a character in Monteverdi's 1642 opera L'incoronazione di Poppea (The Coronation of Poppea),
which is based on the pseudo-Senecan play, Octavia.[102] In Nathaniel Lee's 1675 play Nero, Emperor of
Rome, Seneca attempts to dissuade Nero from his egomaniacal plans, but is dragged off to prison, dying
off-stage.[103] He appears in Robert Bridges' verse drama Nero, the second
part of which (published 1894) culminates in Seneca's death.[104] Seneca
appears in a fairly minor role in Henryk Sienkiewicz's 1896 novel Quo
Vadis and was played by Nicholas Hannen in the 1951 film.[105] In Robert
Graves' 1934 book Claudius the God, the sequel novel to I, Claudius,
Seneca is portrayed as an unbearable sycophant.[106] He is shown as a
flatterer who converts to Stoicism solely to appease Claudius' own
ideology. The "Pumpkinification" (Apocolocyntosis) to Graves thus
becomes an unbearable work of flattery to the loathsome Nero mocking a
man that Seneca grovelled to for years. The historical novel Chariot of the
Soul by Linda Proud features Seneca as tutor of the young Togidubnus, son
of King Verica of the Atrebates, during his ten-year stay in Rome.[107]

See also Baroque marble imaginary

portrait bust of Seneca, by
Audio theater an anonymous sculptor of
Glossarium Eroticum the 17th century. Museo del
Otium Prado
Seneca (crater)
2608 Seneca

Notes
1. Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. Seneca (https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lucius-Annae
us-Seneca-Roman-philosopher-and-statesman).
2. Fitch, John (2008). Seneca. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 32. ISBN 978-0-19-
928208-1.
3. Bunson, Matthew (1991). A Dictionary of the Roman Empire. Oxford University Press.
p. 382.
4. Watling, E. F. (1966). "Introduction". Four Tragedies and Octavia. Penguin Books. p. 9.
5. Habinek 2013, p. 6
6. Dando-Collins, Stephen (2008). Blood of the Caesars: How the Murder of Germanicus Led
to the Fall of Rome. John Wiley & Sons. p. 47. ISBN 978-0470137413.
7. Habinek 2013, p. 7
8. Reynolds, Griffin & Fantham 2012, p. 92
9. Miriam T. Griffin. Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics, Oxford 1976. 34.
10. Wilson 2014, p. 48 citing De Consolatione ad Helviam Matrem 19.2
11. Asmis, Bartsch & Nussbaum 2012, p. vii
12. Habinek 2013, p. 8
13. Wilson 2014, p. 56
14. Wilson 2014, p. 32
15. Wilson 2014, p. 57
16. Wilson 2014, p. 62
17. Braund 2015, p. 24
18. Wilson 2014, p. 67
19. Wilson 2014, p. 67 citing Naturales Quaestiones, 4.17
20. Habinek 2013, p. 9
21. Wilson 2014, p. 79
22. Braund 2015, p. 23
23. Braund 2015, p. 22
24. The Senatus Consultum Trebellianum was dated to 25 August in his consulate, which he
shared with Trebellius Maximus. Digest 36.1.1
25. Cassius Dio claims Seneca and Burrus "took the rule entirely into their own hands," but
"after the death of Britannicus, Seneca and Burrus no longer gave any careful attention to
the public business" in 55 (Cassius Dio, Roman History, LXI.3–7)
26. Habinek 2013, p. 10
27. Braund 2015, p. 21
28. Tacitus, Annals xiii.42; Cassius Dio, Roman History lxi.33.9.
29. Asmis, Bartsch & Nussbaum 2012, p. ix
30. Wilson 2014, p. 130
31. Wilson 2014, p. 131
32. Braund 2015, p. viii
33. Habinek 2013, p. 14
34. Habinek 2013, p. 16 citing Cassius Dio ii.25
35. Church, Alfred John; Brodribb, William Jackson (2007). "xv". Tacitus: The Annals of Imperial
Rome. New York: Barnes & Noble. p. 341. citing Tacitus Annals, xv. 60–64
36. Tacitus, Annales 15.62.
37. Vogt, Katja (2016), "Seneca" (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/seneca/), in
Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 ed.),
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 19 August 2019
38. Gill 1999, pp. 49–50
39. Gill 1999, p. 37
40. Seneca, Lucius Annaeus (1968). Stoic Philosophy of Seneca. ISBN 0393004597.
41. "Massimo Pigliucci on Seneca's Stoic philosophy of happiness – Massimo Pigliucci | Aeon
Classics" (https://aeon.co/classics/massimo-pigliucci-on-senecas-stoic-philosophy-of-happi
ness). Aeon. Retrieved 19 August 2019.
