Title
Dimatulac v. Vilon, G.R. No.
127107, October 12, 1998)
Who are entitled to the mantle of
due process of law?
Guevarra u. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 138792-804,
March 31, 2005
What is the effect of violation of the
due process clause?
Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-
54645-76, December
18, 1986
ex post facto clause
People vs VA G.R. No. 154954
December 1, 2014
Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066,
February 17, 2005
What is the equipoise rule?
The equipoise rule — that if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty,
and does not suffice to produce a
conviction the same must be denied.
(Abarquez v. People, G RNo.
150762, January 20, 2006)
Doctrines
The State, as well as the accused, is entitled to due process of
law. For justice to prevail the scales must be balanced; justice is
not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society
and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered. A verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of
justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for,
to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean
injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the
accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the
other. (Dimatulac v. Vilon, G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998)
In Guevarra u. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138792-804,
March 31, 2005, the Sandiganbayan ordered the dismissal of
13 cases against petitioners over the objection of the Special
Prosecutor. By such order, the court deprived the People of
its right to due process. It acted in excess of its jurisdiction
and committed grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the
criminal cases. Hence, the order was null and void; it may
thus be rectified despite the lapse of 15 days from notice to the
Special Prosecutor.
A void order or judgment has no legal and binding effect,
force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is
non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any
action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even
necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment
or final order; it may simply be ignored.
Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-54645-76, December
18, 1986 upheld the inclusion of public officers and employees
earlier charged for suspension pendente lite under the law
amending R.A. 3019. The amendment was not ex post facto
even if applied retroactively because the suspension was not
a form of penalty but merely preventive. It is not a penalty
because it is not imposed after and as a consequence of hearing
on the merits.
Conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal
cases, moral certainty — not mere possibility — determines the
guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for
the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the
prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof
required in all criminal cases. (Ladonga v. People, G.R. No.
141066, February 17, 2005)

Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396,
February 11, 2003)
1.) Who comprises the different
heads and staff of diplomatic
missions?
2.) What are the limitations to the
immunity principle?
ARTICLE 1- ARTICLE 10
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations lists the
classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include:
(a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of ^ State;
(b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to theheads of
States; and
(c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of
foreign affairs.
Comprising the staff of the (diplomatic) mission are the diplomatic
staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff.
Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic
staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and
service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank.
(Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396,
February 11, 2003)
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he
is acting within the directives of the sending State. The consent of
the host State is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy
between the two sovereigns.
Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the US,
stationed within Philippine territory, under the RPUS Military Bases
Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar
agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the
US (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and
related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the
consent or imprimatur .of the Philippine government to the activities
of the US Drug Enforcement Agency (USDEA), however, is evident.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the
government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both
the Philippine DFA and the US Embassy, as well as the
participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in
the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of MM at the
behest of SS, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status"
of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
of SS within Philippine territory. The job description of SS has
tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers
and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law
enforcers who would then make the arrest. In conducting
surveillance activities on MM, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal
witness in the criminal case against MM, SS hardly can be said to
have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. SS,
as an agent of the USDEA allowed by the Philippine government to
conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the
drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of State immunity from suit.
(Minucher v. CA, February 11, 2003)
Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713
What are the limitations to the
immunity principle?
People v. Paganor, G.R. Nos. 140006-
10, April 20, 2001)
What is the rule on the existence of
intent?
Lim v. CA, G.R. No. 100311, May 18,
1993
How is intent manifested?
People v. Bautista, G.R. Nos. 120898-
99, May 14, 1998
When is motive material in
determining the criminal agency?
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not
be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This
situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official
may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and
in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and
jurisdiction. ( (Shaufv. CA, 191 SCRA 713)
As a general rule, criminal intent is presumed (general intent). But
where intent is an element of the crime (specific criminal intent), the
intent cannot be presumed but must be established. In attempted or
frustrated homicide, intent to kill is a specific criminal intent because
if not established only physical injuries will be charged. Inference of
intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove the fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such
intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is physical
injuries People v. Paganor, G.R. Nos. 140006-10, April 20, 2001)
Intent is a mental state which cannot be seen and therefore its
existence can only be demonstrated by the overt/ acts of a
person. The choice of a particular means will show the true intent
of the actor. Animus furandi is presumed from the commission of an
unlawful act in bringing out from the bodega of the petitioner the
tires which were loaded on his pick-up. Dolo is not required in
crimes punished by a special statute because it is the act alone,
irrespective of the motive which constitutes the offense.
When it was proved that petitioner committed the unlawful acts
alleged in the information, it was properly presumed that they were
committed with full knowledge and with criminal intent, and it was
incumbent upon him to rebut such a presumption. Moreover,
Section 5, P.D. 1612 provides for the presumption from the mere
possession of anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery as prima facie evidence of fencing. This
presumption must be upheld in the light of petitioner's shallow
demurrer premised on a denial and alibi, since a disputable
presumption is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence. (Lim
v. CA, G.R. No. 100311, May 18, 1993)
Motive alone will not give rise to criminal liability because under
the RPC, there must be an overt act or an omission. No matter how
evil the internal thought is, as long as there are no overt acts, no crime
is committed. The rule is that proof of motive is unnecessary to impute
a crime on the accused if the evidence concerning his identification is
convincing. A converso, if the evidence of identification is unclear, then
the jurisprudential doctrine is that proof of motive is a paramount
necessity. People v.Bautista, G.R. Nos. 120898-99, May 14, 1998
People u. Cordova, July 1993
Define intelligence within the purview
of felonies.
Intelligence is the capacity to understand what is right and what is
wrong. Discernment is relevant to intelligence, NOT to intent. It
does not mean that when a person acted with discernment, he
intended the crime or the wrong done. (People u. Cordova, July
1993).

Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, March

19, 1910.
What is mistake of fact?
 That mistake which had the
facts been true to the belief of
the offender, can justify his act.
It is such mistake that will
negative criminal liability
(ignorantia facti excusat)
because of the absence of the
element of intent. However, if
the offender is negligent in
ascertaining the true state of
facts, he may be free from dolo
but not from culpa.
This is the teaching in Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, March19, 1910.
Defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and
both were employed in the same place and usually slept in the
same room. One night, after the defendant had gone to bed, he
was awakened by someone trying to open the door, and called out
twice, "who is there?" He received no answer, and fearing that the
intruder was a robber, leaped from the bed and again called out: "If
you enter the room I will kill you." At that moment he was struck by
a chair which had been placed against the door. Believing that he
was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally
wounded the intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. AC was
charged with murder.

People v. Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June

23, 2000

What is aberratio ictus?

In aberratio ictus or error in the victim
of the blow, the offender intends the
injury on one person but the harm fell
on another.

May treachery be appreciated in
aberratio ictus?
People v. Pinto Jr. G.R. No. 39519,
November 21, 1991
Yes. When the offender fired at his adversary but missed, the
unintended victims were helpless to defend themselves. Their
deaths were murders since the acts were qualified by treachery.
(People v. Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000)

What are the elements of fulfillment In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes
of duty or exercise of right or office? incomplete thereby converting it into a mitigating circumstance
under Articles 13 and 69. (People v. Pinto Jr. G.R. No. 39519,
a. The offender acted in the November 21, 1991)
performance of a duty or
the lawful exercise of a
right or office; and
b. The injury caused or the
offense committed is the
necessary consequence of
the due performance of
such right or office.

(People v. Flores, 252 SCRA 31)
What is the rule of proximate
cause?
Under Article 4, paragraph 1, a person committing a felony is liable
for its consequences. For instance, Kevin announced a hold-up at a
jeepney while brandishing a knife. Because of fear, Cosme jumped
out of the jeepney and was run over by a truck killing him instantly.
Kevin will be liable for the death of Cosme even though he had not
touched the latter. When a person causes a belief in the mind of
another making the latter to act in a manner fatal to him, the former
will be liable for that act of engendering such a belief. Even if there
is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he may be liable for
homicide because of the rule of proximate cause.
Thus, anyone who inflicts injury voluntarily and with intent is
liable for all the consequences of his criminal act, such as
death, that supervenes as a consequence of the injuries. Here,
accused is liable for the demise of the victim for such was caused
by the violent kicks which he inflicted on the vital parts of the
victim's body. (People v. Flores, 252 SCRA 31)