Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

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Expert Systems With Applications

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eswa

Digraph and matrix approach for risk evaluations under Pythagorean

fuzzy information
Anam Luqman a, Muhammad Akram a, José Carlos R. Alcantud b, *
a
Department of Mathematics, University of the Punjab, New Campus, Lahore 4590, Pakistan
b
BORDA Research Unit and Multidisciplinary Institute of Enterprise (IME), Edificio FES, Campus Unamuno, University of Salamanca, 37007 Salamanca, Spain

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an effective framework that is extensively utilized to determine and
Triangular Pythagorean fuzzy numbers eradicate the possible failures from substances, structures, designs, services or organizations. The traditional risk
FMEA evaluating methods have been criticized because of reasons that include disregard for correlative significance of
Risk factor Pythagorean fuzzy digraph
risk factors, complicated multiplications, and lack of exactness and accuracy in the evaluations. In this paper, the
Interrelation matrices
Implementation
effectiveness of traditional techniques is improved by a novel approach to analyze risks in FMEA that makes use
Discussions and comparative analysis of digraphs and matrix techniques under the Pythagorean fuzzy environment. We begin by defining triangular
Pythagorean fuzzy numbers. We use them to express both the linguistic terms and all other data and information
regarding the risk factors (inclusive of occurrence, severity, and detection). Then a Pythagorean fuzzy digraph
captures the interrelations connecting the risk factors and the relative significance among them. Finally, we form
the corresponding Pythagorean fuzzy risk matrices for every identified failure mode, and we calculate the risk
priority indexes in order to identify the risk priorities. We also study an example of a steam valve system in a
power generating plant as an illustrative application of our model.

1. Introduction method has become an advantageous and powerful technique that is

The FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) is a highly considered
tool for the determination and removal of the possible failures, errors,
flaws and faults from products, structures, designs, services or organi­
zations before reaching the consumers (Stamatis, 2003). Its basic motive
is the evaluation of risks in identified failure modes, so that necessary
actions can be applied on deficiencies whose elimination requires more
concentration. In the 1960s, the aerospace industry first introduced the
FMEA procedure as a conventional design methodology according to
their safety requirements (Bowles, Pelaez, 1995). The FMEA technique
that is applied for criticality exploration is also named as Failure Modes,
Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). A bottom-up procedure
characterizes FMEA, through which any complicated product or system
is divided into its constituent parts or subsystems. These subsystems are
gradually analyzed to determine the possible failures and their conse­
quences. The risk assessment in FMEA is a productive and useful tech­
nique that helps to create or control a situation, rather than responding
to it after a failure. It also helps to examine the risks conducive to higher
failure modes. The support data and information are provided to
manage risk and decision making through this analysis. The FMEA
widely used for protection and accuracy analysis of substances, struc­
tures, designs, services or organizations in various fields, including
automotive, electronics, aerospace, health care, and mechanical in­
dustries (Kutlu, Ekmekcioglu, 2012; Song, Ming, Wu, & Zhu, 2013).
In conventional FMEA techniques, the risk rankings in failure modes
are obtained with the help of the risk priority number (RPN). This figure
is defined as a mathematical product of risk factors of failures O, S, and
D, i.e.,
RPN = O × S × D.
Here, O and S are the rate at which a failure can occur and the severity or
seriousness of some specific failure, whereas D is taken as the possibility
of detection of a failure before reaching the customer. These risk factors
are analyzed by FMEA decision makers through an integer scale that
ranges from 1 to 10. The best case is represented by 1 and the worst is
described through 10. The failures having greater RPNs are considered
to be most significant and must be evaluated with greater priorities.
Chang (2014) proposed a more general risk assessment methodology
using a soft set-based ranking technique. The results demonstrated that