42. "Who Is Seneca? Inside The Mind of The World's Most Interesting Stoic" (https://dailystoic.c
om/seneca/). Daily Stoic. 10 July 2016. Retrieved 19 August 2019.
43. Gill 1999, p. 34
44. Sellars 2013, p. 103
45. Sellars 2013, p. 105
46. Sellars 2013, p. 106
47. Sellars 2013, p. 107
48. Sellars 2013, p. 108
49. "His philosophy, so far as he adopted a system, was the stoical, but it was rather an
eclecticism of stoicism than pure stoicism"  Long, George (1870). "Seneca, L. Annaeus" (ht
tps://books.google.com/books?id=RR5SAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA782). In Smith, William (ed.).
Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. Vol. 3. p. 782.
50. Sellars 2013, p. 109
51. Gill 1999, p. 43
52. Colish 1985, p. 14
53. Asmis, Bartsch & Nussbaum 2012, p. xv
54. Colish 1985, p. 49
55. Asmis, Bartsch & Nussbaum 2012, p. xvi
56. Colish 1985, p. 41
57. Asmis, Bartsch & Nussbaum 2012, p. xxiii
58. Asmis, Bartsch & Nussbaum 2012, p. xx
59. Laarmann 2013, p. 53
60. Gill 1999, p. 58
61. The chief modern proponent of this view is Otto Zwierlein, Die Rezitationsdramen Senecas,
1966.
62. George W.M. Harrison (ed.), Seneca in performance, London: Duckworth, 2000.
63. Reynolds, Griffin & Fantham 2012, p. 94
64. John G. Fitch, "Sense-pauses and Relative Dating in Seneca, Sophocles and
Shakespeare," American Journal of Philology 102 (1981) 289–307.
65. A.J. Boyle, Tragic Seneca: An Essay in the Theatrical Tradition. London: Routledge, 1997.
66. Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. His Tenne Tragedies. Thomas Newton, ed. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1966, p. xlv. ASIN B000N3NP6K (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B000N3NP
6K)
67. G. Braden, Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1985.
68. Magill, Frank Northen (1989). Masterpieces of World Literature (https://books.google.com/bo
oks?id=a6cjAQAAIAAJ&q=Thyestes). Harper & Row Limited. p. vii. ISBN 0060161442.
69. Seneca: The Tragedies (https://books.google.com/books?id=tpD1vAkr76gC). JHU Press.
1994. p. xli. ISBN 0801849322.
70. Heil, Andreas; Damschen, Gregor (2013). Brill's Companion to Seneca: Philosopher and
Dramatist (https://books.google.com/books?id=9jqOAgAAQBAJ). Brill. p. 594. ISBN 978-
9004217089. "Medea is often considered the masterpiece of Seneca's earlier plays, [...]"
71. Sluiter, Ineke; Rosen, Ralph M. (2012). Aesthetic Value in Classical Antiquity (https://books.
google.com/books?id=jlXKM1jBhswC). Brill. p. 399. ISBN 978-9004231672.
72. Brockett, O. (2003), History of the Theatre: Ninth Ed. Allyn and Bacon. p. 50
73. R Ferri ed., Octavia (2003) pp. 5–9
74. H J Rose, A Handbook of Latin Literature (London 1967) p. 375
75. R Ferri ed., Octavia (2003) p. 6
76. "Seneca: On Clemency" (http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/sen/sen.clem.shtml).
Thelatinlibrary.com. Retrieved 26 July 2011.
77. "Apocryphal epistles" (http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/tixeront/section1-3.html#epistle
s). Earlychristianwritings.com. 2 February 2006. Retrieved 26 July 2011.
