A.M. No.
L-363             July 31, 1962 it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.
GUTIERREZ, respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar,
admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the
Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the
murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and
together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of
death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was
affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was
changed to reclusion perpetua.  After serving a portion of the sentence
respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on
August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was
remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim
in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying
that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule
127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting
the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the
authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil.
293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason
of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is,
without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes,
social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man
and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham,  84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur.
Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional
pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the
rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the
Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and
thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction,
this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an
attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony
ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe
out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of
the attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before
us. In making it the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon
granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio
decidendi  of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely.
In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343;
and Ex parte  Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State  the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon
the record of the felony conviction could no longer be used as a
basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record,
when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional
pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford
"proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus
cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A
pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to
the judicial construction which that act of executive grace was
 received. Ex parte  Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S.
149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young,  61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte  Garland quoted with
approval in the Lontok case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is
full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of
guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
if he had never committed the offense. It granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and
restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new
man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional,
and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not
reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte  Garland, which was "a
full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection
with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United States."
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure
up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the
admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither
dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue
to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As
stated in Ex parte  Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold
the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world,
to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to
ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and
office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the
nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has
been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the
roll of lawyers.

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable

here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his
conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in
defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its
having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official
position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the
use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra.  The degree
of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from
the profession.

Piatt           September 1, 1933
C.E. PIATT, Chief of Police of Manila, complainant, 
vs.
PERFECTO ABORDO, respondent.
On February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar,
accepted the offer of two individuals to sell him a quantity of opium, a
prohibited drug, and agreed to pay P1.50 per tin for the opium. On the
afternoon of the same day, Abordo was picked up at the corner of Taft
Avenue extension and Vito Cruz in the City of Manila, by one of the
individuals who had made him the opium proposition, and was taken to
Rizal Avenue Extension outside of the city limits where they found a
number of persons awaiting them in an automobile. A can was disclosed
to Abordo as containing opium, and believing that it was opium, he
delivered to one Cabrales the amount of P600 in payment of the stuff.
The can was loaded in the automobile which brought Abordo to the
scene of the delivery, but in returning to Manila another automobile
overtook them and the parties riding therein, pretending to be
constabulary soldiers, told Abordo to stop. Instead Abordo drew his
revolver and commanding the driver of the car to turn into Calle Vito
Cruz was able to evade his pursuers and to arrive safely at his home in
Pasay. Once in his home Abordo examined the contents of the can and
found it to contain fake opium and sand. Thereupon Abordo reported to
the Luneta Police Station of Manila that he had been robbed of P600.
Two individuals were later arrested, charged with the crime of estafa,
and convicted.
Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above,
adding that "he is sincerely sorry for it and vows not to repeat". His
defense is that "there being no evidence in the record establishing the
relationship of attorney and client between the respondent and the
malefactors", and "the act complained of not having been committed in
the exercise of his profession of attorney-at-law", the acts he committed
could not affect his status as attorney-at-law and could not, therefore,
constitute a ground for disciplinary action.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds for
the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer. Nevertheless, it is well settled
that a member of the bar may be suspended or removed from his office
as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. However, as a general rule,
a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to be committed in his private capacity. The
exception to the rule is that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez [1923], 44 Phil., 567.)
The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time
the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their
character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respect as to show
that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.
It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar,
attempted to engage in an opium deal in direct contravention of the
criminal law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan
from succeeding was the treacherous conduct of his co-conspirators.
The intention to flaunt the law was present even if consummation of the
overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of
professional ethics which govern the conduct of attorneys, the act was
as reprehensible as if it had been brought to a successful culmination.
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws" said the United States Supreme Court in the well
known case of Ex Parte Wall ( [1882], 107 U.S., 265), and to that
doctrine we give our unqualified support.

The Solicitor-General submits that the respondent should be

reprimanded and warned that a repetition of similar conduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely. To our minds such leniency on
the part of the Supreme Court would serve merely to condone a
pernicious example set by a member of the bar, and would result in
action entirely inadequate considering the aggravated nature of the
case. In this respect we are not without judicial precedents to guide us.
Thus, in the case of In re Terrel ( [1903], 2 Phil., 266), although the
respondent had been acquitted on the charge of estafa, yet it was held
that, since the promotion of an organization for the purpose of violating
or evading the penal laws amounted to such malpractice on the part of
an attorney as will justify removal or suspension, the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year. Again, In
re Pelaez, supra, where an attorney-at-law who, as a guardian, pledged
the shares of stock belonging to his ward to guarantee the payment of
his personal debt, although this was misconduct committed in his
private capacity, the court nevertheless suspended the respondent from
the legal profession for one year. We think the instant case grave, and
meriting as severe a sentence.

It is the order of the court that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be

suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year to begin on
September 1, 1933.

ADM. CASE No. 3319               June 8, 2000
LESLIE UI, complainant,  with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the
Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City1 and as a result of their
marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay
and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however,
complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an
illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he
begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living
together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in
Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of
the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in
1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent.
Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of
June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui.
Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos
Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over between her and
Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and
thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit
relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an
end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship
between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in
December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second
child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March
1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been
employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then
filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty.
Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with
the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent
averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all
along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had
children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long
been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos
Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in
Hawaii, USA in 19853 . Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not
live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their
Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let
the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together.4 
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and
she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law
practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila
sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted
that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her
discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for
Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March
1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she
reported to work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the woman
who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her
office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with
her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not
illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when
respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her ties
with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in
Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which
belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house
was built exclusively from her parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim,
respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present
allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others,
that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to
complainant and had children with her even at the start of her
relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar,
complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with
the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had  prima facie established the
existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents
allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The
same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was
still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or
the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the
"relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by
complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos
were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live
together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or
later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho
(sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had
been  prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this
same evidence had failed to even  prima facie establish the "fact
of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and
wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of
which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable
cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of
complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting
the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's
evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and
Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents
in support of their respective positions on the matter support
and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
 WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged.
8 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that
respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document
which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among
others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and
attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment.
However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State
Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State
Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of
marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was
October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent
in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false
allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP
that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It
is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of
Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt
of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false
allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated
document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity
which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in
Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have the original
copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession
of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good
faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her
possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised
the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an
immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice
of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on
two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with
the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the
legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent
conducted herself in an immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she
who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not
know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this
fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She
stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the
civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much
time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18 
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged
that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such
marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was
altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for
her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in
1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui
got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed
the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further,
respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that
he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage
certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present
evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the
pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos
Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with
Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house
and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS
313 and a picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that
she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value
according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a
private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings.
Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by
Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the
Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty
of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui.
In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos
Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful,
flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in
love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her
discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui,
she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that
respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a
married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children.
Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s
because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the
Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who
was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed
by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant
likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the
Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an
intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24 , respondent stated that
complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her
disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the
fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such
information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was
courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single.
The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe
in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he
represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not
hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single
men.
 The records will show that when respondent became aware the
(sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States
(in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her
brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent
only talked to each other because of the children whom he was
allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find
any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything
else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation.
Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a
normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single
girl.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross
Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully
attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more
severe penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the
right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the
bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of
law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission
to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as
a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held —
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the
bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is
also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal
 profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a
lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs.
Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26  the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when
she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent
fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such
marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the
true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations
of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling
effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be
defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from
what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of
social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with
greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps
respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising
situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding
out more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate
involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused
respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship
with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance,
respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a
woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the
slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed
unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived
with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui
was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However,
with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct
to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that
is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28 
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true
civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that
she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of
the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if
she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her
Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or
intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by

respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment
of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage
Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as
significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall
the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride,
especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she
got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and
highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information

contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has
personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein.
In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the
defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest

standards of morality.1avvphi1 The legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no
less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris

L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

A.C. No. 10781
[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2764]
COBALT RESOURCES, INC., Complainant,  authorized the armed men to seize CRI’s cellular phones; that the PASG
vs.
ATTY. RONALD AGUADO, Respondent.
In its Complaint,1 CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010, a group of armed
men, clad in vests bearing the mark "PASG" and pretending to be agents
of the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG), hi-jacked its delivery
van which was then loaded with cellular phones worth P1.3 million; that
Dennis Balmaceda (Balmaceda),  the driver of the delivery van, and his
companions were all forcibly taken away at gun point and were dropped
at the Country Hill and Golf Club; that Balmaceda called Antonio
Angeles (Angeles),  the Security Director of CRI, who immediately
reported the incident to the Philippine National Police-Criminal
Investigation Detection Unit (PNP-CIDU); that with the use of Global
Positioning Satellite (GPS)  Tracking Device installed in the cellular
phones, Angeles and the PNPCIDU tracked down the location of the
cellular phones to be in front of Pegasus Bar along Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City; that the PNP-CIDU, together with Angeles proceeded to
Pegasus Bar and found three (3)  vehicles parked in front of the bar: (1)
Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 owned by Atty. Aguado, (2)
Chevrolet Optra with Plate No. ZDW-764 and (3) a motorcycle with Plate
No. NK-1180; that when the PNP-CIDU approached the vehicles,
Anthony Palmes (Palmes)  ran but he was chased by the police officers
and was arrested; that Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the
reception area of Pegasus Bar was not arrested as none of the police
officers knew, at that time, of his participation in the crime; that the
PNP-CIDU searched the vehicles and found the cellular phones, the
Identification Card (ID)  showing Atty. Aguado as Legal Consultant of the
PASG, the Mission Order identifying Atty. Aguado as the Assistant Team
Leader, and a vest bearing the mark PASG.
CRI further averred that the men who hijacked its delivery van used the
fake mission order when it flagged down the delivery van; that the
mission order identified Atty. Aguado as the assistant team leader and
issued a certification stating that the mission order was fake; that Atty.
Aguado carried an ID bearing his picture and name which showed that
he was a PASG legal consultant; and that this ID was likewise fake as
evidenced by a certification issued by the PASG.
Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,2  dated September 8, 2010,
executed by Palmes, CRI concluded that it was Atty. Aguado who
prepared the fake mission order and masterminded the crime as he was
the one who conceived it and laid down the nitty-gritty details of its
execution; and that it was he who recruited the armed men who
actually executed the hijacking.
Eventually, two separate Informations for Robbery3 and
4
Carnapping  were filed against Atty. Aguado and several others.
The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer but, despite several
extensions, he failed to do so.
The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference.
In his Conference Brief,5 Atty. Aguado denied the allegations. He averred
that "on March 5, 2010, at about 11:00 to 12:00 in the afternoon," 6 his
Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 was carnapped along Scout
Mandarin while in the custody of his driver; that he reported the
incident to the police authorities; that on March 7, 2010, he was
awakened by relatives informing him that his name was on the front
page of several tabloids in a story connecting him to the alleged
hijacking; and that he was indicted in the case because of the ID found
hanging in his carnapped vehicle.
In its Report and Recommendation,7 dated May 3, 2011, the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)  found Atty. Aguado liable for
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in falsifying the ID
and mission order showing him as the Legal Consultant and the
Assistant Team Leader, respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-CBD
recommended that he be suspended for two (2)  years. It, however,
deferred the issue of Atty. Aguado’s purported participation in the
alleged hijacking incident as the issue pertained to a judicial function.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the report of the CBD, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and considering that Respondent committed unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct by falsifying the ID and Mission Order,
Atty. Ronaldo Aguado is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years.8
Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for reconsideration9 praying that the
May 3, 2011 report of the IBP-CBD be set aside and that a new
resolution ordering the disbarment of Atty. Aguado be issued. CRI
claimed that Atty. Aguado deserved the ultimate penalty of disbarment
as the falsification of public documents was sufficiently established and,
as the CBD knew, he masterminded the hijacking using his profession to
commit the crime.
On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion for
Reconsideration10 of the March 20, 2013 Resolution praying that it be
set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the complaint. He averred
that the charges of usurpation of authority and falsification filed against
him had been dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City; that he could not be presumed to be the author of the falsification
because he was never in possession of the falsified ID and mission
order; and that he never used, took advantage or profit therefrom. Atty.
Aguado asserted that this case should, at the very least, be suspended
pending the resolution of the robbery and carnapping charges against
him.
In a Resolution,[[11] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors denied both motions and affirmed its March 20, 2013
Resolution.
Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, CRI filed a
petition for review12 before the Court. CRI was firm in its stand that Atty.
Aguado be meted out the penalty of disbarment for his falsification of a
PASG mission order and ID and for his involvement in the hijacking of
the CIR delivery van and its cargo.
Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review insisting on his ATTY. HARON:
innocence and praying for the dismissal of the complaint.
Is she willing to admit that respondent is the same person referred to in
The Court’s Ruling the document called mission order marked as Annex "F" issued by the
PASG.
The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.
ATTY. AMON:
It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being
administrative in nature, is separate and distinct from a criminal action I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.
filed against a lawyer and they may proceed independently of each
other.13 A finding of guilt in the criminal case does not necessarily mean ATTY. HARON:
a finding of liability in the administrative case.14 In the same way, the
dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence I’m showing counsel for respondent with a copy of a mission order
against an accused, who is also a respondent in an administrative case, marked as Annex "F"….
does not necessarily exculpate him administratively because the
quantum of evidence required is different. In criminal cases, proof COMM. CACHAPERO:
beyond reasonable doubt is required.15 "In administrative cases for
disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof Machine copy.
required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant."16 Preponderance of evidence means "evidence ATTY. HARON:
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto."17 This is the copy.

Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was COMM. CACHAPERO:
established that he was in possession of a falsified ID showing him as a
legal consultant of the PASG and mission order identifying him as the Take a look, is that a machine copy?
Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation. Although Atty.
Aguado claimed in his Conference Brief that he was indicted merely on ATTY. HARON:
the basis of an ID found hanging in his carnapped Toyota Fortuner,18 his
counsel, Atty. Letecia Amon (Atty. Amon),  during the mandatory Yes, Your Honor. Annex "F" states that Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is the
conference held on February 25, 2011, acknowledged that the ID assistant team leader of the team by mission order.
and mission order  were found in the Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty.
Aguado, thus: COMM. CACHAPERO:
He is only asking, the respondent is the one who owns that document.
He is not yet asking whether that document is authentic or not.
ATTY. AMON:
Yes, Your Honor, as written here.
What is your proposal Atty. Haron?
x x x.19 [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay20 of Palmes explicitly described
Atty. Aguado’s participation in the crime as follows:

COMM. CACHAPERO: xxx

Yes, he is the one. 2. Alam ko kung sinu-sino ang mga taong kasama sa pagplano at
pagsasagawa ng nasabing ‘hijacking’. Bagamat may
ATTY. HARON: partisipasyon ako sa krimen, hindi ko alam na ang gagawing
paghuli sa mga nasabing cellphone ay labag sa batas dahil ako
Would the respondent also like to admit that the identification card ay pinaniwala na ang gagawin naming paghuli sa mga cellphone
and the mission order were found inside his Toyota Fortuner, Plate ng Cobalt ay isang lehitimong operasyon ng PASG.
No. UNO-68.
3. Bago pa man naganap ang nasabing hijacking ay dati akong
ATTY. AMON: empleyado ng Cobalt na nakatalaga sa Delivery Section/Pull Out
Service. Ngunit hindi nagtagal ay nag-resign ako.
Of which he is the owner, yes.
4. Noong ikalawang lingo ng Pebrero, nilapitan ako ni Jaime
ATTY. HARON: "James" Abedes at sinabi sa akin ng kung pwede ay i-monitor ko
daw ang ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt at ako ay bibgyan niya
Admitted also, Your Honor. ng "budget" upang ang kanyang grupo ay makapagsagawa ng
‘seizure operations.’
ATTY. HARON:
5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong sumangayon sa mungkahi ni
Would the respondent also like to admit the certifications Annexes "G" James ngunit ako ay pinapanatag niya na lahat ng dokumento at
and "H" issued by the PASG are genuine and duly executed. I’m showing papeles ay kumpleto. Sabi pa ni James, "Si Atty. Aguado ang
counsel copies of the certifications, Your Honor, marked as Annexes "G" magbibigay ng complete documents at Mission Order dahil
and "H" which bears the seal of that office, Your Honor. naka-direkta siya sa PASG Malacañang para ma-flag down ang
delivery van".
COMM. CACHAPERO:
6. Ako ay naniwala sa kanyang sinabi dahil sa pagbanggit niya na
may kasama kaming abogado. Dahil dito ay pumayag ako sa
mungkahi ni James.
7. Kinabukasan ay nagkita kami ni James sa Caltex Pioneer
corner Shaw Boulevard. Nalaman ko kay James na may hawak
siyang Security Guard doon. Pinakilala niya ako kay Eliseo De
Rosas alias Nonoy na isa ring tauhan ni James. Siya ay may gamit
na Honda na motorsiklo na kulay berde na may plakang 1180
NK. Noong araw din na iyon ay nagtungo kami sa Brixton Street
upang i-monitor ang warehouse ng Cobalt dahil may warehouse
ang Cobalt sa Brixton Street.
8. Pagkatapos naming pumunta sa Brixton Street ay nagtungo
naman kami sa P. Tuazon Street kung saan may mga clients ang
Cobalt, at doon naming nakita ang delivery van na Mitsubishi L-
300 ng Cobalt.
9. Sinimulan namin ni Nonoy ang pagmonitor ng ruta ng delivery
van ng Cobalt. Sa aming ginawang pag-monitor ay napansin
naming madalas magpakarga ng gas ang nasabing delivery van
sa Petron Station sa Ortigas Avenue corner B. Serrano Street.
Isang lingo kaming nag-monitor ni Nonoy sa ruta ng Cobalt.
Ipinaalam naming kay James ang nakakalap naming
impormasyon. Noong natiyak naming ang ruta ng delivery van
ay nagpaschedule si James ng ‘meeting’ kay Atty. Aguado.
10. Ika-22 ng Pebrero 2010 alas-6 ng gabi sa McDonald’s
Quezon Avenue ay nag meeting kami. Ang mga kasama sa
meeting ay si James, Atty. Aguado, Joe Almonte, at Nonoy.
Noong kami ay nandoon ay lumipat ng lamesa si Atty. Aguado,
James at Joe Almonte at sila ay nagusap.
11. Pagkatapos ng usapan nila ay pumunta sa amin si James at
sinabi sa amin kung ano ang kanilang napagusapan. Sinabi sa
amin ni James na mag-iisue daw ng Mission Order si Atty.
Aguado. Si Atty. Aguado na rin daw ang magbubuo ng grupo ng
mga lalake upang i-flag down ang delivery van ng Cobalt.
12. Noong ika-25 ng Pebrero 2010 alas 7 ng gabi, ay muli kaming
nagkita nila James, Nonoy at Joe Almonte sa McDonald’s
Quezon Avenue. Pagsapit ng alas-8 ng gabi ay tumawag si Atty.
Aguado na nasa Starbucks Cafe sa Tomas Morato Avenue daw
siya naka-puwesto. Kaya’t kaming apat ay sumunod sa
Starbucks. Pagdating naming sa Starbucks ay nandoon nga si
Atty. Aguado at may kasama siyang isang pulis.
13. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis sila Atty. Aguado at James sakay ng
Toyota Fortuner na may plakang UNO-68. Sinabi sa amin ni
James na sila ay magsasagawa ng "ocular" ng lugar kung saan
gagawin ang pag-flag down ng delivery van. Nang sila ay
magbalik, kami ay sinabihan na gagawin namin ang operasyon
sa umaga ng kinabukasan (ika-26 ng Pebrero, Biernes).
Ayon pa sa kanila, ako raw ay pupuwesto sa Petron Station sa
may Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue ng alas-8 ng umaga
upang doon abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van.
Samantalang, ang mga taong magsasagawa ng pag flag down
(pawang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado) ay pupuwesto na rin sa may
Benitez Street. Kapag nakita ko na raw ang delivery van ay agad
akong tumawag kay James upang ipagbigay alam ang pagdaan
nito at i-alert ang mga nasabing mga lalake, pagkatapos ay
tumungo raw ako sa Benitez Street upang siguraduhin na tama
ang delivery van na ipa-flagdown.
Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay isa-isa na kaming
nagsi-uwian.
14. Kaya’t kinabukasan, ika-26 ng Pebrero, alas-8 ng umaga ay
nagtungo ako sa nasabing Petron Station. Ngunit tumawag si
James na hindi raw matutuloy ang operation dahil kulang sa tao
si Atty. Aguado.
15. Kami (ako, Joe Almonte at Nonoy) ay muling pinulong ni
James sa McDonald’s Quezon Avenue noong ika-1 ng Marso
alas-7 ng gabi. Bandang alas-8 ng gabi ay dumating na rin si Atty.
Aguado. Sila Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte [ay] nag-usap