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: m.akram@pucit.edu.pk (M. Akram), jcr@usal.es (J.C.R. Alcantud).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2020.114518
Received 1 April 2020; Received in revised form 1 September 2020; Accepted 17 December 2020
Available online 24 December 2020
0957-4174/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
A. Luqman et al.
the proposed method is appropriate to reflect incomplete data in FMEA.
The existing crisp RPN techniques are criticized for many reasons in the
specialized literature (Liu, Chen, You, Li, 2016, Liu, Liu, Bian, Lin, Dong,
Xu, 2011, Liu, Liu, Liu, 2013, Liu, You, Fan, Lin, 2014, Wang, Chin,
Poon, Yang, 2009, Zhang, Chu, 2011). Let us highlight some disadvan­
tages of crisp RPN techniques that have been pointed out:
• The corresponding significance and interrelations between O, S, and
D are not taken under examination in classical RPN methods. These
factors are supposed to have the same significance, which is not al­
ways true in practical applications.
• The same value of RPN can be acquired from sets of risk factors O,S,
and D that convey very different risk indications. For instance, if the
values of O,S, and D for two distinct failures are 3, 5, 4 and 1, 10, 6,
respectively, their common RPN is 60. The severities for these failure
modes may produce different consequences.
• The multiplication method which is utilized to calculate the RPN
values is controversial and has a strong influence on the variations in
assessments of risk factors. That is, very small variations in the rat­
ings of any risk factor may cause major consequences in RPN values.
• The existing evaluation techniques are complicated. In many real
world applications, it is difficult to determine the three risk factors in
a precise way. In FMEA, most of the data and information are
expressed in linguistic terms, including Very Important, High, Likely,
etc.
• The crisp RPNs are discontinuously distributed; they have many
flaws and they are heavily dispersed at an integer scale from 1 to
1000. Most of the digits of the scale 1–1000 are not obtained from the
product of O, S, and D and there are only 120 elements that are
unique.
1.1. Related work
In this section, the previous studies are reviewed by researchers in
the relevant area of research and the methods applied to assess the re­
sults are compared, the advantages of each method, and its limitations
are briefly described. Xu (2005) developed a practical technique to
obtain OWA operator. Chang and Wen (2010) proposed an inventive
technique by merging OWA operator and 2-tuple. They observed that
the suggested model can give a solution to the problem of measurement
scales effectively and did not drop any specialist to deliver the important
knowledge. Liu, Liu, and Liu (2013) studied 75 FMEA research articles
and classified them regarding the techniques developed to handle the
shortcomings of traditional methods. Liu, You, Fan, and Lin (2014)
initiated a novel technique to assess risks in FMEA that was established
on D numbers and grey relational projection. This model was more
effective for evaluation of risks and managements. Bertolini, Esposito,
and Romagnoli (2020) proposed a TOPSIS based technique to match the
product and technology specifications. They proved the applicability of
their proposed model by studying an industrial case.
Fuzzy sets (FSs) (Zadeh, 1965) are widely applied to FMEA to get
over the disadvantages and flaws of crisp RPN methods. Fuzzy set theory
has been introduced to debate the occurrence of uncertainty in real
World systems. The elementary objective of FSs is that the component
belongs to a FS with a particular level of membership. The FSs are
helpful in situations in which it is difficult to determine the risk rankings
through crisp RPN techniques. Chang and Cheng (2011) evaluated the
risk rankings for failure modes using a simplified algorithm, which is
based on the fuzzy OWA and a DEMATEL approach to categorize the
risks of failures. Their proposed method reduces the occurrence of
duplicate RPN numbers and studies the ordered influence of severity,
occurrence, and detection parameters. A fuzzy RPNs based technique
was introduced by Zhang and Chu (2011) for integrating least squares.
They also developed the imprecision method and generation of more
accurate fuzzy RPNs through the partial ranking method. Further, they
2
Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518
investigated the fuzzy methods and linear programming as a powerful
solution to determine fuzzy RPNs. Kutlu and Ekmekioglu (2012)
developed a fuzzy technique for FMEA by implementing fuzzy TOPSIS
combined with fuzzy AHP. The advantage of using this technique is that
it considers the significance of the risk factors. Moreover, it allows ex­
perts to determine the risk factors of all failures considering linguistic
variables. To find out the priority ranking of failures, Liu, Liu, Liu, and
Mao (2012) investigated a risk priority method based on FSs and VIKOR.
They used the extended VIKOR method to evaluate risk rankings of
all potential failures. In FMEA, the utilization of fuzzy weighted geo­
metric means for risk priority and evaluation of failures was initiated by
Wang, Chin, Poon, and Yang (2009). In the proposed method, fuzzy
RPNs are considered as fuzzy weighted geometric means of the fuzzy
ratings for O, S, and D, and are calculated using α-level sets and linear
programming models. Bowles and Pelaez (1995) described a new
approach, based on fuzzy logic, to prioritize failures for corrective ac­
tions in FMECA. The proposed technique resolved various problems
emerging in crisp methods of evaluation. Alcantud, Biondo, and Giar­
lotta (2018) proposed the modelization of formation of party using
continuous fuzzy profiles. They also provided an algorithm for the
genesis of parties and characterized the new born parties. Ayag and
Ozdemir (2006) studied the AHP technique to handle machine tool
selecting problems. They introduced fuzzy number logic in the com­
parison of AHP to overcome the deficiency of traditional AHP methods.
Chen (2000) generalized the TOPSIS approach to the fuzzy environ­
ment. An example was illustrated to emphasize the methodology of the
proposed model. Liu et al. (2011) investigated FMEA technique based on
fuzzy evidential reasoning and grey theory to improve the efficiency of
traditional techniques. They proved that the proposed model can
represent the team experts’ opinions and rank the potential failures
under different uncertainties. Mandal and Maiti (2014) enhanced the
applicability of FMEA using fuzzy similarity based measurements. They
demonstrated the applications of possibility theory in decision making.
Rojc and Mlakar (2020) introduced a fuzzy unit selection function and
proposed a new fully automatic RGD-based unit selection optimization
process. The main disadvantage of FMEA techniques based on FSs is that
these sets consider only the satisfaction degree of elements and dissat­
isfaction degree is considered as one minus the truth degree which does
not fully explain the various situations existing in real life phenomena.
To handle truth as well as falsity degrees as independent components
of corresponding risk factors and failure modes, the notion of intui­
tionistic fuzzy sets (IFSs) (Atanassov, 1983), as a generalized form of
FSs, is widely applied in FMEA. Atanassov appended a new constituent
in the representation of FSs which determines the falsity or dissatisfac­
tion degree. FSs describe the degree of truth membership of an object in
a given set, while IFSs give both a degree of truth and a degree of falsity,
which are independent from each other. For instance, Liu, You, Shan,
and Shao (2015) investigated a novel framework based on IFSs, called IF
hybrid TOPSIS method, to obtain the rankings of failures in FMEA. The
proposed technique can get over the disadvantages and drawbacks
related with the conventional RPNs and fuzzy FMEA approaches to
evaluate risk. Agarwal, Biswas, and Hanmandlu (2013) generalized
IFSSs (GIFSSs) with the inclusion of moderator’s opinion regarding the
original assessment. They devised the concept of GIFS relation. Further,
they proposed the applications of GIFSSs in medical diagnosis and
supplier selection. Alcantud, Khameneh, and Kilicman (2020) proposed
the first technique to aggregate infinite sequence of IFSs. They defined
the scores and accuracy degrees of temporal IFSs and utilized these
concepts to solve decision making problems. Boran, Genc, Kurt, and
Akay (2009) merged the TOPSIS approach with IFSs to chose suppliers
in MCGDM problems. They illustrated the proposed technique through a
quantitative example of supplier selection. The decision making tech­
niques based on IFSs fail to handle the orthopairs whose sum of squares
exceeds one. For instance, if the risk factors or failure modes are eval­
uated through weights in form of IF membership grades, i.e., (0.9, 0.7).
Then, FMEA techniques based on IFSs cannot deal with such kind of
A. Luqman et al.
uncertainties appearing in risk evaluation.
To overcome the limitations of IFSs, Pythagorean fuzzy set (PFS) as a
new generalization of IFS, was originally proposed by Yager and
Abbasov (2013) and Yager (2014). This model further relaxes the
constraint of orthopair membership grades so that they only need to
satisfy T 2 (x) + F2 (x)⩽1. These works showed the advantages of meth­
odologies that allow for inputs in this model, a convenience that was
further amphasized by subsequent works like Akram, Dudek, and Ilyas
(2019), Akram, Ilyas, and Garg (2019), Peng and Yang (2015), Zhang
and Xu (2014). Thanks to this works we have an array of tools that are
applicable when the specialists provide their inputs in a way that is
incompatible with the constraints of IFSs, but conform to the less
demanding requirements of PFSs. Yager (2014) introduced various ag­
gregation operators for PFSs. He expressed the criteria satisfaction
through Pythagorean membership grades in MCDM. Akram et al. (2019)
extended the TOPSIS technique to solve MCGDM problems under PF
information. They utilized a revised closeness index to rank the alter­
natives and to obtain the optimal solution. Akram et al. (2019) proposed
ELECTRE I method under PF environment to capture incomplete data in
human evaluations. Further, they illustrated numerical examples in the
fields of management and health safety. Joshi (2020) developed a new
framework as a criteria for picture fuzzy entropy and proposed a new
decision making method based on the concept of VIKOR. Applications of
proposed method was studied in forecasting the poll outcome and in
investment problem. Akram and Luqman (2020) explored the granular
structures by applying the hybrid models of fuzzy soft sets and fuzzy soft
graphs to discuss the indiscernibility partition of set of universe. Akram,
Habib, and Alcantud (2020) introduced trapezoidal picture fuzzy
number along with its graphical representation and operational laws.
They proposed Dijkstra algorithm for a network with trapezoidal picture
fuzzy numbers.
Graph theory, as a systematical tool, has been widely applied in
many areas of engineering, including mathematics, chemistry,
networking, operational research, linguistics, etc. Graphs are used to
model any physical situation involving the relationships between
discrete objects. Chen, Jia, and Xiang (2020) reviewed the basic notions
and definitions of knowledge reasoning and studied the methods for
reasoning over knowledge graphs. Surendran, Thomas, and Emmanuel
(2020) modeled the system call sequence as a directed graph and
defined the signals on the vertices of the system call graph. In FMEA, the
digraph and matrix approach (DGMA) was applied by Gandhi and
Agrawal (1992) to analyze the mechanical and hydraulic system. It is
founded on the combination of matrix algebra and graph theory. This
technique possesses various compelling characteristics which help to
solve complicated issues in decision making. For instance, a fuzzy
digraph model in manufacturing flexibility was proposed by Baykasoglu
(2009). The proposed model overcome the inability of collecting precise
data for determining the flexibility. A robot selection and evaluation
method based on digraphs and fuzzy logic was developed by Koulour­
iotis and Ketipi (2011). Liu, Chen, You, and Li (2016) put forward a new
approach to risk assessment in FMEA using fuzzy DGMA. They calcu­
lated the risk priority indexes in terms of fuzzy numbers to find out the
risk rankings of failure modes. The suggested method is a more gener­
alized technique that can be implemented to an arbitrary case in pro­
vision of constructive information for managing risk decisions in service
and industrial organizations. Considering the wide utilization of exten­
sions of FSs and the benefits of DGMA, we propose a novel technique of
risk assessment in FMEA which depends on triangular Pythagorean
fuzzy numbers and DGMA.
1.2. Motivation and contribution
The proposed research work is inspired by both PFSs and DGMA. We
introduce a novel technique, called digraph and matrix approach under
Pythagorean fuzzy information, to evaluate risks in FMEA that emerges
from the hybridization of graph theory and PFSs. Furthermore, the in­
3
Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518
fluence of objective and subjective factors creates various difficulties for
decision experts to provide the accurate assessment on complicated
things in practical decision applications. The Pythagorean fuzzy
numbers (PFNs), defined as the special PFSs on real line, are appropriate
frameworks to represent these ill known terms. Three types of tradi­
tional PFNs are TPFNs, trapezoidal Pythagorean fuzzy numbers
(TrPFNs), and interval-valued trapezoidal Pythagorean fuzzy numbers
(IVTrPFNs). In the proposed model, we have defined and applied TPFNs
as these numbers are more appropriate for measuring the two dimen­
sional uncertain data given in form of orthopairs about decision appli­
cations. Thus, the model developed here provides more flexibility by
combining the fluctuations of two very distinct methodologies. The
main motivation of this article can be summarized by the following
points:
1. We use PFS to describe the importance of risk factors and failure
modes, since it considers the truth T(x) as well as falsity F(x) degrees
of linguistic variables.
2. Additionally, the two functions in PFSs abide by the constraint
T 2 (x) + F2 (x)⩽1, which allows for higher flexibility than IFSs.
3. The representation of risk factors through Pythagorean fuzzy DGMA
illustrates the risk factors and their correlations in linguistic terms.
4. The risk rankings of the failure modes are obtained by the combi­
nation of the comparative importance of risk factors and the as­
sessments of failure modes.
5. The relative importances of the risk factors is the main advantage of
this model: it allows experts to determine the risk factors of corre­
sponding failures in linguistic variables.
Thus the subjectivity as well as the uncertainty in the computation of
risk factors weights and failure modes can be better handled through the
proposed model. It also provides a description of different risk factors
and their interconnections by means of graphical representations. The
most important feature of the proposed technique is that the risk pri­
orities of identified failure modes in FMEA are obtained by combining
the assessment of failure modes and relative significance of risk factors.
The model offers a more rational and effective framework for evaluating
risks in FMEA because it makes an efficient utilization of the rating in­
formation in risk analysis procedures. The contributions of this article
are:
1. The concept of triangular Pythagorean fuzzy number is defined and
explained through graphical visualizations.
2. Two parameters, named as truth membership and falsity member­
ship functions, are defined to describe the confidence and non-
confidence level of a triangular Pythagorean fuzzy number.
3. A Pythagorean fuzzy DGMA is proposed to evaluate risks in FMEA.
We use triangular Pythagorean fuzzy numbers in order to accurately
describe the interrelations between risk factors.
4. We prove the applicability and effectiveness of this technique by
performing a detailed computational study for the calculation of risk
priority indexes. Our case study concerns a power generating plant.
5. The significance of the proposed model is contrasted with the
application of four alternative methodologies to the same problem.
We select traditional RPN, fuzzy VIKOR, fuzzy DGMA, and rough
TOPSIS for this purpose.
1.3. Characteristics and advantages of DGMA
Graph theoretic approach has been extensively utilized in various
areas of technology and science as a logical and systematic methodol­
ogy. Moreover, the matrix technique is convenient to analyze the models
of graph theory in order to meet the objectives. Further advantages of
DGMA are given as:
A. Luqman et al. Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

1. The DGMA contains the digraph representation, the matrix descrip­ where the mappings TP : X→[0, 1] and FP : X→[0, 1] define the truth and
tion, and the permanent function characterization. falsity membership functions of the object a ∈ X to P , respectively, and
2. A digraph is considered as the visual description of the risk factors for every a ∈ X it is the case that
and their mutual dependence. √̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
3. The DGMA has ability to model the interactions between different 0⩽T2P (a) + F2P (a) ≤ 1. Furthermore, πP (a)= 1 − T 2P (a) − F2P (a) is
criteria. called a PF index of a to P .
4. Hierarchical models can be generated using DGMA to solve
The combination of the definition above with graph theory produces
complicated decision making problems.
the following applicable notion:
5. The best structure of a system can be selected rather than to assess
and rank the risks of potential failures. Definition 2.2. (Naz, Ashraf, Akram, 2018) A Pythagorean fuzzy graph
6. An optimum representation of interrelations between risk factors is (PFG) on X is defined as an ordered pair G
̃ = (A,
̃ B),
̃ where A
̃ and B
̃ are
developed using a digraph. PFS and PFR on X, respectively, such that
7. The matrix representation of a graph provides proficiency in com­ T̃(x1 x2 )⩽min{T̃(x1 ), T̃(x2 )} , F̃(x1 x2 )⩽max{F̃(x1 ), F̃(x2 )}, and
B A A B A A
puter processing.
0⩽T̃2 (x1 x2 ) + F̃2 (x1 x2 ) ≤ 1, where T̃ : X × X→[0, 1] represents the
8. The matrix transforms the representation of a digraph into mathe­ B B B

matical form and the permanent function is a mathematical truth membership and F̃ : X × X→[0, 1] represents the falsity member­
B
description that is used to obtain the numerical index. ship of B,
̃ respectively.