78. Joseph Barber Lightfoot (1892) St Paul and Seneca (http://www.biblestudytools.com/classic
s/lightfoot-dissertations-on-the-apostolic-age/st-paul-and-seneca.html) Dissertations on the
Apostolic Age
79. "Pseudo-Seneca" (http://www.bml.firenze.sbn.it/Seneca/eng/pseudo_seneca_contenuto.htm
l). www.bml.firenze.sbn.it.
80. István Pieter Bejczy, The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: A Study in Moral Thought
from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century, Brill, 2011, pp. 55–56 (https://books.google.com/b
ooks?id=VgPRu0CJ_sQC&pg=PA55).
81. GoodReads (https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/45750-religion-is-regarded-by-the-common
-people-as-true-by) (retrieved 5 November 2021)
82. Laarmann 2013, p. 54 citing Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, x.1.126f; Aulus Gellius, Noctes
Atticae, xii. 2.
 83. Moses Hadas. The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca, 1958. 1.
84. Laarmann 2013, p. 54
85. Laarmann 2013, p. 55
86. Wilson 2014, p. 218
87. Wilson 2014, p. 219
88. Ker 2009, p. 197 citing Dante, Inf., 4.141
89. Ker 2009, pp. 221–22
90. Laarmann 2013, p. 59
91. Richard Mott Gummere, Seneca the philosopher, and his modern message, p. 97.
92. Gummere, Seneca the philosopher, and his modern message, p. 106.
93. Moses Hadas. The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca, 1958. 3.
94. Campbell 1969, p. 11
95. Available in English as Girolamo Cardano, Nero: an Exemplary Life Inkstone, 2012
96. Siraisi, Nancy G. (2007). History, Medicine, and the Traditions of Renaissance Learning.
University of Michigan Press. pp. 157–58.
97. Lydia Motto, Anna Seneca on Trial: The Case of the Opulent Stoic The Classic Journal, Vol.
61, No. 6 (1966) pp. 254–58
98. Lydia Motto, Anna Seneca on Trial: The Case of the Opulent Stoic The Classic Journal, Vol.
61, No. 6 (1966) p. 257
99. Nussbaum, M. (1996). The Therapy of Desire. Princeton University Press
100. Nussbaum, M. (1999). Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal
Education. Harvard University Press
101. Harpham, E. (2004). Gratitude in the History of Ideas, 19–37 in M. A. Emmons and M. E.
McCulloch, editors, The Psychology of Gratitude, Oxford University Press.
102. Gioia, Dana (1992). "Introduction". In Slavitt, David R. (ed.). Seneca: The Tragedies. JHU
Press. p. xviii.
103. Ker 2009, p. 220
104. Bridges, Robert (1894). Nero, Part II. From the death of Burrus to the death of Seneca,
comprising the conspiracy of Piso (https://archive.org/details/nerofromdeathofb02bridrich).
George Bell and Sons.
105. Cyrino, Monica Silveira (2008). Rome, season one: History makes television. Blackwell.
p. 195.
106. Citti 2015, p. 316
107. Proud, Linda (2018). Chariot of the Soul. Oxford: Godstow Press. ISBN 978-1907651137.
OCLC 1054834598 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1054834598).

