CO-OWNERSHIP

Jarantilla v. Sps. Jarantilla were survived by their 8 children. Petitioner Federico W/N there is
Jarantilla Jr. is their grandson. His brothers are Doroteo and Tomas.
“Acknowledgement of The Jarantilla heirs extrajudicially partitioned amongst themselves
Participating Capital” the real properties of their deceased parents.
Distinction between Sps. Remotigue and Sps. Deocampo agreed provide mutual
partnership and co- assistance to each other by way of financial support to any
ownership commercial and agricultural activity on a joint business arrangement.
This business relationship proved to be successful as they were
able to establish a manufacturing and trading business.
There was an Acknowledgement of Participating Capital between
Sps. Remotigue, Doroteo and Tomas, Federico Jr., and Antonienta
Jarantilla (aunt).
This case was filed by Antonienta for the accounting of the assets
and income of the co-ownership, for its partition and the delivery of
her share of 8%
Federico Jr. asserts that he was part of the partnershipas evidenced
by the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital
Both the petitioner and Antonieta Jarantilla characterize their
relationship with the respondents as a co-ownership, but in the
same breath, assert that a verbal partnership was formed
Under Article 1767 of the Civil Code, there are two essential elements in a
co-ownership contract of partnership:
(NO) (a) an agreement to contribute money, property or industry to a common
fund; and
(b) intent to divide the profits among the contracting parties
The first element is undoubtedly present in the case at bar, for, admittedly,
all the parties in this case have agreed to, and did contribute money and
property to a common fund.
Hence, the issue narrows down to their intent in acting as they did
It is not denied that all the parties in this case have agreed to contribute
capital to a common fund to be able to later on share its profits. They have
admitted this fact and even submitted evidence to prove such partnership -
the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.
The petitioner himself claims his share to be 6%, as stated in the
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. However, petitioner fails to
realize that this document specifically enumerated the businesses
covered by the partnership: Manila Athletic Supply, Remotigue Trading in
Iloilo City and Remotigue Trading. Since there was a clear agreement that
the capital the partners contributed went to the three businesses, then
there is no reason to deviate from such agreement and go beyond the
stipulations in the document. There is no evidence that the subject real
properties were assets of the partnership referred to in the
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. Petition denied.
Difference between co-ownership and partnership
Co-ownership Partnership

an undivided thing or right belongs to two or more persons bind themselves to

different persons
1769: (2) Co-ownership or co-
possession does not itself establish a
partnership, whether such co-owners or
co-possessors do or do not share any
profits made by the use of the property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does
not of itself establish a partnership,
whether or not the persons sharing
them have a joint or common right or
interest in any property from which the
returns are derived;
contribute money, property, or industry
to a common fund, with the intention of
dividing the profits among themselves
1767 - In order to constitute a
partnership inter sese there must be:
(a) an agreement to contribute money,
property or industry to a common fund;
and (b) intent to divide the profits among
the contracting parties.

Tuason v. Tuason There was a parcel of land with undivided portions belonging to
siblings Tuason: 1/3 Angela, 1/3 Nieves, 1/3 Antonio. Nieves wanted
“MOA with Araneta” to partition and she offered the sale of the land to her siblings and
mother but they declined to buy her share so she sold it to Araneta.
Partnership, not co-
A MOA was executed. The co-owners agreed on subdivision into
ownership
small parcels of land and the proceeds of the sale to be divided.
There was a provision to preserve the co-ownership till all the lots
were sold.
Angela revoked the power of attorney to Araneta and she filed a
complaint for partition but her brother Antonio disagreed
Ining v. Vega Leon died without issue. His siblings Romana and Gregoria had
heirs who are petitioners and respondents in this case.
“Co-owner vs. son-in-
law” Leonardo demanded partition as Romana’s heir. Gregoria’s heirs
refused.
Repudiation by co-
owner RTC ruled that the action had PRESCRIBED because it was filed 30
years beyond Leonardo’s death in 1962. They had till 1992 but filed
Co-owners governed it in 1997
by Family Relations in
Family Code CA held that the action had NOT PRESCRIBED because it ran not
from Leonardo’s death but from Lucimo Sr.’s (husband of Gregoria’s
heir) Affidavit of Ownership, which constituted an act of repudiation
by a co-owner (SC: NO)
In this case, the first element is present since they did contribute money
and property. As to the second element, they presented the Agreement
of Participating Capital which stated the respective businesses to which
the capital went to.
W/N there is The provisions of Art. 494 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The contract
co-ownership far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to
(NO) remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object
the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the
parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-
owners."
"The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until
all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of
dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the document, the parties thereto
practically and substantially entered into a contract of partnership as
best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership,
the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have
been attained."
W/N Leonardo Gregoria and Romana’s heirs are co-owners
can claim
partition (YES) RIGHTS: Art. 486, 493, 494
FOR PRESCRIPTION TO SET IN, REPUDIATION must be done by CO-
OWNER
REQUISITES:
1) unequivocal act of repudiation
2) made known to co-owner
3) evidence is clear and convincing
Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner because he is only a son-in-law and not
Gregoria’s heir. He is excluded under the Family Code: Family Relations
are those between husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and
descendants
Lucimo Sr. cannot therefore repudiate because he is not a co-owner.
Since there was no valid repudiation, Leonardo can claim partition

