Professional Documents
Culture Documents
In Praise of Historical Anthropology
In Praise of Historical Anthropology
In Praise of Historical Anthropology
ANTHROPOLOGY
PERSPECTIVES, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS
TO THE STUDY OF POWER AND COLONIALISM
Acknowledgements ix
Bibliography 207
Index 255
Acknowledgements
We sincerely thank all those people who have offered us valuable insights
into the chapters and different sections of the book: Montserrat Clua,
Maite Ojeda, Sol Tarrés, Yolanda Aixelá, Araceli González, João Melo,
Protasio Paulo Langer and Barbara Arisi have given us continuous reflec-
tions and references to consider, as is the special case of Verena Stolcke,
always generous and inspiring in her comments and observations. We
want to dedicate this book to her. We also thank all our friends and
colleagues, especially those linked to the Department of Humanities at
the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), the Department of Social and Cul-
tural Anthropology at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)
and the Faculdade de Ciências Humanas at the Universidade Federal da
Grande Dourados (UFGD, Brasil). Last but not the least, we thank the
Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica
de Excelencia. Subprograma de Generación del Conocimiento, Proj-
ect HAR2013-40445-P del 2014–2016, the Ministerio de Economía y
Competitividad (MINECO), Projects PGC2018-096722-B-I00 and AEI
FFI2016-79496-P, COFRE program from the Department of Human-
ities at the UPF, Project HAR2017-86776-P, Ministerio de Ciencia, In-
novación y Universidades, from the Department of Social and Cultural
Anthropology at the UAB and the Institut Universitari d’Història Jaume
Vicens Vives (IUHJVV), in which this work is included, for financial
support in translating this manuscript into English. We thank Pamela
Lalonde for doing an excellent job.
This book was originally published by Oberta UOC Publishing and
Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza in 2016.
Introduction
As to why I appear today in this unaccustomed garb, you shall now hear,
if only you will not begrudge lending your ears to my discourse – not
those ears, to be sure, which you carry to sermons, but those which you
are accustomed to prick up for mountebanks in the marketplace, for
clowns and jesters […]1
The journey that produced this book really began some years ago. Our
own pathways crossed in the mid-1990s while working on our Mas-
ters degrees in anthropology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona
(UAB), where we became acquainted with the work of anthropologists
like William Christian and each began our thesis work 2 under the direc-
tion of Verena Stolcke, a pioneer in the particular field that is the object
of our praise here. In the years since, we have worked with documents,
with the living and with the dead in various projects, following in the
wake of a multitude of authors, true little lights guiding us along the
way. It may be that our education in other disciplines (history and sociol-
ogy, in addition to anthropology), as well as our time spent in other aca-
demic environments, has accorded us the gaze of the outsider. Recently,
we began to talk informally about the importance of asserting a way of
practicing anthropology in accordance with the kind of research we pur-
sued during our studies on colonialism in Latin America, the Maghreb
and Asia-Pacific. And, thus, we began down the path that led to this
book, encouraged by Verena Stolcke’s vision and supported by our col-
leagues in the Anthropology and History of the Construction of Social
and Political Identities group. The first fruit of our labour, a workshop
entitled ‘In Praise of Historical Anthropology’, 3 inspired us to write this
book of the same name, which is, in short, a declaration of principles.
1 A Guidebook
This book constitutes a call for new ways to conduct research and, in
particular, to look at the world. In this context, creativity also occupies a
prominent place, a modest tool with which to examine what, to the eyes,
2 Introduction
is a given. This is not merely a matter of looking for new sources, but
of adopting a new perspective to analyse them, emulating the sociolog-
ical imagination of C. Wright Mills and the historical imagination later
claimed by Jean and John L. Comaroff from the realm of ethnography.
We have often encountered misunderstandings and suspicions regard-
ing this type of approach. This has been the case not only in the sphere
of the strictly theoretical, but also when we have directly observed the
results of academic boundaries on the ground, not so much ‘disciplinary’
per se (disciplines do not think), but in the people acting under the au-
thority of ‘their discipline’ who are unwilling to cross boundaries, label-
ling this as ‘not remotely historical’ (a Juan de la Cierva Grant selection
committee) and complaining that that ‘lacks ethnography’ (an observa-
tion made in a blind article review).
It is impossible to include everything written about historical anthro-
pology here, particularly considering that this descriptive category is
neither canonical nor clearly established. Neither is this book intended
to serve as a manual. However, we have tried to demonstrate the mul-
tiplicity of viewpoints and, especially, the diversity of focuses that are
often unknown. These are acquaintances who do not greet each other,
neighbours who are not on speaking terms. These are the aristocrats, the
nouveaux riches and the like, who want nothing to do with their poor
relatives. We do not know if we form part of this group, but it is clear
to us that more humble and less ‘ethnocentric’ approaches are required
(within the academy) that recognize and translate different traditions of
thought. It could be said that we identify with the old Sufi tale in which
it is only after comparing opinions that a group of advisers to the king is
able to conclude that what each one had touched in the dark from differ-
ent angles was, in fact, an elephant.
If we choose to immerse ourselves in this imbroglio, it is because we
believe that it is possible to learn from thinking about the past as an
ethnographic problem, a strange other, and the present as a historical
problem, dragged by the current of Heraclitus’s river. In our view, suffi-
cient material exists to learn from the past, from our ancestors. It is well
known, however, that the memory of the ancestors is selective. Surely in
this selection, we have embraced the authors who have most inspired us,
because they have taken as their starting point complex questions about
power, beyond determinisms, whether materialist or culturalist.
We have also kept our distance from postmodern grandstanding and
from other ‘posts-’ in general. Not only have they not contributed any-
thing new of ethnographic substance, but they have overlooked the fact
that quality engines already exist in the form of the classics and that they
could continue to function with a bit of oil. Given that this book devotes
a significant amount of space to the study of colonialisms, we feel it is
imperative to return to these colonial pasts in order to better understand
postcolonial landscapes. However, we place no trust in the verbiage of
Introduction 3
those approaches that talk about colonialism without studying it di-
rectly, because the study of colonialism has in no way been exhausted
nor has the study of its effects. For that reason, we believe it so import-
ant to read Georges Balandier, John L. and Jean Comaroff, Eric Wolf,
Talal Asad and other clear-sighted minds that have made substantiated
connections between colonialism and postcolonialism, connecting the
micro to the macro, seeking sober approaches to the engine of history
and going into the thickness of a document or to the word in a witness
account, to the archive and to ethnography from a critical evaluation of
the concepts and not from empty exaltation.
2 Between Methods
This book is a critical tribute to inspirational works and methodologies.
It would not be possible to synthesize them all. For that reason, the book
presents forms of research and ways to do research,4 and this selection
of works is certainly indicative of our own positions and desire to pres-
ent dialectical methodologies for the study of human relations, showing
the variants at play, trying to go beyond not so much the ambivalences
as the dualisms (nature-culture, subject-structure, tradition-modernity)
that form part of so many human phenomena, such as so-called identity,
power relations and the emergence of modernity, with its many faces.
The sociological imagination that C. Wright Mills advocated in 1959
has its place in this critical elegy. This does not mean ascribing to a
method called ‘historical anthropology’, as many might think. This does
not mean ‘being’ but ‘doing’, which, as Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.D.
Wacquant (1992) observed, requires the researcher to adopt the method
needed to meet the challenge posed and not the other way round, adapt-
ing the challenge to the method. As we are going to explain on the fol-
lowing pages, this is not a question of choosing one method or another,
of doing ethnography or analysing documents. Instead, it means studying
societies, and the subject matter to be analysed will determine the tech-
nique or focus necessary to address the issue. If the hardest thing is asking
the question – as we have heard Verena Stolcke say so often – we can only
entreat the patient reader to ask many questions after reading this text.
In the presence of this intersection of ideas and methods, it is important
to stress that historical anthropology does not amount to joining forces
between two different disciplines, but rather to formulating the idea that
societies can only be understood if they are analysed historically:
4 User Map
This book is the final process of doing and undoing texts, like Penelope.
Accordingly, the result could have been different, since we considered
the idea of writing additional chapters on the economy, kinship and reli-
gion. But the overwhelming number of studies forced us to limit the the-
matic organization, and it seems particularly important in this context
to provide a sort of reader’s guide to explain the logic behind how we
chose and coordinated our materials and observations.
The book opens with a chapter that reviews the emergence of various
responses – from very different theoretical and academic contexts – to
the problem of history in anthropology, not as a choice, but as a central
element in the study of social relations. 22 This is by no means a linear
history, although these responses can be seen as a dissatisfied reaction
to both the dominance of functionalism in the social sciences in the first
half of the twentieth century and to the paradigm that preceded it, an
evolutionism that, in fact, gained new currency in the middle of the cen-
tury. With the processes of decolonization and the Cold War, relativism
was progressively challenged by a new strategic view of the world that
recast neo-evolutionary paradigms that measured the world based on
material criteria related to growth (Leclerq, 1973).
In this history of historical anthropology, we have tried to include
and recognize traditions that, in most cases, have not interacted with
each other for reasons of language or power relations between the acad-
emies in the centre and the periphery. However, organizing the anal-
ysis of these different proposals in a conclusive way has proven to be
extremely complicated. Some of them, like the French mentalités and
North American ethnohistory, emerged from ‘national’ academic tradi-
tions, which is why we chose to structure our presentation using what
could be characterized as a geographic classification. At the same time,
our study of these theories led us to conclude that, in tandem with the
most influential international and hegemonic schools of thought (located
in Great Britain, France and the United States), other rich traditions have
been developing in the so-called south, as demonstrated by the cases of
Mexico, Peru and Brazil presented here. We would also like to elaborate
briefly on the presentation of the Spanish case, which was also some-
what challenging. Without the components to present a history that is
yet to be done, we have preferred to give priority to the work of two
great authors who have produced historical anthropology about and in
Spain, but neither of whom – not coincidentally – are in the academy (or
what one might call the academy in its most disciplined form). We are
Introduction 7
speaking of Julio Caro Baroja (1914–95) and William Christian Jr. (b.
1944), whose work shows the influence of Caro Baroja, as does the work
of the other researchers also presented in Chapter 2. In fact, Caro Baroja
dealt with many of the problems posed by historical anthropology avant
la lettre, from his study of the Archives of the Inquisition and other
sources related to minorities and excluded groups (Caro Baroja, 1957a,
1962, 1970) to his influential study of the operation and genesis of the
Sahrawi tribal structure (Caro Baroja, 1955b).
The second chapter synthesizes and introduces propositions for and
ways of doing historical anthropology that have struck us as particularly
outstanding. Clearly, this is also a personal selection, but we have al-
lowed ourselves to present them as ‘masters of anthropological thought’
because of the intriguing and pioneering nature of their studies. The
first, Julio Caro Baroja, despite breaking real ground in the field, is often
undervalued by the anthropological profession and unknown outside
the Spanish-speaking world. The second is Marshall Sahlins, included
because of his interesting ruminations on how to create a dynamic the-
ory of change and reproduction. Next is Eric Wolf, for having succeeded
in presenting a diachronic view of power. Jean and John L. Comaroff,
in turn, proposed a model based on doing historical anthropology more
than trying to define it in any uniform way. The central idea shared by
these authors is that the insertion of history is an unavoidable part of the
study and of all worthwhile social theory. Last but not least, William
Christian Jr. is included because of the evocative power of his modus
operandi – which has inspired us, personally – in his research into reli-
gious anthropology, both yesterday and today.
The third chapter presents the primary methodological challenges in-
volved in the analysis of archives and other sources from the past. This
does not, however, entail a mere consideration of the methods used to
analyse the past, but an examination of how to adopt a processual view
of society based on epistemological problems about the situated nature
of researchers, the concepts they work with and ideas about time in their
own societies and in the societies they analyse. This requires under-
standing what concepts about time and history each society has (without
requiring the social sciences to stop thinking about an idea of history,
as proposed by some postmodern gurus, such as Francis Fukuyama in
his 1992 work, The End of History and the Last Man). But time is a
collective representation and a measure of human action, as formulated
by various classic authors years ago. 23 Moreover, this has consequences,
not only for representations of the world, but also for human action,
as seen in the literature on millenarianisms and the political effect of
prophetism. A transcultural comparison reveals the existence of linear
and circular conceptions of time, which have produced different con-
cepts about history and even its absence (Munn, 1992). Here, various
mythological ideas come into play about the origin of the universe, its
8 Introduction
open, circular/entropic or eschatological nature and its relationship with
social relations, as synthesized by Balandier in Le désordre: Éloge du
mouvement (1988).
The fourth chapter focuses on the various applications of the complex
historical anthropology of the Comaroffs and others to the study of co-
lonial situations in their rich variety of forms. Here, we have analysed
the central role played by power relations in the colonial expansion that
began in the late fifteenth century. The colonial empires deployed differ-
ent power technologies across the length and breadth of five continents
within the framework of multiple and paradoxical modernities. These
systems of domination were not unidirectional; there was accommoda-
tion and resistance, as we analyse through the works of Jean Comaroff,
Roger M. Keesing and Jan Vansina. The anti-colonialist movements of
the mid-twentieth century and the modern ethnographic projections of
the eternal natives and their enchanted land suggest a dialectical ap-
proach to power relations. The chapter criticizes not only historians who
do not take the micro into account in their studies, but also anthropol-
ogists who do not incorporate the macro into their fieldwork and pres-
ent the role played by interrelated factors like class, gender and ‘race’. 24
To that end, we focus here on the pioneering works of Verena Stolcke
(1974), Sidney Mintz (1985) and Ann L. Stoler (1985) in the field of co-
lonialism for their work with archive documents and application of key
anthropological questions to the construction of inequalities through
essentialization and the invention of differences.
The book ends with a chapter on the role of systems of social clas-
sification as mechanisms for producing and legitimizing relations of
inequality in very different ways. These cultural classification systems
have not only been symbolic explanation mechanisms, but have broken
into social relations from their performative power. However, the great
challenge this presents for anthropology is, still, how to explain the pro-
duction and, above all, transformation of these systems of classification
and domination over the course of history. Here, we present a compara-
tive study of theological mechanisms and cultural concepts of purity and
impurity, such as the purity-of-blood statutes that appeared in medieval
Iberia and later categories of ‘race’ with all its problematic meanings.
Re-signified from the concept of ‘lineage’ to that of ‘racial group’, ‘race’
is a diffuse category in the modern world, but it is far from certain that
the meaning of this category was unambiguous either in the different
colonial contexts or in the metropoles themselves. The naturalization of
the category, which has become worn out, much as Julio Cortázar sug-
gested in his lament about what happens to certain words, 25 has meant
that ‘race’ is used to talk about purity-of-blood statutes. It is presented as
the mere expression of modern scientific thought, when in some contexts
like the Spanish colonial case, it culminated in a combination of theolog-
ical and scientific concepts and in the postcolonial context, it is used to
Introduction 9
refer to any type of discrimination. Historical anthropology becomes in-
dispensable to understand the current uses of categories of exclusion, un-
derstood from a dynamic point of view, and to contrast them with past
concepts. Finally, the epilogue contains the book’s main conclusions and
presents one last reflective exercise regarding recent categories, such as
cultural fundamentalism and multiculturalism in postcolonial contexts.
Since the 1980s, historical research done by anthropologists has been
on the rise. Although the idea of historical anthropology has not been
institutionalized or developed, considerations about the intersection be-
tween the two disciplines have appeared (Cohn, 1980). This growing
body of research is largely tied to colonial studies and an interest in the
analysis of complex societies. 26 Anthropologists were becoming aware
of the importance of considering the history of the societies where they
were doing ethnography. However, the problem was not confined to
complex societies, but can also be extended to the societies studied by
classical anthropology, erroneously excluded from history.
Notes
http://blogs.uab.cat/ahcisp/?page_id=4
10 Introduction
The work by E.P. Thompson, which was translated into Italian in 1968, had
a profound influence on Italian microhistorians.
20 As Abercrombie (2003: 176) observed, ‘folklorizing public festivals, now a
privileged arena for the gendered construal of Indianness, and for the cul-
tural construction and contestation of the parameters of citizenship’.
22 In his first great ethnography of the Kababish Arabs in 1970, Talal Asad
wrote that history could not simply be an introductory note to a monograph,
but had to be at the core of the ethnography in his consideration of the con-
struction of tribal power structures and their relationship to colonialism
(Scott, 2006: 251).
23 Durkheim and Mauss, Primitive Classification (1903), Herbert Hubert,
‘Étude sommaire de la représentation du temps dans la religion’ (1905),
Evans-Pritchard, ‘Nuer-time reckoning’ (1939), Leach, ‘Two essays concern-
ing the symbolic representation of time’ (1961), Geertz, ‘Person, Time and
Conduct in Bali’ (1966).
24 Dube, 2007c: 610.
25 In the words of Julio Cortázar, ‘(…) words can become tired and ill, like men
and horses tire and become ill. By dint of being repeated, and often misused,
they end up wearing out. Instead of flying out of mouths or writing as they
once were, arrows of communication, birds of thought and sensitivity, we
begin to experience them like spent coins and use them like pocket handker-
chiefs, like used shoes’ (Cortazar, 1981).
26 Viazzo, 2003: 35.
1 Anthropology and History
Uncomfortable Dance
Partners
From the outset, the relationship between anthropology and history has
fluctuated. In the nineteenth century, the great classic thinkers of the so-
cial sciences focused, above all, on change. The emergence of the indus-
trial society, the transition to modernity and the creation of the empires
raised a number of questions for authors like Karl Marx, Max Weber and
Émile Durkheim. For most of them, like Marx and Durkheim, the foun-
dations of the philosophy of history were clearly based on linear views of
time that shared basic evolutionist concepts and the idea of progress itself.
Amongst many of these thinkers, what has been called the ‘watershed
theory’ was predominant, that is, an explanatory model for the transition
from traditional societies rooted in community ties to modern societies
grounded in concepts of the individual and new social structures.2
To understand this artificial partition between anthropology and his-
tory, it is necessary to examine not only theoretical questions and the
philosophical underpinnings of the different paradigms, but also the rel-
evant political and historical aspects. Verena Stolcke (1993), for exam-
ple, provided a detailed explanation of the impact of national academic
traditions on the formulation of theories, concepts and paradigms. The
relationship between anthropology and history as examined in this book
is no exception, and not everybody understands the concepts of history
and anthropology using the same words.3 For a review of this dialectic,
both James D. Faubion (1993) and Pier Paolo Viazzo (2003) have pro-
duced interesting historical archaeologies that start with the classics of
the nineteenth century and continue to the early 1990s, highlighting the
uncertainties that still hang over these dance partners.4
12 Anthropology and History
Our approach to this topic takes as its starting point an epistemolog-
ical problem that has yet to be resolved: transcultural concepts inher-
ited from history and temporality (Wolf, 1982; Mintz, 1985; Roseberry,
1989; Amodio, 2010; Altez, 2012). The way in which human beings in
their cultural diversity interpret time and divide it into ‘past’, ‘present’
and ‘future’ is one of the main concerns of the ethnographic present.5
While the academy and disciplines may be fragmented, the societies that
they analyse are not.6 In the time of the living, there is a present, past
and future, but in the appearance of a saint or possession by a spirit, time
can be suspended. We, too, greatly fear that in a historical anthropology
such as the one that we propose here, societies also speak with their dead
in dreams, without any boundaries between past, present and future.
