INTRODUCTION

Administrative actions are either ministerial or discretionary. A ministerial function

is one where the authority has a duty to do a particular thing in a particular way.
Such actions are however exceptional. In most administrative actions, the
administrative authority has the power either to act or not to act in one way or the
other. This power to act or not to act in one way or other is called Discretionary
power. ‘Discretion’ is the power to decide or act according to one’s judgment.

Administrative authorities have to exercise the discretionary powers in various

ways. For instance whether a statute created for the nationalization of road routes is
far and equitable or not or whether a dispute can be referred to the Industrial
Tribunal act or not.
They also have to decide whether the activities of a person or organization are likely
to be prejudicial to the law or whether a person is likely to be threat to the security
of the state or not.

The problems of Administrative discretion are complex. It is true that in any

intensive form of government, the government cannot function without the exercise
of some discretion by the officials. But it is equally true that absolute discretion is
ruthless master. It is more destructive of freedom than any of man’s invention1. It
could be inferred that the use of discretionary power of the administrative authorities
is very important for the fulfillment of their functions but the exercise of this
discretionary power should not be unguided and uncontrolled. It has to be limited by
certain methods so that they do not become unguided and in turn violate the actions
of the administrative authority.

Such power can be controlled either at the stage of conferment of Administrative

power or at the stage of exercise of such power. This paper seeks to analysis the

1
Justice Douglas in U.S. v Wunderlich, 342 US 98,101 (1951)

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1465519

concept of Administrative Discretion and the limitation on the exercise of
administrative power at the stage of conferment of power. This paper seeks to
examine why limitations on the exercise of the administrative power is necessary
and what are the methods by such power can be controlled and limited. The paper is
a collection of arguments and case laws to analyze the above mentioned.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1465519

 ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION DEFINED
The word Discretion in the layman term can be defined as choosing from amongst
the various available alternatives without reference to any predetermined criterion,
no matter how fanciful that choice may be. For e.g. a person writing his Will has
such discretion to dispose of his property in any manner, no matter how fanciful and
arbitrary it is. But when the term discretion is preceded or qualified by the word
Administration it has an entirely different meaning. In this sense the word discretion
means the Choosing from available options is on the basis of rules of reasons and
justice and not on the personal whims and fancies of an individual. Such exercise is
not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular2.

The West Encyclopedia of American Law has defined Administrative Discretion

as “The exercise of professional expertise and judgment, as opposed to strict
adherence to regulations or statutes, in making a decision or performing official acts
or duties. It is something informal and therefore unprotected by safeguards inherent
in formal procedures. It is a freedom to make a choice among potential course of
action3.”

Prof Julius Grey in hi book Discretion in Administrative Law gas defined it as “

it is a power to make a decision that cannot be determined to be right or wrong in
any objective way.”

Lord Diplock4 in Secretary of State for Education & Science v. Tameride

Metroborough Council5 has defined it as “the very concept of Administrative
Discretion involves a right to choose between more that one possible courses of

2
Sharp v Wakefield, 1891 AC 173
3
West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, available at,
http://www.enotes.com/wests-law-encyclopedia/administrative-discretion.
4
Sir Edward Coke (1 February 1552 – 3 September 1634), was a seventeenth-century English jurist
and Member of Parliament whose writings on the common law were the definitive legal texts for
nearly 150 years.
5
[1976] 3 All ER 665.
action upon which there is a room for reasonable people to hold differing opinion as
to what may be preferred.”

Justice Coke as defined it as “ Discretion is a science or understanding to discern

between falsity and truth, between right and wrong, between substance and shadow,
between equity and colourable classes and pretence not to do according to their wills
and personal affections6.”

DISCRETION INEVITABLE
It has been already stated earlier that no modern day government can work without
the exercise of discretion by its administrative authorities. Therefore it can be
further inferred that the government cannot also function without the grant of
discretionary power to the administrative authorities. The reason for growth of
discretionary power can be attributed to the following reasons:-
• The welfare notion of the government and adoption of other development
policies.
• Environmental Control mechanisms.
• Lack for Technical Competence and requirement of expert advice on the part
of the legislation
• Unforeseen Situations.
• Complexity of Subject matters and variety of problems to be encountered by
the administrative authorities.