References
Asmis, Elizabeth; Bartsch, Shadi; Nussbaum, Martha C. (2012), "Seneca and his World", in
Kaster, Robert A.; Nussbaum, Martha C. (eds.), Seneca: Anger, Mercy, Revenge, University
of Chicago Press, ISBN 978-0226748429
Braund, Susanna (2015), "Seneca Multiplex", in Bartsch, Shadi; Schiesaro, Alessandro
(eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Seneca, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-
1107035058
Campbell, Robin (1969), "Introduction" (https://archive.org/details/lettersfromstoic0000sene),
Letters from a Stoic, Penguin, ISBN 0140442103
 Citti, Francesco (2015), "Seneca and the Moderns", in Bartsch, Shadi; Schiesaro,
Alessandro (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Seneca, Cambridge University Press,
ISBN 978-1107035058
Colish, Marcia L. (1985), The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, vol. 1,
Brill, ISBN 9004072675
Gill, Christopher (1999), "The School in the Roman Imperial Period", in Inwood, Brad (ed.),
The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521779855
Habinek, Thomas (2013), "Imago Suae Vitae: Seneca's Life and Career", in Heil, Andreas;
Damschen, Gregor (eds.), Brill's Companion to Seneca: Philosopher and Dramatist, Brill,
ISBN 978-9004154612
Ker, James (2009), The Deaths of Seneca, Oxford University Press
Laarmann, Mathias (2013), "Seneca the Philosopher", in Heil, Andreas; Damschen, Gregor
(eds.), Brill's Companion to Seneca: Philosopher and Dramatist, Brill, ISBN 978-
9004154612
Reynolds, L. D.; Griffin, M. T.; Fantham, E. (2012), "Annaeus Seneca (2), Lucius", in
Hornblower, S.; Spawforth, A.; Eidinow, E. (eds.), The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Oxford
University Press, ISBN 978-0199545568
Sellars, John (2013), "Context: Seneca's Philosophical Predecessors and Contemporaries",
in Heil, Andreas; Damschen, Gregor (eds.), Brill's Companion to Seneca: Philosopher and
Dramatist, Brill, ISBN 978-9004154612
Wilson, Emily R. (2014), The Greatest Empire: A Life of Seneca, Oxford University Press,
ISBN 978-0199926640

Further reading
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Anger, Mercy, Revenge. trans. Robert A. Kast and Martha C.
Nussbaum. Chicago, IL. University of Chicago Press, 2010. ISBN 978-0-226-74841-2
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Hardship and Happiness. trans. Elaine Fantham, Harry M. Hine,
James Ker, and Gareth D. Williams. Chicago, IL. University of Chicago Press, 2014.
ISBN 978-0-226-74832-0
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Natural Questions. trans. Harry M. Hine. Chicago, IL. University of
Chicago Press, 2010. ISBN 978-0-226-74838-2
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. On Benefits. trans. Miriam Griffin and Brad Inwood. Chicago, IL.
University of Chicago Press, 2011. ISBN 978-0-226-74840-5
Seneca: The Tragedies. Various translators, ed. David R. Slavitt. Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2 vols, 1992–94. ISBN 978-0801843099, 978-0801849329
Seneca: Tragedies. Ed. & transl. John G. Fitch. Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University
Press, 2 vols, 2nd edn. 2018. ISBN 978-0674997172, 978-0674997189
Cunnally, John, “Nero, Seneca, and the Medallist of the Roman Emperors”, Art Bulletin, Vol.
68, No. 2 (June 1986), pp. 314–17
Di Paola, O. (2015), "Connections between Seneca and Platonism in Epistulae ad Lucilium
58" (https://www.academia.edu/13410486/_Connections_between_Seneca_and_Platonism
_in_Epistulae_ad_Lucilium_58_Athens_ATINERS_Conference_Paper_Series_No_PHI201
5-1445_2015_), Athens: ATINER'S Conference Paper Series, No: PHI2015-1445.
Fitch, John G. (ed), Seneca. Oxford University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0199282081. A
collection of essays by leading scholars.
Gloyn, Liz (31 October 2019). Tracking classical monsters in popular culture (https://www.wo
rldcat.org/oclc/1081388471). London. ISBN 978-1-78453-934-4. OCLC 1081388471 (https://
www.worldcat.org/oclc/1081388471).
 Griffin, Miriam T., Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics. Oxford University Press, 1976.
ISBN 978-0198147749. Still the standard biography.
Inwood, Brad, Reading Seneca. Stoic Philosophy at Rome, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008.
Lucas, F. L., Seneca and Elizabethan Tragedy (https://archive.org/stream/senecaelizabetha0
0lucauoft#page/n3/mode/2up) (Cambridge University Press, 1922; paperback 2009,
ISBN 978-1-108-00358-2); on Seneca the man, his plays, and the influence of his tragedies
on later drama.