In a lecture given in 1949 at the Sorbonne in Paris, Claude Lévi-Strauss
asserted that ‘all societies are historical in the same way, but some ac-
knowledge it candidly, while others are reluctant to do so, or prefer to
ignore the fact’.7 At that conference, entitled ‘History and Ethnology’
(1949), the French anthropologist was openly sceptical about the possi-
bility of historifying non-writing societies, but he did not deny the im-
portance of history to describe and interpret present-day societies.8 In
the study of societies, it is essential to bear in mind that history is not an
option to choose. For this reason, ethnographic research cannot be sepa-
rated from the historical context, because this ‘context’ is also the object/
subject of study. We take the same stance as John and Jean Comaroff
and Eric Wolf (although these authors resist the possibility of construct-
ing a ‘method’ in the style of Durkheim, Pierre Bourdieu or Anthony
Giddens) and argue that human beings create the worlds in which they
live. We propose an analysis that definitively parts ways with the ‘water-
shed theory’, a foundational myth of modern human sciences that pits
modernity/movement against traditionalism/staticism, making the case
for an anthropology that is – and must be – a political and ethical prac-
tice.9 This question goes beyond the supposed Lévi-Straussian division
between ‘cold’ societies (in which there is no need to worry about his-
tory, basically, because it is a ‘mechanical’ time, i.e., recurring, repetitive
and non-cumulative) and ‘hot’ societies (where history matters), because
even societies that supposedly do not change require a dynamic to ‘not
change’.10 Likewise, societies that theoretically are in constant trans-
formation carry heavy burdens (dominant social groups or structures).
The challenge, then, consists of combining a structural analysis (con-
strictions, organizations, social reproductions) with an analysis of social
agency and dynamics that make it possible to read societies in motion, in
continuous reconstruction (and, at times, construction and destruction).
This chapter presents contributions from a series of substantial stud-
ies that concur with many of these perspectives. Many hold back from
specifying or canonizing approaches that are highly complex. However,
they share a collection of elements that are worth gathering, presenting
and considering.
Anthropology and History 13
1.1 Attempts at Partnering
In 1990, Clifford Geertz pointed out how anthropologists and histo-
rians were interested in each other’s work – American anthropologists
concerned about reconstructing the history of the Fiji wars and English
historians doing fieldwork related to the cults of the Roman emperors.11
In Geertz’s words, ‘everybody seems to be minding everybody else’s
business’.12 It comes as no surprise then that in 1993, Verena Stolcke
lamented the difficulty inherent in conceiving a history of anthropology,
suggesting that what was needed, above all, was a clear definition of
this so-called discipline of anthropology.13 Indeed, there are as many
definitions as anthropological views and tastes, most of which do not al-
ways overlap and are often trivial. However, one of the central elements
in Western anthropological thinking consists of understanding human
unity in its diversity. According to American anthropologist George W.
Stocking, the anthropological enterprise has always been characterized
not by the study of cultural diversity as a fact, but by the dilemma of
how to reconcile the unity of the human species with its manifest cul-
tural diversity.14 It is another matter to examine the point at which the
European sensibility began to perceive this question as problematic.15 By
the same token, one could ask at what moment anthropology perceived
the need to incorporate history into the analysis of the manifest socio-
cultural multiplicity that characterizes humanity.
What follows is an overview of the primary schools and theories of
historical anthropology that draws on a variety of geographical and in-
tellectual spheres to look at anthropology from a contextual and his-
toricist focus. This country-based approach does not presuppose that
so-called national traditions and their borders are a fundamental clas-
sification factor or that these traditions are necessarily homogenous,
but rather provides different non-linear responses to the issues raised
here, with themes that emerge, disappear and reappear in the history of
ideas. Furthermore, this debate greatly profits from the presentation of
strong contributions from some non-hegemonic anthropologies that are
often neglected in the centre, as observed by the coiners of the concepts
‘anthropology of the South’ (Krotz, 1997) and ‘world anthropologies’
(Ribeiro & Escobar, 2008).
Every real society is a process in time. The changes that result from
this process may usefully be thought of under two heads. Firstly,
there are those which are consistent with a continuity of the existing
formal order. For example, when a chief dies and is replaced by his
son, or when a lineage segments and we have two lineages where
formerly there was only one, the changes are part of the process of
continuity. There is no change in the formal structure. Secondly,
Anthropology and History 15
there are changes which do reflect alterations in the formal struc-
ture. If, for example, it can be shown that in a particular locality,
over a period of time, a political system composed of equalitarian
lineage segments is replaced by a ranked hierarchy of feudal type, we
can speak of a change in the formal social structure. 21
1.1.3 France
Without a doubt, one of the earliest exercises in understanding the im-
portance of reflecting on societies beyond disciplinary partitions was the
so-called French school associated with the journal Annales d’histoire
économique et sociale and, above all, the French medievalist Jacques Le
Goff (1924–2014), André Bruguière (1938–) and the founding fathers
Lucien Febvre (Combats pour l’histoire, 1952) and Marc Bloch (Apolo-
gie pour l’histoire ou metier d’historien, 1954). The roots of the school’s
efforts lay in two research lines that later branched off: socioeconomic
history and the history of mentalities (mentalités). The Annales group
criticized the erudite history inherited from the previous century, char-
acterized by a tedious reconstruction of dates and data that supposedly
provided an ‘objective’ view of the past.54 One of its first prominent
works was the classic book by Marc Bloch (1886–1944) about the belief
in the curative power of the hands of French kings, Les Rois thauma-
turges (1924, usually translated into English as The Royal Touch: Sacred
22 Anthropology and History
Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France). This political history
entertained issues and questions raised by the anthropology done with
‘primitive’ contemporary societies. However, Bloch’s exercise was almost
completely overlooked during this time.55 Another no less classic work
is George Lefebvre’s The Great Fear of 1789 (1932), an excellent study
of popular group mentalities and, more specifically, the mechanisms of
imagination that led to the rural great fear of 1789.
Lucien Febvre (1878–1956) wrote a work that would also receive
praise from Claude Lévi-Strauss, dedicated to the religion of Rabelais
and the problem of unbelief in the sixteenth century (1946). Accord-
ing to this influential French historian, unbelief was unthinkable and,
of course, inexpressible until the end of the eighteenth century. Mere
doubt was considered heresy.56 Febvre sought to situate the human be-
ing in the ‘cultural’ context (or mentalité collective)57 of the era, which
opened history up to other disciplines like psychology and anthropol-
ogy.58 With The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the
Age of Philip II (1947–55), Fernand Braudel (1902–85) reopened the
debate about history and historical time. To some extent, his questions
mirror future debates between Marshall Sahlins and others (which will
be analysed in another section of this book), with their distinction be-
tween event and structure. As opposed to traditional narrative, based on
what François Simiand and Paul Lacombe pejoratively called ‘histoire
événementielle’ – that is, the history of superficial, itemized and singu-
larly sterile events – Braudel’s ‘material life’ endeavoured to find other
‘mentalities’ in structural continuities of longue durée (the long term),
which define human beings in their relationships with the environment
that surrounds them.59
In 1949, Claude Lévi-Strauss made his contribution to all of these
epistemological and methodological problems with his essay ‘History
and Ethnology’, published in Issue 54 of Revue de métaphysique et de
morale and included in his collection Structural Anthropology (1958),
in which he cites Lucien Febvre’s The Problem of Unbelief in the Six-
teenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais (1942) as a work of ethnology.
On the one hand, he rejects the evolutionism, historicism and function-
alism that had failed to explain the common elements that characterize
different ethnic groups since the nineteenth century.60 On the other,
he recognizes that history and ethnology are concerned with the same
question, namely social life.61 Neither did Lévi-Strauss believe that the
difference lay in the method or the sources (written and oral), but rather
in the perspective: history organizes its data on the basis of conscious
expressions and ethnology on the basis of the unconscious conditions
of social life.62 In truth, Lévi-Strauss did not develop a finished the-
ory regarding these questions, but by examining his general theoretical
model, it is clear that he used analytical reasoning as a foundation, in
that he worked with the rules of the intellect and not with categories of
Anthropology and History 23
dialectical-Hegelian reasoning. Local societies are historical manifesta-
tions of universal structures that are ‘deep’ and operate unconsciously.
This geological and structuralist view reduced dialectic to a merely
auxiliary role. For this reason, Lévi-Strauss’s theory also attracted the
French historians of his time from the Annales school, who were not
as interested in recounting changeable events (the conscious) as in dis-
covering permanent and structural factors (the unconscious).63 In the
inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1960, Lévi-Strauss again
defended the role of history at a time when his own method was being
adapted by the Annales historians.
In contrast to the static, synchronic conception of Lévi-Straussian
structuralism, dynamic anthropology (practiced by Georges Baland-
ier,64 René Girard65 and Max Gluckman66) emphasized processual
analysis,67 recapitulating the debates of the 1960s in some sociological
currents, such as developmentalism (Robert Nisbet) and structuralism
(Louis Pierre Althusser, Etienne Balibar) and the debates on conflict
as a driver of social change.68 After the Bandung Conference in 1955,
anthropologists and historians became interested in the independence
movements in Asia and Africa, the national liberation struggles of op-
pressed peoples, ‘black communities’, ‘popular cultures’, ‘indigenous
peoples’, in short, all the social movements that criticized capitalist
exploitation.69
From a Marxist critique of Western imperialism, Frantz Fanon
(1925–61), a French psychiatrist and essayist born in Martinique, ad-
dressed the need to incorporate colonized people into history, recovering
concepts like race, class, body and culture. To overcome their condition,
the dominated (blacks) adopted the cultural baggage of the dominators
(whites), absorbing the racist norms that justified their discrimination
(Peau noire, masques blancs, 1952).70 In this respect, as opposed to the
theses that defined underdevelopment as a socioeconomic state, Baland-
ier situated relations between global societies as an element of transfor-
mation (cf. acculturation theories of Georges Bastide, et al.). Balandier
considered it an error to separate social aspects from cultural aspects in
the relations between unequal societies, emphasizing their internal dy-
namism as well as the social problems created by modernization in the
new postcolonial states.71
Within the general framework of Lévi-Straussian structuralism, Mi-
chel Foucault (1926–84) was also classified as an openly anti-humanist
intellectual, especially after the publication of The Archaeology of
Knowledge (Paris, 1969).72 Both thinkers affirmed the existence of a
‘deep’ or ‘archaeological’ unconscious mental level (Foucault defined
this as discourses, discursive formations or épistémè), to which his-
torical praxis was subordinated (The Order of Things: An Archaeol-
ogy of the Human Sciences, 1966; The Archaeology of Knowledge,
1969). Subsequently, he developed a genealogical method to analyse
24 Anthropology and History
what he defined as the microphysics of power.73 These discourses
constituted referred objects and, ultimately, culture or society in its
entirety. Thus, the main concern of the modern state was ‘the art of
government’ (political arithmetic or statistics). To mould the ‘social
body’, it was necessary to discipline the ‘individual body’. His theory
of biopower represented not only a categorization of the human be-
ing as species, but as an ‘object’ that had to be manipulated and con-
trolled through disciplinary technologies (schools, prisons, hospitals,
workshops, factories).74 These technologies were related to the rise of
modern capitalism: delimitation, fixation and control of the physical
space (Discipline and Punish, 1975). Biopower thus acted as a regime
responsible for identifying pathologies (homosexuality, insanity) and
isolating them using the ‘technologies’ of normalization, applying cor-
rective or therapeutic procedures (psychiatry, medicine) (The History
of Sexuality, Vol. I, 1976). This process of subjectivation (discourses
on sexuality, medicine, criminal justice, etc.) would underpin postmod-
ernist deconstructivism.
1.1.4 Mexico
The arrival of Hernán Cortés in Mexico in 1519 ushered in not only
a process of agricultural transformation in the indigenous world, but
also profound changes in land tenure and exploitation.75 Beginning in
the eighteenth century, as the caciques – or natural lords – disappeared
as ethnic categories,76 land tenure became decoupled from the old sys-
tem of indigenous values and passed into the hands of the community.
Studies by Cheryl E. Martin (1985) in Cuernavaca and David Brading
(1975, 1978) in the Mexican Bajio (lowlands) attest to changes in the
ethnic composition of their peoples.77 The loss of their lands invigo-
rated private initiative, transforming the natives into day labourers and
tenants. At the same time, as a consequence of the movement of the
indigenous population to the most important urban centres like Mexico
City, Puebla and Zacatecas, mestizaje increased, widening social differ-
entiation within communities and weakening ethnic-community ties.78
In the nineteenth century, a process of confiscating indigenous corporate
property and liberalizing the property took place in connection with the
construction of the national state, which intensified with independence.
As historian Margarita Menegus has shown, reconstructing this process
is an arduous task that requires studying the documentation held in mu-
nicipal archives.79
The formation of the nation was in the hands of the criollos, who
declared the legal equality of all Mexicans and preserved communal
property and indigenous governance.80 With Benito Juárez (1806–72)
and La Reforma, the formation of the state passed into the hands of the
mestizos.81 By abolishing communal property, the Constitution of 1857
Anthropology and History 25
destroyed the economic foundations on which indigenous culture was
based. In practice, the situation of the Mexican Indians did not change
much from that of the colonial period. During the ‘order and progress’
dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911), they lived crowded together
like farmhands in shacks located on the hacienda and latifundio estates
established for intensive agriculture. Similarly, the indigenista policies of
the Porfiriato transformed indigenous rituals and customs into part of a
folkloric nationalism that was opposed to local particularisms. The In-
dians became peasants, subservient to the mestizos/ladinos and criollos
because of their ethnic and class status.
In an illuminating article, Claudio Lomnitz argued that mestizophilia
was not, as is sometimes believed, exclusively a state-directed project
to form the Mexican citizen. Instead, ‘mestizaje was also a lived expe-
rience, which later became a state project shaped by experiences on the
border’.82 What was the relationship between ‘race’ and Mexican na-
tional identity? What role did ‘racialization’ play in forming the national
subject? Unlike Brazil, the north-American country shares a long border
with the United States, which certainly made difficult the formation of
a national race. The racially and culturally disparate Mexican society
‘challenged the idea of “the Mexican” as a common or universal type
at a national level’.83 However, in the early twentieth century, economic
dynamism generated waves of migration, both inside Mexico and to the
United States, that consolidated the racialization of the national subject.
As Prisciliano G. Silva, a Mexican general wrote in 1911 after his cap-
ture of an arsenal in Guadalupe, Chihuahua: ‘With these arms we will
avenge the humiliation our race has suffered’.84
The official post-revolutionary ideology (1911–20) reflected on the
identity of the ‘Indian’ and the incorporation of the group into the
national community. The great modern indigenistas such as Manuel
Gamio (1883–1960),85 Alfonso Caso (1896–1970) and Gonzalo Agu-
irre Beltrán (1908–96) activated an assimilationist rhetoric that neutral-
ized racial and cultural pluralism. However, according to historian Alan
Knight, these intellectual indigenistas appropriated the indigenous con-
sciousness, reproducing a good deal of the Western racist discourse. In
his opinion, the Indians were the objects, not the authors, of so-called
indigenismo.86 In 1916, the anthropologist Manuel Gamio published
Forjando Patria. Pro-nacionalismo (Forging a Nation) in a context of
political idealism and optimism. Unlike the prevailing positivism, Ga-
mio’s ethnographic project consisted of reconstructing the soul of the
indigenous peoples, who he considered ‘pure’ and ‘traditional’.87 In the
words of this Mexican anthropologist, ‘We do not know how the Indian
thinks, and we ignore his true aspirations. We prejudge him with our
own sensibilities, when we should familiarize ourselves with his sensibil-
ities to comprehend him and make him comprehend us. We must forge
for ourselves – even if temporarily – an Indian soul’.88
26 Anthropology and History
Despite this desire to achieve a national brotherhood, Gamio wanted
nothing more than to eliminate the biological, geographical and his-
torical antecedents that made the Indians a ‘race’ incapable of attain-
ing the moral standards of Western civilization. The Aztecs, once
colonizers themselves, were first and foremost Indians colonized by
the Spanish Empire and then civilizing icons of the new Mexican na-
tion.89 Thus, while Gamio judged the Mexican Indians negatively, he
glorified Aztec society, elevating it to the level of ancient Greece and
Rome. As Jesuit Father Francisco Javier Clavijero (1731–87), one of
the precursors of enlightened indigenism, noted in Historia Antigua de
México (1780), the Aztecs became the classical heroes of the Mexican
elites, who in turn reduced the contemporary Indians to mere folkloric
representations.
In parallel, ethnic heterogeneity gave way to the symbol of cultural
integration: the mestizo. In Gamio’s words:
1.1.6 Brazil
In his study of ‘peripheral anthropologies’, the Brazilian anthropologist
Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira wrote that since the 1960s, it has been
possible to detect a growing critical awareness amongst anthropolo-
gists about the dichotomies of Western vs. non-Western (or indigenous),
metropole vs. satellite, foreign anthropologist vs. local anthropologist
and centre vs. periphery. These ‘culturally colonized’ anthropologies
challenged the hegemony of the metropolitan disciplines.184 Beginning
in the 1990s, the history of the Indians, which had been overlooked by
historians in Brazil, developed productively in the field of anthropol-
ogy, where the first critical voices emerged, challenging old conceptions
that viewed Indians as passive victims of conquest and colonization and
40 Anthropology and History
nothing else. Anthropologists and historians like Manuela Carneiro da
Cunha (1986, 1998: 7–15) and John Manuel Monteiro (1956–2013)
represented the first attempts to consider them as historical subjects.
In a work that was initially a doctoral thesis done at the University of
Chicago (1985), Blacks of the Land: Indian Slavery, Settler Society, and
the Portuguese Colonial Enterprise in South America (1994), Monteiro
rescued Indians from invisibility in the construction of the colonial soci-
ety and captaincy of Sao Paulo, showing that the dynamics of conquest
and colonialization to a large extent depended on the native popula-
tions, whose actions resulted from the dynamics of their own societies. A
productive interdisciplinary line of research focused on the presence and
actions of the Indians and blacks in regional histories and, more broadly,
on the history of Brazil itself (Monteiro, 1998). Both were galvanizing
agents behind the history of the Indians in contact with colonial and
postcolonial societies, transforming them, in turn, into historical agents.
Following these theoretical-methodological premises, several special-
ists have questioned canonical views of the past that deny the capacity
of the different ethnicities in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo in order to
(re-)construct their history.185 Not only did they survive Portuguese co-
lonialism, but they preserved their traditional uses and customs, remain-
ing village Indians until the nineteenth century.186
Far from disappearing, victims of a demographic collapse, gathered
into villages and forcibly converted, Brazilian Indians, bolstered by in-
tense political activism, have been constructing their identities. While
in recent years they have reacted particularly intensely to the ideology
of assimilation, this has not been free of some essentialization of their
cultural differences. The internalization of indigenous movements has
provided these groups with a forum to introduce re-ethnification in
the Americas, Asia, Africa and Oceania. This is particularly true since
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted on
13 September 2007 by the United Nations Assembly, which helped to
revitalize the identity of indigenous peoples such as the Mapuche com-
munities in Neuquen (Argentina),187 the Chamorros in Guam (Mariana
Islands, US)188 and the Guarani-Kaiowá and Terena in Mato Grosso do
Sul (Brazil), amongst others, appealing to their cultural particularisms
(dietary habits, language, clothing) in addition to the lands that federal
governments and states seized from their ancestors.
