Information Warfare in Past and Recent C

IRJMST Vol 6 Issue 5 [Year 2015] ISSN 2250 – 1959 (0nline) 2348 – 9367 (Print)
INFORMATION WARFARE IN PAST AND RECENT CONFLICTS
Brig Premjit Singh Panesar1*, Maj Gen (Dr) GS Lamba (Retd)2

1
Centre for Research Studies, Noida International University, Sector 17-A, Gautam Budh Nagar,
UP, India, Email: premjit_40@hotmail.com
2
Pricipal, Baba Banda Singh Bahadur Engineering College, Fatehgarh Sahib, Punjab, India, Email:
principal@bbsbec.ac.in
Abstract
Study of recorded history shows that Information Warfare (IW) has been employed by opposing
nations in some form or the other. The use or inability to use IW has at times determined the success
or failure in a particular operation. In this paper, a large number of past and ongoing conflicts have
been studied to identify application of IW. The study shows that IW will emerge as the dominant
factor in future conflicts. It can support overall government strategy, policy during peacetime, crisis,
conflict and post conflict.
Epics and Early Proponents
The Indian Epic Mahabharata, describes a battle between Pandavas and Kauravas. Lord Krishna
tricked the unassailable Guru Dronacharya through half-truth about his son Ashwathama, propagated
by the most trustworthy source Yudhitshtira1. This is a classic case of disinformation, employed to
achieve an objective.
Ancient Indian philosopher Chanakya was not only a master of governance but also of deception in
battle scenarios. He propounded techniques of manipulating public opinion and creating
disinformation, several centuries ago. These lessons in deceit, guile, hypocrisy, machination, and
gore are still relevant today2.
Alexander‘s army at Guagamela in 331 BC, which defeated Persian warrior Daurius despite an
adverse ratio of 1:4, could perhaps be rated as the first ‗systems‘ army functioning in unison through
command and control system. In the medieval ages, the Mongols employed ‗arrow raiders‘
advancing in columns and acting as communicators to exploit information in wars.
Early examples of military deception also exist in the ancient dynasties of Egypt and China; Sun
Tzu's famous work ‗The Art of War‘ discusses many deceptive tactics. Hannibal, widely recognized
as one of the finest military commanders in history, made extensive use of deception in his
campaigns. The Ancient Greeks were noted for several forms of tactical deception. They invented
1
Sunil Sehgal, Encyclopaedia of Hinduism, 1999, Sarup and Sons, India, Page 624.
2
Group Captain SM Hali, ‗RAW at War-Genesis of Secret Agencies in Ancient India, accessed on the Internet on 26 Feb
2015 at http://www.defencejournal.com/feb-mar99/raw-at-war.htm.
International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

http://www.irjmst.com Page 156
smoke screens during the Peloponnesian War and later stories refer to the famous Trojan horse
which allowed them to defeat Troy3.
IW in World War II
The history of the Second World War offers great examples of the military and civilian leadership
manipulating information, even in a very crude fashion, to achieve rather spectacular results. The
two widely used methods of waging IW were based on radio intercept deception and crypto-analysis.
In those days, domination of the information spectrum was carried out by cryptographers who were
on the leading edge of these efforts, the so-called "code breakers." These specialized persons focused
intently upon breaking the Japanese and German codes.
In Europe, the ULTRA project produced spectacular results4. Ultra‘s origin was traced to the
delivery of a German ―Enigma‖ machine to the British by Polish dissidents. The Poles had
established a successful crypto-analytic effort against the Germans by the early 1930s, having begun
their efforts in the early 1920s. Using their own copy of the Enigma, they achieved their first
successful break in reading Enigma ciphers in December 1932 and January 1933. Between 1933 and
1939, successful reading of Enigma traffic was purely a Polish achievement. Once the Enigma fell
into British hands, however, they took the lead and used it successfully throughout the war. Winston
Churchill had a profound interest in the Ultra traffic produced from Enigma and he used the Enigma
machine to read German codes during World War II. He also used information warfare through his
elaborate network emanating from the London Controlling Section, for its time a very complex
intelligence and deception operation. The British and Americans used manipulation through cover
and deception to target specific sources of enemy information. For example, they released false
information to the world press and staged activities that ―made the news.‖ They deceived enemy air
reconnaissance through the maneuver of real troops, use of controlled camouflage (both to conceal
and intentionally show indiscretions), dummy equipment, and ―Q‖ lighting (the positioning of lights
to draw bombers to nonexistent airfields).
After the Normandy invasion, the German 7th Army attempted a counterattack to drive the Allied
forces from the rather tenuous beachhead that they held. But with the help of ULTRA's ability to
read the German mail and message traffic, the Allies knew precisely what they were doing as they
began to gather their forces to make this attack. The Allies were able to put the British Second
Tactical Air Force and the United States Ninth Tactical Air Force immediately upon these armour
formations just as they massed. ULTRA gave them the critical information that allowed us to defeat
the German forces before they ever came in contact with our ground forces.
By comparison, in the Battle of the Bulge of December of 1944, we see an example where the
Germans were able to catch Allies by surprise. They used an alternative communications network,
and the Allies did not realize that the Germans had made this switch 5. It was former‘s lack of
information that really fueled the initial German success in the Battle of the Bulge. The Allies come
3
Latimer, Jon, ‗Deception in War‘, 2001, New York: Overlook Press.
4
Kahn, David, Seizing the ENIGMA: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939–1943 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1991), p.184.
5
Willmott, H. P., The Great Crusade—A New Complete History of the Second World War, (New York: Free Press,
1989), pp. 108–9.

