HR 4 Case digest

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

1. Ramirez vs CA GR No. 93833 September 28, 1995

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that
the private respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a
manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced
a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case was
based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that
the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200.

Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the

consent of both of the party is a violation of R.A. 4200.

Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized
Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and
Other Purposes,” provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize
all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier “any”.

Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a

(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator. The
unambiguity of the express words of the provision, therefore plainly supports
the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.

2. Zulueta vs CA GR No. 107383 February 20, 1996

Facts: Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent

Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
driver and private respondents secretary, FORCIBLY OPENED THE
DRAWERS AND CABINET IN HER HUSBAND'S CLINIC CONSISTING OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CORRESPONDENCE AND HIS ALLEGED
PARAMOURS. The documents and papers were seized and use in
evidence in a case of legal separationand for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which were filed by the petitioner. RTC ruled in favor of
the private respondents, ordering the petitioner to return the properties and
pay damages. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: W/N THE DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS IN QUESTION WERE

INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE --YES

Held: The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication

and correspondence (to be) inviolable" is no less applicable simply because
it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is a party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution
is if there is a "LAWFUL ORDER OF THE COURT OR WHEN PUBLIC
SAFETY REQUIRES OTHERWISE, AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW. Any violation
of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose of the proceeding".The intimacies between husband and wife do
not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking the for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity.THE LAW INSURES ABSOLUTE FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION
BETWEEN THE SPOUSES BY MAKING IT PRIVILEGED. NEITHER A HUSBAND
NOR WIFE MAY TESTIFY FOR OR AGAINST THE OTHER WITHOUT CONSENT
OF THE AFFECTED SPOUSE WHILE MARRIAGE SUBSISTS.NEITHER MAY BE
EXAMINED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER AS TO ANY
COMMUNICATION RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE BY ONE FROM THE OTHER
DURING MARRIAGE, SAVE FOR SPECIFIED EXCEPTION.RULINGWHEREFORE,
the petition for review is DENIED for lack of Merit.

3. Ople vs Torres GR No. 127685, July 23, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that the Court invalidate Administrative Order
No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System” on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

Issue: Whether or not AO No. 308 is violative of the right to privacy

Held: Yes.

The court prescinds from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need
to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable
whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of
A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people’s right
to privacy in clear and present danger.

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308
cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said AO, an
individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government
agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded– whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual’s file may
include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement
of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc.
The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a
huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the
files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes;
but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a
covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of
our authorities to resist.

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources– governments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No.
308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens.

4. Sony Music Entertainment Inc. vs Judge Español GR No. 156804,

March 14, 2005
Facts: Sony Music Entertainment is suing Judge Dolores Español nullifying
the Petition for Certiorari with application for injunctive relief and then
denying reconsideration of the said petition. From the said petition, the
respondents were private namely James Uy, David Chung, Elena Lim and
another officer of respondent Solid Laguna Corporation with violation were
engaged in the replication, reproduction and distribution of videograms
without license and authority from VRB. On Account of this and petitioner's
own complaints for copyright infringement. The National Bureau
Investigation, through Agent Ferdinand Lavin, presided by Judge Español,
for the issuance of search warrants against private respondents doing
business under the name and style “Media Group” inside the factory and
production facility of SLC.

Agent Lavin and the witnesses conduct an investigation, in the course of

which unnamed persons informed them that allegedly infringing or pirated
discs were being manufactured somewhere in an industrial park in Laguna.
The respondents prove before the Department of Justice that they were
licensed by VRB up to the time of search. DOJ dismissed VRB's complaint.
Respondents issued Quash Search Warrants.

Issue: Whether Judge Español committed a grave abuse of her discretion

regarding the case.

Rulings: No. Case, in fact, is lacking of evidence to prove that the

respondents of the case were not authorized reproducers of videograms. The
fact that Agent Lavin do not have actual knowledge about the cd he
purchased was illegally reproduced, thus, he just have learned it from
unnamed person. The fact that the respondenmts do have a license form
VRB made them an authorized replicator and distributor of videograms.

The issuance of search warrant predicated on the sworn testimonies of

persons without personal knowledge of fact they were testifying on and who
relied on a false certification issued by VRB.

Based as it were on hearsay and false information, its issuance was without
probable cause and therefore invalid. The decision was fair and the Judge did
not abuse her discretion.
5. Gaanan vs IAC GR No. L-69809, October 16, 1986

FACTS: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebonoffered
to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after
demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan
through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally
hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was
subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the
money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA 4200). The lower courtfound both
Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200.
The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in

Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation
would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two
parties using a telephone line.

