PI Motion Refiled BufferZone

Case 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ-CHL Document 49 Filed 02/04/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 2189
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY (at Louisville)
Electronically Filed
SISTERS FOR LIFE, INC., et. al. : Case No. 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ-CHL

Plaintiffs :
v. :
LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO :
GOVERNMENT, et. al.
:
Defendants :
PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiffs, Sisters for Life, Inc., Angela Minter, and Kentucky Right to Life, Inc., renew
their request for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. They fully join in
the pending request by Kenney and Harpring [DE#37], but, with most discovery having now
been completed, and with this evidence fully supporting their request for injunctive relief and
resolving, in a manner favorable to the Plaintiffs, the open questions that this Court indicated it
had in September [DE#19], and with trial some eleven months away, they request relief.
In support, they offer the Declaration of Angela Minter, the FRCP 30(b)(6) deposition of
Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government,1 and the depositions of Angela Minter, Edward
Harpring, and Mary Kenney, all of which support the requested relief.
A memorandum in support is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. A proposed
order is attached.
1
Minter’s Declaration authenticates videos played at that deposition, and these videos are being
filed via a Notice of Conventional Filing.
1
Case 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ-CHL Document 49 Filed 02/04/22 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 2190
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Christopher Wiest___________

Christopher Wiest (KBA 90725)
Chris Wiest, Atty at Law, PLLC
25 Town Center Blvd, Suite 104
Crestview Hills, KY 41017
513/257-1895 (v)
859/495-0803 (f)
chris@cwiestlaw.com
/s/Thomas Bruns_____________
Thomas Bruns (KBA 84985)
4750 Ashwood Drive, STE 200
Cincinnati, OH 45241
tbruns@bcvalaw.com
513-312-9890
Counsel for the Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATION AS REQUIRED BY FRCP 65(b)(1)(B)
The undersigned certifies, pursuant to FRCP 65(b)(1)(B), that: (1) he has given notice to
the Defendants of the foregoing by serving same by CM/ECF upon Counsel for the Defendants;
and (2) in any event, given the immediate harm that these Plaintiffs continue to suffer, and the
potential harm to third parties (i.e. the unborn), including loss of life, and the ongoing immediate
and irreparable injury, loss, or damage that continues to result, full briefing should not be
required prior to the issuance of a temporary restraining order. A temporary restraining order is
thus sought.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I have served the foregoing via the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will provide
notice to all counsel or parties of record this 4 day of February, 2022.
2
Case 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ-CHL Document 49-1 Filed 02/04/22 Page 1 of 25 PageID #: 2191

SISTERS FOR LIFE, INC., et. al. : Case No. 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ-CHL

