PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Bridging Program
UM College of Legal Education
Summer of 2021

When Does a Law Become Effective?:

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication. (As amended by E.O. No. 200).

Three possible scenarios:

(a) If the law does not provide for its own effectivity:

Then it shall take effect "after fifteen (15)days following the completion of (its)
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines."

Note that the effectivity date is on the 16th day. For example, if the law is
published on March 30, then it will become effective on April 15.

From a reading of the provisions of Article 2 of the New Civil Code, as amended
by Executive Order No. 200, a law shall take effect on the sixteenth day.

This is so because in counting a period, the first day shall be excluded and the
last day shall be included. (Art. 13, NCC).

（b) If the law provides for its own effectivity date:

Then it takes effect on the said date, subject to the requirement of publication.
This is the meaning of the clause in Article 2 of the NCC which say “unless it is
otherwise provided.”

The phrase “unless otherwise provided” means not the publication, but it refers to
the date of effectivity. The phrase does not dispense with publication.

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（ c) If the law provides that it shall become effective ＂ immediately upon
approval":

There are two conflicting views-

（1) In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary (2003), decided by the SC en banc, it was
held that the effectivity clause of a law which provides that "it shall take effect
immediately upon its approval," is defective but it does not render the entire law invalid.

Notwithstanding the express statement of such law, it must be construed to have

become effective after fifteen (15) days following the completion of its publication
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

However, in La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos (2004), another en banc

case, it was held that a law which provides that it “shall take effect immediately upon
approval” becomes effective immediately upon its publication.

According to this case, there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking
effect on a date other than the 15-day period after its publication and where the law
provides for its own date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O.
No. 200.

According to the Court, this is the very essence of the phrase “unless it is otherwise
provided.”

What is mandatory and what due process requires, however, as held in Tañada v.
Tuvera, is the publication of the law.

Which ruling provides for a better rule?

COMMENT: The ruling in La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos provides

for the better rule, taking into consideration the language of Article 2, as amended by
E.O. No. 200, and the Tañada v. Tuvera case.

Hence, if the law provides for its immediate effectivity upon approval, it must be properly
interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon its publication.

Requirement of Publication:

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（a) Rule: Publication of laws is indispensable and cannot be dispensed with.

The reason for this rule is that the basic constitutional requirement of due
process must be satisfied. Hence, a law does not become effective without
publication.

Once published the people are presumed to have knowledge of the law, even if
they have not read it.

Presumptive knowledge is sufficient. Actual knowledge is not necessary for as long

as the people comply with it as a rule of conduct.

What about the New Civil Code? When did the NCC become effective?

The Civil Code did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the
Official Gazette but “one year after its publication

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication, unless the
legislature fixes a different effectivity date. (Tañada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, 29
December 86).

Covered by these rules are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers, whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Tañada vs. Tuvera, G.R.
No. 63915, 29 December 86).

NOT COVERED BY MANDATORY PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT:

Rules on interpretative regulations.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superior concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties

Which part of the law needs to be published?

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Publication must be in full.

The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws.

(Tañada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, 29 December 86).

Do SC decisions need to be published?

No need to publish Supreme Court decisions.

The Supreme Court said that there is no law that requires the publication of Supreme
Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective.

It is the bounden duty of a lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA),
the Supreme Court Advanced Decisions (SCAD) and law journals.

Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2)

Basis of Rule.

This rule of law is based upon the assumption that evasion of the law would be
facilitated and the successful administration of justice defeated if persons accused of
crimes could successfully plead ignorance of the illegality of their acts. (20 Am. Jur. 209,
210).

This rule applies in criminal as well as in civil cases. If ignorance of the law is a valid
excuse for its non-performance or compliance, then, it would be very easy for a person
to escape scot-free from liability for the commission of a wrong. The reason is founded
on public policy.

Why the law proscribes ignorance of law as defense.

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If ignorance of the law is a valid defense, then, anyone can evade criminal and civil
liability by claiming that he does not know the law. It would create a chaotic society. It
would invite deception, promote criminality.

It must, however, be remembered that mistakes in the application or interpretation of

difficult or doubtful provisions of law may be the basis of good faith. (Articles 526, 2155,
NCC).