to rely on ULTRA and had developed a little bit of self-delusion -- and the Germans took advantage
of it very effectively. The ability to monitor the enemy's communications and use that information as
an integral part of own operations is really nothing new. That's how the information is controlled
and manipulated that the enemy is allowed to receive. One such example is, particularly the
disinformation campaign that centered on General Patton before and during the D-Day landings. At
that time, the Allies understood the German‘s ability to intercept open signals, so they devised a
rather elaborate plan that played to this emerging capability on the part of the Germans. The Allies
set up a fake Army headquarters and generated false communications transmissions in England. As a
result, the Nazis ended up with a significant number of troops placed in the wrong positions. Even as
they started to pick up indications that there was this great Allied armada that was going to invade
Normandy, the Germans refused to believe that there could actually be an Allied invasion of Europe
led by anyone but Patton. The Allies even played on that expectation in a way that kept Patton
associated with his fake headquarters. Even as the Germans began to get higher and higher fidelity
intelligence that indicated a real attack at Normandy, their leaders were frozen in indecision and, as a
result, tied down considerable forces in France across from the shortest invasion route from England.
The Japanese psychological warfare effort during World War II included radio broadcasts that could
be picked up by American troops. Popular music was played, with a commentary in which
propaganda filled messages were broadcast.
Evolution of IW Post World War II
Management of information systems for warfare in its present form, popularly known as IW, dates
back to the later half of the Vietnam War. The technology demonstration of use of modern means of
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) was made. Most military scholars noted this
emergent use of the new technology means with interest. Four years later, in a different continent the
Syrian and Israeli forces clashed on the Golan Heights. The outcome of this war was studied and
from this emerged the concept of ‗deep battle‘ or the extended ‗battle field‘ which meant that combat
could not simply take place at the front but deep in the enemy‘s rear as well where the follow on
echelons will be found. Around this time the Syrians and the Israelis clashed again in Bekka Valley.
This conflict highlighted the importance of domination of electromagnetic spectrum. The
discussions, which followed the phenomena of deep battlefield and other related studies, were
embodied in the US Army‘s Field manual 100-5 (operations) on 20th August 1982 under the heading
of ‗airland battle‘. General William C. Westmoreland had made the famous and often quoted
statement, ―On the battle field of tomorrow enemy forces will be located, tracked and targeted almost
instantaneously‖. By 14th June 1993 the latest revision of FM 100-5 appeared which read, ―Recent
experiences gave us a glimpse of new methods of warfare. This was the end of the industrial age
warfare and the beginning of warfare in the information age.‖ 6 The foundations for a new military
term ‗IW‘ were laid. The US Army published the field manual 100-6 on IW7.
However, it may be noted that it is not the technology alone which was the sole repository of IW.
Media, especially the print and electronic media played a central role in manipulating the public
6
Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 1993.
7
Husain Z, Pathak AK and Vyas R, ‗Management of Information Warfare: Emerging Paradigm‘, International Journal of
Info Tech and Management, 2005, Vol 4, No 1, pp 25-67.

