LECTURE 007 Ruling: Indeed the Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the

Ruling: Indeed the Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality ordered petitioner
bank’s closure on July 31, 1991. However, the general welfare clause invoked by the Court of Appeals is not found
Characteristics of Police Power on the provisions of said law alone. Even under the old Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) 19 which
>Its most pervasive was then in effect, a general welfare clause was provided for in Section 7 thereof.
>Least Limitable
>it can be exercised through the use of taxation and eminent domain. Thus, the closure of the bank was a valid exercise of police power pursuant to the general welfare clause
contained in and restated by B.P. Blg. 337, which was then the law governing local government units. No reversible
Let me remind you of Sec. 16 of the Local Government Code, because this the very foundation of the police power error arises in this instance insofar as the validity of respondent municipality’s exercise of police power for the
of every municipal corporations. general welfare is concerned.

The general welfare clause has two branches. The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
inhabitants, and for the protection of their property.
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. ::: Which do you think among the two branches was exercised by the Municipality of Makati?

Pursuant to Sec. 16 of the Local Government Code, Municipal Corporations are clothed with authority to enact
The Supreme Court in this case , the ordinances imposing licenses and requiring permits for any business
ordinances and issue regulations as may be necessary just to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
establishment, for purposes of regulation enacted by the municipal council of Makati, fall within the purview of
upon it under Sec. 16.
the first branch of the general welfare clause, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal
council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law.
G.R. No. 150763             July 2, 2004

RURAL BANK OF MAKATI, INC., ESTEBAN S. SILVA and MAGDALENA V. LANDICHO, petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI and ATTY. VICTOR A. L. VALERO, respondents.
Petitioner bank claims that the closure of respondent bank was an improper exercise of police power because a
municipal corporation has no inherent but only delegated police power, (tama or mali? TAMA! Ito na portion)
which must be exercised not by the municipal mayor but by the municipal council through the enactment of
ordinances (Tama or mali? You will know later on). It also assailed the Court of Appeals for invoking the General
Welfare Clause embodied in Section 1617 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect in 1992, 18 when
the closure of the bank was actually done on July 31, 1991.
Main argument: Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality ordered petitioner
bank’s closure on July 31, 1991.
Implementation of these ordinances is vested in the municipal mayor, who is the chief executive of the
municipality as provided for under the Local Government Code, to wit:
Sec. 141. Powers and Duties. –
(1) The mayor shall be the chief executive of the municipal government and shall exercise such powers, duties and
functions as provided in this Code and other laws.
Consequently, the municipal mayor, as chief executive, was clothed with authority to create a Special Task Force
headed by respondent Atty. Victor A.L. Valero to enforce and implement said ordinances and resolutions and to
file appropriate charges and prosecute violators. 25 Respondent Valero could hardly be faulted for performing his
official duties under the cited circumstances.

1
(Just a caviat. The SC here found the closure as not proper. The order of closure violated the petitioner’s right to
due process.)
On the issue of the closure of the bank, we find that the bank was not engaged in any illegal or immoral activities
to warrant its outright closure. The appropriate remedies to enforce payment of delinquent taxes or fees are
provided for in Section 62 of the Local Tax Code, to wit:
SEC. 62. Civil Remedies. – The civil remedies available to enforce payment of delinquent taxes shall be by distraint
of personal property, and by legal action. Either of these remedies or both simultaneously may be pursued at the
discretion of the proper authority.
The payment of other revenues accruing to local governments shall be enforced by legal action. 28
Said Section 62 did not provide for (For this remedy) closure. Moreover, the order of closure violated petitioner’s
right to due process, considering that the records show that the bank exercised good faith and presented what it
thought was a valid and legal justification for not paying the required taxes and fees. The violation of a municipal
ordinance does not empower a municipal mayor to avail of extrajudicial remedies (It is not in conformity with Sec.
62).29 It should have observed due process before ordering the bank’s closure. ( So dito napalya ang Mayor)
:: The emphasis here for purposes of discussion right now, is yung dalawang branches na diniscuss ng kasong ito
with respect to the general welfare clause.
