OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL ECONOMY

Marco Merelli
 GLOBAL ECONOMY 2

% GDP Growth
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021(f) 2022(f)
World 3.0 ‐0.1 5.4 4.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.8 3.6 2.9 ‐3.3 6.0 4.4
USA ‐0.1  ‐2.5  2.5  1.6  2.2  1.8  2.5  2.9  1.6  2.2  2.9  2.3 ‐3.5 6.4 3.5
China 9.6  9.2  10.6  9.5  9.6  7.8  7.3  6.9  6.7  6.8  6.6 6.1 2.3 8.4 5.6
Euro Area 0.4 ‐4.5 2.1 1.6 ‐0.9 ‐0.2 1.3 2.0 1.9 2.4 1.9 1.2 ‐6.6 4.4 3.8
Germany 0.8  ‐5.6  3.9  3.7  0.7  0.6  1.9  1.5  2.2 2.5  1.5 0.5 ‐4.9 3.6 3.4
France 0.2  ‐2.9  2.0  2.1  0.2  0.6  0.9  1.1  1.1  2.2  1.7  1.3  ‐8.2 5.8 4.2
Italy ‐1.1  ‐5.5  1.7  0.6  ‐2.8  ‐1.7  0.1  0.8  0.9  1.6  0.8 0.2  ‐8.9 4.2 3.6
Spain 1.1  ‐3.6  0.0  ‐1.0  ‐2.9  ‐1.7  1.4  3.2  3.2  3.0  2.4  2.0  ‐11.0 6.4 4.7
UK ‐0.6  ‐4.3  1.9  1.5  1.3  1.9  3.1  2.2  1.9  1.8  1.3  1.3  ‐9.9 5.3 5.1
Japan ‐1.1  ‐5.4  4.2  ‐0.1  ‐1.1  2.0  0.3  1.1  1.0  1.9  0.3 1.0 ‐4.8 3.3 2.5
Russia 5.2  ‐7.8  4.5  5.1  3.7  1.8  0.7  ‐2.8  ‐0.2  1.6  2.3  1.1 ‐3.1 3.8 3.8
Brazil 5.1  ‐0.1  7.5  4.0  1.9  3.0  0.5  ‐3.8  ‐3.5  1.1 1.3  1.2  ‐4.1 3.6 2.6
India 3.9  8.5  10.3  6.6  3.9  6.4  7.5  8.0  7.1  7.2  6.8  4.8 ‐8.0 11.5 6.8

World Trade ( %) 3.1 ‐10.5 12.5 7.1 2.7 3.6 3.8 2.7 2.5 5,2 3.7 1.0 ‐8.5 8.4 6.5
LIBOR (€) 4.6 1.2 0.8 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 ‐0.0 ‐0.3 ‐0.3 ‐0.3 ‐0.4 ‐0.4 ‐0.5 ‐0.5
LIBOR ($) 3.0 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.5 2.5 2.3 0.7 0.3 0.4
OIL ($) 97 62 79 104 105 104 96 51 43 53 68 61 41 59 55
Inflation (OECD)  3.4 0.2 1.5 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 0.3 0.8 1.7 2.0 1.4 0.7 1.6 1.7
Source: IMF, WEO, April 2021
Growth rates and economic shocks in the world 3

Real GDP Growth Rates

10

8
Globalization
6

-2 European 
debt crisis
-4 Great 
Recession
-6

-8 Great 
Lockdown
-10

United States Emerging market and developing economies Euro area

Source: IMF
GLOBALISATION 4

Rank GDP (trillion $)