Ignorance of the law must not, however, be confused with mistake of facts. Ignorance of
fact may excuse a party from the legal consequences of his acts or conduct, but not
ignorance of the law.

Presumption of knowledge of law.

Everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law. (U.S. vs. De la Torre, 42 Phil. 62).
As explained earlier, even if the people have no actual knowledge of the law they are
presumed to know it after the publication.

Presupposes Publication:

The conclusive presumption that every person knows the law presupposes that the law
has been published. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non escusat”

Rule on Knowledge of Foreign Laws:

There is no conclusive presumption of knowledge of foreign laws. Hence, foreign laws

must be specifically alleged and proved and our courts cannot take judicial notice of
them.

If foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that
the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.

This is known as the DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION or the

DOCTRINE OF PRESUMED-IDENTITY APPROACH in international law.

Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
(3)

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Prospective Application of Laws

Rule: In general, laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation.

( Lex prospicit, non respicit) the law looks forward, not backward.

This is due to the unconstitutional result of retroacting a law's application: it divests

rights that have already become vested or impairs obligations of contract

Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity.

1. When the law itself provides for its retroactivity, unless the retroactive
application of a statute will make it an ex post facto law or will result in the
impairment of obligation of contracts, in which case, it cannot be given
retroactive effect

An ex post facto law is one which makes an action, done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and
punishes such action; or which aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was when committed or which changes the punishment and inflicts
a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or which alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense, in order to convict the offender. A Bill of Attainder is a
legislative act which convicts persons of and punishes them, for, crimes
without judicial trial. It declares the blood of such persons corrupted and
devoid of all heritable quality.

2. When a penal law is favorable to the accused, unless the convicted felon is a
habitual delinquent, in which case, it cannot be given retroactive application.

Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty
of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of the Penal Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws
a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. And
the provisions of this article (Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code), are applicable
even to special laws which provide more favorable conditions to the accused

For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual

delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo
( robbery), hurto ( theft) , estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said
crimes a third time or oftener. ( Art. 62, RPC)
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 Penal laws when retroactive; requisites; example.

If the law is penal in nature, it can be given retroactive effect provided that the
same is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent or a recidivist.
So that even if the law is penal in character, but it is not favorable to the accused,
it cannot be given retroactive effect.

Illustration:

Let us assume that X committed an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua at

the time it was committed. During the trial, a law was passed increasing the
penalty of such offense to death. In case he is convicted after trial, the court
cannot impose the penalty of death because the law is not favorable to him as it
increased the penalty.

But if it were the reverse, where at the time of the commission of the offense, the
imposable penalty was death, and during the trial, it was reduced to only
reclusion perpetua, then it can be retroactive because the law is favorable to the
accused.

But again, even if it is penal in nature and favorable to the accused, still there is another
condition for its retroactivity, that is, he must not be a habitual delinquent or a
recidivist. If he is, then, the law is not retroactive. In sum, for a penal law to have
retroactive effect, it must be favorable to the accused and the latter must not be a
habitual delinquent or a recidivist. The elements must concur.

3. When the law is remedial or procedural in nature, because no vested right may
attach to nor arise from procedural laws.

Hence, statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as

applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent

Laws have no retroactive effect except when they refer to a matter of procedure
or is passed for the sake of convenience, and does not affect substantial rights.

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 Except in case of remedial statutes and those which relate to procedure in the
courts, it is a general rule that acts of the Legislature or of Congress will not be
construed as to make them operate retrospectively, unless the lawmaking body
has explicitly declared its intention that they should so operate, or unless such
intention appears by necessary implications from the nature and words of the act
so clearly as to leave no room for a reasonable doubt on the subject.

The reason for this rule is the general tendency to regard retrospective laws as
dangerous to liberty and private rights, on account of their liability to unsettle
vested rights to disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. Having in mind this
reason it was thus held in a case that laws procedural in nature may operate
retrospectively. Likewise, it was held that statutes making changes in remedies
or procedure are within the discretion of the Legislature or the Congress and are
valid as long as they do not infringe vested rights.