The contents of this article are organized as follows. In Section 2, we We can now extend the structure of a triangular fuzzy number to the
define triangular Pythagorean fuzzy numbers and then we establish case of Pythagorean fuzziness. This structure is amenable for applica­
certain arithmetic operations on them. We also discuss defuzzification tions as explained in Alcantud et al. (2018).
techniques and rankings of triangular Pythagorean fuzzy numbers. Definition 2.3. A triangular Pythagorean fuzzy number (TPFN) P ̃=
[( ) ]
Section 3 describes the representation of risk factors using Pythagorean
fuzzy DGMA. In Section 4, we propose a Pythagorean fuzzy DGMA for p , p, p ; t̃, f̃ is defined as a PFS defined on R, whose truth T̃ and
P P P
FMEA and the whole procedure of the proposed model is described falsity F̃ membership functions are respectively defined as
P
through a flowchart. In Section 5, a problem concerning the steam valve
system for a power generating plant is discussed to provide a potential
⎧( ) /( )
application and explains the benefits of the considered model. Section 6 ⎪
⎪
⎪ w − p t p − p , if p ⩽w < p,
concerns its effectiveness. We implement the fuzzy DGMA, rough TOP­ ⎪
⎪
⎪
̃P
⎪
SIS, fuzzy VIKOR, and traditional RPN solutions to the same case study. ⎨
t̃, if w = p,
T̃(w) =
A brief discussion on the outcomes and comparisons are provided in this P ⎪
⎪
P
/
⎪ (p − w)t (p − p),
section. The last section deals with conclusions and future research ⎪
⎪
⎪ ̃P if p < w⩽p,
⎪
⎩
directions. 0, if w < p or w > p,

2. Triangular Pythagorean fuzzy numbers

and
In this section, we review some fundamental concept relating to
PFSs. Then we define triangular Pythagorean fuzzy numbers and some ⎧[ ( ) ]/( )
arithmetic operations on Pythagorean fuzzy numbers. ⎪
⎪
⎪ p − w + f̃P w − p p− p , if p ⩽w < p,
⎪
⎪
⎪
Definition 2.1. (Yager, Abbasov; 2013, Yager, 2014) A Pythagorean ⎪
⎨
f̃, if w = p,
fuzzy set (PFS) P in X is given as: F̃(w) =
P ⎪ [
P
]/
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪ w − p + f̃(p − w) (p − p), if p < w⩽p,
P = {(a, TP (a), FP (a))|a ∈ X}, ⎪
⎪ P
⎩
1, if w < p or w > p.

The values t̃ and f̃ describe the maximum degree of T̃ and minimum

P P P
degree of F̃, respectively, such that t̃ ∈ [0, 1], f̃ ∈ [0, 1], and 0⩽t 2 +
P P P ̃P
f̃2 ≤ 1. Here, the parameters t̃ and f̃ are defined to describe the
P P P
[( ) ]
confidence and non-confidence level of the TPFN P ̃ = p ,p,p ; t̃,f̃ ,
P P

Table 1
Ratings of risk factor weights using linguistic variables.
Linguistic variables Abbreviations TPFNs

Extremely low exlo [(0.0,0.1,0.3);0.1,0.9]

Low lo [(0.1,0.3,0.5);0.3,0.7]
Medium md [(0.3,0.5,0.7);0.5,0.5]
High hi [(0.5,0.7,0.9);0.7,0.4]
Extremely high exhi [(0.7,0.9,1.0);0.9,0.1]
Fig. 1. A triangular PF number P.
̃

4
A. Luqman et al. Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

respectively.

Example 2.1. Let P

̃ = [(2, 3, 4); 0.9, 0.3] be a TPFN where 0.9 and 0.3
describe the maximum degree of T̃ and minimum degree of F̃,
P P
respectively: observe that 0⩽0.92 + 0.32 ≤ 1. The graphical description
of P
̃ is shown in Fig. 1.

Now we can define some operations on TPFNs as follows:

⎧ [( ) ]
⎪ ∊ ω , ∊ω, ∊ω ; min{t̃, t̃}, max{f̃, f̃} , if ̃ > 0, Ω
ϒ ̃ > 0,
⎪
⎨ [( ) ϒ Ω ϒ Ω ]
̃Ω
ϒ ̃= ∊ ω, ∊ω, ∊ω ; min{t̃, t̃}, max{f̃, f̃} , if ̃ < 0, Ω
ϒ ̃ > 0,
⎪
⎪ ϒ Ω ϒ Ω
⎩ ̃ < 0, Ω
̃ < 0,
[(∊ω, ∊ω, ∊ω); min{t̃, t̃ }, max{f̃, f̃} ], if ϒ
ϒ Ω ϒ Ω

[( ) ] [( ) ]
Definition 2.4. Let ϒ ̃ = ∊ , ∊, ∊ ; t , f and Ω
̃ ̃
̃ = ω , ω, ω ; t , f
̃ ̃
ϒ ϒ Ω Ω
be two TPFNs, and let γ be a real number. We define:
[( ) { } { }]
̃ +Ω
ϒ ̃= ∊ + ω , ∊ + ω, ∊ + ω ; min t̃, t̃ , max f̃, f̃ ,
[( ) { ϒ Ω } { ϒ Ω }]
̃− Ω
ϒ ̃= ∊ − ω , ∊ − ω, ∊ − ω ; min t̃, t̃ , max f̃, f̃ ,
ϒ Ω ϒ Ω

Fig. 4. Triangular Pythagorean fuzzy ratings of risk factors in Table 1.

Table 2
Ratings of failure modes in linguistic terms.
Linguistic variables Abbreviations TPFNs
Fig. 2. Truth membership function of risk factors in Table 1.
Extremely low exlo [(0.0,0.1,0.3);0.1,0.9]
Low lo [(0.1,0.3,0.5);0.2,0.8]
Medium low mlo [(0.1,0.3,0.5);0.3,0.7]
Medium md [(0.3,0.5,0.7);0.5,0.5]
Medium high mdhi [(0.3,0.5,0.7);0.7,0.4]
High hi [(0.5,0.7,0.9);0.8,0.3]
Extremely high exhi [(0.7,0.9,1.0);0.9,0.1]

Fig. 3. Falsity membership function of risk factors in Table 1.

Fig. 5. Truth membership function for rating failure modes in Table 2.

5
A. Luqman et al. Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

Fig. 6. Falsity membership function for rating failure modes in Table 2. Fig. 7. Triangular Pythagorean fuzzy ratings of failure modes in Table 2.

⎧ [( / / ) { } { }]
⎪
⎪ ̃ > 0, Ω
∊ ω,∊ ω,∊ /ω ;min t̃,t̃ ,max f̃,f̃ , if ϒ ̃ > 0,
⎨ [( / / / ) { ϒ G} { ϒ Ω}]
̃ /Ω
ϒ ̃= ∊ ω,∊ ω,∊ ω ;min t ,t ,max f ,f ̃ < 0, Ω
, if ϒ ̃ > 0,
⎪
⎪ [( ) {̃ϒ ̃Ω} {̃ϒ ̃Ω }]
⎩ ∊/ω ,∊/ω,∊ /ω ;min t ,t ,max f ,f , if ϒ
̃ < 0, Ω
̃ < 0,
ϒ ̃
̃ Ω ϒ ̃
̃ Ω

{ [( ) ]
γ ω , γ ω, γ ω ; t̃, f̃ , if γ > 0,
̃=
γΩ [( ) Ω Ω]
γ ω, γω, γ ω ; t̃, f̃ , if γ < 0,
Ω Ω

1
[( / / / ) ]
̃−
ϒ = 1 ∊, 1 ∊, 1 ∊ ; t̃, f̃ .
ϒ ϒ

An earlier approach to the expression of vague knowledge was given

by Zadeh in terms of linguistic variables:

Definition 2.5. (Zadeh, 1975) A variable is called a linguistic variable

whose values are described in the form of linguistic terms, i.e., it is
Fig. 8. Pythagorean fuzzy digraph for n risk factors.
defined as a statement in artificial or natural language that describes a
diversity of values.
2.1. Defuzzification technique and ranking of TPFNs
In this article, the linguistic values that are applied to represent the
weights of relative significance of risk factors belong to the set of lin­ In this subsection, we define a defuzzification technique for TPFNs.
guistic terms (Extremely Low, Low, Medium, High, Extremely High). Their We use the expected values, score functions and accuracy functions to
representation as TPFNs is given in Table 1. In visual terms, the truth convert TPFNs into crisp values and to rank them. These terms are
and falsity membership functions of the linguistic term set (exlo, lo, md, defined as follows:
[( ) ]
hi, exhi) are given in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. Fig. 4 shows the joint
graphical description of linguistic terms in the form of TPFNs that we use Definition 2.6. P ̃= p , p, p ; t̃, f̃ be a TPFN. Then, the expected
P P
to illustrate the relative significance of risk factors. Similarly, the lin­ value E(P)
̃ of P̃ is given as,
guistic values that are applied to describe the PF ratings of failure modes ( ) [( ) ( )]
with respect to risk factors are taken from the linguistic term set ̃ = 1 p + p + p × 1 + t2 − f 2 .
E P (1)
8 ̃P ̃P
(Extremely Low, Low, Medium Low, Medium, Medium High, High, Extremely
High) as shown in Table 2. The truth and falsity memberships of the term Scores are defined by inspiration of similar concepts in the intui­
set (exlo, lo, mdlo, md, mdhi, hi, exhi) are given in Figs. 5 and 6, tionistic fuzzy setting (both static (Agarwal, Biswas, Hanmandlu, 2013)
respectively. Fig. 7 shows the linguistic values in terms of TPFNs that we and temporal (Alcantud, Khameneh, Kilicman, 2020)):
use to describe the PF values of failure modes corresponding to risk [( ) ]
factors. Definition 2.7. P ̃= p , p, p ; t̃, f̃ be a TPFN. Then, the score
P P
function Scor(P)
̃ of P̃ is given as,

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A. Luqman et al. Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