sa labas ng Smoking Area samantalang kami ni Nonoy ay nanatili
sa loob.
16. Nang matapos ang usapan ay sinabi sa amin ni James na
nag-set ulit ng operation si Atty. Aguado kinabukasan, ika-2 ng
Marso, Martes, ngunit hintayin daw naming ang feedback mula
kay Atty. Aguado dahil kelangan daw ng gamit ang mga tao ni
Atty. Aguado.
17. Muli akong nagtungo kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, alas-8 ng
umaga, ngunit maya-maya lamang ay tumawag sa akin si James
at sinabi niya sa akin na hindi na naman daw tuloy ang
operation dahil hindi nakakuha ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty.
Aguado.
Sa puntong ito ay sinabi ko na kay James na sana sigurado ang
mga papeles ni Atty. Aguado dahil ayaw ko ng illegal na trabaho.
Sinabi naman sa akin ni James na kumpleto naman daw ang mga
papeles at legal ang gagawing operation.
18. Ika-4 ng Marso 2010, ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi
niya sa akin na tuloy na daw ang operation kinabukasan (ika-5
ng Marso). Sinabi rin niya sa akin na alas-8 ng umaga ay
kailangan daw na naka-puwesto na ako sa Petron Station.
19. Kaya noong ika-5 ng Marso 2010, alas-8 ng umaga, ako ay
pumuwesto na sa Petron Gasoline Station sa Boni Serrano
corner Ortigas Avenue sakay ng isang motorsiklo. Bandang alas-
8:30 ng umaga ay dumating naman si James sakay ng isang
Chevrolet na may plakang ZDW 764 at may kasama pa siya na
pinakilala sa aking "Larry."
Bandang alas-9 ng umaga ay dumating ang Toyota Fortuner ni
Atty. Aguado. Nakita ko na sakay ng nasabing Toyota Fortuner si
Atty. Aguado at Joe Almonte. Hindi sila bumaba bagkus ay
nagpakarga lamang ito ng gasolina sa nasabing Petron Station.
Hindi nagtagal ay umalis na rin sila. Sumunod namang umalis si
James at Larry sakay ng Chevrolet.
20. Bandang alas-9:30 ng umaga, nakita ko na dumating ang
delivery van ng Cobalt sa Petron upang ito ay magpakarga ng
gasolina. Tumawag ako kay James gamit ang aking cellphone at
sinabi ko, "Nandito na ang delivery van na white, may plakang
NKQ 734."  Sumagot si James, "ok nakapuwesto na kami. Andito
na kami sa area."
21. Agad akong umalis patungo sa Benitez Street upang
abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van upang ma-flag down ito.
Gamit ang aking motorsiklo, ako ay dali-daling nagtungo sa
Benitez Street.
Pagdating ko doon ay nakita ko ang nasabing Chevrolet ni James
at isang L-300 van na kulay blue-green na may plakang DFN-733.
Nadatnan ko rin ang tatlong lalake na pawang armado at
nakasuot ng tsalekong may tatak na PASG at nag-aabang sa gilid
ng daan. Mayroon din akong napansin na nakasakay sa loob ng
nasabing blue-green na L-300 van ngunit hindi ko na nabilang
ang dami nila.
 22. Ako ay pumunta sa Chevrolet (driver side), at binuksan
naman ni James ang bintana nito. Sinabi ko ulit sa kanya na
parating na ang delivery van. Sumagot siya, "Sige. Timbrehan
mo lang sila pag malapit na. Hintayin mo relay kung saan ka
susunod ."  Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na sila.
23. Pagkaalis nila, kami at nang tatlong nasabing lalake ay nag-
abang sa pagdaan ng delivery van. Nang makita ko itong
paparating, agad kong sinabi "approaching na. yang puti, yang
puti."  Pagkatapos noon ay agad pinara ng isa sa mga nasabing
lalakeng nakasumbrero ang delivery van. Sumenyas ito sa driver
ng delivery van na itabi ito sa gilid. Pilit binuksan ng tatlong
lalake ang magkabilang pintuan ng delivery van at nang
mabuksan ang mga nasabing pintuan ay agad hinila palabas ang
tatlo nitong pahinante at agad silang pinosasan.
xxxx
From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had
participation in the crime as charged in the complaint, from the
planning stage up to its execution. These falsified documents found in
his possession, as certified found in his possession, as certified as
evidenced by the PASG, were used to facilitate the commission of the
crime. The well-settled rule is that "in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged
document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification."21 Atty.
Aguado failed to rebut the allegations. Other than the police blotter
showing that he reported the carnapping of his vehicle, Atty. Aguado
presented no other convincing evidence to support his denial of the
crime. He also failed to show any ill motive on the part of Palmes in
testifying against him whom he claimed to have met only in February
2010.
Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner cannot be given
credence considering his inconsistent statements on the matter. In this
regard, the Court quotes a portion of the Report and Recommendation
of Commissioner Oliver Cachapero. Thus:
He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping of his Fortuner car
on the same day the hijacking was staged by supposed PASG personnel
suggesting that he was a victim and not a perpetrator. However, his
allegations in this regard is put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm
sheet, Respondent reported that the carnapping took place at 2:30 of
March 5, 2010 while in his sworn statement, he claimed that his car was
carnapped at 4:31 p.m. the precise time the supposed carnapping was
staged is too vital that Respondent could not have overlooked the same
in his narration of facts in his counter-affidavit or in his statement
before the police authorities expecially because he supposedly reported
the incident on the very same day it happened. But as correctly
observed by the Complainant, even if the report on the time of the
carnapping incident would have been properly made, the hijacking took
place much earlier and therefore the same does not negate the
commission of the crime by the Respondent. Also, the reporting did not
prove the fact of carnapping especially where, as in this case, no
eyewitness account was presented, no suspect apprehended, and no
criminal case was filed.22
The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly
mandates:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
with conditions,23 and granted only to those who possess the strict to be made part of his personal records; the Integrated Bar of the
intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers as instruments Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
in the effective and efficient administration of justice.24 As officers of the all courts.
courts and keepers of the public’s faith, lawyers are burdened with the
highest degree of social responsibility and so mandated to behave at all SO ORDERED.
times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. 25 They are expected
to maintain not only legal proficiency but also this high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.26