In addition to the reasons stated above administrative discretion is inevitable

because it is done to seek fulfillment of certain purposes. Broadly the functions can
be classified as follows:-

6
MASSEY I.P. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 65(2008)
 • At the time of laying down a law the legislators leave certain gaps and
ambiguities in the law. These gaps and ambiguities are to be filled by the
exercise of administrative authorities on case to case basis.
• Determination of rights and interest of people that depends upon the exercise
of discretion of the authorities.
• The policy objectives are sought to be widened by the use of administrative
discretion.
• Discretion is used to deal with unforeseen situation
• It is used to handle matters which require technical expertise as the officers
of a technical department are more quipped to handle such matters as
compared to the legislatures.
• It provides flexibility to cater needs of different situations.
• It provides a time saving mechanism.
• Since it grants certain power to authorities it also fix up their responsibilities
as they are accountable for their action.
Expressions such as ‘if he is of the opinion’, or ‘if he is satisfied’, or ‘if he has
reasonable grounds to believe’, vest power in the authority to act on forming an
opinion or being satisfied that such action is necessary. It was such discretionary
power that became an object of Dicey’s Criticism in his monumental treatise on
constitutional law7. Dicey thought that Discretion was the source of inequality and
discrimination and of arbitrary action. It was therefore negation of rule of law. Rule
of Law according to Dicey, warranted absolute predictability of administrative
action8.

DISCRETION AND LEGALITY

It is of most important concern to the authorities of administrative law that this
power should be exercised properly in accordance with and within the limits of the
law that confers it. As the functions of the state has expanded and has become
7
DICEY, AV, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (MACMILLAN)
8
MASSEY I.P. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 65-66 (2008)
increasingly complex so has increased the conferment of discretionary power. The
Courts are faced with a difficult task of allowing the administrative authorities
maximum freedom so as to enable them to accomplish the purpose of the act
without letting them act arbitrarily.
The Judicial Review has also increased proportionally to the increase in the complex
regulatory functions of the state. In England the court have abandoned the judicial
restraints of the war years9and of the post war years10 and have laid down the test to
be met for the exercise of discretionary power in the Wednusbury’s Case 11 and later
on the proportionality test which came in through the door of European Convention
on Human Rights12.
The Indian courts have also traveled down the same lane with the only difference
that proportionality test was the part of Indian system by virtue of Constitutional
provisions. An Administrative action is subject to review at the stage of Conferment
of discretionary power and at the stage of exercise of discretion. Article 14 and
Article 16 of the Constitution act as regulators of discretionary power at the stage of
conferment. Constitutionally, no act of the legislature or the executive can be valid
if it is outside the scope given by the constitution.13

9
Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206
10
Nakkuda Ali v Jayratne [1951] AC 66
11
Associated Provincial Pictures Ltd. v Wednesbury Corp. (1948) 1 KB 223
12
HCR WADE AND CF FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 181-218 (2000)
13
SATHE S.P., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 387 (2004)
 LIMITATION AT THE STAGE OF CONFERMENT OF DISCRETIONARY
POWER
When the legislature lays down a law in such a manner that the chances of abuse of
that law is higher that is in other words if that particular law can be easily misused
or abused and the rights and interests of the people will be adversely affected than in
that case there is a need for checking or limiting such grant of discretionary power.
Here the power conferred is very wide and leads to the abuse of Article 14 and
Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. Therefore in such cases Article 14 and Article
19 of the constitution act as regulators to such grant of power.
The grant of Administrative Discretion can be challenged on the ground that it
violates the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution. For example, such
discretion may be so exercised as to treat different persons differently without
justification or may make the enjoyment of important freedoms of association, or
freedom of speech and expression, or freedom of assembly, or freedom to carry on
trade or business, dependent upon the sweet will of the administrative authorities. If
the discretion conferred is uncontrolled, there is a possibility of discrimination, the
law conferring such discretion may be held invalid on the grounds of its
inconsistency with the fundamental right to equality before the law and equal
protection of law guaranteed by the Art.14 of the Constitution. Similarly, if a law
grants absolute discretion to the executives to allow or not to allow an activity
involving the exercise of any of the freedoms guaranteed by Art 19, such a law is
held to be unreasonable restrictions on those rights.14
LIMITATION ON GRANT OF DISCRETIONARY POWER AND ARTICLE 14
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution provides certain limitation on the conferment
of discretionary powers. Article 14 of the Constitution says “The State shall not
deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within
the territory of India.” Article 14 provides a fundamental right of equality before
law and equal protection of law to the citizens of India. It lays down that laws