( ) ( ) ( )
̃ =E P
Scor P ̃ × t2 − f 2 , (2) becomes complicated and hence the visual description of the digraph is
̃ ̃ P P supposed to be complex and difficult. To resolve such type of difficulties,
a matrix is used to represent the RFPFDG.
where E(P)
̃ is the expected value of P. ̃
[( ) ]
Definition 3.2. Let there are n risk factors R Fi , (i = 1, 2, …, n) and
Definition 2.8. P ̃= p , p, p ; t̃, f̃ be a TPFN. Then, the accuracy there exists comparative significance among all the risk factors, then the
P P
function Acc(P)
̃ of P
̃ is defined as,
risk factor Pythagorean fuzzy matrix M
̃ of RFPFDG G = (R, D) as shown in
( ) ( ) ( ) Fig. 8 is given as,
̃ =E P
Acc P ̃ × t2 + f 2 ,
̃ ̃ (3)
P P ⎡ ⎤
M1 m12 m13 … m1n
⎢ m21 M2 m23 … m2n ⎥
where E(P)
̃ is the expected value of P.̃ ⎢ ⎥
[( ) ] [( ) ] ̃ = ⎢ m31 m32 M3
M … m3n ⎥
⎢ ⎥,
Definition 2.9. Let P ̃= p , p, p ; t̃, f̃ and Q
̃= q , q, q ; t̃ , f̃ ⎣ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⎦
P P Q Q
be two TPFNs, then mn1 mn2 mn3 … Mn

(i) If Scor(P)
̃ > Scor(Q),
̃ then P ̃ > Q,
̃ where Mi is the PF value of the risk factor R Fi that is expressed by vertex
ri . A one-to-one description is provided by the matrix representation
(ii) If Scor(P) = Scor(Q), then
̃ ̃
of risk factors digraph. Here, mij illustrates the PF relative significance of
ith risk factor over jth risk factor represented by the directed edge dij
• If Acc(P)
̃ = Acc(Q),
̃ then P
̃ = Q,
̃
such that,
• If Acc(P)
̃ > Acc(Q),
̃ then P
̃ > Q.
̃
[( ) ]
• mij = p , p, p ; t̃, f̃ , if the ith risk factor has some relative
P P
3. Visual description of risk factors using Pythagorean fuzzy importance over the jth risk factor (and vice versa) for a given
DGMA problem.
• mij = 0, otherwise.
A risk factor is defined as a significant term to calculate the risk
evaluation of failure modes which are recognized in FMEA. There are Note that, mii = [(1, 1, 1); 1, 0] for all i, because a risk factor can never
three major factors that are utilized in FMEA namely, occurrence (O), possess relative significance over itself.
severity (S), and detection (D) and these are evaluated using crisp
values. In this article, the linguistic variables are utilized for the eval­
3.3. Permanent function of matrix
uation of three risk factors.
Definition 3.1. A risk factor Pythagorean fuzzy digraph (RFPFDG) is an The characteristic, adjacency, and incidence matrices could be uti­
ordered pair G = (R,D), where R = {r1 , r2 , …, rn } is a set of vertices and lized for the evaluation of failure modes,but these evaluations have
D = (dij ) is a family of directed edges. Here, a vertex rj , j = 1, 2, …, n, some drawbacks. The adjacency matrix does not provide any illustration
represents the jth risk factor and directed edges are drawn to describe for the edges having relative significance in both directions. The
the correlative significance among all risk factors that is represented by expansion of adjacency matrix provides only some numbers that do not
TPFNs.
A PFDG G = (R, D) which is based on interrelations of n risk factors
is shown in Fig. 8.

3.1. Description of Pythagorean fuzzy digraph

The RFPFDG is used to illustrate the information about risk factors

when the provided data or knowledge is imprecise in nature. The
RFPFDG presents a graphical description of risk factors and the in­
terrelations among them. The number of vertices in a RFPFDG G = (R,
D) is taken to be equal to the number of risk factors. If the risk factor j, i.
e., R Fj has some relative significance over R Fk , i.e., another kth risk
factor in FMEA, then djk (i.e., a directed edge) is constructed from rj to rk .
The interrelation between risk factors is represented by edges. For
example, occurrence (O) and severity (S) both are equally important in
evaluation of risk ranking of different failures. Thus, the relative sig­
nificance exists between these two risk factors. Similarly the corre­
sponding weights among all other factors can be represented through
RFPFDG. Since the edges of RFPFDG describe the relative significance
among all risk factors, so all the vertices are related to each other. Thus,
all the vertices are connected to each other as all risk factors have some
relative importance. In this way, the DGMA is much effective and
evaluates risks in FMEA easily. In particular, the RPIs defined through
PFDGMA propose a novel technique for the evaluation of failure modes
in FMEA.

3.2. Matrix representation of digraph

As the risk factors in FMEA and their relations enlarge, the RFPFDG Fig. 9. Flow diagram of PFDG and matrix approach.

7
A. Luqman et al. Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

reveal complete physical information associated with the risk factors. assessments:.
The incidence matrix requires more space in computer storage, as the A PF group evaluation matrix P = (μls )q×r is constructed by calcu­
number of edges is usually greater than the number of vertices. The lating the aggregated PF ratings of all failure modes corresponding to
determinant of characteristic matrix may contain both positive and each risk factor where,
negative values and cannot be able to provide the total objective value. [( ) ]
These limitations and flaws of matrices lead to the usage of permanent
μls = μls,1 , μls,2 , μls,3 ; tμls , fμls
function that does not contain the negative sign and hence illustrate the
complete information. [(
p
∑ p
∑ p
∑
) ]
= ωμ k
k ls,1 , ωμ k
k ls,2 , ωμ k
; tμls , fμls . (5)
Definition 3.3. Let M
̃ = [mij ]
n×n be a PF matrix of order n × n. Then, k=1 k=1 k=1
k ls,3

the permanent function of M,

̃ denoted by Pr (M),
̃ is defined as,
( ) In the same way, the aggregated PF weights ω
̃ s , s = 1, 2, 3, …, r of r risk
∑∏ n
Pr M̃ = mkα(k) , (4) factors are computed as:
α∈S n k=1 [( ) ]
ω
̃s = ωs,1 , ωs,2 , ωs,3 ; t̃ωs , f̃ωs
where S n is the symmetric group of order n.
The permanent of a PF matrix is called the risk priority function. [(
p
∑ p
∑ p
∑
) ]
= ωk μks,1 , ωk μks,2 , ωk μks,3 ; t̃ωs , f̃ωs . (6)
In general, the permanent function of a matrix is the same as that of k=1 k=1 k=1
the determinant of a matrix, the only difference is that the Pr (M)
̃ does
Step 2. Determination of interrelations of risk factors:
not contain negative signs, while both negative and positive signs appear
To construct the interrelation matrix of all risk factors, the aggre­
in determinant. The utilization of permanent function in assessment of
gated weights of corresponding risk factors are calculated first. Using the
failure modes helps to represent risk factors as acquired from combi­
aggregated PF weights obtained by Eq. 6, the normalized aggregated PF
natorial consideration. Moreover, no negative sign will emerge in
weights are calculated as:
equations using permanent function and hence no data or knowledge
would be lost. A risk analysis problem is characterized by a risk priority ω
̃s
function, because it consists of all possible systemic constituents of all νs = ∑
r , (7)
ωs,3
risk factors and their interrelations. s=1

4. Pythagorean fuzzy diagraph and matrix model for FMEA Λs =

[( ) ]
λs,1 , λs,2 , λs,3 ; tΛs , fΛs = ∑
νs
, (8)
r
νs
In the literature, the FMEA techniques based on traditional RPNs are s=1

criticized for various reasons so that it influences the possible outcomes

of risk evaluations in failure modes and the remedial actions followed. where νs is the crisp value obtained by defuzzification of νs and
∑r
To eradicate the limitations of traditional and crisp FMEA techniques, a s=1 Λs = 1. The RFPFDG is used to represent the matrix of in­

more accurate and rational model of FMEA is proposed in this section. terconnections between risk factors. For r risk factors, their relative
This model is utilized to assess the identified failures in FMEA proced­ significance is expressed by the following interrelation matrix Ĩ :
M
ure. Our proposed method is based on PFDG and matrix technique that ⎡ ⎤
R Fs R F1 R F2 R F3 … R Fr
considers the interconnections of n risk factors R Fi , (i = 1, 2, …, n) to ⎢ R F1 ⎥
M1 m12 m13 … m1r
critically analyze the considered problem. The following model is ⎢
⎢ R F2 m21 M2 m23 … m2r
⎥
⎥
different from other conventional RPN methods in such a way that it Ĩ = ⎢
⎢RF
⎥,
⎥
M
⎢ m31 m32 M3 … m3r ⎥
deals with the risk factors O, S, and D and the weights of their in­
3
⎣ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⎦
terrelations as PF variables and evaluates them using PF linguistic terms R Fr mr1 mr2 mr3 … Mr
using TPFNs. Firstly, the FMEA team experts independent assessments
are aggregated into a group evaluation then the PFDG and matrix where Ms = [(1,1,1); 1,0],s = 1,2,3,…,r. The relative significance mαβ of
technique is implemented. Thus, we obtain the PF interrelation matrix of risk factor R Fα over another risk factor R Fβ and mβα are obtained as:
all risk factors R Fi and formulate the PF risk matrix of all failure modes
Λα Λβ
FMj . Finally, the risk ranking of all failure modes is obtained with the ξα = ,ξ = , (9)
λα,3 + λβ,3 β λα,3 + λβ,3
help of risk priority index (RPI) that is calculated from risk priority
function. The entire procedure for the priority of all failure modes in ξα ξβ
FMEA by considering the PFDG and matrix approach is shown in Fig. 9. mαβ = , mβ α = , (10)
ξα + ξβ ξα + ξβ
Let us consider that there are p experts TMk , k = 1, 2, 3, …, p in FMEA
team which are responsible for the assessment of q failure modes FMl , l = [( ] [( ]
where Λα = λα,1 , λα,2 , λα,3 ); tΛα , fΛα , Λβ = λβ,1 , λβ,2 , λβ,3 ); tΛβ , fΛβ are
1, 2, 3, …, q corresponding to the r risk factors R Fs , s = 1, 2, 3, …, r. Let
the normalized aggregated weights of R Fα and R Fβ , respectively. Note
ωk > 0 be the weight assigned to each team member TMk such that
∑p that, ξα and ξβ are the crisp values obtained by defuzzification of ξα and
k=1 ωk = 1 to demonstrate the relative significance of every team
ξβ , respectively, which are computed using Eq. (9) such that mαβ +
member in FMEA procedure. Let Pk = (μkls )q×r be the PF evaluation
( ) mβα = 1.
μkls = μkls,1 , μkls,2 , μkls,3 is the PF
matrix of kth team expert TMk . Here, ̃ Step 3. Construction of PF risk matrix:
rating that is specified by TMk on the evaluation of FMl corresponding to The main diagonal of the interrelation matrix is interchanged by
̃ ks = (ωks,1 , ωks,2 , ωks,3 ) be the PF weight of risk factor R Fs assigned
R Fs . Let ω normalized aggregated PF ratings of the corresponding risk factor for a
particular failure mode in order to construct the PF risk matrix for each
by TMk to indicate the relative significance of the corresponding risk
failure mode. Thus, for the failure mode FMl and r risk factors, the di­
factor to analyze the priority of failures. Depending upon these notations
and assumptions, the assessment of p failure modes is ranked using these agonal element M1 is replaced by R ̃ l,1 given as:
steps:
Step 1. Aggregation of FMEA team experts individual