opinions and perceptions on conduct of operations. Whereas, the US forces demonstrated best of the
military arsenals for precision attacks in Vietnam War, by virtue of gory photos of misery and
destruction caused to innocent Vietnamese civilians including women and children, the US troops
lost the battle at homeland. The public opinion swayed in favour of disengagement from Vietnam
and US military was forced to make an unceremonious exit from the war front.
The Indo - Pak War of 1971
In 1971, the Indian government did well to harness the media to launch an anti-Pakistan campaign on
national and international levels. The pre-war whirlwind tour by the late Prime Minister Mrs Indira
Gandhi to seek international help for resolving refugee problem deserves a special mention. The
Indian psychological operations blitzkrieg against East Pakistan for violation of human rights paid
rich dividends.
The Vietnam War
The United States ran an extensive program of psychological warfare during the Vietnam War. The
Phoenix Program had the dual aim of assassinating National Liberation Front of South Vietnam
(NLF or Viet Cong) personnel and terrorizing any potential sympathizers or passive supporters.
During the Phoenix Program, over 19,000 NLF supporters were killed8.
Kosovo Campaign
The Kosovo campaign was the first known major use of IW9, in 1999 when hackers in Serbia
attacked NATO systems in retaliation of NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo. The maturing of
Internet by this time provided an opportunity for the first Internet war along with offensive IW.
However, Pentagon fell back on the ‗Powell Doctrine‘ which states that US should intervene only
when it could muster overwhelming force; this limited IW Operations (IWO) like propaganda,
perception management and offensive IW. Symbolic hard kill by bombing of media and political
centers, offensive IWO like striking Serbian C2 systems, soft kill by graphite bombs against
electrical power infrastructure, hacking Serbian government systems did not yield desired results due
to Belgrade‘s total control over media. Serbia‘s disruption of NATO site and posting pro-Serb sites
was an immature attempt. Thus, NATO failed to use full range of IO tools consequently achieved
only limited success.10
Somalia: A Failure11
8
McCoy, Alfred W, ―A question of torture: CIA interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror‖, Macmillan,
2006, p. 68.
9
Benson Otafu and others, ‗Use of Internet and Associated Technologies in ―Cyber-Warfare‖ and
Issues Affecting its Investigation‘, Paper presented in International Conference on Education Technology and
Information System (ICETIS 2013), downloaded on 26 Feb 2015 at www.atlantis-
press.com/php/download_paper.php?id=8090
10
O‘Brien Kevin A IO and Kosovo Conflict, (International Centre for Security Analysis, King‘s College London),
Internet site http://www.psywarrior . com/Kosovo.html.
11
Adam, James, The Next World War – Computers are the Weapons and the Front Line is Everywhere (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1998), pp. 66 – 75.

Inadequacy of UN efforts and worsening of situation in Dec 1992 compelled USA to launch
‗Operation Restore Hope‘. The media covered initial operations of US marines and Navy seals,
thereby compromising security. Bombing of local warlord Aideed‘s campus and launching of Force
Delta for his capture were handled poorly causing many civilian and combatant casualties. The
Aideed group allowed TV networks to carry pictures of US crews being dragged naked through the
streets. A non-state actor had launched IW against a superpower. In view of public outcry Clinton
ordered withdrawal of American forces from Somalia - Aideed had won the war. The future US
policy of intervention had to reckon power of media in perception management and not allow body-
bag count to affect US interests. The concept of war with minimum causalities gave a fillip to
development of IW.
Haiti : A Success12
Ouster of President Aristide in early 1990s and a decade of brutal repression by dictator Francois
‗Papa Doc‘ led to influx of refugees to mainland USA. Keeping Somalia lessons in mind an effective
IW was launched. Leaflets and thousands of radios tuned to the VOA were air dropped; pro-
American and pro-Aristide propaganda was intensified. News of an impending invasion was spread
by VOA in their broadcast in Creole. The deadline passed and the invasion by 82nd Airborne Div
commenced; this was duly covered by CNN. The junta yielded to this psychological pressure and
the invasion was called off in mid-air. The IW succeeded and there were no causalities.
Bosnia
The signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in Dec 95 assured NATO forces of total support of the
high-tech American IW arsenal. Synergy between intelligence agencies of different countries,
satellite and aerial reconnaissance using Unmanned Aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Joint strategic
Targeting and Radar Systems (JSTARS) and networks ensured latest maps / images were available to
the army. Monopoly of the state owned radio controlled by Milosevic was countered by Radio Free
Europe and VOA, thus influencing the public. Use of the media to report correct facts and establish
credibility paid rich dividends13. Bosnia was the proving ground for offensive IW across the entire
spectrum.
Afghanistan : Operation Enduring Freedom.14
Taliban movement enjoyed an unchallenged grip on the sources of information inside Afghanistan.
Thus, many did not know of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the reason behind the US invasion. Those
who had access to radios heard only defiant speeches on Radio Shariat (meaning "Islamic Law").
These broadcasts laid the baseline for understanding the conflict and evoked powerful emotions. The
one constant rallying point in Afghan history for the various tribes to join was to throw out invaders,
12
Lewis, Brian C, Application of IW, Internet site http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,58422,00.html.
13
Kenneth, Allard, Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary Assessment, (Washington D.C : National Defense
University Institute for National Strategic Studies Report Number 91, November 1996), p. 21.
14
Singer, P.W, Winning the War of Words : IW In Afghanistan (Analysis Paper # 5, 23 Oct 2001America‘s Response to
Terrorism).