HELD: No, An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as

a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA
No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office
use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true
intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts.
6. Morfe vs Mutuc, GR No. L-20387, January 31, 1968

FACTS: Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter
public officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and
improve the tone of morality in public service. One of the specific provisions
of the said act is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after
its approval or after his assumption of office “and within the month of
January of every other year thereafter”, as well as upon the termination of
his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he
belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar.” Said provision was challenged
for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power
and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in
the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with
the prohibition against self-incrimination.

ISSUE: Whether the periodical submission of statement of assets and

liabilities of an official is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional rights.

RULING: No. The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing
and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote
morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public
trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands
the assent of all.

When a government official accepts a public position, he is deemed to have

voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about his personal
affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he
continues to discharge public trust. While in the attainment of such public
good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a
showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution
condemns, the statute allows. The due process clause is not susceptible to
such a reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police
power. It cannot also be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for
disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy.
It is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such compulsory revelation,
there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private
sphere.

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does

not give freedom from testimonial compulsion. It appears clear that no
violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has been
shown to exist by such requirement. Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain
greater plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation of the non-
incrimination clause. The court stresses that it is not aware of any
constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s conduct from judicial
inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice.

7. Griswold vs Connecticut, 381 US 479, 484 (1965)

FACTS: A Connecticut statute made the use of contraceptives a criminal

offense. The executive and medical directors of the Planned Parenthood
League of Connecticut were convicted in the Circuit Court for the Sixth
Circuit in New Haven, Connecticut, on a charge of having violated the statute
as accessories by giving information, instruction, and advice to married
persons as to the means of preventing conception. The Appellate Division of
the Circuit Court affirmed and its judgment was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut. The case was elevated on appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States.

ISSUE:

Did the statute violate a couple’s right to privacy?

HELD:

Yes. The Court held right of privacy to use birth control measures was found
to be a legitimate one. Thus, finding the statute unconstitutional. It held that
marriage lies within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees, which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives
rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals
by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.
Thus, such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. The very idea of
allowing the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.

8. Spouses Bill and Victoria Hing vs Choachuy GR No. 179736, June

26, 2013

Facts: Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned
by Choachuy’s) filed a case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order against the Hing’s.
The latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a fence without a valid permit
and that it would destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the
application for lack of evidence. So in order to get evidences for the case,
on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras
facing the Hing’s property. Their employees even took pictures of the said
construction of the fence. The Hing’s then filed a case against the
Choachuy’s for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC
issued a order granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the
Choachuy’s to remove the two video surveillance cameras they installed. The
Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the RTC’s
decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the installation of two video surveillance cameras of

Choachuy’s violated the Hing’s right to privacy.
HELD: Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s
under Article 26(1) prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s
residence.” Although it is a business office and not a residence, the owner
has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.

9. People vs Estrada, GR Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009

FACTS: An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against
respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal
use of alias was likewise filed. The Amended Information reads: “…to conceal
the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during his tenure and his true identity as
the President, represents himself as JOSE VELARDE in several transactions
and use and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his
registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

Issue: Whether the court erred in holding that the use by respondent Joseph
Estrada of his alias “Jose Velarde” was not public despite the presence of
Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000.

Held: No. The Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel – that
mere communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to
violations of CA No. 142. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No.
142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall
publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to
publicly use the alias must be manifest. The presence of Lacquian and Chua
when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163
does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth
as Jose Velarde. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing
as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian
and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for
Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the
evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s
representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with
no iota of intention of publicity. Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones
of privacy. Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the
documents as “Jose Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the
People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when
Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. Petition was denied.

10. Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College GR No. 202666, September 29,

2014

Facts: This case involves graduating students of the STC-Cebu City;

wherein, the students involved posted pictures on their Facebook account of
them wearing wearing no shirt, but only brassieres from waist up. Said
photos were taken while they were changing into their swimsuits for a beach
party. The said photos were reported to the STC’s computer teacher, Mylene
Rheza Escudero.

Upon discovery thereof, Escudero reported the matter to the school

authorities. The students involved were investigated and were barred to
attend their highschool graduation rites.

A case was filed against the STC and its officials for Injunction and
Damages. Injunction as to the order of the school not to allow the children
to attend their graduation rites. A petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data was also filed. Petitioners (Parents of the students involved)
assert that the privacy of the children were unlawfully invaded. Since the
Facebook accounts of the children are set at “Friends Only”; That the photos
were owned by the ladies, thus cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. They further contended this was violated by saving digital copies
and subsequently showed them to the STC’s officials.