14
SATHE S.P., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 388 (2004)
should be applicable to every person in the same sense and should not discriminate
one person against another. Any law which discriminates between persons or classes
of persons would be invalid and void. A similar criterion has been adopted while
checking the validity of the discretionary power exercised by the administrative
authorities.
The above mentioned point has been highlighted by the Supreme Court in Ram
Krishna v Justice Tendulkar15, The Supreme court after laying down the rule that
what Article 14 forbade was class legislation but not classification, pointed out that
the legislature might itself indicate persons or things to whom or which its
provisions were intended to apply and the basis of such classifications of such
persons and thing might either appear on the face of the statute or be gathered from
the surrounding circumstances known to, or brought to the attention of, the court.
The statute might, however not make any classification of persons or things for the
purpose of applying its provisions and leave it to the discretion of the government to
select and classify persons and things to whom its provisions should apply. In such
case the mere fact that no classification had been made or that the discretion had
been vested in the government did not lead to invalidation of the law. The Court
would inquire whether the statute contained any policy or principles for guiding the
exercise of discretion by the government in the matter of selection or classification
and if it did not, the statute would be struck down on the ground that it had
conferred arbitrary power and uncontrolled power on the government, which would
lead to the discrimination between persons or things similarly situated.
The control imposed by Article 14 can be well understood by analyzing a series of
cases decided on the same issue.
• West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar16
The West Bengal statute provided for special courts to try cases or classes of
cases or offences or classes of offences for ensuring speedier trial. The act
did not lay down any what types of offences or cases were to be tried by

15
AIR 1958 SC 538
16
AIR 1952 SC 75, [1952] SCR 284
 special courts. The executive authorities could arbitrarily select a case for
trial by the special courts. It was held that in so far as the Act empowered the
government to have any case or class of case or offence or class of offences
tried by the special courts, it violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

• IN RE THE SPECIAL COURTS BILL 197817

The Supreme Court in this case upheld the special courts bill, which
provided for special courts to deal with offences committed by persons who
had held high political offices during the period of emergency imposed by
Indira Gandhi government in 1975. The bill gave power to the government
to refer such cases to the special courts. The Court upheld the grant of
discretion because it was controlled by the policy of the Act. The Court held
that the grant of discretion to refer to special courts any case pertaining to the
abuse of power during the period of emergency was valid that constituted a
class. However, the court objected to the grant discretion to refer a case
abuse of power before the period of emergency because the cases of abuse of
power before the emergency did not constitute a class.
• SATWANT SINGH V ASSISTANT PASSPORT OFFICER18
The Passports Act, 1967 was in question in this case. The act gave power to
the passport officer to give or refuse a passport without specifying any
guidelines for the existence of such power, was held invalid. The court asked
the Parliament to specify the criteria in accordance with which the passport
officer was supposed to exercise the discretion.
• MAHARASHTRA V. KAMAL S DURGULE19
Section 65-A of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935,
which conferred blanket powers on the state government to decide matters
contemplated under the Act, even including quasi judicial matters, was held
to be violative of Article 14.
17
(1979) 1 SCC 380
18
AIR 1976 SC 1836
19
(1985) 1 SCC 234, AIR 1985 SC 119
 • CONSUMER ACTION GROUP V TAMIL NADU20
It was held in this case that an attack on the grant of discretionary power can
be repelled by showing that such a grant is circumscribed by a policy and
standards in accordance with which the power is to be exercised. Such a
policy may be discerned from its preamble, the objects and the reasons and
other provisions of the Act.
• R PATNAKAR RAO V ANDHRA PRADESH21
The Court held that normally the discretion is held not to be unguided,
unanalyzed or arbitrary if there are built in checks against its abuse.
The two built in checks are:-
1. If the power is given to a high official or authority;
2. There are provisions requiring that the exercise of discretion should be
preceded by an inquiry conducted in accordance with a quasi-judicial
procedure.
DISCRETION GIVEN TO A HIGH OFFICIAL
• MANOHAR LAL V MAHARASHTRA22
The Court upheld Section 187-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 which
authorized customs officers to refer a case for importing prohibited goods
to a magistrate or to confiscate the goods and impose fine. The Court noted
that the power was to be exercised by a customs officer not lower than in
rank than the assistant collector of customs. Here the court indirectly laid
down that when power is exercised by an officer of higher rank it is
arbitrary.
• ACCOUNTANT GENERAL V S DORAISWAMY23
The Supreme Court in the current case upheld a grant of discretion to the
CAG given by r 7(2) of the India Audit and Accounts Departments
(Subordinate Accounts and Subordinate Railway Audit Services) Service