1995 2020 2020 (current exchange rate)
% World GDP % World GDP World 84.5
US 24.7 24.8 1 USA 20.9
EU‐27 26.7 17.9 EU27 15.2
UK 4.3 3.1 2 China 14.7
Canada 1.9 1.9 3 Japan 5.0
4 Germany 3.8
Japan 17.6 5.8 5 India 2.9
South Korea 1.8 1.9 6 UK 2.7
7 France 2.6
China 2.4 17.7 8 Italy 1.9
India 1.2 3.1 9 Canada 1.6
10 Korea 1.6
Italy 3.8 2.2
11 Russia 1.5
12 Brazil 1.4
13 Australia 1.4
G7 countries 65.7 45.5
14 Spain 1.3
Emerging and  15 1.1
5.8 25.1 Mexico
Developing Asia 16 Indonesia 1.1
IMF WEO database, 2021
 THE LONG RUN IMPACT OF THE PREVIOUS CRISIS 5

Cumulated 
GDP change 121,6

Country 2007‐2019
USA 22%
UK 14%

Euro Area 10%
109.7
Germany 16%
France 11%
Spain 8%
Italy ‐4% 

Russia 17% 
China 150%
Brazil 19% 
India 127% 
2019
World 49%
Source: IMF data
 6
US vs. EU response
 DEBT/GDP RATIO 7

Budget balance Budget balance Budget balance

Country 1980 1994 2001 2007 2013 2019 2020 2022 2020 % GDP 2021 % GDP (f) 2022 % GDP (f)
Germany 30 48 58 64 79 60 69 67 ‐4.2 ‐5.5 ‐0.4
France 21 50 58 65 93 98 113 114 ‐9.9 ‐7.2 ‐4.4
Spain 17 59 54 36 96 96 117 117 ‐11.5 ‐9.0 ‐5.8
Italy 56 130 109 104 132 135 156 156 ‐9.5 ‐8.8 ‐5.5
EuroArea 71 68 65 93 84 97 97 ‐7.6 ‐6.7 ‐3.2

UK 43 41 34 42 85 86 104 109 ‐13.4 ‐11.8 ‐6.2

USA 31 64 53 65 105 106 127 132 ‐15.9 ‐15.0 ‐6.1
Japan 49 85 145 175 232 238 256 254 ‐12.6 ‐9.4 ‐3.9
Advanced 
economies 70 71 104 103 120 122 ‐11.7 ‐10.4 ‐4.5

China 22 25 29 37 52 67 74 ‐11.4 ‐9.6 ‐8.7

India 73 79 74 67 72 90 86 ‐12.3 ‐10.0 ‐9.0
Brazil 70 64 60 89 99 99 ‐13.4 ‐8.3 ‐7.2
Russia IMF, WEO,50 44
April 2021 8 13 14 19 18 ‐4.0 ‐0.8 ‐0.3
Source: IMF, WEO, April 2021
CENTRAL BANK ASSETS 8
MACRO SCENARIOS – THE SHORT RUN 9

Business cycles and economic policies (Governments & Central Banks)

MACRO SCENARIOS – THE LONG RUN 10

GDP per  GDP per 
capita capita % Change
2000 2019 2000 ‐ 2019
USA 45.640 56.844 +25%

• Germany 37.647 46.765 +25%

France 35.778 41.227 +15%
UK 33.531 40.881 +22%
Spain 30.346 36.311 +20%
Italy 36.085 35.331 ‐2%

Russia 14.092 25.878 +84%

China 3.682 17.027 +365%
Brazil 11.491 14.371 +25%
India 2.546 7.315 +187%
$ PPP
Source: IMF data
THE SHORT RUN

Marco Merelli
 12

Business cycles
peak
peak

Growth
expansion contraction
rate

trend

Business cycle

trough trough
Periodic fluctuations in macroeconomic variables, particularly GDP
Aggregate phenomenon that has typical impact on customers, firms and
economic policies
 13

Key facts on business cycles

• Expansions are longer than recessions

• Recessions are sharper than expansions
• Cycles are correlated across regions and across countries
• Most aggregate variables fluctuate together: macro-economic variables are closely related
• GDP is less volatile in more industrialized countries (BUT in 2009…)