Del Banco v. IAC The brothers Pansacola: Benedicto, Jose, and Manuel (father)
agreed to buy Cagbalite Island from the Spanish Government as
“4 agreements to their common property. It included Manuel’s minor children Domingo
distribute” and Baldomera (1859 agreement).
Sale of co-owners They modified the agreement to include the heirs of their brother
portion, partition, Eustaquio dividing it four ways into ¼ portions (1868 agreement).
prescription
The heirs of the original owners entered into an agreement to
partition the island (1907 agreement) supplemented by another
agreement (1908 agreement). Domingo Arce sold his portion of
land.
the
100 years, in 1968, respondents brought a special action for
partition under Rule 69 including the heirs of the co-owners of
Cagbalite Island in the second contract of co-ownership.
anytime
W/N there was There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical
partition (NO) partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or
their heirs or successors-in-interest. There was merely an agreement to
distribute the benefits.
With the distribution agreed upon, each of the co-owner is a co-owner of
the whole, and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of
dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the
instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island which
is truly abstract, because until physical division is effected such portion is
merely an Ideal share, not concretely determined
Definitely, there was no physical partition of the Island in 1859. Neither
could there have been one in 1894 because the manner of subdividing the
Island was only provided for in the later agreements entered into by the
heirs in 1907 and 1908
DISTRIBUTION SUFFICIENT TO SELL PRO INDIVISO PORTION: While
the agreements referred to “partition”, there need not be a physical partition;
a distribution of the Island even in a state of indiviso or was sufficient in
order that a co-owner may validly sell his portion of the co-owned property.
The sale of part of a particular lot by one co-owner was within his right pro-
indiviso is valid in its entirety. Thus, the fact that there was a distribution of
the Island among the co-owners made the sale of Domingo Arce of the
portion allocated to him though pro-indiviso, valid.
PARTITION: A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-
owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to Rule 69,
adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in
common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners.
It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co- owner
can claim any definite portion thereof.
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They
must have a subdivision plan drawn. The mechanics of actual partition
should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
The actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by
some of the petitioners cannot be considered a repudiation of the co-
ownership

Aguilar v. Aguilar Virgilio and Senen are brotherswho co-own a house and lot in
Paranaque for the purpose of having their father live there.
“Brother’s continued
possession” They initially agreed on the following:
Virgilio – 2/3 share
Senen – 1/3 share
Partition terminates
co-ownership and But the executed an agreement amending their share to ½ each with
the right to enjoy Senen assuming the mortgage in exchange for allowing him to enjoy
possession the house.
They also agreed that the title would be in Senen’s name since
Virgilio was disqualified to obtain a loan from SSS.
After the death of their father, Virgilio demanded that Senen vacate
the house and the property be sold so they can divide the proceeds.
Senen refused at first so Virgilio filed a complaint and prayed for 2/3
of the proceeds plus rent of Senen accruing after the death of his
father.
Senen filed an answer saying that he agrees if the division would be
50-50 and said that he didn’t need to pay rent since he was a co-
owner.
RTC ruled that they did have 50-50 share but also that Virgilio was
deprived of enjoying the property by Senen’s continued enjoyment
thereof and he can demand partition. Court also ordered Senen to
pay rent from the time of complaint. (SC: YES)
CA reversed.
An action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly
repudiated by the co- owner
PRESCRIPTION: No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against
his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership (There must be a clear repudiation communicated to the
co-owners).
An action for partition does not prescribe
Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the action to
demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches
W/N Virgilio Art. 498 is resorted to
can demand
partition (YES) (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-
owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or
its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and
(b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be
allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the
co-owners.
See Art. 494 and 498. Being a co-owner respondent has the right to use
the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may
use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest
of the other co-owners.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-
ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the
allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his
continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that
respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale can be
effected immediately
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the
trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the
co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the
possession jointly also ceased.
 Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house
prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold
and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and from
then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and
his family vacate.