8
A. Luqman et al. Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

Table 3 To obtain the risk priority index (RPIl ) of all failure modes FMl , the
FMEA of the steam valve system (Song, Ming, Wu, Zhu, 2013). permanent Pr (R̃ ) of PF risk matrix is defuzzified using the score and
Ml
No. Failure Causes of Effects of Detection accuracy values of TPFNs and the failure modes are evaluated. Step 5.
modes failures failures measures
Evaluation of failure modes:
F M1 Closing time Extravagant Excessive speed Valve closing The higher vale of risk priority index (RPI) indicates the failure mode
of choice of rotor with greatest risk and the higher risk priority. Hence, the risk priority of
valve is long of spring of steam turbine analysis
all failure modes is obtained in terms of their risk priority indexes. Step
and break
down of parts 6. Analysis of results and suggestions:
F M2 Valve is not Shaft bending, Rusting of Valve leak analysis After obtaining the ranking of all failure modes depending upon their
closed tightly large bushing blade risk priorities, the failure modes having higher risk priorities can be
grounding selected by risk managers. This selection of some specific failure mode
F M3 Leakage of Force of Thermal loss Checking after the
from a set of identified failure modes allows the FMEA team members to
steam compression
in valve of sealing filler and chemical shifting of packing
arrange the improved resources and take remedial actions. Thus, the
system water developed model which is based on PFDGMA proves to be a novel
is insufficient wastage technique for FMEA that combines the benefits of TPFNs and digraph
F M4 Valve Hydraulic Hazardous Visual analysis of and matrix technique. The properties of TPFNs are used to construct the
cylinder operation
RFPFDG. This RFPFDG illustrates the risk factors and the relations be­
vacillations leakage due to irregular gauge in cylinder
opening and pressure tween them in the form of TPFNs. Finally, the defuzzification of TPFNs
closing using the score values and accuracy functions is applied to prioritize the
of valve different failure modes after calculating the PF permanents of all failure
F M5 Valve is Higher Valve Valve system
modes.
distortion compression
compressed of valve disturbs the inspection
Based upon the all above discussion, the generic procedure of our
because of regular proposed method is described in Algorithm 1.
defecting functions Algorithm 1: General procedure of Pythagorean fuzzy digraph and
material matrix approach
F M6 Valve shaft Wearing out Tripping of Metallographic Step 1. Aggregation of FMEA team experts individual assessments:
analysis (i) The PF ratings of all failure modes corresponding to every risk factor are
is fractured due to turbine unit on the breaking aggregated using Eq. 5.
continuous (ii) The PF weights of all risk factors are computed using Eq. 6.
stress parts (iii) Construct the PF evaluation matrix using the aggregated ratings and
F M7 Breakdown of Short stability Irregular Disassemble test weights.
working Step 2. Construction of interrelations matrix of risk factors:
valve handle of bearing of valve system (iv) Normalize the aggregated weights using Eqs. 7,8 that were obtained by
support material Eq. 6.
bearing (v) Construct the interrelation matrix to express the relative importance
F M8 Extra noise Vibrating The customer Operating between risk factors.
system condition (vi) Obtain the relative significance of risk factor R Fα over another risk
of system caused by becomes and frequency factor R Fβ using
improper annoying Eqs. 9,10.
clearance of and service life measurement of Step 3. Construction of PF risk matrix:
components is reduced valve system are (vii) Aggregate the PF ratings of interrelation matrix through the method of
changed linear scale transformation as given
in Eq. 11.
(viii) Interchange the main diagonal of the interrelation matrix by
Table 4 normalized aggregated PF ratings of the corresponding risk factor to
Linguistic evaluations of risk factors weights. obtain the PF risk matrix for FMl .
Step 4. Determination of risk priority index (RPI):
Risk factors
(ix) Calculate the permanent functions of PF risk matrices corresponding to
TM1 TM2 TM3 TM 4 all failure modes using Eq. 4.
(x) Compute the score and accuracy values of permanent functions using
Occurrence lo md md hi Eqs. 2,3.
Severity md hi hi exhi (xi) Determine the RPIs of all failure modes by computing the expected
Detection md hi md hi valued using Eq. 1.
Step 5. Evaluation of failure modes:
(xii) Obtain the risk priority of all failure modes in terms of their risk
⎡ ⎤
R Fs R F1 R F2 R F3 … R Fr priority indexes.
⎢ R F1 ̃ l,1
R m12 m13 … m1r ⎥ (xiii) The higher vale of risk priority index (RPI) indicates the failure mode
⎢ ⎥ with greatest risk and the higher risk priority.
⎢RF m21 ̃l,2
R m23 … m2r ⎥
R̃ = ⎢
⎢R
2 ⎥.
⎥
Ml
⎢ F3 m31 m32 ̃ l,3
R … m3r ⎥
⎣ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⎦
̃ l,r 5. Implementation of PFDGMA in power generating plant
R Fr mr1 mr2 mr3 … R

Here, the PF ratings are aggregated through the method of linear scale In the following section, we provide a discussion about steam valve
transformation as given in the following Eq. 11, system in a power generating plant to illustrate the advantages and
⎡⎛ ⎞ ⎤ potential applications of proposed PFDGMA in FMEA. Steam valve
r
̃ r
̃ r
̃ system is considered as an important feature of a steam turbine opera­
(11)
̃l,s = ⎣⎝ ls,1 ls,2 ls,3 ⎠; maxtl,s , minfl,s ⎦.
R , ,
max̃rls,3 max̃rls,3 max̃rls,3 l l
tion and its failure can reduce the accuracy of entire power plant. A
l l l steam valve system operates in very complicated working conditions to
check a transporting medium having high pressure and temperature and
The linear scale transformation technique is applied to maintain the is placed between low pressure cylinder (LPC) and moisture separator
attribute that the domain of normalized TPFNs belongs to [0, 1]. Step 4. re-heater (MSR). A steam valve should work properly in any position
Determination of risk priority index (RPI): from entirely open to entirely closed and should be closed and opened

9
A. Luqman et al. Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

Table 5
Triangular Pythagorean fuzzy assessments of failure modes.
Risk factors O S D
Team members TM1 TM2 TM 3 TM 4 TM1 TM2 TM 3 TM 4 TM1 TM 2 TM 3 TM 4

Failure modes F M1 mdlo mdlo md lo exhi exhi exhi hi hi hi mdhi md

F M2 mdlo mdlo md mdlo lo exlo lo mdlo mdlo md md mdlo
F M3 mdhi mdhi md md mdlo mdlo md mdlo mdlo mdlo lo md
F M4 mdlo lo mdlo mdlo mdhi mdhi mdhi md md lo mdlo mdlo
F M5 mdlo mdlo md md exhi exhi mdhi hi mdlo mdlo lo mdlo
F M6 lo mdlo lo mdlo exhi exhi exhi exhi lo mdlo mdlo md
F M7 md md mdhi md mdhi mdhi hi hi mdlo lo mdlo mdlo
F M8 md mdhi md mdhi md md mdhi mdhi mdlo md mdlo mdlo

Table 6
Pythagorean fuzzy group assessment matrix and aggregated weights of risk factors.
F Ml Occurrence Severity Detection

FM1 [(1.5,3.3,5.1);0.2,0.8] [(8.8,9.8,10);0.8,0.3] [(5.95,7.5,9.05);0.5,0.6]

FM2 [(1.7,3.7,5.7);0.3,0.7] [(0.2,1.1,2.3);0.1,0.9] [(2.3,4.3,6.3);0.3,0.7]
FM3 [(3.9,5.9,7.9);0.5,0.6] [(1.7,3.7,5.7);0.3,0.7] [(1.05,2.7,4.35);0.2,0.8]
FM4 [(0.7,2.4,4.1);0.2,0.8] [(4.6,6.6,8.6);0.5,0.6] [(1.0,2.7,4.4);0.2,0.8]
FM5 [(2.1,4.1,6.1);0.3,0.7] [(7.4,8.75,9.65);0.7,0.5] [(0.65,2.3,3.95);0.2,0.8]
FM6 [(0.5,2.0,3.5);0.2,0.8] [(9.0,10,10);0.9,0.1] [(1.25,3.1,4.95);0.2,0.8]
FM7 [(3.7,5.7,7.7);0.5,0.6] [(6.65,8.1,9.55);0.7,0.5] [(0.7,2.4,4.1);0.2,0.8]
FM8 [(4.0,6.0,8.0);0.5,0.6] [(4.1,6.1,8.1);0.5,0.6] [(1.6,3.6,5.6);0.3,0.7]
Weights [(0.31,0.51,0.71);0.3,0.7] [(0.51,0.71,0.89);0.5,0.5] [(0.4,0.6,0.8);0.5,0.5]

Table 7
Interrelation matrix of risk factors.
Risk factors Occurrence Severity Detection

Occurrence [(1,1,1);1,0] [(0.814,1.346,1.873);0.3,0.7] [(0.911,1.507,2.093);0.3,0.7]