Atty. Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit and unable
to faithfully discharge his bounden duties as a member of the legal
profession. Because he failed to live up to the exacting standards
demanded of him, he proved himself unworthy of the privilege to
practice law. As vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are expected at
all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal professor and to
refrain from any act or omission which might diminish the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal
profession.27

In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of gross
dishonesty, imposed the supreme penalty of disbarment for engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful acts by falsifying documents.
In Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi,  28 the Court disbarred the lawyer when he
falsified a special power of attorney so he could mortgage and sell his
client's property. In Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr.,29  the penalty of disbarment
was meted out against the lawyer who authored the falsification of an
inexistent court decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for gross

misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF the
roll of attorneys.
 Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated
from the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990,
where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their
classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being admitted as
members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP
Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with

whom he has three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married
to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations
with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007.
These alleged illicit relations involved:

a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of

Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal
knowledge of such illicit relations;

b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from

1994 to 1996, despite being already married to Jardiolin;

c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being

romantically involved with DDD;

d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite

still being married to Jardiolin and while still being
romantically .involved with CCC; 
A.C. No. 10676               September 8, 2015
e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant,  period from May 2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still
vs. being romantically involved with CCC.3
ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse,
The Facts deceived CCC and DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor,
thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair with him, when
in. truth, he was then still married to Jardiolin.4
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during
the period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation
proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation
(KOC). However, despite being a public officer and a government
counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel
of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case,
and, in effect, that of the Philippine Government.5
Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe
then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the
cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest
efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded
with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The
vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and
officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own home
and in the OGCC premises itself.6
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant
claims that respondent was summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning
rampant faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an
investigation of the alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate
Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice &
Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be
investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or
disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave misconduct or violation of
the Revised Penal Code.7
It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry,
respondent even attempted to conceal the evidence by requesting
complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B.
Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in
Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's request,
however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that the
vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry.8
It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the
Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against
respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019.9 Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as
an educator in Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College,
College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where respondent
induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and
entertained the romantic gestures of his female students in exchange
for passing grades.10 The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-
1973.
In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline,
Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to file his verified
answer.
In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present any counter-
statement of facts in supp01i of his defense. Instead, respondent simply
argued that the petition suffers from procedural and substantive
infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations
or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that Annex "J" of the
Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked
formal requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of
paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to
the petition were inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence.13 He claims that the identities of the
owners of the e-mail messages, as well as the allegations of illicit
relations and abuse of authority, were not properly established.
Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's
witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant consideration.
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer),14 stating
that the allegations in the complaint were deemed admitted by reason
of respondent's failure to make specific or even general denials of such
in his Answer.
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),15 respondent simply
denied all of complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for
"lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity thereof."16
On August 3, 2007, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for mandatory
conference on August 28, 2007,17 which respondent failed to attend. It
appears that respondent filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing,18 praying for
the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly due to a previously
scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was opposed
by complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his
Order19 dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's
Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons
who shall be complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by
Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the
presentation of complainant's witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the
respective subpoenas21 were issued.
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration,22 praying that the Order dated August 28,
2007 be set aside and that the hearing be reset to sometime during the
third week of October. In said motion, respondent informed the IBP-
CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known as "sore
eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to two
weeks while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion were
photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R.
Pangalangan was suffering from sore eyes.
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant
opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that based on his personal
verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Parafiaque City, there was no case calendared for
hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant also argued
that this is another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings because
he knew that complainant worked overseas and was only in the country
for a limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition,
respondent's motion was denied and complainant was allowed to
present his witnesses.23 Complainant presented his witnesses, as
follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms.
Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong),
Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs.
Visitacion Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his recollection
that the Senate Report had recommended the disbarment of
respondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish
that the email messages submitted by complainant indeed originated
from respondent based on their familiarity with respondent, paiiicularly,
the email messages which contained references to his daughter, his
relationship with complainant, and respondent's high blood pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD
to her as his girlfriend and that sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw
respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite still being married to
his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled encountering respondent at a party
sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived to be
respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent
had, in more than one occasion, brought with him his students during
their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements
about respondent's preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus also
testified that ODD called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to
inform her that the latter had broken up with respondent upon learning
that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based on her
telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter
his actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that
during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent
introduced CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or
2001.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the
execution of their affidavits since their testimonies were based on the
affidavits that complainant included in his petition.
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the
mandatory conference/hearing was terminated and the parties were
directed to submit their respective verified position papers with
supporting documentary evidence within thi1iy (30) days from receipt
of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the case was
considered submitted for report and recommendation.
On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's
Manifestation (with Comments),24 pertaining to respondent's Motion to
Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally request for
records from Branch 77 of MTC, Parañaque City to verify respondent's
claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first scheduled
mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received
complainant's Compliance (with Comments),25 submitting the certified
photo copies of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the
Resolution dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the
Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position
Paper.26 Complainant thereafter filed two Manifestations,27 asserting
that respondent is already barred from submitting his verified position
paper and that any decision or judgment would have to be based solely
on complainant's Verified Position Paper.28
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
After the case was submitted for report and recommendation,
Commissioner Villadolid rendered a Report,29 finding that there is more
than sufficient evidence establishing respondent's gross misconduct
affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and
member of the bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal
Code30 and/or RA 301931 as reflected in the Senate Report, the
Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information, Commissioner Villadolid
found that despite respondent's denials, complainant was able to
present certified true copies of the relevant documents which support
his allegations in the petition.
As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid
discredited complainant's asse1iion that respondent is guilty of gross
immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on
the Rep01i, complainant was not able to discharge the burden of
proving the authenticity of the email messages pertaining to this
adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However,
Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim that
respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit
relations with ODD, CCC, and BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to
wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws. which as a lawyer he swore under oath to
protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof
clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution. is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
xxxx
4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon I, and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that .. a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct"' nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life. behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession".32
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and
recommendation: V. Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than
sufficient evidence establishing Respondent's gross misconduct affecting
his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member
of the bar, this Commissioner respectfully recommends that
Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his
conduct in a manner consistent with the norms prescribed by the
Canons of Professional Responsibility.33
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a
Resolution34 adopting and approving, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of
Governors disbarred respondent, thus:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's
violations of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A.
Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off
from the Roll of Attorneys.
On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration35 dated July 3, 2013, to which complainant was
required to submit his comment.36
For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-
CBD Report dated June 28, 2012)37 dated August 17, 2013. Similarly,
respondent was required to comment on complainant's motion in an
Order38 dated August 27, 2013. On the same date, complainant filed his
Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration).39 Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment
on/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Leave40 dated
September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or
Opposition41 dated September 20, 2013.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution
denying respondent's motion for reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the
Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this
Court on November 11, 2014.43
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross
immoral conduct, which would warrant his disbarment.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the
Board of Governors' resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly
immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life. behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession.44 Good
moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must
also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity.45
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or
suspension proceedings against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court
has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of administrative penalties on a member of the
Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the
other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under
Section I of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all
the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying. the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses' interest or want of interest. and also their personal credibility
so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt
on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be
against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise
doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence
required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the
equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.46
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the
grounds by which respondent has been found committing gross
immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs. This Court has, in
numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven
to have not only failed to retain good moral character in their
professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the
institution of marriage by maintaining illicit affairs.
In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he
showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law, by having
an extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.47
A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the
Court revoked his privilege to practice law after his philandering ways
was proven by preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.48 We ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress
but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.
xxxx
The fact that respondent s philandering ways are far removed from the
exercise of his profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer
may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license
and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaw, "[t]he grounds
expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not !
imitative and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a
lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession
of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the
practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the
bar.49
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan
Catindig,50 the Court disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly
and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to
various legal strategies to render a facade of validity to his invalid
second marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage. We said:
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance. which makes
'a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage." In various
cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer
abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with
another woman who has borne him a child.51 (emphasis ours.)
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on
several adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own
wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as
well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DOD
and CCC by preponderant evidence. Respondent's main defense against
the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not sufficiently
established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's
petition contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence.
Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and,
instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting
documents.1âwphi1 Due to respondent's own failure to attend the
hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence of
respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated
Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to
protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically A1iicle XV, Section 2 thereof
clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.52 (emphasis in the original.)
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner
Villadolid' s findings that respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule I 0.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 10 - A LA WYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT. Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
xxx
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of
a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and corruption against
him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and
Justice & Human Rights Committees to be investigated and prosecuted
by the Ombudsman, the same as contained in their "Committee Final
Report No. 367" herein attached as Annex D;
14. Respondent has also been recommended by the abovementioned
committees to suffer the penalty of disbarment, among others, as
evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a
case for graft and corruption against him is still pending with the
Sandiganbayan."53
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his
Answer that complainant failed to adduce additional evidence that a
case had been filed against him, and that complainant's statements
were merely self-serving averments not substantiated by any evidence.
In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied complainant's
averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report,
viz:
4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his
Answer were made in attempt to mislead this Commission. Respondent
could have easily admitted or denied said allegations or explained the
same, as he (sic) clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose
to take advantage of Complainant's position of being not present in the
country and not being able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt
the issue, and mislead the Commission. In doing so, he has violated
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do
no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice" and that "a
lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in
the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as
an officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds
that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he should be
disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)
In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention
but to mislead the IBP, which intention was more so established
because complainant was able to submit supporting documents in the
form of certified true copies of the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's
Resolution, and Information.
We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent
violated the lawyer's oath which he took before admission to the Bar,
which states:
I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines: I will support its Constitution and obey laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not
wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same: I will delay no man for money
or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a
mockery out of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his
legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing
to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to
ADOPT the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and
adopting, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond
A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating
Section 2 of A1iicle XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty.
Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar Confidant and
his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let
copies of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and circulated by the Cou1i Administrator to all the
cou1is in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159486-88               November 25, 2003

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA
CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

"The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, acting through his counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the
Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition prays –

"1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the
Honorable Court disqualify themselves from hearing and
deciding this petition;

"2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be

vacated and set aside; and

"3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905
pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.

