MEMORANDUM

To: Henry Lowi

From: Olivia Singh
Date: February 26, 2018
Subject: Case Brief for ​McBride v. Appleton

Case cited: ​McBride v. Appleton ​[1946] O.R. 17, [1946] 2 D.L.R. 16

Procedural History:

The court considered the issue of whether the contract between the minor Russell and the
appellent, McBride was “adverse to the infant” (​McBride v. Appleton ​[1946] O.R. 17, [1946] 2
D.L.R. 16). It was found that there was no clause that was deemed detrimental to the minor
Russell. On September 30, 1942, McBride brought a case against Appleton, claiming that he was
still the owner of the Harley-Davidson motorcycle that Russell rented from him. The appellant
declined to give it up. The judgement was made in favour of Appleton and appealed by McBride.
This case was heard by the Supreme Court [Court of Appeal] as well and his appeal was
dismissed.

Facts:

The minor Russell purchased a motorcycle by way of conditional sale and then transferred it to a
third party. This motorcycle was later spotted by the Renter McBride, who demanded possession
of the motorcycle as Russell had not paid for it in full, despite signing a printed contract to do so
on March 27, 1942. The respondent had allowed Russell to have possession of the property. In
addition, he had signed a transfer of the motorcycle permit to Russell.

Issues:

● Into what class does an agreement between a minor and an adult to sell properly fall?
● Can the appellant set up by way of defence that the agreement to sell is (a) void or (b)
voidable?

Decision: ​The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Reasons:

In an action by the vendor against the third party the majority of the court held that the contract
was voidable rather than void. Roach J.A. dissented and believed that the contract was void as a
whole, and not just voidable. The reasons given were that the infant or the minor was not bound

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by a contract to which he s a party within a reasonable time after entering into such an
agreement. As such, Russell could elect to have the contract void if it were prejudicial against his
interests or voidable if he changed his mind. By this logic, Russell could choose to sell the
motorcycle to the third party and not be liable for it.

Ratio decidendi:

Roach J.A., thinking that the contract was void, raised issue of the passing of property. He
appeared to proceed on the assumption that property did not pass from the vendor to the minor as
a matter of general principle, but in the final analysis concluded that the vendor had clothed the
minor with all the indicia of title, and was therefore estopped from setting up the void contract
against the third party.

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