Severity [(1.346,1.873,2.346);0.5,0.5] [(1,1,1);1,0] [(1.048,1.457,1.824);0.5,0.5]
Detection [(1.182,1.764,2.351);0.5,0.5] [(0.820,1.228,1.637);0.5,0.5] [(1,1,1);1,0]

timely. Therefore, steam valve should be quickly closed to disconnect
the steam entering into the LPC in any eccentric operating occurrences
to make sure the accuracy and security of the turbine system.
In order to supply the insufficient preserved resources, a FMEA
analysis team containing four team members TMk , k = 1, 2, 3, 4, is
organized to identify the most critical failure modes from a collection of
identified failure modes by conducting the risk evaluation. The FMEA
team members have explored eight major possible failure modes
considering the brain storming. These eight failure modes FMl ,l = 1,2,3,
…, 8, the causes arising them, the potential effects and diagnosis mea­
sures are given in Table 3. The relative weights that are assigned to four
experts because of their experience and domain knowledge while per­
forming the FMEA procedures are given as: 0.15, 0.30, 0.35, and 0.20.
The evaluation of eight failure modes is done by considering the risk
factors occurrence (O), severity (S), and detection (D). The risks of the
identified failures are ranked by analyzing the PF assessment matrix that
is provided by the four experts through the proposed FMEA model. The
linguistic weighting variables in the form of TPFNs as given in Table 1
are assumed by FMEA team experts to evaluate the comparative sig­
nificance of all risk factors. The four team experts determine the weights
of risk factors as given in Table 4. The linguistic rating variables
employed by the team experts of FMEA to evaluate the risk factors
corresponding to every failure mode are given in Table 2. The assess­
ments of all failure modes in terms of linguistic variables provided by the
four experts are displayed in Table 5. After transforming the indepen­
dent assessments by the team experts into respective TPFNs, these as­
sessments are aggregated using Eqs. (5-6). This process eschews the
verification that there might be ‘inconsistency’ among these opinions,
and we rather consider that divergent assessments are the natural
expression of the various perspectives from the agents. We then obtain
the PF group assessment matrix P = (μls )8×3 and aggregated PF weights
̃ s ,s = 1,2,3, for O,S, and D. The results of these calculations are given
ω
in Table 6.
For instance, the aggregated weights for risk factor “occurrence” are
calculated as: The relative weights which are assigned to four FMEA
team experts are: 0.15, 0.30, 0.35, and 0.20, respectively. The linguistic
evaluations of risk factor “occurrence” weights that are assigned by
FMEA team experts are given as: lo, md, md, and hi, respectively. The
ratings of risk factor weights as given in Table 1 are:
[(0.1,0.3,0.5);0.3,0.7] for low, [(0.3,0.5,0.7);0.5,0.5] for medium, and
[(0.5,0.7,0.9);0.7,0.4] for high. Substituting all these values in Eq. 6, we
have

ω
̃ 1 = 0.15 × [(0.1, 0.3, 0.5); 0.3, 0.7] + 0.30 × [(0.3, 0.5, 0.7); 0.5, 0.5] + 0.35 × [(0.3, 0.5, 0.7); 0.5, 0.5] + 0.20 × [(0.5, 0.7, 0.9); 0.7, 0.4]
= [(0.015, 0.045, 0.075); 0.3, 0.7] + [(0.090, 0.150, 0.210); 0.5, 0.5] + [(0.105, 0.175, 0.245); 0.5, 0.5] + [(0.100, 0.140, 0.80); 0.7, 0.4]
= [(0.310, 0.510, 0.710); 0.3, 0.7]

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A. Luqman et al. Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

The relative importance between O and S is calculated as:

Similarly, all other aggregated values as given in Table 6 can be calculated
using Eqs. (5-6). Divergent opinions may be due to the fact that for ξ1 =
Λ1
=
[(0.845, 1.175, 1.472); 0.5, 0.5]
example, team expert 1 is an engineer while expert 2 is an economist, λ1,3 + λ2,3 1.175 + 1.472
expert 3 is a politician, and expert 4 is a union member. The production of = [(0.193, 0.319, 0.444); 0.3, 0.7],
the interrelation matrix for risk factors O,S, and D is considered to be very
Λ2 [(0.845, 1.175, 1.472); 0.5, 0.5]
critical step to compute the risk priority of failures. This matrix is obtained ξ2 = =
λ1,3 + λ2,3 1.175 + 1.472
by applying Eqs. (7-10) to aggregate PF ratings of risk factors as given in
Table 6. The relative significance between two factors is represented by = [(0.319, 0.444, 0.556); 0.5, 0.5].
each element of this matrix. The interrelation matrix for the considered
application is shown in Table 7. Some further explanation of the calcula­ The defuzzified values ξ1 , ξ2 of ξ1 , ξ2 , respectively, are obtained as:
tions above follows. The PF aggregated weights of O,S, and D are given as: 1
[( ) ( )]
ξ1 = 0.193 + 0.319 + 0.444 × 1 − 0.32 − 0.72
Aggregated PF weights for occurrence : [(0.310, 0.510, 0.710); 0.3, 0.7], 8
Aggregated PF weights for severity : [(0.510, 0.0.710, 0.890); 0.5, 0.5], = 0.072,
Aggregated PF weights for detection : [(0.400, 0.600, 0.800); 0.5, 0.5]. [(( )) ( )]
1
ξ2 = 0.319 + 0.444 + 0.556 × 1 − 0.52 − 0.52
8
The comparative importance between O and S can be calculated as:
= 0.165.
ω
̃1 [(0.310, 0.510, 0.710); 0.3, 0.7]
ν1 = =
Now we are ready to calculate the relative importance between m12 and
ω1,3 + ω2,3 + ω3,3 2.4
m21 , which is given as:
= [(0.129, 0.213, 0.296); 0.3, 0.7],
ω
̃2 [(0.510, 0.710, 0.890); 0.3, 0.7] ξ1 [(0.193, 0.319, 0.444); 0.3, 0.7]
ν2 = = m12 = =
ω1,3 + ω2,3 + ω3,3 2.4 ξ1 + ξ2 0.237

= [(0.213, 0.296, 0.371); 0.5, 0.5], = [(0.814, 1.346, 1.873); 0.3, 0.7],
ω
̃3 [(0.400, 0.600, 0.800); 0.5, 0.5] ξ2 [(0.319, 0.444, 0.556); 0.5, 0.5]
ν3 = = m21 = =
ω1,3 + ω2,3 + ω3,3 2.4 ξ1 + ξ2 0.237
= [(0.167, 0.251, 0.333); 0.5, 0.5]. = [(1.346, 1.873, 2.346); 0.5, 0.5].
[( ) ] ν1
Λ1 = λ1,1 , λ1,2 , λ1,3 ; tΛ1 , fΛ1 = The rest of the elements in Table 7 are computed in analogous manner.
ν1 + ν2 + ν3
Subsequently, the normalized aggregated PF ratings of risk factors O, S,
[(0.129, 0.213, 0.296); 0.3, 0.7] and, D are calculated using Eq. (11). These values are given in Table 8.
=
0.048 + 0.094 + 0.110 Note that, the diagonal of interrelation matrix consists of ones which are
= [(0.512, 0.845, 1.175); 0.3, 0.7], replaced by the normalized aggregated weights and a PF risk matrix is
obtained for every failure mode. The PF risk matrix for FM1 is given as:
where ν1 , ν2 , and ν3 are the defuzzified values of ν1 , ν2 , and ν3 , respec­
tively. Similarly, we have

⎡ ⎤
[(0.188, 0.413, 0.638); 0.5, 0.6] [(0.814, 1.346, 1.873); 0.3, 0.7] [(0.911, 1.507, 2.093); 0.3, 0.7]
Ĩ = [(1.346, 1.873, 2.346); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.880, 0.980, 1.000); 0.9, 0.1] [(1.048, 1.457, 1.824); 0.5, 0.5] ⎦,
⎣
M1
[(1.182, 1.764, 2.351); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.820, 1.228, 1.637); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.657, 0.829, 1.000); 0.5, 0.6]

[( ) ] ν2
Λ2 = λ2,1 , λ2,2 , λ2,3 ; tΛ2 , fΛ2 =
ν1 + ν2 + ν3 The PF permanent Pr (Ĩ ) of Ĩ which is calculated using Eq. 4 is given
M1 M1
[(0.167, 0.251, 0.333); 0.5, 0.5] as:
=
0.048 + 0.094 + 0.110
= [(0.845, 1.175, 1.472); 0.5, 0.5], ( ) [( ) ]
[( ) ] ν3 Pr Ĩ = 3.976, 12.695, 27.928 ; 0.3, 0.7 .
M1
Λ3 = λ3,1 , λ3,2 , λ3,3 ; tΛ3 , fΛ3 =
ν1 + ν2 + ν3
[(0.167, 0.251, 0.333); 0.5, 0.5]
= Subsequently, the PF risk matrices for all failure modes are given as
0.048 + 0.094 + 0.110
follows:
= [(0.663, 0.992, 1.321); 0.5, 0.5].

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A. Luqman et al. Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

⎡ ⎤
[(0.213, 0.463, 0.713); 0.5, 0.6] [(0.814, 1.346, 1.873); 0.3, 0.7] [(0.911, 1.507, 2.093); 0.3, 0.7]
Ĩ = ⎣ [(1.346, 1.873, 2.346); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.020, 0.110, 0.230); 0.9, 0.1] [(1.048, 1.457, 1.824); 0.5, 0.5] ⎦,
M2
[(1.182, 1.764, 2.351); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.820, 1.228, 1.637); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.254, 0.475, 0.696); 0.5, 0.6]
⎡ ⎤
[(0.488, 0.738, 0.988); 0.5, 0.6] [(0.814, 1.346, 1.873); 0.3, 0.7] [(0.911, 1.507, 2.093); 0.3, 0.7]
Ĩ = ⎣ [(1.346, 1.873, 2.346); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.170, 0.370, 0.570); 0.9, 0.1] [(1.048, 1.457, 1.824); 0.5, 0.5] ⎦,
M3
[(1.182, 1.764, 2.351); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.820, 1.228, 1.637); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.116, 0.298, 0.481); 0.5, 0.6]
⎡ ⎤
[(0.088, 0.300, 0.513); 0.5, 0.6] [(0.814, 1.346, 1.873); 0.3, 0.7] [(0.911, 1.507, 2.093); 0.3, 0.7]
Ĩ = ⎣ [(1.346, 1.873, 2.346); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.460, 0.660, 0.860); 0.9, 0.1] [(1.048, 1.457, 1.824); 0.5, 0.5] ⎦,
M4
[(1.182, 1.764, 2.351); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.820, 1.228, 1.637); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.110, 0.298, 0.486); 0.5, 0.6]
⎡ ⎤
[(0.263, 0.513, 0.763); 0.5, 0.6] [(0.814, 1.346, 1.873); 0.3, 0.7] [(0.911, 1.507, 2.093); 0.3, 0.7]
Ĩ = ⎣ [(1.346, 1.873, 2.346); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.740, 0.875, 0.965); 0.9, 0.1] [(1.048, 1.457, 1.824); 0.5, 0.5] ⎦,
M5
[(1.182, 1.764, 2.351); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.820, 1.228, 1.637); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.072, 0.254, 0.436); 0.5, 0.6]
⎡ ⎤
[(0.063, 0.250, 0.438); 0.5, 0.6] [(0.814, 1.346, 1.873); 0.3, 0.7] [(0.911, 1.507, 2.093); 0.3, 0.7]
Ĩ = [(1.346, 1.873, 2.346); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.900, 1.000, 1.000); 0.9, 0.1] [(1.048, 1.457, 1.824); 0.5, 0.5] ⎦,
⎣
M6
[(1.182, 1.764, 2.351); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.820, 1.228, 1.637); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.138, 0.343, 0.547); 0.5, 0.6]
⎡ ⎤
[(0.463, 0.713, 0.963); 0.5, 0.6] [(0.814, 1.346, 1.873); 0.3, 0.7] [(0.911, 1.507, 2.093); 0.3, 0.7]
Ĩ = [(1.346, 1.873, 2.346); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.665, 0.810, 0.955); 0.9, 0.1] [(1.048, 1.457, 1.824); 0.5, 0.5] ⎦,
⎣
M7
[(1.182, 1.764, 2.351); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.820, 1.228, 1.637); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.077, 0.265, 0.453); 0.5, 0.6]
⎡ ⎤
[(0.500, 0.750, 1.000); 0.5, 0.6] [(0.814, 1.346, 1.873); 0.3, 0.7] [(0.911, 1.507, 2.093); 0.3, 0.7]
Ĩ = [(1.346, 1.873, 2.346); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.410, 0.610, 0.810); 0.9, 0.1] [(1.048, 1.457, 1.824); 0.5, 0.5] ⎦.
⎣
M8
[(1.182, 1.764, 2.351); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.820, 1.228, 1.637); 0.5, 0.5] [(0.177, 0.398, 0.619); 0.5, 0.6]