20
(2000) 7 SCC 425
21
(1996) 5 SCC 359
22
AIR 1971 SC 1511
23
(1981) 4 SCC 93
 Rules 1974. The CAG was held to be a high- ranking constitutional
authority, who could be expected to act according to the needs of the
service and without arbitrariness. There was moreover a presumption that
public officials would discharge their duties honestly and in accordance
with the rules of law.24

24
Chinta Lingam v India (19790) 3 SCC 768
 • HIMMAT LAL K. SHAH V COMMR. OF POLICE25
Rule 7 under Section 44 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 gave unguided
discretionary power to the police Commissioner to grant or refuse
permission for any public meeting to be held on a public street. The
Supreme Court struck down Rule 7 as being unreasonable restriction on
the exercise of a fundamental right.
The above mentioned case provides a contrary view to the fact that
although in some cases the apex court has laid down that if the discretion is
exercised by a higher official it would not be void.
POWER TO BE EXERCISED BY A QUASI- JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
• DIGAMBAR V PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION26
Where the Government was given power to revoke or modify a
permission given under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966, it was held that the power was not unguided since it could be
exercised only after the person concerned was given an opportunity of
being heard. The impugned law could not be held void on the grounds that
were no grounds for appeal.
• INDIA V ANNAM RAMALINGAM27
It was held that the Gold Control Act 1968 did not confer arbitrary power
on the administrator in deciding whether or not to grant permission to a
dealer to carry on money- lending in some premises because the power
was required to be exercised after giving a hearing to the dealer.

25
(1973) 1 SCC 227: AIR 1973 SC 87
26
AIR 1987 Bom. 297
27
AIR 1985 SC 1013
 • LIMITATION ON GRANT OF DISCRETIONARY POWER AND ARTICLE 19
Article 19 of the Constitution provides the right to freedom of speech and
expression along with several other rights. It is basically a privilege given to the
citizens of India that they have right to speech and expression and other rights under
this chapter. When a person exercises this right other persons are under a duty not to
infringe or curtail such rights. Therefore grant of any Discretionary power which
acts as a hindrance to the fundamental right of the citizens or curtails such
fundamental rights is declared void. Therefore Art 19 acts as a regulator on the
conferment of Discretionary power.
Art 19 says “Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.
(1) All citizens shall have the right-

(a) To freedom of speech and expression;

(b) To assemble peaceably and without arms;

(c) To form associations or unions;

(d) To move freely throughout the territory of India;

(e) To reside and settle in any part of the territory of India;

(g) To practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.

If any discretionary power is granted which is violative of the above mentioned

rights than such grant of discretionary power would be void. But the State under Art
19 (2) to (6) can impose reasonable restrictions on the above mentioned rights. The
Court determines the reasonableness of the restrictions.28 While deciding the
reasonableness of a restriction, the principle laid down is that the power conferred
on the executive by the law should not be arbitrary and unregulated and it should not
be left entirely to the discretion of an authority to do as it likes without any check
and control by the above authority.29

28
Chintaman Rao v Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118
29
Dwarka Prasad v Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 224.
 1. FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ASSEMBLY AND EXPRESSION

• R M SHESHADRI V DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, TANJORE

A rule requiring an exhibitor of films to show at each performance

approved film of such length and for such duration as the government
will direct was held to be unreasonable, as the duration and the length
had not been specified in the act, and the government was vested
with unregulated discretion to compel a exhibitor to show a film of
any length. This was held violative of his fundamental right of speech
and expression

• K.A. ABBAS V INDIA30

In this case it was held that the freedom to speech and expression
includes the right to make and exhibit films. Although censorship of
films is generally valid, provided it is based on guidelines.