Issue: Whether the rights to privacy by the students were violated

Decision: No.

Facebook has privacy safeguard tools. Utilization of this tools is the

manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his right to
informational privacy.

That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolsters
the petitioners’ contention. It is well emphasize at this point that setting a
post’s or profile detail’s to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the
content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by
the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former.

11. Pollo vs Chairperson David GR No. 181881, October 18, 2011

Facts: CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an unsigned

complaint letter which was marked “Confidential” and was sent through LBC
from certain Allan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The letter
contain allegations that the petitioner have been helping many who have
pending cases in the CSC and the letter sender pleas that the CSC should
investigate this anomaly to maintain the clean and good behaviour of their
office.

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with

background in IT, and issued a memo directing them to conduct an
investigation and specifically “to back up all the files in the computers found
in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at
Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of
computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by
several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely
monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text
messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office
at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their
divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the
anonymous letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is
not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC.
He accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and
subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right
against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the
petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his
constitutional right to privacy

RULING: No, the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of
his personal files was lawful and did not violate his constitutional right.

The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and computer files. The search authorized by the CSC
Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer
is reasonable in its inception and scope.

The case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the
petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence
government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate
and monitor.

1. Abrams vs US, 250 US 610

Facts: In 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on

Russian soil against Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the
tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated literature calling for
a general strike in ammunition plants to undermine the US war effort. The
defendants were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New York City
window. One denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the
second denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of the production
of weapons to be used against "Workers Soviets of Russia". They were
sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Issue: Do the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those

amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the First
Amendment?
Held: The Court held that in calling for a general strike and the curtailment
of munitions production, the leaflets violated the Espionage Act. Congress’
determination that all such propaganda posed a danger to the war effort was
sufficient to meet the standard set in Schenck v. United States for
prosecuting attempted crimes. As in Schenck, the Court emphasized that
protections on speech are lower during wartime.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the First
Amendment protects the right to dissent from the government’s viewpoints
and objectives. Protections on speech, he continued, should not be curtailed
unless there is a present danger of immediate evil, or the defendant intends
to create such a danger. The evidence in this case consisted of two leaflets,
which he concluded did not meet the “clear and present danger” test.

2. Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS: Petitioners posted 2 tarpaulins within a private compound housing

the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately
6′ x 10′ in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within
public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law”
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-
RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X”
mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those
who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team
Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for
by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains
names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped
in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUE: Whether the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which
the Comelec has the power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall
constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech.

RULING:

It is not election propaganda.

While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the

second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining
“political advertisement” or “election propaganda.”

The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That
petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the
basis of a single issue—and a complex piece of legislation at that—can easily
be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the candidates and party- list
organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed,
as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the
example of petitioners.

But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of

our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good
conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only
in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.

3. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs COMELEC GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010

FACTS: “Ang Ladlad” is an organization of people who identify themselves as

lesbians, gays, bisexuals or trans- genders. The Comelec dismissed the
petition on moral grounds as “the definition of the LGBT sector makes it
crystal clear that it tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.”
ISSUE: Whether “Ang Ladlad” party-list application should be denied as the
organizational legedly tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.

RULING: No. The denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion

by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion; including its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the government must act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. “Ang Ladlad” has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Hence, its application as a party-list should be granted.

4. New Sounds Broadcasting Network Inc vs Dy GR No. 170270

&179411, April 2, 2009

Facts: Petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayor’s permit on 2002.
Bagnos Maximo [the City Zoning Administrator-Designate] required the
petitioner to submit "either an approved land conversion papers from the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing that the property was
converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land, or an approved
resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod
authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to
commercial land." Petitioners had never been required to submit such
papers before, and from 1996 to 2001, the OMPDC had consistently certified
that the property had been classified as commercial.

Due to this refusal by Maximo to issue the zoning clearance, petitioners were
unable to secure a mayor’s permit. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City to compel the issuance
of the 2002 mayor’s permit.
RTC denied the application of the petitioners; CA dismissed the case due to
the availability of other speedy remedies with the trial court.

Issue: Whether the acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their
operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the
press.

Held: Yes. The court recognized that the LGU concerned has legal authority
to promulgate ordinances required for permits. However, the burden is with
the government concerned to establish compelling reasons to infringe the
freedom of speech and expression as in the case at bar. The court justifies
further its ruling based on the concept of content based restraint (subject to
more strict scrutiny) rather than content neutral regulation for the reason
that the circumstances surrounding the case warrants it such as the alleged
ill motives of the defendants together with the timing as it is very near
election. The steps employed by the City is to ultimately shutdown the
petitioners. The case falls on the classification of Prior Restraint. To reiterate,
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or
other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.