Plaintiffs :
v. :
GOVERNMENT, et. al.
:
Defendants :
:
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR TEMPOARY
RESTRAINING ORDER, AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiffs Sisters for Life, Inc. and Angela Minter, submit this Memorandum in Support
of their Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
Introduction
As this Court is aware, this matter involves the Defendants’ buffer zone ordinance. With
the benefit of discovery and additional evidence, including videos, we renew our Motion for
relief against the buffer zone ordinance.
I. FACTS
A. The verified Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiff, Sisters for Life, Inc. (“Sisters for Life”), is a Kentucky non-profit corporation,
with its headquarters located in Louisville, Kentucky.1 (Pl’s Second Amended Compl., DE#28,
¶2, Authenticated and verified with the Declaration of Angela Minter, filed herewith). Formed
in 2003, Sisters for Life is a Christian, non-profit organization and ministry inspired by God to
1
https://www.sisforlife.org/ (last visited 6/6/2021).
1
put into action a comprehensive advocacy for preborn babies, and their mothers and fathers who
are faced with an unplanned or crisis pregnancy. Id. They also advocate for God’s family
values. They believe God has a good plan and purpose for every life and family, and they see it
as their mission to help God’s family have hope and a future. Id. As such, they believe it is their
assignment to serve and assist God’s family in fulfilling God’s plan. Id.
Angela Minter is the founder of Sisters for Life, and its President, who regularly engages
in evangelism associated with intervention with pregnant women entering abortion clinics, and
specifically EMW Women’s Surgical Center (“EMW”), which is the abortion clinic located at
136 W Market St, Louisville, KY 40202. (Id., ¶3). For almost two decades, Angela has
personally ministered to mothers and fathers outside EMW, sharing her own experiences and
regrets with abortion, connecting with them and telling them about her experience as a teenager
who aborted two of her children, and her lifelong regret from having done so. Id. Outside of
sidewalk ministry, Angela ministers in the community, reaching out to Louisville’s black
churches, engages in all forms of outreach, and seeks to end the cycle of death brought on by the
abortion industry, including its disproportionate impact to her black community. Id.
Plaintiff, Kentucky Right to Life Association, Inc. (“KRLA”), founded in 1973, serves as
the state coordinating body for local Right to Life Chapters representing tens of thousands of
Kentucky citizens. (Id., ¶4). It is a volunteer, non-profit organization composed of grassroots
people of different political persuasions, faiths, and economic, social and ethnic backgrounds.
KRLA exists to protect life. Id. Its members frequently conduct sidewalk ministry outside
EMW in furtherance of the KRLA mission, and KRLA and its members are harmed by the
challenged ordinance, and, further, the ordinance impairs the KRLA’s mission. Id.
2
Defendant Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government (“Louisville Metro”) is a duly
organized combined municipal and county government under KRS Chapter 67C, governing
Jefferson County. (Id., ¶5). Its legislative body is the Metro Council, and its executive is the
Mayor. Id. Defendant Mayor Greg Fischer is the duly elected Mayor of the Louisville-Jefferson
County Metro Government. (Id., ¶6). Pursuant to KRS 67C.105, “[a]ll executive and
administrative power of the government shall be vested in the office of the mayor.” Id. Further,
pursuant to KRS 67C.105(5)(d), the Mayor is charged to, and does, “[e]nforce the ordinances of
the consolidated local government.” Id. Defendant Ericka Shields is the duly appointed Chief of
the Louisville Metro Police Department, who, among other things, has primary responsibility for
the enforcement of city ordinances and other Kentucky laws within the City of Louisville. (Id.,,
¶7). Defendant Mike O’Connell is the Jefferson County Attorney. (Id., ¶8). In that capacity,
and pursuant to KRS 15.725(2), he is commanded to, and does, “prosecute all violations whether
by adults or by juveniles subject to the jurisdiction of the regular or juvenile session of the
District Court of criminal and penal laws.” Id.
As part of the practice of their faith, Angela and Sisters for Life engage in sidewalk
ministry outside 136 W Market St, Louisville, KY 40202, which is the location of EMW, the last
abortion clinic located in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and the most prolific provider of
surgical abortions within the Commonwealth, having been responsible for 3,645 abortions in
2019, or 99.5% of all abortions in Kentucky in 2019.2 (Id., ¶11). Angela and Sisters for Life
have engaged in their ministry since 2003. Id. In the same vein, KLRA members frequently
engage in similar sidewalk ministry outside of EMW, in the same manner that Angela and Sisters
2
https://chfs.ky.gov/agencies/dph/dehp/vsb/Forms/2019KYAbortionAnnualReport.pdf (last
visited 6/6/2021).
3
for Life do. (Id., ¶12). Sidewalk ministry involves offering both verbal and written materials
outlining alternatives to abortion and help for anyone wishing to pursue those options. (Id., ¶13).
Angela and Sisters for Life inform women and their partners of other life choices
available to them for their child other than abortion, including adoption, free housing during and
after the pregnancy, free child care, free help with college tuition if they choose not to abort their
child, parenting resources including diapers, formula, clothes, parenting classes, counseling and
more, including information about child development that shows parents how developed their
child is at the particular stage of their pregnancy. (Id., ¶14).
Angela and Sisters for Life typically will initiate a conversation by, among other things,
asking would-be patients if they would like some literature. (Id., ¶15). During these exchanges,
Angela and Sisters for Life consider it essential to maintain a caring demeanor, a calm tone of
voice, and direct eye contact. (Id., ¶16). Such interactions, Plaintiffs believe, are a much more
effective means of dissuading women from having abortions than confrontational methods such
as shouting, brandishing signs, blocking access, loud speakers, or other methods which, in
Plaintiffs’ view, tend only to alienate their intended audience. Id.
Some of the things Plaintiffs are called to do (and do) are make efforts to engage women
and hand them literature, walk alongside and talk to women headed towards the clinic who,
presumably, want to procure an abortion, and pray for the women who start to enter the abortion
clinic. (Id., ¶17). Angela will often, as part of this ministry, tell these women about her own
harrowing experience with abortion as a teenager and the lifelong regret she has suffered as a
result. (Id., ¶18). And, as part of this experience, she will tell the women that God loves them,
and their baby, regardless of the decision they make. Id.
4
Necessarily, this sidewalk ministry is not loud, obnoxious, or confrontational; experience
has shown Plaintiffs that those tactics are counter-productive. (Id., ¶19). Nor is the sidewalk
ministry a protest or meant or intended to block access to the clinic – the message and ministry
are a final intervention with women who often are in crisis and believe they have no alternative
to abortion. Id. Plaintiffs deliberately walk along with the women who are in the process of
walking into EMW, and deliberately do not block them. Id.
Spectacularly, the ministry and interventions of Angela and Sisters for Life have been
responsible for saving over 800 babies outside EMW.3 (Id., ¶20). Those 800 children are alive
today, thereby saving their mothers, fathers and families from the guilt and grief of having a
hand in their death. Id.
For the avoidance of all doubt, the sidewalk ministry and counseling are part of the
sincerely held religious beliefs of the Plaintiffs, and are undertaken in accordance with those
same beliefs. (Id., ¶21).
Given this success, it is not surprising that, at the insistence of EMW, which substantially
profits from the abortion trade, the Metro Council of Louisville Metro passed legislation
substantially restricting activities on the sidewalk outside EMW. (Id., ¶22).
On May 20, 2021, the Metro Council passed Ordinance O-179-21 (the “Ordinance”), in a
14-11 divided vote. (Id., ¶23). A true and accurate copy of that Ordinance is attached as Exhibit
1 to the Second Amended Complaint. Id. Thereafter, Mayor Fischer signed the Ordinance on
June 2, 2021, and, upon information and belief, it has been published in accordance with law or
is in the process of being so published. (Id., ¶24). The Ordinance, while perhaps appearing
3
As reflected in Ms. Minter’s deposition testimony, below, the results are actually well above
this number.
5
modest at first blush, is actually remarkable in both its overbreadth and scope. (Id., ¶25). First,
it provides: “(1) No person shall knowingly obstruct, detain, hinder, impede, or block another
person’s entry to or exit from a healthcare facility.” Id. It further provides that “(2) No person
shall knowingly enter, remain on, or create any obstruction within the driveway of a healthcare
facility or within a ‘buffer zone’ on the public way or sidewalk extending from the entrance of a
healthcare facility to the closest adjacent sidewalk curb and 10 feet from side to side, during the
facility’s posted business hours, except: (a) persons entering or leaving such facility; (b) persons
using the public sidewalk or street right-of-way adjacent to such facility solely for the purpose of
reaching a destination other than such facility; or (c) law enforcement, ambulance, firefighting,
construction, utilities, public works and other municipal agents acting within the scope of their
employment; or (d) employees or agents of such facility acting within the scope of their
employment.” (Id., ¶26).
A true and accurate depiction of the buffer zone is below:
Id. at ¶28.
6
The buffer zone effectively prohibits persons from walking through it, or into it, except as
expressly permitted under an exception to the Ordinance. Id. at ¶29. Further, the Ordinance is
enforced with fines of up to $500 for each violation. Id. at ¶30.
Since the operation of the Ordinance in question, Plaintiffs have been materially
impacted in their ministry. Id. at ¶31. Specifically, Plaintiffs have attempted to engage in
sidewalk ministry both before, and after the ordinance, and have been largely unable to
successfully do so after the passage and implementation of the ordinance. Id. at ¶32. The
Plaintiffs’ ministry is substantially burdened by the ordinance, including as a result of the
practice of EMW clinic escorts to block Plaintiffs access to those entering the clinic (both
physically and by shouting over us talking with their pro-choice messaging), as well as a result
of the clinic escorts dropping patrons off in a vehicle directly into the buffer zone, which,
coupled with the zone, has led Plaintiffs to be unable as a practical matter to interact with those
entering the clinic. Id. at ¶33.
Further, as an impediment to messaging by Plaintiffs towards those entering the clinic has
been shouting and loud speaker usage by protesters of the clinic that drown out Plaintiffs’
messaging (again, Plaintiffs cannot and do not use loud speakers to try to compete with
protesters because that is not what Plaintiffs are trying to do with our messaging, which relies on
a softly spoken calm, message). Id. at ¶34. Collectively, these features render Plaintiffs unable
to interact with most of the persons who are entering the clinic who Plaintiffs are trying to reach
with their message. Id. at ¶35.
As it turns out, the buffer zone Ordinance prohibits the Plaintiffs and other sidewalk
ministers from speaking, praying, or interacting with those entering the EMW clinic, including,
without limitation, even with those entering who invite or otherwise solicits contact with
7
Plaintiffs. Id. at ¶36. The buffer zone compromises the Plaintiffs’ ability to initiate the close,
personal conversations that Plaintiffs view as essential to their sidewalk ministry. Id. at ¶37.
Another pernicious effect of the buffer zone is to relegate the Plaintiffs to raising their
voices at clinic patrons from outside the zone – a mode of communication sharply at odds with
the compassionate message Plaintiffs wish to convey. Id. at ¶38. The buffer zone, in large part
for the reasons set forth above, also makes it substantially more difficult for Plaintiffs to
distribute literature to arriving parents, again even where the clinic patrons wish to receive the
literature. Id. at ¶39.
At the same time, the Ordinance explicitly permits EMW staff and volunteers to escort
those seeking an abortion into the buffer zone and into the clinic, where those staff and
volunteers regularly, and within the scope of their employment or volunteer status, escort,
encourage, and counsel the women seeking to enter the clinic to follow through with an abortion,
thus providing speech in the buffer zone, but on only one side of the abortion debate. Id. at ¶40.
For the avoidance of all doubt, volunteers and employees of EMW will, within the scope of their
employment or volunteer status, and within the buffer zone, thwart or attempt to thwart or block
Plaintiffs’ efforts to speak or hand literature to those in the process of walking to the EMW clinic
property, regularly disparage Plaintiffs to those seeking to enter the EMW clinic property, and
will offer encouragement of those seeking to obtain an abortion to do so, again providing speech
on only one side of the abortion debate. Id. at ¶41. Again, for the avoidance of all doubt, EMW
authorizes its escorts to have these conversations, with those being escorted, within the buffer
zone. Id. at ¶42. The Ordinance is an insidious content and viewpoint-based speech
gerrymander, designed to squelch dissenting speech, and the practice of sincerely held religious
beliefs, in the vicinity of EMW. Id. at ¶43.
8
It should be noted that prior to the passage of the challenged Ordinance, Louisville Metro
already had ordinances on the books to prevent blocking sidewalks. Specifically, the City has
had, at all times relevant hereto, ordinance 97.072, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in or on any sidewalk or any premises in or abutting
thereon to make any speech or harangue; to demonstrate, sell, or offer for sale goods,
wares, or merchandise; or to display any signs, device, information, or exhibition in
consequence of which there is caused or created such a gathering of persons on the
sidewalk as to interfere with pedestrian traffic thereon. Id. at ¶44.
Louisville Metro has not seriously attempted less restrictive measures to combat the
purported ills that it contends required the passage of the Ordinance, including individual
prosecutions, injunctions, ordinances against following and harassing people within a certain
number of feet of a health care facility, passage of legislation similar to the federal Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (18 USC 481(a)(1)), or ordinances requiring, at the
directives of the police, the dispersal of individuals blocking entrances to healthcare facilities.
Id. at ¶45.
The Ordinance in question provides a number of secular exceptions to the buffer zone
requirement, but makes no allowance for the practice of sincerely held religious beliefs, such as
those engaged in by the Plaintiffs. Id. at ¶46. Specifically, the Ordinance allows persons within
the buffer zone who are (a) entering or leaving such facility; (b) traversing the sidewalk but only
if they are reaching a destination; (c) law enforcement, ambulance, firefighting, construction,
utilities, public works and other municipal agents acting within the scope of their employment;
and (d) employees or agents of such facility acting within the scope of their employment. Id.
B. The Depositions taken to date in this matter
This Court need not merely rely on the verified complaints in this matter. Relevant
depositions have been taken.
9
Angela Minter: Ms. Minter is the President and founder of Sisters for Life. (Depo.
Minter, DE#44, at 5). She is a sidewalk counselor who meets women and their families on the
sidewalk outside the abortion clinic, and offers them resources as an alternative to abortion; she
has engaged in sidewalk counseling for the past 13 years. Id. at 8-9. Sisters for Life does
sidewalk counseling Tuesday through Saturday, usually with three or four sidewalk counselors
present. Id. at 10-11. This process begins by the counselor asking women entering the facility if
the counselor can help them. Id. at 17. Minter knows that people entering the facility are there
to obtain abortions because that is what people entering the facility have told them. Id. at 18, 25-
26.
Minter confirmed that it is very important to approach people entering the clinic in a
caring demeanor, with a calm voice, and to obtain eye contact with them. Id. at 20. She also
confirmed that there are protesters present on many mornings that she has observed. Id. at 21.
She also testified that the EMW Women’s Clinic (“EMW”) operates a vehicle shuttle with its
clinic escorts that drops patrons off right in front of the door, and, when this happens, sidewalk
counselors have less than 10 seconds from the time that person exits the vehicle to the time they
are inside. Id. at 23.
Minter testified that she and her ministry and counselors have saved over 900 children
from abortions over the past 18-19 years. Id. at 37-38. But the buffer zone ordinance has
changed things, and rendered them largely unable to perform their ministry. Id. at 40. There is
no way to contact the women being dropped off by the EMW shuttles, sidewalk counselors are
being drowned out by loudspeakers, and the buffer zone has eliminated the ability to approach
and speak to women and conduct their ministry. Id. at 44-45.
10
Since the passage of the buffer zone ordinance, EMW conducts significantly more shuttle
drop offs right into the buffer zone, than patrons walking the sidewalk to get to the clinic, and in
fact the “vast majority” of women entering the clinic are dropped off via shuttle. Id. at 32-34.
Minter also testified that EMW employs escorts who block sidewalk counselors so that they
cannot talk to persons entering the clinic. Id. at 36. In fact, Minter testified that she regularly
hears the EMW clinic escorts and their pro-choice message in the buffer zone and because of the
frequency and routine with which this occurs, it must be authorized by EMW. Id. at 47, 49-50.
These escorts tell their clinic patrons not to listen to the sidewalk counselors in the buffer zone.
Id. at 48.
And if there were any doubt that the buffer zone ordinance constitutes a “catastrophic”
detriment to Minter’s ministry, prior to the buffer zone ordinance, Minter and her sidewalk
counselors were able to change the minds of 3 to 6 women in the buffer zone a month, but since
September, 2021, that number has fallen to zero. Id. at 54-55. Simple math reveals that is
between 12 and 24 babies in the womb have been executed as a consequence of the buffer zone
ordinance from the Sisters for Life ministry alone since September.
Ed Harpring: Mr. Harpring is a former pro-life coordinator for the Archdiocese of
Louisville, and has been (and continues to be) a sidewalk counselor for the past 38-39 years.
(Depo. Harpring, DE#45, at 5-7). He conducts his sidewalk ministry at the sidewalk outside
EMW. Id. His ministry consists of offering life-affirming alternatives to abortion. Id. at 8-9.
This includes offering free ultrasounds, medical help, spiritual help, counseling, financial
support, and mentoring. Id. at 10.
He conducts sidewalk counseling every Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday. Id. at 15. And
he confirmed that all EMW does is offer abortions. Id. He likewise testified that the shuttle that
11
EMW operates causes most EMW patrons to be dropped off directly into the buffer zone. Id. at