• S RANGARAJAN V P JAGJIVAN RAM31

The Supreme Court in this case overruled the judgment of the High
Court and said that it cannot be exercised to ban a film that criticises
government policy on reservations of seats or jobs for the weaker
section of the society. Where government gave exhibition license to
such films but the High Court cancelled it in response to a public
interest petition.

• MAHARASHTRA V PRABHAKAR PANDURANG32

In this case a detenue, under r 39(1) (b) Defence of India Rules,1962

sought permission from the government of Maharashtra to send the

30
AIR 1971 SC 481
31
(1989) 2 SCC 574
32
AIR 1966 SC 424
 manuscripts of his book, which was purely of scientific interest, out
of jail to his wife for publication, the State government was held to
have acted contrary to law in refusing to send the manuscript.

• MADRAS V V G RAO33

The Supreme Court struck down law as being violative and

unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to freedom of
association, because it authorized an administrative authority to
declare an association as unlawful on its subjective satisfaction that
the association was carrying on subversive activities. The Law did
not provide the grounds of imposing such restrictions to be tested on
judicial inquiry. The Court further held that the right to association is
the life blood of a democracy.

• VIRENDRA V PUNJAB34

The Supreme Court in this case upheld a law which empowered

the executive to impose restrictions on freedom of the press if it was
satisfied that such restrictions were necessary to combat any activity
prejudicial to the maintenance of communal harmony. Here, the
administrative discretion was controlled by the right of the aggrieved
person to make a representation to the court.

2. FREEDOM TO RESIDE IN ANY PART OF INDIA

• EBRAHIM VAZIR V BOMBAY35

In this case it was held that a statutory provision which authorized

government to impose the penalty of removal of a citizen from India
on ‘reasonable suspicion entertained by it that the person concerned
33
AIR 1952 SC 196
34
AIR 1957 SC 896; the case deals with the freedom of press.
35
AIR 1954 SC 229, [1954] SCR 933
 has committed an offence against the permit law’ was invalid.
Section 3 of The Influx from Pakistan (control) Act, 1949 prohibited
entry of any person into India without a valid permit. Section 7 of
that Act empowered Central government to direct removal from India
of any person committing an offence under the Act. The Court held
that the since the Act has left the question, whether an offence had
been committed, to be determined entirely by the executive on the
basis of a reasonable suspicion it gave uncontrolled administrative
discretion and, therefore, violated the fundamental right to reside and
settle in any part of the country.

3. FREEDOM TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY

• RAGHUVIR V COURT OF WARDS36

A law that sought to derive a person from the possession of his

property for an infinite period merely on the subjective satisfaction of
an Officer was held invalid.

• JAGANNATH V ORISSA37

In this case a law authorizing the executive to frame a scheme of

management and administration of an endowed property without the
intervention of judicial tribunal at any stage was held to be invalid as
constituting an unreasonable restriction on the right to property.

4. FREEDOM OF BUSINESS

• DWARKA PRASAD V UTTAR PRADESH38

36
AIR 1953 SC 373
37
AIR 1954 SC 400
38
AIR 1954 SC 224
 The Supreme Court held that a rule requiring a person get a license to
stock, sell or store for sale of an essential commodity as Coal was not
objectionable. However, provisions that empowered the licensing
officer to exempt any person or class of persons from taking out a
license and gave absolute power to her to grant or refuse to grant,
renew or refuse to renew, suspend, revoke, cancel or modify any
license, without the presence of any rules, principles or directions to
guide the authority were held invalid as being violative of fundamental
rights.

• M/S DIWAN SUGAR MILLS CO. LTD V INDIA39

A notification under SS 4 & 5 of the Sugar (control) Order 1955,

compelling factories to sell sugar at affixed price was upheld. The
prices fixed were neither below the cost of production nor arbitrary.
The enabling Act was also upheld, as it provided for adequate
safeguards against abuse of power.