4. When the law creates new substantive rights provided it has not prejudiced
another acquired right of the same origin.

The principle that a new law shall not have any retroactive effect only governs
the rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former laws but if the right
be declared for the first time by subsequent law it shall take effect from that time
even though it has arisen from acts subject to the former law, provided that it
does not prejudice another acquired right of the same origin.

It is well known that hereditary rights are not born nor does the will produce any
effect except from the moment of the death of the person whose inheritance is
concerned. (Bona vs. Briones, 38 Phil. 276).

If a right is created for the first time, like proof of filiation by way of “open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child” which was not present
in the Civil Code, yet, it was incorporated in Article 172 of the Family Code, such law
can be given retroactive effect.

The condition is that, it must not impair vested rights. (Castro vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 50974-
75, May 31, 1989).

5. Curative statutes. ––

The term “curative statutes,” refer to those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities in judicial or administrative proceedings, and which are designed to give
effect to contracts and other transactions between private parties which otherwise would
fail of producing their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or
the failure to comply with some technical requirement.
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Statutes impairing vested rights.

When the effect of giving to a statute a retrospective construction would be to make it

destroy or impair vested rights, such construction will be avoided, and the statute will be
held to apply to future acts and cases only, provided, that this can be done by any
reasonable interpretation of the language used by the legislature. The courts uniformly
refuse to give to statutes a retrospective operation, whereby rights previously vested will
be injuriously affected unless compelled to doubt that such was the intention of the
legislature. (Chew Heong vs. U.S., 112 U.S. 536).

The rule is that a statute affecting rights and liabilities should not be so construed as to
act upon those already existing, and it is the result of the decisions that although the
words of a statute are so general and broad in their literal extent as to comprehend
existing cases, they must yet be so construed as be applicable only to such as may
thereafter arise, unless the intention to embrace all is clearly expressed. (In re
Protestant Episcopal Public School, 58 Barb. [N.Y.], 161). Thus, again, a statute
providing for the forfeiture of that part of an estate whereon waste is committed by the
tenant for life cannot be construed to affect life estates existing at the time of its
enactment. (Kent vs. Bently, 3 Ohio December 173).

RECAP:

Prospectivity of laws is the general rule.

As a general rule, laws shall have prospective effects only. There are, however, certain
exceptions, such as:

a) when the law provides for its retroactivity;

b.) when the law is penal in nature and which is favorable to the accused who is
not a habitual delinquent or recidivist;

c.) when the law is procedural in nature;

d.) when it creates new substantive rights; when the law is curative in nature;

e.) when it is interpretative of other laws.

Prospectivity of doctrinal rulings.

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When a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is
especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws where it is necessary
that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
Accused was acquitted. (People vs. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, February 27, 1974).

Family Code is retroactive.

If the law provides for its retroactivity, it retroacts but whether it be substantive or
procedural, if it is given effect, the condition is that it must not impair vested
rights.

One such law that provides for its retroactivity is the Family Code, but it
expressly provides that its provisions are retroactive provided that no vested
rights are impaired. (Art. 256, Family Code; Tayag vs. CA, June 9, 1992; Rep. vs.
CA, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992).

Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory

laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. (4a)

Rule: Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws

shall be void.

Exceptions:
（i) When the law itself authorizes the validity of the act.
（ii) When the law makes the act valid, but punishes the violator.
（iii) When the law makes the act voidable, that is, valid unless annulled.
（iv) When the law declares the act void, but recognizes legal effects arising from it.

Example 1: Marriage laws are mandatory and prohibitory, such that if the marriage is
contracted where one of the parties is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties to the marriage bond, the marriage is void (Art. 36, Family Code); but the law
recognizes as legitimate, a child born or conceived out of such marriage, provided
that the child is conceived or born prior to the declaration of nullity of the marriage. (Art.
54, Family Code).

Example 2. In the case of DBP vs. CA, 65 SCAD 82, 249 SCRA 331, October 16, 1995,
the Supreme Court said that the buyer of a parcel of land that is considered as non-
disposable land of the public domain did not acquire a valid title over the land, but

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recognized certain effects of the same, in that when the buyer asked for reimbursement
of what was paid to the DBP, the value of the fruits gathered from the land was
deducted from the amount reimbursed. This is a recognition of a right, even if no title
was transmitted in favor of the buyer. And, the reduction of the amount reimbursed is in
conformity with the rule that no one shall enrich himself at the expense of another.