from the Persians and the British, to most recently the Soviets. The Taliban's broadcasts painted US
as outsiders. Thus, US had to take over Taliban radio and drop leaflets to subvert the Taliban's tools
of misinformation to win the battle of hearts and minds. IW campaign was also aimed at splintering
Taliban leadership by turning native leaders against imported and highly affluent leaders. The
principle that emerged was IW can meet with success under certain conditions. A dominant and
reliable message must be targeted at receptive groups keeping in mind local culture. As regards
international support, USA did get it, even though it did not need it.
Gulf War I15
The doctrine of air land battle and IW were being given final shape in 1991, when US Army was
called in to head the coalition forces in the now famous Gulf War. The Gulf War ―Operation Desert
Storm‘ was the first war where IW was employed across its entire spectrum. Deception strategies,
Electronic Warfare (EW), psychological operations, dominant manoeuvre and speed were mainly
employed against C2 infrastructure to decimate Iraqi forces. Radio and TV broadcasts, leaflets, and
loudspeakers were effectively used. Twenty-nine million leaflets were disseminated; the 4th PSYOP
Group aired more than 210 hours of live broadcasts on "Voice of the Gulf". Iraq‘s strategy to use a
woman, "Baghdad Betty", to conduct propaganda failed as it lacked credibility. Isolated by aerial
loudspeaker missions, Iraqi forces on Faylaka Island surrendered without a single shot having been
fired.
Writing on the lessons of Gulf War Gen John Galvin the supreme Allied commander Europe says,
―Schwarzkopf was able to dismantle the electromagnetic spectrum (so that) he effectively closed
Saddam‘s eyes and ears‖. As for the eyes and ears of the coalition forces the US used about 34
satellites in the combat zone, supported by computer networked communication (about 3000
computers were used for this purpose in the combat zone itself)16. The preconditions for waging a
successful IW i.e. gain the desired information superiority while denying the same to the adversary
was achieved. Besides underlining the importance of battlefield information system, secured high
speed, high volume digital communication system backed up by a large computer network the Gulf
War also brought out the importance of deft handling of media. The handling or management of the
media was done in such a clever way that by the time the war started not only the US people but
most of the international community was in favour of the US theme of attacking Iraq. During the war
the Pentagon mastered the handling of CNN and other media. The stupid Bombs falling on the Iraqi
defences and civilians killing thousands were not shown on the TV. The smart cruise missiles and
attacks on scud launch sites were shown with all the multimedia and graphic effects. Precision
targeting the information became as important as the precision targeting of weapons. This aspect was
later known as ‗spin doctoring‘ a much more sophisticated and subtle propaganda or psychological
warfare. Spin doctoring is also an important factor while combating insurgency or low intensity
conflict operations. The current technology being perfected for the purpose is insertions of high
15
Caterinicchia Dan with French Mathew, Technology in Gulf Wars, accessed on the Internet on 03 Mar 2014 at
http : // / www.fc.com/fc/articles 2003/06/09/cov-. netcentric-06—09-03.asp
16
Sir Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War, in Alan
D. Campen, ed., The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers and Intelligence Systems in the
Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, October, 1992), p.121.