The case of the Kaiowá is representative of the demands made by in-
digenous peoples based on their own motivations and interests. After
being assigned to indigenous reserves by the Indian Protection Service
(SPI) between 1915 and 1928, the Kaiowá became the object of the state
education and agro-pastoral expansion policies enacted during the ‘New
State’ period of Getulio Vargas, which created a full-fledged federal col-
onization project.189 As a consequence of the capitalist exploitation of
national land, the Kaiowá were forced to live in very small areas in a
Anthropology and History 41
systematic and relatively violent confinement process. Discussions re-
lated to the indigenist legislation that was partially incorporated into
the Indian Statute and the new Federal Constitution of 1988 (Articles
231–232) – in part, drafted with the participation of notable anthropol-
ogists like Manuela Carneiro da Cunha190 – forced the Brazilian state to
ensure respect for ethnic and cultural diversity and guarantee the right of
Indians to permanently enjoy the lands they inhabit, using new territo-
rial strategies like re-territorialization to defend their areas.191 In 1995,
recognition and delimitation processes such as the Panambizinho Indig-
enous Land initiative were extended, allowing the Kaiowá in 2005 to
recover 1,272 hectares of what was a much larger territory in its day.192
The Terena leaders of the Buriti Indigenous Land in Mato Grosso
do Sul have also demanded the return of their ancestral lands. A large
amount of the Terena land was occupied by Paraguayan troops during
the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–70), and armed resistance was not
sufficient to expel the invaders.193 Although the SPI in 1930 forced the
Terena to concentrate their people on 2,090 of the 17,200 hectares that
they occupied in the early twentieth century, beginning in 2000, the
National Indian Foundation (FUNAI, established in 1967) drafted a
proposal to extend the reduced area, but without much success.194 On
15 May 2013, a group of Terena occupied a parcel of land that they were
claiming as part of the lands of their ancestors. The parcel, property of
a local politician, was located in the municipality of Sidrolândia and
was occupied for two weeks until elite police troops violently evacuated
them, leaving one dead and several injured.195
This and other topics have compelled specialists to rethink indige-
nous ideas about the past to better understand Amerindian societies and
their role in historical processes.196 How can the diversity of indige-
nous concepts about the past be understood in the historical process?
To what point have the indigenous claims for rights and their successes
legitimated a specific field of academic activities for Brazilian Indians?
Is there one indigenous anthropology and history and other Western
histories? One might naively believe that multiculturalism provides the
bases for justice and equality applicable, on paper, to all citizens regard-
less of race, colour or social class. In Multicultural Dialogue: Dilem-
mas, Paradoxes, Conflicts, Randi Gressgård considers these questions
from the standpoint of the coexistence of differences in a single national
political space. Reconciling these opposites – dignity/equality, identity/
difference – requires asking whether it is possible to transfer theoretical
debates about the sociopolitical recognition of ethnic minorities to the
level of praxis. In other words, the liberty, dignity and equality of human
beings before the law are universal rights of modernity (Taylor, 1994).
At the same time, however, the question arises regarding the need to
protect the particular features and specific qualities of individuals and
human groups. Today, many indigenous communities like the Xavantes
42 Anthropology and History
in the territory of Mato Grosso have abandoned their traditional diet
based on cassava, pumpkin and sweet potatoes, introducing sugary
drinks and processed foods with added sugar that have led to the ap-
pearance of chronic illnesses like diabetes. As a consequence of these
nutritional imbalances, obesity and childhood mortality have soared,
altering the relationship between the Xavantes and their ecological
environment.197
Latin American nation-states have invisibilized ethnic minorities
(or minoritized majorities) in national construction projects, in many
cases forcing these ‘minorities’ to fight for their rights against national
companies (Brazilian, Peruvian, Bolivian) and corporations and power
groups that instrumentalize them for their own ends. In the state of
Mato Grosso do Sul, where most of the Guarani-speaking people of Bra-
zil live, there is a long history of appropriated manpower and land. For
the large livestock and mining corporations, the Indians continue to be
an obstacle to progress. Military governments, which are heavily biased
towards exploiting natural resources from a capitalist and developmen-
talist perspective, act against the interests of indigenous communities.
Currently, biofuels like soy and sugarcane have produced the diaspora
of thousands of peasants and indigenous peoples, which threatened to
become a type of urban sub-proletariat in the Amazon and doubtless
endangering the biodiversity of the region as well.198
In central Brazil, the Kayapo (‘Mebengokré’), an indigenous commu-
nity that live on the banks of the Xingu River, were able to build their
first airport in the middle of the forest. They invested large sums of
money to exploit the Maria Bonita Gold Mine, which entailed the inevi-
table transformation of their so-called traditional way of life, a transfor-
mation that was recorded on video for the first time.199 In this respect,
the book by John L. and Jean Comaroff Ethnicity, Inc. offers proposals
to understand and conceptualize an ethnicity that has transitioned away
from its primordialist, ontological dimension and the ability of human
groups to commercialize their culture as a consumer product. Contrary
to a traditional, monolithic image that defines ‘ethnic’ as something that
ascribes certain fixed, predetermined and ‘natural’ cultural patterns to
the individual, the Comaroffs consider ethnicity as a constantly evolving
cultural product. From this perspective, the concepts of ‘culture’, ‘soci-
ety’, ‘power’ and ‘social reality’ should not be analysed in the present,
but as the result of historical processes. 200 The image of the Kayapo
loading video cameras onto their shoulders, writing on laptop comput-
ers and dancing for tourists reveals the adaptive strategies with which
different peoples and nations delimit their identities and project them
outwards.201
In the northeast part of the country, the ‘misturado’ (or ‘mestiçado’)
mixed-blood Indians have constituted themselves as an ethnic commu-
nity in opposition to the ‘pure’ Indians of the past, who are idealized and
Anthropology and History 43
presented as mythical ancestors. 202 Starting with the concept of territori-
alization as a process of social reorganization that depends on historical
contingencies (the ‘ethnicities’ of the French colonies, the ‘reducciones’
and ‘resguardos’, or communal landholdings, in Spanish America, the
‘indigenous reserves’ in Brazil, etc.), anthropologist João Pacheco de Ol-
iveira emphasizes the inter-social context in which ethnic groups are
constituted in defined historical processes.203 Other anthropologists,
like Rodrigo de Azeredo Grünewald, see territoriality as a latent force
in any human group. Through a process of ethnic revitalization and
ethnogenesis, for example, the Indians living in the Atikum Indigenous
Land of the Uma Hills in the municipality of Carnaubeira da Penha have
constituted themselves as ethnic communities with full rights. 204 These
examples have led María Regina Celestino de Almeida to conclude that
‘villages operate as a possible space for the recreation of the ethnic iden-
tities of the diverse groups that have come together there’. 205
The theoretical renewal of indigenism, territoriality and the idea of
plural identities must then be analysed as an open process of cultural
exchanges (or flows, to borrow from Ulf Hannerz), through which ethnic
groups construct their own traditions in a dynamic social space. In the
opinion of anthropologist Paul E. Little, the theoretical renewal of the
concept of territoriality must pass through a historical reconstruction of
the collective memory of the groups involved.206 Again, the key is under-
standing what it means to be Indian. In the face of the indigenous illusion
of aboriginal purity, 207 R. Radhakrishan asks why he cannot simply be
an Indian without being an ‘authentic’ Indian, wondering whether au-
thenticity is really a ghetto built to satisfy the ruling world.208 In the
Uma Hills, toré (‘Indian science’) determines the Indianness that distin-
guishes the Atikum from whites.209 In this group, individuals who decide
at some point to live elsewhere, abandoning their indigenous ethos, are
no longer considered caboclos, the ‘civilized Indians of the Uma Hills’.
Those who choose to live in the Uma Hills come to be seen as members
of the Atikum ethnicity from the moment that they actively participate
in the toré, a dynamic body of knowledge on which the secret of the tribe
is based.210 According to the Constitution of 1988, for a land to be con-
sidered indigenous, its Indian inhabitants must establish a traditional,
stable and regular occupation on it.211 To satisfy this requirement, the
Atikum sought out the surrounding peoples who taught them toré, so
that they could demonstrate their ‘ethnic purity’. Additionally, recent
studies have shown that powerful inter-ethnic relationships between In-
dians from the villages of Rio de Janeiro require a rethinking of the
processes of mestizaje. Are ethnic groups – mestizos, Indians, blacks –
and social groups – Indians, non-Indians – monolithic blocks that act
with one voice according to the ethnic and/or social places and roles
attributed to them?212 The instrumental reason of the Brazilian state
has been based on the incorporation of some 220 distinct ethnic groups,
44 Anthropology and History
according to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE),
into the national territory.213 However, from the indigenous perspec-
tive, this territoriality cannot be explained exclusively as the geopolitical
strategy of conflicting groups, but rather as a socioeconomic logic that
these ethnic groups instrumentalize to their own advantage.214
Notes
Anthropology and History 45
46 Anthropology and History
structure and archetype (White, 1987). Ginzburg has highlighted the con-
nections between White’s scepticism and Italian neo-idealism, similar to
relativist positions (Ginzburg, 2010b: 312, 387).
Anthropology and History 47
48 Anthropology and History
Greco-Roman culture or, on the contrary, they should be assimilated with
the American savages they found in the New World. In other words, ‘were
the French to the Ancients what the Amerindians were to the French?’
(Melzer, 2012: 166).
100 Knight, 1997: 82.
101 Despite the fact that they began their activities at almost the same time, the
Direction of Indigenous Affairs and the National Indigenist Institute never
merged (Marzal, 1993: 417).
102 In 1938, Cárdenas funded the creation of the National School of Anthro-
pology and History (ENAH). Four years later, in 1942, the ENAH merged
with the INAH to teach indigenous history and anthropology.
103 Marzal, 1993: 391–6.
104 De la Peña, 2008: 168.
105 According to Knight, despite denying the superiority or inferiority of the
‘races’, indigenist intellectuals accepted that they were all biologically de-
termined and therefore that ‘race’, as understood in Mexico (Indian, white
or Indo-European, mestizo, black), did indeed exist (Knight, 1997: 87).
106 Marzal, 1993: 393–4; Knight, 1997: 94.
107 One example is seen in the fights led by the indigenous teachers in one of
the poorest and most isolated regions of Mexico, La Montaña, Guerrero
(1950–2000). See the doctoral thesis by García Leyva, 2010: 206–25.
108 Parallel to mestizaje, the Chicano movement emerged as a new ethnic myth
that attracted many Mexicans and Latinos living in the United States.
Anthropology and History 49
This movement manipulated pre-Hispanic symbols, particularly Aztlan,
the legendary homeland of the first Aztecs. As Aztlan was located in the
southwest United States, many Chicanos believed themselves to be the de-
scendants of the Aztecs who migrated to found Mexico-Tenochtitlan (Klor
de Alva, 1992: 3–8). As Roger Bartra has observed, the Mexican national
character only has a mythological existence. For a critique of the myths
produced by the hegemonic culture in postcolonial Mexico, see Bartra,
1996.
109 On the contrary, Guy Rozat (1992) formulated an inevitable critique: the
indigenous texts of the conquest analysed by León Portilla and others are
not historical, but theological documents, and must be approached from
this perspective. In other words, the ‘viewpoint of the defeated’ is really
a discursive trick, given that the indigenous texts produced between the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were profoundly linked to a medieval
theological-historical culture.
119 De la Peña, 2008: 172. Also, El pasado indígena (1996) by Alfredo López
Austin and Leonardo López Luján criticized the neoliberal policies that
plunged the indigenous peoples into misery. While there were few weapons
of resistance, the most valuable, according to the authors, included ‘a cul-
tural legacy that, forged over 13 centuries during the entire Early Preclassic
period, formed the essence of Mesoamerica’ (2001: 306).
120 Bonfil, 2009: 229–33. See also Bonfil, 1970.
121 Tavárez & Smith, 2001: 19.
122 Bracamonte, 1994. For an analysis of the dialogue with interlocutors from
other cultures, see Wulf, 2008: 110.
123 De la Peña, 2008: 179.
124 De la Peña, 2008: 180.
125 On the contrary, during the first years of independence, Chilean patriots
lauded the rhetorical figure of the Araucanian (Mapuche) as the fighting
Indian, heroic and invincible against the Spanish invader (Gallardo, 2001:
119–34).
126 Thurner, 1997: 9; Husson, 2001: 132.
127 Thurner, 1997: 12.
128 Méndez, 2000: 27.
50 Anthropology and History
129 Méndez, 2004. With reason, Frank Salomon wrote that ‘the turn of the
twentieth century was a dark hour both for Andean peoples and for An-
dean studies’ (Salomon, 1985: 86).
130 Salomon, 1985: 88.
131 Andrés García, 2010: 31–2; Salomon, 1985: 88. In the early twentieth cen-
tury, the different Andean nations, like the Aymara, were integrated into
the empire of the Incas and, in turn, into the ‘Peruvian nation’ (Branca,
2017).
133 For a criticism of the heuristic value of the opposition between peninsu-
lares and criollos, see Acosta, 1984: 73–88; Acosta, 1981: 29–51; Gara-
vaglia, ‘Una breve nota acerca de los “patriotas criollos”’; Pérez Vejo, 2010:
169–212.
134 Koselleck, 2004a: 37–8.
135 Lavallé, 1993: 23–5.
136 Mazzotti, 1996: 173–4.
137 Céspedes del Castillo argues that the real distinction between criollos and
peninsulares is not due to the place of birth, although that was the basis for
the difference. Indeed, some ‘criollos’ were born in Spain and some ‘pen-
insulares’ in America (cited in Acosta, 1984: 80). See also Lavallé, 1993,
2007: 375–85.
138 Cañizares-Esguerra, 2001: 204–10, 2007: 29–36.
139 Cañizares-Esguerra, 1999: 33–68.
140 See Cañizares-Esguerra, 1999: 33–68.
144 Bauer & Mazzotti, 2009: 1–42. See also Garrett, ‘Locating “criollo”’,
2012: 139–65. See also García-Bedoya (2003: 182), who has highlighted
the Janus-faced aspect of criollo subjectivities.
146 Salomon, 1985: 92; Villar & Combès, 2012: 7–31.
62
1 Escobar, 1970: 162.
163 Fuenzalida et al., 1970. See also Salomon, 1982: 84.
164 Smith, 1984.
165 As João Pacheco de Oliveira has observed, the process of deterritorializing
the indigenous people of Brazil led to the administrative recognition of
their lands by the state, ‘resguardando-lhes a posse permanente e o usu-
fruto exclusivo das riquezas ali existentes’ (Pacheco de Oliveira, 1998: 45).
166 Abercrombie, 2012: 137–45.
167 Lorandi, 2012: 19–20.
168 Only some anthropologists, like Viveiros de Castro (1992), have suggested
other forms of historicity, in other words, alternative (native) forms of
looking at the past that have nothing to do with Western chronology and
the succession of historical events in time through documentary sources.
169 Rivera Andía, 2011: 423–31.
177 J. Mª Arguedas, Las comunidades de España y el Perú, Lima: Universidad
Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Departamento de Publicaciones, 1968.
52 Anthropology and History
the Resurgence Group also tried to combine the different efforts to defend
Indians in Peru. One of its members, Luis Enrique Valcárcel (1891–1986),
published a book with a prologue by José Carlos Mariátegui: Tempestad
en los Andes (1927). In this book, Valcárcel not only strongly criticized the
negative effects of mestizaje, but also defended a homogenous Andean cul-
ture, condemning the lack of a national spirit and calling for a new indige-
nous leader to lead this protest movement (Andrés García, 2010: 230–42).
179 Palomino, 2010: 22.
180 Palomino, 2010: 22, 45.
182 Pease and Saignes, cited in Lorandi, 2012, 19–20.
183 Spalding, 1984. In her book De indio a campesino (1974), Spalding called
for a study of the Andean world similar to what Gibson did with Mexico
(Pérez Zevallos, 2001: 109).
184 Cited in Krotz, 2008: 47–8. Cardoso de Oliveira’s first field study anal-
ysed the assimilation of the Terena Indians of Mato Grosso do Sul into the
world of the whites. (Eremites de Oliveira, 2009: 10–11).
185 Gambini, 1988.
186 Almeida, 2012: 113.
187 Kradolfer, 2011: 44–51. For a recent historical-anthropological analysis of
Mapuche shamanism, see Bacigalupo, 2016.
188 Pérez, 2005: 571–91.
189 Lourenço, 2008; Maciel, 2012: 25–39.
190 ‘Manuela Carneiro da Cunha: una antropóloga militante’. http://revista
pesquisa.fapesp.br/es/2009/12/01/una-antropologa-militante/
191 Maciel, 2012: 25–31. See also Little, 2002: 14.
192 Maciel, 2012; Maciel, ‘Após medio século: Terra Indígena Panambiziho’
(manuscript).
193 Eremites de Oliveira, 2009: 11.
194 Marques Pereira, 2009: 23–44.
[…] the more things remained the same the more they changed, since
every such reproduction of the categories is not the same. Every re-
production of culture is an alteration, insofar as in action, the cate-
gories by which a present world is orchestrated pick up some novel
empirical content.19
This is all due to the fact that culture is a creation in action. Human expe-
rience is based on the appropriation of specific perceptions through gen-
eral concepts that order the world in an arbitrary and historical way, and
the use of concepts in empirical contexts submits cultural meanings to
practical revaluations. In this way, ‘traditional’ categories also transform,
although this transformation is relative because ‘things must preserve
some identity through their changes, or else the world is a madhouse’.20
From this concept of mytho-praxis, Sahlins also developed the con-
cept of the ‘structure of the conjuncture’ to grapple with the role of
social action in structures. Sahlins proposed a model similar to Gid-
dens’s ‘structuring structures’ or Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ or ‘constructivist
structuralism’ that allows for an area of individual freedom for agents
and/or actors within the limits imposed by these structures.21 The model
opens the way for a ‘political culture’ in general and concepts of justice,
authority and power in particular, by questioning how the reproduction
of a structure becomes its transformation. 22 Thus, the norms, values
and symbols shared by a social, ethnic and religious community con-
stitute fundamental elements to understand collective and individual
behaviours.
In the early 1990s, Sahlins’s thesis (1981, 1985), which he had applied
to the history of Hawaii and, especially, the presence, death and myth-
ification of Captain James Cook in 1779 was contested by Gananath
Obeyesekere (1992). This led to a passionate debate on the relationship
between anthropology and history. 23 The case demonstrated the diffi-
culties inherent in interpreting the past (and the present) and the emer-
gence of different interpretative alternatives. A debate centred on how
the Hawaiians understood Captain Cook before and after his death.
One of the main questions concerned whether the priests of Kuali’i had
regarded Cook as the god Lono before he was killed (Sahlins) or if he had
62 “Masters of Thought”
really always been seen as a colonizer who was made into a god a pos-
teriori (Obeyesekere). 24 This case broaches a central topic where several
problems that influence the work of the anthropologist converge: how do
other peoples understand themselves and the world around them? The
interpretation of what the natives supposedly thought about Captain
Cook contains a debate between universalism and relativism, the differ-
ent models to explain social action and the epistemological determinants
in the different analyses, in this case, of Sahlins and Obeyesekere.
Obeyesekere accused Sahlins of projecting a mythical thinking
(mytho-praxis) onto the Hawaiians that led them to believe that Captain
Cook was a god (and that they would put a ritual end to him, as they did
with one of the gods in their mythology), when in reality the Hawaiians’
political behaviour was rational, characterized by practical reasons to
expel a potential enemy. Moreover, Sahlins had incorrectly interpreted
the sources based on the testimonies of Cook’s companions, given that
they were not fluent in Polynesian languages and confused a god with
a political chief. Sahlins, therefore, should have studied the mythology
of the British. To argue that the Hawaiians conceived of these men as
gods implied, on the one hand, accepting that these were ‘superstitious’
peoples or, in other words, homogenizing ‘native’ Hawaiian culture in
terms of cultural purity, while, on the other, obscuring the devastating
effects of British colonialism in the Pacific.