16. Mr. Harpring testified that he finds the most effective sidewalk counseling approach to be
trying to stand still, and to ask in a normal voice if he can offer the women entering the EMW
facility literature. Id. at 18. Some women have talked with him and others do not. Id. at 19.
As for the buffer zone, Mr. Harpring testified that the effects of it are to end
conversations that have begun further back the sidewalk, and, more critically, he has had women
tell him that things he has said to them right before they enter the EMW facility have changed
their minds, and now he has to raise his voice to be heard at this critical moment, which is
ineffective. Id. at 20-21.
Meanwhile, EMW escorts flank patients and block sidewalk counselors, which deprives
Harpring and other sidewalk counselors of the ability to even hand them literature, particularly
for patrons being dropped off via the EMW shuttle. Id. at 25-26. In fact, EMW escorts speak in
the buffer zone, telling patients not to take sidewalk counselor’s literature and to move on. Id. at
26. Harpring estimates that a counselor has four of five seconds to potentially reach a patron
dropped off via EMW clinic shuttle and that far less women have been able to speak or hear
sidewalk counselors because of the buffer zone ordinance. Id. at 28. Part of that is due to the
active efforts of EMW clinic escorts who will position their bodies to block leafletting. Id. at 29.
Mary Kenney: Ms. Kenney is a stay-at-home mother, who has been a sidewalk counselor
for 15 years. (Depo. Kenney, DE#46, at 5-7). Her ministry offers women alternatives to
abortion and informs them of resources available to them. Id. at 6. She confirmed that the EMW
shuttle activity has increased since the buffer zone ordinance has been passed. Id. at 13. And
she confirmed that the EMW clinic escorts escort the women, and that, with the buffer zone, has
reduced the ability of sidewalk ministers to reach women entering the EMW facility. Id. at 16.
12
Mrs. Kenney confirmed that her role is to engage women going to EMW in a quiet,
compassionate, non-threatening, one-on-one conversation, and to try and convince them that
there are alternatives to abortion. Id. at 17. She confirmed EMW clinic escorts block sidewalk
counselors and keep them handing out literature, and even strike or block sidewalk ministers’
hands. Id. at 18. She has had her literature grabbed and torn up by these EMW clinic volunteers.
Id. at 19. And this activity by EMW escorts occurs with both patrons dropped off via the
shuttles, or patrons who walk along the sidewalk. Id. at 19. She also testified that she had the
ordinance enforced against her and has received a warning. Id. at 25.
Caleb Stewart, LMPD Lieutenant, FRCP 30(b)(6) witness: Lieutenant Stewart is
employed with the Louisville Metro Police Department, and is in charge of the area where the
EMW clinic is located. (Depo. Stewart/FRCP 30(b)(6) Deposition, DE#47 at 1-5). He has
personally observed both protesters, EMW clinic escorts, and sidewalk counselors outside the
clinic. Id. at 6-9. He has observed, on a weekly basis, protestors with loud speakers, usually on
Saturday mornings. Id. at 10-11. And he acknowledged that persons with loudspeakers inhibit
the ability to have close, intimate conversations and require any person attempting to have such a
conversation with another person to be far closer than would normally be necessary. Id. at 11-
12. That is particularly the case with anyone entering or exiting the EMW clinic. Id. at 12.
He has likewise observed the EMW clinic utilize shuttles to drop patrons off right at the
front of the clinic and into the buffer zone. Id. at 13-14. He acknowledged that the time between
when the person exits a EMW clinic shuttle and gets to the front door is under 10 seconds. Id. at
14.
We then explored less restrictive measures and the history of police activity at the EMW
clinic with Stewart. He confirmed that, from 2013 to the present, most arrests were not for
13
blocking the clinic or any sort of access issues, and, in any event, police were able to take action
and arrest people who did block the clinic (or otherwise commit crimes with respect to the clinic)
using existing laws, which Lt. Stewart testified were a sufficient response to each incident. Id. at
22-35, Exhibit 2.
In advance of passing the buffer zone ordinance, the Police Chief of Louisville sent
police out to observe and investigate the EMW clinic in March and April of 2021, in response to
complaints by the operators of the EMW clinic. Id. at 35-43, Exhibit 3. In March, 2021, LMPD
patrolled outside the clinic, obtained certain body camera footage, and determined that no
obstruction of anyone’s access to the clinic occurred. Id. In April, 2021, LMPD again patrolled
and investigated activity outside the EMW clinic. That weekend, which corresponded with
Easter Weekend, there were over 50 people present, most of whom were from out of town. Id. at
44-47, Exhibit 3. And, again, people were on the sidewalk but no one obstructed it. Id. at 48.
One person had a large sign, and they were asked to move by LMPD and immediately did so. Id.
at 49.
Lt. Stewart confirmed that local groups – the sidewalk counselors – were not the people
causing any issues. Id. at 49-50. In fact, he confirmed that sidewalk counselors do not
appreciate the protestors with loudspeakers, because they impact the ministry of the counselors.
Id. at 51. And, again, he acknowledged that it is hard to initiate a soft intimate conversation with
loudspeakers blaring in the background. Id. at 51-52.
In terms of less restrictive options to the buffer zone ordinance, Lt. Steward confirmed
that LMPD could be stationed as a detail outside the clinic, particularly on Saturdays. Id. at 45.
Or the clinic itself has video that can be reviewed if there are incidents that could be used for
trespassing charges, civil injunctions, or blocking sidewalk charges. Id. at 59, 99. In fact, the
14
police could just tell someone who has obstructing to move, and, if they did not, probable cause
would access that they were obstructing access. Id. at 100. He acknowledged that, for blocking
issues, the City could issue orders to disperse. Id. at 96. He also testified that prior to the buffer
zone ordinance, the City pursued criminal charges where appropriate, but the City had not
obtained any injunctions against persons causing trouble. Id. at 90-92. In fact, Lt. Stewart
acknowledged a number of existing laws and ordinances that were on the books prior to the
enactment of the buffer zone ordinance that could address issues, Id. at 62-64, Exhibit 7, but he
stated that the justification for the buffer zone ordinance was that it made life easier, because it is
easy to enforce an ordinance that restricts people from going between painted lines. Id. at 99,
122-123.
Lt. Stewart did not know if the City could have merely passed an anti-congregation
ordinance as opposed to a buffer zone ordinance. Id. at 101.
Lt. Steward also acknowledged exceptions to the ordinance, both those codified, and
“unofficial” interpretative exceptions, all of which were secular, and non-of which made
exceptions for religious practice. Id. at 52-26, 103-115, Exhibit 4. EMW clinic escorts can talk
to patients from within the zone, but sidewalk counselors cannot. Id. at 56, 58.
We then reviewed a number of videos with Lt. Stewart: videos of loudspeaker protesters
operating outside the clinic (Exhibit 12), videos of the loudspeaker in operation with a sidewalk
counselor being tried to be heard over it (Exhibit 13), EMW shuttles in operation with patrons
being dropped off and limited time for sidewalk counselors to interact with them (Exhibit 14),
EMW clinic shuttles in operation, the operation of loudspeakers, and the need to get close to
them to have a intimate conversation (Exhibit 15). Id. at 72-81, Exhibits 12, 13, 14, and 15. We
15
also reviewed video of EMW clinic escorts talking to patients within the buffer zone, and other
associated activity on the clinic sidewalk. Id. at 81-87, Exhibits 16, 17, 18, and 19.
II. LAW AND ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review
When deciding whether to issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction,
the court must consider the following four factors: (1) Whether the movant has demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) Whether the movant would suffer irreparable
harm; (3) Whether issuance would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) Whether the public
interest would be served by issuance. Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 528 (6th Cir. 1998);
Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir.
2006). These "are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met." In re DeLorean
Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985).
Clear Sixth Circuit law establishes that the remaining factors are met where constitutional
rights are infringed upon, and so, in these cases, the likelihood of success factor is dispositive.
H.D.V. - Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (abuse of discretion
not to grant preliminary injunction where constitutional violation found); Roberts v. Neace, 958
F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020); Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610 (6th Cir.
2020); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (irreparable harm from violation of rights);
Foster v. Dilger, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95195 (EDKY 2010) (no substantial harm to others,
even where registry incurred printing costs, where constitutional rights at stake); Martin-
Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 568 (6th Cir. 1982); see also G & V Lounge v.
Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[I]t is always in the public
interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights."). See, also, Elrod v. Burns,
16
427 U. S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).
B. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits
1. The Ordinance violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Guaranties