5. Chavez vs Gonzales GR No. 168338 February 15, 2008

Facts: Congress, acting as national board of canvassers, proclaimed

President Arroyo winner in the 2004 presidential elections. Radio station
DZMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the conversation discussed
"rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo.
Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media organizations
which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of RA 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.

NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing
the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.

Chavez, as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the "acts, issuances, and
orders" of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez; that respondents’ conduct
violated freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June
2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

Held: Yes. Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and

democratic society. Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition to
the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. No society can
remain free, open and democratic without freedom of expression. Freedom
of expression guarantees full, spirited, and even contentious discussion of all
social, economic and political issues. To survive, a free and democratic
society must zealously safeguard freedom of expression.

The function of freedom of expression is to stir disputes: it may indeed best

serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea.

6. Soriano vs Laguardia GR No. 164785, April 29, 2009

FACTS: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the
program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks
against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against
petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M.
Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a
minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE: Whether Soriano's suspension is violative of his right to free speech.

RULING: No, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was
an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or
as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the
paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media),
a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on
the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few,
if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.

7. Iglesia ni Cristo vs CA GR No. 119673, July 26, 1996

FACTS: Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo”

of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for
public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offended and
constituted an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its
“attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of the petitioner’s religious program?

HELD: YES, respondent Board gravely abused its discretion when it

prohibited the airing of the petitioner’s religious program.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board X-rated petitioners TV series
for “attacking” other religions, especially the Catholic Church. An
examination of the evidence will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions.
The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not
presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as
indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from
public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner’s freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion.

Under our constitution, it is not the task of the State to favour any religion
by protecting it against an attack by another religion. The freedom of
religion is the freedom of thought. The embers of truth will be fanned in the
heat of colliding ideas.The respondents failed also to apply the CLEAR and
PRESENT DANGER RULE. In this case, it was not present. There is no
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially
the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken
the life of a reality already on ground.

8. Sanidad vs Comelec GR No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Commission on Elections from

holding and conducting the referendum-plebiscite; to declare without force
and effect Presidential Decree numbers 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution as well as PD 1031, insofar as it
directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite.

Petitioners contend that the President has no power to propose amendments

to the new constitution, a such, the referendum has no legal basis.

Issues: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the
amendment of the Constitution.

Ruling: Yes. In the transitory provision of the 1973 provisions, the National
Assembly, although composed mainly by legislators, amending the
Constitution is not legislating.
The prerogative of the President to approve or disapproved applies only to
the ordinary case of legislation. The President has nothing to do with the
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

The petitions are dismissed.

9. Gonzales vs Katigbak GR No. L-69500 July 22, 1985

Facts: The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim, was classified “For
Adults Only.”

The main objection was the classification of the film as “For Adults Only.” For
petitioners, such classification “is without legal and factual basis and is
exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression. The film is an
integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now
offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as
a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the
Board as basis for its classification.”

Issue: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion in classifying said film as
“For Adults Only.”

Held: No. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari solely on the ground
that there are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of
discretion in the classification of Kapit sa Patalim as “For Adults Only.”

10.Iglesia ni Cristo vs CA GR No. 119673, July 26, 1996

FACTS: Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo”

of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for
public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly

“offended and constituted an attack against other religions which is

expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical
interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of the petitioner’s religious program?

HELD: YES, respondent Board gravely abused its discretion when it

prohibited the airing of the petitioner’s religious program.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board X-rated petitioners TV series
for “attacking” other religions, especially the Catholic Church. An
examination of the evidence will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions.
The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not
presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as
indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from
public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner’s freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion.

Under our constitution, it is not the task of the State to favour any religion
by protecting it against an attack by another religion. The freedom of
religion is the freedom of thought. The embers of truth will be fanned in the
heat of colliding ideas.The respondents failed also to apply the CLEAR and
PRESENT DANGER RULE. In this case, it was not present. There is no
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially
the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken
the life of a reality already on ground.