The corresponding permanents of all PF risk matrices Ĩ for all failure 5.1. Proof of the performance of the proposed model
Ml
modes are given as:
( ) In view of its advantages and characteristics, the DGMA has been
Pr Ĩ = [(2.497, 9.257, 22.503); 0.3, 0.7], combined with PFSs to evaluate the failures in a power generating plant
( M2 ) system. The proposed FMEA can not only deal with the subjectivity and
Pr Ĩ = [(2.752, 10.061, 24.210); 0.3, 0.7],
( M3 ) vagueness in both the risk factors weights determination and the failure
Pr Ĩ = [(2.709, 10.027, 24.184); 0.3, 0.7], modes evaluation process, but it also allows us to visualize various risk
( M4 )
factors and their interrelations using a graphical representation. In the
Pr Ĩ = [(3.129, 10.923, 25.333); 0.3, 0.7],
( M5 )
Pr Ĩ = [(3.195, 10.981, 24.943); 0.3, 0.7],
( M6 ) Table 9
Pr Ĩ = [(3.224, 11.175, 26.052); 0.3, 0.7], Pythagorean fuzzy permanents and risk priority indexes.
( M7 )
Pr Ĩ = [(3.114, 11.074, 26.263); 0.3, 0.7]. FMl TPF Permanents RPI Ranking
M8
FM1 [(3.976, 12.695, 27.928);0.3,0.7] 3.348 1
Since, the risk factors weights and risk ratings are all TPFNs, the FM2 [(2.497, 9.257, 22.503);0.3,0.7] 2.570 8
calculated permanents are also TPFNs for all failures as given in Table 9. FM3 [(2.752, 10.061, 24.210);0.3,0.7] 2.777 6
Note that, the PF permanents are converted into crisp values using FM4 [(2.709, 10.027, 24.184);0.3,0.7] 2.769 7
defuzzification techniques such as expected and accuracy values of FM5 [(3.129, 10.923, 25.333);0.3,0.7] 2.954 4
TPFNs to compute the risk priority indexes for every failure mode. FM6 [(3.195, 10.981, 24.943);0.3,0.7] 2.934 5
Table 9 shows that FM1 owns the maximum RPI and should be corrected FM7 [(3.224, 11.175, 26.052);0.3,0.7] 3.034 2
with higher priority to be corrected followed by FM8 , FM7 , FM5 , FM6 , FM3 , FM8 [(3.114, 11.074, 26.263);0.3,0.7] 3.034 3
FM4 , and FM2 .

Table 8
The normalized aggregated ratings of risk factors.
F Ml Occurrence Severity Detection

FM1 [(0.188, 0.413,0.638);0.5,0.6] [(0.880, 0.980, 1.000);0.9,0.1] [(0.657, 0.829, 1.000);0.5,0.6]

FM2 [(0.213, 0.463,0.713);0.5,0.6] [(0.020, 0.110, 0.230);0.9,0.1] [(0.254, 0.475, 0.696);0.5,0.6]
FM3 [(0.488, 0.738,0.988);0.5,0.6] [(0.170, 0.370, 0.570);0.9,0.1] [(0.116, 0.298, 0.481);0.5,0.6]
FM4 [(0.088, 0.300,0.513);0.5,0.6] [(0.460, 0.660, 0.860);0.9,0.1] [(0.110, 0.298, 0.486);0.5,0.6]
FM5 [(0.263, 0.513,0.763);0.5,0.6] [(0.740, 0.875, 0.965);0.9,0.1] [(0.072, 0.254, 0.436);0.5,0.6]
FM6 [(0.063, 0.250, 0.438);0.5,0.6] [(0.900, 1.000, 1.000);0.9,0.1] [(0.138, 0.343, 0.547);0.5,0.6]
FM7 [(0.463, 0.713, 0.963);0.5,0.6] [(0.665, 0.810, 0.955);0.9,0.1] [(0.077, 0.265, 0.453);0.5,0.6]
FM8 [(0.500, 0.750, 1.000);0.5,0.6] [(0.410, 0.610, 0.810);0.9,0.1] [(0.177, 0.398, 0.619);0.5,0.6]

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A. Luqman et al. Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518

Table 10
Comparison of rankings.
F Ml The proposed RPN Rough Fuzzy FDGMA
model TOPSIS VIKOR

Ranking O S D RPN Ranking CCl Ranking Ql Ranking Ranking

FM 1 1 4 9 7 252 1 0.367 1 0.960 1 1

FM2 8 4 3 4 48 8 0.737 8 0.000 8 8
FM3 6 6 4 4 96 6 0.600 7 0.506 6 6
FM4 7 4 6 4 96 6 0.587 6 0.209 7 7
FM5 4 4 9 4 144 3 0.474 3 0.516 5 4
FM6 5 4 10 3 120 4 0.493 4 0.694 2 5
FM7 3 7 8 2 112 5 0.473 2 0.600 4 3
FM8 2 6 6 5 180 2 0.495 5 0.642 3 2

proposed application, the linguistic weighting variables are expressed in
the form of TPFNs. They are assigned by team experts to evaluate the
comparative significance of all risk factors. For instance, [(0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
; 0.7, 0.4] represents the rating of risk factor weights using the linguistic
variable “high”. Note that 0.7 +0.4 = 1.1 > 1 but 0.72 + 0.42 =
0.650 < 1, which proves the applicability of PFSs when FSs or even IFSs
fail to accommodate this input. Similarly, all ratings of risk factors and
failure modes weights are represented through TPFNs in the proposed
application to enhance the space of applicability as compared to other
uncertainty theories. Therefore, we have applied TPFNs as these
numbers are more appropriate for measuring the two dimensional un­
certain data given in form of orthopairs about decision applications. The
foremost reason for defining and using TPFNs is stated as their compu­
tational efficiency and intuitive representation. After that, the visuali­
zation of various risk factors and their interrelations are represented
using the graphical representation, i.e., the RFPFDG. Moreover, the
utilization of permanent function in assessment of failure modes helps to
represent risk factors as acquired from combinatorial consideration. In
such utilization, no negative sign will emerge in equations hence no data
or knowledge would be lost. Finally, the evaluations of failure modes
and the relative significance of risk factors have been used together to
determine the risk priorities of the failure modes which is considered as
the most important feature of the proposed technique. Hence, the new
model is able to make full utilization of the assessment information in
the risk analysis process, thus providing a more rational risk evaluation
framework for FMEA.
Further, we have defined defuzzification techniques for TPFNs. We
have utilized the expected values, score functions and accuracy func­
tions to convert TPFNs into crisp values and to evaluate them. For
example, the TPF permanent for failure mode FM1 in the form of TPFN is
given as P̃ = [(3.976,12.695,27.928); 0.3,0.7]. Then, the expected value
E(P)
̃ of P
̃ is calculated using Eq. 1 as,
( ) [( ) ( )]
E P̃ = 1 3.976 + 12.695 + 27.928 × 1 + 0.32 − 0.72 = 3.348.
8
(12)

The score function Scor(P)

̃ of P
̃ is calculated using Eq. (2) as,
( ) ( )
̃ = 3.348 × 0.32 − 0.72 = − 1.339.
Scor P (13)

Fig. 10. Comparison of rankings of proposed model, FDGM, and traditional The accuracy function Acc(P)
̃ of P
̃ is calculated using Eq. 3 as,
RPN techniques. ( ) ( )
̃ = 3.348 × 0.32 + 0.72 = 1.942.
Acc P (14)

To obtain the evaluation with PFSs, the TPF permanents for failure
modes are converted into crisp values using these defuzzification tech­
niques to compute the risk priority indexes. In the proposed model, we
have used the expected values to obtain the ranking of failure modes.