• All sectors rise and fall together over the business cycle, but volatility is most pronounced in
manufacturing and construction and is less pronounced in services and government spending
• Consumption is less volatile than Investment

• Economic fluctuations occur systematically, but they are irregular, for their timing and duration is
unpredictable
• International trade, industrial output, labour market data, PMI purchasing manager index, stock
exchange index, yield curve are indicators used to forecast a change in the business cycle

https://www.markiteconomics.com/?language=en
14
 15
EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN GDP

Q1 2007 = 100 Real Values

Q1 Q4 % Change Q4 2020
2007 2019 Q1 2007 bn €
bn € bn € Q4 2019

Export 118 137 + 16% 125

Consumption 266 262 - 1.5% 236
GDP 448 430 - 4% 402
Investments 98 79 - 19% 77
Government
82 79 - 4% 82
Spending
 16
The Aggregate Demand (AD)

GDP = C + I + G + NX
(domestic production = total demand for that production)

• Consumption (C): the spending by households on goods and services,

with the exception of purchases of new housing
• Investment (I): the spending on capital equipment, inventories, and
structures, including new housing
• Government Purchases (G): the spending on goods and services by local
& national governments (excluding transfer payments which simply shift
income around without production of new goods)
• Net Exports (NX): exports (EX) minus imports (IM)
 17
Business cycles

Business cycles can be seen as movements of output around its natural/structural trend.

They are the result of a continuous stream of shocks to aggregate supply (wages, technology,
price of oil, … ) or aggregate demand (consumption, investment, net export) and of the
dynamic effects of each of these shocks on output, i.e. the propagation mechanism of the
shock.

Generally speaking the economic policy try to keep the actual GDP as close as possible to
potential GDP with expansionary measures during recession and contractionary policies during
expansion

Sometimes shocks are sufficiently large, or policies are inconsistent, so to generate a

recession and/or currency/sovereign/financial crises
 Output gap and the business cycle 18

The output gap measures the difference between the potential output of an economy and the actual GDP obtained in a
given year.
During periods of recession / or slowing of the business cycle, the output gap is thus negative.
Fiscal and monetary policy interventions are useful to smooth the cyclical fluctuations, closing the output gap.
But only innovation and structural reforms may improve the potential output of the economy…

Business cycle Trend

New Trend
Negative output gap
Role for “traditional” economic policy

Role of «structural reforms»

Trend Business cycle

 19
BUSINESS CYCLES AND ECONOMIC POLICY

Expansionary measures during recession can be used to reduce the output

gap

19
 20
DIFFERENT KINDS (AND PROBLEMS) OF ECONOMIC POLICY

Expansionary policy (AD and GDP increase)

• A decrease in tax and/or an increase in Government spending
• Main problem: public deficit and debt

• An increase in monetary base and/or a decrease in interest rate by the Central Bank
• Main problem: inflation

Contractionary policy (AD and GDP decrease)

• An increase in tax or a decrease in Government spending
• A decrease in monetary base and/or a increase in interest rate by the Central Bank
• Main problems: political support & risk of recession
21
22
INFLATION IN THE EURO AREA
23
 HOW IS IT POSSIBLE TO CONTROL INFLATION
24

(AND AVOID HYPERINFLATION)?

• Credibility of the monetary

policy
• Rules (e.g. inflation targets)
• Independent Central Bank

24
 25
Hyperinflation

• High and persistent rate of inflation

• Relationship to fiscal policy

Finance government.
spending via inflation
tax

Rising Inflation
Declining value of Money

People decrease
money holdings by
buying goods
HIGHEST INFLATION RATE (2020) 26

2020 2019
Venezuela 2,960 19,906
Zimbabwe 349 255
Sudan 269 51
Lebanon 150 7
South Sudan 66 30
Iran 48 22
Yemen 45 53
Argentina 36 51
Haiti 25 41
Angola 25 27
Libya 22 5
Zambia 19 17
Ethiopia 18 25
Nigeria 16 16
Congo 16 5
Turkey 15 12
 The ECB new PEPP 27