• M/S KRISHNA BUS SERVICE P LTD. V HARYANA40

Under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, the government of Haryana

issued a notification appointing the general manager of the Haryana
Roadways as Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) for the purpose
of the Act. The DSP was to exercise powers of inspection, search and
seizure, detention under the Act. These powers had to be exercised
fairly and without bias. The General Manager of Haryana Roadways,
being the Head of a rival business organization, It was held that his
appointment as DSP would cause an unreasonable restrictions on
freedom of trade and business guaranteed by 19(1) (g).
39
AIR 1959 SC 626
40
AIR 1985 SC 1651
 FOREIGN LANDMARK CASES ON LIMITATION ON DISCRETION OF
POWER AT THE STAGE OF CONFERMENT

• PADFIELD V. MINISTER OF HEALTH41

The minister of Health made a milk marketing scheme. This scheme
was enforced on the basis of a statutory provision. The Scheme
provided for transport of all milk products to the City for distribution.
The scheme also provided that if any interested party is dissatisfied
by the provisions of the scheme he can file an application with a
committee which was specially created for the above mentioned
purpose. Some of the milk producers faced problem in transporting
their milk products to the city. They filed an application. Under the
scheme the minister was responsible to receive the complaints and
forward it to the committee. The minister did not forward the
complaint. This action of the minister was challenged in the court of
law.
The minister said that he did not forward the complaint because it
would have been detrimental to his career. The House of Lords said
the reasons given by minister are unsatisfactory and unreasonable.
Use of power must be reasonable and backed by justification.

• R V METROPOLITAN POLICE COMMISSIONER EX PARTE BLACKBURN42

Under the law that regulated the working of the Metropolitan Police,
it was the duty of police to provide safety in public areas including
gambling joints. Problem faced by the Police department was that
there were not enough police personnel i.e. Police force were
insufficient in providing security at every place especially at the
gambling joints. Internal instructions were issued by the Police
41
1986 AC (appeal cases) 997
42
(1968) 2 QB 118
 Commissioner that we will not send policing to gambling clubs of the
society. Confidential police decision was taken against the existing
laws. The Court held that discretion of police not absolute and
uncontrollable.

• LIVERSIDE AND ANDERSON43

The case was regarding the powers to be exercised by the Home
Secretary in UK under regulation 18B formulated under the Defence
General Regulation Act. He was given the power that he can order
any person to detention if the Home Secretary has reasonable cause
to believe that a person is of hostile nature. No hearing was
mandatory and arrest made under this order should not be disclosed.
The majority in this case held the power of the Home Secretary valid.
Lord Atkins gave dissenting opinion. He said judiciary is behaving in
more executive manner and this badly affects the rights & interest
and liberty of a person.

43
1942 AC 206
 CONCLUSION

Administrative Discretion forms an essential part of the rule making process of the
administrative authorities. It gives them the power to make rules and regulations that
the legislature fails to do for a number of reasons as discussed earlier in the paper.
Administrative Discretion in affect is the pillar on which the working of the
administrative authorities rests, without it the authorities would be like a bow
without an arrow or gun without any gunpowder. Administrative Discretion as a
concept is like double edged sword. On one hand the importance of administrative
power is well understood and in no situation the administrative discretion can be
done away with, provided it is not arbitrary and on the other hand this discretionary
power brings in a danger of the authorities exercising such power being
unreasonable and arbitrary and acting in a way detrimental to the interest of the
people. It even brings in the danger of negation of Rule of Law.

The basic premise of the validity of discretionary power is that it should be

exercised on reasonable grounds and should be backed by justification. Any power
which is exercised on the whims and fancies of the authority exercising it, has a
danger of being unguided, uncontrolled and against the rights of the citizens.
Therefore any discretionary power which looks to be unreasonable and unguided
should be checked at the stage of conferment itself. This is done with the help of
Fundamental Rights under Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Any rule or statute
conferring discretionary power to the authorities, which is violative of Fundamental
Rights, is void. Article 14 and 19 acts as regulators of the discretionary power at the
stage of conferment and any power going against the requirements laid down by
these Article is declared to be unlawful, arbitrary and void.