Example 3. It is well-settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within

a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, so that non-compliance
with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended
such result it would have clearly indicated it. (Marcos vs. COMELEC, et al., 64 SCAD
358, 248 SCRA 300). An example is the Constitutional provision requiring courts to
render judgments within a certain period. The Constitution says:

“Sec. 15. Art VIII All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of the Constitution
must be decided or resolved within 24 months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts.

A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or
by the court itself.

Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect

signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a
copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the
parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been
rendered or issued within said period.

Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence
thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for
determination, without further delay.” (Art. VIII).

But a closer look into such constitutional provision does not make a judgment
rendered beyond the reglementary period void.

However, the judge who does not comply with the prescribed periods can be subject to
administrative sanctions. But still, the judgment is valid.

Hence, such law can be considered directory. In Marcelino vs. Cruz, it was said that the
difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on the
ground of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by
disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
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 Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)

Waiver defined.

Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a

known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such
waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a
capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be
surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an
act inconsistent with claiming it.

It is the relinquishment or refusal of a known right with both knowledge of its existence
and an intention to relinquish it. (Portland & F.R. Co. vs. Spillman, 23 Or. 587; 32 Pac.
689).

Requisites for Valid Waiver:

Rights may be waived. However, for there to be a valid waiver, the following
requisites are essential:

1. That the person making the waiver possesses the right;

2. That he has the capacity and power to dispose of the right;

3. That the waiver must be made in a clear and unequivocal manner,

although it may be made expressly or impliedly; and

4. That the waiver is not contrary to law, public policy, public order, morals,
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of
a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact

General rule and exceptions on waiver of rights.

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The general rule is that rights may be waived. But this rule is not absolute. It admits of
two exceptions, such as:

a)  When the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good
customs; and

b)  When the waiver is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Example : An example of a waiver of right which is contrary to public policy and morals
is the situation in Cui vs. Arellano University, L-15127, May 30, 1961. A student was
granted scholarship but agreed not to transfer to another school, unless he would
refund all benefits he derived out of his scholarship.

The Supreme Court said that this is void.

The ruling in Cui vs. Arellano University is consistent with Article 1306 of the Civil Code
where the parties to a contract are given the liberty to stipulate on its terms and
conditions, provided the same are not contrary to law, public policy, public order, morals
and good customs. Furthermore, Article 1409 of the Civil Code states that contracts
whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy are void.

CAN NOT BE WAIVED:

Future inheritance.

Waiver of future inheritence is void. That is contrary to law. This is especially so if the
waiver or repudiation is intended to prejudice creditors. Hence, under Article 1052 of the
Civil Code, if an heir repudiates inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the
latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir. The
acceptance is to the extent of their credit.

There is really nothing contrary to law, public policy and morals if a person waives such
hereditary right for as long as it has already been vested upon him by the death of the
source of such right, the decedent.

What is void is when a person waives or renounces a future inheritance because such
right is merely inchoate. Thus, Article 905 of the Civil Code expressly prohibits it when it
says that:

“Every renunciation or compromise as regards a future legitime between the

person owing it and his compulsory heirs is void, and the latter may claim the

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 same upon the death of the former; but they must bring to collation whatever
they may have received by virtue of the renunciation or compromise.”

Along the same line, Article 1347 of the Civil Code prohibits a person from entering into
a contract pertaining his future inheritance.

It provides that “all things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future
things, may be the object of a contract.

All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts. No contract
may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law.”

Waiver contrary to law. SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE

In Leal vs. IAC, G.R. No. 65425, November 5, 1986, a contract of sale with right to
repurchase was entered into by the parties with a prohibition against selling the property
to any other person except the heirs of the vendor a retro.

This was held to be void because it is contrary to law. It amounts to a perpetual

restriction on the right of ownership.

What was declared void however, was the stipulation prohibiting the sale to any other
person, not the whole contract itself.

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.