definition broadcast transmission that can deliver pictures of great clarity. This technology is being
exploited for clandestine psychological operations through commercial electronic media.
Gulf War II
Although the use and exchange of information have been critical elements of war since its inception,
the Gulf War was the stage for the most comprehensive use of information, and information denial,
to date. New technologies in this conflict enhanced the Coalition‘s ability to exchange and use
information and highlighted the imperative of denying the adversary his ability to communicate with
his forces.
While in large part these technologies were space-dependent, recent advancements in digital
technology permitted the rapid processing, transmission, and display of information at all echelons,
enabling decision makers to respond rapidly to developing situations on the battlefield. Some
prototype systems, such as JSTARS, successfully made their trial run during this conflict, earning
their place in history as contributors to the Coalition success in this war.
Architectures enabling connectivity between these many systems were nonexistent when Iraq
invaded Kuwait; however, they were put in place during the buildup and supported Coalition forces
for the duration of the war. These architectures were clearly necessary to effectively control the
myriad activities operating simultaneously in the battlefield. For example, 11 Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) aircraft controlled 2,240 sorties a day, more than 90,000 during the war,
with no midair collisions and no friendly air engagements. Satellite connectivity permitted this same
air activity to be displayed live in the Pentagon command center.
JSTARS tracked tanks, trucks, fixed installations, and other equipment. Satellites, microwave, and
landlines handled 700,000 phone calls and 152,000 messages a day. Coalition forces avoided
communications interference through successful de-confliction of more than 35,000 frequencies.
Space assets, both military and commercial, belonging to the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and the USSR provided the Coalition with communications, navigation, surveillance,
intelligence, and early warning, as well as offering live television of the war to home viewers around
the world for the first time. Using some 60 satellites, Coalition forces had access to secure strategic
and tactical communications in-theater and into and out of the theater of operations. These satellites
bridged the gap for tactical UHF and VHF signals that heretofore had been limited to terrestrial line
of sight. Thus time-sensitive information could be exchanged between ground, naval, and air units
spread throughout the theater. The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) using a
constellation of 14 satellites proved to be a battle winning factor. Coalition forces were able to locate
and designate targets with remarkable precision, navigate through the naked Iraqi Desert better than
the Iraqis themselves, and find troops in distress faster than ever before. The US Army used the GPS
to navigate the Iraqi Desert in the middle of sand storms, surprising even the Iraqis, who themselves
do not venture across it for fear of becoming lost. Access to GPS, and its attendant capabilities,
added tremendously to the morale of Coalition forces.
More than 30 military and commercial surveillance satellites were used for intelligence gathering
during the war. These satellites provided Coalition forces with imagery, electronic intelligence, and
weather data. These systems provided precise targeting information on enemy locations, movement,

and capabilities. Precision targeting combined with the use of precision guided munitions
significantly decreased civilian casualties and collateral damage to buildings.
The RC-135 Rivet Joint, flying in coordination with its sister ships, the E-3 AWACS and E-8
JSTARS, flew 24 hours a day to support the war. Referred to as the ―ears of the storm‖ in contrast to
the AWACS role as ―eyes of the storm,‖ the RC-135 provided real-time intelligence to theater and
tactical commanders in the desert and Persian Gulf areas. Specially trained personnel used on-board
sensors to identify, locate, and report Iraqi emitters that might pose a threat to Coalition forces. The
Coalition not only recognized the value of information to its efforts, it also saw the benefits of
denying the Iraqi command and control system its ability to function. The Coalition identified the
Iraqi leadership and Iraqi command, control, and communications (C3) facilities as the key centers of
gravity. While command of the air was the initial key objective, C3 facilities received priority in
targeting. The Coalition used massive airpower at the onset of hostilities to accomplish this
objective. Targeting strategic military, leadership, and infrastructure facilities, the Coalition launched
its attack on Iraq on 17 January 1991. Early warning sites, airfields, integrated air defense nodes,
communications facilities, known Scud sites, nuclear/ chemical/biological facilities, and electrical
power facilities were attacked by air.
Within the opening minutes of the war, Iraq had little C3 infrastructure remaining. 17 What little
communications capability Iraqi tactical commanders did have, they used improperly. Apparently
concerned over Coalition communications monitoring, the Iraqis practiced strict communications
security through near total emission control. While this did have a negative effect on Coalition
signals collection efforts, it also blinded Iraqi tactical units. One Iraqi brigade commander, in
reflecting his surprise over the speed with which a US Marine unit overran his unit in Kuwait,
showed he had no idea the Marines were coming even though another Iraqi unit located adjacent to
him had come under attack two hours before.
Although leadership as a target was difficult to locate and survived the conflict, the successful
attacks against Iraqi C3 essentially put her leadership in the position of having no strings to pull.
Trained to operate under centralized control, Iraqi forces did not know how to function
autonomously. Air defense forces became fearful of emitting because of their vulnerability to anti-
radiation missiles.
Thus IW proved itself to be a battle-winning factor for the Coalition Forces. Since then there has
been a growing interest in this form of warfare.
The Indo - Pak Conflict in Kargil - 199918
The basic reason for OP VIJAY was the failure of intelligence agencies in detecting intrusion by
surveillance / human intelligence (HUMINT); this can be considered as the failure of defensive IW
on part of India. However, the Kargil war was the first Indian war covered live on TV. Images of
17
Alan, D. Campen, Iraqi Command and Control: The Information Differential, in Alan D. Campen, ed., The
First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf
War (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, October 1992), p.171.
18
Chakraborty, A.K.., IW Challenges in the Twenty First Century , New Delhi, Trishul Publications, 2003 , p. 12.