"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the

inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court from hearing the
petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political
activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated
by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the assumption of
Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have
thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken
by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v.
Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent
mockery of justice and due process.
"Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed
an Omnibus Motion on 19 May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking
that ‘the appointment of counsels de officio (sic) be declared functus
officio’ and that, being the now counsel de parte, he be notified of all
subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and
No. 26905 pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the
foregoing criminal cases against his client be dismissed.
"During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner
presented to the court several portions of the book, entitled ‘Reforming
the Judiciary,’ written by Justice Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the
evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion
pleading, among other things, that –
"a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove
the ‘truth’ of the statements contained in Justice Artemio
Panganiban’s book, ‘REFORMING THE JUDICIARY,’ in relation to
the prejudgment committed by the Supreme Court justices
against President Estrada in the subject case/s of Estrada v.
Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,
"b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to
Justice Artemio Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice
Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department of
National Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide,
Jr. for them to testify and bring whatever supporting documents
they may have in relation to their direct and indirect
participation in the proclamation of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book of
Justice Panganiban, including the material events that led to
that proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada vs. Arroyo,
supra.’ (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)
"The ‘truth’ referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in
the motion of petitioner pertains to what he claims should have
been included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:
‘The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint
Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last
January 20, 2001 in:
‘a) going to EDSA 2;
‘b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as
President on the ground of ‘permanent disability’ even without
proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional
conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or
majority of his cabinet; and
‘c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same
ground of permanent disability.
‘It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these
material facts which are obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the only
defense of President Estrada.’ (Petition, Rollo, pp. 13-14.)
"On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the
foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner.
Forthwith, petitioner filed a ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ of the
foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his
‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the three justices of
the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and
partiality against his client. Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V.
Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language
when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha naman kaming gago,’ (Rollo, p.
13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion
as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or
opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant
Estrada’s motion would result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by
the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of the Sandiganbayan justices,
Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their
disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed
resolutions, i.e., the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July
2003, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito
Estrada’s ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ (Na tumutukoy sa Joint
Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6, 2003 is DENIED for lack of
merit.’ (Rollo, p. 37.)
"and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003,
denying petitioner’s motion for disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:
‘WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of
merit, hereby DENIES the Motion for Disqualification.’ (Rollo, p. 48.)
"The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED
for gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion, an
indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary
relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the authority
and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on the other hand,
he would elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a
patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went on to
state that-
‘The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public
office.1awp++i1 But the act of the public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not
the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the justices, if
LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if
UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the
Decision in ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule
5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme
Court but is merely the wrong or trespass of those individual Justices
who falsely spoke and acted in the name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano
vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem absurd to
allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for
their UNLAWFUL act.’ (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
"Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would
be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten the court
and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto,
82 Phil 595.)
"The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to
end any question pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo
into the presidency. By reviving the issue on the validity of the
assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency,
Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a
long dead issue.
"Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his
client’s case within the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his
assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media. Rule 13.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar
from making such public statements on any pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia
may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially
dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
"It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar
conduct towards the Supreme Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003,
addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of
forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending
before the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this
Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary
sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar
submissions to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-
meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to
persist on end.
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the
Court hereby orders Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten days from notice hereof,
why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and
an officer of the Court."
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the
show-cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate
display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship
against the members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has
tirelessly quoted to give some semblance of validity for his groundless
attack on the Court and its members, provides -
"Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political
questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall
not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse
candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political
activities."
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term "partisan
political activities;" the law states:
"The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an
act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate
or candidates to a public office which shall include:
"(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or
other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate.
"(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or
holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate
for public office;
"(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials
designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for
or against a candidate."
It should be clear that the phrase "partisan political activities," in its
statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the success or the
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed certificates
of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of
office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice
of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest
Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such
an event could be no different from their appearance in such other
official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by
the President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce
criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can
truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith
in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it
to practice law in the Philippines.1âwphi1
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the
lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others.
In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert
the dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of
Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a
member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that
may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably,
Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Court’s well-meant
admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia
wrote to say -
"What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s right to
due process of law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo
unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were not observed.
There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed
his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already
committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already made
and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the
proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily
admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?"
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of
like nature.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary
sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and
as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take
heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended
from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts of the land through
the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 11256

FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA, Complainant 
vs
ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA, Respondent

DECISION

In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the

respondent in his law office in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to inquire
about the process of annulling her marriage with her husband, Juan C.
Madria.

After giving th e details of her marriage and other facts relevant to the
annulment, the respondent told her that she had a strong case, and
guaranteed that he could obtain for her the decree of annulment. He
told her, too, that his legal services would cost ₱25,000.00, and that she
should return on November 19, 2002 inasmuch as he would still prepare
the complaint for the annulment. At the time of the consultation, she
was accompanied by her daughter, Vanessa Madria, and her nephew,
Jayson Argonza.1

The complainant returned to the respondent's office on November 19,

2002. On that occasion, he showed her the petition for annulment, and
asked her to sign it. She paid to him an initial amount of ₱4,000.00.2 He
acknowledged the payment through a handwritten receipt.3
The complainant again went to the respondent's office on December 16, did not exist in the court records, as borne out by the letter signed by
2002 to deliver another partial payment, and to follow up on the case. Atty. Aura Clarissa B. Tabag-Querubin, Clerk of Court of the RTC Branch
The respondent advised her to just wait for the resolution of her IV, to wit:
complaint, and assured her that she did not need to appear in court. He
explained that all the court notices and processes would be sent to his MS. RACHEL M. ROXAS
office, and that he would regularly apprise her of the developments. 4 On Officer-in-Charge
December 28, 2002, she returned to his office to complete her payment, Regional Consular Office
and he also issued his receipt for the payment.5 Tuguegarao City

The complainant's daughter Vanessa thereafter made several follow-ups Madam:

on behalf of her mother. In the latter part of April 2003, the respondent
informed the complainant that her petition had been granted.6 Thus,
Vanessa went to the respondent's office and received a copy of the trial
court's decision dated April 16, 2003 signed by Judge Lyliha Abella
Aquino of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, in Tuguegarao City.7
According to the complainant, the respondent advised her to allow five
months to lapse after the release of the decision before she could safely
claim the status of "single." After the lapse of such time, she declared in
her Voter's Registration Record (VRR) that she was single.8
The complainant, again through Vanessa, received from the respondent
a copy of the certificate of finality dated September 26, 2003 signed by
one Jacinto C. Danao of the RTC (Branch 4).9
Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant used the
purported decision and certificate of finality in applying for the renewal
of her passport.10 However, she became the object of an investigation
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) because her former
partner, Andrew
Dowson Grainge, had filed a complaint charging that she had fabricated
the decision for the annulment of her marriage. Only then did she learn
that the decision and the certificate of finality given by the respondent
This is in reply to your letter dated June 23, 2011 inquiring on whether
Civil Case No. 6149 for the Annulment of Marriage between Flordeliza
Argonza Madria and Juan C. Madria was filed and decided by this Court.
As per records of this Court, the above-entitled case was filed on April
25, 2003 but was dismissed as per Order of this Court dated April 6,
2004.
The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino as appearing in the
alleged decision attached to your letter is a blatant forgery.
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
AURA CLARISSA B. TABAG-QUERUBIN
Clerk of Court V11
As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for violation of
the Philippine Passport Act  in the RTC in Tuguegarao City.12 She claims
that she had relied in good faith on the representations of the
respondent; and that he had taken advantage of his position in
convincing her to part with her money and to rely on the falsified court
documents.13
In his answer,14 the respondent denies the allegations of the
complainant. He averred that he had informed her that he would still be
carefully reviewing the grounds to support her petition; that she had
insisted that he should prepare the draft of her petition that she could
show to her foreigner fiance; that she had also prevailed upon him to
simulate the court decision to the effect that her marriage had been
annulled, and to fabricate the certificate of finality; that she had assured
him that such simulated documents would be kept strictly confidential;
that he had informed her that the petition had been filed in April 2003,
but she had paid no attention to such information; that she had not
appeared in any of the scheduled hearings despite notice; and that he
had not heard from her since then, and that she had not even returned
to his office.  We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Findings and Recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and Recommendation15 wherein
she concluded that the respondent had violated his Lawyer's Oath; and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of
two years.
The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, modified the recommendation of
suspension from the practice of law for two years to disbarment
through its Resolution No. XXI-2015-242, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-242
CDB Case No. 14-4315
Flordeliza A. Madria vs.
Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", considering violation of his lawyers'
oath as a lawyer and a member of the Bar by preparing a simulated
Court decision granting the petition for annulment of marriage of
complainant and a certificate of finality of the annulment petition.
Hence, Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.16
Ruling of the Court
Governors.
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for annulment
of marriage, and of the simulation of the decision and certificate of
finality. His explanation of having done so only upon the complainant's
persistent prodding did not exculpate him from responsibility. For one,
the explanation is unacceptable, if not altogether empty. Simulating or
participating in the simulation of a court decision and a certificate of
finality of the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or
forgery. One need not be a lawyer to know so, but it was worse in the
respondent's case because he was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were legally
intolerable. Specifically, his deliberate falsification of the court decision
and the certificate of finality of the decision reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of the administration
of justice in this country. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as
a member of the Bar.
The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules 1. 01
and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,  to wit:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
xxxx
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOY AL
TY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness.
The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a lay person
like the complainant could have swayed a lawyer like the respondent
into committing the simulations was patently improbable. Yet, even if
he had committed the simulations upon the client's prodding, he would
be no less responsible. Being a lawyer, he was aware of and was bound
by the ethical canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,  particularly those quoted earlier, which would have been
enough to deter him from committing the falsification, as well as to
make him unhesitatingly frustrate her prodding in deference to his
sworn obligation as a lawyer to always act with honesty and to obey the
laws of the land. Surely, too, he could not have soon forgotten his
express undertaking under his Lawyer's Oath to "do no falsehood, nor
consent to its commission." 17  Indeed, the ethics of the Legal Profession
rightly enjoined every lawyer like him to act with the highest standards
of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of
law.18 As we have observed in one case:19
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
bar.1âwphi1 Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession. Members of the
Bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost
fidelity and good faith.
Also, Canon 1520 and Rule 18.0421 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility  required the respondent be true to the
complainant as his client. By choosing to ignore his fiduciary
responsibility for the sake of getting her money, he committed a further
violation of his Lawyer's Oath by which he swore not to "delay any
man's cause for money or malice,"  and to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."  He compounded this
violation by taking advantage of his legal knowledge to promote his own
selfish motives, thereby disregarding his responsibility under Canon
17.22
Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,  a lawyer may be
disbarred on any of the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a
case without authority so to do.
Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit,
malpractice or misconduct in office, any of which was already a ground
sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court.24  The moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the
respondent to act with the highest degree of professionalism, decency,
and nobility in the course of their practice of law.25 That he turned his
back on such standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character,
dishonesty, lack of probity and general unworthiness to continue as an
officer of the Court.26
We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for
unprofessional conduct. In Cruz-Villanueva v. Rivera,27he was suspended
from the practice of law because he had notarized documents without a
notarial commission. This circumstance shows his predisposition to
beguile other persons into believing in the documents that he had
falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop to such proclivity. He
should be quickly removed through disbarment.
It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution
and only for the most imperative reasons or in cases of clear misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and member of the bar.28 But we do not hesitate when the
misconduct is gross, like in the respondent's case. We wield the power
now because the respondent, by his gross misconduct as herein
described, absolutely forfeited the privilege to remain in the Law
Profession. As we reminded in Embido v.  Pe,29 in which we disbarred the
respondent lawyer for falsifying a court decision:
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the
legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only to the
deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him
who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer's Oath and the canons of
ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and
omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings,
but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his
professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his
unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law confers
upon him. Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of
the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish
lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private
capacity. The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and
whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an
officer of the Court.30
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. CARLOS P.
RIVERA guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION OF THE
LAWYER'S OATH; and, ACCORDINGLY, ORDERS his DISBARMENT. Let
his name be STRICKEN from the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR for dissemination to all courts throughout the country
for their information and guidance; (b) the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES; (c) the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT for appending to
the respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar; and (d)
the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE for possible criminal prosecution of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 1203            May 15, 1903

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the

practice of law.

Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the

Court of First Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February,
1903, why he should not be suspended as a member of the bar of the
city of Manila for the reasons:

First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas

Artes" Club, after he had been notified that the said organization was
made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the
time of and after its organization, which organization was known to him
to be created for the purpose of evading the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A.
Kincaid, made answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed
affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony given by said
Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H. D.
Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the said
affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found,
and decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made against Howard
D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made an order suspending him
from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the
clerk of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order
of suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the
same was based.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the
United States, vs.  Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has
not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is
charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to be
condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the
ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D.
Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of
one year from the 7th day of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended
from the practice of law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It
is so ordered.

We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the

conclusion that they were such as to justify the court below in arriving
at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the accused in
connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were
of such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from
practice.

The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the

purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such
misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer of the court, as
amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which
he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.)
The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be
dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify
disbarment.