Source: Algebris Policy Research Forum; BEA Advisory
 28

Italian public debt by owner (bn €) 2014 2020

Bank of Italy (ECB) 106 556

Italian banks 662 653
Italian insurance companies 387 361
Other Italian private investors 322 232
Foreign investors 726 767

Public debt 2,203 2,569

Source: Bank of Italy

 29

Source: Bloomberg
Bloomberg, 15 June 2021
 30
30

THE EURO AREA REFORMS 2012-2019 & 2020

• European Semester
• ESM European Stability
Mechanism • OMT Outright Monetary
Transaction
• ESM - Pandemic Crisis • QE Quantitative Easing
Support (credit line for direct
and indirect health
Reform of factor
markets
• PEPP Pandemic Emergency
expenditures) Growth-oriented Purchase Programme
policies
• Sure
Banking union
• Next Generation EU
(Recovery Fund)
THE COVID-19 SHOCK 31

1. Supply-side shock: disruption of GVCs and lockdowns

2. Demand-side shock: losses for firms, lack of income for workers and uncertainty about the
future

3. Supply-side shock: lack of liquidity and shut down of economic activities

4. Demand-side shock: fall in employment and income
The recovery: economic stimulus measures 32

Fiscal measures (national / EU)

Monetary measures (ECB)

Source: Gourinchas (2020)
 Fiscal Response 33

• Health Spending
• Boosting the response to the health emergency

• Jobs and Income Support
• Extension of short‐term job schemes to preserve employment
• Deferral of upcoming mortgage payments
• Income subsidies for self‐employed
• Income support for less affluent families

• Corporate Lifelines
• Loans or credit guarantees to companies
• Tax / Social Security Relief
• Deferral of payment deadlines for taxes, social security contributions

Similar measures across countries to freeze the economy during lockdowns
34
35
FINANCIAL RISKS OF THE COVID PANDEMIC 36

• In case of macro-financial crises, with investors (smart money) rushing for the exit, the main
tools available to national financial authorities are
1. Currency devaluation
2. Capital controls
3. Bail-in

Despite the extensive historical record, there is no universally acknowledged playbook!

Governments generally hesitate because of the adverse side-effects on different interest groups
and the unclear longer-term consequences:

1. Will currency depreciation result, unleashing lasting high and volatile inflation?
2. Can capital controls be anything more than a stop gap, buying time for more far-reaching
action?
3. Will bail-in of the creditors of failed banks undermine future access of the sovereign and of
private firms to the financial markets?
COVID-19 AND SUPPLY CHAIN IMPACT 37

• “depleted” supply chains, “increased lead times for deliveries” and “widescale shortages”.
• Years of globalisation and just-in-time ordering management had ironed out bullwhip effects
across the world’s manufacturers.
• Bullwhip effect of the depletion of retail inventories during the lockdowns and initial post-
reopening shortages (double-orders and overstock of supplies).
• These actions are now echoing down from retail stores to basic materials and producers of
sub-assemblies such as semiconductor chips.
• Commodities supercycle? But we still have continued high unemployment, low wages
• Risks: temporary boom. Once the public stimulus runs out, we are facing a fiscal cliff unless
private demand is up by 5-10 per cent next year...
 THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON GLOBAL SHIPPING 38

• Baltic Index – from China to Mediterranean • Freight rate at high level

• Schedule reliability is at an all
time low
• (ocean carries with record
financial results)
THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON COMMODITIES 39

Metals prices have

increased by 72 percent
relative to their pre-
pandemic levels
(reaching a nine-year
high in May in inflation
adjusted terms).
The prices of most
agricultural and energy
commodities are also
tracking upward, but at a
slower rate.
Energy commodities (oil,
coal, and natural gas), in
particular, sit only a few
percentage points above
pre-pandemic levels.
WILL METALS’ PRICES KEEP INCREASING OR 40