Obeyesekere’s accusations regarding Sahlins’s ethnocentrism and
lack of ethical commitment received a solid response from the Amer-
ican anthropologist in How “Natives” Think: About Captain Cook,
For Example (1995). While Obeyesekere portrayed Cook as a powerful
chief with unquestionable ‘divine’ qualities that were instrumentalized
by King Kalani’opu’u to his own advantage, Sahlins avoided these dual-
isms (‘divine’, ‘human’) to argue that rationality is not universal, but a
characteristic of Western thinking. He warned of the danger of falling
into the trap of rationalist universalism, observing that a historical event
is constructed culturally from a specific symbolic logic. Even if the Ha-
waiians allied themselves militarily with the Europeans, it did not mean
that they lost their ‘divine’ qualities, but that they were integrated into a
world of multiple incarnations – because of Cook’s powerful qualities,
they could turn him into the kino lau of Lono – for sociopolitical reasons
that ultimately depend on the historical context of the time. Similarly, if
the Hawaiians decided to attack them, they did so with the potentially
full awareness that these were gods.25
Sahlins’s did not stop there. In Apologies to Thucydides: Understand-
ing History as Culture and Vice Versa (2004), the author vindicated
historical anthropology, comparing different ways of thinking about the
past. To that end, he reconstructed and established parallels between
the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431–404 BCE)
and the Fijian War (1843–55) between the kingdoms of Bau and Rewa
“Masters of Thought” 63
using texts by Thucydides and the Methodist missionary John Hunt.
This comparative study reveals conflicting power structures between a
model of societies with exemplary displays of ritual power – Athens and
Bau, respectively – different to that of Sparta and Rewa. There is a ba-
sic contradiction in this comparison, which criticizes the universalism
of Thucydides from a universalizing perspective that allows Sahlins to
make his historical comparison. Throughout this work, Sahlins presents
different models of historical change and the way in which historical
contingencies are constituted by the cultural order, in a sort of neo-
culturalism. Sahlins continued this type of intellectual exercise, espe-
cially in his historical study of the illusion of the Western idea of human
nature (Sahlins, 2005, 2008).
In conclusion, in his search for a method for historical anthropol-
ogy, Sahlins’s work has passed from materialist neo-evolutionism (Stone
Age Economics, 1972) to a culturalist approach. Anthropologists Adam
Kuper and Jonathan Friedman have both observed an excess of cultural
determinism in Sahlins’s work, 26 with Sahlins swinging to the other side
of the pendulum after applying Marxist materialism in his early years.
The structural definition of culture would therefore imply considering
it as an a priori to the historical event.27 Other critics have emphasized
the dangers of a relativism that seeks to recognize different concepts of
time and history, precluding a common front for comparison or ‘objec-
tivation’, as observed by Jan Vansina. 28 The dichotomy between myth
and history opened the debate on the forms of history and temporality,
particularly in those societies ‘not exclusively determined by the evolu-
tion of the state institution and colonial domination’. 29
In any case, Sahlins’s contribution was clearly to shake the anthropo-
logical discipline out of its ‘intellectual laziness’ in the study of global-
ization. The traditional subject of anthropology was not disappearing,
as suggested by postmodern philosophy, but anthropology needed to
analyse the new dialectic between different worlds in contact and their
power relations, as Sahlins suggested in his illuminating article ‘What is
Anthropological Enlightenment?’ (1999), where he challenges concepts
of change that are not always suited to observing processes of domina-
tion or indigenous strategies to appropriate modernity.
This third point, the focus on societies as processes over time, contains
several challenges: the concept of ‘system’ would be a fiction, an analyt-
ical licence to explain the world and the invisible connections between
social phenomena. However, counter to postmodern scepticism and al-
though social life seems episodic or irregular, it has not been demon-
strated that forms and relationships do not exist.
In the recognition of ‘other histories’, it is very important to consider
the endogenous perspective of social worlds. However, it has been quite
common to exclude certain indigenous populations from history until
the arrival of ‘people with history’ (Wolf, 1982), even though the history
of the indigenous people did not begin with the arrival of the Europeans.
This prejudice is rooted in perspectives that refer to ‘pre-capitalist soci-
eties’, as if there were no history before capitalism. Indigenous peoples
did not construct the past through a (colonial) chronology, but through
mythical time. Here, the Comaroffs do not find much illumination in the
works of Wolf, Meillassoux, Sahlins and Bourdieu and their view of the
historicity of non-European peoples.
The analytical units and methods used in anthropology begin with a
very clear view. Events and individuals are studied in accordance with
the expectations of the anthropologist or the historian. The usual tech-
niques take the concept of the individual for granted: biography, life
history, memoir, personal diary and so on. These forms, however, re-
flect the idea of a seventeenth-century person in Europe, in which an
individual is an accumulation of events and their agent. The irony lies
in the fact that for historical purposes, the importance of agency and
events is not always as great as, for example, laws that may shape a
person’s daily life. By way of illustration, the Comaroffs compare the
68 “Masters of Thought”
Battle of Trafalgar (1805), an episode full of agency and events, with the
1870 Married Women’s Property Act, which allowed married women
to be the legal owners of property and their earnings. This law affected
nineteenth- century living conditions in Great Britain much more deci-
sively than the battle.
The best way to explain the Comaroffs’ modus operandi is to present
an example from the analyses included in their book Ethnography and
the Historical Imagination: the study of missionary spaces in nineteenth-
century South Africa. The main methodological problem with this type
of research is to go beyond the rhetoric of the actors, in this case mission-
aries, to analyse forms of control over practices and bodies. The British
missionaries tried to ‘civilize the natives’, reconstructing their habitat
and habitus in the image and likeness of the bourgeois ethos of the in-
dustrial revolution. Their analysis, however, did not entail a mechanical
application of models and theories, but interrogated the sources using
ethnographic questions. The imposition of square buildings over indige-
nous round ones, which were considered less rational, is one example of
the practical applications of their metaphors. The African desert was to
be planted with gardens that would become the icon and example of the
civilizing mission. Local actors, like ‘rainmakers’, were delegitimized
by the missionaries, who presented science as superior to indigenous
magic. The Comaroffs were able to use oral history and documents to
see how the Tswana view of knowledge exchange allowed them to main-
tain their assumptions about the cosmos despite missionary pressure.
The missionaries transmitted the colonial ethos of private property,
competition between individuals and the use of time. Local women’s
work in the field was to be confined to the domestic sphere and was
branded as backwards. Monetarization, the orientation of production
to the market, and processes similar to those presented by Stoler (1985)
and others were the expression of these new tensions. In this respect, the
missionaries embodied the bearers of the Protestant ethic of capitalism.
Religion was not conceived of as an autonomous sphere, but as a dis-
seminator of a discipline (Asad, 1993), an intraworldly asceticism in ac-
cordance with the new work ethos. Moreover, although the missionaries
promoted a local ‘colonization of the consciousness’, the consciousness
of colonialism was ambiguous, since the same missionaries projected the
idea of the lost paradise of a pre-industrial society onto Africa, and con-
stituted a fraction of the dominant group competing with other views
of colonialism.
In short, the Comaroffs’ analysis reconstructs a context from the past
using holistic ethnographic tools, showing the tensions between the
ideological models of the dominators (state model, the settlement colo-
nialism of the Boers and the colonialism of the missionaries) and their
expressions on the land, on bodies and spaces, in the daily theatre of
representations, imposing grids on the space and readying society for the
“Masters of Thought” 69
modern capitalist ethos. Thus, they revised essentialist theories about
power and, in this case, colonialism by showing its paradoxes and ten-
sions, just as the following author did.
No doubt local people are much more likely to retain anecdotes an-
chored in kinship and place and less likely to remember messages
of political or theological importance. By contrast, the written re-
ports of ideologues like Burguera would likely leave out the more
local meanings. These seers were speaking simultaneously to both
levels.73
Notes
12 Castilla Urbano, 2002: 130.
“Masters of Thought” 83
20 Sahlins, 1985: 153. For this reason, far from thinking of culture as an en-
dangered object, Sahlins cautions about the danger of abandoning it for
the sake of ‘sentimental pessimism’, ‘on pain of failing to comprehend the
unique phenomenon it names and distinguishes: the organization of human
experience and action by symbolic means’ (Sahlins, 2000: 158).
22 Kuper, 2001: 209; Aljovín de Losada & Jacobsen, 2007; Aljovín de Losada,
2012: 54–5.
23 This debate is summarized in Borofsky, 1997.
24 Something similar occurred when the first Jesuits reached Brazil and then
Paraguay, where many of them were considered successors to the mythical
hero Sumé, associated with Saint Thomas, one of the 12 apostles of Jesus
Christ, who had supposedly evangelized the natives of the New World be-
fore the arrival of the Europeans (Vieira Cavalcante, 2009: 27–35).
25 For a more complete discussion of these topics, see the review by Jonathan
Friedman (1997: 261–2) in American Ethnologist. Frank Salomon also an-
alysed the various interpretations of the past that can result from the same
source when it is read by an indigenous historian (Obeyesekere) and a for-
eign academic (Sahlins) (Salomon, 1999: 19–95).
26 Kuper, 2001: 232–3.
27 Wilde, 2018: 103.
28 Vansina, 1968: 153–75.
29 Wilde, 2018: 104. Our translation.
30 In La identidad de la antropología (1990: 9–22), Josep R. Llobera also de-
fends a conception of the discipline that is at once humanist, critical and
scientific.
34 Comaroff & Comaroff, 1992: 9.
36 Lorandi, 2012: 29.
40 See, in this respect, Jack Goody’s critique of the Eurocentric and Western
warp of European history (Goody, 2006: 7–15).
4 4 Wolf, 2001: 215–29.
46 Contreras et al., 2000: 323.
64 Aliaga et al., 2014: 118. Tim Ingold expressed this in similar terms in his
book Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture (2013), in
which he firmly argues for an interdisciplinary approach.
65 Christian, Jr., (1978: 11). Interestingly, Christian mentions that the use of
the word ‘popular’ in the Spanish version (Religiosidad popular. Estudio
antropológico en un valle español) does not conform to his perspective and
was due to a translation of his Person and God in a Spanish Valley that was
altered for editorial reasons (Aliaga et al. 2014: 115).
66 This type of ‘scandal of ecstasy’, established by the Holy See around 1525
(García-Arenal & Pereda, 2012: 113), also took place in Muslim contexts,
when nineteenth- and twentieth-century reformist movements went after ec-
static brotherhoods, saints and mediators (Spadola, 2008).
67 Christian, Jr., 1981: 9.
72 Christian, Jr., 1996: 138–45.
73 Christian, Jr., 1996: 177.
3 Epistemologies and
Methods
This methodological problem is not new. In his text, Futures Past (1979),
Reinhart Koselleck analysed the difficulty of working with categories
from the present to analyse phenomena – or events – from the past.
This epistemological challenge is not unlike the problems inherent in
anthropology, when it tries to analyse phenomena from other cultural
contexts and their own reference points, invoking the supposed ‘objec-
tivity’ of the ethnographic method.83 The debate is an old one and much
has been written about the role of historians in the construction of social
categories. Perhaps, however, less work has been done on the common
denominator that affects both historians and anthropologists and the
potential lessons that could come from comparing ethnocentrism and
chronocentrism.84
106 Epistemologies and Methods
How can societies be analysed from the perspective of the modern/
postmodern debates in the social sciences? The criticism of anthropol-
ogy and history as objective disciplines serves to show the mechanisms
behind the construction of knowledge and their ties to questions of
power. However, having acquired this constructivist awareness supplied
by postmodernism, what then is to be done with the documents, the so-
cieties of the past, what can be said about them, their people, their ways
of thinking, their social relations and the exercise of power?
An initial step involves putting the house in order. The rather stunted
debate about the history of anthropology is part and parcel of the same
set of problems (Stolcke, 1993a). Putting the focus on anthropology raises
issues similar to those raised when studying the local experiences of so-
cieties. This was a key issue for nineteenth-century authors, although,
as is well known, their questions were shaped by a supra-historical, evo-
lutionist starting point and focus. This focus was more normative than
descriptive, since it tended to ‘explain’ institutions in sequential order
through a dynamic of stages of society, presupposing universal laws de-
termined by the idea of progress and linear time (Marx himself was
inspired by the anthropological work of Lewis H. Morgan). However,
other anthropologists like Boas had already called attention to the prob-
lem, and around the same time a little cited author, the English historian
Frederick William Maitland (1850–1906), criticized evolutionist teleol-
ogy, saying that anthropology should be historical or be nothing.85
An overview of the history of anthropology shows that history and
social change were in no way negated by the ‘bookish ethnology, as am-
ateur as speculative, of the evolutionists and diffusionists’.86 According
to Viazzo, 1922 was the critical year when anthropology was sepa-
rated from history, the year that saw the publication of books by Bron-
islaw Malinowski (Argonauts of the Western Pacific, 1922) and Alfred
Radcliffe-Brown (The Andaman Islanders, 1922).87 In his book Out
of Time: History and Evolution in Anthropological Discourse (1989),
Nicholas Thomas warns that prioritizing a long-term ‘ethnographic pres-
ent’ excluded the anthropological object from historical time. Viewed as
an exclusive method – and rite of passage – of the anthropologist, the
ethnographic practice seemed to exist outside of historical time.88 Proof
of this was the disdainful way that professional ethnographers tried to
exclude and delegitimize reports from the early explorers, missionaries
and colonial civil servants. This marginalization of the (colonial) history
done by modern ethnographers, according to Thomas, has always been
problematic.89 It is no surprise that Lévi-Strauss himself in his book The
Sad Tropics (1955) described the work of the French explorer Jean de
Léry as the ‘breviary of the ethnologist’.90
The anthropologist needs historical data to understand the change
that is always occurring in structural processes. However, presentism
must be avoided when evaluating and interpreting the past using the
Epistemologies and Methods 107
criteria of the present.91 Social phenomena are historical by nature; hu-
man beings interpret reality from within social structures and mean-
ings whose origins cannot be detached from the past. But what is this
history? In his last book, The Theft of History (2006), Jack Goody
(1919–2015) wrote that ‘Europe has stolen the history of the East by
imposing its own versions of time (largely Christian) and of space on the
rest of the Eurasian world’.92 In antiquity, Athens became the cradle of a
democracy whose values, of course – freedom, equality, rationality – did
not quite mirror common Greek cultural practices like slavery. Other
cities like Tyre, a Phoenician colony, and Carthage also followed demo-
cratic procedures, but they were deliberately ‘written out of the script’.93
However, imagining an exclusive European antiquity made it possible
to create a developmental scheme that pointed towards the take-off of
modern capitalism. India and China were also ‘civilizations’, but after
José de Acosta’s (1540–1600) famed Natural and Moral History of the
Indies (1590), European historians considered those countries inferior
because, despite their cultural sophistication, they were not Christian.94
The present and past, in effect, are regarded as the peak of a Christian
Europe that consolidated its domination over the world beginning in
the sixteenth century, first through trade and then through the conquest
and colonization of new lands. The imposition of this domination led to
the establishment of a hegemonic model that allowed western European
countries to take ownership of time and apply it to the rest of the world.
The challenge represented by Islam was an important factor in the con-
solidation of ‘Europe’ as a single family or civilization, giving form to
the idea of the ‘West’.95 However, anthropology must return time to the
peoples ‘without a history’, not because they lived outside of it, but be-
cause European history simply did not correspond to them.
Notes
1 Viazzo, 2003: 11.
2 Leiris, 1995: 34.
3 Leiris, 1995: 40–1.
4 Jiménez, 1995: 32, 1972: 163–96; Sanchiz Ochoa, 1997a: 54.
5 Ginzburg, 2010: 9; Ginzburg and Ponti, 1991: 1–10.
6 Ginzburg, 2010: 396.
7 Trevor-Roper, 1985: 77–152.
8 On Thomas’s use of ethnographic examples in his Religion and the Decline
of Magic (1971), see the debate in the 1975 issue of the Journal of Interdis-
ciplinary History (Amodio, 2010: 385).
9 Viazzo, 2003: 219.
10 Greenblatt, 1981: 40–61.
11 Burke, 2006: 62; Ginzburg, 2010: 15.
12
Ginzburg, 2010: 396–7.
13 Ginzburg, 2010: 374.
14 Macfarlane also applied this total analysis in a pioneering monograph on the
life of a Protestant vicar in Essex Ralph Josselin (1977) during the second
108 Epistemologies and Methods
half of the seventeenth century, using a diary that allowed MacFarlane to
recreate the social life of the era from within.
15 Ginzburg, 2005, 2010: 371.
16 Rosaldo, 1986: 79.
17 Rosaldo, 1986: 82.
18 Amodio, 2010: 387–8.
19 Stoler, 2010: 47.
20 See the works by Dirks (2002) and Stoler (2010).
21 Martínez Mauri & Orobitg Canal, 2015: 7–12.
22
Cabello, 2004, cited in Martínez Mauri & Orobitg Canal, 2015: 12.
23
Sanchiz, 1997a: 53–60; Suñe, 1997a: 69–105.
24 For his interpretation of so-called ‘archaeological anthropology’ or ‘new ar-
chaeology’, see Alcina Franch, 1973: 47–62, 1989: 5–9.
25 Jiménez, 1997a: 29. One of the projects where ethnohistorical methodology
was applied looked at the territories of the Audience of Guatemala (sixteenth
century), which comprised a vast area, including the current republics of
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and the Mexi-
can lands of Chiapas and Soconusco (1997b: 107–16).
26 Some authors, like Pilar Sanchiz Ochoa (1997a: 59), believe that ‘the lack
of data on values and beliefs (although the Spanish of the era did interpret
them) makes it impossible to fully understand the mental aspect, and of
course, reach the ideal level of the indigenous culture’. We believe that doc-
uments provide quite valuable information to help understand the political,
social and economic motivations of ethnic groups at local level.
27 Stoler, 2010: 31.
28
Stoler, 2010: 32.
29 Stoler, 2010: 35.
30 See here the text by Keesing (1987) on the political production of knowl-
edge, Bourdieu’s doxa, the ‘world taken for granted’ of Schütz and Geertz
and Mary Douglas’s ‘implicit meanings’.
31 See the work done by our research group, Antropologia e Historia de la
Construcción social de identidades sociales y políticas: Stolcke (2008), Ma-
teo Dieste (2012a), Ventura et al. (2014), amongst others.
32 Stoler, 2010: 49.
33 On the Ottoman case, see Fetvaci (2013).
34 In 1921, Lord Lugard wrote The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa,
an authentic manual that emphasizes the importance of being familiar with
African political organization. This question would guide the aims of func-
tionalist political anthropologists until well into the 1940s. As far back as
the 1920s and 1930s, a large number of colonial civil servants had become
members of the Royal Anthropological Institute. In 1926, the International
African Institute was founded, the birthplace of classic functionalist ethnog-
raphies by Fortes, Evans-Pritchard and Seligman.
35 In the colonies themselves, the need to ‘know the natives’ led to the creation
of institutions like the Committee for Historical and Scientific Studies of
French West Africa in 1915 to study the Sudanese legal system. In 1914,
Delafosse established the Colonial School, followed by the Paris Institute for
Ethnology in 1924. The processes were similar in North Africa. In 1904,
M.A. Le Chatelier, a professor at the Collège de France, founded the Sci-
entific Mission of Morocco. In 1914, he agreed with the government of the
French Protectorate in Morocco to publish the series Cities and Tribes of
Morocco, largely based on reports from the colonial information service.
36
It is quite significant that the first modern national archive came into being
after the French Revolution in 1790 (Dirks, 2002: 61).
Epistemologies and Methods 109
110 Epistemologies and Methods
64 Foster-Carter, 1977: 46–55.
65 Terradas, 1988: 284.
66 Viazzo, 2003: 302.
67 Terradas, 1988: 285.
68 Altez, 2012: 136.
69 Hartog, 2009: 1438–42.
70 On this subject, see the excellent article by Stewart, 2016: 79–94.
71 For a consideration of this type of projection, see the intriguing text by Witt-
genstein (1967) and his criticism of Frazer that the idea of superstition is not
inherent to the ‘natives’, but to Frazer himself.