Caro v. CA 3 Brothers (Alfredo, Benjamin, and Mario) co-owned 2 lands. They
each had 1/3 share. Mario died and was survived by his wife Basilia.
“Widow attempting to
be co-owner” Benjamin executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner
Caro of his 1/3 undivided portion. And with the consent of the other 2
co-owners, a subdivision title was issued to Caro.
Partition terminates
co-ownership and
Basilia learned that Caro acquired a 1/3 undivided share in each of
the right to enjoy the two parcels. Hence, she offered to redeem the 1/3 sold to Caro,
possession which was ignored. She filed for annulment of sale and mortgage
saying that she was not notified of the sale.
Right to redemption
must be exercised Caro interposed the defense that there were notices sent and that
before partition there was also an affidavit of the other co-owner’s consent.
Co-owners governed RTC ruled in favor of Caro saying that there was notice and the
by Family Relations in widow didn’t have the power to exercise right of legal redemption
Family Code
CA reversed the ruling for lack of notice since even the affidavit
didn’t specify the terms of the sale. Thus, allowed redemption of the
1/3.
W/N legal As early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land was terminated when
redemption Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito agreed to
lies (NO) subdivide the property.
Once the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the
community has terminated and there is no reason to sustain any right of
legal redemption.
The right of redemption under Article 1067 may be exercised only before
partition. In this case the right was asserted not only after partition but after
the property inherited had actually been subdivided into several parcels
Respondent argues that petitioner Luz Caro acted in bad faith and in fraud
of the rights of the heirs of deceased Mario Benito in obtaining a subdivision
title over a one-third. Fraud was not proven in this case. The title is now
indefeasible and its validity cannot be attacked.
Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that
therefore, the right of legal redemption exists, private respondent as
administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right

Redemptioner should tender payment of the redemption money within thirty

(30) days from written notice of the sale by the co- owner. It has been held
that this thirty-day period is peremptory because the policy of the law is not
to leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day
period.

It is not a prescriptive period but is more a requisite or condition precedent

to the exercise of the right of legal redemption.

The right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this case because
admittedly a subdivision title has already been issued in the name of the
petitioner on becomes moot and academic, if not unnecessary to decide
whether private respondent complied with the notice requirements for the
exercise of the right of legal redemption