The First Amendment guaranties, among other things, that government may make no law
“abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const., Amend. I. It has been incorporated against the
states. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Public streets and sidewalks comprising the buffer zone under the Ordinance are
traditional public forums, triggering the traditional public forum analysis under First Amendment
analysis and scrutiny. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476-477 (2014). To begin, the
Government’s ability to restrict speech in such locations is “very limited.” Id. Restrictions in
such areas can be upheld only if they are “reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and they
leave open alternative channels for communication of the information.” Id. at 477.
The tailoring requirement “does not simply guard against an impermissible desire to
censor.” Id. at 486. “The government may attempt to suppress speech not only because it
disagrees with the message being expressed, but also for mere convenience.” Id. “But by
demanding a close fit between ends and means, the tailoring requirement prevents the
government from too readily ‘sacrific[ing] speech for efficiency.’” Id.
First, the restrictions here are not content neutral (and, in fact, constitute viewpoint
discrimination, which is presumptively unconstitutional) because they permit EMW and its staff
and volunteers to engage in pro-abortion speech within the buffer zone, while foreclosing
Plaintiffs from engaging in pro-life speech. The Court now has proof of this, via video.
17
As Coakley made clear, “an exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of
speech may represent a governmental ‘attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an
advantage in expressing its views to the people.’” Id. at 483. And, in Coakley, where the
Supreme Court held that the ordinance in question did not amount to viewpoint discrimination,
the Court also observed that “[i]t would be a very different question if it turned out that a clinic
authorized escorts to speak about abortion inside the buffer zones.” Id. at 484. “In that case, the
escorts would not seem to be violating the Act because the speech would be within the scope of
their employment.” Id. at 484-485. “The Act’s exemption for clinic employees would then
facilitate speech on only one side of the abortion debate—a clear form of viewpoint
discrimination that would support an as-applied challenge to the buffer zone at that clinic.” Id. at
485. But that is the record here. The Ordinance fails on that basis alone.
Further, the exceptions to the Ordinance permit a variety of people, including the general
public, to occupy the buffer zones for various purposes. For instance, if someone from the
general public is walking down the sidewalk with an intention to reach another point, they are
permitted within the zone for that purpose. But for the Plaintiffs, who engage in the same exact
walk along the same exact piece of sidewalk to convey speech and their ministry to someone on
their way to enter EMW, their conduct is illegal. The application of the Ordinance is thus
“drawn based on the message a speaker conveys,” it is therefore “subject to strict scrutiny.”
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 164 (2015). Said another way, the applicability of the
statute “depend[s] entirely on the communicative content” of the petition. Id.
This is true when a set of rules that may not be viewpoint discrimination on their face,
become so in an as-applied manner when some speech is permitted or encouraged, but where
other speech is discouraged. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 at 484-485 (noting that permitting one class
18
of speakers to speak and not another raises questions of viewpoint discrimination). It goes
without saying that “[g]ranting waivers to favored speakers (or . . . denying them to disfavored
speakers) would of course be unconstitutional.” Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316,
325 (2002).
Courts have not hesitated to find as-applied viewpoint discrimination in situations such as
these, where a policy may be viewpoint neutral on its fact, but in application favors one side of a
debate, or some speakers, but not others. Aids Action Comm. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp.
Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 9-12 (1st Cir. 1994). Moreover, “regulations that ‘selectively grant[] safe
passage to speech of which [officials] approve while curbing speech of which they disapprove’
are impermissible.” Nieto v. Flatau, 715 F. Supp. 2d 650, 655 (EDNC 2010); L.D. Mgmt. Co. v.
Thomas, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72593 (WDKY 2020) (finding viewpoint discrimination based
on selecting targeting or enforcement of speech); Teufel v. Princeton City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4923 (SDOH 2013) (finding a facially valid policy can be applied in a
discriminatory manner raising viewpoint discrimination claims); Hart v. Thomas, 422 F. Supp.
3d 1227 (EDKY 2019) (inconsistent enforcement coupled with suppression of the Plaintiff's
expression constituted as-applied viewpoint discrimination); Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146
F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining as-applied viewpoint and content based discrimination);
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining as-applied enforcement and
discrimination of neutral policies is unconstitutional).
But even if the Ordinance did not amount to content and viewpoint discrimination, it also
is not narrowly tailored under the less exacting narrow tailoring in a content-neutral forum
analysis, and it fails to leave open alternative channels for communication of the information.
Specifically, in application, it restricts an even greater area than the U.S. Supreme Court struck
19
down in Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, and, as in Coakley, Louisville Metro has not undertaken less
restrictive measures to achieve its purported ends. 573 U.S. 464 at 490-496.
The Supreme Court in Coakley observed, “[w]e have previously noted the First
Amendment virtues of targeted injunctions as alternatives to broad, prophylactic measures.” Id.
at 492. The Supreme Court in Coakley observed that “[s]uch an injunction ‘regulates the
activities, and perhaps the speech, of a group,’ but only ‘because of the group’s past actions in
the context of a specific dispute between real parties.’” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, “given
the equitable nature of injunctive relief, courts can tailor a remedy to ensure that it restricts no
more speech than necessary.” Id. But here Defendants have not pursued these measures.
“In short, injunctive relief focuses on the precise individuals and the precise conduct
causing a particular problem.” Id. A statutory buffer zone, “by contrast, categorically excludes
non-exempt individuals from the buffer zones, unnecessarily sweeping in innocent individuals
and their speech.” Id. at 492-493. As in Coakley, the Metro Government “has available to it a
variety of approaches that appear capable of serving its interests, without excluding individuals
from areas historically open for speech and debate.” Id. at 493-494.
Thus, "[t]o meet the requirement of narrow tailoring [in the context of content-neutral
regulations], the government must demonstrate that alternative measures that burden
substantially less speech would fail to achieve the government's interests, not simply that the
chosen route is easier." Id. at 495. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has been particularly hesitant to close off channels of communication
which provide individuals with inexpensive means of disseminating core political messages. See,
e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-56 (1994) (ordinance banning residential signs
almost completely foreclosed "a venerable means of communication that is both unique and
20
important" and for which there is no adequate substitute, particularly for persons of modest
means”); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door to door distribution of
circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.").
The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of providing access "within the forum in
question." Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655
(1981). "One is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
880 (1997).
Limiting all gatherings to across the street is no constitutional substitute. United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). Supreme Court jurisprudence directs reviewing courts to look at
the purpose and goals of the speech in question, and to determine if the proposed alternative is as
effective as the original intended forum. Id.
In Coakley, the size of the buffer zone made it difficult to distinguish persons headed to
the clinic from passersby "in time to initiate a conversation before they enter[ed] the buffer
zone." 573 U.S. 464 at 487. As a result, the plaintiffs were often forced to raise their voices from
outside the buffer zone once they identified the clinic patients, thereby forcing a mode of
communication contrary to their compassionate message and preventing them from distributing
pamphlets. Id. Where the plaintiffs wished to engage in quiet conversations with women seeking
abortions and not in noisy protest speech, the Court held it was "no answer to say that petitioners
can still be 'seen and heard' by women within the buffer zones." Id. at 489. Instead, the Supreme
Court concluded the buffer zones had "effectively stifled petitioners' message" by prohibiting the
plaintiffs' chosen means of communication. Id. So too here. Indeed, Sixth Circuit has
21
repeatedly observed that “[a]n alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the
intended audience." Saieg v. City of Dearborn, 641 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2011).
Applying Coakley and Saig, the objective of these Plaintiffs is to be heard by the women
on their way to entering the EMW clinic, not in a loud, shouting manner, but in a soft, non-
confrontational, caring manner. The substitute offered by the Defendants, to be forced to shout
from a distance, is no substitute at all.
“Plaintiffs wish to converse with their fellow citizens about an important subject on the
public streets and sidewalks—sites that have hosted discussions about the issues of the day
throughout history.” 573 U.S. 464 at 496. “Respondents assert undeniably significant interests
in maintaining public safety on those same streets and sidewalks, as well as in preserving access
to adjacent healthcare facilities.” Id. “But here the [Defendants] ha[ve] pursued those interests
by the extreme step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public forum to all speakers.”
Id. “It has done so without seriously addressing the problem through alternatives that leave the
forum open for its time-honored purposes.” Id. They “may not do that consistent with the First
Amendment.” Id.
Here, as in Coakley, “the police appear perfectly capable of singling out lawbreakers.”
Id. at 495. And, as in Coakley, if the EMW Clinic can rely “on video surveillance” to show
police conduct against the law, “we do not see why they cannot do the same to support
injunctions and prosecutions against those who might deliberately flout the law.” Id. at 495.
Here, as in Coakley, Lt. Stewart testified that “fixed buffer zones would ‘make our job so much
easier.’” Id. And, while “[a] painted line on the sidewalk is easy to enforce, … the prime
objective of the First Amendment is not efficiency.” Id. In fact, Lt. Stewart acknowledged what
the Supreme Court observed in Coakley, “[t]o determine whether a protestor intends to block
22
access to a clinic, a police officer need only order him to move” and “[i]f he refuses, then there is
no question that his continued conduct is knowing or intentional.” Id. “Given the vital First
Amendment interests at stake, it is not enough for [Defendants] simply to say that other
approaches have not worked.” Id. This case is on all fours with Coakley. The Ordinance thus
violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech guaranties.
2. The Ordinance violates the First Amendment’s Freedom of Assembly