72 Leiris, 1995: 54. In the midst of the decolonization process initiated by
France at the Brazzaville Conference (1944), Leiris published the piece ‘L’et-
nographe davant le colonialisme’ in Les Temps Modernes (August, 1950).
This work presents a critique of the decolonization processes in Africa and
Indochina (Delgado, 1995: 7–32), as a continuation of his first major con-
sideration of colonialism in Afrique fantôme (1934), a book that exposed
the bad practices of the Dakar-Djibouti expedition (1931–33) of Marcel
Griaule, for whom Leiris served as secretary.
73 Leiris, 1995: 55.
74 Stoler, 2016: 37–67.
75 Viazzo, 2003: 317.
76 Viazzo, 2003: 2–3.
77
This sceptical spirit underlies the study by S.J. Tambiah (1990), which offers
an interesting alternative model.
78 The main goal of the so-called Subaltern Studies Group was, broadly speak-
ing, to rectify the elitist inclination behind the analysis of the history of
British colonialism and Indian nationalism, establishing a perspective that
viewed subalternity ‘as a name for the general attribute of subordination in
South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age,
gender and office or in any other way’ (Guha, 1988: 35). For these postco-
lonial intellectuals, the central question in the historiography of colonial
India was ‘the study of the historical failure of the nation to come to its own’
(Guha, 1988: 43).
79 Ingold, 1996a: 161–84.
80 Similar processes have occurred around genealogical interpretation, for ex-
ample, regarding purity of blood in different contexts (Porqueres, 2001) and
in the political battles for access to genealogy in the Arab-Muslim world
(Bonte et al., 1991; Kilani, 1992).
81 Stoler, 2016: 25–30.
82 Song, 2012: 566.
83 Pagden, 1991: 43–53.
84
Taylor, 1988: 151–92.
85 Viazzo, 2003: 69; Altez, 2012: 125. Maitland criticized the anthropological
use of the past by Henry Maine (1822–88) in his Village Communities in the
East and West (1871). See Nolan (2003: 570).
86 Viazzo, 2003: 1, 65.
87 Thomas, 1989, chap. 2.
88 This argument was made earlier by Bernard Cohn in ‘History and Anthro-
pology’ (1980: 199).
89 Thomas, 1990: 155–6.
90 Lévi-Strauss, 1988: 83.
91 Viazzo, 2003: 55.
92 Goody, 2006: 286.
93 Goody, 2006: 291.
Epistemologies and Methods 111
94 To understand the commotion that accompanied Christianity with its new
time and an authority from the past that was radically different to that of
the Roman Empire, see Hartog (2009: 1425–8).
95 The word ‘Europeans’ seems to have emerged in the eighteenth century
in reference to the victory of Charles Martel over Islamic forces in Tours.
J.M. Roberts, of course, noted in The Triumph of the West that groups be-
come more aware of themselves in the presence of an outside challenge and
that such awareness fosters cohesion.
4 Colonial Systems of Power
and Domination
Very few studies take it upon themselves to analyse the complete process
of power relations, and those studies are usually fragmented, either in
Europe or in the colony. In fact, Mintz’s work is a response to questions
that arose during his 1948 ethnographic work in Puerto Rico on the
122 Colonial Systems
destination and use of tropical products.55 The inhabitants of Barrio
Jauca were involved in processing sugar, but it was not being manufac-
tured for them:
Had there been no ready consumers for it elsewhere, such huge quan-
tities of land, labor, and capital would never have been funneled into
this one curious crop, first domesticated in New Guinea, first pro-
cessed in India, and first carried to the New World by Columbus.56
[…] at first glance, the fact that a white man wants to get married
to a mulatta draws attention, but if this white man is a commoner,
with no family to cause problems, with no regard in society, and
used to associating with mulattos […]77
The origins of the Catholic Zionist movement lie in the poor late
nineteenth- century American urban classes, and the church was
founded in Chicago in 1896 by John Alexander Dowie. When it spread
to South Africa around 1904, it clashed with the orthodox Protestant
model based on Cartesian dualism, and its healing rituals recovered
the precolonial holistic worldview while offering worldly utopias for a
changing time with new emerging classes. Both in the United States and
in South Africa, this church offered a protest language to those dispos-
sessed by proletarianization.106 As in other revivalist cases, the church
called for the restoration of a native institution and reform in people’s
daily lives. New and old elements mixed, but control over the body was
central to the religion. These rites were, in effect, a somatization of so-
cial conflicts or physical disorder as an expression of social malaise. For
Dowie, healing the body depended on purifying society, in some way
140 Colonial Systems
similar to modern Islamism, which also looks to origin myths. This was
not, however, a matter of merely going back to the past. The movement
was motivated by ‘pain and desire that were products of the process of
alienation itself, a disjuncture between means and ends’.107 The fol-
lowers of Zionism did not openly oppose the dominant system politi-
cally and economically, but constituted a counterculture that challenged
dominant symbols.
For Comaroff, resistance did not necessarily involve ‘dramatic re-
sponses’ like public ideologies, organizations, encounters, protests and
strikes, especially in situations where these were impeded by rigid con-
trol and resistance was restricted to daily life. Ritual here is a key form
of protest centred on iconoclastic practices with dominant symbols:
At the end of this complex presentation, Comaroff asks whether the rit-
uals that supposedly subvert the dominant system do not really contrib-
ute to its reproduction, since they do not ever transform the structural
conditions of inequality.109 This question, which is also posed by Kees-
ing, centres around the debate over agency, consciousness and change,
and Comaroff’s study is, to some extent, disconcerting. In the end, it
recognizes that everyday, or religious, resistance does not challenge the
dominant powers, although it does alter their penetration into the struc-
tures of the ‘natural world’ (in terms borrowed from social phenome-
nology). Therefore, the resistance is implicit.110 Although there is still
some awareness of inequality, it does not generate explicit consciousness
or strategic class action. Additionally, it may well be that the supposed
resistance is producing the opposite effect, by keeping workers under
apartheid both dominated and docile, as several South African black
intellectuals have argued. Beyond this theoretical debate, one criticism
of this work concerns the lack of personal and biographical details that
could provide a less hypothetical view of the lives of the Tshidi, shedding
additional light on the debate about resistance and consciousness. In
this book, the debate is excessively theoretical or perhaps structuralist,
unlike Keesing’s work discussed below. However, Comaroff presents a
premonitory criticism of restrictive ideas about resistance and the polit-
ical that only understand direct action, especially in light of the contri-
butions from millenarianism.
Colonial Systems 141
In Custom and Confrontation: The Kwaio Struggle for Cultural Au-
tonomy (1992), Roger Keesing documents the history of the Kwaio of
the Solomon Islands based on an exceptional fieldwork study that cov-
ers a thirty-year period beginning in 1962, complemented to a lesser
extent by colonial archive material. This long-term view allows him to
explain the determinants of the collective action of the Kwaio from the
inland of Malaita Island. Up until 1927, there was violent armed con-
frontation on the island, but after the colonizers imposed themselves
using brute force, confrontation took other forms such as the ancestral
revelations that began in 1930,111 which then transformed into politi-
cal confrontation after 1940. Keesing, however, is reluctant to restrict
these moments by categorizing them as phases, in the sense of con-
tinuous periods, since transversal elements, like the ancestral cult, are
found in all three cases.
Because of the exceptional length of the time that Keesing spent follow-
ing the society, readers are able to observe the author’s transformation
and his relationship with the group over time, with the anthropologist’s
work gradually taking shape alongside the Kwaio’s own political project.
Keesing presents a chronicle of the long relationship between the Kwaio
and the Europeans and their battle to preserve their autonomy and lands
over the course of 120 years. As the modern history revolves around
the local reaction to colonialism, Keesing deemed it necessary to issue
some caveats regarding the question of resistance, which was in vogue
when he was writing his book: (1) First, he asks, what is resistance? The
question is directly tied to the concept of consciousness. As with the
Tshidi analysed by Jean Comaroff, amongst the Kwaio, religious forms
developed that did not openly express any consciousness of resistance;
(2) What about the effects of symbolic resistance? If there is no change
in the structures of domination and the protest is purely symbolic, the
result is that the situation is accepted; (3) Keesing cautions about the bias
inherent in romantic views of resistance, which can obscure transitory
factors like the personal ambitions of some leaders; (4) He prefers to
avoid the use of essentialist dichotomies to refer to units like ‘capital-
ism’ and ‘the West’, focusing instead on specific groups or people, like
the missionary or the district official, actors on the ground; (5) Other
methodological problems materialize when the study of resistance is
based on oral sources that are representations of events, recreated from
the present. While Keesing advocates the incorporation of the voices of
the Kwaio in order to better understand the entire process, he also cau-
tions about indigenous (and colonizer) simplifications that use dominant
structural dichotomies and counterpoints for their counter-hegemonic
discourses. Here, Keesing uses the example of ‘black is beautiful’, a slo-
gan that continues to recognize and reinforce the importance of the he-
gemonic contrast between black and white,112 similar to what happened
with the category of mixed blood. The methodology used to reconstruct
142 Colonial Systems
these power relations is varied. To gather the oldest history, the author
drew on epic songs and stories about the past, while for events that took
place after 1920, he incorporated the testimony of men and women who
had been alive at that time. He also included the oral histories that he
had collected and translated from Koio, the Kwaio language, over the
course of 28 years.
Keesing rightly highlights the importance of not losing sight of what
the Italians phrased ‘traduttore-traditore’ (‘the translator as traitor’) in
ethnographic work, which is even further complicated by the historical
exercise. Translating the terms that the Kwaio used to describe the death
of Westerners at their hands, for instance, is not a trivial matter. Keesing
must choose how to translate the word ‘mae’ – ‘die’, ‘be dead’, ‘fight’,
‘battle’, ‘killing’ and more – aware that his choice colours the reading of
a text. This difficulty takes on special importance when analysing cate-
gories of resistance that refer to the act of killing and that can have very
different political nuances:
There can be few more dramatic and direct ways to express resis-
tance than to assassinate the agent of political domination while he
is in the process of exacting tribute and to massacre his armed force.
But, even here, the concept of “resistance” is somewhat clumsy in
its romanticization of action directed to a collective cause. Basiana
and the other warrior leaders had motives and agendas of their own,
were manipulating, withholding information, and scheming. They
were bent on self-aggrandizement and personal vengeance as well
as liberation.120
One of the principal political movements on the Solomon Islands was Maa-
sina Rule, which demanded an end to injustice and the re- establishment
of local customs. The Maasina movement contained a number of dif-
ferent revivalist elements, including ending – and demanding that the
colonial authorities put a stop to – abuse on the plantations, the payment
of tributes and the loss of autonomy. At the heart of the demands lay a
concern that continued to play a role into the late twentieth century: the
codification of their customs or kastomu. The paradox in this historical
process is comparable to that seen in other contexts with the generation
of an idea of ‘culture’ as self-representation and reaction.121 After the
imposition and adoption of new social forms and the abandonment of
the old ones, the Kwaio developed an interest (almost obsession) in estab-
lishing and codifying their customs,122 reflecting Favret-Saada’s (1967)
consideration of tradition as an excess of modernity.
Keesing ends his study by exploring debates related to resistance. The
resistance of the Kwaio did not necessarily operate from a logic of con-
frontation, but of compartmentalization. Indeed, the locals incorpo-
rated the Europeans, emulating or adopting external symbolic elements
such as the flag, paramilitary armies and the need to transcribe the
‘law’.123 Many analytical problems are involved in situating the context
of resistance, from what resistance is and what produces it to the possi-
bility that resistance was not conceptualized as such at that time, in its
later romanticized version. Are there continuities in resistance? Several
examples repeat, like the opposition to paying taxes from the Mela-
nesian perspective of reciprocity.124 Transgenerational inheritances of
versions of the past can also lead to resistance, as in the case of the
massacres of 1927 (in some way comparable to family memories of the
Spanish Civil War). Turning to theory, Keesing raises James C. Scott’s
considerations about daily forms of resistance and the existence of a
‘subaltern subculture’ (a phenomenon that Stoler did not see anywhere
with the Javanese domestic workers). In truth, the debate dates back to
Colonial Systems 145
Karl Marx’s classic The Eighteenth Brumaire and the idea of conscious-
ness in the dominated class. Keesing’s concern – echoing Comaroff,
Taussig and Ong – is that consciousness of resistance does not always
exist when the protest adopts other languages, such as possession by
spirits. This would constitute what Scott terms ‘hidden transcripts’, as
in the cargo cults, where the actors do not seem to be conscious of their
political motivation.
This then leads to another question: Is there one resistance in the
eyes of the observer and another in the eyes of the observed? When the
subjugation is powerful, to what extent is accommodation a latent form
of resistance? If passivity is also resistance, what, then, is resistance?
More confusion emerges when looking at the scope of the resistance
in terms of the human universe. Is collective resistance truly collective
or is it made up of actions performed in the name of a collective, like
some sort of group ventriloquism executed by actors with individual
motivations?
The third work analysed here is Being Colonized: The Kuba Experi-
ence in Rural Congo, 1880–1960 (2010) by Jan Vansina. In this book,
the Belgian author reconstructs the history of the Kuba in the Congo to
present their particular experience with colonialism, underscoring the
need to take the oft-overlooked viewpoint of the Africans into consid-
eration. At no time does Vansina attempt to make the Kuba experience
representative of the entire Congo, let alone the African continent. The
author emphasizes the importance of detail and proximity to the peo-
ple being studied, but also advocates the use of triangulated sources
to gain a better understanding of their perspective. Like Keesing with
the Kwaio, the great value of Vansina’s study lies in the comprehensive
overview that he was able to attain after a long relationship working
with the Kuba. Vansina himself reveals the limits of the British method
in vogue when he began his fieldwork in early 1953. The method of a
temporary stay based on participant observation was insufficient in his
eyes. At that time, he had the insight to bring together a group of local
young people, who he trained to collect information about their own
society, rescuing the memory (‘reminiscences’, in Vansina’s words) of
the elders and becoming, to some extent, improvised ethnographers.
Years later, Vansina used this collection to complete his monograph.
These rich sources were complemented by field notes and documents
obtained over time from colonial and private sources and photographic
archives. In order to incorporate the local perspective, Vansina bal-
anced the ethnographic photographs with documents produced by the
Kuba kingdom itself and the autobiography of a man of letters, Georges
Kwete Mwana. Some of his most original sources were the Kuba’s sto-
ries about dreams, which he used to reconstruct the desires, contradic-
tions and changes felt by common people when new objects or people
enter their dream worlds.
146 Colonial Systems
Vansina traces the history of the Kuba kingdom throughout the re-
gion, presenting the changes and dynamics generated by the colonial
impact on the population. Contrary to the dominant simplifications
representative of European sources, the consideration of reminiscences
and other local stories portrays the history of the Kuba kingdom in all
its complexity, considering its social structure, battles between factions
and the role of the kings with their own internal political logic, seen
in, for instance, the rivalry between the successor lines of King Kwet
aMbembeky. The king ordered powerful charms so that the other lines
would be infertile or die, with one of those lines eventually creating
its own countercharms. When King Kwet aPe came to power, it was
interpreted as a victory for this magic. These symbolic elements played
an important role in local interpretations of the colonial conflict over
the years.
The first rebellions occurred around the turn of century in some vil-
lages where state agents had been abusive.125 In the locality of Olenga,
the inhabitants joined a new group cult called Tongatonga around 1904
to cope with their misery. The spirit of rebellion in this cult extended
to other areas as a clear reaction to colonial exploitation; participation
in the cult required abstinence from European goods if the charm were
to work.126 In the framework of the debate about types of resistance,
Vansina insists that Tongatonga was not a nationalist movement, be-
cause it did not involve an elite spreading rebellion to gain independence,
but was more like a ‘primary resistance’ movement (Hobsbawm, 1974).
However, when pressure increased from the Compagnie du Kasai con-
cession company to exploit cork (backed by the Presbyterian missions
collaborating in the process), King Kuba himself ended up accepting the
massive exploitation of manpower. One example of the structure estab-
lished between the external and local was the pressure applied by the
company to produce more cork when the world market prices were de-
clining. The obligation imposed on the Kuba to collect cork often meant
that they could not attend to their basic crops, and the shortage led to
several conflicts between neighbouring groups to obtain food.
As in the other cases analysed here, after the armed uprisings were
repressed, other forms of response emerged and, again, when catego-
rizing the reactions of the colonized peoples subordinated to colonial
domination, the restrictive definition of ‘political’ can be deceptive. Re-
ligious and symbolic movements contained aspects of protest, rebellion
and adaptation, and the Kuba case is no exception. It is clearly essential
to foreground the local perspective of the conflict. The Kuba were aware
that something terrible was happening in their society. Their poloo
(peaceful social harmony) had been endangered, and phenomena like
low birth rates were attributed to witchcraft and envy. The only way to
re-establish social order was to invoke cults and practices that would put
an end to the chaos.127
Colonial Systems 147
The Kuba conceived of the world as inhabited by ngesh (nature spir-
its) that bestowed fertility or inflicted disease upon those who did not
observe their prohibitions as a punishment. The desires of these spirits
manifested themselves in trances and the dreams of priests. The system
is similar to that described by E.E. Evans-Pritchard amongst the Azande:
the existence of witchcraft, localized in bodily organs, the agent of evil;
and the production of charms and magic to counteract the witchcraft or
to make wishes. Upon their death, kings themselves could become ngesh
and cause all sorts of problems for those who displeased them. Indeed,
the deaths during the rebellions of 1923–25 in Kampungu and Misumba
were attributed to the previous king.
According to Vansina, the colonial effects were more devastating in ru-
ral areas, due to the economic exploitation of forced labour on the plan-
tations and public work projects and the payment of tributes. In 1917,
the peasants were forced to plant certain types of products like palm
and cotton, under pain of prison. In the 1940s, the plantation system
was encouraged, as it increased productivity. At times, these obligations
produced resistance, because certain products like cotton exhausted the
soil.128 Colonialism also brought about changes in subsistence forms.
The structure of forced labour, connected to salaries, was articulated
around innovative methods of social control like taxes. More subtle in-
novations, such as new forms of consumption that required money (and
paid work), also introduced external products, consequently creating
new tastes and new needs in order to imitate white society or distinguish
oneself from it.129 The androcentric European view also openly clashed
with the matrilineal kinship system, revealing the contradictions of co-
lonialism. The official rhetoric claimed to be introducing civilization and
development, although the effects were exactly the opposite: the intro-
duction of economic underdevelopment and burnout amongst peasants
forced to grow specific products, do public works or join the military.
Moreover, the Christian ideology of the missionaries aimed to transform
the power of women in Kuba society.130 The words of Prosper Denolf, a
Catholic missionary, are very clear:
[…] received a gun from Maxi Schillings [the son of the administra-
tor]. I went with it to track a leopard that I had wounded earlier on.
My reason for killing this animal was to be invested with the title of
Cikl.134 But when I came very close to the beast I became afraid and
in its evil way the leopard killed my dog.135
Notes
1 Stolcke, 1992: 186.
2 For humanist Peter Martyr of Angleria, ‘dis-cover’ meant simply showing
what was once hidden. For this reason, Christopher Columbus ‘[…] boasts
of having given mankind this land, as being hidden he discovered it with
his industry and labour’, Martyr of Angleria, 1530: 55.
3 Taylor, 1985: 116.
4 On the question of the body in colonial contexts, see Martí, 2012.
5 Wachtel, 1993: 9.
Colonial Systems 149
6 In his Natural and Moral History of the Indies (1590), Jesuit José de
Acosta created a hierarchization of human societies based on criteria that
included, in addition to the Christian religion, writing. See Mignolo, 1995.