What are the limitations in the exercise of that delegated Police Power of the LGU
*You have to compare the difference of the Limitation of Police power of the State and the LGU.
In Consti 2, there are only 2 basic limitaitons whenever the State exercises such powers.
What are those?
In the case of DECS vs. San Diego the court said, for the State to exercise Police Power the power must be validly
exercised if there is a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. So, meaning to say, valid/ lawful yung
subject na ireregulate natin, at tsaka yung means ng pag regulate must be lawful also.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly
exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5
Yun lang yung tinitingnan natin everytime we check on the question whether the state exercises the Police Power
Validly or not.
But because we are dealing with Municipal Corporations and we know for a fact that the police power of municipal
Corporations is just a delegated power from the state. From Congress, diba! So aside from those limitations that
you already learned from consti 2, let’s add some more. Because delegated man ito, meaning to say mas limited
yung page exercise nila ng kapangyarihan na yan.
For example: This time you will also have to consider that there are territorial limits, meaning to say, as I explained
to you last time, The City of davao can only exercise its delegated police power within its jurisdiction. It cannot
exercise beyond its territorial jurisdiction. So, that’s one of the limitations.
Another is that, The exercise of Police Power Must not be contrary to the Constitution and the laws, public moral,
public order and public policy. (Nandiyan parin yung lawful subjects, nadiyan parin yung lawful means)
Now, let us inspect the cases under this topic.
G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997
ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO vs.
HON. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES
Facts:
On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which
took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998. And there was a subsequent
ordinance also.
Issue: Is this a valid exercise of police power?
Ruling: YES! The validity of questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.
(Ano ba yung reason bakit gumawa ng ganung ordinace)
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed
season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to protect the
coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due
to illegal fishing activities.
2
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal
waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The devolution of such power
has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the
express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties
for acts which endanger the environment. 33
Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact
ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities
with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to
penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami,
and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery
laws.46 Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang
panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such
other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance."47
G.R. No. 148357             June 30, 2006
ANIANO A. ALBON, Petitioner,
vs.
BAYANI F. FERNANDO, City Mayor of Marikina, ENGR. ALFONSO ESPIRITO, City Engineer of Marikina, ENGR.
ANAKI MADERAL, Assistant City Engineer of Marikina, and NATIVIDAD CABALQUINTO, City Treasurer of
Marikina, Respondents.
May a local government unit (LGU) validly use public funds to undertake the widening, repair and improvement of
the sidewalks of a privately-owned subdivision? - NO
In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and repair the existing
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. It was undertaken by the city government pursuant to Ordinance
No. 59, s. 19933 like other infrastructure projects relating to roads, streets and sidewalks previously undertaken by
the city.
Now, let us go first in the city of Marikina itself, is it empowered to enact such kind of ordinance? The answer is
YES! It is expressly vested with that kind of power and it is within the ambit of Police Powers. Police powers
delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause
Ruling: The use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it
directly contravenes Section 335 of RA 7160.
Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set forth in the Local
Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general
welfare clause of RA 7160.8 With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives,
health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial
jurisdictions.9
Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and
responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic
services and facilities, including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents
and which are financed by their own funds. 10 These infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads and
bridges and similar facilities.11
There is no question about the public nature and use of the sidewalks in the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision.
One of the "whereas clauses" of PD 121612 (which amended PD 95713) declares that open spaces,14 roads, alleys
and sidewalks in a residential subdivision are for public use and beyond the commerce of man. In conjunction
herewith, PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be
devoted exclusively for the use of the general public.
Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993. It was
enacted in the exercise of the City of Marikina’s police powers to regulate the use of sidewalks. However, both the
trial and appellate courts erred when they invoked our 1991 decision in White Plains Association and automatically
applied it in this case.
Ownership of the sidewalks in a private subdivision belongs to the subdivision owner/developer until it is either
transferred to the government by way of donation or acquired by the government through expropriation.
Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money or property shall be appropriated or applied for
private purposes. This is in consonance with the fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local
government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes. 25
Clearly, the question of ownership of the open spaces (including the sidewalks) in Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision is material to the determination of the validity of the challenged appropriation and disbursement
made by the City of Marikina. Similarly significant is the character of the direct object of the expenditure, that is,
the sidewalks.
3
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City for the reception
of evidence to determine (1) whether V.V. Soliven, Inc. has retained ownership of the open spaces and sidewalks
of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision or has donated them to the City of Marikina and (2) whether the public has
full and unimpeded access to, and use of, the roads and sidewalks of the subdivision. The Marikina City Regional
Trial Court is directed to decide the case with dispatch.
[G.R. No. 71169. August 25, 1989.]
JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, Petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES R. GASTON,
JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-petitioners, v.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION, Respondents.
*In this case, demolition ang nangyari
The claim that the demolition of the gates at orbit and Jupiter streets amounts to deprivation of property without
due process of law or as appropriation without just compensation.
Here there is no taking of property, so eminent domain is out of the argument. The act of the mayor now is
challenge in the concept of Police Power. What happened here again is the demolition of the subdivision gates.
It is alleged by petitioner that by its orders of March 4, 1980 and November 14, 1980, the respondent Court has
unlawfully deprived the petitioner of its right to due process to which it is entitled under the Constitution, and that
respondents’ acts are tantamount to grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Was there eminent domain?- NO
The next question is whether or not the Mayor, by himself, is vested with the power to order the demolition so
questioned, without the backing of a proper ordinance.
On this score, the Mayor submitted in evidence Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as amended by Resolution No. 139,
dated November 21, 1948, 20 requiring a Mayor’s permit to erect construction anywhere in Makati.
Is this a valid a justification for the mayor to abolish those gates?
Ruling:
There is no merit in BAVA’s claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amounts to
deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation. 14 There is no
taking of property involved here. The act of the Mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of police power.
Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation.
Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Street was unjustified, or that
the Mayor acted unreasonably. The fact that it has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument
against the Municipality’s effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati (This is the main objective of the ordinance).
Certainly, the duty of a local executive is to take care of the needs of the greater number, in many cases, at the
expense of the minority.
:::: Now, meron bang kapangyarihan si mayor na gawin yun? whether or not the Mayor, by himself, is vested with
the power to order the demolition so questioned, without the backing of a proper ordinance.
The next question is whether or not the Mayor, by himself, is vested with the power to order the demolition so
questioned, without the backing of a proper ordinance. On this score, the Mayor submitted in evidence Municipal
Ordinance No. 17, as amended by Resolution No. 139, dated November 21, 1948, 20 requiring a Mayor’s permit to
erect construction anywhere in Makati.
The Court is convinced that Ordinance No. 17 is a valid justification for the questioned act of the Mayor. The fact
that some time had elapsed before the mayor acted, can not render the ordinance uneforceable or void. At any
rate, the gate, the destruction of which opened Orbit Street, has the character of a public nuisance, in the sense
that it "hinders or impairs the use of property.
At any rate, the decisive point is that independently of the said ordinance, petitioners’ constructions which have
been duly found to be public nuisances per se (without provision for accumulation or disposal of waste matters
and constructed without building permits contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of the main water
pipelines which supplies potable water to the Greater Manila area) may be abated without judicial proceedings
under our Civil Code.
In addition, under Article 701 of the Code, summary abatement may be carried out by the Mayor himself.
---------Now, how will you compare this case with the case of City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta-------
4
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII;
HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
Here, there is an Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF.
Issue: Is the Ordinace Valid? Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power? NA
comply ba ang lawful subject and lawful means?
Ruling;
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their
death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed
and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police
regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law,
nay, even without compensation.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation (you are just
trying to avoid payment of just compensation, that is why you want to do it under the guise of police power) of a
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on
any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad
and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking.
Hence, it is not Valid.
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY OF
BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.