The First Amendment also guaranties the right “of the people peaceably to assemble.”
This guaranty has also been incorporated against the states. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937). Assembly on public streets and sidewalks is among the guaranties protected by the First
Amendment. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). These rights, being
fundamental rights, trigger strict scrutiny. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). The
Ordinance is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. It is thus also
a violation of the Freedom of Assembly guaranty of the First Amendment.
3. The Ordinance violates the First Amendment’s Free Exercise of Religion

The First Amendment also provides that: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” This clause, too, has been
incorporated against the states. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
“[A] law that discriminates against religious practices usually will be invalidated because
it is the rare law that can be ‘justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.’" Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2020). That is because a
“a law might appear to be generally applicable on the surface but not be so in practice due to
exceptions for comparable secular activities.” Id. “Do the four [categories] of exceptions in the
[ordinance], and the kinds of [exceptions] allowed, remove them from the safe harbor for
generally applicable laws? We think so.” Id. "At some point, an exception-ridden policy takes
23
on the appearance and reality of a system of individualized exemptions, the antithesis of a neutral
and generally applicable policy and just the kind of state action that must run the gauntlet of
strict scrutiny." Id. at 413-414. See, also, Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63
(2020).
The exceptions to the Ordinance permit a variety of people, including the general public,
to occupy the buffer zones for various purposes. For instance, if someone from the general
public is walking down the sidewalk with an intention to reach another point, they are permitted
within the zone for that purpose. But for the Plaintiffs, who engage in the same exact walk along
the same exact piece of sidewalk to convey speech and their ministry to someone on their way to
enter EMW, their conduct is illegal. This cannot stand under Roberts, 958 F.3d 409 at 413. And
the Ordinance in question and its enforcement thus violates these Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights.
4. The Ordinance violates Plaintiffs rights under KRS 446.350
KRS 446.350 provides:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's freedom of religion. The right to act
or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief may not be
substantially burdened unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence
that it has a compelling governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to
act and has used the least restrictive means to further that interest. A "burden" shall
include indirect burdens such as withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or an exclusion
from programs or access to facilities.
“The point of the law is to exercise an authority every State has: to provide more
protection for religious liberties at the state level than the U.S. Constitution provides at the
national level.” Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 612 (6th Cir. 2020).
“Application of this test requires little elaboration in most respects.” Id. “Defendants’ actions
substantially burden the [Plaintiffs’] sincerely held religious practices—and plainly so.” Id.
“Religion motivates the [sidewalk ministry.]” Id. The likelihood-of-success inquiry instead
24
turns on whether [Defendants’ Ordinance was] ‘the least restrictive means’ of achieving [the
Defendants’ interests]. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 446.350.” Id. “That's a difficult hill to climb, and it was
never meant to be anything less.” Id.
Defendants had numerous less restrictive measures they could have pursued, but did not –
and the U.S. Supreme Court made just this observation in Coakley. 573 U.S. 464, 493-495.
Thus, the Ordinance violates KRS 446.350.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the requested Emergency Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