Tiger Hill, Tololing feature and the slogan ―Yeh Dil Mange More‖ are still reverberating in Indian
minds. The media reporting had generated national upsurge of gigantic proportions; also, projection
of Pakistan as a rogue state supporting terrorism were perfectly orchestrated. The resultant no-
nonsense no-support stand by USA and the isolation of Pakistan in international community bears
testimony to the power of IW in projecting righteous cause. The final success did manage to rescue
lost pride, but at a great cost. India had learnt the lessons of IW.
Conflict in Chechnya
In the realm of ―information-based conflict,‖ the war in Chechnya is replete with diverse examples
on both sides of psychological operations, deception, perception management, and electronic
warfare. Closely inter-netted communications played a crucial role in Chechnian reaction operations
in the mountains. Their mobile air-defence weapons were controlled by radio and changed their
locations constantly hampering the Russians‘ ability to detect and destroy. Chechens reduced the
effectiveness of Russian air-mobile and bombardment forces both by jamming Russian radio
transmissions and by hunting down (via radio direction finding) and killing their forward air
controllers whose job was to guide Russian forces to their targets19.
In terms of psychological warfare, the Russians used leaflets and loudspeakers, and interfered
electronically with Chechen radio broadcasts. The Chechens used human roadblocks, mass protests
by women confronting Russian troops, and deceptive threats ranging from falsely claiming
possession of nuclear weapons to the ability to unleash an Islamic fundamentalist terror campaign.
At the strategic psychological level, the Chechens proved adept at enlisting support from NGOs,
bringing pressure to bear on Yeltsin from outside Russia, while at the same time reaching the
Russian mass public, damaging morale, and seriously affecting Russian popular support for the war.
This activist ―social netwar‖ proved highly effective in pressuring Yeltsin to negotiate a cease-fire.
For deception, the Chechens used a wide range of activities. Chechen fighters routinely dressed in
Russian uniforms, this got them through hostile checkpoints for striking repeatedly behind the lines.
Chechens sent deliberately provocative fake radio messages that were intended to be intercepted.
They sent messages addressing Russian officers by name, telling them the location of their wives and
children, and that Chechen ―hit squads‖ were ―on their way.‖ Finally, the Chechens used a radio
jamming system to limit the influence that the Russian mass media might have on the Chechen mass
public. More proactively, they used small, mobile television platforms with Sony radio and television
equipment to override Russian television programming, in order to transmit his own, personal taped
messages to the average Russian. Thus for the Russians, the ―The information war was lost.‖
The Russians were not without resources in the information war, though the successes they achieved
were less. For example, at one point the Russians ―captured‖ a database including Chechen payroll
lists with addresses, and used the information to make sweeping arrests. At a less technical level, the
Russians dealt with the problem of distinguishing between true noncombatants and Chechen fighters
19
John Arquilla and Theodore Karasik, ‗Chechneya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict‘ Paper in Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, Taylor and Francis, retrieved from Internet on 27 Feb 2015at
http://nps.edu/Academics/Institutes/Cebrowski/Research/ArquillaIO/Arquilla%20Chechnya%20article.pdf.