Mitchell, David. Legacy: The Apocryphal Correspondence between Seneca and Paul (http://
www.SenecaandPaul.com/) Xlibris Corporation 2010
Motto, Anna Lydia, ”Seneca on Death and Immortality“ (https://www.jstor.org/stable/329328
8?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents), The Classical Journal, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Jan. 1955),
pp. 187–89
Motto, Anna Lydia, "Seneca on Trial: The Case of the Opulent Stoic" (https://www.jstor.org/st
able/3294099), The Classical Journal, Vol. 61, No. 6 (March 1966), pp. 254–58
Sevenster, J.N. (http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/search;jsessionid=zbgg0j0g98kp.x-
brill-live-02?value1=&option1=all&value2=J.+N.+Sevenster&option2=author), Paul and
Seneca, Novum Testamentum, Supplements (http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/conten
t/series/novum-testamentum-supplements;jsessionid=zbgg0j0g98kp.x-brill-live-02), Vol. 4,
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961; a comparison of Seneca and the apostle Paul, who were
contemporaries.
Shelton, Jo-Ann (http://www.classics.ucsb.edu/shelton.php), Seneca's Hercules Furens:
Theme, Structure and Style (https://books.google.com/books?id=1VhPTSGtPiUC&printsec=
frontcover), Göttingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978. ISBN 3-525-25145-9. A revision of
the author's doctoral thesis at the University of California, Berkeley, 1974.
Wilson, Emily, Seneca: Six Tragedies. Oxford World's Classics. Oxford University Press,
2010.

External links
Seneca's Dialogues, translated by Aubrey Stewart (https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/sene
ca/dialogues/aubrey-stewart) at Standard Ebooks
Works by Seneca the Younger at Perseus Digital Library (https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hop
per/searchresults?q=Seneca+)
Vogt, Katja. "Seneca" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/seneca/). In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Wagoner, Robert. "Seneca" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/seneca). Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Original texts of Seneca's works at 'The Latin Library' (http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/sen.htm
l)
Works by Seneca the Younger in eBook form (https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/seneca) at
Standard Ebooks
Works by Seneca the Younger (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/author/1308) at Project
Gutenberg
Works by or about Seneca the Younger (https://archive.org/search.php?query=%28%28subj
ect%3A%22Seneca%22%20OR%20creator%3A%22Seneca%22%20OR%20description%
3A%22Seneca%22%20OR%20title%3A%22Seneca%22%29%29%20AND%20%28-media
type:software%29) at Internet Archive
Works by Seneca the Younger (https://librivox.org/author/257) at LibriVox (public domain
audiobooks)
 Collection of works of Seneca the Younger at Wikisource (https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Auth
or:Seneca)
Seneca's essays and letters in English (at Stoics.com) (http://www.stoics.com/books.html#S
ENECAE1)
List of commentaries of Seneca's Letters (http://www.curculio.org/Seneca/em-list.html)
Incunabula (1478) of Seneca's works in the McCune Collection (http://www.mccunecollectio
n.org/)
Seneca's Tragedies and the Elizabethan Drama (http://www.shakespeare-online.com/plays/
hamlet/senecadrama.html)
SORGLL: Seneca, Thyestes 766–804 (http://www.rhapsodes.fll.vt.edu/seneca.htm), read by
Katharina Volk, Columbia University. Society for the Oral reading of Greek and Latin
Literature (SORGLL)
Digitized works by Lucius Annaeus Seneca (http://bdh.bne.es/bnesearch/Search.do?field=a
utor&text=S%c3%a9neca%2c+Lucio+Anneo&showYearItems=&exact=on&textH=&advance
d=false&completeText=&language=esEn) at Biblioteca Digital Hispánica, Biblioteca
Nacional de España
Guide to Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, Spurious works. Manuscript, ca. 1450 (https://www.lib.uc
hicago.edu/e/scrc/findingaids/view.php?eadid=ICU.SPCL.MS42) at the University of
Chicago Special Collections Research Center (https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/scrc/)
Digitized Edition of Seneca's Opera Omnia from 1503 (https://www.e-rara.ch/sbs/doi/10.393
1/e-rara-79805) (Venice) at E-rara.ch (https://www.e-rara.ch)

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