When the court declares a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only

when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)

Manner of Repeal:

(A) Express repeal:

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 An express repeal is that contained in a special provision of a subsequent
law, known as the repealing clause, and the latter identifies or designates the law
to be abolished.

(B) Implied repeal:

It takes place when the provisions of the subsequent law are incompatible with
those of an earlier law and there is no express repeal.

Rule on Implied Repeal:

It is not favored. It is the long-standing policy of the Court to disfavor repeals by

implication, for laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of
all laws existing on the subject. The failure to particularly mention the law allegedly
repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal the said law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

Requisites of Implied Repeal: In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law

cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

There are two requisites for implied repeals:

(1)the laws cover the same subject matter; and

(2) the latter is repugnant to the earlier

EFFECT OF REPEAL OF A REPEALING LAW:

1. Express Repeal: When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed,
the law first repealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby be revived unless
expressly so provided.

2. Implied Repeal: When a law which impliedly repealed a prior law is itself repealed,
the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.

Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the

silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)

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 Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (n)

Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy
shall not be countenanced. (n)

Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of

evidence. (n)

Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty- five days each; months, of
thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number
of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included.
(7a)

Illustration:

A filed a suit at the RTC, Manila, against B. Summons was served upon B on
September 1, 1996. In computing the 15-day period to file a responsive pleading,
September 1, 1996 should not be included. The 15-day period should be computed
from September 2, because in the computation of a period, the first day shall be
excluded and the last day shall be included. The reason for the law is that you can no
longer complete a whole day on September 1, 1996.

Computation of Legal Period

Two Laws on Counting of Legal Periods:

(1) Article 13 of the NCC; and

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(2) Section 31, Chapter 8, Book 1 of the 1987 Administrative Code of the Philippines.
Both laws cover the same subject matter and the provisions are almost the same,
except in counting a “year.”

There was an Implied Repeal of Article 13 of NCC. in Counting a ＂ Year": Under

Article 13 of the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days, whether it be a regular
year or a leap year. Hence, the actual number of days is important.

Under the Administrative Code, however, a year is understood to be "twelve calendar

months." Under the Administrative Code, the number of days is irrelevant. Hence, there
exists a manifest incompatibility between the two laws with respect to the counting of "a
year."

Consequently, the Court declared the implied repeal of the provision of Article 13 of the
NCC by Section 31, Chapter 8, Book 1 of the 1987 Administrative Code, with respect to
the counting of a “year.”

Therefore, under existing law and jurisprudence, a “year” shall now be understood to be
"twelve calendar months.”

How to Count "Twelve Calendar Months":

A Calendar month is “a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number
of days it may contain. ”It is the ＂period of time running from the beginning of a certain
numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next
month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and
including the last day of that month.”

To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31,2007 will be from January 1, 2008
to January 31,2008; from January 31, 2008, it will be from February 1, 2008 until
February 29, 2008; the next calendar month is from March 1,2008 until March 31, 2008;
and so on and so forth. Hence, twelve calendar months from December 31,2007 is
December 31,2008.

Other Provisions of Article 13 Still in Force:

The other provisions of Article 13 of the NCC remain consistent with the provisions of
Section 31, Chapter 8, Book 1 of the Administrative Code and are, therefore, still in
force. Thus, a "month" is understood to consist of thirty days, unless it refers to a
specific calendar month, in which case it shall be computed according to the number of
days the specific month contains; a “day” shall be understood to consist of 24 hours;
and “night” shall be from sunset to sunrise.

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 Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.

Principle of GENERALITY of Philippine Penal Laws

Rule: Philippine penal laws and those of public security and safety are obligatory upon
all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Hence, the penal laws of the Philippines are
obligatory not only upon its citizens but upon all persons who are within the Philippine
territory.

Exceptions: By way of exception to the principle of generality, the penal laws of the
Philippines may not apply if:

（i) Treaty stipulations provide to the contrary;

（ii) Principles of public international law provide to the contrary; and
（iii) Laws of preferential application provide to the contrary.

Reminders:
（a) Following the principles of international law, heads of state are not subject to
Philippine territorial jurisdiction.

(b) It is a well-established principle of international law that diplomatic

representatives, such as ambassadors or public ministers and their official
retinue, possess immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the country of their
sojourn, and cannot be sued, arrested or punished by the law of that country.
（c) However, a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an
ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country
to which he is accredited.