Christopher Wiest (KBA 90725)
Chris Wiest, Atty at Law, PLLC
25 Town Center Blvd, Suite 104
Crestview Hills, KY 41017
859/486-6850 (v)
513/257-1895 (c)
859/495-0803 (f)
chris@cwiestlaw.com
/s/Thomas Bruns_____________
Thomas Bruns (KBA 84985)
4750 Ashwood Drive, STE 200
Cincinnati, OH 45241
tbruns@bcvalaw.com
513-312-9890
Counsel for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I have served the foregoing via the Court’s CM/ECF system, this 4 day of February,
2022.
25
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
SISTERS FOR LIFE, INC., et al., PLAINTIFFS
v. Case No. 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY
METRO GOVERNMENT, et al., DEFENDANTS
DECLARATION OF ANGELA MINTER
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746, the undersigned, Angela Minter, makes the following declaration,
under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the facts contained
herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and that such facts are made
based on my personal knowledge:
1. My name is Angela Minter, and I am a Plaintiff in the above captioned matter. I am
also the President of Sisters for Life, Inc. The allegations in my Second Amended
Complaint are true and accurate, and based on personal knowledge.
2. Exhibits 12 to 19 of the FRCP 30(b)(6) Deposition of Defendant Louisville/Jefferson
County Metro Government (and filed conventionally by my counsel) are true and
accurate copies of videos that were taken, at my direction, on Saturday, September
11, 2021, outside of, and depict the sidewalk outside of, the EMW Women’s Surgical
Center, in Louisville, Kentucky, located at 136 W Market St, Louisville, KY 40202.
On that morning, the buffer zone area had not yet been painted. These videos and
depict, among other things, clinic escorts blocking people entering the clinic from us,
clinic escorts talking to patrons including in the area of the current buffer zone, the
operation of the shuttle drop off (which is today right into the buffer zone) by the
EMW Women’s Surgical Center. All of those events continue to the present.
1-26-2022