11. Tulfo vs People, GR No. 161032, September 16, 2008

Facts: From May to June 1999, Erwin Tulfo published articles in his column
in the tabloid REMATE where he accused Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of
Customs of corruption. As a result, Atty. Carlos So of the Bureau of Customs
sued Tulfo for several counts of libel as he felt that he was the one being
referred to in the articles. Tulfo then published another article further
accusing Atty. So of corruption.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Tulfo. His conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

On appeal before the Supreme Court, Tulfo argued that his newspaper
articles were covered by the doctrine of qualified privileged communication
which provides that fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed
innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official
may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion,
based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to
be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tulfo’s articles are protected by the doctrine of

qualified privileged communication.

HELD: NO. In order for the doctrine of qualified privileged communication to

apply, Tulfo must prove that he was not reckless in writing his articles. He
failed to prove lack of recklessness. During his testimony, Tulfo admitted
that he based his write ups on a sole informant. Tulfo admitted that he failed
to conduct further research to verify his source. Journalists have a
responsibility to report the truth, and in doing so must at least investigate
their stories before publication, and be able to back up their stories with
proof. The rumors and gossips spread by unnamed sources are not truth.
Journalists are not storytellers or novelists who may just spin tales out of
fevered imaginings, and pass them off as reality. There must be some
foundation to their reports; these reports must be warranted by facts.

12. Primicias vs Fugoso GR No. L-1800, January 27, 1948

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the
respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza
Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by
the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the
fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter
and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the
faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a
disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police
power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927
prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending
to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body
or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of
Public Place.

ISSUE:Whether the freedom of speech was violated.

HELD: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section
provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets
and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is
subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The
court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to
authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our
democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly
granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency.

The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone
justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech
to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of
free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will
result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that
speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not
enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious
injury to the state.

13.People vs Alarcon GR No. 46551 December 12, 1939

Facts: On the first count, on December 1944, the defendant joined a military
organization Makapili in Nueva Ecija; received an army rifle from the enemy;
stood guard every morning at the headquarters and received military
training under Filipino and Japanese instructors; accompanied Japanese and
Makapili soldiers in search of guerillas and supported by witnesses.

As to the third count, the testimony of Lorenzo and Felizardo Sampang

support the conclusion that on January 11, 1945, a group of Japanese and
Makapili soldiers arrested Lorenzo, his two sons and son-in-law and took
them to Makapili HQ; that the arrested persons met the accused and were
submitted to rigid examination about their connection with the guerillas and
that when the son-in-law refused to answer, the appellant took him to a
room, maltreated and tortured him so much he could hardly walk; and that
they were released except for the son-in-law whose whereabouts is
unknown.

As to the fourth count, that the accused on December 1944, retreated with
the Japanese forces towards Bongabon before the arrival of American forces
in Cabanatuan is supported by witnesses

Issue: W/N the defendant is liable for treason.

Held: Yes. having joined and acted as a member of the military organization
called Makapili, since the appellant, as one of the members of said
organization, had to retreat with the Japanese soldiers and the Makapilis to
the mountains. Said organization was created, according to Exhibit D, to
"accomplish the fulfillment of the obligation assumed by the Philippines in
the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan, to shed blood and sacrifice the
lives of our People in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia,
to establish unreservedly and uninterestedly with the Imperial Japanese
Army and Navy in the Philippines, and to fight the common enemies;" and
therefore, unless the appellant was forced to join or joined the Makapili
organization against his will, of which there is no evidence in the record, by
joining and acting as a member thereof he adhered to and gave the enemy
aid and comfort, regardless of whether the motive prompting him to do so
was merely sympathy or pecuniary gain.

14. IBP vs Mayor Atienza GR No. 175241 February 24, 2010

Facts: IBP filed for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola bridge. The
Office of the Manila Mayor issued the same but it changed the venue of the
rally to Plaza Miranda. IBP allege that such modification violated their
Freedom of Assembly.

Issue: Whether the modification of place in the permit issued for the rally
constitute aviolation of Freedom of Assembly.

Held: Yes. SC held for the Petitioners. Freedom of assembly is not to be

limited, muchless denied, except on a showing, as is the casewith freedom
of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent. Respondent failed to show that there is a clear
and present danger as his reason for the modification.
15. Disini vs Secretary of Justice GR No. 203335 February 11, 2014

FACTS: RA 10175 (Cybercrime Law) was enacted, which aims to regulate

access to and use of the cyberspace. Petitioners filed petitions to declare
several provisions of Cybercrime Law unconsitutional and void. One of the
assailed provisions is Section 5, which punishes the aiding or abetting and
attempt in the commission of Cybercrimes such as libel. Petitioners argue
that such provision suffers from overbreadth, creating chilling and deterrent
effect on protected expression. The OSG, however, contends that the current
body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects
the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves
of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and
jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a
crime as to protect the innocent.