7 Drawing on William H. Prescott’s fable (History of the Conquest of Mex-
ico, 1840), Todorov (1987) believed that the Spanish, at the hand of Hernán
Cortés, had a ‘superior technology of symbolism’ that allowed them to
cheat and lie, while the Nahuas were crippled by a culture dominated by a
cyclical understanding of time.
8 Robertson, 1997: 27; Gruzinski, 2014; Subrahmanyam, 2014.
9 Robertson, 1997: 27–8.
10 Fabre & Vincent, 2007: 1–2; Bailyn & Denault, 2009: 2; Elliot, 2009:
21–6.
11 A regular route that began in 1593 over which two 300-tonne ships per
year loaded with Eastern merchandise sailed to the American viceroyalty
in exchange for significant amounts of silver used to ensure Spanish control
of the Philippine archipelago (Schurtz, 1992).
12 Taylor, 1985: 122.
13 Some theoreticians like Anibal Quijano understand ‘coloniality’ to be the
right and self-assigned power of the Iberian elites to impose their image on
peoples they considered inferior (Quijano, 1992: 437–47, 2000). However,
this superiority, based on the Christian faith and the supposed purity of
their lineage, was not imposed mechanically, but based on tensions and
conflicts between the colonizers and the colonized.
14 Robertson, 1997: 25–44; Županov, 1999; Aranha, 2010: 79–83.
15 Diaz, 1993, 1995, 2010: 1; Gutiérrez Estévez, 2010: 121–2; Atienza de
Frutos & Coello de la Rosa, 2012.
16 Martínez Shaw & Martínez Torres, 2014: 1–32.
17 The term ‘frailocracia’ was popularized by Marcelo Hilario del Pilar’s pam-
phlet, La frailocracia filipina (Barcelona: Imprenta Ibérica de Francisco
Fossas, 1889), which emphasized the enormous influence that religious or-
ders had exerted in the political-social life of the Philippine archipelago.
He was a member of the ‘Movimiento de Propaganda’, which defended
the independence of the Philippines, still under Spanish control. In other
texts, such as La soberanía monacal en Filipinas (1888) and Filipinas en
las Cortes (1890), Del Pilar expressed the same ideas regarding influence in
the archipelago. Although it is true that the regular orders were an essential
element in maintaining peninsular domination in the Philippines, this does
not mean that the colonized societies were largely passive or apathetic. For
an analysis of the role played by local caciques in the network of colonial
power, see Inarejos, 2015.
18 Verlinden, 1994: 13–18.
19 Bishop Vasco de Quiroga was one of the first to condemn the contradic-
tions in the ‘civilizing process’. For more details on Vasco de Quiroga’s
thinking and his reformist policies, see Gómez, 2000: 101–21.
20 Canny (1976: 66, 133–6), especially Chapter 6, ‘The Breakdown: Elizabe-
than Attitudes towards the Irish’.
21 Canny, 1976: 124; Ellis, 2003: 28. In this respect, one Englishman con-
fessed that ‘we have Indians at home: Indians in Cornwall, Indians in
Wales, Indians in Ireland’ (Hill, 1974: 20).
22 On the religious objective of the Jesuit reducciones, see the briefs writ-
ten by Juan de la Plaza (1585) in Zubillaga, 1961: 181–244; Acosta, De
Procuranda, 1984: 303–12: II: 8. However, many of the new settlements
were located in areas of proven economic influence, like Huamanga and
Potosi.
150 Colonial Systems
23 In her dissertation, Irene Silverblatt provides important insights into the
alterations resulting from the reorganizational and tributary practices im-
posed by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo on native practices in general (Silver-
blatt, 1990).
24 Sempat Assadourian, 1992: 81.
25 In his Noticia General del Perú (approx. 1630), treasury official Francisco
López de Caravantes wrote that the viceroy ordered the ‘reduced’ Indians’
former houses to be burned so that they would not return to their place of
origin (Escobedo, 1979: 81).
26 Coello, 2006, 2007: 951–90.
27 Blanchoff & Casanova, 2016: 1–13.
28 Elliot, 2007. More recently, see Elliot, 2009: 21–6.
29 The barangay was the basic Tagalog political unit (Reed, 1978: 11–16).
Regarding these reductionist policies, see also Javellana, 2000: 428–30.
30 See, for example, the evangelizing strategies of the Italian Jesuits Alessan-
dro Valignano (1539–1606), Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607) and Mateo
Ricci (1552–1610) in China (Standaert, 2000).
31 Coello, 2010, 2013, 2016.
32 Rubiés, 2005: 243.
33 Joan-Pau Rubiés has highlighted the role that this ‘Jesuit accommodation’
indirectly played in the process of secularizing European culture up until
the Enlightenment (Rubiés, 2005: 244).
34 Prakash, 1995: 3–4; Lockhart, 1999.
35 Sempat Assadourian, 1985: 83 y ss.
36 Thomas, 1990: 152.
37 Quimby, 2011: 24–6.
38 According to the reports (1887–89) written by French explorer Antoine-
Alfred Marche (1844–98) for the Museum of Paris, in 1830, the number of
mestizos had increased significantly (3,865) with respect to the Chamorros
(2,628). One of the reasons was to avoid paying taxes (Underwood, 1976:
208; Craig, 1982).
39 After the publication of the famous Memoria of 1828, the governors of the
Marianas distributed free land for cultivation to individuals. The aim was
to promote population on the islands and stop them from being gradually
abandoned (Brunal-Perry, 2001: 405).
40 In 1856, a violent measles epidemic reduced the population to 5,241 inhab-
itants (Marche, 1982: 5–6), which paved the way for the arrival of convicts
in the Marianas.
41 Deportation to prison on the Marianas Islands was a common practice.
The Spanish deportees of 1873 greatly expanded cultivated farmland and
hydraulic works, creating new towns and, then, family ties with the indig-
enous population (Martínez, 1886: 33).
42 Del Valle, 1979: 52–5; Rodao, 1998: 31.
43 Rodao, 1998: 27–35. Compare this codification process with the study by
Keesing (1992) on the codification of the kastomu of the Kwaio people,
discussed in the last section.
44 Keesing, 2000: 234–5.
45 Keesing, 2000: 235.
46 Stade, 1998: 184–200.
47 On the idea of narrative identity, see Somers, 1994: 621. We thank Dome-
nico Branca for the reference.
48 Ricoeur, 1996: 107.
49 At this time, what were once called aniti are known as taotaonomo’na
(Del Valle, 1979: 24–25; Haynes & Wuerch, 1995).
Colonial Systems 151
50 The OPI-R no longer exists, but other groups like Famoksaiyan, Nasion
Chamoru, Taotao Mo’na Native Rights Group and We are Guahan, among
others, continue to defend Chamorro culture, whether against past (Span-
ish) colonialism or present (American) colonialism (Diaz, 2010: 254–5).
51 Altez, 2012: 132.
52 Altez, 2012: 132.
53 Friedman, 1994: 15–42. One argument against reductionism in all its
forms is Stuart Hall’s (1932–) ‘radical contextualism’. In the words of cul-
tural studies scholar, Lawrence Grossberg, ‘an event or practice (even a
text) does not exist apart from the forces of the context that constitute it as
what it is. Obviously, context is not merely background but the very condi-
tions of possibility of something’ (Grossberg, 1997: 255).
54 Mintz, 1985: xxx. See also the obituary by Sarah Hill published in Bos-
ton Review (31 December 2015): http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/
sidney-mintz-in-memoriam
55 His fieldwork in the Caribbean served as the basis for his book Worker in
the Cane: A Puerto Rican Life History published in 1960.
56 Mintz, 1985: xviii.
57 Mintz, 1985: xvii.
58 Mintz, 1985: xvii.
59 In terms of salary, before the fifteenth century in Europe, sugar was a lux-
ury product that was 30 times more expensive than butter (a kilo of sugar
was worth one or two months of an unskilled worker’s salary), while in
developed Western countries in 1980, the price of a kilo of sugar was equal
to ten minutes’ salary (Bairoch, 1986: 285).
60 Mintz, 1985: 95.
61 Mintz, 1985: 95, 253.
62 In Turkey, Persia, India and other Islamic lands, some historians, like Mus-
tafa ‘Ali ibn Ahmad ibn ‘Abdullah of Gallipoli (1541–1600), the author of
The Essence of History, wrote histories of the world from the Ottoman
point of view. Others, like The History of the Western Indies, include in-
formation about American colonization in their accounts based on reading
Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s Historia General de las Indias, 1535 (Sub-
rahmanyam, 2005: 30–1; 2014).
63 ‘Le système de filiation comorien étant matrilinéaire, le statut de la mère
prévaut sur celui du père. Les enfants, issus de ces mariages, ne se recon-
naissent nullement hadrami mais comme waungwana, c’est-à-dire nobles
de par leur lignée maternelle. Le statut d’Arabe et encore mieux celui
de Sharif de leur ancêtre ne font que valoriser leur statut déjà élevé’ (Le
Guennec- Coppens, 1991: 153).
64 Ginzburg, 2015: 472.
65 Friedman, 1994: 147–66.
66 On the phenomena of imitation in African cults, see Stoller, 1995.
67 From a different perspective, Reynaldo Ileto emphasized the revolutionary
potential of native subaltern classes, analysing different Messianic revo-
lutionary movements, like that led by Andrés Bonifacio during the 1898
revolution (Ileto, 1979).
68 Sánchez Gómez, 2001: 145–72. De los Reyes was arrested in 1897 for revo-
lutionary activities. He returned to Spain, but this time to be imprisoned in
Montjuïc Castle, where he happened to meet some Cuban anti-colonialists
and the anarchists jailed for the bomb attack during the Corpus Christi
procession in Barcelona in June, thus expanding his intellectual networks.
He was released in 1898 and returned to the Philippines in 1901, after the
Americans had settled in (Bragado, 2002: 50–75).
152 Colonial Systems
69 Anderson, 2005: 14. For a study of Isabelo de los Reyes as a Filipino eth-
nographer and nationalist, see Loyré, 2001: 121–43; Mojares, 2006.
70 Anderson, 2005: 17. El Folk-lore filipino was published in 1889. See also
Loyré, 2001: 125–8. On the first indigenous self-ethnographies, see Fahim
(1982) and Howe (2009).
71 Despite the fact that it has been demonstrated that ‘race’ does not exist,
the abusive use of the term requires that we place it in inverted commas
to make it clear that this is a generalized concept and not an object like a
biological entity.
72 Stolcke, 2010: 327.
73 Stolcke, 1992: 15.
74 Stolcke, 1992: 31.
75 Stolcke, 1992: 57.
76 Stolcke, 1992: 58.
77 Stolcke, 1992: 108, from an original document.
78 Stolcke, 1992: 115.
79 The concept of ‘purity of blood’ is analysed in Chapter 5.
80 According to Stuart Hall, ‘stereotyping reduces, essentializes, natural-
izes and fixes “difference”’. It is a ‘form of symbolic violence’ that has the
power to ‘mark, assign and classify’ behaviours considered anomalous and
unacceptable (Hall, 1997: 258)
81 Clancy-Smith & Gouda, 1999; Mateo Dieste, 2003b.
82 Stoler, 2013: 9.
83 Bruneteau, 2006: 35.
84 Hunt, 2013: 44. See also Bruneteau, 2006: 31–58.
85 Stoler, 2002: 49.
86 Stolcke, 2008; Mateo Dieste, 2012a.
87 Stoler, 2002: 82.
88 Stoler, 2002: 99.
89 On the projection of women as a symbol of the nation in the Arab context,
see Abu-Lughod, 1998.
90 Stoler, 2002: 168.
91 Stoler, 2002: 175.
92 Stoler, 2002: 184.
93 Stoler, 2002: 178.
94 Mateo Dieste, 2003a: 40.
95 Stoler, 2002: 183.
96 The term ‘accommodation’ helps to explain the strategic adaptation of the
colonized to a new political situation, where collaboration may be one pos-
sible adaptation or the only one after a military imposition. The term is
taken from Levtzion (1978: 345). See also Robinson (1976) and Triaud
(1997: 13–14).
97 Gledhill, 2000: 137.
98 There is also a debate over the supposed role played by possession cults as
rites of social protest. Boddy (1994) criticizes the classic work by Lewis
(1989), which takes a functionalist position regarding the attribution of
this role to the most unfortunate.
99 Comaroff, 1985: 2.
100 Comaroff, 1985: 14.
101 Comaroff, 1985: 11.
102 Comaroff, 1985: 12.
103 Comaroff, 1985: 149.
104 Comaroff, 1985: 143.
105 Comaroff, 1985: 167.
Colonial Systems 153
06 Comaroff, 1985: 177.
1
107 Comaroff, 1985: 184.
108 Comaroff, 1985: 198.
109 Comaroff, 1985: 251.
112 Keesing, 1992: 8.
113 Keesing, 1992: 12.
115 Keesing, 1992: 25.
119 Keesing, 1992: 72.
120 Keesing, 1992: 72.
121 On the Kayapo, see the work by Turner (1991).
122 Keesing, 1992: 124.
123 Keesing, 1992: 200.
124 Keesing, 1992: 209.
125 The system in the Congo was unique in the history of modern colonialism.
Until Belgium took official control of the colony, it was literally the private
property of Belgian King Leopold II and, in the absence of a colonial state,
the king’s agents performed economic and military functions and also col-
lected personal commissions for their own benefit, which resulted in many
documented abuses.
126 Vansina, 2010: 94. This phenomenon is quite similar to other cases of
colonial resistance, such as those in Morocco. One form of protest there
consisted of rejecting the purchase or use of European – particularly
Spanish – products (Mateo Dieste, 2003a: 36–7). Some authors have
termed this practice ‘cultural resistance’.
127 Vansina, 2010: 244.
128 Vansina, 2010: 219.
129 Vansina, 2010: 230. Balandier also examined the impact of colonialism
and proletarianization in African society through the monetarization of
the economy, the appearance of paid labour and the transformation of the
forms of production and consumption, what Balandier termed a ‘social
inversion’ (Balandier, 1971).
130 The king’s mother possessed privileges and effective power. Kuba women
engaged in trade and had control over their finances, and elderly women
filled the role of treasurer in matrilineages, exercising considerable influ-
ence in marriage transactions and trials, with specific juries for women.
131 Vansina, 2010: 238.
all was chaos, that is, earth, air, water, and fire were mixed together;
and out of that bulk a mass formed – just as cheese is made out of
milk – and worms appeared in it, and these were the angels. The
most holy majesty decreed that these should be God and the an-
gels, and amongst that number of angels there was also God, he
too having been created out of that mass at the same time, and he
was named lord with four captains, Lucifer, Michael, Gabriel, and
Raphael. 24
Ginzburg accompanies the story of the trial with discussions about the
social context of the time. In particular, he presents a society in conflict,
with factions of nobles, and a system of exploitation based on Church
influence. It is not surprising that Menocchio, who classified himself as
a member of the dominated classes, was critical of a system that he saw
as oppressive, and delegitimized its ecclesiastical institution, describing
the sacraments as merchandise. At this point, Ginzburg begins a thrill-
ing, profound investigation to determine whether Menocchio took his
ideas from movements of the era, if he participated in some group or if
he was simply inspired by ideas that were circulating around the region,
appropriating them to create his own synthesis to criticize Church rit-
ual and argue for a more egalitarian Christianity. Ginzburg proposes a
detective-like hypothetical game to determine what influences can be
discerned in the words said during the trial. Menocchio’s use of the term
‘Lutheran’, for example, thoroughly challenges the use of concepts in
terms of the anthropological emic-etic dichotomy. The miller elaborated
his own version of ‘Lutheranism’ (a sort of network of critical ideas) that
did not necessarily correspond to the definition provided by Lutheranism
itself or by the canonical definitions of other authors. On the contrary,
Ginzburg finds another explanation to explain the miller’s motivations:
the existence of a set of ‘pagan’ ideas that were more or less reproduced
orally amongst the peasants that had already existed before the Refor-
mation and that at times served as a framework for radical criticisms of
the social order.
The inquisitors, in turn, seemed to want to find some ‘rationality’ in
his discourse. They wanted to identify the heterodoxy that had inspired
him and what colleagues had encouraged him. The miller’s arguments
that he had come up with his ideas on his own, then, upset the inquisi-
tors. Ginzburg analysed the list of main texts that Menocchio said he had
read. It is not easy to establish a tie between his ideas and the contents
of the books. In some cases, they clearly overlap, but in many others, the
connection between the text and the miller’s interpretation is strange.
162 Classification and Social Exclusion
This underscores the fact that it is a mistake to transplant the contents
from a text to the mind of the person who interprets and reads it. The
miller was inspired by both his own ideas and those of others, but in any
case, he adapted certain ideas to his own general interpretative system:
apocryphal gospels, criticisms of the image of Christ as God, doubts
about the virginity of Mary. He was also inspired by travel literature,
like the 1371 work Travels of Sir John of Mandeville (ca. 1300–72); the
book’s fantasies about pygmies intensified Menocchio’s relativist doubts.
There is a crucial passage in which Menocchio deduces that the soul also
dies with the body. From reading Mandeville’s words about cannibals,
the miller decided that there could be no afterlife, because other societies
did not share that belief: ‘from there I got my opinion that, when the
body dies, the soul dies too, since out of many different kinds of nations,
some believe in one way, some in another’. 25
The study of the interrogations also reveals the inquisitors’ ratio-
nalization processes. They demanded that the miller justify an entire
complex system of theological thought and make it coherent, explaining
whether God preceded the chaos or came after. The inquisitor’s concerns
focused on deciphering whether other superior beings with more power
than God existed in Menocchio’s mind; hence, the questions about the
role of angels (whether they were assistants or equals). These passages
foretell Ginzburg’s later thoughts when he defines the ‘inquisitor as an-
thropologist’, an ironic response to the text by Renato Rosaldo criticiz-
ing anthropologists who act like inquisitors. In this back and forth of
questions and answers, the inquisitors become obsessed with trying to
discern the basis of Menocchio’s thinking. However, they failed in their
attempt, because the references were too diverse and lacked the internal
coherence that the inquisitors expected.
The questions and answers about the body, the soul, the spirit, par-
adise and what comes after death reflect the distance between the two
sides. The inquisitors were disoriented by ideas that should have coin-
cided with orthodoxy, but they rejected as heretical, without really un-
derstanding their source. At stake were the idea of God and especially
the legitimacy of the Church, as constantly demonstrated by Menocchio.
At stake was the social order. The sentence, which was three times as
harsh as the usual punishment, highlighted the inquisitors’ viciousness.
The miller’s challenge to the hegemonic ontology and disrespect for the
Church, God and Jesus Christ was intolerable and merited constant stig-
matization. He was initially condemned to life in prison and then forced
to wear a penitential garment embellished with a cross. After early re-
lease, he was accused again and called before the Inquisition in 1599.
In the new auto-da-fé, Menocchio once again described his naturalist
vision, arguing that there is no distinction between the creator and the
created world, and God is everything. Consequently, all beliefs were ac-
ceptable, whether heretical or Turkish. To some extent, he was justifying
Classification and Social Exclusion 163
his own position, regardless of what his interrogators said. Menocchio’s
rhetoric was certainly modern and presented a universalist relativism:
we are all equal despite our differences.
Persecutions against heretics and relapsos took place across the conti-
nent, and the production of heresies emerged as a mechanism of knowl-
edge and power. The voluminous amount of material coming out of these
persecutions is comparable to the enormous mass of documents produced
by phenomena like colonialism that make it possible to reconstruct past
societies today. Ginzburg’s approach, like many later authors, 26 advo-
cated not only visiting these documents, but reinterpreting other sources
that may seem to be exhausted, but actually merit a re-reading from the
perspective of new questions. One example of the possibility of interro-
gating historical sources with an anthropologist’s eye is Enric Porqueres’s
study of the Chuetas of Majorca and, in particular, the mechanisms of cre-
ation and reproduction in social groups. In this case, endogenous factors
interact with external processes of social stigmatization and exclusion.