RETRENCH?
• A manufacturing-based recovery: Manufacturing activity did not slump as much at the start of the pandemic
and recovered more quickly than services, especially in China (which is the major user of metals). At the
same time, global road fuels consumption is still -7% of pre-pandemic levels, restraining a further rebound of
petroleum prices.
• Supply-side factors: Many mining operations were temporarily disrupted by COVID-19. What’s more, freight
rates for the transportation of bulk materials reached a ten-year high due to congestion in key ports,
quarantine restrictions, ongoing problems staffing shipping crews, and a rebound in fuel prices from the deep
troughs in Spring 2020.
• Expectations for faster energy transition and infrastructure spending in EU and the US: Both would
increase the “metal intensity” of the global economy: lithium, graphite, cobalt, and nickel for electric cars and
renewables, copper, iron ore, and other industrial metals for infrastructure.
• Storability of metals: Metals are easier to store than other commodities. This makes their pricing more
forward looking and, thus, more sensitive to changes in interest rates (lower interest rates reduce the “cost of
carry,” which also includes cost of storage, insurance, and other expenses) and, thus, tend to support
commodity prices and market expectations.
• Market participants seem to expect a peak in metals prices relatively soon, as factors (1) and (2) are
supposedly temporary in nature. Indeed, futures markets suggest an increase of industrial metal prices by 50
percent in 2021 (year-over-year), but a decrease by 4 percent in 2022.
• That 2000 supercycle was driven by urbanisation, investment and an ascendant middle class in emerging
markets (China, in particular). Governments from around the world now declare that they intend to bring a new
type of transformation. The price of commodities in the coming decade depends in large part on whether they
do what they say.
THE LONG RUN

Marco Merelli
 42
World Trade and Globalization
TRADE 43

WORLD TRADE AND GDP

 44
The new globalisation: Globalisation 3.0
• Globalisation accelerated again around 1990, when the ICT revolution radically
lowered the cost of moving ideas.
• Globalisation’s second unbundling – the geographic separation of each
manufacturing stage, organised in 'global value chains' (GVCs) – became feasible
(the ICT revolution made it possible to organise complex activities at distance)
• The north-south wage gap inherited from the first unbundling made this
offshoring profitable.
 45
Global value chains
A value chain is the full range of activities that firms engage in to bring a product to the market,
from conception to final use (from design, production, marketing, logistics and distribution to support
the final customer).
Global value chains (GVCs) are the natural offspring of globalization:
• Reduction in transport, trade and investments costs (due to technology, trade and investment
liberalization).
• The growing interconnectedness of economies and access to foreign markets (inputs and
outputs). In GVCs economic activities are fragmented and dispersed across countries.
• Specialisation of firms and countries in tasks and business functions.
• Networks of global buyers and suppliers. In GVCs firms control and co-ordinate activities in
networks of buyers and suppliers, and multinational enterprises (MNEs) play a central role.
New drivers of economic performance. In GVCs, trade and growth rely on the efficient
sourcing of inputs abroad, as well as on access to final producers and consumers abroad, and
access to technology (FDI to gain access to strategic knowledge assets where there are skilled
workers, universities, research centers, competitors..).
TRADE AND FRAGMENTATION OF PRODUCTION 46

01/31/2006 12:24 PM
The Global Toothbrush
By Ralf Hoppe
 47
Global Value Chains (big & complex)
 48
Global value chains
Land Rover Discovery
+30,000
components
UK components
account for 44% of
parts in British-built
cars.
Hard Brexit? WTO
rules mean a 10%
tariff on vehicles and
an average 4.5%
tariff on component.
 49

Foreign direct investments (FDIs)

FDI involves the control by a firm of a firm resident in an economy
other than that of the foreign direct investor (≠ portfolio investment).
• Greenfield: the foreign firm builds a new facility
• Brownfield: the foreign firm buys an existing facility