ISSUE: Whether or not aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is

constitutional.

RULING: When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a

facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable.
The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. A petitioner
may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed
statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or
vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the
"chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free
speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime
under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking
in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus
chills him into silence. Here, the terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves
through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5
of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.
16.Cabansag vs Fernandez GR No. L-8974 October 18, 1957

FACTS: Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of

Germiniana Fernandez from a parcel of land. He later wrote a letter to the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) regarding the delay
in the disposition of his case before the CFI Pangasinan. The judge ordered
Cabansag and his lawyers to show cause why he should not be held liable for
contempt for sending such letter which tended to degrade the court in the
eyes of the President (Magsaysay) and the people. After due hearing, the
court rendered a decision finding Cabansag and his lawyers guilty of
contempt and sentencing them to pay a fine.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cabansag's letter created a suficient danger to a fat

administration of

HELD: NO. The letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help
because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of
action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper
had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme
Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must
cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can we
infer that such act has "a dangerous tendency" to belittle the court or
undermine the administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his
constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate
grievance.

17. Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 79690-707 April 27, 1988

FACTS: Petitioner filed Resolution including Motion to Cite in Contempt

Special Prosecu tor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez. Gonzalez in:
(1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in criminal
case before the Sandigan bayan, and (2) issuing certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in
where respondent is claiming that he is acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman.
A Resolution from the Supreme Court required respondent to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to adm
inistrative sanctions for making certain public statements. Portion of the
publi shed article from Philippine Daily Globe in his interview: "What I am
afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is
difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course."

Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he

acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to
him are substantially correct.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. Gonzales is entitled to invoke

freedom of speech as a defense.

HELD: NO. Respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. The
Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court
i n facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar.(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) [F]reedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.

SHORTER VER.

FACTS: Zaldivar sought to restrain Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul

Gonzales from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases
were filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority.

ISSUE: Whether the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct preliminary

investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan

HELD: Under the Constitution, the Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate

of the Tanodbayan and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the
latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the
prosecution cases but only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the
Ombudsman.

18. RE: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A

Statement by the faculty of UP College of Law on the allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. AM No. 10-
10-4-SC

Facts: Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, the counsel for the petitioners therein filed,
1) a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental responsibility of
states in protecting its citizens’ human rights specifically pertaining to jus
cogens norms; and, 2) a supplement thereto asserting that the Vinuya
decision was plagiarized from different sources and that the true intents of
the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente to suit the arguments
laid down in said decision. Thereafter, an ethics committee tasked to
investigate the veracity of the alleged plagiarism, the authors who were
purportedly plagiarized sent their respective letters to the Supreme Court.
Due to this, the faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement
(Restoring Integrity Statement), which alleged plagiarism against Justice del
Castillo, treating the same not only as an established fact, but as a truth.
Said statement was posted online and at the College’s bulletin board and
was submitted to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom
of expression.

Held: No, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom
of expression. The purpose of the statement of the faculty was to discredit
the April 28, 2010 decision in the Vinuya case, establish as a fact that
Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism pending an ongoing
investigation, and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity, and competence
in addressing the motion for reconsideration. The statement was an
institutional attack and insult. The right to criticize the courts and judicial
officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference

19. Akbayan vs Aquino, GR No. 170516, July 16, 2008

Facts: Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners– non-

government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers– sought
via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the
full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for
an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to
give them the said copies until the negotiation is completed. Final text of
JPEPA was made available on September 11, 2006, respondents do not
dispute that, at the time the petition was filed up tothe filing of petitioners'
Reply -when the JPEPA was still being negotiated -the initial drafts thereof
were kept from public view.

Issue: Whether the refusal of the government to disclose the docuiment

bearing JPEPA negotiation violates their right to information on matters of
public concern.

RULING: To be covered by the right to information, the information sought

must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
From the nature of the JPEPA, as in international trade agreement, it is
evident that the Japanese and Philippine offers submitted during the
negotiations towards its executions are matters of public concern.It is
established, however, that neither the right to information nor the policyof
full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public
concern or interest, are recognized as privileged. The categories of
informationthat may be considered privileged includes matters of diplomatic
character and under negotiation and review.

The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to
negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the exceptions to the
right of access to information on matters of public concern and policy of
publicdisclosure. They come within the coverage of executive privilege. At
the time when the Committee was requesting for copies of such documents,
the negotiations were ongoing as they are still now and the text of the
proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering the
status and nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently
covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions and
settled jurisprudence.