At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below:
ORDINANCE--640
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE
BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR
OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL
PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET
Issue: Is this a valid ordinance? Is this a valid exercise of Police Power
Ruling:
The ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. 22 The
evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out
the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the
price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made
to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but
it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be
difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the
ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit
of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the
respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the
age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not
unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the
ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume
that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that
it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being
unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as
valid.
5
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds
of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or
calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police
power.33 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not
encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner
to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such,
within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their
property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any
person who did not approve could stay away. 36
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right.38
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume
that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that
it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being
unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as
valid.
G.R. No. L-27247 April 20, 1983
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO.
386 OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION INC., and JUNIOR CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY,
INC., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, respondents-appellees.
In this petition for declaratory relief originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch II, what is
involved is the validity of Ordinance 386 passed by the City Council of Baguio City which took effect on February
23, 1967, quoted together with the explanatory note, as follows:
ORDINANCE 386
AN ORDINANCE CONSIDERING ALL SQUATTERS OF PUBLIC LAND, OTHER THAN THOSE EARMARKED FOR PUBLIC
USE IN THE CITY OF BAGUIO WHO ARE DULY REGISTERED AS SUCH AT THE TIME OF THE PROMULGATION OF THIS
ORDINANCE AS BONAFIDE OCCUPANTS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE LOTS AND WHICH SHALL HEREAFTER BE EMBRACED
AS A CITY GOVERNMENT HOUSING PROJECT AND PROVIDING FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
RULING:
The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It considered all squatters of public land in the City of Baguio as bona-
fide occupants of their respective lots.
In the instant case, the land occupied by the squatters are portions of water sheds, reservations, scattered
portions of the public domain within the Baguio townsite. Certainly, there is more reason then to void the actions
taken by the City of Baguio through the questioned ordinance.
Being unquestionably a public land, no disposition thereof could be made by the City of Baguio without prior
legislative authority. It is the fundamental principle that the state possesses plenary power in law to determine
who shall be favored recipients of public domain, as well as under what terms such privilege may be granted not
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
And the law has laid in the Director of Lands the power of exclusive control, administrations, disposition and
alienation of public land that includes the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concessions or
disposition and management of the lands of public domains. 5
Nor could the enactment of Ordinance 386 be justified by stating that "this Ordinance is primarily designed to
extend a helping hand to the numerous landless city residents and the so called squatters within the Baguio
townsite in their desire to acquire residential lots which they may rightly call their own and that the reported
people who have violated the City's building ordinances were not so guided by any criminal perversity, but were
given to it more by circumstances of necessity and that they are, therefore, entitled to a more human treatment,
more understanding and more of pity rather than be herded before the courts, likened to hardened criminals and
deliberate violators of our laws and ordinances." 6
::: Maganda man, maganda yung project, its actually very pro people. Kaya lang, mali talaga, mali yung means,
kung paano mo sya ginawa.
the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders,
unmindful of the lawful and unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate
conflicts instead of attaining their just solution. (Bernardo vs. Bernardo, 96 Phil. 202, 206.)
::: So here, the ordinance was declared void.
--------How will you compare this with the case of Binay vs. Domingo---------------------
G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
6
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A
BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURY.
::: Was it a valid exercise of Police Power? May taking ba dito? Wala namang taking of private property because in
fact you are going to use your available funds. An appropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury.
Ruling:
The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a
painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60
vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
::: So Lawful subject is there, lawful means- YES! But how will you compare this with what we have learned in the
Quezon City vs. Ericta case. Kasi doon patay din yun e, the requirement of getting a portion of lot in the memorial
park para ibigay sa mga tao. There was taking there, under the guise of Police Power. Which the Supreme Court
said is unreasonable. In this case naman kasi, wala namang ganun. So yan!
Now, in the case of Parayno vs. Jovellanos
G.R. No. 148408             July 14, 2006
CONCEPCION PARAYNO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE JOVELLANOS and the MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIAO, PANGASINAN,* respondents.
The Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline
station. In Resolution No. 50.
Ruling:
Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner's gasoline
station. While it had, under RA 7160,14 the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and
general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.15 The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause
and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. 16
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it
maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school
and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such
distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices
that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either.
G.R. No. L-24693             July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.
that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer
or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby
7
open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date
of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in
the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his
residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such
form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being
provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection
either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives.
; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being
accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
::: So yun yung laman ng Ordinance 4760. Is it VALID? Is it a valid exercise of Police Power?
Ruling:
YES! It is VALID! But this is a 1967 case.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful
to public morals.
the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the
existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus
become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the
clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to
fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of
the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government."
::: So Valid, but that is again a 1967 case.
Let us now go to a more later case. To start with, a 1983 case.
Here, there is this ordinance 4964 of the city of manila, whereby it says there that it shall be prohibited for any
operator of barbershop to conduct the business of massage, of massaging customers or other persons in any
adjacent room or rooms of the said barbershop or in any room or rooms within the same building where the
barbershop is located as long as the operator of the barbershop and the room where massaging is conducted is
the same person.
::: Is this Valid?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court said here, YES! It’s valid. The objective here is to be able to impose payment of license fee for
engaging in the business of massage clinic which is separate and distinct from barbershop and in order to forestall
possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.
So, this is base on general welfare clause 1983 case.
G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983
TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN, EDMUNDO UNSON, APOLONIA RAMIREZ and LOURDES LOMIBAO,
as component members of the STA. CRUZ BARBERSHOP ASSOCIATION, in their own behalf and in representation
of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila, HON. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, Vice-Mayor and Presiding
Officer of the Municipal Board in relation to Republic Act 4065, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA
and EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief of Police of the City of Manila, respondents-appellees.
This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the
constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a
deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The
assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the
business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any
room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber
shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."
Ruling:
As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its
enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic
under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance
regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of
the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers."
8

Now, let us go to the 2005 case.
Here, there is this ordinace prohibiting the operation or establishment of amusement entertainment services and
facilities in the Ermita-Malate area.
The ordinance was enacted to address and arrest social fears purportedly spawned by the establishments in the
Ermita-Malate area which allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate license and tax pay night
clubs, bars, karaoke bars, girly houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels.
Now, the petitioner insists that even the court, ginamit nya pa yung 1967 case. Cinite pa ng city dito, na even the
court in that case already taken judicial notice of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila, traceable in great part to exercise of motels which provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and therefore become the ideal haven for prostitutes
G.R. No. 118127             April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR.,
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the
Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-
paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels.  Petitioners insist that
even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila63 had already taken judicial notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the
City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.
:::So this time, what do you think is the ruling of the court?
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's
police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than
by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses
"allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise
stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral
welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication
nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not warranted
under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are
not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is
of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the
most innocent of places.
::::Immorality is not a thing, a building, or an establishment. It is in the hearts of men. So sabi ng court dito, VOID!
NOTE: The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,96 it needs
pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the
mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and
immorality. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance
did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an
assumed power to prohibit.97
Now, much later case, 2009 case…
G.R. No. 122846               January 20, 2009
9
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
2 3
This Petition  under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision  in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled,
"An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the
Ordinance).
* the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
Ruling:
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. 71 It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights.
::: So short time is still allowed. Sabi ng court diyan.
G.R. No. 111397            August 12, 2002
HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO REYES and BISTRO PIGALLE, INC., respondents.
On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition 5 for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s license
as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night
club and restaurant operations.6 Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the
work permit applications of Bistro’s staff, for the year 1993. 7
::: Was the exercise validly performed? Was the power validly exercised?
Ruling:
It is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary
power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these
licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The
laws specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits were issued.
Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the
prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising
these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden
Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 7716 18 which expressly prohibits police raids and inspections.
There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private
commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due
process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the
allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
Lim’s exercise of this power violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected under the due process clause of
the Constitution.
10