Pardell v. Bartolome Vicenta and Matilde are the recognized natural daughters of W/N Matilde Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole
spouses Ortiz (deceased). was entitled, property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that
“Two sisters fighting Mrs. Ortiz made her four children Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and
over a house” Matilde heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca died.
Relative by affinity Vicenta and her husband filed a case against Matilde and her
does not have co- husband Gaspar, a justice of the peace. Vicenta and her husband
ownership rights have been living abroad for several years.
They alleged that without judicial or extrajudicial agreement, Matilde
and her husband took upon themselves the administration and
enjoyment of the properties, collecting the rents, fruits, and products.
That notwithstanding demands to divide the property and deliver the
½ portion and its fruits and rents, they refused.
RTC held that Matilde and her husband did not cause damage to
Vicenta and the expenses were compensated because Matilde and
her husband had been living in the house for several years which
was pro indiviso of joint ownership
Arambulo v. Nolasco Arambulo filed a petition alleging that all of the co–owners have
authorized Arambulo to sell their respective shares but only the
“Co-owner withholds Nolascos are withholding their consent to the sale of their shares.
consent, Art. 491”
Arambulo cites Article 491 of the Civil Code, that if one or more co–
Art. 493 owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing
owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.
RTC ruled in favor of Arambulo and ordered the Nolascos to give
their consent to the sale, holding that the act of withholding consent
being prejudicial to the common interest constitutes alteration under
Art. 491.
with her he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, for the reason that, until a
husband, to division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined
reside in the and every one of the coowners exercises, together with his other
house without coparticipants, joint ownership
paying to
Vicenta one- Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said
half of the rent house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did
she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate
(YES, but her right pertaining to her as coowner of the property.
husband is
not) Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or
a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an
office for the justice of the peace. Justice requires that he pay his sister-in-
law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could
have produced
Even as the husband of the defendant co-owner of the property, he had no
right to occupy and use the lower floor, where he lived with his wife, to the
detriment of Vicenta
Any of the co-owners of a pro indiviso property, subject to division or sale, is
entitled to petition for its valuation by competent expert appraisers.
Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint owners, but is beneficial
to their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the assessed value of
a building or a parcel of realty is less than the actual real value.
The husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any
remuneration for the administration of the pro indiviso property belonging to
both parties
W/N Art. 491 We have to remove the issue out of the coverage of Article 491. It does not
applies (NO) apply to the problem arising out of the proposed sale of the property co–
owned by the parties in this case.
Article 493 applies. Each one of the parties herein as co–owners with full
ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the
petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the
respondents of the part that belongs to them. Even if a co–owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of
the other co–owners who did not consent to the sale.
Since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners is not
 CA cited Art. 493 in holding that the Nolascos cannot be compelled null and void. However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are
to agree with the sale. transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property.

Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co–owners Lopez case: Each co–owner is the same as an individual owner. The share
with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The of the co–owner, that is, the part which ideally belongs to him, is his and he
sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership may dispose of the same as he pleases, because it does not affect the
by the respondents of the part that belongs to them right of the others.

Bailon-Casilao v. CA The petitioners Bailon are co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. W/N The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or
petitioners are for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third
“Sister sold co-owned Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the land to Delgado. barred by person but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
land without co- laches (NO) remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and
owner’s consent” administered it
Rosalia alone sold a portion to Lanuza. Lanuza acquired from
Delgado the latter’s portion. Lanuza then sold the land to respondent
Remedies of co- Afable. Rosalia’s siblings filed a case to recover the property. The The appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were
owners when sale main issue before the lower courts was prescription and laches not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the
made without their undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION
consent: under Rule 69.
CA affirmed the decision of the lower court insofar as it held that
PARTITION, NOT prescription does not lie against plaintiffs because they are co-
RECOVERY OF owners of the original vendors. However, although registered Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the
POSSESSION property cannot be lost by prescription, nevertheless, an action to defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint
recover it may be barred by laches. It held the petitioners guilty of ownership of the common property claimed. Since a co-owner is entitled to
laches and dismissed the case. sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.

Prescription and laches:

Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in
favor of a co-owner or co- heir so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership."

Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also
against his hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes
of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the
personality of their predecessor- in-interest.

Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein

petitioners.

The mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. It is required that

(1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of defendant or of
one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded an
 opportunity to institute suit.

While there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not
attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring
suit. They were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit inasmuch as
they were kept in the dark about the transactions entered into by their
sister.
Vda de Castro v. Tomas and Arsenio de Castro leased a fishpond to Atienza for a W/N Arsenio The answer is given by appellant in his brief: it would result in a
Atienza period of 5 years. They are co-owners of in equal shares of the as co-owner of partnership between the lessee and the owner of the other undivided half.
leased property. Tomas died. the fishpond
“Widow refuses to owned pro- If the lease could be entered into partially by one of the co-owners, insofar
cancel lease” Atienza and Arsenio agreed to annul the lease and they executed an indiviso by him as his interest is concerned, then the lease, can also be cancelled partially
agreement. Vda. De Castro, Tomas’s widow, refused to sign the with his as between plaintiff and defendant.
agreement brother Tomas
Art. 493 could validly
Therefore, we conclude that the consent of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro
lease his half-
is not essential for the cancellation of the lease of defendant's one-half
interest to a
undivided share in the fishpond to plaintiff.
third party
(respondent
Atienza) This is fully supported by Art. 493 of the Civil Code
independently
of hisco-owner
// W/N arsenio
can cancel the
lease without
Vda. De
Castro’s
consent (YES)