SISTERS FOR LIFE, INC., et. al. : Case No.

Plaintiffs :
v. :
GOVERNMENT, et. al.
:
Defendants :
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Pursuant to FRCP 65, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order. Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those acting in
active concert with them who receive notice of this Order, are hereby ENJOINED from
enforcing Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government Ordinance O-179-21.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits,
irreparable harm will result, the balance of harms favors the Plaintiffs, and the public interest
weighs in favor of the issuance of an injunction.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this ___ day of June, 2021:
___________________________
District Judge

PI Motion Refiled BufferZone

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

PI Motion Refiled BufferZone

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

PI Motion Refiled BufferZone

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ-CHL Document 49 Filed 02/04/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 2189

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SISTERS FOR LIFE, INC., et. al. : Case No. 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ-CHL

A memorandum in support is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. A proposed

/s/ Christopher Wiest___________

CERTIFICATION AS REQUIRED BY FRCP 65(b)(1)(B)

/s/ Christopher Wiest___________

/s/ Christopher Wiest___________

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SISTERS FOR LIFE, INC., et. al. : Case No. 3:21-cv-00367-RGJ-CHL

relief against the buffer zone ordinance.

A. The verified Second Amended Complaint

Kentucky citizens. (Id., ¶4). It is a volunteer, non-profit organization composed of grassroots

Defendant Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government (“Louisville Metro”) is a duly

District Court of criminal and penal laws.” Id.

child is at the particular stage of their pregnancy. (Id., ¶14).

Plaintiffs’ view, tend only to alienate their intended audience. Id.

and their baby, regardless of the decision they make. Id.

Necessarily, this sidewalk ministry is not loud, obnoxious, or confrontational; experience

walking into EMW, and deliberately do not block them. Id.

hand in their death. Id.

same beliefs. (Id., ¶21).

substantially restricting activities on the sidewalk outside EMW. (Id., ¶22).

employment.” (Id., ¶26).

A true and accurate depiction of the buffer zone is below:

enforced with fines of up to $500 for each violation. Id. at ¶30.

Plaintiffs’ ministry is substantially burdened by the ordinance, including as a result of the

entering the clinic. Id. at ¶33.

with their message. Id. at ¶35.

literature. Id. at ¶39.

beliefs, in the vicinity of EMW. Id. at ¶43.

had, at all times relevant hereto, ordinance 97.072, which provides:

B. The Depositions taken to date in this matter

depositions have been taken.

are inside. Id. at 23.

and speak to women and conduct their ministry. Id. at 44-45.

Ed Harpring: Mr. Harpring is a former pro-life coordinator for the Archdiocese of

support, and mentoring. Id. at 10.

ineffective. Id. at 20-21.

Caleb Stewart, LMPD Lieutenant, FRCP 30(b)(6) witness: Lieutenant Stewart is

loudspeakers blaring in the background. Id. at 51-52.

ordinance as opposed to a buffer zone ordinance. Id. at 101.

II. LAW AND ARGUMENT

Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985).

time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).

B. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits

1. The Ordinance violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Guaranties

states. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

government from too readily ‘sacrific[ing] speech for efficiency.’” Id.

As Coakley made clear, “an exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of

statute “depend[s] entirely on the communicative content” of the petition. Id.

discrimination of neutral policies is unconstitutional).

Amendment virtues of targeted injunctions as alternatives to broad, prophylactic measures.” Id.

chosen route is easier." Id. at 495. (emphasis added).

circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.").

effective as the original intended forum. Id.

from a distance, is no substitute at all.