Illustration:

Rudy is an American citizen. He is having his vacation in Manila. He raped Jane inside
a motel. He can be charged with rape and be made liable. He cannot invoke his being a
foreigner because everybody who sojourns on Philippine territory is bound by Philippine
penal laws and those of public safety.

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But suppose Rudy is an American ambassador, the rule would be different, because the
obligatory force of Philippine penal laws and those of public safety is subject to
accepted principles of international law and treaty stipulations.

It is a well-accepted principle of international law that ambassadors are granted

diplomatic immunities. The remedy against him is not criminal prosecution, but for him
to be recalled by his government on the ground that he is a persona non grata.

Thus, under the principle of extraterritoriality, there are foreigners who are exempted
from the operation of Philippine laws, like when the offense is committed by a foreign
sovereign or diplomatic representatives while on Philippine territory; or when the crime
is committed inside a public or armed vessel of a foreign country.

But a merchant vessel is not covered by the principle of extraterritoriality, for the
moment it enters the Philippines, it subjects itself to the laws of our country;
hence, if an offense is committed within said vessel while on Philippine territory or
post, the offense constituting a breach of public order, the same is triable here.

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. (9a)

Nationality Principle

Nationality Rule: The Civil Code follows the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although
living abroad.

Applying the nationality principle in Article 15, the following issues shall be governed by
the national law of the person concerned:

(1) status of persons;

(2) condition of persons;
(3) legal capacity of persons; and
(4) the matter of his family rights and duties.

Wherever a Filipino is, Philippine law shall govern him with respect to his family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity.

This is true even if he is living abroad.

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 Example:

If A and B, both Filipino citizens, are married but they are living abroad, the law
that governs them with respect to their family rights and duties, status, condition
and legal capacity is Philippine law.

So that, the mandate under Article 68 of the Family Code that the husband and
wife are obliged to live together, love one another, help, support and observe
mutual respect and fidelity would still apply.

Suppose in Sweden, where they are living, the law allows them to live separately
and maintain other partners, the same cannot apply to them, because what
governs their relationship is Philippine law. Or, if in Sweden, there is no
obligation to support one another, still the law cannot apply, because under
Philippine law, they are obliged to support one another.

Absolute Divorces Involving Filipinos:

（a) Rule if both parties are Filipinos: Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.

A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce

obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

An absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary

to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this
jurisdiction.

（b) Rule in mixed marriages:

However, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, paragraph 2 of

Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.”

In the landmark case of Republic v. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580 (2018) the Court
ruled that said law is also applicable even if the decree of divorce is obtained by
the Filipino spouse, so long as the divorce obtained is valid and capacitates the
foreigner spouse to remarry pursuant to the latter's national law.
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 The Court explained that the letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. The Court also explained that even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.

Since the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation

where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse, the application of the law should be extended
to cover mixed marriages where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign
spouse.

The ruling in Manalo was reiterated inRacho v. Tanaka, Morisono v. Morisono, Juego-
Sakai v. Republic, and Nullada v. Civil Registrar of Manila. In all these cases, the
divorce was obtained by the mutual agreement of the spouses. Recent jurisprudence,
therefore, holds that a foreign divorce may be recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it
is validly obtained, regardless of who among the spouses initiated the divorce
proceedings.

Absolute Divorces Obtained by Aliens: It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Hence, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws

Reckoning Point in Determining Citizenship:

For purposes of determining the validity of absolute divorces obtained abroad, the
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at
the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.

Once it is proven that a party was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the
divorce from his Filipino spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn would be applicable.

In other words, the validity of the divorce will be determined based on the law of the
country of which he is a citizen at the time the valid divorce is obtained.

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In Republic v. Orbecido III, where the decree of divorce was obtained by a former
Filipino citizen, the Court applied paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code because
at the time that such divorce was obtained he was already a naturalized citizen of a
foreign country.

In Bayot v. Court ofAppeals,85 the Court also recognized the validity of the absolute
divorce obtained by Rebecca Bayot from the Dominican Republic because she was still
an American citizen when the divorce decree was obtained, although she obtained
Philippine citizenship thereafter.