The construction of boundaries between groups was not only articulated
around the formulation of policies of forced conversion and persecution.
Rather, multiple symbolic mechanisms establish powerful, unquestioned
systems that extend, for instance, to the concepts of purity and impu-
rity that would lead to purity-of-blood statutes,27 in addition to kinship
and marriage mechanisms related in part to symbolic concepts that shape
group construction dynamics. The question of alliance as a constructor,
reproducer and transformer of groups has received considerable scholarly
attention in different historical and geographic contexts.28
Enric Porqueres’s (2001) work on endogamy, identity and marriage
amongst the Chuetas, Jews in Majorca who were forced to convert be-
ginning in 1391, synthesizes all these complexities. Porqueres did an
ethnography of the group using documentary material dating from
between 1435 and 1750, to which he applied anthropological theories
about alliance and symbolic exclusion, producing a rich interpretation
of the sources. His book contains an intriguing comparison of various
excluded groups like the Cagots, the Vaqueiros de Alzada, the Moriscos
and the Roma. In his study of the Chuetas, the author demonstrates the
importance of constructing grounded questions to read the sources in a
distinctive way, in this case, applying theories about the reproduction
of groups and marriage strategies, ranging from Lévi-Strauss and his
structuralism to Bourdieu (1988). Porqueres, however, added a series of
questions that correlated social structure and alliance to pose an origi-
nal question that can be applied to other historical case studies: do the
Chuetas marry each other because they are Chuetas or are they Chuetas
because they marry each other? Identity here is not a primary driver of
behaviour, but an effect of alliance strategies, evidently shaped by very
clear political limits, responses to pressure and religious repression based
on criteria of inheritance, or purity of blood, that defined the person.
164 Classification and Social Exclusion
Porqueres’s primary analytical source are the autos-da-fé of the Holy
Inquisition, which gave him insight to the group locally known as ‘the
people of the Street’ (specifically, Sagell Street), where most of, although
not all, the group was concentrated. The patronymics of converts to
Christianity and, above all, marriage guidelines indicate, to some ex-
tent, the amount of endogamy and exogamy. The main body of marriage
documents that Porqueres analysed came from between 1565 and 1600
and were related to 365 marriages, of which a quarter involved someone
from outside the group.
However, it was not easy to find an ‘identity’ based on religion, di-
etary habits, residency or names, since the patronymics acquired after
conversion were not exclusive to this group. 29 Despite the lack of cultural
markers or identifiers, however, the Inquisition and notarial documents
are perceptibly different and the tragic consequences of this differentia-
tion will play out in the autos-da-fé of 1679 and 1691. For Porqueres, the
real element that explains the existence of the group is marriage as the
engine of reproduction.30 Endogamy explains the identity of the ‘people
of the Street’. However, they do not marry each other because they share
a common ancestry as Jews in Majorca; they are descendants of Jews
because they marry each other.31
Identity, then, is not a mere reproduction, but an acquisition, the
product of a process in which alliance is more powerful that filiation.
Porqueres analyses the data about the Chuetas from a critique of both
the matrimonial strategies that Bourdieu applied in Bearn and other
scholars of the history of the family in Europe, who stress the repro-
duction of the social system. Porqueres counters that with a model that
focuses on social creation and recreation, intended to break away from
the economic reductionism of marriage strategy studies and the deter-
minism of Bourdieu’s idea of habitus, in which the social actor as player
can never change the rules of the game.
In his analysis of marriages and genealogies, Porqueres proposes to
begin with an analysis of the social consequences of marriage more than
its cause.32 From a theory of Weberian connotations, the author does
not repudiate the study of intentions, which he deems to be an extremely
complex activity when using documents, but rather insists that inten-
tions do not necessarily correspond to the subsequent consequences, in
accordance with the concept of undesired effects. He grants that the
members of the Sagell group were obviously intentional beings, but ar-
gues that they should not be redefined by the effect of their intentions.33
Indeed, the context of the intentions clearly shapes their consequences.
For example, he notes that a sixteenth-century mixed marriage could
have had consequences far different to a seventeenth-century union.
While the former could bring the couple’s children one step closer to be-
ing natural Christians, the latter could merely ‘contaminate’ the Chris-
tian spouse.34
Classification and Social Exclusion 165
According to this logic, religious identity is not necessarily the effect of
a transference, but of marital alliances. In the analysis of the statistical
matrices of marital practices, endogamic patterns emerge related to pat-
ronymics that are also associated with factors of class, since the wealthiest
lineages almost always intermarried.35 This does not, however, mean that
there were no changes in class or patronymics. Regarding kinship endog-
amy, Porqueres also observes that the data can be interpreted in differ-
ent ways. Endogamy cannot only be seen as determined by belonging or
by genealogical lines, but by the fact that people become related because
marriages occur. This is true of successive marriages, of reconnections
between lineages, something very common amongst the Chuetas.36
This practice was recorded in marriage dispensations, an interesting
documentary source used by other kinship anthropologists like Joan Be-
stard, which allowed him to reconstruct the history of the family on the
island of Formentera beyond oral genealogical memory. Bestard found
numerous cases of endogamy on the island in the papers kept by some
families, including marriage dispensations.37 For a traditional, peasant
society like the Balearic society, the continuity of the home as a struc-
tural element of the kinship system revolved around the two principles
of social reproduction: descent and alliance. Consanguineous mar-
riage as defined by canon law formed part of their matrimonial strate-
gies.38 Indeed, between 1872 and 1888, almost half of the unions were
consanguineous.
In the late sixteenth century, 378 out of 1,000 marriages required a
dispensation, and there were other connections with more distant de-
grees of relatedness. One indicator of these endogamies was the con-
tempt expressed towards mixed marriages, also amongst the Chuetas,
which appears in declarations made to the Inquisition in 1673, where it
is said that the Chuetas referred to those who married Old Christians as
‘badly mixed’ (‘mal mezclados’) and their descendants as apple-peaches
(‘poma presech’).39 One example of the model proposed by Porqueres
to explain the character of recreating dynamics is that, in light of the
hostility they faced, these ‘apple-peaches’ ended up marrying each other,
and those alliances were once again affected by political factors. Af-
ter the autos-da-fé of 1691, mixed marriages ceased to occur, especially
amongst the wealthier Christian classes.
As in other situations studied, the concepts of body and the exclusion
criteria affecting the Chuetas have generated debates about the chrono-
centrism of the concepts used. What did the words mean in their time?
In the accusation against Úrsula Forteza, for example, the inquisitor
writes, ‘all the more so because of the nature of her infected blood and
for being a descendant of Jewish conversos’.40 The idea remained in
oral culture, like popular songs that speak of Chueta blood as dirty or
mention the outer physical attributes that identify them, in a recourse to
animalization (calling them ‘rabuts’ in reference to their alleged tails).
166 Classification and Social Exclusion
In the final part, the study makes an intriguing comparison between
the Chuetas and other groups that have been marginalized for similar
reasons, and where the engine of endogamy has structured the produc-
tion, segregation and redefinition of the group. Porqueres stresses, addi-
tionally, that this endogamy by exclusion was also supported by symbolic
rhetoric and unquestioned concepts about, above all, the body, or that
used the body as a metaphor for difference: corporal attributes of impu-
rity and infection, where blood played a central role in many of the cases.
The transmission mechanism for belonging was not exclusively by blood,
however, but also by mother’s milk, when a defect would be attributed
to a person because they had been fed by a wet nurse from another social
group.41 The question of milk is particularly compelling,42 especially be-
cause it transmitted status in some cases, but not in others. For instance,
the slaves in the southern Moroccan oases lived in the same houses with
their masters to prevent sexual contact between milk siblings. Milk did
not always transmit status, but it could pass on certain qualities, as in
the cases studied by Soler (2011) in an original historical work on the
relationship between wet nurses from the Pas region of Cantabria, the
Catalonian bourgeoisie and in some cases, the Spanish royal family.
that great injury has resulted and still results, since the Christians
have engaged in and continue to engage in social interaction and
communication they have had and continue to have with Jews – who,
it seems, seek always and by whatever means and ways they can to
subvert and to steal faithful Christians from our holy Catholic faith
and to separate them from it, and to draw them to themselves and
subvert them to their own wicked belief and conviction […]
(The Edict of Expulsion of the Jews, 1492)
168 Classification and Social Exclusion
Purity of blood symbolized a genuine and unshakeable faith in God.
The gradation between purity and impurity was, above all, a moral
problem. Despite converting to Christianity in the mid-fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, Jews continued to be seen as the enemy, leading to
a new way of conceiving of them. According to Porqueres, the Bible told
how Pontius Pilate offered to free Jesus, but the Jews refused, exclaim-
ing that ‘his blood shall be upon you and your children’. The Jews were
thus still guilty, even if they converted. As Porqueres notes, at issue was
a new, indelible genealogical element that was added to the religious cri-
terion. In this respect, the Renaissance intensified the social importance
of kinship instead of lessening it. 56 The extensive kinship group was
replaced by linearity, creating deep genealogies. While kinship in the
fifteenth century meant, above all, the flesh, beginning in the sixteenth
century, people spoke about blood and fluids. The argument was based
on very strong rhetoric that reinforced old genealogies, blood ties and
the ‘accursed races’ (the Cagots, Vaqueiros, Moriscos, New Christians,
Roma, etc.) marked by their impure ancestry. This indelible genealogical
logic, which was connected to a modernity that subdivided humanity
into a hierarchy of ‘races’ endowed with unequal moral and intellec-
tual qualities, was later reinforced in the nineteenth century by scientific
discourse, laying the bases for nineteenth-century racism. According to
Porqueres, the ‘accursed races’ were systems of social classification that
manipulated the concept of a person in the Western Christian kinship
system.
The insistence on the purity of Old Christians contradicted the Span-
ish Crown’s policy of Christian integration. In theory, it was a tool to
make genealogical differentiations through ‘proofs of merit’ (‘probanzas
de mérito’) and purity-of-blood reports that had less to do with skin co-
lour than the ‘calidad’ – that is, reputation, nobility or purity of blood –
of a person. In practice, this became a system for social classification
that excluded neophyte Christians on the grounds of the impurity of
their blood (in other words, for being descendants of Jews, conversos,
Muslims or some other ‘recently converted sect’). 57 What was novel here
was the fact that a recognizable mark was inscribed on the body of the
marginalized person. Jews were suspected of transmitting heresy or dis-
honour based on their hidden humoral pathologies like circumcision and
menstrual flows that could contaminate other Christians.58 Dirtiness,
impurity and filth were used as discursive and moral categories to justify
certain ethnic-social categories, such as Judaizers and crypto-Jews.
Although there were officially no Jews in Spain after the expulsion of
1492, they continued to be identified with conversos, also referred to
by a variety of derogatory terms (marranos, notados, confesos, torna-
dizos and neófitos).59 This is evidenced by the purity-of-blood statutes,
which established a stratified classification system of ‘Old Christians of
clean blood without raça or the stain of descent from Jews, Moors or
Classification and Social Exclusion 169
conversos or any other newly converted sect’ (Inquisition Report, 1626).
Historians and anthropologists like Albert A. Sicroff, Verena Stolcke,
Francisco de Borja Medina, Enric Porqueres, Jean-Paul Zúñiga, Max S.
Hering Torres, Robert Aleksander Maryks and Tamar Herzog have all
studied the supposed defects contained in mixtures of ‘bloods’ and the
implications for the construction of races or pure ethnic-social catego-
ries. As a factor of integration, honour and quality (sometimes referred
as condición) reinforced hereditary ties between family and lineage.60
At the same time, however, it was a primary discriminator of behaviour.
Inherited blood was a symbol of the continuity and integrity of Chris-
tian lineages.61 Any mixture with heretics or apostates implied a loss
of honour, which impeded the social rise of New Christians (or Jewish
conversos).62
After the ‘dis-covery’ of America, purity-of-blood statutes were ap-
plied not only to Jews (1492) and Moriscos (1609–14), who rejected the
opportunity to assimilate into the new religious order, but also to ‘chil-
dren of the land’, those of impure blood who were mistrusted for being
‘mixed’, whether with blacks or Indians. The Indians were proud of their
purity of blood, but many Spaniards considered them descendants of the
ten tribes of Israel.63 In a legal sense, colonial law posited a formal sepa-
ration between the ‘republic’ of Indians and that of Spaniards. In actual
practise, this actual division was not so strict. The rapid appearance
of mestizos in every part of the New World blurred the lines of lineage
and phenotypes as bases for the notion of ‘race’ or racialism (Konetzke,
1946; Mörner, 1967; Wade, 1997). Thus, the Spanish were wary of the
Indians for belonging to inferior lineages, identifying them more with
their place of residence (reducciones, repartimientos), type of work
(the encomienda labour system) or the payment of tribute than with
any specific physical characteristics.64 In the mid-seventeenth century,
American criollos assumed a larger economic, political and social role in
the American viceroyalties, affirming their dignity, wealth and rights.65
Faced with the reality of a grim climatic determinism that subordinated
them to better equipped peoples, they began to write laudatory poems,
treatises and chronicles that praised the American capitals like Mexico
City and Lima and their criollo inhabitants,66 equating them with Span-
ish cities and towns in moral and ethnic terms.
The legal tradition of the Ancien Régime served as a mechanism to
preserve the hierarchical social order. The Bible, legal Roman and canon
law texts and custom legitimized these hierarchies.67 To protect the priv-
ileges of the peninsulares, the mezclados were accused of being low,
ordinary and lacking lineage.68 There was, however, more convergence
than divergence between the children of the land (criollos)and those
from the Peninsula. While a legal definition of the criollos as Spaniards
was necessary, the mestizos were relegated to an inferior social category
as being of lesser quality, which established sociocultural barriers with
170 Classification and Social Exclusion
respect to the other categories of Spaniard and criollo.69 Additionally,
the ideal of purity of blood inevitably required that female sexuality be
controlled.70 The objective was none other than to prevent the infiltra-
tion of impure blood into the family lineage, meaning that any ‘racial’
discourse was crosscut by ideas about gender. Any individual born out-
side marriage was immediately suspected of being the ‘mixed’ progeny
of Indian or black women. Concern about clandestine or inappropriate
marriages in terms of prestige, rank or status also became more wide-
spread after the Council of Trent.71 However, marriage to a mestizo or
‘common’ (tribute-paying) Indian constituted an example of an unequal
union that, in some way, could be compared to other marriages, like
the one between the conquistador and nephew of Ignatius de Loyola,
Martín García Oñez de Loyola, and the Inca princess (ñusta) Beatriz
Clara Coya, especially if the marriage came with a rich encomienda as
a dowry.72 As Berta Ares has written, the status of hidalgo – or noble –
was transmitted by the father even to illegitimate children born outside
of marriage.73 Unlike the illicit, asymmetrical or impure relationships
between the first conquistadores and ‘their’ Indian women, unions be-
tween hildagos and women from royal Inca families (panakas) or local
elite families – and the other way round, between members of the Inca
aristocracy like Cristóbal Paullu, and Extremaduren women like María
Amarilla de Esquivel – served as a guarantee of political and religious
fidelity.
Information about purity of blood in this respect did not only serve as
a prophylactic mechanism for the quality of the members of the Catholic
community, but was also a tool for ethnic and social discrimination. The
construction of the modern state of Peru, according to Irene Silverblatt,
cannot be separated from the invention of a whole set of racial catego-
ries, and she suggests that the inquisitors, defined as the first modern
bureaucrats, assigned these racial categories to colonial subjects in order
to better dominate them.74 Thus, a crucial question is: to what extent
racism should be treated more as an European and North American
pathology rather than a Latin American affliction?75
To counteract their supposed inferiority related to their place of birth,
Peruvian criollos promoted their somatic features or phenotypes and
their genealogies, whether real or fabricated, as indicators of an individ-
ual’s purity of blood. Not only did they thus surmount their physical and
intellectual weaknesses, but they passed those traits on to the mestizos
in an attempt to exorcise the negative components of their raça.76 Sexual
limits became moral limits. The supposed deficiencies of the plebeian
mestizos and Indians, such as barbarism, ugliness, dirtiness and per-
verse customs, were not applicable to the criollos, because their origins
were supposedly linked to the dominant group.77
The problem of (self-)marginalization – the Spanish-criollo rivalry that
Bernard Lavallé spoke of78 – revolved around the degree of separation
Classification and Social Exclusion 171
that could be maintained with respect to mestizos and Indians in the
New World.79 Within a context of power and more specifically politi-
cal power, common-law unions, morganatic marriages and mixed mar-
riages violated the seniority and purity of family lineage structures.80 To
preserve social boundaries between criollos and mestizos, it was essen-
tial to prevent illegitimate unions that would result in unequal relation-
ships, because they, in turn, spawned third groups suspected of heresy.
However, the increase in the number of new mestizos and the dynamic
nature of their activities made them a fluid and heterogeneous social
category.81
With the spread of colonization, mestizos were seen as the result of il-
licit sexual relations between Spanish Christians and indigenous peoples
that altered the established colonial order. Indians voiced many of the
hostile and derogatory views of mestizos. They were accused of being
prone to violence, of having licentious customs and their presence threat-
ened criollo status based on discourses of moral and ethnic-racial purity,
bathing the mestizo in an aura of sin and contamination that needed to
be exorcized.82 For the Jesuit Father Acosta, the blood purity criterion
seemed not to be of great importance to allow mestizos to receive and ac-
cept evangelization.83 The problem arose when the increase in the mes-
tizo population forced the pure Christians to differentiate themselves by
appealing to the purity of their lineages. Obviously, mestizaje focused on
sex and not on other types of relationships, whether consensual or illicit,
because it challenged the reproduction of the hegemonic social catego-
ries of Spanish and criollo.84 To prevent their proliferation, the colonial
oligarchies thought of themselves in terms of a criollo civilian corps,
whose social purity had to be defended. The criollo predominance was
based on family alliances that reinforced the reputation of their lineages,
while at the same time defending them from illicit intrusions. At stake
were both economic and social reproductions. Beginning in the seven-
teenth century, the Lima Indians moved to rural areas, while blacks and
mulattos became the new urban majorities.85 In this situation, mixing
became a symbol of contamination for all the distinguished criollos
competing with the Spaniards for the civil and ecclesiastical positions in
the viceroyalty. Genealogy gave way to a discourse about ethnic purity
that ensured the absence of Indian, black or mestizo blood in the princi-
pal criollo families, while legitimizing their right to settle in urban areas
like Lima, Cuzco and Arequipa.86
In the eighteenth century, the social demarcation in the American vice-
royalties reinforced the unity of different groups in which ‘whiteness was
understood as an ordering factor in the system of differences’.87 Spanish
and criollos were not supposedly mixed, while mestizos and mulattos
were considered impure. They were accused of being ‘unknown peo-
ple’, from low social backgrounds, whose cleanliness was questionable.
However, while the metropolitan discourse pointed a finger at them,
172 Classification and Social Exclusion
the local ecclesiastical and civil authorities – the ‘organic intellectuals’,
to use Gramsci’s term, of the criollooligarchies – invented the mestizos
on America land as social categories opposed to the criollos. While it
was determined that mixed or ‘stained’ origins were an insurmountable
obstacle to gain access to the best administrative, ecclesiastical and mili-
tary positions in the viceroyalty capitals like Mexico City and Lima, the
colonial authorities allowed mestizos to preside over rural Indian par-
ishes, where the Spanish were scarcely distinguishable from the criollos
and mestizos, who constituted the government elite in an area largely
inhabited by Indians.88 Thus, the accusation of belonging to a ‘dirty’
or ‘impure’ lineage was always a powerful weapon to take an adversary
down and out of the spheres of political and economic power.