6. Discussions and comparative analysis

The effectiveness of our proposed method depending on PFDG and

Fig. 11. Comparison of rankings of rough TOPSIS and fuzzy VIKOR techniques.
matrix technique is verified by implementing the conventional RPN
method, fuzzy VIKOR, fuzzy diagraph and matrix (FDGM) technique,
and rough TOPSIS for the given case study. The risk priority indexes and
the evaluation of all failures which are obtained for each technique are
given in Table 10. It is observed from Table 10 that the final orders of
ranking of FM1 and FM2 are similar corresponding to all five techniques.
That is, the failure mode FM1 having the maximum risk ranking should
be given the highest risk priority and the failure mode FM2 comprising
the minimum risk ranking must be assigned the lowest risk priority. The

13
A. Luqman et al.
other failure modes possess the distinct ranking levels in all the five
independent FMEA techniques. This proves that the classical RPN
technique, fuzzy VIKOR, rough TOPSIS, and FDGM approach determine
the risk priority rankings using different mechanism. Note that, RPN for
both FM3 and FM4 is 96 but both failures have different risk levels
whereas the resulted ranking of PFDG and matrix approach reveals that
FM3 owns a greater risk priority contrary to FM4 , which is also same with
the results determined through the fuzzy VIKOR and FDGM approach. It
can be noted that in conventional RPN method, the risk factors O,S, and
D are prioritized in an absolute and accurate way and multiplied simply
to calculate the RPN without assuming the vagueness in evaluation and
relative weights importance. Additionally, the final evaluation of our
developed model represents that the failure mode FM5 possesses larger
risk priority in comparison with FM6 . Note that, the evaluation of FM5
through rough TOPSIS and conventional RPN techniques is also higher.
However, FM6 experiences a larger risk priority in FMEA using fuzzy
VIKOR approach. In the adopted method for risk assessment in FMEA,
FM8 is evaluated as the second most important failure mode and owns a
greater risk ranking as compared to FM7 . Since the interconnections
among risk factors are not assumed in rough TOPSIS and fuzzy VIKOR
techniques that cause the inconsistencies and biased rankings of results.
Comparison of rankings by applying the proposed model PFDGM
approach, FDGM, and traditional RPN technique is given in Fig. 10 and
comparison of rankings by applying rough TOPSIS and fuzzy VIKOR
techniques is shown in Fig. 11.
The above analysis and discussions conclude that the rankings of risk
evaluations of all failure modes are more reliable and accurate through
the PFDGMA. Although, Table 10 shows the same ranking of results
through different techniques, but the priorities of the proposed method
are described as follows. The proposed model permits experts to assess
the risk factors and their corresponding weights in form of linguistic
variables rather than in an exact way as the conventional RPN tech­
niques. This makes the evaluations much easier and simpler to be carried
out. The main reason to prefer the proposed technique over rough
TOPSIS and fuzzy VIKOR techniques is that the interconnections be­
tween risk factors are not taken into consideration in later methods that
can cause biased ranking results. Furthermore, FDGMA technique
combines the benefits of DGMA and FSs. In this technique, the uncer­
tainty is considered only in one direction, i.e., only the confidence level
is represented through fuzzy numbers. To deal with confidence as well
as non confidence level in form of truth and falsity degrees, the proposed
model provides a better illustration of FMEA problem. In particular, the
RPIs defined through PFDGMA propose a novel technique for the eval­
uation of failure modes in FMEA.
6.1. Comparison with existing techniques
. applications. The foremost reason for defining and using TPFNs is stated
(i) Gandhi and Agrawal (1992) presented a technique for FMEA
based on DGMA. The functional and structural interaction of the
system was considered in the proposed method. The digraph was
represented using matrices for efficient computer processing. A crisp
DGMA approach is unable to handle information containing uncer­
tainty. Our proposed model overcomes this deficiency of crisp
DGMA. The model not only deals with vague information but also
combines the truth and falsity degrees to represent confidence and
non confidence levels within widen range.
(ii) Kutlu and Ekmekcioglu (2012) proposed a fuzzy approach for
FMEA that allowed decision makers to utilize linguistic variables to
determine the risk factors. They applied ‘technique for order pref­
erence by similarity to ideal solution’ (TOPSIS) method combined
with fuzzy ‘analytical hierarchy process’ (AHP). The main disad­
vantage of their proposed method is that the relative importance
between all risk factors is not taken under consideration.
14
Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518
Furthermore, FMEA technique under fuzzy environment only de­
scribes the truth degree, i.e., the satisfaction degree. These tech­
niques lack some information regarding the falsity degree, i.e., the
dissatisfaction degree. This shortcoming of fuzzy methods is handled
through PFDGMA, i.e, our proposed model.
(iii) Liu et al. (2016) developed a DGMA for FMEA under fuzzy
environment. The proposed technique combined the benefits of
DGMA and FSs. Thus, the functional and structural interaction of the
system was considered dealing with vagueness. In this technique, the
uncertainty was considered only in one direction, i.e., only the
confidence level was represented through fuzzy numbers. To deal
with confidence as well as non confidence level, the proposed model
provides better illustration in form of truth and falsity degrees.
(iv) Liu et al. (2015) introduced a novel modified TOPSIS method,
namely IF hybrid TOPSIS approach, to obtain risk rankings of failure
modes. They considered both the subjective and objective weights of
risk factors. The FMEA techniques based on IFSs fail to handle un­
certainties when the sum of squares of orthopairs exceeds one. The
proposed model deals the information presented in the form of
orthopairs by relaxing the constraint of IFSs. Moreover, the evalua­
tion of risk factors in linguistic variables (instead of the accuracy
demanded by traditional methods for FMEA) makes the rankings
easier to be followed through.
6.2. Advantages of the proposed scheme
The concept of FSs was initiated by Zadeh (1965) to handle vague­
ness by assigning a membership degree to every element that ranges
between 0 and 1. After that, IFSs were proposed as a more generalized
concept whose fuzzy membership was denoted by mutually orthogonal
FSs, named as orthopairs, rather than a singe value (Atanassov, 1986).
Since IFSs restrict the selection of orthopairs from a triangular region
due to its defining constraint, i.e., 0⩽T(x) + F(x) ≤ 1. This condition
confines the applicability of IFSs in various practical applications. To
expand the space of assigning orthopairs, PFSs were defined as an
extended form of IFSs (Yager 2014). The two membership functions,
namely truth and falsity degrees, in PFSs satisfy the expression
0⩽T2 (x) + F2 (x) ≤ 1. Thus, PFSs have enlarged space as compared to
other uncertainty theories, including FSs, IFSs, and hesitant FSs.
Furthermore, the influence of objective and subjective factors creates
various difficulties for decision experts to provide the accurate assess­
ment on complicated things in practical decision applications. The PFNs,
defined as the special PFSs on real line, are appropriate frameworks to
represent these ill known terms. Three types of traditional PFNs are
TPFNs, trapezoidal PF numbers (TrPFNs), and interval-valued trape­
zoidal PF numbers (IVTrPFNs). In the proposed model, we have applied
TPFNs as these numbers are more appropriate for measuring the two
dimensional uncertain data given in form of orthopairs about decision
as their computational efficiency and intuitive representation.
By comparing this approach with conventional RPN techniques, and
investigating its applicability, we can summarize the main advantages of
the suggested scheme as follows:
1. The evaluation of risk factors in linguistic variables (instead of the
accuracy demanded by traditional methods for FMEA) makes the
rankings easier to be followed through.
2. The evaluation and rankings of the failure modes combine the rela­
tive significance of risk factors and their linguistic assessments.
Hence this linguistic approach yields a better assessment of failure
modes.
3. The developed model contains the complete structural components
of relative significance among risk factors.
A. Luqman et al.
4. Not only the evaluation of failure modes is provided by a PFDGMA. It
also presents a graphical description of risk factors and the in­
terrelations between them.
5. Little changes in risk factors lead to notable differences in RPIs,
which makes the proposed model capable to fully identify the failure
modes by evaluating them in descending order.
6. Hence, the proposed model based on PFDGMA is effective and it
evaluates risks in FMEA easily.
7. In particular, the RPIs defined through PFDGMA propose a novel
technique for the evaluation of failure modes in FMEA.
7. Conclusions and future directions
FMEA is a powerful technique to determine, recognize, and eradicate
possible or known failures from products, structures, designs, services or
organizations before reaching the customers. The basic purpose of FMEA
is to determine the possible failure modes, analyze the sources and
consequences of different elements of failures, and discover what could
abolish or minimize the possibility of failure. The results of the evalu­
ation can help experts to identify and upgrade failures with dangerous
and damaging effects on the structure or system, thus enhancing its
productivity and proficiency at the production and design stages. In this
article, we have proposed a new technique to evaluate risk rankings of
failure modes in FMEA based on TPFNs and DGMA. The developed
technique not only overcomes the flaws and shortcomings of traditional
RPN and fuzzy techniques. It also allows the FMEA experts to analyze
the risk factors and the corresponding significance between them in
linguistic terms. We have calculated the RPIs by defuzzification of the PF
permanents that are obtained in terms of TPFNs. The interrelation
matrices have been utilized to collect crucial data and important infor­
mation associated with the problem. The RPIs, obtained by PF perma­
nents, have provided the FMEA with a compatible process of risk
prioritization assuming all the interrelations among risk factors.
Further, we have studied a real case of a power generating plant. We
have performed detailed computations for calculating RPIs in order to
examine the potential application and effectiveness of our technique.
Fuzzy VIKOR, fuzzy DGMA, and rough TOPSIS techniques have been
used for comparison with well-established techniques. We have proved
that the proposed technique resolves some critical problems of existing
methods and provides more precise risk evaluation results for remedial
actions. Since the risk factors have a significant impact on the final
assessment of failure modes in FMEA, the assumption of in­
terconnections among risk factors provides a novel direction in the
domain of risk evaluation.
For future work, the technique that we have developed can be uti­
lized to handle other decision making problems, including
manufacturing systems selection, supplier selection, project selection,
factory location, and various other fields of management resolution
problems. Thus, this study can be extended as follows:
1. PF membership grades can be extended to q-rung orthopair fuzzy
grades to evaluate failure modes in FMEA.
2. The DGMA technique can be combined with the m-polar fuzzy hybrid
weighted operators to handle risk evaluations in case of multi polar
information.
3. Alternative MCDM techniques can be applied to FMEA under the
assumption of more than three risk factors, e.g., the PF-TOPSIS
method and PF-ELECTRE I method.
4. Hesitant PF membership grades can be applied in risk evaluation to
represent hesitant degrees of corresponding failure modes.
5. Alternative MCDM techniques can be combined with the AHP tech­
nique in order to evaluate risks in FMEA. This should result into a PF
TOPSIS-based PF AHP method.
15
Expert Systems With Applications 170 (2021) 114518
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Anam Luqman: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Writing -
original draft, Writing - review & editing. Muhammad Akram: Meth­
odology, Supervision, Writing - original draft. José Carlos R. Alcantud:
Formal analysis, Writing - review & editing.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
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