Extraordinary Spouses Maria and Apolonio Ballesteros had 2 children. Juan Would the sale The right to sell part of an undivided interest in the co-owned property is
Development Corp (married to Leonarda) and Irenea (married to Santiago). by a co-owner absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has
v. Samson Bico of a physical full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign
Apolonio owned a parcel of land. The property was inherited by Juan portion of an or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. (Art. 493)
“Heirs of Juan and and Irenea. When the latter died, the Heirs of Juan and Irenea undivided
Heirs of Irenea” became co-owners of the property. property held We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully
in common be dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
valid? (YES) among all the co-owners.
Sale of undivided The heirs of Juan (without the consent of respondents, the heirs of
physical portion of Irenea) executed in favor of EDC a Deed of Absolute Sale covering
property valid the subject property. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything
at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold
Art. 493 Heirs of Irenea wrote EDC informing it of the co-ownership. EDC to him.
wrote back that it will look into the matter and asked respondents to
further establish the basis of their claims. Since the co- owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object
of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by
 EDC alleged that it is a buyer in good faith and for value of the
subject property because it was of the honest belief that the heirs of
Juan are the only heirs of the late Apolonio.
Heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were aware of and were
parties to the contract to sell entered into by them and EDC. The
heirs of Juan claimed that respondents received their share in the
downpayment.
RTC ruled that the heirs of Juan did not have the right to sell the one
half share of the heirs of Irenea. EDC was not a buyer in good faith
because it knew that respondents were co-owners of the subject
property. CA held that the sale was valid only as to the ½ owned by
heirs of Juan
Mercado v. Liwanag Petitioners Ramon Mercado and his sister Basilia and her husband
seek to annul a Deed of Sale on the ground of fraud based on Art.
“New TCT” 493
Ramon and Liwanag executed a Deed of Sale over the subject land.
The land is co-owned by Ramon and Basilia and the sale was made
without Basilia’s consent. The TCT states that Ramon and Basilia
are co-owners pro indiviso
RTC held that the sale was valid under Art. 493.
Tomas Claudio Respondents De Castro filed an action for Partition
Memorial HS v.
CA They alleged that their father owned a parcel of land and that
without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their
“Brother sold co- brother Mariano to petitioner TCMHS. The sale was made possible
owned land to a when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property.
High School”
It is the contention of private respondents that the sale made by
Sale of co-owned Mariano affected only his undivided share to the lot in question but
virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in
an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction.
In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner
and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in
common.
W/N the trial What a co-owner may dispose of under Article 493 is only his undivided
court erred in aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
ruling that the him upon the termination of the co- ownership.
sale was valid
(NO) He has no right to divide the property into parts and then convey one part
by metes and bounds.
Also, a new TCT was issued. It did not reproduce the description in the
instrument but carried the names of appellee Pio D. Liwanag and Basilia
Mercado as "co-owners pro-indiviso." There is no suggestion by any of the
parties that this new certificate of title is invalid, irregular or inaccurate. As
far as Basilia Mercado is concerned she retains in all their integrity her
rights as co-owner which she had before the sale, and consequently, she
has no cause to complain.
Since, according to this title, what Liwanag acquired by virtue of the sale is
only an undivided half-share of the property, which under the law the vendor
Ramon Mercado had the absolute right to dispose of, the trial court
committed no error in dismissing the action.
W/N Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only
prescription or his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to
laches lies the sale.
(NO)
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects
only the sellers share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what
corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of
the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-
 grantor’s share not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner/seller
the property. are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Proper remedy:
PARTITION TCMHS alleges prescription and laches. The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or
for the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the
Partition third person, but for division or partition of the entire property if it
imprescriptible continued to remain in the possession of the co- owners who possessed
unless expressly and administered it. Such partition should result in segregating the portion
repudiated by co- belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
owner
In the light of the foregoing, petitioners defense of prescription against an
action for partition is a vain proposition.

Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged to

remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
This Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for
partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article
494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of
a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership.

Roque v. IAC A parcel of land was registered in the name of Januario Avendaño a W/N partition PARTITION: An action for partition has two principal issues.
bachelor who died without children. can prosper
“Deceased bachelor; when co- (1) whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to
Brothers sold share to His heirs executed an extrajudicial partition: owners assert be partitioned.
half sister” adverse title
(YES)
a) (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada Avendaño. (2) assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue; how
2 principal issues in the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s) — i.e.,
partition b) (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio Avendafio and what portion should go to which co-owner.
Miguel Avendaño.
Co-owners asserting If the IAC finds that the defendants do not dispute the status of the
adverse title c) (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and plaintiff as co-owner, the court can proceed to the actual partitioning.
Rufina, all surnamed Avendaño.
In case the defendants assert exclusive title in themselves adversely to the
d) (1/4) undivided portion to respondent Emesto Roque and plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the action for partition but, on the
Victor Roque. contrary and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question
of whether the plaintiff is co- owner or not.
The co-owners Avendano transferred their ¾ portion to the co-
owners Roque vesting full ownership in the latter. 2 Deeds of Sale Should the trial court find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his
were executed. The latter sold the ¾ portion to their half sister claimed status as co-owner, or that the defendants are the exclusive
Concepcion but the land remained registered in Januario owners of the property involved, the court will necessarily have to dismiss
Avendano’s name.
 A Subdivison Plan was made identifying ¼ portion belong to Victor
and Ernesto and the ¾ portion belonging to Concepcion.
Partition was allegedly agreed upon but Ernesto and the heirs of
Victor refused to acknowledge Concepcion’s ownership. Concepcion
filed an Action for Partition alleging her ¾ share.
IAC held that an action for partition will not prosper as such from the
moment an alleged co- owner asserts an adverse title.
Arriola v. Arriola Respondent John Arriola filed for judicial partition of the properties of
his father Fidel Arriola; he is the son from the first wife. Petitioner
“Brothers from Anthony Arriola is the son from the second wife.
another mother;
Partition of house The brothers failed to agree on how to partition so John sought a
separate from land” sale via public auction to which Anthony agreed. RTC set the auction
but reset it when Anthony and his wife refused to include the house.
Family home
protected from RTC excluded the subject house because respondent never alleged
partition its existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-
ownership thereof.
CA held that any decision in the action for partition of said estate
the action for partition.
If, upon the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-
ownership among the parties litigant, the court may and should order the
partition of the property in the same action.
It is unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and
independent from that for partition originally instituted.
PRESCRIPTION: While the action for partition does not prescribe, the co-
ownership does not last forever since it may be repudiated by a co-owner
In such a case, the action for partition does not lie. What may be brought
by the aggrieved co-owner is an accion reivindicatoria or action for
recovery of title and possession. That action may be barred by
prescription.
An entirely different situation, however, obtains in the case at bar. First of
all, petitioner Concepcion Roque- the co-owner seeking partition — has
been and is presently in open and continuous possession of a three-fourths
(3/4) portion of the property owned in common. Respondents do not dispute
this finding of fact
Neither of the parties involved had asserted or manifested a claim of
absolute and exclusive ownership over the whole of Lot No. 1549 adverse
to that of any of the other co-owners: in other words, co-ownership of the
property had continued to be recognized by all the owners. Consequently,
the action for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had not yet
prescribed at the time of institution by Concepcion of the action below.
W/N the As correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the
house can be subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The right to accession
partitioned is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner
(NO) or the principal. So that even if the improvements including the house
were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed
included in the lot on which they stand, following the principle of
accession.
While we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership, we stop short
of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time.
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it
stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is
shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code
should cover not just the subject land but also the subject house. Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or
for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition
the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule
shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted
the family home.

Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the
family home regardless of its ownership.

This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to
the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them,
this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary
property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law.

The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home

cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the
beneficiaries of the family home.

Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject
house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if
it has passed to the co- ownership of his heirs, the parties herein.

Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date
or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor
beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be
partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to
otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property.