Principle of Lex Rei Sitae

Rule: With respect to property, be it personal or real, it is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. This is the principle of lex rei sitae.

It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the

laws of the country or state where it is located.

The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property - its immobility.

Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by
what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a
title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained
or lost.

This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of
immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other
conveyances. This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed
relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument
will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the
lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place
where the instrument is
actually made, his capacity is undoubted.

Exceptions: Even if properties are involved, it is the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration (the decedent) and not the law of the country where
the property is situated that will govern with respect to the following aspects of
succession, whether testate or intestate:

(1) order of succession;

(2) amount of successional rights;
(3) intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions; and
(4) capacity to succeed from the decedent.
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Principle of Lex Loci Celebrationis

Rule on Extrinsic Validity:

The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

This is known as the principle of lex loci celebrationis. However, when the acts referred
to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.

Exception to Lex Loci Celebrationis in Execution of Wills:

Generally, a will executed by a Filipino citizen in a foreign country in any of the forms
established by the law of the country in which he may be is valid and may be probated
in the Philippines.

However, joint wills executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid, even
though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed.

Rule on Intrinsic Validity of Contracts:

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws.
The rule followed by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a
contract must be governed by the lex contractus or the proper law of the contract.

This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law
intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis).

The law selected may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with the
transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts would do well
to adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties
to select the law applicable to their contract, subject to the limitation that it is not against
the law, morals, or public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a
substantive relationship to the transaction.

Effect of Foreign Laws, Judgments or Conventions Upon Prohibitory Laws

Rule: Philippine prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be

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rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Illustrative Examples: As a consequence of the foregoing rule –

（a) An absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary

to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this
jurisdiction, even when the same may be valid in the country where it was obtained.

（b) Marriages which are prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38
of the Family Code shall remain void ab initio even if they are solemnized abroad and
valid in the place where they were solemnized.

In Del Soccoro v. Van Wilsem,101 a Dutch national, after divorcing his Filipino spouse,
failed to support their child for several years.

When charged with a violation of Republic Act No. 9262 for refusing and/or failing to
give support to the child, he pleaded the law of the Netherlands to advance his position
that he is not obliged to support his son.

The Court held that even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent's
obligation to support his child nor penalize noncompliance therewith, said foreign law
cannot be applied in the Philippines because it is contrary to a sound and established
policy of the forum; and that, additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Thus, notwithstanding his national law, his obligation to support his child is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

SUMMARY OF CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES

Subject Matter Governing Law

Family rights and duties of persons: National law of the person concerned.

Status and condition of persons: National law of the person concerned.

Legal capacity of persons: National law of the person concerned

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Except:
1. Capacity to succeed from the Law of the nation of the decedent
decedent, whether the succession is
testate or intestate.

2. Capacity of the person making a deed Lex Loci rei sitae

relating to immovable property, no matter
what its nature may be

Real and personal property: Law of the country where it is situated, or

lex loci rei sitae
(Art. 415 of NCC )

Except: In succession, whether testate or National law of the person whose

intestate, as to the following aspects: succession is under is under
consideration
(I) Order of succession; sino ang
magmana sa isang tao

( presence in the class of heirs who will

succeed) the presence of one class
necessarily excludes the others – primary
heirs ( decendants – children or ascendants )

or secondary heirs

or concurring heirs

（ii) Amount of successional rights;

( by how much share?

（iii) Intrinsic validity of

testamentary provisions (wills);
and
Will is valid or not depends on the
national law of the decedent
（iv) Capacity To succeed from the
decedent

Formalities or solemnities of the Law of the country in which they are

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contracts, wills and other public executed.
instruments
Exception: A joint will executed by
Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be
valid in the Philippines, even
though valid in the place of execution

A joint will is void and invalid

under Philippine law.

Article 818 of the Civil Code states that: Two

or more persons cannot make a will jointly,
or in the same instrument, either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third
person.

Intrinsic validity of contracts, its nature Law voluntarily agreed upon by the
Law voluntarily agreed and construction. parties, or the law intended by them
either expressly or implicitly.

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