Authors like Tamar Herzog and Kathryn Burns have argued that
practices of exclusion cannot only be explained by classification systems
based on Spanish, American or African ancestry (or ‘race’), but involve
other discourses based on Weberian concepts of belonging or not be-
longing to local political communities.89 Legal categories like vecinos
(neighbours) and naturales (natives) could be applied indiscriminately to
Spaniards, criollos, mestizos and Indians, regardless of their ethnicity,
as opposed to those considered extranjeros or foreigners. This would ex-
plain why the cleric from Cuzco, Juan de Espinosa Medrano (1628/30?–
88),90 better known as Lunarejo (‘spotty-faced’), became one of the most
renowned exponents of culteranismo at the Cuzco Cathedral, despite his
quite obvious mestizo origins.91 The Spanish-Andean duality contrasted
with the religious criollos of Lima, who celebrated their Spanish origins
in exclusive terms, without stain or mixing with other Peruvian nations.
In this respect, the Dominican friar Juan Meléndez (ca. 1640–90) wrote
that ‘we call ourselves criollos, and not Indians, to indicate the singular
estimation and appreciation that we have for having descended from
Spaniards and for preserving pure Spanish blood in the Indies without
mixing with another nation’.92 This criollismo was underpinned by a
powerful sense of self-worth and the denigration of mixed groups (Indi-
ans, mestizos, blacks, mulattos and ‘other castes’), evoking blood as the
transmitter of the calidad – or impurity – of a people.
In the first decades of the eighteenth century, the American viceroy-
alties were made up of a majority criollo population, in addition to the
indigenous population. These criollos included both the children of
first-generation Europeans and individuals mixed with Indians, who
could be included in the category of mestizo. Unquestionably, the ‘chil-
dren of the land’ did not constitute a clearly defined group, making it
difficult to discern how these people channelled their interests within
their society by delimiting the social margins. Some Spanish bureau-
crats, like Antonio de Ulloa (1716–95), did not hide their contempt for
the criollos, who he believed to be degraded by their environment and by
mixing with Indians and blacks (the so-called brown castes).93 In Secret
Classification and Social Exclusion 173
News of America (c. 1749), written in collaboration with Jorge Juan y
Santacilia (1713–73), Ulloa echoed the words of General Girolamo Car-
affa (1564–1633), stating that ‘those societies are deposits of subjects of
all the nations, with Spaniards, Italians, Germans, Flemish, and they all
live in union, except for the Europeans and Criollos, which is the critical
point where there can be no tolerance’.94
A colonial society that was aware of its own fragility needed to reflect
the racial and socioeconomic hierarchy of its members according to the
proportion of Iberian blood.95 As R. Douglas Cope has observed, ‘all
elites were Spaniards, but not all Spaniards were members of the elite’.96
The first caste paintings (‘cuadros de castas’), done by Juan Rodríguez
(1715) in New Spain, corresponded to the zeal for classification that
characterized eighteenth-century scientism.97Castas or castes (castizos,
Moriscos, mestizos, mulattos) were a graphic reflection of new genera-
tions of mestizo bodies – individuals who descended from parents with
different phenotypes – beginning to overrun the official documentation
of the viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain.98 While castes usually re-
ferred to those ‘mixed’ people who disarranged the three New World
categories of Spanish, black and Indian, caste paintings rearranged the
prevalent racial hierarchy of the colonial period, where ethnic origins
and physical appearance determined a person’s position, prestige and
rights (so-called pigmentocracy).99 This was, then, a matter of arranging
not a racial disarrangement, but a terminological one based on the con-
ceptual triad of colour lines, calidad and race.100
In the meantime, the colonial authorities had to control (and protect)
the genealogy of the Spanish elites. Purity of blood was partially secular-
ized, although not completely, to stigmatize mixing with Indians in part,
but especially with Africans and their mulatto progeny (the so-called
brown castes), who might contaminate Old Christian families (the Span-
ish, criollos) if strict genealogical control was not established.101 There
was widespread belief that the Africans were descendants of Ham and
bore the stigma of slavery due to the curse that God put on Noah’s son
Ham as a punishment for mocking his father. Their uncertain origins
made it impossible to trace the genealogy of their faith since, in many
cases, slavery severed kinship relationships and their ancestors could not
be identified.102 For this reason, it was necessary to oversee marriages
to ensure the calidad of the bride and groom.103 In this context, King
Charles III’s Pragmatic Sanction of 1778 was issued to protect the so-
cial and racial hierarchy of the Spanish-criollo elites by giving family
patriarchs more control over their children’s betrothals and marriages to
secure the socioracial class endogamy that was being threatened by an
increase in unequal marriages within the social hierarchy.104 Marriage
thus became a process that produced or transformed racial identities.105
At the same time that a racial segregation policy was being developed,
the Crown fuelled the illusion of upward mobility with the first sales of
174 Classification and Social Exclusion
royal edicts, the Reales Cédulas de Gracias al Sacar, in 1795. For centu-
ries, the Spanish monarchs had exempted Jewish conversos, commoners
and illegitimate children from their ‘dark origins’. The Bourbon admin-
istration organized and systematized this practice, establishing uniform
fees across the empire. Thus, any commoner who could pay between 500
and 800 reals could ‘erase’ the supposed defects or stains that set them
apart from decent people (gente decente) and people of reason (gente de
razón).106 However, as María del Carmen Baerga has noted, the 1795
racial clauses were added at the end, which seems to indicate that the
goal was never to bring about racial reform, but to raise one particular
(brown or mulatto) person from a lower ‘calidad’ to a higher one.107
At this point, one wonders: what were the indicators of purity of
blood of the time? How was the ‘calidad’ or ‘quality’ of a person estab-
lished? What did ‘notable inequality’ really mean in the eighteenth cen-
tury? What about being ‘white’, ‘black’ or ‘brown’? What made blood
decisive as a system of social classification? Did caste paintings, as the
expression of a type of colonial knowledge, inform the emergence of the
‘races’?108 At the base of the debate lies the origin of different human
species and the determinism of the culture of blood. As Jean Paul Zúñiga
observed, the caste paintings very clearly exhibit the idea of returning to
the origin story.109 Monogenists like Benedictine friar Benito Jerónimo
de Feijoo y Montenegro (1676–1764) aligned themselves with the Judeo-
Christian tradition of history based on the unity of the human race.
They vehemently attacked polygenist theories that situated American
Indians and, hence, their criollo descendants in a stage that predated the
Great Flood.110 In his monumental Universal Critical Theatre (1730),
Father Feijoo objected to the idea of the hidden influence of blood and
the immutability of the cradle, which led people to believe that children
inherit the temperament and attitudes of their ancestors.111 However,
his opinions did not constitute a break with the existing social order.
The origin and quality of blood did not disappear from the world of rep-
resentations, but were maintained as an element of social cohesion.112
In the late eighteenth century, caste paintings gave philosopher Im-
manuel Kant (1724–1804) the proof he needed about the existence of
human ‘races’, which were naturalized in scientific terms as the natural
sciences rose and developed under the influence of the Enlightenment.113
Theorizing about the ‘races’ naturalized ethnic-social inequality. Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) rejected the idea of a connection between
physical and social inequality in his Discourse on the Origin and Ba-
sis of Inequality Among Men(1755). On the contrary, François-Marie
Arouet, better known as Voltaire (1694–1778), justified the inferiority
of savage peoples on the principle of the differentiation in nature. A
divine natural determinism established the principle of inequality that
governed human evolution. Thus, the hierarchization of societies and
cultures derived, in his opinion, from the characters of nations, which
Classification and Social Exclusion 175
rarely change (Essay on the Manners and Spirit of Nations, 1756). In
contrast with the postulates of Rousseau, the history of humanity is
nothing other than the slow emergence of the species, epitomized by the
appearance of civilized man as opposed to the ‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’,
who lived fully in his animal nature, passive, indolent and subject to the
laws of a universal mechanism.
The scientific and industrial revolutions and Western imperialism
brought a new economic technology, in addition to a new technology of
knowledge that overtook both Newtonian physics and Kant. The inabil-
ity of these thinkers to develop a system of superorganic causality was
revealed when intellectuals began to ask about the process that gener-
ated the various species. In the early eighteenth century, some curious,
enterprising minds tried to explain the relationship between the physical
and social environment. The naturalist Jean-Baptiste Monet, chevalier
de Lamarck (1744–1829), formulated a complete, coherent evolutionist
theory. His Zoological Philosophy (1809) suggested that the hierarchical
order of the different types of organisms reflected a kinship relationship.
The species that had not been able to evolve to the human form were
explained by a set of habits acquired in their local environment, result-
ing in genealogical classification systems. Lamarck thus established an
evolutionist hypothesis for different animal groups based on a modify-
ing principle, which corresponded to a progressive conception that went
from inferior to superior, from simple to complex, and that inevitably led
to the transformation of one species into another.
However, this thesis did not arouse much interest, due in part to the
criticism directed against it by Georges Cuvier (1769–1832), a man of
enormous prestige in his time, despite his role in the unfortunate case of
Saartjie Baartman, the so-called Hottentot Venus.114 Cuvier was critical
of theories of evolution, despite recognizing the biological nature of fos-
sils. As a faithful representative of Christian traditionalism, he offered
the alternative of catastrophism, which postulated that the Earth, while
ancient, underwent periodic catastrophic events that wiped out all life.
Cuvier also used this emphasis on the forces of nature to justify the in-
ferior ability and status of ‘savages’, who were more susceptible to those
forces.115
On the contrary, the geological uniformitarianism of Charles Lyell
(1797–1895), a staunch critic of biblical messianism, tried to reconcile
the role of men with nature, laying the grounds for the establishment
and development of theories of evolution with his Principles of Geology
(1833). In 1859, one of his most outstanding disciples, Charles Darwin
(1809–82), published a revolutionary scientific text On the Origin of
Species by Means of Natural Selection. Using irrefutable evidence, Dar-
win argued, amongst other things, that the adaptation of living beings
to the environment constituted the foundation of the reproduction of life
and that through the struggle for life, a process of natural selection took
176 Classification and Social Exclusion
place that translated into the survival of the fittest. A series of random
variations occurred in living organisms that were passed on hereditarily.
This new natural economy, based on the competitive relationships be-
tween living beings and the natural environment, proved the existence of
an unstable, dynamic order. Evolutionism thus became an explanatory
synthesis for reality that swallowed the empirical knowledge acquired by
the other sciences in order to provide them with a positive teleological
fundamentalism. The temptation to insert Darwinian concepts into the
social sciences and the very conception of human history is reflected in
the following passage from On the Origin of Species:
As all the living forms of life are the lineal descendants of those
which lived long before the Silurian epoch, we may feel certain that
the ordinary succession by generation has never once been broken,
and that no cataclysm has desolated the whole world. Hence we may
look with some confidence to a secure future of equally inapprecia-
ble length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the good
of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to
progress towards perfection.116
112 Hernández Franco & Rodríguez Pérez, 2013: 357.
113 For a contrast with the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment and the
construction of ‘race’ as an expression of a new hierarchical universalism,
see Sebastiani (2013).
Classification and Social Exclusion 191
Museum in Paris where they remained until 1937, when the Musée de
l’Homme put her remains in its anthropology wing (Badou, 2000).
115 Wade, 1997: 10–11.
19
1 Graham, 1997: 2.
120 Baerga, 2015: 38.
121 Engels, 1972: 51.
122 This in no way means that any prior racial disqualification existed. In-
deed, Morgan was in no way indifferent to the sociopolitical ingenuity of
indigenous peoples. Just like the Jesuit José de Acosta with respect to the
Incas and the Franciscan Bernardino de Sahagún with the Nahuas, Mor-
gan was interested in the basic principles that regulated government, social
structures, descent laws and the religious systems of some groups, like the
famous League of the Iroquois, recognizing their place on the scale of his-
tory. What separated the ‘savages’ from ‘civilized people’ was the degree –
not the type – of their intellectual mental capacity, which placed them on
an unequal evolutionary scale. Morgan’s monogenist theses established a
common ancestor for all humans. This unique creation guaranteed that
all human beings shared the same mental and moral equipment. Updating
this potential depended, ultimately, on the greater or lesser perfection of
sociopolitical institutions. As he wrote in his famous The American Beaver
(1868), if some mammals, like the beaver, showed signs of intelligence,
imagine what could be expected of the savage Indian! (Valdés Gázquez,
1995: 129–54).
123 Stocking, 1968.
124 The so-called primitives were dis-considered living fossils of human an-
cestors, relics of the first evolutionary stages of humanity. They were peo-
ple without writing, whose oral traditions provided little and superficial
knowledge about their culture, although they did share a thinking principle
with their civilized namesakes(Valdés Gázquez, 1995: 10). See also Kuper,
1988.
125 Graham, 1997: 2.
126 Iglesiaset al., 1980: 484.
127 Racialism implied not only the existence of ‘historical races,’ but a sci-
entism that appealed to the inexorable determinism of ‘race’: Tzvetan
Todorov argued that individuals are impotent in the face of race, their fate
decided by their ancestors, and the efforts of educators are vain (Todorov,
1991: 186).
128 In the words of George W. Stocking,
the idea of race is built not simply on the notion of likeness but also on
the idea of consanguinity. A race is a group of individuals who share
certain characteristics by virtue of their common ancestry. As phys-
ical anthropology subjected these characteristics to more and more
192 Classification and Social Exclusion
measurement […] the racial ‘likeness’ became a statistical rather than an
individual phenomenon, and common ancestry became almost a gratu-
itous assumption.
(Stocking, 1968: 165)
144 Sarmiento, 1915: 310. Authors’ italics. After the military defeat of 1898,
Spanish eugenicist doctors like Felipe Ovilo y Canales and Luis Sánchez
Fernández attributed the weak resistance of Spanish soldiersto ‘deficient
mestizaje’ (Goode, 2009: 121–42).
146 In his essay, Nuestra América: Ensayo de psicología social (1903), Argen-
tinian lawyer and sociologist Carlos Octavio Bunge tried to demonstrate
that ethnic composition determines the ‘national character’ of the Latin
American peoples (Bunge, 1918: 153).
Classification and Social Exclusion 193
prominently as a health-based rationale for racialist theories in most West-
ern countries and was applied both in the countries themselves and in their
colonies. For this comparative exercise, see Bashford&Levinell, 2010.
148 Verena Stolcke (1992: 103–97) also observed that racism or the naturaliza-
tion of social inequality is an ideological doctrine aimed at reconciling the
illusion of equal opportunity with the reality of existing inequalities.
150 Peter Wade also called attention to the importance of examining con-
cepts of ‘race’ and ethnicity in their historical contexts. As their meanings
change over time, ‘we have to see both of them as part of an enterprise of
knowledge’ (Wade, 1997: 6–7).
151 This could also apply to Zygmunt Bauman’s interpretation of Nazism and
the extermination of the Jews, not as an act of collective insanity, but the
tragic consequence of a modern model of instrumental rationality in We-
berian terms that was applied to science and to an industrial logic of elim-
inating human beings (Bauman, 2008).
152 Walter Mignolo noted that ‘while class division was shaping the life and
institutions of Europeans, racism continued to shape the life and insti-
tutions in the colonies’ (Mignolo, 2005: 89). However, domestic racism
also existed amongst some European groups living on the margins of the
Enlightened bourgeois model, such as farming communities and urban
sectors that formed part of what De Martino would term subaltern cul-
tures. Additionally, some physical anthropologists like Italian criminolo-
gist Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909) also carried out research with different
‘minorities’, such as marginal groups of delinquents and prostitutes. In fact,
Lombroso also included anarchists in his classifications (Los anarquistas,
1894).
153 According to Goldberg (1993: 1, 70), ‘modernity can be characterized by
an increasingly personalized, self-conscious, and atomized individualism’,
through which racial thinking gradually becomes naturalized.
154 Despite comprehension problems during encounters with the indigenous
peoples of the New World (see the famous Valladolid debate between Ginés
de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de Las Casas in 1550), in the end, a mono-
genist interpretation of the origins of human beings prevailed in Europe in
the late sixteenth century (Goldberg, 1993: 63).
155 Goldberg, 1993: 1. Nicholas Thomas (1994: 13) also openly recognized
that racism had long been the common denominator in European colonial-
ism, ‘as a virtually built-in and natural product of that encounter, essential
to the social construction of an otherwise illegitimate and privileged access
to property and power’.
156 Goldberg, 1993: 54.
157 In his book The Racial State,Goldberg argues that the modern state is
racially configured; it naturalizes the inequality of ‘inferior others’ and
excludes them to construct homogeneity or negate heterogeneity. In this
respect, the racial state is characterized by the power to include or exclude
subjects (or citizens) in racial terms, categorizing them hierarchically ac-
cording to phenotypic patterns (Goldberg, 2002).
158 Baerga, 2015: 20–1.
159 Stolcke, 1995: 24.
160 As Howard Winant (1992: 178) notes, ‘the fact that 100 years after the
end of slavery blacks are still overwhelmingly concentrated in the bottom
strata certainly suggests that race is still a crucial determinant of economic
success’. See also Hall, 1980: 305–45.
194 Classification and Social Exclusion
162 As Young observed, the concept of race ‘has been always racially con-
structed. Culture has always been racially constructed’ (1995: 54).
163 Conte & Essner, 1995.
164 Baerga, 2015: 33–4.
165 The term corresponds to George Balandier’s classic article, ‘La situation
coloniale: approche théorique’, in which he defines colonialism as an emi-
nently historical process (Balandier, 1951: 44–79).
166 Baerga, 2015: 35.
167 Cooper, 2005: 7.
168 Chakrabarty, 1992, 2000.
Epilogue
The Dilemma of Multiculturalism
Notes
1 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/09/28/actualidad/14434
51409_279006.html; www.huffpost.com/entry/french-syrian-refugees_n_
55f6f734e4b077ca094fbefb.
2 According to Cohn,
research in history is based on finding data; research in anthropology is
based on creating data. Obviously, the historian has to find the sources
Epilogue 205
on which to base his research. If he cannot find them, then no matter how
good his ideas are or how well thought through the problem is on which
he wants to work, he cannot do the research. […]. The anthropologist,
on the other hand, often is interested in a problem, descriptive or theo-
retical, and the question is then one of deciding what types of materials
he will need for pursuing the problem.
(Cohn, 1990: 6)
3 According to Löwenthal (1985), the past is not only in time, but also in
space, since the past was constructed not only as a distant time, but as a
faraway place. And conversely, coming into contact with realities that are
far-off in space enables people to take a trip to the past. See also Geertz,
1990: 323; Ingold, 1996a; Rakić, 2004: 231–2.
4 For a defence of universalist values and a criticism of relativisms, see
Todorov, 1988: 5–11, 1991.
5 Dumont observed that ‘we ourselves are made to look back on our own
modern culture and society as one particular form of humanity’, an excep-
tional one that denies its own universality (Dumont, 1986: 207).
6 Stoler, 2013: 1–35.
7 Footnote: From the album Françafrique, 2002.
8 Todorov, 1988: 7; Stolcke, 2011: 6.
9 Santos, 2000: 23–36; Comaroff, 2011: 222.
12 Baumann, 1996, 1999.
20 Stolcke, 1995: 24.
22 Gressgård, 2010: 11.
23 Gressgård, 2010: 11–12.
24 Stolcke, 1995: 1–24.
25 Gonçalves Barbosa, 2011: 477–92.
26 According to Walsh, interculturality signals and signifies processes of con-
struction of one knowledge another, of one political practice another, of one
social and (state) other power and of one society another; one form another
of thought related to and against modernity/coloniality, paradigm another
that is thought through political praxis. (Walsh, 2007: 47).