85% of the global stock of multinational investment

was created after 1990 (after adjusting for inflation). The flow is still positive, but decreasing
FDIs stock in 2019 (% GDP) 50

Inward Outward Inward Outward

British Virgin Islands 55,042 60,716 Bahamas 200 56
Cayman Islands 8,885 4,018 Libya 48 55
Cyprus 1,817 1,807 Azerbaijan 66 53
China, Hong Kong SAR 507 487 Norway 40 53
Malta 1,406 419 Austria 46 53
Luxembourg 184 310 Bahrain 78 49
Singapore 469 306 Finland 29 49
Netherlands 193 283 Chile 95 47
Ireland 290 281 Germany 25 45
Switzerland, Liechtenstein 190 215 Spain 54 44
Liberia 336 180 Australia 51 41
Belgium 107 124 UAE 38 38
Canada 60 95 USA 44 36
Sweden 64 75 Japan 4 36
Barbados 141 72 Estonia 88 32
United Kingdom 74 69 Malaysia 46 32
Taiwan 16 59 Lebanon 122 29
South Africa 43 59 Israel 43 28
Denmark 30 58 Italy 22 28
Togo 31 57 South Korea 14 26
France 32 57 Thailand 47 25
China 20 16
India 15 6
 51

FDIs after Trade Wars and Covid-19

2020 vs (2019)
Billion $

CHINA 163 (157)

US: 134 (262)
UE: 110 (373)
 52

The WTO Four principles

1. Reciprocity. WTO members have symmetric rights and obligations, and should obtain mutually beneficial 
reductions of trade barriers.
2. Consensus. Any decision taken within the WTO requires unanimity of all the participating countries. Inefficient? 
countries often negotiate in coalitions centred around the main trading partners (historically USA, EU, Canada, 
Japan, now also BRICs) 
3. Tariff bindings. Once a tariff reduction has been negotiated and accepted, it becomes “bound” at the 
negotiated rate (sanctions if it is increased).
4. Non‐discrimination. Two clauses: 
– The National Treatment (NT) rule requires that once foreign products enter an importing country, they 
should be accorded a treatment equal to the one guaranteed to similar national products (e.g. same tax 
treatment);
– The Most‐favoured‐nation (MFN) treatment: all WTO members should receive from a given home country 
the same treatment as the one accorded to the partner country that receives the best (most favoured) 
treatment. Therefore the MNF clause should guarantee the tariff rate on any given product to be uniform
across trading partners, at the lowest level (it is not necessarily zero).
 The world seems to have 3 53
interconnected production
hubs for trade in parts and
components.

China aside, developing The color of the nodes (and their

countries are generally on the export flows) is from blue to red,
blue indicating the highest
periphery and tend to trade degree of centrality
with the hub that is
geographically closest (gravity
model). Most African countries are
far from existing hubs. Source: GVC Development Report, 2017
TRADE WARS IN THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN ERA 54

• GVCs amplify the effects of tariffs (tariffs are applied to the gross value of a good rather
than just the ‘new’ value added so every border crossing increases the total tariff bill associated
with production).
• GVC linkages mean that the burden of tariffs falls differently among consumers,
workers, and firms involved throughout the value chain (the costs and benefits of higher
tariffs may extend well beyond the immediate ‘intentional’ targets to include countries and
companies around the world, including the very country that imposed the new protection)
• GVC structure is the result of strategic sourcing and foreign investment decisions of globally
engaged firms and tariffs may have large, long-lasting, and unanticipated consequences
for the pattern of global production (this additional production dislocation will carry
additional efficiency, job, profit, and welfare losses)
• higher tariffs give firms an incentive to consolidate their global supply networks into fewer
countries, border crossings (and thus vulnerabilities). (Reshore or instead regionalization in
“factory Europe” or “factory Asia”?)
 The WTO achievements and the state of the play… 55

Tariff rate, applied, weighted mean, all products (%)

After 1995 multilateral negotiations are 
not progressing: failure of the Millenium
Round (Seattle 1999) and deadlock of the 
Development Round (Doha 2001). 
Agreements among 164 countries 
are extremely complicated to negotiate 
and the agenda is not focused anymore 
only on tariffs but more sensitive issues 
are at stake such as environment and 
labour standards, liberalization of 
agricultural sector and services.