by sniffing them for the smell of gunpowder or gun oil—a lesson learned from the war in
Afghanistan20.
Both sides deliberately used acts of brutality to attack the other‘s morale— but the Chechens far
outdid the Russians in these grisly psychological tactics. They hung Russian wounded and dead
upside down in the windows of defensive positions, for example, forcing the Russians to fire at their
comrades in order to engage the rebels. Russian prisoners were decapitated, and at night their heads
were placed on stakes beside the roads leading into the city, over which Russian replacements and
reinforcements had to travel. Both Russian and Chechen dead were routinely booby-trapped by the
Chechens, who showed sophisticated insight into the likely actions and reactions of the average
Russian soldier.21
The Chechens were very innovative in their use of ham radio contacts and television feeds to relay
information to combatants and civilians alike. These older information technologies were useful in
informing Chechens of general news events, and helping families and relatives to stay in touch. They
kept Chechen fighters and civilians informed about where travel was dangerous. And, during periods
of intense fighting, Chechen commanders used ham radios and cell phones extensively to issue
orders and maintain overall command and control of their widely scattered forces 22. Thus using tools
of Information Warfare, the Chechen rebels were able to defeat a vastly superior Russian Army.
Afghanistan Conflict
Both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Taliban strived to win
the battle of perceptions in Afghanistan as well as to positively influence the wider world opinion.
The Taliban conducted information warfare effectively, which was poorly matched by ISAF,
undermining NATO‘s effort in Afghanistan. This is partly due to the asymmetric nature of the
information battle, characterized principally by the difference between how the Taliban conducted its
information activities in comparison with ISAF Info Ops. While ISAF conducted kinetic operations
supported by Info Ops, the Taliban conducted information activities supported by its kinetic
operations; ISAF sought to demonstrate its capability and use Info Ops and psy-ops to persuade its
audiences, the Taliban used intimidation and coercion to get its messages across. ISAF also
interacted differently with the media and were constrained by legal, political and ethical
considerations in getting its messages across which often meant that it was unable to effectively
rebut or counter Taliban propaganda. The Taliban‘s messaging and approaches to Information
Activities were effective, especially with regard to local Afghan audiences. The Taliban was
effective in gaining quick media access to influence local audiences, but lacked credibility and has
therefore limited effect on strategic audiences23. Nato's top commander in Afghanistan, Gen Stanley
20
John Aruilla, op cit.
21
Lester Grau, ―Lessons from the Battle for Grozny,‖ Strategic Forum, Number 38, July 1995.
22
Peter Ford, ―Chechen Linkup Outdoes the ‗Net‘,‖ The Christian Science Monitor 17 (January 1996), p. 1.
23
Thomas Elkjer Nissen, ―The Taliban‘s information warfare- A comparative analysis of NATO Information Operations
and Taliban Information Activities‖, Royal Danish Defence College, December 2007 accessed on the Internet on 09 Mar
15 at http://forsvaret.dk/fak/documents/fak/publikationer/the_talibans_information_warfare.pdf.

McChrystal, made this point explicitly in an interview24, ―This is all a war of perceptions. This is not
a physical war in terms of how many people you kill or how much ground you capture, how many
bridges you blow up. This is all in the minds of the participants‖.
Ukraine-Russia Conflict
The violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine that broke out in early 2014 has become a case
study for hybrid conflict, where traditional kinetic actions are shadowed by cyber and information
warfare activity. The Russian annexation of Crimea is not the first instance in the region where
traditional military engagement occurred in parallel with Internet based hostile activity. During the
2008 Russia-Georgia War, botnets were used while kinetic military operations were taking place to
deface websites and to conduct Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, which overwhelmed
websites and rendered them inaccessible. These actions primarily targeted Georgian government and
news media websites, disrupting communication channels and generating confusion at the time of
crisis. Many of these strategies were redeployed in Ukraine, while others have reached new levels of
sophistication25. Social media has enabled the use of disinformation on a wide scale. Analysts have
found evidence of doctored or misleading photographs spread by social media, possibly with state
involvement26.
War by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
ISIS group gained notoriety after it drove the Iraqi government forces out of key western cities in
Iraq while in Syria it conquered and conducted ground attacks against both the government forces
and rebel factions in the Syrian Civil War. ISIS is known for its well-funded web and social media
propaganda, which includes Internet videos of the beheadings of soldiers, civilians, journalists, and
aid workers, as well as the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage sites. ISIL's use of social media
has been described by one expert as "probably more sophisticated than that of most US
companies"27. It regularly takes advantage of social media, particularly Twitter, to distribute its
message by organising hashtag campaigns, encouraging Tweets on popular hashtags, and utilising
software applications that enable ISIL propaganda to be distributed to its supporters' accounts. In
August 2014, Twitter administrators shut down a number of accounts associated with ISIL. ISIL
24
Jonathan Marcus, ―Afghanistan conflict an 'information war',‖BBC News, 11 Feb 2010, accessed on the Internet on 09
Mar 2015 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8511477.stm.
25
Scott Jans, ―The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Cyber and Information Warfare in a Regional Context‖, International
Relations aand Security network, 14 Oct 2014, accessed on the Internet on 02 Mar 2015 at
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=184345
26
Rawlsey Adam, ―Be very scaptical – A lot of open source Intel is fake‖, Medium, 01 Nov 2014 accessed at the Internet
on 03 Mar 2015 at https://medium.com/war-is-boring/be-very-skeptical-a-lot-of-your-open-source-intel-is-fake-
5e4a5d5a9195.
27
Roula Khalaf and Sam Jones, "Selling terror: how Isis details its brutality", Financial Times, 17 June 2014, Retrieved
09 Mar 2015.