1990 2000 2016 2019

USA 4.0 1.8 1.6 13.8
EU 5.1 2.1 1.5 1.8
China n.a. 14.6 3.5 2.5
Brazil 19.0 12.7 7.7 8.0 Source: World Bank
India 27.1 23.3 6.4 6.6
 56

China 148 236 304 202 195 25 141 299 274 238
India -32 -27 -22 -14 -49 -57 -25 27 -36 -54
Russia 33 57 68 24 32 115 64 32 67 58
Brazil -79 -101 -54 -24 -15 -41 -51 -12 -9 -13
Source: IMF WEO
 23
26 Italy
USA 22 57
24
21
22
20
20
19
18

16 18

14 17

12 16
Total investment Gross national savings Total investment Gross national savings
10 15

55
53
China 31
Germany
29
51
49 27

47 25
45 23
43
21
41
19
39
37 17
Total investment Gross national savings
Total investment Gross national savings
35 15
58
 59
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2020)
Business cycle vs. potential output 60

Cyclical fluctuations of actual

GDP around potential GDP
(Business Cycle)

Long-run equilibrium in the

growth model
Drivers of potential output 61
 INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF GDP 62

1990-2017 2018 2019 2020

Average
1990-2017 2018 2019 2020
China 44 44 43 44 Average
Korea 31 31 31 32 Advanced 23 22 22 22
India 29 33 31 28 countries
Indonesia 27 35 34 32 Emerging Europe 24 24 23 23
Emerging Asia 36 40 39 39
Spain 25 20 21 20 Latin America 20 19 18 18
Portugal 24 18 19 19 Middle East & 27 28 31 30
Greece 22 13 13 13 Central Asia
France 22 24 24 24 Sub Saharian 19 22 24 22
Italy 20 19 18 18 Africa
Germany 20 22 21 20 World 24 26 26 26

Japan 27 26 26 26
USA 21 21 21 21
UK 17 18 18 17

Brazil 19 15 15 15

Source: IMF
PRODUCTIVITY 63

GDP per hour GDP per hour

worked worked
($ PPP) ($ PPP)
2019 2000

USA 71,8 54,4 +32%

France 67,5 57,2 +18%

Germany 66,4 56,1 +18%
UK 58,4 49,7 +18%
Italy 53,4 52,8 +1%
Spain 52,5 45,0 +17%
Poland 41,1 22,3 +84%

Japan 46,6 38,4 +21%

Korea 40,5 20,5 +98%

source: OECD Database

R&D 64

% PIL
Miliardi USD

Source: OECD
 DOING BUSINESS IN
65

Economy Rank

New Zealand 1
Singapore 2
Hong Kong 3
Denmark 4
Korea, Rep. 5
US 6
Georgia 7
UK 8
Norway 9
Sweden 10
Germany 22
Spain 30
France 32
Italy 58
 66
CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES
GDP GDP
per capita per capita Cumulated GDP per 
2000  2019 capita change
($ PPP) ($ PPP) 2000 ‐ 2019
USA 45.640 56.844 +25%

Germany 37.647 46.765 +25%

France 35.778 41.227 +15%
UK 33.531 40.881 +22%
Spain 30.346 36.311 +20%
Italy 36.085 35.331 ‐2%

Russia 14.092 25.878 +84%

China 3.682 17.027 +365%
Brazil 11.491 14.371 +25%
India 2.546 7.315 +187%
Source: IMF data