recreated and publicised new accounts the next day, which were also shut down by Twitter
administrators28. ISIS has been using Internet based campaigns to recruit volunteers for its war.
Incidents of Cyber Warfare

Incidents of Cyber warfare were recorded in 1994 with the stealing of millions of dollars from
Citibank by Russian Vladimir led group of hackers, 1999 Chinese cyber attacks on and defacing of
U.S governmental websites after the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, U.S
military computer warfare on foreign bank account of Serbian leaders and Yugoslav president. In
2003, series of assaults code named ―Titan Rain‖ were launched against US government computer
systems by hackers traced to China. In 2003 also, a slammer worm took down internet services in
parts of South Korea and Japan and as well disrupted phone services in Finland. More recent
examples include 2007 attacks believed to be from Russia which brought down government, banks,
newspapers and communication websites in Estonia; the 2008 cyber attacks on Georgian government
and commercial websites during military conflict between Georgia and Russia, 2009 shut down of
two Kyrgyzstan‘s internet service providers through attacks and 2010 Stuxnet malware attack on
Iran‘s nuclear facilities29. Many more incidents of cyber warfare have been reported in recent times
Conclusion
Hiding own information and trying to know about the enemy has been present in warfare since ages.
Though IW is largely driven by technology and RMA, its dissemination and manipulation in the
simplest way has played a very significant role from the very inception of warfare in the human race.
Manipulation of information for the purpose of perception management and deception has, and will
always be the basic form of IW in any conflict. The means to carry out this activity as also protect
own mass and force will only undergo change with new technologies such as the Internet. Increased
exploitation of electromagnetic spectrum has thrown large possibilities and challenges in conduct of
IW. Command and control, communication, computers and information centers will be the prime
targets in any future wars to facilitate collapse of the adversary in the shortest possible time. The
future battlefield milieu will comprise of precision attacks with smart weapons employing a wide
variety of surveillance assets in a net centric environment under media glare. The winner will be the
side which will be able to exploit technology better for waging IW. IW alone will not be able to win
wars, it will be an essential force multiplier for the military in employment of conventional ground,
air and naval forces. The study shows that IW will emerge as the dominant factor in future conflicts.
It can support overall government strategy, policy during peacetime, crisis, conflict and post conflict.
28
Dan Friedman, "Twitter stepping up suspensions of ISIS-affiliated accounts: experts", Daily News, 17 August 2014,
New York, retrieved from Internet on 09 Mar 2015.
29
Amber Corrin,"Some key events in the history of cyber warfare", 2009 accessed on the Internet at
http://fcw.com/articles/2009/10/19/feat-dod-cyber-timeline.aspx.


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IRJMST Vol 6 Issue 5 [Year 2015] ISSN 2250 – 1959 (0nline) 2348 – 9367 (Print)

INFORMATION WARFARE IN PAST AND RECENT CONFLICTS

Brig Premjit Singh Panesar1*, Maj Gen (Dr) GS Lamba (Retd)2

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

War by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

Incidents of Cyber Warfare

International Research Journal of Management Science & Technology

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